**2.3 Autonomous underwater vehicles, ROVs and on-water platforms**

It is evident that the use of the technology for water sample collection would be of benefit to managers and conservationists alike, especially within a regulatory context where water quality assessment of such ecosystems is required on a regular basis. In England, for example, there are 52 coastal saline lagoons defined in Special Protection Areas or Special Areas of Conservation, with an additional 28 lagoonal water bodies identified under the Water Framework Directive [6]. All these lagoons and lagoonal water bodies require monitoring, assessment and reporting of the

ecological quality. The use of autonomous or semi-autonomous UAVs to gather water samples could de-risk the overall activity, provide samples from inaccessible locations (increased representativeness) and increase the cost-effectiveness of the monitoring programme.

A faster route to achieve autonomous water sampling capability is the use of autonomous or semi-autonomous on-water platforms (**Figure 3**). Small boats with autonomous capability will overcome some of the limitations highlighted for UAV technology. In addition to water quality parameters, the capability of on-water platforms could be expanded to include factors such as water depth, bathymetry mapping, underwater habitat and emergent/submerged vegetation assessment. This would facilitate the temporal and spatial collocation of sampling for multiple variables. Recent studies have looked at their use within the context of freshwater ecosystem monitoring [20]. For example, Vandrol et al. [20] presented a structure-from-motion-based approach for the characterization of habitat and morphology in rivers for small boats capable of navigating autonomously along rivers. The methodology presented could also be transferred to lagoon environment characterization. Fornai [21] presented the small-size autonomous surface vessel (ASV) able to perform water column monitoring with a bespoke sampling probe (**Figure 3**). The autonomous solar-powered vessel "BUSCAMOS-RobObs" equipped with side scan sonar, sub-bottom sonar, laser systems, ultrasound sonar, depth metres, a multi-parametric probe and a GPS for collecting georeferenced oceanic data has been tested at the coastal lagoon system of Mar Menor (Spain) [22] (**Figure 3**). Low-budget and portable autonomous vessels have also been proved to be efficient with the collection of bathymetry and other variables in remote and dangerous coastal areas [23] (**Figure 3**).

Characterization of the euphotic and epipelagic zones can be achieved with both autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) (**Figure 4**). AUVs are robots able to travel underwater at different depths without the need of input from an operator. Remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) are a variant of this type of robot. ROVs are directed by an operator via a remote control or an umbilical. Both AUVs and ROVs have been used for lagoon environment monitoring. For example, AUVs have been used in the Mar Menor (Murcia, Spain) coastal lagoon in different studies. The Mar Menor lagoon is separated from the Mediterranean Sea by a 20 km long dune cord that acts as a barrier to seawater ingress and ensures the protection of

#### **Figure 3.**

*Schematic diagram showing multiple autonomous surface vessels (ASV) used in coastal areas and lagoon systems. (1) ASV equipped with a winch system for autonomous water column sampling [21]; (2) the solarpowered ASV equipped with a large range of sensors is able of self-mooring [22]; (3) the affordable and portable size ASV used in coastal surveys in Greenland [23].*

**149**

tions in lagoon environments.

**2.4 Concluding remarks**

**Figure 4.**

*Autonomous Systems for the Environmental Characterization of Lagoons*

the characteristics of both environments. In [24], the AEGIR [25], Seacon [26], Guanay II [27] and SPARUS AUV [28] were deployed in the Mar Menor lagoon to better understand the ingress-egress of marine and freshwater into the environment. The multiple AUVs were equipped with probes to capture real-time measures of salinity. Similarly, in the Indian River Lagoon (Florida, USA) [29], AUVs have been used to collect spatially dense water quality data to study the spatial variability of conditions related to algal blooms. The Indian River Lagoon extends across three estuaries for over 160 miles. Phytoplankton blooms are frequent within the lagoon and are well known to have an ecological impact on the three estuaries. The AUV was used to measure water quality parameters that provide indicators of algal activity, temperature, conductivity, pH, dissolved oxygen, turbidity, total chlorophyll and phycocyanin fluorescence. In [30], the authors developed an AUV system able to track a leopard shark tagged with an acoustic Lotek MM Series transmitter along the SeaPlane Lagoon (Los Angeles, USA). The AUV was fitted with a stereo-hydrophone and receiver system able to detect acoustic signals. Further applications of AUVs exist in marine environments [31], many of which could be transferred to lagoon environments. Predicted improvements of the technology, such as enhanced hovering capability, long endurance and rapid response capabilities [31], will facilitate further monitoring applica-

*Schematic diagram showing multiple autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and a remotely operated vehicle (ROV). (1) Guanay II [27]; (2) SPARUS [28]; (3) Seacon [26]; (4) general remotely operated vehicle (ROV).*

The use of RAS for lagoon environmental monitoring has proved to be successful for multiple variables. The cost-effectiveness of such methods is yet unknown and needs to be understood in relation to comprehensive and more integrative monitoring programmes. The capabilities provided by RAS could further benefit lagoon environment monitoring via the integration of different platforms—e.g. UAVs, AUVs, ROVs and bespoke sensors. The technology readiness level of such approaches is still constrained by a number of factors, such as the miniaturization of sensors, but initial conceptual models have already been tested [32, 33]. Successful design of integrated solutions will require a significant degree of collaboration between experts from different disciplines, including engineers, biologists, ecologists, environmental scientists, marine scientists, data analysts and software developers. Future developments and investment should focus on further

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90405*

*Autonomous Systems for the Environmental Characterization of Lagoons DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90405*

**Figure 4.**

*Lagoon Environments around the World - A Scientific Perspective*

monitoring programme.

dangerous coastal areas [23] (**Figure 3**).

*portable size ASV used in coastal surveys in Greenland [23].*

ecological quality. The use of autonomous or semi-autonomous UAVs to gather water samples could de-risk the overall activity, provide samples from inaccessible locations (increased representativeness) and increase the cost-effectiveness of the

A faster route to achieve autonomous water sampling capability is the use of autonomous or semi-autonomous on-water platforms (**Figure 3**). Small boats with autonomous capability will overcome some of the limitations highlighted for UAV technology. In addition to water quality parameters, the capability of on-water platforms could be expanded to include factors such as water depth, bathymetry mapping, underwater habitat and emergent/submerged vegetation assessment. This would facilitate the temporal and spatial collocation of sampling for multiple variables. Recent studies have looked at their use within the context of freshwater ecosystem monitoring [20]. For example, Vandrol et al. [20] presented a structure-from-motion-based approach for the characterization of habitat and morphology in rivers for small boats capable of navigating autonomously along rivers. The methodology presented could also be transferred to lagoon environment characterization. Fornai [21] presented the small-size autonomous surface vessel (ASV) able to perform water column monitoring with a bespoke sampling probe (**Figure 3**). The autonomous solar-powered vessel "BUSCAMOS-RobObs" equipped with side scan sonar, sub-bottom sonar, laser systems, ultrasound sonar, depth metres, a multi-parametric probe and a GPS for collecting georeferenced oceanic data has been tested at the coastal lagoon system of Mar Menor (Spain) [22] (**Figure 3**). Low-budget and portable autonomous vessels have also been proved to be efficient with the collection of bathymetry and other variables in remote and

Characterization of the euphotic and epipelagic zones can be achieved with both autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) (**Figure 4**). AUVs are robots able to travel underwater at different depths without the need of input from an operator. Remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) are a variant of this type of robot. ROVs are directed by an operator via a remote control or an umbilical. Both AUVs and ROVs have been used for lagoon environment monitoring. For example, AUVs have been used in the Mar Menor (Murcia, Spain) coastal lagoon in different studies. The Mar Menor lagoon is separated from the Mediterranean Sea by a 20 km long dune cord that acts as a barrier to seawater ingress and ensures the protection of

*Schematic diagram showing multiple autonomous surface vessels (ASV) used in coastal areas and lagoon systems. (1) ASV equipped with a winch system for autonomous water column sampling [21]; (2) the solarpowered ASV equipped with a large range of sensors is able of self-mooring [22]; (3) the affordable and*

**148**

**Figure 3.**

*Schematic diagram showing multiple autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and a remotely operated vehicle (ROV). (1) Guanay II [27]; (2) SPARUS [28]; (3) Seacon [26]; (4) general remotely operated vehicle (ROV).*

the characteristics of both environments. In [24], the AEGIR [25], Seacon [26], Guanay II [27] and SPARUS AUV [28] were deployed in the Mar Menor lagoon to better understand the ingress-egress of marine and freshwater into the environment. The multiple AUVs were equipped with probes to capture real-time measures of salinity. Similarly, in the Indian River Lagoon (Florida, USA) [29], AUVs have been used to collect spatially dense water quality data to study the spatial variability of conditions related to algal blooms. The Indian River Lagoon extends across three estuaries for over 160 miles. Phytoplankton blooms are frequent within the lagoon and are well known to have an ecological impact on the three estuaries. The AUV was used to measure water quality parameters that provide indicators of algal activity, temperature, conductivity, pH, dissolved oxygen, turbidity, total chlorophyll and phycocyanin fluorescence. In [30], the authors developed an AUV system able to track a leopard shark tagged with an acoustic Lotek MM Series transmitter along the SeaPlane Lagoon (Los Angeles, USA). The AUV was fitted with a stereo-hydrophone and receiver system able to detect acoustic signals. Further applications of AUVs exist in marine environments [31], many of which could be transferred to lagoon environments. Predicted improvements of the technology, such as enhanced hovering capability, long endurance and rapid response capabilities [31], will facilitate further monitoring applications in lagoon environments.


EU accession and applicant countries such as Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Ukraine, and Georgia, as well as EU member states such as Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Poland, and even Italy, a G7 nation, have benefited from BRI investments since bilateral agreements with China were signed in 2015. The China-Ukrainian-Hungarian-Serbian Railway was the first of many Iron Belt projects under the BRI. This railroad, which crosses Ukraine, carries up to 80% of land container transport from China to Europe and highlights the devastating impact that the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war has on the BRI (Wang, J. 2019, p. 242).

Hence, it was only a matter of time that the EU would react to the BRI as a competitor, not only economically but also politically with China's influence in Europe undermining democratic norms. In 2020, the EU started to establish an initial modest resilience plan against the rise of illegitimate regimes and the rapid autocratisation processes elsewhere in the world. Modest, because the EU focused primarily on its own territory and potential accession countries, such as Ukraine, Serbia, and others. The new head of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, highlighted that the EU had to more strongly defend its principles and values, above all democracy and human rights, under a new EU Democracy Action Plan. This became a new programme with the title "Making EU democracies stronger" in 2021. Together with the GGI and the other initiatives, this programme highlights that *"[…] free media and civil society must be able to participate in an open debate, free from malign interference. Therefore, the EU is taking action to make our democracies in the EU more resilient*" (EU Commission Action Plan 2020).

The EU has, since 1999, invested in Strategic Partnerships and Cooperation Agreements along the BRI, but with less focus on democracy prior to 2020. With the global energy crisis most likely to intensify in the next decade, and Russia's decline as a geopolitical leader in Eurasia after the war in Ukraine, the Central Asia's gas and oil fields and hydropower energy supplies will be of interest to any external investor. The EU Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters, for example, has already brought forth a close investment partnership in Eurasia as part of the GGI with a focus on the importance of the rule of law and human rights.

While the EU Commission has often not gone beyond lip-service in favour of human rights and democratisation prior to 2021, the EU Parliament is now taking on more of a role as a human rights reminder. The parliament has responded to severe breaches of democratic principle and human rights standards related to the BRI in Central Asia and elsewhere. After the Kazakh government crackdown on protesters in 2022, protests which were related to heavy anti-Chinese sentiment and BRI investment in the region, the EU parliament raised concerns and called for upholding the rule of law in the country. Kazakhstan's roles include a geopolitical corridor, port to Europe, breadbasket, and energy supplier for China. It is host to the main container and train terminal in Dostyk ("friendship") in Khorgos at the Chinese-Kazakh border which handles rail freight traffic of over 500 thousand containers per year from China to Europe. Fewer containers go in the other direction from Europe to China. Kazakhstan is a key partner for Chinas BRI and the first country in which President Xi announced the BRI during his state visit in 2013. Hence, the country is vital to the EU's plans to foster democracy and human rights vis-à-vis the BRI, something which it had already highlighted in the 2019 EU-Central Asia Strategy paper.

The political violence in 2022 was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of antigovernmental uprisings and anti-Chinese sentiments in the region. With the economy and energy crisis coming to a peak in 2021 as a result of the pandemic, which has also increased corruption and autocratic leadership, protests took place against Chinese companies, their work ethics, and blackmail practices on the one hand, and the apathy and silence of their governments vis-à-vis Chinese investors on the other. This is what erupted into mass protests in the Kazakh metropole and economic centre of the country, Almaty, in January 2022. The week-long protests left more than 400 people dead and thousands of people in prison. Chinese President Xi stressed that China firmly opposed protests that attempted to harm the "Chinese-Kazakh friendship" after protesters pointed to China as the root cause for the conflict in the first place, a root which revealed the long-simmering anger over corruption, nepotism, rising inequality, and economic hardship in the country (Toktomushev, 2022).

The EU parliament condemned the political violence and repressive measures taken against the protesters, highlighting that it " *[…] stands together with the people of Kazakhstan, who should fully enjoy the right to organize a peaceful rally in protest against the lack of reforms in Kazakhstan and in defence of a prosperous future for the country; strongly condemns the dramatic and continually deteriorating situation of human rights in Kazakhstan, including of freedom of expression and labour and social rights […]*" (European Parliament, 2022). The response showed that, despite China's heavy investment in the region, and its reliance on building solid relationships with the governments of post-soviet countries such as in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Ukraine, it did not mitigate the belligerent public sentiments and get the much-desired legitimate support for their prosperity and efficiency based "working democracy" from the citizens in the region (Adnan, 2020). China's President Xi, fearing the loss of significant influence over this vital geopolitical ally in Central Asia and over China's gateway to Europe, announced the renewal of Chinese ties with the region and his plan to visit Kazakhstan again in 2022.

#### **26.4 The Glocal Response to the BRI**

The New Cold War between democratic and autocratic political regimes is on and, sadly enough, one of its first hot war outbreaks happened in a BRI stronghold country, Ukraine, after the aggressive invasion by Russia in 2022. This invasion was led by Russian President Putin, who like Xi, views democracy as a domestic and global threat. This turns this war into a proxy war between autocratic and democratic systems. Moreover, this war is the first glocal one, in which global democratic norms are defended by local, private, multi-stakeholder, and non-state actors alike (Mihr, 2021). The Ukrainian forces are receiving mass support from private donors from across the globe, from millionaires to celebrities and civil society who have donate money and supplies. On the ground, there are also private rescue teams and warfare donors and an international battalion composed of fighters from around the globe. International and private aid and human rights organisations have individualised the war by holding solely one aggressor, namely Russian President Vladimir Putin, responsible for the war and not the Russian people as such. This is quite rare in the history of wars, although the British governments had attempted to do earlier calling Napoleons invasions in Europe, the "Napoleonic Wars" in the Nineteenth century, and during World War I, calling it an "industrial war" in which all sides are victims of senseless killings. But after the war this narrative vanished and changed into an aggressor war by the German Empire at that time, holding the whole nation accountable for it.

But this Ukrainian war has become more of a glocal warfare because private actors and civil society is greatly involved. Local and private initiatives justify their involvement by invoking global democratic norms, highlighting the need to help in a war against a state aggressor (Mihr, 2022).

In the same vein, the local and private response to the globalised economy has turned much of the local response to the BRI into a glocal one. The fact that many local communities, civil societies, labour unions, mayors, and businesses have withstood the autocratic way the BRI is governed on an inter-state level undermines the concept of territorial nation-states and state sovereignty in a way we have not seen before. The Chinese government fears global democracy as a threat because it erodes their state from the inside, even while the survival of a state depends on adaptation to global and local challenges. The CCP, in this case, is responding to the threat of global democracy through its White Paper, hoping that real democratic upheaval in China will not occur.

Yet at the same time, during the Democracy Summit in December 2021, the list of invitees of national, international, local, and private actors and leaders, underlining multi-stakeholder initiatives, was more than symbolic. It emphasises the claim that the future of democratic regimes is based on glocal governance, and so the International Day of Human Rights on December 10 was chosen as the meeting date. This was a response by the US President and the EU to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's statement earlier that year in January 2021 that, "*Some see China as the so-called biggest threat and their China policy based on this misperception is wrong. What has*

*happened proves that the US attempt to suppress China and start a new Cold War has not just seriously harmed the interests of the two peoples, but also caused severe disruptions to the world […]*"3 The Summit participants highlighted that the backsliding of democracies is ongoing as democratic regimes have begun illiberalizing, failing, becoming populist, nationalising, unconsolidating, and becoming otherwise dysfunctional, particularly across Eurasia in the light of the BRI.

After a talk with President Xi in March that year, the US president announced a counter initiative to the BRI with a focus on strengthening democratic procedures, as a joint answer "*[…] pulling from the democratic states, helping those communities around the world that in fact need help,"* (Reuters, 2021). Eventually, the EU launched the GGI and the US the New Global Deal (NGD) to bring democratic welfare states back in. It is not a coincidence that war in Ukraine broke out shortly after the Western allies announced economic and state building measures against autocratic regimes, such as Russia and China, in December 2021.

Although one cannot ignore the fact that some countries in Eurasia have been economically successful in the short run despite not following democratic and human rights principles—these include states such as Serbia, Belarus, Russia, Turkey, and some Central Asian countries—ten years after the BRI launched, these same countries show significant economic decline and regime instability. Their regimes lack legitimacy and need to invest endless resources and energy into keeping their non-legitimate autocratic regimes up and running. This is true even when they are launching a brutal war against neighbouring states and no matter how wealthy their leadership or how well distributed the wealth is in society.

Meanwhile, the CCP does what it always does, namely to legitimise its nonlegitimate regime democratic wordings. In the White Paper, one can read about the response of the CCP to a competitive, liberal, and collaborative democratic model, namely that "China's electoral system is adapted to the country's national conditions, dependent on the stage of socio-economic development." Since there are no competitive and free political parties or presidential elections in China, the electorate and participatory rights are only among the members within the Communist Party, and they follow a strictly hierarchical order of nomination instead of election.

Hence, the Chinese statement in favour of elections only refers to a partisan group of party members and delegates to the National People's Congress that meets once a year in Beijing. Nevertheless, the CCP insists that "*all citizens who have reached the age of 18, except those persons deprived of political rights following the law, have the right to vote and stand for election*" (CCP 2021, White Paper, Democracy, III. Concrete and Pragmatic Practice, 1. Democratic Elections).

Even when democratic practices take place in countries where BRI investments are strong, such a glocal and multi-stakeholder approach can never fully replace a specific regime type, but it can complement dysfunctional regimes, no matter how authoritarian or democratic they may be. Glocal governance initiatives adhere to

3 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi talks about China-U.S. relations with CGTN. 2 January 2021, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3245444e77554464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/index.html

universal principles and global standards, such as freedom of assembly, fair elections, and freedom of the media and enact these locally. For example, when global supply chain rules are applied, anti-corruption measures sanction de facto corrupt and autocratic practices. European countries and institutions have, since the 1990s, experimented with these types of local ownership, citizen dialogues, public–private partnerships, and multi-stakeholder initiatives to enhance democratic performance and resilience alongside its funding and investment policies (Mihr, 2022). Despite the fact that there is much room for improvement in the implementation of these measures, there has been a start in the correct direction via the proliferation of the multistakeholder approach within and outside the EU. Glocalisation has also produced various kinds of inter-municipal, metropolitan, and asymmetric governance arrangements, and thereby has increased the occurrence of differentiated government in the EU. Governments have changed roles from that of direct service providers to that of enablers, advisors, and facilitators, which requires new capacities at the central level (Charlie Jeffery and John Peterson, 2020, p. 763). Ultimately, this paradigm shift in governance has increased ownership over production and well-being and hence satisfaction among people on the community level. The people receive a regular and transparent response from local authorities and, in reverse, are willing to compromise and negotiate standard rules for all.

Morlino et al. (2020) observed the localisation of democratic practices within the EU and assert that state governments are no longer critical holders of sovereign power, something which can also be seen in other BRI-related countries. Instead, the authors argue that, if state authorities are no longer capable of balancing people's desire for freedom and equality in general as well as in terms of economic investments and development, the idea of the multi-class state will begin to take hold, reflecting a wish for autonomy and the organisation of forces arising from civil society, as seen in Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 2022. Democratic power in the traditional sense of representative democracy declines, but the desire for technical-scientific expertise rises. This means that the democratic deficit and backsliding must be compensated for in other ways, namely through procedural multi-level, stakeholder participation.

In 2004, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—of which China is not officially a member—had already been alert to the changing paradigms and connectivity between economic growth and local ownership (and hence democracy), establishing Principles of Corporate Governance and providing guidelines for the evaluation of practical policy impacts through a multistakeholder approach. Private or corporate actors enjoy political legitimacy if they provide public services to communities without an effective government. They focus on the links between globally agreed upon standards, values, and mechanisms around CSOs, and national governments and businesses.

Chinas' way of governing the BRI, however, is far from any multi-stakeholder approach or public–private partnership. Instead, China counts on top-down statecontrolled implementation mechanisms absent consensus building with local stakeholders, and there is little evidence that this will change. Huang et al. (2016) argue that, despite China's modernisation and internationalisation, the education and economic sector has remained unchanged, and has thus made China neither global nor local, but has instead strengthened their centralistic approach to governance. Because of the strict top-down governmental approach, the mindset of the people has not changed despite the influx of international standards, norms, and even products, movies, or cultural practices. Global trade, let alone BRI initiatives, has not made the Chinese system more adaptive or competitive because the education system and the governance regime remain autocratic. Instead, the BRI revenues have made the rich richer while making the poor poorer, resulting in corruption, injustice, and a lack of local participation in China (Huang et al., 2016).

At the same time, the Chinese government has shown a serious lack of control over the public sector despite its heavy investments in G5 technology, smart cities, and cyber-surveillance, using more and more political violence and suppression to compensate for governmental failure in this area (Mihr, 2017). This lack of control over domestic affairs also affects its control over BRI investments, which can lead to uncontrolled outbreaks and often violent protests. Chinese companies and domestic governments encounter opposition along the BRI, as in Kazakhstan and, since 2018, in Myanmar, Belarus, and Pakistan (Nalbandov, 2014). Instead of turning Eurasia into a new "Sinostan" through the BRI as Xi anticipated in 2013 and 2017, the badly governed BRI has become a boomerang for the CCP which has led people to turn against their own governments inside and outside China. Even though most of these protests have been shut down by armed forces and have led to stronger autocratisation of rulership via the implementation of draconic measures to pacify the population, such events will, soon or later, destabilise a country from the bottom up (Pantucci & Petersen, 2022).

As stated earlier, glocal movements and initiatives are not an alternative to democracy but often work hand in hand with democratic movements, and hence not in direct competition with any specific political regime type per se. The glocalisation of regimes is emerging to the extent to which governments fail to exercise their obligations towards their citizens. Glocal governance is grassroot and community driven and strengthens weak democratic institutions because it legitimises its governors.

The 2012 UNDP report on "Good Governance and Development in the World" already emphasised that the methodological concepts for assessing governance policies are too short-sighted to understand economic growth or societal development. Against that backdrop, some authors have argued that the BRI was never meant to trigger global growth and development outside China—let alone a specific regime type—but has always been a purely domestic policy tool to prevent unemployment and economic decline and thus to avoid social uprisal and instability within China (Jiang, 2021).

Thus, the BRI may trigger bottom-up uprisal, protests, and democratic initiatives inside and outside China, as has occurred in Xinjiang province and in the neighbouring states of Kazakhstan and Myanmar where people have been claiming more democratic options in their fight against local corruption, mismanagement, and bad governance practices that arise from BRI-related investments and businesses. Though Xi's initiative for development may never have anticipated it, interestingly enough, glocalisation of private initiatives and governance picked up speed with the start of the BRI.

#### **26.5 The BRI's Impact on Governance**

A year after the BRI was launched, in 2014, President Xi undertook a state visit to Europe. While addressing the EU, he highlighted that all that mattered was the outcome of the BRI, not the way it was governed, stating "The fruit may look the same, but the taste is quite different."4 The same ideas can be found in the 2021 White Paper in which Xi does not discredit the innovations, technology, or even Western lifestyle, but objects to any liberal, consensus building democratic way in which these achievements are governed. That a free society and technical innovation are closely intertwined is not what autocrats tend to believe.

China's ability to copy Western lifestyles in all aspects of architecture, technology, and culture is breath-taking, particular with respect to its disregard for the fact that further progress and development of this lifestyle is only achievable in a free, fair, and inclusive society. Even redefining human rights as "extensive rights," as was done in the most recent White Paper, will not defer from the problem of poor governance. The White Paper states, "*China has completed the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects. The entire country has shaken off absolute poverty and embarked on common prosperity. […] Their rights to subsistence, development and health are fully protected, and their economic, political, cultural, social, environmental, and other rights keep expanding*" (CCP, 2021, White Paper, IV. Democracy That works, 1. Extensive Rights.).

From the start, China has taken the "New Cold War" more seriously than democratic regimes in Europe or North America, whether for reasons of Western hypocrisy or simply because Western governments underestimated the threat that a democratic lifestyle and fundamental freedoms can pose to autocratic leaders. For autocratic leaders, all that matters is stability so as to ensure the survival of their own rulership, no matter the cost. This survival mode can never be up for election, free choice, or deliberation. Any governance model that could successfully compete with a oneparty or strongman leadership style is a potential threat—regardless of the "taste of the fruit."

As stated earlier, the regime in Beijing is a fragile and often toxic mixture of Han-Nationalism paired with contradictory ideological foundations in Socialism and Capitalism and a de facto one-party rulership under a life-long head of the party. President Xi is following this exclusive doctrine of "national capitalist driven communism" and the superiority of the Han Chinese as the "organic whole."

With the country's closure during the pandemic years from 2020 to 2022 and the Russian War in Ukraine in 2022, President Xi has felt internal and external pressure in terms of the need to legitimise his regime, and retaliation and hostile moves against neighbour states in Asia and the West, and above all towards the United States, have intensified. At the same time, a top-down Cancel Culture rally has gained speed within the country, replacing anything foreign and Western with "Chinese characteristics."

4 Irish Times, 2 April 2014, Brussels, "Democracy not for China," says Xi Jinping. "Political systems of other countries would not suit Chinese," https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asiapacific/democracy-not-for-china-says-xi-jinping-1.1747853 (August 2021).

One way of doing this is by using the artificial intelligence-driven Social Scoring System and surveillance technology to dismantle so-called unicorn companies such as Huawei and Alibaba. Many of these are global players who represent a Western capitalistic mentality and more diverse and participatory forms for governance both inside and outside China.

BRI's success has instead increased anti-Western sentiments in China. Anything Western, even leisure culture, ought to be reinterpreted as Chinese. Any sympathy for glocalisation, democracy, or human rights must be replaced by Han-patriotism in the form of a pseudo-religious mix between ideology and personal identity for which many people are willing to sacrifice their lives. For some, China has become a "fearful giant" with a powerful BRI toolbox providing instruments which can influence modes of governance elsewhere in the world, but many of these measures seem to become a boomerang for China. If the government can no longer keep people satisfied through economic growth, the way BRI is governed could potentially boomerang to China because it is becoming disconnected to its main markets in Europe and the US. Unrest and turmoil inside and outside its borders are already starting to grow.

The CCPs slogan "Development for China and the World" (sic),5 leaves no. room for interpretation, meaning that China comes first before the rest of the world. This slogan justifies the privileges that the Han Chinese enjoy over others and lead to over 80% support rate for the government—even by critical standards. It is unclear, however, how long this can be sustained in times of rapid decline of domestic economy and rise of civil unrest. Furthermore, the CCP aims to reclaim control over the economy at the same time as cleansing the country of any political opponents, including former CEOs of global businesses, many of whom have taken lead roles under the BRI.

China's technical modernisation, its openness towards technology, mobility of its people, and Western style architecture, belies the autocratic style of government. Instead, the strict state control is the engine for the permanent technological advancements which keep people happy. "Smart refrigerators," e-cars, the newest versions of smart phones, and rapid transport of fresh vegetables from the vast steppes of Inner Mongolia to all corners of the country provide the illusion of a progressive state and ever-caring government. The latest governmental economic intervention "Made in China 2025," aimed at increasing the domestic Chinese proportion of core materials to 70% by 2025, however, illustrates that the BRI has not achieved the goals that Xi anticipated in 2013.

President Xi has repetitive emphasised his nation's urge to overcome the indignation and humiliation suffered at the hands of the West in the late nineteenth century, and one way of doing so is via the massive modernisation of the country (Fenby, 2017). This indignation is deeply ingrained in the people's mind and kept vividly alive through propaganda and education. It should thus not be underestimated as a key driving force in the support for the autocratic regime. The more state propaganda fuels this perception of the past, the more people will be alienated from the concept

5 "China Public Diplomacy Association Established in Beijing," 31 December 2012, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceie/eng/NewsPress/t1003792.htm

of a pluralist and liberal Western democracy. Even though history may repeat itself and propaganda sooner or later must meet reality, it has thus far been successful at keeping the country stable.

The concern that China will draw on BRI resources and "befriend" country's governments in Eurasia to resolve domestic turmoil is not far-fetched. China already holds a military base in Tajikistan to monitor the corridor and conflicts between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and de facto owns and controls territorial enclaves, declared as "special economic zones" in Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Belarus, and elsewhere.

Many countries across Eurasia depend heavily on BRI investments, but this is especially true of its close's neighbours in Central Asia, such as Kazahkstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. China has actively been involved in security measures in Afghanistan both during and after the withdrawal of NATO allies 2021; and engages in regular casualty-causing military border conflicts with India in the Kashmir region. At the same time, China has become the fifth-largest arms exporter in the world overall, with particular export focus into conflict regions in Asia and Central Europe (Seekins, 2021). The genocide against Muslim minorities and the coup d'état in Myanmar in 2018 and 2020 was partly influenced by China and linked directly to the BRI (US Institute for Peace, 2018).

#### **26.6 Conclusion**

China's BRI is neither a curse nor blessing for democracies, and Europe's response illustrates only one aspect of the global reactions to the way China's investments trigger local and social unrest in countries in which investments are made. For some countries, BRI investments have led to a modest economic growth and a stronger middle class, which has led to a growth in civil society calling for democratic reforms. In others, local unrests have led to more strongly repressive and autocratic regimes. Nevertheless, there is no direct causal link between the BRI and democratic movements on the one side or stronger autocratisation on the other. What can be highlighted instead, is a line of intriguing correlations between BRI investments and autocratic governing styles, social unrest, and political violence.

For China itself, the BRI is becoming a boomerang. Instead of consolidating its own political regime and strengthening social stability, the CCP must now use more political force, surveillance, and resources than ever before to keep the country stable, even issuing a White Paper on democracy to fooling the world and to keep the Chinese people calm. The beneficial returns from the BRI, namely "to first stabilize China, then the World" are far from real. Now that trillions of dollars have been invested across the world however, the Chinese government cannot easily withdraw from these investments.

While many BRI partner governments, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus, have outmanoeuvred the influx of democratic liberal ideas from the West, and have become more authoritarian or autocratic, others, who have been open and responsive to a more vigorous and educated middle class, thanks to the BRI, often find themselves in internal turmoil, and even wars over democratic norms, as is the case for Ukraine.

Again, it is difficult to directly link the BRI to political regime change, but intriguingly enough, the higher the amount of BRI investment in a country, the higher the likeliness of social unrest and political violence. Countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and many across Central Asia and Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and Myanmar, have benefited from the modest development and wealth that the BRI brought, but at the same time face serious political turmoil, violence, and even (domestic) war.

Despite China's strict non-interference policy in the public affairs of other countries, its influence has changed the infrastructure landscape of BRI partner countries and connected them to the world through its exports, for example, via the 5th generation of mobile networks and Internet, 5G technology.

The CCP insists on its position that "*External interference and democratic transformation bring nothing but endless trouble. China never seeks to export the Chinese model of democracy, nor does it allow any external force to change it under any circumstances. It firmly supports the independent choice by every country of its own path to democracy and opposes any interference in others' internal affairs on the pretext of 'bringing democracy"* (CSC, 2021, White Paper, V. A New Model for Democracy, 2 Following the Most Suitable Path to Democracy). Nevertheless, China's government can no longer deny that political turmoil in recipient countries of their investments is not always under their control.

Circumstances are likely to change following Russia's war in the Ukraine and the resultant shift of hegemonic powers on the Eurasian continent, with China taking the lead in the East over the "BRI countries"—despite its many shortcomings—and the EU acting as the lead governing power in the West through a yet to be tested GGI.

#### **References**

Fenby, J. (2017). *Will China dominate the 21st century?* John Wiley & Sons.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Part III Future Research and Debates**

## **Chapter 27 Balkanization Instead of Eurasianism: Fragmented Technological Governance Across the OSCE Domain and Its Implications**

**Tobias Burgers**

#### **27.1 Introduction**

Digital technologies have fundamentally changed and transformed our lives, and cyberspace has assumed dominance in society. Indeed, as Nassehi (2019) illustrates, while not all of society's interactions occur in the digital realm or through digital technologies, we have become a society that predominantly can be understood by and through digital means. The importance of and reliance on digital technology will only further increase with the integration of technologies such as AI, big data, deep learning, autonomous machines, and the internet of things (IoT). These technologies, at times described as "general-purpose technologies," are finding ways to change and even overhaul our societies (UNESCAP, 2020). It is these changes that will determine how technologies will be placed and valued in any given societal context. While we may think of these technologies as neutral, they will have a substantial impact, evoking changes depending on how and for what objectives they are being used. Considering these changes up to the present time and those currently emerging, fundamental questions must be raised about how nations and societies will control and direct these technologies. What previously were considered questions and concerns of technical and technological management, best left to technical experts, have evolved into questions of societal importance, requiring urgent governance of technologies by lawmakers, politicians, and bureaucracies (Goodman & Lin, 2007). Among these questions are those addressing the purpose of the concerned technologies and whom they should benefit.

T. Burgers (B)

Faculty of Social Sciences, Fulbright University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
#### **27.2 Technological Governance in Eurasia**

For a considerable time, the rise of digital technologies and the global proliferation of the internet were popularly considered a force for the good, one which would promote and foster democracy (Best & Wade, 2009; Gotlieb, 2002) by disseminating information and increasing its quality and availability (Hindman, 2008). This would enable it to support human rights and good governance (Selian, 2002). Such a utilitarian view of technology saw prominence in the first decade of this century with the mass social uprisings of the Arab Spring, the Twitter revolution in Iran, and the Rose and Orange revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. It seemed that cyberspace and digital technologies—in particular social media—functioned in all of them as catalysts for democratic change and human rights progress (Wolfsfeld, 2013). These desirable values went hand in hand with a tech governance model that emphasized that the internet and digital technologies should be minimally controlled by individual nation states. Some proponents of this model even argued that the internet and digital technologies were in fact difficult, if not impossible, to administer and govern. Famed is the quote by the then US President, Bill Clinton, who commented on early Chinese efforts to regulate and control the internet and digital technologies, saying, "Now there's no question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet. Good luck! That's sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall" (New York Times, 2000). This vision of technology was combined with a tech governance model, advocated by the USA and supported by the EU, that sought to keep state interference to a minimum, with minimal governmental oversight and responsibility for managing and governing cyberspace and digital technologies in the hands of tech companies. However, over the last two decades, other visions of how technology should be used, regulated, and governed in view of definite objectives have arisen. Chief among the proponents of such a vision is China, which has been developing an alternative governance model since the start of this century, known as the "Networked Authoritarianism" model (Burgers & Robinson, 2016; MacKinnon, 2011). This model is extensive in its aims and in the reach of governance efforts and has been remarkably successful. China has been able to control its national internet through the Great Firewall and has been highly effective in surveilling its cyberspace, imposing rules on information allowed onto the Chinese internet, and setting out under which conditions selected companies—national and international—can participate in Chinese cyberspace activity (Ibid, 2011, 2016). These policies demonstrate that it is possible to nail Jell-O to the wall (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2016). Through legal and regulatory frameworks, the Chinese government strictly regulates and controls tech companies while advocating—nationally and internationally—for cyber sovereignty. The frameworks determine data management practices and content that can be hosted in authorized frameworks with government access to and control over data. Meanwhile, and more recently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also set (micro) rules and regulations aimed at internet celebrities and influencers, illustrating the broad and in-depth reach of Chinese tech governance efforts. Their success illustrates two things. First, it is perfectly feasible to control, regulate, and govern digital technologies and cyberspace. Second, cyberspace and digital technologies are well suited to the attempts of authoritarian regimes to surveil and control their societies. Inspired by China, its northern neighbour Russia has sought to follow suit, albeit less successfully. Its tech model overlaps with the Sino model in its aims to rein in tech companies, ensure official access to and control over data, and establish cyber sovereignty. However, the Russian governance efforts have been less extensive and detailed.

#### **27.3 External Technological Players in the Region**

While China has perfected its Networked Authoritarianism model, the European Union (EU), witnessing the growing power of tech companies and the harmful effects of data-driven economies and societies, has sought to put the brakes on "big tech," and regulate and govern cyberspace and digital technologies (Bremmer, 2021). These efforts have led to the emergence of a distinctive European tech governance model which emulates that of China in its strong regulatory efforts and the reach of its governance model. This is reflected in policies such as the European Commission's digital policy roadmap "Shaping Europe's Digital Future," the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the Digital Services Act (DSA). Part of these policies is the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) under the concept of "trustworthy AI" (Fefer, 2021). In this regard, the EU has sought to curb the excesses of digital technology, while maintaining the vision that digital technology can remain a force for the better, the promotion of democracy, the fostering human rights, and the supporting of equality. Finally, there seems to be a noticeable shift even in the United States, with the growing perception that its laissez-faire model needs a regulatory overhaul. The recent Facebook revelations and the growing power of big tech, among other concerns, are spurring a national movement to develop a new tech governance model that would seek to restrain the sprawling power of the tech companies themselves (Bremmer, 2021). Some success has been achieved, most notably with the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). Yet, on a federal level, strong(er) regulations are still a work in progress, with an uncertain outlook on what an updated American model of tech governance might look like.

#### **27.4 (Tech) Competition or "Balkanization" Ahead?**

We have seen how, across two decades, the early unipolar and utilitarian vision of tech governance has transformed into a mosaic of different tech governance models. While there is some overlap between these models, including—surprisingly—between the Chinese and the EU models, they are essentially different. This diversification of tech governance models along separate paths has led to the emergence of what Malcomson (2015) refers to as the "splinternet" or, as it is alternatively known, the "Balkanization" of cyberspace and tech governance (O'hara & Hall, 2018). Diversification has provided other nations, which are increasingly seeking to integrate new digital technologies into their societies, with a number of policy options regarding the purpose and the means with which to achieve it. This development has unsurprisingly created competition between the various models. In the current era of increasing geopolitical competition between the United States and China, and increasingly also between the EU and China, as well as the United States and Russia, the tech domain has also become subject to intense competition.

#### **27.5 The Role of the OSCE in Global Tech Competition**

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) currently finds itself amidst competing international approaches to cyberspace oversight. As an intergovernmental organization that "assists host countries in putting their OSCE commitments into practice," it plays a role of considerable importance (OSCE, 2021a). Furthermore, through its field operations, it supports national authorities in developing new policies (Ibid, 2021a). This gives the OSCE the ability to influence policies and thereby punch above its weight in the technological governance debate. It could, in theory, function as an actor that, through the promotion of specific tech governance models, might enhance unipolarity and limit the possible balkanization of cyberspace. However, for this to occur, emerging tech nations need to be receptive to OSCE tech policies. Also, we need to determine if any other actors that provide alternative models, such as China, would have the ability to steer the development of technological governance.

Being receptive to OSCE tech policies starts with understanding what they offer. Here, we must differentiate between policies and programmes that focus on digital security governance (ICT, cybersecurity, cyber conflict, and critical infrastructure protection) and policies that provide a framework for governing digital technologies suited to particular objectives (OSCE, 2021b). The former policies focus on preventing actual cyber conflict and crime. These can be bolstered through projects such as cyber awareness month, a training programme of national cyber police forces and courses on cyber security confidence-building measures (OSCE, 2021b; 2021c, 2021d). With regard to providing frameworks for governing digital technologies for particular outcomes, it is apparent that the OSCE views digital technologies as (potential) enablers for good governance. The organization regards digital technology as a force that can contribute to shaping better and fairer media, improve accessibility to information, support freedom of expression, and constitute a tool that combats corruption, labour issues, sex trafficking, and so on. In addition, the OSCE believes that technology can enhance democratic functions and foster sustainable development (OSCE, 2021e, 2021f, 2021g, 2021h, 2021i). In particular, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) within the OSCE promotes the idea of digital technologies in just this sense (2021); "Governments, civil society and religious or belief communities can engage in the digital sphere to foster mutual respect, understanding, and inclusion. Increased digitalization can go a long way towards addressing systemic inequalities and barriers […] At the same time, civil society can tap into the potential of the digital space to streamline and synergize its efforts, which increasingly depend on new technologies when faced with limited resources, increased workload and decreased capacity, especially during the pandemic" (ODIHR, 2021). The OSCE seeks to bring these beliefs into practice through ODIHR co-sponsored meetings such as the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (SHDM) III, which is focused entirely on digital technologies. In the words of OSCE Director-General Elinor Hammarskjöld, "Digital technologies have great potential to promote and enhance the enjoyment of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law" (OSCE, 2021i).

Clearly, the OSCE, and in particular the ODIHR, advocate for and aim to advance a tech governance model that is situated between the American and European models: A model that understands digital technologies as tools that can foster good governance, promote, and enhance democracy, and foster human rights and freedoms, rather than one which regards them as tools for surveillance and digital control. Furthermore, through its activities, the OSCE seeks to advance data protection policies in its member states. Thus, the OSCE's digital governance policies and ideas align with the organization's overall goals of supporting and promoting democratic development, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance.

#### **27.6 Digital Policies and Politics in the Central Asian Nations**

Examining the literature for ongoing tech projects, developments, and early tech governance efforts in three Central Asian nations—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—we find indicators of emerging tech governance (UNESCAP, 2020). Projects such as "Digital Kyrgyzstan 2019–2023" illustrate this point very well. Tajikistan has likewise presented such initiatives (World Bank, 2016). Much of this initial vision of how digital technologies should be utilized focuses on economic development. It is felt that they should streamline and improve the financial sector and supply chain management, allow for the development of e-commerce, and finally enhance agricultural output (Jenish, 2019; UNESCAP, 2020). Beyond this, there is some limited evidence that the three nations additionally saw digital technologies also as tools for improving governance. As the then President of Kyrgyzstan, Jeenbekov, noted "The digitization of society is a requirement of today. This will open up new opportunities for our citizens. The human factor in the provision of public services will be excluded, which will contribute to the eradication of corrupt elements" (Jeenbekov, in Alkanova, 2019). Other literature shows how regional governments initially saw digital technologies as tools for enhancing governmental services and improving democratic local governance, particularly in Kyrgyzstan (Brimkulov & Baryktabasov, 2014; Dzhusupova, 2015). This indicates, at least in theory, that the three nations appeared to be supportive of the original OSCE vision. Nevertheless, observing the current situation, it seems those lofty goals and ideas have not been turned into reality. Spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, a wide-ranging group of authors notes how the three nations have used digital technologies for surveillance and control purposes and as tools to suppress free speech, human rights, and democratic liberties instead. As Shastry notes, "Too many governments in the region are focusing on control and surveillance instead of citizens' rights." This indicates that, despite best earlier intentions, the three nations are increasingly rejecting the OSCE tech governance model and are moving towards a tech governance model akin to the Chinese model.

Furthermore, strong support from Chinese official and private actors increases the likelihood of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan advancing along the Sino model of technological governance. Through the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Digital Silk Road (DSR), Chinese state and non-state actors can provide these Central Asian nations with below-market priced digital tools and technologies such as big data and deep learning programmes, hardware for mobile infrastructure, digital command centres for police forces, facial recognition software, digital monitoring systems, and other video surveillance systems (Burgers, 2022). What only enhances the interest of the region in Chinese technology projects, such as the "Safe Cities" and "Sharp Eyes" projects, is that these governmental programmes utilize digital technologies for surveillance purposes (Marat & Sutton, 2021). This suggests that Chinese hardware and tech governance policies will assume an everwidening presence, and may even become the standard among those three nations.

#### **27.7 Balkanization Instead of Eurasianism: Implication and What the OSCE Can Do**

Whereas initial technology policies indicated some desire to follow a liberal model of technological governance, with limited regulation and the use of technology as a force for good, the current observation is that, because of the growing degree of Chinese technological surveillance resources and programmes, the Central Asian states are pivoting away from their initial preference for the liberal model towards the Chinese technological governance model. This development, which is likely to receive Russian support, seems to ensure that Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan will most likely embrace tech governance models in line with those of China and Russia. This will lead to a further fragmentation and increased cyberbalkanization of the digital sphere in the region. This brings up the question of what the OSCE, as an active participant in these countries, can effectively do to advance its own model of technological governance, i.e. a model that seeks to utilize digital technologies as tools with which to positively impact the economic sector, assist political freedom, enhance good governance, and ensure that digital technologies are embraced as a force for the social good. It is a question which remains unanswered, and a topic which requires much further research and discussion.

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Chapter 28 Exploring Heritage Diplomacy: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) an the Western Balkans**

**Erman Akilli**

#### **28.1 Introduction**

The Western Balkans (WB) became a destabilized region in the wake of the Yugoslav Wars (1991—2001) which were aroused by ethnic conflicts. Despite the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s support and presence in the area and active role in promoting dialogue and tolerance during these years, peace and democracy have, arguably, not been established to the extent the OSCE had aimed for in 1995. During the wars in the WB, historical buildings were targeted because they represented the opposing sides' cultures, ethnicities, or religious views. Even after the conflicts had finished, threats to cultural heritage remained. In response, the Council of Europe (CE) and the European Commission supported cultural heritage programmes and policies to repair and restore artefacts and monuments in the WB region, including inscription into the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage list (Bold & Pickard, 2018). In order to explain the heritage of the WB, it is not possible to neglect Ottoman history, as the region formed part of that empire for 600 years. Thus, the WB state identity construction is influenced by the Ottoman legacy; even today, WB national identity theorists continue to view this identity-based "other-ness" as a defining characteristic (McDonald, 2012). Former Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Thorbjørn Jagland sums the identity of the entire region as being based in cultural heritage and democracy. During his speech at the Ljubljana Conference, Mr. Jagland explained the notion as follows: *"Heritage is simply part of our cultural DNA, … and democracy is our identity"* (Jagland, 2009). Apart from Mr. Jagland's approach towards heritage, on the other side of the World, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an important and successful example of bringing harmonious relations to the Northeast Asia region through Heritage Diplomacy (HD). As seen in the BRI case, heritage as diplomacy can be used to establish bridges between peoples,

E. Akilli (B)

International Relations Department, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
A. Mihr et al. (eds.), *Securitization and Democracy in Eurasia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16659-4\_28

inspire peace, promote cultural variety, and catalyse economic development which can help local communities directly. In this paper, I examine the concept of HD and its potential usage in the WB based upon an analysis of the BRI's success in promoting regional cooperation. To do so, I examine the BRI, its historical roots, structure, and geographical extensions.

#### **28.2 Intertwining Approaches in Diplomacy: Heritage and Culture**

As a form of Soft Power (Nye, 1990), the concept of heritage, which acts as a bridge between the past and the present, essentially expresses the cultural accumulation of a country. HD, which is the manifestation of the concept of heritage in foreign policy, is defined as a series of processes in which shared cultural ties and historical past among nations are transformed into exchanges, collaborations, and cooperative governance forms. Heritage, which has emerged as a form of foreign policy management today, is shaped primarily based on the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage list. The concept of HD, which is the manifestation of the idea of (cultural) heritage in foreign policy, was introduced into International Relations literature by Tim Winter with his article titled "HD" published in 2015 (Winter, 2015). In his article, Winter defined it, as stated above, as a set of processes by which shared cultural ties and a historical past among nations are transformed into exchanges, collaborations, and forms of cooperative governance (Winter, 2015). As Winter implies, the significant aspect of HD is assistance provided to other countries in the form of renovation/cultural heritage protection and heritage management assistance, technology transfer, capacity building, or institutional support (Winter, 2015). According to Winter, this type of (foreign) aid brings the people of the donor and recipient countries closer together (Winter, 2016). On the other hand, Winter also emphasizes that HD should be read as, empirically and conceptually different from cultural diplomacy. For Winter, despite definitional sharpness, cultural diplomacy typically revolves around the projection or expression of a particular art form as a *soft power* mechanism (Winter, 2015); movies, celebrities, sports, or fashion are among the often-cited examples of cultural exports that help countries gain influence beyond their national borders (Cull, 2009). Cultural diplomacy can be defined as the process of actions based on the interactive exchange of ideas, values, traditions, culture, and identity. This (cultural) interaction can develop relations between states alongside socio-cultural cooperation (Akıllı, 2019). From the Roman Republic's strategy of inviting the sons of foreign "friendly kings" to be educated in Rome to Sufi mystics spreading a simple and tolerant message across borders during the early Ottoman period, early cultural diplomacy was a persistent element in all of the principal civilizations (Donelli, 2019).

Unlike classic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy assumes that political interaction will be easier between culturally closer parties (Akıllı, 2016) and that cultural diplomacy is related to the government of that country (Sancar, 2012); thus, it is a crucial tool of the state for promoting a positive image abroad to facilitate all diplomatic affairs (Chartrand, 1992, 134). In other words, it should be easier for states to impose the legitimacy of their foreign policy decisions on a country that they can influence with their cultural values (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). According to another definition, cultural diplomacy is a strategy to develop mutual understanding between states through human communication and exchange (Purta¸s, 2013b, 2017). Cultural diplomacy is a catalyst for social change and transformation and a means of mutual interaction between societies (Fisher, 2009). According to Kazou Ogoura, modern cultural diplomacy aims "to improve a nation's image and prestige through such aspects of culture as fine and performing arts, language education, and intellectual traditions" (Ogoura, 2009).

According to Winter, HD is more comprehensive than cultural diplomacy. It involves only the export or projection of a particular artistic form; it also focuses on exchanging bi- and multi-directional cultural flows (Winter, 2015). For Winter, HD goes beyond the use of culture as a tool for diplomatic relations; HD acts as a transboundary and politicized field of governance as it connects various sectors such as renovation/architectural preservation, social development, and post-disaster reconstruction (Winter, 2015). Nonetheless, Winter states that "heritage as diplomacy" is much politically more substantial than heritage in diplomacy (Winter, 2015). In this context, a state's HD towards its hinterland is "inherited as diplomacy," while HD under other conditions can be expressed as "heritage within diplomacy." Winter also draws attention to the material/economic dimension of HD. As a concrete example of this situation, he states that heritage is part of state development aid packages to other states and international aid institutions operating on heritage (Winter, 2015). As discussed below, China's BRI shines through this perspective.

#### **28.3 China's BRI: "A Nearby Neighbor is Better than a Distant Relative"**

Part and parcel of the cultural heritage in the Caucasus and WB are the ancient trading routes. Starting from China's Han dynasty era and continuing for centuries (130 BCE – 1453 CE), the "Silk Road" formed a trade route connecting continents and trade centres. As the Silk Road connected continents, countries, and trade networks; Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a new "Silk Road" plan as China's Central Asia strategy during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2013—a plan which would reach out to different routes and continent and, most importantly, would advance China's interest through cooperation (Banjimin & Faulknor, 2017). During his speech at Nazarbayev University, President Xi stated, "A nearby neighbour is better than a distant relative," articulating the vision behind the BRI. He also proposed that China and the Central Asian countries build an "economic belt along the Silk Road," a trans-Eurasian project spanning from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea. In order to accomplish this, China has invested a three trillion US dollars, most of which has been spent on infrastructure development. Moreover, the BRI/One Belt One Road (OBOR) project encompasses the Eurasian and Asia–Pacific economies as well as the European economic zone by creating/extending economic networks. This project thus connects approximately 65 countries and a population of 4.4 billion, or 63% of the global population, and 21,000 billion dollars of the global economic product (Mardell & Eder, 2018). The objectives of the BRI are: (1) Building an integrated grand market that will utilize both local and global markets, (2) Enhancing mutual collaboration on every level of cooperation, (3) Technology transfer, renovating/creating infrastructure for economic networks; and (4) Creating a safe environment by promoting trust and understanding between member states.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the BRI was a grand strategy presented by China (Aoyama, 2016; Rolland, 2017) towards Central Asia; this leads to several questions regarding the stated objectives of the initiative (Chatzky, 2020; Chin, 2018; Singh, 2019). Apart from the ongoing debate over the BRI's core objectives, primarily as to whether it seeks economic benefits or pursues geopolitical and military goals (Ishnazarov, 2020), the uniqueness of the BRI lies in its promotion of cooperation between states for those objectives. As the Chinese president proposed the BRI in order to improve connectivity and collaboration between the member states on a transcontinental level, this advantageous strategic plan also effects foreign policy. As Winter implies, the most critical aspect of HD is to assist other countries with renovation/cultural heritage protection and heritage management assistance, technology transfer, capacity building, or institutional support (Winter, 2015), which are significant elements of China's BRI. Looking at the principles of the BRI, multifaceted cooperation stands out. As with HD, lasting collaboration is vital for the BRI to achieve its goals. Another focus is that the mutual trust environment established between states will contribute to the evaluation of strategic and sensitive issues between countries and will pave the way for conflict resolution. After World War II, such HD was instrumental in China's positive development of relations with the states in its geographical region. This has continued as it is not possible for the BRI to be successful until disputes between member states are resolved. This is why it presents a meaningful formula for use among the WB countries.

#### **28.4 HD in the WB**

The conflict that tore the WB region apart in the 1990s had a long and complicated history. Yugoslavia arose from a post-World War I political arrangement intended to reward the victorious countries' Serbian allies, while its very creation contained the seeds of its demise. Yugoslavia was situated on several destabilizing geopolitical faults. These were drawn along religious, ethnic, intellectual, and political lines. The death of Marshall Tito in 1980 set in motion a chain of events that eventually led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Derek, 2012). As mentioned above, China's BRI gains its effectiveness through its heritage background and stimulates that very background with cooperation and implementation of diplomacy towards partner states. The BRI is an important and successful example of harmonious regional relations. For instance, post-World War II diplomatic tension in the Northeast Asia region (between China, Japan, and Korea) has been delicate since 1945. Today, however, with the transformation through the BRI, international cooperation between countries across Asia has gained momentum. As part of the BRI, Balkan states can use the same formula as China to overcome diplomatic tensions between one another. To overcome such frozen conflicts or/and hardships (for instance the aftermaths of Yugoslavian war, Bosnian war, and Kosovar war; ethnic problems, etc.), such cooperation presents a great opportunity. Some may say that the BRI shines on economic cooperation (Callahan, 2016), but as mentioned above, the BRI's true uniqueness is bringing harmony and continuous collaboration between partners of the initiative. The idea of *reviving* the Silk Roads through the BRI creates new institutional and political relationships around cultural heritage. These processes will contribute significantly to the remapping of Eurasian and Indian Ocean historical narratives (Winter, 2018). The Balkan region is essentially based on shared culture and history for the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage list.

#### **28.5 Conclusion**

This study aimed to explain HD as a tool, which can be used in conflict resolution for frozen hardships. In the wake of the 1990s, former Yugoslavia became the stage for conflict and dispute regarding the events that caused almost ten years of war in the region. As the Yugoslav Wars tore the WB region apart, events during and after World War II did the same for the Northeast Asia region, but today, through HD practiced under the BRI, China has promoted regional cooperation, stability, and constructive diplomatic relations. Thus, the WB can use the same formula. HD is a tool for promoting and facilitating continuous cooperation and harmony between states under the principles of the initiative. As mentioned above, the cultural heritage artefacts in the WB were negatively affected due to the nature of the Yugoslav Wars and their aftermath. The Ljubljana Conference/Process initiated cultural heritage programmes and policies to repair and restore artefacts and monuments in the WB region which are included in UNESCO World Cultural Heritage list. Rehabilitating the WB region on the basis of heritage can be considered to be the very first step in HD practice. As mentioned above, the concept of heritage as diplomacy can be used to establish bridges between peoples, inspire peace, promote cultural variety, and catalyse economic development which can help local communities directly.

Bringing back the concept of the "Silk Road" from the past centuries highlights the importance of crowning people-to-people connections, something which has been vital for BRI. Cultural heritage and HD are crucial to explaining the nexus between people, routes, networks, hubs, and corridors. BRI partner states can reclaim this Silk Road heritage as a concept of shared heritage and cultural bonds and which can be used to strengthen the ways of cooperation (Winter, 2018). World Heritage nominations for "Silk Road" properties form part of enhancing elements in which countries can participate to renovate or rebuild historical and cultural monuments. Maritime archaeology across the region, for example, has become a vital point in which China has provided funding for salvage operations in the Indian Ocean which show historical cultural connections China and other countries (Winter, 2018).

In other words, China's grand strategy, the BRI, which crowns openness, connectivity, cooperation, and harmony, could eventually transform the OSCE region and the whole world. Notably, while EU membership is seen as a carrot for overcoming conflicts, under the BRI, as mentioned above, disputes had to be solved so that projects that will bloom over the continuous cooperation, harmony, economic growth, and infrastructure development—elements which lacked support from European actors in the region—could be carried out.

For WB to engage in reconciliation practices efficiently, international partners need to be acquainted with the cultural context of the region (Lederach, 1997), something which can be aided through HD usage. HD, something which shines in the BRI, can also act as a catalyst for the Balkan region. Intertwined with cultural diplomacy, HD can be used to enhance cooperation and political dialogue between WB states that share common heritage and culture.

#### **References**

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**3.4. Dimensionality problem**

Kim and Lingenfelser [102] introduce an ensemble combination strategy that accounts for the capability of some ensemble members to classify certain classes better than others. Therefore, they rank the classes according to the accuracy of their classification across all ensemble members using the confusion matrices produced from the training data. To reach an ensemble decision for an observed sample, the classifier corresponding to the highest-ranked class performs the classification. We refer to that class as the test class. If the classification result matches the test class, then that result is taken to be the ensemble decision. If not, then the next class in the ranked list becomes the test class and the procedure is repeated. If we do not obtain a match for any of the classes, then the classifier with the best overall performance on

Lastly, Gupta, Laghari, and Falk have made use of a variant of the SVM called relevance vector machines (RVMs) for affect recognition. RVMs have the same functional form of SVMs but are embedded into a Bayesian framework [103]. Therefore, for classification, RVMs compute the probabilities of class membership rather than the point estimates. These class membership probabilities can be seen as a measure of classifier "confidence" and were used as weights for decision-level fusion [90]. While the work in [90] focuses only on a single modality, EEG, it fused the decisions of classifiers trained on different classes of EEG features (power spectral, asymmetry, and graph theoretic), and thus the observed advantages could also be seen for

For the ensemble decision of continuous output problems, the probabilities for each class over all classifiers can be used for fusion. Lingenfelser et al. [95] refer to this probability as support and we adopt this terminology. Using these probabilities, several decision-level combination rules are conceived. We detail only a subset of these rules. The maximum rule stipulates that the ensemble decision for an observed feature vector corresponds to the class with the largest support. The sum rule sums the total support for each class chosen by any of the classifiers. Then, the class with the largest support is chosen as the ensemble decision. Similarly, the mean rule calculates the mean support for each chosen class as opposed to the sum. Instead of calculating the mean, a weighted average of total support for each chosen class can also be calculated. Finally, the product rule is similar to the sum rule, except for the use of the multi-

plication operation instead of the addition for the calculation of the total support.

When a fusion technique combines feature and decision-level fusion, it is referred to as a hybrid-fusion scheme. For instance, we can achieve fusion in two stages. In the first stage, a classifier can perform feature-level fusion. For example, a single classifier can handle features from audio and video signals. In the second stage, decision-level fusion can be used to combine the results of that classifier with another one operating on physiological (e.g., HRV)

Ref. [104] proposes a simple hybrid-fusion approach where the result from the feature-level fusion is fed as an additional input to the decision-level fusion stage. Lingenfelser et al. [95]

the training data is tasked with the classification on behalf of the ensemble.

*3.2.3. Combination strategies for continuous output classifiers*

68 Emotion and Attention Recognition Based on Biological Signals and Images

multimodal setups.

**3.3. Hybrid fusion**

features.

Affective information tends to be highly dimensional. It is not unusual for a feature set to contain thousands of variables. Valstar and Pantic [105] model the facial action temporal dynamics by extracting 2520 features from each facial video frame. The problem can be further exasperated when multiple modalities are considered. Feature-level fusion techniques are especially vulnerable to this problem. For instance, Kim and Lingenfelser [102] extract 1280 speech and 26 physiological features to classify affect. Two strategies are generally adopted to reduce the feature space dimension. First, feature-selection techniques that choose a subset of the feature set for model construction are widely used [7, 12, 28, 104]. Second, dimensionreduction methods such as principal component analysis and linear discriminant analysis are commonly employed [7, 10, 106].