To sum up this section, empirical studies consistently demonstrate that unrealistic optimism is strong and widespread, not only in neutral situations but also during a pandemic. Moreover, it is resistant to clear signals indicating the gravity of the situation (clear and present danger). It is present in all the countries where it was studied, showing that it is not related to the culture or history of a given country nor the background of the study participants.

### **2.2 The Better-than-Average Effect in a Time of Pervasive Threat**

We know from the previous section that unrealistic optimism is at work in the COVID-19 pandemic: research participants from many countries unanimously declare that it is others who will get sick, not them (which, of course, makes no sense; if so many people say they won't get sick, then who will?). Meanwhile, as we already know from Sect. 1.3, unrealistic optimism is not the only means of falsifying reality deployed by the internal censors responsible for our self-image. Another method is the belief that we are, for some reason, better than others. So let's look at whether the censor triggers better-than-average thinking under conditions of a real, massive, and serious threat – during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The frst of our studies to address this issue was conducted online on student populations in three countries: Iran, Kazakhstan, and Poland (Kulesza et al., 2022a, b). The surveyed students were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (do not follow) to 11 (fully follow) to what extent they follow the recommendations just announced in each country for the functioning of daily life during the pandemic. The comparisons involved issues related to the medical recommendations that a given country's citizens can follow to fght the pandemic: wearing masks, maintaining social distance, washing hands frequently with soap and water and disinfecting them, etc. In order to see whether participants see themselves in a better light than other people similar to themselves, we asked them, using the same scale, to declare the extent to which the average student of their sex from their country follows such recommendations and then – in order to estimate the possible magnitude of differences glorifying oneself – to estimate to what extent the average resident of their country does so. We repeated this survey with the same people approximately 10 days later.

As we can see, we registered a classic better-than-average effect. The participants declared that they behaved more correctly than the average student of their sex, and they saw an even greater difference in this regard between themselves and the average resident of their own country. Interestingly, the passage of a mere 10 days reduced the participants' declared belief that they were conscientiously following the recommendations, but similarly, it also reduced it to the same extent for the average student and the average resident of their own country (they, too, according to the respondents, began following the recommendations to a lesser extent than 10 days earlier). Thus, the magnitude of the better-than-average effect remained constant.

An obvious weakness of the above study is that the student population we surveyed is quite specifc for many reasons (age, education, place of residence, leisure activities, etc.). A major methodological caveat fows from this fnding. It would be unwise to construct recommendations for an entire population on the basis of a study of a specifc part of it.

We therefore decided in a subsequent study to examine members of a different population that would be closer to typical average people (Kulesza et al., 2022b, "social psychology journal"). For the study, we selected subscribers to a popular online university newsletter, which features texts and audio broadcasts popularizing scientifc knowledge. Since the newsletter appeared in Polish, we were limited to Polish residents. Because of the strict lockdown implemented at the time, the survey was conducted online.

Several hundred such subscribers who agreed to take part in our study were asked – in a similar fashion to the previous survey – frst to estimate to what extent they themselves comply with medical recommendations and then to say to what extent they think the average university newsletter subscriber does so; fnally, we called on them to estimate the extent to which the average Polish citizen follows such recommendations. As expected, the participants thought they were the ones who behaved the most appropriately; the average newsletter subscriber was less disciplined than them; and the average Pole adhered to the recommendations the least. The better-than-average effect noted in our frst study has thus been replicated. Although we still do not have representative data for the entire population, it can already be assumed with greater probability that the pattern of results is typical of residents of the country where we conducted the research (i.e., Poland). However, there is still another problem: perhaps it is only the residents of a particular region of the world who are susceptible to this kind of censorious falsifcation of reality? In discussing unrealistic optimism, we showed that this is not the case. In the case of better than average, however, further investigations were needed to test the universality of the recorded effects.

Fortunately, studies on the occurrence of the better-than-average effect under pandemic conditions have been conducted in many countries around the world. For example, Kim and Han (2022), surveying 210 respondents from the United States and 214 from South Korea, indicated the prevalence of this effect in both countries; they likewise obtained a result demonstrating the universality of the human tendency to falsify reality. In doing so, the researchers showed that the magnitude of the better-than-average effect correlated with negative attitudes toward people who do not follow medical advice during a pandemic. This result can be interpreted in terms of grievances: "my efforts to stop the pandemic are being thwarted by irresponsible people who totally ignore medical recommendations," which points to a potentially important conclusion for global health practitioners. Think about building narratives aimed at showing the active involvement of a social group in the fght against a pandemic. After all, consider that we have already shown multiple times that the core cognitive biases, the falsifcation of reality, are comparisons to the group: it is impossible for "everyone to be superior to the average group member." The key, then, may be a narrative about group behaviors to change individuals' perceptions of themselves: you are not necessarily less likely to get sick than others (unrealistic optimism), and you are not necessarily more engaged in protecting yourself than others (better than average). We will return to testing such narratives as a way of curbing the activity of our internal censors, falsifying reality, in Sect. 4.3, where we present a study in which we tested exactly such a method.

Respondents' belief that they behave better, more responsibly, than other people during a pandemic was also tested in European studies conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands (Hoorens et al., 2022). In these studies, participants answered a series of questions on issues such as the medical authorities' recommendation to wash their hands with soap and water more often and more thoroughly than usual and to maintain physical distance from others; they also commented on the frequency of behaviors that are clearly not recommended by medical authorities, such as leaving home for fun, meeting relatives and friends, visiting other people in their homes, and running an errand that is not necessary. The research participants were asked to estimate how often they themselves exhibit such behavior and how often the average person of their age and sex does so. A clear better-thanaverage effect was noted. Evidently, the Belgians and Dutch they surveyed were convinced that they themselves were more likely to follow medical advice than their fellow countrymen. This effect was particularly pronounced with older (vs. younger) respondents. The researchers also asked the participants about their predictions for the aforementioned behaviors in the near future (how things will be next month). It turned out that while the better-than-average effect also surfaced then, its strength was less.

In doing so, let us note that the predictions of the Belgian and Dutch respondents as the situation in a month's time coincided exactly with the results of the real-time estimation studies we presented above, conducted in Iran, Kazakhstan, and Poland by the frst author of this monograph and his colleagues (Kulesza et al., 2022a, b). Perhaps people realize that, under the infuence of an emerging threat, they begin to engage in behaviors recommended by authority fgures quite intensively, but they habituate existing threats relatively quickly, and the aforementioned avoidanceoriented activities decrease in intensity. This hypothesis may give rise to further practical recommendations. Perhaps changes in narratives that reduce the sense of being superior are needed to avoid weakening the impact of such messages in the long term.

Very interesting results linked to the better-than-average effect (and providing further evidence that the better-than-average effect is not restricted to just one country or residents of one area of Europe) were obtained by Salgado and Berntsen in a study conducted on the UK population (Salgado & Berntsen, 2021). They asked participants about the likelihood in various situations that they would buy and wear masks, use hand sanitizers, and maintain physical distance from others and the likelihood that such behaviors would be exhibited by close others and acquaintances. They also asked questions about the extent to which it is necessary for themselves and close others and acquaintances to manifest these very behaviors in order to effectively guard against the threat of infection. It turned out that, in the respondents' estimation, it is equally necessary for everyone to manifest the aforementioned behaviors, but they themselves exhibit them at a slightly higher frequency than close others, and at a signifcantly higher frequency than acquaintances – see Fig. 2.7.

The better-than-average effect was also revealed by Kupier-Smith et al. (2020), surveying 828 people from additional European countries (the United Kingdom and Germany) and the United States in March 2020. The participants expressed the belief that they take pandemic-related medical recommendations more seriously and responsibly than the average person. In particular, they believe that they reduce the number of direct interpersonal contacts to a greater extent than other people and are more careful than others about personal hygiene during this exceptional period. And here arises a practical conclusion analogous to the one we presented when discussing the research by Kim and Han (2022). In cases of ubiquitous threats, it seems sensible to make people realize that ... it's simply impossible! As we have previously noted, we are afficted by cognitive egocentrism: we are more aware of our own actions than of other people's behavior. This causes us to falsify our selfimage and that of others. Perhaps, then, active presentation of other people's healthpromoting actions in various media could reduce this cognitive bias. We will return to this issue in Chap. 4 with a thorough presentation of a study directly dedicated to this very issue.

The results presented in this chapter clearly indicate that we (i.e., people) believe that we are better than others about following medical recommendations designed to protect us from coronavirus. Thus, we manifest the classic illusion of a betterthan-average effect. Not surprisingly, we consequently have a sense of being less likely to contract COVID-19, so we manifest another classic illusion in the form of unrealistic optimism. In other words, it is clear that we defend ourselves against an uncontrollable threat that is challenging to understand by employing a set of cognitive biases: they are double-edge swords cutting in unison, coherently, in multiple directions.

**Fig. 2.7** Attitudes towards protective behaviour against COVID-19 Source: *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 10*, p. 373 Copyright: Elsevier

*Note*: Left panels illustrate the necessity of using facemasks (A1), hand sanitizer (B1), and keeping a physical distance (C1). Right panels show the likelihood of buying and using facemasks (A2), hand sanitizer (B2), and the likelihood of keeping a physical distance (C2). All panels illustrate the data as a function of the target of the tasks: self, close other, and acquaintance. Bars denote the group means, and error bars represent 95% Confdence Intervals of the mean

Having said this, the practical recommendations are clear: global health politics should aim at reducing not one but at least two social cognition biases. In the short term, they would take away procedures aimed to reducing fear, anxiety, and depression even but in a long run would prolong life and quality of life (since COVID-19 is extremely dangerous in terms of not only mortality but also in the long-term perspective which we present in the last chapter). Under conditions of real danger, one should be less concerned with well-being and stress reduction and more concerned with protecting human life. There will be time to augment well-being after the grave threat has subsided.

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# **Chapter 3 Time to Worry? Comparative Biases and Health-Related Behaviors in the Time of the COVID-19 Pandemic**

The manifestation of unrealistic optimism during the particular period of a pandemic is unquestionably a cognitively interesting phenomenon in its own right. Equally (or perhaps even more) interesting is how cognitive biases are related to the manifestation of specifc, e.g., health-promoting, behaviors. After all, you have likely been thinking to yourself for some time: "well, I know what cognitive biases are; I can see that they occur during the COVID-19 pandemic as well. I also remember that they are functional: they enable us to reduce stress, fear, and anxiety. Perhaps, then, this falsehood should not be taken away from us? After all, what's wrong with deluding ourselves about the present and the future?"

These questions are absolutely crucial because the reduction of prolonged stress should have a positive effect on long-term health. Egotistical illusions can therefore be treated as a health-promoting factor.

### **3.1 Unrealistic Pessimism**

Recall at this point that the very idea of our carrying out an extensive program of research on comparative illusions during a pandemic originated in our observation that this distinctive state of vagueness and a sense of widespread danger is very much like the situation in which a radioactive cloud loomed over people's heads in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. At that time, one of the authors of this book and his colleagues (Dolinski et al., 1987) observed the occurrence of unrealistic pessimism. Most of the people in their research felt more vulnerable to radiation exposure than the average person. Of course, in the rather large population studied by these psychologists at the time, there were also those who demonstrated unrealistic optimism. They believed that it would be others, rather than them, who would become ill in the future with diseases that were a consequence of signifcantly elevated radiation.

The aforementioned study also specifed the relationship between comparative optimism and pessimism, on the one hand, and the declared intensity of manifestation of various preventive behaviors that could (at least potentially) reduce the effects of radiation, on the other hand. Such behaviors were, for example, drinking Lugol's iodine or refraining from drinking milk (the milkman system was popular in Poland at the time, and fresh unpasteurized milk which came from cows feeding on irradiated grass was delivered to the doors of homes in the morning). Another health-promoting behavior was to refrain from eating fresh vegetables that grew on contaminated soil and to limit time spent outdoors or even keeping windows closed in the home.

It turned out that people exhibiting unrealistic pessimism are far more likely to engage in such behavior than those demonstrating unrealistic optimism. The link between unrealistic optimism and ignoring health recommendations seems quite obvious here: since I think that the disease will affect others rather than me, there is no reason for me to manifest any health-promoting behavior that requires me to make smaller or larger sacrifces. And conversely, the pessimist believes that they are especially vulnerable and declares proactive health-oriented actions. To summarize, optimism seems wildly dangerous for one who falsifes their perception of reality in this way! This then gives rise to the assumption that some social biases are dysfunctional. We should take a closer look at this issue, as it may turn out that in the current (and future!) pandemic, social communication efforts should be aimed not only at encouraging health protection measures (wearing masks, refraining from participating in social gatherings at a time of rising rates of the disease, hand washing, and – above all – vaccination) but also at demolishing people's illusions.

### **3.2 Unrealistic Optimism: Pre-pandemic Research**

The negative association of unrealistic optimism with the manifestation of healthpromoting behaviors has also been noted in numerous psychological studies conducted under "normal" conditions, i.e., those in which there was no state of emergency or widespread danger. Moreover, other studies do not rely on the declaration noted in our study in the aftermath of the Chernobyl explosion (pessimistic respondents claimed to actively protect their health, but of course we did not know if they actually did so), so it is possible to see exactly how social biases affect real behavior (health-promoting or health-destroying). For example, it was shown that tobacco smokers who showed unrealistic optimism about getting lung cancer were less likely to quit smoking than those who exhibited no such optimistic bias (Dillard et al., 2006). This means that unrealistic optimists have actively damaged their health by increasing the risk of serious, fatal diseases like lung cancer.

This is not an isolated result: women demonstrating unrealistic optimism about the possibility of developing breast cancer were less likely to undergo mammography screening (McCaul et al., 1996), which directly leads to lower detection of this dangerous type of cancer, reducing the chance of early (and therefore more

effective) medical intervention. Another study (Dillard et al., 2009), on the other hand, found that students demonstrating unrealistic optimism about the likelihood of experiencing various problems associated with excessive alcohol consumption actually experienced them more frequently and intensely in the future (this was investigated more than 2 years later). It is worth mentioning in passing that the association of unrealistic optimism with a risky drinking style also occurred in a study conducted by Kim and Niederdeppe (2016). Davidson and Prkachin (1997), in turn, showed that people who were advised to exercise did so less often if they displayed unrealistic optimism about their health status and the potential for it to deteriorate in the future. These researchers also gauged the level of unrealistic optimism in people at risk for coronary heart disease and then invited them to attend a special lecture on preventive health behaviors recommended for such individuals. It turned out that people characterized by unrealistic optimism benefted the least from this lecture (i.e., remembered the least relevant information). Most likely, they decided that there was no point in listening carefully or taking notes because such a threat simply did not apply to them. Summarizing the results of Davidson and Prkachin (1997), we thus see a troubling nexus of detrimental reactions triggered by unrealistic optimism: not only do I actively withdraw from behaviors that are recommended for me, but I fail to acquire new information about my condition, which sets in motion further negative consequences. I will not engage in health-promoting activities because I simply know less about them (than a person unaffected by the tendency to falsify reality). This, in turn, shows how deeply social bias penetrates us: once we are affected by negative changes in our bodies, then, despite reducing anxiety or worry, in the long term, we are bound not only to exacerbate our health problems. And with their onset or aggravation, our rates of psychological discomfort will also increase.

Kim and Niederdeppe (2013), on the other hand, measured participants' levels of unrealistic optimism about infection with the H1N1 virus and asked them about their intention to pay particular attention to hand hygiene (as a proven behavior that protects against infection). It turned out that the relationship between the two phenomena was negative: the more someone exhibited unrealistic optimism, the less they intended to follow medical recommendations.

Treloar and Hopwood (2008), on the other hand, show that unrealistic optimism can lead to either abandoning or delaying help-seeking in conditions where, objectively speaking, the patient needs it (immediately!). Hepatitis C patients believed that the negative side effects of therapy tended to affect other people rather than themselves. When such negative side effects appeared, unrealistically optimistic patients frst ignored them for a long time and then reacted with shock and strongly negative affect when confronted with reality. Let us emphasize: hepatitis C is insanely dangerous, and postponing or downplaying treatment directly damages the patient's health! Thus, an exceedingly serious conclusion emerges: unrealistic optimism is a useful short-term psychological mechanism for reducing fear and anxiety but in the long-term a serious detriment when it relates to issues of health. Concluding this review, let us note that a raft of other data on the relationship of unrealistic optimism to the possibility of experiencing various medical conditions and ignoring medical advice is also presented by Perloff (1983), whose work we recommend to the reader interested in the details.

### **3.3 Unrealistic Optimism in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic**

Now we move on to the substance of this work (which is not to say that the previous chapters were superfuous; they constitute a conceptual framework, contextualize our later research, and ultimately produce practical recommendations), that is, to see if and how unrealistic optimism can modify behaviors aimed at protecting one's health. In light of the fndings presented so far, it seemed not only to us but also to other researchers very likely that studies of human functioning under conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic would also reveal a negative association of unrealistic optimism with the manifestation (or lack) of health-promoting behavior. This is precisely the very clear negative association between levels of unrealistic optimism and behaviors aimed at protecting one's health that was noted in a large-scale study conducted in four countries (Italy, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) involving more than 12,000 people (McColl et al., 2022). The study took place during the frst wave of COVID-19 cases in February and March 2020. They found that levels of unrealistic optimism were negatively correlated with the reported frequency of behaviors such as wearing a mask, avoiding touching one's mouth and nose, using hand sanitizer gel, and avoiding contact with people who look sick. This means that in the case of COVID-19 as well, those who falsify reality are harming themselves! It is also worth mentioning that for other recommended behaviors, such as frequent hand washing, using disposable tissues when sneezing or coughing, and avoiding the use of public transportation, while the association with the level of unrealistic optimism did not reach the conventional level of statistical signifcance (0.05), it too was negative.

A similar pattern of results was noted by Wise et al. (2020), who conducted their studies in the United States between March 11 and 16, 2020 on a sample of about 1500 people. Their analysis yielded a group of 135 people from this sample who were particularly unlikely to engage in preventive behaviors with respect to the risk of contracting COVID-19 (mainly involving thorough hand washing and limiting the number of direct contacts with other people). It turned out that the effect of unrealistic optimism was particularly strong in this particular group. Juxtaposed with the previous result, therefore, a clear picture is emerging of how in the COVID-19 pandemic unrealistic optimism does harm in the same way as in earlier studies (and discussed in the previous section) on the relationship between social bias and health-oriented behaviors.

Park et al. (2021), in turn, showed that the individuals displaying the strongest unrealistic optimism about the likelihood of contracting COVID-19 also report the least interest in obtaining information from medical and other sources about the disease and how to minimize the likelihood of contracting it. This should not come as a surprise. Since, in their view, it is not they but rather other people who are particularly susceptible to contracting the virus, it is these others, not they, who should seek such information. We note here the consistency with the research cited above on unrealistic optimism and hepatitis C. The results are convergent: not only do we harm ourselves by abandoning health-promoting behaviors when we exhibit cognitive bias in the form of unrealistic optimism, but we also forego access to knowledge that could help us stay healthy!

Oljača et al. (2020), on the other hand, examined people's general tendency to manifest unrealistic optimism (i.e., the belief that various negative events will more likely affect others than oneself) and declared adherence to medical recommendations during a pandemic. It turned out that both measures correlated negatively.

In our research (Izydorczak et al., 2023: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/ doi/10.1098/rsos.220775), we decided to go a step further and tested the level of comparative optimism with the declaration of intent to take a vaccine. Note that in the case of COVID-19, vaccination is the cheapest, easiest, and most effective preventive protection to date against death resulting from infection with COVID-19. Thus, examining the relationship between unrealistic optimism and the coronavirus pandemic was also particularly important in that it may facilitate some predictions for human behavior during future pandemics, which would be tackled with newly introduced vaccines.

It is worth stipulating that our study was conducted on data collected from June to August 2020, when COVID-19 vaccines were not yet available (and there was no cause to believe they would soon be ready), so, unable to study the actual act of vaccination, we relied on declarations of willingness to vaccinate. A noteworthy strength of our study was the mini-meta-analysis we conducted (i.e., analyzing the data collected in our various studies and comparing the distribution of results for consistency indicating a stable, strong effect, or inconsistency making it diffcult to report a stable phenomenon). We took into account the results of our six studies (*N* = 2409 conducted around the world – Germany, Poland, Italy, etc.). Our participants estimated the risk of contracting COVID-19, so we were able to distinguish three groups of people, which we conventionally called pessimists (who thought they were more at risk than others), realists (the largest group, these people estimated as equal the probability that they themselves would get sick and that another person would get sick), and optimists (those who thought they were less at risk than others).

Figure 3.1 shows the results of our research.

As we can see, the results were surprising. Both pessimists and optimists were more likely than realists to say they would vaccinate whenever possible. The inclination of pessimists to vaccinate is fully understandable and in line with our research conducted after the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion: pessimists declared high proactivity toward protecting their health by avoiding exposure to radioactive contamination (avoiding leaving the house, closing windows, not eating contaminated products, and drinking Lugol's iodine). In our research, we may assume that since unrealistic pessimists feel particularly threatened, they are obviously

**Fig. 3.1** Forest plot (**a**) difference in vaccine intention between comparative realists and comparative optimists, (**b**) difference in vaccine intention between comparative realists and comparative pessimists. (Source: Royal Society Open Science, Copyright: The Royal Society Publishing)

motivated to take measures that reduce this threat, and inoculation is undoubtedly one of them. What is puzzling, however, is the inclination of optimists to be vaccinated and the lack of such propensity among realists. We will begin with the latter issue.

Our third study, conducted in August 2021, a time when vaccines were already available (Izydorczak et al., 2022), sheds some light on explaining why realists declared the weakest willingness to vaccinate. It turned out that realists, in contrast to optimists and pessimists, were less afraid of getting infected with COVID-19 but also more afraid of the vaccine per se. Realists often expressed concern that the vaccines were introduced too hastily, without proper and comprehensive studies.

In this light, however, the positive relationship between unrealistic optimism and declared willingness to vaccinate may seem surprising. However, we believe that this relationship is only superfcially illogical. It may surprise us when we treat unrealistic optimism as the independent variable and the tendency to vaccinate as the dependent variable. The belief that I am less likely than the average person to contract a disease should result in a refusal to be vaccinated, rather than a willingness to be vaccinated. However, we should note that the results we obtained only prejudge the correlation relationship, not the direction of a possible (because even this is not certain) causal relationship. So let's try to invert our understanding. Treat the decision to get vaccinated in the near future as the independent variable and the level of unrealistic optimism as the dependent variable. One who has made the decision to get vaccinated against COVID-19 in the near future ("whenever possible") now has a full rational basis for perceiving themself as less vulnerable than the "average other." After all, they know that there are many people in the population who are skeptical of vaccination against COVID-19, so many people will not be vaccinated. With this interpretation, the results regarding optimists cease to be surprising and assume a reasonable logic.

The results of experiments conducted in Brazil (Vieites et al., 2021) seem consistent with such an assumption. The researchers hypothesized that if they focus an individual on the fact that they are demonstrating preventive behaviors, they will consequently reveal higher levels of unrealistic optimism than somebody who is simply asked to estimate the risk of disease for themselves and others. This, we note, is because such an awareness-raising infuence increases self-conscientiousness by elevating it, and – as we discussed above – this is heavily associated with social cognition biases. In keeping with this line of reasoning, the researchers have rightly assumed that one of the sources of unrealistic optimism is cognitive egocentrism – the mechanism we outlined in Sect. 1.4, i.e., that one's own behavior is more cognitively accessible to us than other people's behavior. (We simply know perfectly well how we behave and cannot have such equally precise and expansive knowledge of others if only for the reason that we do not see/experience other people's behavior as much as our own.) Through simple interventions, however, it is possible to further increase an individual's cognitive accessibility to information about their appropriate and desirable reactions. In their frst experiment, the researchers simply asked people frst how often they wore a mask and then estimated their level of unrealistic optimism. In the second study, prior to measuring their degree of unrealistic optimism, participants were asked to determine whether they agreed with the following statement:

The authorities have recommended mask wearing as a measure to contain the dissemination of the coronavirus. According to experts, wearing a mask when going out signifcantly reduces the risk of contamination. Do you agree with this statement? \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No. (Vieites et al., 2021, p. 626)

It turned out that both of these simple interventions led to increased levels of unrealistic optimism. When looking at them, it is essential to consider that the measure of unrealistic optimism was constructed by the researchers in such a way that the lower the bars on the graphs, the higher the level of unrealistic optimism (this refers to the way the authors coded the results; we have already said that there are different methods of measuring and analyzing unrealistic optimism).

### **3.4 Better than Average**

There is also the question of whether the stated intention to vaccinate against COVID-19 will be positively correlated with another positive comparative bias we write about in this book, i.e., the better-than-average effect. In one of our studies (Kulesza et al., 2022b), we decided to test this. The respondents frst estimated the extent to which they themselves engage in various behaviors recommended during the pandemic by medical authorities (keeping social distance, wearing masks, frequent hand washing, etc.) and the extent to which the average person of their sex and age does so. This allowed us to calculate a better-than-average effect factor for each participant. We then asked each participant to indicate on an 11-point scale (from "defnitely not" to "defnitely yes") their intention to take a COVID-19 vaccine as soon as it became available. (We conducted the survey in August 2020, when no such vaccine was available, but it was already rumored to be coming relatively soon.) Regression analysis showed a moderate relationship between the two variables.

Thus, we see that the magnitude of the better-than-average effect is a predictor of intention to vaccinate; but, on the other hand, the relative weakness of this relationship indicates that the tendency to vaccinate is based largely on other mechanisms than the propensity to manifest other health-promoting behaviors. There is no doubt that, from a medical perspective, the most effective way to prevent a pandemic is mass vaccination of the population. From a psychological perspective, however, the situation is quite complex. Indeed, as we have shown in previous sections of this book, cognitive biases may not foster various health-promoting behaviors. The studies we present now, on the other hand, show that they can induce people to get vaccinated.

It is this distinctiveness of vaccination from other forms of protection against infection that may psychologically partly explain why the studies recorded a negative association of the level of unrealistic optimism with the frequency of such medical/health-related behaviors as washing one's hands or limiting real, direct contact with other people but unrealistic optimism was positively associated with the intention to be vaccinated. Perhaps unrealistic optimism is associated differently with behaviors that have already been manifested (or are currently being manifested) and still differently with hypothetical, future behaviors that the individual is only just considering. Whether this is indeed the case could only be conclusively determined by empirical research, which we strongly encourage.

However, it should be emphasized here that the positive relationship declared in our study conducted in Poland (a country with an average vaccination rate) between unrealistic optimism and COVID-19 vaccination did not occur in the study conducted in Romania – a country with a record low level of COVID-19 vaccination and also the highest mortality rate from the disease in Europe (Maftei & Petroi, 2022). Four groups of people were engaged in the study – those declaring they would defnitely not vaccinate, those who were hesitant, those declaring they would defnitely vaccinate, and those who had already been vaccinated. Unrealistic optimism was examined in relation to both the probability of contracting COVID-19 and the severity of the disease. The respondents were asked to determine the probabilities of both states of affairs for themselves and the average Romanian of their age and sex. It turned out that those declaring that they would defnitely not vaccinate exhibited the highest level of unrealistic optimism, the hesitant slightly lower, and those determined to vaccinate the lowest. We should add for the sake of argument that those who had already been vaccinated also reported high optimism (the same as those who defnitely did not want to be vaccinated), but in their case, it is diffcult to speak of unrealistic optimism. After all, they were comparing themselves with the average person, and the vast majority of the Romanian population was not vaccinated.

As we proceed toward recommendations, summaries, and therefore the conclusions of this book, let us consider the studies presented above in a broader perspective. The McColl et al. (2022) study conducted in four Western European countries and the Maftei and Petroi (2022) study just discussed by us in Romania, as well as the Wise et al. (2020) and Park et al. (2021) studies we mentioned earlier in this book, show clearly that, in certain cases, unrealistic optimism can lead to inappropriate behavior, increasing not only the likelihood of a particular person contracting the disease but consequently the spread of infections and the growth of a pandemic. To put it bluntly, unrealistic optimism thus has destructive consequences both at the individual level (avoidance of health-promoting behaviors) and at the community level (when the mass of people avoids washing their hands thoroughly or wearing masks, a pandemic will develop!). If we additionally consider the fact that, in the realm of health, unrealistic optimism can also prove dangerous for many other diseases and disorders (e.g., Dillard et al., 2006, 2009; McCaul et al., 1996) and the fact that the aforementioned illusion can also be dangerous in areas of human functioning other than health (e.g., Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010; Yang et al., 2007), the question of ways to reduce unrealistic optimism clearly must arise. Moreover, it may turn out that unrealistic optimism in general negatively affects all healthpromoting behaviors, signifcantly degrading the health of the person falsifying reality in this way. In other words, we would like to say that, so far, what has been analyzed is the association of unrealistic optimism with single health-promoting behaviors targeting particular diseases. Probably nobody has yet analyzed the role of unrealistic optimism in downplaying all types of health risks. If it turned to be the case that unrealistic optimism globally infuences a particular person's disengagement from a vast number of health-promoting behaviors (e.g., forgoing mammograms, screening and follow-up examinations, excessive alcohol consumption, avoidance of dietary recommendations, etc.), we could speak of a sort of psychological sepsis! Even if this is not the case, the potential (i.e., concerning specifc individual risks) harm of unrealistic optimism is beyond question. The vital issue of methods to reduce unrealistic optimism is therefore the focus of the next section of this book.

We also note in passing that in the preceding section we have paid almost no attention to the relationship between the better-than-average illusion and healthpromoting behavior. This is because we did not fnd many works reporting such results. More research is therefore needed, both on the COVID-19 pandemic and the broader aspect of global health. This seems crucial to developing a better understanding (and therefore preparation) for upcoming pandemics (and perhaps other sudden, unpredictable, and massive disasters; we will write more about this in the conclusion of this book).

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# **Chapter 4 Time to Act! Means of Reducing Positive Illusions**

You, the reader, are already well aware that in this book we analyze two cognitive positive biases: the better-than-average effect and unrealistic optimism. The former seems to produce negative consequences only when it is acutely amplifed, when, to use Baumeister's (1989) language, it ceases to be an illusion and takes the form of a delusion. In such situations, the individual, convinced of their own perfection, may lose motivation to enhance their competence and skills (Brown, 2012; Moore & Healy, 2008). Research also shows that, in certain situations, it can also diminish one's interpersonal attractiveness, especially in the long term (Bonanno et al., 2005). While certainly in some cases the belief that one is better than others can also have – as we have shown above in the context of prevention against COVID-19 – negative consequences for people's functioning in the area of health, by far the second of the biases analyzed in this book, unrealistic optimism, seems more dangerous. In his pioneering article on this positivity bias, Neil Weinstein (1980) already draws attention to the dangers of optimism construed in this way. In doing so, he presents research showing how the magnitude of this positivity bias can be reduced. While we have also discussed a number of works in the broad context of healthcare confrming these preliminary results and presented a detailed analysis of the dangerous link between realistic optimism and the failure to employ active behaviors targeting COVID-19, the key question is "what can be done" to reduce the widespread and dangerous presence of unrealistic optimism during threats such as the coronavirus pandemic.

Recall that the author of the concept of unrealistic optimum, Weinstein, started from the premise that one of the reasons for the occurrence of unrealistic optimism may be a false image of other people. The individual may believe that, for various reasons, they are very likely to be victims of various undesirable events and, on the other hand, lack the competence, motivation, perseverance, or other attributes to achieve desirable states. In other words, while people are aware of their own attributes and competencies, they are not aware that other people also have them. And it is precisely this discrepancy in knowledge about oneself and knowledge about other people, referred to as cognitive egocentrism, that is one of the sources of unrealistic optimism. Now let us look at how cognitive egocentrism is empirically tested for the reduction, or even elimination, of unrealistic optimism.

### **4.1 You Are Not Exceptional, Not at All!**

In Weinstein's (1980) pioneering experiment, 120 female students of Rutgers University took part. They were asked to estimate from what percentage of female students at that university they were more likely to experience various negative events and from what percentage of female students they were more likely to have various positive experiences. The respondents were then asked to write down the various factors that lead them to make such judgments. So they were to write down what actually makes them more likely than others to have positive things happen in their lives and what makes them relatively (i.e., compared to other people) less likely to experience various traumatic events. After doing so, they were handed a folder with pages that had been written by fve other female participants who had been surveyed earlier in the experiment. They were asked to read these notes carefully. By this procedure, the students were able to see that other people gave a whole host of different reasons why they would be highly likely to experience desirable states and avoid undesirable ones. Finally, respondents again flled out a questionnaire allowing them to estimate their level of unrealistic optimism. It turned out that this procedure led to a signifcant decrease in the level of bias analyzed here.

In subsequent studies, Weinstein (1983) used a slightly different procedure, although the idea of reducing unrealistic optimism itself remained the same. This time, both men and women were studied, and participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. In the frst condition (control), they simply estimated their chances of experiencing various negative states of affairs, comparing them to the chances of the average university student of their own sex. In the second condition (own risk), the participants were asked to think about whether, in their case, the possibility of avoiding undesirable events might be infuenced by the various factors presented to them, and only then did they measure their level of unrealistic optimism about various negative events. In the third group (information), participants were shown the same list of factors, but at the same time, with each question they were told what percentage of previously surveyed students at that university considered the factor to be important in their own case. The reduction or increase in the level of unrealistic optimism can be described in this experiment by comparing the estimates made by participants in the last two groups with those made by participants in the control condition, that is, those who were simply asked to provide risk assessments.

Weinstein asked participants to estimate their own chances of avoiding negative events compared to those of the average student for ten different events. He chose fve for which very strong unrealistic optimism had been recorded in earlier studies (diabetes, heart attack, drinking problem, suicide, lung cancer) and fve for which unrealistic optimism was weak or not reported at all (other form of cancer, ulcer, tooth decay, high blood pressure, auto accident injury, mugging).

It turned out that among the participants subjected to the "information" type of intervention (reduction of cognitive egocentrism, orientation to others), there was a marked reduction in the level of unrealistic optimism with regard to events where the research usually recorded high levels of this bias, and except for one case (auto accident injury), there was no change in their belief about the chances of avoiding undesirable conditions with regard to events where the bias was generally weak. In contrast, there was an increase in the level of unrealistic optimism among participants who refected only on their own situation (own risk group, where selfcenteredness boosts egocentrism). Interestingly, this effect appeared both for events in which unrealistic optimism is usually noted and for events in which it usually does not appear or is weak.

We can therefore see that one way to reduce unrealistic optimism may be to make people aware that they are not unique with regard to certain events – other people also have various attributes or competencies that may, in their individual case, favor the avoidance of undesirable states. This assumption is consonant with the fndings of Weinstein and Lachendro's (1982) experiment, in which it was shown that even just getting people to think about various factors that can reduce the risk of others experiencing negative events may to some degree reduce the level of positive illusion discussed here.

A number of years later, Rothman et al. (1996) took a more systematic look at this regularity. They had reliable statistics at their disposal on the probability of various negative states of affairs for the American population. Thus, for example, the probability of at least one divorce in a lifetime was 38% at the time the experiment was conducted, for pneumonia ending in death 2.2% for women and 1.9% for men, and for alcohol dependence or problems resulting from excessive drinking 4.5% for women and as high as 19.5% for men.

The experiment reported here involved female students who were randomly divided into three groups. In the frst group, real statistics were presented on the probabilities of various negative events occurring in an American woman's life (such as divorce, alcoholism, chlamydia, depression requiring treatment, or reaching a weight 20% above the norm). In the second group, these statistics were fabricated by giving the participants twice the actual values. In the third group, the respondents were also given false data, but the fgures were 150% of the actual values. They were asked to indicate the probabilities that various negative states of affairs would happen to them.

The results were unequivocal. When the respondents were presented with real statistics, they exhibited unrealistic optimism. This illusion was amplifed when they were given fabricated statistics suggesting that the risk to the population was lower than it actually was. If, on the other hand, they were provided with false statistics that overstated the risk, they also made higher estimates of the probability that negative events might be their lot. Note, however, that while this is clear evidence that, in estimating risks to themselves, people take into account the probability that such an event could befall the average person in their population, this does not necessarily lead directly to the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism. In other words, the question is whether people demonstrate a belief that they are less likely to experience various negative states of affairs from the statistical values they are provided.

It turned out that in circumstances when they were given falsifed statistics suggesting that the risk was higher than it actually was, this was the case. Under such conditions, the women in the study believed that they were clearly less likely to experience such events than the average American woman. However, if the participants were given statistics falsely suggesting that the probability of experiencing various negative events was lower than the actual probability, not only did they not manifest unrealistic optimism but actually considered themselves slightly more likely to experience undesirable conditions than the average American woman. In summary, there is a very interesting interrelation here. If we mislead someone by suggesting that the objective (statistical) probability of some negative event occurring in the life of a person from the group to which they belong is lower than it really is, then, while they will incorrectly assume that the probability of them experiencing it is low (i.e., they will think it is lower than objective statistics suggest), they will not, at the same time, manifest unrealistic optimism. They will not believe that they are less vulnerable than most other people (and may even believe that they are slightly more vulnerable than they are). If, on the other hand, we present them with falsifed statistics, from which it will appear that the threat, statistically speaking, is high (more accurately, higher than it would appear from objective data), then they will overestimate the threat to themselves, while at the same time demonstrating heightened unrealistic optimism. Thus, we can conclude that misleading people about such statistics is a double-edged sword and therefore counterproductive. We also cannot overlook the ethical aspect here. After all, lying to patients or clients of a doctor or psychotherapist must not be condoned. Thus, although the experiment presented here, aimed at identifying the mechanism responsible for reducing unrealistic optimism, is cognitively meritorious, we cannot recommend the described interaction as a way of reducing this bias.

### **4.2 Don't Look Away: Think About the Danger!**

You may recall that unrealistic optimism helps reduce fear and anxiety. Thus, it can be assumed that it allows us to disregard that which threatens us. Anxiety, after all, concentrates our attention on the factor that causes it. So let us look at another possibility, consistent with this assumption, for reducing such positive illusions, which comes from research published by Frank McKenna and Ian Albery (2001).

In contrast to the researchers whose experiments we have discussed above (where the effect of reducing egocentrism on lowering unrealistic optimism was tested), McKenna and Albery assumed that a decrease in unrealistic optimism could be achieved by directing one's attention to oneself, rather than to other people. However, this is not a matter of focusing on various real or hypothetical competencies or mental dispositions that can help a person avoid a threat but on the negative event itself as such. A situation in which the individual can imagine being a participant in, or actually a victim of, such accidents can increase their subjective belief that this is possible (it is diffcult to fear something we don't know about and don't pay attention to, such as Ebola for Europeans). In turn, this is easiest to imagine if one has already experienced such a situation.

McKenna and Albery (2001) explored this possibility in a simple fashion and ensured that their study included drivers with a variety of driving experiences: those who, according to police records, had never been in an accident, those who had caused a minor accident that did not injure its participants, those who had caused a serious accident in which someone else was injured, and those who had caused an equally serious accident in which they themselves were victims. Participants were asked to estimate how skilled they were at driving compared to the average driver and how safe they drive, as well as how likely they were (also, of course, compared to the average driver) to cause a traffc accident in the future. Thus, we see that we are dealing here with both questions pertaining to the realm of better than average (the frst two questions) and to that of unrealistic optimism (question three).

It turned out that, with regard to the frst two questions, two groups proved distinct from the other two. Common sense would dictate that drivers who had never caused an accident considered themselves more skilled and safer drivers than those in the other groups. After all, it is diffcult to assume that one is an unsafe driver if one has never caused an accident. Drivers who themselves suffered in an accident they caused considered themselves, in turn, to be the least capable and the least safe of the four groups surveyed. This, too, is perfectly understandable: having accidents = not driving safely.

However, it turned out that when estimating the likelihood of causing an accident in the future, no differences were noted between the four groups of drivers. For the sake of clarity, we should add that strong unrealistic optimism was recorded in all four groups. Thus, summarizing these results, it can be said that personal experiences can change unrealistic beliefs about one's own above-average abilities but do not reduce the level of unrealistic optimism and perception of the future. This may yield serious lessons for pandemic management and the feeling of unrealistic optimism: regardless of whether we have been affected by the virus, we unrealistically assume that it will not affect us (anymore), but it will affect others!

As part of our own empirical research program on the positive illusions experienced by people during a pandemic, we also faced failure in developing a technique to reduce the level of unrealistic optimism. Our idea was inspired by the so-called cognitive accessibility heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A good example of this phenomenon is a study whose participants read a list of names. In one case, it consisted of the names of 19 famous men and 20 rather unknown women, and in the other case, it consisted of the names of 19 famous women and 20 little-known men. When the participants were then asked whether there were more women or men on the list, those reading the frst list mistakenly thought there were more men, while those reading the second list thought there were more women. The explanation for these mistakes is that familiar names were cognitively easier to remember and recall (because they were familiar) when it came to answering the question of whether men or women dominated the list in terms of numbers.

Building on the concept of the accessibility heuristic, Norbert Schwarz and colleagues concluded that in certain situations, people can base inferences about their own characteristics on the extent to which certain information is accessible to their cognitive processes (Schwarz et al., 1991). Some participants in the experiment were asked to recall 6 episodes from their own lives when they behaved assertively, while others were asked to recall 12 such episodes. Subsequently, they completed a self-assessment and were asked to evaluate, among other things, their own assertiveness (understood as a personality trait).

It turned out that those who were previously tasked with recalling 6 episodes were considered more assertive than those who recalled 12 such events. Why? Recalling six episodes of one's own assertive behavior is quite easy, and probably each of us can perform this task. By then answering the question "how assertive are you?," the participants have a solid basis for thinking of themselves as people endowed with such a trait: "Since I can easily recall situations in which I reacted assertively, it means that I am assertive." However, recalling 12 such episodes is diffcult or even very diffcult for most people (for us, the authors of this book, it is very diffcult). Thus, if the participants of the study are asked how assertive they are, their inference proceeds as follows: "Since I had so much diffculty recalling real situations from my own life in which I reacted assertively, it means that I'm probably not very assertive."

Seeking to apply the above results to the pandemic context, we hypothesized that the same might be true of unrealistic optimism and the assumption that one is less likely to contract COVID-19 than other, similar people (we discussed this research in Sect. 3.3). In designing our study, we assumed that if we asked people to give a small number of reasons for believing that they were less likely to experience a negative event (contracting COVID-19) than the average person, it would be an easy task for them. However, if we ask them to give a large number of such reasons, the task becomes diffcult. Consequently, in the frst of these cases, people should demonstrate heightened unrealistic optimism ("My risk of contracting COVID-19 is lower than that of other, similar people"), but in the second, the degree of this positive illusion should decrease ("it's hard for me to give reasons why I'm actually at less risk so I suppose I'm in the same danger as other, similar people").

In our experiment (Kulesza et al., 2023c), we conducted an online survey of a large group of subscribers to an online university portal for the dissemination of scientifc knowledge. We randomly divided the participants into four groups. In the frst (control) group, they simply estimated the probability that they themselves would become ill with COVID-19 and estimated the probability that an average subscriber of that portal of their sex would become ill. In the other groups, before making such an estimate, they were asked to list (3, 6, or 9, respectively) factors that should prevent them from becoming ill with COVID-19 themselves, and only after doing so did they answer the same two questions we asked in the control condition.

While we had presumed that an individual's generating six and certainly nine reasons why they were at low risk of getting sick would diminish their unrealistic optimism, nothing of the sort occurred. In addition, we found that the more reasons people gave for remaining healthy in a pandemic, the higher their level of unrealistic optimism was.

### 4.3 Chameleon? Failed!

So, as we can see, we failed to confrm our assumptions. Perhaps this was because generating even nine reasons to justify one's own optimism was not diffcult enough for our participants. (Unfortunately, we did not control for this in our experiment.) It is also possible that our proposed method of reducing unrealistic optimism, while ineffective for contracting a virus during a pandemic, would be effective in other situations. Only future research can answer these questions.

Further research is also undoubtedly needed on the suggestion for reducing unrealistic optimism presented by Hye Kyung Kim and Jeff Niederdeppe (2016). They addressed the problem of risky drinking by college students. They noted that "dry" information about the harms of alcohol and behaviors that can lead to alcoholism or other problems associated with excessive drinking is not very impressive to students, who prefer to party hard with huge amounts of beer or whiskey. They also noted that the level of unrealistic optimism they measured in the student population is clearly related to such alcohol-fueled, leisure activities presenting health risks.

How did the study work? The unrealistic optimists were provided with either dry descriptions saying that drinking large amounts of alcohol was very harmful, or they were introduced to narratives from a student who related that heavy partying based mainly on getting drunk had led him to considerable health problems and an inability to concentrate on his studies (e.g., increasing diffculty in completing homework assignments) during the experiment. The hard-partying student also added that he by no means realized that drinking alcohol could lead to such a predicament. In the control conditions of this experiment, the students were not given any information about the consequences of alcohol use or abuse. All of the participants were asked, in turn, what they thought the likelihood was that they themselves would experience negative consequences of alcohol use during the current semester.

It turned out – contrary to the expectations of the study's authors – that the aforementioned perceived threat was the same in all three experimental conditions (i.e., the "dry" information, narrative, and control conditions). Note, however, that Kim and Niederdeppe examined the level of unrealistic optimism only at the beginning of their study, and after the experimental manipulation, they asked the participants only about the threat they perceived in relation to themselves. The lack of measurement of an analogous threat to the "average other," therefore, makes it impossible to judge whether the narratives bear any relation to unrealistic optimism per se. This issue therefore requires further empirical exploration, as we have already noted.

### **4.3 Chameleon? Failed!**

As part of our research program, we considered whether, for example, doctors – when visiting and talking to patients – or others directly interacting for health purposes with people affected by the COVID-19 pandemic should employ the common method of mimicry, an imitation also called the "chameleon effect" in the literature. There were several justifcations for choosing this technique to change views of comparative biases. First, mimicry has been shown to reduce egocentrism: a mechanism we discussed in the frst chapter that is a key factor in the constitution of comparative biases. In numerous studies it was shown that mimicry changes the social focus from "me" toward "others" (Lakin et al., 2008; Van Baaren et al., 2004) and changes in social orientation from "me" to "you" create greater tendency to perform mimicry (Castelli et al., 2009; Leighton et al., 2010; Van Swol & Drury-Grogan, 2017).

Participants of our experiment (Kulesza et al., 2022a) for 10 min interacted online with the confederate. The study took place under strict lockdown, so exposure to the COVID-19 threat was imminent, making this experiment especially relevant: participants were not asked to "imagine" being in a pandemic (see also Dolinski, 2018). To stress the focus of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the topic of the interview concerned opinions on the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In the mimicry condition, the confederate repeated some verbal statements expressed by participant, while in the control condition the confederate only assessed understanding of the statements ("yes," "I understand"; see details for this manipulation, Kulesza et al., 2014).

Contrary to our expectations – backfred – it fueled the unrealistic optimism bias in estimation of risk of COVID-19 infection. Importantly, it is probably the frst experiment in the body of research on comparative biases showing that a specifc manipulation may fuel this phenomena, indicating that future studies should also research this area.

Our next empirical program, on the possibility of using mass media for this purpose, turned out to be more conclusive in terms of fnding a way to reduce levels of unrealistic optimism (Dolinski et al., 2022).

### **4.4 Media Intervention Program**

As we already know, the mechanism of cognitive egocentrism leads the individual to focus on their own behavior, while being less aware of other people's actions. This makes them think they have a better chance than others to avoid various negative events. Part of the techniques described above for lowering the intensity of unrealistic optimism are thus focused on making one realize that other people also take various actions that are motivated by their desire to reduce risk (Weinstein, 1980, 1983; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982; Rothman et al., 1996). Note, however, when people estimate the risk of contracting an easily spread virus during a pandemic, the situation is much more complex than with regard to diseases and disorders such as alcoholism or obesity. In cases of alcoholism or the possibility of obesity, the actions and behaviors of others have a very limited impact on the individual's situation. One may or may not become an alcoholic and may or may not become obese regardless of what other people (especially those outside their circle of acquaintances) do.

In the case of infectious diseases, however, the situation is quite different. The behavior of other people who can transmit viruses remains in close relation to the situation of the individual, who, willingly or unwillingly, must come into contact with such people, at least from time to time. This creates, from the perspective of factors that can affect the level of unrealistic optimism, a unique situation. On the one hand, making the individual aware that others also frequently wash their hands, keep physical distance, disinfect surfaces in the places they are in, or wear masks should make us realize that we are not unique in these respects and, consequently, reduce our level of unrealistic optimism. On the other hand, however, the conviction that many others are acting unwisely and not following medical advice should make us realize that this increases the likelihood that we ourselves will get infected (from such people) and become ill. Nevertheless, in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, many of us have contracted this dangerous disease at least once, and certainly we all know people affected by the virus. Moreover, unfortunately, some of us have suffered the death of a loved one from COVID-19. Consequently, infuenced by just such information, we should also experience a reduction in unrealistic optimism.

In doing so, we should note that during a pandemic the mass media can present all sorts of images and information about people's behavior. They can – and do! – both create the impression that the vast majority of the population follows medical recommendations and publicize cases indicating that there are numerous situations in which people do not wear masks or ignore bans on mass events (such as rock concerts). As part of our empirical research program, we decided to test how the aforementioned information of various kinds (other people follow medical recommendations vs. other people don't follow them) affects the level of unrealistic optimism that individuals demonstrate.

Our frst study included 350 participants of both sexes randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (Dolinski et al., 2022). (The initial pool had 360 participants, but it turned out that 10 of them were infected with COVID-19, so they were excluded from analysis.) For the two experimental groups, the participants read newspaper articles we had prepared especially for them. In the frst condition, they made clear that people were widely ignoring medical advice on how to function in a coronavirus pandemic. In the second condition, the thrust of the articles was completely different. They indicated that people were universally following medical guidelines. Participants in the third group (control conditions) did not read any of the newspaper articles we had prepared. They were asked questions about their own risk of getting infected and that of the "average other" (a classic measure of unrealistic optimism). We present the results of this experiment in Fig. 4.1.

As we can see, the pattern of results for respondents who read articles about people ignoring medical recommendations is the same as in the control condition. In both cases, people demonstrate unrealistic optimism, and estimates of risk to self and risk to the average other are also almost identical. However, the situation is different when people have read information about others behaving responsibly, and public compliance with medical recommendations is widespread. This time the unrealistic optimism vanished! For the sake of clarity, we add that this effect was achieved because people began to perceive themselves as more likely to get sick. The effect is therefore analogous to that obtained in earlier studies dealing with

**Fig. 4.1** Unrealistic optimism effect in three experimental conditions Source: *Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being, 14*, p. 505 Copyright: Wiley

*Note*: Bars represent mean values, error bars represent standard error of mean

noncommunicable diseases and other adverse conditions (Weinstein, 1980, 1983; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982; Rothman et al., 1996).

In our second study, we decided to see if this pattern of results would be replicated in conditions using media that employ images rather than words. This time, we presented 600 participants with videos (no words, conversations, or commentary were heard) showing the behavior of a group of people in a coffee shop. Some people saw a video in which people ignored medical recommendations (they did not disinfect their hands when entering the café despite passing a visible dispenser; they did not wear face masks; they crowded in line at the counter when choosing pastries and ordering coffee), while some were shown a video in which people behaved completely differently – they complied fully with all medical recommendations. Participants were not shown any video in the control condition.

Analysis of the results of this experiment quite unexpectedly revealed an entirely different structure to those of the experiment discussed previously. As we will see in Fig. 4.2, people observing others who behave as prescribed medically felt less at risk overall, that is, they exhibited unrealistic optimism. Compared to participants in the control condition, they believed that both they themselves and the "average other" were at less risk. At the same time, these participants demonstrated the same strong unrealistic optimism as those in the control condition. It was the "average other" who, in their view, was more likely to contract COVID-19. In contrast, we noted a decrease in unrealistic optimism among the participants who had watched the video showing people ignoring medical recommendations.

**Fig. 4.2** Unrealistic optimism effect in positive and negative movie conditions Source: *Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being, 14*, p. 508 Copyright: Wiley *Note*: Bars represent mean values, error bars represent standard error of mean

Thus, we see that a completely different pattern of results was obtained when the participants read texts versus when they viewed images. In the frst case (reading a newspaper piece), unrealistic optimism was reduced under conditions when the participants learned that other people were behaving properly and following medical recommendations, while in the second case (observing other people's behavior in a video), the pattern was exactly the opposite – it happened only when people saw others completely ignoring medical recommendations.

How can these discrepancies be explained? We assumed that the pivotal factor is that reading articles is more effortful than watching videos, as refected in the results of numerous studies (e.g., Dalrymple & Scheufele, 2007; Eveland et al., 2002). Thus, reading an article reduces cognitive egocentrism and prompts us to focus on the threat and assume that, because other people exhibit different health-promoting behaviors, there is no reason for us to continue believing that we are less likely than they to get sick. Watching a video, which is less effortful because it is less demanding, is not as likely to induce analytical thinking. In conditions where the participant sees people ignoring recommendations, the image acts as a danger signal: "because of people like them, I can get sick." In other words, the key to explaining the different patterns of results in our two aforementioned experiments is found in the fact that particular forms of media lead people to process the information they receive more or less carefully.

The results of our third experiment, in which we independently manipulated the form of the message (written text vs. video footage) and information about other people's behavior (consistent with medical recommendations vs. inconsistent with them) essentially confrmed the validity of this interpretation.

### **4.5 Teach and Learn?**

In the frst chapter of this book, we have already presented one of our studies conducted at the very beginning of the pandemic (Study #2; Kulesza et al., 2021). As a reminder, unrealistic optimism was found in three different countries, Poland, Kazakhstan, and Iran, and this comparative bias did not disappear. In that paper, we also reported a second study that may indicate some directions for another mechanism responsible for reducing unrealistic optimism, i.e., knowledge and education.

This survey was conducted in the Polish highest tertiary referral pediatric hospital with almost 1000 beds, up to 50,000 hospitalizations, and about 120,000 ambulatory clinic visits per year and thus in a frontline hospital not only in terms of fghting COVID-19 pandemic but in the volume and complexity of cases. We were interested if healthcare professionals would present unrealistic optimism or not, since both scenarios were possible: (1) to the best of our knowledge, so far there is no research showing that some work environments are free from unrealistic bias; thus we could expect that healthcare professionals would report this comparative bias as well; (2) since healthcare professionals are not only highly educated in terms of academic knowledge but frst and foremost during COVID-19 pandemic were witnesses – to an extent inaccessible for the average person – to the severity of this virus, as a result, they would not report this bias. In this case, formal education and/ or exposure to the severity of the pandemic both would "educate."

More than 200 healthcare professionals (doctors/physicians, nurses, frst responders/paramedics) completed the survey. Importantly, they did so during the frst wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, when we assessed unrealistic optimism in Poland. They delivered surprising results: no unrealistic optimism was found! A summary of the results can be found in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

A very cautious practical conclusion is that we should educate (in the formal sense; academically, through coursework; "in real life," by showcasing the effects of the pandemic). We note that this professional group possesses both qualities. While

**Table 4.1** Summary of the results from the second study (dependent samples t-test)

**Table 4.2** Summary of the results from the second study (independent samples t-test)

formulating the above cautious recommendation, we would like at the same time to strongly emphasize several caveats. The referenced study may suggest the previously described relationship between exposure to COVID-19 (direct, contact with patients, and indirect, knowledge of the disease), but it must be kept in mind that this was not a classic experiment! Therefore, it is possible that other factors specifc to this professional group (e.g., the extreme fatigue experienced during this period) prevented it from exhibiting egotistical illusions.

In concluding this chapter, we would like to note that the search for methods to reduce unrealistic optimism is, without a doubt, of great importance in developing recommendations both for therapists conducting individual work with overly optimistic clients and for policy-makers implementing mass media information policies in the face of all sorts of crises. Our review of this subject shows that while psychologists have succeeded in making some empirical fndings, further intensive research on this important problem is imperative. This is important because the effects of COVID-19 are multifaceted and long term. It would often seem that if we have "survived" COVID-19, then the worst is behind us. It turns out that there are many more long-term effects, which, from the perspective of this book, broadens the horizon of the sense of struggle to ensure that as many people as possible do not get sick in the future. We will discuss this in the next chapter.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Chapter 5 Time to Bother! Longitudinal Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic (and Others Too): Why Dismantling Social Cognition Biases Is Absolutely Crucial to Save Not Only Lives**

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has reminded us of a truth that we have either actively repressed or simply forgotten: pandemics entail a massive serving of – often existential – anxiety for us and our loved ones, anxiety for our health and our future, in economic terms as well as psychological: well-being, stress, burnout, and depression. Thus, it is clear that the global threat to life and health resulting from the emergence of pandemics engenders a diffcult-to-overestimate and analogous threat to our psychological and psychiatric well-being.

The paradox of the current threat is that, despite our own experience, we act as if we have none. On the one hand, an analogous pandemic took place more than a century ago (the so-called Spanish fu), and essentially – owing to censorship that shielded the public fear of the victims of World War I – it did not penetrate broadly into the consciousness of those living at the time, while reducing the risk of massive psychological and psychiatric effects caused by this fear. Only historians (of pandemics, of medicine) uncovered this danger by describing – in retrospect – the terrible toll it took. On the other hand, the less indiscriminate polio pandemic left its mark on those living roughly 50–70 years ago (and thus a small group of the readers of these words). We remember it faintly (if we were alive in those days, e.g., Dariusz Dolinski) or not at all (if we had not yet come into being, e.g., Wojciech Kulesza). Eyewitnesses to this tragedy (our parents, grandparents) who went through this tragedy in full consciousness are no longer alive or are nearing the end of their lives, so the experience of the psychological and psychiatric consequences does not have a place in our collective consciousness.

As a consequence of both these factors, analyses of the psychological results of pandemics are rather historical, with the present times visiting the frst (and painful) lesson on a living social organism: ourselves. The current pandemic is creating a collective consciousness of mainly the medical effects just mentioned, without yet heeding the psychological and psychiatric effects. Before summarizing the discussed methods of self-deception for coping with the unpredictable future, anxiety, and stress resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, we offer a momentary refection on what psychological effects – both short and long term – the pandemic brings.

We will begin with the short-term ones, which are not only more intuitive (they are experienced directly by us and our loved ones; there is already a rich literature describing this time horizon) but, for obvious reasons, are better understood than the long-term ones. There is not yet enough research on the long-term effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as the primary factor in solidifying knowledge from research fndings is passage of the necessary time. For this reason, the following section references reasonably up-to-date knowledge as of the fall of 2022 (so only 2 and a half years after the COVID-19 pandemic was announced).

### **5.1 Psychological and Psychiatric Consequences**

It probably will not come as a surprise that the COVID-19 pandemic was associated with an increase in anxiety and depression (Huang & Zhao, 2020; Prati, 2021; Prati & Mancini, 2021; Taylor et al., 2020; Vanderlind et al., 2021). What seems less clear, however, is the dynamics of these processes during the pandemic. This issue was the focus of a study by Debowska et al. (2022). More than 7000 Polish students were surveyed with various questionnaires during fve phases of the pandemic: (1) March 1–15, 2020, i.e., immediately after the frst cases of COVID-19 were identifed in Poland; (2) March 16–22, after the frst restrictions were introduced, e.g., closure of schools and universities, cancellation of mass events; (3) March 23–29, when regulations were introduced restricting direct human contact; (4) March 30– April 5, when a ban on entering forests and parks was introduced and it was established that people should not approach each other at a distance of less than 2 m; (5) April 6–30, when some restrictions were lifted but a mandate to cover mouths and noses was introduced. In addition to tools measuring anxiety and depression, they also examined levels of perceived stress and suicidal tendencies. As we can see in Fig. 5.1, the level of emotional dysfunction not only depended on the period in which the study was conducted but also on the sex of the subjects.

Another psychological disorder often reported following the COVID-19 pandemic is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD – Mak et al., 2009; Mazza et al., 2020; Parker et al., 2015), noted in almost one-third of COVID-19 survivors (Cai et al., 2020; Mazza et al., 2020). Chinese studies show that the mere information of

**Fig. 5.1** University students' stress, depression, anxiety, and suicidality in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic Source: *Psychological Medicine, 52*, p. 3746

Copyright: Cambridge University Press *Notes*: Solid line = females; dashed line = males

a positive test result can trigger PTSD (Yuan et al., 2021), leading to the conclusion that it is not only the disease that produces psychological effects but also the mere fact of being diagnosed with it. The question may arise as to where the aforementioned consequences of infection come from. The answer may be provided by studies showing that the effect of the ongoing pandemic (affecting healthy people as well) is social isolation, which subsequently leads not only to the depression just mentioned (Clair et al., 2021) but to other disorders as well. Studies of the etiology of post-traumatic stress disorder commonly draw attention to the role of lack of social support (e.g., Gros et al., 2016). Limiting direct social contact, on the one hand, and people's anxiety-driven focus on themselves, on the other, clearly promoted the development of PTSD.

Finally, it turns out that the pandemic makes its mark on us by not only infecting us per se but by exacerbating existing diseases or mental disorders. It has been shown, for example, that the aforementioned isolation (arising from the quarantine) caused people who had completed treatment for OCD prior to the pandemic to report an increase in hand-washing compulsions during the quarantine as a result of campaigns mandating frequent disinfection to prevent transmission of the virus (Davide et al., 2020; Kumar & Somani, 2020).

One community particularly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and its psychological and psychiatric consequences is the school environment of students and teachers, starting from early childhood education. It has been shown, for example, that young children not only fear infection with the virus but also fear further transmission of COVID-19 to the elderly, who, as children know, should be especially protected (Idoiaga et al., 2020). In turn, older children (and teachers) have been noted – as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic – to experience increased fear and stress (Browning et al., 2021; USAID, 2021). In academia as well, a decline in various mental health indicators has been reported (Savage et al., 2020), indicating, for example, an increase in suicidal thoughts and depression (Wang et al., 2020).

Against the background of psychological effects in the school environment, we turn to consideration of the long-term effects of the ongoing pandemic. The group of outcomes discussed below is not only less intuitive (it is diffcult to predict the long-term effects of something that is currently afficting us), but for obvious reasons, research on this topic is still scarce.

### **5.2 COVID-19 Pandemic = School Closures = Longitudinal Social Disaster**

In January 2022, the World Bank, Global Education Evidence Advisory Panel, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Offce (FCDO), and UNICEF Offce of Research-Innocenti published an analysis titled "Prioritizing Learning During COVID-19: The Most Effective Ways to Keep Children Learning During and Post-Pandemic," which captures the essence of the long-term psychological losses: children and adolescents were hardest hit by the pandemic. Pupils lost access to education and related services. The analysis was based on a broader perspective than the experience of people in Western Europe, developed Asian countries like South Korea and Japan, or North America. The report takes into account losses for underdeveloped or developing countries, the regions of the world that, after all, have the highest concentration per capita of the world's children. In these countries, schools were either closed for longer periods during rising illness rates or did not open at all for months or even years. Children in these areas of the world did not have the opportunity for distance learning most often because teachers did not have access to computers either. Demonstrating the scale of long-term losses, it is suffcient to mention that the report indicates that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic affected 1.6 billion children, who were kept out of school because of it.

Even at this early stage in the analysis of the report (and this chapter), the question may arise as to why distance learning, which has been introduced in some parts of the world, has not reduced the psychological costs paid by children. The report makes it clear that distance learning supports some aspects of education but cannot replace them. Those that remain irreplaceable introduce the extremely high costs we have already discussed. Distance learning as well is, in the main, less effective. The report in question, describing the long-term effects, showed a decline in the quality of education by an average of 1.5 grades in a given subject (see also Andrabi et al., 2021; Marcotte & Hemelt, 2008) and a 0.19 standard deviation of math score (compared to the same exam administered during non-pandemic times, Maldonado & De Witte, 2021). Experiments in Brazil have shown outright that a group receiving online – as opposed to classroom – instruction covered as much as 75% less material (Lichand et al., 2021). Of particular importance, as a result of the pandemic, some children "dropped out" of the education system and never reentered school, which has long-term effects on their entire future lives (Bandiera et al., 2020). After all, the detrimental aspects of being undereducated need no explanation: among other things, reduced chances of high earnings, which, in turn, will be refected in the quality of life of the next generation conceived by the COVID-19 pandemic generation.

The aforementioned report also revealed that school closures lead to an increase in educational inequalities, where higher-income families were less affected by the consequences of the pandemic for their children, as their resources allowed them to pay for other forms of education. A striking result from a study in the Netherlands showed that 55% of the effects/costs (losses) of school closures were concentrated around the 8% least educated families. Using a similar example, one can analyze the costs of school closures that lead to the inability to provide other education-related services. The report mentions that 388 million students beneft from school meals (which in many areas of the world is itself an incentive to send children to school). The pandemic triggered a decrease in the availability of meals for 370 million children, magnifying the poverty and food insecurity already affecting lower-income families at the outset. Against this backdrop, other long-term effects of the ongoing pandemic are clearly positioned. After all, what are the effects of child malnutrition? For example, the level of children's cognition and future school achievement drops (Fore et al., 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic particularly affects less privileged students who, in adulthood, will not be able to provide their children with the standard of living they would have achieved had there been no pandemic.

It has also been shown that 16% of girls and 8% of boys in Kenya did not return to school due to the COVID-19 lockdown (Presidential Policy and Strategic Unit and Population Council, 2021). Moreover, income projections show that schoolchildren affected by the COVID-19 pandemic will earn 17 trillion US dollars less over their lifetimes compared to what they would have earned had there been no pandemic (Abreh et al. 2021). Analogous losses are projected for preschool children at \$308 billion (McCoy et al., 2021). This directly shows that the next generation – the children of today's children – will be affected by the lower parental incomes that were reduced by the COVID-19 pandemic! So the effects of the 2020–2022 pandemic (ending as we are concluding the writing of this book) will be permanently, tangibly, and materially felt for decades to come!

The report also indicates the long-term impact of this and future pandemics in that 96% of highly developed countries and only 16% of underdeveloped countries have implemented online learning. When we contrast this result with the continued problem of access to the Internet in underdeveloped countries (e.g., via cell phones, highly and moderately developed countries report that nearly 90% have cell phones in their homes, while underdeveloped countries report 17%), it is clear that the chasm between the situations of children from underdeveloped and highly developed countries will widen.

A similarly unfavorable contrast is revealed in the fact that 85% of highly developed and moderately developed countries provided support for teachers working online, while less than 30% of teachers received such assistance in underdeveloped ones. As a result, millions of teachers have incurred serious costs, not only professionally but also purely psychological in order to adjust to new working conditions. And teachers, after all, have their own families, themselves affected by the pandemic in this way as well.

In conclusion, the report under discussion above showed explicitly that closing (often frst; before businesses) schools will exert a long-term effect on 1.6 billion children (UNESCO, 2021) and their capacity to develop through education while reducing their well-being and, fnally, dramatically degrading their productivity. These losses are estimated to last for years, or even decades, while it is estimated that the broader business sector will recover its lost revenue much faster. The report's authors suggest methods to combat the psychological effects of future airborne pandemics: (1) prioritize the openness of schools (ahead of businesses; schools provide educational development but also, e.g., provide food); (2) focus on reducing infection in schools (e.g., by prioritizing vaccination of teachers); (3) support teachers in their ability and capacity to teach children. In short, the priority in pandemics should be to keep schools open at every stage of education for the reason that, in the long run, it is children who will be more affected by a pandemic than adults.

### **5.3 Neurological Impact = Years of Cognitive Dysfunctions**

The last long-term change as an aftermath of COVID-19 is neurological changes leading to cognitive alterations. Let us note at the outset the multiplicity and breadth of brain areas that are affected by COVID-19 infection:

The list above does not exhaust the range of neurological areas affected, as early data indicate that the COVID-19 virus affects the central nervous system (Yong, 2021), which may be associated with functional impairments (Cheng, Yang, Gao, 2020) and neurodegenerative conditions (Heneka et al., 2020). In young people who are not, after all, in the risk group for COVID-19 infection, deterioration of shortterm and semantic memory, attention, and verbal learning diffculties have been observed even up to 3 months after infection (Woo et al., 2020). Other reported impairments include diffculty processing commands to perform simple motor activities (Helms et al., 2020), verbal memory impairment (Almeria et al., 2020) and working memory impairment (Hampshire et al., 2021), and cognitive slowing (Ferrucci et al., 2021) referred to as "post-COVID fog." Taken together, all of this means that the long-term neurological consequences will be very serious, permanently affecting the cognitive functioning of infected individuals.

In conclusion, it is clear that one of the few constant, unchanging features of the world around us is that in our perception it has threatened us, threatens us now, and will continue to threaten us. In addition to individual attacks from animals or other humans, we are menaced by weather disasters, volcanic eruptions, meteorite strikes, and, fnally, disease. For centuries, these events have decimated not only *Homo sapiens* but all living creatures on earth. Therefore, it is safe to assume that in learning methods to avoid deadly threats, we have also evolved by developing the ability to cope with them. Unfortunately, the tools commonly applied in this struggle include the social cognition biases whose harmfulness we have written much about in this book. The following section is intended to illustrate the potential results of failing to respond to our deployment of these harmful mechanisms: the consequences of inaction will be felt for generations to come. And this, after all, is not the only threat facing us.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Final Remarks: It's Scary, but Manageable**

We wrote this book at a time when optimists were proclaiming that the pandemic was dying out and pessimists were declaring that the mutated virus could still do mankind enormous harm. As psychologists, we will not pretend to know anything about virus mutations and epidemiology. Moreover, we don't know what the future holds with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic (however, by the time you hold this book in your hands, it may have become clear), although at the moment there seems to be little cause for optimism (sudden increase in cases in China, December 2022).

On the other hand, we can be certain that while our research program has identifed several important regularities and opened up space for new questions and new research, we certainly wouldn't want another pandemic to serve as the springboard for investigating these issues. That said, we are aware that in this volume we have not exhausted all of the issues underlying the phenomenon of falsifcation of reality during the COVID-19 pandemic. You may feel a desire for more, which we fully understand. This is why, on multiple occasions in this book and for the last time here, we ask, encourage, and implore other researchers to take up the theme; it will perhaps allow us not only to successfully manage the current pandemic but also subsequent ones. And we must be prepared for the possibility that such an occasion will, unfortunately, arise again. Without waiting for this to happen, for the time being, we highlight what we have established:

that people who are "unbiased," convinced that they are at the same at risk of contracting the disease as others, turned out to be the least likely to be vaccinated.

5. There are effective ways to reduce levels of unrealistic optimism both in the individual dimension (e.g., in doctor-patient contact) and at the collective level (e.g., through mass media).

However, we feel obliged to highlight here several limitations of the studies that we and other research teams have conducted during the pandemic. First of all, we note that the vast majority of such studies are based on verbal declarations by the participants. It is the respondents who tell us, the researchers, how often they wash their hands, how often they wear masks, or how much they avoid being in large groups of people (visiting movie theaters, attending concerts, etc.). This limitation is attributable to the period in which we had to conduct our research, forging a double-edged sword. On the one hand, we conducted research during a pandemic (the participants did not have to imagine "what would happen if they were in a pandemic"). On the other hand, we were conducting research in the middle of a pandemic, so the nature of the studies was such that we had no way of recording people's real-world behavior.

Therefore, we do not know whether the participants only seem to be prudent and disciplined or whether this is actually the case. It is also possible that they do not have such a good opinion of themselves and their behavior at all and are deliberately misleading us. They simply present themselves as decent and informed citizens because "it's the right thing to do." Wanting to make a good impression on the researchers, participants say what they think the researchers want to hear.

Occasionally, the situation becomes even more complicated. This is because sometimes we ask people not about their past or current behaviors but rather about their intentions for future – socially expected – behaviors. This was the case in numerous studies conducted when COVID-19 vaccines were not yet available, and the researchers asked people whether they would want to be vaccinated once it was possible. There are at least two methodological problems here. First, as before, we don't know whether the people declaring such a desire in our study actually have the intention to get vaccinated; and second, even if they do intend to do so at the time of the study, we don't know whether they will still have that intention once a vaccine is available. Maciuszek, Polak, and Stasiuk (2022) asked people about their intention to vaccinate against COVID-19 at the time when the vaccine was just being developed; next, after the vaccines had become available, they asked them whether they had vaccinated. It turned out that the relationship between the two phenomena was not very strong.

This is not to say that people's verbal declarations are not an important source of knowledge in scientifc research. Of course they are! However, we must realize that they do not always necessarily coincide with real behavior. The caveats mentioned above, however, do not change the fact that the results of studies on comparative illusions accumulated by psychologists during the pandemic serve not only to expand psychological knowledge. We frmly believe that they can also be useful in designing interactions (e.g., global health policies) aimed at infuencing other

people to avoid unnecessary risks and manifest various health-promoting behaviors: getting screened, following a proper diet, or giving up smoking and reducing alcohol consumption. In turn, such interactions can take place both on a microscale (e.g., when one person persuades another to get vaccinated against the fu or do more physical exercise) and a macroscale (e.g., when an advertising agency works on a concept for a social campaign to persuade people to reduce their consumption of red meat or have screening tests done).

Looking at climate change, yielding adverse consequences in the form of sudden droughts (Somalia), foods (California), fres (Australia), as well as at geopolitical events (the invasion of Ukraine; North Korea's nuclear tests; unrest in Iran), and looking at changes in the growth of global health risks (not only the obvious increase in pandemic risks but, for example, the rise of antibiotic-resistant bacteria resulting from overuse of antibiotics), we can clearly see that research into how we cope psychologically with risks (sometimes severely and even fatally harming ourselves) is crucial. It is our hope that this small contribution to understanding emergencies and threatening mass events will also contribute to envisioning and designing a future in which we are not so much censors as we are scientists using knowledge for the common good.

Once, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Lech Wałęsa, an electrician responsible for dismantling the Soviet Union and communist bloc in Europe, was asked in an interview about how to deal with some particular diffculties. Wałęsa, famously known for his quick and colorful wit, replied: "If you are afraid of a fever, just break the thermometer [in this case you won't have a temperature]."

And that is why we have written this book, so that you avoid breaking the thermometer, or at least not every time, and take a careful look at it. By doing so, you can avoid illness or other serious worries. Thank you, dear reader, for taking the time to read it.

# **References**

Orwell, G. (1949/2021). *1984*. Intra.

# **Index**

### **A**

Alcoholism, 3, 18, 20, 27, 57, 61, 62

### **B**

Better-than-average effect, ix, 3, 7–16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 38–43, 52–55, 59, 77 Bias reduction, 57 Black Death, vii Breast cancer, 17, 46

### **C**

Chameleon effect, 61 Chernobyl nuclear plant eruption, vii, 24, 25, 27, 49 Cognitive biases, 26, 27, 40, 41, 45, 49, 52 Cognitive dissonance, 1 Cognitive egocentrism, 20, 41, 51, 55, 56, 62, 65 Comparative optimism and pessimism, 46 COVID-19, vii–ix, 3, 23–43, 48–53, 55, 60, 62–64, 67, 69, 70, 72–75, 77, 78 COVID-19 pandemic, viii, ix, 7, 21, 26, 27, 31, 33, 37, 38, 45–54, 61–63, 66, 69–75, 77

### **D**

Delusions, 1–5, 55 Developmental consequences, 71 Directing one's attention to oneself, 58 Disaster, 15, 23, 25, 54, 72–75

### **E**

Egotism, 5–7 Egotistical illusions, 45, 67

### **F**

Face masks, 64 Following medical recommendations, 41, 65

### **H**

Hand sanitizing, 41, 48 Health, 25, 26, 31, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 45–49, 53–55, 61, 69, 72, 78, 79 Health-degrading behaviors, 53 Health-promoting behaviors, ix, 46, 49, 52, 53, 65, 79 Hepatitis C, 47, 49 HIV/AIDS, viii Hygiene, 41, 47

### **I**

Illusion of control, 2, 3 Illusions, ix, x, 1–5, 7–9, 15, 16, 20, 21, 26, 31, 34, 38, 41, 45, 46, 53, 55–67, 77, 78 Imitation, 61

### **L**

Learning and teaching, 66–67 Long term consequences, 67, 69, 70, 72–74 Lung cancer, 17, 46, 56

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023 W. Kulesza, D. Doliński, *Social Biases During Covid 19*, SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34706-1

### **M**

Malcom X, vii Mammography, 46 Media intervention programme, 62–66 Mental health, 1–3, 72 Mental illness, 1 Mimicry, 61, 62

### **N**

Neurological consequences, 75

### **O**

Optimism, 15–18, 25–28, 31, 32, 46, 49, 53, 55, 61, 77

### **P**

Pandemics, vii–ix, 7, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31–34, 38, 40, 45, 46, 49, 52–55, 59–63, 66, 69–74, 77–79 Polio, viii, 69 Psychiatric consequences, 70–72 Psychological consequences, vii, ix, 70–72, 74 Public health, viii

### **R**

Radioactive cloud, 24, 25, 45

### **S**

Sadder but wiser effect, 2 Short-term consequences, 47 Social distance, 38, 52 Spanish Flu, vii, 69

### **T**

Totalitarian ego, 2

### **U**

Unrealistic optimism, ix, 3, 7, 15–21, 23–41, 45–53, 55–67, 77, 78 Unrealistic optimism among HoReCa workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, 33, 34 Unrealistic optimism dynamics/change in time, 23–38 Unrealistic pessimism, 25–28, 32, 45–46

### **W**

War in Ukraine, vii Well-being, 2–4, 7, 43, 69, 74