volunteers on social media to support government policy and oppose critics. This reveals that though Central Asian governments permit digital activism to a certain extent, the regimes aim to control internet content and to promote government discourses to strengthen their rule. This finding indicates the nature of transforming networked authoritarianism in the Central Asian region, as revealed in the literature by Kurmanov and Knox (2022). In the next section, the chapter investigates three specific cases of digital activism, one each in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, respectively, to explore what roles such activism plays in the evolving autocracies of the region.

#### **9.4 Digital Activism to Initiate Police Reform in Kazakhstan: Legitimation Instead of Cooperation**

Kazakhstan has been a stable yet autocratic regime for the past 30 years. Under the rule of the first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991–2019), the country experienced significant autocratization. Though Nazarbayev introduced attempted public

**Table 9.3** V-Dem indicators. Government control of social media. Selected V-Dem indicators for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Digital Society. 2021. (V-Dem, 2022)

sector reforms, their impacts were not realized in strengthening democratic institutions and broader civil society (Knox, 2008). On paper, the civil society sector in Kazakhstan has significantly grown and developed over the years since the country's independence in 1991. Even though the civil society in Kazakhstan partners with the government in public service provision and is actively growing, this sector remains almost entirely controlled and regulated by the state (Knox & Yessimova, 2015). This authoritarian control has led to a controlled and subdued Kazakh civil society while the internet and online activism have grown in importance. Digital activism in Kazakhstan has grown since the second President, Tokayev, came to power in 2019 with a program of political reforms that were ostensibly aimed at increasing openness, transparency, and responsiveness. Tokayev announced the concept of a Listening State and embarked on creating open government institutions in the country. However, as Kurmanov and Knox (2022) demonstrate, the open government in Kazakhstan has not resulted in the empowerment of citizens but has led to the co-optation and legitimization of the regime.

In Kazakhstan, digital activism has been on the rise due to the relative freedoms of the internet. The case of activism by Kazakh citizens devoted to initiating police reform serves as an elaborate example of the interaction between digital activism and the state. It started on 19 July 2018 when Kazakh citizens were shocked to learn about the tragic murder of a famous Kazakh figure skater in Almaty who was stabbed in broad daylight in the center of Almaty (Satubaldina, 2018). This critical incident caused massive citizen participation on social media and sparked a public outcry over public safety. On the day of the funeral, the activists gathered to discuss police reform and started preparing a clear policy document with demands for policy reform. As a result, the digital activists formed a group on Facebook called *Trebuyem Reformu MVD* (Demanding the Reform of the Ministry of Interior Affairs), and the citizeninitiated project for the reform of the Kazakhstani police was initiated (Mashayev, 2019). The Facebook group membership increased to 15,000 people within two days. The group's activists genuinely believed that, through minor yet effective changes, the political system in Kazakhstan could be changed, even the notorious police of Kazakhstan. The activists saw their role as moderators between citizens, the state, and experts in the reform of Kazakhstani police and chose to cooperate to trigger change and legal reforms.

Initially, the Kazakh government resisted the activists' demands to reform, for example, concerning the power of the Kazakhstani police. President Nazarbayev claimed that 'General Kassymov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, is the most experienced policeman in our country, an honest, decent man… he will suggest what we should do with the police ' (Trotsenko, 2019). The Minister did not react but then supported citizen input in the reform by providing more information related to the incident and the work of the police (Mashayev, 2019). Instead, in February 2019, Kassymov was replaced as the head of the Kazakh police by Yerlan Turgumbayev, who introduced a Roadmap for the Reform of the Police that incorporated some of the digital activists' recommendations related to the introduction of service police in Kazakhstan (Service Police in Kazakhstan, 2019). The head of the Agency for Civil Service arrived in Almaty in Spring 2019 and supported the work of the activists. During the meeting, a three-sided plan was developed to create a "service police", a pilot project was supposed to be launched in Almaty.

As the reform proceeded, it succumbed to slow implementation and superficial changes. More than 112 recommendations were suggested by the concise policy document prepared by the activists' coalition. However, only 12% of all recommendations were fully implemented, 10% were partially implemented, and 78% were ignored (Kazakh Activist #4, 26.11.2019). Hence, the outcome of the reform still needs to be achieved; the state bodies would not engage in reform but would prefer the appearance of such. The police reform focuses shifted from the concept of service police toward a focus on technologies and inter-agency cooperation between state bodies in public safety. The Kazakh president, Tokayev, focused the police reform on local police services rather than introducing systematic changes (Kazakh Activist #3, 25.11.2019). The main suggestion was to create police stations within walking distance and to strengthen the reform of local police services. Interviews with the key informants on both state and civil society sides revealed that the reform needed to be top-down with little consideration for citizen input (Kazakh Activist#4, 26.11.2019).

Overall, the visible government drive for police reform transformed into a mimicry of cooperation with the activists of *Trebueym Reformu MVD*. Furthermore, the use of information manipulation and information overload by the Kazakh government was noted by some activists (Kazakh Activist #4, 26.11.2019). Activists were invited to numerous meetings with the officials in Almaty and Nur-Sultan/Astana and needed a feasible results plan (Kazakh Activist #2, 24.11.2019). Other activists noted that only some reforms were implemented (Kazakh Activist #4, 26.11.2019). For instance, superficial reforms were implemented (change of training, renaming of police academies, and mandatory bodycams for police officers) while structural and systematic changes were missed (Kazakh Activist #3, 25.11.2019). The group *Trebuyem Reformu MVD* cooperated with state officials, generally avoided contestation, and generated a specific proposal of recommendations. However, the Kazakh State disengaged and initiated a facsimile of police reform while maintaining superficial cooperation with the activists. This example illustrates how digital activism can legitimize an autocratic regime, although the government does not collaborate.

#### **9.5 Urban Activism in Uzbekistan: Constrained Cooperation**

Under the first Uzbek president, Karimov (1991–2016), the country became a hard-line autocratic state following his "Uzbek Way" ideology. President Karimov imposed stringent conditions on the country's civil society development (Khamidova, 2018). Even though the number of NGOs is considerable (around 9,200 are registered in Uzbekistan), most are conservative religious and secular organizations (Khamidova, 2018). The second President, Mirziyoyev, announced political reforms aimed at democratic reforms and increased responsiveness of state officials to citizens. Mirziyoyev has actively promoted the liberalization of the Internet and social media space as a part of the reforms. The President's efforts to promote free and critical thinking have led to the development of an active virtual civic space that has started to act autonomously. Moreover, Saida Mirziyoyeva, the President's daughter, was appointed Deputy Chairwoman of the Board of Trustees of the Public Foundation for Support and Development of National Mass Media in Uzbekistan, tasked with the provision of support and protection for bloggers and online activists in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has experienced the emergence of many Facebook groups and virtual civil communities (Murtazashvili & Mirakilov, 2020).

As Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev has pursued liberalization reform, the country's rising influence of virtual civil society groups has been observed. If a specific incident happens and the bloggers start to write about it in their groups, the government can listen and respond accordingly with a decision (Uzbek Activist #5, 22.12.2020). Several influential online groups dedicated to specific issues have been created. This chapter concentrates on a case of digital activism related to citizens' fight against housing demolition in Tashkent City. From 2017–2019 the city government of Tashkent (khokimiyat) embarked on massive construction projects by private developers that involved demolishing people's homes in the city. Massive evictions occurred, and thousands of citizens were neither properly informed nor compensated (Bennetts, 2019).

The *Tashkent Snos* (Tashkent Demolition) is a Facebook-based group that was created to discuss and protest the decisions of local authorities (khokimiyat) to demolish homes of citizens and historic buildings/areas in the capital Tashkent. The group has acquired approximately 23,600 members, and their posts led to the suspension of the demolition of old buildings in Tashkent and other Uzbek cities (Uzbek Activist #5, 22.12.2020). The posts of activists in the group present an example of the work of online communities in Uzbekistan. The group is an example of digital citizen activism aimed at protecting citizens' rights.

Local state bodies [khokimiyat] violate the vital rights of citizens by allocating land to private companies who simply demolish houses. And it turned out that in such a situation, no one protects citizens. At first, we turned to lawyers, and they answered: "What can you do now? This is a wave; you must adapt and do as the state says." So, we organized ourselves quite spontaneously on Facebook. I opened the Tashkent Snos.uz group so that people could help each other, for example, with advice, exchange legal information.

(Uzbek Activist #8, 11.03.2021).

The *Tashkent Snos* group achieved some notable success in defense of the rights of citizens concerning the protection of their houses against demolition. In 2017 the group sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan questioning the legal status of the guarantee letters [garantiynyye spravki] given to the residents whose houses were to be demolished (Uzbek Activist #8, 11.03.2021). The Ministry of Justice stated that the guarantee letters were illegal and that proper compensation should be provided in demolition cases. Another example is that the group managed to prevent the destruction of a grove of trees in Tashkent (Uzbek Activist #7, 10.03.2021). The developer received a huge fine, and the construction project was canceled. Hence, the digital activists cooperated with the Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan to protect citizen interests.

However, the group's cooperation on some major issues could have been more fruitful. The members of the *Tashkent Snos* group participated in a discussion of the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 911, a cornerstone legal act that defined rules for demolition. They opposed the introduction of a legal norm allowing the state to seize land for investment projects in addition to state needs. State bodies should have considered the group's suggestions and allowed private companies to acquire land in such a fashion (Uzbek Activist #8, 11.03.2021).

Instead, the group started to face growing reluctance from state bodies (especially the local executive office of Tashkent—*khokimiyat*) to acknowledge citizen requests. Private construction companies have acquired land in central Tashkent and park areas to construct a planned commercial development. According to activists, this was doubtless motivated by the rent-seeking interests of the officials of local executive bodies (*khokimiyat*) (Uzbek Activist #7, 10.03.2021). Digital activists noted that the state bodies (such as the prosecutor's office and courts) were on the side of the local executive office (khokimiyat) and private developers (Uzbek Activist #8, 11.03.2021). The developers were large firms owned by officials or their relatives. Thus, digital activism faces limits even when it chooses cooperation if the activists contest the vested interests of an autocratic state.

As this case illustrates, the digital activists chose cooperation rather than contestation in their fight against private developers' housing demolition in Tashkent. The Uzbek state organized meetings with the activists of the *Tashkent Snos* group. However, the group still failed to achieve its goals, and the Uzbek state seems to imitate cooperation with activists while maintaining a legitimation discourse. Overall, the group had limited success in cooperating with the authoritarian state. Meanwhile, the Uzbek state attempted to control the information space and create a government message to distort reality and enforce its legitimation. To promote state discourse, the Uzbek authorities claimed that the demolition was legal and that citizens received the necessary compensation and information (Letters, 2019).

#### **9.6 Digital Activism in Tajikistan: Arrested Cooperation**

The Civil War in Tajikistan (1992–1997) substantially impacted the institutions and development of the regime and the country, let alone the civil society. Instead, state authorities face significant erosion and dysfunctionality (Markowitz, 2012). The Tajik president, Rahmon, managed to take power in the peace negotiations of 1997 and later mobilized external support and aid to cement his power (Marat, 2016). Scholars have noted that, in the 2000s, President Rahmon established a "soft authoritarian" state that focused on creating a political narrative and used a co-optation strategy to increase its supporters (Marat, 2016; Markowitz, 2012). However, from 2010–2021 Rahmon consolidated his political power and established a stronger authoritarian state (Marat, 2016). Lemon and Thibault (2018) have argued that the Tajik regime used the counter-insurgency threat to justify its oppressive regime and crack down on civil society, political opposition, and activists.

In Tajikistan, there has been growing digital activism related to the political transformation in the country and the shift from a soft-line authoritarian regime into a strong autocracy. Considering the high number of Tajik migrant workers in Russia, Tajikistan has witnessed a significant rise in digital activism on social media platforms such as Vkontakte, a Russia-based analog of Facebook, and Odnoklassniki Platform, a Russia-based social media platform created early in the 2000s. Marat (2016) observed that the vast diaspora of Tajiks working abroad, mainly in Russia, using these platforms, including Facebook, pose a threat to the authoritarian regime in Dushanbe through the internet and social media channels.

A study of the *Mometavonem* platform initiated by foreign donors and local civil society organizations provides substantial insight into digital activism in the country. The *Mometavonem* platform was created in 2012 by a push from civil society and the Soros Foundation in cooperation with the mayor's office of Dushanbe city. The platform was intended to encourage inhabitants' participation in reporting and mapping municipal service problems and monitoring their improvement through an online interactive platform. This site allowed any user to register their request on one of the priority issues quickly, indicate the problem's location, and provide a telephone number for communication. Hence, the platform became autonomous for digital activism in municipal services. More than 6,000 citizen complaints were sent to the platform, and 4,000 were registered as unique (South-South World, 2015).

Initially, *Mometavonem* was planned to focus on socioeconomic issues covering 16 types of services, including water supply, heating, gas, electricity, and maintenance of sanitation conditions, roads, and public transportation (South-South World, 2015). However, the platform quickly transformed from an online platform to record problems with city utilities and services to inform and participate in solving Dushanbe city problems. According to a decision by the mayor of Dushanbe, special offices of *Mometavonem* were created at the district level of local government (*khukumat*), and responsible state officials were assigned. The platform allowed digital activists to cooperate with city authorities to resolve and improve city service delivery.

As the interviewees noted, two significant forces drove the creation of the *Mometavonem* portal. The first was support from international organizations to bring new collaborative and participatory mechanisms based on applying new technologies to Tajikistan (Tajik Activist #2, 22.05.2020). The enthusiasm of local civil society and activists triggered the realization of the platform. They sparked an impulse for enhanced collaboration with civil society organizations in Dushanbe (Tajik Activist #3, 04.06.2020). The second driving force was the deliberate decision by the then-Mayor of Dushanbe, Ubaydulloev, an influential and experienced politician in Tajikistan who supported Dushanbe's development after the civil war (Tajik Activist #7, 13.11.2020). The mayor provided the office, necessary funding, and resources to realize this platform (Tajik Activist #2, 22.05.2020).

*Mometavonem* quickly became popular, and Dushanbe residents endorsed the platform's interactivity, which enhanced the responsiveness of the city officials. The platform sparked digital activism by citizens in a way that was directed at cooperation with authorities rather than contestation. The site, which existed in working mode for five years, ceased to be updated at the end of January 2017 after Ubaydulloev was dismissed and Rustami Emomali (the Tajik President's son) took his place. The new mayor shut down the platform immediately without explanation (Tajik Activist #3, 04.06.2020). It was revealed that the decision to close the online platform was driven by middle-level officials of the city government (*khukumat*) who resisted responding to citizens' complaints and requests. Rustami Emomali reportedly stated that Dushanbe city officials did not like the platform because it generated criticism of officials' work (Tajik Activist #7, 13.11.2020). The transformation to deeper autocracy in Tajikistan has suspended this effective form of cooperation. The mayor of Dushanbe worried about the potential for contestation that could come out of the platform.

As a result of rising contestation in the digital arena, the Tajik government has focused on blocking and maintaining control over social media and the internet. The presence of "networked authoritarianism" was revealed as it manifested through the attempts by the Tajik authorities to curtail citizen activism and discussion using more sophisticated means. The government started to rely on so-called "pro-state volunteers" who created online profiles with fake names and pictures and defended pro-government narratives in critical online groups and communities (Shafiev & Miles, 2015). The government regularly forces students to become "volunteers" who create accounts on Facebook and disseminate government-influenced messages. The Tajik state created a youth group called *Avangard* ("Vanguard") to protect the regime by posting pro-government content and attacking independent digital activists (Tajik Activist #7, 13.11.2020).

The Tajikistan case reveals several essential features of digital citizen activism in the country. First, digital activists initially chose a cooperative role in improving the provision of utility services in Dushanbe city. However, as the Tajik regime transformed into a hardline autocracy, the state opposed and limited such activism. Second, the Tajik government started actively disseminating and enforcing its message in digital space. Hence, a legitimation discourse was imposed by the state on digital activists.

#### **9.7 Digital Activism in Central Asia**

Although the civil society sector and digital activism have been well controlled and "managed" by hard-line autocracies in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, the countries have experienced a rise in digital activism that has enjoyed the relative freedoms of internet space. This chapter has examined the development of the roles of digital citizen activism in post-Soviet Central Asia. This work reveals that digital activists in Central Asia mainly seek cooperation with the authoritarian state to resolve citizen issues. However, once activists face resistance from state bodies in responsiveness to their needs, they use digital media to articulate their concerns about their cause.

Table 9.4 summarizes the digital activism strategies and how authoritarian states respond.

Three major findings can be generated based on investigating these digital activism cases. First, digital citizen activists mainly organized to pursue their groups' interests

**Table 9.4** Contestation, cooperation, and legitimation discourses in Central Asia

in cooperation with the authoritarian state. As the cases of police reform in Kazakhstan, prevention of demolition of historical buildings in Tashkent, and the digital platform for city utility services in Dushanbe demonstrate, the activists used the technologies and social media to aggregate the interests of concerned citizens and to articulate a list of proposals/recommendations for state officials. Activists sought cooperation and collaboration with various state agencies to resolve their grievances. This work uncovered that activists were not necessarily co-opted or forced to collaborate and work together with state structures. The activists had an agency of their own in their activities and attempted to shape and modify state policies and the delivery of public services. This finding provides a relatively novel understanding of the cooperation role of activism and broader civil society in autocracies and is more expansive than the notion of "involuntary participation" (Mansuri & Rao, 2013) or co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013; Przeworski & Gandhi, 2006).

The cases of digital citizen activism illustrate that contestation was pursued more nuancedly by online communities in Central Asia. Contrary to Diamond and Plattner (2012), Arafa and Armstrong (2015), and other scholars, this work finds that the contestation role of activists does not necessarily oppose the regimes' autocratic nature. The digital activists did not seek democratization but sought to overhaul policies that infringed on or violated the rights of citizens. This finding is counterintuitive to the Western concept of civil society and civic activism, understood as the force for contestation and democratism. Furthermore, this finding contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the role of digital activism and broader civil society in non-Western settings.

The third finding is that Central Asian autocracies have learned to use social media and online spaces to promote their strategic narratives and pursue their legitimization. Confirming the authoritarian regime legitimization literature (Gerschewski, 2013), this work argues that autocracies in Central Asia aim to consolidate their rule in their engagement with digital activism. As the case of police reform in Kazakhstan illustrated, the state took control of the reform through meaningless engagement. In the case of the fight against demolition in Tashkent city, the state actively proceeded with the destruction of commercial projects by pushing its narrative while imitating the process of cooperation with activists. Hence, an autocratic state imposes a legitimation discursive role on digital activists.

#### **9.8 Conclusion**

This chapter provides the first scholarly glimpse into the interaction between digital activism and authoritarian states in post-Soviet Central Asia. This chapter aimed to tackle questions on the role and the possible impact of digital activism in authoritarian countries in Central Asia; and whether and to what extent digital activism results from increased demand for democratic reforms or the desire for the legitimacy of autocratic regimes. Both are valid assumptions.

This analysis of three cases from post-Soviet Central Asia has revealed that digital activism can play many roles in authoritarian settings. However, this work uncovers that activists seek to engage in cooperation rather than contestation with the authoritarian state. Digital activism aspires to redress the rights of citizens infringed on by the state through productive interaction, such as by providing suggestions on legislative changes and participating in meetings with state officials. However, when an authoritarian state faces cooperation, the state officials aim to employ digital activists in public service delivery and tweak policies. This resistance to becoming responsive to articulated citizens' needs in the form of digital activism curtails the ability of such activism to become genuinely effective. The state is unwilling to change its policies based on the demands of digital activists. Critically, when an autocratic state identifies the potential for contestation in collective and collaborative digital activism, the non-democratic regime oppresses or channels such activism toward legitimation discourses. Therefore, the role of digital activism is limited to legitimation discourse in authoritarian settings where potential criticism is not tolerated and cooperation is unwanted.

Consequently, this chapter concludes that the rise of digital activism has a limited impact on increased democratization in evolving autocracies. Non-democratic states have learned to use the tools of networked authoritarianism to eliminate any potential threats from emerging virtual civil society. Ultimately, the authoritarian state manages to control and channel digital activism into legitimation roles that prop up its long– term durability. The investigation of cases in this chapter shows that, although Central Asian regimes have experienced significant political transformation in the past 30 years, they have managed to construct resilient autocratic states with a capacity for network authoritarianism. However, there are some notable differences among the autocracies of post-Soviet Central Asia: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have declared that they are reforming toward increased responsiveness, openness, and liberalization of the media space, while Tajikistan has transitioned from a soft to a hard-line autocratic regime. The officially proclaimed policies of transparency and responsiveness in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have resulted in the arguably higher acceptance of potential contestation from activists. However, as the cases of Mometavonem in Tajikistan demonstrated, authoritarian states in Central Asia cannot allow the formation of autonomous spaces that could generate alternative viewpoints. This work supports Lewis' (2013) point that autocracies benefit from the self-organization power of civil society but tend to dismiss its potentially dangerous liberating power. However, further research on how Central Asian autocracies can use digital activism for authoritarian legitimation is warranted.

**Table 9.5** Interviews conducted in Kazakhstan. (\* = conducted virtually)

#### **Appendix A. Detailed List of Interviews Conducted**

The institutional affiliation of the interviewees was clarified and added to the column profile. The authors provided respondent organizations' names only where the interviewees explicitly allowed for this disclosure and when it did not pose risks to our interviewees (Tables 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7).

**Table 9.6** Interviews conducted in Uzbekistan. (\* = interviews conducted virtually)

**Table 9.7** Interviews conducted in Tajikistan. (\* = interviews conducted virtually)

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Chapter 10 The Dilemma of Good Governance Versus Power Grab in Georgia**

**Shalva Dzebisashvili**

#### **10.1 Introduction**

Since the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) in the early 1990s, the proponents of successful democratic transition have looked tirelessly for instances in which regime change has led to the establishment of more democratically functioning institutions, i.e., the use of democratic practices and thus to the tradition to *good governance* and a consolidated democracy (Huntington, 1991). Georgia has been titled the lighthouse of democracy as a part of this wave, following the 2003 "Rose Revolution", has gradually regressed in its democratic credentials, and after the parliamentary elections and the change of political regime in 2012, ultimately plunged into the category of partly authoritarian (or hybrid) democracy (Freedom House, 2021). As the *Nations in Transit 2020* calmly states, the 29 countries which have experienced a democratic breakdown, leading to the maximum number of undemocratic regimes since 1995 in Europe and Central Asia, are characterized by:

…these politicians have stopped hiding behind a facade of nominal compliance. They are openly attacking democratic institutions and attempting to do away with any remaining checks on their power. In the region stretching from Central Europe to Central Asia, this shift has accelerated assaults on judicial independence, threats against civil society and the media, the manipulation of electoral frameworks, and the hollowing out of parliaments, which no longer fulfill their role as centers of political debate and oversight of the executive (Freedom House, 2020).

Despite the laudable attempt of the *National Movement* government to establish a tradition of peaceful transition of power (to the coalition of *Georgian Dream*) through parliamentary elections, the hopes of further democratic consolidation and the proliferation of good governance principles quickly died and were replaced by growing

© The Author(s) 2024

A. Mihr and C. Pierobon (eds.), *Polarization, Shifting Borders and Liquid Governance*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44584-2\_10

S. Dzebisashvili (B)

The University of Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
domestic and international concerns (Kakachia & Lebanidze, 2019). In fact, this negative tendency is typical not only for Georgia, but a series of countries in Europe and Central Asia, once again highlighting the problem of "democratic automatism", in which democratically held elections do not automatically herald the advent of stable democratic institutions. This point is shared by Joseph Derdzinki and Thomas Carothers, who conclude that the movement away from a dictatorship or an authoritarian regime in no way guarantees the movement toward democracy (Derdzinski, 2009). The quest for the best formula of democratic development, especially for those countries that, similarly to Georgia, experienced an authoritarian past, remains unfinished, thus ultimately boiling down to the ability of the political system to force the government and of the government itself, to act in the spirit of good governance and the practices involved.

According to Fukuyama, the discussion of contemporary politics on how to constrain tyrannical governments has centered on the institutional mechanisms that constrain the government, that of the rule of law and democratic accountability (Fukuyama, 2014). Thus, it has become highly relevant from the political and policy analysis perspective, including the extensive menu of concepts on the general rationale and practical mechanisms authoritarian regimes use, to justify the retreat from democratic achievements and ensure the effective monopolization of power. In this context, Lust and Waldner (2015) distill the essence of the problem and frame it as changes made by authoritarian regimes in formal political institutions and informal political practices that significantly reduce citizens' capacity to control the government and keep it accountable (Lust & Waldner, 2015). The backsliding of democracy has thus been accelerated over the past decade.

This implies that the institutional mechanisms of accountability and the means of internal political and societal control, such as the internal security services, will inevitably come to the center of analytical scrutiny and bear great potential for providing deeper insight into the processes of general political transformation. The literature on the role of internal intelligence and other state security services is still underdeveloped, resulting in a "lacunae of understanding" and significance of these agencies in general and their political decision-making, not less in obstructing the democratic consolidation of institutions, i.e., the application of good governance practices (Alymbaeva & Fluri, 2021). It should also be noted that literature still needs to hold the so-called security sector's control and accountability at the core of its analysis. Such literature is known as the Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature. However, as David Lewis correctly points out, largely the product of OSCE, the SSR is too overly optimistic while remaining unable to deliver a coherent doctrine with isolated assistance programs of primarily prescriptive and technical nature, divorced mainly from other initiatives and disconnected from the complexities (challenges) of political transformation (Lewis, 2011).

#### **10.2 Hypothetical Approach**

One can argue and assume that the wide variety of theoretical explanations for the democratization processes offers little to distill a universal formula for a successful transition. But still, it remains a mere simplification (Geddes et al., 2018). Instead, an attempt must be made to construct a hypothetical proposition based mainly on the more narrow systemic factors of political change: the strength of external (international) demands, the lack of internal pressure from below, and the nature of bureaucratic tradition, typically dominated by internal security apparatus in the Soviet era. As the aspect of international involvement (pressure) is visible in Georgia before and after the regime change in 2012, our first hypothetical claim is pretty much in line with Haggard and Kaufman's (2016a, 2016b) statement that the absence of a powerful opposition turns a transition from authoritarian rule to a mode of more liberal, good governance which is elite-driven mainly with external, i.e., international, inducements and constraints playing a much higher role in the calculus of the existing regime (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016a, 2016b).

The second hypothetical explanation takes the influence of bureaucracy as a focal point of analysis, whether from the point of political (party) domination or the level of infiltration by loyal personnel or security service cadres. One could assume that, due to the heavy domination of the Soviet past, institutional/normative legacies, and bureaucratic ethics, the Russian pathway of "democratization" inevitably becomes a role model of failed democracy for Georgia. This is the crucial factor to be considered while studying post-Soviet regimes where, similarly to Russia, a large portion of senior bureaucrats (a quarter in Russia) can have a security services background (Treisman, 2018). This type of bureaucracy is intimately linked to the ability of the ruling regime to control and monitor at all levels of governance to ensure collaboration and prevent sabotage. However, as Barbara Geddes states, it also increases the power of the so-called inner circle of the regime and the clientele networks, as well as often requiring a concentration of power by chief executives and the replacement of the competent bureaucracy with regime supporters (Geddes et al., 2018).

#### **10.3 Political Elites as Role-Model?**

The role of political elites and leaders is a variable determining governance and regime type outcomes. No doubt, leaders exert immense influence on political processes and decision-making. However, as Ilie looked deeper into the identity of political leadership and the *prime-sites* of their emergence, he paraphrased that most research rests on the stereotypical approach of heroic individuals in hierarchical positions who mobilize supporters to achieve certain organizational goals. Whereas managers who know the rules, and how to break the rules, win (Ilie & Schnurr, 2017).

The significance of the arrangements between outgoing and incoming elites has been extensively discussed by Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo (2018). In essence, the negotiations are regarded as pacts and enterprises undertaken by political elites for other elites, and the institutional architecture of democracy is designed to shield the incumbent elites from the rule of law (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). Therefore, the ability of voters to translate their preferences into policies is blocked, leaving the very authoritarian DNA of almost every democracy untouched (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). Understandably, pacts between rival elites have tremendous consequences on the quality of democratic transformation and its institutional effectiveness. Conversely, as Luca Tomini concludes, the opposite process can happen in which opposing parties view each other as mortal enemies, and the narrow ruling elite perceives the political demands of the opposition as a threat. Thus, the choice is made to favor more authoritarian rule (entrenchment, repressions, and suspension of the rule of law) (Tomini, 2018). Viewing leadership as a systemic element, Ilie assigns the leader a significant role in shaping the human and institutional environment, where individual commitments, corporate, and cultural values (e.g., Nokia vs. Erikson) define the change processes (Ilie & Schnurr, 2017). This logic is further strengthened by Sarah Binder, who draws attention to the ability of party leaders to control resources and be exceptionally well informed and, therefore, to dominate the rank and file (Binder & Lee, 2015). In the end, the willingness to reach particular types of political arrangements for power-sharing is detrimental to political elites, according to Bell (2018). The elites themselves have to be distinguished by the degree of multilevel accountability, i.e., the multiplicity of stakeholders, as this indicates the interests and values upon which their power is constructed (Ade, 2019).

Hence, the role of leaders and elites in democratic transition reveals strong references to designing proper institutional mechanisms. Because the existing ones have contributed to the longevity of the previous regime and can be used by the new ruling party in the same way. Graeme considers the essence of democratic consolidation in the ability of all political groups to accept the established political institutions and the rules of the game, thus highlighting even more strongly the importance of institutional design typically carried out by political elites (Gill, 2000). Naturally, the definition of a consolidated democracy implies the existence of democratic institutions that fully comply with the principles of good governance, i.e., have the ability and mechanisms of (self)checks and balances. The elites in charge are very aware of this. However, to make good governance happen or, as Fukuyama puts it before governments can be constrained, they have to be able to govern—an apparent reference to governance practices and effective bureaucracy (Fukuyama, 2014).

Considering what has been discussed above, conceptually and context-wise, the critical political events during and after the Rose Revolution in 2003 in Georgia must taken under the analytical scrutiny. These can be broadly divided into two periods of differing political rule: The period of Saakashvili and United National Movement (UNM) domination and the authority of the Georgian Dream (GD) and the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili after their parliamentary victory in 2012. As for the case of Georgia, primary emphasis can be placed on the ability and willingness of transitional elites to bargain, strike a deal, and agree on (including institutional) arrangements that either secure the incumbent regime's interest or enable a more radical systemic (with or without personnel) purge.

Recognizing the role of leaders and elites in designing political institutions, the logic, and structure of those institutions, including constitutional arrangements, will be given special attention, along with the assessment of institutional mechanisms that either support political consensus building or, in contrast, increase the chance of negotiation failure. Not least important is to recognize from the very beginning the risk of having an institutional design that is incredibly informal and leaves sufficient space for building and utilizing informal, shadowy centers of actual and effective decision-making. This is even more important when societies are politically divided and polarized. Here, we regard institutions based on consociationalism and, thus, the arrangements for power-sharing as the best model that is primarily elite-driven (Jakala, 2018).

Even in stable democracies, according to Mansbridge and Martin, institutions and political organizations have little incentive to further successful political outcomes, thus resulting in frequent policy reversals and government changes (Mansbridge & Martin, 2013). It should not be forgotten that, in the case of Georgia, the socialist past has to be elevated as a critical variable determining the institutional arrangements at all levels where the expectations of consensual power-sharing have to be minimal. This comes as no surprise due to the basic acknowledgement that socialism could be regarded as democratic as long as it allows for elite competition for power, and not the rigid domination of politics and industry by a single elite (Medearis, 2001). The basics for any change in political institutions appear to be the agreement on the very constitutional document that safeguards the vital rights and interests of elites, especially those about to "exit the dictatorship on their terms" (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). It is likely that if an agreement is not reached. The institutional arrangements lack legitimacy, as Justin Parkhurst argues. Their constraining effect is too weak, and the incumbent regime (as well as its opponents) starts to treat politics as a "winner-take-all" game and "abuse office to marginalize oppositions permanently" (Parkhurst, 2017; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016a, 2016b). Such abuse of office is typically understood as the monopolization of institutions and state agencies under which government departments "operate as 'party fiefdoms'", and are identified with individual ministers (Jakala et al., 2018).

Haggard and Kaufman argue that those regimes, along with the domination of state agencies, allow for limited political participation and reward those who cooperate conditionally (e.g., in semi-competitive elections), endure most, and are even capable of minimizing the impact of regime opponents who "choose to remain outside the controlled institutional space" (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016a, 2016b).

It should also be noted that the term "controlled institution" does not exclude the existence of a hidden or informal center of decision-making. Kunicová points out this by dwelling on distributive politics and formal institutions in Russia (Shapiro et al., 2008). And this claim is further supported by Albertus and Menaldo, who include the political culture and patronage in this context. They conclude that informal institutions can work in tandem with formal ones or even bolster them (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). Contemporary research is still struggling to uncover the evidence of hidden power and the "shadowy world" and thus remains insufficient primarily to change government policy, as Duncan Green admits (Green, 2016).

As the solid administrative body of bureaucracy represents the essence of institutions and the machinery of governance, the bureaucratic arrangements and policies in critical areas of political decision-making will be examined, as well as the norms and procedures of formal accountability and transparency, as these represent the central pillars of the concept of good governance and democratic institutional development, even more so as the role of bureaucracy is being discussed. Since control by institutions and of institutions is the key to regime stability, the democratic system typically asks for mechanisms of *answerability* and punishment. The first is related to the availability of information (transparency), and the second is directly linked to the capacity to impose negative sanctions on office holders (National Research Council, 2008). While there are many interpretations of accountability (e.g., horizontal vs. vertical), we would rather look for the evidence of *within the system (or systemic) accountability* and *external accountability*. The former implies the mechanisms within the governance system, whereas the latter relates to the means of accountability before the public (society) and international actors. The external or *third dimension of accountability* is centered around the power of international actors (governments and organizations) to hold a state institution to account. It is particularly relevant since new democracies usually seek foreign support and legitimization. For example, David Lewis draws attention to the limited effects of the assistance provided by OSCE in police reform in post-soviet Central Asia, as it has been very narrow and technical in nature and needs more significant oversight from competent officials (Lewis, 2011). Furthermore, some sources point directly toward references to good governance and the rule of law that are largely absent or vaguely defined in EU demands to the partners to whom assistance programs are provided (Brockmann & Bosold, 2009). This aspect is particularly relevant to Georgia, as every ruling party since the declaration of independence in 1991 formally recognized the European perspective as the only way of state development. However, the permanent and traditional reference to a European future and the respective increase in bureaucratic and technical-normative linkages with the standard tool of the EU's conditionality does not always result in a high speed or quality of democratic transformation.

Thus, Parkhurst correctly confronts the problem of bureaucratic abuse and political monopolization with the challenge of growing dominance of technocratic expertise in political institutions as harboring the risk of moving away from democratic ideals (Parkhurst, 2017). Since we are far from recognizing the technocratic essence of bureaucracy as problematic in our research context, the primary focus is devoted to the qualities that make bureaucracy "well trained, of good standing and tradition…with a strong sense of duty and no less strong *esprit de corps*" (Schumpeter, 2003). Schumpeter doubles down on this matter, highlighting the critical importance of a strong, independent, and powerful bureaucracy (of the Weberian mold) to be able to guide and, if needed, instruct the politicians in various ministries (Schumpeter, 2003). This perfect picture is contrasted and presented by him as the main argument and answer to governments staffed by amateurs who typically don't understand that this "powerful engine"—a product of a centuries-long development—cannot be created in a hurry or hired with money (Schumpeter, 2003). This finding is illuminating as it helps in every respect to search for plausible answers in cases like Russia or Indonesia, where in one instance, Russians remained wary of the democratic institutions. At the same time, Indonesians learned quickly to use their institutions for channeling their preferences (Lussier, 2016). Hence, the influence of bureaucracy becomes a focal point of analysis, whether from the point of political (party) domination or the level of infiltration by loyal personnel or security service cadres.

Consequently, we won't be able to avoid the comparison of Georgia with the Russian "model" and political reality because, often, new democracies experience common pathologies they have inherited from the former colonial occupiers, as Albertus and Menaldo aptly highlight (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). Do we have profound evidence of institutional roots still linked to Soviet-era KGB and *Siloviki*  (power services), and does the communist past represent the defining factor that explains the more substantial grip and control over society, thus the difference to noncommunist authoritarian regimes (Kelley, 2017)? These questions are, evidently, very relevant and must be responded to since many post-Soviet countries, in their transformation processes, expose political regimes that are characterized by the power of strong executives "buttressed by control over economic rents, the judiciary, the police", and institutions that work "…in concert with the court and legal systems which were under strong political influence in the Soviet period and have remained equally subordinate to political elites…" in the post-Soviet period (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016a, 2016b).

Similarly, when the former secret intelligence service of East Germany, the Stasi, ruled the country, the communist party-dominated government jobs and public offices had to be additionally controlled and monitored by the Stasi. Hundreds of thousands of agents infiltrated and guided solely by their loyalty to the secret service Ministre of State Security and his control (Geddes et al., 2018). In this context, the formality of checks and balances and respective institutions becomes an increasingly dominant marker for these regimes. Infiltration of the government by the "contemporary incarnation of the Cheka" can be seen down to the regional governmental offices that have been stripped of their authority (administrative or financial) space and "transformed" into presidential representations, staffed with envoys (*polpreds*) with a background in the security services (Kovalev, 2017; Zimmerman, 2014). Consequently, it is no surprise that absolute power corrupts absolutely and easily. Those who capture state institutions start to increasingly engage in economic and business activities by abusing their coercive power and control over the justice system to "reassign state property to themselves as private owners while maintaining that they are, indeed the state" (Osipian, 2019). This is relevant and intriguing as it also refers to the monolithic self-understanding, reflection, and mentality of those individuals belonging to the "elite uncontrolled class" of *Siloviki*, characterized by the shared belief in a strong state, order, unity, primacy of the state over the individual, desire to bring others under control, and loyalty to one's team (Taylor, 2018). The power of shared mentality, norms, and corporate values cannot be ignored. In fact, this might become a powerful, if not central, obstacle to institutional change, as the carriers of this mentality denigrate the ability of ordinary citizens to understand the "realm of official politics" and regard themselves as uniquely competent to understand the existing challenges (Treisman, 2018). Thus, as Caparini argues, this phenomenon has to be carefully and decisively dealt with by ensuring "…that the mentality of those working in the new service doesn't reflect that of the former service"(sic!) (Green 2016). This can be done by ensuring that the security apparatus remains "agnostic about the party in power," through lustration and prosecution practices to ensure justice, legitimacy, and consolidation and by political-administrative purging and vetting (Derdzinski, 2009; Fraihat, 2016; Harris & Reilly, 1998). In the end, if we borrow from Joseph Derdzinski, it is essentially whether we'll be able to prove the power of authoritarian legacies per se or the inherent choice of the new political elite to preserve them to secure their interests (Derdzinski, 2009).

#### **10.4 The Georgian Reality**

On the eve of the *Rose Revolution* in 2003, President Eduard Shevardnadze's aging and weak administration was quite sure about the prospects of successful parliamentary elections. It did not regard the young generation of politicians such as Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, or Nino Burdjanadze as the mortal enemies of its political longevity. It had several reasons. They were all nurtured in the Shevardnadze government-led "Citizens' Union" party, occupied various mid-to high-level official (political) positions, and organizations created by them for the electoral purpose were not expected to do well, and, indeed, did not score a dangerously high number of votes (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003). The "white fox", prone to balancing his powerful ministers and regularly holding consultations with the minister of interior, initially Kakha Targamadze, and later his successor Koba Narchemashvili, could hardly believe that the situation following the rigged elections of 2003 got out of control that he was forced to negotiate with the "Troika" of Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze, and managed only to secure his inviolability, but not that of his party nomenclature or the members of the corrupt economic oligarchy (Zamalashvili, 2004). Valentin argues that only limited space for goodwill and common ground was visible (Ade, 2019). We can see a rapid change and replacement of elites, both political and economic, following the deal reached between the revolutionary Troika and the ousted president Shevardnaze, which did not include guarantees of no prosecution, imprisonment, or exile, as Albertus and Menaldo would argue (2018). Interestingly, the incumbent regime's firm control of the security apparatus during the transition of power is the critical factor for such guarantees. Yet this was lacking from the beginning of the protest and even grew more problematic as the protests transitioned into a full-blown street revolution.1 Unofficial channels, used intensively by several UNM and other leaders of the revolutionary alliance during the demonstrations, were not intended to create a certain level of trust but rather to implant disunity, intimidation, and chaos.2

<sup>1</sup> Koba Narchemashvili, the Former Minister of Interior in Georgia in 2003, personal communication, July 2, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Valeri Khaburdzania, the former Head of Intelligence Service, personal communication, February 21, 2021.

Since the source of support and legitimacy of the incoming political elite was utterly distinct from the incumbent regime, the primary way to signal loyalty to the president's base was through excessive extortion practices and prosecutions (Albertus & Menaldo 2018).

The personality and leadership qualities of former president Saakashvili who led the mass storming of the parliament as it was about to legitimize the falsified results of the elections, significantly increased his popularity and led the other members of the Troika to agree to his candidacy for the presidential elections in 2005.3 The United National Movement stood firmly under the personal control of Saakashvili, with, essentially, no instances of internal severe disagreements to whatever decision was made, be it sudden relocation of the parliament unconvincingly justified by the need for decentralization or a hasty decision to build a deep sea port called Lasika (with no evidence of complex, serous evaluations done in advance) (Saakashvili, 2011). Even his very last decision, to return to Georgia, with no chance of any massive popular support, can only be explained hopes of his still existing personal popularity (vs. declining approval rates of the UNM) and the fear to lose his grip not only on the political situation in Georgia, but in the UNM party itself.

Personalities in party politics matter very much and aside from a few individuals such as Zurab Adeishvili, Giga Bokeria, and Vano Merabishvili in the UNM the role of ministers and deputy ministers was reduced to the technical function of executing decisions made in the inner circle.4 This resulted in the frequent replacement of premier ministers and ministers, ironically called in public the government carousel, on which one individual could "practice" several ministerial positions within a short period of time.5 Irakli Okruashvili, who, similar to other UNM ministers, occupied several key positions in the power ministries (from 2003 to 2006), and ended up at odds with Saakashvili due to his growing popularity, did not want to accept the Ministry of Economic Development as compensation for his political ambitions, and was eventually arrested and exiled to France in 2007 (Civil.ge, 2007).

The Georgian Dream (GD), led by the oligarch Ivanishvili, utilized similar patterns of leadership, consolidating a vast coalition of political parties, movements, and organizations supported by a mass base, a significant part of which was alienated by the strict and repressive policies of the Saakashvili regime (Transparency International Georgia, 2010). All of the critical political appointees in the new government following the parliamentary victory of the GD in 2012, and especially after 2016, were former members of the CARTU-foundation and Cartu Bank, institutions run by Bidzina Ivanishvili since the late 90s (Cartu Bank, 2022). During the political

<sup>3</sup> Giorgi Baramidze, the member of the UNM, former minister of Interior in 2004, personal communication, October 3, 2021.

Nino Burjanadze, former Chairmain of the Parliament in 2001-2008, personal communication, August 5, 2022.

<sup>4</sup> Burjanadze, personal communication, August 5, 2022. Khaburdzania, personal communication, February 21, 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Note: Among many instances (incl. dozens of prime ministers) the career paths of Giorgi Baramidze and Irakli Okruashvili were extraordinary as they managed to occupy several key power-ministerial positions in a very short period of time.

developments and solidification of his power, he increasingly relied on his close circle of accomplices. Ultimately, he decisively distanced himself from several coalition parties that were domestically considered pro-western and democratic (Topuria 2014).

After resigning from political activities as prime minister and handing over this position to his closest ally, Irakli Gharibashvili in 2013, he again returned as the chairman of the Georgian Dream party and, in 2021, distanced himself again from the political life by once again appointing Irakli Gharibashvili as a prime minister. As a result, Gharibashvili had "unexpectedly" resigned from the position of PM in 2015, supposedly due to heavy criticism from the oligarch (Gogua, 2015). Given all this, alongside other frequent instances of governmental carousels, where previously praised and credited political figures and colleagues (Kvirikashvili and Gakharia), became a "disgrace" to the GD, as well as the frequent changes of ministerial positions which continued to be a routine practice, the centrality of Bidzina Ivanishvili's leadership in the GD cannot be denied (Radio Liberty, 2021). Furthermore, the frequent use of informal and shadowy mechanisms of decision-making and influence while deciding on political appointments or projects of economic and/or financial importance was frequently corroborated by Gia Khukhashvili, who happened to be at the very center of GD creation and the building of the team which led the oligarch to parliamentary victory in 2012.6

In a position of political domination and individual control of their party, such regimes exploit the absence, i.e., the weakness of the political opposition (caused by political nihilism and inability to mobilize additional supporters) and create or modify institutional designs to meet their preferences and interests. Such elite-driven transformation lacks pressure from below and can only exhibit some degree of external accountability (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016a, 2016b). Both parties (UNM and GD) immediately exploited their constitutional majorities in the parliament to proceed with constitutional changes that favored the political interests of the incoming regimes. In the case of the former, the constitution was amended to reduce the president's power and turn the presidential republic into a German-modeled parliamentary republic with the prime minister on the top of the executive (Khidasheli, 2012). Arguably, this was done to allow President Saakashvili, who no longer could be elected in a presidential capacity, to transfer to the prime minister's chair and continue ruling the country. Similarly, the Georgian Dream, having promised to introduce direct and proportional elections (with no majoritarian seats in parliament), broke its promise and postponed the introduction of the promised electoral model until 2024 (Radio Liberty, 2019).

The decision was relatively easy to explain since the promise of 'better elections' was forced by the political crisis and massive popular demands for government resignation during the *Gavrilov Night*. Additionally, the decision to abolish the seats in the parliament that are elected based on majoritarian victory could hardly be accomplished as those parliamentarians typically represent the local (regional) servants or

<sup>6</sup> Gia Khukhashvili, former Councelor of Bidzina Ivanishvili, personal communication, July 27, 2021.

clientele of the ruling regime and are thus a potent tool of parliamentary domination. The political intentions manifested in institutional design can also be seen in other domains of political activity, such as the center-region relationship, i.e., the delegation of authorities from the center to the regions and municipalities, widely termed in Georgia as politico-administrative decentralization. We also see a similarity, which can be attributed to the typical pattern of authoritarian behavior, such as the maximization of control.

During UNM rule, for example, the position of regional governors, at that time unconstitutional entities, was strengthened and heavily subordinated to the president through the appointment of personally loyal individuals and party cadres (e.g., Petre Ziskarishvili, Akaki Bobokhidze, and Zaza Gorozia). These moves made it possible to minimize the space of political activism in the provinces and paralyzed local economic initiatives and activities, making them almost entirely dependent on endorsement from the political center in Tbilisi. However, the GD government promised to implement administrative decentralization before the parliamentary elections in 2012. It soon threw away these promises. It continued the tradition of staffing governors' positions with loyal cadres and even decreased the number of free municipalities from twelve to five (Civil.ge, 2017a, 2017b). In the end, the significant factor that constrains each regime and keeps it within the frames of democratic acceptability is the external (European/Western) influence, reflected in multiple conditions and demands of technical, institutional-procedural, or a pretty radical political nature (Association Agreement, or the EU-Commission Opinion on the Candidacy status), that despite their increasingly demanding nature cannot be entirely ignored by the ruling regime (European Commission, 2022).

Schumpeter paraphrased that an effective bureaucracy cannot be created promptly and hired with money. It must be sufficiently independent and powerful to avoid becoming a government of amateurs (Schumpeter, 2003). Unfortunately, the Georgian reality in all cases reveals substantial evidence of an administrative apparatus that is heavily politicized and thus prone to frequent reshuffling across the entire bureaucratic pyramid based on political but also increasingly individual (ministerial), loyalty (Mariamidze, 2018; Urushadze, 2018). Retaining the pattern of behavior from the UNM and initially committing to the political purge of governmental offices as the UNM did in 2003, the GD even expanded the number of employees in public offices, hitting a record, albeit somewhat reducing the number of public employees fired bluntly at ministerial demand and with no solid legal protection (Lomidze & Dzidziguri, 2020; Urushadze, 2018). Admittedly, such bureaucracy can hardly meet the high demand for efficacy, which is especially important at managerial and administrative levels (Harris & Reilly, 1998). The degree of bureaucratic accountability can hardly be assessed as optimal due to the formal nature of control mechanisms, the politicization of justice, and the low availability of relevant information. For instance, the parliamentary committees rarely question or call intensive hearings on matters of great urgency for the ruling party, and even those that functionally deal with issues of state security, in fact, serve the interests of the agencies to be held accountable (Dzebisashvili, 2014). Furthermore, the deputy chairman of the Defence and Security Committee in the Georgian parliament Ms. Teona Akubardia was forced to write a letter to the Speaker of Parliament (GD), listing all the activities of the committee related to security services, where she and other opposition members of the committee were stripped the constitutional right to participate by the current committee chair Irakli Beraia (a blatant abuse of power). In essence, this powerful mechanism of parliamentary control, questioning, and investigation became an extended hand of the executive during the Saakashvili era. They were successfully "imported" and utilized by the Georgian Dream.

The absence of practical tools of checks and balances and the formality or informality of the accountability mechanisms of government agencies has become even more problematic as it allows the incumbent regime to increasingly resort to undemocratic and violent means of political control and domination that typically can only be executed by heavy reliance on security services or the *Dzalovnebi*, a Georgian term widely used in political language and a direct translation of the Russian *Siloviki.* The initial popularity after the revolution in 2003 was wasted due to the heavy and clumsy activities of power agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior (with the intelligence department integrated) and a prosecutors' office that has essentially eliminated the freedom of the judiciary and increasingly expanded intimidation practices toward the businesses and large segments of the population.

In line with Caparini's findings, the parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence services in Georgia has become a pure formality and, similar to the Russian case, has been captured by party members and has thus lost its independence and value (Caparini, 2007). Significant challenges related to ineffective oversight, a lack of political neutrality, and undemocratic practices in internal security services continue to mark security governance in Georgia. This is similar to the Russian model exemplified by the limited ability of national legislatures to control security services, where the State *Duma* often even increases their discretion by delegating legislative initiatives to the concerned security agencies themselves (Treisman, 2018). The phenomenon of the rapidly growing influence of security services in the political system down to the very critical moment of forming a new elite—a mix between *nomenklatura* and *siloviki*—to destroy competitors and secure economic and political instruments of power, including the means of coercion, has been brilliantly covered by Andrei Kovalev (Kovalev, 2017). The members of these agencies, in extreme cases as in Russia, can gradually take over key positions across the country, and "United by a common identity, a shared worldview, and a deep personal loyalty", the *siloviki* constitute a cohesive corporation, accountable to no one but the president himself, being the driving force behind authoritarian policies (Treisman, 2018).

Under Ivanishvili's leadership, the intimidation practices toward businesses and the population decreased significantly. Nevertheless, the intensity and extent of political espionage toward the opposition, journalists, social activists, clergy, and foreign diplomats, and election fraud were made possible through massive intimidation of "vulnerable" segments of voters by security agents. The infiltration of security apparatus-related individuals in central or regional administration offices reached a point of concern (Civil.ge, 2022). This tradition was not GD-novum and was first effectively instrumentalized during the UNM rule. But the scale of merging and diffusion between the *Dzalovani(siloviki)* agencies and other public offices such as ministries, municipalities, parliamentarians, or even businesses and, most importantly, the ruling GD party is alarming.7 It should be noted that similar to their Russian counterparts, the members of the Georgian security agencies have developed a common mindset, shared understanding, and set of principles that unites them, whether active in duty or outside of the institutional framework. This is expressed in the word—*Tanamshromeli*—meaning 'colleague' but far better matches the Russian version—*Sotrudnik*. This code word, which testifies to your professional background and corporate values, makes it much easier to transfer from one power (*Dzalovani*) agency to another and remain indefinitely in any public office if needed.

#### **10.5 Conclusion**

The problem of the diffusion of bad practices in transitional democracies is not new. Similar to other international cases, an initial push for a more democratic rule in Georgia did not necessarily result in a consolidated democracy in which institutions play significant and independent roles in keeping democratic principles such as transparency and accountability, i.e., the mechanism of good governance, viable. The reality is sobering. Instead, the new political elites (UNM or GD) had opted to take advantage of authoritarian tools and formal accountability (reform masking) and do little to prevent the total monopolization of power and state capture. Whether under UNM led by Mikheil Saakashvili or the GD led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, the common feature is that the monopolization of politics by both regimes started with the individual monopolization of the party. The party structures of UNM and GD, although different in design, constituency, and commitment to a cohesive political ideology, reveal a striking similarity in the behavior of their political leaders and appointment policies and principles based mainly on political and individual loyalty. Leaders are instrumental at every level of political decision-making, utilizing formal or informal frameworks (formats) of policymaking. They lead negotiations and are the best informed to make decisive moves, whether by designing new institutional frameworks or defining the acceptable level of institutional accountability.

In his policy of centralization of power by eliminating the possibility of local self-governance and appointing personal trustees as governors accountable solely to him personally, President Saakashvili provided only lip service to the democratic prospects of the country and allowed Bidzina Ivanishvili to benefit from this mistake. Similarly, the bureaucracy, the backbone of the effective administrative functioning of any country, was reduced to the function of a politically (and individually) trusted pool of public offices and technical implementers, stripped of any ability and responsibility of independent or neutral thinking and initiative. With the degradation of existing

<sup>7</sup> Note: the story of the former deputy minister of State Security Service is exemplary, as it reflects a rapid ascendance of "nobody" with the condition of social dependency to the position of deputy minister and the status of multimillionaire. The involvement of the Russia based businessman David Khidasheli in the David Gareji affair and his consequent reward by the Georgian Government (thousands of hectares of forest in the natural resort area Racha) is pretty much telling.

accountability mechanisms of state institutions and agencies to the level of formal and embarrassing mimicry of Western practices, the process of creating the so-called *power vertical* (or *Vertikalj Vlasti* as it is called in Russia) in Georgia was complete. State capture, evident by the end of UNM rule, became even more articulated during the GD government with an ever-growing and all-embracing bureaucratic apparatus.

All this, with a great dose of insights into the difficulties of parliamentary oversight over security and intelligence services when institutions are captured by party members and thus lose their independence and ethical value, is extensively reviewed by Caparini (2007). Pretty in Russian style the national legislature in Georgia plays little if any role in executing serious control over Dzalovnebi/Siloviki. This is even more dangerous, as due to the growing tendency of merging between the political nomenklatura and formally former representatives of power agencies the risk of a complete takeover of the entire fabric of political governance becomes looming, effectively turning it to truly unaccountable and closed system. It is no secret that even in the most democratic countries the democratic oversight of security and intelligence services is challenging. In authoritarian countries or even transitional democracies, these services represent a key means of maintaining power and neutralizing domestic opposition. Therefore, we agree with Joseph Derdzinski that studying the "powerful and shadowy security apparatus" and the degree they were exposed to systemic changes and liberalization could have powerful policy implications toward "nudging the holdouts" (Derdzinski, 2009).

With all markers in place, the current political system and the way of governance in Georgia strongly resembles the system created by Vladimir Putin in Russia, with the strong central pillar of power exerting influence and control both in the administrative structures of the country and party echelons using the security apparatus (infiltration and proliferation). If continued unchecked, this practice will inevitably result in a more totalitarian system, except when this damaging prospect is balanced by the increased involvement of external actors (the EU and/or USA) and their respective accountability demands and other tools of good governance. Unfortunately, the external pressure, i.e., whether the EU-12 point recommendations on the prospects of Georgia's EU candidacy or the promise of NATO membership have increasingly failed to create positive resonance in the current government in Georgia. This has been demonstrated by canceling the so-called EU-brokered *Charles Michel Agreement* on the side of this ruling GD party, the stunning lack of practice and implementation of the EU-Commission 12-point recommendations, and the increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward the EU and the US by the GD representatives in the context of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. This fact points toward the need for greater importance to the mandatory nexus between the external pressure factors and internal demands represented by a powerful democratic opposition. Without this strong linkage, where external and internal democratic pressures can be mutually reinforcing when needed, reliance solely on the positive effects of international demands can be futile and misleading.

Not least, domestic political competition must be characterized by the permanent presence of a robust democratic opposition, which can not only increase the impact of external (democratic) pressure but also enormously benefit from it, forcing the incumbent regime to comply with its demands. If these changes remain on paper, Georgia will risk becoming a champion of isomorphic mimicry only.

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National Research Council. (2008). *Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, 9*(6). The National Academies Press.

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## **Chapter 11 Transformations of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine Towards EU Membership**

**Malkhaz Nakashidze**

#### **11.1 Introduction**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of independence, many OSCE member states are engaged in democratic transformation. The relations of post-Soviet states with international actors, such as the European Union (EU), play an important role in this transformation process. Becoming closer to and joining the EU is the main goal of certain states within the process of the country's transformation. Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have been cooperating with the EU for several decades in different formats (Eastern Partnership, Associated Trio, etc.). Along with economic modernization, the primary task of all three countries is the transformation of democratic institutions, and the EU provides various ways of partnership in this regard, including financial support.

Despite many obstacles and challenges, the achievement of visa-free travel and a free trade and association agreement with the European Union can be considered a particular success of the transformation process. Today, these agreements are a significant framework, an agenda for developing these countries. All three countries have left behind many vicious features of post-Soviet statehood, although they still have many steps to take before achieving a perfect democratic system. Associate country status is undoubtedly a confirmation of progress. Its achievement could have been smoother, especially in the face of growing pressure from the Russian Federation. Today, the main task of these countries is to show more progress on the path to democratic transformation. This will allow them to receive candidate status for EU membership and become full members. In June 2022, in the context of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the European Union granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, with the European perspective on Georgia based on the condition of fulfilling certain obligations.

© The Author(s) 2024

M. Nakashidze (B)

Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University, Batumi, Georgia e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
A. Mihr and C. Pierobon (eds.), *Polarization, Shifting Borders and Liquid Governance*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44584-2\_11

The transformations of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have been widely discussed by scholars, including from a comparative perspective. The development of these countries is examined in the context of democratization and security in the Eastern neighborhood (Nilsson & Silander, 2016), which is characterized by specific difficulties (Ahmad Way, 2022). The transformation process has also been a subject of research from a legal perspective (Elsuwege & Petrov, 2017), especially in terms of legal and constitutional challenges arising from the association agreement (Petrov, 2016). The processes of transformation have exhibited a lack of democracy (Nodia et al., 2017) and have encountered many obstacles (Grecu, 2015), including state capture, the influence of oligarchs on institutions (Delcour et al., 2019; Kono´nczuk et al., 2017), and implementation of ineffective anti-corruption policy (Emerson et al., 2017). The transformation process of these countries is the subject of extensive research in the context of Europeanization, democratization, and external and internal challenges (Popsoi & Franchino, 2021). An important source of this research is also the decision of the European Union on granting candidate status to these countries (European Commission, 2022), which obliges the national governments to undertake multifaceted reforms. This chapter considers the transformation process in connection with European integration and its requirements. In the scholarly literature, European integration is defined as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing federal states. This broad definition includes both a social process and a political process, as well as the construction of new political institutions with a direct say in at least a part of their member states' affairs (Wiener et al., 2018).

The chapter assesses how Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have fulfilled the political criteria for EU membership. The following questions have been identified that will guide the analysis: (1) what conditions the countries must fulfill in the process of transformation, (2) what progress they have experienced so far, and (3) what concrete steps should be taken in the coming years to join the EU. The remainder of the chapter consists of five sections.

The following two sections address EU enlargement and membership criteria and the transformation achievements of the three countries under discussion since the entry into force of the association agreements. The following section addresses the main challenges of transformation in European integration and specific challenges in the change process, such as political polarization, improvement of the justice system and the rule of law, anti-corruption reforms, de-oligarchization, promotion of human rights, and others. Finally, the chapter analyzes the EU's decisions on Georgia's candidate status versus those for Ukraine and Moldova and related challenges.

#### **11.2 The European Union Enlargement**

EU enlargement is essential to its integration policy (European Council, 2006). Six rounds of enlargement have been carried out since the foundation of the EU. In the process of integration, the European Union uses various instruments for the Europeanization of partner countries. Conditionality and socialization are the most critical elements among these instruments, although the EU has other agencies. Schimmelfennig (2009: 8) identifies eight tools available to the EU when dealing with countries that are not members of the Union. Under conditionality, the European Union offers various incentives to partner states, e.g., financial assistance and access to the EU market, and in return, requires the fulfillment of multiple conditions. By contrast, socialization comprises all EU efforts to "teach" EU policies—as well as the ideas and norms behind them—to outsiders to persuade outsiders that these policies are appropriate and, therefore, to motivate them to adopt EU policies (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 9). Conditionality is one of the tools that the EU uses successfully to convert those states that have trade and economic relations with it, or that are trying to become closer (Lavenex, 2004: 682). Conditionality entails the linkage between fulfilling particular tasks (conditions) and receiving distinct benefits (rewards). The Copenhagen criteria and the acquis establish it, and EU conditionality influences the domestic structures in the applicant countries (Eli, 2015).

The first step of EU membership for a country is to meet the key criteria for accession. These were mainly defined at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and are hence referred to as the "Copenhagen criteria". Countries wishing to join need to have: (1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; (3) the ability to take on and effectively implement the obligations of membership, including respecting the objectives of political, economic, and monetary union (Presidency Conclusions, 1993). After a country receives candidate status, the EU begins negotiations, and the government must ensure further compliance with the EU "acquis" (Access to European Union Law, 2022). This is the body of common rights and obligations binding on all EU countries as EU Members and includes 35 chapters. Applicant countries must accept the *acquis* before joining the EU (DG NEAR, 2012). Throughout the negotiations, the Commission monitors the candidate's progress through regular reports, Communications, and clarifications on conditions for further progress (European Commission, 2012).

Thus, in the next few years, the EU and citizens of these non-EU countries expect intensive transformations of national political systems from the national governments of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The accession process of these three countries may be slower than it was for the granting of candidate status. The lesson from previous enlargements is clear: negotiations always take longer and become much more complicated than anticipated at the start (Grabbe, 2017). However, it is also necessary to consider the political significance of EU accession and the role of Ukraine in this matter. Some European scholars estimate that granting Ukraine membership is a political and moral imperative as the Ukrainian people are fighting not only for their country but also for common European values of peace, democracy, fundamental freedoms, and civilized international relations (Emerson et al., 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Membership applications raise existential questions not just about the borders of the Union and relations with neighboring countries but also about the future shape of the EU and how power and financial resources will be distributed internally (Emerson et al., 2022a).

#### **11.3 Transformation in the Process of European Integration**

On June 23–24, 2022, the European Council adopted a decision regarding the EU membership applications of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. The European Council granted candidate country status only to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. The European Council noted it is ready to give Georgia the candidate country status after considering the priorities indicated in the Commission's conclusion on Georgia's membership application. The decision of the European Council places particular emphasis on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. It emphasizes the importance of reforms, especially in the rule of law, independence, functioning of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, and the rights and equal treatment of minorities (European Council, 2022). The European Commission proposed 12 recommendations to Georgia (Liboreiro, 2022), 9 to Moldova, and 7 to Ukraine (European Commission, 2022). The following paragraphs will discuss the main challenges facing all three countries according to the respective areas.

#### *11.3.1 Political Polarization in Georgia*

Polarization is not a new phenomenon in Europe (Bértoa & Rama, 2021) and affects the discussion of EU integration issues in the national parliaments (Wendler, 2016). According to the European Commission, one of the particular challenges faced by Georgia is political polarization. The polarization in Georgia is characterized by a lack of compromise, a winner-take-all approach, and a highly personalized political system without strong institutions. In the Georgian case, polarization is not based on ideological party differences but on mutual rivalry between two political camps (Gelashvili, 2021). Opinion-poll data show that Georgians' stated ambitions to join the EU lag behind their understanding of what constitutes a civic and more inclusive national identity as it is broadly understood throughout most of the union—a phenomenon that Georgia currently shares with Hungary and Poland. This culture clashes over what it means to be "European" is now becoming more of a political battleground in Georgia (Gegeshidze & De Waal, 2021).

According to the commission, Georgia remains faced with critical challenges due to its overly divided political scene and political polarization. It suggests that strengthening democratic oversight and eliminating vested interests should be a priority (European Commission, 2022). In the final recommendation, the Commission indicates that Georgia should address the issue of political polarization by ensuring cooperation across political parties in the spirit of the April 19, 2021, agreement. This agreement was directly brokered between the political parties by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, although the ruling party later declared the agreement annulled (EU, 2021). Political polarization remains one of the most critical challenges for the country. Besides hindering the achievement of consensus among the main political actors, it also impacts its ability to carry out essential reforms for European integration as the political parties only make statements and do not take real action.

#### *11.3.2 Justice System and Rule of Law*

All three countries are facing the need for significant reforms in the judicial system. However, there have been several attempts to implement reforms at different times (Cenu¸sa, 2019; Minzarari, 2022; Nakashidze, 2021; Zhernakov, 2016). The democracies of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are not perfect, but they stand out among the Eastern Partnership countries. They have demonstrated steady improvement towards the standards set out by the Copenhagen criteria of a functioning market economy, stable democracy, strong rule of law, and the capacity to implement all EU legislation (The Eastern Partnership Index, 2021). The attention of the European Commission is directed towards Georgia. In particular, the Commission has recommended the country to adopt and implement a transparent and effective judicial reform strategy and action plan post-2021 based on a broad, inclusive, and cross-party consultation process; to ensure a truly independent judiciary, in particular, the Supreme Court; and to undertake a reform of the High Council of Justice and appoint the High Council's remaining members. The European Commission has especially emphasized that all these measures must fully comply with European standards and the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

Judicial reform is also one of the main challenges for Moldova (Minzarari, 2022). Moldova started to create the legislative foundations of an independent judiciary and reform implementation relatively late after the country's government changed following the last elections in 2021. The Commission's recommendations for Moldova are relatively general and require completing the essential steps of the recently launched comprehensive justice system reform, including through efficient use of asset verification and effective democratic oversight. From this point of view, the bill on 'pre-vetting' key judicial appointments, passed by the Moldovan parliament on 17 February 2022, should be noted. The law provides for a preliminary check of candidates for the positions of members of the Superior Council of Prosecutors and the Superior Council of Magistracy. However, regarding the rule of law, experts still point to the politically corrupt judiciary and the need for reforms (Emerson et al., 2022c).

As for Ukraine, the European Commission draws attention to ensuring that Ukraine, following the recommendations of the Venice Commission, enacts and implements legislation on a selection procedure for judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, including a pre-selection process based on the evaluation of their integrity and professional skills, in line with Venice Commission recommendations. The European Commission also advises Ukraine to finalize the integrity vetting of the candidates for the High Council of Justice members by the Ethics Council and select candidates to establish the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine. A common problem in Georgia and Ukraine is the composition of the Supreme Council of Justice. As the members are not appointed to the judiciary through an open and transparent process, their independence and impartiality could be better. New appointments to the court are in the hands of a select group of judges, and other judges have little influence over the council's decisions.

Despite the differences between the two countries, justice sector reforms in Ukraine and Moldova have run into the same problems. Scholars believe that transforming the justice sectors in the countries is blighted by the legacy of Soviet institutions. It requires changing the operating environment for politicians and businesspeople to the point where they see the value of independent courts for upholding rights. Society has a vital role in this process by holding its leaders accountable and demonstrating a sustained demand for impartial justice (Lough & Rusu, 2021).

#### *11.3.3 Institutions and Elections*

For Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in the last few decades, it has been a big challenge to hold democratic, accessible, and fair elections (Leshchenko, 2016). The task of integration into the European Union puts before these countries the necessity of holding democratic elections following European standards. According to the European Commission and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia were competitive, and overall, fundamental freedoms were respected. However, at the same time, the European Commission indicates that the ODIHR highlighted allegations of voter pressure, vote buying, and the blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state.

The situation in Moldova is slightly different. According to the European Commission, the 2021 elections were well-administered and competitive. However, at the same time, ineffective campaign finance oversight, political bias of news outlets, and the partiality of the Central Election Committee remain to be addressed. The parliamentary nature of democracy has been confirmed by recent competitive elections at the parliamentary and presidential levels (European Commission, 2022). Therefore, the European Commission only generally indicates that Moldova should address the shortcomings identified by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe/Venice Commission. Despite the electoral democracy in Moldova being greatly improved after years of instability and oligarchical power (Emerson et al., 2022c), public accountability has not been achieved since actual power is not located in public institutions, but within the informal networks controlled by the oligarchs (Crowther, 2022).

As for Ukraine, the European Commission has not given any specific election recommendations (European Commission, 2022). However, the assessment does mention the new electoral code of Ukraine adopted in 2019, which introduced an open-list proportional representation system, enfranchised internally displaced persons, and strengthened gender quotas. The Commission notes that Ukraine first tested the Code of Conduct during the 2020 local elections but identified the need for additional changes regarding campaign finance transparency, balanced and unbiased media coverage, and election complaint procedures. Noteworthy, the law on national referenda was adopted in January 2021, and a new law on local referenda is underway based on the Venice recommendations of the Council of Europe (CDL-PI (2022) 001 e, 2022). The need for legislative regulation of local referenda was determined by the election program of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "Democracy through referendums", which provides a legislative mechanism according to which the Ukrainian people should carry out the main tasks of government through referendums and other forms of direct democracy (Verkhovna Rada, 2021a). According to the conclusion of the European Commission, Ukraine is a vital parliamentary, presidential democracy with competitive elections at national and local levels based on a comprehensive constitutional, legislative, and institutional framework that corresponds to European and international standards (European Commission, 2022). It should be noted that a similar assessment concerning Georgia is not to be found in the conclusions of the European Commission. Indeed, the 2020 parliamentary elections were followed by a large protest in Georgia and the opposition's announcement to boycott and refuse to enter the new parliament.

#### *11.3.4 Anti-corruption Reforms*

Corruption has been a significant challenge for all three countries since independence. Georgia has been, to some extent, successful in the fight against corruption, and it has been a valuable experience for Moldova and Ukraine over the years (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2021). Nonetheless, although Georgia moved from being a "failed state" to a state with low corruption rates following the Rose Revolution of 2003 (Gvindade, 2012; Kupatadze, 2012), today, there are institutional problems in the fight against corruption, and cases of corruption are observed at high levels of the public sector. This is why the European Commission advised Georgia to strengthen the independence of its Anti-Corruption Agency, bringing together all essential anticorruption functions to address high-level corruption cases rigorously (European Commission, 2022). Creating a special investigative service is also a big challenge for Georgia and has been under constant discussion for the last ten years. The protection of personal data is an additional important challenge. The European Commission advised Georgia to equip the new Special Investigative Service and Personal Data Protection Service with resources commensurate with their mandates and to ensure institutional independence.

Moldova faces several challenges in the fight against corruption. The European Commission has advised Moldova to deliver on its commitment to fight corruption at all levels by taking decisive steps towards proactive and efficient investigations and ensuring a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions (European Commission, 2022).

As for Ukraine, the country needs to strengthen the fight against corruption, particularly at high levels, through proactive and efficient investigations and a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions (European Commission, 2022). In Ukraine, a Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office was established; however, this development has not succeeded. Hence the recommendation of the European Commission to complete the appointment of a new head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and the appointment of a new director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. On the other hand, Georgia boasted the best score among the ten countries in 2016 and 2021 (André, S. 2022).

#### *11.3.5 De-oligarchization*

Since the signing of the Association Agreement, oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have been considered key obstacles to reforms (Kono´nczuk et al., 2017). After the last democratic elections, Moldova and Ukraine have removed the oligarchs from the country's government structures and reduced their influence on politics. Nevertheless, this problem has not been entirely overcome in the EU's integration process. Referring to Georgia, the European Commission pointed out that the country should implement the commitment to "de-oligarchization" by eliminating the excessive influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life. Before the recommendation of the European Commission, the European Parliament adopted a resolution (European Parliament, 2022) that directly mentions Bidzina Ivanishvili, the former Prime Minister, who formally maintains influence over the ruling party. Likewise, regarding Moldova, the European Commission has pointed out that Moldova should implement the commitment to "de-oligarchization" by eliminating the excessive influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life.

The European Commission has advised Ukraine to implement an anti-oligarch law to limit the excessive influence of oligarchs in economic, political, and public life. Despite the differences of opinions at the national (Denisova, 2021) and international levels (Zakaria, 2021), the country has already taken some steps in this direction and adopted a law on oligarchs (Verkhovna Rada, 2021b), taking into account the recommendations of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (CDL-REF (2021) 086) and international experience (Hubareva, 2022). The law entered into force on 7 May 2022, though its implementation has been somewhat delayed due to the war and because the register of oligarchs still needs to be compiled. Ukraine has already taken important steps in this direction, such as the arrest of Viktor Medvedchuk (Breuninger, 2022), the imposition of sanctions on Kolomoisky (Blinken, 2021), the initiation of criminal proceedings against ex-president Poroshenko (DW, 2022), and others. Similarly, Moldova has also engaged in this field through the calls for the arrest of ex-president Igor Dodon (Euronews, 2022), the removal of oligarch Plahotniuk from the government, and the imposition of international sanctions (OFAC, 2022).

The goal of de-oligarchizing Georgia has also been mentioned in EU official documents (European Parliament, 2022). The major problem faced by the country is that the ruling party "Georgian Dream" framed the de-oligarchization campaign as an attempt to discredit the country's governance system (CIVIL GE, 2022f). In addition, it will be quite difficult for Georgia to comply with the European Commission's deoligarchization condition, primarily because state institutions (including the courts) in such a weak democracy do not enjoy the trust of civil society (Menabde, 2022).

#### *11.3.6 Fight Against Organized Crime*

Creating effective mechanisms to fight against organized crime is another essential condition for integration in the European Union. At the legislative level, all three countries have partially implemented international standards and adopted special laws. However, effective implementation still needs to be solved. The European Commission, for example, indicates that Georgia has made significant efforts to fight organized crime within the framework of its national strategy and corresponding action plans and has stepped up cooperation with Europol and EU Member States (European Commission, 2022). Nevertheless, European Commission also advised Georgia to strengthen the fight against organized crime based on detailed threat assessments, rigorous investigations and prosecutions, and guaranteeing accountability and oversight of law enforcement agencies.

Moldova is facing a significant challenge against organized crime. According to the European Commission, Moldova is a source, transit, and destination for trafficking in human beings—particularly for sexual exploitation and forced labor although there have been few convictions of perpetrators. The Commission noted that the General Police Inspectorate tackles organized crime, but conviction rates are unavailable. Therefore, the European Commission has advised Moldova to strengthen the fight against organized crime based on increased cooperation with regional, EU, and international partners. With Ukraine, the European Commission has recommended that the government ensure that its anti-money laundering legislation follows the Financial Action Task Force standards and adopts an overarching strategic plan to reform the entire law enforcement sector (European Commission, 2022). Even in this case, the ineffectiveness of law enforcement mechanisms is a significant challenge. Remarkably, Georgia successfully fought against organized crime in 2004–2012 when the parliament adopted the law "On Combating Organized Crime and Racketeering" (Law of Georgia, 2005). The law was relevant for fighting against organized crime, and this experience could be helpful in Ukraine and Moldova.

#### *11.3.7 Free Media and Human Rights*

Media freedom is one of the essential indicators of the success of all three countries on the path towards integration into the EU. The media environment has always been different in the three countries, and cases of oligarchs or government influence have caused concern in Europe. After applying for EU membership, the issue of media freedom was raised most acutely in Georgia. The European Parliament also adopted a special resolution on the media environment in Georgia, where strong criticism was expressed towards the country (European Parliament, 2022). Accordingly, the European Commission mentioned that Georgia should vigorously guarantee a free, professional, pluralistic, and independent media environment by ensuring the highest legal standards and by launching impartial, effective, and timely investigations in cases of threats against the safety of journalists and other media professionals.

Regarding media freedom, compared to Georgia, the European Commission has a weak note with Ukraine and notes that the country should tackle the influence of vested interests by adopting a media law that aligns Ukraine's legislation with the EU audio-visual media services directive and empowers an independent media regulator. Steps have already been taken to improve media freedom in Ukraine. For example, one of the oligarchs—Rinat Akhmetov—said that his System Capital Management (SCM) group is set to transfer the licenses of the television channels owned by its Media Group Ukraine to the Ukrainian government. These media holdings include the Ukraine and Ukraine 24 TV channels, which before Russia's full-scale invasion, were among the most-watched channels in the country (The Kyiv Independent, 2022). Regarding Moldova, the European Commission has not expressed any opinion or recommendation on the media environment.

The human rights situation in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine has always been a subject of attention from the EU, and the specific conditions are reflected in the annual reports on the implementation of the Association Agreement. After applications for EU membership by the three countries, the European Commission has yet to present detailed recommendations in this field. The European Commission emphasized that Georgia should move swiftly to strengthen the protection of the human rights of vulnerable groups by bringing perpetrators and instigators of violence to justice more effectively. In particular, the country should consolidate its efforts to enhance gender equality and fight violence against women, especially considering that crimes against women represent a big challenge (Public Defender of Georgia, 2021). The European Commission made similar recommendations concerning Moldova, which faces discrimination against minorities, especially in Transnistria (Emerson et al., 2022c). Finally, the European Commission has indicated that Ukraine should finalize the legal framework reform for national minorities currently under preparation as recommended by the Venice Commission. The country has indeed started implementing relevant reforms in the mentioned area, although enforcement mechanisms still need to be fully implemented.

In addition, the European Commission advised Georgia to adopt legislation so that Georgian courts proactively consider European Court of Human Rights judgments in their deliberations. Georgia should also ensure that an independent person is nominated as a new Public Defender (Ombudsperson) and guarantee the Office's practical institutional independence. The Government of Georgia has already announced that it will not appoint the candidacy of Public Defender and has requested non-governmental organizations to submit an agreed-upon candidate.

#### **11.4 Georgia's Current Challenges**

From the beginning, scholars expected that the decision of the European Union towards Georgia would be different (Emerson et al., 2022a). As became known after the decision, the European Commission set Georgia different conditions for obtaining EU candidate status than Moldova and Ukraine, including addressing issues of political polarization, the full functioning of all state institutions, judicial reform, the independence of an anti-corruption agency, de-oligarchization, the fight against organized crime, an independent media environment, the protection of human rights and gender equality, and the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes, as well as taking into account ECHR judgments and nominating a new Public Defender (Ombudsperson) (EU, 2022).

It should be noted that the Georgian authorities criticized the different decisions of the European Commission towards Georgia. In the beginning, the ruling team criticized (CIVIL GE, 2022b) the European People's Party, which pointed to oligarchic governance (EPP, 2022); they then said that Georgia had been prevented from obtaining this status due to its geographical location and European leaders had directly indicated this in advance (GPI, 2022). The ruling party responded to US State department's statment (Civil Ge, 2022h) and also actively criticized the EU ambassador to Georgia and said that the Ambassador "played a strictly negative role in relations between the European Union and Georgia" (Civil Ge, 2022g). The Georgian Dream party also said that if Georgia were to go to war against Russia before December, the country would be "guaranteed" European Union candidate status (Civil Ge, 2022d). The Government of Georgia stated that Georgia would not apply for EU membership until 2024 (Civil Ge, 2022a) and that granting candidate status to Ukraine was offered only because of the ongoing war (GD, 2022).

However, despite such a position, after the decision of the European Council, which was followed by public protests against the government in Georgia, the ruling party slightly changed its political tactics (Kobakhidze, 2022) and presented a plan to implement the 12-point recommendations written by the European Union (BMG, 2022). The plan was met with skepticism by the President of Georgia and the opposition (Civil Ge, 2022c). However, the ruling party nevertheless discussed implementing the European Commission's recommendations with a part of the opposition (Civil Ge, 2022e). The action plan to implement the 12 recommendations of the European Commission was also presented by Georgian civil society organizations (OSGF, 2022b). In this plan, all 12 issues are described in detail, with the only exception of de-oligarchization. Nonetheless, in the 5th step of the plan, the authors write that fulfillment of all other priorities in this 12-point list should automatically reduce the oligarchic influence on democratic institutions (OSGF, 2022a). Such an approach may not be justified since the implementation of the other 11 recommendations, which are doubtful to be achieved based on the authorities' attitudes, cannot automatically lead to oligarchization.

The ruling party created working groups in the Georgian parliament to implement the recommendations. These working groups are for further institutional strengthening of de-oligarchization, judicial reform, electoral code revision, anti-corruption measures, special investigation service, and personal data protection service. The working group for the revision of the Election Code of Georgia is headed by the first deputy chairman of the Georgian Dream faction, and all other groups are governed by the chairman of the legal committee (Parliament of Georgia, 2022). Regarding the composition of the groups, not all opposition parties and leading non-governmental organizations participate in their work. For example, the ruling party announced that one of the professional organizations, "Fair Elections" (ISFED) will not participate in any working group. In solidarity with ISFED, four other non-governmental organizations also suspended their work in the functional groups, who considered that the decision contradicts the recommendations of the European Commission number 10 about broad involvement of civil society in the decision-making process (1TV, 2022; Radio Liberty, 2022a, 2022b).

The Parliament developed the rules for staffing the working groups. According to this rule, each group should have four members from the parliamentary majority, another four from the non-majority, and representatives of the CEC, State Audit Service, National Communications Commission, and civil society. Only a few minor political parliamentary groups are represented in the working group. In addition, since the parliamentary majority determined that only two civil society members from the representatives of the "Georgian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Forum" should be allowed in the group, this participation was somewhat limited. The Government of Georgia has indeed started working on the implementation of the recommendations of the European Commission. Still, there are no high expectations regarding this, particularly because of the position of the ruling party regarding de-oligarchization.

The attitudes of the citizens of Georgia indicate such a conclusion. According to a July 2022 survey by CRRC-Georgia (CRRC Georgia, 2022), almost a third of respondents (30%) could not name a reason for Georgia to have been refused the candidate status (CRRC Georgia, 2022). The interviewees said that the reasons for such a decision were non-fulfillment of demands (14%), obstruction of the opposition (8%), Georgia not engaging in the war against Russia (4%), and action of the Russian government (3%). Most of the population did not think that obtaining EU candidate status was dependent on the start of a war with Russia, and 60% of the population believe that this is little or not at all true. According to the survey, a large part of the population (45%) does not expect that the Georgian government will carry out the reforms requested by the EU by the end of the year. Fifty-one percent (51%\_ of Georgian Dream supporters do not know what the European Commission means by oligarchs, while most of the opposition supporters (60%) assume that the European Union is referring to Bidzina Ivanishvili when talking about de-oligarchization (CRRC Georgia, 2022).

#### **11.5 Conclusion**

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have made significant democratic transformations after the Association Agreements with the European Union came into force. These three countries are distinguished by their democratic reforms among the members of the Eastern Partnership; however, the functioning of state institutions, the fight against corruption, the rule of law, and ensuring high standards of human rights protection and media freedom remain significant challenges on the way to EU integration.

One of the critical challenges for all three countries is the reduction of the influence of oligarchs and the weakness of state institutions, although significant differences emerge. Moldova and Ukraine, where the oligarchs have been officially removed from power, have more political will and ability to complete the reforms. Georgia, where the oligarch is behind the ruling party, will need much effort to fully implement de-oligarchization. Without that, it will be challenging to implement the reforms necessary for EU integration. Ukraine's experience in this field should be shared with Moldova and Georgia, and Georgia's experience in the fight against corruption should be shared with the other two countries.

The opinions provided by the European Commission as part of the EU candidate status process are an essential guide for all three countries. They will significantly assist national governments in implementing the reforms necessary to meet the membership criteria. However, it is vital to recognize the existing problems and develop clearly defined strategies for development. This concerns especially Georgia, whose government does not fully accept the recommendations issued by the EU and instead criticizes the EU itself. In the coming years, the challenge for Ukraine and Moldova will be the implementation of reforms and active preparation for negotiations with the EU. The success of this process will also depend on the end of the war in Ukraine. Everyone acknowledges that Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the struggle of the Ukrainian people have influenced European enlargement priorities. However, the progress made by countries in previous years should be considered when granting candidate status. Different decisions on the part of the EU towards Georgia, as compared to Ukraine and Moldova, resulted from several failures of the Georgian authorities in various fields in the past years. First, Georgia saw significant deterioration in media freedom and human rights. In addition, it was detrimental that the agreement reached between the parties on April 19, 2021, providing a detailed plan for democratic transformation with the unprecedented involvement of the President of the European Council, was later annulled. The process was also negatively affected by the weak support provided by the Georgian government to Ukraine and its European partners in the contest of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict. Membership in the European Union means first partnership and respect for shared values. In the nearest future, it is necessary to strengthen the collaboration between all three countries and show commitment to common European values.

#### **References**

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## **Chapter 12 Backsliding Rule of Law and "Stabilitocracy" in Montenegro**

**Mirko Ðukovi´c**

#### **12.1 Introduction**

As a result of Montenegro's accession negotiations with the European Union (EU) and as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it faces significant political, institutional, and constitutional challenges. The challenges can be seen as a political crisis that is the product of the decades-long rule of one party that has managed to shape the governance system following its prerogatives on one side and the lack of political culture involving compromise on the other ( Cagorovi´ ˇ c, 1993; Erin & Bieber, 2014; Jovanovi´c & Marjanovi´c, 2002). The political system of Montenegro was built on feeble promises of Euro-Atlantic integration, values of Western democracy, and the principle of the rule of law and equality. Aside from fulfilling the criteria to join NATO in 2016 and being the most advanced candidate state in the EU accession process relative to its neighbors (Soyaltin-Colella, 2022), Montenegro suffers from structural deficiencies in upholding those values which it proudly proclaimed in its Constitution in 2007.

The EU, first and foremost, expects institutions to work towards achieving the goal of becoming its member. Therefore, Montenegrin institutions should adhere to and protect values stipulated in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The article sets the values on which the EU is founded and represents the community's constitutional identity. Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights are at the core of the legal order of the EU. Member States are to protect these values, and the legal framework of the EU, including common constitutional traditions of Member States, ensures that all national policies are aligned with the *acquis communautaire*. Unfortunately, Montenegro has seen marked stagnation in its EU accession. The current geopolitical

© The Author(s) 2024 A. Mihr and C. Pierobon (eds.), *Polarization, Shifting Borders and Liquid Governance*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44584-2\_12

M. Ðukovi´c (B)

Central European University, Vienna, Austria e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
situation suggests, it could be an opportunity for Montenegro to become a member. The political and constitutional crises have gravely affected this prospect.

Since the elections in August 2020, Montenegro has gone through an intensive and turbulent political period. The 42nd Government was voted out, and the 43rd—a so-called minority government—was formed in April 2022. However, it lost a vote of confidence three months later. President Milo Ðukanovi´c refused to give a mandate to the candidate that the majority of the Parliament had supported. The political crisis continued when the President dissolved the Parliament and called for snap elections. At the same time, the mandate of the President ended, and the new President, Jakov Milatovi´c, was elected. The election of Constitutional Court judges was used as a political bargaining chip. Under pressure of the EU, parties finally made a consensus. They elected three out of four missing judges in the Constitutional Court, as it is the only institution responsible for solving electoral disputes. In this way, the Court was formally unblocked. This chapter explores the correlation between the political polarization that is entrenched in the ethnopolitical division of society (Džanki´c, 2014; Keiichi, 2007; Morrison, 2009), a division that the ruling party has carefully manipulated for three decades (Ba´ca, 2017b; Komar & Živkovi´c, 2016), and the constitutional and institutional crisis that has undermined the EU accession process by directly affecting the rule of law principle.

The chapter analyzes the influence of political processes on the rule of law and access to justice in Montenegro. More specifically, it focuses on the ongoing constitutional crisis. It posits that the situation is not only a result of the lack of political culture around compromise but a direct result of an ineffective transition carried out by a single party that has remained in power for three decades. The chapter will show the correlation between the crisis and the "stabilitocracy" phenomenon, involving "weak democracies with autocratically minded leaders, who govern through informal, patronage networks and claim to provide pro-Western stability in the region" (Kmezi´c & Bieber, 2021). The ruling elites have successfully capitalized on the global geopolitical crisis, presenting themselves to Western partners as the only ones who can maintain cohabitation and political stability. The EU has tolerated this dynamic and possibly unintentionally accelerated democratic backsliding (Ba´ca, 2017a; Džanki´c et al., 2018). This chapter thus suggests that the "consolidation transition phase" ended in 2020 when the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) lost the election.

For the first time since the introduction of political pluralism, one of the main features of democracy—government replaceability—has been achieved in Montenegro in 2020. Very turbulent dynamics mark the fourth transition phase within the ruling majority, the experimental phase of a technocratic government, futile cohabitation, "minority government," the reconciliation of the "old majority" that won the 2020 elections, and the rise of the populist centrist movement "Pokret Evropa sad" ("Europe now Movement") that the ousted technocratic ministers founded. The lack of political dialogue and the continuous violation of the Constitution have led directly to dysfunctional institutions. As a result, the rule of law has progressively deteriorated, and democracy is backsliding (Jovi´c, 2022; Kapidži´c, 2020; Papada et al., 2023).

The chapter investigates whether the ongoing institutional and political crises since 2020 directly result from reforms carried out by one political actor anchored in the comfortable port of "stabilitocracy" and whether Montenegro has officially entered the fourth period of its long transition to liberal democracy. To answer these questions and to understand the nature of the constitutional blockade and institutional incapacity to resolve it, the chapter takes a historical overview of transition and democracy building in Montenegro. This overview provides solid ground to unpack the political processes that have occurred in the last three decades and, to a certain extent, allows for a causal-comparative approach to establish cause and effect between these processes of political hegemony and justice system reform on one side and constitutional crisis on the other. Furthermore, the socio-legal approach allows for applying non-legal issues in the judiciary and constitutional crisis context.