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## **Meet the editor**

Mark Pestana received his Doctorate, under the supervision of Stephen Toulmin, Christine Korsgaard and Paul Ricoeur, from the University of Chicago. He currently teaches courses in medieval philosophy, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind in the philosophy department at Grand Valley State University in western Michigan. He is the author of MORAL VIRTUE OR MENTAL

HEALTH and several articles in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. His current research involves the development of a metaphysical analysis of subjectivity. He and his wife Mary Beth have two children, Stephanie Simone and Simon John.

Contents

**Preface VII**

Mark Pestana

Kenneth Dorter

Curtis L. Hancock

Chapter 4 **Metaphysics Between**

D.F.M. Strauss

Joseph A. Bracken

Bogomir Novak

Chapter 5 **Whiteheadian Structured Societies as**

**Open-Ended Systems and Open-Ended**

**Introductory Chapter 1**

Chapter 1 **The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy 9**  Marie-Élise Zovko and Jure Zovko

Chapter 2 **Appearance and Reality in Parmenides 45**

Chapter 3 **The Nature of Metaphysics and Science: The Problem of the One and the Many in Thomas Aquinas 65**

**Reductionism and a Non-Reductionist Ontology 83**

**Systems as Whiteheadian Structured Societies 111**

Chapter 6 **The Meaning of Education in the Age of Technology 127**

## Contents

#### **Preface** XI

**Introductory Chapter 1**  Mark Pestana

Preface

The papers in this volume provide us with a good sample of contemporary metaphysical inquiries. The first essay, by Zovko and Zovko, develops an account of the nature of metaphysical inquiry in general, which account is grounded in the history of this discipline. Their essay illuminates the great divide between ancient and medieval thought, on the one hand and modern and post-modern metaphysical thinking, on the other. The authors finally argue for a species of anti-realist idealism and for the necessity of metaphysical thinking within the dominant contemporary focus on the subject of experience. They conclude with a powerful argument for the

The next three essays, by Dorter, Hancock and Strauss, are inquiries into the work of classical metaphysicians. As noted above, not all metaphysical work survives the test of time. However, the works that have survived this brutal test are always worth revisiting because their original formulations of thought (or system of thoughts) are in many ways impossible to improve upon. Fresh insight can be gained from returning to the sources. The second essay in this volume is an investigation of a fundamental account of perhaps the fundamental metaphysical problem—the distinction between appearance and reality as first articulated by the (great grand) father of metaphysics, Parmenides. Dorter explores a fundamental topic addressed in human thought via problems that have arisen in the interpretation of Parmenides' thoughts about that fundamental topic. And his essay is a perfect example of how reality can be illuminated for our minds by means of explicating a great and ancient thinker's thoughts. The second historically oriented essay, by Hancock, addresses a comparably fundamental metaphysical problem—the problem of "the one and the many". The issue here is that being is one, i.e., all things have being and just in so far as they have being or are beings, all beings are one being (or one in being) *and* being is many, i.e., all things are different from each other in their being and constitute a multitude of beings. So, the problem is to make sense of how being is both one, undivided, unitary, single, singular, the same *and* multiple, divided, plural, diverse, the different. Hancock explicates Thomas Aquinas' Aristotelian answer to this question (and explains Thomas' points of departure from Aristotle). In the course of this dense explication Hancock articulates a classical realist account of how the mind comes to know in general and how our minds "work" when we engage in inquiry into metaphysical realities. He includes, as needed in explaining the solution to the

social embedded-ness of metaphysical reflection.

## Preface

The papers in this volume provide us with a good sample of contemporary metaphysical inquiries. The first essay, by Zovko and Zovko, develops an account of the nature of metaphysical inquiry in general, which account is grounded in the history of this discipline. Their essay illuminates the great divide between ancient and medieval thought, on the one hand and modern and post-modern metaphysical thinking, on the other. The authors finally argue for a species of anti-realist idealism and for the necessity of metaphysical thinking within the dominant contemporary focus on the subject of experience. They conclude with a powerful argument for the social embedded-ness of metaphysical reflection.

The next three essays, by Dorter, Hancock and Strauss, are inquiries into the work of classical metaphysicians. As noted above, not all metaphysical work survives the test of time. However, the works that have survived this brutal test are always worth revisiting because their original formulations of thought (or system of thoughts) are in many ways impossible to improve upon. Fresh insight can be gained from returning to the sources. The second essay in this volume is an investigation of a fundamental account of perhaps the fundamental metaphysical problem—the distinction between appearance and reality as first articulated by the (great grand) father of metaphysics, Parmenides. Dorter explores a fundamental topic addressed in human thought via problems that have arisen in the interpretation of Parmenides' thoughts about that fundamental topic. And his essay is a perfect example of how reality can be illuminated for our minds by means of explicating a great and ancient thinker's thoughts. The second historically oriented essay, by Hancock, addresses a comparably fundamental metaphysical problem—the problem of "the one and the many". The issue here is that being is one, i.e., all things have being and just in so far as they have being or are beings, all beings are one being (or one in being) *and* being is many, i.e., all things are different from each other in their being and constitute a multitude of beings. So, the problem is to make sense of how being is both one, undivided, unitary, single, singular, the same *and* multiple, divided, plural, diverse, the different. Hancock explicates Thomas Aquinas' Aristotelian answer to this question (and explains Thomas' points of departure from Aristotle). In the course of this dense explication Hancock articulates a classical realist account of how the mind comes to know in general and how our minds "work" when we engage in inquiry into metaphysical realities. He includes, as needed in explaining the solution to the problem of the one and the many, an account of the classical Aristotelian distinctions between form and matter and a (brief) account of Aristotle's metaphysical categories of being. This essay will excite readers into further exploration of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysical system of thought, perhaps the most massively complex system of such thinking in the Western tradition (the opposite of Quine's "desert landscape" ontologies).

Preface IX

**Professor Mark Pestana,**

USA

Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan,

being as being has now become the science of artificial being as being! This is catastrophic for the human psyche since to the extent that we are what we know, we ourselves have become artificial in a fundamental sense. Accordingly, Novak issues a clarion call to our educators to explicitly inform their charges of these facts and thereby pre-empt our descent into un-reality. There is much to ponder in this closing

It is our hope that this collection will give readers a sense of the type of metaphysical investigations that are now being carried out by thinkers in the Western nations. We also hope that the reader's curiosity will be peaked so that

essay.

further inquiry will follow.

The fourth essay with historical content (by Strauss) addresses the famous problems raised by Zeno concerning the reality of motion (and more generally the reality of change). In this insightful and stimulating work Strauss argues against giving in to reductionist tendencies in our thinking about the nature of being. He demonstrates that such reductionism can lead to unsolvable antimonies, by explicating the attempt in modern mathematics to explain the continuous entirely in terms of the discontinuous and the attempt in ancient physics to explain or explain away motion. He ends by arguing that a non-antimonious ontology can only rest on a irreducible plurality of fundamental categories of being (instead of Quine's desert, a tropical rainforest landscape).

The final two works in this collection bring us to the present. Joseph Bracken explains and champions the metaphysics, or more properly the theory of nature, developed by Alfred North Whitehead in the early part of the 20th century (and in spite of the antimetaphysical positivism of that time). Whitehead's intriguing and powerful development of Aristotle's basic analysis of becoming has always been of interest to scientists and scientifically oriented philosophers. In recent decades the study of "complex systems" has blossomed and Whitehead's conceptions of the fundamental nature of nature perfectly extend such rational inquiry from the sensorily accessible realm of the real (studied by the empirical sciences) into the abstractly conceivable and foundational realm of the real (studied by metaphysics). Bracken introduces the reader to and explains the fundamental concepts that Whitehead developed for understanding the fundamentals of reality, such as "prehension", "societies of being", "creative systems". Work of this sort is relevant to contemporary attempts to explain living matter, conscious matter and other self-organizing, self-referencing realities. Bracken connects the Whiteheadian foundational analysis with analyses developed by Kaufmann, Sloan Wilson, Varela, Luhmann of the nature of such self-similar, fractallike systems.

The final paper returns to issues concerning the very nature of metaphysical inquiry. The overarching theme of this closing chapter concerns the relationship between technology and education and the basic claim that Nocak advances is that technology has brought about a significant loss of meaning for human beings. The reality we now encounter, so Novak argues, is completely mediated to us through technologies and, thus, "our" reality is now essentially artificial or artifactual.  Thus, metaphysics as the science of being as being has now become the science of artificial being as being! This is catastrophic for the human psyche since to the extent that we are what we know, we ourselves have become artificial in a fundamental sense. Accordingly, Novak issues a clarion call to our educators to explicitly inform their charges of these facts and thereby pre-empt our descent into un-reality. There is much to ponder in this closing essay.

VIII Preface

rainforest landscape).

like systems.

problem of the one and the many, an account of the classical Aristotelian distinctions between form and matter and a (brief) account of Aristotle's metaphysical categories of being. This essay will excite readers into further exploration of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysical system of thought, perhaps the most massively complex system of such thinking in the Western tradition (the

The fourth essay with historical content (by Strauss) addresses the famous problems raised by Zeno concerning the reality of motion (and more generally the reality of change). In this insightful and stimulating work Strauss argues against giving in to reductionist tendencies in our thinking about the nature of being. He demonstrates that such reductionism can lead to unsolvable antimonies, by explicating the attempt in modern mathematics to explain the continuous entirely in terms of the discontinuous and the attempt in ancient physics to explain or explain away motion. He ends by arguing that a non-antimonious ontology can only rest on a irreducible plurality of fundamental categories of being (instead of Quine's desert, a tropical

The final two works in this collection bring us to the present. Joseph Bracken explains and champions the metaphysics, or more properly the theory of nature, developed by Alfred North Whitehead in the early part of the 20th century (and in spite of the antimetaphysical positivism of that time). Whitehead's intriguing and powerful development of Aristotle's basic analysis of becoming has always been of interest to scientists and scientifically oriented philosophers. In recent decades the study of "complex systems" has blossomed and Whitehead's conceptions of the fundamental nature of nature perfectly extend such rational inquiry from the sensorily accessible realm of the real (studied by the empirical sciences) into the abstractly conceivable and foundational realm of the real (studied by metaphysics). Bracken introduces the reader to and explains the fundamental concepts that Whitehead developed for understanding the fundamentals of reality, such as "prehension", "societies of being", "creative systems". Work of this sort is relevant to contemporary attempts to explain living matter, conscious matter and other self-organizing, self-referencing realities. Bracken connects the Whiteheadian foundational analysis with analyses developed by Kaufmann, Sloan Wilson, Varela, Luhmann of the nature of such self-similar, fractal-

The final paper returns to issues concerning the very nature of metaphysical inquiry. The overarching theme of this closing chapter concerns the relationship between technology and education and the basic claim that Nocak advances is that technology has brought about a significant loss of meaning for human beings. The reality we now encounter, so Novak argues, is completely mediated to us through technologies and, thus, "our" reality is now essentially artificial or artifactual.  Thus, metaphysics as the science of

opposite of Quine's "desert landscape" ontologies).

It is our hope that this collection will give readers a sense of the type of metaphysical investigations that are now being carried out by thinkers in the Western nations. We also hope that the reader's curiosity will be peaked so that further inquiry will follow.

> **Professor Mark Pestana,**  Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan, USA

*Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan,*

Metaphysics has enjoyed something of a revival in the Western intellectual world in recent decades. Earlier in the 20th century the discipline had suffered serious setback and exclusion at the hands of logical positivists and existentialists. This sort of death and rebirth has occurred throughout the history of metaphysics, a discipline with has a tendency to "bury its gravediggers". But what is the nature of this field of inquiry and why does it have such a convulsive history? As should be expected, Aristotle provided the first systematic definition of the field and his characterization is helpful still. In his book that came to be called The Metaphysics, he construed this type of inquiry as the study of being as such or of being qua being. In other words, he understood metaphysics to be a highly abstract scientific investigation into the fundamental principles or structures of being itself (and not an investigation of the principles, etc. of particular types of beings—they are the province of the specialized sciences). Such inquiry is scientific because it deploys the same methods of reasoning to arrive at certain conclusions that are used in all types of rational inquiry. This scientific inquiry is highly abstract precisely because it targets the general, overarching characteristics of all things that have existence of any sort whatsoever and the very being of those things. In short, metaphysics answers questions about the nature of being itself, the fundamental types of beings that exist, the ways in which things exist, etc. Any search for answers to these sorts of questions differs, in Aristotle's originating conception, from the search for answers to questions concerning the fundamental nature of change or changing being or becoming. The underlying principles of becoming form the basic structures of the world of which we have sensory experience and which is systematically investigated by the specific sciences. Aristotle addressed these issues in his book which has come down to us as The Physics (clearly the meaning of this term is different from the contemporary name of the specific empirical science). The questions that physical inquiry answers are questions about the very nature of change as such, the fundamental types of change, the ways things change, etc. Aristotle was a realist and he regarded both of these investigations, into being as such and into becoming as such, as differing from reflective inquiry into the nature of our knowing activities. This latter type of epistemological study is of the psychological powers and their specific activities that result in knowledge. However, many Western intellectuals since the 17th century eschew realism and accordingly a clean separation of metaphysical (and physical) and epistemological problems and studies is not possible for them. Because of their Cartesian "turn to the subject" metaphysical (and physical, in Aristotle's sense of the term), inquiry evolved for them into investigation of the fundamental principles of the mind, or basic forms of consciousness or deep and universal structures of language. The apotheosis of this was the change wrought by Immanuel Kant on the Aristotelian "categories of being", the basic types of things that are. Kant turned these principles of real,

**1. Introduction**

Mark Pestana

*USA*

Mark Pestana *Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan, USA*

#### **1. Introduction**

Metaphysics has enjoyed something of a revival in the Western intellectual world in recent decades. Earlier in the 20th century the discipline had suffered serious setback and exclusion at the hands of logical positivists and existentialists. This sort of death and rebirth has occurred throughout the history of metaphysics, a discipline with has a tendency to "bury its gravediggers". But what is the nature of this field of inquiry and why does it have such a convulsive history? As should be expected, Aristotle provided the first systematic definition of the field and his characterization is helpful still. In his book that came to be called The Metaphysics, he construed this type of inquiry as the study of being as such or of being qua being. In other words, he understood metaphysics to be a highly abstract scientific investigation into the fundamental principles or structures of being itself (and not an investigation of the principles, etc. of particular types of beings—they are the province of the specialized sciences). Such inquiry is scientific because it deploys the same methods of reasoning to arrive at certain conclusions that are used in all types of rational inquiry. This scientific inquiry is highly abstract precisely because it targets the general, overarching characteristics of all things that have existence of any sort whatsoever and the very being of those things. In short, metaphysics answers questions about the nature of being itself, the fundamental types of beings that exist, the ways in which things exist, etc. Any search for answers to these sorts of questions differs, in Aristotle's originating conception, from the search for answers to questions concerning the fundamental nature of change or changing being or becoming. The underlying principles of becoming form the basic structures of the world of which we have sensory experience and which is systematically investigated by the specific sciences. Aristotle addressed these issues in his book which has come down to us as The Physics (clearly the meaning of this term is different from the contemporary name of the specific empirical science). The questions that physical inquiry answers are questions about the very nature of change as such, the fundamental types of change, the ways things change, etc. Aristotle was a realist and he regarded both of these investigations, into being as such and into becoming as such, as differing from reflective inquiry into the nature of our knowing activities. This latter type of epistemological study is of the psychological powers and their specific activities that result in knowledge. However, many Western intellectuals since the 17th century eschew realism and accordingly a clean separation of metaphysical (and physical) and epistemological problems and studies is not possible for them. Because of their Cartesian "turn to the subject" metaphysical (and physical, in Aristotle's sense of the term), inquiry evolved for them into investigation of the fundamental principles of the mind, or basic forms of consciousness or deep and universal structures of language. The apotheosis of this was the change wrought by Immanuel Kant on the Aristotelian "categories of being", the basic types of things that are. Kant turned these principles of real,

schools of thought—the claims of which are contradictory, are constantly undergoing testing, are constantly being revised and updated revising, and which seem to pass the testing with more or less the same scores (as it were). These major schools of metaphysical thought vary along several parameters and various combinations of the parameters are possible (and of course, synthetic, syncretistic positions have been articulated which attempt

First and foremost is the division between materialist and idealist schools of thought concerning the ultimate nature of being as such. Materialism claims that all reality is material, that being as such is material in nature. Of course, the understanding of materiality has undergone tremendous transformation since the day of the ancient Greek atomists (reality consists of empty space and matter in the form of atoms in motion) to contemporary materialism (reality is an 11 dimension manifold of energy in wave packet form undergoing transformations). However, the fundamental contrast with the idealists remains. Idealism claims that all reality is ideal, that being as such is ideational or noetic in nature. The evidence each viewpoint adduces in its favor is throughout the ages drawn from distinct sources. Materialism traditionally appealed to the evidence the senses and now appeals to the empirical sciences, whereas idealism traditionally appealed to and currently appeals to the evidences of mathematical inquiries. What is revealed in each of these types of inquiry is taken to disclose something to us of the ultimate nature of reality, of being as such. It is worth noting here that this divide in metaphysical thought cuts across the distinction between realism and anti-realism in epistemology. The staunchest advocates of idealism, e.g. Berkeley, have advocated realism (noetic being is real being, i.e., exists independently of our consciousness of it). A contemporary post-modernist scientist might advocate an antirealistic materialism (i.e., appearances themselves are all there is and have only physical

A second recurring division among metaphysical schools of thought, and one usually related to the just noted distinction, is between naturalist and super-naturalist conceptions of reality. According to naturalism (which usually goes hand in hand with materialism, Spinoza being a notable exception), the system of nature is all that there is, the universe revealed to us by empirical science exhausts the domain of being. And the only types of beings that exist are those that can be (or have been, are or will be) studied by such sciences. Super-naturalism makes fundamental transcendental claims about what is real—reality is more than, over, above, beyond what we experience in the ordinary way or in the scientific way. In fact, so the transcendentalist claims, the fundamental "part" of reality is just that which is beyond the ordinary. Being as such then must include in some way both the reality of the commonplace and the reality of the beyond. The evidence claimed by the protagonists in this dispute concerns the sufficiency of our explanations of experience. Naturalists claim that all of our experience can be sufficiently explained in terms of what is contained in or carefully reasoned from our sensory experience (of the world of nature), whereas supernaturalists claim that no such explanation suffices and hence that a final explanatory appeal must be made to a little known and little knowable (though most real) ultimate being.

Metaphysical systems have historically diverged on the more esoteric issue of the singularity of being as contrasted with the universality of being. Singularists, more commonly known as nominalists, claim that being is individual, that reality consists of singular beings, concrete and, usually material in nature. The evidence adduced in favor of

to combine the polarities of the various dimensions).

characteristics).

extra-mental being, into the fundamental schemata of consciousness by which a world of apparently real entities is constituted by the mind (or by a transcendental unknowable). Metaphysical inquiry was turned into, in Kant's system of thought, an inquiry into the very nature of and structures of our own minds.

However one conceives of the object of such investigation (as an extra-mental reality or as of the mind itself), metaphysical investigation is rational, argumentative, reasoned inquiry. In other words, claims concerning the fundamental structure of reality require justification and are in principle refutable, defeasible. This distinguishes metaphysics from divinely inspired revelation about reality, from mystical experiences concerning existence and from poetical intuitions of being. But if this type of inquiry is carried out in total abstraction from the world of our sensory experience (including sensory experience aided by scientific instruments) then how can any meta-empirical claim be corroborated or refuted? There seems to be no testing of the results of metaphysical investigation. This was Kant's great complaint about the accumulated history of such inquiry that had preceeded him participants in these investigations could make any claim whatsoever without fear of refutation and hence various and contradictory metaphysical viewpoints perdure over the centuries. However, Kant overstated his concern. There are two basic tests of any metaphysical claim or system of metaphysical claims and many such claims and systems of metaphysical thought have been rejected throughout history for failing to measure up (people tend not to study thinkers whose thoughts have been soundly refuted). The first test of any metaphysics is simple internal consistency. If the claims concerning the nature of being, the types of beings that exist, etc. are incoherent then they cannot be true and are not countenanced. The second test is simply external consistency, coherence with everything else we know to be true (or have good reason to think true, or etc.). This test is especially important in contemporary metaphysical inquiries—their results must not contradict what the empirical sciences tell us about the nature of reality (or must not contradict the way in which empirical science works). We are now all beholden to the extraordinary successes of the empirical sciences in revealing to us the nature of particular types of beings. Accordingly, any results from an attempt to discover the fundamental principles of being as such must be in agreement with the results of discoveries concerning specific types of beings. Now, the first point to note here is that many metaphysical claims are in the dustbin precisely because they have failed these tests. No one regards ancient Greek atomism as correct (though with massive modification it can be turned into a system of thought approximating contemporary physics), no one takes Leibniz's metaphysics seriously, no one accepts Descartes' theory of the two substances (and no one believes the Australian Aborigine's claim that reality ultimately is the dreaming of the green ants). A second point to note is that the refutation or corroboration or testing of a metaphysical system takes time, a long time, hundreds of years in fact. Thus, at any one time in our intellectual history there has always been a plurality of conceptions of the fundamental character of being, of becoming, of things, etc. At any time these will be undergoing testing (for internal consistency and coherence with all else we know). So, it always looks as though there are multiple, and mutually contradictory, conceptions of the basics and it is easy to throw up one's hands in despair of acquiring metaphysical knowledge we can be assured of. Furthermore, the same basic sorts of metaphysical claims made about the ultimate nature of being, about the nature of ultimate being, etc. constantly appear on the scene. In other words, there have persisted throughout the history of metaphysical inquiry the same major

extra-mental being, into the fundamental schemata of consciousness by which a world of apparently real entities is constituted by the mind (or by a transcendental unknowable). Metaphysical inquiry was turned into, in Kant's system of thought, an inquiry into the very

However one conceives of the object of such investigation (as an extra-mental reality or as of the mind itself), metaphysical investigation is rational, argumentative, reasoned inquiry. In other words, claims concerning the fundamental structure of reality require justification and are in principle refutable, defeasible. This distinguishes metaphysics from divinely inspired revelation about reality, from mystical experiences concerning existence and from poetical intuitions of being. But if this type of inquiry is carried out in total abstraction from the world of our sensory experience (including sensory experience aided by scientific instruments) then how can any meta-empirical claim be corroborated or refuted? There seems to be no testing of the results of metaphysical investigation. This was Kant's great complaint about the accumulated history of such inquiry that had preceeded him participants in these investigations could make any claim whatsoever without fear of refutation and hence various and contradictory metaphysical viewpoints perdure over the centuries. However, Kant overstated his concern. There are two basic tests of any metaphysical claim or system of metaphysical claims and many such claims and systems of metaphysical thought have been rejected throughout history for failing to measure up (people tend not to study thinkers whose thoughts have been soundly refuted). The first test of any metaphysics is simple internal consistency. If the claims concerning the nature of being, the types of beings that exist, etc. are incoherent then they cannot be true and are not countenanced. The second test is simply external consistency, coherence with everything else we know to be true (or have good reason to think true, or etc.). This test is especially important in contemporary metaphysical inquiries—their results must not contradict what the empirical sciences tell us about the nature of reality (or must not contradict the way in which empirical science works). We are now all beholden to the extraordinary successes of the empirical sciences in revealing to us the nature of particular types of beings. Accordingly, any results from an attempt to discover the fundamental principles of being as such must be in agreement with the results of discoveries concerning specific types of beings. Now, the first point to note here is that many metaphysical claims are in the dustbin precisely because they have failed these tests. No one regards ancient Greek atomism as correct (though with massive modification it can be turned into a system of thought approximating contemporary physics), no one takes Leibniz's metaphysics seriously, no one accepts Descartes' theory of the two substances (and no one believes the Australian Aborigine's claim that reality ultimately is the dreaming of the green ants). A second point to note is that the refutation or corroboration or testing of a metaphysical system takes time, a long time, hundreds of years in fact. Thus, at any one time in our intellectual history there has always been a plurality of conceptions of the fundamental character of being, of becoming, of things, etc. At any time these will be undergoing testing (for internal consistency and coherence with all else we know). So, it always looks as though there are multiple, and mutually contradictory, conceptions of the basics and it is easy to throw up one's hands in despair of acquiring metaphysical knowledge we can be assured of. Furthermore, the same basic sorts of metaphysical claims made about the ultimate nature of being, about the nature of ultimate being, etc. constantly appear on the scene. In other words, there have persisted throughout the history of metaphysical inquiry the same major

nature of and structures of our own minds.

schools of thought—the claims of which are contradictory, are constantly undergoing testing, are constantly being revised and updated revising, and which seem to pass the testing with more or less the same scores (as it were). These major schools of metaphysical thought vary along several parameters and various combinations of the parameters are possible (and of course, synthetic, syncretistic positions have been articulated which attempt to combine the polarities of the various dimensions).

First and foremost is the division between materialist and idealist schools of thought concerning the ultimate nature of being as such. Materialism claims that all reality is material, that being as such is material in nature. Of course, the understanding of materiality has undergone tremendous transformation since the day of the ancient Greek atomists (reality consists of empty space and matter in the form of atoms in motion) to contemporary materialism (reality is an 11 dimension manifold of energy in wave packet form undergoing transformations). However, the fundamental contrast with the idealists remains. Idealism claims that all reality is ideal, that being as such is ideational or noetic in nature. The evidence each viewpoint adduces in its favor is throughout the ages drawn from distinct sources. Materialism traditionally appealed to the evidence the senses and now appeals to the empirical sciences, whereas idealism traditionally appealed to and currently appeals to the evidences of mathematical inquiries. What is revealed in each of these types of inquiry is taken to disclose something to us of the ultimate nature of reality, of being as such. It is worth noting here that this divide in metaphysical thought cuts across the distinction between realism and anti-realism in epistemology. The staunchest advocates of idealism, e.g. Berkeley, have advocated realism (noetic being is real being, i.e., exists independently of our consciousness of it). A contemporary post-modernist scientist might advocate an antirealistic materialism (i.e., appearances themselves are all there is and have only physical characteristics).

A second recurring division among metaphysical schools of thought, and one usually related to the just noted distinction, is between naturalist and super-naturalist conceptions of reality. According to naturalism (which usually goes hand in hand with materialism, Spinoza being a notable exception), the system of nature is all that there is, the universe revealed to us by empirical science exhausts the domain of being. And the only types of beings that exist are those that can be (or have been, are or will be) studied by such sciences. Super-naturalism makes fundamental transcendental claims about what is real—reality is more than, over, above, beyond what we experience in the ordinary way or in the scientific way. In fact, so the transcendentalist claims, the fundamental "part" of reality is just that which is beyond the ordinary. Being as such then must include in some way both the reality of the commonplace and the reality of the beyond. The evidence claimed by the protagonists in this dispute concerns the sufficiency of our explanations of experience. Naturalists claim that all of our experience can be sufficiently explained in terms of what is contained in or carefully reasoned from our sensory experience (of the world of nature), whereas supernaturalists claim that no such explanation suffices and hence that a final explanatory appeal must be made to a little known and little knowable (though most real) ultimate being.

Metaphysical systems have historically diverged on the more esoteric issue of the singularity of being as contrasted with the universality of being. Singularists, more commonly known as nominalists, claim that being is individual, that reality consists of singular beings, concrete and, usually material in nature. The evidence adduced in favor of

within two aspects of modernist paradigm. First, Descartes initiated (and Kant solidified) the great shift to anti-realism. If real being exists independently of our consciousness then we can only know how it appears to us. We therefore have no reason to suppose that real being exists independently of our consciousness, so we are left with only appearances (not appearings *of* some thing, merely appearings *to* a subject). Being consists then in those appearings (the subject is merely an appearance to its self, a merely phenomenal ego). Second, Spinoza initiated (and 20th century science confirmed) the great shift to naturalism. "What you see is what you get." There is nothing more to being than is revealed by/in scientific investigation of appearances and what must be posited in a lawlike manner in order to explain in a lawlike manner the order of those appearances (no appeal to

However, in the 20th century alongside of the anti-realist, naturalistic though scientific metaphysics (of the appearances of things and events) there arose an existentialist reaction against all such formalistic ontologies of things and their essential natures. This was most forcefully stated by Heidegger in his famous critique of all Western thought as guilty of a "seinsvergessenheit", a forgetfulness of being. By conceiving of being entirely in terms of the essences of things the occidental mind has become oblivious to the sheer existing of beings. Of course, it was precisely conceiving of being as essence that made modern science possible (Western science has uniquely revealed to the peoples of the world *what* things are). This divide indicates yet another dimension along which metaphysical thoughts differ. Many systematic metaphysical accounts in the West have been "essentialist" in their conception of being—being equals essence, the whatness of being is all there is to being. And this contrasts sharply with an existentialist metaphysics which focusses on the sheer existing of things, the be of entities, and especially on the be-ing of human being. Their metaphysical inquiries attempt to determine the various ways in which human beings are, existentially. This 20th century existentialist critique of thing/substance/essence ontologies again calls our attention to the important fact about the history of metaphysics noted above—no age is monolithic in its metaphysical conceptions. Alongside antirealist phenomenologists in the last century there have been champions of classical realism. And notwithstanding Heidegger's critique, recent work in metaphysics has been precisely in the essentialistic tradition, most notably in the formal ontology movement which began in the 1990s. This fascinating development in philosophy appears to have partly arisen out of attempts to create and manage virtual realities in cyber space. The problems encountered in these efforts to bring worlds into being are precisely the problems of classical metaphysical inquiry: what is a world, in what sense do these worlds exist, how are worlds populated with entities, what are entities, how are entities differentiated into types and into individuals, what sorts of fundamental properties do entities possess, under what conditions does change occur to these entitites, what is change, can a world as such change, etc.? This short list indicates some of the problems that contemporary metaphysicians are investigating. The formal ontology movement has completely resurrected the problem of

fundamental categories of being, the classical topic of metaphysical inquiry.

Other problems being addressed emphasize the following sorts of issues: the identity of entities over time as they undergo changes; the nature of the properties possessed by such entities (the old problem of the ontological status of universals); the nature and individuation of events; the nature of and relations between space and time; the nature of

transcendent mysteries is allowed).

this view concerns our immediate and direct contact with what is, i.e., the world we experience appears immediately to us to consist of concrete, determinate individual entities and that is all there is to it. Universalists, most famously Plato, have claimed that being is universal in nature, that reality consists of universals and that singular beings are in some sense or other less real (they have less being). The arguments for the universality of being (being as universal in nature) appeal to the nature of necessity, the plurality of instances of the same kind of being and to the possibility of possible beings.

The basis of yet another fundamental division between results of metaphysical inquiries was just noted in passing. Throughout the ancient and medieval periods of thought it was argued (or taken for granted) that being admits of degree. Some things are more real than others, they have a greater measure of existing than do other lesser entities. What counts as evidence for such a claim depends heavily upon how the difference in degrees is defined in the first place. If as Plato seems to have indicated, things are more real only in the sense that they are more able to act on other beings or more capable of being affected by other beings then the evidence of our senses would point to such differences in degree of reality. At any rate, this view contrasts sharply with conceptions according to which an entity either is or is not, there is no in between, "it's all or nothing". This modern and contemporary way of understanding being seems to comport well with what we know about reality from the empirical sciences. This general division is intimately related to the division within conceptions of being between being as actual and being as possible. Here the distinction lies between schools of thought that countenance possible beings in addition to (as it were) actual beings. Some schools of thought, especially existentialistically oriented metaphysics, emphasize actuality or actual being to the exclusion of possible being. In other words, being is only actual and possible being is non-being, there simply is no such thing. Other schools of thought emphasize possibility, i.e., reality includes possible beings, the being of which is possible which is a less real mode of existing than is actual existing.

Other parameters along which schools of metaphysical thought can be sorted include thing ontologies versus event ontologies, substance ontologies versus relation ontologies, top down ontologies (being proceeds from one to many) versus bottom up ontologies (being proceeds from many to one).

Clearly many combinations of such different parameters are possible though not all such combinations have seen the light of day in Western thought. In what ever way the parameters are combined the result is either a monistic metaphysical conception or a dualistic conception (or more generally a pluralistic conception). That is to say, in the final analysis it is claimed either that reality is homogeneous, all being is of one type or it is claimed that reality is heterogeneous, all being consists in more than one type of being. Using these basic parameters it is possible to trace in broad brush the history of metaphysical inquiry in the West.

In the ancient and medieval periods metaphysical thinking was realistic and supernaturalistic. Thinkers during these great ages assumed that real being existed independently of human knowledge of it, that the human mind could access reality as it is in itself (though doing so required systematic sustained investigation), and that reality consisted of more than could be experienced directly through our sensory powers. All of this changed in the modern period and in spite of contemporary reactions against modernity all of us now think

this view concerns our immediate and direct contact with what is, i.e., the world we experience appears immediately to us to consist of concrete, determinate individual entities and that is all there is to it. Universalists, most famously Plato, have claimed that being is universal in nature, that reality consists of universals and that singular beings are in some sense or other less real (they have less being). The arguments for the universality of being (being as universal in nature) appeal to the nature of necessity, the plurality of instances of

The basis of yet another fundamental division between results of metaphysical inquiries was just noted in passing. Throughout the ancient and medieval periods of thought it was argued (or taken for granted) that being admits of degree. Some things are more real than others, they have a greater measure of existing than do other lesser entities. What counts as evidence for such a claim depends heavily upon how the difference in degrees is defined in the first place. If as Plato seems to have indicated, things are more real only in the sense that they are more able to act on other beings or more capable of being affected by other beings then the evidence of our senses would point to such differences in degree of reality. At any rate, this view contrasts sharply with conceptions according to which an entity either is or is not, there is no in between, "it's all or nothing". This modern and contemporary way of understanding being seems to comport well with what we know about reality from the empirical sciences. This general division is intimately related to the division within conceptions of being between being as actual and being as possible. Here the distinction lies between schools of thought that countenance possible beings in addition to (as it were) actual beings. Some schools of thought, especially existentialistically oriented metaphysics, emphasize actuality or actual being to the exclusion of possible being. In other words, being is only actual and possible being is non-being, there simply is no such thing. Other schools of thought emphasize possibility, i.e., reality includes possible beings, the being of which is

Other parameters along which schools of metaphysical thought can be sorted include thing ontologies versus event ontologies, substance ontologies versus relation ontologies, top down ontologies (being proceeds from one to many) versus bottom up ontologies (being

Clearly many combinations of such different parameters are possible though not all such combinations have seen the light of day in Western thought. In what ever way the parameters are combined the result is either a monistic metaphysical conception or a dualistic conception (or more generally a pluralistic conception). That is to say, in the final analysis it is claimed either that reality is homogeneous, all being is of one type or it is claimed that reality is heterogeneous, all being consists in more than one type of being. Using these basic parameters it is possible to trace in broad brush the history of

In the ancient and medieval periods metaphysical thinking was realistic and supernaturalistic. Thinkers during these great ages assumed that real being existed independently of human knowledge of it, that the human mind could access reality as it is in itself (though doing so required systematic sustained investigation), and that reality consisted of more than could be experienced directly through our sensory powers. All of this changed in the modern period and in spite of contemporary reactions against modernity all of us now think

the same kind of being and to the possibility of possible beings.

possible which is a less real mode of existing than is actual existing.

proceeds from many to one).

metaphysical inquiry in the West.

within two aspects of modernist paradigm. First, Descartes initiated (and Kant solidified) the great shift to anti-realism. If real being exists independently of our consciousness then we can only know how it appears to us. We therefore have no reason to suppose that real being exists independently of our consciousness, so we are left with only appearances (not appearings *of* some thing, merely appearings *to* a subject). Being consists then in those appearings (the subject is merely an appearance to its self, a merely phenomenal ego). Second, Spinoza initiated (and 20th century science confirmed) the great shift to naturalism. "What you see is what you get." There is nothing more to being than is revealed by/in scientific investigation of appearances and what must be posited in a lawlike manner in order to explain in a lawlike manner the order of those appearances (no appeal to transcendent mysteries is allowed).

However, in the 20th century alongside of the anti-realist, naturalistic though scientific metaphysics (of the appearances of things and events) there arose an existentialist reaction against all such formalistic ontologies of things and their essential natures. This was most forcefully stated by Heidegger in his famous critique of all Western thought as guilty of a "seinsvergessenheit", a forgetfulness of being. By conceiving of being entirely in terms of the essences of things the occidental mind has become oblivious to the sheer existing of beings. Of course, it was precisely conceiving of being as essence that made modern science possible (Western science has uniquely revealed to the peoples of the world *what* things are). This divide indicates yet another dimension along which metaphysical thoughts differ. Many systematic metaphysical accounts in the West have been "essentialist" in their conception of being—being equals essence, the whatness of being is all there is to being. And this contrasts sharply with an existentialist metaphysics which focusses on the sheer existing of things, the be of entities, and especially on the be-ing of human being. Their metaphysical inquiries attempt to determine the various ways in which human beings are, existentially. This 20th century existentialist critique of thing/substance/essence ontologies again calls our attention to the important fact about the history of metaphysics noted above—no age is monolithic in its metaphysical conceptions. Alongside antirealist phenomenologists in the last century there have been champions of classical realism. And notwithstanding Heidegger's critique, recent work in metaphysics has been precisely in the essentialistic tradition, most notably in the formal ontology movement which began in the 1990s. This fascinating development in philosophy appears to have partly arisen out of attempts to create and manage virtual realities in cyber space. The problems encountered in these efforts to bring worlds into being are precisely the problems of classical metaphysical inquiry: what is a world, in what sense do these worlds exist, how are worlds populated with entities, what are entities, how are entities differentiated into types and into individuals, what sorts of fundamental properties do entities possess, under what conditions does change occur to these entitites, what is change, can a world as such change, etc.? This short list indicates some of the problems that contemporary metaphysicians are investigating. The formal ontology movement has completely resurrected the problem of fundamental categories of being, the classical topic of metaphysical inquiry.

Other problems being addressed emphasize the following sorts of issues: the identity of entities over time as they undergo changes; the nature of the properties possessed by such entities (the old problem of the ontological status of universals); the nature and individuation of events; the nature of and relations between space and time; the nature of

only rest on a irreducible plurality of fundamental categories of being (instead of Quine's

The final two works in this collection bring us to the present. Joseph Bracken explains and champions the metaphysics, or more properly the theory of nature, developed by Alfred North Whitehead in the early part of the 20th century (and in spite of the anti-metaphysical positivism of that time). Whitehead's intriguing and powerful development of Aristotle's basic analysis of becoming has always been of interest to scientists and scientifically oriented philosophers. In recent decades the study of "complex systems" has blossomed and Whitehead's conceptions of the fundamental nature of nature perfectly extend such rational inquiry from the sensorily accessible realm of the real (studied by the empirical sciences) into the abstractly conceivable and foundational realm of the real (studied by metaphysics). Bracken introduces the reader to and explains the fundamental concepts that Whitehead developed for understanding the fundamentals of reality, such as "prehension", "societies of being", "creative systems". Work of this sort is relevant to contemporary attempts to explain living matter, conscious matter and other self-organizing, self-referencing realities. Bracken connects the Whiteheadian foundational analysis with analyses developed by Kaufmann, Sloan Wilson, Varela, Luhmann of the nature of such self-similar, fractal-like

The final paper returns to issues concerning the very nature of metaphysical inquiry. The overarching theme of this closing chapter concerns the relationship between technology and education and the basic claim that Nocak advances is that technology has brought about a significant loss of meaning for human beings. The reality we now encounter, so Novak argues, is completely mediated to us through technologies and, thus, "our" reality is now essentially artificial or artifactual.  Thus, metaphysics as the science of being as being has now become the science of artificial being as being! This is catastrophic for the human psyche since to the extent that we are what we know, we ourselves have become artificial in a fundamental sense. Accordingly, Novak issues a clarion call to our educators to explicitly inform their charges of these facts and thereby pre-

empt our descent into un-reality. There is much to ponder in this closing essay.

all of these works are in the tradition of analytical thought.

to Levinas(Columbia University Press, 2011)

It is our hope that this collection will give readers a sense of the type of metaphysical investigations that are now being carried out by thinkers in the Western nations. We also hope that the reader's curiosity will be peaked so that further inquiry will follow. Below is a very short list of anthologies of articles on metaphysics and introductory texts on the subject for those interested in further fundamental inquiry into the fundamental nature of all being. With the exception of the Grondin book, which surveys continental metaphysical writings,

[1] David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman, editors Metametaphysics: New

[2] Jean Grondin (trans. Lukas Soderstrom) Introduction to Metaphysics: From Parmenides

Essays on the Foundations of Ontology(Oxford University Press, 2009)

desert, a tropical rainforest landscape).

systems.

**2. References**

causality and whether causal relations are deterministic and/or indeterministic; consciousness, mind and brain; and of course, the nature of mathematical entities.

The papers in this volume provide us with a good sample of contemporary metaphysical inquiries. The first essay, by Zovko and Zovko, develops an account of the nature of metaphysical inquiry in general, which account is grounded in the history of this discipline. Their essay illuminates the great divide between ancient and medieval thought, on the one hand and modern and post-modern metaphysical thinking, on the other. The authors finally argue for a species of anti-realist idealism and for the necessity of metaphysical thinking within the dominant contemporary focus on the subject of experience. They conclude with a powerful argument for the social embedded-ness of metaphysical reflection.

 The next three essays, by Dorter, Hancock and Strauss, are inquiries into the work of classical metaphysicians. As noted above, not all metaphysical work survives the test of time. However, the works that have survived this brutal test are always worth revisiting because their original formulations of thought (or system of thoughts) are in many ways impossible to improve upon. Fresh insight can be gained from returning to the sources. The second essay in this volume is an investigation of a fundamental account of perhaps the fundamental metaphysical problem—the distinction between appearance and reality as first articulated by the (great grand) father of metaphysics, Parmenides. Dorter explores a fundamental topic addressed in human thought via problems that have arisen in the interpretation of Parmenides' thoughts about that fundamental topic. And his essay is a perfect example of how reality can be illuminated for our minds by means of explicating a great and ancient thinker's thoughts. The second historically oriented essay, by Hancock, addresses a comparably fundamental metaphysical problem—the problem of "the one and the many". The issue here is that being is one, i.e., all things have being and just in so far as they have being or are beings, all beings are one being (or one in being) *and* being is many, i.e., all things are different from each other in their being and constitute a multitude of beings. So, the problem is to make sense of how being is both one, undivided, unitary, single, singular, the same *and* multiple, divided, plural, diverse, the different. Hancock explicates Thomas Aquinas' Aristotelian answer to this question (and explains Thomas' points of departure from Aristotle). In the course of this dense explication Hancock articulates a classical realist account of how the mind comes to know in general and how our minds "work" when we engage in inquiry into metaphysical realities. He includes, as needed in explaining the solution to the problem of the one and the many, an account of the classical Aristotelian distinctions between form and matter and a (brief) account of Aristotle's metaphysical categories of being. This essay will excite readers into further exploration of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysical system of thought, perhaps the most massively complex system of such thinking in the Western tradition (the opposite of Quine's "desert landscape" ontologies).

The fourth essay with historical content (by Strauss) addresses the famous problems raised by Zeno concerning the reality of motion (and more generally the reality of change). In this insightful and stimulating work Strauss argues against giving in to reductionist tendencies in our thinking about the nature of being. He demonstrates that such reductionism can lead to unsolvable antimonies, by explicating the attempt in modern mathematics to explain the continuous entirely in terms of the discontinuous and the attempt in ancient physics to explain or explain away motion. He ends by arguing that a non-antimonious ontology can

causality and whether causal relations are deterministic and/or indeterministic;

The papers in this volume provide us with a good sample of contemporary metaphysical inquiries. The first essay, by Zovko and Zovko, develops an account of the nature of metaphysical inquiry in general, which account is grounded in the history of this discipline. Their essay illuminates the great divide between ancient and medieval thought, on the one hand and modern and post-modern metaphysical thinking, on the other. The authors finally argue for a species of anti-realist idealism and for the necessity of metaphysical thinking within the dominant contemporary focus on the subject of experience. They conclude with a

 The next three essays, by Dorter, Hancock and Strauss, are inquiries into the work of classical metaphysicians. As noted above, not all metaphysical work survives the test of time. However, the works that have survived this brutal test are always worth revisiting because their original formulations of thought (or system of thoughts) are in many ways impossible to improve upon. Fresh insight can be gained from returning to the sources. The second essay in this volume is an investigation of a fundamental account of perhaps the fundamental metaphysical problem—the distinction between appearance and reality as first articulated by the (great grand) father of metaphysics, Parmenides. Dorter explores a fundamental topic addressed in human thought via problems that have arisen in the interpretation of Parmenides' thoughts about that fundamental topic. And his essay is a perfect example of how reality can be illuminated for our minds by means of explicating a great and ancient thinker's thoughts. The second historically oriented essay, by Hancock, addresses a comparably fundamental metaphysical problem—the problem of "the one and the many". The issue here is that being is one, i.e., all things have being and just in so far as they have being or are beings, all beings are one being (or one in being) *and* being is many, i.e., all things are different from each other in their being and constitute a multitude of beings. So, the problem is to make sense of how being is both one, undivided, unitary, single, singular, the same *and* multiple, divided, plural, diverse, the different. Hancock explicates Thomas Aquinas' Aristotelian answer to this question (and explains Thomas' points of departure from Aristotle). In the course of this dense explication Hancock articulates a classical realist account of how the mind comes to know in general and how our minds "work" when we engage in inquiry into metaphysical realities. He includes, as needed in explaining the solution to the problem of the one and the many, an account of the classical Aristotelian distinctions between form and matter and a (brief) account of Aristotle's metaphysical categories of being. This essay will excite readers into further exploration of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysical system of thought, perhaps the most massively complex system of such thinking in the Western tradition (the opposite of Quine's

The fourth essay with historical content (by Strauss) addresses the famous problems raised by Zeno concerning the reality of motion (and more generally the reality of change). In this insightful and stimulating work Strauss argues against giving in to reductionist tendencies in our thinking about the nature of being. He demonstrates that such reductionism can lead to unsolvable antimonies, by explicating the attempt in modern mathematics to explain the continuous entirely in terms of the discontinuous and the attempt in ancient physics to explain or explain away motion. He ends by arguing that a non-antimonious ontology can

consciousness, mind and brain; and of course, the nature of mathematical entities.

powerful argument for the social embedded-ness of metaphysical reflection.

"desert landscape" ontologies).

only rest on a irreducible plurality of fundamental categories of being (instead of Quine's desert, a tropical rainforest landscape).

The final two works in this collection bring us to the present. Joseph Bracken explains and champions the metaphysics, or more properly the theory of nature, developed by Alfred North Whitehead in the early part of the 20th century (and in spite of the anti-metaphysical positivism of that time). Whitehead's intriguing and powerful development of Aristotle's basic analysis of becoming has always been of interest to scientists and scientifically oriented philosophers. In recent decades the study of "complex systems" has blossomed and Whitehead's conceptions of the fundamental nature of nature perfectly extend such rational inquiry from the sensorily accessible realm of the real (studied by the empirical sciences) into the abstractly conceivable and foundational realm of the real (studied by metaphysics). Bracken introduces the reader to and explains the fundamental concepts that Whitehead developed for understanding the fundamentals of reality, such as "prehension", "societies of being", "creative systems". Work of this sort is relevant to contemporary attempts to explain living matter, conscious matter and other self-organizing, self-referencing realities. Bracken connects the Whiteheadian foundational analysis with analyses developed by Kaufmann, Sloan Wilson, Varela, Luhmann of the nature of such self-similar, fractal-like systems.

The final paper returns to issues concerning the very nature of metaphysical inquiry. The overarching theme of this closing chapter concerns the relationship between technology and education and the basic claim that Nocak advances is that technology has brought about a significant loss of meaning for human beings. The reality we now encounter, so Novak argues, is completely mediated to us through technologies and, thus, "our" reality is now essentially artificial or artifactual.  Thus, metaphysics as the science of being as being has now become the science of artificial being as being! This is catastrophic for the human psyche since to the extent that we are what we know, we ourselves have become artificial in a fundamental sense. Accordingly, Novak issues a clarion call to our educators to explicitly inform their charges of these facts and thereby preempt our descent into un-reality. There is much to ponder in this closing essay.

It is our hope that this collection will give readers a sense of the type of metaphysical investigations that are now being carried out by thinkers in the Western nations. We also hope that the reader's curiosity will be peaked so that further inquiry will follow. Below is a very short list of anthologies of articles on metaphysics and introductory texts on the subject for those interested in further fundamental inquiry into the fundamental nature of all being. With the exception of the Grondin book, which surveys continental metaphysical writings, all of these works are in the tradition of analytical thought.

#### **2. References**

**1**

**The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy**

In the history of philosophy there exists a clear continuity regarding investigation of the epistemic conditions of understanding and explanation of reality. Herein lies philosophy's essentially metaphysical character – and the reason why metaphysics continues to comprise an indispensable constituent of philosophizing and a philosophical approach to life. Drawing on selected paradigms from classic works from the history of philosophy, we focus on metaphysics of subjectivity as fundamental philosophical discourse of modernity, which finds its archetypal expression in Kant's conception of the unity of self-consciousness (transcendental unity of apperception), as precondition for our understanding and explanation of objectivity and the world of our experience. This opens a range of

Today, no consideration of metaphysics is possible without reference to "post-metaphysical" thought, that is, to the "destruction" or rejection of metaphysics which emerged from Kant's and the Idealists' critique of traditional metaphysics, as well as from criticism directed towards the German Idealists' own "absolute-dialectic" brand of metaphysics.1 The situation of "metaphysics after metaphysics", however, requires more than theoretical illumination of the epistemic conditions of human knowledge and self-consciousness; it requires a deep connection to the implementation of our role and purpose in the world and in society. One possible source for active renewal of metaphysics in the post-metaphysical era may be found in the communal aspect of *interpretation*, the basis of all knowledge and communication, as exemplified by Royce's reconceptualisation of Peirce's semiotics and his expansion of Peirce's idea of the "community of scientific investigators", within the context of an "absolute pragmatism" and a "philosophy of loyalty" to the ideal of universal community of

The methodology of exposition applied here exemplifies what is described by Wolfgang Wieland2 as a productive relationship of philosophizing to its own history. In Wieland's

1 Cf. L. Nagl. *Das Verhüllte Absolute. Essays zur zeitgenössischen Religionsphilosophie.* (Frankfurt am Main:

2 "Über den Grund des Interesses der Philosophie an ihrer Geschichte," in: Rolf W. Puster (hrsg.) *Veritas*

*filia temporis: Festschrift für Rainer Specht* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995) 11-30.

possibilities for innovative analysis of the metaphysical character of philosophy.

**1. Introduction**

interpretation.

Peter Lang, 2010), 13.

Marie-Élise Zovko1 and Jure Zovko2

*1Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb,*

*2University of Zadar,*

*Croatia*

## **The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy**

Marie-Élise Zovko1 and Jure Zovko2

*1Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, 2University of Zadar, Croatia*

#### **1. Introduction**

8 Metaphysics

[4] Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Z. Korman, and Ernst Sosa Metaphysics: An Anthology, second

[6] Michael Loux, editor Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, second Edition(Routledge,

[7] Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, editors The Oxford Handbook of

[9] A. W. Moore The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of

[10] Nicholas Rescher Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Methods of

[11] Theodor Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean Zimmerman, editors Contemporary Debates

[3] D. W. Hamlyn Metaphysics(Cambridge University Press, 1984)

[5] E. J. Lowe A Survey of Metaphysics(Oxford University Press, 2002)

[8] Michael Loux Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction(Routledge, 2006)

edition.(Wiley—Blackwell, 2012.)

Metaphysics(Oxford University Press, 2005)

Things(Cambridge University Press, 2011)

Science(Oxford University Press, 2003)

in Metaphysics(Wiley-Blackwell, 2007)

2008)

In the history of philosophy there exists a clear continuity regarding investigation of the epistemic conditions of understanding and explanation of reality. Herein lies philosophy's essentially metaphysical character – and the reason why metaphysics continues to comprise an indispensable constituent of philosophizing and a philosophical approach to life. Drawing on selected paradigms from classic works from the history of philosophy, we focus on metaphysics of subjectivity as fundamental philosophical discourse of modernity, which finds its archetypal expression in Kant's conception of the unity of self-consciousness (transcendental unity of apperception), as precondition for our understanding and explanation of objectivity and the world of our experience. This opens a range of possibilities for innovative analysis of the metaphysical character of philosophy.

Today, no consideration of metaphysics is possible without reference to "post-metaphysical" thought, that is, to the "destruction" or rejection of metaphysics which emerged from Kant's and the Idealists' critique of traditional metaphysics, as well as from criticism directed towards the German Idealists' own "absolute-dialectic" brand of metaphysics.1 The situation of "metaphysics after metaphysics", however, requires more than theoretical illumination of the epistemic conditions of human knowledge and self-consciousness; it requires a deep connection to the implementation of our role and purpose in the world and in society. One possible source for active renewal of metaphysics in the post-metaphysical era may be found in the communal aspect of *interpretation*, the basis of all knowledge and communication, as exemplified by Royce's reconceptualisation of Peirce's semiotics and his expansion of Peirce's idea of the "community of scientific investigators", within the context of an "absolute pragmatism" and a "philosophy of loyalty" to the ideal of universal community of interpretation.

The methodology of exposition applied here exemplifies what is described by Wolfgang Wieland2 as a productive relationship of philosophizing to its own history. In Wieland's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. L. Nagl. *Das Verhüllte Absolute. Essays zur zeitgenössischen Religionsphilosophie.* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 13.

<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Über den Grund des Interesses der Philosophie an ihrer Geschichte," in: Rolf W. Puster (hrsg.) *Veritas filia temporis: Festschrift für Rainer Specht* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995) 11-30.

The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy 11

with these fundamental questions, questions which continue to define the central concerns

Prominent thinkers from the field of classical metaphysics attempted accordingly to answer questions regarding the "first" or "highest" principles and causes of things and being as a whole, as well as of our knowledge of them, i.e. of reality, its causes and principles. Historians of philosophy customarily differentiate three main periods or stages in the history of metaphysics: the Ancient and Medieval period, when the discipline which later came to be known as "ontology" concerned itself with the question of the *being of that which exists*7; second, the modern period extending from Descartes until the collapse of German Idealism, during which metaphysical reflection was directed toward establishing the epistemic conditions of our knowledge of reality, taking the form, thus, of a primarily subjective, foundationalist metaphysics of (self-)consciousness; and finally, from the second half of the 19th century

This division is heavily influenced by the thought of Martin Heidegger and his claim to have "destroyed" the history of metaphysics and its purported "forgetfulness of being" by what he calls "thinking from another beginning", i.e. from "being itself" in the verbal (extra- or noncategorical) sense of its "existing" or "occurrence" (Ereignis). Heidegger opposes his approach to what he sees as traditional metaphysics' concern with conceptualisation of the "being-ness of being" (Seiendheit des Seienden), which in his estimate always involves imposing a certain inappropriate "thingfulness" (Dinglichkeit) on what cannot be described by general characteristics or made into a thing possessing even the most eminent properties.9 Heidegger's "destruction" of the history of metaphysics largely neglects currents of thought like (Neo-)Platonism, from thinkers like Plotinus and Proclus, Medieval and Renaissance Platonism to Platonists or Platonist-influenced thinkers of the modern period and German Idealism, whose thinking on the relationship of finite things and the unconditional source of all that is and is thought tends to contradict central assertions of Heidegger's interpretative stance and purported "destruction" of metaphysics.10 This has

7 In contrasting the perspectives of the Ancient & Medieval period on the one hand, and the modern and postmodern period on the other, our selection of thinkers and texts is necessarily limited. While striving to be representative, our exposition focusses on the problems themselves, and is not intended as a valuation of individual thinkers. For reasons of space, and because their treatment presupposes consideration of the encounter between the major religious traditions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and works of Classical Antiquity, thinkers of the Medieval period are not

8 Cf. J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken. Philosophische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt a. M: Suhrkamp, 1988)

9 Heidegger's standpoint after the so-called "Kehre" ("turn", "conversion") represents a development of Schelling's later philosophy, with its opposition of "negative" and "positive philosophy" and advocacy for a historical and "positive" philosophy over metaphysics of essence. Cf. M.E. Zovko, "Die Spätphilosophie Schellings und die Kehre im Denken M. Heideggers." In: *Jahrbuch für Philosophie des*

10 Cf. M.E. Zovko, *Plotinovo i Heideggerovo Poimanje vremema.* (Zagreb: Filozofska iztraživanja, 1991; Magisterarbeit: Freiburg i. br., 1985). Regarding similarities and differences between Heidegger's approach to philosophizing from the "other beginning" and Platonist views of the highest principle of thought and being "beyond being", cf. M.E. Zovko, (1999) 143. Concerning Fr. Schlegel's influence on

of the discipline known as metaphysics from Ancient times until the present.

onwards, the "post-metaphysical" era of philosophy in its various forms.8

20f.

considered in this article.

*Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover* (10) 1999, 135-173.

estimate, study of the history of philosophy can play an integral and productive role in philosophy, if philosophy takes as its aim not only to learn *about* its history, but to learn *from* it, when history is taken as a source of truth.3 Although the precise method and the rules for successful study and interpretation of philosophical texts often remain unreflected, it is the question of doing justice to an historical work's ability to be a carrier of truth which is at the center of this approach. Every text has both a material and an intentional aspect. The former concerns the circumstances of its genesis – its time, author, the conditions under which it was composed, the whole constellation of psychological, social, individual, and transindividual relationships which led to its existence as a thing and object of study. The latter regards the capacity of the text, as a "sign", to refer to something other than itself. The text functions thereby as a medium by which to turn the reader's attention to the subject matter in question, a medium which allows us to reflect upon the "truth content" it is intended to convey.

In this article, selected texts from the history of philosophy serve as a medium for consideration of the specific problem of the possibility of metaphysics and the metaphysical character of philosophy. The historical circumstances of the selected texts is of secondary importance. This approach entails the reader's active participation in a dialogue with specific previously existing attempts to formulate and resolve the philosophical problems at hand. For, properly understood, the search for truth and the process by which philosophical problems emerge, whether in older or more recent philosophical texts, is part of a permanent and ongoing process of interpretation, an exchange in which the interpreter attempts to draw forth the truth content of the text to be interpreted for those for whom it is to be interpreted and who, by their own act of reflection, carry forward the process of interpretation, participating thus as co-interpreters in the larger process of inquiry and exchange.

#### **1.1 Metaphysics and the post-metaphysical era**

Metaphysics is a fundamental, defining discipline of the European philosophical tradition. The origin and original meaning of the word "metaphysics" is disputed, having in all likelihood been coined by the first editor of Aristotle's writings, Andronicus of Rhodus, to designate the body of more or less contiguous writings grouped together "after the physics".4 These writings dealt with "being as such", its "principles" and "causes", the subject matter of what Aristotle variously calls "first philosophy", "wisdom", "theology".5 Therewith, Aristotle takes up central questions which first arose among his predecessors, the so-called Presocratics, whom Aristotle in this respect calls the "first philosophizers"6, and with his own teacher Plato: what (really) is? what makes it the way it is? where does it come from? how does it come to be? The word metaphysics, thus a more or less accidental creation, becomes in medieval philosophy a general designation for reflection on issues connected

<sup>3</sup> ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. H. Flashar, Aristoteles. In: *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*. Bd. 3, *Ältere Akademie-Aristoteles-Peripatos*, ed. H. Flashar(Basel/Stuttgart: Schwab, 1983) 256.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 982 a 1-3; 983 a 8-9.

<sup>6</sup> ibid. 983 b 5-6.

estimate, study of the history of philosophy can play an integral and productive role in philosophy, if philosophy takes as its aim not only to learn *about* its history, but to learn *from* it, when history is taken as a source of truth.3 Although the precise method and the rules for successful study and interpretation of philosophical texts often remain unreflected, it is the question of doing justice to an historical work's ability to be a carrier of truth which is at the center of this approach. Every text has both a material and an intentional aspect. The former concerns the circumstances of its genesis – its time, author, the conditions under which it was composed, the whole constellation of psychological, social, individual, and transindividual relationships which led to its existence as a thing and object of study. The latter regards the capacity of the text, as a "sign", to refer to something other than itself. The text functions thereby as a medium by which to turn the reader's attention to the subject matter in question, a medium which allows us to reflect upon the "truth content" it is

In this article, selected texts from the history of philosophy serve as a medium for consideration of the specific problem of the possibility of metaphysics and the metaphysical character of philosophy. The historical circumstances of the selected texts is of secondary importance. This approach entails the reader's active participation in a dialogue with specific previously existing attempts to formulate and resolve the philosophical problems at hand. For, properly understood, the search for truth and the process by which philosophical problems emerge, whether in older or more recent philosophical texts, is part of a permanent and ongoing process of interpretation, an exchange in which the interpreter attempts to draw forth the truth content of the text to be interpreted for those for whom it is to be interpreted and who, by their own act of reflection, carry forward the process of interpretation, participating thus as co-interpreters in the larger process of inquiry and

Metaphysics is a fundamental, defining discipline of the European philosophical tradition. The origin and original meaning of the word "metaphysics" is disputed, having in all likelihood been coined by the first editor of Aristotle's writings, Andronicus of Rhodus, to designate the body of more or less contiguous writings grouped together "after the physics".4 These writings dealt with "being as such", its "principles" and "causes", the subject matter of what Aristotle variously calls "first philosophy", "wisdom", "theology".5 Therewith, Aristotle takes up central questions which first arose among his predecessors, the so-called Presocratics, whom Aristotle in this respect calls the "first philosophizers"6, and with his own teacher Plato: what (really) is? what makes it the way it is? where does it come from? how does it come to be? The word metaphysics, thus a more or less accidental creation, becomes in medieval philosophy a general designation for reflection on issues connected

4 Cf. H. Flashar, Aristoteles. In: *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*. Bd. 3, *Ältere Akademie-Aristoteles-*

intended to convey.

exchange.

 3 ibid.

6 ibid. 983 b 5-6.

**1.1 Metaphysics and the post-metaphysical era**

*Peripatos*, ed. H. Flashar(Basel/Stuttgart: Schwab, 1983) 256.

5 Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 982 a 1-3; 983 a 8-9.

with these fundamental questions, questions which continue to define the central concerns of the discipline known as metaphysics from Ancient times until the present.

Prominent thinkers from the field of classical metaphysics attempted accordingly to answer questions regarding the "first" or "highest" principles and causes of things and being as a whole, as well as of our knowledge of them, i.e. of reality, its causes and principles. Historians of philosophy customarily differentiate three main periods or stages in the history of metaphysics: the Ancient and Medieval period, when the discipline which later came to be known as "ontology" concerned itself with the question of the *being of that which exists*7; second, the modern period extending from Descartes until the collapse of German Idealism, during which metaphysical reflection was directed toward establishing the epistemic conditions of our knowledge of reality, taking the form, thus, of a primarily subjective, foundationalist metaphysics of (self-)consciousness; and finally, from the second half of the 19th century onwards, the "post-metaphysical" era of philosophy in its various forms.8

This division is heavily influenced by the thought of Martin Heidegger and his claim to have "destroyed" the history of metaphysics and its purported "forgetfulness of being" by what he calls "thinking from another beginning", i.e. from "being itself" in the verbal (extra- or noncategorical) sense of its "existing" or "occurrence" (Ereignis). Heidegger opposes his approach to what he sees as traditional metaphysics' concern with conceptualisation of the "being-ness of being" (Seiendheit des Seienden), which in his estimate always involves imposing a certain inappropriate "thingfulness" (Dinglichkeit) on what cannot be described by general characteristics or made into a thing possessing even the most eminent properties.9 Heidegger's "destruction" of the history of metaphysics largely neglects currents of thought like (Neo-)Platonism, from thinkers like Plotinus and Proclus, Medieval and Renaissance Platonism to Platonists or Platonist-influenced thinkers of the modern period and German Idealism, whose thinking on the relationship of finite things and the unconditional source of all that is and is thought tends to contradict central assertions of Heidegger's interpretative stance and purported "destruction" of metaphysics.10 This has

 7 In contrasting the perspectives of the Ancient & Medieval period on the one hand, and the modern and postmodern period on the other, our selection of thinkers and texts is necessarily limited. While striving to be representative, our exposition focusses on the problems themselves, and is not intended as a valuation of individual thinkers. For reasons of space, and because their treatment presupposes consideration of the encounter between the major religious traditions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and works of Classical Antiquity, thinkers of the Medieval period are not considered in this article.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken. Philosophische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt a. M: Suhrkamp, 1988) 20f.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger's standpoint after the so-called "Kehre" ("turn", "conversion") represents a development of Schelling's later philosophy, with its opposition of "negative" and "positive philosophy" and advocacy for a historical and "positive" philosophy over metaphysics of essence. Cf. M.E. Zovko, "Die Spätphilosophie Schellings und die Kehre im Denken M. Heideggers." In: *Jahrbuch für Philosophie des Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover* (10) 1999, 135-173.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. M.E. Zovko, *Plotinovo i Heideggerovo Poimanje vremema.* (Zagreb: Filozofska iztraživanja, 1991; Magisterarbeit: Freiburg i. br., 1985). Regarding similarities and differences between Heidegger's approach to philosophizing from the "other beginning" and Platonist views of the highest principle of thought and being "beyond being", cf. M.E. Zovko, (1999) 143. Concerning Fr. Schlegel's influence on

lives.

(cf. Cherniss 449). 14 Cherniss 452f. <sup>15</sup> *Met*. A9 990 b12.

17 Republic I, 352d.

epistemology, ontology, and ethics.

The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy 13

stages in a sequence of natural phenomena, i.e. of proximate "causes" and their "effects", with the the hypothesis of ideas13, Plato provided philosophy with a unified explanatory approach to ontological, epistemological and ethical phenomena. This enabled him to turn his attention to human beings' role as *subjects* of philosophical inquiry into the constitution of reality – and to the implications of such inquiry for the conduct of our

Plato recognized that the phenomena of the sense world can only be known and explained by concepts or *ideas* which name or correspond to them. Knowledge of phenomena is made possible by "participation" of the matter of sensation in ideas, and of ideas in the matter of sensation. In other words, sensation itself (and hence experience, knowledge) is impossible without ideas. These he postulates as the unchanging principles and causes of things whose essence they (the ideas) define or express. At the close of the dialogue *Cratylus* (339c-340c), an argument is presented by which to explain how our knowledge and understanding of changeable phenomena can be enduring and reliable. The logos lends to our perceptions, and therewith to the changing phenomena of the world of flux, eidetic stability. The ineluctable and undifferentiable fluidity of change achieves solidity, stability, and form for our experience only by means of conceptualisation and linguistic expression. In this respect, Harold Cherniss' claim is justified that the world of phenomena can only be "saved", that is, aequately explained, with the help of ideas: "The instability of phenomena can be explained only by assuming a world of Ideas as source of phenomenal characteristics".14 This hypothesis proves to be the only adequate basis for explanation in the realm of

Plato's discovery that one and the same idea is present in diverse phenomena and that as such ideas possess the explanative structure of "one in the many" (*hen epi pollon*), is called by Aristotle the "argument from science" (*logoi ek ton epistēmon*).15 Plato is therewith one of the first philosophers to recognize the fact that we explain the experiential world by means of eidetic structures which are the result of our process of cognition.16 Simply put, there exist ideas for all the data of which we have knowledge. This, however, is for Plato not a purely epistemological insight. The central, burning question of the early dialogues is how to achieve a good and happy life.17 While physicalist and scientistic neo-ontologies attempt to reduce knowledge to its descriptive content and associated practice to potential technological applications, for Plato and his teacher Socrates knowledge of things is

13 Cf. the anecdote regarding the "second-best route" (*deuteros plous*), Plato *Phaedo* 96 a-100a (followed by Socrates' summary of the "theory of ideas", 100b-102a). Cf. H. Cherniss, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas", *American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), 455. The "economy of the theory of ideas", i.e. Plato's demonstration of the indispensability and adequacy of the hypothesis of separate and substantive ideas as causative and explanatory principles of being, knowledge and value, is characterised in Henrich's interpretation as the replacement of the "unity of nature" by the "unity of concepts" (Cf. Henrich 1987, 62). Cherniss' argument turns on the "determination of intellection as an activity different from sensation and opinion" and on the priority of the former with respect to the latter

16 Heraclitus was arguably the first to explicitly recognize this fact. Cf. Zovko (2002).

done little, however, to attenuate its wide-reaching influence and its role in ushering in a new "post-metaphysical" era. Additional impetus for the idea of the "end" of metaphysics was provided, moreover, from another corner, by the movements known as analytic philosophy and logical positivism, as initiated by Frege, Russel and Wittgenstein, and their view that philosophy has to do not with higher truths, principles or causes, but with the analysis of propositions.

In contrast to the view that following Kant and the German Idealists philosophy irrevocably entered a post-metaphysical era, we shall attempt in this article to delineate the thematic unity and continuity of European philosophy as concerns inquiry into the epistemic preconditions of knowledge and explanation of reality. It is this thematic continuity, we argue, which constitutes what may be called the metaphysical character of philosophy and which, regardless of the changing aspect of philosophy's specific interest and expression, cannot be revoked or eliminated – short of elimination of philosophy, and consequently, of humanity itself.

#### **1.2 Classical origins of metaphysics and epistemic conditions of knowledge: Plato and Aristotle**

Plato (and in an historical and foundational respect his predecessors among the Presocratic thinkers, in particular Parmenides and Heraclitus11) may be credited with two important discoveries upon which the whole of European metaphysics is founded: first, the principle of identity, that a thing is what it is, with its complement, the principle of non-contradiction, according to which it is impossible "for the same thing to be attributed and not to be attributed at the same time to the same thing in the same respect."12 These together comprise the precondition of coherent speech, scientific argumentation and successful communication. The second discovery is that of the primacy of concepts as the basis of explanation. This discovery is embodied in Socrates' so-called "flight to the *logoi*" (*kataphugē eis tous logous*), as described in the *Phaedo*, outcome of his youthful fascination and ultimate frustration with the search for causes, or rather, with the manner in which the investigation of nature (*historia peri tes psuchēs*) had hitherto been conducted. By replacing the unending regress entailed by mere enumeration of the successive phases or

Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics, cf. also Michael Elsässer, *Friedrich Schlegels Kritik am Ding*, (Hamburg: Meiner 1994). Cf. also Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952, as well as John Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics*. (Fordham University Press, 21982).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. M.E. Zovko, "Plato's Heracliteanism Reconsidered," *Dionysius*, 20 (2002): 23-50.

<sup>12</sup> *Cf. Plato, Rep. 436b: "*The same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time". Cf. *Phaedo* 102e, *Theaetetus* 188a, *Sophist* 220b, 602e*;* Cf. Aristotle's three formulations, *Met.* IV 3 1005b19–20, with respect to existent things: "'It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same relation'"; 1005b 23-24, in the form of an "ultimate belief" which anyone trying to demonstrate anything refers back to: "it is impossible for the same man to suppose at the same time that the same thing is and is not; for the man who made this error would entertain two contrary opinions at the same time"; and finally, in its logical form: "the most certain of all beliefs is that opposite statements are not both true at the same time" (1011b13-14).

done little, however, to attenuate its wide-reaching influence and its role in ushering in a new "post-metaphysical" era. Additional impetus for the idea of the "end" of metaphysics was provided, moreover, from another corner, by the movements known as analytic philosophy and logical positivism, as initiated by Frege, Russel and Wittgenstein, and their view that philosophy has to do not with higher truths, principles or causes, but with the

In contrast to the view that following Kant and the German Idealists philosophy irrevocably entered a post-metaphysical era, we shall attempt in this article to delineate the thematic unity and continuity of European philosophy as concerns inquiry into the epistemic preconditions of knowledge and explanation of reality. It is this thematic continuity, we argue, which constitutes what may be called the metaphysical character of philosophy and which, regardless of the changing aspect of philosophy's specific interest and expression, cannot be revoked or eliminated – short of elimination of philosophy, and consequently, of

**1.2 Classical origins of metaphysics and epistemic conditions of knowledge:**

Plato (and in an historical and foundational respect his predecessors among the Presocratic thinkers, in particular Parmenides and Heraclitus11) may be credited with two important discoveries upon which the whole of European metaphysics is founded: first, the principle of identity, that a thing is what it is, with its complement, the principle of non-contradiction, according to which it is impossible "for the same thing to be attributed and not to be attributed at the same time to the same thing in the same respect."12 These together comprise the precondition of coherent speech, scientific argumentation and successful communication. The second discovery is that of the primacy of concepts as the basis of explanation. This discovery is embodied in Socrates' so-called "flight to the *logoi*" (*kataphugē eis tous logous*), as described in the *Phaedo*, outcome of his youthful fascination and ultimate frustration with the search for causes, or rather, with the manner in which the investigation of nature (*historia peri tes psuchēs*) had hitherto been conducted. By replacing the unending regress entailed by mere enumeration of the successive phases or

Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics, cf. also Michael Elsässer, *Friedrich Schlegels Kritik am Ding*, (Hamburg: Meiner 1994). Cf. also Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952, as well as John Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming*

<sup>12</sup> *Cf. Plato, Rep. 436b: "*The same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time". Cf. *Phaedo* 102e, *Theaetetus* 188a, *Sophist* 220b, 602e*;* Cf. Aristotle's three formulations, *Met.* IV 3 1005b19–20, with respect to existent things: "'It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same relation'"; 1005b 23-24, in the form of an "ultimate belief" which anyone trying to demonstrate anything refers back to: "it is impossible for the same man to suppose at the same time that the same thing is and is not; for the man who made this error would entertain two contrary opinions at the same time"; and finally, in its logical form: "the most certain of all beliefs is that opposite statements are not both true at the same time"

11 Cf. M.E. Zovko, "Plato's Heracliteanism Reconsidered," *Dionysius*, 20 (2002): 23-50.

analysis of propositions.

humanity itself.

(1011b13-14).

**Plato and Aristotle**

*Metaphysics*. (Fordham University Press, 21982).

stages in a sequence of natural phenomena, i.e. of proximate "causes" and their "effects", with the the hypothesis of ideas13, Plato provided philosophy with a unified explanatory approach to ontological, epistemological and ethical phenomena. This enabled him to turn his attention to human beings' role as *subjects* of philosophical inquiry into the constitution of reality – and to the implications of such inquiry for the conduct of our lives.

Plato recognized that the phenomena of the sense world can only be known and explained by concepts or *ideas* which name or correspond to them. Knowledge of phenomena is made possible by "participation" of the matter of sensation in ideas, and of ideas in the matter of sensation. In other words, sensation itself (and hence experience, knowledge) is impossible without ideas. These he postulates as the unchanging principles and causes of things whose essence they (the ideas) define or express. At the close of the dialogue *Cratylus* (339c-340c), an argument is presented by which to explain how our knowledge and understanding of changeable phenomena can be enduring and reliable. The logos lends to our perceptions, and therewith to the changing phenomena of the world of flux, eidetic stability. The ineluctable and undifferentiable fluidity of change achieves solidity, stability, and form for our experience only by means of conceptualisation and linguistic expression. In this respect, Harold Cherniss' claim is justified that the world of phenomena can only be "saved", that is, aequately explained, with the help of ideas: "The instability of phenomena can be explained only by assuming a world of Ideas as source of phenomenal characteristics".14 This hypothesis proves to be the only adequate basis for explanation in the realm of epistemology, ontology, and ethics.

Plato's discovery that one and the same idea is present in diverse phenomena and that as such ideas possess the explanative structure of "one in the many" (*hen epi pollon*), is called by Aristotle the "argument from science" (*logoi ek ton epistēmon*).15 Plato is therewith one of the first philosophers to recognize the fact that we explain the experiential world by means of eidetic structures which are the result of our process of cognition.16 Simply put, there exist ideas for all the data of which we have knowledge. This, however, is for Plato not a purely epistemological insight. The central, burning question of the early dialogues is how to achieve a good and happy life.17 While physicalist and scientistic neo-ontologies attempt to reduce knowledge to its descriptive content and associated practice to potential technological applications, for Plato and his teacher Socrates knowledge of things is

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the anecdote regarding the "second-best route" (*deuteros plous*), Plato *Phaedo* 96 a-100a (followed by Socrates' summary of the "theory of ideas", 100b-102a). Cf. H. Cherniss, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas", *American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), 455. The "economy of the theory of ideas", i.e. Plato's demonstration of the indispensability and adequacy of the hypothesis of separate and substantive ideas as causative and explanatory principles of being, knowledge and value, is characterised in Henrich's interpretation as the replacement of the "unity of nature" by the "unity of concepts" (Cf. Henrich 1987, 62). Cherniss' argument turns on the "determination of intellection as an activity different from sensation and opinion" and on the priority of the former with respect to the latter (cf. Cherniss 449).

<sup>14</sup> Cherniss 452f.

<sup>15</sup> *Met*. A9 990 b12.

<sup>16</sup> Heraclitus was arguably the first to explicitly recognize this fact. Cf. Zovko (2002).

<sup>17</sup> Republic I, 352d.

The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy 15

cross products, i.e. the products of the means and of the extremes, can be used to find a missing term. The three known terms of the analogy can thus be used to discover a fourth missing term. The original ratio of unequal sections is repeated in each of the ratio's component parts. This implies the proportionality of the subordinate ratios both to each other and to the original ratio, illustrating not only the reflection, or refraction in another dimension, of the original ratio of knowledge and opinion, the sensible and the intelligible, in each of the constituent members of the proportion, but also the analogy of the internal relationships of the analogues from each individual realm to each other and to the whole (i.e. the analogy of the relationship between imagination [*eikasia*] and belief [*pistis*], to the relationship between discursive [*dianoia*] and intuitive thought [*noēsis*], as well as of the corresponding relationships between their respective objects [for *eikasia* the *eikones* or images*/* for *pistis* the *zoa, phuta, skeuasta* (animals, plants and the "whole class of objects made by man", of which things the *eikones* are likenesses)*/* for *dianoia* the *mathēmatika /* for *noēsis* the *ideai*] and of both analogies to the overarching division of knowledge and reality into opinion and "science", sensible and intelligible (*doxa/*with its objects the *horata* or *aisthēta*: *epistēmē,* also called *noēsis* in a broader sense, including *noēsis* and *dianoia* as

The layered proportionality of the Line admonishes against a dualistic interpretation of Plato's division of reality and the corresponding activities of the soul.20 While the Line represents a *unity in duality*, the primary duality is not that of opposition of the intelligible and the sensible, but what might be called a *duality of reference*, the Line referring, on the one hand, as a complex *sign* or *symbol*, to the whole of reality and on the other to the integrated functioning of the faculties of the soul or intelligence which make reality accessible to us. Each section of the complex proportion of the Line represents both an activity or function of the soul and the specific object or aspect of reality which that particular activity "intentionally" contains or refers to. At the same time, according to the fundamental image of the Line, reality is *one*: the functions of the soul which enable cognition of reality are *one* and convey *one reality* by means of its different aspects*.*  Intelligence is *one* taken in the entirety of the process of knowing and in unity with the reality which the diversity of its functions conveys. The law of proportion (the method of analogy) which forms the basis for analogy appears, moreover, as a specific, indirect method of discovery (as opposed to identification, recognition, deduction, induction and

the Way Back are the Same. The Ascent of Cognition in Plato's Analogies of the Sun, the Line and the Cave and the Path Intelligence Takes," in: *Platonism and Forms of Intelligence* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008)*,* 313-341; 334f. and n. 49-52. The Analogy of the Line has been widely interpreted, particularly in Anglo-american literature. Cf. R. N. Murphy, *The interpretation of Plato's Republic,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1951), 157-160; R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic.* (London: Oxford Press 1953), 147-201; A. S. Ferguson, "Plato's Simile of Light. I. The Simile of the Sun and the Line", *Class. Quarterly* (15) 1921, 131- 152; cf. also Th. Ebert, *Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie Platons* (Berlin: de Gruyter 1974), 173-193; H. Krämer, Idee des Guten. Sonnen- und Liniengleichnis (Buch VI 504-511e), in: O. Höffe (ed.) *Platon.*

20 Even though Plato in places, for example, in the first part of the *Parmenides,* appears to favour a dualistic conception of the relationship of ideas to sensible particulars, the complexity of his exposition must not be ignored, and requires a correspondingly complex interpretation. W. Wieland, *Geschichte der Philosophie in Text und Darstellung. Bd. 1 Antike. Einleitung* (Stuttgart: Reclam

subordinate functions*/*with its objects the *noēta*).

*Politeia* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1997), 179-204.

1988), 25.

inextricably tied to the Delphic imperative to "know thyself". Definition and argument are inextricably bound to the attainment of the inherent excellence (*aretē*) of the knower and of the things known. Theory is thus inseparable from morality.

In modern science, the criteria of a theory's validity is its ability to accurately describe observable phenomena and reliably predict their future behaviour on the basis of mathematical models and replicable experiments. Despite their efforts to maintain complete "objectivity", however, the sciences are never, in fact, "value neutral". Every theory is influenced by the standpoint of the researcher, and by value-related assumptions, and has implications or consequences which require ethical reflection and choice. Purportedly "objective" descriptions of phenomena, furthermore, do not in themselves provide a meaningful context for human action, including qualifying reasons for choosing one set of actions or aims, one path in life over another. Pragmatists appeal to the principle according to which thought distinctions are to be resolved by their practical consequences. The question remains, however, – above all with respect to technological development and application of theoretical discoveries in practice: why should one set of consequences be preferred over another?

In Plato's "theory of ideas", descriptive, mathematical, and ethical predicates are ultimately grounded in the triad of ideas: beauty, goodness, and justice, which function not only as standards of truth and causes of being, but as *ideals* for the direction of our moral behaviour. The ethical predicates, for their part, possess particular relevance, not only for the constitution of our individuality and for the conceptualisation of our life's orientation, but also for the foundation of knowledge. In other words, there are ideas of things, mathematical ideas, ideas of virtues, but these are never hermetically separated from each other; and all ideas are founded ultimately in the idea of the good. Ideas establish thus not only *what a thing is by nature and how it behaves*18, but also the criteria or point of orientation towards which we may "turn our gaze" (*apoblepein*) in the search for knowledge, as to a standard and paradigm (*paradeigma*), by which to judge whether our actions and the actions of others are just, prudent, pious or otherwise.

With the Analogy of the Line, Plato elaborates his understanding of the epistemic conditions of knowledge and reality. The Line functions as image or *interpretandum*, of the interrelationships of knowledge (*epistēmē*), probable opinion or belief (*doxa*), and their objects, intelligible and sensible reality (*noēta*, *aisthēta*). Socrates presents the image of the Line in the manner of a mathematical problem: he asks Glaukon to first imagine a line and then to cut it into two unequal parts, and when this has been accomplished to divide each part *according to the same ratio* (*ana ton auton logon*). Plato utilizes thus a geometrical proportion as analogue of the complex relationship of the knower to the content of his knowledge, providing at the same time perhaps the first explicit example analogical reasoning as a specific *method* of investigation.19 In keeping with the law of proportion, the

<sup>18</sup> Heraclitus' formulation of the original task of the philosopher, Cf. H. Diels/W. Kranz *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* . Vol I(Hildesheim: Strauss & Cramer, 1985), 22 [12] B 1; and Zovko (2002) 35.

<sup>19</sup> Recent research in the fields of psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence regards analogical reasoning as one of the most highly advanced operations of human intelligence. On structures of analogical reasoning and recent research on this topic cf. M.E. Zovko, "The Way Up and

14 Metaphysics

inextricably tied to the Delphic imperative to "know thyself". Definition and argument are inextricably bound to the attainment of the inherent excellence (*aretē*) of the knower and of

In modern science, the criteria of a theory's validity is its ability to accurately describe observable phenomena and reliably predict their future behaviour on the basis of mathematical models and replicable experiments. Despite their efforts to maintain complete "objectivity", however, the sciences are never, in fact, "value neutral". Every theory is influenced by the standpoint of the researcher, and by value-related assumptions, and has implications or consequences which require ethical reflection and choice. Purportedly "objective" descriptions of phenomena, furthermore, do not in themselves provide a meaningful context for human action, including qualifying reasons for choosing one set of actions or aims, one path in life over another. Pragmatists appeal to the principle according to which thought distinctions are to be resolved by their practical consequences. The question remains, however, – above all with respect to technological development and application of theoretical discoveries in practice: why should one set of consequences be preferred over

In Plato's "theory of ideas", descriptive, mathematical, and ethical predicates are ultimately grounded in the triad of ideas: beauty, goodness, and justice, which function not only as standards of truth and causes of being, but as *ideals* for the direction of our moral behaviour. The ethical predicates, for their part, possess particular relevance, not only for the constitution of our individuality and for the conceptualisation of our life's orientation, but also for the foundation of knowledge. In other words, there are ideas of things, mathematical ideas, ideas of virtues, but these are never hermetically separated from each other; and all ideas are founded ultimately in the idea of the good. Ideas establish thus not only *what a thing is by nature and how it behaves*18, but also the criteria or point of orientation towards which we may "turn our gaze" (*apoblepein*) in the search for knowledge, as to a standard and paradigm (*paradeigma*), by which to judge whether our actions and the actions

With the Analogy of the Line, Plato elaborates his understanding of the epistemic conditions of knowledge and reality. The Line functions as image or *interpretandum*, of the interrelationships of knowledge (*epistēmē*), probable opinion or belief (*doxa*), and their objects, intelligible and sensible reality (*noēta*, *aisthēta*). Socrates presents the image of the Line in the manner of a mathematical problem: he asks Glaukon to first imagine a line and then to cut it into two unequal parts, and when this has been accomplished to divide each part *according to the same ratio* (*ana ton auton logon*). Plato utilizes thus a geometrical proportion as analogue of the complex relationship of the knower to the content of his knowledge, providing at the same time perhaps the first explicit example analogical reasoning as a specific *method* of investigation.19 In keeping with the law of proportion, the

18 Heraclitus' formulation of the original task of the philosopher, Cf. H. Diels/W. Kranz *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* . Vol I(Hildesheim: Strauss & Cramer, 1985), 22 [12] B 1; and Zovko

19 Recent research in the fields of psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence regards analogical reasoning as one of the most highly advanced operations of human intelligence. On structures of analogical reasoning and recent research on this topic cf. M.E. Zovko, "The Way Up and

the things known. Theory is thus inseparable from morality.

of others are just, prudent, pious or otherwise.

another?

(2002) 35.

cross products, i.e. the products of the means and of the extremes, can be used to find a missing term. The three known terms of the analogy can thus be used to discover a fourth missing term. The original ratio of unequal sections is repeated in each of the ratio's component parts. This implies the proportionality of the subordinate ratios both to each other and to the original ratio, illustrating not only the reflection, or refraction in another dimension, of the original ratio of knowledge and opinion, the sensible and the intelligible, in each of the constituent members of the proportion, but also the analogy of the internal relationships of the analogues from each individual realm to each other and to the whole (i.e. the analogy of the relationship between imagination [*eikasia*] and belief [*pistis*], to the relationship between discursive [*dianoia*] and intuitive thought [*noēsis*], as well as of the corresponding relationships between their respective objects [for *eikasia* the *eikones* or images*/* for *pistis* the *zoa, phuta, skeuasta* (animals, plants and the "whole class of objects made by man", of which things the *eikones* are likenesses)*/* for *dianoia* the *mathēmatika /* for *noēsis* the *ideai*] and of both analogies to the overarching division of knowledge and reality into opinion and "science", sensible and intelligible (*doxa/*with its objects the *horata* or *aisthēta*: *epistēmē,* also called *noēsis* in a broader sense, including *noēsis* and *dianoia* as subordinate functions*/*with its objects the *noēta*).

The layered proportionality of the Line admonishes against a dualistic interpretation of Plato's division of reality and the corresponding activities of the soul.20 While the Line represents a *unity in duality*, the primary duality is not that of opposition of the intelligible and the sensible, but what might be called a *duality of reference*, the Line referring, on the one hand, as a complex *sign* or *symbol*, to the whole of reality and on the other to the integrated functioning of the faculties of the soul or intelligence which make reality accessible to us. Each section of the complex proportion of the Line represents both an activity or function of the soul and the specific object or aspect of reality which that particular activity "intentionally" contains or refers to. At the same time, according to the fundamental image of the Line, reality is *one*: the functions of the soul which enable cognition of reality are *one* and convey *one reality* by means of its different aspects*.*  Intelligence is *one* taken in the entirety of the process of knowing and in unity with the reality which the diversity of its functions conveys. The law of proportion (the method of analogy) which forms the basis for analogy appears, moreover, as a specific, indirect method of discovery (as opposed to identification, recognition, deduction, induction and

the Way Back are the Same. The Ascent of Cognition in Plato's Analogies of the Sun, the Line and the Cave and the Path Intelligence Takes," in: *Platonism and Forms of Intelligence* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008)*,* 313-341; 334f. and n. 49-52. The Analogy of the Line has been widely interpreted, particularly in Anglo-american literature. Cf. R. N. Murphy, *The interpretation of Plato's Republic,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1951), 157-160; R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic.* (London: Oxford Press 1953), 147-201; A. S. Ferguson, "Plato's Simile of Light. I. The Simile of the Sun and the Line", *Class. Quarterly* (15) 1921, 131- 152; cf. also Th. Ebert, *Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie Platons* (Berlin: de Gruyter 1974), 173-193; H. Krämer, Idee des Guten. Sonnen- und Liniengleichnis (Buch VI 504-511e), in: O. Höffe (ed.) *Platon. Politeia* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1997), 179-204.

20 Even though Plato in places, for example, in the first part of the *Parmenides,* appears to favour a dualistic conception of the relationship of ideas to sensible particulars, the complexity of his exposition must not be ignored, and requires a correspondingly complex interpretation. W. Wieland, *Geschichte der Philosophie in Text und Darstellung. Bd. 1 Antike. Einleitung* (Stuttgart: Reclam 1988), 25.

The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy 17

Fig. 1. Diagram of Plato's Line transected according to the Golden ratio

December 2011).

The Analogy of the Line is a seminal text in the history of philosophy and of metaphysics. Its division of the stages of knowledge and their objects was of pervasive influence for subsequent divisions of human faculties from Antiquity to the Modern period. As Adam maintained, the Line contains "perhaps more

whole line is to the greater segment, so is the greater to the less" (cf. Euclid, *Elements* Bk VI, Def. 3, and above n. 22). On various methods for dividing a line segment according to the "golden section" cf. R. Knott, *The Golden section ratio: Phi* http:// www.maths.surrey.ac.uk/hostedsites/R.Knott/Fibonacci/phi.html and *Two-dimensional Geometry and the Golden section* http://www.maths.surrey.ac.uk/hosted-sites/R.Knott/Fibonacci/phi2 DGeomTrig. html#phi2D (16

other forms of inference).21 The constellation of relationships which holds among the individual sections of the line proceeds thus not from simple gradation of degree or a simple opposition of terms, but proportionately and organically – with unexpected consequences for our understanding of the relationship between knowledge and reality.22

Excursus: The Metaphysical Character of Philosophy according the Plato's Divided Line23

22 On the mathematical properties of the proportion equation and, cf. Zovko (2008) 326 f., and n. 37, 40, 41. For complete mathematical formulation of the proportion equation and its component ratios cf. J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato. With Critical Notes, Commentary and appendices.* 2nd ed. with an introduction by D.A. Rees, Vol. II (Cambridge University Press 21963), 64 n. 3. The fundamental ratio CB:AC gives the equivalencies CB:AC::EB:DC and CB:AC::CE:AD and furthermore CE:EB::AC:DC, *componendo*, CE + EB: EB::AD+DC::DC, in other words CB:EB::AC:DC, and so forth (for the remaining steps of the formulation cf. Adam 141, n. to 534a). Although in Plato's time the proportion was solved geometrically, and the numerical value was not calculated until the 16th century, Plato frequently refers to the so-called "rule of three", the method by which, on the basis of an original ratio, when three terms are given, a fourth can be derived (cf. above n. 21 and Zovko [2008] 327 f.). Plato is also credited with having been the first to study the proportion known as the "golden ratio", whose discovery is attributed to the Pythagoreans. The Line may have been intended to be sectioned according to the golden ratio, to which Plato refers in the *Timaeus* 31c-32a in describing the regular or Platonic solids, some of which contain the "golden section". "The golden ratio, also known as the divine proportion, golden mean, or golden section, is a number often encountered when taking the ratios of distances in simple geometric figures such as the pentagon, pentagram, decagon and dodecahedron." Wolfram Mathworld http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GoldenRatio.html (16 December 2011). The term "golden ratio" was not used until much later. Euclid calls this "division into the mean and the extreme", "the line *AB* is divided in extreme and mean ratio by *C* if *AB*:*AC* = *AC*:*CB*" (*Elements,* Book 6, Definition 3).

23 On the Analogy of the Line, its interpretation and graphic illustration, cf. Adam (1963), 63ff. notes to 509dff. and Appendices to Book VII, I: "On the Similes of the Line and the Cave" 156-163; cf. also M.E. Zovko (2008), 323ff. Any diagram of the Line is necessarily inadequate to the task of depicting the dynamics and complexity of the Line's construction and exposition. Step-by-step illustration of the unfolding of the proportion and its interpretation, including possible alternatives and disputable aspects, would be more appropriate. The method of reasoning by analogy, namely, though employing analysis and inference, is not that of demonstrative proof, but an experimental awakening of insight into the actual content of our experience and the premisses on which that experience is based. G. Patzig provides an illustration of the Line similar to the one provided here, dividing the line, "for the sake of simplicity" and "in order to ease our understanding" into nine equal parts, and making the original cut at the "third partial division from below" , whereby he obtains as fundamental ratio 2:1 (*Tatsachen, Normen, Sätze* [Stuttgart: Reclam 1988], 134, cf. 132f.). Plato, a geometer at heart, in all probability would not have taken this approach. It is likelier he would have constructed the Line geometrically, "in the extreme and mean ratio" (for example, using triangles or the "golden rectangle") to produce what was later termed the "golden section", such that "as the

<sup>21</sup> Socrates explicitly mentions this method in connection with the investigation of the virtues as a method of discovering a fourth, unknown term (*Republic* 428a). Since in the *Politeia,* the image of the state and its constitution (its division and parts, the proper education of its citizens, its injustice or justice) is intended as an analogy of the soul (its division and parts, its proper education, of the path to the realisation of its virtue/ justice, i.e. the good life), the same method can be applied, at a multitude of levels, to the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole.

other forms of inference).21 The constellation of relationships which holds among the individual sections of the line proceeds thus not from simple gradation of degree or a simple opposition of terms, but proportionately and organically – with unexpected consequences for our understanding of the relationship between knowledge and

21 Socrates explicitly mentions this method in connection with the investigation of the virtues as a method of discovering a fourth, unknown term (*Republic* 428a). Since in the *Politeia,* the image of the state and its constitution (its division and parts, the proper education of its citizens, its injustice or justice) is intended as an analogy of the soul (its division and parts, its proper education, of the path to the realisation of its virtue/ justice, i.e. the good life), the same method can be applied, at a multitude of