**Studies in the History of Law and Justice 6** *Series Editors:* Georges Martyn · Mortimer Sellers

## Ulrike Müßig *Editor*

# Reconsidering Constitutional Formation I National Sovereignty

A Comparative Analysis of the Juridification by Constitution

## **Studies in the History of Law and Justice**

Volume 6

#### **Series editors**

 Georges Martyn University of Ghent , Gent , Belgium Mortimer Sellers University of Baltimore , Baltimore , Maryland, USA

#### **Editorial Board**

**António Pedro Barbas Homem**, *Universidade de Lisboa* **Emanuele Conte**, *Università degli Studi Roma Tre* **Gigliola di Renzo Villata**, *Università degli Studi di Milano* **Markus Dirk Dubber**, *University of Toronto* **William Ewald**, *University of Pennsylvania Law School* **Igor Filippov**, *Moscow State University* **Amalia Kessler**, *Stanford University* **Mia Korpiola**, *Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies* **Aniceto Masferrer**, *Universidad de Valencia* **Yasutomo Morigiwa**, *Nagoya University Graduate School of Law* **Ulrike Muessig**, *Universität Passau* **Sylvain Soleil**, *Université de Rennes* **James Q.Whitman**, *Yale Law School*

 The purpose of this book series is to publish high quality volumes on the history of law and justice.

Legal history can be a deeply provocative and infl uential fi eld, as illustrated by the growth of the European universities and the *ius commune* , the French Revolution, the American Revolution, and indeed all the great movements for national liberation through law. The study of history gives scholars and reformers the models and courage to question entrenched injustices, by demonstrating the contingency of law and other social arrangements.

Yet legal history today fi nds itself diminished in the universities and legal academy. Too often scholarship betrays no knowledge of what went before, or why legal institutions took the shape they did. This series seeks to remedy that defi ciency.

Studies in the History of Law and Justice will be theoretical and refl ective. Volumes will address the history of law and justice from a critical and comparative viewpoint. The studies in this series will be strong bold narratives of the development of law and justice. Some will be suitable for a very broad readership.

Contributions to this series will come from scholars on every continent and in every legal system. Volumes will promote international comparisons and dialogue. The purpose will be to provide the next generation of lawyers with the models and narratives needed to understand and improve the law and justice of their own era.

The series includes monographs focusing on a specifi c topic, as well as collections of articles covering a theme or collections of article by one author.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11794

 Ulrike Müßig Editor

## Reconsidering Constitutional Formation I National Sovereignty

 A Comparative Analysis of the Juridifi cation by Constitution

 This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 339529. ReConFort is a research project in the fi eld of legal history (ERC-AG-SH6 – ERC Advanced Grant – The study of the human past).

 The positions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial opinion of the ERC or the European Commission.

 *Editor*  Ulrike Müßig Advanced Grantee of the ERC Chair of Civil Law German and European Legal History University of Passau Passau , Germany

 ISSN 2198-9842 ISSN 2198-9850 (electronic) Studies in the History of Law and Justice ISBN 978-3-319-42404-0 ISBN 978-3-319-42405-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-42405-7

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### **Acknowledgements**

 This volume reports on the fi rst research results of the ERC Advanced Grant ReConFort, **Re** considering **Con** stitutional **F** o **r** ma **t** ion. The transdisciplinary project deals with selected constitutional discourses in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and focuses on the experimental ambiguity or indetermination of constitutional texts with regard to state-organisational core elements. At the invitation of the University of Macerata from 9 to 11 March 2015, the post docs and myself as principal investigator presented the research results on national sovereignty. The essays of this volume rely on the elaborated version of the papers given in Macerata. This book wouldn't have come into existence without the help of many I express my warmest thanks here. I am particularly grateful to Luigi Lacché (Macerata) who invited us for the spring conference 2015; to Brecht Deseure (Brussels), Giuseppe Mecca (Macerata) and Anna Tarnowska (Torún) for their excellent commitment to the project, to Shavana Musa (Manchester) for her native speaker's correction of my texts and to the doctoral students (Franziska Meyer, Passau; Joachim Kummer, Berlin) for their support with sources and literature. My thanks also go to the organisational masterminds of ReConFort Stefan Schmuck (Passau) and Elisabeth Schneider (secretary at my chair) who gave much of their time to bring my ideas into life.

Passau, July 2016 Ulrike Müßig

## **Contents**

## **Contributors**

 **Brecht Deseure** University of Passau and Vrije Universiteit Brussel , Passau , Germany

 **Giuseppe Mecca** Faculty of Law , University of Passau , Passau , Germany

 **Ulrike Müßig** Advanced Grantee of the ERC, Chair of Civil Law, German and European Legal History , University of Passau , Passau , Germany

 **Anna Tarnowska** Faculty of Law and Administration , Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland

## **Juridifi cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Europe**

#### **Ulrike Müßig**

 **Abstract** In its fi rst research period (2014–2015), the Research project ReConFort focused on national sovereignty/constituent sovereignty as a key category of its overall research on communication dependencies of historic constitutions. The topos was not only used as a search item, but also as *tertium comparationis.* On a comparative overview, national sovereignty is used to explain a legal starting point of the constituting process (the so-called 'big bang-argument'). All references to national sovereignty mark the process of juridifi cation of sovereignty by means of the constitution, i.e. political legitimation is turned into legal legitimation. This is coincident with the normativity as goal of the modern constitutional concept arising out of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.

 The essay of the Principal Investigator examines the juridifi cation of sovereignty in the French discourse around the works of Sieyès and the parliamentary prerevolution. In the debates around the Great Sejm the old aristocratic understanding of the Polish Nation as one of the noblemen is found to be powerful. The procedural openness of the May Constitution 1791 is explained as a refl ex onto juridifi cation of national sovereignty. National sovereignty in the Spanish Cádiz Constitution 1812 is connected to the anti-Napoleonic context of the constitutional process. The general and extraordinary Cortes' claim to the constituent power by virtue of the recourse to national sovereignty cannot be understood as representing a Rousseauian national *volonté générale* . The natural origin of national sovereignty in the Cádiz' liberal understanding is infl uenced by late scholastical concepts and combines the supralegal limitations for the royal government with the historical legitimisation of the Cádiz constitution by the old fundamental laws of the Monarchy ( *las antiguas leyes fundamentales de la Monarquía* ). The constituent sovereignty in the Norwegian *Grunnloven* May 1814 is in various aspects comparable with the Spanish case: the constitutional process was received as guarantee of national independence. The Moss Process into the Swedish Union under the Fundamental Law of the Norwegian Empire of November 4, 1814 demonstrates the Extraordinary Storting as Constituent Assembly and the monarchy as constituted power. The statement of the Christiana

U. Müßig (\*)

Advanced Grantee of the ERC, Chair of Civil Law,

German and European Legal History , University of Passau , Passau , Germany e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>www.reconfort.eu

© The Author(s) 2016 1

U. Müßig (ed.), *Reconsidering Constitutional Formation I National Sovereignty*, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 6, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-42405-7\_1

Faculty of Law 1880 on the King's veto with regard to constitutional amendments relies on the differentiation between constituent and constituted sovereignty by explaining why constitutional amendments cannot be left to either of the constituted powers – neither to an ordinary parliamentary assembly nor to the King alone.

 The French *Charte Constitutionelle* 1814, mixing constitutional binding and divine reign, avoids the term sovereignty. The reference to authority ( *l'autorité tout entière* ) in the preamble permits the prerevolutionary subsumption as divine right. The monarch by the Grace of God Louis XVIII appears as constituent sovereign, the label as charter ( *charte* ) tries to create the impression of a royal privilege. Due to his absolute power, the monarch is the sole bearer of executive power (Art. 13), of the exclusive right of legislative initiative (Art. 45, 46) and of jurisdiction (Art. 57). The *Charte Constitutionnelle* 1814 was imitated numerously until 1830, including its intrinsic systematic incompatibilities (between the monarchical principle and parliament's legislative and budgetary rights). Its revolutionary overcoming in the French July Revolution 1830 led to a European-wide constitutional movement, whose connection with national struggles for freedom, invigorated the people and its representation as constitutional factors. Like in France, a parliament took over the task of drafting a constitution in Belgium after the Revolution of 1830: The constituent assembly, dominated by the liberal-catholic legal minds, is *pouvoir constituant* , the newly-to-be-appointed King is just taking on the role as *pouvoir constitué* . Contrary to the French model, the Belgian Constitution is not negotiated with the monarch, but freely proclaimed by a national congress in its own right.

 In the octroi of the Piedmontese *Statuto Albertino* 1848, the constituent act of granting the fundamental law ( *statuto fondamentale* ) was communicated to maintain the *plenitudo potestatis* of the absolute monarchy, to rationalize the old royal sacredness. Therefore, according to the preamble of the *Statuto Albertino* , the participation of the Council ( *Consiglio di conferenza* ) was simply advisory. The Piedmontese state was to remain based on the 'monarchical constitutional foundation' (art. 2) and 'the person of the King is holy and inviolable' (art. 4). The oath of the Senators and Representatives contained fi rst the loyalty towards the King and then towards the constitution and the laws (art. 49). The Italian coincidence of the monarchical sovereignty in its absoluteness with the granting of the Albertine Statute was meant to avoid any scope for the differentiation between *pouvoir constituant* and *pouvoir constitué* . The improvised parliamentarism in the Frankfurt National Assembly corresponded with the openness of the 'Sovereignty of the Nation' whereby Heinrich von Gagern inaugurated the St. Pauls church-assembly. This avowal to the singular and unlimited *pouvoir constituant* of a not existant German nation did not make sense as a programmatic claim to self-government, but refl ected the indecisiveness of the post- kantian liberalism between monarchical and popular sovereignty. It avoided the open commitment to popular sovereignty and thus the confl ict with the monarchy, enabling a consensual framework between imperial government and parliamentary majority.

 **Keywords** National sovereignty • Constituent sovereignty • Constitution • juridifi cation • Normativity

#### **1 On ReConFort's Research Programme in General**

 The traditional approach in legal history focuses on constitutional documents, believing in a nominalistic autonomy of constitutional semantics . Looking onto the European Constitutionalism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, even a written constitution cannot statically fi x the administrative-legal relations of power, as they depend on the legal interpretation and the confl ict mentality of the political decision-makers. In the context of ReConFort, 1 constitution is understood as an evolutionary achievement of the interplay of the constitutional text with its contemporary societal context, with the political practice and with the respective constitutional interpretation. Such a functional approach keeps historic constitutions from being simply log books for political experts. It makes apparent how sovereignty 2 as constituted power translates ways of thinking and opinions in the Burckhardt ean sense 3 : sovereignty can only be exercised with the consent of the ruled. Even the constitutional cycle anticipated by Polybius has presupposed that the *politeiai* of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy degenerate, where sovereignty is not accepted or gambled away. 4

 The interest in the interdependencies between constitution and public discourse reaches the key goal legitimation: Thomas Paine ' s response to 'Mr. Burke's attacks on the French Revolution' rests on the argument that legitimacy is not transmitted through tradition or established institutions, but rather solely through the consent and agreement of the citizens. 5 Not the text-body of the constitution, but rather the agreement of those to be ruled by the *pouvoirs constitutés* creates sovereignty. For David Hume , the discourse-dependency of the state power is axiomatic: 'it is […] on opinion only that government is founded' (1758). 6 Sovereignty is considered to depend on the belief of the subjects and the political élites in its utility and legitimacy . 7 The 'belief in sovereignty ' which went along with the founding act of forming a constitution becomes palpable in the 'religious affi nities' of the constitutional pre-

1 ReConFort, Reconsidering Constitutional Formation. Constitutional Communication by Drafting, Practice and Interpretation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, 7th Famework Programme, "Ideas", ERC-AG-SH6 – ERC Advanced Grant – The study of the human past, Advanced Grant No. 339529.

2 *Müßig* , *Ulrike,* Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27 (2014), 107 n. 2 and the discourses in *idem* ., Recht und Justizhoheit, (Law and Judicial Sovereignty) 2nd ed., Berlin 2009, p. 90 et seq.; p. 141 et seq.; p. 205 et seq.; p. 208 et seq; p. 210 et seq.; p. 279 et seq.

3 *Burckhardt* , *Jacob,* Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (The culture of the Renaissance in Italy), Leipzig 1869, p. 364.

4 Cited by *von Fritz, Kurt,* The Theory of Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Idea, New York 1954, p. 10 et seq.

5 *Paine* , *Thomas,* Rights of Men: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on the French Revolution, London 1792, p. 15, p. 134.

6 *Hume, David,* Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1758), in: Political Essays, Cambridge 1994, p. 127.

7 See also *Luhmann* , *Niklas* , Macht (Power), 3rd Edition, Stuttgart 2003, p. 4 et seq, who describes state authority as a "symbolically generalized communication medium".

ambles in the eighteenth century: Such an affi nity does not mean the recourse of the constituents to divine authority for the written text, but rather the presentation of central constitutional guarantees as philosophical truths with a claim to eternal validity. 8 This is contextually why the constitutional debates in the northamerican colonies are read as 'creeds of the new time' (" *Glaubensbekenntnis der neuen Zeit* "). 9

 The litmus test of the communication dependency of constitutions is their indecisiveness in crucial points *.* This is not only elaborated for the *pouvoirs constitués* , 10 but is also true for the *pouvoir constituant* , the constituent sovereignty . Under the impression of the Jacobinian reign of virtue and terror and the struggle for resistance of the allied monarchies against the revolutionary army of the *Republique Française* , the republic got discredited into antagonism with monarchy and there was a remarkable 'renaissance' of the monarchy in the early constitutionalism. 11 The constitutional formation in the strict legal sense, i.e. the act of constituting, 12 could 'defend the monarchy from the threat of the people', as explained for the Albertine Statute 1848, 13 could be a 'legal decision of a national constituent assembly ' as in the Belgian Case 1831, 14 could borrow from the old notion of a fundamental law as in the Polish Case 1788–1792 15 or try to remain in between as the reference to the 'Nation as sovereign' in the French September Constitution 1791 does, which has

8 The most prominent example is the French Declaration of the Rights of Men: The "natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man" (Preface to the French Declaration of the Rights of Men), are laid down catechistically as the basis of "all political society" (Art. 2, also Art. 16). Cf. *Sieyès* , Préliminaire de la constitution, Reconnaissance et exposition raisonnée des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, Observations, cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 1004: " *Quand cela serait; une déclaration des droits du citoyen n'est pas une suite de lois, mais une suite de principes* ." For the American Constitution cf. *Stolleis,* Michael, Souveränität um 1814, in: Müßig (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt, Tübingen 2006, p. 101–115, 103. Muß, Florian, Der Präsident und Ersatzmonarch, Die Erfi ndung des Präsidenten als Ersatzmonarch in der amerikanischen Verfassungsdebatte und Verfassungspraxis, Munich 2013 (Diss. iur. Passau supervised by Ulrike Müßig).

9 *Dreier* , *Horst,* Gilt das Grundgesetz ewig? Fünf Kapitel zum modernen Verfassungsstaat, Munich 2008, p. 14.

10 *Müßig* , *Ulrike,* L'ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel après 1830 : à la recherche d'un équilibre entre la souveraineté monarchique et la souveraineté populaire, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 79 (2011), 489 et seq.

11 Therefore, trust in a strong representation of the people, as the French Constitution of 1791 breathes, is hardly found among European Constitutions around 1800. Apart from the Norwegian Grunnloven of Eidsvoll (May 1814), echoes of the French September Constitution are just found in the short-lived Spanish Constitution of Cádiz 1812.

12 Deciding on the legal text in contrast to the broader sense of constitutional formation, on which ReConFort is based, comprising also constitutional praxis and interpretation.

13 The *Omnipotence of Parliament* in the legitimisation process of 'representative government' during the Albertine Statute (1848–1861, in: Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 159.

14 National sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the meanings of article 25, in: Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 93 et seq.

15 Sovereignty issues in the Public Discussion around the Polish May Constitution (1788–1792), in: Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 215.

infl uenced the Cádiz Constitution 1812. Therefore, constituent sovereignty is the perfect starting point for the research project on communication dependency of constitutions, as it is the legitimizing explanation of the constitutional process .

#### **2 Method of Comparative Constitutional History**

#### *2.1 Targeted Sources of ReConFort*

 ReConFort's approach to the interplay of constitutional processes and public participation relies on a systematic analysis of constitutional documents in combination with refl ective documents of acting political stakeholders. 16 The targeted sources comprise constitutions and constitutional materials, 17 relevant cross-border private correspondences of protagonists and their publicist activities including exile literature, regional/national and cross-border constitutional journalism in public media. The last category of sources opens up the research approach onto the reporting on constitutional affairs in a selected number of leading media 18 or specialised/ exile media. 19 Both categories, the fi rst being determined by the cut off-principle (largest readership) and the second by specialisation on certain opinions, have a special regard to the causative interdependencies between media dissemination and the politicisation of the population. Such an analysis of public media in the eighteenth and nineteenth century combine the quantitative reconstruction (surveying) with the subsequent qualitative elaboration of typological key passages (cognitive, classifi catory or narrative). The following key passages ( *topoi* ) form the debates as semantic paradigms:

16 Cf. www.reconfort.eu . The whole team comprises also the British post doc Dr. Shavana Musa (Dec. 2015 till August 2016), two doctoral students Franziska Meyer and Joachim Kummer, the project manager Stefan Schmuck and is supported by an international advisory board. Translations by the Advanced Grantee are marked here with UM.

17 Constitutional drafts or offi cial stenographic records of constitutional debates .

18 For instance: Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, Journal Hebdomadaire de la Diète, Pamiętnik Historyczno-Politczny-Ekonomiczny (PL); El Constitucional: ó sea, Crónica científi ca, literaria y política, La Constitución y las leyes, Mercurio histórico y político, El Universal. Observador español (ES); Journal des Flandres, L'Union Belge; Politique (BE); Allgemeine Zeitung, Deutsche Zeitung, Kölnische Zeitung (DE); Il censore, giornale quotidiano politico polpulare, Il nazionale, Gazetta del populo, La Concordia (IT).

19 Exile Lit.: El Español (London 1810–1814), El Español Constitucional (London 1824–1827), L'Avenir (Paris 1830–1831). For representing tendencious opinions: El Censor. Periódico político y literario, El Defensor del Rey, El Zurriago; Kreuzzeitung, Neue Deutsche Zeitung; L'Imparziale. Foglio Politico.

#### *2.2 Methodological Challenges: Finding the* **Tertia Comparationis**

 Any comparative legal historical approach is burdened with a double hermeneutical circle . First *,* there is 'an unalterable difference between interpreter and author that originates from the historical distance'. 20 Secondly, the past linguistic usage is enshrined in the constitutional development of different legal systems. The legal terms 'nation' and 'sovereignty' are not interchangeable in Belgian, English, French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish sources and thus not comparable by themselves. Language has to be accepted as the frontier of its user's world. 21 Therefore, different historical formulations of the national sovereignty cannot serve as *tertia comparationis* in a historical comparison. This is obvious for everybody consulting the following linguistic expressions: In the introduction and in Art. 2 of the Polish May Constitution 1791 the nation is equivalent to the nobility , in the French September Constitution 1791 (Tit. III, Art. 1) the nation is a political point of reference next to the monarch , and the address of the General and Extraordinary Cortes of Cádiz to the sovereignty of the nation in Tit. 1, Art. 2 means to annul the declaration of abdication given in Bayonne in favour of Napoleon.

 If one searches for benchmarks abstracted from the constitutional wording, the *contexts of the claims* for national sovereignty are useful *tertia comparationis* . So my paper does not deal with national sovereignty as an abstract perception of the political history of ideas, but as the *political polemics in concrete situations of confl ict* . Common to all contexts is the use of national sovereignty as a legal starting point ('big bangargument'). This is coincident with the normativity as goal of the modern constitutional concept arising out of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. 22

 All references to national sovereignty mark a process of juridifi cation of sovereignty , i.e. political legitimation is turned into legal legitimation. A constitution is a legal codifi cation to fi x the political order as a legal order. This solves the paradox of the Bodin ian sovereignty, which could not explain the legal bindingness at the moment of concluding the social contract . According to Bodin binding obligation was only thought of in relation to already existent law. 23 It is only with the differentiation between the sacrosanct and the dispositive law that the legal term of the

20 *Gadamer* , *Hans* - *Georg,* Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 3rd extended ed., Tübingen 1972, p. 280.  Paraphrasing transl. by UM.

22 *Müßig* , *Ulrike,* Konfl ikt und Verfassung, in: idem (ed.), *Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt* , Tübingen 2006, p. 2.

23 Of course, the *lois fondamentales* were binding after conclusion between the parties as " *conuentions iustes & raisonables* " in contrast to the statutory " *lois de ses prédécceurs"* . And the binding authority of natural or divine law is not questioned. *Holmes, Stephan* , Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion, in: Pennock, James Roland/Chapman John W. (ed.), Religion, Morality and the Law, New York 1988, p. 17 et seq.

constitution of the eighteenth century manages to justify the self-commitment of political power without the concept of the state contract ( *Staatsvertrag* ). National sovereignty is the synonym for the juridifi cation of sovereignty by means of the constitution.

#### *2.3 Constitutionalisation by Public Sphere*

#### **2.3.1 Press Media as Roadster of Politicisation**

 In his leading titles 'The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere' 24 and 'Communication and the Evolution of Society' 25 the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argues that the emergence of the public sphere is twinned with the 'growth of democracy, individual liberty and popular sovereignty and the emergence of a self-conscious bourgeoisie and a reasoning public'. 26 As the countries of my comparative overview all share constitutional formation **(i)** in the stress fi eld of external hegemonic powers (French Revolutionary Wars, Polish Partitions, French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars, Belgian secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, German Restoration under the big four of the Vienna Congress , Franco-Austrian rivalry over Italian territories) or **(ii)** in the light of internal rivalries between ethnic-cultural or language factions (competing models for citizenship in post-1815 German territories and the Habsburg Empire, confl icts between Flanders and Walloons), the constitutional formation has a key role for 'national' self-determination under external encroachments. Therefore publicistic debates on constitutional matters do not represent technical items for specialized elites, but are the mouthpiece of a general 'politicised' public. Due to the general atmosphere of upheaval, the reports of constitutional affairs are at the core of a fundamental politicisation of the broader population. The constitutional debates in the Belgian National Congress 1830–1831 are accompanied by the reports of the lead-

24 *Habermas* , *Jürgen,* The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge 1962 transl 1989. On the self-conscious bourgeoisie and the public sphere, see p. 81: "The constitutional state as a bourgeois state established the public sphere in the political realm as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally the connection between law and public opinion". On the "reasoning public", ibid., p. 83; p. 107: the principle of popular sovereignty could be realized only under the precondition of a public use of reason. On popular sovereignty, liberty, and their connection to the public sphere, p. 101: The representative system does this, (1) by discussion, which compels existing powers to seek after truth in common; (2) by publicity, which places these powers when occupied in this search, under the eyes of the citizens; and (3) by the liberty of the press, which stimulates the citizens themselves to seek after truth, and to tell it to power."

25 *Habermas* , *Jürgen,* Communication and the Evolution of Society, Boston 1979, p. 114.

26 *Eisenträger, Stian A.E.,* The European Press and the Question of Norwegian Independence in 1814, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Masterthesis 2013 ( http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/ bitstream/ handle/11250/187931/Eisentrager\_master.pdf?sequence = 1), p. 29. The following argumentation relies on Eisenträger's argumentation at p. 29 et seq.

ing journal *Politique* (Liège), which was the fl agship of the independence movement. 27 And the national unifi cation movement *il Risorgimento* (resurgence) is named after a newspaper founded in 1847 in Turin by the Sardinian politician and architect of the Italian unifi cation Cavour . The outburst of political periodicals from 1848 onwards ( *Il nazionale, Gazetta del populo, La concordia* ) prove the Italian national liberation movement to be a product of the reciprocal communicative dimensions of constitutional processes . In the pre-revolutionary feudal society, people were born into certain estates of the realms, without the chance for change. Newspapers and journals as mass means of dissemination and communication motivated a broad politicisation and served as transmittors of the new ideas of the modern constitutional concept . 28 The *Allgemeine Zeitung, Deutsche Zeitung, Kölnische Zeitung, and the Neue Berliner Zeitung* were mouthpieces of the German liberalism and, together with other political writings, 29 accompanied the debates regarding the concept of national sovereignty in 1848/49.

 Furthermore, the political impact of the press-based public sphere is mirrored by the rigorous censorships which governments of the eighteenth and nineteenth century invented to 'regulate the fl ow of ideas'. 30 Press freedom in the liberal understanding could fi rst be found in England through the expiration of the Long Parliament's Licensing Act 1695 . 31 The emancipation of the bourgeoisie was traced by the turn-up of the constitutional guarantees of Press freedom . 32

27 Its spiritus rector Paul Devaux was secretary to the constitutional commission.

28 *Kovarik* , *Bill,* Revolutions in Communications: Media History from Gutenberg to the Digital Age, New York 2011, p. 26. Eisenträger, ibid. (n.26), p. 30.

 A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present day, Manchester/New York 2003, p. 129.

31 Also called "An Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing". Regarding the expiration compare  *Deazley, Ronan,* On the Origin of the Right to Copy, Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695–1775), Oxford 2004, p. 1 et seq. Yet the effect of the expiration of the Licensing Act on press freedom should not be overestimated: *the same* , p. 5: "In May 1695, […] the Lord Justices declared that the offences of criminal and seditious libel were, when detected, still punishable at common law. In one sense then, nothing had really changed".

32 Compare Willoweit, Dietmar/Seif, Ulrike (=Müßig) ed., Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte (European Constitutional History), Munich 2003: First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from November 3, 1791: Art. I *"Congress shall make no law (…) abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press (…)."* (p. 277); Constitution Française from September 3, 1791: Titre premier *"La liberté à tout homme de parler, d'écrire, d'imprimer et publier ses pensées, sans que les écrits puissant être soumis à aucune censure ni inspection avant leur publication (…)"*  (p. 295); Constitution du 5 fructidor an III from August 22, 1795: *"353. Nul ne peut être empêché de dire, écrire, imprimer et publier sa pensée. – Les écrits ne peuvent être soumis à aucune censure avant leur publication. – Nul ne peut être responsible de ce qu'il a écrit ou publié, que dans les cas prévus par la loi."* (p. 387); Constitutión política de la Monarquía Española from March 19, 1812: Capítulo VII. "Art. 131. *Las facultades de las Córtes son: (…) 24° Proteger la libertad política de la imprenta.* " (p. 448). The Cádiz Constitution lacks a general press freedom, but rather, only a

#### **2.3.2 Importance of Cross-Border News: The American Revolution in the Polish Public Discourse**

 With the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars the demand for news increased, and especially for news from abroad. In his monograph on French, German, English and American journalism Jürgen Wilke illustrates the dominant position of foreign affairs in news coverage 33 and explains 34 the substitute-function of foreign matters over domestic matters: It was safer against censorship to report on external political variables. In my contribution to the Polish Legal History Conference in Krakow 2014 35 I reported in length about the American Revolution in Polish journalism. The main lines of argumentation are recapitulated here, as the rhetorical use of the American struggle for freedom against Westminster both by the 'patriotic' reform minds as well as by the 'old-Republican' sustainers is a masterpiece of

mere political press freedom is laid down. Compare also Art. 371, which only talks about the freedom to publish "political ideas". ( http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/fi cheros/historicas/ cons\_1812.pdf , 13.01.2016). Charte Constitutionelle from June 4 – 10, 1814: Art. 8 " *Les Français ont le droit de publier et de faire imprimer leurs opinions, en se conformant aux lois qui doivent réprimer les abus de cette liberté.* " (p. 485 f); Constitution for the Kingdom of Bavaria from May 26, 1818: § 11. " *Die Freiheit der Presse und des Buchhandels ist nach den Bestimmungen des hierüber erlassenen besondern Edicts gesichert.* " (p. 498) *;* Constitution de la Belgique from February 7, 1831: Art. 18. " *La presse est libre; la censure ne pourra jamais être établie; il ne peut être exigé de cautionnement des écrivains, éditeurs ou imprimeurs. Lorsque l'auteur est connu et domicilié en Belgique, l'éditeur, l'imprimeur ou le distributeur ne peut être poursuivi.* " (p. 512) *;*  Fundamental law for the Kingdom of Hannover from September 26, 1833: § 40. " *Die Freiheit der Presse soll unter Beobachtung der gegen deren Mißbrauch zu erlassenden Gesetze und der Bestimmungen des teutschen Bundes stattfi nden. Bis zur Erlassung dieser Gesetze bleiben die bisherigen Vorschriften in Kraft.* " (p. 538) *;* German Federal Act from June 8, 1815: Art. XVIII.  The Frankfurter Constitution from March 28, 1849 [Paulskirchenverfassung] guarantees in Art. IV, § 143: "(…) *Die Preßfreiheit darf unter keinen Umständen und in keiner Weise durch vorbeugende Maaßregeln, namentlich Censur, Concessionen, Sicherheitsbestellungen, Staatsaufl agen, Beschränkungen der Druckereien oder des Buchhandels, Postverbote oder andere Hemmungen des freien Verkehrs beschränkt, suspendiert oder aufgehoben werden. Ueber Preßvergehen, welche von Amts wegen verfolgt werden, wird durch Schwurgerichte geurtheilt. Ein Preßgesetz wird vom Reiche erlassen werden.* " (p. 582).

33 1796, only the Parisian *Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur Universel* was an exception.

34 *Wilke, Jürgen,* Foreign news coverage and international news fl ow over three centuries, Gazette 39 (1987), 147–180, p. 174: "A need for information could be satisfi ed this way, and at the same time, attention could be diverted from more pressing internal matters. A 'clamp-down' of news on the home front could be reconciled with an openness to news from the outside world".

35 Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75–93. I owe the retrieval strategy into the publicism around the Great Sejm to *Libiszowska, Zofi a* , The Impact of the American Constitution on Polish Political Opinion in the Late Eighteenth Century, in: Samuel Fiszman (ed.), *Constitution and Reform in 18th-Century Poland, The Constitution of 3 May 1791* , Indiana Press 1997, p. 233 et seq.

 communication dependency on constitutional debates . Yet the presentation of the constitutional draft 36 to the representative chamber on May 3, 1791 was connected to the Anglo- American republican discourse . 37 Kołłątaj 's 38 dedication for the representation of the cities in the Sejm referred to the democratic ideas of Franklin and Washington 39 . The role model of the American society lacking estate differences inspired the editor of the *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny* Piotr Świtkowski to discuss the rights of the townspeople in his article about the United States. In America, it was 'the personal accomplishment and not noble birth (paraphrased)' 40 that counted, George Washington being a favorite example. Reading the pro-patriotic *Gazeta Narodowa i Obca* , one is convinced by Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz : 'Nobody of us knows who the father of Washington or the grandfather of Franklin was. … But everybody knows and will remember in the future that Washington and Franklin freed America (paraphrased).' 41 Washington and Franklin leave even more marks in the *Gazeta Narodowa i Obca* as media vehicles for the Polish Constitutionalism; the introductory speech of President Washington in the fi rst Congress is printed in two

36 Together with Sejmmarshall Stanisław Małachowski (1736–1809) there are the following protagonists considered as the editors of the May constitution: Scipione Piattoli, royal secretary, Ignacy Potocki, spokesman of the patriots in the Sejm, Hugo Kołłątaj, since 1791 royal vice chancellor and the monarch himself (compare *von Unruh* , *Georg-Christoph* , Die polnische Konstitution vom 3. Mai 1791 im Rahmen der Verfassungsentwicklung der Europäischen Staaten, in: Der Staat 13 [1974], 185 et seq.).

37 "In this century, there were two pivotal Republican constitutions, the English and the American, ours [the Polish] outperforming the two of them; it guaranteed liberty, security and all freedoms." Paraphrasing translation of the speech, cited in: Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 37, 7 May 1 1791. It may be due to political calculus that Małachowski does not mention the French Revolution. These associations of Małachowski with the Anglo-Saxon constitutions mirrors the importance of the English constitutional model and the American constitutional movement in the journalism during the Great or Four-Year Reichstag ( *Sejm Wielki* or *Czteroletni* ) from October 6, 1788 until May 29, 1792. Materiały do dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego [Sources concerning the deeds of the Four-Year Sejm], published by Michalski, Jerzy, Emanuel Rostworowski, Woliński, Janusz, vol. 1–5, together with Eisenbach, Artur, vol. 6, Warszawa 1955–1969.

38 Hugo Kołłątaj (1750–1812), Former dean of the University of Krakau and later royal vice chancellor in 1791, had great infl uence on the Sejmmarshall Stanisław Małachowski. Concerning Kołłątaj's person and oeuvre compare *Pasztor, Maria* , Hugo Kołłątaj na Sejmie Wielkim w latach 1791–1792, Warsaw 1991. H. Kołłątaj, the spiritual cornerstone of the "forge" (Kuźnica), became the reform motor due to its Listy Anonima (1788/90) and a constitutional draft (prawo polityczne narodu polskiego, 1790). The Polish writings of Kołłątajs were newly edited during the 50s by  *Leśnodorski, B.,* who also wrote an article on Hugo Kołłątaj in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli fi lozofi cznej i spolecznej, Volume 2, Warsaw 1956.

39 *Kołłątaj, Hugo,* Uwagi nad pismem… Seweryna Rzewuskiego… o sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka [Remarks about Seweryn Rzewuski's short essay on the throne succession in Poland], Warsaw 1790, p. 71–77.

40 "Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej" [The true state in the free North America], Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, April 1789.

41 Gazeta Narodowa i Obca *, no. 27* of March 9, 1791. A selection from Niemcewicz's speech was cited in The Newport Mercury of July 30, 1790. Compare *Haimann* , *Miecislaus,* The Fall of Poland in Contemporary American Opinion, Chicago 1935, p. 35.

consecutive editions in January 1791 42 when the Polish constitutional draft was more and more opposed by the old-Republican opposition of conservative noblemen led by Seweryn Rzewuski (1743–1811). Franklin's praise of the American constitution 43 was published in order to advertise for the Polish reform project. 44 Occasionally, the press reports about America were formulated as letters from America – with a clear tenor against the intrigues of the aristocratic opposition. 45 In the *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny* , one fi nds Piotr Świtkowski's history of America, 'which had only shortly come into its political existence under the fl ag of liberty (paraphrased)' 46 and whose success was meant to promote the acceptance of the Polish constitutional efforts.

 Not only the patriotic reform powers, but also the old-Republican constitutional opponents make use of the American role model. In his chronological information about the loss of liberty under a hereditary monarch ( *Wiadomość chronologiczna, w którym czasie, które państwo wolność utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukcesyjnych* 1790), the Field-Hetman and old-Republican spokesman Seweryn Rzewuski devalued the English hereditary monarch by viewing the American struggle for liberty as being incompatible with liberty: The Americans did not have 'any other option but to fi ght the English crown (paraphrased)'. 47 Franklin and Washington had 'unmasked the true spirit of the English liberty (paraphrased)'. 48 The equation of the hereditary monarch and despotism is explained through the English suppression of the American colonies. 49 According to Rzewuski's essay on the succession to the throne in Poland ( *O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka* 1789), the traditional

42 Gazeta Narodowa i Obca *,* no. 4, of January 14, 1791.

43 Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 46, of June 8, 1791.

44 [ *Potocki, Ignacy* ], Na pismo, któremu napis "O Konstytucji 3 Maja 1791."… odpowiedź [Answer to the publications with the title "About the May constitution 1791"], Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 46, of June 8, 1791. Compare *Smoleński* , *Władyslaw,* Ostatni rok Sejmu Wielkiego [The last year of the Great Diet], Kraków 1897, p. 77.

45 For instance, a letter supposedly originating from Boston opposes the cabinet intrigues, the wars and disagreements in Europe to the wealth, calm and openness in the self-administered and independent United States of America in the *Gazeta Narodowa i Obca* of May 1791. Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 63, of July 6, 1791.

46 "Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej" [The true state of the free North America], Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, April 1789, p. 1128–1142.

47 [ *Seweryn Rzewuski* ], Wiadomość chronologiczna, w którym czasie, które państwo wolność utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukcesyjnych [Chronological information on when and what state lost its liberty due to a hereditary monarch], Warszawa, without a year [1790]. Zofi a Zielińska convincingly shows that Rzewuski was himself the author of most of he pamphlets (Republikanizm spod znaku buławy. Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788–1790 [Republicanism under the Field-Hetmans Streitkolben. Political articles of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788–1790], Warsaw 1991, p. 23 et seq.

48 [ *Seweryn Rzewuski* ], Uwagi dla utrzymania wolnej elekcyi króla polskiego do Polaków, w Warszawie roku 1789 [Remarks for the Polish on the assurance of free elections of the Polish king].

49 List z Warszawy do przyjaciela na wieś o projektach Nowey formy Rządu [A letter from Warsaw to a friend on the countryside about the proposals of a new governmental form], 9 August 1790.

old- republicanism with elective monarchy and *liberum veto* corresponds to American federalism if transferred to Polish circumstances. 50 A few anonymous authors supported Rzewuski's position of the elective kingdom as a guarantee for liberty by reference to the newly founded Republic of America. 51

 Stanisław (Wawrzyniec) Staszic (1755–1826) 52 though, answers Rzewuski 's polemics with the warning that the (noble) Republic cannot exist between despotic monarchies. 53 For the liberal reform wing the American role model strengthens the conviction that the executive power is best vested in a hereditary monarch, 54 as it had been idealised by Montesquieu 's description of the French monarchy (II, 4 De l'Esprit des Lois). 55 In his series of essay in *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny,* Świtkowski compares the Polish and American constitutional circumstances 56 and draws the reader's attention to the fact that the exterior political threat of Poland demands a strengthening of the executive as well as the introduction of a hereditary

50 *Rzewuski* , *Seweryn,* O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka [A short essay on the throne succession in Poland] 1789). Compare *Zielińska* , *Zofi a,* Republikanizm spod znaku buławy. Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788–1790 [Republicanism under Feldhetmans Streitkolben. Political articles of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788–1790], Warszawa 1991, p. 57 et seq.; "O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze 1787–1790" [About the succession to the throne in Poland 1787– 1790], Warsaw 1991.

51 [ *Seweryn Rzewuski* ], Myśli nad różnemi pismy popierającymi sukcesyą tronu [Thoughts on the different essays on the support of the succession to the throne], 1790.

52 *Stanisław Staszic* infl uenced the reform discussion immensely with his articles on Uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego (1787) and Przestrogi dla Polski (1790) ( *Suchodolski, Bogdan* , Art. zu Stanisław Staszic, in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli fi lozofi cznej … Volume 2, Warsaw 1956; *Goetel* ,  *W.,* Stanisław Staszic, Kraków 1969). Staszic later became President of the infl uential society of the friends of science (1808).

53 *Staszic* , *Stanislaw,* Przestrogi dla Polski [Warnings to Poland], in Pisma fi lozofi czne i społeczne, published by Suchodolski, Bogdan, vol. 1, Warsaw 1954, p. 192.

54 In the same direction goes the pamphlet "Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucji" (Short advice on how to elaborate a good constitution) which was published in 1790 in its paraphrased translation: "Even if a nation has no king , the legislative and executive power have to be separated. Then, the executive power is vested in the administration; the legislative power is vested in the national representatives. This is the situation in the thirteen American provinces … where each province has its own administration, its own courts, its own tax and military and all together have their House of Representatives with their President which only differs from the English King by his name [sic!] and enjoys the executive power and the might to make laws for the whole territory." ([ *Kajetan* ] *Kwiatkowski* , Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucyi [Short piece of advice on how to elaborate a good constitution], without a place of publication 1790, p. 28).

55 Compare concerning the convincing power of the idealised monarchy as it is portrayed in  *Montesquieu* in II, 4 De l'Esprit des Lois (Pléiade-Edition, Oeuvres complètes, published by Roger Caillois, tome II, Paris 1994, p. 247 et seq.) *Konic* , *Charles-Etienne-Léon* , Comparaison des Constitutions de la Pologne et de la France de 1791 (thèse doct. Univ. de Neuchatel), Lausanne 1918, p. 45 et seq. More generally on II, 4 De l'Esprit des Lois see *Seif (=Müßig), Ulrike,* Der mißverstandene Montesquieu: Gewaltenbalance, nicht Gewaltentrennung, ZNR 22 (2000), 149– 166 (157 et seq.).

56 The United States, a confederation of colonies having gotten rid of George III. were said to be eager to fi nd a surrogate for the king when modelling the presidential offi ce.

monarchy. 57 Support comes from Ignacy Potocki who regrets that Poland cannot be a general republic or confederation according to the given circumstances, but only a constitutional monarchy. 58

#### **3 References to the National Sovereignty in the Historic Discourses of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Europe**

#### *3.1 In General: The Nation's Start as Singular State Organisational Legal Point of Reference*

 'Long live the nation!', the exclamation of thousands of soldiers from the French Revolutionary Army during the cannonade of Valmy on September 20, 1792 astonished the Prussians . The infantry banners of the Revolutionary Army showed the maxim 'The King, the Nation, Freedom, the Law'. The war correspondent and companion of the Duke Karl August von Sachsen-Weimar Johann Wolfgang von Goethe noted in his late (1820/1821) autobiographical report *Kampagne in Frankreich* ( *Campaign in France* ): 'Here and on this day begins a new era of world history'. 59 Leaving aside the doubt of the literary studies, 60 the French perception as a victory of the nation is more important than the popularity of Goethe's words concerning Valmy. It was no longer a victory of the French King: on September 21, 1792, one day after the cannonade, the King was declared to have abdicated and the Republic was proclaimed. The Victory at Valmy was historic since the Revolutionary Army consisting of unexperienced volunteers was unlikely to win against the higher ranked Prussian army. And the news of the victory at Valmy was decisive for the consolidation of the rule of the convent in Paris. 61 It is not by chance that the Republic Constitution of (24 June) 1793 contains elaborate provisions on who is a

57 *Świtkowski* , *Piotr,* "Dalsze myśli i uwagi względem Konstytucji 3 Maja" [Further thoughts and remarks on the constitution of May 3], Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, August 1791, p. 737–745.

58 Ignacy Potocki an Eliasz Aloe, 7 August 1790. Mss. Potocki Papers, no. 277 vol. 303, AGAD, Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw. Ignacy Potocki was the spokesman of the patriots in the Sejm.

59 *Von Goethe* , *Johann Wolfgang ,* Die Kampagne in Frankreich [Campaign in France], in: Goethes sämtliche Werke, Stuttgart 1902, p. 60: "Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen, ihr seid dabei gewesen" [From here and today, a new epoch begins in the history of the world, and you could say to be witnesses].

60 *Borst, Arno,* Valmy 1792 – Ein historisches Ereignis?, in: Der Deutschunterricht, Vol. 26/6, 1974, 88–104 (101): "This is the purest example of a history of effects of pieces of art that can be imagined".

61 Keyword "Valmy" in Jeschonnek, Bernd: Revolution in Frankreich 1789–1799. Ein Lexikon (Revolutions in France 1789–1799. An encyclopedia) Berlin 1989, p. 232–233.

member of the nation and who is not. 62 The *Acte constitutionnel de la République* attributes in Art. 7 the sovereignty to the people, defi ned as the entity of the French citizens. 63 Art. 4 defi nes the citizenship precisely for any French men born and bred of 21 years, for any foreigner of 21 years living in France for one year, who sustains himself by his work or has acquired ownership, married a French woman, adopted a French child or supported a French old man, and for any foreigner who was declared by the legislative corps to have merits for humanity. 64

 Napoleon declared the day of Valmy the beginning of the French triumphal procession in Europe, which was 'crowned' with his emperorship and had the canons brought into position before *Les Invalides* where even nowadays they can still be marvelled. And the 'King of the Citizens' Louis-Philippe I (reg. 1830–1848) who served as an offi cer in the Revolutionary Army 65 let immortalize the canonade of Valmy by means of painting (1835) by Jean Baptiste Mauzaisse (1784–1844) in the gallery of heroes in the *Chateau de Versailles* . What Goethe's genius had seen was that the term 'nation' had entered the stage of world history as an abstract point of reference. To make this turning point clear we have to go back to the pre- revolutionary French Enlightenment.

 The Marquis d' Argenson (1696–1764), 66 a close friend of Voltaire, noted in his *Memories*67 that 'the words nation and fatherland were not common under Louis XIV

62 The actual text of the constitution is preceded by a declaration of human and civil rights . Its article 23 in the French original reads: " *La garantie sociale consiste dans l'action de tous pour assurer à chacun la jouissance et la conservation de ses droits: cette garantie repose sur la souveraineté nationale* ." The latter is translated as «sovereignty of the people » by Gosewinkel/Masing (p. 195). Yet article 25 reads: " *La souveraineté réside dans le peuple* ; elle est une et indivisible, imprescriptible et inaliénable and article 26: " *Aucune portion du peuple ne peut exercer la puissance du peuple entier ; mais chaque section du souverain, assemblée, doit jouir du droit d'exprimer sa volonté avec une entière liberté* ." In fact, article 28 seems to attribute the constituent sovereignty to the people: Article 28. Un peuple a toujours le droit de revoir, de réformer et de changer sa constitution. Une génération ne peut assujettir à ses lois les générations futures.

63 *Pölitz* , *Karl Heinrich Ludwig,* Die europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The European Constitutions from the Year of 1789 to the Modern Age, Including Historical Explanations and Introductions), Second Volume, Second, Restructured, Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 1833, p. 24, Art. 7, Von der Souverainetät des Volkes.

64 *Pölitz* , ibid. (Fn. 63), Vol. 2, p. 23, Art. 4, Von dem Bestand der Bürger.

65 As the Duke of Orléans Louis Philippe III (1773–1850) he got access to monarchical power in 1830 under the name of Louis-Philippe I er .

66 From his literary remains was published: *Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent de la France* (Amsterdam 1764), a luminous document for the understanding of the internal conditions in France at the time.

67 *De Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis d'Argenson, René-Louis,* Mémoires et journal inédit du marquis d'Argenson, éd. Rathéry, Edme Jacques Benoît, vol. 4, Paris 1858, p. 189 et seq., Note of 24. Juillet 1754: " *On remarque qu'on n'a jamais autant parlé de nation et d'État qu'aujourd'hui. Ces deuz noms ne se prononҫoient jamais sous Louis XIV, on n'en avoit seulement pas l'idée. On n'a jamais été si instruit qu'aujourd'hui sur les droits de la nation et de la liberté. Moi-même, qui ai toujours médité et puisé des matériaux dans l'étude sur ces matières, j'avois ma conviction et ma conscience tout autrement tournées qu'aujourd'hui: cela vient du parlement et des Anglois* ".

and that there was not even yet an idea of them.' Since the adjective 'national' was not existent as a keyword in the *Encyclopédie* , it was consequently also not contained in Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique* 1764. For the lemma 'nation' 68 the *encyclopédists* (1765) follow the lexical tradition of a geographic connotation since the *Dictionnaire Furetière* 1690. 69 Up to the revolution, the relations which described the (state) organisational subordination were defi ned personally from human to human: the civil servants were servants of the King ; the commanders in chief of the army, the ambassadors, the members of the judiciary were all the King's. There was no unity or national coherence beyond the social ranks and above all, the élite of the Enlightenment was predominantly cosmopolitan.

 Rousseau's and amongst all others Sieyès' ideas were the masterpieces to explain the new legal state organization since the victory at Valmy was evidently no longer a victory of the French King.

 For the fi rst time, the modern term 'nation' appears in the article *Essai sur la constitution de la Corse* where Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote: 'All people are to have a national character and if it were to be missing, it would have started by giving it one'. 70 And he explains it as identifi cation with the nation by both his body and spirit, his will, his feeling to belong to it with all his might 71 and even more pathetic by dying for the nation and – what is more relevant for us legal historians – by obeying all its laws and its commands. 72

 This text is pivotal for the coinage of the modern term of nation; for Rousseau, the nation is the point of reference of participation, the laws and the political decision- makers. The nation is no longer the collective term for all those who live within the borders of the territorial state or under the centralised monarchical

68 In addition to the geographic understanding ("*mot collectif dont on fait usage pour exprimer une quantité considérable de peuple, qui habite une certaine étendue de pays, renfermée dans certaines limites, et qui obéit au même gouvernement*.") the Encyclopédie (vol. XI) describes the medieval universitarian use ("La faculté de Paris est composée de quatre nations; savoir, celle de France, celle de Picardie, celle de Normandie, celle d'Allemagne… "La nation d'Allemagne comprend toutes les nations étrangères, l'Angloise, l'Italienne").

69 " *Se dit d'un grand peuple habitant une même étendue de terre, refermée en certaines limites ou sous une même domination* ." Cit. according to *Pasquino, Pasquale* (Sieyès et l'invention de la constitution en France, Paris 1998, p. 56) who also refers to the equivalent defi nition in the dictionnaire de Trévoux 1752. The Dictionnaire de l'Académie (4.éd. Paris 1762) defi nes the 'nation' as ' *Terme collectif. Tous les habitants d'un même État, d'un même Pays, qui vivent sous les mêmes lois, parlent le même langage* .' (cit. ibid.). Cf. also *Clere, Jean-Jacques* , Etat-Nation-Citoyen Au Temps de la Revolution, in: Conrad, Marie-Françoise/Ferrari, Jean/Wunenburger, Jean-Jacques (ed.), L' Idée de Nation, Dijon 1987, p. 97.

70 " *tout peuple doit avoir un caractère national et s'il manquait, il faudrait déjà commencer par le lui donner* " *Rousseau, Jean-Jaques,* Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964, Projet de constitution pour la corse, p. 913.

71 *Suratteau, Jean-René,* La nation de 1789 a 1799. Sens, idéologie, évolution de l'emploi du mot, in: Gilli, Marita (ed.), Région, Nation, Europe: Unité et Diversité des processus sociaux et culturels de la Révolution franҫaise, Paris 1988, p. 687.

72 " *je jure de vivre et de mourir pour elle, d' observer toutes ses lois et d' obéir à ses chefs en tout ce qui sera conforme à ces lois* " *Rousseau, Jean-Jaques,* Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964, Projet de constitution pour la corse, p. 943.

administration, but for the fi rst time appears as a singular self-sustaining political subject, as a state organisational legal point of reference. Nevertheless, the Rousseauian sovereign formed by the common will ( *volonté générale* ) is not on the mainroad of the French discourse , even if it served as justifi cation that the Third Estate made itself the constitutional assembly by abolishing the estatal representation and the despotic majority of the fi rst two estates. The metaphor of the *volonté générale* as combination of natural law contractual theory and popular sovereignty in the *Contrat Social* (1762) is constantly realised in the state, 73 namely in the form of statutes – *actes de la volonté générale.* 74

 Rousseau declares the content of sovereignty to be found exclusively in legislation, which is reserved for the people as a whole. The executive is a non-sovereign organ for carrying out laws. The Rousseauian sovereign as political body ( *corps politique* ) of the legal rules about the rights and duties of the citizens is absolute. With the passing of the social contract , every citizen alienates his rights of the state of nature to the sovereign ( *aliénation totale* ). 75 The absolute freedom, which the individual transfers to the sovereign, enables him to do everything in absolute freedom.

 Deriving sovereignty from the general will leads to the following pivotal question: the identity of individual and common interest. As an expression of societalisation, 76 the common will ( *volonté générale* ) is 'not an agreement between the superior and the inferior.' 77 Neither is it the sum of the particular wills ( *volontés particulières* ). Rather, to work out the general will, it has to be fi ltered from the particular wills in a dialectical process of decision. The general will aiming at this can be found in the judicial-political decision making procedure of the legislature, where the particular wills, by mutual contradiction, cancel out each other. Rousseau holds the so-formed general will to be the guarantee of the objective good, the

73 " *La souveraineté n'étant que l'exercice de la volonté générale ne peut jamais s'aliéner et … le souverain, qui n'est qu'un être collectif, ne peut être représentée par la même raison qu'elle ne peut être représentée par lui-même* " ( *Rousseau* , *Jean-Jaques,* Du contrat social II, 1, p. 368. Compare ibid. III, 15, p. 429: " *La Souveraineté ne peut être représentée, par la même qu'elle ne peut être aliénée; elle consiste essentiellement dans la volonté générale, et la volonté ne se représente point.* " [Edition Pléiade, vol. III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964 ; the Roman numeral refers to the book, the Arabic one to the chapter].

74 *Rousseau* , Du contrat social II, 6, p. 379: " *Alors la matière sur laquelle on statue est générale comme la volonté qui statue. C'est acte que j'appelle une loi* ."

75 *Rousseau* , Du contrat social I, 1, p. 360: " *Ces clauses bien entendues* [les clauses Du contrat social – Annotation of the author] *se réduisent toutes à une seule, savoir l'aliénation totale de chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté* […]." Thus, the subjective rights are negated both by Rousseau's contract construction as well as Hobbes since they are being consumed by sovereignty.

76 *Rousseau* , Du contrat social II, 4, p. 375: The 'volonté générale' is a *"convention légitime, parce qu'elle a pour base le contract social […]"* (legitimate convention because it is based on the social contract).

77 *Rousseau,* Du contrat social II, 4, p. 375: " *Qu'est–ce donc proprement qu'un acte de souverainité? Ce n'est pas une convention du supérieur avec l'inférieur, mais une convention du corps avec chacun de ses membres* […]."

' *bonum commune* ' of classical philosophy; the danger of a dictatorship of truth of the majority arose only under Robespierre and the Jacobins. The *volonté générale* is the phrase for the central statement of the Rousseauian constitutional draft for Poland 78 and Article 6 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* of 1789: freedom arises from participation in legislation. 79

 The absoluteness of the sovereign and the fact that it is rooted in the will of the citizens has two consequences: sovereignty is based on the political and legal equality of all people, which is acquired through the social contract , and is inalienable and indivisible. 80 The intellectual precondition is the equality of all people under natural law laid out in the *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men* (1755). 81 Representation and separation of powers are excluded. 82 The indivisibility of governmental power is the consequence of the indivisibility of the sovereignty of the people . 83 The irrepresentability of sovereignty (' *l'irréprésentabilité* ') leads Rousseau to the denial of any representative assembly or estates' assembly in which the right to vote of the representatives of the people called by the monarch is not based on the person but rather their social class. 84

82 *Rousseau,* Du contrat social II, 1, p. 368; ibid., III 15, p. 429.

78 *Rousseau* , Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée en avril 1772, cap I (État de la Question), p. 954: " *Je vois tous les Etats de l'Europe courir à leur ruine. Monarchies, Républiques, toutes ces nations si magnifi quement instituées, tous ces beaux gouvernements si sagement pondérés, tombés en décrépitude, menacent d'une mort prochaine* […]." And he continued, cap VIII. (Moyens de Maintenir la Constitution), p. 978 et seq.: " *Un des plus grands inconvénients des grands Etats, celui de tous qui y rend la liberté le plus diffi cile à conserver, est que la puissance législative ne peut s'y montrer elle-même, et ne peut agir que par deputation. Cela a son mal et son bien, mais le mal l'emporte. Le Legislateur en corps est impossible à corrompre, mais facile à tromper. Ses répresentans sont diffi cilement trompés, mais aisément corrompus, et il arrive rarement qu'ils ne le soient pas* ."

79 This idea is totally unknown in the American constitutional discourse , which never associates  *legislation* with the word *will* .

80 *Rousseau* , Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369. See ibid. II, 13, p. 427: " *l'autorité souveraine est simple et une, et l'on ne peut la diviser sans la détruire* ."

81 Rousseau's *Discours sur l 'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes* 1755 inspired Kant's autonomy of pure practical reason. Kant changed both Rousseau's state of nature as well as the term social contract"from an experience into an idea, he believed not to be devaluating but rather to found and secure this value in a narrower sense" ( *Cassirer, Ernst,* Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, ed. and introduced by Rainer A. Bast, Hamburg 1991, p. 24 et seq., p. 37).

83 *Rousseau,* Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369: " *Par la même raison que la souveraineté est inaliénable, elle est indivisible. Car la volonté est générale, ou elle ne l'est pas; elle est celle du corps du peuple, ou seulement d'une partie. Dans le premier cas cette volonté déclarée est un acte de souveraineté […]. Mais nos politiques ne pouvant diviser la souveraineté dans sons principe, la divisent dans son objet […]; ils font du Souverain un être fantastique et formé de pieces rapportées.* "

84 *Rousseau,* Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369. Cf. also his Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée en avril 1772, chap. VIII, p. 978 et seq.

 Rousseau's logical connection between lawmaking and equality was refi ned by the polemic paper 'What is the Third Estate ?' (1789) into the representation of the *volonté nationale* , i.e. of the will of the majority of the National Assembly. 85

#### *3.2 The Various Interpretations of National Sovereignty in the Works of Sieyès*

 The actual architect of national sovereignty is Emmanuel Sieyès, the author of the pamphlet 'What is the third estate?' and the protagonist in the political discussion after the convocation of the general estates up to the debate on the royal veto . The declaration of the Third Estate as the National Assembly on June 17, 1789 86 which resembled a coup d'état, was not enough to transfer the sovereignty of the King onto the nation. 87 For that, the development of a new collective identity and a new political subject was necessary: the nation. The creation of the modalities of the exercise of the sovereignty 88 was also necessary: the constitution. Sieyès himself defi ned the

85 *Sieyès* , Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État?, Edition critique avec une introduction et des notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 178 et seq., chap. 5: " *Les associés sont trop nombreux et répandus sur une surface trop étendue, pour exercer facilement eux-mêmes leur volonté commune. Que font-ils ? Ils en détachent tout ce qui est nécessaire, pour veiller et pourvoir aux soins publics; et cette portion de volonté nationale et par conséquent de pouvoir aux soins publics ils en confi ent l'exercice à quelques-uns d'entre eux. Nous voici à la troisième époque, c'est-a-dire, à celle d'un gouvernement exercé par procuration. […] ce n'est plus la volonté commune réelle qui agit, c'est une volonté et par conséquent représentative .*" Together with the brochures *Essai sur les privilèges*  (Paris 1788) and *Vues sur les moyens d'exécution dont les Représentans de la France pourront disposer en 1789* (Paris 1788) the script *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État?* (Paris 1789) form the most infl uential brochures on the eve of the French Revolution.

86 After the unsolvable dispute of the voting issue 'by estates' not 'by head', the representatives of the 3rd Estate began to meet on their own as the *Communes* (Commons), from June 17 onwards they called themselves National Assembly . The majority of the clergy and some of the nobles joined them on June 19. The royal counter with the closing of the assembly room led to the famous moving to the tennis court with the Tennis Court Room Oath on the 20th June " *de ne jamais se séparer, et de se rassembler partout où les circonstances l'exigeront, jusqu'à ce que la Constitution du royaume soit établie et affermie sur des fondements solides* ." The King recognised the National Assembly on June 27.

87 By *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 54 referring to Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Boris, La Souveraineté de la nation, Revue politique et parlementaire CLXVIII 43 (1936), p. 130.

88 In the terminology of Sieyès, representation is another word for the perception of duties – also in politics and in all public functions – by agency or division of labour. Cf. *Loewenstein, Karl,* Volk und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789: Studien zur Dogmengeschichte der unmittelbaren Volksgesetzgebung (People and parliament according to the theory of the state of the French National Assembly in 1789: Studies on the history of the doctrine of direct popular legislation), Munich 1922, repr. Aalen 1964; *Schmitt, Eberhard,*  Repräsentation und Revolution: Eine Untersuchung zur Genesis der kontinentalen Theorie und Praxis parlamentarischer Repräsentation aus der Herrschaftspraxis des Ancien régime in Frankreich (Representation and Revolution: An appraisal of the genesis of continental theory and practice of parliamentary representation in the government practice of the Ancien Régime in France) (1760–

constitution in his hardly known Discours of the Second Thermidor III (July 20, 1795) as 'almost complete in the organisation of the central public creation' and he defi ned the central public room as 'the political machine that you create to create the law, for … the execution of the law under all aspects of the Republic'. 89 For Sieyès, national sovereignty and represented government are logical twins.

 Following the French historiographical state-of-the art, 90 the studies of Elisabeth Fehrenbach 91 and their profound elaboration by Pasquale Pasquino 92 three interpretations of nation were present in the political vocabulary of 1789, predominantly infl uenced by Sieyès.

#### **3.2.1 Anti-estate Societal Meaning of National Sovereignty**

 The nation is a homogeneous and self-suffi cient entity as opposed to the estate society, which the convocation of the general estates by Louis XVI on May 5, 1789 tried to reactivate. The nation, which was constituted by the declaration of the Third Estate as the National Assembly developed as a new political subject and embodied the (revolutionary) claim to representing everything of a part (of the Third Estate) for the entirety. This exclusionary consequence for the privileged estates was criticised by the speaker of the moderate monarchists in the *constituante* Pierre-Victor Malouet 93 : 'But they [the clergy and the nobility ] are part of the Nation […] and

91 Art. Nation, in: Reichardt, R./Schmitt, E. (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, booklet 7, Munich 1986, p. 75–107.

92 *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 55 et seq.

1789) Munich 1969; *Hafen, Thomas,* Staat, Gesellschaft und Bürger im Denken von Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (State, society and citizens in the thinking of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès), Bern 1994;  *Pasquino* , *Pasquale,* Sieyès et l'ínvention de la constitution en France, Paris 1998.

89 " *presque entière dans l'organisation de l'établissement public central"* ("almost complete in the organisation of the central public creation") *"la machine politique que vous constituez pour donner la loi, pour… l'exécution de la loi sous tous les points de la république* " ("the political machine that you create to create the law, for … the execution of the law under all aspects of the Republic") Published in *Bastid, Paul* , Les Discours de Sieyès dans les débats constitutionnels de l' an III, Paris 1939, p. 13 et seq. and in: *Bastid, Paul* , Sieyès et sa pensée, Genf 1978, p. 373.

90 *Bacot, Guillaume* , Carré of Malberg and the distinction between sovereignty of the people and national sovereignty, Paris Édition du C.N.R.S. 1985; *Clere* , (n. 69); *idem* , L' emploi des mots nation et peuple dans le langage politique de la Révolution française (1789–1799), in: Nation et République, les éléments d'un débat, actes du colloque de l'AFHIP des 6–7 avril 1994 à Dijon, Presse Universitaires d' Aix-Marseille 1995, p. 51–65; *Slimani, Ahmed* , La modernité du concept de nation au XVIIIe siècle (1715–1789): Apports des Thèses Parlementaires et des Idées Politiques du Temps, Presse Universitaires d' Aix-Marseille 2004.

93 As spokesman of the moderate monarchists in the constituante he explaines his use of sovereignty in his manuscript "Sur la révolte de la minorité contre la majorité" (1791): " *Le Corps législatif est seul indépendant, dans le royaume, de toute personne et de toute autorité. Le Corps législatif, et le roi à la tête, voilá la représentation exacte de la souveraineté nationale; mais le monarque représente à lui seul la souveraineté de la loi* ." (Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 499). He pleads for the royal veto (ibid., p. 507) and seems to quote from Montesquieu's ideal monarchy (ibid., p. 507).

you, the representatives of the commoners, why do you call yourself the only representatives of the Nation?'. 94 The starting point for this term of the nation, which excludes the aristocracy [and thereby expressing the state citizen equality] is the fi rst chapter of Sieyès Tiers État: 'Such a class [the nobility ] is absolutely unknown to the nation by its idleness' 95 since it does not work, does not create value or bears public functions. Even more precise is the abridge version of the Tiers État which is kept in the French National Archives and which Pasquino has managed to edit. There you can read the equalization of 3rd estate and nation in Sieyès original soundtrack: " *Le tiers n'est point le tiers, c' est la nation, et si l' on veut distinguer des non-privilégiés les deux classes privilégiées, il faut alors dire: le clergé, la noblesse, et la nation* ." 96 The pathetic ending of this pamphlet concludes with the address to the French people as Spartanian Helotes. 97

 Similar, but more pointedly anti-monarchical is the second meaning of nation in 1789.

#### **3.2.2 Anti-monarchical Meaning of National Sovereignty**

 The nation and the theory of national sovereignty are addressed against the twelve hundred years of French monarchy. The monarchy by divine right ( *le droit divine* ) is still the characteristic wording of the edits against the *Parlement de Paris* under the redaction of the chancellor Maupeou 98 : " *Nous ne tenons notre couronne que de Dieu: le droit de faire des lois par lesquelles nos sujets doivent être conduits et gouvernés nous appartient à nous seuls, sans dépendance et sans partage* ;" 99 It is exactly this absolutistic claim to 'hold our crown … for the grace of God' and the claim for exclusive monarchical legislation 'the right to make laws by which our subjects will be governed is to us alone without any kind of dependence and without any kind of sharing'– which the second meaning of nation in 1789 aims at putting in the museum of history. There are many voices to question any monarchical legitimation. Pasquino quotes the ' *Mémoires ou Tableau historique et politique de l* ' *Assemblée constituante* ' (1797) of Antoine de Rivarol on the fi rst months of the

94 " *Mais ils [le clergé et la noblesse] font partie de la Nation […] et vous, les deputés des communes, pourquoi vous appelleriez-vous les seuls représentants de la Nation?* " Second discours sur la constitution des communes en Assemblée nationale, cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 451.

95 " *Une telle classe [la noblesse] est absolument étrangère à la nation par sa fainéantise* " Ed. by Zapperi, Robert, Genf 1970, p. 125.

96 Archives Nationales Paris, 284 AP 4 doss. 8, ed. by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 169.

97 " *Je m'adresse à tous les bons citoyens, à tous ceux qui tremblent pour l'evénement et croient déjà voir deux cent mille aristocrates replonger dans les fers vingt-cinq millions d' ilotes* ." (Archives Nationales Paris, 284 AP 4 doss. 8, ed. by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 170).

98 Cf. for the context of the prerevolutionary parliamentary opposition: *Müßig* , *Ulrike* , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 105.

99 Edit de décembre 1770, in: *Jourdan/Décrusy/Isambert,* Tome XXII, p. 501, p. 506 et seq.

French revolution : "*La couronne n' est plus qu' une ombre vaine*" ('The crown is nothing more but a vaine shadow'). 100

 Despite the monarchical position as head of the executive and integral part of the legislative, the September Constitution 1791 does no longer cause illusions due to the only suspensive royal veto (Tit. III, Chap. III, Sec. 3, Art. 1, 2). 101 Sieyès wants to eliminate the crown's integration into legislation. In his manuscript ' *Représentation et Élections* ' 1791, Sieyès argues against any monarchical participation in the legislation, denying even a suspensive veto of the king, otherwise the legislative decisionmaking process would be divided into two branches, in a national will and a hereditary monarchical will: " *Suivant le comité le corps législatif se divise en deux branches, l'Assemblée et le roi. Dans ce cas le pouvoir législatif est formé de deux volontés, la volonté nationale exercée par le système temporaire des élus et la volonté royale héréditaire* ." And he closes this rarely known manuscript with the polemic, that 'the king is not a minister in the national interest next to the national assembly, therefore he is not a legislative representative.' 102 Such a theoretical position is congruent with those of the President of the Constituent National Assembly Jacques Guillaume Thouret 103 or the Jacobine Antoine Barnave . 104 And the highlight of this democratic-republican use of nation is the explanation of the national sovereignty in the 1793 constitution as popular sovereignty .

#### **3.2.3 The National Sovereignty as Idea or Principle of an "ordre nouveau"**

 Sièyes' idea 105 of the nation is a principle that is incompatible with aristocratic privileges and legitimizes the civil war against the Ancien Régime as new " *droit commun* ", as " *ordre nouveau* ". This (modern) term of the nation which has been coined

100 *Rivarol, Antoine de* , Mémoires ou Tableau historique et politique de l'Assemblée constituante, Paris Maret, Desenne, Cérieux 1797, p. 226. Antoine de Rivarol (1753–1801) was a French and Europe-wide known editor, from an originally Italian Bourgeois family.

101 Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 326; *Müßig* , Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion des 18. Jahrhunderts (The European Constitutional discourse of the 18th c.), Tübingen 2008, p. 49.

102 *Le roi n'agit que comme ministre de l'intérêt national auprès de l'Assemblée, il n'est pas représentant législatif* 284 AP 4 doss. 12, cit. also in *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 173.

103 1746–1794.

104 Together with Adrien Duport and Alexandre Lameth, Antoine Barnave was called the "Troika" in the constituante. He supported Sieyès, though in favour of the suspensive monarchic veto , and was, apart from Mirabeau, the rhetoric protagonist at the National Assembly. His passionate dispute with Mirabeau and Jacques Antione Marie de Vazalès on the question of whether the King had the right to decide on war or peace (May 16–23, 1791) is deemed one of the most notable scenes in the history of the National Assembly.

105 Lafayette is to talk of the principle of the nation later on in his pre-draft on the declaration of human and citizen rights of July 11, 1789, cf. here No. 3 and AP, Vol. VIII, BN, Microfi lm M-11174(4): AP, Vol. VIII, P. 222 [11 juillet 1789]. Malouet critisises in his Opinion sur l'acte

in the Fifth Chapter of the Tiers État is the expression of the state citizen equality and carries through with the Tennis Court Oath: 'The nation exists before all, it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal and it is the law itself.' 106

 Now the Third Estate can declare itself the National Assembly , the exclusive representative of the nation construed as the sovereign: " *Une société politique, un peuple, une nation sont des termes synonymes* .", formulates Sieyès' manuscript ' *Contre la Ré-Totale* ' (1792). 107 If one opposes the absolutistic sovereignty attitude of the Leviathan according to which it is impossible to think the sovereign without the people, 108 the new legal conception (of the nation) becomes evident: the nation consists before all and is the origin of all. Thus, the nation can exist independent of the process of the representation and can be carrier of the *pouvoir constituant* . 109

 Thereby, for the fi rst time, the (normal) legislative power can be distinguished from the constituent assembly . Sieyès is the person who fi rst formulates the distinction between *pouvoirs constitués* and *pouvoir constituant* in his preliminaries of the French Constitution: 'A healthy and useful idea was established in 1788, that is the idea of the division between the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoirs constitués. It belongs to the discoveries that have found their way, it is due to the French' (his discours of 2 thermidor III). 110 Often, the *pouvoirs constitués* are called *pouvoirs commettants* by Sieyès, especially when they have been voted for. 111

 Constitution-creating sovereignty of the nation resolves the self-referring paradox of the sovereignty as an unfi xed power of self-bindingness, which had been left in the open by social contract theories. 112 With the fi ction that the will of the nation

constitutionnel: " *Tel est donc le premier vice de votre Constitution, d'avoir placé la souveraineté en abstraction* ," (cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, vol. I, édition Pléiade, Paris 1989, p. 503.

106 *La nation existe avant tout, elle est l'origine de tout. Sa volonté est toujours légale, elle est la loi elle-même* . ( *Sieyès* , Qu' est-ce que le tiers état?, edition by Zappieri, R., p. 180).

107 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (1), cit. also in *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 175.

108 *Hobbes, Thomas* , Leviathan, Part II (of commonwealth), cap. XVII (Of the Causes, Generation, and Defi nition of a Commonwealth): 'And in him consisteth the essence of the Commonwealth; which, to defi ne it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. And he that carryeth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject.' (in: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Molesworth, William (ed), vol. III, London 1839, Reprint Aalen 1962, p. 172).

109 *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 63.

110 *«Une idée saine et utile fut établie en 1788, c'est la division du pouvoir constituant et des pouvoirs constitués. Elle comptera parmi les découvertes qui ont fait faire un pas à la science, elle est due aux Français» Discours sur le projet de constitution et sur la jurie constitutionnaire.— Moniteur* du 7 thermidor an III (25 juillet 1795) = Les discourses de Sièyes dans les débates constitutionnels de l'an III (2 et 18 thermidor), ed. and with introduction by Paul Bastid, Paris 1939, p. 20.

111 *Sieyès* , Préliminaire de la constitution francaise, p. 35 et seq.; *idem* , Quelques idées de constitution applicables à la ville de Paris, p. 30 et seq. Realized by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), note 58 on page 65. 112 *Müßig* , Konfl ikt und Verfassung, p. 5 and also *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 63.

itself is always lawful and that it is the law in itself – designed by Sieyès in the cited fi fth chapter – the entire decisive process of the juridifi cation of the sovereignty is initiated. 113 This is so, since the constitution is understood as decision ( *acte impératif de la nation* ) according to Émile Boutmy: 'a decision which creates the positive law and leads back to a conception of the constitution'. 114 Essential for the understanding of Sieyès sovereignty concept, articulated in his third estate-pamphlet, is the differentiation between *pouvoirs constitués* and *pouvoirs constituant* . 115 This is elaborated further in his not well-known abridged version of the pamphlet 'What is the third estate ?': From the non-interchangeability of the *pouvoirs constitués* and the *pouvoir constituant* Sièyes concludes that the ordinary legislative body cannot touch the constitution. 116

 Even less well-known is Sieyès' manuscript ' *Limites de la Souveraineté* ' (limits of the sovereignty), 117 where he specifi es the exclusion of any absolutistic political power by the sovereignty of nation and its immanent differentiation between constituant assemblies and ordinary legislative bodies. Thereby he seems to anticipate the liberal state theory of the Kantian Metaphysics of Morals 118 and points out that any kind of absolutistic omnipotence of the constituted powers ( *pouvoirs constitués* ) is excluded. The political power ( *le pouvoir politique* ) is limited by the political object of society ( *l'objet politique de la société* ). 119 The latter has the same meaning as Locke 's extra- statutory natural law as an immanent limit of every exercise of power with the freedom guarantee of the common law before the prerogative. 120 Sieyès' pamphlet declares the protection of liberties and rights as a political object of any

113 " *Das Verfassungsdenken wird von einem wachsenden Rechtspositivismus durchzogen* ." ( *Schmale, Wolfgang,* Constitution, Constitutionnel, in: Reichardt, Rolf/Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Handbuch politsch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, Munich 1992, p. 37).

114 *Boutmy, Émile,* Études de droit constitutionnel: France, Angleterre, États-Unis, Paris 1885 (3rd éd. 1909), p. 241: " *une décision qui crée le droit positif, et renvoie à une conception de la constitution* ".

115 *«Dans chaque partie, la constitution n'est pas l' ouvrage du pouvoir constitué, mais du pouvoir constituant.» Sieyès* , Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État? Edition critique avec une introduction et des notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 180–181.

116 " *J'y vois que le pouvoir constitué et le pouvoir constituant ne peuvent point se confondre. Et qu'ainsi le corps des représentants ordinaires du peuple, c'est-à-dire ceux qui sont chargés de la législation ordinaire, ne peuvent sans contradiction et sans absurdité toucher à la constitution. Il est évident que tous les droits appartiennent toujours à la nation et que dans tous les différends qui regardent la constitution, c' est à la nation elle-même d'y mettre ordre, en confi ant, à cet effet, un pouvoir spécial à des représentants ordinaires dont les forces ainsi que celles de la nation ellemême sont libres, et indépendantes, des formes constitutionnelles sur lesquelles ils ont à juger* ." (284 AP 4 doss. 8, cit. also by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 168).

117 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 177 et seq.

118 Cf. *Müßig* , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 279 et seq.

119 *Il y a une grande différence entre un pouvoir absolu/total, complet, et le pouvoir politique. Celui-ci pris même dans son intégrité est déjà borné par l'objet* politique de la société ; 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 177.

120 Cf. *Müßig* , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 210 et seq.

societal association. The majority's decision becomes law. 121 If the constitution doesn't exist before the majority's decision it falls within the nucleus of the association- contract conducted under the unanimous will of the people. Therefore the constituent sovereignty is under control by means of the personal veto of every dissenting individual. Even if the constitutional decisions have to be taken for practical reasons by the majority, the guarantee of the minority resides within the act of the association and therefore within the legal text of the constitution decided upon in the constituent national assembly. This immanent guarantee is the equivalent of the *bonum commune* by the political philosophers since ancient times and bars the sovereignty executed by the majority from unifying all of the political powers, from disorganising them and from reframing their constitutional organisation. 122 And for Sieyès this imminent guarantee is the safeguard for personal liberty by means of constitutions. Thereby despotism is excluded before the legal second in which the ordinary legislative body (deciding on statutory law by the majority) is established

121 *[…] On s'associe pour être protégé et aidé dans l'exercice de sa liberté/ses droits par la puissance de toute l'association. Ainsi donc la toute-puissance n'appartient point au souverain, il est souverain de l'association et non maître des associés. Quant aux limites de ce pouvoir politique pris dans sa totalité, voyons : Un acte qui exige l'unanimité, c'est l'acte d'association. Puisque chaque individu y entre, il y reste librement, c'est sa volonté. Toute autre volonté commune concernant les intérêts de la société peut n'être pas unanime. Il faut néanmoins qu'elle fasse loi. L'acte d'association est donc une convention tacite ou formelle de reconnaître pour loi la volonté de la majorité des associés. […] (284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 178) Bolding by UM* .

122 *[…] C'est le passage de la première époque à la seconde, qui décide de la liberté d'un peuple. Si la constitution n'existe pas avant l'action de la majorité (la majorité ne peut décider pour la minorité qu'en la représentant, la représentation est libre de la part du représenté; il faut donc qu'il existe de la part de chacun un engagement préalable de reconnaître la majorité même contre son vœu individuel; cet engagement fait partie de l'acte social) ou si la majorité peut manquer aux lois constitutionnelles, l'aristocratie se montre à la place de la liberté. On se trompe donc lorsqu'on parle de la souveraineté du peuple comme n'ayant point de bornes. 1. Ce ne peut jamais être la toute-puissance sur les associés, nous l'avons prouvé plus haut, la souveraineté est enfermée dans les limites d'un pouvoir politique. 2. Le peuple votant à l'unanimité ne peut pas exercer une souveraineté dangereuse, puisque chaque individu a dans cette supposition son veto personnel. Dès que le peuple votant ainsi a arrêté son acte d'association et ses lois constitutionnelles qui en sont la garantie (puisqu'il ne peut plus, à moins d'être en demeure, continuer à vouloir à l'unanimité, car dans cette supposition, il n'y aurait jamais de lois, chacun aurait son veto et la société manquerait son but, elle s'anéantirait) il est évident que la souveraineté lorsqu'il vote à la majorité n'embrasse pas le droit de réunir tous les pouvoirs politiques ni de les désorganiser, ni d'en exercer aucun en particulier autrement que suivant les lois de son organisation constitutionnelle. La liberté d'un peuple tient essentiellement à cette condition. Sans elle, la majorité dévorerait la minorité, et s'il faut exécute [?] elle-même, elle continuerait à se dévorer jusqu'à l'anéantissement de la liberté. La garantie de l'acte d'association, et de la minorité réside donc dans sa constitution. Les philosophes et surtout ceux de l'Antiquité diront que cette garantie est dans les mœurs et dans la bonne volonté du peuple* . *Mais comme la bonne volonté est ambulatoire et ne peut trop aux ordres des passions, comme les mœurs se dépravent ou changent par le seul avancement des arts et la progression des richesses, je dis que c'est à la constitution à nous garantir notre liberté*. *[…] Bolding and underlining by UM. (284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 178 et seq)* .

as *pouvoir constitué* . 123 Sieyès' conclusions from his differentiation between the decision on constitution and the passing of ordinary legislative acts in his ' *Limites de la souveraineté* ' are expressly against Rousseau : 'Respresentation can never be a direct act, and under the constitution it is always divided, never accumulated and always dependent on the constitutional laws.' 124

 With the introduction of the nation a second point of reference besides the monarchy comes into existence. The monarch is indeed disempowered, but not abolished. In my perception, this means a quite decisive process of juridifi cation of sovereignty . 125

 This can be traced via the elaboration of Sieyès' concepts in Lafayette's draft of the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights July, 11 1789. The Declaration of Human and Civil Rights in the National Assembly on August 26 to November 3, 1789 relies indirectly on Lafayette's draft: " *Le principe de toute souveraineté réside dans la nation* . 126 *Nul corps, nul individu ne peut avoir une autorité qui n'en émane expressément* " ('The principle of the entire sovereignty is vested in the nation. Nobody, no individual can have an authority which is not derived therefrom'). 127

 Tout homme nait avec des droits inaliènables et imprescriptibles; telles sont la liberté de toutes ses opinions, le soin de son honneur et de sa vie; le droit de proprieté, la disposition entière de sa personne, de son industrie, des toutes ses facultés; la communication des ses pensées par tous les moyens possibles, la recherche du bien-être et la résistance à l'oppression.

127 The wording of Lafayette continues : "Tout gouvernement a pour unique but le bien commun. Cet intérêt exige que les pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire, soient distincts et défi nis, et que leur organisation assure la représentation libre des citoyens, la responsabilité des agents et l'impartialité des juges.

Les lois doivent être claires, précises, uniformes pour tous les citoyens.

Les subsides doivent être librement consentis, et proportionellement répartis.

 Et comme l'introduction des abus et le droit des générations qui sed succèdent nécessitent la révision de tout établissement humain, il doit être possible à la nation d'avoir, dans certains cas, une convocation extraordinaire de députés, dont le seul objet soit d'examineer et corriger, s' il est nécessaire, les vices de la constitution." Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a 1860, Recueil complet débats législatifs & politiques des chambres françaises, sous la diréction de M.J. Mavidal/MM. E. Laurent et E. Clavel, première série (1789 à 1799), Tome VIII du 5 Mai 1789 au 15 septembre 1789, Paris 1875.

123 " *Le despotisme doit être rendu impossible avant qu'on se permette de faire une loi à la majorité* ." 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 179).

124 " *Donc, la représentation et non l'action directe; dons la représentation divisée, sous la constitution, et non accumulée et rendue indépendante de ses lois constitutives* ." 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by *Pasquino* , (n. 69), p. 179 et seq.).

125 " *The constitutional thinking is permeated by a growing legal positivism.* " ( *Schmale* , *Wolfgang,*  "Constitution, Constitutionnel", in: Reichardt, Rolf/Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich (Handbook of social-political basics in France) 1680 – 1820, Munich 1992, 37).

126 AP, Vol. VIII, BN, Microfi lm M-11174(4): AP, Vol. VIII, p. 222 [11 juillet 1789]: M le marquis de Lafayette fait lecture du projet qui suit:

 "La nature a fait les hommes libres et égaux; les distictions nécessaires à l'ordre social ne sont fondées que sur l'utilité générale.

L'exercice des droits naturels n'a de bornes que celles qui en assurent la jouissance aux autres membres de la société.

Nul homme ne peut être soumis qu'à des lois consenties par lui ou ses représentants, antérieurement promulguées et légalement appliquées." Then the quotation in the main text follows.

'The origin of all sovereignty is intrinsic to the nation', it is formulated in the declaration of the human and civil rights of 1789. In the September constitution of 1791 , Title III, Article 1 repeats: 'The sovereignty is unique, indivisible and nonsusceptible to time-barring. It only belongs to the nation. No part of the people and no singular person can appropriate its exercise.' 128 Such an understanding corresponds with Sieyès' periphrasis of legal equality: 'I think of the law as being in the centre of an enormous sphere: all citizens without exception fi nd themselves in the same distance on the surface, all depend equally from the law, all give their freedom and belongings under its protection. … All these individuals …, enter into obligations and trade, always under the same guarantee of the laws … By protecting the common rights of every citizen, the law protects every citizen in everything until the moment when that what he wants begins to be opposed to the common interest.' (translat. U.M.). 129

 The wording of the sovereignty of the nation in the French September Constitution 1791 does not only manage to integrate two sovereigns, but also joins the constitutional idea with national integration. 130 Symbolizing the revolutionary pathos for equality, the idea of a French nation was expanded from that of a few privileged to all of the citizens, with a corresponding census. Thus, the French Constitution of 1791 created a right of citizenship (Tit. II, Art. 2–6), 131 and announced civil equality (Tit. I), 132 even though three sevenths of French men (due to poverty) and French women altogether were excluded from the right to vote (Tit. III, Chap. I, Sec. II, Art. 2), 133 and the right to stand for election (Tit. III, Chap. I, Sec. III, Art. 3). 134 The demand for civil equality expresses itself also in the modern understanding of laws as abstract/general norms, 135 and in the postulate of a unitary, legally equal nation as

128 Cit. by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 299.

129 *Sieyès* , *Emmanuel Joseph* , Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État? Edition critique avec une introduction et des notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 209, chap. VI (Chapitre VI) : « *Je me fi gure la loi au centre d'un globe immense ; tous les citoyens sans exception sont à la même distance sur la circonférence et n'y occupent que des places égales ; tous dépendent également de la loi, tous lui offrent leur liberté et leur propriété à protéger ; et c'est ce que j'appelle les droits communs de citoyens, par où ils se ressemblent tous. Tous ces individus correspondent entr'eux, ils négocient, ils s'engagent les uns envers les autres, toujours sous la garantie commune de la loi.* […] *La loi, en protégeant les droits communs de tout citoyen, protège chaque citoyen dans tout ce qu'il peut être, jusqu'à l'instant où ses tentatives blesseroient les droits d'autrui.* "

130 Cf. for more details, *Müßig* , Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27 (2014), 107 et seq., 109.

131 Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 297 et seq.

132 Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 294 et seq.

133 Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 302.

134 Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 305.

135 *Sieyès,* tiers état, chap. 6: " *Je me fi gure la loi au centre d'un globe immense; tous les citoyens sans exception sont à la même distance sur la circonférence et n'y occupent que des places égales; tous dépendent également de la loi, tous lui offrent leur liberté et leur propriété à protéger; et c'est ce que j'appelle les droits communs de citoyens, par où ils se ressemblent tous. Tous ces individus correspondent entr'eux, ils négocient, ils s'engagent les uns vers les autres toujours sous la garantie commune de la loi.* […] *La loi, en protégeant les droits communs de tout citoyen, protège chaque citoyen dans tout ce qu'il peut être, jusqu'à ses tentatives blesseraient les droits d'autrui.* " (I imagine the law in the center of an enormous globe: all citizens without exception are equally

a rationally based unit, in which individuals may realise their pursuit of happiness. The antonym 136 of the happy constitution ( *heureuse constitution* ) and the preconstitutional state ( *agrégat inconstitué* ) corresponds with the *bonum commune* of the antique political philosophy in the enlightened adaption. 137

 In relation to Sieyès' quoted explanation of legal equality, the King himself or members of the former privileged estates are also included. Therefore, the monarchical principle was held compatible with the sovereignty of the nation (Tit. III, Chap. II Sec. I, Art. 2). 138 It is the abstractness of national sovereignty that allows a monarchical reading of the September Constitution 1791. It is again Malouet , who opens our eyes for the monarchical impact within the process of juridifi cation by constitution: " *Le Corps législatif est seul indépendant, dans le royaume, de toute personne et de toute autorité. Le Corps législatif, et le roi à la tête, voilá la représentation exacte de la souveraineté nationale; mais le monarque représente à lui seul la souveraineté de la loi. Ainsi, tout ce qui peut porter atteinte à sa dignité, à sa prérogative d'indépendance, à son autorité légitime, est aussi criminel en fait qu'absurde en principe, si l'on veut conserver la monarchie* ." 139 Neither the implementation of Sieyès' ideas into the declaration of 1789 nor into the text of the September constitution 1791 were antimonarchical.

#### *3.3 Openness of the Political Vocabulary of 1789 for the Rankly Oriented Use of Nation by the French parlements*

 Besides Sieyès' connotations of the nation, there is one other infl uence on the political vocabulary of 1789, which derives from the usage of the French *parlements* as origin of the estate resistance since 1760. From the registration right ( *droit de*

spaced on the surface, all equally alike depend on the law, all their freedom and their property themselves under its protection. … All these individuals are facing each other in relationships with each other, enter into commitments, and do business, always under the joint guarantee of the law. …While the law protects the common rights of every citizen, it protects every citizen in all that he may be up to the moment when what he wants to be, begins to harm the common interest.) ed. Zapperi, p. 209.

136 In the *Cahiers* an *agrégat inconstitué* describes the opposite of the happy constitution ( *heureuse constitution* ). Cf. Goubert, Pierre/Denis, Michel (ed.), Les Français ont la parole (The French have the word), p. 65 quotes the Cahiers de doléances des États généraux, Paris 1775: " *régnez comme Charlemagne; mais ajoutez à votre gloire ce qui a manqué à la sienne: forces vos successeurs à maintenir l'heureuse constitution que vous allez nous rendre* " *.*

137 Cf. defi nition by the *L* ' *Encyclopédie methodique, Economie politique* of 1784, that when a nation wishes to form a political society, it must give itself the most suitable constitution, which will be exactly the one, which aims at its " *salut* …, *perfection* …, *bonheur* " (Démeunier, Jean Nicolas (ed.) Encyclopédie méthodique, Economie politique, vol. 1. Paris 1784, p. 642).

138 Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig) ibid. (n. 32), p. 310.

139 Sur la révolte de la minorité contre la majorité (Fev. 1791), cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 499.

*remontrance avant l'enregistrement* ) the *parlements* derived their right to be the (estate) guardians of the right of the nation, 140 which had been eternalized by Montesquieu in his idealisation of the French monarchy (II, 4). 141 At the heart this is about the rest of the estate restrictions of the absolute monarchy. In my habilitation ' *Recht und Justizhoheit* ' ('Law and Judicial Sovereignty'), I elaborately took a stance concerning the pre-revolution of the *parlements,*142 as defendant of the old constitution of the Kingdom and of the estate rights which are described as natural law; the *parlements* describe themselves as *cours souveraines*143 in their remonstrances and notably the *Parlement de Paris* since 1788 as " *représentants de la nation* ". 144 The King was well aware of the danger as his speech in the Parlement de Paris in 1766 on the occasion of a *lit de justice* , known under the name *Séance de la fl agellation* made evident: " *Les droits et les intérêts de la nation, dont on ose faire un corps séparé du monarque, sont nécessairement unis avec les miens, et ne reposent qu'un mes mains* " ('The rights and the interests of the nation of which one dares to make a body separate from the Monarch are necessarily united with mine and extend only to my hands'). 145 A very similar read is the dissertation by the court historian and apologist of the Ancien Régime Jacob Nicolas Moreau of 1789 by the title ' *Défense de notre constitution monarchique francaise* ': 'I have said it without reference to the nation'. 146 These ideas of the prerevolutionary parliamentary opposition against the French crown have been well known in the National Assembly since 1789. For contemporaries, they open up the interpretation of the nation as canon of old republican freedoms, that understanding which can easily be traced in the Polish May Constitution 1791.

140 Esp. *Müßig* , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 121.

141 *Müßig,* Justizhoheit, ibid. (n. 2), p. 122 et seq.

142 *Müßig,* Justizhoheit, ibid. (n. 2), p. 130 et seq.

143 *Müßig, Ulrike,* Höchstgerichte im frühneuzeitlichen Frankreich und England – Höchstgerichtsbarkeit als Motor des frühneuzeitlichen Staatsbildungsprozesses, Akten des 36. Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages in Halle an der Saale 2006, Lieberwirth, Rolf/Lück, Heiner (ed.), Baden-Baden 2008, p. 544–577, 544 with the quotation according to the French-Latin Dictionary, ed. in Paris 1569.

144 *Müßig* , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2); *Bickart* , *Roger,* Les Parlements et la nation de souverainetés nationale au XVIIIe siècle, Paris 1932.

145 *Flammermont/Tourneux* , Remonstrances, II, Paris 1895, p. 558.

146 " *Je l'ai dit, sans le roi point de nation* […]" Exposition et défense de notre constitution monarchique française, précédé de l'Histoire de toutes nos Assemblées Nationales, dans deux mémoires où l'on établit qu'il n'est aucun changement utile dans notre administration, dont cette constitution même dont cette constitution même ne nous présente les moyens, vol. II, Paris 1789, p. 105.

#### *3.4 The Nation in the Polish May-Constitution 1788*

#### **3.4.1 Old Republicanism as an Integral Part of the Juridifi cation by Constitution**

 In the tradition of the pre-revolutionary estate-based ideas, the Polish constitution of May 1791 , just after its preamble , includes a constitutional contract between the estates' assembly representing the nation on the one side and ' *Stanisław August by the Grace of God through the will of the nation King of Poland* ' (Introduction to the Polish May Constitution 1791) 147 on the other. The constituent nation in the sense of the preamble is not meant to be understood as the sovereign people of free and equal citizens, but – and this is in accordance with the old-estate understanding of the nobility as 'the furthermost pillar of liberty and the contemporary constitution' 148 – as the nation of the nobility . 149 The affi rmation of the old-Republican *pacta conventa* in Art. 7 perfectly fi ts into the picture. 150 Even in the non-state period after the Polish partitions , the ancient Republican principles served as legitimations for the historic Polish Nation. Yet the *Grande Émigration* 1830 after the Warsaw upheaval relies on the 'legitimacies' 151 of the Polish Nation as Joachim Lelewel's manuscript

147 This passage is a precision of *Müßig* , Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75- 93. It elaborates the fi rst delineation in *Müßig* , Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – Research challenges of Comparative Constitutional History, Journal of Constitutional History/Giornale di Storia Costituzionale, 27 (2014), 107–131. The introduction is cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 281.

148 Art. 2 at the end, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 283.

149 In the introduction and Art. 2 of the May constitution, the meaning of nation is equivalent to nobility .

150 Art. 7, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 287.

151 « *La nation polonaise avait aussi ses légitimités; on les a discutées, on les a sacrifi ées avec les légitimités de tant d'autres peuples, pour statisfaire à l'avidité d'honorables brigands, déprédateurs couronnés. La dipolmatie envahissante en 1807 et en 1808, et spoliatrice en 1815, sanctionnant les partages anciens avec de nouveaus morcellemens, et évitant de donner une sincère satisfaction à la légitimité de la nation polonaise, renouvelait, par ce fait même, les violences qu'elle lui avait déjà fait subir, et donnait ainsi une preuve de l'existence de sa légitimité. Disons dons quelques mots sur la position et la nature de cette légitimité* ." (Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel, Joachim* , Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen 1836. B.r. Imp. D. Brière. 8°, p. 12). In the paraphrasing English translation it reads: 'The Polish Nation also had its legitimacies; …, we have hailed them with the legitimacies of so many other peoples to satisfy the avarice of the honourable bandits, the crowned predators. The overgrown diplomacy in 1807 and in 1808, and the raiding in 1815 sanctioning the old habits with new fragmentations and avoiding to give a true satisfaction to the legitimacy of the Polish Nation renewed by the very same fact the violence that it had already caused it to suffer and thereby proved the existence of its legitimacy. Let us say a few words on the position of the nature of this legitimacy.' As long as no Polish state existed after the Polish partitions , the Polish Nation remained the point of reference of the legitimacy. The mastermind of this and an important French voice in the Grande Emigration after the Warsaw upheaval 1830 was Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861). He has not only published a manuscript " *Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise* ", but also a comparative history of Spain and Poland and a comparative analysis of all Polish constitutions. He uses 'nation' as 'state' (p. 12).

' *Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise* (1836)' 152 indicates. For this mastermind accompanying Adam Jerzy Czartoryski , 153 Frédéric Chopin and Adam Mickiewicz, the language 154 and the political element are points of national legitimacy . The latter is explained explicitly: The social state ( *l'état social* ) is the main legitimation: 'In one word, if we want to depict in the history of Poland a true social element this is no different from the political element. The civil life only, purely political creates exclusively the principal themes of the Polish history.' 155 The political element is specifi ed as 'political habit of the ancient Poland'. 156 National legitimation is synonymous with Republican legitimation: For Lelewel 's ex post-perspective after the Warsaw upheavel, Poland was a Republic and as the great ancient Republics, 157 it has elected its head on its own for his lifetime. And every candidate had the same honour without differences as to the rank or his wealth since the 'brotherhood' ( *braterstwo* ), and the 'equality' ( *równość* ) was decisive for the Polish Republic. Thus, the sovereignty of the people manifested itself in all rulers: in the judiciary that is independent and representative, in the administration which executes the will of all. 158 Lelewel's explanations about the old Polish Republicanism refer to the slavistic linguistic speciality. In the Polish language, the word for slave did not exist, only for subject ( *podany* ). This foundation of the Polish Republicanism is an important condition for freedom from the point of view of the *Grande Émigration* 1830. 159

 Interestingly enough, around the Great Sejm 1788–1792 there were some inaccuracies, which mark the Polish term of the nation to be in between the sense of the old aristocratic Republic and the opening towards an understanding of a gen-

152 *Lelewel* , ibid. (n. 151).

153 On the advice of Eugène Delacroix he bought the hotel Lambert on the Île Saint-Louis, where the Polish Library is still situated.

154 Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel* , ibid. (n. 151), p. 2.

155 Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel* , ibid. (n. 151), p. 4, paraphrased and translated by UM.

156 " *La vie civique seulmenet, vie purement politique, fournit exclusivement les sujets principaux d'histoire polonaise*" ("The civil life only, purely political creates exclusively the principal themes of the Polish history"); " *coutumes publiques de l'ancienne Pologne* " ("political habit of the ancient Poland") Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel* , ibid. (n. 151), p. 5.

157 *Là est la légitimité de la Pologne; et si les Polonais combattent légitimement pour son existence et leur propre indépendance, c'est encore un devoir légitime pour eux que de rechercher ces mêmes principes républicains que leurs ancêtres leur ont laissés en heritage*." ('There is the legitimacy of Poland; and if the Polish legitimately fi ght for their existence and their own independence , then that is still a legitimate goal for them as it is to look for their own Republican principles that they inherited from their ancestors'). (ibid. p. 8). Cf. also page 12, where Lelewel closes his plea on by reference to the legitimation by means of the old Republican principles.

158 Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel* , ibid. (n. 151), p. 8. Also at p. 9.

159 Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel* , ibid. (n. 151), p. 10. His comparative analysis of the constitutions of 1791, 1814 et al. and a comparative constitutional history of Poland-Spain will be analysed in future publications.

eral political body. The law on 'Our free Royal Cities in the States of the *Rzeczpospolita* ' of April 18, 1791' 160 was adopted unanimously and received the constitutional rank as a law in article III of the May Constitution , a law that gives the free Polish Aristocracy a new, true and powerful force for the safety of its freedoms and the inalienability of the common fatherland. 161 There seem to be two ideas behind this prudent and rather confusing formulation. The fi rst one is that the law on the free royal cities in the states of the Republic of April 18, 1791 does not want to restrict the aristocrats' privileges in any way. The second one is that the foundation of the 'Republic' are both the Polish aristocracy and the citizenship. Lelewel made it very clear that the law of the free royal cities should not be seductive for the assumption of a unitarian urban area. He pointed out in his manuscript ' *Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise* ' 162 that Poland had never had a unifi ed 'national law' since the cities functioned as small Republics, especially with their German town law. 163

 The inaccuracies with the usage of the term of the nation fi t into this picture. In Article II of the May Constitution, the nation is the point of reference in the sense of an old aristocratic nation 164 while in Article IV 165 even the farmers seem to be included. And the union that was renewed on October 20, 1791 was named *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów* , the Republic of two nations . The sovereignty of the nation is claimed to be the origin of all state authority (Art. 5), even though since the second and third division of Poland a nation in the sense of a politically mobil-

160 The First English translation is accessible here in the Appendix . The German translation was done by *Inge Bily* with the help of *Danuta Janicka* (Torún) and *Zygfryd Rymaszwski* (Łódź). The Polish text can be found in the edition of Kawecki, J., "Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w Rzeczypospolitej", in: "Konstytucja 3 maja 1791" PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 125–136.

161 Therefore this volume includes in the Appendix the fi rst English translation of the law of the free royal cities of the republic (edited by Kawecki, J., "Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w Rzeczypospolitej", in: "Konstytucja 3 maja 1791" PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 125–136). The English translation was made by Max Bärnreuther and Ulrike Müßig. The free royal cities are not equivalent to the "free towns" under German law or to the royal cities, but are cities within a *res publica* . The new granted rights freed them from the feudal corset. The meaning of the new "freedom" is explained in Art. I Nr. 2 of the law ('We acknowledge the inhabitants of these cities as free men. Furthermore, we acknowledge their land property in the cities in which they live, their houses, villages and territoria which currently legally belong to these cities. All this is acknowledged by us as hereditary property of the inhabitants of these cities.').

162 Ibid. (n. 151).

163 Polish Library Paris, *Lelewel, Joachim* , Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen. B.r. Imp. D. Brière. 8°, p. 6, esp. at n. 2.

164 *Handelsman* , *Marceli,* Konstytucja Trzeciego Maja roku 1791 [Die Konstitution vom 3. Mai 1791; The Constitution of May 3, 1791], Warsaw 1907, p. 58 et seq.

165 Wording of Article IV according to Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 283, in paraphrased translation: 'The land people under the hands of which fl ows the most fertile source of the belongings of the Empire that makes up the greatest part of the nation and consequently is the most powerful protection for the country – that we protect by the law both from the point of justice and Christianity as well as our own, well understood interest'.

ised people is lacking. 166 Hence, contrary to the French September document, the Polish May constitution does *not* establish a new basis of legitimation for modern statehood after a revolutionary break with inherited power structures. 167 Though it does not systematically fi x the conditions of legitimacy as 'the basis and foundation of government' (in the wording of the Virginia Bill of Rights 1776 168 ) or as " *le but de toute institution politique* " (in the wording of the declaration of human civil right as it is found in the September constitution 1791 169 ), the Polish May Constitution fi xes a core part of normativity and a positive uniform constitutional text due to the notion of constitutional supremacy. It is the only constitutional document of the revolutionary era which expressly states the precedence of the constitution: that 'all consecutive resolutions of the current sejm are to be consistent with the constitution in all respects' (ending of the Introduction, May Const. 1791). 170 It is the argumentation of the American revolutionaries, opposing the 'unconstitutional' taxation of the colonies by the Westminster Parliament against the constitutionally legitimate resistance of the colonies, which suited, from the Polish point of view, the legitimation of the Polish resistance against the Russian Tsarina, the Prussian King and the Habsburg Kaiser of the Holy Roman Empire.

 With the modern concept of the constituent sovereignty , the 1791-text of the Great Sejm seems to combine the old idea of an aristocratic nation. The openness of the sovereignty of nation in the Polish May Constitution to continuities with the pre-revolutionary class-based state can be seen in different aspects, which I laid down in length at the Polish Legal History Conference in Cracow. 171 In regard to national sovereignty as juridifi cation, we can concentrate on the May Constitution's procedural openness.

166 Only the Polish nobility was inhibited by liberal reform ideas. Accordingly, the Polish Constitution of 1791 regulated no Polish civil rights.

167 Therefore there was no declaration of rights, only religious and cultural freedom was mentioned in the context of the fi xing of Catholicism as the state religion in Art. 1.

168 Compare " *le but de toute institution politique* " in the diction of the preamble of the Declaration of human and civil rights 1789(cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 250).

169 Cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 251.

170 Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 281.

171 *Müßig* , *Ulrike,* Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75–93.

#### **3.4.2 The Procedural Openness of May Constitution as Refl ex onto the Juridifi cation of National Sovereignty**

 The procedural openness of the May Constitution refl ecting the juridifi cation of national sovereignty fi nds its fi rst expression in the partnership of legal and parliamentary ministerial responsibility. As 'father and head of the nation', the Monarch is not responsible. The ministers appointed by the King assume legal responsibility for the decrees issued by the king by means of countersignature. Moreover, in Art. 7, the May constitution fi xes a parliamentary vote of no confi dence, which resembles the American impeachment requiring a two thirds majority: 'In the case, by contrast, that both chambers united in the *Reichstag* demand the resignation of a minister from the state council or another position by means of a two thirds majority of secret votes, the King shall be held to most immediately appoint another to this position'. 172 The partnership of legal and parliamentary ministerial responsibility motivates my often articulated intervention 173 against the popular contrast between constitutionalism and parliamentarism. 174

 Another aspect is the elaboration of the executive in Art. 7 with the separation of the hereditary monarch 175 and the state council which was referred to as *straż praw* (guardian of the rights) in accordance to Montesquieu's *dépôt des lois* . The constitutional terminology of 'the King in his state council' is proven by individual inter-