particularly for families with young children, often combined with remote work from home. A nationwide study of UK adults [20, 21] revealed that the gender division of unpaid care work at both an individual and couple level before and after confinement produced psychological distress in men and women. The study also noted that women spent significantly more time doing housework and childcare than men. Women were more likely than men to reduce work hours and adjust employment schedules due to increased unpaid care time [22]. In addition, increased time spent doing housework and childcare was associated with higher levels of psychological distress for women only.

#### **4. Gender inequality of opportunities at the university level**

It has also led to the emergence of the first gender asymmetry produced by COVID-19 and related to the reproductive dimension of care and housework. This reproductive gap also affects all groups of women workers at the university level, as well as another series of asymmetries associated with the productive dimension, derived from their gender condition that varies according to the functions they perform in the university and the contractual relationship that each one has with the institution [23–25]. A report by the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research confirms the fact that women academics are losing research time. The results of the survey revealed that women professors with children are the most affected; however, in general, it is considered that both parents have been affected [26].

According to the 2013 "She Figures" report, women accounted for 20.9% of the teaching and research staff at the highest level of the academic career in the 28 EU countries in 2013. Probert [27] pointed out that marriage and having a family, along with other cultural barriers, negatively affect the role of women. In Spain, the literature concludes that the problems to balance personal work and social life for women academics is complicated due to a university power system that does not offer the possibilities for a happy exercise of a good personal and professional coexistence of men and women academics, professors and researchers [28–31]. In addition, there is an implication that educational agents and decision-makers have an impact from a gender perspective on both the explicit study plan and the hidden study plan. Therefore, it is necessary for academic decision-makers involved in the creation of the study plan and the training of university students to be aware of some fundamentals of gender theory [32, 33]. For example, the fact that women and men do not have essences derived from biology, but that those are symbolic constructions regarding the order of language and representations [7]. Moreover, they should consider that in societies and in the academic environment, the androcentric ideology persists. In this context, the definition that Scott [34] raises is very useful: "*gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, but it is also a primary way of signifying relationships of power*".

#### **5. Methodology**

This qualitative, exploratory-descriptive study has a nonexperimental field and cross-sectional design that used the field technique of focus groups [35–38]. This study considered three countries, Peru, Chile and Ecuador because they had profiles of universities with different characteristics. This allowed us to make a

comparison between different realities [39]. In the case of Peru, we analysed a private, Catholic and nonprofit university. In the case of Chile, we analysed a public and secular university; and in the case of Ecuador, a public (free) and secular university.

The study involved the participation of 33 undergraduate and graduate women academics. In the case of Peru, part-time and full-time professors, who participated in the study, worked at CENTRUM PUCP Business School of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. In the case of Chile, full-time professors worked at Universidad de Valparaíso. And, in the case of Ecuador, full-time professors were from the Universidad de Guayaquil. In all cases, women academics had regular contracts and others had tenure (i.e. they obtained job stability after winning a public competition).

The study had three objectives: Identify the different types of work performed by women professors during their workday during the pandemic, Identify the main difficulties and consequences that virtual teaching has had on their personal lives during the pandemic and analyse the context and institutional support where women professors have worked during the pandemic.

**Table 1** shows the relationship between the three research objectives, the seven factors of the study and the 39 variables used to develop the focus group questions.

#### **6. Research results**

The main relevant factors perceived by women professors on their work and family lives during the pandemic included time use, the perception of the impact of the pandemic and the institutional support to do remote work. These factors are related to two very important SDGs linked to our study: Lack of gender equity (SDG 5 - Gender equity) and the lack of equal roles between men and women (SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities).

Research results are presented below based on seven factors that explain the impact of the pandemic on the work and family/personal lives of women professors:

#### **Table 1.**

*Factors and variables in the study on the impact of the pandemic on women academics in LA.*

a.Sociodemographic factors: The women professors who participated in the study were between 25 and 60 years old. Most of them were married and had young children (who had virtual classes during 2020 and 2021) and others with older children. A minority group were women who live alone. Half of them were full-time professors and the others had tenure. All of them were part of the undergraduate and graduate teaching staff of various faculties of economic and administrative sciences. In **Table 2** we can find the 4 profiles of the academic women found in the study. The types of women academics derived from the reality observed in this research.

#### **Table 2.**

*Research has helped us to identify four types of women academics.*

b.Time use factors during remote work: According to women academics in the three countries, the new virtual work method has created 24/7 jobs due to an increase in their academic responsibilities. But also, an increase in their household chores and the care and accompaniment of older adults and minor children. The results have reflected that women assumed the greatest burden in their households, mainly type 1 and 2 women.

"I thought I was going to have more time to study certain topics. Now I feel like I have less free time than before. I can't move from the office to home." (Woman type 4 - Peru). "My husband helps me. He knows how to do everything a woman does. However, we have to help the girls with their homework. We live in a house here in Brazil and we have to clean. It is very challenging. My husband is my support. (Woman type 1 - Peru). "I don't leave my house and I have to take care of my daughters. They tell me: Mom, tell your boss that you have to play with us. It is difficult." (Woman type 1- Peru), "…" If someone would help me, my life would be much easier and I would say, you know, that I have time, but now I feel like I don't have time at all" (Woman type 2- Chile).

c.Time use factors at home: three sub-variables were included in this factor: *machismo* (superiority of men over women), unequal distribution of household chores and the increase in the workload. Women academics recognized their role as women, compared to that of men. However, generally speaking, in the three countries, women professors showed a sexist attitude because they naturally assumed at all times that unpaid care work at home has to be done by women. It should be noted that the majority of them lost the support of the maid/domestic worker or nanny.

According to the SIGI study (2019), women invest more than 4.5 hours a day on housework or caring for children and elders, 3 times more time than men do,

prior to the pandemic. The time invested on housework has replaced research time [41]. This is why gender differences persist between academics equally capable and motivated. Many women academics stated that they have no time for their research activities.

"We have to do the housework because we don't like the way men do things at home" (Women, type 2- Chile). "The strategic position of women is alarming to me because I get the impression that now we are working more but it is an instrumentalized work. We are in charge, we are the visible faces, because of the accreditations and certifications, but if the result is negative, the prestige of women, not men, might be affected (Woman type 3, Chile). "I don't get the idea that because we are women, we have to cook or take care of everyone. No sir, I ask respect before anything. Nobody should interrupt me" (Woman, type 2, Ecuador). "Even though the caring role is not the priority, women's responsibilities cannot be abandoned, we women must show that we are good and can do things well" (Woman, type 1, Ecuador).

d.Factors of the perception of the pandemic's impact on the personal and family lives of women professors. The participants from the three countries indicated that the pandemic and subsequent quarantine had caused them feelings of anguish, uncertainty and permanent stress due to the home confinement. In the case of Ecuador, the pandemic was directly linked to the word "death". This is because unfortunately in this country, the media showed tragic "deaths in the streets" because of the pandemic.

The pandemic has also had a socio-economic impact on families. This means an increase in economic expenses, new members in the family nucleus and changes in local and international residences. The economic impact in Ecuador was complicated because the women professors of the University of Guayaquil experienced a two-month delay in the payment of their salaries, once the pandemic began, between April and May 2020. This caused labour uncertainty. "During the first months we faced the economic problem that the government owed us 2 months of salary, but we joined with other family members and children to help us" (Woman type 3, Ecuador). In Peru and Chile, the women professors did not have economic problems, and some of them even pointed out that they are saving money on transportation due to remote work.

All the participants stated that they had not been direct victims of violence by their partners, but all of them mentioned that they knew women who had been abused during the pandemic, and some of them had even been direct witnesses of the physical violence that their friends, neighbours and colleagues had suffered. Chilean professors reported labour discrimination and mobbing due to gender, whereas Ecuadorian and Peruvian women professors indicated that they had not been victims. Violence is often physical and sexual, but also, sometimes psychological. This violence is mostly silent and has a tremendous impact on the mental health of thousands of women who may be victims of their partners or the people they live with at home [42, 43]. In fact, during the pandemic, cases of violence have increased due to home confinement, and to this date, there are still no public programs or policies in force to address the effects of this public health problem [44].

 One day the police came and said to the woman, who was assaulted; if you want, you can report it and I will take the guy". I said to the police officer "Sir, I reported the assault." The police officer told me that it had to be reported by the victim, but my neighbour did not want to do it". After witnessing this event, seeing a woman being abused, I got sick for a month, but well, we had to move on and continue with my work. It was very painful". (Woman, type 4- Peru). "The University psychologist deals with many complaints of domestic violence. There is evidence of many students who live with uncertainty, mistreatment and sexual abuse. The situation within the households is complicated. I think we have gone back 20 years" (Woman, type 1 - Chile), "I associate violence and domestic and child abuse spaces with imprisonment situations because the aggressor's condition is that of a delinquent. People around the aggressor are disturbed by the space in which he lives and that is the biggest problem. He considers himself the king of the house, he has no borders or limits". (Woman, type 3- Ecuador), "Distancing from authorities and peers because of the quarantine has been beneficial, it has been some kind of escape from work" (Woman, type 2- Chile).

e.Factors of the perception of the pandemic's impact on the work lives of women professors. In the three countries, the women professors indicated that remote work has produced greater workload, stress and fatigue, especially for type 1 and 2 women professors. However, those of types 3 and 4 also associated the pandemic with the words: home confinement, death, infection, pain, fear, loneliness, sadness, fear of death, anguish, nervousness, tension and nightmares. The women academics analysed the negative aspects in the two subcategories: personal and work. In general, participants felt that they were in a situation of job uncertainty, especially those women professors who were working under contracts. In Ecuador, some professors dropped out and others retired because they preferred to take this path rather than take on the challenge of virtual teaching. This situation has increased the fear of instability and work overload since many of them have doubled the number of classes. There is also uncertainty about the time remaining to resume the "normality" and in-person classes. In this regard, according to ECLAC [11] in its special report on COVID-19 No. 9, women's economic autonomy in sustainable recovery and equality mentions that the labour participation rate of women maintained at 46% in 2020, while that of men at 69% (in 2019 they reached 52% and 73.6%, respectively). The unemployment rate for women in 2020 reached 22.2%, a higher percentage than the rate originated in 2019. In 2020, there was an overwhelming outflow of women from the labour force, who did not resume their job search because they had to meet the demands of caring for their homes.

"I'm afraid we're dehumanizing ourselves. We are losing touch. That worries me". (Woman, type 4- Peru), "I feel fear because of the lack of socialization and not having a limit at work". (Woman, type 2- Peru), "I am a problem for the university because sometimes I am not that available, but I need to work, I wonder what will happen at the end of the year, will they hire me again? The institutionality has been based on the mental health of women; it worries me because if this scenario does not change, it will be very difficult for me". (Woman, type 1- Chile), "Now my life is my work, and it overwhelms me that my work is in my house". (Woman, type 2, Chile), "I experience states of sadness and depression caused by home confinement and routine". (Woman, type 3- Chile), "It is a constant challenge to balance work and family life while attending family needs" (Woman, type 1- Ecuador).

The women academics also analysed the positive aspects in the two subcategories: personal and work. As for employment, in the three countries, the women professors pointed out that the positive aspects have been the opportunity to use ICT platforms and improve the use of technological tools, work reinvestment, the possibility of being in many places and working remotely, as well as the access to international networks. "For me, (the benefit is) the group work and connection through technological platforms" (Woman, type 2- Chile).

The positive impacts reported by the women professors included the possibility of being with their children, raising the young children and in general spending more time with the family. "Being closer to my daughters and my husband" (Woman, type 2-Peru). "Enjoy each day because there are certain variables that we do not control, today everything is ok, but tomorrow we will see. I feel like a guilty mother, I missed my daughter's growth and now I am living it" (Woman, type 1-Chile). "Family time has been wonderful and watching my 1-year-old daughter grow up" (Woman, type 2-Ecuador).

f. Factors of institutional support (resources) for remote work. The participants said that they needed resources to carry out their work activities from home. The participants from the three countries indicated that they had received training for the new virtual teaching method. However, the women professors had to create a space in their homes for teaching classes and in many cases buy chairs, lamps and internet access to improve their connectivity.

"My laptop crashed and died. The computer I use now was given to me immediately. They brought the laptop to my house" (Woman, type 3- Peru). "I bought a gamer chair because I had severe lower back pain, I was on medical rest" (Woman, type 3, Ecuador). "At the beginning, I had to adapt my office in a common space at home, later I managed to set it up in an exclusive space for me" (Woman, type 3, Chile). "I was overwhelmed by all the trainings. Eventually, it became too much. We never had so much knowledge at hand" (Woman, type 2, Peru).

g.Factors of institutional coexistence during remote work. The study revealed that women academics have carried out their virtual teaching tasks facing two challenges: the management of the virtual classroom and the relationship with students during virtual classes. It is evident that the relationship and experience with students have improved with the use of applications, social networks and virtual classroom resources. In Peru and Chile, women professors were trained right after the quarantine started, so they felt more confident. Whereas in Ecuador, the training process took place more slowly, which is why they have had greater difficulties with virtual teaching.

"We see very often that students turn off their cameras during the classes. This creates distance." (Woman, type 3 - Chile). "There are no conditions for practice, we cannot have contact in the field and do experiments" (Woman, type 3- Ecuador). "The fact that the cameras are on has allowed us to know the realities of the students. However, the management of the virtual classroom does not replace personal contact and access to more human realities that could help us to transform and influence students so they can overcome their difficulties" (Woman, type 2- Chile).

In terms of their relationship with the institution (academic and administrative staff) and their relationship with their colleagues, Peruvian women professors reported having received support from their authorities. Meanwhile, in Ecuador, there were two types of responses: some women professors felt supported by their authorities and others expressed there is favouritism for other colleagues. In Chile, women professors did not mention direct authorities but emphasized there was a lack of empathy with them. Nevertheless, none of the cases showed that the authorities were particularly concerned about the situation of type 1 women professors who have to deal with the care of their young children, unpaid domestic activities and work overload. It is clear that there is no public policy in this regard or internal policies for universities to address this issue. As for the relationship with colleagues, all of them said they missed their professor friends. Likewise, when it comes to the relationship with students, women professors pointed out that this new virtual teaching method exposes the inequalities of access and opportunities for students, since not all of them have the same conditions.

*"I have two female bosses. I felt supported. When I got sick, she told me to get well, be fine and not to worry. I think the managerial area works very well" (Woman, type 4- Peru). "I have a negative perception regarding the lack of empathy for the situation of single women with children because of their condition of caregivers" (Woman, type 1, Chile). "There is an overload of work for women in leadership positions, there is over-exploitation, and I feel impotent about it. It is evident that some miss their colleagues, especially those with whom they have built good relationships" (Woman, type 2, Chile)."Yes, there is recognition at work. They respect the condition of women and their human position. They are honest authorities, who have been awarded two times" (Woman, type 3, Ecuador). "There is no recognition, there is favoritism for the professors with tenure, and nothing for those with regular contracts" (Woman, type 2, Ecuador). "We miss interacting with colleagues; we miss the meetings and the coffees in the morning and afternoon" (Woman, type 3, Ecuador).*

In general, with regard to the seven factors analysed, we can conclude that women type 1 - Mothers and wives with young children - have been the most affected. The most important differences observed between the focus groups were that these women with children and adolescents were affected by the decrease in physical space in their homes, raising children and accompanying them in their virtual classes; lack of support; and the increase in hours of unpaid work in an inequitable manner compared to other adults in the house. In addition, we observed feelings of generalized anxiety and stress in women academics who were mothers, as well as feelings of guilt for the absence during parenting before the pandemic; and the lack of time and space in parenting during the pandemic. Some participants mentioned, "I am a guilty mother, I missed out on my daughter's growth and now I am living it" (Woman, type 3, Chile); "I have sacrificed everything for my mother's health" (Woman, type 2, Chile). The differences between the focus groups differ more according to the possibility of having family support and/or services to which they have access for unpaid work, rather than cultural differences between countries. **Table 3** shows the result of the analysis of the four types of women.

### **Table 3.**

*Analysis of results for the seven variables in the four types of women.*

#### *Effects of the Pandemic on Academic Women in Latin America DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106815*

All types of women academics increased their workload and were affected by an increase in their responsibilities, household chores, care and support to the family group (children and older adults) during confinement. The lockdown restrictions especially affected women with young children because they had to adapt their work patterns to childcare/homeschooling [45]. They had to work late at night, early in the morning or on weekends. They also had poor sleep quality, lack of time to do physical exercises and feelings of loneliness, overwhelm, anguish and great fatigue. Distress levels were particularly high in the cases of single-parent women who were heads of households with young children. They had to adapt their work patterns exclusively, with a greater sense of abandonment and injustice. The adaptation of work patterns due to childcare/homeschooling appears to be more detrimental for single mothers than for cohabiting mothers. Women academics mentioned their partners provided great support but still, they felt the working patterns were unequal. The greatest distress was caused by the care and school accompaniment of young children, but also for the care of older and/or sick adults because the uncertainty and fear of COVID-19 contagion of the latter increased dependence and an impact on their psychological health [46].

In the other factors analysed, no substantive differences were observed. There was a general consensus on the inequitable distribution of domestic and care work among the members of the household; on the perception of a greater workload for women; the existence of sexist labour relations among colleagues and authorities; and in several cases, knowledge and intervention in situations of sexist violence among students and their families. Gender inequality in the division of unpaid care work during confinement increased. Among the three countries analysed, Ecuador was the country that faced the greatest health crisis due to COVID-19, which was reflected in the statements of women academics who reported greater stress due to traumatic situations experienced (**Table 4**).

#### **7. Conclusions and recommendations**

The COVID 19 pandemic has significantly affected women due to their human condition and other cultural characteristics of Latin American countries. Women academics are proof of this. Despite their academic studies and good quality of work, they have become women affected by inequity and inequality in their own homes. During the pandemic, the vast majority of them lost the external support they used to have at home and assumed more household chores. Their workload also increased because virtuality increased the demand for students. This impact has been reflected in an increased gender inequality (SDG 5) and an increased inequality (SDG 10).

According to the results of this research, it is evident that the pandemic has affected the quality of life of women academics. Many of them stated that virtual work from home has meant working 24/7, with no breaks and on weekends. In all cases, high levels of physical and emotional stress were observed due to an increased labour demand in the universities, regardless of the gender. This is mainly because they have had to invest hours to learn how to use new virtual environments and the high demand from students for digital media such as email, WhatsApp and text messaging. According to their statements, women academics have experienced feelings of frustration, anger, nerves and even guilt, which were heightened by the prolonged home confinement in Latin America and the excessive fatigue generated by it. Women academics type 1 were the most affected since they had to add to their virtual working day, household chores and support to their young children during their virtual classes.

**Table 4.** *Proposals for the fight for equality and reduction of inequality of academic women with regard to SDG 5 and SDG 10.*

#### *Effects of the Pandemic on Academic Women in Latin America DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106815*

Despite the greater burden of work, care and household chores, many of the women's stories have shown the normalization of the sex-gender binarism, which leads them to assume these greater burdens as a condition and with guilt. This is particularly evidenced in the naturalization of the unequal distribution of domestic work and the care of the elderly at home, as well as the attendance to virtual classes with their children during the pandemic.

The results of the study show that the perception of women academics from universities in Ecuador, Peru and Chile about gender inequity and inequality gaps has increased during the pandemic, regardless of their socio-demographic characteristics, level of studies (with master's and doctoral degrees) and type of work activity. There is no consensus about the role they play in their private spaces because some of them consider that their family members "have helped them" with unpaid work and that in the workplace, despite not having material support and being demanded without a gender perspective, they have been able to respond motivated, although stressed, to the new challenges.

In this context, women academics had to maintain a balance between their personal and work lives. Despite the high levels of stress and anxiety, they remained the pillars of their households and offered stability to their members. However, the greatest impact has been the little or no time they have had for applied research, development of publications and attendance at conferences. These activities have been totally relegated for 2 years now since the second anniversary of the pandemic will be in March 2022. Said activities were put on hold because they had to prioritize teaching and student care.

In terms of the response of the universities to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the academics stated that, in general terms, the university authorities responded by offering technical support in terms of resources such as computers, internet and, in some cases, training. However, they mentioned that they did not receive special consideration or special treatment for being women with small children or in charge of elderly adults. In fact, several academics even reported having lost direct family members due to COVID-19.

In this regard, the great challenge for the universities is to know the reality that women academics are currently living. It should be noted that to date the pandemic has not ended, classes are still virtual, and we are still living in a state of confinement almost two years after the beginning of the pandemic. Therefore, universities should implement some actions such as research groups where they can include women academics who wish to continue researching and who, due to the situation described above, have not had time to invest in research. The challenge of reducing inequalities within the academic sphere has become a challenging social responsibility program that can help reduce inequalities.

This study about the perception of women academics in the area of administration and trainers of leading professionals in three Latin American universities has revealed the need to propose policies within the universities to promote a culture with a gender focus. There is a need to include the gender perspective in the study plan; an inclusive STEM training (in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics); the creation of gender units or departments with effective power to sanction; promotion of research, creation of networks; alliances with the community; encouragement of leadership and female empowerment; and generation of spaces for women's entrepreneurship.

Women academics, who are mostly found in pedagogical and administrative spaces and less often in research and power positions, are subordinated to

#### *Effects of the Pandemic on Academic Women in Latin America DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106815*

male-dominated institutional decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to work on the gender approach considering the work of women academics so that they are aware of their transformative role to move towards an equity and inclusion revolution. Therefore, universities should propose internal institutional policies that, besides the current laws, aim to understand the reality of women academics working in Latin American universities. The need to work on the promotion of gender equity and the elimination of inequality in the academic environment are great challenges for universities. If they succeed, women academics will promote in the classrooms a culture of respect and appreciation of women's work, in all social, economic and political contexts and spheres.

#### **Author details**

Julianna Ramirez Lozano CENTRUM Católica Graduate Business School, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, Lima, Peru

\*Address all correspondence to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **References**

[1] Sigua-Rodríguez E, Bernal-Pérez J, Lanata- Flores A, Sánchez-Romero C, Rodríguez-Chessa J, Haidar Z, Iwaki-Filho L. COVID-19 y la Odontología: una revisión de las recomendaciones y perspectivas para Latinoamérica. International Journal of Odontostomatology. 2020;**14**(3):299-309

[2] Esquenazi A, Rosales S, Velarde Y. Índice de Desigualdad de Género en Cuba: un enfoque territorial / Index of Gender Inequality in Cuba: a Territorial Approach. Estudios del Desarrollo Social: Cuba y América Latina. 2017;**5**(2):132-152

[3] Aguinis H, Ji Y, Joo H. Gender productivity gap among star performers in STEM and other scientific fields. The Journal of Applied Psychology. 2018;**103**(12):1283-1306

[4] Krajewski V. Ciencia de Datos con perspectiva de género para crear políticas públicas destinadas al desarrollo sostenible. Córdoba: Universidad Siglo; 2021

[5] Muñiz Pérez JC. La enseñanza universitaria en perspectiva de género. TF [Internet]. 2021. Available from: https://www.icesi.edu.co/revistas/index. php/trans-pasando\_fronteras/article/ view/4582. [Accessed July 16, 2022]

[6] Ochman M, Ortega-Díaz A. Advances in women's empowerment: An overview. In: Ochman M, Ortega-Díaz A, editors. Advances in Women's Empowerment: Critical Insight from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited; 2020. pp. 1-12

[7] Lamas M. La perspectiva de género. Revista de Educación y Cultura. 1996;**47**(8):216-229

[8] Gallego N. Invisibilización y negación de la discriminación de género en la Universidad. In: Martínez MJI, Cabezas IL, editors. La (in)visibilidad de las mujeres en la Educación Superior: retos y desafíos en la Academia. Alicante: Feminismo/s; 2017. pp. 125-152

[9] Vargas M.G, Higuita C.G, Muñoz D.A.J. El estado del arte: una metodología de investigación. Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales. 2015;**6**(2):423-442

[10] Organización Internacional del Trabajo (ILO). La brecha de género en el empleo: ¿qué frena el avance de la mujer? [Internet]. 2019. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/infostories/ es-ES/Stories/Employment/barrierswomen#unemployed-vulnerable. [Accessed: July 16, 2022]

[11] Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (ECLAC). La autonomía económica de las mujeres en la recuperación sostenible y con igualdad. Informe Especial. 2021;**9**:1-15

[12] Guterres A. La pandemia expone y explota desigualdades de todo tipo, incluida la de género. [Internet]. 2020. Available from: https://www.un.org/es/ coronavirus/articles/guterres-covid-19 expone-desigualdad-genero. [Accessed: July 16, 2022]

[13] Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL)/Organización Internacional del Trabajo (ILO). El trabajo en tiempos de pandemia: desafíos frente a la enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19). Coyuntura Laboral en América Latina y el Caribe. 2020;**22**:1-60

[14] Iturralde CA, Duque LE. Precarización del teletrabajo en ecuador en contexto de covid-19: variables de análisis desde

*Effects of the Pandemic on Academic Women in Latin America DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106815*

el enfoque marxista [Internet]. 2021. Available from: https://chakinan.unach. edu.ec/index.php/chakinan/article/ view/503. [Accessed: July 16, 2022]

[15] Amorós J, Ciravegna L, Mandakovic V, Stenholm P. Necessity or opportunity? The effects of state fragility and economic development on entrepreneurial efforts. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 2019;**43**(4):725-750

[16] Farrell C, Marsh J & Huguet A. Building teachers' data-use capacity: Insights from strongand developing coaches. Education Policy Analysis Archives/Archivos Analíticos de Políticas Educativas, 2014;**22**:1-28

[17] Martínez S. Mujeres y mercado laboral en la actualidad, un análisis desde la perspectiva de género: genéricamente empobrecidas, patriarcalmente desiguales. RES, Revista de Educación Social*.* 2015;**21**:64-83

[18] Sanhueza Díaz L, Fernández Darraz C, Montero Vargas L. Segregación de género: narrativas de mujeres desde la academia. Revista Latinoamericana. 2020;**19**:55

[19] Sayer L. Gender, time and inequality: Trends in women's and men's paid work, unpaid work and free time. Social Forces. 2005;**84**(1):285-303

[20] McMunn A, Bird L, Webb E, Sacker A. Gender divisions of paid and unpaid work in contemporary UK couples. Work, Employment and Society. 2020;**34**(2):155-173

[21] Xue B, Mcmunn A. Gender differences in the impact of the Covid-19 lockdown on unpaid care work and psychological distress in the UK [Internet]. SocArXiv; 2020. Available from: osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/wzu4t. [Accessed: July 16, 2022]

[22] Calero A, Dellavalle R, Zanino C. Uso del tiempo y Economía del Cuidado. In: Informe sobre maternidad; August 2015; Buenos Aires: UADE; 2015

[23] Moratalla A. Neoliberalismo, Covid19 y su impacto en la academia desde una perspectiva de género. Urbano*.* 2020;**23**(42):04-07

[24] Montes de Oca A. Dificultades para la Transversalización de la Perspectiva de Género en una Institución de Educación Superior. Revista Latinoamericana de Educación Inclusiva. 2019;**13**(1):105-125

[25] Morón N. Discriminación de Género en el Sistema Universitario Argentino. Revista Estudios Feministas. 2018;**26**(2):1-18

[26] Hendon JA, Santoro CM. Diferencias de género de autores y revisores antes y después del inicio de la pandemia. Latin American Antiquity. 2021;**32**(2):229-238

[27] Probert B. I just couldn't fit it in: gender and unequal outcomes in academic careers. Gender, Work & Organization. 2005;**12**(1):50-72

[28] Guil A. Techos de cristal en las universidades andaluzas. In: Lara C, editor. El segundo escalón: desequilibrios de género en ciencia y tecnología. Sevilla: Arcibel; 2006. pp. 88-114

[29] Antón P. Motivación del profesorado universitario para la aplicación de las propuestas metodológicas derivadas de la utilización de las tecnologías de la información y de la comunicación en la docencia. Revista Latinoamericana de Tecnología Educativa. 2005;**4**(1):101-110

[30] Puy A. Barreras a la promoción de las mujeres a puestos de alto status en la universidad. Madrid: Ministerio de Igualdad. 2008

[31] Tomàs i Folch M, Guillamón Ramos C. Las barreras y los obstáculos en el acceso de las profesoras universitarias a los cargos de gestión académica. Revista de educación. 2009;**350**:253-275

[32] Buquet A, López H, Moreno H. Relevancia de los estudios de género en las universidades. Perfiles Educativos. 2019;**42**(167):178-196

[33] Camarena ME, Saavedra ML. La perspectiva de género en los programas de estudio de las licenciaturas contables administrativas. NOESIS. 2018;**27**(54):39-58

[34] Scott-Jones D, Clark M.L. The school experiences of black girls: the interaction of gender, race, and socioeconomic status. The Phi Delta Kappan. 1986;**67**(7):520-526

[35] Bansal P, Corley K. The coming of age for qualitative research: Embracing the diversity of qualitative methods. Academy of Management Journal. 2011;**54**(2):233-237

[36] Charmaz K. Grounded theory: Objectivist and contructivist methods. In: Denzin NK, Lincoln Y, editors. The Handbook of Qualitative Research. 2nd ed. California: Sage Publications; 2000. pp. 509-535

[37] Hays D, Singh A. Qualitative Inquiry in Clinical and Educational Settings. New York: Guilford Press; 2011

[38] Krueger RA. Guía práctica para la investigación aplicada. Madrid: Pirámide; 1991

[39] Callejo J. El grupo de discusión: introducción a una práctica de investigación. Ariel. 2001

[40] Carmona D, Valdebenito F, Henríquez R, Vásquez P, Salazar C, Vega N, Llanquinao E. Impacto en la vida personal y laboral de profesoras y profesores en chile, a un año de crisis sanitaria. Red Docente Feminista (REDOFEM) [Internet]. 2021. Available from: https://g5noticias.cl/wp-content/ uploads/2021/08/Encuesta-Docente-REDOFEM-1er.-Informe-Agosto-2021. pdf. [Accessed: July 16, 2022]

[41] González C, Jacinto R, Peñaloza L. Women Accountants in Academic and Research Spaces in Colombia. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited; 2020. pp. 23-34

[42] Organización Internacional del Trabajo (ILO). Convention 190: Convention Concerning the elimination of violence and harassment. In: World of Work, Adopted by the Conference at Its One Hundred and Eighty Session. Geneva: ILO; 2019

[43] Vara-Horna A, Santi I, Asencios Z, Lescano G. Impacto de la violencia contra las mujeres en el desempeño laboral docente. Lima: Universidad de San Martín de Porres; 2017

[44] Organización Panamericana de la Salud. La violencia contra la mujer es omnipresente y devastadora: la sufren una de cada tres mujeres (COVID-19) [Internet]. 2021. Available from: https://www.paho.org/es/ noticias/9-3-2021-violencia-contramujer-es-omnipresente-devastadorasufren-cada-tres-mujeres. [Accessed: July 16, 2022]

[45] Jara S, Rosales J. Beyond transport time: A review of time use modeling. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice. 2017;**97**:209-230

[46] Castellanos E, Mateos J, Chilet E. COVID-19 en clave de género. Gaceta Sanitaria. 2020;**34**(5):419-421

#### **Chapter 4**

## The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19 Pandemic

*Juan Dempere*

#### **Abstract**

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, most regimes worldwide adopted restrictive policies intended to minimize the adverse effects of the pandemic but also decreased most liberties enjoyed by their citizens. Such restrictive policies affected several freedom-related dimensions like business, labor, monetary, trade, investment, financial, and press freedoms. The time-inconsistency problem arises when achieving short-term goals jeopardize attaining long-term strategic objectives. In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, the time-inconsistency problem may describe how and why policymakers engage in right and wrong decisions when trying to control the pandemic. Electoral accountability is a powerful political motivation for effectively managing the pandemic in democracies. However, once the initial public support for social restrictions disappeared, the electoral accountability logic worked in the opposite direction: most political leaders perceived that lifting pandemic restrictions early would increase their electoral chances. Democracies should struggle for an institutional and regulatory framework that insolate policymakers from political pressures when the time-inconsistency problem can result in a biased decision-making process. National government institutions with political insulation like that enjoyed by central banks should constitute an effective national crisis management system for western democracies.

**Keywords:** COVID-19, outbreak, pandemic, economic freedom, political system, government effectiveness, democracy, autocracy, authoritarian regimen

#### **1. Introduction**

This chapter analyzes some challenges national governments worldwide face when implementing policies to control COVID-19. These government policies affected several freedom-related dimensions in all countries asymmetrically. The analysis of these government policies may provide some clues about national differences in the success of controlling the pandemic. Like Dempere [1], we categorize these policies based on economic freedom dimensions related to national regulatory efficiency and market openness, including business, labor, monetary, trade, investment, financial, and press freedoms. The analysis also includes institutional and social perspectives comprising some factors studied by Dempere [2] like the national political system,

the impact of fake news, and the health institutional framework. The chapter will also expose the most relevant institutional deficiencies that hindered some governments' effectiveness at controlling the pandemic.

#### **2. COVID-19 and business freedom restrictions**

The notion that only democratic regimes can provide superior business freedom than less democratic ones is fallacious. Like Dempere [1–2], we used the classification of the 2021 Economist's Intelligence Unit's [3] democracy index (full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, and authoritarian regime) and calculated the average index of business freedom compiled by the Heritage Foundation [4] for 161 countries from 2014 to 2021. This index quantifies the government restrictions on domestic business activities. **Figure 1** below shows the top ten authoritarian regimes with the highest average degree of business freedom and the democracies with lower business freedom.

The figure shows that citizens of these ten so-called "authoritarian" regimes like the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etcetera, have enjoyed superior average business freedom from 2014 to 2021 compared to 108 countries, including 30 democracies like Spain, Luxemburg, India, Brazil, Philippines, etcetera, during the same period. Dempere [1] finds that countries enjoying a high degree of the Heritage Foundation's (HF's) business freedom index imposed the softest government restriction and experienced higher averages of COVID-19 cases and deaths per million. He explains that nations with a tradition of business freedom experienced significant challenges when trying to impose business restrictions to control the pandemic. The resistance of business owners to accept business and social limitations like lockdowns and curfews magnified the negative impact of the outbreak. Indeed, Spiegel and Tookes [5] find that implementing government policies related to the mandatory use of masks, restaurant and bar closures, gym closures, and other high-risk business closures have predictive power on new COVID-19 deaths.

Business actors' resistance to adopting the government restrictions was primarily explained by the economic costs associated with such business constraints. Indeed, Fairlie [6] studies the pandemic impact on US small business owners and finds that small business activities decreased by 22% in the two months between February and April 2020, or the closure of 3.3 million small businesses. The impact was more severe among minorities, including African-Americans (41% drop), Latins (32% drop), Asians (26% drop), and female business owners (25% drop). Government restrictions also had a disproportionately negative impact in some industry sectors, while others experienced an economic benefit from such constraints. Indeed, Fairlie and Foseen [7] analyze data from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration and find that some industry sectors were negatively affected by lockdowns

**Figure 1.** *2014–2021 average of Heritage Foundation's index of business freedom per country.*

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

(accommodations experienced sales losses of 91%). At the same time, other industry sectors flourished (online sales grew 180%).

#### **3. COVID-19 and labor freedom restrictions**

The perception that people living in democratic regimes enjoy higher labor freedom than less democratic nations is incorrect. We classified countries again like in **Figure 1** and determined the average HF's index of labor freedom for 161 countries from 2014 to 2021. This index estimates the degree to which national governments allow labor to work and move freely without unnecessary restrictions except those intended to protect and maintain the freedom itself. **Figure 2** below shows the top ten less democratic countries' averages of labor freedom and the democracies with lower values of this freedom.

The figure above shows that people living in autocracies like the UAE, Bahrain, Belarus, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etcetera enjoy more labor freedom than 117 countries, including 43 democracies like Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Netherlands, etcetera, over the same period. Dempere [1] finds a significant relationship between the national labor freedom and the daily average of COVID-19 cases per million. He suggests that regimes with low labor freedom experienced high unemployment rates requiring state intervention and controls. These actions minimize the negative impact of the pandemic on labor markets but also reduce domestic labor freedom.

Indeed, Bell and Blanchflower [8] study the pandemic effects on the labor market and find that a third of the Canadian and US workers lost about 50% of their income due to the COVID-19 crisis, compared with 25% in the UK and 45% in China. Similarly, Chi-Wei et al. [9] find a significant association between COVID-19 cases and unemployment in Italy, Germany, and the UK. Equally, Mekonnen and Kassegn [10] find that the working hour loss during 2020 was more than 10% in Eritrea, Cape Verde, and Uganda. They inform that pandemic-driven lockdowns caused a 10.6% decrease in Ethiopia's agricultural output and 19.8% in Ghana. They also find increases in food insecurity of 6–15% in Nigeria, 38% in Kenya, and 44% in Uganda.

According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [11], many regimes adopted policies to safeguard existing jobs, like job retention arrangements and administrative suspensions of dismissals. They inform that nations with comprehensive restrictive labor regulations and resources experienced the lowest increases in unemployment rates during the early stages of the pandemic. Alternatively, those countries that experienced high unemployment rates due to low government interference in the labor market (high labor freedom) faced substantial challenges in encouraging people to stay at home. Otherwise, regimes with strict regulations aimed at protecting the domestic labor market (low

labor freedom) enjoyed the enhanced public acceptance of government restrictions to control the pandemic.

#### **4. COVID-19 and monetary freedom restrictions**

The view that only democratic countries have better monetary freedom than less democratic ones is misleading. We classified nations again like in **Figures 1** and **2** and determined the average HF's index of monetary freedom for 161 countries from 2014 to 2021. This index measures domestic inflation and government policies that may result in biased prices of goods and services. **Figure 3** below shows the top ten authoritarian regimes' averages of monetary freedom and the democracies with lower averages of monetary freedom.

The figure shows that people living in less democratic regimes like Jordan, Burkina Faso, UAE, Mali, Niger, etcetera, have enjoyed greater monetary freedom than 105 countries, including 31 democracies like the United States, Greece, France, Canada, Norway, etcetera, during the same period. Dempere [1] finds a significant negative relationship between a country's degree of monetary freedom and the pandemic response time, but a positive association between monetary freedom and the daily average of COVID-19 cases per million. He explains that during the first wave of the outbreak, nations worldwide endured shortages and price spikes of many goods due to frozen manufacture, crops rotting due to lack of harvesting, global supply-chain interruptions, etcetera. As a result, the World Health Organization [12] requested businesses and governments to coordinate efforts to minimize the increased demand for products due to panic purchases, speculation, and hoarding, especially for medical materials. Those regimes with high monetary freedom before the pandemic experienced significant challenges when enforcing regulations to control market distortions created by the COVID-19 crisis. Those nations with low monetary freedom could implement controls more quickly and effectively, resulting in faster pandemic response time and lower coronavirus cases. Such regulation intended to reduce the harmful impact of the pandemic on the domestic market of goods and services also reduced the national monetary freedom.

Indeed, Ahn [13] finds that South Korea imposed a fixed price on 80% of the medical masks sold to the public to ensure the public health and reduce the pandemic spread. Similarly, Chakraborti and Gavin [14] study the impact of current anti-gouging laws in several US states banning price increments during the COVID-19 crisis. Using the number of Google searches as a proxy metric for depletion of sensitive goods like toilet paper and hand sanitizer, they find a positive relationship between states prohibiting price gouging and shortages of these goods. Likewise, Islam et al. [15] study the buying behaviors during the COVIDID-19 crisis in the U.S., China, India, and Pakistan. The perceived limited quantity and time scarcity dimensions

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

increased impulsive and obsessive consumer buying in these countries. Equally, Hall et al. [16] find evidence of stockpiling consumer behaviors during the pandemic from increased spending in some consumer goods categories.

#### **5. COVID-19 and trade freedom restrictions**

The perception that only democratic nations have superior trade freedom than no democratic ones is deceptive. We again classified governments like in **Figures 1**–**3** and found the average HF's trade freedom index for 161 countries from 2014 to 2021. This metric includes tariff and non-tariff barriers to the international trade of goods and services. **Figure 4** below shows the top ten authoritarian regimes' averages of trade freedom and the democracies with lower averages of trade freedom.

The figure shows that citizens of less democratic regimes like Eswatini, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, etcetera, have experienced superior trade freedom than 86 nations, including 18 democracies like South Korea, Philippines, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, etcetera, over the same period. Dempere [1] finds a significant association between trade freedom and the daily average of COVID-19 deaths per million. Indeed, the World Trade Organization [17] informs that during the first wave of the pandemic, several nations engaged in trade restrictions to alleviate dangerous food and health materials scarcities. Similarly, Carreño et al. [18] list some countries imposing trade restrictions during the COVID-19 crisis, including Indonesia's temporary ban on face masks, sanitizers, and some medical equipment, and India banning similar exports, including ventilators and anti-malaria medicines. They also listed Kazakhstan banning all product exports, Serbia banning exports of sunflower oil, Vietnam suspending exports of rice, El Salvador and Honduras banning exports of vegetables temporarily, Kyrgyzstan prohibiting the export of some food products, and Romania banning exports of wheat, corn, rice, and other grains.

In the same way, Hoekman et al. [19] inform of 75 governments, including the US, China, the EU, India, Turkey, and the UK, implementing trade restrictions on medical supplies and medicines during the pandemic. Likewise, Pauwelyn [20] reports 69 governments banning or limiting personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, and other medical supplies exports. A landmark incident reported by Willsher et al. [21] was about the US government (emblematic democratic regime) being accused of "modern piracy" after outbidding the German government (another democracy) and diverting a shipment of N95 masks intended for the German police. They informed that Andreas Geisel, the interior minister for Berlin State in 2020, described the incident in the following terms: "This is no way to treat trans-Atlantic partners," Geisel said. "Even in times of global crisis, there should be no wild west methods" [21]. All the trade restrictions mentioned above

were intended to minimize the negative impact of the pandemic on international trade but also diminished domestic trade freedom.

#### **6. COVID-19 and investment freedom restrictions**

The erroneous belief that only democracies can provide superior investment freedom to their citizens than no democratic regimes is widespread. We classified nations again as in **Figures 1**–**4** and calculated the average HF's index of investment freedom for 161 countries from 2014 to 2021. This index assesses the quality and quantity of national limitations to the flow of investment capital, such as limits on access to capital transactions, transfers, payments, and foreign exchange. **Figure 5** below shows the top ten authoritarian regimes' averages of investment freedom and the democracies with lower averages of this freedom.

The figure shows that people in less democratic regimes like Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Oman, Burkina Faso, etcetera, have experienced better investment freedom than 83 nations, including 17 democracies like Philippines, Malaysia, Greece, Brazil, Thailand, etcetera, over the same period. Dempere [1] finds a significant association between investment freedom and the daily average of COVID-19 cases and deaths per million. Equally, Liu et al. [22] verify negative abnormal returns among 21 leading stock market indices after the virus outbreak. Likewise, Chang et al. [23] study data from 20 countries and find that government response to the pandemic significantly positively impacts stock market returns. Similarly, Phan and Paresh [24] analyze the government control of COVID-19 among 25 countries and find that the stock market reacted negatively to news on coronavirus infections and deaths in most countries. They also find a positive stock market reaction in seven countries (Switzerland, Germany, Peru, India, Russia, Israel, the US, and Chile) to the announcement of lockdowns and another positive stock market reaction in nine countries (Peru, South Korea, Italy, Chile, Spain, Japan, Russia, Israel, and Poland) to the announcement of some measures of government stimulus.

Another significant impact of the COVID-19 crisis on capital markets worldwide was the result of national monetary policies implemented by central banks. Indeed, Fischer [25] compares the government economic interventions during the pandemic and finds that most central banks in developed nations could minimize the impact of COVID-19 through central banks unprecedented interventions in terms of scope, speed, and magnitude of asset purchase and emergency lending programs. Milstein and Wessel [26] list the US Federal Reserve (FED) responses to minimize the economic impact of the pandemic, including the FED's Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility aimed to buy directly new and existing corporate bonds and provide loans to corporations. They also report about the FED's Commercial Paper Funding Facility, allowing the FED to buy

#### *The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

corporate commercial papers for up 3 months as a short-term lending tool for corporations. Similarly, Fischer [25] informs about the Bank of England's (BoE's) Term Funding Scheme program to reduce the bank borrowing costs for small and medium enterprises. He also reports the BoE's COVID Corporate Financing Facility intended to buy commercial papers from large companies and the BoE's quantitative easing monetary policy to allow the purchase of government and corporate bonds. He also informs about the expansion of the European Central Bank's Asset Purchase Program and the new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program to buy national, regional, and local government bonds, corporate bonds, and asset-backed securities, including commercial paper of non-financial corporations. These monetary policies implemented by central banks reduced the pandemic's adverse effect on national capital markets and decreased domestic investment freedom.

#### **7. COVID-19 and financial freedom restrictions**

The belief that people living in democratic regimes can enjoy superior financial freedom is inaccurate. We classified countries again like in **Figures 1**–**5** and determined the average HF's index of financial freedom for 161 countries from 2014 to 2021. This index evaluates each country's banking efficiency and independence from government influence and interference in the financial sector. **Figure 6** below shows the top ten authoritarian regimes' averages of financial freedom and the democracies with lower values of this freedom.

The figure shows that those living in less democratic regimes like Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, etcetera enjoy superior financial freedom than 87 countries, including 19 democracies like Costa Rica, Argentina, Greece, India, Uruguay, etcetera, over the same period. Dempere [1] finds a significant positive relationship between financial freedom and the daily average of cases and fatalities per million but a negative and significant association with the outbreak response time.

Indeed, Long et al. [27] study the monetary policies' impact on 38 countries and find that central bank interventions had an initial positive influence on reducing the pandemic-caused inflation but limited effect on minimizing the impact of COVID-19 on unemployment rates. Alternatively, Fernández et al. [28] anticipated the current spike in inflation exacerbated by the war in Ukraine when studying the long-term effects of central banks' stimulus policies aimed at minimizing the economic impact of the pandemic through low-interest rates and purchases of large quantities of public and private debt. In the same way, Milstein and Wessel [26] inform about the FED monetary policies to minimize the impact of the pandemic on the banking sector, including the reduction of the Federal funds rate by 1.5% and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility to provide low rate short-term loans to 24 large financial institutions. They also report the FED's Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility to give the

banks with loans collateralized by prime money market funds and its international swap lines to provide US dollars to foreign central banks in exchange for foreign currencies and charged interest on the swaps. They also inform of the FED's reduced rate (0.25%) loans to banks from its discount window and temporary relaxed regulatory bank liquidity and capital requirements to increase bank lending during the outbreak.

Similarly, Fischer [25] informs that the BoE reduced its Bank Rate to 0.1% in response to the pandemic, which constituted a historic all-time low record. He also reports a further reduction of the ECB deposit rate to a −0.5% in response to COVID-19 and the expansion of its targeted long-term refinancing operations to provide banks with low-rate & long-term loans as an incentive to promote bank lending operations. He finds that most major central banks temporarily relaxed regulatory restrictions on bank lending practices during 2020. These monetary policies adopted by many central banks were intended to minimize the harmful effects of the pandemic on the domestic banking sector but also decreased national financial freedom.

#### **8. Is press freedom a blessing or a course during pandemic times?**

The notion that only democratic regimes can provide superior press freedom is correct. No country without press freedom is compatible with any classification of democracy, so no figure was included in this category. However, significant evidence suggests that press freedom may be a disadvantage for most democracies trying to control the pandemic.

Dempere [29] finds that the daily average of coronavirus infections and deaths per million has a positive and significant relationship with a country's information and communication technology (ICT) readiness. His results are consistent with the challenges that fake news posed to governments worldwide during the early stages of the pandemic. He suggests that regimes with superior ICT reediness experienced significant challenges from pandemic fake news and deception in social media. The World Health Organization [30] has warned that spreading COVID-19 misinformation through media and similar digital platforms constitutes a worse threat to public health than the coronavirus itself.

In the same way, Arafat et al. [31] suggest that media is critical in explaining panic buying since public perceptions drive this collective behavior. They indicate that reporting fake news to appropriate government authorities will help to prevent panic buying. Similarly, Arafat et al. [32] analyze content media reports during the COVID-19 pandemic and find that 46% of news highlighted scarce products and around 82% informed drivers of panic buying. Equally, about 80% covered the impact of panic purchases, and approximately 25.7% highlighted rumors explaining some panic consumer behavior. They conclude that the media has significant responsibility when reporting panic buying.

The strategies to mitigate the effects of fake news during the pandemic by less democratic regimes constitute a sharp contrast with most democracies. Indeed, Arab News [33] informs about the fines and jail time awaiting people spreading pandemic-related fake news in the Middle East. Specifically, the news outlet reports that Egypt would impose imprisonment of up to 3 years and fines of up to \$1200, and Saudi Arabia would enforce up to 5 years of jail time and fines up to \$800,000. Equally, Oman would levy up to 3 years of jail term and fines up to \$7700; the UAE would impose up to 3 years of imprisonment and fines up to \$816,000. Correspondingly, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon would take the necessary legal actions *The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

(including possible arrests) against people causing panic by spreading COVID-19 misinformation.

The spread of fake news in some democracies started with their leaders. Indeed, the most prominent was former President Donald Trump's recommendation to his health officials to study the injection of bleach into the human body to fight the coronavirus [34] or his alleged daily doses of hydroxychloroquine to prevent COVID-19 [35]. Similarly, Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro characterized the pandemic as a "little flu" and abused his constitutional powers to distort clinical protocols, data disclosure, and vaccine procurements [36]. He also recommended hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19 patients [36]. Likewise, Indian Prime Minister Neranda Modi declared at a global forum in January 2021 that India "saved humanity... by containing corona effectively." [36]. On April 17, 2021, Modi held a massive political gathering with thousands of participants in West Bengal, a state where Modi was trying to win local elections and where no pandemic restrictions had been imposed. That same day India reported 234,692 new COVID-19 cases, more than 20 times the daily figures from late January to early February 2021 [37]. Four weeks later, Modi's government allowed the massive Kumbh Mela pilgrimage, where millions of pilgrims gathered to bathe in the Ganges River throughout April. From January 1, 2020, to December 2021, India (the largest democracy on Earth) reported 481,000 COVID-19 deaths, but the World Health Organization estimates this number at about ten times as many [38]. In the same way, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador resisted imposing social restrictions in the early stages of the pandemic and continued holding political rallies nationwide, frequently refusing to wear a mask [36]. A comprehensive list of leaders mishandling the coronavirus crisis cannot be provided due to the chapter's length restrictions.

Burki [39] studies the online anti-vaccine movement during the COVID-19 crisis and informs that the British Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) has reported "...*31 million people follow anti-vaccine groups on Facebook, with 17 million people subscribing to similar accounts on YouTube. The CCDH calculated that the anti-vaccine movement could realize US\$1 billion in annual revenues for social media firms. As much as \$989 million could accrue to Facebook and Instagram alone, largely from advertising targeting the 38·7 million followers of anti-vaccine accounts. Huge sums indeed, but it is worth noting that, in 2019, Facebook generated revenue of \$70·7 billion*..." [39].

McDonald et al. [40] identified 34 Facebook pages considered super-spreaders of false information about COVID-19, with more than 100,000 likes each and 14,139,288 likes total. They mention the WorldTruth.TV channel with 1,683,036 Facebook page likes and posts claiming that the COVID-19 vaccine would use "microchips" used for a "global tracking system" [40] and that COVID-19 vaccines would "alter" human DNA. Another example was The Truth About Cancer cannel, with 1,140,726 Facebook page likes and posts stating that social restrictions to control COVID-19 were "obedience training" [40] and that Bill Gates will use the COVID-19 vaccine to monitor people. Another example was the EnVolve channel, with 684,972 Facebook page likes and posts informing that Dr. Anthony Fauci, the director of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, was personally profiting from a COVID-19 vaccine. Again, a comprehensive list of social media accounts spreading fake news cannot be provided due to the chapter's length restrictions.

Like in "Ripley's Believe It or Not!" (the American franchise founded by Robert Ripley reporting bizarre facts or items so strange and unusual that readers would mistrust such claims), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [41] informs about the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News,"

Disinformation and Propaganda of 2017 in the following terms: "...*Standards on Disinformation and Propaganda.*

*a. General prohibitions on the dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including 'false news' or 'non-objective information,' are incompatible with international standards for restrictions on freedom of expression, as set out in paragraph 1(a), and should be abolished.*..." [41].

Not surprisingly, the 2021 Nobel Peace laureate Maria Ressa said that "…social media companies have a responsibility to fight disinformation and its corrosive effects on public discourse and democracy…" and that "…'If you're working in tech, I'm talking to you,' said Ressa, addressing dignitaries in Oslo's cavernous city hall. 'How can you have election integrity if you don't have integrity of facts?'…" [42].

Equally and not surprisingly, Fischer [43] informs about The Edelman Trust Barometer's 2022 global survey of 35,000 respondents across 28 countries, showing a collapse of trust in democracies. The survey also found that most respondents considered journalists (67%), government leaders (66%), and business executives (63%) as the social actors who intentionally mislead people with false or wrong information. Similarly, Mark [44] informs that the same survey ranks institutions in Germany (down 7 to 46%), Australia (−6 to 53%), the Netherlands (−6 to 57%), South Korea (−5 to 42%), and the US (−5 to 43%) as the top losers of public trust during 2021. Alternatively, the survey found that public confidence in institutions in China (+11 to 83%), the United Arab Emirates (+9 to 76%), and Thailand (+5 to 66%) and the top winners of public trust for the same year.

#### **9. COVID-19 and democracy**

The growing literature on COVID-19 & democracy can be classified as those articles with evidence of inferior performance for democratic systems compared with less democratic ones versus those with evidence supporting otherwise. Indeed, Dempere [2] identifies some government success metrics in managing the first wave of COVID-19. He finds that democracies implemented the softest social restrictions and experienced the highest daily averages of cases & deaths per million and mortality rates. He also finds that democratic nations demonstrated the quickest outbreak response time and the most prominent daily averages of tests per thousand. Similarly, Engler et al. [45] study the impact of institutional protection of democratic principles among 34 European countries and find that countries with strong regulatory protection of individual freedoms faced substantial challenges in adopting restrictive policies. Likewise, Cheibub et al. [46] find that democracies react slowly to the pandemic by implementing restrictive measures and abrogating some civil rights. They concluded that governments faced conflicting alternatives between preventing deaths with a significant economic cost (long-term) and protecting livelihoods (short-term). The notion of state capacity could not explain their heterogeneous results since most of their metrics for quality of governance did not have explanatory power over the democratic delay measured by daily or cumulative deaths.

In the same way, Cepaluni et al. [47] find that democracies experienced higher COVID-19 deaths per capita and quicker than less democratic countries. They concluded that democracies were less effective at controlling the initial stages of the pandemic. Equally, Narita and Sudo [48] find that democratic nations suffered higher COVID-related deaths and higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss. Herren et al. [49] find that the democracy index, GDP per capita, and country-specific COVID-19

#### *The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

trend have explanatory power on people's acceptance of government restrictions for pandemic control. Trein [50] finds that countries with less democratic institutional traditions faced minor challenges when enforcing coronavirus-related limitations than nations with more democratic institutional legacy. Huang et al. [51] find that most democratic regimes experienced a higher incidence of COVID-19. Valev [52] finds a positive relationship between democracy and COVID-19 cases & fatalities per million using a sample of 45 countries. Mazzucchelli et al. [53] also find that the democracy index and its components have a significant and positive association with the pandemic fatality rates. Ashraf [54] finds a weak association between democracy and pandemic deaths in a sample of 120 countries but a significant relationship between tourist arrivals and COVID-19 fatalities.

Alternatively, some studies have found a negative association between COVID-19 & democracy by using non-official datasets. Indeed, Esarey [55] analyzes Karlinsky and Kobak's [56] dataset in a not peer-reviewed article and finds a negative bivariate correlation between excess mortality and democracy. In another not peer-reviewed paper, Badman et al. [57] study the effectiveness of democracies at controlling the pandemic and find that less democratic regimes are weakly associated with higher excess mortality rates. In the same way, Jain et al. [58] find that democracies have a significant negative relationship with excess fatalities during the first 18 months of the COVID-19 crisis.

Knutsen and Kolvani [59] argue that less democratic regimes have strong motivations to engage in propaganda based on distorted facts to mask domestic problems that may negatively affect the local public perception of government effectiveness. They explain that autocracies have excellent opportunities to misrepresent inconvenient data to foreign audiences. As a result, these regimes are more prone to underreport actual COVID-19-related statistics than democracies. They use excess mortality data from the Economist [60] and find that democratic government have higher officially reported fatality rates than less democratic nations. Still, this difference is due to underreporting in autocracies. They also find that high-capacity democracies have lower fatality rates than autocracies.

There is a flaw in the logic behind the assumption that excess mortality is better than official statistics to measure the real impact of the COVID-19 crisis. One fundamental factor calculating excess mortality is using national historic trends to estimate the expected mortality rate without the effects of the pandemic. Based on past trends, the fatalities above the predicted death toll determine such excess mortality. This methodology implies that autocracies must have reported accurate and reliable data before the COVID-19 crisis and that the same regimes must have provided misleading information only after the beginning of the outbreak in 2020. However, such misleading information must be only about the total COVID-19 deaths since this methodology requires considering the total national deaths as reliable data for all countries and periods. No logical explanation exists to support this rationale. A researcher must assume that all the data from autocracies is unreliable or otherwise. Nevertheless, considering the autocracies' COVID-related data are reliable before 2020 and inconsistent after the pandemic's beginning makes no logical sense. Similarly, assuming that autocracies' coronavirus deaths are false values while their total deaths for the same period are actual values has no rational explanation and produces biased results.

Excess mortality is a measurable phenomenon that cannot be denied. This anomaly in the national statistics can be interpreted in many ways. The health profile of people in democratic regimes may have contributed to the lower deaths caused by COVID-19 in less democratic countries. Indeed, Dempere [1] analyzes the national

health quality index (NHQI), a primary health care system metric, and finds that countries with the lowest average daily cases and fatalities per million also exhibited the highest NHQIs. He explains this seemingly spurious result by classifying the countries based on their NHQIs and finding that nations with the highest NHQIs are wealthy democracies measured by their GDP per capita. People in these countries usually experience health problems that are less frequent in developing countries, like a high percentage of 65 or older, a high incidence of cardiovascular illness, cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory disease, and a high proportion of the urban population. All these factors predict the average coronavirus daily deaths per million [61–65].

Alternatively, the collapse of deficient health care systems in developing countries may also explain the non-COVID-19-related deaths component of the excess mortality. Indeed, while coronavirus patients crowded hospitals and clinics looking for medical treatment, the rest of the population with other medical conditions could not receive medical attention exacerbating the non-pandemic mortality rates compared with historical records. In addition, people needing medical attention may have been reluctant to go to health care centers crowded with COVID patients and face the risk of infection. Indeed, Taylor [66] informs that on March 17, 2020, nine out of twentysix Brazilian states experienced an 80% occupancy rate of their covid-19 intensive care beds, and 15 states experienced an even higher occupancy rate of 90%. Equally, López et al. [67] inform that the Venezuelan healthcare system collapsed to the everincreasing number of COVID-19 patients needing hospitalization, forcing desperate people to opt for self-medication.

#### **10. COVID-19 and the time-inconsistency problem**

The outstanding performance of central banks in addressing the economic impact of the pandemic described before is due to their relative insulation from political pressures and the resulting capacity to manage the time inconsistency problem. The timeinconsistency problem arises when achieving short-term goals jeopardize attaining long-term strategic objectives. The term is commonly used in public administration to refer to the challenges facing monetary policymakers when pursuing short-term unemployment reductions at the expense of high long-term inflation rates [68–70]. Policymakers are inclined to implement expansionary monetary policies to increase economic growth and employment in the short run. This policy predisposition may happen before electoral processes when political support is usually associated with voters' current rather than future wellbeing. However, such expansionary policies may result in high inflation rates in the long term, which may reduce economic growth and employment.

The time-inconsistency problem may affect policymakers in any national government functional area. In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, the time-inconsistency problem may describe how and why policymakers engage in right or wrong decisions when trying to control the pandemic. At the beginning of the outbreak, human fear was the main driving force behind the public support for restrictive government policies. Indeed, Bol et al. [71] find that lockdowns increased political support, government trust, and satisfaction with democracy using a questionnaire between March 2 and April 2, 2020, in 15 European countries. Similarly, Schraff [72] applies a representative Dutch household survey in March 2020 and finds that increased COVID-19 statistics lead to increased political trust explained by the notion of an emotionally driven anxiety effect.

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

Restrictive government policies go against freedom-related democratic values, so public support for such policies is associated with a lack of support for a political system unable to restrict social freedoms and control the pandemic. Indeed, Marbach et al. [73] find that lockdown policies increase authoritarian values and support for autocracy using survey data collected from 27,317 respondents between March and May 2020 in the U.S. and four European countries. Similarly, Amat et al. [74] study survey data collected from March 20 to 28, 2020, and find Spanish public support for a technocratic and authoritarian government style capable of restricting individual freedoms.

The initial public support for restrictive measures to control COVID-19 had a heterogeneous impact among nations in terms of intensity and duration. Such initial support for vigorous government intervention to prevent the pandemic may have explained some electoral outcomes during 2020, the most notorious the US election. Indeed, Baccini et al. [75] study the influence of COVID-19 on the 2020 US presidential election and find that coronavirus cases and deaths had a significant negative relationship with former US President Donald Trump's vote share. Their analysis suggests that Trump would probably have won re-election if pandemic cases had been 5 percent lower.

Knutsen and Kolvani [59] suggest that the lack of electoral accountability provides autocracies more flexibility to adopt restrictive measures. This rationale is simple but incomplete. Although electoral accountability is a powerful political motivation for effective control of the pandemic in democracies, this premise assumes that people would support social restrictions for as long as needed to control the outbreak. Unfortunately, this premise proved wrong in most democracies due to the devastating impact of COVID-related stressors on a personal level.

The literature on COVID-19's psychological impact can explain the waning support for pandemic-related restrictions. The studies include analyses on the resulting domestic violence derived from long periods of lockdown-induced proximity joint with economic uncertainty and crisis-related instability [76]. In addition, during the pandemic, some articles verified high levels of anxiety, depression, and fear [77–79]. Similarly, many studies find a severely adverse psychological impact, including post-traumatic stress symptoms, confusion, anger [80, 81], and high rates of suicide [82–84]. Some studies focused on the negative physiological impact of COVID-19 patients' feelings of guilt and shame [85]. Once the public support for social restrictions disappeared, the electoral accountability logic worked in the opposite direction: most political leaders perceived that lifting pandemic restrictions early would increase their electoral chances.

In other words, after the initial public support for restrictive measures disappeared, many government authorities find themselves confronting a time-inconsistency problem. Graichen [86] illustrates this COVID-19 time-inconsistency problem in his comparative analysis of Germany's first and second waves of the pandemic. The poor performance of the German government in managing the second wave of the outbreak was due to the changing priorities of German politicians. The short-term economic recovery represented by keeping businesses open took precedence over strict social distance policies and mobility restrictions to reduce cases and deaths over the long term. The second wage challenged many democratic systems to persuade people to follow the recommended scientific path, as scientific arguments were less relevant in the second wave than in the first.

Similarly, Sager [87] studies the Swiss response to the first COVID-19 wavebased expert medical advice from the Federal Office of Public Health. He finds that during the lockdown period, the Swiss political debate about the country's timing for reopening switched from analyzing scientific health-related evidence to an economic-centered discussion. Such arguments were driven by economic actors with vested interests and special access to the Swiss political elites, particularly the restaurant and tourism umbrella organizations: GastroSuisse and HotellerieSuisse, which were severely hit by the COVID-19 crisis. The outcome was an earlier than expected restaurant reopening and a reversal in the customer contact tracing program, which might have explained the devastating Swiss second COVID-19 wave.

The lack of realization about the time inconsistency problem as a critical democracies' structural problem reduces the chances of urgent restructurings in these regimes. Indeed, Golberg [88] clearly expressed the need for reforms when analyzing the interaction of US President Joe Biden with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping where he explained that: "... *democracy doesn't work anymore. Among other things, Xi said, democracy requires consensus, and mustering a consensus takes too long in a fast-moving world. Only autocracies are equipped to meet the extraordinary challenges of modern times...We Americans often treat our liberal democracy as a national religion, and routinely assert, as if no evidence were needed, that it is the most moral, just, effective and admirable system on Earth. But few would deny that there's been some disturbing evidence to the contrary in recent years. The Jan. 6 riot, of course, was a low point. Then there was the chaotic, inefficient, politicized response to the pandemic... Another reason is that in a democracy, elected officials have no incentive to support policies that require pain and sacrifice today in exchange for future gain... In most cases, courageous politicians who supported such policies would be voted out of office*..." [88].

Like the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Knutsen and Kolvani [59] also recognize that democracies have a more complex institutional and regulatory framework that hinders the quick passage and implementation of restraining pandemic policies and regulations. The critical impact of time when adopting coronavirus mitigating strategies places democracies at a disadvantage compared with less democratic regimes. Autocratic regimes could react faster to the pandemic because they did not need to invest any time to reach a consensus or get input from many institutional actors with veto power on government decisions.

Hodge [89] suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin is another autocratic leader aware of democracies' time-inconsistency problems. Putin has engaged in a long-term war with Ukraine, hoping that international fatigue will force the international community to push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's government to make concessions to Russia. The US faced this same time-inconsistency problem when fighting the Afghanistan war. The saying "You have the watches, but we have the time" attributed to a captured Taliban fighter reflects the Taliban's awareness that they were operating on different political horizons and timelines. Like the US war in Vietnam, the Taliban only needed to outlast, but not defeat, the technologically superior US military since they were confident that public support for the war in a democracy would wane over time. Like the fading initial support for social restrictions during the COVID-19 crisis, Putin is waiting for the same outcome as the impact of inflation and economic recession will switch the public support for the war in Ukraine in most western democracies. Another tragic example of democracies without politically insulated institutions capable of avoiding the time-inconsistency problem in critical decision-making processes.

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

#### **11. Conclusions**

The fallacious argument that any criticism of western democracies in their current state of historical development implies automatic support for their authoritarian counterparts is prevalent even in academic forums. The deficiencies of democratic systems must be solved to avoid the threat to their existence represented by disenfranchised voters.

Democracies should struggle for an institutional and regulatory framework that insulates policymakers from political pressures when the time-inconsistency problem can result in biased decision-making processes. Independent central banks constitute an example of effective institutions engaging in quick decision-making processes that allow policymakers to pursue long-term strategic goals without significant pressure from short-term political priorities.

National government institutions with political insulation like that enjoyed by many central banks should constitute an effective national crisis management system for western democracies. Such institutions should design multidisciplinary-based policies with input from previous domestic crisis experiences and foreign ones. Indeed, Yang et al. [90] find that the exemplary case of South Korea at implementing effective and innovative initial measures to control the first wave of COVID-19 overshadows the valuable lessons painfully learned from its efforts to control the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2015. The most valuable knowledge from the Korean MERS failure experience was the lack of government informational transparency and openness to the public.

The radical view of considering any government policy or practice from less democratic countries inferior is not based on science but on ideology. The assumption that the current dimensions of democracies and autocracies are the only alternatives for government regimes is an absurd dichotomy. Unfortunately, such a view is prevalent in many organizations and directly affects decision-making processes. Indeed, Repucci and Slipowitz [91] suggest on behalf of the Freedom House that autocratic leaders have succeeded in shifting global democratic incentives to place at risk the premise that democracy is "the only viable path to prosperity and security" [91] while promoting more authoritarian political regimes. Blaming others is an easy way to justify that in 2021 more democracies suffered deterioration compared to those experiencing progress, expanding a trend of 16 consecutive years of democratic decline. Unfortunately, the need for urgent institutional reforms is rarely suggested as a possible explanation for this democratic decline worldwide.

Alternatively, several less democratic regimes have evolved quickly by implementing reforms that provide their citizens with levels of freedom (e.g., business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom) far superior to many democracies. Most democracies assume that democracy in its current form constitutes the best political system, so the need for reforms is not considered an urgent priority. Unfortunately, this lack of immediate reforms may explain the significant decay of democracy worldwide.

*Resilience and Realities – Exploring Pandemic Effects, Governance Challenges, and Economic Insights*

#### **Author details**

Juan Dempere HCT, Ras Al Khaimah, UAE

\*Address all correspondence to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

#### **References**

[1] Dempere J. Control of the first wave of COVID-19: Some economic freedom-related success factors. Journal of International Studies. 2021;**14**(4):187- 200. DOI: 10.14254/2071-8330. 2021/14-4/13

[2] Dempere J. A recipe to control the first wave of COVID-19: More or less democracy? Transforming Government: People, Process, and Policy. 2021;**15**(4):597-611. DOI: 10.1108/ TG-08-2020-0206

[3] The Economist-Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2021. The China challenge 2021. Available from: https:// www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracyindex-2021/#mktoForm\_anchor. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[4] Heritage Foundation. Index of Economic Freedom. 2020. Available from: https://www.heritage.org/index/. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[5] Spiegel M, Tookes H. Business restrictions and COVID-19 fatalities. The Review of Financial Studies. 2021;**34**(11):5266-5308. DOI: 10.1093/rfs/ hhab069

[6] Fairlie R. The impact of COVID-19 on small business owners: Evidence from the first threemonths after widespread social-distancing restrictions. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2020;**29**(4):727-740. DOI: 10.1111/ jems.12400

[7] Fairlie R, Fossen F. The early impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on business sales. Small Business Economics. 2022;**58**(1):1853-1864. DOI: 10.1007/ s11187-021-00479-4

[8] Bell D, Blanchflower D. US and UK labour markets before and during the

COVID-19 crash. National Institute Economic Review. 2020;**252**:R52-R69. DOI: 10.1017/nie.2020.14

[9] Chi-Wei S, Dai K, Ullah S, Andlib Z. COVID-19 pandemic and unemployment dynamics in European economies. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja. 2021;**35**(1):1752-1764 DOI: 10.1080/1331677X. 2021.1912627

[10] Mekonnen E, Kassegn A. Food insecurity and unemployment crisis under COVID-19: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. Cogent Social Sciences. 2022;**8**(1):12-31. DOI: 10.1080/ 23311886.2022.2045721

[11] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD Economic Outlook, 2020. Paris, France: OECD Publishing; 2020. DOI: 10.1787/ 0d1d1e2e-en

[12] World Health Organization. Shortage of Personal Protective Equipment Endangering Health Workers Worldwide. 2020. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/ detail/03-03-2020-shortage-of-personalprotective-equipment-endangeringhealth-workers-worldwide. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[13] Dae-Yong A. Government intervention and the Price of KF94 masks in the Covid-19 era. Risk management and healthcare. Policy. 2021;**14**:2377. DOI: 10.2147/RMHP.S313984

[14] Chakraborti R, Roberts G. Anti-gouging Laws, shortages, and COVID-19: Insights from consumer searches. The Journal of Private Enterprise. 2020;**35**(4):1-20. http://journal.apee.org/index.

php?title=Parte1\_2020\_ Journal\_of\_ Private\_Enterprise\_Vol\_35\_No\_4\_Winter

[15] Islam T, Pitafi A, Arya V, Wang Y, Akhtar N, Mubarik S, et al. Panic buying in the COVID-19 pandemic: A multicountry examination. Services. 2021;**59**:102357. DOI: 10.1016/j. jretconser.2020.102357

[16] Hall M, Prayag G, Fieger P, Dyason D. Beyond panic buying: Consumption displacement and COVID-19. Journal of Service Management. 2021;**32**(2):113-128. DOI: 10.1108/JOSM-05-2020-0151

[17] World Trade Organization. Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. Information Note. 2020. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/ covid19\_e/export\_prohibitions\_report\_e. pdf [Accessed: 07 August 2020]

[18] Carreño I, Dolle T, Medina L, Brandenburger M. The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade. European Journal of Risk Regulation. 2020;**11**(2):1-9. DOI: 10.1017/err.2020.48

[19] Hoekman B, Fiorini M, Yildirim A. COVID-19: Export controls and international cooperation. In: COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won't Work. London, UK; Centre for Economic Policy Research - CEPR Press; 2020. pp. 77-87. Available from: https:// voxeu.org/system/files/epublication/ Covid-19\_and\_Trade\_Policy.pdf. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[20] Pauwelyn J. Export restrictions in times of pandemic: Options and limits under international trade agreements. In: COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won't Work. London, UK: Centre for Economic Policy Research - CEPR Press; 2020. pp. 77-87. Available from: https:// voxeu.org/system/files/epublication/

Covid-19\_and\_Trade\_Policy.pdf. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[21] Willsher K, Borger J, Holmes O, US Accused of 'Modern Piracy' after Diversion of Masks Meant for Europe. London, Uk: The Guardian, Guardian News & Media Limited. 2020. Available from: https://www.theguardian. com/world/2020/apr/03/mask-warscoronavirus-outbidding-demand. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[22] Liu HY, Manzoor A, Wang CY, Zhang L, Manzoor Z. The COVID-19 outbreak and affected countries stock markets response. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020;**17**(8):2800. DOI: 10.3390/ ijerph17082800

[23] Chang C-P, Feng G-F, Zheng M. Government fighting pandemic, stock market return, and COVID-19 virus outbreak. Emerging Markets Finance & Trade. 2021;**57**(8):2389-2406. DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2021.1873129

[24] Phan D, Bach H, Narayan P. Country responses and the reaction of the stock market to COVID-19—A preliminary exposition. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade. 2020;**56**(10):2138-2150. DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2020.1784719

[25] Fischer S. Comparing the Monetary Policy Responses of Major Central Banks to the Great Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Working Paper. MA, USA: MIT Management Sloan School, Cambridge; 2021. Available from: https://gcfp.mit.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2021/11/Monetary-Policy-Research-Paper-Stanley-Fischer-Nov2021.pdf. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[26] Milstein E, Wessel D. What Did the Fed Do in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis? Washington, DC, USA: The Brookings Institution; 2021. Available

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

from: https://www.brookings.edu/ research/fed-response-to-covid19/. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[27] Long H, Chang C-H, Jegajeevan S, Tang K. Can central Bank mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the macroeconomy? Emerging Markets Finance & Trade. 2022;**58**(9):2652-2669. DOI: 10.1080/1540496X. 2021.2007880

[28] Fernández M, Náñez S, Forradellas R, Vázquez J. From the great recession to the COVID-19 pandemic: The risk of expansionary monetary policies. Risks (Basel). 2022;**10**(2):1-17. DOI: 10.3390/ risks10020023

[29] Dempere J. Explanatory power of the tourist destination competitiveness index on the control of the first wave of COVID-19. European Journal of Management and Business Economics. 2022;**31**(4):269-284. DOI: 10.1108/ EJMBE-07-2021-0215

[30] World Health Organization. Social Media & COVID-19: A Global Study of Digital Crisis Interaction among Gen Z and Millennials. 2021. Available from: https://www.who.int/ news-room/feature-stories/detail/ social-media-covid-19-a-globalstudy-ofdigital-crisis-interaction-among-gen-zand-millennials. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[31] Arafat Y, Kar S, Kabir R. Possible controlling measures of panic buying during COVID-19. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction. 2021;**19**:2289-2291. DOI: 10.1007/ s11469-020-00320-1

[32] Arafat Y, Kar S, Menon V, Kaliamoorthy C, Mukherjee S, Alradie-Mohamed A, et al. Panic buying: An insight from the content analysis of media reports during COVID-19 pandemic. Neurology, Psychiatry and

Brain Research. 2020;**37**:100-103. DOI: 10.1016/j.npbr.2020.07.002

[33] Arab News, 'As Dangerous as the Virus': Middle East Cracks Down on COVID-19 Rumor Mongers. 2020. Available from: https://www.arabnews. com/node/1649286/amp. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[34] McGraw M, Stein S. It's Been Exactly One Year since Trump Suggested Injecting Bleach. We've Never Been the Same. Arlington, VA, USA: Politico; 2021. Available from: https://www.politico. com/news/2021/04/23/trump-bleachone-year-484399. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[35] Carvajal N, Liptak K. Trump Says he Is Taking Hydroxychloroquine though Health Experts Question its Effectiveness. Atlanta, GA, USA: CNN Politics; 2020. Available from: https://edition.cnn. com/2020/05/18/politics/donald-trumphydroxychloroquine-coronavirus/index. html. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[36] Ganguly S, Chin D, King E, Fonseca E, Vargas F, Vázquez S, et al. 5 Leaders Who Mishandled the COVID-19 Pandemic. New York, NY, USA: U.S. News & World Report; 2021. Available from: https://www.usnews.com/news/ best-countries/articles/2021-05-18/5 leaders-who-badly-mishandled-thecovid-19-pandemic?context=amp. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[37] Frayer L. 'This Government Has Failed us': Anger Rises In India over PM Modi's COVID Response. Washington, DC, USA; NPR. 2021. Available from: https://www.npr. org/2021/05/11/995446333/thisgovernment-has-failed-us-anger-risesin-india-over-pm-modis-covid-response. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[38] Biswass S. Why India's Real Covid Toll May Never be Known. London,

UK; BBC News. 2022. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiaindia-60981318. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[39] Burki T. The online anti-vaccine movement in the age of COVID-19. The Lancet Digital Health. 2020;**2**(10):E504-E505. DOI: 10.1016/ S2589-7500(20)30227-2

[40] McDonald K, Gregory J, Tewa S, Padovese V, Richter M. COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation Super-Spreaders. Misinformation about Development of a COVID-19 Vaccine Spreads Widely on Facebook. New York, NY, USA; NewsGuard. 2020. Available from: https:// www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/ special-report-covid-19-vaccinemisinformation/. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[41] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Information warfare, disinformation and electoral fraud. 2019. Available from: https://www.unodc. org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-14/ key-issues/information-warfare- disinformation-and-electoral-fraud. html. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[42] Langfitt F. Nobel Peace Laureates Blast Tech Giants and Warn against Rising Authoritarianism. Washington, DC, USA; NPR. 2021. Available from: https://www.npr. org/2021/12/10/1063218669/nobelpeace-laureates-blast-tech-giants-andwarn-against-rising-authoritarianism. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[43] Fischer S. Distrust in Political, Media and Business Leaders Sweeps the Globe. Arlington, VA, USA: Axios Media Trends. 2022. Available from: https://www.axios. com/2022/01/18/distrust-in-politicalmedia-and-business-leaders-sweeps-theglobe. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[44] Mark J. Autocracies Outdo Democracies on Public Trust - Survey. Toronto, CA; Reuters. 2022. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/business/ autocracies-outdo-democracies-publictrust-survey-2022-01-18/. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[45] Engler S, Brunner P, Loviat R, Abou-Chadi T, Leemann L, Glaser A, et al. Democracy in times of the pandemic: Explaining the variation of COVID-19 policies across European democracies. West European Politics. 2021;**44**(5-6):1077-1102. DOI: 10.1080/ 01402382.2021.1900669

[46] Cheibub J, Yeon J, Hong J, Przeworski A, Rights and Deaths: Government Reactions to the Pandemic. Working Paper. 2020. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=3645410. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[47] Cepaluni G, Dorsch M, Branyiczki R. Political regimes and deaths in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice. 2021;**37**(1):27-53. DOI: 10.1332/2 51569121X16268740317724

[48] Narita Y, Sudo A, Curse of Democracy: Evidence from 2020. Working Paper 2021. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=3827327. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[49] Herren C, Brownwright T, Liu E, El Amiri N, Majumder M. Democracy and Mobility: A Preliminary Analysis of Global Adherence to Non-pharmaceutical Interventions for COVID-19. Rochester, NY, USA; SSRN Electronic Journal. 2020:PMCID:PMC7366805. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3570206

[50] Trein P. The Paradox of Prevention: Authoritarian Past and Liberal Democracy in Times of Crisis. Rochester, NY, USA; SSRN Electronic Journal. 2020. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3625523

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

[51] Huang J, Teoh J, Wong S, Wong M. The potential impact of previous exposure to SARS or MERS on control of the COVID-19 pandemic. European Journal of Epidemiology. 2020;**35**(1):1099-1103. DOI: 10.1007/ s10654-020-00674-9

[52] Valev D. Relationships of total COVID-19 cases and deaths with ten demographic, economic and social indicators. MedRxiv. 2020;**9**(5):20188953. DOI: 10.1101/2<IP_ADDRESS>88953

[53] Mazzucchelli R, Dieguez A, Dieguez E, Villarías N. Democracy and Covid-19 mortality in Europe. Revista Española de Salud Pública. 2020;**94**:e202006073: 1-9 www.researchgate.net/ publication/342448913\_Democracy\_and\_ Covid-19\_mortality\_in\_Europe

[54] Ashraf B. Devastation caused by COVID-19: Is democracy to blame? SSRN Electronic Journal. Rochester, NY, USA. 2020:1-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3596009

[55] Esarey J. The Myth that Democracies Bungled the Pandemic. Washington, DC, USA: The Atlantic. 2021. Available from: https://www.theatlantic.com/ ideas/archive/2021/10/dictatorshipsdemocracies-coronavirus-vaccinesdeaths/620272/. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[56] Karlinsky A, Kobak D. Tracking excess mortality across countries during the COVID-19 pandemic with the world mortality dataset. eLife. 2021;**10**:e69336. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.69336

[57] Badman R, Wu Y, Inukai K, Akaishi R. Blessing or Curse of Democracy? Current Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic. ArXiv: 2021.2105.10865. DOI: 10.48550/ arXiv.2105.10865

[58] Jain V, Clarke J, Beaney T. Association between democratic governance and

excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic: An observational study. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health. 2022;**76**(1):853-860. DOI: 10.1136/jech-2022-218920

[59] Knutsen C, Kolvani P. Fighting the Disease or Manipulating the Data? Democracy, State Capacity, and the COVID-19 Pandemic. V-Dem Institute. Gothenburg, Sweden Working Paper, Series; 2022. p. 127. Available from: https://www.v-dem.net/media/ publications/Working\_Paper\_127\_final. pdf

[60] The Economist. Tracking COVID-19 Excess Deaths across Countries. Chicago, IL, USA: The Economist Group. 2021. Available from: https://www.economist. com/graphic-detail/coronavirus-excessdeaths-tracker. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[61] Caci G, Albini A, Malerba M, Noonan D, Pochetti P, Polosa R. COVID-19 and obesity: Dangerous liaisons. Journal of. Clinical Medicine. 2020;**9**(8):1-12. Available from: www. mdpi.com/2077-0383/9/8/2511/pdf

[62] Tahmasebi P, Shokri-Kuehni S, Sahimi M, Shokri N. How Do Environmental, Economic and Health Factors Influence Regional Vulnerability to COVID-19? MedRxiv. 2<IP_ADDRESS>59659. DOI 10.1101/2<IP_ADDRESS>59659

[63] Urashima M, Otani K, Hasegawa Y, Akutsu T. BCG vaccination and mortality of COVID-19 across 173 countries: An ecological study. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020;**17**(15):1-20. DOI: 10.3390/ ijerph17155589

[64] Rali A, Sauer A. COVID-19 pandemic and cardiovascular disease. US cardiology. Review. 2020;**14**:e01.v. DOI: 10.15420/usc.2020.14

[65] Miller R, Englund K. Transmission and risk factors of COVID-19. Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine. 2020;**1**(1):1-2. DOI: 10.3949/ccjm.87a.ccc029t

[66] Taylor L. Covid-19: Brazil's hospitals close to collapse as cases reach record high. The BMJ. 2021;**372**:n800. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.n800

[67] López E, González M, Esparza J. Venezuela is collapsing without COVID-19 vaccines. The Lancet. 2021;**397**(10287):1806. DOI: 10.1016/ S0140-6736(21)00924-7

[68] Calvo G. On the time consistency of optimal policy in the monetary economy. Econometrica. 1978;**46**(4):1411-1428

[69] Kydland F, Prescott E. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy. 1977;**85**(3):473-491. https:// www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1830193.pdf

[70] Barro R, Gordon D. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model. Journal of Political Economy. 1983;**91**(4):589-610. https://www.jstor. org/stable/pdf/1831069.pdf

[71] Bol D, Giani M, Blais A, Loewen P. The effect of COVID-19 lockdowns on political support: Some good news for democracy? European Journal of Political Research. 2021;**60**(2):497-505. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12401

[72] Schraff D. Political trust during the Covid-19 pandemic: Rally around the flag or lockdown effects? European Journal of Political Research. 2020;**60**(4):1007-1017. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12425

[73] Marbach M, Ward D, Hangartner D. Do COVID-19 lockdown policies weaken civic attitudes? Survey evidence from the United States and Europe. SocArXiv.

2020;**1**(1):1-30. DOI: 10.31235/osf. io/5nsgc

[74] Amat F, Faclco-Gimeno A, Arenas A, Munoz J. Pandemics Meet Democracy: Experimental Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis in Spain. Working Paper. 2020. pp. 1-31. https://osf.io/ dkusw/download

[75] Baccini L, Brodeur A, Weymouth S. The COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 US presidential election. Journal of Population Economics. 2021;**34**:739-767. DOI: 10.1007/s00148-020-00820-3

[76] Usher K, Bhullar N, Durkin J, Gyamfi N, Jackson D. Family violence and COVID-19: Increased vulnerability and reduced options for support. International Journal of Mental Health Nursing. 2020;**29**(4):549-552. DOI: 10.1111/inm.12735

[77] Ahorsu K, Lin C-Y, Imani V, Saffari M, Griffiths M, Pakpour A. The fear of COVID-19 scale: Development and initial validation. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction. 2022;**20**(1):1537-1545. DOI: 10.1007/ s11469-020-00270-8

[78] Dawson D, Golijani-Moghaddam N. COVID-19: Psychological flexibility, coping, mental health, and wellbeing in the UK during the pandemic. Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science. 2020;**17**(1):126-134. DOI: 10.1016/j. jcbs.2020.07.010

[79] Ripon R, Mim S, Puente A, Hossain S, Babor M, Sohan S, et al. COVID-19: Psychological effects on a COVID-19 quarantined population in Bangladesh. Heliyon. 2020;**6**(11):e05481. DOI: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05481

[80] Brooks S, Webster R, Smith L, Woodland L, Wessely S, Greenberg N, et al. The psychological impact of

*The Challenges of Assessing Government Economic Restrictions to Control the COVID-19… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107079*

quarantine and how to reduce it: Rapid review of the evidence. The Lancet. 2020;**395**(10227):912-920. DOI: 10.1016/ S0140-6736(20)30460-8

[81] Zhu S, Wu Y, Zhu C-Y, Hong W-C, Yu Z-X, Chen Z-X, et al. The immediate mental health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic among people with or without quarantine managements. Brain, Behavior, Immunity. 2020;**87**(1):56-58. DOI: 10.1016/j.bbi.2020.04.045

[82] Dsouza D, Quadros S, Hyderabadwala Z, Mamun M. Aggregated COVID-19 suicide incidences in India: Fear of COVID-19 infection is the prominent causative factor. Psychiatry Research. 2020;**290**:113145. DOI: 10.1016/j. psychres.2020.113145

[83] Mamun M, Griffiths M. First COVID-19 suicide case in Bangladesh due to fear of COVID-19 and xenophobia: Possible suicide prevention strategies. Asian Journal of Psychiatry. 2020;**51**:102073. DOI: 10.1016/j. ajp.2020.102073

[84] O'Connor R, Wetherall K, Cleare S, McClelland H, Melson A, Niedzwiedz C, et al. Mental health and well-being during the COVID-19 pandemic: Longitudinal analyses of adults in the UK COVID-19 Mental Health & Wellbeing study. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 2021;**218**(6):326-333. DOI: 10.1192/ bjp.2020.212

[85] Cavalera C. COVID-19 psychological implications: The role of shame and guilt. Frontiers in Psychology. 2020;**11**(1):1-4. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.571828

[86] Graichen H. What is the difference between the first and the second/third wave of Covid-19? – German perspective. Journal of Orthopedics. 2021;**24**(1): A1-A3. DOI: 10.1016/j.jor.2021.01.011

[87] Sager F. Switzerland's COVID-19 policy response: Consociational crisis management and neo-corporatist reopening. European Policy Analysis. 2020;**6**(2):293-304. DOI: 10.1002/ epa2.1094

[88] Golberg N. Is Democracy Failing? Xi Jinping Says it Is, and he's Not Entirely Wrong. Los Angeles Times; 2022. Available from: https://www. latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-04-28/ autocracy-democracy-marine-le-penxi-jinping-vladimir-putin-joe-biden. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[89] Hodge N. After 100 Days of War, Putin Is Counting on the world's Indifference. CNN; 2022. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/02/ europe/putin-ukraine-invasion-100 days-analysis-intl-cmd/index.html. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

[90] Yang T, Noh J, Song J-Y, Cheong H, Kim W. How lessons learned from the 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome outbreak affected the response to coronavirus disease 2019 in the Republic of Korea. The Korean Journal of Internal Medicine. 2021;**36**(2):271-285. DOI: 10.3904/kjim.2020.371

[91] Repucci S, Slipowitz A. Freedom in the World 2022. The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule. Freedom House; 2022. Available from: https:// freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ files/2022-02/FIW\_2022\_PDF\_Booklet\_ Digital\_Final\_Web.pdf. [Accessed July 1, 2022]

#### **Chapter 5**

## Entrepreneurship during a Crisis: An Examination of the Insertion of Millennial Workers in "Yurimaguas, Peru"

*Jesús Enrique Reyes Acevedo, Nayeli Yulissa Tello Campos, Santiago Luis Vela Del Águila, Yuli Novak Ormeño Torres, Rosa María Velarde Legoas, Flor Lavanda Reyes, Jorge Lázaro Franco Medina and Ramon Osorio Alberto Bueno*

#### **Abstract**

The goal and purpose of this theoretical research are to analyze the evidence provided on the characteristics of the millennial generation and verify how these traits influence the human talent retention practices carried out by entrepreneurs. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic review of the scientific literature that includes 17 studies that were found in academic Google databases and university repositories. The results indicate that millennial workers are the generation with the highest rate of labor turnover so the retention practices most valued by them are related to opportunities for professional growth, greater flexibility between work and personal life, and better organizational communication. In most of the studies analyzed, economic remuneration is not a practice highly valued by this generation; however, in other studies, the results indicate that remuneration has a higher percentage of valuation, with a slight difference between the factors with greater and lesser representation by millennial employees.

**Keywords:** millennials, labor force, retention, human talent, entrepreneurship

#### **1. Introduction**

The term generation has been approached in different ways. However, its definition can be encompassed as the group of people who were born in the same period of time and who have lived within the same historical context. This has allowed them to develop distinctive features (lifestyles, ideologies, needs, expectations, behaviors, etc.) that differentiate them from previous generations. From the perspective of the Strauss-Howe generational theory, generations are characterized by cyclical changes called "turns" that occur in the same pattern. Each turn has specific archetypes

classified as: prophets (baby boomer generation), nomads (generation x), heroes (millennial generation), and artists (homeland or centennial generation). According to this theory, after the hero generation, the change would return to artists, thus producing a cycle of archetypes.

For Howe, the hero archetype was born during an awakening, in a time where institutional weakness prevails and where individuals were forced to become self-sufficient and pragmatic. So that it is believed that they grow up as optimistic youth, into energetic, overconfident, and politically powerful adults. This describes the current millennial generation, which, according to these authors, responds to the typical nature of the previous generation and the crises of the new millennium (technological age, economic recessions, political crisis, social movements, etc.). This gives rise to the contribution of Karl Mannheim's generational theory, whose foundation is that the generations are more influenced by the social contexts they live in than by the generations that preceded them. And it is that in the current world in which we live, dominated by globalization, instability, and constant technological development, a generation has emerged that has changed all the rules of the game: The Millennials or Generation Y.

Millennials are a demographic successor to generation x and predecessor to generation z or centennial. Even if the start and end dates of this generation are not precise and vary according to the authors, most studies consider the age range from 1981 to 2000 given by American authors Karsh and Templin (2013) in their book "Manager 3.0: A Millennial's Guide to Rewriting the Rules of Management". There, they mention that Millennials are tearing down the corporate ladder through a creative, collaborative and ambitious approach.

This is how today, this generation is made of people between the ages of 22 and 41, who represent the majority of the workforce worldwide.

In order to understand millennials, the historical aspects in which they were born and raised must be considered. Authors such as Nilda Chirinos point out that, among the events that defined this generation, the creation of computers, the development of the Internet, global warming, the economic boom of the 1990s, and terrorist attacks in various countries stand out ([1], p.140). In this way, millennials were born and grew up alongside technology, understanding it and developing skills that would allow them to master it and thus adapt to the current era of information technology. That is why they are also called digital natives.

According to Karsh and Templin, during their childhood, millennials received a lot of attention from their parents, who made them believe that they were the most special and precious thing in the world and always told them that they could become what they proposed because they had been born perfect (Karsh and Templin, 2013) cited in Mitta Flores and Dávila Salinas [2]. Retention of human talent: policies and practices applied to young "Millennials" in a group of entrepreneurs.

The fact that authors such as those mentioned describes the context in which millennials have developed, and lays the groundwork for understanding their behavior when joining entrepreneurs and the factors that influence them to decide whether or not to stay within those entrepreneurs.

In the workplace, millennials are well-rounded individuals with exceptional skills, making them very appealing to entrepreneurs seeking to attract and retain them. However, their attributes can become a double-edged sword for those in charge of the human resources area, since, although millennials have everything they seek as employees, this generation does not usually tolerate rigid work structures, routine jobs, and much less a bad work environment. They are not willing to sacrifice their

*Entrepreneurship during a Crisis: An Examination of the Insertion of Millennial Workers… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109469*

personal lives for work and are always looking for more and better opportunities to grow professionally. Unlike previous generations like generation x or baby boomers, millennials do not live just to work, they want to change the world and make a difference. Therefore, having different characteristics, needs, and expectations from previous generations in relation to employment, they show work behaviors and decision-making not fully understood by entrepreneurs, causing them to choose to leave their jobs, causing high levels of turnover. Here then is the need to better understand this generation that has been taking the reins of the labor market and that needs different attention from entrepreneurs in order to retain them through management practices that meet their expectations. Well, now it is the organizations that must adapt to this generation and not *vice versa*.

In this way, the objective of the following review is to systematically analyze the available evidence about the practices most valued by the millennial generation in the workplace and to verify whether or not these practices are carried out by entrepreneurs, all this with the intention of shedding light on the current panorama and contributing to the better functioning of human talent management.

#### **1.1 Population and methods**

In this work, a systematic review of the published scientific literature on human talent management and its relationship with the millennial workforce has been carried out. Next, the elaboration process will be detailed in its different phases.

#### **1.2 Initial search**

The first searches were carried out in May 2022 in the Google academic databases as part of the research work II course. The terms "millennial generation," "workforce," and "retention of human talent" were combined. The combination of these terms yielded a fairly large number of results, and many of them were not very useful for the review. However, the different studies provided a global vision of the subject and a better understanding of it.

#### **1.3 Systematic search**

The systematic search was carried out in August 2022 in the same database, Google Academic, limiting the results from 2015 to the present.

The combination of terms that yielded the best results in this search engine was millennials and retention of human talent "millennial workers." Specifically, 76 results were obtained in this database. Adding 13 more works found in repositories of different universities, being a total of 89 works. Prior to the selection of the works, the following inclusion and exclusion criteria were defined:

Inclusion criteria.

Exclusion criteria.

Based on these criteria, and only by reading the title, 27 articles were considered adequate. After that, it was proceeded to read the abstract, the results, and the conclusions. From this reading, 9 studies were discarded mainly because they were only a literature review (n = 1) and because they did not have a representative sample of the population to study (n = 9).

Finally, 17 articles met the inclusion criteria and were selected to carry out the systematic review.

#### **2. Results**

A summary of the results of the selected studies can be consulted in the table provided. However, the analysis to be carried out was considered the most pertinent to facilitate the understanding and integration of the results.

Mitta Flores and Dávila Salinas [2] inquired about the policies and practices of retention of human talent in entrepreneurs, with the general objective of identifying the policies and practices of personnel retention that serve to retain millennials young collaborators. The approach they used was mixed, using quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) tools. The survey was applied to 237 students of the ninth and tenth cycle of PUCP of the careers of Management and Senior Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering who have had work experience, while the interview was conducted with the managers and/ or managers of human resource areas of a group of entrepreneurs. The results of this study were that, with respect to the behavior of the young people surveyed, it was obtained that 94.94% of the participants reflected that their position regarding the future is optimistic; 92.83% feel the need for feedback about the development of their tasks; 82.70% of the participants look for a balance between work and family; 80.17% consider themselves collaborators; 78.48% feel respect for the authority in their workplace; 74.68% perform several tasks at the same time; and 70.04% of the participants finish their pending tasks in any place. The results reflect in this case that millennial workers value non-remunerated aspects more, such as better feedback from their superiors, as well as the balance between work and family, thus confirming what was previously mentioned about the fact that this generation looks for flexibility and balances its personal life with work.

Bergerman Zapata and Tantaleán Sánchez [3] developed a proposal for the retention of millennials in the Banco de Credito del Peru financial entity in the department

#### *Entrepreneurship during a Crisis: An Examination of the Insertion of Millennial Workers… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109469*

of Lambayeque, with the purpose of providing relevant information for that entity and for other companies in order to know the behavior, attitudes, and interests of this group of people who are the direct potential of entrepreneurs today. The approach used was non-experimental and of field, having as a representative sample 148 young people between 18 and 35 years old who work in the Credit Bank branches of the said department. The results showed that millennials look for to transcend and develop experiences in their work stage that help them in their personal and professional development. In this way, the study concluded that it will not be possible to retain them for a long time, since the main characteristic they have is that they look for short-term experiences, and for this, they must seek opportunities elsewhere.

Buitrago García et al. [4] conducted a study about the impact of millennials on human talent processes in the Club el Nogal corporation, located in Bogota city, Colombia. The main objective of the work was to show the impact that collaborators identified as millennials have within the processes of attraction, selection, hiring, and reasons for retirement at El Nogal Club. To achieve the aforementioned objective, the technique of collecting information from the club's database and the analysis of its content was used. In this way, it was identified that, of the 776 employees of the club, 353 belong to the millennial generation, being the workforce with the greatest presence in entrepreneurs. Likewise, it was reviewed that, of all the retirements by generation during 2016 and the first semester of 2017, 58% came from the millennial generation. Among the reasons why millennial employees quit are job opportunities (37%), study opportunities (14%), and opportunities to become independent (8%). These results are aligned with the global characteristics of this generation, confirming that they are people who are always looking for growth and opportunities and with high job demands, which cause their retirement and high turnover.