The APRP refers reintegrees to participating demining agencies after they have been vetted, enrolled and provided with a stipend for transition assistance. By including both former insurgents and non-combatants, the APRP is careful not to "reward" those who participated in conflict or to exacerbate tensions within the community. Very importantly, reintegrees begin receiving a salary from day one of demining training, immediately relieving pressure to return to conflict for monetary reasons. In 2010 HALO Trust started to employ former combatants as deminers, and thus to support DDR explicitly. This initiative was based on HALO Trust's belief that by promoting peace and stability in its areas of operation, it would be able to perform its core activities better while at the same time contributing to broader peacebuilding goals. When reintegrees graduate from the training, they are assigned to demining teams that are deployed in the same way as all other HALO Trust teams.270

Many other APRP activities require a significant timespan to demonstrate results to both reintegrees and communities; in contrast, reintegration as deminers shows benefits from the first day of training. While demining has remained a small component of the overall APRP, it has proven to be an important and effective means of demonstrating the benefits of peace. Another added value of having reintegrated former combatants in teams alongside community deminers is that reconciliation is effectively nurtured. They learn to work together with former enemies towards a common goal. Deminers must be able to trust one another fully to work safely in the field.271 HALO Trust has reintegrated hundreds of former Taliban and Hezbi Islami combatants in Baghlan and Kunduz provinces into its demining ranks and trained them as community-based deminers.272

Assisting directly in DDR initiatives can have repercussions for a neutral humanitarian organization such as HALO Trust. The employment of former combatants of an ongoing insurgency could be perceived by some as a partisan act siding with the government. While some assessments of HALO Trust's involvement in DDR in Afghanistan conclude that the NGO did not encounter any specific risks or threats as a result of the reintegration of former combatants,273 others testify that its employees were perceived as spies and threatened.274 Although the overall experience was seen as good, this clearly sheds light on the new challenges and risks for humanitarian NGOs when engaging in inherently political processes and working with former insurgents. As Blaney et al. pointed out, "DDR and SSR are political and dangerous efforts as they dismantle the de

facto institutions of power in conflict-affected countries. A general or warlord may not welcome the suggestion to put down his gun and become a farmer. As such, purely technical approaches to DDR and SSR will fail."275

It is of course important for an NGO to mitigate these risks, for instance by underlining and communicating its neutral and technical work and its benefits for communities. Nevertheless, caution and close monitoring are required, since reputation and trust are much more easily lost than built.276 Mine action organizations may also need to reinforce security measures for this very reason, since the risk of attacks against reintegrated fighters may increase.277 In conclusion, the example of HALO Trust's involvement in DDR in Afghanistan illustrates the added value of mine action organizations' contribution to reforming the security sector.

In sum, it can be demonstrated that the common conceptual approaches of SSR and mine action are resulting in concrete linkages between both communities of practice in some areas, such as capacity development, national ownership and the promotion of human rights, while such linkages are largely missing in others, as in the case of gender and diversity. While this latter example might highlight room for new opportunities, it also raises the fundamental question as to the limits of potential synergies. Finally, the trend towards increased interaction between mine action organizations and security providers identified in this section might not necessarily be a given in all contexts.

# Conclusion

This paper focuses on three questions aiming at identifying the linkages between SSR and mine action at conceptual and operational levels in post-conflict contexts. We show that both SSR and mine action share a common understanding of security: human security. This concept broadens the traditional state-centric definition of security and adopts a people-centred perspective which encompasses human safety, livelihood and dignity.

By focusing on national ownership, accountability and effectiveness, SSR aims to create conditions that are conducive not only to state and human security, but also to socio-economic development. Similarly, mine action actors have gone beyond the immediate removal of mines and ERW for humanitarian purposes and expanded their spectrum of activities to contribute to long-term development and address wider threats related to conventional weapons. Finally, this pattern of a broadening spectrum of activities and the recognition of the interdependencies of risks to state and human security match the qualitative change of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, which today fully integrate SSR and mine action where relevant.

The conceptual linkages between SSR and mine action are reflected by significant commonalities in their approach to designing and implementing programmes. This paper finds that both SSR and mine action programmes promote national ownership, give significant attention to the development of local capacities and seek to apply the principles of good governance. A people-centred, rights-based approach is at the core of SSR, not least because SSR mostly takes place in countries in which the security sector may have been a major threat to the human rights of its own constituency. A focus on people and human rights is also key in mine action, as it is anchored in international conventions addressing the humanitarian consequences of mines and ERW. Finally, both SSR and mine action mainstream gender equality and diversity, which are considered fundamental to ensuring effective, accountable and non-discriminatory provision of security.

Both domains have become components in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. MINUSCA and UNOCI are good examples testifying to the synergies from cooperation between SSR and mine action, with its increasingly related domains such as PSSM and SALW. MINUSCA has a mandate to incorporate PSSM into SSR and develop capacities in managing SALW. Connecting these activities may contribute indirectly to the promotion of human rights. UNOCI also gives PSSM an important role in the stabilization of the country. In addition to these cases, the paper demonstrates that the broadening involvement of mine action actors in related fields of activities has led them to work increasingly with DDR and security actors that are traditional stakeholders in SSR programmes. As illustrated by several examples, mine action can facilitate SSR by contributing to the professionalization of national security and defence forces, and consequently support capacity development and ownership.

Despite these positive trends, this paper also notes that interaction between SSR and mine action is still limited at field level. The synergies between them are mostly confined to PSSM and do not take advantage of the full spectrum of potential activities (mine action's five pillars) that could be conducted jointly to improve the impact of interventions on the ground. In particular, the paper identifies some areas in which opportunities for cooperation remain to be explored.

A potential area of cooperation is promotion of good governance. The example of Ukraine, where efforts are being made to support the development of wellgoverned, efficient and accountable mine action institutions by combining SSR and assistance to mine action, is an illustration of possible synergies. Another area is gender and diversity, which is a shared approach and a priority of both domains. The recent establishment of the Maison de la paix Gender and Diversity Hub in Geneva might be a first and encouraging sign of increasingly joint work on this critical aspect.

We recognize that some important differences between SSR and mine action render synergies challenging and, consequently, may explain the limitations in linking SSR and mine action in post-conflict contexts. A particular challenge is to bridge the political dimension of SSR and the humanitarian origin of mine action. On the one hand, this paper recognizes that SSR addresses politically sensitive issues, especially in post-conflict contexts where state institutions are contested or weak and control over the security sector is key to political influence and governance. On the other hand, it stresses that mine action has grown as a humanitarian activity abiding by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. This feature has pushed mine action away from sensitive political questions and reduced the room for cooperation with SSR.

Another challenge relates to the strong operational and technical focus of mine action, which has at least three consequences. First, it may relegate broader security and institutional issues to a second order of priority. Second, the technical nature of mine action can overshadow its contribution to security governance and, as demonstrated by the case of Burundi, SSR actors may simply not perceive it as relevant to SSR. Third, there is often a "time lapse" because mine action actors tend to be early on the ground and have their programmes and network already established when SSR actors come into play. This renders cooperation more difficult, requiring a readjustment of already ongoing mine action programmes.

However, these differences should not undermine strong opportunities for enhancing the interaction between SSR and mine action. These opportunities are important, since they facilitate the delivery of SSR and mine action support by combining expertise and experience. Building bridges and operationalizing the shared approaches and objectives will prove valuable to address security issues from a broader and more holistic perspective, leading to increased impact and effectiveness of interventions.

Human security could play an important role to bridge divides and strengthen the interaction between SSR and mine action. This concept provides a general framework in which the specific goals of SSR and mine action are understood as contributing to one single goal. The human security concept, with its people-centred approach and the relevance given to human rights, gender and diversity, is instrumental in strengthening the existing common features between SSR and mine action.

At a more practical level, the paper identifies specific areas where SSR and mine action could benefit from improved cooperation. Mine action could contribute to overcoming the challenges identified by the 2013 report of the UN Secretary-General on SSR.278 In particular, it could help SSR in bridging shortand long-term security provision by dealing with immediate threats from mines and ERW, on the one hand, and addressing longer-term challenges through the development of local capacities and institutions on the other hand. In addition, mine action has a more codified legal-normative framework than does SSR and this could be used to leverage issues that are at the core of both mine action and SSR agendas. Finally, the need for establishing mine action institutions is a potential entry point for SSR programmes.

Moreover, stronger linkages to SSR would be beneficial for a better understanding of the broader political and security context in which mine action institutions need to be developed. In other words, SSR's holistic nature complements mine action by providing a wider analysis of security needs and capacities. As seen in the cases of Nepal and Ukraine, the development of mine action capacities (or lack thereof) and their effectiveness are determined by the overall institutional security framework. SSR actors could facilitate contact with other national security stakeholders that are not among the usual interlocutors for mine action organizations but play a role in establishing mine action programmes and institutions, such as members of parliament.

Stronger interaction with security providers and SSR more generally also seems to result naturally from recent trends in mine action. First, while many mine-affected countries complete their clearance targets or treaty obligations, residual contamination may remain to be addressed. Instead of dedicated mine action institutions, this task often requires appropriate response capacities streamlined into security providers such as the military or police. Second, as mine action organizations increasingly address issues such as PSSM or DDR, their primary interlocutors may no longer necessarily be humanitarian bodies, but security actors. Given the ramifications of such issues in aspects of national security, mine action organizations may need to pay more attention to political considerations in the future and, as a result, take SSR priorities increasingly into account.

Post-conflict contexts in particular tighten the relationship between SSR and mine action for multiple reasons. First, in these environments mines and ERW often constitute a severe threat to security and an impediment to development, and must be addressed not only in the immediate aftermath of conflict but also in the long term to support socio-economic development, access to social services and the fulfilment of civic and human rights. Second, mine action requires appropriate, effective and accountable institutions which SSR aims also to create. Finally, these institutions and programmes involve a plurality of actors, from state ministries and agencies to local and international civil society, NGOs and corporations. Thus mine action has to address and solve issues and challenges that are common to all the other pillars of the security sector. Ultimately, the linkages between mine action and SSR demonstrate the importance of better articulating the close and sometimes cross-cutting relationship between these two agendas in order to improve the theory, policy and practice of post-conflict peacebuilding.

### **Notes**

191 Ted Paterson, Prabin Chitrakar and Abigail Hartley, *Evaluation of the UN Mine Action in Nepal* (Geneva: GICHD, 2012).

192 Ibid., p. 36.

207 Ibid.

208 NATO, "NATO Trust Fund Projects", www.nspa.nato.int/en/organization/logistics/LogServ/ntfp.htm.

190 Ibid.

260 MAG, "Burundi", www.maginternational.org/mag/en/where-mag-works/burundi/#.VipTzdKqqko.

Linking Mine Action and SSR through Human Security

#### **Linking Mine Action and SSR through Human Security**

Ursign Hofmann, Gianluca Maspoli, Åsa Massleberg and Pascal Rapillard

Security sector reform (SSR) and mine action share a strong common conceptual basis, which draws from a shared understanding of security. They both reflect a conceptualization of security that is not limited to the level of the state, but takes into account security threats and needs at societal and individual levels. This common basis provides opportunities for synergies between SSR and mine action. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that the strong conceptual basis is not fully reflected in concrete activities, and the linkages remain limited and underexplored. Despite this gap, there are positive examples showing the potential for synergies between SSR and mine action. Ultimately, this paper maintains that the concept of human security provides a comprehensive framework which can bridge the differences and open broader opportunities for cooperation, which in turn will increase the impact of interventions in SSR and mine action.

**Ursign Hofmann** is an advisor in the External Relations and Policy Division at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). He undertakes research and publishes on legal, policy and operational aspects of mine action in relation to broader human security. Prior to joining the GICHD he worked at the United Nations on a comprehensive review of UN mine action.

**Gianluca Maspoli** is an advisor in the External Relations and Policy Division at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). He is responsible for projects strengthening the linkages between mine action and human security. Prior to joining the GICHD he worked in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions for Switzerland and international organizations.

**Åsa Massleberg** is an advisor in the Risk Management Division at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Her main responsibilities include work on transition processes, the development of national mine action strategies and linking mine action and development. She previously worked with the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines Gender and Mine Action Programme. Åsa has also worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other development and human rights organizations in different countries.

**Pascal Rapillard** is head of External Relations and Policy Division at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). He is responsible for communications and outreach, relations with stakeholders and partners, and governance issues. Pascal also coordinates the GICHD's support to the development and implementation of international humanitarian law. Prior to joining the GICHD he worked at the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and as an assistant to the commissioner of the Thirtieth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.


**3.6 Purulence**

The infectious agent from lesions such as abscess, wound and fistula are searched by bacteriological examination.

Taking Examination material:

### **3.7 Serous liquids**

Liquids accumulated in cavities of pleura, pericardium and peritoneum and synovial and hydrocele liquids are sent to the laboratory to search for the bacteriological agent in case of infection.

Serous liquids should be taken under sterile conditions and out into a sterile container. To prevent the coagulation by putting some of the liquid into a citrate solution or a beaded bottle is appropriate.

Isolation and Identification of Salmonellas from Different Samples 133

**Reservoirs of microorganisms that cause food poisoning**

**HUMAN**

Staphylococcuses *Salmonella*, Cl. Perfringens the

Intestine Acute, slight or recovery case with uncertain porter

Dysentery bacillus

Hands

When they are kept in hot kitchen, organisms may reproduce.

Contamination

Food poisoning

products Stool

Nose Or skin lesions (i.e. septic finger )

Hands

Food stuffs When they are kept in hot kitchen,

Toxin

Food poisoning

Meat for human and animal

Meat- raw milk

Horse - Cow - Pig - Duck - Chicken – Mouse, Cat - Rat – Bird – Turtle, Frog, Snake

Meat and

**ANIMAL ORIGIN OF** *SALMONELLAS* **Animals**  (And animal feed)

*SALMONELLA*

Raw of rare food stuufs

Infection

Food posinoning (Infection type)

Meat Egg and meat

organisms may reproduce. Food stuffs