# NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE Vol. 21

# **Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?**

Perspectives on Nationhood, Identity, and Belonging in Europe

> Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady (eds)

Peter Lang

Bayó Belenguer and Brady (eds)

**21**

**Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?**

9781787073043 \_Cover.indd 1 17-Jan-20 15:17:38

NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE

In the aftermath of the twentieth century's raging warfare, attempts were made to create an environment in which new relationships between European nations could be built around a common identity. Yet, in the twenty-first century, identity conflicts are gaining a new intensity in parts of the continent. In the analysis of some sub-state nationalist parties, the prospect of European Union membership reduces the economic and political risks of secession. Meanwhile, to the east, any moves towards expansion of EU membership are viewed by Russia not as a peace project but as acts of aggression. This volume assembles a series of comparative and single -area case studies drawn from different academic disciplines. While interrogating the history of identity conflict in the European context, an essential component of efforts to reduce such conflicts in the future, the authors bring an array of methodological approaches to analyses of the many intersecting political, cultural and economic factors that influence the formation of nationhood

**Dr Susana Bayó Belenguer** is a lecturer in the Depar tment of Hispanic Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, where she teaches contemporary Spanish politics and histor y, and the representation of histor y in literature and visual media. Her publications have centred on the intellectual and writer Manuel Vázquez Montalbán and on the Spanish Civil War. She is member of the editorial board of *Ediciones Alfar* (Spain) and of a Research Network, which is officially recognized by the Spanish Ministry of Education, on the

**Dr Nicola Brady** is a Research Associate with the Department of Hispanic Studies, Trinity College Dublin. Her Ph.D. examined the response of the Catholic Hierarchy to political violence in Nor thern Ireland (1921-1973) and the Basque Country (1936-1975). She is currently employed as General Secretary to the Irish Council of Churches where her work has a particular focus on the contribution of Christian churches to peace, reconciliation and social justice in Ireland, as well as in a wider European and global context. In 2019 she was awarded an Eisenhower Fellowship to examine the role of churches and faith communities in overcoming political polarization and social exclusion in the United States. She is a Director of Christian Aid Ireland

and identity, and the resurgence of nationalism.

www.peterlang.com

International Brigades.

and the Maximilian Kolbe Foundation.

# NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE

In the aftermath of the twentieth century's raging warfare, attempts were made to create an environment in which new relationships between European nations could be built around a common identity. Yet, in the twenty-first century, identity conflicts are gaining a new intensity in parts of the continent. In the analysis of some sub-state nationalist parties, the prospect of European Union membership reduces the economic and political risks of secession. Meanwhile, to the east, any moves towards expansion of EU membership are viewed by Russia not as a peace project but as acts of aggression. This volume assembles a series of comparative and single -area case studies drawn from different academic disciplines. While interrogating the history of identity conflict in the European context, an essential component of efforts to reduce such conflicts in the future, the authors bring an array of methodological approaches to analyses of the many intersecting political, cultural and economic factors that influence the formation of nationhood and identity, and the resurgence of nationalism.

Bayó Belenguer and Brady (eds)

**21**

Vol. 21

**Pulling Together or**

Perspectives on Nationhood, Identity,

NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE

**Pulling Apart?**

and Belonging in Europe

Susana Bayó Belenguer

and Nicola Brady (eds)

**Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?**

9781787073043 \_Cover.indd 1 17-Jan-20 15:17:38

Peter Lang

**Dr Susana Bayó Belenguer** is a lecturer in the Depar tment of Hispanic Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, where she teaches contemporary Spanish politics and histor y, and the representation of histor y in literature and visual media. Her publications have centred on the intellectual and writer Manuel Vázquez Montalbán and on the Spanish Civil War. She is member of the editorial board of *Ediciones Alfar* (Spain) and of a Research Network, which is officially recognized by the Spanish Ministry of Education, on the International Brigades.

**Dr Nicola Brady** is a Research Associate with the Department of Hispanic Studies, Trinity College Dublin. Her Ph.D. examined the response of the Catholic Hierarchy to political violence in Nor thern Ireland (1921-1973) and the Basque Country (1936-1975). She is currently employed as General Secretary to the Irish Council of Churches where her work has a particular focus on the contribution of Christian churches to peace, reconciliation and social justice in Ireland, as well as in a wider European and global context. In 2019 she was awarded an Eisenhower Fellowship to examine the role of churches and faith communities in overcoming political polarization and social exclusion in the United States. She is a Director of Christian Aid Ireland and the Maximilian Kolbe Foundation.

Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?

NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE

**Pulling Together or**

Perspectives on Nationhood, Identity,

**Pulling Apart?**

and Belonging in Europe

Susana Bayó Belenguer

and Nicola Brady (eds)

Bayó Belenguer and Brady (eds)

**21**

Vol. 21

**Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?**

9781787073043 \_Cover.indd 1 17-Jan-20 15:17:38

Peter Lang

NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE

In the aftermath of the twentieth century's raging warfare, attempts were made to create an environment in which new relationships between European nations could be built around a common identity. Yet, in the twenty-first century, identity conflicts are gaining a new intensity in parts of the continent. In the analysis of some sub-state nationalist parties, the prospect of European Union membership reduces the economic and political risks of secession. Meanwhile, to the east, any moves towards expansion of EU membership are viewed by Russia not as a peace project but as acts of aggression. This volume assembles a series of comparative and single -area case studies drawn from different academic disciplines. While interrogating the history of identity conflict in the European context, an essential component of efforts to reduce such conflicts in the future, the authors bring an array of methodological approaches to analyses of the many intersecting political, cultural and economic factors that influence the formation of nationhood

**Dr Susana Bayó Belenguer** is a lecturer in the Depar tment of Hispanic Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, where she teaches contemporary Spanish politics and histor y, and the representation of histor y in literature and visual media. Her publications have centred on the intellectual and writer Manuel Vázquez Montalbán and on the Spanish Civil War. She is member of the editorial board of *Ediciones Alfar* (Spain) and of a Research Network, which is officially recognized by the Spanish Ministry of Education, on the

**Dr Nicola Brady** is a Research Associate with the Department of Hispanic Studies, Trinity College Dublin. Her Ph.D. examined the response of the Catholic Hierarchy to political violence in Nor thern Ireland (1921-1973) and the Basque Country (1936-1975). She is currently employed as General Secretary to the Irish Council of Churches where her work has a particular focus on the contribution of Christian churches to peace, reconciliation and social justice in Ireland, as well as in a wider European and global context. In 2019 she was awarded an Eisenhower Fellowship to examine the role of churches and faith communities in overcoming political polarization and social exclusion in the United States. She is a Director of Christian Aid Ireland

and identity, and the resurgence of nationalism.

www.peterlang.com

International Brigades.

and the Maximilian Kolbe Foundation.

# NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE VOL. 21

### SERIES EDITORS

Dr Tomasz Kamusella (University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK)

Dr Krzysztof Jaskułowski (University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poland)

#### EDITORIAL BOARD

Balázs Apor (Dublin) Peter Burke (Cambridge) Monika Baár (Groningen) Andrea Graziosi (Naples) Akihiro Iwashita (Sapporo) Sławomir Łodziński (Warsaw) Alexander Markarov (Yerevan) Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov (Sofia) Alexander Maxwell (Wellington) Anastasia Mitrofanova (Moscow) Michael Moser (Vienna) Frank Lorenz Müller (St Andrews) Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Pretoria) Balázs Trencsényi (Budapest) Sergei Zhuk (Muncie, Indiana)

Oxford · Bern · Berlin · Bruxelles · New York · Wien PETER LANG

Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady (editors)

# Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?

Perspectives on Nationhood, Identity and Belonging in Europe

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Control Number: A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org

Cover design by Peter Lang Ltd.

ISSN 22351809 ISBN<PHONE_NUMBER>043 (print) • ISBN<PHONE_NUMBER>748 (ePDF) ISBN<PHONE_NUMBER>755 (ePub) • ISBN<PHONE_NUMBER>762 (mobi)

Open Access: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution CCBY 4.0 license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

© Peter Lang AG 2020

Published by Peter Lang Ltd, International Academic Publishers, 52 St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3LU, United Kingdom<EMAIL_ADDRESS>www.peterlang.com

All rights reserved.

All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems.

This publication has been peer reviewed.

Nationalism's kingdom is frankly of this world, and its attainment involves tribal selfishness and vainglory, a particularly ignorant and tyrannical intolerance […] nationalism brings not peace but the sword. — Carlton J. H. Hayes

Identity is revealed to us only as something to be invented rather than discovered; as a target of an effort, 'an objective'; as something one still needs to build from scratch or to choose from alternative offers and then to struggle for and then to protect through yet more struggle.

— Zigmunt Bauman

The disappearance of nations would have impoverished us no less than if all men had become alike, with one personality and one face. Nations are the wealth of mankind, its collective personalities; the very least of them wears its own special colours and bears within itself a special facet of divine intention.

— Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

# Contents

# Tables

# Preface

The editors, Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady, have put together a penetrating and stimulating collection of studies on the subject of nationhood and identity on Europe's multi-ethnic peripheries, with the main focus on the case of Spain. How Spain has addressed and is addressing the challenges of diversity are explored from a variety of disciplines, including politics, history, law, international relations, sociology, anthropology, media studies, and even literature. The scope and methodology of chapters vary even more widely, from a broad-ranging interview with Professor Xosé M. Núñez Seixas on the subject of nationalism to the analysis of an account of Jewish life in Salonika in the language of Judeo-Spanish.

A theme that runs through the volume and which is implicit even in the chapters with a particular historical focus is that Spain's pluri-national constitution remains a work in progress, as is evident in the analysis of both the Basque and Catalan cases. The larger emphasis on Catalan nationalism reflects changing contemporary priorities, with the waning of violence in the Basque Country. Still relevant to both cases is the issue of national identification: to what extent do people in these regions identify as both Basque and Spanish or as both Catalan and Spanish? Or is there a trend to identify exclusively with one or the other? This issue has been addressed in line with an innovative methodology that Luis Moreno developed as far back as 1986. He designed a self-identification scale that asked respondents what weight they gave to different national identities. For example, did they feel more Basque than Spanish or vice-versa? Or did they attach equal importance to both identities? The Moreno question continues to be asked in many different countries and to yield significant results that chart changes in sentiment over time. The rise of the politics of identity, as well as that of status, has meant that for many voters, these issues have become more salient than the bread and butter concerns that previously dominated their political preferences.

A corollary is that from a policy perspective, the accommodation of different identities looms large in the governance of European states. In states in which ethnic minorities within a country are associated with particular regions in which they constitute a majority of the population, the granting of regional autonomy is an obvious step. However, it is rarely the end of the matter, as arguments between the region and the centre over the exercise of their respective powers are likely to remain a source of friction, even under the most carefully designed constitutions. Further, dissatisfaction over the terms of autonomy and demands for their radical modification short of full independence may generate practically as much heat as the original push for autonomy and in the process increase support for secession. As a number of chapters in this volume underline, this is precisely what has happened in Spain.

The inclusion of other cases of multi-national and bi-national states gives further weight to the comparative approach to the analysis of these issues, with chapters on Russia and the Ukrainian crisis, Ulster Unionism during the partition of Ireland, sub-state nationalism in Scotland and Flanders, Romania's relations with its kin-state of Moldova, and separatism as a phenomenon across Europe. One chapter compares the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, examining in forensic detail their prospects of achieving independence within Europe. Hitherto, the European Union has been unwilling to accept the legitimacy of secession within any member state, but has been ready to accept as members, states that emerged as a result of the collapse of communism and the break-up of states in Eastern Europe, i.e. that involved secession outside of the European Union. Whether the European Union would be ready to accept Scotland as a member after Brexit remains a fascinating question, as does the attitude of the Spanish government to such a possibility.

Even while broadly discouraging the flow of refugees from outside of Europe, the European Union has played a generally constructive role in the promotion of the accommodation of diversity within Europe. That is one reason why Brussels has been a target of populists of a nativist bent. But, as the editors point out, the European project has by no means eliminated ethnic fault lines, nor should populism and the reaction against immigration and multi-culturalism simply be seen as manifestations of nationalism, even majoritarian nationalism. The multiple angles from which these issues are addressed in this volume provide a valuable addition to our understanding of the processes of both integration and disintegration.

Adrian Guelke

#### Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady

# Introduction

Our present world is simultaneously moving towards the opposing dystopias of hyper centralisation and endless fragmentation.

— Francis Fukuyama (2018)

This publication has its origins in a multi-disciplinary conference of the same name hosted by the Department of Hispanic Studies in Trinity College, Dublin University, which, at a time when many Western democracies are being pulled apart by identity politics, brought together academics from around the world to explore themes of nationhood and belonging. In addressing multiple issues within identity formation, this volume assembles comparative and single-area case studies from different academic disciplines which enable an holistic view of the evolution of identity-based conflict in Europe, and situate contemporary challenges in their historical context.

It is appropriate therefore to set the scene by outlining the conceptual and contextual notions that underlie its themes, looking at what is understood by terms like 'nation' and 'nationalism' in the search for socio-political identity. And as our setting is Europe, it also seems apt to consider briefly the problems of an embattled EU at a time when Brexit is spearheading a general rising of dissent among its members.

The Resilience of Nationalism as a Sociopolitical Force

Experts recognize that, in divisive power, nationalism in the present western world has come to occupy the place once held by faiths, both prompting a visceral adherence and defying rational conceptualizations. As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr noted: 'Nationalism remains […] the most vital political emotion in the world – far more vital than social ideologies such as communism or fascism or even democracy' (1998: 53). Years earlier, in the aftermath of the First World War, Carlton Hayes had made much the same point, asking 'why apostles of nationalism are characterised by a missionary zeal that is fiery and why its multitudinous disciples are possessed of a love that is consuming' and linking the question to the assertion that 'it is the latest and nearest approach to a world-religion' (1926: 6).

Nationalisms and their associated phenomena have continued to defy precise definition because they possess perhaps too many dimensions, too many facets, too many subjectivities to pin down.1 But, although whatever we may measure and quantify of the brain contributes only marginally to an understanding of what our thoughts are 'made of ', we continue to observe that which is as yet definitionally out of reach. In much the same way we may note that common to all our understandings of identity, of nationalism and of nation are (equally indefinable) emotions, beliefs and desires that continue to confound debate. Spain's internal divides provide a clear example, as perfectly sound arguments from one region are refuted by perfectly valid arguments from another, while all concerned are aware that debate is futile without a common understanding of what is meant by 'nation'.

Definitions are elusive also because, as Ernest Renan (1882) long ago realized, nationalism and nation are often compounds of the worst and best aspirations of communities, who call upon an 'imagined' past in support of demands for a future that will cater for present ambitions of 'national' identity. It is clear that to belong (however understood) and specifically, for the purposes of our present concern, to belong to a place, to a definable space, remains among the most powerful needs of human beings, and thus nationalism has the potential to arouse in us what Schlesinger identifies as '[t]he hostility of one tribe for another' (1998: 12). This oldest of tribal instincts, still engendering among even the most advanced societies a drive to exclude from belonging, and the urge to cast out whatever is perceived as not belonging, is implicit in what Alain Touraine maintained: 'Society

1 Among the perspectives from which they may be viewed, in no particular order, are: ethnic, geographic, religious, linguistic, historical, socio-biological, instrumentalist, modernist and postmodernist.

is not merely a system of norms or a system of domination: it is a system of social relations, of debates and conflicts, of political initiatives and claims, of ideologies and alienation' (1977: 30). Identity, that inherent heart of belonging, whatever its subjective and objective components, is realized as a social phenomenon, with the person finding expression only in terms of a society, and society having meaning only in terms of the person. Thus the ability of nationalism to (re)surface and adapt to the times depends substantially on its offering a perennially utopian vision of one's roots, of one's tribal identity within a recognizable community of kindred people. In the words of Anthony D. Smith: 'Just as "the nation" is felt and willed and acted out, as well as imagined, so do many of the members of today's nations feel that their own interests, needs and welfare are bound up with the welfare and destiny of "their" nation' (2009: 14).2

But understandings of precisely what is meant by their nation may be as many and as varied as the members, and – just as significantly – the non-members, of it. In 1913 Joseph Stalin defined the nation along the lines of a community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up.3 Not too differently, but from a non-Marxist perspective, Ernest Gellner (1983), asserting that without nationalism there would not exist

the nation, gave two down-to-earth exemplifications of what constitutes a nation:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.

[…]

A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members. (Gellner 1983: 6, 7)4

But whereas in the past a shared culture and ethnicity (however indefinable or smudged by history) over a sufficient period of time might have made it relatively easy to identify, and to identify with, one's fellow nationals, Europe is increasingly experiencing an era not unlike that of the later Roman Empire in the West (itself long hybrid), when movements of people, many of them motivated by threats from other groupings, obliged overwhelming hegemonic shifts in a remix of cultures and communities that would take centuries to resolve into what we today understand as 'Europe'. Similarly, today from a different direction, a new wave of migration is beginning to force a reconsideration of what constitutes a national identity, and to oblige a recognition of challenges to the traditional state (see, for example, Guibernau and Rex, 2010, 'Introduction').

And to muddy even further the already murky waters, Benedict Anderson, in taking a conceptual approach, suggested that the nation

is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign […] The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them […] has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations […] It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm […] Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always

4 For a discussion of Gellner's thought see Breuilly (2006).

conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (Anderson 1983: 49–50)

Hayes had similarly equated nationalism with 'an emotional loyalty to the idea or the fact of the national state, a loyalty so intensely emotional that it motivates all sorts of people and causes them to subordinate all other human loyalties to national loyalty' (1926: 3). And present-day nationalisms have familiar echoes of a past which tore Europe apart in wars between 'nations' whose claim to that title might be no more than the possession of frontiers established by a ruling dynasty, or whose political elite were prepared to have millions of people slaughtered over territorial hegemonies disguised as ideological value disputes and 'home' defence. On all sides, a common call to arms was bolstered by appeal to the solidarity of a people, motivated then as now by what Victor Orbán has recently put in these terms: 'This is our homeland, our life, and since we don't have another one, we will fight for it until the very end and we will never give it up'.5

As historian Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (2012: 14) has noted, questions about nationalism might be asked about regionalism and regional identity (local or sub-national identities), and a better understanding of both might be arrived at by considering to what extent regionalisms are 'complementary' or 'opposed' to national identities and what differentiates them from nations, nationalism and 'separatism'.6 He has claimed that regionalism and nationalism share common traits, that regionalist aspirations

'generally precede or even accompany sub-state nationalisms.' It is widely perceived that these aspirations may turn into claims when a confluence of economic and socio-political circumstances coincides with emotional reactions to what is considered disregard for a collective regional identity by the nation-state;7 these reactions may include what Wendy Brown (1995) identified as a sense of 'woundedness', the basis for aggressive individual and collective affirmation of identity. Present-day Europe is struggling with and currently failing to find coherent solutions to the many disparate definitions, feelings, aspirations and expectations that clamour for expression, both within a context of EU unity and opposed to it.

### The Integration of Nations in the European Union

Though it is well recognized that the establishment of the European Union was, at its core, a peace project, unity is today also troubled to the east as any moves towards expansion of its membership are viewed by Russia as acts of aggression. It matters little that the EU was founded only on visions of peace as a continent wounded from two world wars and reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust sought to create a new foundation on which all could unite around a common European identity. Alliances of any sort are of concern to those not within them and Russia, naturally sensitive to any transfer of allegiance on its borders, is not alone in wariness of the European bloc. In a world of endless competition, it also matters little that, in the words of Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission:

This community is not due to military power or political pressure, but owes its existence to a creative act. It is based on sound legal standards and its institutions are subject to legal control. For the first time, the rule of law takes the place of power and its manipulation of the equilibrium of forces, of hegemonic aspiration and

7 As noted in Charles Kupchan (1995), when the state neglects to perform the basic functions expected by its citizens, they may turn to other forms of political and social organization.

of the game of alliances […] In the relations between Member States, violence and political pressure will be replaced by the preeminence of the law. (Quoted in Danwitz 2018: 4)

It was hoped that as the strategic importance of the supranational context increased in political, social and economic terms, the significance of ethnic, cultural and national differences would diminish, with minority identities finding accommodation in sub-state arrangements.

This hope has begun to look increasingly forlorn as in the twenty-first century these differences – far from being subsumed within an overarching 'European' identity – are gaining a new intensity in parts of the continent as unities (including some not owed to the European Union but rather forged over centuries) begin to fracture under the weight of localized perceptions of identity. Europe sees itself at ever-greater risk of splitting apart as in the analysis of some sub-state nationalist parties the prospect of European Union membership reduces the economic and political risks that secession would otherwise bring them.

To the internal conflicts of Europe we may add an enforced participation in other threats that are sweeping the world. As Francis Fukuyama has argued: 'Identity politics has become a master concept that explains much of what is going on in global affairs' (2018b: 92) and '[d]emocratic societies are fracturing into segments' (2018b: 93). This threat is focused less on national and ethnic identity alone as on gender, sexuality and social class. It is almost as though globalization, far from being an antidote to the narrow tribalism of nationalism, is itself the generator of another kind of multiculturalism, and one not envisaged by its antinationalist proponents. Where once it was possible to conceive of ethnocultural congruence as the essential core of multiculturalism, of internationalism, the rise of identity politics has added yet another component to intraculturalism.

Alongside such unity destabilizers, Jan-Werner Müller cautions against over-simplifications that equate the recent rise in populism with a straightforward resurgence of nationalism: what we are seeing is the instrumentalization of nationalism by populist leaders who 'seek out and thrive on conflict; their political business model is permanent culture war. In a way they reduce all political questions to questions of belonging. Whoever disagrees with them is labelled an "enemy of the people"' (2019: 36). Perhaps few recent world events illustrate the emotive power of Müller's innocent word 'belonging' or of the divisive potential of independence aspirations better than the British people's experience of Brexit.

If these contentions were not of themselves sufficient to erode the EU, Cézar Baena and Michael Neubert claim that mistrust of 'elites' and 'the establishment' lies at the heart of many of the societal divisions witnessed across Europe today:

In some countries, anti-establishment movements are in power: Lega and the Five Star Movement in Italy, Law and Justice in Poland, the Freedom Party in Austria, Fidesz in Hungary. These movements share a critique of the EU bureaucracy and its attempts to regulate markets, impose rules on economic and technological development, and establish quotas for migrants. Often called populists, they seek to dismantle the EU bureaucracy and take power back to the people (i.e. the nation state or smaller units of decision-making). Brexit and the *gilets jaunes* movement in France have emerged within this context. (Baena and Neubert 2019: n.p.)

Yet all this seems to have erupted from faultlines thought to be no longer active beneath the construction project of European unity. By the 1990s, nationalism had seemed to be a spent force, overcome by policies of globalization, and with any fears of a kind of featureless multicultural identity – the sort that would make Barcelona indistinguishable from Berlin – allayed by notions of federalism. Hence the ease with which it was possible to conclude that nationalism was ultimately a dead end, merely another artefact of the creators of 'us' and 'them' animations.8 Or, alternatively, to dismiss nationalism as little more than popular local reactions to what are perceived as distant elites. It seemed farsighted of Ernest Renan (1882) to have maintained that 'nations are not something eternal', that they 'have their

<sup>8</sup> For positive aspects of nationalism see Moore (2001); De Schutter and Tinnevelt (2011); Tamir (2019).

beginnings and they will end' and that '[a] European confederation will very probably replace them'.9 And it did not seem wildly premature of Rousseau to have long since observed that 'these days, whatever else one may say, there are no longer any Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans or Spaniards, there are only Europeans' (quoted in Seth and Kulessa 2017: 132).

But by the new millennium there were already signs of a growing unease over internationalist fervour and, perceptively, Smith (2009: 128–9) challenged the demise of nations, pointing to their staying power, to their ability to continually evolve as socio-cultural communities ('ethnies', from the French). Research between 2008 and 2009 showed that loyalty to Europe among EU citizens took third place after the first loyalty to the nation and the second to the region of origin; but, perhaps significantly, when asked about what contributed most to a European identity, 41 per cent selected 'democratic values', with far fewer (at 24 per cent each) opting for 'geography' and 'common history'. Overall, the strongest feelings of being European were found in the north of Europe and the weakest with Britain and Greece.10

Whether causal or correlational, perhaps the most unsettling and alarming development has been the rise of nationalism and identity politics in Hungary, Poland, Spain and Austria, a mounting populist anti-migrant feeling in Italy, Sweden and Germany, an insistent anti-European sentiment in, for example, the UK and the appearance of newly formed populist parties of the left and of the right in Austria, France, the Netherlands and Spain. Opposition to the very thought of a politically united Europe is becoming more overt, with Catalan secessionist aspirations offering a

recent illustration: 'Así no nos interesa esta Europa' [So we are not interested in this Europe].11

A factor in the gradual re-emergence of affective nationalism in Europe must be a widely perceived dichotomy between the EU as an ideal and its institutional realization, with both the European Parliament and the European Commission generally viewed unfavourably even by the strongest supporters of a united Europe. For example, Germany, currently showing some 63 per cent support for the EU, manages only 47 per cent for the Parliament and 38 per cent for the Commission; weaker supporters such as England and Greece (48 per cent and 37 per cent respectively in favour of the EU), drop to 35 per cent and 30 per cent for the Parliament, and 32 per cent and 26 per cent for the Commission (Wike et al. 2019).12

Both England and Greece lay particular emphasis on the 'national sovereignty' that, within its limits, the sociologist Frank Furedi today defends, supporting the common perception that EU bureaucrats are out of touch with the realities of EU citizens, and declaring the EU oligarchs as detrimental to the European ethos, as having 'pathologized' populism by 'turning it into a toxin poisoning the continent'. National sovereignty, he maintains, provides 'a far more democratic and meaningful setting for the conduct of public life than the transnational institutions favoured by

EU cosmopolitans do.'13 This accords with, albeit is less extreme than, the perceptions of, for example, Pablo Iglesias (leader of the left-wing party Podemos in Spain)14 or Nigel Farage (ex-leader of UKIP and leader of the Brexit Party in Britain) who describe the history of the EU as one of failure and deception.15

Furedi's stance is thus given vigour by a key challenge facing European attempts at unity: member states do not in fact share a common vision of the future EU. The Brexit vote itself as much as its divisive aftermath have clearly shown that a perceived otherness, however marginally approved or ill-prepared for, can trump any advancement towards a more integrated or quasi-federal institution. Reports of the death of 'the nation' are therefore premature as members of the EU continue to play this 'national interest' card on issues such as centralism versus regional autonomies, open interior borders and immigration from outside Europe. More pulling apart than pulling together, the EU has yet, in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, to find a consolidated European identity in accord with the ideals of its architects. Socio-political foundations once thought to be firmly established are being undermined by a seeming inability to present a cooperative, let alone a united, front.

From one perspective the start of the current wave of internal pressures on the EU may be traced to the 2007–8 economic crisis, to be followed too closely by the 2012–13 recession. And just when Europe needed most to focus on the economy it had to give attention to the ongoing migrant

and refugee crisis from 2015 onwards (whose main effects were felt by Greece, Italy and Germany), to terrorist attacks in Paris, in Brussels, in Spain, Denmark, the UK and Germany, and to the unanticipated effects of the 2016 Brexit vote.

Within the EU itself national representatives confront its mandarins: in the newly elected European Parliament, MEP and committed Brexiteer, Ann Widdecombe, vigorously accused the institution of being undemocratic, a charge fuelled in part by the dissatisfaction of many MEPs with the process of top-level appointments, and by the refusal of Donald Tusk to provide any kind of satisfactory response to it. Widdecombe expostulated:

If I needed any convincing at all that the best thing for Britain is to leave here […] it was the way that those elections were conducted yesterday […] there is a pattern consistent throughout the history of oppressed peoples turning on the oppressor. Slaves against their owners, the peasantry against the feudal barons. Colonies, Mr Verhofstadt, against their empires and that is why Britain is leaving […] *Nous allons, wir gehen, we're off*.16

And in Britain, perhaps more than elsewhere in Europe, new internal divisions can be seen to some extent at least as re-articulations of old discontents, notwithstanding the very considerable democratic and egalitarian strides made there during the past 100 years. Where irreconcilable social discord might previously have fed into a discourse of class division, it is now, with the coupling of globalization and multiculturalism with the whole European question, able to embrace with greater fervour much broader definitions of difference. The Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells, influenced by Touraine, perceived in the upsurge of populist identity politics across the social spectrum – once solely the preserve of the left and anti-globalization groups – the consequence of a process of reassertion, of reaffirmation of identity by individuals and communities in response to globalized networks: '[I]n a world of global flow of wealth, power and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or

<sup>16</sup> James Crisp, 'Ann Widdecombe compares EU to slave owners in maiden European Parliament Speech', *The Telegraph*, 4 July 2019, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> accessed 4 July 2019.

reconstructed, becomes the fundamental source of social meaning'. He goes on to note the dangers of disassociation between how we work and the way we feel, between a 'techno-economic-network society and identity' as originator of the need of individuals to rely on themselves and of the appearance of 'communities' (weaker individuals who come together to vindicate a cause: nationalism, environmentalism, etc.) while civil society and the state are progressively becoming less effective.17

### Contemporary Challenges to Nationalism from Globalization and Migration

While, by the 1990s, many experts on multiculturalism believed that globalization was going to change how we interacted and lived, what was meant by globalization was not necessarily clearcut, as Natalie Sabanadze's 2010 study vigorously and meticulously (if controversially) has pointed out.18 And whereas globalization optimists might once have believed that frontiers would become irrelevant and peoples, capital and goods would freely move – that transnational entities would weaken the nation-state, which in turn would lead to a kind of cultural and economic universalism – the economic crisis of 2007–8 was to show that socio-economic realities could swiftly confound these aspirations in what has been labelled the socialization of losses and the privatization of profits.19

In Europe and beyond, the present upsurge of nationalism and what has come to be known as 'populism' were identified by Zygmunt Bauman (2000) in a world of constant change. Some eight years later, in discussion with Bauman, Mark Haugaard remarked: 'The so-called "unintended effect" of neoliberalism is globalization which augments fears through the constant movement of capital, which makes jobs insecure and creates the threat of the "economic migrant"' (Bauman and Haugaard, 2008: 120). In a 2016 interview Bauman was to reiterate that what lies at the root of crises of identity and feelings described as nationalist is a 'continuous uncertainty, which makes us afraid.'20 This is highly fertile ground for populism to flourish, for representative populist parties from the right and the left across Europe to demand power for the people against the elites, that is, against liberal and democratic institutions which they consider outmoded and, above all, corrupt, and thus people power against the neoliberal technocrats of the EU, and international financial institutions. Examples of these demands abound.

Many are concerned that globalization and multiculturalism have diluted the meaning of 'European' and simultaneously hastened the decline of the unique and continuous historical and cultural narrative that allowed for an affirmation of a specific identity as, for example, French, or Polish.21 Others attribute the rise of terrorism to the inability of traditional societies to accept the changes: in maintaining that nationalism (of a certain kind) and multiculturalism, both being social constructs, are not mutually exclusive, Asari, Halikiopoulou, and Mock (2008: 1) have remarked on 'the failure to produce a discourse that integrates various ethnic groups under the umbrella of a common British identity'.22 This present volume illustrates that much the same could be said of other countries.

#### *Introduction* 15

Richard Ashcroft and Mark Bevir have argued that '[c]ultural pluralism was a clear cause of Brexit. Post-war non-white immigration created a modern multiculturalism that some see as a threat to social cohesion and security' (2016: 355). In April 2018 the European Commission published a report on the integration of immigrants in the EU (*Special Eurobarometer 469*). The survey, conducted across the twenty-eight member states, revealed that in all but two (Croatia and Estonia) respondents overestimated the number of immigrants living in their country and in nineteen states the level of immigration was perceived as more than double what it really was; this is a significant indication of a less than positive response to immigration. The study is also revealing of the member state divisions that have become more pronounced in recent years, as the flow of migrants and refugees to the southern borders of the Union have increased. Citizens living in countries on the Mediterranean coast, and at the Eastern border, are much more likely to be concerned about illegal migration.23 As the numbers of migrants seeking access to the EU shows no sign of slowing in the near future, and with migrant labour an essential requirement for many member states, it is therefore a priority concern that, according to the Eurobarometer, 40 per cent of Europeans view immigration from outside the EU as a problem while only 20 per cent see it as more of an opportunity.24

Multiculturalist and cosmopolitan outlooks have increasingly had to confront challenges to notions of shared spaces, of racial and cultural hybridity as well as to views of contemporary society as horizontal networks rather than territorial spaces or hierarchies.25 In addition, they have had to heed the arguments from both right and left that the multicultural project (notably in regard to assimilation) has been branded a 'failure' and a 'tragedy'26 while in academia the realization that there is no agreed and clear definition of the concept of multiculturalism presents difficulties in researching its failure. Some see the answer lying solely, since 2001, in the racial and religious rejection of Muslim immigrants by the majority of EU member states, citing the impact on Europe of the displacement of millions of peoples by conflicts in which the West has become embroiled,27 fleeing 'from tyranny, from poverty, from famine, from ecological disaster' with 'the dream of a better life somewhere else' (Schlesinger 1998: 12).

Notwithstanding that, as Schlesinger put it 'the history of our planet has been in great part the history of the mixing of people' his further observation still resonates: 'Mass migrations have produced mass animosities from the beginning of time' (1998: 12). Terrorist attacks in Europe simply fuel present-day nationalist fears of overwhelming immigration. Examples of

27 Germany alone, between 2015 and 2016, took in over 1.5 million immigrants.

#### *Introduction* 17

measures to control both the fear and the immigration are found in France where, in 2007, the Sarkozy government established the short-lived Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development; Germany has created a *Heimat* Ministry because, as the Health Minister acknowledged: 'People have a need for comfort and Heimat'.28 Where once such measures might have been seen as a sop to the more conservative (and generally older) elements of society, today the expansion of youth groups and organizations defending an exclusive European-continent identity has seen the 2016 and 2017 protests in Germany against immigrants include attempts to stop refugee boats.29 Castells has noted that the use of socialmedia communication networks allows today's identitarian groups to be both 'glocal' and 'global' on specific issues, such as immigration or the authoritarianism of the EU,30 and a recent article also identified these populist groups as a challenging change in politics.31 Schlesinger put his finger on it when he said, with deceptive simplicity: 'The more the world integrates, the more people cling to their own in groups increasingly defined […] by ethnic and religious loyalties' (1998: 12–13).32

### Overview of the Case Studies Reported in this Volume

The discordant notes touched on so far in a European-wide context are evident as this present volume explores the limitations of a top-down

<sup>28</sup> 'Whose Heimat?', *The Economist*, 14 April 2018, pp. 6–7. For the rise of nationalist feelings in Eastern Germany see Hogwood (2001).

approach to national problems of unification. The conference and this volume take as their point of departure the case of Spain, a country whose attempts at nation-building are instructive not only in a wider global context but in their more immediate impact at EU level today. The unity of the state, of loyalty by 'nations' within that state to the central authority, is a constant theme in Spanish history. While the ways in which *El Caudillo* sought to mould a nation in his image and likeness have been extensively analysed by scholars of the Franco era (1939–75), Richard Gow takes an in-depth look at what may be regarded as its precursor, the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–30). The failure of its attempt to enlist the military as key allies in support of national regeneration through the eradication of corruption and the mobilization of civil society only served to reinforce mistrust of the 'political classes', a perception which has clear resonance today.

Several contributors address the response to competing national identities in the post-Franco era of the late 1970s and early 1980s when the nascent Spanish democracy sought to accommodate the hopes and aspirations of all in a new Constitution. Leyre Arrieta Alberdi considers the response of the moderate wing of Basque nationalism (the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV) to the new opportunities presented in the transition to democracy, and the risks and compromises that this entailed. The significance of the European context for minority nationalities is evident. Gorka Etxebarria Dueñas, in considering the coexistence of Basque and Spanish nationalism at political and social levels during the same period, examines how the battle for hegemony on the ground in the Basque Country was played out in emotional conflicts in the bitterly contested area of national symbols, emblems and flag displays on public buildings.

Reflecting on the failure of the constitutional compromise agreed in 1978 to abate national and regional tensions, Joan Romero et al. argue that the way in which the original vision of a State of Autonomies has been executed in political terms has been seriously flawed. The authors conclude, hopefully, that a viable framework for integration does exist, provided there is the political will to 'rebuild bridges'. Again, the European context is viewed as a critical support for the plurinational state. This is a timely contribution as federal models are currently being considered as a

#### *Introduction* 19

possible basis for conflict resolution in other contexts, notably in response to calls for a border poll on the island of Ireland.33 Taking the Basque and Catalan Autonomous Communities as negatively impacted by the Spanish government's current model of autonomy, Iñigo Urrutia examines the legal context in which a new constitutional consensus might be developed, drawing on relevant international precedents. He highlights the dichotomy that exists between the practices of devolution and the aspirations of self-determination, a contributory factor to the 'constitutional crossroads' at which Spain now finds itself.

Jan-Werner Müller has recently referred to the way that in a representative democracy, '[r]epresentation is a dynamic process, in which citizens' self-perceptions and identities are heavily influenced by what they see, hear and read: images, words and ideas produced and circulated by politicians, the media, civil society, and even friends and family members' (2019: 40). Fukuyama places particular emphasis on the digital sphere: 'Social media and the internet have facilitated the emergence of self-contained communities, walled off not by physical barriers but by belief in shared identity' (2018a: 182). Given the critical role played by the media in identity formation, a study by Marçal Sintes et al. usefully analyses media coverage from the moment in 2012 when the constitutional controversy in Catalonia became a news story at local, national and international level, and considers the extent to which news coverage reflects, and supports, a pluralist approach to national identity.

Taking us from the Spanish case to the wider European context Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, in a wide-ranging interview with the editors, reflects on what other nations might learn from the Spanish experience, with particular reference to the current trends towards emotionally charged referenda on national identity questions. Continuing the emphasis on the powerful draw of nationalism, Robert Saunders reflects on how ethnic separatism has been a driving force in European history for over a century. His analysis rejects an east/west divide, highlighting instead the common features that characterize how the challenge of secessionist movements has been

33 See, for example, Burgess (2018), and Spain (2019). For an overview of the legal context for the border poll see Basset and Harvey (2019).

experienced across the continent. In the process of dividing nations and re-drawing boundaries, pragmatic choices and compromises have had to be made, sometimes with significant implications for the future of people and nations.

Decisions about minorities in the redrawing of territorial boundaries have had an acutely de-stabilizing effect throughout the course of European history, and Daniel Purcell highlights the profound impact on Ulster Protestant identity of the choices made by the Ulster Unionist community at the moment of the partition of Ireland and the establishment of the Northern Ireland State. His study exemplifies how any political decision to 'leave behind' part of an ethnic group is charged on many levels of emotion and consequence while, equally, the inclusion of minorities who identify with a nation outside the state may, as history has shown, have political, social and cultural ramifications far into the future.

Both Sorina Soare and Carles Jovaní Gil consider the powerful pull of irredentism. Soare reflects on the attitude adopted by post-communist Romania to the territory lost to the former USSR, as illustrated in outreach to its kin community in the Republic of Moldova through preferential access to Romanian citizenship. This has become a concern not only for the government of Moldova, which experienced the move as a challenge to its sovereignty, but also for the European Union, as a Romanian passport could provide access to EU citizenship for Moldovans, thereby implicating the EU as a whole in the tensions between Romania and Moldova. Jovaní Gil argues argues that the Kremlin, in its approach to the conflict in Crimea and the Donbas/Donbass, has been seeking to consolidate a Eurasian bloc as a geopolitical and cultural alternative to the West. Political developments in Ukraine presented Moscow with grounds for intervention justified as protection of Russian nationals abroad, setting a dangerous precedent that challenges the conventions established by international law in general and the EU in particular.

Katerina Garcia, writing on the cultural and linguistic heritage of the Jewish community of Salonika (Thessaloniki), reminds us that for all that national and ethnic identity can be defined in legislation, and shaped and re-shaped by pragmatic political choices, there is a deeply emotional element to it that finds perhaps its truest expression in the arts and cultural heritage of a national or ethnic group and in the traditional practices of the family and/or religious community. Such is the strength of this emotional connection and sense of belonging that people will hold fast to the identity it both creates and sustains, even at the greatest cost, as the Jewish communities of Europe bear witness.

Looking to the future, Fukuyama has suggested that the antidote to the increasing fragmentation of the nation-state could be found in 'creedal national identities' which, he explains, 'are built not around shared personal characteristics, lived experiences, historical ties or religious convictions but rather around core values and beliefs. The idea is to encourage citizens to identify with their countries' foundational ideals and use public policies to deliberately assimilate newcomers' (2018b: 106). However, several of our contributors have identified cases where a values-based analysis is employed to make a case for secession on moral and ethical grounds. Mark Friis Hau uses an approach more commonly associated with religious behaviour to explore how Catalan identity can be construed as a moral, as well as a political, choice and how this influences the sense of belonging and community that develops as a result. Erik Vanderheyden, in a similar vein, considers the example of 'ethical nationalism' in Belgium, examined comparatively alongside the case of Scottish nationalism, with reference to how social policy is articulated in the political discourse of the nationalist parties in both cases.

The response of the European Union to conflicting notions of identity is of critical importance, given the centrality of shared values to its founding vision for European citizenship. Emmanuel Dalle Mulle examines the challenges posed by the Scottish and Catalan attempts to enlarge the EU 'from within', highlighting the importance of 'Independence in Europe!' as a rallying call for both movements, and analysing the contrasting responses of the British and Spanish authorities.34

<sup>34</sup> The then president of the European Parliament (2017–19) said that EU institutions would not recognize Catalan independence <youtube.com/ watch?v=Ooq3mmp4sOI> accessed 18 February 2018.

### Learning from the Past to Build for the Future?

Of course, from the British perspective, Brexit has fundamentally altered the context, in ways that have yet to be fully clarified. At the time of writing, the shock of Brexit among other EU member states has given way to a deep frustration at the lasting uncertainty arising from the failure to achieve political consensus in the UK. It may prove to be the case that the likelihood of other member states seeking to follow the British example will have been greatly reduced as the political and social consequences for the UK become even more evident.35

Meanwhile, EU leaders must remain confident that the present difficulties can be overcome with patient understanding on all sides. On 3 July 2019 David-Maria Sassoli, the newly elected centre-left president of the European Parliament, declared his hopes for the future of Europe and reminded MEPs that there was a need to recall the spirit of the founding members of the EU, who determinedly rejected military confrontation and nationalism in favour of peace and equality.36 These were necessary injunctions, as leaders observe the deep fissures within the EU not only turning into major challenges to the European ideal but acting against any ability to tackle together issues of joint concern, among which Michel Barnier, in defending the preparations made by the EU for Brexit, identified: 'Climate change, migration, industrial and technological disruptions, and terrorism' all 'seismic challenges on which Member States cannot deliver alone'.37 He did

<sup>35</sup> For an overview of the regional tensions within the UK arising from Brexit, and the pending political challenges in terms of devolution see Torrance (2018).

not evade the reasons for disunity, but admitted grounds for division among the member states:

There is also the feeling that Europe, its governments and institutions are not responding to legitimate concerns:

This view is not unique to the UK. We need to listen, understand where it comes from, and respond. Acknowledge that Europe has sometimes been wrong. Rediscover a Europe that allows each nation, people, and citizen to feel protected and part of a collective ambition. (Barnier 2019)

Fukuyama states that '[i]dentity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present' (2018a: 183). In an increasingly globalized world, European nations have greater incentive than ever to foster positive relations of trust to facilitate the kind of political, social and economic integration and collaboration that will allow them to compete collectively in the global economy. As recent developments have shown, however, economic incentives alone will not suffice to prevent the European Union and its individual member states being torn apart by conflicts centred on values and emotional understandings of belonging and identity and how these translate into concepts of sovereignty and perceptions of the legitimacy of political authority. Understanding the history of identity conflict in the European context is an essential foundation for efforts to resolve or limit such conflicts in the future. In addition, there is a need to create the space for new and emerging categories of identity that are providing alternative routes to building community, outside the traditional national/ethnic lines.

### Bibliography

Castells, M. (2007). *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

#### Leyre Arrieta Alberdi

# The Basque Country within Spain and Europe: Basque Nationalist Party Proposals during the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975–1980)

#### abstract

This chapter examines the public discourse of the Basque Nationalist Party (the PNV) following the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain (1975–80). It highlights an important transitional period during which the traditional ethnic and religious criteria of 'Basqueness' gave way to a wider political understanding of identity. The political demands of the PNV centred on the restoration of the historical rights of the Basque People to self-government. The party's aim was twofold: to reinforce the consciousness of a Basque identity, while simultaneously justifying its involvement in the newly emerging Spanish democracy. The wider European context had a defining influence on the party's self-understanding and the way in which it framed its political agenda. The chapter concludes with an epilogue on the development of Basque nationalist discourse and its political project over time.

As recently noted by Anwen Elias and Ludger Mees, stateless nationalist and regionalist parties 'have in common their shared demand for a reform of the territorial structure of the state in which they operate, in order to provide some kind of self-government for a distinctive territorial community' (2017: 133). This is the case today and has been in previous historical periods, particularly in times of transition to democracy. The Basque nationalist movement made this kind of demand for territorial reorganization at the end of Franco's dictatorship.1

The aim of this chapter is to describe the discourse produced during the process of transition to democracy in Spain (1975–80) by the Basque

1 This chapter is part of a research project funded by the Secretariat of State for Research, Development and Innovation (ref: HAR2015-64920-P, MINECO/ FEDER) and of the research activity carried out by the Communication Team of the University of Deusto, recognized and financed by the Basque government.

Nationalist Party (known by its Spanish initials, 'PNV'), which represented the moderate wing of Basque nationalism.2 In particular, it focuses on the place that the PNV thought the Basque Country ought to have, both within Spain and in Europe. The party endeavoured to achieve a higher degree of self-government for the Basque Country by relying on its *fuero*s [historical rights].3 The Basque Country was on good terms with the Spanish state and sought to find a 'natural' fit within the European environment. While it acknowledged the contribution that migrants had made to its welfare (and its ethos) in the past, it maintained with varying success but unwavering determination its own ethnic and cultural distinctiveness as a 'nation' within the wider nation of Spain.

This chapter discusses how that determination manifested itself after Franco's dictatorship. It highlights an important transitional period during which the historical ethnic and religious criteria of 'Basqueness' gave way to a wider political understanding of identity, an understanding which, while (re)claiming its distinctive nature, also agreed to remain within the Spanish state, with its sights set on Europe. The *fueros* were a key component of the

PNV's definition of 'national identity' and of its proposal for the territorial organization of a democratic Spain.

The first section briefly discusses the changes brought about by the death of Francisco Franco and the internal reorganization that the PNV underwent at the time. The second section analyses the discourse of the demands for the restitution of the historical rights of the Basque people generated by the PNV. The third section examines the party's proposals for the role that they saw the Basque Country playing within both Spain and Europe. The chapter concludes with an epilogue on the development of Basque nationalists' discourse and political project over time.

### Reorganization of the PNV in the New Historical Context

The death of Franco in November 1975 opened a new political era in Spanish history, one which the PNV had long awaited and prepared for, having spent years calculating and analysing the behaviour that they should adopt in this new period, estimating their chances, their choices and every potential consequence.4 They had adopted a moderate strategy in the previous decade. The party had made small advances through a pragmatic policy of limited co-operation with Spanish democratic forces, both in the Peninsula and in Europe. This long-term strategy was aimed at ensuring the PNV's active role during the post-Franco political era. They had planted the seeds for the future, and that future had finally arrived.

4 The party had moderated its demands over several decades, focusing on developing a Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country, an objective that it achieved in 1936. After Franco prevailed in the civil war, the leaders of the PNV and many of its members had to take refuge abroad, a point which marked the start of a fortyyear exile. The most exhaustive and complete study of the history of the PNV is undoubtedly that by Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees, and José Antonio Rodríguez Ranz (1999–2001).

In the late 1960s the PNV underwent an internal reorganization to prepare for the new political scene. Their command centre was relocated from Paris and the French Basque Country to the Spanish Basque Country. A generational handover took place, and the relations between party leaders on both sides of the border deteriorated. Disagreements arose not only from the lack of communication that geographical distance caused, but also from differing political slants: those in exile were more open to cooperation with others, whereas those in the Spanish territory were more radical and uncompromising. These two tendencies coexisted within the PNV from very early on. One was more radical and sought independence, and the other was more pragmatic in its approach. This has led experts to use the metaphor of the pendulum to explain the historical oscillation between these two positions (Pablo 1999–2001).

At the end of the 1970s, the PNV's goal was to appear as an approachable, young and attractive party, shaking off the traditional image of anachronism and exile. ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna* [Basque Country and Freedom])5 was born in 1959 and their message appealed to a large part of the PNV, particularly the young members of *Eusko Gaztedi* [Basque Youth], who were already vocal in criticizing what they perceived as their elders' modest ambitions.6

The key landmark in the process of restructuring and ideologically updating the PNV during the first few years of the transition to democracy was the National Assembly held in Pamplona in March 1977. There, the party reasserted Sabino Arana's founding principles, kept the motto he devised, *Jaungoikoa eta Lege Zarra* [God and Old Law] and strove to present themselves as a Basque people's party with mass appeal. As they sought

legitimacy for the new era after a record of fighting against Francoism alongside the defeated Spanish Republic they highlighted their near-century of history, in contrast to the recent hodgepodge of new political formations, stressing its democratic ethos and the continuity of its political project.

However, notwithstanding efforts to defend this ongoing political project, the connection with the founder's ideological proposals was now irreversibly damaged, as the party's identification with Christianity was set aside and the integration of migrants from within Spain was accepted.7 In this way, the race-based, essentialist definition of the Basque people was abandoned; 'no lo constituye la sangre ni el nacimiento, sino la voluntad integradora, la impregnación cultural y la aportación a su desarrollo en cualquier orden de la vida' [they were no longer defined by blood or birth, but by the will to become a part of the community, by cultural permeation and by contributions to development in all orders of life]. Independence was not mentioned at this stage, although references to an 'Estado vasco autonómico' [autonomous Basque state]' left this open to interpretation.8 This eclectic proposal was their way of bringing together the variety of internal schools of thought and preserving the allegiance of those who might feel tempted by other new proposals of the Basque nationalist scene.

### The Discourse: Reclaiming Historical Rights

The choice of the phrase 'autonomous Basque state' was in itself a declaration of intent in which ambiguity was valued over specificity. This could be interpreted as a demand for a high degree of autonomy from Spain, but also as a call for independence. For the PNV, a potential 'Basque state' required the construction of a network of relationships with other peoples

7 Alfredo Crespo has stated that by doing so, 'el PNV parecía establecer una ruptura' [the PNV seemed to have established a break (with the past)]. In his view, the party's modernization process 'estuvo guiada las más de las veces por criterios pragmáticos' [was mostly guided by pragmatic concerns] (2012: 287 and 290). 8 EAJ-PNV (1977).

in the Spanish state, within the context of a 'Europe of the Peoples', where *Euskadi* [the Basque Country] would finally find its rightful place on an equal footing with the other peoples of the continent.

In the words of the nationalist leader Xabier Arzalluz, the central point of the party's discourse was the demand for 'los derechos propios de los vascos' [the rights belonging to the Basques] (*fueros*), which became the recurring theme of the PNV's discourse during the early years of the transition to democracy.9 For the party's support base, fighting to recover such historical rights provided a legitimate reason to participate in the Spanish political transition process, for this would allow them to recover what had once been taken away from them.

The Basque people (defined as 'cuantos viven y trabajan en Euskadi' [all those living and working in the Basque Country]) were the intended subjects of those historical rights. Thereby Sabino Arana's racist and essentialist definition was explicitly set aside. There was now a Basque people who had a set of defining ethnic, historical, linguistic and cultural features of their own:

[V]ascos que tienen sus derechos de los que no pueden apartarse si quieren vivir como tales. El vasco no olvida y reclama los suyos, y pretende, como todos aquellos pueblos que tienen conciencia de su ser, realizarse lo más ampliamente posible.

[Basques who have some rights that they cannot give up if they want to live as such. Basques do not forget their rights, but instead demand them, and intend, as do all peoples with a consciousness of their own being, to find fulfilment in the widest possible sense.]10

Recovering the sovereignty that the *fueros* once granted would therefore provide the Basques with a sense of their 'political being'. In other words, the traditional charters enabled a centuries-old definition of a very specific Basque national identity and of their communal will.

The transformation of an ancient legal code into the basis for a modern political campaign required, in the first instance, a reconstructed narrative

<sup>9</sup> Xabier Arzalluz (1976). PNV's rally at Frontón de Anoeta, Donostia-San Sebastián, December 1976, *El Diario Vasco*, 7 December, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Gerardo Bujanda (1977), a member of the EBB (executive committee of the PNV) (*El Diario Vasco*, 5 March, p. 10).

of the past to affirm the existence of a distinctive political identity. At a time of change, hope and opportunity (of which the party was fully aware), it was necessary to 'recover' and update the history of a people thousands of years old, as that history shaped the connection between the past (the original sovereignty), the present (the fact that they were the same people with the same rights) and the future (the advances to be made in their self-government). This narrative gave the PNV's discourse the desired continuity and legitimized their political project.11

In their analysis of the past, the PNV identified two historical epochs: the first witnessed the supremacy of the 'modernos reinos europeos' [modern European kingdoms], interpreted by Basque nationalists as 'formaciones políticas heterogéneas, en las que coexistían bajo una misma Corona entes políticos de estructura diferente y de desigual vinculación con esa misma Corona' [heterogeneous political formations, with political entities that had a wide range of structures coexisting under the same rule under varying degrees of relation to the Crown]. Such was the case of the Crown of Castile, under whose influence several political units coexisted: Álava, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and later, also Navarre. Their coexistence rested on a pact between these units and the Crown, which saw its power diminished by the mere existence of the pact. During this period the Basque community enjoyed a high level of self-government.12

According to the PNV's thesis, the rise of so-called 'nation-states' produced by the application of the doctrines of the French Revolution put an end to this period of coexistence. The birth of the nation-state brought about centralized, homogenized communities which lost power in favour of central governments and stopped being subjects of law in their own

11 The argument about the traditional charters also played a central role in the discourse of the Basque right during the early transition to democracy. Both the PNV and UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) used the reference to the *fueros* as 'pieza clave de sus distintas maneras de entender y definir la idea de nación y la idea de España' [a key part of their different ways of understanding and defining the idea of nation and the idea of Spain]. But while for the PNV the *fueros* justified the existence of a Basque people as a subject of political rights, for the UCD it demonstrated a specific way of being Spanish (Landaberea 2018).

<sup>12</sup> EAJ-PNV (1977: 33–9).

right, thus becoming a mere collection of individuals. From this point on, individual citizens became the subjects of law. For the PNV, the laws passed on 25 October 1839 and 21 July 1876 epitomized this change and culminated in a reduction of their power and the suppression of Basque historical rights.13

However, the time had now arrived to reclaim the rights that had once been taken away. The PNV's demands and their federal project (an adaptation of the traditional charters) provided the tools to achieve self-government. This was considered a right and not a privilege, 'un derecho de nuestro pueblo que nace de su propia identidad y que ya tuvo realidad en épocas anteriores' [a right of our people which stems from its own identity and which already existed in previous times], and was therefore a legitimate claim in a democratic landscape.14 For the *jeltzales*15 there was nothing revolutionary or extreme about this demand, since it only involved the Basque people exercising a right that they had previously possessed and which ought to be restored by the budding democratic system.

The essential first step was the formation of an autonomous government integrated into the Spanish state, together with retention of their original goal of building a Basque state. To achieve this as swiftly as possible

and as a way to start addressing the historical debt owed to the Basques the PNV supported efforts to draft a democratic constitutional text. Joining forces with other parties in the Assembly that shared their charter-based discourse, the PNV reached a compromise in support of the Spanish State of the Autonomous Regions,16 a decision which would have aroused fierce opposition just a few years earlier. Participation in Spanish politics was justified by the demand for the restitution of the traditional rights.

First, the *jeltzales* demanded a constitution which would support the legal and political structure of a democratic state, the only possible environment for their project to thrive. Second, they called for it to grant the 'ejercicio de los derechos individuales y sociales y el control del poder y de quienes lo ejercen' [exercise of social and individual rights, as well as due control of power and of those who exercised it].

The PNV's concept of individual rights was inextricably linked with the rights of the community, since the former were to be exercised by the individuals belonging to the community of the Basques and operating through that community. Third, and perhaps most important, the constitution had to guarantee autonomy 'para los pueblos de Euzkadi, Catalunya, Galicia, Andalucía y demás pueblos, para que se estructuren conforme a su propio carácter, desarrollen su propia lengua y cultura y resuelvan sus problemas con arreglo a su propia manera de ser' [for the peoples of *Euskadi*, Catalonia, Galicia, Andalusia and others, so that they may organize according to their own character, develop their own language and culture, and solve their problems while remaining true to their own selves].17

The campaign slogan chosen by the party for the first democratic elections ('seguiremos donde siempre hemos estado' [We will remain where

we have always been]) summed up their history and discourse thus far. It was specifically based on the Basque traditional charters, and continued to advocate 'los intereses del Pueblo Vasco allá donde se nos discutan' [the interests of the Basque people wherever they are challenged].18 By asserting their idea of the old law, the PNV shielded their concept of community, which was modernized by the incorporation of federal notions.

The past and its codes of law also formed the basis for the second essential element of the discourse for the restitution of historical rights: territory. This is one of the defining elements of any nationalist project and represents the substrate on which to develop and preserve a community.

For the PNV, the ideal was a Basque territory that contained the four historical units included in the Spanish state (Álava, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Navarre) and the three included in the French state (Lapurdi, Zuberoa and Lower Navarre). Despite their different characteristics, throughout history all seven have shared a set of institutions, rights, customs and traditions, notwithstanding various attempts to take them away. In the case of *Iparralde* [French Basque Country], this happened in the late eighteenth century, and in the case of the other four provinces, in the nineteenth century.19 These territories were the home of the Basque community. However, despite the official discourse, during the process of transition to democracy the PNV mostly focused on the three provinces currently in the Basque Autonomous Community plus Navarre, omitting the provinces beyond the French border. What was at stake at that time was the future of the Spanish State, and that set some specific geographical boundaries to action and influence.

Navarre became central to the PNV's idea of a community, and constant references were made to this territory during the development of the

Spanish Constitution and the period that preceded the arrangement into Autonomous Regions.20 Navarre was the touchstone of the PNV's historical chronicle and their definition of a Basque community. However, this was precisely the main obstacle in the negotiations that led to the State of the Autonomous Regions, and the cause of the frontal opposition between the *jeltzales* and the Navarran UCD (Union of the Democratic Centre).21

### The Place of the Basque Country within both the Spanish State and Europe

In the PNV's view, the seven Basque territorial units should be articulated on a confederal and a local basis. A territorial confederation would ensure full respect for the institutions and the particularities of each Basque region, and would also allow for some shared entities and a 'national' statute of autonomy (the nation being the Basque Country). This framework would enable the 'personalidad vasca integral' [integral Basque personality] to be preserved, and would provide the mechanisms for addressing financial, political and social issues as required, while maintaining Basque culture and the Basque language throughout the territory. This pact among Basques needed to be supplemented by another pact between the Basque territories and the new Spanish democratic State. The federal idea, as an updated version of the system outlined by

the charters, protected Basque identity and at the same time enabled an agreement with the emerging Spanish State.

The Constitution was the specific means for realizing the *jeltzales'* ideas, and very early on the PNV decided to become an active agent in the constitutional process and to run in the first democratic election held after Franco's death.

#### *Euskadi* within the Spanish State

Participating in the general election turned out to be a good decision. After the vote held on 15 June 1977, the UCD had a majority in the whole of Spain, and the PNV was the majority party in the Basque Country.22 It appeared that the discourse woven around the demand for the historical rights of the Basques had reached a wide sector of the population, and the PNV had been given the support base to initiate the path to restitution through self-government.

However, problems soon arose in the process leading to the Spanish State of the Autonomous Regions, the first of which was the Navarran question. The irreconcilable proposals of Basque and centre Navarran parliamentarians hindered the negotiations between the Basque Parliamentarians' Assembly (established in June 1977) and the Spanish government. The agreement for a preliminary structure based on Autonomous Regions was reached on 30 December 1977, and two important decrees were signed on the following day. The first decree approved the Basque preliminary autonomous arrangement and came into force in January 1978; this led to the establishment of the Basque General Council (CGV). The second decree outlined the procedure for the possible incorporation of Navarre into the Basque Country in the future. For some nationalists, the fact that this incorporation did not take place immediately was interpreted as a concession from the PNV.

22 The PNV obtained 290,000 votes (approximately 29 per cent), which granted them eight members of Congress and four members of the Senate.

The party justified its decision on the grounds that a pragmatic approach was required at that particular time.

The Basque Country's preliminary autonomous arrangement was not particularly fruitful as far as the PNV's aspirations were concerned. Consequently, their efforts focused on the constitutional process, to ensure that provisions to guarantee Basque self-government in the future would be included in the Constitution. In December 1977, the rapporteurs submitted the bill to the constitutional commission. The parliamentary group formed by the PNV submitted 101 amendments, most of which rejected the model of a unitary State and demanded that the Constitution recognize the sovereignty of the Basque people. Title VIII, on the Autonomous Regions, and the First Additional Provision, referred to historical rights, which were the most important issues at this stage.

The definition of the Basque community brought to the constitutional debates by the PNV was difficult to adapt to the new political, legal and institutional framework in Spain. From the start, it was apparent that it would be highly problematic to articulate concepts such as 'soberanía original' [original sovereignty] and 'teoría del pacto' [pact theory] within the wording of a Constitution focused on the indivisible sovereignty of the Spanish nation. Aware of this situation, the PNV's spokesperson, Xabier Arzalluz, submitted an additional verbal amendment in June 1978, in an attempt to reconcile recognition of the Basque historical rights with the structure that was being outlined, which was based on Autonomous Regions. This second attempt also failed. Instead, the Commission approved a different verbal amendment, with the agreement of the rest of the parliamentary groups, which was included in the First Additional Provision: 'La Constitución ampara y respeta los derechos históricos de los territorios forales. La actualización general de dicho régimen foral se llevará a cabo, en su caso, en el marco de la Constitución y de los Estatutos de Autonomía' [The Constitution protects and respects the historical rights of *fueros* territories. This *fuero*s-based system may be updated within the scope of the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy] (Larrazabal 1997: 361). Ignoring the guidelines of the EBB, Arzalluz voted in favour of this amendment because it guaranteed that the Constitution would refer to historical rights. He also submitted and defended the PNV's original amendment as an individual vote before the full Congress.

The PNV issued a statement on 21 June 1978 expressing its disappointment with the outcome of the constitutional debates. The party again justified Arzalluz's support for the amendment on the grounds that otherwise historical rights would not even have been mentioned at all. However, the statement criticized the amendment because it made the recognition of historical rights conditional upon their falling within the scope of the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy.

The PNV attempted to change the wording of the Provision by negotiating with the UCD and the PSOE [Socialist Party].23 They even agreed with the PSOE on a proposal to replace the phrase 'en el marco de la Constitución' [within the scope of the Constitution] with one that stated that the Statute would be the 'norma institucional básica' [basic institutional rule], as provided in the Constitution. The UCD approved the PSOE's wording and even seemed to be willing to support the PNV's amendment related to an increase in the jurisdictional competencies of the Autonomous Regions, provided that the *jeltzales* voted against the right to self-determination defended by Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE).

The PNV kept its word, but when the amendment was brought to a vote in the Congress of Deputies the UCD opted for the wording of the Additional Provision that had been provided and approved by the Constitutional Commission, instead of the wording proposed by the PNV. The PNV's representatives were so angry that they left the Parliament building, so that when the Constitution bill was approved they were not present.

They continued to negotiate, but to no avail. On 5 October 1978 the Senate also approved the amendment that had been agreed by the Congress (the PNV senators voted against it and the PSOE abstained).

Then the Constitution had to be ratified by a referendum. The PNV's National Assembly had mixed views: they ruled out voting 'no' because the Constitution was a break-away from the dictatorship and it established the

23 According to Ludger Mees, 'el PNV actuó con firmeza y supo aprovechar hábilmente su papel que también los demás partidos le otorgaban como actor clave para la solución del "problema vasco"' [the PNV acted firmly and managed to make good use of the role that the other parties gave it as a key actor in solving the 'Basque problem'] (2013, 341).

rule of law and they also appreciated some of its positive aspects, such as recognition of the various nationalities within the State and the reference to the historical rights; however, they were unwilling to support a 'yes' vote because some articles in the Constitution were difficult for the nationalists to accept, and the PNV questioned the concept of the State envisaged by the constitutional provisions. They advocated abstention.

This was also a way to put pressure on the central government to increase the Basque Country's level of autonomy and to distance themselves from the nationalist left, which voted 'no'. The campaign for abstention was full of references to historical rights. 'Defiende los fueros: abstente' [Defend our historical rights: abstain] was one of the most common slogans. The referendum on the Constitution took place on 6 December 1978. Abstention was higher in the Basque Country than the Spanish average. Very high abstention rates were recorded in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, and less so in Álava and Navarra.

After the disappointment with the constitutional process, the PNV devoted their efforts to the preparation and approval of the Statute of Autonomy. The drafting of the Statute of Autonomy began in November 1978. The General Basque Council entrusted production of the text to the Assembly of Basque parliamentarians, and a Commission was appointed to prepare the first bill based on the project submitted by the PNV. The Commission included members of parliament from all Basque parties, except *Herri Batasuna* (left nationalist party) which excluded itself. At the end of December the Assembly of Basque parliamentarians officially ratified the text and submitted it to the Spanish Congress. The debate on the bill for a Basque Statute in the Congress began on 2 July 1979. The PNV had previously started to negotiate with the UCD and the PSOE, but relations with the former were tense. Ultimately, negotiations succeeded largely as a result of discussions between Adolfo Suárez (UCD leader, president of the government of Spain) and Carlos Garaikoetxea (the then president of the PNV's Executive Committee). An agreement was eventually reached on 17 July 1979 and the final version of the Statute was published in the Official Gazette of the Spanish Parliament on 1 August 1979.

The Statute was approved in a referendum held on 25 October 1979, a date which thus far, for the nationalists, had symbolized the end of Basque independence. The PNV considered it 'un buen Estatuto. El mejor que podríamos haber sacado' [a good Statute. The best we could have got].24 Still far from their ultimate ambition, this was nevertheless a fundamental step in the process, a time when 'se abren las puertas para cohesionar institucionalmente la Nación Vasca, dotándole de un importante instrumento para su autogobierno' [a door has opened for us to strengthen the institutions of the Basque nation, now that we have an essential tool for self-government].25 Once the Statute was approved, an election for the Autonomous Regions was held in March 1980. Results once again backed the proposals made by the PNV, the party with the highest number of votes. Its leader, Carlos Garaikoetxea, became *lehendakari* of the Basque government and initiated the process of building the Basque autonomy. Several milestones were soon achieved, such as the creation of the *Ertzaintza* [Basque police force], the official recognition of *Euskera* [the Basque language] and the establishment of public media. With no time to waste, the symbolic elements were put in place: the *ikurriña* [Basque flag] and the *Eusko Ereserkia* [Basque national anthem], both conceived by Sabino Arana, which now functioned as identifiers of the Basque community.26

#### *Euskadi* in Europe

Continuing on from this first step in the PNV's discourse about the restitution of historical rights, that is, finding a place for the Basque Country within the institutions of the Spanish State, it was now time to move to the second step, as described in the document produced by the Pamplona Assembly. The ill-defined 'Basque State' mentioned in the document had to fit (along with other peoples of the Spanish State) into a Europe of the

Peoples, which was advocated by the PNV so that *Euskadi* could be on an equal footing with the other peoples of the continent.

The reference to Europe was nothing new in the history of the PNV. The years following the end of the Second World War had been marked by the reasonable (if perhaps excessive) optimism of Basque nationalists, who hoped the resulting Europe would be not only democratic, but nation-based instead of state-based. Between 1945 and 1950 the PNV's leaders had played an active role in important European organizations thanks to the links they had had with senior figures in the Christian Democrat parties from the days of the Second Spanish Republic. These organizations included the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI), the leading Christian Democrat association in Europe at that time, and the Union of European Federalists (UEF).27

However, 1975 Europe was no longer the Europe that had been dreamt of in 1945, a federal union of nations that was able to reconcile the diversity of its constituent elements. The Europe that Basque nationalists now faced was based on strong states, whose foundational role precluded the independent participation of sub-entities like the European peoples, and Western democracies had inclined towards Franco on several occasions.

Despite all the difficulties, the PNV acknowledged that the moral support of the European organizations of which they had been a part 'había contribuido en grado notable a sostener ante el mundo la justicia de la causa vasca' [had contributed notably to making the world see the justice of the Basque cause].28 For this reason, the strategy remained markedly pro-European. References to Europe in the text produced by the Pamplona Assembly highlighted two principal ideas: the alleged crisis of nation-states and the party's support for a 'Europe of the peoples', both of which shaped the PNV's pro-European discourse during the years of the transition to democracy. Regarding the crisis of nation-states, the text stated:

Los Estados europeos, anclados aún en sus estructuras de Estado-Nación, no disponen ya, sin embargo, de la capacidad de decisión soberana de la que hasta hace poco disfrutaron. La aparición de las grandes potencias y la política de bloques les han arrebatado el protagonismo político e internacional que ejercieron hasta la II Guerra

Mundial. Se anuncian elecciones generales para un Parlamento europeo, porque el nuevo marco económico europeo exige ineludiblemente un nuevo marco político. Si Gran Bretaña, Francia o Alemania ya no pueden sostener su autoestatalidad en la plenitud de soberanía como hasta ahora, es lógico que el pueblo vasco no debe caer en la tentación de pretender darse a sí mismo una estructura estatal caduca y superada.

[European states, still clinging to their Nation-State structures, do not have at their disposal the power of decision they enjoyed until not long ago. The rising of the great powers and their bloc politics have deprived them of the central international and political role they had until the Second World War. General elections are announced for a European Parliament because the new European economic environment demands a new political framework. If the United Kingdom, France, and Germany can no longer remain fully sovereign states as they have until now, it is only logical that the Basque people should not fall into the temptation of longing for the same obsolete and outdated state structure.]29

From this alleged crisis of nation-states, Basque nationalists deduced (as their leader José Antonio Aguirre had done many years before) that fighting to provide the Basque Country with the state structures defined thus far was unrealistic. The only reasonable alternative was a supranational European organization which was not opposed to the independence of stateless nations and was willing to recognize political autonomy within member states. The Europe envisioned by the PNV was united in all senses: politically, culturally, socially and financially. It should be

una Europa en la que cada pueblo pueda desarrollarse plenamente a partir de su propio ser y peculiaridad, laborando codo a codo con los demás en la construcción de una Europa nueva, libre, progresiva, democrática y con vocación mundial […]. El Partido Nacionalista Vasco reitera su vocación europea […]. Esa Europa, en cuya creación y desarrollo debe influir y participar también el Pueblo Vasco, la concibe el PNV: como una Europa de pueblos libres, con una base común de civilización y de cultura, libre en su ser político y diferencial y unidos bajo un techo estructural común político y económico, susceptible de cubrir un desarrollo comunitario, y no exclusivamente como una Unión de los Estados actuales, superados como estructura política y dominados por intereses económicos internacionales.

[a Europe in which all peoples may fully develop in their own specificity, working alongside other peoples in constructing a new, free, progressive, democratic and

29 EAJ-PNV (1977).

world-oriented Europe […]. The Basque Nationalist Party reaffirms its European calling […]. This Europe, that the Basque people must also contribute to building and developing, is envisioned by the PNV as a Europe of free peoples, with a common base of civilization and culture, free to express themselves in their politics and in their differences, united under a common political and financial structure capable of fostering the development of communities. It should not be exclusively a reunion of the currently existing states, which are obsolete as political structures and ruled by international financial interests.]30

Without a doubt, the description most frequently used in the PNV's European proposal was a 'Europe of the peoples'. This notion implied a federal Europe which would be willing to protect small and stateless nations. It would be founded on the right of all peoples to express their will and on acknowledging the artificiality of existing states, which the PNV believed were limited and ill-adapted to the needs of the real Europe. Therefore, it was necessary to create wider political units which allowed for the expansion of markets and the financial advancement of peoples. In the words of the *jeltzale* Gerardo Bujanda, the PNV aspired to realizing 'una Europa de los Pueblos en cuya geografía política el pueblo vasco pueda desarrollar plenamente su personalidad' [a Europe of the peoples in whose political geography the Basque people may fully develop their character], a Europe that was 'suma de culturas de todos los que han de integrarla – incluida, claro está, la de Euzkadi [*sic*] – formando un todo armonioso en que Pueblos y hombres puedan cultivar su personalidad en libertad' [the sum of the cultures of all members, including, of course, that of *Euskadi*, forming a harmonious whole in which peoples and men can freely cultivate their personalities].31 Although the phrase 'Europe of the peoples' had only occasionally been used before, it became common at the end of the 1950s, when Francisco Javier Landaburu (chief representative of the Basque government in pro-European organizations) employed it in his book *La causa del pueblo vasco* [The cause of the Basque people], and especially in the 1960s, with the emergence of European regionalism.

<sup>30</sup> EAJ-PNV (1977).

<sup>31</sup> Urrun (1963). 'Euzkadi-Europa', *Alderdi*, 16–17 (April–May), 204–5. Second quotation from Urrun (1968). 'La Unión Europea', *Alderdi*, 8, 244–5.

However, such PNV discourse, woven as it was around the concept of a 'Europe of the peoples' was not aligned with the party's practices. After the 1948 Hague Congress, faced with the choice of accepting the real Europe or being sidelined, they decided to participate actively in the Europe of states as a lesser evil and as a stepping stone towards a nationbased Europe. During the Spanish transition to democracy, once again, the party was halfway between theory and practice, between the desire to become a free *Euskadi* in a federal Europe of nations and acceptance of the predominant regionalist approach, which allowed the Basque Country to take part in the European project only as a region, and not as a nation.

In the years prior to Franco's death, as nationalists anticipated a transition to democracy in the foreseeable future, they started co-operating with Spainwide democratic forces as a way of ensuring their participation in European institutions.32 In the 1960s this approach enabled the PNV to take part in state-wide organizations such as the CFEME (the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, which they had contributed to establishing in 1949), the Christian Democratic Team of the Spanish State and, during the early years of the transition process, the Democratic Convergence Platform. The strategy of moderate co-operation with Spanish forces clearly eased their participation in those years. Meanwhile, in their French exile, the PNV kept alive their bonds with institutions like the European Christian Democrat International (previously NEI, *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*), in which they were part of the Spanish Christian Democrat Team.

### From the Transition to Democracy to the Present Day

In the years before Franco's death the exiled PNV had been preparing to position themselves in the new democratic Spain which it was anticipated

<sup>32</sup> In previous years, the PNV's potential co-operation with Spanish forces had been the origin of many disagreements among the various factions of the party.

would soon come into being. They intended to participate in the transition process and in the articulation of the new democratic State in order to achieve the highest possible levels of self-government for the Basque Country. And the truth is that the party 'had a remarkable influence', as noted by Alfredo Crespo (2012: 285).

As in previous periods, the PNV adopted a pragmatic approach, but without ever relinquishing their aspiration to independence. They structured their discourse around the claim for the 'historical rights' of the Basques, which was sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate both the secessionist and the more pragmatic positions (Elias and Mees 2017: 136). Their long-term goal was independence, but it was supplemented by a more moderate discourse that interpreted Basque autonomy as the first step towards their ultimate aspiration. The Basque Country was articulated within the Spanish State through its status as an Autonomous Region. This duality also existed in Europe; while the PNV's discourse advocated a Europe of the Peoples in which the Basque Country would be a nation, in practice it accepted the Europe of the States of which it was a part, together with other Spanish political parties.

Over the following years, the PNV was a key actor in the establishment of a fully autonomous structure in the Basque Country. Mees noted that the party was 'el máximo protagonista de la nueva Euskadi democrática' [the major player in the new democratic *Euskadi*] (2013: 324). Following on from the PNV's 'pendular' tradition, their political strategy has continued to oscillate between the aspiration to become independent from Spain and a more moderate realpolitik, which has sought to have a greater degree of self-government and more consensus with non-nationalist Basque parties.

A clear example of the former was the declaration made by the PNV at the end of the 1990s. On 12 September 1998, the leaders of the Basque nationalist parties gathered in the Navarrese town of Lizarra (known in Spanish as Estella) and signed the 'Lizarra Pact', in which they asserted that the Basque nation was a political subject entitled to self-determination from Spain and France. The PNV sought to create a Basque nationalist bloc, which was separate from non-nationalist parties such as the PSOE, with which they had previously formed a coalition in government. In September 2002 the *lehendakari* Juan José Ibarretxe presented a proposal for a new political status for the Basque Autonomous Region that demanded the right to self-determination and the establishment of a new bilateral relationship between Spain and the Basque Country through 'free association'. The plan was presented before the Spanish Parliament in February 2005. It was supported only by Basque, Catalan and Galician nationalists.

The failure of the Lizarra proposal placed the PNV in an extremely difficult situation. The more moderate sector of the party criticized the pro-sovereignty strategy advocated by Ibarretxe, and the PNV gradually turned towards more pragmatic positions under the presidencies of Josu Jon Imaz (2004–7) and Iñigo Urkullu (2007–12). In the first decades of the twenty-first century the strategy of building up nationalist forces has given way to agreements between parties (both nationalist and nonnationalist). The traditional duality, between radical long-term demands for an independent state within Europe and relatively more realistic shortterm demands, has been reinstated.

Taking into account the tenets discussed in this chapter, it is interesting to note that the current moderate discourse of the PNV continues to include the key concepts of 'historical rights' and 'pact':

Como nación foral que somos, nuestros derechos históricos, amparados y respetados, pueden dar de sí tanto cuanto pueda alcanzar nuestra capacidad de lograr pactos institucionales, adoptar decisiones políticas que sean refrendadas por la ciudadanía y respetadas. El futuro del Autogobierno vasco pasa por la recuperación del espíritu de pacto, el mutuo reconocimiento y la bilateralidad.

[Since our nation is based on historical rights, these rights need to be protected and respected, and their scope will depend upon our capacity to reach institutional agreements and make political decisions that are respected and supported by the people. The future of a self-governing Basque nation is dependent upon the recovery of a pact-based approach, mutual recognition and bilateralism.]33

33 Iñigo Urkullu, *lehendakari* of the Basque government, general policy debate, the Basque Parliament, 24 September 2015 <https://www.irekia.euskadi.eus/es/ events/28306-pleno-politica-general?criterio\_id=1032349&track=1> accessed 10 September 2018.

### Bibliography

# Nationalism and Identity: An Interview with Professor Xosé M. Núñez Seixas1

*May we begin, Professor, by asking you for your own favourite description of Nationalism, given that during the past century and a half or so no world authority has been able to provide an unchallenged definition?*

There are indeed as many definitions of nationalism as nationalism scholars, and I'm afraid that I shall be no exception to the rule. I'm a pragmatic modernist, and I tend to be 'parmenidean', in Anthony Smith's terms. In my view, nationalism is the political ideology and political culture that holds in the public sphere that a given territory is a nation, that is, a subject of sovereignty. Within this broader definition, many different ideologies may ascribe to a nationalist creed − yet, there are nationalists who are more visible than others, depending on the intensity and visibility that their national claim acquires within their political agenda. And there are nationalists who define the criteria of belonging to their nation − the condition to be a national, a member of the nation − in cultural terms, while others put emphasis on civic elements, and many others on a blend of civic and ethnic requisites.

*What can historians bring to the twenty-first-century debate among political scientists, philosophers and sociologists on the revival of nationalist claims across the world?*

In my view, as far as their definitions of nationalism and the nation are concerned, historians of nationalism are in greater agreement than are political scientists and sociologists. Yet, historians may make a substantial contribution in three respects. First, they may accurately appreciate what is new and what is not so new in the revival of nationalist claims − and perhaps question whether there is a 'revival' as such. Second,

<sup>1</sup> Conducted by Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady.

they may better identify why national identity and national allegiance becomes so extremely important for people at very specific moments − at turning points, junctures where people experience increasing incertitude towards the near future (transition from Ancien Regime to new liberal order; break up of communist regimes; Great Depression since 2007 and decadence of Europe …). Third, historians always have a greater sensitivity towards continuity and change, and tend not to make snapshots of a moment, or take static pictures, but rather to see mid- and long-term evolutions. This is especially important for the analysis of nationalist mobilization and discourses, since they all claim to be rooted in history and tradition and founded on past grievances and myths. Historians prefer instead to stress that nations are constructs, and that the past is always much more complex than nationalist discourses want it to be.

*Further referendums are being called for in, for example, Catalonia, Scotland, the UK − how appropriate, in your opinion, is a referendum as a mechanism for dealing with contested national identity?*

Wherever and whenever there is a consistent claim, sustained by a majority of people in a given territory over a certain time, to collectively decide what their future form of shared government may be, I see no better solutions. Certainly, referendums are not necessarily the perfect solution, but they are an expression of democratic will. Sooner or later, that reality will impose itself. In my view, the main question is not whether a referendum is an appropriate mechanism for dealing with contested identities in a given territory, but rather how the referendum must be implemented, what are the questions to be asked (just two questions or many options?), how binding must the result be, whether a qualified majority is required … Obviously, no one discusses whether Norway's access to independence in 1905, based on more than 90 per cent of affirmative votes, was fully legitimate. Yet: is a 50.1 per cent majority vote enough to legitimize such an important step as secession? Doubts may arise. But this must be dealt with in democratic terms, allowing democratic deliberation to take the protagonist role.

*In the aftermath of a divisive referendum, or a breakdown in political relations, what can a government do in the short term to heal a divided nation?*

If you mean the state government, a first priority should be the reconstruction of political dialogue and de-escalation of written and oral confrontation. By all means, political fractures must not become social fractures. Civil society tends to be wiser than political elites, and to prefer bridges and dialogue rather than clash of identities. Yet, in many cases international mediation is the only solution left.

*Would you agree with those historians who see the major achievement of the Spanish transition to democracy as the creation of the 'Estado de las Autonomías'?*

It was the best solution that could be achieved in the late 1970s, within the rules that conditioned the process of the Spanish transition to democracy. Certainly, the State of the Autonomous Communities managed to channel ethno-territorial concurrence in a mostly peaceful and constructive way, and contributed to reinforcing meso-territorial identities, as well as to deepening democratization and welfare. Most Spaniards are satisfied with decentralization. Certainly, it may be debated whether the spread of political decentralization all over Spain and the creation of regions 'from above' was necessary, or whether the financial system was appropriate. Yet, political systems are subject to evolution, and to the changing demands of each new generation.

#### *What can other nations learn from efforts to deal with competing national identities in Spain since the transition to democracy?*

Basically, that cohabitation of different levels of territorial governance is good for democracy and for building pluralism and democratic consensus. Also, they may note the fact that most social and political actors during the democratic transition gave preference to the achievement of democracy over the territorial structure of the state, and hence the demos of that democracy. I would add that until the first decade of the twenty-first century, Spain was also an example of how hybrid territorial loyalties can be, and therefore of how important it is to keep tolerance towards ethnocultural and national diversity as a basic principle of democratic deliberation.

*What in your view have been the major influences in converting recent Catalan nationalism from a relatively moderate force of compromise into a major threat to the Spanish nation-state?*

In my view, this has been the outcome of three intertwined processes. First, a generational change within Catalanist leadership and enforced political competition among political parties: existing Catalanist elites now believed that the time for independence was come. Second, growing political and social uncertainties derived from the impact of the Great Economic Depression since 2007/8: social fears may be expressed in terms of reinforced national identity and the aim to preserve threatened welfare by building a state of its own. Third, the short-term social frustration generated by the winding evolution of the reform of the Home-Rule Statute since 2006 and the parallel reinforcement of Spanish nationalism. Among additional factors may have been the fact that the paradigm that the European Union will be a union of states has dominated EU politics since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and the dream (or the utopia) of the 'Europe of regions' is definitively dead. Catalonia may be a further, peculiar expression of a general phenomenon: the return of the nation-state in Europe.

*From the three books you have very recently published on nationalism and identity, each with a different emphasis, what lessons can be drawn in distinguishing current Spanish nationalism from Francoist nationalism?*

I've tried to be consistent with my own definition of nationalism, and therefore I have identified diverse currents of thought and different trends under the umbrella of Spanish nationalism, or Spanish patriotic discourses. Spanish nationalism is shared by very diverse political actors today, from Vox to Podemos, yet each of them has very divergent concepts of what the nation is, who its members are, what its limits may be and even what its symbols were in the past and are in the present. I don't see Spanish nationalism as a sheer expression of Francoism, but rather Francoist (or rather National-Catholic) nationalism as a distinctive stage in the history of right-wing Spanish nationalism, within which Fascist features coexisted with other markers inherited from Catholic-traditionalist nationalism. Yet, many Republicans-in-exile also upheld a particular view of the Spanish nation, and were convinced that they had fought in 1936–9 and beyond for the independence of the Spanish nation. Since the 1970s, there are Spanish democratic nationalists or 'patriots', as much as there are neo-Francoist or simply 'constitutional' patriots who may share some nostalgia for Francoist tenets. What is true is that the shadow of the Francoist eagle persists, and affects the political legitimacy of openly expressed Spanish nationalist tenets in the left-wing spectrum.

### *In light of rising nationalisms, what do you think are the prospects for maintaining a European Union in its present form?*

I tend to be pessimistic, as the return to the nation-state seems to gain more and more acceptance among many European citizens, who believe that a solution for their future problems may be found in the past. The EU should have advanced more decidedly in the past towards the creation of a real European demos, empowering the European Parliament and creating a really transnational constituency. Now I'm afraid that it is too late.

### *To what extent do you think the rise in sub-state nationalism may be a reaction to multiculturalism and mass immigration?*

I don't see sub-state nationalism as a reaction to those challenges, since most of them, from Scotland to Frisia and Galicia, existed before the advent of multiculturalism and even of non-European mass immigration. There are indeed some radical currents within these movements which developed as a reaction against mass immigration and gained currency within them, as happened in Flanders. In many other cases these tendencies do exist, but remain as marginal trends. In most cases, substate nationalisms have attempted to deal with mass immigration in an imaginative way, and this necessity has generally reinforced their embrace of civic concepts of the nation, as well as their leaning towards progressive positions. Actually, in present-day Europe, state nationalisms are far more restrictive towards mass immigration, and feel tempted to return to ethnocentric concepts of the nation.

*In your view, will increasing globalization eventually completely erode the statist 'nationalities principle' of every nation having its own state and every state its own nation?*

This is what many scholars (including myself ) believed in the 1990s. Some even predicted the upcoming end of the nation-state and the advent of a global era, in which post-national governance will allow regions, nationalities, metropolitan areas and municipalities to gain foot, while European and/or transnational co-operation and federalism would erode the power of nation-states. Yet, the capacity of state nationalisms, and of ethnic nationalism as a driving emotional force in times of uncertainty, has been definitively underestimated. A return to the nationality principle, and to the belief in the correspondence of ethnic/linguistic borders with political borders, seems for many people to be a safe shelter in a time of globalization and uncertainties. Yet, the nations of the future will have to be transcultural, post-national, fully civic and, if one will, transgender. The extraordinary ability of the national idea to adapt to changing circumstances will make it possible, I hope.

#### Emmanuel Dalle Mulle

# Enlargement from Within? Secession and EU Membership

#### abstract

In their recent drives for full self-determination, separatist actors in Catalonia and Scotland have taken for granted their regions' continued membership of the European Union after independence. Is such an assumption warranted? This chapter tries to provide an answer by looking at the arguments put forward by the actors involved and at the relevant literature, especially the legal arguments on the status of a territory seceding from an EU member state. It highlights the highly political nature of this situation and presents alternative scenarios concerning the two cases. It concludes that, although final outcomes will depend on the characteristics of each self-determination process, it is likely that an interim solution preserving at least some core substantive elements of the rights and duties attached to EU membership over the territory of these two regions is likely to be agreed upon pending the results of negotiations on a permanent settlement.

### Introduction

In recent years Catalonia and Scotland have been in the news because of the growing strength of movements calling for independence. A self-determination referendum was held in Scotland in September 2014 and, although the No side won, 45 per cent of voters indicated their preference for an independent Scottish state. In Catalonia, a long process of confrontation with the Spanish state on the organization of an independence referendum (declared illegal by the government in Madrid and legitimate by the Catalan executive) led to an unrecognized vote on the issue being held on 1 October 2017. This saw the heavy-handed intervention of the Spanish police, a 'temporarily suspended' declaration of independence on the part of the Catalan president Carles Puigdemont, and the Spanish government's subsequent application of article 155 of the Constitution aimed at taking control of the Catalan autonomous executive. Several Catalan pro-independence leaders were prosecuted and some jailed while others, among them Carles Puidgemont, fled abroad.

Separatist actors have predicated their drive for self-determination upon the slogan 'Independence in Europe'. In other words, they have presented the Union as a means of minimizing the disruption brought about by secession and of taking greater advantage of the opportunities offered by the single market. Yet, in doing so, they have taken for granted their region's continued membership of the European Union after independence. Is such an assumption warranted?

This chapter tries to provide an answer by looking, first, at the arguments put forward by the actors involved, that is, the political parties campaigning for independence, the governments of the states they belong to and the representatives of the European Union (EU), the European Commission in particular. Then, the chapter examines the relevant literature, especially the legal arguments on the status of a territory seceding from an EU member state. In that section, it focuses on both the domestic and international law regimes, aiming at establishing which state would be the rightful successor to EU membership and what procedure would then be engaged in to redefine its relationship with the EU. It highlights the highly political nature of this situation and deals with such political aspects in more detail. The chapter finally presents alternative scenarios concerning the specific cases of Catalonia and Scotland.

Currently, demands for full self-determination are still made by large swathes of the population in both Catalonia and Scotland. This chapter argues that, although final outcomes will depend on the characteristics of each self-determination process, it is likely that, regardless of the concrete legal procedure that might be followed, an interim solution preserving at least some core substantive elements of the rights and duties attached to EU membership over the territory of these two regions – notably with regard to the single market – is likely to be agreed upon pending the results of negotiations on a permanent settlement. While events may overtake some specifics within this chapter, the outline of the debates as well as the basic principles under discussion will remain valid.

### The Debate over EU Membership of Scotland and Catalonia

The SNP's case for independence in Europe is an old propaganda argument. The point was first made by Jim Sillars (1989), influential SNP member, in his seminal pamphlet *Independence in Europe*, where he argued that, contrary to Tory thinking, Scotland would not be expelled from the EU as soon as it declared independence. Sillars pointed to the absence of precise rules about secession within the Community's legislation and, therefore, to the necessity to flexibly accommodate such a situation within the existing treaties. To reinforce his argument, he also referred to the case of Greenland – which left the EU after long negotiations while remaining part of Denmark – and the (then forthcoming) process of German reunification that, he suggested, 'could be accommodated without the need for serious disruption to the Community' (Sillars 1989: 33). Furthermore, quoting the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Sillars argued that Scotland's independence would entail the dissolution of the UK and the rise of two new independent states, Scotland and the rump-UK, both successors to the UK membership of the EEC (Sillars 1989: 34).

The SNP's arguments have not changed much since. Almost every manifesto after 1989 took for granted Scotland's continued EU membership (SNP 1992, 1994, 1997b, 1999, 2005, 2009, 2011) and the observations made above were reiterated in the most complete publication on the subject, the 1997 pamphlet entitled *The Legal Basis of Independence in Europe* (SNP 1997a). The debate flared up again in the months preceding the 2014 independence referendum. In this context, the SNP's reasoning focused on two versions of the arguments already illustrated: as Scottish citizens have been members of the EU and the EEC for about forty years, it would be against the democratic principles of the EU to strip them of the rights so acquired; and, given the lack of any procedures to deal with issues of secession within the EU, Scotland's membership would be negotiated within the Treaties, notably through the application of art. 48 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (see Maddox 2012a; Scottish Government 2013: 216–24).

The position of different UK governments has not changed much since the SNP adopted the 'Independence in Europe' slogan, that is, Scotland would cease to be a member of the Union as soon as it declared independence and would need to reapply. In the run-up to the referendum, David Cameron's government stated through the Scottish Office that it had been 'consistent and clear in its view that an independent Scotland would most likely need to seek re-entry into the EU on renegotiated terms' (quoted in Maddox 2012b). This position was later confirmed in the first of a series of UK government papers supporting the case for the Union in the run-up to the referendum (Secretary of State for Scotland 2013). Nevertheless, no UK major politician assumed a confrontational stance towards Scotland's EU membership. Furthermore, nobody implied that the UK, as an EU member state (at that time), would stand in Scotland's way, either by vetoing her entry or opposing automatic membership or a kind of fast-track application procedure.