interests and perspectives. We performed interviews to gain information about "how" and "why" these actors defend their goals in temporary housing to get to know their motives (Yin, 2018: 118). More precisely, we conducted interviews with seven temporary users, six property owners, six mediator agencies (non- and for-profit), and one representative of the city department for housing. In addition, we interviewed one expert from the local tenants' association, one from the local homeowners' association, one expert from a private local real-estate management agency as well as two politicians of the local legislative parliament. All interviewees were chosen due to their detailed understanding and knowledge of the topic as well as based on their practical expertise related to the position they occupied within certain professional structures (Yin, 2018: 118). For instance, the actors representing the temporary users, the property owners, and the mediator agencies were chosen as they were part of seven ongoing temporary housing projects in Zurich city region (Table 5.7). In doing so, we aimed to gain knowledge from participants directly involved in—or affected by—temporary housing. We stopped interviewing people when no new insights from data gathering were collected because the answers of the respondents coincided (Yin, 2018: 118). In a *third step*, we focused on the temporary users' socio-economic housing situation to draw conclusions on the beneficiaries of for-profit temporary housing strategies. To do so, we carried out "unstructured field observations" (Althaus et al., 2009: 24) of the seven temporary housing sites to systematically document impressions related to the quality, size, and location of home and to provide material for the formulation of detailed questions during interviews. We noted all our observations in a field book to constantly improve our knowledge and to tailor questions prior to new interviews (Yin, 2018: 132). Moreover, we conducted a questionnaire with the temporary users, including specific questions capturing their socio-economic profile (age, gender, education/employment, income in relation to rent, household size, duration). The data collected makes it possible to compare the users' situation with each other (Table 5.7) and to reflect on potential repercussions for municipal policymaking. All temporary users interviewed signed a document for ethical approval to ensure that the data collected in their home can—in an anonymous way—be used for publication.

#### *5.5.4 The Commodification of Temporary Housing in Zurich*

The emergence of a for-profit temporary housing model in Zurich took place in two stages (Fig. 5.4). *First*, through a process of institutionalization, which demarcated it from squatting, temporary housing was no longer considered illegal. Temporary housing became regulated through formal rules and procedures, but with non-profit objectives. Actors involved in institutionalized temporary housing benefit not only from higher legal protection, but also from the ability to sanction abuses.

At the beginning of the 2010s, out of institutionalized non-profit temporary housing, *an additional step* took place towards the emergence of a commodified model. This step was connected to the legal obligation to densify within municipal boundaries in Swiss cities which has led to increasingly tight urban housing markets. Under scarce land conditions legal security becomes relevant for landowners, as well as planning predictability, flexibility, and economic security. To cope with building delays, temporary housing offers them a leeway to bypass tenant protection in housing and to realize profitable housing projects at central locations without substantial investment risks. In this model, private mediator agencies provide their services and knowledge to their clients

216 G. DEBRUNNER

**Fig. 5.4** The emergence of for-profit temporary housing in Zurich can be explained by the twofold process of institutionalization and commodification

(property owners) with profit-oriented motives and get paid for their mediation work.

In the following section, we explain in detail these two mechanisms at play that lead to the shift towards profit-seeking in temporary housing by analyzing the local regulatory framework and the involved actors' rationale.

#### *Local Regulatory Framework*

In this section, we analyze the local regulatory framework (stressing both public policies and property rights) regulating temporary housing in Zurich. Temporary housing is addressed in several public law areas. We start with the city's police power. Then, we emphasize aspects of housing and planning policy because of their significant impact on housing (re)development. Finally, the role of private law will also be addressed as it has an impact on the property owner's decisions regarding the use of urban vacancies (Table 5.8).

#### Public Policies Regulating Temporary Housing in Zurich

The "1980-opera-riots" have marked a significant change in Zurich's police practice, particularly in regard to the clearance of housing squats. Following the claims of the activist groups, in the year 1989, the municipal parliament agreed to introduce a legally binding temporary housing clause in police law in order to calm down the youth protests of that time (Interview 20, member of municipal legislative parliament, 06.05.2015). Following the new legislation, the city police were only allowed to clear

**Table 5.8** Main dimensions of the regulatory framework influencing temporary housing practice in Zurich

housing squats if the property owners could provide an approved building permit (Municipal Housing Squat Regulation17 ). Otherwise, the owners had to pay for the evacuation costs themselves (Interview 34, CEO of a for-profit mediator agency, 26.04.2019). In the following years, this legal change has led to increased public and political openness towards squatting and temporary use in Zurich (Stahel, 2006).

In housing policy, the opera riot led to several changes too. During the 1990s and 2000s, public subsidies for non-profit housing organizations increased with the primary aim to support vulnerable groups who struggle to find adequate housing (Municipal Housing Policy Act,18 Art. 1–6). Many of these social housing organizations are still tightly connected

17 See "Zurich Housing Squat Regulation of 1989" which is based on the Cantonal Police Act of 10 March 1831 (CPA 550.1).

18 Municipal Housing Policy Act of July 9th 1924 (LHPA 841.110).

to the municipality and considered a political response to the demands formulated during the "1980-opera-riot". Furthermore, on November 27, 2011, following a popular municipal initiative, 75.9% of Zurich's voting majority agreed to raise the share of social housing property (public and non-profit cooperative) to at least a third (33.3%) of the total housing stock by 2050 (Municipal Constitution,19 Art. 2). In 2019, the property share of non-profit housing amounted to 24.6% (City of Zurich, 2019a). To meet this policy objective, the city of Zurich builds on an active land acquisition strategy in favor of public housing and non-profit housing cooperatives (Balmer & Gerber, 2017).

Temporary housing, moreover, is influenced by planning law. As already mentioned in the introductory section, in March 2013, the Swiss voting majority approved the revision of the Federal Spatial Planning Act (SPA) which, among other purposes, aims to increase density within municipal boundaries. Following the revised SPA, the city of Zurich has updated its planning legislation in 2018. Particularly, the city council initiated planning measures such as the introduction of densification zones20 to effectively promote population growth through internal settlement development and the efficient use of energy (Zurich City Council, 2013: 5). As a consequence, urban densification projects leading to redevelopment of existing stocks have intensified in the last five years (Interview 35, City Department for Housing, 03.05.2019). Under these circumstances, temporary uses of vacant residential properties shortly before demolition or reconstruction have become a favored coping strategy for landowners. Temporary uses help them to flexibly deal with short-term vacancies and potential planning delays in this context of densification (Bürgin, 2017). Simultaneously, however, residents' social resistance strategies and NIMBY-syndromes against densification projects have increased too as modernization often leads to higher rents and to social exclusion processes of lower-income groups (COSD Zurich, 2014).

#### Private Law Configurations: Institutional Differences Between Letting Vs. Loaning

The temporary use of housing stocks is not only influenced by public regulations. Private law also impacts urban housing development. Swiss

19 Municipal Constitution of April 26th 1970 (LC 101.100).

20 In these zones, landowners can realize higher exploitation rates (number of apartments) in comparison to the former Municipal Zoning Act (1999).

landowners are in a power position to decide on the use and disposal of their housing premises due to the constitutional guarantee of property (Art. 26, SC). Property rights can only be restricted if strict conditions are met. In any case, full compensation is to be paid (Art. 5, 26, 36 SC).

In contrast, the rights of temporary users are protected by the articles for tenancy matters in the Swiss Constitution (Art. 109 SC) as well as in the Federal Obligations Code of 1911 (Art. 253274 OC). Under the rules of Swiss tenancy, private landlords, temporary users, and mediators agree to sign a terminable rent contract. What we observe in temporary housing practice is that the mediators are renting the whole building from the property owner with a regular rental contract that is time limited. The mediators sublet the individual apartments to the final temporary users (sub-tenants). Through this institutional set up, the landlord has the guarantee to have his facilities empty at the date initially planned because the options granted by the law to object to any decision of the landlord are weakened due to the limitations of the subletting contract. Theoretically, the mediators as legal tenants are still able to have recourse against the owner in the cantonal tenancy court but in practice they do not because they need to maintain a good relationship with the owners for further housing options.

Strategic weakening of the tenants' position takes place above all through another institutional mechanism. In Zurich, besides tenancy law, loaning law regulation is also accepted to regulate temporary uses in the housing sector (Federal Obligations Code, Art. 305–311). Historically, loaning law was introduced in 1911 as part of the Federal Obligations Code to arrange temporary uses of all kinds in vacant places (e.g., in garages or tool rooms). In contrast to short-term rent or lease, loaning regulation allows flexible use of vacant sites at low cost without being obliged to follow the rules of tenancy (e.g., three month contract termination deadline, rent deposit payment, etc.). This also means that the user—legally the "borrower"—does not have to pay a fixed rent but rather a fee for monthly maintenance and operation costs such as water, heating, and electricity. The owner—legally the "lender"—has no restriction to keep the three month contract termination deadline, as is mandatory in Swiss tenancy law. This legal framing gives property owners the ability to force users to leave the property at any moment and at short notice as they do not have a legal standing to claim their rights in court. Additionally, lenders have no duty to provide maintenance, such as insulation, heating, or covering any damages in the apartment as would be mandatory under tenancy law. It is therefore possible that lenders use this legal discretion to evict borrowers on short notice. The temporary user, in addition, does not have the right to appeal against contract termination, unfair treatment, or other abuses in the cantonal arbitration board as legally, they are not identified as "tenants" (Büchi & Gehrig, 2014). In Zurich, loaning law was first used for the regulation of temporary housing projects in 2013. In contrast to other Swiss cities, there exists no legal restriction which forbids the use of loaning law for housing premises (see discussion for details).

Ironically, in practice, our case study reveals that temporary users develop resistance strategies against loaning practice since they do not have to pay a rent but instead a monthly fixed fee for additional operation costs. For example, one temporary user installed a whirlpool in his backyard as he could not be charged for additional water consumption. Consequently, mediators developed legal strategies to counteract these abuses and raised the maintenance costs at the beginning (Interview 17, CEO of a for-profit mediator agency, 20.02.2015). Lastly, loaning contracts can easily and quickly be signed electronically, which reduces the administrative costs and optimizes the work efficiency of the mediator agencies in that model (Büchi & Gehrig, 2014).

#### *Stage 1: The Emergence of Institutionalized but Non-Commodified Temporary Housing in Zurich During the 1980s*

In Zurich, temporary housing agencies working on a non-profit basis (stage 1) are organized under the tenancy law regime (Table 5.9). Typically, the mediators rent an apartment or a whole building from the property owner through a temporary rental contract and sublet the apartments to specific target groups. These social organizations were founded more than 30 years ago and appeared as a political response to the demands of the "1980-opera-riot". They are therefore still strongly connected to the municipal government.

The investigated non-profit housing organizations "Woko" (in German: "Studentische Wohngenossenschaft"), "Juwo" (in German: "Jugendwohnnetz"), and "Domicil foundation" receive public financial support for their services and thus represent an integrated part of Zurich's social housing policy system. In other words, these social institutions are part of an approach to ensure adequate and affordable housing provisions for vulnerable and low-income households (e.g., young adults, families, and social welfare recipients) in the city. By helping them to manage their

**Table 5.9** The two stages towards the commodification of temporary housing in Zurich

daily life (budget, housing rules, household work), they act mostly as social workers and take responsibility for the tenants' social integration and security within urban neighborhoods. The main motivation of these social organizations is to widen the housing possibilities for the specific needs of their social target groups. They select beneficiaries according to set criteria (age, income, degree of education) and provide apartments exclusively for persons in difficult living situations. As a result, the agencies identify themselves as an integrated part of the tenants' community and do not provide affordable housing to generate monetary returns (Interview 11, Director of Domicil foundation, 21.01.2015).

*Woko*, for example, was founded as a self-help association in 1956 and was later transformed into a housing cooperative in the 1970s. Its core business lies in renting affordable housing units to students. Additionally, Woko has always been a mediator between students looking for accommodation and property owners. In 1987 (after the 1980s social protests in Zurich), a public foundation for student housing SSWZ (in German: "Stiftung für Studentisches Wohnen Zürich") was created next to Woko. Thanks to SSWZ, it became possible to build new apartments for students for the first time in Zurich. While Woko focused on administration and facility management of student housing, the buildings were mainly owned by the foundation SSWZ, the municipalities of Zurich and Winterthur, the Canton of Zurich, and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Interview 7, Director of Woko, 12.01.2015).

*Juwo*—the housing network for young people—is legally organized as an association and was founded as a direct response to the "1980ssocial-movements" and the affordable housing crises in Zurich of that time. Juwo mainly arranges temporary housing options for a young and low-income segment of the population (Interview 4, Director of Juwo, 08.01.2015).

The private *foundation Domicil* was founded in 1994 and, as the others, follows a clear social objective. Its core interest is providing wherever possible—long-term affordable housing. Particularly, Domicil works together with low-income people, families, single parents or people who experienced discrimination in the housing market. Many of them receive social welfare contributions. Temporary housing is only used as alternative strategy because it is very hard to find long-term affordable rental options that they can mediate to their clients in Zurich (Interview 11, Director of Domicil foundation, 21.01.2015).

We show people how to clean a cooker, where 'Migros' [the local grocery store] is and what type of cleaning equipment they need to clean with. We also provide information about ventilation or mold prevention in the apartment or how to deal with the neighbour. We explain how to cooperate with the housekeeper and the property administration. All these different levels when it comes to housing (…). (Interview 11, director of Domicil foundation, 21.01.2015)

Since the 1980s, the affordable housing shortage has become a very strong driving force for the institutionalization of temporary housing in Zurich. It serves as a flexible and individualized approach to address specific housing needs. Hence, the non-profit agencies started to expand their regular housing portfolio with temporary apartments. In a context of land scarcity and increasing redevelopment of existing buildings, this housing type has become practiced more intensively since the beginning of the 2010s (Interview 7, Director of Woko, 12.01.2015).

We arrange temporary housing if people are totally in emergency. If we can simply not find any other solution. [...] In Zurich, there exists a clear housing shortage for this group of people we care about. [...] It is precarious. [...] Therefore, we started to add temporary housing to our portfolio. (Interview 11, director of Domicil foundation, 21.01.2015)

Property owners who allow temporary housing mediated by the nonprofit sector in their premises recognize this model either as a time and money-saving opportunity in the phase that precedes redevelopment or as an effective protection against squatting and vandalism (or both). In their view, they benefit from higher predictability, secure economic profit, and lower maintenance costs than when leaving the property empty. Interestingly, they gain higher financial income due to the rent than property owners who rely on for-profit temporary housing (see next section). Some property owners also emphasize the moral satisfaction when enabling affordable housing options for users in need and when working together with non-profit mediators (Interview 8, private property owner, 16.01.2015).

For the whole house, which is divided into two apartments, I get a rent of 3300 francs plus 700 francs maintenance costs for water and electricity supply per month. [...] I wanted to have about the same income as if the apartments were rented long-term. [...] Because of financial reasons. I needed the income. I do not have a house in Zurich only because it is nice. (Interview 8, 69-years old private owner, 16.01.2015)

#### *Stage 2: The Emergence of Temporary Housing as a Business Model in the 2010s*

Commodified temporary housing is regulated under the loaning law regime. The investigated mediator agencies (two private limited companies and one joint-stock company) organize temporary housing under loaning law to earn a living out of the vacancy business. Since the year 2010, three companies positioned themselves in the profit-oriented vacancy business in Zurich (Projekt Interim GmbH, Intermezzo AG, and novac solutions GmbH). Their core business activity is managing realestate vacancies in a profit-oriented manner on the owners' behalf and using them for temporary uses of all kind (e.g., creative economy, shared office spaces, or housing units).

We organise temporary uses. Normally before conversion or demolition of buildings. [...] We started in 2011 and professionalised in 2013. [...] This was because we received requests. (Interview 17, CEO Projekt Interim, 20.02.2015)

The most successful firm in the vacancy business we investigated is the private firm Projekt Interim GmbH (limited company). Originally, this firm was organized as a non-profit organisation until its shareholders changed the business structure to a private profit-oriented limited company in 2013. According to the founders, they changed their business structure to for-profit as they acknowledged an increasing demand from the owners' side. In recent years, complex densification projects within the urban built environment have required longer waiting times for building permits which is why the number of property vacancies has started to escalate. This means that many property owners terminate rent contracts even though they do not already have a building permit or know the date on which they can start reconstructing. In case the rent contracts expire but no approved building permit can be demonstrated, a potential vacancy period between dismissal and demolition/renovation emerges. As a consequence, temporary use suddenly becomes all the more profitable for the initiators of Projekt Interim GmbH since owners demand professional services to manage these vacancies. The firm brings together people with a wide range of expertise such as technical skills in realestate management, a good network in Zurich's creative scene, and legal knowledge about local and national regulations regarding temporary use (Interview 17, CEO Projekt Interim, 20.02.2015).

Property owners who choose working together with profit-oriented companies follow the clear objective to minimize risks of development delays in a city under densification pressure and a tight urban housing market. They are under high economic investment pressure and fear losing money due to building delays, which is why they need to be sure to start with the new construction on time. Their main objective is to increase predictability and flexibility in a period of economic uncertainty (Interview 34, CEO Intermezzo AG, 26.04.2019). Therefore, they willingly pay for the mediator's services to benefit from the legal possibility of evicting the temporary users at short notice. From a financial point of view, temporary housing under loaning law mainly affects the property owners because they agree to pay for the mediators' management skills and the legal security to expel occupants (Interview 33, CEO Novac Solutions AG, 24.04.2019).

After legal advice, we [institutional property owners] recognised that if someone with a loaning contract applies for a contract extension, the person does not have any legal possibility to extend. [...] This way, potential objections are directly off the table. At the same time, we can get temporary users out of the house within a short time. They can do nothing about it. [...] It is primarily about planning security. (Interview 14, institutional property owner, 30.01.2015)

*Effects of Letting Vs. Loaning on Temporary Users' Housing Situation*  According to a study on residents' income in the city of Zurich (Martinovits, 2014), the majority of the occupants living in the investigated temporary apartments can be identified as low-income, with a monthly net-income per person of 1000–3500 Swiss francs (Table 5.9). As a rule of thumb, in Switzerland, it is generally assumed that a quarter of the household net-income can be spent on housing costs without negatively impacting other dimensions of life (FOSI & FOH, 2015).

Under loaning law, the temporary housing prices are much cheaper than under tenancy. For instance, when renting a 4.5 room temporary apartment in Zurich (see investigated project Nr. 3: 2260 CHF for 4.5 rooms), the price is more than three times as expensive as when loaning temporary housing (see project 5: 740 CHF for 4.5 rooms) (Table 5.10). Due to these massively cheaper offers under loaning law, the socio-economic profile of temporary users changed significantly in the 2010s. Nowadays, besides the temporary users of the creative scene (e.g., students, young urban creatives) more and more working-poor families, young families, people with social aid, and low-income immigrants decide to benefit from low-cost and centrally located dwellings. In comparison to options on the regular housing market, temporary housing is offered below market rates (in letting and loaning), although in substandard conditions (e.g., with bad sanitary, insulation, and heating facilities).

It is a very special house. The ceilings are very low. Everything is crooked. You cannot find any right angle here. If you look at this wall, you surely have 5 to 10% inclination. It has no heating. [...] It is very rudimentary. It has a shower cabin downstairs but up here it has no shower. [...] Nobody would invest money to renovate something because it is a temporary use. (Interview 2, 26-year-old male, temporary user and student at Zurich University, 06.01.2015)

In addition to affordability, some temporary users—namely students and young professionals—appreciate the flexibility provided by temporary housing. As they have not settled down yet, they acknowledge temporary living as a unique opportunity to explore the city (Interview 9, 27-years-old architect, 17.01.2015).

However, out of the seven temporary user parties investigated (three students, two young urban professionals, one working-poor family, and one low-income immigrant family) all of them stated that they would not decide to live in a temporary apartment if they could have a long-term, stable, and similarly cheap alternative on the regular housing market. It is especially difficult with children to live in temporary housing because of the frequent changes of backgrounds and friends. Temporary users living with their family also stated that they had to live in temporary apartments due to their work during night shifts. They were dependent on living at a low cost but also close to their workplace in the city center so temporary housing remained the only option (Interview 10, single mother with two children, working as cleaning assistant, 17.01.2015).

**Table 5.10** Comparable example of a 4.5 room temporary housing apartment under letting and loaning (Wüest & Partner, 2017, and questionnaire with temporary users)

At this moment, it is financially ideal. Also in Zurich, where it is almost impossible to find something for a good price at a good location. [...] But for a family, it is hard. A little tough. We are now looking for a longterm apartment because of our child. It would be nice if we could have a little rest. (Interview 13, 32-year-old male temporary user, working as cook and freelancer, living together with his wife and his one-year old boy, 28.01.2015)

Astonishingly, temporary users are financially more affected in the nonprofit model than they are in the commodified model. From a purely economic perspective, this is legitimized by the fact that paying for the rent ensures that their housing rights remain protected in court.

## *5.5.5 Discussion: All in Favor of Commodified Temporary Housing?*

The main research questions of this article address the tension between housing provision, temporary use, and tight urban housing markets as follows: *What are the institutional arrangements that make for-profit temporary housing possible? Which rationales of the different actors involved in this system explain its expansion?* And what are the consequences on the different categories of actors? Then, we show how institutional arrangements and the strategic behavior of different actors involved in temporary housing are at the core for answering these research questions. Not only do our results reveal how the municipal regulatory framework affects the temporary use of urban housing stocks. They also show how different actors involved in temporary use respond to and are impacted by new legal practices such as the shift towards loaning law in temporary housing.

We show that a commodified temporary housing model that is managed on the owners' behalf has emerged in Zurich. In this new business model, temporary housing is favored by a coalition of all major actors involved—property owners, mediators, temporary users, and municipal authorities. Despite the apparent agreement, however, this does not remain without consequences for those in need of affordable housing. We reveal that the short-term interests of the property owners and the for-profit mediators get the upper hand over the long-term and stable housing needs of low-income households.

*For-profit mediator agencies* take advantage of the gaps in Swiss tenancy law to offer short-term housing solutions based on loan use regulation. Individual knowledge from the non-profit temporary use sector and a strong business intuition were the drivers to institutionalize temporary housing through these new rules of the game (loaning law) and with for-profit objectives. Although for-profit mediators insist that they are aware of their social responsibility to organize temporary housing, they contribute to the weakening of tenants' security through the promotion of a housing model outside of tenancy law.

*Property owners* in the commodified model do require payment for operation costs but not rent. Due to increasingly complex inner-city redevelopment procedures and corresponding planning delays (e.g., due to objections by neighbors), the financial investment risks for owners increased in recent years. In this situation, temporary housing under loaning law fulfills a specific niche function on real-estate markets in the sense that it increases planning predictability, legal security, flexibility, and economic security for the owners. More specifically, in an environment where land is scarce and competition to use this land is increasing, property owners can no longer afford to leave their properties empty for an unpredictable duration. Inevitably, they are interested in a time and money-saving solution to remain flexible and economically competitive. In the end, because of the almost repealed protection of tenants' rights and the absence of any legal tenancy obligation to provide maintenance services, owners enjoy maximal economic security and full decision-making power.

The need for better predictability might even be reinforced by the municipal police regulation on housing squats which accepts squatting as long as landowners cannot demonstrate a formal building permit. Paradoxically, this attitude might create additional pressure on the owners as their property is no longer protected by the state in the period of vacancy and planning uncertainty. Hence, the owners are in need of finding a short-term solution which helps them to manage their vacant properties. Although the municipality of Zurich does not directly financially support the for-profit model, they contribute to its economic success by tolerating the loaning law regime in housing. Even though this model frames housing in a completely different way, it seems that the city government has not yet realized potential detrimental consequences. To counterpoise this decision, politicians and NGOs in other Swiss cities have started to call for legal prohibition of loaning law practice in housing, for instance in the city of Basel. Here, a temporary user is legally allowed to claim that the costs paid by the users for maintenance are too high for its acceptance as a loan. Instead, it can be classified as rent which makes eviction at short notice illegal (City of Basel, 2018).

Finally, the *temporary users*—namely low-income families, single parents, people receiving social aid, young urban professionals, and students—appreciate the ability to live centrally and at a low cost in Zurich. However, these vulnerable groups are caught in a vicious circle leading to dependence on precarious housing solutions and the erosion of their social rights and protection in housing. By signing loaning law contracts, temporary users abandon their legal protection as they do not have the ability to extend contracts or to claim their rights in court. Under this legal framing, they remain totally dependent on the conditions offered by the owners and mediators. In the investigated non-profit model, in contrast, temporary housing can still be interpreted as a part of the existing social housing policy system as the provision of housing is organized for the users'—not the owners'—benefit. Nevertheless, even if non-profit temporary housing follows clear social objectives, it still needs to be critically questioned whether the requested rent prices are justified for temporary apartments that are mostly substandard and designated to be demolished.

#### *5.5.6 Housing Is a Matter of Tenancy Law, Not Loaning Law!*

While there is a growing body of literature critically discussing how temporary urbanism affects urban social life (Galdini, 2019; Lai et al., 2018; Vallance et al., 2017), and another line of research focusing on the potentials of temporary use for the flexible development of urban spaces in general (Cardullo et al., 2018; Dubeaux & Sabot, 2018; Németh & Langhorst, 2014; Özdemirli, 2014), research on how different forms of temporary use affect the housing situation in cities is still thin (Lara-Hernandez et al., 2020; van Holm, 2020). More qualitative and quantitative research is therefore needed to understand how temporary housing changes everyday life in cities and potentially leads to precarious living situations for lower-income groups. Future research should focus more intensively on the social dimension of sustainability in cities (affordability, tenure security, stability, etc.) to understand how to cope with tight urban housing markets and intensifying scarcity of land.

In this article, we explained the emergence of a commodified temporary model in the Swiss urban context. Even though our results are limited to the city of Zurich, potential for generalization results from the following identified causal mechanisms which are expected to have broader significance in other urban contexts too: our analysis reveals that even though the city council publicly commits to affordable and socially equitable housing development (Municipal Constitution, Art. 2, Para. 5), in temporary housing, it assists in bypassing tenancy law by accepting the loaning law regime in housing. This, in turn, assures increased flexibility and predictability for the owners (no contract termination deadline and no corresponding judicial uncertainty). The municipal government might be reluctant to prohibit the loaning law regime for temporary housing as it might hinder property owners from densifying their parcels as investment risks increase. Simultaneously, property owners benefit from an economic incentive to raise the profit margin when obtaining densification measures due to smaller transaction costs. For temporary users, however, we see that loaning regulation leads to the erosion of their social rights, stability, and protection in housing as it promotes a precarious standard and short-term perspective of living. This model stands for a more general shift towards the acknowledgment of housing as a commodity and investment asset rather than as a basic human need and unique kind of good (Harvey, 2005, 2012; Marcuse, 1985; Rolnik, 2013). We finally identify a risk that low-income residents become increasingly excluded from innercity housing as the supply of new housing—in particular through support measures for housing cooperatives—targets the middle class instead of the lower socio-economic segments of the population—a highly unsustainable urban development scenario! If the for-profit temporary housing model becomes more mainstream and competes even more directly with nonprofit firms, it may reinforce the residents' dependence on the owners' short-term decisions and increasingly become a social challenge for the city government. In the long run, public expenses for social aid might rise as the number of residents suffering from unstable housing conditions increases and more people potentially become dependent on social welfare contributions.

Let's not open Pandora's box—housing is a matter for tenancy law, not loaning law, to protect the users' stability, security, and long-term right to housing. We are convinced that Zurich's municipal government is in the power position to change the legal setting to prohibit temporary housing under loaning law and to minimize further flexibilisation of the housing sector. As demonstrated in other Swiss cities (e.g. Basel), legal changes in tenancy law neither lead to an increase of urban vacancies nor to a prohibition of non-residential temporary uses. Instead, temporary housing vacancies are managed under non-profit objectives and with predictable tenure conditions for the users. Simultaneously, Zurich's city government should point particular attention to housing provisions for those with the lowest incomes. To look more closely at those who pay the social price of densification and corresponding urban upgrading measures is essential if urban quality and viability is to be retained for all, including more vulnerable socio-economic groups.

# References

Brunaupark Tenants Association. (2019b). *Petition Leben im Brunaupark*.

Accessed 18 Oct 2020.

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# Discussion of Results

# 6.1 Discussion of Key Results

In this chapter and Chapter 7, a final discussion and conclusion are drawn *whether* and *how* the implementation of densification objectives leads to social sustainability in housing. This is done by analyzing the institutional regime (key finding 1), and the different actors' strategies using housing stocks under scarce urban land use conditions (key findings 2 to 4). Making explicit the local governance mechanisms of possible trade-offs *and* power games among actors (key finding 5) in densification procedures is a new contribution of this research project to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research.

**SQ1**: How do institutional rules affect the outcomes of densification in terms of social sustainability in housing?

**Key empirical finding 1: Institutional incoherence between landowners' and tenants' rights, and the extent of rules influencing the implementation of densification objectives, lead to socially unsustainable housing development**

Results of Articles 1 to 4 *confirm hypothesis 1* (see Sect. 3.6): in a context of densification, the Swiss institutional regime in force is indeed key for disentangling *how* and *why* social sustainability in housing is produced. Article 1 demonstrates *how* the unequal distribution of legal power between public policy *and* property rights in the Swiss federal regulatory framework, *but also* the extent of formal rules impacting the densification implementation process, affect the way actors use housing goods and services (e.g. affordable living space, energy source). Whereas property titles are strongly secured by the Swiss Constitution *and* the Civil Code, and are very enduring and long-lasting, Swiss public policies regulating housing stocks are quickly revised depending on current political majorities. More precisely:

Article 1 shows that while in Swiss federal planning, tax and energy policy the parliament has only recently agreed to introduce new legislation that stronger enshrines energy efficiency objectives, legal amendments to support social interests of densification (e.g. in housing, planning, or social welfare policy) have not been made. Federal policy instruments in favor of socially sensitive redevelopment such as the introduction of a fixed minimum share of 10% non-profit housing in the Swiss Constitution1 or the obligation for private homeowners to pass tax benefit for energetic renovation to tenants, have been politically debated but never fully enacted.

In addition, on November 20, 2020, the Swiss Federal Court only recently decided that landlords can increase the rent by several hundred Swiss francs in case new renters move into an apartment (in stock as well as in new built housing). This decision was made based on the grounds that institutional owners (e.g. pension funds) would make too little profit due to the low interest rates on the property markets. It is therefore expected that the number of mass dismissals in the rental segment will increase in Switzerland since owners can benefit of fast and increasing rent revenue (Perricone, 2020).

Consequently, even though the land use context in Swiss cities has changed, Swiss property owners still benefit from public subsidies for energetic renovation or modernization wherever housing stock is being densified. Owners must neither pass the received subsidies to the tenants nor are they obliged to stick to certain rent levels where real estate is demolished and refurbished resulting in higher costs for residents. In

1 On February 9, 2020, the Swiss electorate voted on the popular initiative "more affordable homes". The initiative proposed that across Switzerland at least 10% of newly built homes should belong to non-profit developers (mostly housing cooperatives). Swiss voters rejected the initiative. Final results show it won 42.9% of the vote nationwide, with 57.1% against, on a turnout of 41.7% (Swiss Federal Council, 2020).

sum, owners are encouraged to densify through public incentives (e.g. for energetic renovation, energy efficiency), but without any restrictions or duties regarding rent increase, dismissal of elderly, or disruption of long-enduring communities. While this power guaranteed to landowners has not triggered any conflicts on unbuilt green- or brownfields, the legal tensions between owners' and residents' interests have increased in a context of densification.

Indeed, even though the socio-spatial conditions under the compact city model have changed significantly, results show that property owners are still allowed to densify existing housing stocks without further tenancy restriction. They can terminate an open-ended rent contract within three months without any specific reasons and without any legal obligation to compensate the tenants, for example, for moving costs. Moreover, in newly built housing, it is possible for landowners to start the rent at a new level. They do not have to follow rent levels as would be mandatory for renovated real estate. Therefore, property owners are highly motivated to densify through complete demolition as they can make a lot of profit through increased rent revenue after rebuilding.

Moreover, their position is secured by strongly protected property titles. This means that the owner is free to define the profit margin to be targeted on the parcel and can set the rents according to market prices. Hence, urban densification is essentially profit-driven in Switzerland since property owners do not face any institutional boundaries that would prevent them from acting socially unsustainable. Housing providers are not forced by law to follow a more socially inclusive solution (e.g. in terms of housing affordability, prevention of discrimination).

Tenants, in turn, are not in the legal position to be heard or to counteract. Regardless of their strength of social integration, age, or years of residency in a neighborhood, tenants can legally be evicted within three months. Under the Swiss rules of tenancy, residents do also not need to be informed about upcoming redevelopment tasks *before* receiving the contract termination. In daily practice, this often leads to social eviction at short notice. Tenants may counteract in court; however, in most cases they do not use this option as they neither have the financial means nor the expert knowledge to do so.

Under this given legal setting, results of Article 1 show that the Swiss federal government withdraws from its responsibility of covering the housing needs for all income segments. In the name of federalism, it passes the duty on to the cantons, municipalities, and ultimately the individual subjects. The federal government does not enforce more rigorous institutional rules and policy instruments to protect tenants. Because legal regulations and policy instruments, which would directly alleviate the land rent (e.g. rent level or social eviction controls, quotas for affordable housing, zoning measures etc.), would lead to strong owners' resistance (see key finding 2). Simultaneously, owners make full use of their rights to private ownership including their rights to control housing access, rights of management, rights of exclusion, or rights of alienation.

Ultimately, results of Articles 2 and 4 reveal that this institutional incoherence between property owners' and tenants' rights in the Swiss federal regulatory framework trickles down to cantonal and municipal levels. While private property owners' profit-making interests are very strongly protected by law in Switzerland, tenants do not experience the same legal protection of their affordable housing needs. This legal dependence from the owners' position encourages the performance of densification as an "Eco-Business" at the expense of its social function (key finding 5).

**SQ2**: What use strategies do actors (owners and non-owners) follow to contribute to socially sustainable housing in a densifying city?

#### **Key empirical finding 2: Resistance power of landowners prevents socially sustainable housing development in a densifying city**

Results of the four articles of this book *confirm hypothesis 2* (Sect. 3.6): private property owners together with the private building and real estate industries working on their behalf are identified to be the main driving force behind tenants' social exclusion in Swiss cities. For them, densification represents a lucrative business and financial asset since they benefit from enhanced revenue on centrally located parcels (more apartments). In comparison to the development on greenfield outside of the builtup urban areas, they regard residential urban densification as an attractive business for stable rates of return and as a solid risk diversification strategy. As a consequence, consolidation in Swiss cities increasingly becomes a process led by capital in the sense that it is primarily shaped and guided by private actors. They intend to boost the city's economic activity through intensive investment into housing (re)development. Owners (including speculators), investors, and the private construction industry congruently benefit from this emerging "Business of Densification" as it leads to a substantial increase in land rent and income revenue.

Moreover, the private companies (investors, banks, insurances) studied in Articles 2 and 4 are of a certain size, and are thus able to possess large-scale housing projects. They can manage them through considerable means (purchase of land, demolition of old infrastructure, construction costs, etc.). In addition, investors (such as Credit Suisse pension fund) acknowledge the compact city as an opportunity to legitimize the transfer of property rights power over public planning principles (densification) from one scale to another and to justify the precedence of densification accorded to financial values over use values. They promote densification in a way that neglects distributional consequences or social equity issues and ignores the residents' needs for increased affordability, integration into decision-making, or community cohesion. Results show that these firms neither engage with the concerned communities nor are they aware of intersectional power structures. Because their rights to private property prevent them from choosing more socially stable solutions.

Goals of social inclusion, community cohesion, or housing accessibility are not considered in decision-making since investors *by law* do not feel compelled to act socially responsibly (key finding 1). As long as they are not legally required to do so, and their position is secured by strong property titles, owners acknowledge no need to support tenants' interests. Furthermore, results of Article 1 show that the interests of these private development firms are well represented in the federal parliament. Profit-oriented goals of densification become increasingly integrated into political games taking place at higher decision-making levels. Through the coalition of political forces (in legislative and executive committees), the introduction of formal rules that aim to promote more socially inclusive objectives in housing is constantly prevented, for example, in regard to the provision of affordable housing, mass dismissals, or improved tenure security.

**Key empirical finding 3: Effective tenants' resistance against rent increase and displacement is limited due to their weak legal standing in front of powerful landowners**

The assumption made in *hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed*: results of the four articles of this book reveal that tenants confronted with contract termination in most cases neither have the financial means nor the legal standing to counteract the landlords' decision effectively. Under the given Swiss federal institutional setting (key finding 1), *and* the decision-making strategies applied by property owners (key finding 2), tenants' capacity for resistance against rent increase and displacement is limited. Swiss property owners are well equipped to resist tenants' claims thanks to their strong position as titleholders. Even though residents try to resist through street rallies, formal petitions, or the collaboration with local tenants' associations, they do not succeed in defending their social interests effectively (e.g. for affordable housing provision). They face discrimination due to their low-income status and weak legal position. Hence, even in the Swiss direct democratic system, tenants' grassroots resistance does not lead to enhanced socio-political pressure on governments and owner-actors to obtain measures against dismissal and displacement.

In the studied municipalities, NIMBY-efforts prevent planned projects only to the extent that new developments might be delayed, but never fully rejected. Moreover, property owners (but also public authorities) develop strategies to counteract such NIMBY-opposition *in advance* in order to prevent building delays, which cost them a lot of money. For instance, Article 4 shows that property owners have started to promote a temporary housing model that works outside of tenancy law (loaning law), which obliges low-income households to live in precarious housing situations in buildings shortly before demolition. The city government of Zurich has not prohibited this practice even though it leads to the constant erosion of tenants' social rights and legal security. In doing so, owners prevent former residents from squatting their buildings, which would delay their consolidation and upgrading plans. By supporting this housing format, public authorities manage to implement densification goals effectively.

In addition, results of Articles 2 and 4 reveal that property owners have developed professional communication strategies with tenants and planning authorities to hinder social resistance. For example, to convince residents to participate, investors develop strategies to make densification palatable to them even though it leads to the loss of their social habitats. They offer, for instance, economic compensation measures to tenants such as alternative dwellings in parts outside the city to diminish NIMBYism that may delay their projects. Simultaneously, public planning administrations too develop a financial language and management skills that smooth the dialogue with private investors *and* tenants. Participatory forms of planning such as cooperative planning, test planning, or urban design competitions play a central role in this context as they make the densification process more efficient and profitable for both sides—investors *and* local authorities.

In essence, the constant erosion of their social rights, relations, and contacts to family members, neighbors, and friends worsens the housing situation of tenants living in private rental housing stocks in Swiss cities. Even though they do their utmost to rebel and to make their protest against densification and upgrading visible, their weak legal standing hampers effective resistance. Even though they might be included in participative forms of planning, in case they do not agree with the plans, they do not have the legal standing to actually incorporate their visions into formal rules and regulation. As a consequence, they remain heavily dependent on the decisions made by the landowners.

Those being displaced have become the victims of powerful forces of capitalist urbanization and differential spending power in the Swiss legal system. To cope with this legal situation, informal mechanisms of accountability occur within self-organized arrangements that enable community-based collective action, for example, in the form of non-profit housing associations or non-profit temporary housing organizations (see Article 4). However, I argue in this book that current housing challenges need to be solved in a way that includes profit-oriented housing providers as well, because the non-profit sector only holds a small share of the total housing stock in Switzerland.

Finally, results of Article 1 show that enhanced tenants' lobbying power is needed to change the regulatory framework in force in favor of more social goals. While the Swiss homeowners' association manages to constantly influence the implementation of energy policy instruments or tenancy regulations to make densification less socially diverse, for many years, tenants' activist groups have not succeeded in activating new rules that promote tenants protection. This lack of access to formal decisionmaking at the federal level (due to lack of lobbying power) constantly reinforces social inequalities in the Swiss legal and housing policy system. This subsequently also affects regulatory regimes at the cantonal and municipal levels.

**Key empirical finding 4: Municipal authorities' strategic activation of public and private law instruments leads to socially sustainable housing development in a dense city**

Results of Article 3 *confirm the assumption made in hypothesis 4*: a shift towards active municipal land policy is necessary to promote socially sustainable housing in a context of urban densification. Municipal planning administrations are in the key position to intervene into private development interests. They can prevent tenants' social exclusion, but they therefore must know *how* to densify.

Article 3 provides a central theoretical contribution to this field of research in the sense that—by conducting comparative case study research—the article makes a clear suggestion what an effective municipal land policy strategy for socially sustainable housing transformation might look like. In a context of urban land scarcity, public authorities do not only need to understand the technical challenges such as contamination. They must also (re)consider neighborhood conflicts or the underlying property rights' structure if they aim to fight urban sprawl without discrimination, displacement, and social exclusion. Article 3, moreover, indicates that planners should be aware that, at the center of the action system are the owners, who initiate the densification process as well as the private homebuilding industry working on their behalf. Together they form a private alliance that favors densification in order to promote business (key finding 2).

To counteract such profitability objectives—resulting in rising rents and displacement—results in Article 3 show that municipal planning authorities must find ways to deal with the power of titleholders. More specifically, they need to understand *how* to activate specific public and private law instruments that do not always need to limit property owners' rights, but also work *with* property rights. Such an active approach requires public intervention outside of a purely market-based investment logic. Besides the mere introduction of new policy instruments (e.g. quota for affordable housing), it involves the strategic activation of existing formal rules.

Moreover, Article 2 demonstrates that to legitimize such land acquisition strategy, broad political support, knowledge, as well as financial and personnel resources are needed. These are not always given, even in big and wealthy cities such as Zurich or Basel. Consequently, making densification more socially sensitive is a matter of the ability of municipal planning administrations to familiarize themselves with the entire range of existing intervention possibilities. The strengthening of more social measures must be given more weight in the planning process, and should be considered and included more actively into formal decision-making processes (for details see Sect. 7.1).

**SQ3**: How does the implementation of densification objectives impact social sustainable housing outcomes?

#### **Key empirical finding 5: The Business of Densification—the basic human need for shelter is being neglected in favor of economicenvironmental ("Eco-Business") functions of housing estates**

The final assumption made in *hypothesis 5 can be confirmed*: results of all four articles show that even though densification has been introduced as a legally binding policy objective in order to promote sustainable settlement development effectively, its implementation process is far from socially sustainable in the sampled Swiss cases. In the Swiss context, densification objectives are implemented in a way that neglects the social pillar of sustainability in favor of economic (profit) and environmental (energy efficiency) dimensions. Consolidation is promoted as an "Eco-Business" by coupling urban competitiveness with ecologic viability goals, while neglecting social aspects such as housing affordability, -availability, or tenants' inclusion into formal decision-making. More precisely:

Results of Articles 1 to 4 reveal that densification—as a key objective of Swiss planning policy—only gets implemented if private titleholders agree to obtain new development. To convince owners to participate in densification policy efforts, public authorities agree to the development terms and conditions dictated by the landowners. Because public planning administrations cannot trigger densification objectives alone. They are reluctant to intervene against property owners using measures that directly influence the land rent (e.g. stricter zoning) because they fear strong resistance. Therefore, planning authorities implement densification according to the landowners' profitability terms rather than not being able to promote consolidation goals at all. Otherwise, they would risk that densification as key element of environmentally sustainable settlement transformation might slow down—or even come to a standstill—if property owners refuse its implementation.

Under the flag of "sustainable urban development", this results in consolidation implemented in the form of "green gentrification" (Budd et al., 2008: 266), which couples ecologic modernization (energy efficiency) with densification goals, but at the expense of a city's social qualities. The policy shift towards densification enables owners to (re)develop existing real estate through the construction of more and newly renovated apartments at the same location (key finding 2). They can increase rent revenue steadily and substantially. Moreover, even though public authorities would be the ones responsible for counteracting trends of gentrification through targeted government intervention, results of Articles 2 to 4 show that the political instrumentalization of the compact city is a very real possibility for municipalities.

Indeed, public authorities use the compact city as a cover to push forward policies and interventions that have goals other than social stability. For example, energy efficiency or climate adaption objectives. Since the compact city model fits into very different political agendas, this increases the possibility that it is used instrumentally. Densification enables governments to grow, attract, and accommodate new (potentially higher-income) residents. Hence, authorities try to justify the (re) development of old housing stocks with the need to produce increased net financial capacity for managing urban growth. In the city of Zurich, for example, municipal planning authorities define planning documents that facilitate the (re)construction of housing stocks as they are interested in attracting wealthy taxpayers in order to increase tax revenue (Articles 2 to 4). Public authorities (on behalf of local executive and legislative committees) entail an economistic perspective—yet one often integrated with ecological discourse—by highlighting the financial cost of sprawl and by mobilizing arguments in favor of dense and compact cities. Such arguments include, for instance, a reduction of transaction costs through spatial proximity, which subsequently may lead to increased urban livability.

Consequently, more than ever before, public actors incorporate gentrification into densification policy objectives—used either as a justification to obey market forces and private sector entrepreneurialism, or as a tool to direct market processes in the hopes of reorganizing urban landscapes in a more benevolent fashion. Swiss public authorities (particularly planning administrations) seem to regard gentrification as one of the social costs of economic success or ecologic renovation that is worth tolerating. To do so—in the sampled Swiss cases—they argue that failure to allow new private buildings will create definite and severe impediment to economic growth or climate protection. In Articles 2 and 3, for instance, municipal authorities legitimize their actions with the argument that the impact of doing nothing for economic or environmental sustainability would be devastating. Primarily, because "doing nothing" could potentially create additional pressure for production, jobs, and residents to move out of the city, which could foster urban decline. Terms like "partnerships", "participation", "collaboration", or "sustainability" are used instrumentally to reinforce the power of the central state or to presage the hegemony of property owners' lobbies.

While the displacement of lower income encouraged in the course of implementing densification programs is generally made a taboo, the furthering of participation and articulation options for desired groups and newcomers is widely discussed and politically promoted. However, such an urban development strategy is far from the original aims of the compact city and considered highly unsustainable as it supports social displacement and eviction of residents. In the Swiss context, results of the four articles show that implementing densification goals not only leaves the very housing situation of the lowest-income groups at risk but also that of the middle class. Through consolidation and upgrading, affordable housing units are demolished and rebuilt with higher densities but also with the consequence of higher rents. Findings reveal that social ties in neighborhoods are being disrupted at short notice because evicted tenants cannot afford rental prices on the free market after contract termination anymore. Social aspects such as housing affordability, housing availability, or tenants' access to decision-making are bypassed during the process of upgrading. Social qualities that are a city's basis of community-based initiatives and solidarity-creating capacities are jeopardized, which leads to social exclusion, gentrification, and -polarization of lower income (particularly old-aged), but also middle class. In Swiss cities, this results in a way of implementing densification goals that is highly unattainable, especially regarding its socioeconomic consequences for the residents.

# 6.2 Intermediate Summary

In summary, results so far show that the conditions for socially sustainable housing development in Swiss cities have changed in recent years due to a situation of urban land scarcity. The shift towards densification has strongly influenced actors' use interests in housing and the way they activate the regulatory institutional regime in force. At the local level, coordination among competing housing uses may be improved **through mutual adjustment of institutions** (stronger protection of tenants' rights, see key finding 1) or **strategic capacity building of municipal planners** (through active land policy, see key finding 4). However, results show that coordination in favor of socially sustainable densification is often impeded by the following:

Chapter 7 closes with the findings answering the main research question.

## References

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# Final Conclusion: Governance Mechanisms for Socially Sustainable Urban Densification

Since many decades, planning and policy efforts have increased dramatically that embrace densification as a key element of sustainable settlement transformation. The compact city model has been introduced as a global attempt to incorporate green growth objectives (e.g. energy efficiency) to the level of cities (e.g. Elkin et al., 1991; Frey, 1999; Newman & Kenworthy, 1999). However, this book has demonstrated that when the concept is applied to practice, the compact city solution starts to lose some of its gloss.

Land use claims in dense city areas appear diverse and contradictory. Decision-making procedures, for example, those meant to reduce affordable housing shortages, are complex due to intricate and changing small-scale ownership structures, veto rights controlled by power actors, and intertwined interests. To capture these use conflicts and power games among actors, this book has applied a neoinstitutionalist political ecology analysis approach—the one of the Institutional Resource Regimes (IRR)—that combines theories of policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutional economics (property rights), *and* political ecology (power). It appraises densification as a political field by analyzing the socio-political determinants of socially sustainable housing provision and discusses arising challenges in a more solution—and practical planning-oriented manner.

More precisely, by mobilizing the IRR conceptual framework (Gerber et al., 2009, 2020; Knoepfel & Nahrath, 2007), causal relationships between *housing as a resource*, *institutions* (both on the public policy and property-titles level), and *involved actors' strategies* are explained. In contrast to other neoinstitutional analysis attempts (e.g. Healey, 2007; Needham et al., 2018; Ostrom, 1992), such an approach enables the researcher to recognize that many different resource users can come into conflict with each other and puts particular emphasis on the distinction between the characteristics of public policy and property rights. It allows for a systematic analysis to examine *how* various actors behave in response to a specific socio-political setting. The IRR moreover manages to address issues of power, scale, politics, embeddedness, and social justice in interactions between humans and their environment.

The leading question of this book, which is—**What governance mechanisms lead to socially sustainable housing development in a dense city?—**can be answered as follows: In cities characterized by scarce land use conditions, social sustainability in housing can be achieved if local governance mechanisms are to be improved by the following:

	- . public control mechanisms *of housing finance capital* (e.g. municipal housing foundations, public subsidies for non-profit housing associations);
	- . public control mechanisms *of private land* (e.g. restrictive zoning in favor of social criteria, provision of building leases to housing cooperatives, or public land acquisition);
	- . *social protection mechanisms* for tenants (e.g. eviction controls, rent controls, legal protection from redevelopment or modernization).

Such policy measures (for details see Article 3) would foster stronger protection of rents and residents from market-dependencies and thus lead to more decommodified forms of housing.

3. *by counteracting* the decision-making capacity and resistance power of private property owners and other owner-actors (e.g. private real estate industry), who are in the legal position to resist. To do so, municipal authorities must approach an active land policy strategy that promotes decommodification of housing stocks. Besides the activation of existing or the introduction of new policy instruments (see previous argument), such a strategy includes city authorities' capability and sensitivity to promote affirmative action as well as equitable resource allocation in order to raise political pressure and to limit profiteering. Public planning administrations must take the socioeconomic consequences of densification seriously and start to plan for those with less financial means.

Closer analysis of the shift towards active municipal land policy is presented in Sect. 7.1.

This book concludes that the emerging "Business of Densification" in Swiss urban areas has city—specific implications for the integration of the urban poor and middle-classes. Insecurity of land tenure compounded by high prices and scarcity of land results in precarious housing forms such as profit-oriented temporary housing based on loaning law. Social criteria (e.g. social mixing, tenure security, housing affordability) are put in the background, while economic and ecological criteria become more prioritized. However, an urban structure in which only high-income people can continue to afford to live ultimately reduces fair distribution of, and access to life-sustaining resources (such as housing as a basic human need). If densification is approached only through a process of green gentrification (energetic modernization leading to social eviction), city sustainability will be put at risk. It cannot be achieved by supporting particular economic and environmental aspects at the cost of the social. The diminishing of one dimension affects the others.

In other words, sustainable settlement transformation calls for "the continuous creation and re-creation of adequate patterns of social organization, within which technological progress can unfold properly, the use of natural resources can be managed soundly, and the social actors of development can participate, both individually and collectively, and can share the goals and benefits of development" (Cernea, 1993: 19). To contribute to such change, this book has addressed a gap in IRR research (e.g. Balmer & Gerber, 2017; Nicol, 2013; Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008) by more closely connecting housing challenges to land scarcity, and land policy debates (e.g. Davy, 2012; Kolocek, 2017), as well as social sustainability concerns (e.g. Bramley et al., 2009; Burton, 2000; Chiu, 2004).

The foregoing argument has shown that, unless strategic municipal governmental action is taken, residents and non-profit tenants' associations will continue to remain excluded from the emerging "Business of Densification". Taking into account future challenges of land scarcity that currently evolve in many cities, the findings of this research may help municipal planners, practitioners, and policymakers to counteract trends of rising commodification in housing, and to develop new forms and modes of housing resource management in order to (re)organize paths of capital accumulation. Only by doing so, city governments will be able to adequately address social equity issues and the needs of the disadvantaged in a context of intergenerational resource stability both in the short and in the long term.

# 7.1 Policy Recommendations: Towards Active Municipal Land Policy for Socially Inclusive Urban Housing in Densifying Cities

This book explores how in daily planning practice every society sets the boundaries where commodification begins and where it ends. It reveals that where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. In housing, the role of institutions becomes crucial for explaining exclusion and unjust societal structures. Moreover, it demonstrates that the redefinition and redistribution of the rights of private property and the profit rate derivative entails a revolution in political-economic practices. Political struggles towards decommodification, and even of freedom itself, move center-stage in the search for alternatives.

The four articles that constitute this book confirm that strategies of decommodification exist even in Switzerland, a state representing the very core of advanced capitalist economies. Even though results confirm that marketization and commodification of housing are not going to go away—what urban practitioners, local politicians, civic organizations, and other public and private stakeholders must find are more collective forms of governance and housing production so that densification processes respond to the needs of the public at large rather than simply catering to private individuals and firms.

To accomplish this aim, municipal planning authorities, *first*, can promote **the introduction of new policy instruments** to make densification more socially sensitive. Such instruments include, for instance, a quota for affordable housing, public subsidies for non-profit housing cooperatives, or social eviction controls (Article 3). However, the introduction of new rules presents by no means a panacea. Instead, making densification more socially sustainable is strongly influenced by the strategic ability of public administrators to familiarize themselves with all existing intervention possibilities.

*Second*, effort should therefore be made **to properly activate existing instruments in force**, for instance, zoning regulations. In the case of Switzerland, some municipalities (e.g. Zurich, Köniz) have indeed allocated plots of their land to non-profit foundations or cooperatives on favorable terms. By following the cost rent principle, these social organizations offer dwellings at lower prices than those determined by the free market. In Basel, moreover, municipal authorities have started to negotiate the terms and conditions of (re)development via public–privatepartnerships (contracts). Such action could become more generalized to integrate social equity goals more effectively into concrete densification projects. Planning authorities need to initiate a more project-oriented approach (rather than plans only) and collaborative approaches (rather than hierarchical organizations) to cope with social challenges. However, it must also be noted that there are risks associated with project planning as well. The most important one is the issue of equality of treatment of different stakeholders involved in the planning process—which local planning administrations need to be aware of when entering a new project.

*Third*, making densification more socially sensitive presents a matter of political will for social sustainability. To promote institutional change or to legitimize a proactive land acquisition strategy in favor of tenants' social inclusion, broad political support is needed. However, local politicians often regard offending private investors' plans as too risky for the municipality's financial situation. In such situations, it takes **all the finesse and professional competencies** of municipal planning administrations and politicians (e.g. expert knowledge, financial resources, networks, personnel) to promote social aspects, because landowners have the power to defend the status quo with strong veto rights. So, even though community cohesion and residential stability are widely acknowledged as important components for urban livability, there is still a risk of downplaying this aspect in daily densification practice. Here, municipal authorities are in a key position to take responsibility in order to include local ideas about community stability and cohesion and to encode them into land use regulations.

*Fourth*, municipal planning needs **to be sensitive** to the potentially disruptive impacts of densification on local identity and diverse ways of living. This book advocates for planners and policymakers to consider social sustainability criteria (e.g. affordability, cohesion) in order to address more accurately potential trade-offs between economic, environmental, *and* social concerns of densification. Planning processes should not be limited to actors with the right of appeal but should include all affected actors such as residents of different age, income, or nationality. To ensure the inclusion of local knowledge and inhabitants' social mix, municipal planners should encourage owners to share and to discuss ideas about upcoming projects or dismissal trials *before* owners submit the building application so that formal facts and procedures are not created beforehand.

*Finally*, it must be noted that, even though local planners are theoretically able to intervene into strong market forces, the decision is not only up to them. Their action depends on whether there is political will for such an intervention strategy, which is—particularly in the Swiss liberal context—often not the case. This said, Sect. 7.1 has outlined for municipal authorities four possible intervention ways *how* to intervene strategically and actively into housing densification procedures. It therefore demonstrates *how* it might be worth at least a try to follow these paths for creating a more socially sensitive and inclusive city.

# 7.2 Theoretical and Methodological Limitations

This book has some theoretical and methodological limitations that need to be addressed in order to critically reflect upon the results. From a *theoretical perspective*, a challenge in using the IRR was to uncover the strategies behind specific actions taken and to make them visible. Depending on the institutional background, stakeholders are considered to have different means to either change these dimensions or to influence others to do so. An interdependent relationship between the actors and the institutional structure is assumed although this interaction is sometimes limited (particular in regard to informal networks). To counteract these ambiguities, my work mostly followed a policy instrument-focused approach to make the applied strategies graspable in the format of the tools activated. The way actors aimed to achieve particular goals became visible by analyzing *how* and *why* they activated specific formal rules (e.g. zoning or property rights).

Moreover, the social sustainability indicators introduced in this book (e.g. in Article 2) are considered a useful approach to evaluate housing use conflicts in dense cities. By developing a deeper understanding for the multi-faced processes that housing under scarce land use conditions is confronted with, my attempt was to connect consolidation with ongoing debates of social exclusion and gentrification. In addition, my goal was to connect the concept of social sustainability with the IRR framework that allows for a systematic analysis of social challenges in dense urban environments.

However, it must be noted that the indicators introduced do not fully present the complete picture. Each process is only a part of the complex whole constituting the city. Great attention is needed for the transferability of such norms and perspectives of social sustainability and its physical adequacy. The evaluative model provides potential for the application to, for example, other households living in existing housing stocks. Nevertheless, the extent to which the criteria can be compared to other cases with different policy and housing market contexts needs to be assessed. Within the wider Swiss situation, for instance, authentic commitment to social sustainability in housing would need to be reflected in national and local approaches and directives that move beyond rhetoric. While this research project attempts to provide a theoretical basis for a more comprehensive land use planning policy, more work will need to be performed to empirically apply the proposed evaluative criteria so as to evaluate different policy instruments from various stakeholders' perspectives.

Conclusory, by applying the IRR analytical framework, this book has evaluated social challenges in dense urban environments by combining concepts from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutional economics (property rights), and political ecology (power). Making explicit the local governance mechanisms of possible sustainability trade-offs *and* power games among actors in densification procedures is a new contribution of this research project to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research. Indeed, the differentiated discussion of the results shows that combining these concepts has led to new insights in critical environmental studies as: **(a)** power structures were systematically detected by adding a neoinstitutionalist perspective to political ecology research, *and* **(b)** power structures were explicitly discussed rather than as an integral part of public policy analysis.

This combination has led to results showing that depending on the institutional background, stakeholders have different means to either change the formal rules in force or try to influence others to do so. These governance mechanisms are at the same time the channels through which stakeholders exercise power. However, further research is needed to refine these concepts (e.g. by integrating a Foucauldian or feminist political ecology perspective) to enable analyzing *how* exactly stakeholders make use of these "power channels", and *what* factors increase their effectiveness in relation to their institutional background means.

From a *methodological perspective*, the case studies employed in Articles 1–4 provide in-depth insights into actors' behavior and regulatory regimes shaping residential densification. Even though results are limited to Switzerland (and findings should only be generalized to other cases with caution), potential for generalization to other states and cities results from the identified causal mechanisms (key findings 1 to 5), the relevance of which is expected to be broader than in the analyzed cases only. Through the clear description of the research setting, the reasons for case selection, the deductively developed research approach, as well as the critical discussion of the methods conducted (Chapter 4), the validity of the results of this book is clearly outlined.

# 7.3 Implications for Future Research: Densification, The IRR, and Beyond

This book raises further interesting questions. Even though densification has become a core objective of policy agendas across the globe, critical analysis of its socio-political limitations, challenges, and contradictions, particularly concerning its impacts on tenants from a social sustainability perspective, was largely missing when this research project started. It would therefore be interesting to initiate an **international comparative study** in order to compare the Swiss case with other examples in different state contexts. For example, to investigate *if* and *how* housing stocks are affected by densification measures in other urban contexts in order to understand *how* the process is negotiated and governed in different state settings.

Further research is indeed needed to analyze **the burgeoning field of research on land policy in planning**. In particular, *how* different stakeholders make use of certain institutional rules or policy instruments, and what factors increase their effectiveness in defending their interests. While much literature so far has focused on individual policy instruments (e.g. urban growth boundaries), the strategic combination of different instruments to reach particular densification goals still needs to be empirically further analyzed and theoretically conceptualized.

For example, it would be interesting to focus more on the role of the investors and *how* they recognize existing power relations and institutional mechanisms that regulate their access to housing in densifying cities. Decisions on the acquisition and sale of parcels, housing and building stocks, or building rights are primarily made by the head management of large investment firms. Mainly in the person of the portfolio manager, but under the supervision of the board members. To promote meaningful engagement with diverse local stakeholders and interests, it is necessary for owners to become more socially responsible. However, the question still remains *how* exactly and in *what kind* of setting. The operations, motivations, and funding structures of housing investment companies should therefore be analyzed in greater detail. Actions should also be designed to encourage each type of landownership (public, cooperative, private) to use their room for maneuvering to promote social sustainability in housing.

By applying the IRR analytical framework, this book has tried to evaluate these questions by using concepts from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutional economics (property rights), and political ecology (power), as well as by applying a qualitative case study methodology. Further cross-fertilization between different academic stands and methodological approaches can offer new insights into ongoing debates such as multi-level governance or rural densification. For instance, a more quantitative approach to evaluating socio-spatial differences, room stress of households, or socioeconomic effects of densification could provide inspiration for further study of such issues as what are the housing needs for different groups or individuals.

Moreover, it is imperative that qualitative empirical research be brought to bear on issues, such as the extent to which there are disproportionate housing risks borne by specific groups of people. Actions taken on behalf of environmental sustainability—such as the policy shifts towards the compact city model—have a consequence on the environment *and* the people. Especially but not exclusively the disadvantaged. More must be learned about those effects so that residents who are likely to be overlooked become more included into decision-making procedures. Because one thing we have learned in this book: only a socially inclusive city is also a sustainable city.

## References

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