The fragmented and decentralised nature of Lebanon's social protection schemes has left upwards of half the population without any comprehensive social protection. Specifc groups (i.e. Palestinians, elderly, migrants) inhabit an even more precarious position due mainly to restrictive policies in place or an impasse on inclusive policies to provide protection for larger segments of the population. The lack of social protection coverage, coupled with a number of other defciencies, has both historically and presently motivated many Lebanese to seek better opportunities and security abroad. For many Lebanese households, having a family member or close friend residing abroad has been an indispensable source of social and economic protection from the country's instability. For foreigners residing in Lebanon, the only social protection scheme they can beneft from is the NSSF. However, due to the limiting stipulations from the reciprocity of treatment for social protection from the Social Security Law of 1963 (Article 9), only citizens from France, Belgium, the UK and Italy are able to formally beneft. Lebanon has regularly posited itself *not* as a country of immigration nor refuge.41 Most migrants and refugee communities are often perceived as a burden on infrastructural needs, security concerns and economic opportunities. Most importantly, the tenuous sectarian balance pervasive in the country is cited as a primary reason for the lack of social protection and naturalisation rights for many migrants. Lebanese authorities have tacitly and explicitly stressed the concern about providing particular services and/or rights to migrant populations for trepidation that they may not leave the country.

41Lebanon is not signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol.

In 2004, the offce of the Prime Minister and the MoL drafted a bill which proposed changes to the ESI component of the NSSF and provided key redistributive measures to mitigate vulnerability from employees with poor earnings, the risk of longevity and unemployment. In 2011, the MoL proposed another draft bill to adopt a "Notional Defned Contribution" system where individuals pay contributions from their salary and fund benefts for the retired population. Each individual would maintain a 'notional account,' and upon retirement, benefciaries would receive at least 40% of wages. However, none of these draft laws have been passed. Also, Lebanon moved towards implementing comprehensive and universal health care coverage in 2012. The Comprehensive Health Project was presented by the Minister of Labour with the explicit objective to unify and include all Lebanese under one non-contributory health care system. However, this too has yet to be implemented (Nasnas 2016).

As discussed previously, the NPTP (and the ENPTP) has been implemented as a short-term social assistance program meant to alleviate the economic and social diffculties stemming from the Syrian crisis. Recently, the Government of Lebanon has been looking into legally institutionalising the NPTP as a permanent feature of Lebanon's social protection system. Although the draft law is still under discussion, this would constitute a signifcant step in providing vulnerable Lebanese a social safety net (World Bank 2016).

For the approximate 270,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, UNRWA is the only institution to provide some semblance of social protection. Because Palestinians are considered foreigners in the country (irrespective of the overwhelming majority being born in Lebanon), they are not entitled to any social protection afforded to Lebanese citizens. The UN (2019) has stated that UNRWA is facing "the greatest fnancial predicament in its history this year following the abrupt end to funding by the United States." Pierre Krähenbühl, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, further describes that the shortage of US\$ 446 million42 has threatened the general education of 525,000 students, essential primary health care for 3 million patients and food assistance for 1.7 million refugees who fed diffcult emergencies, including Syria. As of late, global funding campaigns are underway to assuage the substantial fnancial shortfall.

Finally, endemic in Lebanese institutions and administrations are sectarian and clientelist politics which have obstructed and hindered the development, modernisation and inclusivity of many vital institutions. The NSSF, for example, is not a public independent sector nor is it separated from the political Lebanese reality. In fact, their internal work practices and the recruitment processes are highly politicised and controlled by clientelist agendas (Abi Yaghi 2014). Even offcial fgures containing the number of staff in government positions and ministries is classifed information due to the sensitivity of the sectarian aspect (Mourtada n.d.). What Lebanon has managed to create in terms of social protection can be described as a 'political safety net' rather than an essential 'social safety net' which would

42US\$ 446 millions accounts for approximately 40% of UNRWA's operating budget (UN 2019).

overcome political or sectarian affliation and provide a comprehensive and equitable welfare scheme to assist all segments of the Lebanese population and non-Lebanese residing in Lebanon.

**Acknowledgements** This chapter is part of the project "Migration and Transnational Social Protection in (Post)Crisis Europe (MiTSoPro)" that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No. 680014). In addition to this chapter, readers can fnd a series of indicators comparing national social protection and diaspora policies across 40 countries on the following website: http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/.

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Chapter 11 Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Lebanese Citizens Abroad**

**Paul Tabar and Andrew Denison**

#### **11.1 Introduction**

This chapter aims to explain, frstly, the characteristics, infrastructure and key policies relating to the Lebanese diaspora; and secondly, an outline of the key social protection policies will be provided, specifcally in the areas of unemployment, health care, pensions, family-related benefts and economic hardship by Lebanese authorities. Principally, the diaspora engagement policies refect a concerted effort to increase investment, capital, tourism and other economic activities back into Lebanon. Until recently, Lebanon has also made efforts to engage politically with the diaspora. Repatriation and voting abroad were particularly important in terms of diaspora engagement as Lebanon underwent a national parliamentary election in May of 2018 with Lebanese nationals abroad having the right to vote for the frst time in absentia. Yet, as Lebanon struggles to enact meaningful social protection policies for its own citizens at home, providing such social protection for Lebanese abroad has simply not been a priority for the government. The focus of diaspora engagement predominately in economic activities stems from the necessity of economic remittances, boosting tourism from visits to the homeland and creating businesses, trade and investment opportunities (Hourani 2007). Remittances not only constitute a signifcant portion of Lebanon's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it also provides numerous citizens some semblance of a social safety net as well. Engagement with the diaspora politically will become more active in the future as the importance of the diasporic vote may not only impact the parliamentary election outcomes, but also disrupt the delicate sectarian balance of the political establishment.

P. Tabar (\*) · A. Denison

Lebanese American University (LAU), Beirut, Lebanon e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2020 199 J.-M. Lafeur, D. Vintila (eds.), *Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond (Volume 3)*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51237-8\_11

#### **11.2 Diaspora Policy Infrastructure and Key Policies**

A brief historical account of Lebanese emigration including a number of diffculties encountered with the diaspora will be summarised. Furthermore, infrastructure, central to the engagement with the diaspora, will be described along with key policies implemented by the government.

#### *11.2.1 The Lebanese Diaspora and Its Relations with the Homeland*

Accurate fgures on the number of Lebanese emigrants and their characteristics are in large part fragmented and/or uncertain. Due mainly to historical controversies and political concerns over the true size of the Lebanese diasporic population, fgures have differed drastically depending on how quantitative data is gathered, whether children and grandchildren of former migrants are considered and who may be collecting the data (MPC 2013).1 Such concerns derive from the fragile political system which functions according to sectarian affliation. Hence, demographic numbers of Lebanese, whether in Lebanon or abroad, have major political implications which can affect the country's sectarian balance and disrupt sect-based power-sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, De Bel-Air (2017) estimates that 885,000 Lebanese migrants, either frst-generation or born in Lebanon, are residing abroad as of 2014. Of the 885,000 Lebanese migrants abroad: 41% reside in the Gulf States; 23% in North America; 21% in Europe (including Norway and Switzerland); and 16% in other countries including Australia and Brazil. Moreover, given the selectivity of many immigration countries, Lebanese emigrants are almost twice as educated as non-migrants with at least 25% maintaining tertiary education (De Bel-Air 2017; ETF 2017).

Historically, Lebanon has experienced waves of emigration for more than 150 years as a result of lopsided economic development, undemocratic communal politics and national and international conficts (Tabar 2015). The frst wave of emigration occurred in the mid to late nineteenth century with a small number of mainly Christians who were sent to Rome in order to return and serve as clergy. Also, with increasing integration of British and French capitalist markets, a number of Lebanese Christians emigrated to the main centres of trade between Europe and the Near East, including Egypt, Livorno, Marseille and Manchester. The second wave is marked by rapid population growth with an increasing number of educated and skilled persons. By the end of the late nineteenth century and with the collapse of the silk industry, the local population sought better economic opportunities abroad. By World War I, a third of the population (mostly Christian) had left mainly to North and South America, Australia, West Africa, Europe and New Zealand. Between 1945 and 1975

1E.g. in 2009, the UN Lebanese national population estimates differed by almost 400,000 people.

constituted the third wave of emigration. Because of political instability and economic deterioration from the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 and also the demand of labour in the Gulf States, many Lebanese decided to emigrate. With the onset of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989), approximately 990,000 people left the country which accounted for 40% of the total population. This fourth wave of emigration led many Lebanese to fee primarily to Canada, Australia, the United States, France, Germany and the Gulf States (Tabar 2015). Since the 1990s, Lebanon has seen increased confrontations with Israel which resulted in the 2006 Israeli invasion, political instability, assassinations and civil strife. The Syrian civil war which began in 2011 has also put considerable strain on the Lebanese economy and infrastructure as well.

The long and complex history of emigration can help explain the rough estimation of 4–13 million Lebanese immigrants abroad. Furthermore, such numbers can become infated due to the prevalence of urban myths, a natural desire to exaggerate the presence of the Lebanese diaspora and the diffculty of locating and disseminating accurate data (Muglia 2015; Joulin 2006). This brief historical account of Lebanese emigration can shed light on why there is a lack of meaningful engagement between state-diaspora relations. It is often the inability of the government to provide economic opportunities or protect its citizens from national/international conficts. As emigration is often used as a means to fee confict and fnd economic prosperity, the diaspora is often held up as the safeguard for many Lebanese at home. Economic investments, remittances, trade, etc. have been employed not only to provide a safety net, but also to stimulate the economy and for reconstruction and development efforts after confict and war.

Presently, in most offcial capacities, Lebanese ministries and sub-ministries refer to Lebanese nationals abroad as such or as emigrants. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, makes numerous references to Lebanese nationals, expatriates, co-ethnics or children of Lebanese parents as the "Lebanese Diaspora" as a means to stimulate engagement when encouraging investment or tourism in Lebanon. This is done, in particular, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants' engagement programme, the Lebanese Diaspora Energy.2

#### *11.2.2 Diaspora Infrastructure*

Lebanese diaspora infrastructure consists of consulate networks, government ministries and sub-ministries and consultative institutions which facilitate engagement with the diaspora. Within Lebanon's top fve destination countries, the consulate networks maintained are relatively sparse. The United States of America contains three consulates with three honorary consulates; Canada contains one consulate with one honorary consulate; Australia contains two consulates with two honorary consulates; Germany does not contain a consulate but does have one honorary

2See the Lebanese Diaspora Energy webpage at http://www.lde-leb.com/index.php

consulate; and France contains two consulates with zero honorary consulates.3 Furthermore, Lebanon does not support any mobile consular services to any of the top destination countries.

The primary Lebanese public institution and national authority relating to Lebanese nationals residing abroad is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants (MoFAE). Formerly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was merged with the Ministry of Emigrants to create one entity.4 Under the auspices of the MoFAE, Lebanon has two main sub-ministries which maintain specifc mandates in addressing the needs of Lebanese nationals abroad: the General Directorate of Emigrants (GDE) and the Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs (DPCA). The General Directorate of Emigrants is primarily tasked with outreach activities as a means to boost and develop the cultural and educational bonds with Lebanese nationals abroad. It further attempts to serve the needs by acknowledging the importance of the contributions made by them. Moreover, the GDE pushes for Lebanese nationals abroad to be considered as *de facto* investors and should be provided the proper securities and incentives for increased contributions to the home country (Zbeeb 2015).5 The Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs was established to provide the Lebanese nationals abroad assistance for important services including (but not limited to): renewal and authentication of offcial documents and passports; information on investment opportunities; registering and recording personal status related matters; and registration of voting abroad.6

The Economic and Social Council of Lebanon (CES) is a consultative body with its mission to develop inter-dialogue, cooperation and coordination within/among various social, economic and professional sectors and actors.7 The CES formulates relevant economic and social policies for the Lebanese government to implement if they so choose. Although the CES primarily functions within Lebanon and between numerous sectors, associations, syndicates and vocations, it also seeks cooperation and coordination with expatriate institutions through the mobilisation of international conferences reckoning that dialogue between the CES and Lebanese nationals or expatriates abroad can enhance/facilitate collaboration.8

The Lebanese Diaspora Energy (LDE) was established in 2014 by the MoFAE as a means to encourage engagement with the Lebanese diaspora and the home country in order to stimulate investment and tourism in Lebanon. The LDE's major

3See a complete list of Lebanese embassies and consulates at http://www.lebanity.gov.lb/downloads/MF-List-Of-Embassies-EN-2016-08-17.pdf. The MoFA does not maintain a comprehensive list of consulates.

4Law No. 247 of 2000 incorporated the Ministry of Emigrants and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

5The General Directorate's offcial website is emigrants.gov.lb. However, the website is not operational at this time.

6The Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs does not have an offcial website to provide information regarding its services or programmes.

7The Economic and Social Council of Lebanon (CES) was established by Law No. 533/096 in 1999.

8For more information on the Economic and Social Council of Lebanon's contributions see Nasnas 2016.

initiative is the organisation of annual international conferences at crucial locations where Lebanese nationals abroad are present.9

Since the passing of Lebanon's Parliamentary Election Law in 2008,10 Lebanese nationals abroad have the right to vote. Registering to vote was done online via an application from the MoFAE or at the nearest Lebanese consulate. Voting abroad took place at designated polling centres most often at the consulates themselves. The most recent election and frst to include Lebanese nationals abroad occurred in May 2018. A total of 46,799 votes were cast abroad (UNDP 2018). Most notably, the Lebanese Forces political party, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP)11 offered the most developed infrastructure in place for voter engagement of Lebanese nationals abroad. This infrastructure consists primarily of dedicated diaspora engagement within their offcial website in the form of information and donation portals. The Lebanese Forces provided a mobile phone application which helped facilitate information regarding how to register and vote, to connect with other Lebanese Forces supporters and to obtain donations.12 The Free Patriotic Movement also maintains online websites providing news and information for voting and investment. Notably, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, has also been the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement since 2015. The SSNP also has a directorate of foreign affairs with the role to establish connections and networks between Syria and the diaspora.

#### *11.2.3 Key Engagement Policies*

Although there has been no transversal strategy in which authorities respond to the social protection needs of Lebanese nationals abroad, there has been a concerted effort by government offcials to not only stimulate economic activities between Lebanon and the diaspora, but also repatriate Lebanese expatriates abroad.13 Since the drafting of the law that extends the Reacquisition of Lebanese Citizenship to the Descendants of Lebanese Emigrants in 2011 and passed by the Lebanese Parliament in 2015, signifcant effort has been focused on the acquisition of Lebanese citizenship to those who have either renounced their Lebanese citizenship or are

9See LDE conference in Montreal http://www.lde-leb.com/northamerica2018.php

10Parliamentary Election Law (No. 25 of 2008).

11The SSNP is an active and secular political party operating in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine and Syria which advocates for a *greater* Syrian state based on historical and cultural boundaries of the Syrian nation-state. The party originated as an anticolonial organisation in Beirut in 1932.

12For more information on the Lebanese Forces app, visit http://lebanese-forces.info/app/

13See Lebanon's simplifed citizenship programme; http://www.foreign.gov.lb/Library/Assets/ LEBANESE%20CITIZENSHIP%20PROGRAM.pdf. Furthermore, see http://www.lebanity.gov. lb/ whereby the MoFAE advocates the Lebanese diaspora to repatriate.

descendants of Lebanese emigrants.14 As discussed earlier, the enactment of the 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law which guaranteed the right of Lebanese nationals abroad to vote has placed a focus to encourage Lebanese descendants and nationals abroad to register for elections in their home country. As mentioned previously, Lebanon's frst election after implementing the Parliamentary Elections Law witnessed a total of 82,965 registered voters abroad with 46,799 Lebanese nationals actually voting (UNDP 2018). Comparing these fgures to an estimated 885,000 Lebanese nationals abroad (frst-generation, born in Lebanon) in 2014 and a roughly 4–13 million people of Lebanese descent worldwide in the Lebanese diaspora, Lebanese offcials and political entities are fully cognisant of the latent and vast political and economic capital that will require harnessing and, subsequently, contending over (De Bel-Air 2017; Al Kantar 2016; Joulin 2006).15 Therefore, boosting engagement with the Lebanese diaspora is of substantial importance particularly as overall remittances have been dropping over the last several years.16 One example of such engagement is clearly seen with the MoFAE's organisation of LDE international conferences at locations with sizeable diaspora populations. The Lebanese government's strategy with regards to the LDE conferences has involved appealing to the nostalgia between Lebanon and the diaspora for deeper engagement and consequently increased economic and political capital back into the home country.17

Lebanon has also taken legislative steps to ease legal restriction on foreign property ownership. The Foreign Acquisition of Property and Property Rights in Lebanon is one such legislation designed to encourage investments in Lebanon, particularly in the industry and tourism sectors.18 The law also lowers real estate registration fees for both Lebanese and foreign nationals (Zbeeb 2015). Encouraging Investment in Lebanon is another example of a law which provides a series of incentives for foreign investments in Lebanon.19 This law also established the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL); a public agency entrusted to encourage and attract Lebanese nationals abroad to invest in Lebanon (ICMPD and IOM 2010; IDAL

14The acquisition of Lebanese citizenship follows the *jus sanguinis* principle, however, only paternally. For more information on the eligibility to reclaim Lebanese citizenship see http://globalcit. eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Translation\_Draft%20Law%20\_Lebanon.pdf

15According to the World Bank, the population of Lebanon in 2016 was estimated at six million. Consequently, Lebanon has not had an offcial government census since 1932. This is because of the sensitivity of demographic fgures in politics.

16Remittances as a percentage of GDP was estimated at 23.9% in 2008; the peak in the last 20 years. However, remittance levels as a percentage of GDP stands at 14.1% in 2016 (Adweh 2014; KNOWMAD 2017).

17 "Keep that fame of love for Lebanon alive in your heart, while keeping your success in the diaspora." Quote from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gebran Bassil, from the Lebanese Diaspora Energy. LDE conferences primarily involve gathering the diaspora's business elite abroad and fostering engagement.

18The Foreign Acquisition of Property and Property Rights Law No. 296 of 2001.

19Encouraging Investment in Lebanon Law No. 360 of 2001.

2001).20 IDAL has been responsible for implementing investment incentives in the form of tax exemptions granted in the felds of technology, information, telecommunications/media, tourism, industry and agriculture. IDAL is also managing agency responsible for bilateral Promotion and Protection of Investments agreements between Lebanon and Canada, France and Germany (IDAL 2016a).21 These bilateral investment agreements are meant to create and maintain favourable investment conditions through contractual protection of such investments. Furthermore, the agreements are meant to provide fair and equitable treatment on a nondiscriminatory basis and full protection and security of foreign investments in both countries (Zbeeb 2015). Lebanon also participates in bilateral agreements to avoid the double taxation and to also encourage the exchange of goods, technology and the infows of capital (IDAL 2016b).22

Partnered with the MoFAE and the UNDP, Live Lebanon is an initiative to provide an online platform for the Lebanese diaspora to contribute funds, investments or professional expertise for local development projects in the areas of health, environment and education in struggling communities. One example of Live Lebanon's activities involved the procuring of a power generator for the Bhamdoun Al Mhata village. The funds were generated by donations made from the Lebanese diaspora towards Live Lebanon's project initiatives. Utilisation of the term diaspora is prevalent as a means to emphasise the importance of assisting communities that are struggling in the homeland.

The Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) is another relevant programme organised by the UNDP and executed through the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).23 Although CDR is not an agency that directly engages with Lebanese nationals abroad, it is involved with this particular project. TOKTEN's primary objective is to obtain the technical experience of Lebanese nationals abroad (or Lebanese descendants) in order to reinforce the national development efforts in Lebanon and transfer their skills and know-how.24 TOKTEN encourages the return of Lebanese abroad for short-term consultancy assignments in the form of volunteerism (Tabar 2009).

The World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU), originally founded by the Lebanese government in 1960, is a civil organisation which maintains a

20Although IDAL does maintain a specifc focus for attracting investment from Lebanese nationals abroad, it also encourages investment from non-Lebanese and local Lebanese nationals as well.

21Among Canada, France and Germany who have signed investment protection agreements, Lebanon also maintains a bilateral investment agreement with 51 other countries. For a comprehensive list and description see IDAL's Investment Protection Agreements at investinlebanon.gov.lb

22Countries that Lebanon signed an agreement with to avoid double taxation are: Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Gabon, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sudan, Oman Sultanate, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, U.A.E., Ukraine, Yemen.

23Established by government decree No. 5 of January 31, 1977, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is a public authority unit established by the Lebanese government.

24One example of TOKTEN's consultancy assignments was the training of army offcers on cyber defence. See TOKTEN article: http://www.toktenlebanon.org/annoucement/more.php?id=22

non-political, non-religious and non-proft position. Its primary goal is to strengthen ties, promote mutual friendships and understanding among the Lebanese diaspora (anyone of Lebanese decent abroad) and Lebanon. This is primarily achieved by establishing, promoting and enhancing understanding via encouraging and exchanging cultural, educational, social and tourist activities (Hourani 2007). Lebanon's Ministry of Tourism is also tasked with promoting Lebanon's cultural heritage at home and abroad. Although not mandated to specifcally engage with Lebanese nationals abroad, the Ministry of Tourism does engage with them in the capacities of promoting return to the homeland for seasonal tourism and also to invest in tourism-related projects.

#### **11.3 Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Lebanon**

Lebanese engagement with nationals abroad in the area of social protection can be summed up as almost entirely absent. Outside the basic services offered by consulates described below, Lebanese consulates provide assistance to nationals abroad in the case of arrest, detention, serious illness/accident, or in the case of death. Moreover, what engagement Lebanese authorities and institutions do have with nationals abroad consists almost exclusively of enticing, incentivising or rousing engagement for political and/or economic benefts of the home country. One attributable reason is that social protection in general is considered to be at a nascent stage in Lebanon. The social protection system is characterised by a multiplicity of social assistance and insurance programmes that more or less operate in an ad hoc manner in response to crises (Kukrety 2016).25 Additionally, the approximate share of informally-employed persons in Lebanon is estimated at about half the Lebanese workforce, and so those within the informal labour market are outside of any meaningful social security coverage (Ajluni and Kawar 2015).26 Roughly 40% to 50% of the Lebanese population are not enrolled in the National Social Security Fund,27 and as a result, the most vulnerable populations (elderly, people with disabilities, the unemployed, foreign workers, women, farmers, etc.) are ignored from formal social protection systems (Abi Yaghi 2014). As a consequence, the major providers of social protection from severe poverty come from individual families, emigrant remittances, private/civil institutions, charities, non-governmental organisations, or religious/political organisations which, due to the absence of a centralised system of

25Lebanon is currently hosting an approximate 1.5 million Syrians as of October 2016 as a result of the fallout from the confict in Syria (UN and GoL 2017).

26 ILO fgures are taken from both the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics' (CAS) 2004 *Household Survey* and the 2009 *Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey* along with the World Bank's MILES report. Self-employed work with limited access to social security or health insurance coverage is also added to informally-employed persons.

27The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is Lebanon's national social insurance system.

effective social protection, strengthen and deepen sectarian or partisan clientelist practices within the country (Cammett 2014; Abi Yaghi 2014).

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement (EMP) was signed by Lebanon in 2002 with the fnal draft coming into force in 2006. Although the EMP is primarily an economic and trade agreement, Article 65 of the agreement maintains social protection provisions to bolster and improve projects and programmes in the social protection feld. However, the EMP signed with Lebanon does not contain provisions for the coordination of social protections between the EU and Lebanon as compared to the agreements signed with other states (i.e. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). Therefore, compared to EMP agreements with other countries, what social security provisions that are included are wholly absent from the EMP agreement with Lebanon (García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016).

Lebanon's bilateral agreements for the promotion and protection of investments do mention social services, however, they are included in the General and Specifc Exceptions annex. As a result, social services (i.e. income security, social security, health and child care, etc.) are included as exceptions that will not be impacted by the bilateral agreement.28

#### *11.3.1 Unemployment*

Lebanon does not maintain any offcial government policy, programmes or services to provide benefts or training for Lebanese nationals living abroad in the case of unemployment. This is not unreasonable given the fact that the Lebanese government does not provide such benefts to its citizens residing in Lebanon. More often, successive Lebanese governments have used migratory outfow as a tool to ease unemployment pressure and increase remittance fows back into the country (Hourani 2007).29 Summarily, in terms of any signifcant protection for Lebanese nationals abroad, neither the Lebanese government nor consulates offer any protection nor assistance for host country unemployment services in the case of economic hardship or unemployment.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement that Lebanon is signatory to does address key issues regarding unemployment social protection in Article 65.30 However, the EMP does not go beyond the arrangement of dialogue on core issues

28A complete list of social service exemptions found in the agreement are: public law enforcement; correctional services; income security or insurance; social security or insurance; social security or insurance; social welfare; public education; public training; health and child care.

29Unemployment is a prominent push factor for many highly educated Lebanese. Approximately 50% of Lebanese emigrants have at least secondary education and an estimated 25% with tertiary education resulting in a signifcant *brain drain* effect for Lebanon (ETF 2017).

30Article 65(2) The Parties shall engage in a dialogue on all aspects of mutual interest and particularly on social problems such as unemployment, rehabilitation of the less able-bodied, equal treatment for men and women, labour relations, vocational training, safety and health at work.

of social protection in the area of unemployment, and unlike EMP agreements with other countries (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Lebanon's EMP agreement maintains no reciprocal commitments concerning economic or social cooperation (Ayadi and Gadi 2013). No mention of unemployment protection is stated in any of Lebanon's bilateral agreements on the promotion and protection of investments.

#### *11.3.2 Health Care*

The Lebanese health care system remains heavily fragmented primarily between and within public and private institutions with government entities acting as offcial regulators (WHO 2006). Although Lebanon maintains no relevant offcial policy whereby consulates provide healthcare or invalidity services, cash/in-kind benefts or coverage to Lebanese nationals abroad, certain public health care schemes do provide some form of health care coverage abroad. The Civil Servants Cooperative under the tutelage of the Council of Ministers does provide pre-admission health coverage abroad up to 90% for Lebanese government employees and their dependents abroad.31 Furthermore, the Lebanese Army retains its own public health services as well.32 It provides pre-admission health care coverage abroad up to \$10,000 for Lebanese employed in the army or security services and their families (Ammar et al. 2000; Ammar 2009).33

Lebanese consulates or institutions do not provide assistance in accessing host country health coverage or benefts. However, consulates have been known to provide cash assistance to Lebanese nationals abroad in the case of serious health emergencies. Nevertheless, there is no formal policy for these cash benefts, and they are given only at the discretion of offcials at consulates or embassies.

Lebanon has been struggling to establish a non-contributory health care protection scheme for all Lebanese citizens. In 2012, Ministry of Labour, Charbel Nahas, presented the Comprehensive Health Project. The primary aim of the project was to unify the differing health care protection schemes in the country and also provide comprehensive health care coverage to those with limited or no income. Unfortunately, the Comprehensive Health Project has yet to be implemented (Nasnas 2016).

31Health care coverage under the Civil Servants Cooperation amounts to approximately 4.4% of the Lebanese population. However, an estimated 8–9% of the Lebanese may be eligible (Ammar et al. 2000; Ammar 2009).

32The Army's health care scheme falls under the patronage of the Ministry of Defence whereas the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the Internal Security Forces, General Security Forces and State Security Forces. However, all army/military health schemes are fnanced by the Lebanese government and contain essentially the same coverage rules for care (Ammar 2009).

33Health care for the army or security services amount to approximately 9% of the Lebanese population. However, an estimated 11% may be eligible (Ammar et al. 2000; Ammar 2009).

Although Lebanon maintains a large number of private health insurance services, a considerable portion of the population is still unable to afford full medical coverage. Therefore, Lebanon's national social insurance system, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is the country's most important social protection insurance provider. It offers employees with health and maternity insurance, family and educational allowances and end-of-service indemnity to retirees. However, the NSSF does not cover any medical treatment outside of Lebanon. Additionally, those who are informally or self-employed and unemployed do receive basic essential health care from the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH).34 This coverage too is not provided outside of Lebanon.

Article 65 of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement which Lebanon has ratifed stipulates a cooperation between parties to *improve social security and health insurance systems* and *improve the health care system through cooperation*. However, little meaningful reforms have been undertaken by Lebanon since the ratifcation of the EMP.

Medical tourism has fared well in Lebanon with the country being a top destination for medical tourists in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. According to Hassan (2015), an estimated 10% of the tourists entering Lebanon identifed medical treatment as their purpose of visit. As part of an effort to promote Lebanon as a health care tourism destination, the Eighth Conference on Medical Tourism was held in Beirut in 2013. The conference was a means to promote Lebanon as a key destination of medical tourism, health and beauty, along with promoting Lebanese tourism in general.

#### *11.3.3 Pensions*

Lebanese civil servants and those in the military are covered by generous publicsector pension schemes which are fnanced by a pay-as-you-go method with public employees contributing an equivalent of 6% of the wages in the public sector.35,36

34The MoPH covers what would be considered as 'catastrophic' payments for households without health insurance. Approximately 43% of Lebanese citizens possess no health care insurance and are only able to rely on the MoPH in dire circumstances (WHO 2006).

35The pension scheme for public servants was established by the 1959 Public Servants System Legislature Decrees and the military follows a 1961 legislative decree. These pension schemes are considered unsustainable with expenditures on civil servant pensions at 1.2% GDP and spending on military pensions at 2% of GDP (Rached 2012). The pension scheme's replacement rate is often close to 100%. It does not enforce a minimum retirement age, so accrual rate is high with respect to the retirement age. Additionally, benefts can distort due to ad hoc and costly additional benefts like extra lump-sum payments for retirees who completed 40+ years of service. Variations in pension payments are also high as they are based on the last salary earned by retiree (Jarmuzek and Nakhle 2016).

36 In the case of fnancial disparities or shortfalls in funds as a result of demographic shifts or an unsustainable beneft formula, the government is directly covered by the Treasury's general reve-

Lebanese nationals under the public-sector pension scheme are permitted to obtain their pension benefts while living abroad. Summarily, Lebanese nationals under the public-sector pension scheme must renew their pension benefts annually while abroad. This is done by completing and signing the "application from retiree" form which then must be brought to the nearest consulate for legalisation. Lebanese nationals abroad under this scheme must also provide proof of identifcation in the form of the Lebanese civil identifcation. Afterwards, the "application from retiree" form, along with their Family Registry Record and proof of their Lebanese residence must be sent to the Ministry of Finance. For a Lebanese national abroad as a *benefciary* of the public pension, they are able to obtain pension benefts abroad.37 The process is similar except the "application from a benefciary" form must be legalised by the consulate along with either proof of divorce, death or mental illness; all documents must be sent to the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance 2016).

The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is an independent institution established in 1963 under the Ministry of Labour which provides services primarily to private-sector and contractual government employees. The NSSF's retirement scheme involves a lump-sum cash beneft upon retirement.38 All benefts are terminated after the lump-sum payment leaving many post-retirees with no pension or health coverage after retirement. For those Lebanese who retire from the informal sector, they will only have their savings to survive on. With the absence of public safety nets, many elderlies rely on income transfers from their children (Rached 2012).39

Consulates are not directly involved in the acquisition of pension benefts for Lebanese abroad in the case of acquiring Lebanese benefts or host country benefts. However, consulates do provide legalisation of particular documents including life certifcates.

#### *11.3.4 Family-Related Benefts*

Lebanon and Lebanese consulates do not maintain any offcial policy with regards to providing cash or in-kind benefts to assist families in birth or raising a child abroad. The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) does contain protection services

nues (i.e. taxpayers) (Nasnas 2016).

37Benefciaries of Lebanese pensioners pertain to divorced, widowed or unmarried daughters, widowed wives, any son or daughter under the age of 18, or a son or daughter with mental disabilities.

38This lump-sum is equivalent to the accumulated contributions associated with past employers and one month of earning for each year of service with fnal employer (up to 20 years).

39According to PAPFAM data, 74.8% of elderly Lebanese derive their income from transfers from their children (Tohme et al. 2010).

in the feld of maternity and family and educational allowances.40 However, to be eligible for NSSF's services, a Lebanese national must be formally employed and residing in the country. Those working in the informal sector are also not entitled to NSSF's maternity and family benefts (Kukrety 2016).

Although Lebanese consulates do not provide protection services to Lebanese nationals abroad, they are responsible for a number of administrative procedures concerning families. Mainly, Lebanese families abroad must register *vital events* at the nearest consulate or embassy; this can be done either in person or by mail. These events normally include marriage, divorce, birth or death.41 Lebanese nationals are also able to obtain Lebanese birth certifcates abroad through consulates. Primarily, parents must obtain the host country's birth certifcate certifed by the appropriate Ministry of the host country and provide it to the consulate. The consulate will then send the appropriate documents to Lebanon whereby the Lebanese birth certifcate is sent back to be picked up at the receiving consulate.

Lebanon's bilateral agreements have maintained some provisions with regards to family protection. Article 65(1)(c) of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement stipulates cooperation within projects and programmes with the aim of bolstering and developing Lebanon's family planning and mother and child protection programmes. In 2010, Lebanon also ratifed the Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Lebanon regarding Cooperation on Protecting the Welfare of Children.42 In summation, the agreement establishes a structure between the governments of Lebanon and Australia to assist parents in either country to resolve disputes across international borders concerning their children. The agreement helps mediate and coordinate with the proper authorities of each country to: facilitate the transmission of information and documents related to applications; encourage dialogue between parents and assist in fnding an amicable resolution to the issues in dispute; monitor and report on the progress of individual cases. International Social Service Australia (ISS) further provides international parent child abduction services including information, advice, emotional support, counselling for family members, mediation and assistance with reunifcation and returns.43

40The NSSF provides maternity indemnity in cases where employers do not provide maternity leave. Family and educational allowances are provided in the case of an emergency for families faced with economic hardship normally due to medical emergencies/shocks. The allowances are provided as funds for school to ensure children remain in the educational system. There is a cap of fve children per family whereby allowances will decrease (Kukrety 2016).

41Registration of vital events oftentimes comes at no cost. Furthermore, for Lebanese nationals abroad, it is important to stay up-to-date with registration of vital events. They are particularly salient in the case of, for example, receiving pensions as a benefciary or repatriation/acquisition of citizenship.

42For the full agreement, see https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary\_business/committees/house\_ of\_representatives\_committees?url=jsct/25november2009/treaties/lebanon\_text.pdf

43For more information on ISS Australia's protection services in the case of parental disputes across international borders, see https://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/Families/ InternationalFamilyLaw/Pages/InternationalParentalChildAbduction.aspx

#### *11.3.5 Economic Hardship*

Lebanon does not maintain policies which provide guaranteed minimum resources for Lebanese in economic hardship. As a consequence, Lebanon does not provide any such policies for nationals living abroad. However, there have been different interventions and safety nets implemented usually in response to particular crises, wars or emergency situations.44 Yet, there has been no cohesive nor clear national policy/strategy to provide Lebanese relief or protection from poverty.

One such example of a "safety net" is the Emergency National Poverty Targeting Programme (ENPTP). ENPTP is a combination of social assistance and social services to the "extremely poor" Lebanese households in the form of medical bill payments, school fee waivers and food assistance. The programme was implemented as a response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. However, Lebanon would not be able to fnance the programme if it were not for the assistance of international organisations like the World Bank, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs to help implement the programme. As of June 2015, a total of 160,985 Lebanese households had applied to beneft from the programme. However, ENPTP services primarily target those vulnerable within Lebanon, and services are not exportable to Lebanese nationals living abroad (Kukrety 2016).

In terms of guaranteed minimum resources for economic hardship, neither Lebanese public institutions nor consulates abroad assist Lebanese with accessing host country benefts. In exceptional cases, consulates may provide cash benefts to Lebanese nationals abroad in dire situations, however, there is no formal policy and benefts are given by the consulates discretion only. It is only in the most extreme or dire cases that the most vulnerable are given any form of assistance and only through assistance from international organisations. It is most often the Lebanese diaspora and their remittances which provide any semblance of a "safety net" that Lebanese can rely on.45

#### **11.4 Conclusions**

The principal effort of Lebanese authorities' engagement with the diaspora involves increasing investment, capital, tourism and other economic fows back into the home country. As Lebanon moves from crisis to crisis due in large part to regional powers vying for infuence, along with the country's delicate confessional balance in parliament, the country struggles to implement meaningful long-term public

44Examples of emergency situations have been the 2006 Israeli invasion and recently the Syrian crisis which began in 2011.

45Remittances are mainly used by individuals and families for consumption and to raise their standard of living. According to Barendse et al. (2006), in a mini-survey conducted, researchers found that 56% of respondents used remittances for 'daily expenses,' 24% on school fees, 10% were used for investments and 5% for the building of a house.

social protection policies that beneft Lebanese universally. Although there has been no shortage of proposals for meaningful social protection programmes, more often, fnancial or political limitations have hindered implementation.46 As current trajectories suggest, Lebanon will likely continue to engage with the diaspora predominantly to stimulate economic investment while overlooking fundamental social protection policy gaps for their citizens abroad.

Lebanon must also look beyond fnancial and economic gains when interacting with the international community. The overwhelming majority of bilateral and multilateral agreements that Lebanon has ratifed are primarily focused on economic and investment benefts. Vital bilateral social security agreements or noteworthy provisions of social protection in existing agreements are virtually absent, particularly with Lebanon's top destination countries as well.

However, since the enactment of the 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law which guaranteed the right for Lebanese nationals abroad to vote and Lebanon's frst election in 9 years occurring in 2018, the signifcance of the Lebanese diaspora may be entering a new stage. With roughly 5% of Lebanese nationals abroad casting a vote in the 2018 election, there does exist a latent yet considerable political potential within the diaspora. Furthermore, slated for the next election, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, stated that there will be six parliamentary seats assigned for the diaspora (Ministry of Information 2018).47 As Tabar (2014) explains, by broadening the scope of participation through allotted diaspora seats in parliament, migrants may have the political opportunity to make independent political demands free from home-based political calculations and beneft more from the policies of the Lebanese government.

**Acknowledgements** This chapter is part of the project "Migration and Transnational Social Protection in (Post)Crisis Europe (MiTSoPro)" that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No. 680014). In addition to this chapter, readers can fnd a series of indicators comparing national social protection and diaspora policies across 40 countries on the following website: http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/.

#### **References**

46 In terms of fnancial limitations, the IMF concluded that public debt is estimated above 150% of GDP at the end of 2017.

47The six parliamentary seats for the diaspora were introduced in a new 2018 electoral law that has yet to be ratifed by Cabinet decree.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Chapter 12 Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, Emigrants and Resident Nationals in Morocco**

**Abderrahim Oulidi and Keivan Diakité**

#### **12.1 Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration Features in Morocco**

This chapter aims to discuss the legal framework regulating Morocco's welfare system and the access of national residents, non-national residents, and non-resident nationals to social benefts across fve policy areas: unemployment, health care, family benefts, pensions, and guaranteed minimum resources.

The current Moroccan welfare system can be better understood when tracing the historical development of its key components. Like in many African countries, the social security in Morocco until the protectorate was mainly based on a traditional form of solidarity and family mutual assistance (Reimat 1997). Occupational groups, such as the traditional trade guilds, developed a solidarity system that guaranteed care in case of accidents or illness to everyone.1 It was only after the establishment of the French protectorate that the Moroccan state started to adopt specifc legislation in the feld of social protection- especially pensions. However, this legislation was mainly intended to protect the needs of French workers and offcials

A. Oulidi (\*)

1 « Le système de retraite au Maroc » Revue Al Maliya, n°40 march 2007, p 22. Available here: http://www.fnances.gov.ma/Maliya%20tawassol/fle\_220807\_151728869.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.

Studies and Risk Management Department, Solidarity Fund Against Catastrophic Events, Rabat, Morocco

K. Diakité

Louvain Institute of Data Analysis and Modeling in Economics and Statistics (LIDAM), Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium

residing in Morocco. In 1917, the protectorate's administration created the Moroccan Provident Fund (CPM) with an optional membership. Similarly, several institutions were created to respond to the needs of different professional groups of French residents covering mainly the workers' compensation scheme managed by private insurance companies, the pension scheme for civil servants, the family allowance scheme fnanced by European employers, and the pension plan of the European high offcials.

#### *12.1.1 Main Characteristics of the National Social Security System*

The different components of the Moroccan social protection system have been developed in a rather fragmented manner over a very long period of time. The current system consists of a contributory scheme (the National Social Security Fund, CNSS2 ; the National Fund of Social Welfare Organisations, CNOPS3 ; the Moroccan Pension Fund, CMR; the group retirement allowance plan, RCAR); a partially contributory system (the Medical Assistance Plan, RAMED4 ) and a non-contributory system (programs for vulnerable populations such as "Tayssir", "Kafala", or the National Initiative for Human Development, INDH5 ). The system covers employees from all public sectors and a large part of private sector employees,6 by providing them protection against the risks associated to maternity, invalidity, old age, survival, death, unemployment, and family.

Compulsory social security schemes fulfl an important function of risk coverage and fnancial transfers in the form of family allowances and income replacement in the form of sickness and maternity benefts, and through the pension scheme (oldage, invalidity and survivors). There are several management bodies: CNOPS manages the public scheme and students; RCAR manages the pensions of state employees, local authorities and public institutions subject to the fnancial control of the state; CMR manages the pensions of the civilian and military state personnel; and the CNSS manages the private scheme. Medical coverage based on a noncontributory scheme has also been put in place for the poorest population including migrants and refugees (the convention has been ratifed, but not yet implemented). They will be part of the Medical Assistance Scheme RAMED, which will be managed by the National Health Insurance Agency (ANAM).

2*Caisse Nationale de Securité Sociale*, http://www.cnss.ma/fr. Accessed 26 March 2020.

3*Caisse Nationale des Organismes de Prévoyance Sociale*, http://www.cnops.org.ma. Accessed 22 March 2020.

4*Régime d'assistance médicale*, http://www.ramed.ma. Accessed 26 March 2020.

5 http://www.indh.ma. Accessed 26 March 2020.

6Morocco now has 3.8 million employees in the private sector. About 600,000 of them are not declared by their employers. Source: www.cnss.ma/fr/content/chiffres-clés-1. Accessed 22 March 2020.

The Moroccan pension system is currently based on four schemes. Three of them are mandatory and managed by public institutions: two schemes cover public sector employees (CMR and RCAR) and the third one covers private sector employees via the CNSS. A fourth (optional) scheme is aimed at private sector employees (CIMR). Non-salaried workers (traders, craftsmen, individuals with liberal professions, farmers, and fshermen) cannot join any of these schemes, although Law No. 99–15 of December 2017 proposed the creation of a pension plan for these workers. Also, there is no non-contributory pillar of solidarity in Morocco and the system covers only 40% of the employed labour force.

As for fnancing, the contributory plans are fnanced by employers' contributions, state contribution, donations and any other resources assigned to basic compulsory retirement insurance plans under legislation or special regulations. The four pension plans are also fnanced by the interest generated by their reserve funds. RAMED is fnanced by the state, local collectivises, tax revenue, donations, other resources assigned to basic compulsory health insurance plans and fat-rate contributions from vulnerable populations. Since its entry into force in 2006, the CNSS manages the compulsory health insurance (AMO) for private sector employees subject to the Moroccan social security scheme. Recipients of a minimum pension (500 dirhams per month) and people with an annual income of less than 5.650 dirhams per person are covered by RAMED.

#### *12.1.2 Migration History and Key Policy Developments*

During the last decades, Morocco has put in place several initiatives aiming to ensure the social protection of mobile individuals, including foreigners residing in Morocco and Moroccan nationals residing abroad. Bilateral social security agreements have been signed with Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Egypt, Spain, France, Libya, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Quebec, Romania, Sweden, and Tunisia; and different conventions have been adopted aiming to make the living conditions of foreign residents meet equal standards as for Moroccan citizens.

Morocco's special historical-cultural relationship with West Africa is refected in the conditions of access to the territory enjoyed by citizens of different countries. While these facilities also concern nationals of European countries, Morocco has in recent years made a strategic revaluation of its diplomatic, commercial, political and security relations with French-speaking West African states. The deployment of various programs has allowed for closer ties between these states and Morocco in the framework of bilateral and international cooperation. The limits and challenges that Morocco faces as a link between Europe and Africa have been quickly emerging, especially given the situation of sub-Saharan migrants who transit Morocco to reach Europe. If for some foreigners, Morocco is actually seen as a transit country in their journey to Europe, for others, it is also and above all a country of immigration.

Over the years, Morocco has become a destination country for different types of immigration, of various geographical origins (Europe, Africa and elsewhere), permanent or limited in time. Offcially, about 84,000 foreigners are currently registered as living in Morocco7 (the Moroccan population is 36 million people). The majority of foreigners residing in Morocco come from African countries (41.6%) and European countries (40%). Among the most represented nationalities, the French come frst (25.4%), followed by Senegalese (7.2%), Algerians (6.8%) and Syrians (6.2%). 15.2% of foreigners come from Asian countries (82.8% from the Middle East) and 3.2% from other continents. The advantages and attractions offered by Morocco as a host country are geographical, economic, linguisticcultural, but also political. As a politically stable country, in the process of economic and social modernization, offering geographical and linguistic-cultural proximity to Europe, Morocco attracts a potentially large target group of foreigners wishing to emigrate.

Nowadays, a foreign employee of the private sector can beneft from CNSS services in the same way as a Moroccan citizen. Furthermore, a framework agreement has been recently adopted to allow immigrants and refugees to access the Medical Assistance Scheme (RAMED). However, migrants and refugees still do not have access to RAMED benefts as technical problems between the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Moroccans living abroad, and the National Health Insurance Agency delayed the publication of affliation cards to gain access to medical benefts for migrants and refugees.

According to the OECD (2017) report on Moroccan emigrants, it is estimated that just over 4.3 million Moroccans live abroad. Given that the total population of Morocco is 36 million people, the estimated share of non-resident Moroccans corresponds to 11% of the population residing in Morocco. It is therefore not a coincidence that a Ministry in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad (MRE)8 exists in Morocco. However, the historical reasons for migration and the direction of migration fows differ. As an example, the labour agreements that Morocco concluded with Belgium and France in the early 1960s led to a growing outfow (until the 1970s - then, thanks to family reunifcation, until the 1990s) of Moroccan migrants residing in France and Belgium, particularly manual labourers settling there and raising children. The recent outfow of Moroccans to the Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia) can also be mentioned.

As shown in Figs. 12.1 and 12.2, the main destination of Moroccan emigrants is Europe. 86% of Moroccans residing abroad live in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The second destination is North America, where 7.5% of the emigrant population is found, followed by Arabic and Middle East countries that host around for 4.5% of the emigrant population.

7High Commission for Planning report (2018)

8Website of the Ministry of Moroccans living abroad (MRE). https://marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/. Accessed 26 March 2020.

**Fig. 12.1** Destinations of Moroccans residing abroad, 2018. (Source: Ministry of Moroccans living abroad (MRE))

**Fig. 12.2** Main European countries of destination of Moroccan emigrants. (Source: Ministry of Moroccans living abroad (MRE))

More than half of Moroccan emigrants in Europe mention family reasons as reasons for migration, whereas work is the second most common reason. This fow includes a considerable number of seasonal workers. 58% of Moroccan emigrants have low levels of education (frst cycle of secondary education), whereas emigrants with a high level of education are proportionally more numerous in North America (two-thirds of Moroccan emigrants are graduates of higher education) (OECD 2017).

#### **12.2 Migration and Social Protection in Morocco**

CNSS affliates, whether national citizens or foreigners residing in Morocco, are protected in terms of access to social benefts. To become a CNSS affliate, a person must be employed in Morocco. The entitlement to AMO benefts is conditioned by the justifcation of 54 days of prior contribution for a period of six months. Affliation is a legal obligation of every employer who is required to join CNSS no later than 30 days after the frst employee is hired, to regularly report to the CNSS the monthly amount of wages paid and the number of days worked by their employees.

Foreigners residing in Morocco are subject to the same conditions as nationals and receive the same benefts. Moroccans living abroad cannot voluntarily enter the Moroccan social security scheme if they were not affliated before moving abroad. However, some of the acquired rights are subject to exportability, including the oldage pension, the disability pension, or maternity benefts. Since the 1960s, social security benefts that are subject to exportability are paid to affliates even if there is no bilateral social security agreement between Morocco and their respective countries of residence. The only condition is to show a proof of residence in the new country. Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that Morocco is part of several regional integration organisations, including the African Union (UA), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). However, none of these regional integration schemes has made specifc efforts to ensure the social protection of intra-regional migrants or to facilitate their access to specifc benefts in the countries of residence.

The next section of the chapter discusses the eligibility conditions for accessing social benefts for national residents, non-national residents and non-resident nationals; and it further highlights the specifcities of each policy area.

#### *12.2.1 Unemployment*

The National Social Security Fund (CNSS) provides employees who involuntarily lose their jobs and are actively seeking for work a minimum income called Loss of Employment Compensation (IPE). This allowance is fnanced by employees (0.19% of salary capped at 6.000 dirhams) and employers (0.38% of salary capped at 6.000 dirhams). The beneft is granted for up to 6 months to employed workers affliated to CNSS. Resident nationals and foreigners can claim this allowance under the same conditions. To claim the beneft, individuals must have accumulated 780 days of salary declarations during the last 36 months preceding the date of job loss, including 260 days during the last 12 months preceding this date. The monthly amount is equal to 70% of the reference salary (average monthly salary declared for

the last 36 months), without exceeding the amount of the statutory minimum wage.9 Those who receive the beneft must register with the National Agency for Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) and actively search for work (although the job search is never checked). 25% of people registered for the unemployment allowance have either resumed their job or found a new one (CNSS 2018).

#### *12.2.2 Health Care*

The medical coverage system in Morocco consists of a basic system including the Mandatory Health Insurance (AMO) and the Medical Assistance Plan (RAMED).10 AMO is based on the contributory principle and the principle of risk pooling. It provides benefts in kind in case of sickness and cash benefts for sickness and physical invalidity. Membership is compulsory for companies that are subject to the social security scheme and do not have any medical coverage at the date of entry into force of the Mandatory Health Insurance.11 Article 14 of the Law 65–00 provides for a period of fve years from the decree of application of the law to allow companies to join AMO. However, the application decree has never been released, which leads to the fact that today, 1.27 million private sector employees are not affliated to the AMO, including 303.000 employees of the public sector.12 However, they remained covered by private insurance.

The right to basic health care AMO benefts13 for private sector employees is subject to the completion of a contribution period of 54 working days during the six months preceding the care, the actual payment of contributions by the employer, the identifcation of family members of the insured or pensioner with the CNSS, and the declaration of long and costly diseases at the CNSS. In order for the CNSS to reimburse the care costs (doctors' fees, prescribed medications, etc.), affliates must submit a health care form flled by their physician. The reimbursement period set by law is three months from the fling date, and a physical medical check can be scheduled as part of the AMO Services. Resident nationals and foreign citizens can access benefts in kind in Morocco under the same eligibility conditions. However, medical care abroad is only reimbursable or covered if the insured person falls ill

9As of January 1, 2018, the legal minimum wages in Morocco (SMIG) is 13.46 dirhams/hour in the sector of industry, trade and liberal professions. The monthly SMIG is equal to 13.46 MAD/Hour \* 191 Hours/Month = 2570.86 dirhams. Source: http://blog.ojraweb.com. Accessed 26 March 2020.

10This scheme, which entered into force on 18 August 2005, was introduced by Law 65.00 on the code of medical coverage.

11Article 114 Law 65–00, https://www.cnss.ma/sites/default/fles/loi-65-00-amo\_0.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.

12ANAM (2017). Convention de partenariat relative à la production et à la délivrance des cartes d'assistance médicale pour les migrants au Maroc.

13The medical coverage taken into account. http://www.cnss.ma/fr/content/que-couvre-lamo. Accessed 26 March 2020.

unexpectedly. In this case, the refund is made on the basis of national pricing, so health benefts in kind are not transferable. Moroccans residing abroad cannot thus claim these benefts from Morocco.

Sickness cash benefts are available only to employees. Both resident nationals and foreigners can claim the sickness allowance under the same conditions. There is no specifc requirement of prior residence in the country, although cash benefts do depend on a period of insurance (54 days of contribution during the 6 months preceding the sickness).Sickness allowances are not transferable for nationals living abroad (the beneft is only paid in Morocco during a maximum period of 52 weeks),but individuals who receive sickness benefts can move temporarily abroad if they show up for the medical check in Morocco. However, disability pensions can be transferred abroad if affliates show a residence certifcate. Invalidity pensions are available only to employees, foreigners or nationals. The minimum period of insurance required to become eligible is 3 years. If the invalidity is caused by an accident on the workplace, this condition does not apply and the beneft is automatically granted. The amount of the pension is based on the previous earnings. The invalidity pension is always granted on a temporary basis and it is replaced by an old-age pension when the benefciary reaches the pensionable age.

The medical assistance scheme is based on the principle of national solidarity for the beneft of the poor population.14 RAMED only provides benefts in kind.15 Based on the principle of solidarity, this scheme has a semi-contributory part fnanced by a fxed participation of people and households deemed vulnerable.16

The Moroccan health care system was initiated under the French protectorate. More than 60 years after independence and despite the progress made since 2002 with the introduction of health insurance schemes for private sector employees, civil servants and the poor, the system is still struggling to comply with the principles of universality, solidarity, and quality of care. In 2016, 45.4% of the population did not have medical coverage.17 Self-employed persons are not yet covered by any health social protection scheme, although they account for a third of the Moroccan population. The 98–15 draft law plans to include them in the AMO regime. It will come into force once published in the Offcial Bulletin.

14*Loi portant code de la couverture médicale de base*, https://www.cnss.ma/sites/default/fles/ loi-65-00-amo\_0.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.

15List of benefts in kind: http://www.anam.ma/lagence/presentation/la-couverture-medicale-debase/ramed/ prestation-couverte/. Accessed 26 March 2020.

16Vulnerable people in urban areas are recognized as having a weighted income of more than DH 3767 per person per year and DH 5650 per person per year and rural residents whose heritage score is greater than 28 and less than or equal to 70 which corresponds to 120 DH per person and capped at 600 DH per household and a non-contributory part fnanced by taxes, reserved for the poor (Persons whose income is less than or equal to DH 3767 per person per year when they live in an urban area, or whose heritage score is less than or equal to 28, are recognized as being in a poverty situation.)

17 "La protection sociale au Maroc "Rapport du conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, 2018, http://www.ces.ma/Documents/PDF/Auto-saisines/2018/AS34-2018/Av-AS34-VF.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.

#### *12.2.3 Pensions*

Four different plans provide retirement benefts to public and private sector employees (national citizens and foreigners) in Morocco: the CNSS, the CMR, the RCAR and the CIMR.18 The largest pension fund is CNSS, with 3.2 million affliates. The eligibility conditions for claiming old-age pensions differ from one pension fund to another. For CNSS, these conditions include: having reached the age of 60 (or 55 for minors who have worked underground for at least 5 years); having ceased all salaried activity; and having contributed at least 3240 days. The minimum pension is 1000.00 dirhams per month.19 The amount of the pension corresponds to 50% of the monthly salary capped for those who totalize at least 3240 days of contribution (around 10 years). This amount is increased by 1% for each additional insurance period of 216 days.20The maximum is 70% of the average monthly salary. All taxable employees, whether Moroccan or foreign residents, are entitled to this pension, provided they have made suffcient contributions. There is therefore no differential treatment based on the nationality of the employee.

In the public sector, the CMR and the RCAR provide pensions on the basis of a contributory pillar. The required period of contribution is 10 years for CMR and 3 years for RCAR, respectively. The minimum pension for affliates having the required contribution is 1500 dirhams in both schemes. For CMR, the benefts and contribution are not capped and the contribution rate is 28% (14% employee, 14% state) after the 2016 reform.21 The 2016 reform also changed the retirement age from 60 to 63 years gradually from 2016 to 2020. At RCAR, contributions are capped22 and the threshold for a contribution salary in 2017 was 17,100 dirhams. The normal contribution period is 30 years and the legal retirement age is 60 years. Each year of contribution entitles to 2% of average career salary. The maximum pension to which an affliate is entitled to equals 80% of the average career salary. The contribution rate is 18% (6% the employee and 12% the employer). The condition for accessing these two pension schemes are the same for nationals and foreigners.

18However, a draft law (99–15) provides for the establishment of a pension system for nonemployed workers, which will come into force once published in the Offcial Bulletin. The law, which is likely to affect 11 million people, provides that the independent pension plan is managed by the CNSS and operates in points.

19CNSS activity report 2016, https://www.cnss.ma/sites/default/fles/fles/CNSS%20-%20 Rapport%20D'activite%CC%81%202,016%20Vf.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020. 20 Pension averagesalaryfor the last years contributio 8 0, . 5 0 01 n period in days 3240 216

21www.courdescomptes.ma/upload/MoDUle\_20/File\_20\_466.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.

22Each year the threshold are published here: https://www.rcar.ma/?q=fr/indicateurs/salaires-plafond. Accessed 26 March 2020.

In addition to these three plans, Morocco also implemented a survivor pension scheme allocated to family members23 of an insured person who, at the time of death, was receiving an old-age pension or was eligible to receive it.

Old-age pensions are exportable. If affliates decide to live abroad, their acquired rights are transferred to the new country of residence. CNSS also conducts yearly life control operations.

#### *12.2.4 Family Benefts*

In Morocco, child benefts fnancing is the responsibility of the employer. These benefts are intended for employees who reside in Morocco and exercise an activity subject to the social security scheme or pensioners with children born no later than 300 days after the effective date of the pension (regardless of their nationality). To qualify for the benefts, insured individuals must have 108 days of contributions during a period of six months of registration and a monthly salary greater than or equal to 60% of the minimum wage. The amount of child benefts is fat-rate. Since 2007, child benefts are paid directly to the insured. There is a residency condition for children in order to open access to those benefts that are granted independently of the nationality of the benefciaries, but are non-exportable. Hence, national citizens residing abroad cannot claim this type of benefts from Morocco. Furthermore, CNSS periodically conducts legal control operations aiming to check if children entitled to family benefts continue to meet the living, schooling, or learning conditions.

Regarding maternity benefts, salaried women who cease all wage activity for child birth receive a daily allowance for 14 weeks. The condition for granting this beneft is to have contributed two months during the last 10 months. The amount of the beneft is 100% of the average daily wage (capped). It is exportable if the affliate decides to reside abroad, although she has to show a residency certifcate in the country she is moving to.

Morocco does not have yet specifc schemes of paternity or parental benefts. However, it offers some targeted programs for children and families in vulnerable situations. Yet, these schemes exclude foreign residents, as they are exclusively dedicated to Moroccan citizens. Examples in this regard are the cash transfer programs for children in precarious situations, such as the program for direct assistance to vulnerable widowed women with orphaned children set up in 2014. Financed by a social cohesion support fund, the Family Care Fund pays the widow, for each orphan child under 21 years of age (with the exception of disabled children for whom there is no age limit), an amount of 350 dirhams per month, with a monthly ceiling not exceeding 1050 dirhams monthly per family and subject to schooling or

23This includes dependent spouses and children under the age of 16, 21 (if they continue their studies) or 18 (if they are apprenticed) or dependent children with disabilities without a stable income regardless of their age.

child's registration in vocational training. Likewise, the Fund provides divorced poor women and their children (when the father is absent or insolvent) an alimony advance of the same amount and with the same ceiling as that granted for the direct assistance program for widowed women in precarious situations. There are also additional programs for the education of children in need.24

#### *12.2.5 Guaranteed Minimum Resources*

There is no specifc scheme of non-contributory guaranteed minimum income in Morocco. Only the members of the liberation army can receive a lump sum allowance from CMR that could be considered a minimum income. However, this represents a special category, and the beneft cannot be granted on the basis of volunteering or membership in the fund.

Also, the compensation fund in Morocco is an opportunity to overhaul the social protection system. The compensation system was created in the 1940s to protect the purchasing power of the population and allow them to have access to basic necessities (sugar, four, soft wheat, butane gas). Until 1973, the compensation fund played a real equalization role by fnancing subsidies from its own resources, particularly from the oil sector. After 1973, the fund was deprived of its own revenue, entirely dependent on the state budget, thus reducing it to a mere subsidy fund.

#### *12.2.6 Obstacles and Sanctions*

Foreigners residing in Morocco may be affliated to existing social protection schemes provided they are employees. In accordance with the provisions of Article 516 of the Labour Code Law 65.99,25any employer wishing to recruit a foreign employee must obtain an authorization from the Government Labour Administration. This authorization is granted in the form of a visa affxed to the work contract. This formality is mandatory and the Labour Code stipulates penalties in case of omission:

24For instance, the "Tayssir" program is a conditional cash transfer for households living in the poorest communes, aiming to combat dropping out of school. The scheme is currently carried out by municipalities and benefts all rural communes with a poverty rate higher than 30% and a school dropout rate higher than 8%. Also, the Royal Initiative "One Million Schoolbags" aims to fght against school dropout and inequalities by allowing reduced tuition fees for families of millions of primary schools in rural and urban areas and colleges in rural areas. The Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training also distributes schoolbag kits (bags, books, booklets, school supplies) according to the school level and the environment. With an annual budget of 400 million dirhams in 2013–1014, this initiative has benefted 3,897,542 children aged 6 to 15, including 2,401,432 from rural areas.

25www.droit-afrique.com/upload/doc/maroc/Maroc-Code-1999-du-travail.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.

the employer risks a fne and must pay the repatriation costs of the employee who has not obtained the required work visa or its renewal. For its part, the unauthorised employee cannot work legally and remain in the Moroccan territory. Employment contracts concerning foreigners must be of an indefnite duration. Thus, the affliation to the social security scheme does not, in any case, affect a foreigner's application for temporary and permanent residency, family reunifcation, or citizen application.

#### *12.2.7 Bilateral and Multilateral Social Security Agreements*

Morocco has signed bilateral social security agreements with 15 countries (Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Egypt, Spain, France, Libya, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Quebec, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia). Moroccans who have worked in these countries and immigrants from these countries residing in Morocco can totalise the periods worked to access contributory old-age and invalidity pensions. National citizens residing in these countries can claim these benefts without returning in Morocco. Morocco is also part of three regional integration organisations, but none of them has made any progress towards the social security coordination between the member states or facilitated access to social benefts for Community migrants. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, social security benefts that are subject to transportability are paid to affliates even if there is no bilateral social security agreement between Morocco and the country of residence. The only condition is to prove a residence certifcate.

#### **12.3 Conclusions**

This chapter has examined the social protection system in Morocco and the access of national residents, non-national residents and non-resident nationals in the feld of social insurance, social assistance, health, family benefts, employment and social action plans. As a general rule, the access to social benefts in Morocco is reserved for affliates- nationals or foreigners without distinction. Current laws (laws 98–15 and 99–15) provide for the extension of retirement and health benefts to non-salaried workers in the future. This highlights the momentum in which the government has been working since 2002 to make social protection more accessible to different social categories of Moroccans and foreign residents through the extension of health benefts to migrants at frst. The current social protection system is too fragmented and involves a large number of actors whose coordination is not yet developed. Through the many bilateral agreements put in place between Morocco and its partners, Moroccans living abroad have access to more and more social benefts like retirement pensions and disability fringe benefts even if the question of the transportability of other contributory benefts needs to be addressed.

**Acknowledgements** This chapter is part of the project "Migration and Transnational Social Protection in (Post)Crisis Europe (MiTSoPro)" that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No. 680014). In addition to this chapter, readers can fnd a series of indicators comparing national social protection and diaspora policies across 40 countries on the following website: http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/.

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Chapter 13 Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Moroccan Citizens Abroad**

**Rilke Mahieu**

#### **13.1 Diaspora Policy Infrastructure and Key Policies**

#### *13.1.1 The Moroccan Diaspora and its Relation with the Homeland*

Moroccans are currently one of the largest and most dispersed migrant populations in Europe, with large diaspora communities in France (1,146,000), Belgium (298,000), the Netherlands (363,000), Italy (487,000) and Spain (766,000) and smaller ones in many other European countries, including Germany (127,000) (De Haas 2014).1

Europe's need of cheap labour after the Second World War has been an important driver for Morocco's post-war emigration (Charef 2014). Morocco's signature of a series of labour treaties with European states during the 1950s and 1960s can be put forward as the decisive factor of the twentieth century Moroccan emigration. While the initial labour migration wave was primarily low-skilled and male-dominated, this unidimensional picture should be nuanced in at least four ways. First, the presence of Moroccans in Europe is older than post-war migration, including Moroccan soldiers' participation in the World Wars. Second, Moroccan emigration has always been motivated by other than strictly economic factors, such as political repression under Morocco's authoritarian regime following independence. Third, after the abandonment of the labour recruitment treaties in 1973, Moroccan emigration continued, albeit in different shapes. Other types of Moroccan migration emerged such as (female) family reunifcation, student migration, high-skilled migration,

R. Mahieu (\*)

© The Author(s) 2020 231

1Figures based on consular registration data.

University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
J.-M. Lafeur, D. Vintila (eds.), *Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond (Volume 3)*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51237-8\_13

marriage migration, etc., thus adding to the diversity in the Moroccan expatriate population. Fourth, the Moroccan population abroad has expanded geographically to an increasing number of destinations. Initially, the Moroccan labour migration went to France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (the four countries that had signed a labour treaty with Morocco). Among these, France was the primary destination, with population movements being anchored in the status of Morocco as a French protectorate until the Moroccan independence in 1956. From the 1970s and 1980s onward, while migration to the original destination countries continued, Spain and Italy emerged as new major destinations. Since then, Moroccan migration fows have also been oriented towards other European countries (e.g. the UK and Scandinavian countries), the United States and Canada (Fondation Hassan II & IOM 2014). Since the 1990s, the Gulf has become an important destination (Ibid). In addition, large waves of Moroccan-Jewish migration have taken place from 1948 onward, primarily towards Israel, but also to France and North America (De Haas 2014).

The Moroccan population abroad, currently estimated by the Moroccan government at fve million *Marocains Résident à l'étranger* (about 15% of the total Moroccan population), contributes in various ways to Morocco's economy and society. Most notably, there is an annual remittance fow of around \$7 billion (through offcial channels only). Remittances are the second source of hard currency after tourism receipts, which are also, to a large extent, provided by expatriate Moroccans during summer holidays (MPC 2013), as more than two million Moroccans return every year during holidays. Because of this signifcant fnancial input, the Moroccan population abroad is often depicted as the "cash cow" of Morocco. Many also own houses in Morocco, and at the community level, numerous small-scale non-governmental initiatives improve general welfare and contribute to local development in Morocco.

Since the beginning of Moroccan mass emigration in the early 1960s, there have been attempts by the Moroccan state to control the Moroccan population abroad and to manage and consolidate their economic contribution (Iskander 2010). However, Moroccan diaspora policies have changed signifcantly over time and are often described as an evolution from a repressive "long arm of Rabat" to a cooperative "outreached hand" (Bouras 2012). Notwithstanding this shift, distrust towards the Moroccan state persists among expatriate Moroccans. While it is diffcult to make generalised claims, both historical (Iskander 2010) and contemporary experiences of non-resident Moroccans with origin-state institutions (represented, for instance, by police and consular staff (Kahmann 2014)), contribute to a general sense of distrust towards the Moroccan state. Diaspora policy institutions in particular are regularly being evaluated as ineffcient, non-transparent and undemocratic (Belguendouz 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). More generally, major defciencies in the Moroccan political system further spur a sceptical stance regarding Moroccan state's discourses and actions.

#### *13.1.2 Diaspora Infrastructure*

Morocco's consular network spans all major destination countries. In each of the top fve destination countries, there are several consulates whose number depends on the size and geographical dispersion of the Moroccan populations, as well as the size of the territory. There are 16 Moroccan consulates in France, 11 in Spain, 7 in Italy, 3 in Belgium and 4 in the Netherlands. Beside the consular infrastructure, mobile consulates offering similar services are organised, although on an irregular basis. In addition, Morocco has appointed 75 honorary consuls, mainly in countries and regions lacking consular representation.

While the Moroccan consular network is vast, the lack of quality of its services has been a source of frustration among Moroccans living abroad (Iskander 2010; Belguendouz 2006). Among others, Moroccans abroad complain about the very long waiting lines and unequal treatment due to favouritism. In response to this situation, the improvement of consular services has become a governmental priority since 2015, under the impulse of King Mohammed VI.23 Among others, a large number of consular employees were fred and replaced, and a hotline for complaints about the consular services was installed.

Beside the consular network operating under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various other Moroccan national institutions and foundations have an important stake in emigrant affairs. First, there is the Ministry Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad and Immigration Affairs (MDCMREAM). This Ministry is charged with the task of preparing and implementing the governmental policy regarding both Moroccans residing abroad and immigrants in Morocco, in cooperation with other ministries and institutions inside and outside Morocco in the realm of migration affairs. The Ministry for Moroccans living abroad was frst created in 1990 and has taken different forms since then (sub-ministry, independent ministry). In its current form, it has operated since 2017, during the Othmani government.

Second, there is the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad. Created in 1990 and presided by the King's sister Lalla Meryem,4 this Foundation

2See the Royal Discourse of the 16th Coronation Celebration on July 15, 2015.

3 In the latest governmental declaration (2016–2021), the following goal has been set "Completion of the consular reform project and the process of modernizing and improving the quality of consular and social services, for the beneft of members of the Moroccan community residing abroad, as part of a dedicated action program".

4 It should be noted that while the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad and the Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation are, strictly speaking, non-political institutions, they are however very tightly connected to the monarchy, which is at the heart of political power in Morocco. The Hassan II Foundation has been designed as a quasi-governmental social aid agency, the major source of income constituting a direct contribution by the Moroccan fnancial institutions governing migrant remittances, based on a fxed interest rate on emigrant savings (Belguendouz 2006). The Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation's budget mainly stems from a committee of around 100 regular donors, including all major fnancial institutions and a range of other

aims to support the ties between Moroccans living abroad and their home country and to help non-resident Moroccans to overcome diffculties resulting from their emigration. This institution organises language and cultural education and activities for children, offers judicial, economic and social assistance and promotes cooperation. In addition, it contains an observatory on Moroccan migration.5

Third, a national consultative body was created in 2007: the Council of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad (CCME). The CCME's responsibilities include the monitoring and evaluation of the country's public policies with regard to its nationals abroad. It is responsible for issuing notices to ensure the defence of the interests of overseas Moroccans and strengthening their contribution to the economic, social and human development of the country. Furthermore, it also aims to reinforce diplomatic relations and cooperation between Morocco and the countries of residence.

Fourth, since 2000, the Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation, a humanitarian organisation presided by King Mohammed VI,6 is in charge of the annual *Marhaba* mission, described as "a humanitarian mission consisting of the management of the transfer of 2.5 million Moroccans between their host countries in Europe and their home country, Morocco, during the summer season".

It should be noted that all diaspora institutions are situated at the national level, which refects Morocco's centralised political system.7 While the presence of various diaspora institutions in Morocco indicates the importance adhered to emigration by the central authorities, it has also spurred the criticism that there are too many institutions with overlapping competencies in the feld of Moroccan diaspora policies (Belguendouz 2006).

Regarding the target population of Moroccan diaspora policies, the most commonly used term for Moroccan nationals abroad is "MRE" (*Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger* or "Moroccans Living Abroad"), while "MDM" (*Marocains du Monde* or "Global Moroccans") is also increasingly used. These terms are used in the broadest sense possible. They include Moroccan emigrants and their foreign-born descendants (second, third and further generations). This inclusive understanding draws on the Moroccan Nationality Code according to which any child born of a Moroccan father or mother is a Moroccan citizen, irrespectively of the place of birth or residence (*ius sanguinis* principle). As the Moroccan nationality is granted automatically and cannot be renounced, all persons with Moroccan origins are automatically considered as "MRE". However, due to the ordinary naturalisation process and the acquisition of the host country's nationality at birth (*ius soli* principle), a large share of Moroccans abroad has dual nationality. For instance, in the

companies in Morocco. However, the nature of the budget of both foundations should not conceal that they are policy instruments employed by the monarchy.

5For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the Ministry and the Hassan II Foundation, see Mahieu (2019).

6See footnote 4.

7However, in 2008 a process of "advanced regionalisation" has started, with the aim of making the regions more autonomous.

main destination country- France, approximately two out of three Moroccans have French nationality (Wels et al. 2015).

#### *13.1.3 Key Engagement Policies*

The Monarchy sets the course for Moroccan diaspora policies. King Mohammed VI (r.1999-present) and his predecessor and father Hassan II (r.1961–1999) have drawn the institutional outlines of these policies and defne(d) to a large extent the policy agenda (Brand 2006). In addition, the new Moroccan Constitution (2011) provides some of the guiding principles for Moroccan diaspora policies.8 However, an integrated, transversal Moroccan diaspora strategy is non-existent.

As stipulated in Article 16 of the Constitution, the Moroccan state aims for the "strengthening of MREs' contribution to the development of their home country, Morocco, and the tightening of cordial and cooperative ties with the governments and societies of the destination countries". This illustrates well the Moroccan diaspora policies' focus on the contribution of Moroccans living abroad to the socioeconomic development of Morocco. Traditionally, Moroccans living abroad have sent large fows of remittances, which are facilitated by several Moroccan banks having agencies in the major destination countries (e.g. *Banque Populaire* and *Atijariwafa Bank*). While remittances are still considered important, current diaspora policies focus more on the mobilisation of Moroccan human resources and investment capital. Through supporting transnational entrepreneurship (e.g. by offering individual guidance to start-ups), stimulating investment in real estate and other sectors (through reduced taxation rates and targeted investment programs), setting up platforms to mobilise and create business networks (such as *Maghribcom*) and disseminating information, the Moroccan state takes an active role in this feld.9 Characteristic for policies linking "migration" and "development" is that commonly supranational, regional and other international institutions are involved. Examples of international actors involved in this branch of Moroccan diaspora policies are the International Organisation for Migration, the European Union, the United Nations and development agencies of several receiving countries.10 Usually, external actors provide a large share of the funding for these policies. Depending on the partnership confguration, initiatives in this feld are sometimes oriented towards specifc segments of the Moroccan expatriate population.11

8Art. 16, 17, 18, 30 and 163.

9On Morocco's mobilisation strategy, El Asri (2012).

10A good example here is SHARAKA, a project co-fnanced by the EU Commission, France and the Netherlands (www.sharaka.ma). This project ran between 2014 and 2017 and was part of the broader EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership, established in 2013.

11For instance, the *Maghrib Entrepreneurs Program* offers support to Moroccan-French entrepreneurs in France and Morocco with their start-up business in Morocco. The program was run in 2014–2015 by the MDCMREAM in cooperation with *l'Agence Française de Développement*.

Beside the socio-economic focus, the ideas of maintaining cultural ties and preservation of the national identity take a pivotal position in Moroccan diaspora policies and discourses (Mahieu et al. 2017; Mahieu 2019). To these aims, several learning programs are being implemented, including Arabic Language and Moroccan Cultural Education (*ELACM*) in major destination countries and an online Arabic language-learning platform (*e-Madrassa*), both coordinated by the Hassan II Foundation. In addition, homeland tours or immersion programs are offered to different age groups, with the aim of immersing children and youngsters in the Moroccan culture, history and society. Examples of these programs are the Seasonal Universities for students in higher education aged between 18–25 (organised by the MDCMREAM) and summer camps for children (organised by the Hassan II Foundation) (Mahieu 2015). Beside visiting programs, Moroccan diaspora institutions also aim at supporting the proliferation of the Moroccan cultural life in the host societies, for instance by supporting Moroccan theatre tours and by creating Moroccan cultural centres (both initiated by the MDCMREAM).

While legally, Moroccan nationals living abroad are entitled to vote and to be eligible in legislative elections at the national, regional and local level (2011 Constitution, Article 17 and Article 30), in practice, this right is not implemented by the Moroccan state. According to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, logistic and diplomatic obstacles for the creation of a constituency abroad in the destination countries impede the electoral participation of nationals living abroad.12

Concerning return migration, returnees currently receive little support from the Moroccan state (SHARAKA 2015). However, policy strategies on return migration are emerging (Cherti et al. 2013), and targeted support initiatives are being set up.13

#### **13.2 Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Morocco**

Pivotal for the social protection of Moroccans nationals living abroad are the Bilateral Conventions on Social Security. In response to large-scale Moroccan labour emigration since the 1960s, Morocco has signed Bilateral Conventions with a number of destination countries for Moroccan emigrants.14 Among the top fve destination countries, four have concluded bilateral agreements on social security

12However, during the period 1985–1989, Moroccan nationals abroad were able to directly elect fve representatives in parliament (Iskander 2010).

13 In 2017, a convention was signed between the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad, and the Regional Council of Beni Mellal-Khenifra on the establishment of a reception centre for MRE, which would be the frst one in Morocco. The centre will aim at both temporary visitors as returnees, and would offer a broad range of administrative and cultural services and leisure.

14Morocco has signed Bilateral Social Security Conventions with 14 countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Germany, Libya, Denmark, Romania, Tunisia, Canada, Portugal, Québec, France, and Luxembourg. With several others, negotiations are continuing.

with Morocco: France (2007),15 Spain (1979), Belgium (1968), and the Netherlands (1972). A similar Bilateral Convention with Italy has been drafted in 1994, but due to Italy's refusal to sign it, it has not been implemented.

All Conventions include key principles such as: the fact that the primary legislation is the one of the country of labour (i.e. the country of residence); equal treatment of nationals and expatriate workers; the exportability of benefts that are normally subject to the residence condition (such as pensions and child benefts); the coordination of the social security systems of both parties. As such, the Conventions guarantee that Moroccan nationals working abroad have the same social security rights and obligations as employed citizens of their residence countries. They also ensure that, under certain conditions, Moroccan nationals, receive Moroccan social security benefts while living abroad and, in case of return to Morocco, that social rights built up in the destination country are exportable to Morocco. Finally, such Conventions also guarantee that periods of activity in both countries are totalised for their entitlement to social security benefts and for the calculation of these benefts.

However, the Conventions only cover *contributory* benefts (i.e. benefts the person has contributed to directly, as part of an insurance system) and benefts based on non-contributory solidarity mechanisms (welfare redistribution drawing on the taxes paid by all tax payers) are not included (Wels et al. 2015). Also, the Conventions only cover Moroccan nationals (and their dependants) with a *legal* residence status, who are also *workers* (or have an equivalent status) in their residence countries.16

In addition to bilateral relations, the protection of social rights of Moroccans in Europe is also affected by European harmonization processes. For instance, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement,17 signed in 2000 by Morocco and the EU Member States, also addresses the social protection of Moroccans in European countries. While primarily a trade agreement, Article 65 of the Euro-Med Agreement concerns social security. It establishes the principle of equal treatment of Moroccan nationals and the citizens of EU Member States in the domain of social security,18 the principle of exportability of social rights from one country to another when nationals move, and the aggregation of activity periods of Moroccan nationals in different EU Member States for the entitlement to and calculation of certain social security benefts.19 However, the Euro-Med Agreement's provisions are not directly implementable

15Original Convention signed on 9-7-1965, revised Convention signed in 2007.

16The various Bilateral Social Security Conventions differ in what refers to the categories of employees that they cover. Often, only employed workers are covered, but the French-Moroccan and Spanish-Moroccan Bilateral Conventions, also include self-employed workers (but only France and Spain do so, not the Moroccan state).

17 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc\_127906.pdf

18However, this non-discrimination principle has been underpinned by EU Members States earlier by the ratifcation of the International Labour Organisation's *Migration for Employment Convention* N°97 (1949) in the 1950s and 1960s.

19The accumulation of social rights across Member States is important, as there have been signifcant migration fows of Moroccan nationals from Southern to Northern European countries during

(since regulatory instruments are needed). To take effect, the agreement still needs to be endorsed by the Morocco-EU Association Council (García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016). Notwithstanding, the European Court of Justice has ruled that the non-discrimination principle in social security is directly implementable anyway (Eisele 2014).20 Also, the principle of aggregation of the benefciary's periods of activity in different Member States is effective yet (García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016).

While there are overlaps between the protection offered by the Euro-Med Agreement on the one hand, and the Bilateral Conventions on the other hand, the Conventions offer a far more comprehensive social protection. These differences explain why Morocco continues to prioritize a bilateral strategy, by initiating or continuing bilateral negotiations with other destination countries (like Norway), renegotiating existing conventions (for instance, with France in 2007) and concluding new administrative arrangements to specify the application of the existing conventions (for instance, with Belgium in 2014).21 While the social protection offered by the Conventions has become more extensive over the years in several cases (e.g. Belgium and France), an inverse tendency of more restrictive application may be noted in the case of the Netherlands. In 2016, the Dutch government announced to lower certain benefts of Moroccan nationals' dependants living in Morocco,22 this decision being justifed by the Dutch government by the lower cost of living in Morocco compared to the Netherlands. While the Moroccan government and diaspora institutions initially contested the decision as unfair, the dispute was settled in favour of the Dutch position.

Beside the provisions defned in bilateral and European agreements, the social protection of Moroccans living abroad receives only limited attention by Moroccan public institutions. There is no systematic dissemination of information on the social protection of nationals abroad, or on the application of the relevant bilateral and EU agreements in particular. Information is disseminated on an irregular basis or to limited audiences, such as through the publication of studies (e.g. by the CCME), the organisation of conferences (e.g. by the Hassan II Foundation) or by organising information sessions (by the National Social Security Fund, CNSS).23 Sometimes, information gaps are addressed by campaigns of international or foreign national development agencies,24 or by host country institutions. A recent study on Morocco's Bilateral Social Security Conventions with Belgium and France found that information provision by the host country institutions is seen by benefciaries as effective,

the latest European economic crisis.

20Case C-18/90 Kziber (1991) ECJ I-199.

21 In 2014, a new administrative arrangement was signed, consolidating returning Moroccan pensioners' rights to health care in Morocco.

22 In particular, dependant widows and children of emigrants would be affected by the measure and lose up to 40% of their benefts.

23For studies, see CCME (2016a) and CCME (2016b). The Hassan II Foundation organised the conference « *Le troisième âge des Marocains résidant à l'étranger* » in June 2005 in Rabat.

24For instance, with regard to return migration to Morocco, a guide has been developed by the SHARAKA consortium, also covering the issue of social security: http://www.sharaka.ma/assets/ Uploads/Guide-MRE-Version-Francaise2.pdf

while information provision by Moroccan public institutions is considered inadequate as administrative staff is often ill-informed (Holzmann 2016).

With regard to the Moroccan consular network, enhancing access to the Moroccan social security protection is not considered a core task of consulates, nor do they assist Moroccan nationals abroad in accessing host country benefts. Consulates do not offer in-kind or cash assistance to nationals abroad and consular services are usually limited to arranging civil and administrative affairs. Helping Moroccans in dealing with social protection in Morocco or in the destination country is not a part of consulates' formal mission.

As most Moroccan nationals abroad live in stable welfare democracies, repatriation in order to ensure the safety of nationals abroad is usually not at stake. However, Article 56 of the decree regulating consular activities25 defnes that, if the citizen abroad is in need and does not receive any support yet by the receiving state, cash or in-kind assistance may be provided, including repatriation. However, the Moroccan state may demand a reimbursement for a period up to 3 years after repatriation in case the repatriated citizen (or the head of household of his/her family) turns out to have means in Morocco. Beside the consulates, also the Hassan II Foundation offers repatriation services to particular categories of vulnerable Moroccans. Sick persons or those in need can fle a request with the Foundation for repatriation support. Under exceptional circumstances (such as civil war), repatriation is considered on a more collective basis. This has been the case for Moroccan nationals living in Libya. In 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a "crisis cell" with the aim of following up political events in Libya and taking necessary measures, including potential repatriation of Moroccan nationals. In addition, there have been several "repatriation operations" for liberating Moroccan migrants incarcerated in Libya in the context of the European battle against clandestine migration to Europe and enabling them to return to Morocco.

No general state policy exists regarding the repatriation of the remains. Repatriation costs are normally covered by special (private) insurances. However, if a Moroccan national abroad dies without an insurance and the family has no means, the Moroccan state covers the cost of repatriation. Both the Hassan II Foundation and the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad include in their services the coverage of the cost of repatriation of the body to Morocco, partially or totally. Candidatebenefciaries (i.e. family members) have to fle a demand with the Ministry (via the local consulate) or the Foundation Hassan II.

#### *13.2.1 Unemployment*

The Social Security Conventions with France and Spain and the Euro-Med Agreement do not take into consideration the coordination of unemployment benefts. As a general rule, unemployment benefts are considered as non-exportable. In

25Décret n° 2-66-646 du 21 kaada 1389 (29 janvier 1970) portant application du dahir n° 421–66 du 8 chaabane 1389 (20 octobre 1969) relatif aux attributions des agents diplomatiques et des consuls à l'étranger.

the Euro-Med Agreement, it is mentioned though that Moroccan nationals, with regard to all social security matters – including unemployment – should receive a "treatment free from any discrimination based on nationality relative to nationals of the Member States in which they are employed" (Art. 65.1).

However, the Bilateral Social Security Conventions that Morocco signed with the Netherlands and Belgium introduce one coordination measure concerning unemployment: to determinate the right to unemployment benefts, the insurance periods of Moroccan nationals during their residency in Morocco and abroad will be aggregated (i.e. the periods the person has worked, or any equivalent period, such as the maternity leave).

Beside these legal provisions, the Moroccan state has also adopted a more proactive strategy regarding unemployment among Moroccan nationals abroad: a vocational training program beneftting young Moroccans abroad in a diffcult social situation. The program was launched in 2011 by the Ministry Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad and Immigration Affairs. It particularly targets young nationals abroad in a number of Arab and African countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Senegal), and aims at stimulating their economic integration in the host societies. Candidates are selected via the embassies and consulates in those countries. The program aims at the acquisition of vocational skills during a 6–8 months training in Morocco, and is implemented in cooperation with the Professional Training and Labour Promotion Offce (OFPPT) and the Ministry of Crafts, Social and Solidary Economy. However, it is a small-scale program with only 30–40 benefciaries each year.

#### *13.2.2 Health Care*

The access to general health care, maternity benefts and benefts related to occupational accidents or occupational diseases are provided by the Bilateral Conventions that Morocco signed with France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. These Conventions ensure that Moroccan nationals are entitled to a health care insurance under the same conditions as the citizens of the country of residence. The Conventions also protect the dependants of the insured person. Also, upon return to Morocco, Moroccan pensioners are entitled to health care insurance (AMO) in Morocco.26

Moroccans nationals in Italy are not covered by a Bilateral Convention, although they are entitled to health care insurance in Italy under the same conditions as Italians through the non-discrimination clause in the Euro-Med Agreement and other treaties (see above). Contrary to their co-nationals in the other top fve

26This is a recent measure, as AMO was introduced in Morocco in 2006.

destination countries, dependants of Moroccans residing in Italy are protected only if they also reside in Italy, not in Morocco.

Beside the obligatory health care insurance (*Assurance Maladie Obligatoire* – AMO, introduced in 2005), covering illness, maternity and accidents, Morocco has introduced the medical assistance program RAMED since 2008. It provides free or partially free medical services in public hospitals in Morocco to the most disadvantaged who are not covered by any health care insurance. Currently, the program is only accessible for Moroccans living in Morocco, but since 2013, the extension of the program to expatriate Moroccans nationals (who return to Morocco) and their dependants has been "under study" by the Health Care Ministry.

During their stay in Morocco over summer, expatriate Moroccans can also beneft from the basic health care provided by the annual *Marhaba* operation. The Mohammed V Foundation is in charge of assisting them in this period, such assistance encompassing administrative, legal and medical help. In transit regions (airports, ports, stations) and throughout Morocco, 20 temporary support centres are equipped with around 800 medical staff members and social assistants. The medical aid provided concerns mainly frst aid in case of emergencies occurring during expatriate Moroccans' journey to Morocco (e.g. traffc incidents), including assistance to the victim's family members.

#### *13.2.3 Pensions*

As the demographic profle of the Moroccan expatriate population is shifting, the exportability of old-age pensions is a relevant issue. In main destination countries (France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands), where the Moroccan population is ageing rapidly (Fondation Hassan II 2006), the question of return is particularly at stake. The Bilateral Social Security Conventions cover this issue. Retired Moroccans who return to Morocco permanently continue to receive the pensions they were entitled to in the receiving country. In case the pensioner deceases, the dependants are usually entitled to a survivor's pension, no matter whether they live in Morocco or in the destination country. Only Spain maintains a residence requirement (CCME 2016a).

However, the principle of exportability only applies to regular pensions, not to any (non-contributory) top-ups that are offered in the receiving countries to pensioners with a pension below the minimum income. This is an important aspect, as approximately one out of three Moroccan pensioners living abroad beneft from such top-ups (Holzmann 2016).

Beside the legal provisions regarding pensions, there are also support programs for old Moroccans living abroad. One of the Moroccan diaspora institutions, the Hassan II Foundation, considers the elderly as an important target group of its "Cooperation and Partnership program". In this social program (in place since 1998), NGOs or other institutions or individuals working with retired Moroccans abroad can request the support of the Foundation Hassan II for their projects (partial fnancial support or in-kind support). In some of the implemented projects, the aim was to enhance the access of Moroccan pensioners to their social rights, but many projects focus more broadly on the elderly's well-being and their ties to Morocco.

#### *13.2.4 Family-Related Benefts*

The Bilateral Social Security Conventions that Morocco signed with four of the top fve receiving countries guarantee Moroccans' access to family benefts even when the dependants (spouse and children) are residing in Morocco.27 In contrast, the Euro-Med Agreement only guarantees family benefts when the children are residing with the worker in an EU Member State. As a result, Moroccan heads of households working in Italy are not entitled to family benefts when their children are living in Morocco.

In 2010, a scholarship program was launched to support the school careers of Moroccan youngsters abroad. The Ministry Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad and Immigration Affairs (MDCMREAM), together with the Ministry of Higher Education, Academic Research and Professional Training offers 1000 university scholarships annually to students in a "precarious situation". Their candidacy is made via the local consulate and the selection process is done by a Commission including members of both Ministries. The scholarship is limited to one student per family and the monthly allowance is around 1000 Moroccan Dirham (= around €100).

For Moroccan families living in Algeria and the Ivory Coast, there is another specifc school support program. Deprived families can apply for fnancial support helping to cover their children's school fee. The aim is to boost school attendance by this group. The MDCMREAM provides support to 1000 Moroccan families in Algeria and 120 in the Ivory Coast. The fee depends on the number of children in the family (one child: 1000 Moroccan Dirham per year, 500 Dirham extra per child, up to a maximum of 5 children.)

#### *13.2.5 Economic Hardship*

The Moroccan state does not provide guaranteed minimum resources for Moroccans in Morocco. Therefore, unsurprisingly, there are no provisions to guarantee minimum resources for Moroccans living abroad. In the residence countries, guaranteed minimum resources are considered as non-contributory benefts and therefore nonexportable. To beneft from them, the Moroccans benefciary needs to reside in the receiving country.

27Sometimes, there is a restriction with regard to the number of children abroad creating an entitlement to family benefts. For instance, the French-Moroccan Social Security Convention defnes a limit of four children.

However, in 2013, the government has launched the idea to offer in-cash assistance to needy nationals abroad. The former prime minister announced the creation of a National Solidarity Fund for Moroccan nationals living abroad who fnd themselves in a precarious situation. The aim would be to help the "most vulnerable or needy citizens abroad". The Solidarity Fund would contain ten million Moroccan Dirham (= €1 million.) and allocation of money would operate via consulates and embassies. However, this Fund does not seem to be operational (yet), and it is unclear who would beneft from it and under what conditions.

The lack of guaranteed minimum resources does not mean that Moroccan nationals who do not have an income are left to their fate. Due to the extensive social protection in Europe (where the largest share of the Moroccan population abroad is located), foreign nationals including Moroccan nationals are usually entitled to welfare benefts in the country of residence, although eligibility criteria vary across countries. However, Moroccan institutions (consular services, diaspora institutions) do not offer assistance to Moroccans living abroad in accessing these welfare benefts.

#### **13.3 Conclusions**

The focus of Moroccan diaspora policies is the mobilisation of Moroccan nationals' human and fnancial capital for socio-economic development in Morocco. Social protection of nationals abroad does not take a central position on the political agenda. When considering the state of the Moroccan society, with relatively high poverty and unemployment rates28 and an emerging Moroccan social security system, this lack of prioritization of expatriate nationals' social protection is not surprising.

However, some important steps have been taken in this regard. The primary tools for expatriate nationals' social protection are a series of Bilateral Social Security Conventions that Morocco negotiated with top destination countries, including France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These Conventions pursue coordination of the social security systems of Morocco and the destination countries and allow the exportability of (contributory) social benefts from origin to destination countries and vice versa. In the second place, harmonising EU policies towards its Mediterranean neighbours have also led to some coordination in the protection of social rights. This is especially important for Moroccans living in countries that have not signed a Social Security Convention with Morocco, such as Italy.