This gave the multistakeholder board the last word in defining certification requirements under the code.

This innocuous language belies both the significant amount of division certification requirements caused among stakeholders and the considerable effort required to achieve compromise and consensus. In early 2011 the US Department of Defense launched an initiative that endeavoured to establish "objective and measurable standards for providing Security Services based upon this Code". In pursuing this objective, the Department of Defense contracted with ANSI to develop a national quality management system based on the Montreux Document and the ICOC. The standard developed through this process, PSC.1, was finalized in spring 2012.

ANSI PSC.1 takes a form similar to ISO 9001 and other similar quality management system (QMS) standards, incorporating the principles and standards contained within the ICOC and the Montreux Document. For those not familiar with these kinds of standards, a QMS can be described as a collection of business processes as expressed in the implementing organization's structure, policies, procedures, processes and resources. Examples of company processes that make up part of a QMS include internal audits, corrective action and preventive action.148 To be certified under a QMS, an organization must demonstrate that it has defined these processes, and explain how they are sequenced and how they interact with each other. Certifications of companies to the standard are typically carried out by auditors working for certification bodies.

As stakeholders were divided over the extent to which certification to the ANSI PSC.1 standard could fulfil certification requirements under the ICOC as defined by the ICOCA, a compromise was reached that is reflected in the language quoted above, leaving open the possibility that certification under a national or international standard could be used to fulfil requirements for certification under the ICOCA, but that the multistakeholder board would decide to what extent this would occur and would also have the power to define additional requirements.149

#### *Article 12: Reporting, monitoring and assessing performance*

The subject of much less controversy, Article 12 requires that the board should develop these procedures, specifying that they must use "established human rights methodologies". It then goes on in some detail to give an overview of the kinds of reporting and monitoring envisaged. To these ends, it requires member companies to "provide to the Association a written assessment of their performance pursuant to a transparent set of criteria", and empowers the executive director to initiate field monitoring, "unless the Board decides otherwise", in cases where there is an identified need for more extensive monitoring, including "field based review", or where a member of the association (either company, state or civil society) has made a request. All alleged violations of the code must be referred by the executive director to the board, which will review them and offer any observations and advice to the concerned member company it deems pertinent. If the board finds that corrective action is necessary to remedy a member company's non-compliance with the code, it will enter into a process to bring this about. Thus even the executive director and secretariat have important roles in overseeing companies, carried out in close cooperation with the multistakeholder board.

#### *Article 13: Complaints process*

Article 13 describes an approach that aims to give effect to the ICOC requirement that grievance procedures "must be fair, accessible and offer effective remedies"150 in the face of limited financial resources. Essentially, Article 13 describes a process in which either the implicated member company or the secretariat receives complaints of code violations by a member company that harm one or more individuals, and then informs the complainant of the various available grievance mechanisms that can offer an effective remedy, including but not limited to the company's own internal grievance mechanism required under Article 67 of the ICOC. Where a complainant alleges that the company's internal grievance mechanism does not offer an effective remedy, or otherwise is not in compliance with Article 67, this is reviewed by the secretariat and can have several follow-on effects, including recommending the complainant to other grievance mechanisms such as mediation or use of the "Association's good offices", and review of the member company's grievance mechanism by both the secretariat and the board. If the latter procedures find the company's grievance mechanism lacking, this triggers a dialogue with the company to implement corrective action to bring the grievance mechanism into compliance with the code; and if the company fails to take reasonable corrective action within a specified period or to cooperate in good faith the board must take action, which can include suspension or termination of membership.

#### *Finance*

Often dominating meetings to the detriment of more substantive issues, finance – specifically how much the oversight mechanism would cost, and most importantly who would pay – was a critically important element of discussions. While there was a general understanding that member PSCs would have to bear a significant share of the costs, opinions varied as to the percentage that share should be.

To that end, a finance working group developed the "TSC Note on Financing the ICoCA",151 which aimed to set out initial expectations for the costs and financing of the organization. This note included:

order to demonstrate the association's financial viability for the information of prospective members.

The note also opens a window into the thinking of the TSC on how the ICOCA AOA would be operationalized as a functioning oversight organization. In the "Workload" section of this document, the TSC explains that it expects the first two years of the association's operations to be devoted to developing the procedures for the functions set out in Articles 11 (Certification), 12 (Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance) and 13 (Complaints Process). The note goes on to say that the ICOCA would probably not become fully operational until the third year, and further that it will likely take several more years for these procedures to mature.

Because of this expected work-stream, the TSC believed there would be an "inelastic relationship between the number of member companies and the workload of the Association during the first two years", as its efforts would be largely devoted to developing the procedures – tasks that are not very much dependent on the number of member companies – rather than implementing them, when the level of increased costs would be very much dependent upon the number of companies joining the association. This explains in large part the approach for member company dues, the first two years of which are set out in the chart below.

The note goes on to say that it would expect industry dues to rise after the first two years of operation, "as company members realise increasing benefits from membership and as the Association becomes fully operational".153

Beyond industry dues, the note considers other sources of funding, in particular pledges made by governments (Swiss, UK, US and Australian) and the possibility that CSOs could bring in financial support from foundations for those functions related to the human rights objectives of the association and the code. Finally, income from non-voting observers to the association – a category still to be developed by the board – is presented as another possible revenue stream.

**60** Anne-Marie Buzatu **61** Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

Taking all these elements into consideration, the TSC offers in the note a "Five-year indicative model". While the long list of assumptions and caveats preceding this model underscores its conjectural nature, it does accomplish one important objective: reassuring companies and other potential members that a working association was viable with the amount of funding it was likely to receive.

Another important aspect of this note was the presentation of a multistakeholder approach to funding. While many in the process seemed to assume that industry members would bear the brunt of funding, this model portrays states as providing slightly more, with potential revenue streams coming from other actors. In this "indicative model", industry is portrayed as bearing around 43 per cent of costs, states 48 per cent and CSOs and other actors around 9 per cent.  Such a model responds in part to criticisms about the industry membership fees being too low,154 as states are expected to provide slightly more of the funding, and in any case membership dues are expected to rise as operations get into full swing.

#### **The ICOC as a point of reference for new regulatory initiatives**

In response to the development and launch of the ICOCA, several new regulatory initiatives on both national and international levels have been created which depend in part on the ICOC and the governance and oversight functions of the ICOCA. These initiatives make compliance with the ICOC/membership in the ICOCA a requirement either as a matter of law or as a prerequisite for obtaining private security contracts with the state or an international organization.155 These co-regulatory approaches combine the advantages of an international-level multistakeholder governance model with the force of statutory and/or contractual obligations, potentially helping to fill some of the governance gaps identified at the start of this paper and making the "soft law" approach of the ICOC initiative somewhat harder. Furthermore, such efforts cut against the *voluntariness* of the ICOC, in that if PSCs want access to these markets, they must join the ICOCA and/or demonstrate compliance with the ICOC.

#### *The UN guidelines on the use of armed security services by PSCs*

Beyond providing a forum to draft international standards and agreements, the UN is also an important consumer of private security services to support its operations around the world.156 To minimize the negative impacts that PSCs can have on UN missions, the UN Department of Safety and Security adopted

guidelines at the end of 2012 for the hiring and use of PSCs. The guidelines detail a number of requirements for hiring PSCs, including those on screening, training and use of force, as well as outlining management and oversight responsibilities towards the PSCs. Of note, the guidelines require as a prerequisite for engagement that the PSC be a member of the ICOCA, and specifically that it meet the requirements of the ICOC in the areas of use of force and weapons handling. While at the time of writing it is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the UN guidelines on the private security industry, companies operating from one region have been signing up to the code in clusters in response to requests for proposals to provide security services to a UN operation in the same region. This serves to highlight the power of the client to require adherence to an MSI as a prerequisite for making a bid to provide services, with "hard" or binding obligations being found in the contract.

#### *The UK government and the Security in Complex Environments Group*

As mentioned earlier, the SCEG is a novel public-private partnership between the UK government and an industry body. Currently this organization requires its members to agree to abide by the ICOC and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and to demonstrate intent to become certified under ANSI PSC.1. These efforts to articulate human rights standards and some form of accountability for the private security industry demonstrate the industry's belief that a commitment to ethical and accountable practices is necessary for the success of its business.

#### *US government PSC procurement policies*

The US government has taken an active participatory role in developing both the ICOC and the ICOCA and publicly pledged its support, including by providing financial support.157 Furthermore, the US Department of State has indicated its plan to require membership of the ICOCA in its procurement policies.158 However, the US Department of Defense has taken a different position, requiring "conformance" with the ANSI PSC.1 standard, which as discussed incorporates requirements from the ICOC and the Montreux Document. It is not clear whether such "conformance" necessarily requires certification to PSC.1 by a certification body, or whether there is another means by which such conformance can be demonstrated. Currently, certification to PSC.1 is only offered by two certification bodies, both located in the UK, resulting in limited capacity to obtain certification. Nevertheless, the inclusion of ICOC principles and standards in PSC.1 and in the upcoming ISO standard offers yet another regulatory framework, helping to reinforce and harmonize international standards and norms for the provision of private security services.

#### *Australian government PSC procurement policies*

The Australian government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has included requirements in its procurement regulations for the PSCs it engages in conflict environments. It requires that they be signatories to the ICOC, or state their willingness to become signatories, as a condition of tender. Further, the DFAT requires that PSCs demonstrate compliance directly to the department with a number of requirements consistent with those of the ICOC, including that the PSC does the following:

By requiring as a condition of tender adherence to the ICOC as well as demonstrated compliance with a number of ICOC-consistent requirements, the Australian DFAT is helping to reinforce the ICOC standards while also providing its own direct oversight over certain elements that are consistent with the code.

*The Swiss Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad* Taking the multistakeholder initiative to another level, this Swiss law requires membership in the ICOCA of private security companies either domiciled in

or operating from Swiss territory providing private security and related services outside Switzerland and European Union/European Free Trade Area states. At the time of writing the ordinance providing implementing instructions for this law had just been released;159 once they are fully operational, these will provide more information about the impact of the law. Of particular note, the ordinance gives a more developed definition of complex environments, and establishes a regulatory authority to review whether the relevant services provided by affected PSCs are in compliance with Swiss law.

#### *The overall effect*

The process of developing an MSI really matured during the second phase of establishing the ICOCA mechanism. The more structured approach driven by an active and committed TSC and supported by the neutral facilitator resulted in the development of a governance framework that aims to ensure balanced and accountable decision-making by members of both the board and the plenary. The number of client organizations at national and international levels which are now requiring PSC membership in the ICOC also demonstrates a level of confidence in the initiative's approach to setting standards and holding companies to account to those standards. Time will tell, however, if the initiative is successful in its overarching objective: "to promote the responsible provision of security services and respect for human rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code".160

## Good Practices and Lessons Learned

With a view to answering one of the questions posed at the beginning of this paper, how to develop more effective regulation for PSCs, a number of key lessons can be identified and are considered in more depth in this section. This analysis considers both elements of *process*, or what activities and approaches were undertaken to develop the standards and the governance framework of the ICOC initiative, and elements of *substance*, discussing how the results of these processes help to fill governance gaps.

#### *Developing the ICOC initiative: Elements of process*

In crafting an MSI in which diverse stakeholders with sometimes antithetical views participate, it is critically important that these actors have *substantially similar overall objectives and vision for the initiative.* This is not to say that the reasons why each stakeholder group participates need to be the same. All the different rationales for participating can be satisfied by the same result: improved human security. With this common "end-game result" desired by all participants, they are likely to be more flexible when grappling with details, to work together to find creative solutions and to believe in the good-faith intent of other stakeholders.

As a close corollary to the first point, *building trust among all stakeholders is essential.* Building trust between such disparate actors takes time and requires substantial work investments, as illustrated by the multiple meetings, workshops,

expert working groups and conferences that resulted in several rounds of draft documents. Importantly, it is through these many occasions to discuss challenges and exchange ideas – leading to consensus on how to meet them – that trust among different stakeholders is slowly built. An *iterative process* that advances on the basis of small victories and developing consensus as stakeholders get to know each other allows the agreement to emerge in a series of small, forward-moving steps. This is essential to bridge differences and support productive discussions that can lead to the fulfilment of the initiative's objectives. This cannot be skipped over or fast-tracked, and is likely the single most important factor for success in developing an MSI.

The building of trust is also supported through adopting governance structures that allow for *equally weighted participation and decision-making from all involved stakeholder groups*, 161 sometimes called true or real multistakeholderism.162 For example, the TSC was made up of nine voting representatives, three from each stakeholder group, each of whom had an equal weight and voice in discussions. However, when taking decisions the requirement that there be some support from all three stakeholder groups helped to ensure that all decisions would be multistakeholder in character. In practical terms, *adopting a weighted majority voting process supported decision-making by consensus.* This ultimately encouraged new thinking and often resulted in innovative approaches that could build consensus. Furthermore, the practice of rotating the TSC chair among all stakeholder groups helped to ensure that all groups had a say, stayed engaged, encouraged consensus and helped to build trust across the different stakeholders.

Another element that can encourage the building of trust is the *participation of a neutral facilitator* who is trusted by different stakeholders, can bring them together, structures and manages the project, and facilitates discussions and helps to resolve differences – if possible before they rise to the level of real conflicts. From a practical standpoint, the facilitator can also serve as a point of contact and a centre of gravity for the initiative, from which communications about the work and progress of the initiative can be shared and disseminated. The website created by DCAF to provide information on the progress of the development of the ICOCA is one example of this. It helped to support better *transparency*, allowing anyone with an interest to keep up to date with the latest developments in the process.

To support more constructive meetings in which clear progress is made, it is helpful to *set clear public objectives with milestones and approximate timelines.* In contrast to the development of the ICOC, where milestones and timelines were not publicly announced, the process to develop the ICOCA was much more structured and focused, helping to move the process in a forward direction. This more structured approach served to keep the TSC on track even as it was grappling with the significantly more challenging task of developing a multistakeholder governance and oversight mechanism.

Another strategy that helped to support progress was *the development of small multistakeholder subgroups* to work on specific tasks and challenges in between regular meetings. These groups, which at crucial times in the process invited subject-matter experts from the broader stakeholder communities to provide additional advice and guidance, helped both to advance the progress of the project and to obtain broader expertise, guidance and lessons learned from other similar processes. This helped to ensure that the ICOC initiative was able to benefit from the experience of other initiatives, which provided a basis from which the ICOC could evolve and develop further.

#### *Developing the ICOC initiative: Elements of substance*

Turning to matters of substance, in terms of the governance functions of the ICOCA, *certification* is meant to provide snapshots at regular intervals in time that capture the extent to which companies have implemented due diligence requirements in their systems and policies. Essentially, companies will need to provide information on how they have transformed the principles and standards from the ICOC into practices within their company. This would include, for example, describing the methods they use for selection and vetting of personnel and the types and content of training they provide to them, as well as the procedures they have in place for handling grievances. Member PSCs should also provide evidence that they use practices respecting human rights to manage and support personnel, such as by taking reasonable precautions to provide them with a safe and healthy working environment, and implementing a zero-tolerance policy for harassment and abuse within the company. Ultimately, these practices are meant to filter into the way that companies operate and provide private security services, thereby significantly lowering the likelihood that their activities will negatively impact human rights.

Certification will be complemented by ongoing *monitoring*, consisting of processes that collect real-time information on companies' operations in between the certification "snapshots", with the objective of becoming a kind of "early warning system" to detect signs that a company is not operating in conformity with the code. A finding of non-conformity would trigger a dialogue with the

company on the manner in which it is operating, and should help to prevent larger, more damaging incidents from occurring. If the company does not participate in good faith in this dialogue and begin to rectify the non-compliance, this would kick off a process that could lead to the company's membership being suspended or terminated, and potentially for it to lose business. This ambitious and complex function will likely take up the bulk of the ICOCA's activities and resources. As the procedures for the function are currently under development, it is yet to be seen whether this non-state mechanism will be able to perform monitoring effectively such that it can achieve at least some of its aims.

Along the same lines, the *grievance mechanism* should provide a means for injured parties to obtain effective remedies, particularly where other accountability mechanisms are ineffective or unavailable. While not able to prosecute personnel members or companies for criminal wrongdoing, such an approach at least should be able to provide some measure of relief and recompense to those negatively impacted by companies' activities. Furthermore, the decentralized system whereby a company's internal grievance mechanism serves as the regular venue of first instance, operating under the watchful eye of the ICOCA, provides a compromise that keeps costs lower while providing some assurance that aggrieved parties are treated fairly and get the remedies they deserve. At the same time, leaving the option open that they can approach the ICOCA directly in the first instance in certain situations,163 or as a kind of venue of appeal in cases where the company's handling of the grievance did not meet the requirements of the code, offers the flexibility to adapt to different situations in order to fulfil the objectives of the grievance mechanism. Finally, this flexibility in handling and responding to grievances is necessary to ensure that the ICOCA is not negatively impacting or undermining effective investigations of abuses being carried out by governments, but can step in and provide a forum to hear grievances where government authorities are not conducting effective investigations. In fact, it is conceivable that having the international standards developed by the ICOC and the oversight mechanism of the ICOCA could even encourage more effective oversight and accountability by states, both by providing more clarity on the kinds of behaviours of PSCs that respect human rights standards and by offering a little "friendly competition" in terms of accountability mechanisms: the existence of a multistakeholder grievance mechanism available to step in when governments show reluctance to handle grievances effectively may exert some pressure on them to carry out their state responsibilities to protect victims and provide them with effective remedies.

Finally, the growing number of governments and intergovernmental organizations encouraging or requiring membership in the ICOCA changes the nature of the multistakeholder approach to governance, shifting it from an initiative which relies largely on the willingness of companies to participate to one in which membership in good standing is a condition of entry into some markets and a condition of law in others. This "co-regulatory" approach allows the different relevant actors to exert influence and take decisions where they have the best expertise and the most leverage, bringing in both subject-matter knowledge and the concerns of the affected communities, as well as the availability of enforcement through obligations of contracts and as a matter of law. Taken together, these efforts are emblematic of an emerging consensus that effective governance of these kinds of private actors requires regulatory efforts by multiple actors – both public and private – often overlapping, but all largely harmonized in the standards they use. Perhaps most importantly, the ICOC initiative approaches human rights standards from the perspective of persons impacted by the activities of PSCs, or from a *human security* vantage point. In contrast to a state-centric national security approach in which abuses of the civilian population by either public or private actors may not trigger a response from the international community, the ICOC initiative holds the respect for human rights of the civilian population as the standard against which companies are assessed and held accountable, recognizing that respect for human rights concerns matters between state and state, citizen and state, and citizen and citizen.

### Conclusion

The need to develop and implement effective approaches to close governance gaps created by the global marketplace will continue to grow in importance as our world becomes more socially interconnected and economically interdependent. Identifying these gaps is an essential first step in being able to conceptualize and craft effective responses that can address real challenges to governance and accountability. This paper aims to present such a process undertaken in the context of the private security industry, first identifying governance gaps in public regulatory frameworks and then describing a multistakeholder response that endeavours to set international standards for the private security sector and address governance gaps in its oversight and regulation. The processes to develop both the ICOC and the ICOCA demonstrate that multistakeholder approaches involving relevant actors from both the public and private sectors can be successful in developing and setting international standards, as well as in crafting regulatory frameworks that make use of complementary public and private means of accountability and enforcement – thereby offering the potential to fill some governance gaps.

In considering the foregoing elements, it is important to view them in the context of the point of departure of this paper, namely why the private security industry has voluntarily submitted itself to regulation by an MSI. While it would not be incorrect to say that in embarking on this journey the private security industry was seeking legitimacy for its activities, the reasons for this lack of **70** Anne-Marie Buzatu **71** Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

legitimacy were due not only to wrongdoing on the part of PSCs, but also to the failure of the international legal system composed of states to oversee PSCs and hold them accountable effectively. This also points to the trend of states increasingly outsourcing to private actors many activities that were traditionally understood to be the responsibility of the state, including security provision, and which are the subjects of multiple international agreements. In this complex, multifaceted and continuously evolving situation in which both public and private actors have influence and control, and where private actors are not directly regulated by international agreements, additional forms of regulation, oversight and governance are required. This was recognized by the PSC industry, and explains why it considered that an initiative to develop a code of conduct with effective governance was necessary.

This also helps to explain why government and civil society actors were invited to participate with PSCs in this endeavour: all these actors have a stake in the provision of private security, with governments in the role of both regulators and sometimes clients, civil society being directly impacted by PSC activities, and PSCs delivering these services. To ensure as far as possible that private security is provided in such a manner that activities on the ground respect international law and the rights of individuals, it needs the participation of all these actors. PSCs can offer a "reality check" on the services they are providing, including the actual challenges they face on the ground, and how to integrate international standards effectively into private security provision; civil society can provide information on how these services and activities are actually affecting people on the ground; and governments are able both to regulate PSCs at national and international levels and to include requirements in their laws and procurement practices. Non-state clients also have an important stake and the ability to impose requirements in their contractual agreements describing how the PSCs they hire must provide private security services.

This also helps to answer the second question posed at the start of this paper, asking what form this regulation should and could take, and furthermore how it could be developed. Taking the two parts of this question in reverse order, as explained above, those actors with important relationships to and experience in private security provision had the expertise to contribute substantively to a consultative and iterative process that identified their challenges and needs, as well as good practices and positive experiences. This information was interpreted through the lens of well-established international human rights and IHL standards by legal scholars and experts, which resulted in the ICOC, or the standard-setting part of regulation. The ICOCA takes regulation to another level by establishing a multistakeholder governance framework that requires companies to demonstrate they have implemented the ICOC in their management systems and policies, and to submit their activities to monitoring and to a process for handling grievances that includes providing effective remedies to those negatively impacted by their private security services. Finally, as more state and non-state clients contractually require the PSCs they hire to operate in compliance with the standards of the ICOC and to become members in good standing of the ICOCA, this adds another level to the regulatory matrix, helping to "harden" an essentially "soft law" approach.

Furthermore, in participating in this initiative, it is important to recognize the level of scrutiny to which the industry was subjected in the course of these processes. More accurately, the private security industry can be said to have submitted its activities and ways of doing business to an in-depth review by its peers, governments, clients and members of civil society – effectively asking the question what does the multistakeholder international community think is appropriate for the private security industry to provide, and according to what standards and within what limits? The answer paints a picture of private security activities that should be quite limited in scope and in use of force, and should not be involved in overthrowing governments or directly participating in armed conflict, but in so far as these services can positively contribute to public and human security in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights standards, they can be beneficial.

While at the time of this writing it is too early to say how successful the ICOCA will be in achieving its objective of promoting "the responsible provision of security services and respect for human rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code", both the ICOC and ICOCA can already be said to have had important normative effects. Increasingly, the ICOC is seen as the benchmark against which other standards and regulatory efforts for private security are measured. With signatures by over 700 companies headquartered in 71 different states, the ICOC has achieved a high level of recognition and acceptance across the PSC industry. Furthermore, the principles and standards contained in the ICOC are currently being transformed into an ISO standard.164 This document, like its ANSI precedent PSC.1, takes a QMS approach to the ICOC, setting out a framework to evaluate the extent to which the systems and policies of a PSC demonstrate compliance with the ICOC. So long as the future ISO standard faithfully reproduces and incorporates the principles and standards **72** Anne-Marie Buzatu **73** Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

contained in the ICOC, its subsequent adoption will be another indicator of the standard-setting success of the ICOC. While the value of such standards in the absence of a fully functioning oversight and governance mechanism supporting and verifying implementation may seem questionable, setting a clear normative benchmark can have an effect of its own, giving clients leverage to demand higher standards from their service providers.

Evidence that this is already happening can be found in the increasing number of government and intergovernmental clients that are referencing the ICOC and ICOCA in their procurement guidelines – even before the ICOCA has fully implemented its oversight functions. Such references can be seen as a vote of confidence for both the standards and the potential of a multistakeholder governance framework as embodied in the ICOCA. Called by some in the business and human rights community "the next generation of multistakeholder initiatives",165 the ICOCA is increasingly viewed as a model for other MSIs to emulate.

A more interesting question is whether the multistakeholder governance model can lead to "good governance"; that is, to what extent does it result in a system that ensures both effectiveness and accountability within a framework of rule of law and respect for human rights? In light of the foregoing discussions, certain points are worth keeping in mind as this and other MSIs go forward. In particular, MSIs raise the question of who is a good and relevant stakeholder. The answer – transcribing rationales for democratic governance to the realities of a transnational global marketplace – seems to indicate something going beyond nationality, where "stakeholder citizens" are expected to have a particular expertise, background or *stake* as a requirement for influencing decisions that will ultimately impact them in a proximate way. How to ensure that all relevant stakeholder citizens are included in the appropriate MSI such that they are not disenfranchised and do actively participate, can appropriately influence and effectively control the sector, and are properly overseen supporting a kind of "stakeholder rule of law" are important questions that will require more complete answers as the number of MSIs increases.166

While this paper does present the case that multistakeholder approaches to governance can improve regulation of the private security sector, it does not present concrete evidence of the effectiveness of multistakeholder approaches to governance, e.g. proof of reduced instances of human rights abuses by PSCs. On one hand, this goes to the difficulties in obtaining reliable baseline information against which success or lack thereof can be compared. However, it also speaks to the relatively nascent nature of these approaches, and the need to develop appropriate methodologies for analysing the effects and impacts of MSIs, particularly on the civilian populations they are aiming to protect.

Against this backdrop, it is suggested that additional work be undertaken along these lines to analyse the different approaches of existing MSIs. Specifically, further research of these initiatives is required to identify good practices, lessons learned and reliable indicators for implementation, with a view to developing more standardized frameworks for evaluating their impacts and effectiveness, and contributing to their improvement. In conducting this research, attention should also be paid to the quality of governance, specifically how to ensure as far as possible that the relevant and appropriate stakeholders are taking part and have an appropriate say and influence in the initiative so as to support "good governance" in the multistakeholder context. Even more importantly, this future research should consider the impacts of such initiatives as experienced by the civilian populations that these efforts are meant to protect. Finally, the recent trend of governments and intergovernmental organizations requiring ICOCA membership illustrates an interesting hybrid approach relying on both state regulation and the regulation and oversight capacities of the multistakeholder ICOCA as a means of filling some governance gaps, and may serve as model for more governments and organizations to emulate. Taken together, these recommendations will help support the development and evolution of multistakeholder governance approaches to respond effectively to emerging governance challenges, while also helping to ensure that they will meet their human rights protection objectives.

# Annex: International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers

### **9 November 2010**

#### **A. Preamble**

	- a) to operate in accordance with this Code;
	- b) to operate in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and in accordance with relevant corporate standards of business conduct;
	- c) to operate in a manner that recognizes and supports the rule of law; respects human rights, and protects the interests of their clients;
	- d) to take steps to establish and maintain an effective internal governance framework in order to deter, monitor, report, and effectively address adverse impacts on human rights;
	- e) to provide a means for responding to and resolving allegations of activity that violates any applicable national or international law or this Code; and
	- f) to cooperate in good faith with national and international authorities exercising proper jurisdiction, in particular with regard to national and international investigations of violations of national and international criminal law, of violations of international humanitarian law, or of human rights abuses.
	- a) Establish objective and measurable standards for providing Security Services based upon this Code, with the objective of realizing common and internationally-recognized operational and business practice standards; and
	- b) Establish external independent mechanisms for effective governance and oversight, which will include Certification of Signatory Companies' compliance with the Code's principles and the standards derived from the Code, beginning with adequate policies and procedures, Auditing and Monitoring of their work in the field, including Reporting, and execution of a mechanism to address alleged violations of the Code's principles or the standards derived from the Code;

and thereafter to consider the development of additional principles and standards for related services, such as training of external forces, the provision of maritime security services and the participation in operations related to detainees and other protected persons.

8. Signature of this Code is the first step in a process towards full compliance. Signatory Companies need to: (1) establish and/or demonstrate internal processes to meet the requirements of the Code's principles and the standards derived from the Code; and (2) once the governance and oversight mechanism is established, become certified by and submit to ongoing independent Auditing and verification by that mechanism. Signatory Companies undertake to be transparent regarding their progress towards implementing the Code's principles and the standards derived from the Code. Companies will not claim they are certified under this Code until Certification has been granted by the governance and oversight mechanism as outlined below.

**76** Annex **77** International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers

#### **B. Definitions**

These definitions are only intended to apply exclusively in the context of this Code.

**Auditing** – a process through which independent auditors, accredited by the governance and oversight mechanism, conduct on-site audits, including in the field, on a periodic basis, gathering data to be reported to the governance and oversight mechanism which will in turn verify whether a Company is meeting requirements and if not, what remediation may be required.

**Certification** – a process through which the governance and oversight mechanism will certify that a Company's systems and policies meet the Code's principles and the standards derived from the Code and that a Company is undergoing Monitoring, Auditing, and verification, including in the field, by the governance and oversight mechanism. Certification is one element of a larger effort needed to ensure the credibility of any Implementation and oversight initiative.

**Client** – an entity that hires, has formerly hired, or intends to hire a PSC to perform Security Services on its behalf, including, as appropriate, where such a PSC subcontracts with another Company.

**Company** – any kind of business entity or form, such as a sole proprietorship, partnership, company (whether public or private), or corporation, and "Companies" shall be interpreted accordingly.

**Competent Authority** – any state or intergovernmental organization which has jurisdiction over the activities and/or persons in question and "Competent Authorities" shall be interpreted accordingly.

**Complex Environments** – any areas experiencing or recovering from unrest or instability, whether due to natural disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule of law has been substantially undermined, and in which the capacity of the state authority to handle the situation is diminished, limited, or non-existent.

**Implementation** – the introduction of policy, governance and oversight mechanisms and training of Personnel and/or subcontractors by Signatory Companies, necessary to demonstrate compliance with the Code's principles and the standards derived from this Code.

**Monitoring** – a process for gathering data on whether Company Personnel, or subcontractors, are operating in compliance with the Code's principles and standards derived from this Code.

**Personnel** – persons working for a PSC, whether as employees or under a contract, including its staff, managers and directors. For the avoidance of doubt, persons are considered to be personnel if they are connected to a PSC through an employment contract (fixed term, permanent or open-ended) or a contract of assignment (whether renewable or not), or if they are independent contractors, or temporary workers and/or interns (whether paid or unpaid), regardless of the specific designation used by the Company concerned.

**Private Security Companies and Private Security Service Providers (collectively "PSCs")** – any Company (as defined in this Code) whose business activities include the provision of Security Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of how such Company describes itself.

**Reporting** – a process covered by necessary confidentiality and nondisclosure arrangements through which companies will submit to a governance and oversight mechanism a written assessment of their performance pursuant to a transparent set of criteria established by the mechanism.

**Security Services** – guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which the Personnel of Companies are required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance of their duties.

**Signatory Companies** – are PSCs that have signed and agreed to operate in compliance with the Code's principles and the standards derived from the Code and "Signatory Company" shall be interpreted accordingly.

#### **C. Implementation**

#### **D. General Provisions**

#### **E. General Commitments**

Code, applicable national or international law, or applicable local, regional and international human rights law, and are not excused by any contractual obligation from complying with this Code. To the maximum extent possible, Signatory Companies will interpret and perform contracts in a manner that is consistent with this Code.

**82** Annex **83** International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers

the Competent Authorities in the country where the act took place, the country of nationality of the victim, or the country of nationality of the perpetrator.

### **F. Specific Principles Regarding the Conduct of Personnel**

#### *General Conduct*

28. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, treat all persons humanely and with respect for their dignity and privacy and will report any breach of this Code.

#### *Rules for the Use of Force*

29. Signatory Companies will adopt Rules for the Use of Force consistent with applicable law and the minimum requirements contained in the section on Use of Force in this Code and agree those rules with the Client.

#### *Use of Force*

#### *Detention*

33. Signatory Companies will only, and will require their Personnel will only, guard, transport, or question detainees if: (a) the Company has been specifically contracted to do so by a state; and (b) its Personnel are trained in the applicable national and international law. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel, treat all detained persons humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law or international humanitarian law, including in particular prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

### *Apprehending Persons*

34. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, not take or hold any persons except when apprehending persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence, or following an attack or crime committed by such persons against Company Personnel, or against clients or property under their protection, pending the handover of such detained persons to the Competent Authority at the earliest opportunity. Any such apprehension must be consistent with applicable national or international law and be reported to the Client without delay. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel to, treat all apprehended persons humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law or international humanitarian law, including in particular prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

### *Prohibition of Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*

*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse or Gender-Based Violence*

38.  Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence and, where discovered, report such instances to competent authorities.

#### *Human Trafficking*

39. Signatory Companies will not, and will require their Personnel not to, engage in trafficking in persons. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of trafficking in persons and, where discovered, report such instances to Competent Authorities. For the purposes of this Code, human trafficking is the recruitment, harbouring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for (1) a commercial sex act induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (2) labour or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery.

*Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour*

40. Signatory Companies will not use slavery, forced or compulsory labour, or be complicit in any other entity's use of such labour.

*Prohibition on the Worst Forms of Child Labour*

	- a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in provision of armed services;

 Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, report any instances of the activities referenced above that they know of, or have reasonable suspicion of, to Competent Authorities.

#### *Discrimination*

42. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, discriminate on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, social origin, social status, indigenous status, disability, or sexual orientation when hiring Personnel and will select Personnel on the basis of the inherent requirements of the contract.

#### *Identification and Registering*

### **G. Specific Commitments Regarding Management and Governance**

*Incorporation of the Code into Company Policies*

44. Signatory Companies will incorporate this Code into Company policies and internal control and compliance systems and integrate it into all relevant elements of their operations.

#### *Selection and Vetting of Personnel*

	- a) been convicted of a crime that would indicate that the individual lacks the character and fitness to perform security services pursuant to the principles of this Code;
	- b) been dishonourably discharged;
	- c) had other employment or engagement contracts terminated for documented violations of one or more of the principles contained in this Code; or
	- d) had a history of other conduct that, according to an objectively reasonable standard, brings into question their fitness to carry a weapon.

 For the purposes of this paragraph, disqualifying crimes may include, but are not limited to, battery, murder, arson, fraud, rape, sexual abuse, organized crime, bribery, corruption, perjury, torture, kidnapping, drug trafficking or trafficking in persons. This provision shall not override any law restricting whether a crime may be considered in evaluating an applicant. Nothing in this section would prohibit a Company from utilizing more stringent criteria.

49. Signatory Companies will require all applicants to authorize access to prior employment records and available Government records as a condition for employment or engagement. This includes records relating to posts held with the military, police or public or Private Security Providers. Moreover, Signatory Companies will, consistent with applicable national law, require all Personnel to agree to participate in internal investigations and disciplinary procedures as well as in any public investigations conducted by competent authorities, except where prohibited by law.

#### *Selection and Vetting of Subcontractors*

#### *Company Policies and Personnel Contracts*

#### *Training of Personnel*

55. Signatory Companies will ensure that all Personnel performing Security Services receive initial and recurrent professional training and are also fully aware of this Code and all applicable international and relevant national laws, including those pertaining to international human rights, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and other relevant criminal law. Signatory Companies will maintain records adequate to demonstrate attendance and results from all professional training sessions, including from practical exercises.

#### *Management of Weapons*

	- a) secure storage;
	- b) controls over their issue;
	- c) records regarding to whom and when weapons are issued;
	- d) identification and accounting of all ammunition; and
	- e) verifiable and proper disposal.

#### *Weapons Training*

this Code and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), and national laws or regulations in effect in the area duties will be performed.

*Management of Materiel of War*

	- a) secure storage;
	- b) controls over their issue;
	- c) records regarding to whom and when materials are issued; and
	- d) proper disposal procedures.

#### *Incident Reporting*

63. Signatory Companies will prepare an incident report documenting any incident involving its Personnel that involves the use of any weapon, which includes the firing of weapons under any circumstance (except authorized training), any escalation of force, damage to equipment or injury to persons, attacks, criminal acts, traffic accidents, incidents involving other security forces, or such reporting as otherwise required by the Client, and will conduct an internal inquiry in order to determine the following:

	- a) time and location of the incident;
	- b) identity and nationality of any persons involved including their addresses and other contact details;
	- c) injuries/damage sustained;
	- d) circumstances leading up to the incident; and
	- e) any measures taken by the Signatory Company in response to it.

Upon completion of the inquiry, the Signatory Company will produce in writing an incident report including the above information, copies of which will be provided to the Client and, to the extent required by law, to the Competent Authorities.

#### *Safe and Healthy Working Environment*

	- a) assessing risks of injury to Personnel as well as the risks to the local population generated by the activities of Signatory Companies and/or Personnel;
	- b) providing hostile environment training;
	- c) providing adequate protective equipment, appropriate weapons and ammunition, and medical support; and
	- d) adopting policies which support a safe and healthy working environment within the Company, such as policies which address psychological health, deter work-place violence, misconduct, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual harassment and other improper behaviour.

#### *Harassment*

65. Signatory Companies will not tolerate harassment and abuse of co-workers by their Personnel.

#### *Grievance Procedures*

68. No provision in this Code should be interpreted as replacing any contractual requirements or specific Company policies or procedures for reporting wrongdoing.

#### *Meeting Liabilities*

69. Signatory Companies will ensure that they have sufficient financial capacity in place at all times to meet reasonably anticipated commercial liabilities for damages to any person in respect of personal injury, death or damage to property. Sufficient financial capacity may be met by customer commitments, adequate insurance coverage, (such as by employer's liability and public liability coverage appropriately sized for the scale and scope of operations of the Signatory Company) or self insurance/retention. Where it is not possible to obtain suitable insurance cover, the Signatory Company will make alternative arrangements to ensure that it is able to meet such liabilities.

#### **H. Review**

70. The Swiss Government will maintain a public list of Signatory Companies and convene an initial review conference with a view to reviewing the Code after governance and oversight mechanisms (as referenced in the Preamble and Section C "Implementation" to this Code) are developed.

# Annex: International Code of Conduct Association Articles of Association

#### **Article 1: Name and Registered Office**

#### **Article 2: Purpose**

the responsible provision of security services and respect for human rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code.

2.3 The Association may engage in all activities and take all actions necessary and appropriate to carry out this purpose in accordance with these Articles.

#### **Article 3: Membership**

Montreux Document and the Code, including the development of their domestic regulatory framework for PSC activities, and to promote compliance with the ICoC in their contracting practices and policies.

#### **Article 4: Liability**

4.1 The Association's financial obligations shall be satisfied only from its assets. Members of the Association shall not be personally liable for any acts, omissions, obligations or debts of the Association. The Association shall adopt appropriate procedures to address the indemnification of Members of the Board of Directors, Secretariat and the Executive Director.

#### **Article 5: Association Bodies**

5.1 The bodies of the Association are: the General Assembly; the Board of Directors; the Secretariat operating under the supervision of an Executive Director; and such other bodies that may be established pursuant to these Articles.

#### **Article 6: General Assembly**

#### **98** Annex **99** The ICOCA Articles of Association

#### 6.4.8 Complaints Process Procedures.

#### **Article 7: Board of Directors**

the stakeholder pillar he or she represents. Board Directors shall be selected in accordance with the requirements set forth in this Article and under nomination procedures to be established by each stakeholder pillar. Directors shall be selected with regard for the need for a high level of competency, commitment to participation, and diversity of experiences, insights and perspectives related to the Purpose of the Association. The Board shall maintain a record of the nomination procedures adopted by each stakeholder pillar. Election and dismissal of Board Directors shall be approved by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 6.5.

7.8 Board Directors shall act on an unpaid basis and be entitled only to the compensation of their effective costs and travelling expenses.

#### **Article 8: Powers of the Board of Directors**

#### **Article 9: Executive Director and Secretariat**

#### **Article 10: Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants**

10.1 An Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants shall be established. The Forum will be open to all Montreux Document Participants irrespective of their membership status in the Association and will be available as a resource to the Board. The purpose of this body is to provide advice to the Association on national and international policy and regulatory matters.

#### **Article 11: Certification**

#### **Article 12: Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance**

#### **Article 13: Complaints Process**

corrective action, including the suitability of the complaint being referred to another, identified fair and accessible grievance procedure that may offer an effective remedy.

#### **Article 14: Finances**

14.5 The Association shall not normally be responsible for the costs of Board Directors fulfilling their duties nor make payment for fulfilling duties as a Board Director.

#### **Article 15: Formation and Dissolution**

#### **Notes**

However, the seeming impunity for those actors who were involved in incidents made the lack of an effective oversight and governance regime apparent.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

**112** Anne-Marie Buzatu **113** Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

directly or indirectly participate in any manner in the initiation, causing or further of (i) an armed conflict, or (ii) a coup d'état, uprising or rebellion against any government; or (iii) directly or indirectly perform any act aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state". The 2006 law also includes a list of "security services", as distinct from mercenary activity, which may be performed with approval from the South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee.

their additional protocols of 1977. Of note, the convention adds a definition of "third states", being states whose nationals are employed to work for a PMSC. These third states were not explicitly recognized in the Montreux Document, but despite adding the definition there is no other indication in the draft as to what the rights or obligations of these third states would be.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

ing to an approach that a finding of non-conformity with the code could impact a company's standing within the association regardless of where the services are provided. This is probably influenced by the decision in the ANSI PSC.1 standard and the upcoming ISO standard to drop the notion of "complex environments", instead favouring "applicability in all situations".

or may not accept. The membership requirements for CSOs as adopted by the board and confirmed by the general assembly can be found in "Requirements for association membership", www.icoca.ch/en/ resources?keywords=Requirements%20for%20Association%20Membership&form\_id=\_search\_for\_ resources\_filter\_form.

	- revenue less than US\$9 billion = \$35,000 annual membership dues
	- revenue more than US\$9 billion = \$45,000 annual membership dues
	- new members must pay a one-time application fee of \$5,000.

Anne-Marie Buzatu

#### **Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: A View from Inside a Multistakeholder Process**

Anne-Marie Buzatu

The use of private security companies (PSCs) to provide security services has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, with PSCs operating in a number of contexts, including armed conflict and areas where the rule of law has been compromised. The use of private actors to perform services that are traditionally associated with the state is not limited to PSCs, but is emblematic of a growing trend by governments to outsource functions with a view to improving efficiency and cutting budgets. Privatization of public functions can, however, present a number of challenges to existing national and international regulatory and oversight frameworks. In the private security sector these challenges were brought to international attention after high-profile incidents in which PSCs injured civilians revealed difficulties in effectively holding international PSCs accountable. This paper argues that crafting a multistakeholder regulatory approach in which key stakeholders work together to develop standards that are appropriately adapted for the private sector, as well as to create governance and oversight mechanisms to hold these private actors to effective account, helps to fill some of the governance gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches. It recounts the developments leading to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC) and its governance and oversight mechanism, the ICOC Association, offering an example of the development of an initiative which sets new international standards and elaborates a multistakeholder framework and approach to governance for the private security sector. A recent trend of state and non-state clients requiring compliance with the ICOC initiative in their contracts with PSCs offers a new take on binding international regulation of private actors.

**Anne-Marie Buzatu** is deputy head of the Public-Private Partnerships Division at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Working under a mandate of the Swiss government, she led DCAF's work to support the elaboration of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers from January 2009 to November 2010. She subsequently led the development of the ICOC Association, a multistakeholder governance and oversight mechanism for the ICOC, which began operations in September 2013. Current projects include working with the International Committee of the Red Cross to develop guidance related to security sector governance and reform for multinational companies, as well as supporting better governance approaches for internet/cyber security.

**SSR Paper 12** **SSR Paper 12**

**Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: A View from Inside a Multistakeholder Process**

**Towards an International**

**Private Security Providers:**

**Multistakeholder Process**

**Code of Conduct for**

**A View from Inside a**

Anne-Marie Buzatu


**7. Concluding Remarks**

Amorphization of drugs has great value in research and application due to the benefits of improving the solubility, dissolution, and bioavailability of poorly water-soluble drugs. It is of importance to develop characterization methods for studying the physicochemical properties of ASDs, especially for maintaining their physical stability. With a better understanding on the recent development of the characterization methods, it is expected that the commercialization of ASDs with desired pharmaceutical properties would be greatly accelerated.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, Q.S., C.Z. and Y.W. (Yanan Wang); Writing—original draft preparation, Y.W. (Yanan Wang) and Y.W. (Yong Wang); Writing—review and editing, Q.S., J.C., H.C., J.X. and Z.L.; Funding acquisition, Q.S. and C.Z. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** The authors are grateful for financial support of this work by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (nos. 81803452, 21803004), the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (no. BK20211114), Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Committee (no. JCYJ20200109141808025) and the National Subject Cultivation Project of Jiangsu Vocational College of Medicine (no. 20204304).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.


**Abstract**

Food quality and safety are the major issues in food industry around the world. With the abundance of processed food with long supply chain in the market, food fraud is always a concern. Food fraud is defined as modification of an actual labeling of food chemicals in which expensive, less accessible original ingredients are replaced by lower cost and more accessible alternatives, which is also known as food adulteration. Some of these food adulterations might only affect the public mass financially, but some adulteration might affect others more seriously. Various food authentication techniques can be utilized to ensure safety and quality of food products adhering to the standards, such as DNA-based techniques with polymerase chain reaction, vibrational spectroscopy, electronic nose, and mass spectrophotometry, which has been used widely to estimate pharmaceutical and biological samples. However, most of these techniques still require substantial sample preparation or some have very high sensitivity to adulterants and are prone to give undefined results. Complex mixtures of food adulterants can be identified using very high resolution mass spectroscopy. The chemical compounds and structure of natural and mixtures of the adulterants are examined in this chapter using advanced mass spectroscopy technique and gas chromatography time-of-flight mass spectroscopy to identify the lard biomarker.

**Keywords:** mass spectrometry, gas chromatography time-of-flight mass spectrometry, adulterated food, lawful food, mixture food


**3. Conclusions**

We are now at a crossroads in new anti-tuberculosis drug and regimen development. New initiatives, such as the the European Union (EU) Innovative Medicines Initiative IMI2 call and the Gates Medical Research Institute alliance, have the potential to accelerate research and synergize with existing efforts carried out by academia, public-private partnerships, such as the TB Alliance, and industry. If researchers collaborate and join forces towards the common aim of innovative regimens, there is a possibility of pursuing effectively a transformational improvement of treatment of all forms of TB [25]. If, however, such initiatives compete for limited resources and resist cooperation, the targets expressed at the time of the Moscow Conference in late 2017 and subsequently at the United Nations General Assembly in 2018 may remain a dream.

**Author Contributions:** The two authors contributed equally to the writing of the article. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.


*Article* **Viscoelastic Particle Focusing and Separation in a Spiral Channel**

**Haidong Feng 1,† , Alexander R. Jafek 1,†, Bonan Wang 2 , Hayden Brady 1 , Jules J. Magda 2 and Bruce K. Gale 1,\***

**Abstract:** As one type of non-Newtonian fluid, viscoelastic fluids exhibit unique properties that contribute to particle lateral migration in confined microfluidic channels, leading to opportunities for particle manipulation and separation. In this paper, particle focusing in viscoelastic flow is studied in a wide range of polyethylene glycol (PEO) concentrations in aqueous solutions. Polystyrene beads with diameters from 3 to 20 µm are tested, and the variation of particle focusing position is explained by the coeffects of inertial flow, viscoelastic flow, and Dean flow. We showed that particle focusing position can be predicted by analyzing the force balance in the microchannel, and that particle separation resolution can be improved in viscoelastic flows.

**Keywords:** particle separation; viscoelastic flow; inertial focusing; spiral channel


*A Critical Review on the 3D Modeling and Mitigation Strategies in the Thermal Runaway… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114319*

independently or provide specialized modules for co-simulation with MATLAB/ Simulink, particularly for electronic vehicle (EV)-specific LIBs [33]. Battery Management Systems (BMSs) find widespread application across aerospace, EVs, and consumer electronics industries, equipped to handle intricate geometries and fluid dynamics aspects of heat transfer media like air or liquid cooling agents. Various computer-aided engineering (CAE) software packages such as Simcenter STAR-CCM+ and Fluent are employed to address computational fluid dynamics (CFD) challenges, particularly in BMS design, leveraging conjugate heat transfer (CHT). Multi-physics packages like Simcenter STAR-CCM+ enable complex geometry meshing and the application of diverse physics principles, including fluid dynamics/ mechanics and electromagnetism, to generate high-fidelity simulations. A nonexhaustive list of frequently used commercial products for LIB design and simulation includes SIMENS, ANSYS, DASSAULT systems, Gama Technologies, COMSOL, MATLAB, LS-DYNA, Altair, Thermoanalytics, Materials Design, and OpenFOAM.

This short review has the following four main objectives: (1) bring some of the most challenging issues and overlooked phenomena that are faced in TR propagation simulation into light. (2) Pinpoint the most promising experimental and modeling strategies. (3) Compare the efficacy and suitability of recent successful simulations. (4) Shed light on the prospects of advanced TMSs as it is applicable to LIB modules. The exceptional capabilities of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) state-of-the-art FTRC are explained in detail. Contrary to common belief, it is hard to understand how and why a more considerable portion of the generated heat is carried by ejecta material. Some of the most important mitigation strategies in view of structural design are also covered in this work.


*Edited by Vladimir V. Kalinin, Cicek Hocaoglu and Shafizan Mohamed*

Anxiety is a widespread and universal problem with significant adverse effects on mental health and quality of life. This book examines the phenomenology, psychopathology, and biological mechanisms of anxiety disorders. Over three sections, the book examines various social and clinical aspects of anxiety as well as neurobiological data and pathogenesis of anxiety disorders such as Capgras syndrome and de Clerambault's syndrome. It also presents results of immunological and neurochemical studies of some anxiety states.

Published in London, UK © 2021 IntechOpen © miquelpijoan / iStock

Anxiety Disorders - The New Achievements

Anxiety Disorders

The New Achievements

*Edited by Vladimir V. Kalinin, Cicek Hocaoglu and Shafizan Mohamed*


*2.5. Phylogenetic Analyses Reveal the Presence of a Few Clades Grouping the PAC Domain Proteins According to Their Associated Domains*

Based on all the criteria described above, 300 PAC domains have been selected for the building of phylogenetic trees (S1,S2). They have been chosen from plant families representative of the green lineage from Bryophytes to Brassicales based on a phylogenetic tree established using plastid gene sequences [32]. When several species were available for a given plant family, only one or a few of them were selected to represent it. For each plant family, the PAC domains sequences were analyzed for their percentage of identity, and the most representative plant species was retained. When the sets of PAC domain sequences were too different between plants of the same family, several species could be maintained. In addition, only PAC domains showing less than 85% of identity inside a given plant species were conserved. As a first step, the sequences were aligned according to their predicted secondary structure. Such a strategy was used in previous studies where the conservation of the primary sequences of the proteins was not sufficient to ensure relevant alignments [33–35]. The PROMALS3D software was used, and the resulting alignment was introduced in the MEGA7 software to build up a maximum likelihood tree using 500 bootstraps. Due to the low level of conservation between amino acid sequences and especially between the PAC domain sequences of the older lineages, we have decided to build up two independent trees to avoid bias due to long-branch attraction: the first one (Tree I) including plants from Bryophytes to *A. trichopoda*, and the second one (Tree II) from *A. trichopoda* to Brassicales.

Regarding Tree I, it is difficult to define clades grouping all the PAC domain sequences because most of the bootstrap values were low (S9). We only considered clades corresponding to bootstrap values higher than 30. We could define seven clades grouping 71% of the retrieved PAC domains, six of them containing one *A. trichopoda* PAC domain: clade A (AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS>, mostly type 1-PAC domains); clade B (AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS>, type 4-PAC domains); clade C (AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS>, type 1-PAC domains, highly conserved sequences); clade D (AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS>, type 2 W-W domains); clade E (AmTr.v1.000047, type 2-PAC domains); clade J (AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS>, type 2-PAC domains); and clade K (*Equisetum sp* PAC domains). The distribution of the PAC domain sequences of the other species was not clear. PAC domains of Bryophytes were represented in clades A, D, and E, whereas a *Tmesipteris parva* (Psilotale) PAC domain was found in clade B, and a *Phylloglossum drummondii* (Lycopodiale) PAC domain in clades C, and J. Of course, one cannot exclude that PAC domains of plants, which have divergent earlier than Amborellales are still missing since only a limited number of fully sequenced genomes are available. Despite the presence of the key Cys residues and of conserved 3D-structure, the large evolutive distance existing between Bryophytes and *A. trichopoda* together with a relaxed selective pressure could explain the low sequence identity observed between sequences of Tree I. Indeed, whereas terrestrialization is assumed to have occurred 450 MYA [36], the age of angiosperms emergence was estimated to be between 169-199 MYA [37]. Based on the putative interaction with cell wall polysaccharides and *O*-glycans, the PAC domain sequence variability could be correlated with the variability of the cell wall composition from Bryophytes to angiosperms [38].

In Tree II, the PAC domains were distributed into 10 clades with high confidence bootstrap values (from 72 to 100) with the exception of clade H (28) (Figure 6, S9). An *A. trichopoda* PAC domain was found in each of them. Four clades were specific to higher plants, each of them, respectively, comprised the following *A. trichopoda* PAC domains: AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS> (clade F); AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS> (clade G); AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS> (clade H); and AmTr.v<IP_ADDRESS> (clade I). Monocot and dicots were represented in all the clades, but clade J comprised a high number of grass PAC domains originating from gene duplication (see above). Interestingly, although the tree has been built up with PAC domains only, they grouped according to their association to other domains: type 1-PAC domains were found in clades A, C, F, H, and I; type 2-PAC domains were grouped in clades D, E, and J, with type 2 W-W domains in clade D; type 3-PAC domains were found in clade G with the exception of three of them in clade H with short Proline-rich motifs at their N-terminus; and type 4-PAC domains were only found in clade D. Thus, it seems that there is a link between the amino acid composition of PAC domains, their secondary structure, and the associated domains. Finally, it seems that all the PAC domains of higher plants have a counterpart in *A. trichopoda*, meaning that the modern multi-domain structures of the PDPs found in the ten angiosperm clades preceded the emergence of angiosperms.

**Figure 6.** Phylogenetic Tree II. Tree II was built up using 196 PAC domains sequences from *A. trichopoda* to *A. thaliana*. Ten clades (A to I) were defined according to significant bootstrap values (higher than 72, with the exception of clade B). The type of PDPs (e.g., Type 1 is 1, see Figure 2) found in each clade indicated between brackets. The name of the *A. trichopoda* PDP found in each clade is indicated and highlighted with a red star.


Another Interaction respondent explained how he became an atheist, both through questioning religious belief and through researching religion on the internet:

It was through, for me an experience when I was 17 years old. I went on student exchange and I was situated in ... the Bible Belt in the United States. And so staying in America and living with a family that was very religious and all of my high school friends were very Evangelical Christian believers. That sort of forced me to make up mind about what I believed in and you know the questions were 'is there a God, is the Bible the word of God, was Jesus the son of God, is evolution true,' all of these questions all of a sudden were very important to me ... arriving at my own conclusion, I guess that science was the best tool to figure out the reality of the world. ... I did a lot of reading online and I read a lot of books ... There were a lot of Atheist sort of blogs. And ... it was just something I was really passionate about ...

Shipley (2018, p. 193) also identified hybridity and 'questioning' as characteristics of the RGSY cohort. For example, one 24-year-old spiritual but not religious Canadian respondent, who had been raised Catholic, stated:

Right now, I'd say I'm at a confused stage, to say the least. I'm—I'm very interested in different aspects of different religions... I've also been in contact with quite a lot of Indigenous traditions ... and that has also been quite influencing [sic] ... I haven't, you know, given up believing altogether, but I'm also very confused and can't really identify where I stand.

Shipley (2018, p. 197) has highlighted that questioning of and complicated attitudes about religion often arose in young people as a result of conflicting views that some religions had pertaining to gender identity and sexuality equality. For example, one of the RGSY respondent's religious identity has been 'complicated ... by living in a common-law relationship with a transgender (female to male) partner'. In the respondent's conservative Catholic community, being transgender is unacceptable, and so this created 'a barrier in her personal self-identification as religious' and made her question religion more generally.

Another respondent specified her religious identity as 'questioning', given she was 'working through her personal disagreements with Catholic teachings (such as sex outside marriage, treatment of the lgbtqi community, and women's ordination)'. At the same time, she said that 'she feels strongly that she wants to raise her children within the Catholic tradition and get married in a Catholic Church ... wanting similar experiences and the community that it has offered to her' (Shipley 2018, pp. 197–98). Another respondent was raised in a Catholic household, but didn't experience a 'personal connection' with the Catholic teachings she received at home and in church. She questioned her religious identity and converted to Islam. At the time of her interview, she was engaging in both personal and online Islamic practices, as she could no longer attend her local mosque given what she described as its 'sexist, racist and homophobic' attitudes. She hoped to find a more progressive and inclusive mosque in future (Shipley 2018, p. 198).

It is important to note that participants in all three of these studies, while critically aware of religion's capacity to impinge at times upon the rights of others, were not entirely negative about religion. In the RGSY study, they also highlighted positive aspects of religion, such as its capacity to provide community and good values, such as respect for others, as things they valued (Shipley 2018, p. 200; Young and Shipley 2020).

This type of questioning regarding religion during teen years was also evident in the AGZ study. For example, one of the AGZ study interviewees, who has a parent who is a committed member of the Church of Latter-day Saints, described how, when she was a teenager, she went through an important time of personal questioning, to be sure that her religion was right for her and that she wasn't simply following convention. She explained how:

I was really young, like, from a baby on I've been part of that religion and then there was a point in time where I was like, when you're a teenager and you're thinking, there are so many options for me, what's going on, is this real, is this right, is this true, and it—it really did hit me and I was like, what am I doing? ... I didn't want to just go into life and be like yeah, this is the religion that I'm in and just like a follower. It was more like I wanted to make my choice and to see for myself if it was making me happy, and me 'me'.

Alongside this questioning, and similarly to the RGSY study, the vast majority of AGZ teens have a positive view of religious diversity and religious freedom. However, these positive views were often moderated when participants perceived conflicts between religious practice and the rights of others. While 93% of participants agree with the statement: 'Having people of many different faiths makes Australia a better place to live', AGZ teens' opinions were far more divided on issues where religion may have the capacity to impinge on their rights or to offend people. Half of Australia's teens (50%) thought that people with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others and 45% thought that religion causes more problems than it solves (Singleton et al. 2019). These results display a critical awareness and strong questioning of religions' place in society, particularly in negotiation with other freedoms and rights. Students in one of the AGZ focus groups stated a variety of orientations toward questioning:

P1: ... I think a big thing about it is ... how we view religion can be in a sense altered by ... to an extent some people believe that [their] religion has to be the right one ...

P2: I've only really disagreed with people about things, such as like I guess you could kind of call it political view or something or people who are like homophobic or something ...

P3: Well, I only have an issue with it if—I don't generally care what—what a person believes, as long as they don't try and implement the way they think on the way I think.

P2: Yeah, or—or as long as they are not, um, making specific reference or offending people with like their views.

In this exchange, we see participants concerned about religious people asserting that their faith is the "right one". Political views and homophobia are deemed ripe for contestation, especially if they are seen as offensive or imposing on individual beliefs. One of the spiritual but not religious AGZ interviewees echoed these sentiments when he described how his circle of friends had a 'variety of beliefs and religions', and that they 'all got along fine'. He added, 'the main thing was, I don't mind whatever you identify as, as long as you don't try and force your beliefs upon me.' Another nominally Hindu AGZ interviewee explained how:

I've noticed that it—it does kind of affect more when people push religion and their values. Like, I'm happy to know about it and respect theirs, but ... it kind of bothered me ... I think as long as people respect everyone's, um, kind of boundaries and their own beliefs, it's—it's justified to, um, be religious I guess.

In the excerpts above, AGZ participants repeatedly questioned beliefs that impacted upon the views and rights of others, but this discomfort with infringement is somewhat qualified ('kind of', 'I only have an issue if'). One senses that participants are inclined to live and let live, except when people are perceived to cross boundaries by imposing their beliefs on others, or if they're being explicitly intolerant. Potentially, this tendency towards qualification was a function of the methodology utilised in the study. Speaking with young people in focus groups meant they had to enunciate different types of worldviews in front of peers, a vulnerable move at any age. Qualification may provide focus group participants with an opportunity to voice opinions without appearing too strident themselves.

Similarly to the RGSY study findings, clashes between religious freedom and sexuality rights appeared to be a highly charged issue for participants. The AGZ survey was, coincidentally, conducted at the same time as Australia's non-compulsory postal vote on same sex marriage. AGZ teens, who were excluded from voting on the question of marriage equality, were highly supportive of sexuality diversity. Eighty-two percent of teens supported marriage equality, compared to the 62% of adults who voted for it in the Marriage Equality survey (Singleton et al. 2019).

Some students who participated in the AGZ focus groups were highly aware of internal tensions between progressive and conservative movements within religions. Moreover, in the post-survey interviews, when asked about religious exemptions to hire/fire staff in religious organisations, including schools, most AGZ teens were surprised that these exemptions even existed and were strongly opposed to them, especially when lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer (LGBTQ) staff or students could be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or sexuality. This once again displays a strong critique of religion and a deep level of care about how LGBTQ people can be impacted by discrimination related to religious freedom.

In the surveys and interviews a direct relationship between religiosity and LGBTQ rights was also noted. Strongly held religious beliefs, among the 'religiously committed', were the most powerful indicator that a participant would be against LGBTQ rights and freedoms. This also portrays a level of critique of progressive pro-LGBTQ views and a strong sense of investment in these issues, although it also arguably depicts a lack of empathy regarding the negative impacts of prejudice against LGBTQ individuals and communities.

One religious and spiritual AGZ interviewee queried 'so they can still do that?', with regard to religious exemptions against LGBTIQ pupils and teachers. One religiously committed Buddhist said it was 'ridiculous' and a this-worldly non-religious teen simply incredulously said 'wow'. A this-worldly AGZ teen said: 'I just don't agree with that at all ... Just I think having to fire someone because—or like exclude a certain student or teacher *from just being themselves*, I think is just outrageous.' Finally, another AGZ this-worldly interviewee explained the hypocrisy of the conservative religious position in the religious freedom debate, which fights for the right to discriminate against others in the name of freedom, but only for their religious group at the expense of the rights of others:

I'm not particularly aligned with the concept of religious freedom. I figure if they're the set of rules, it doesn't really matter what you practice, you have to follow those rules. Like, also if, there's a lot of white Australians trying to fight the people wearing burqas, to take them off ... And they're quite opposed to having LGBT classes in the school, which is kind of along the same lines, when you think about it. So, religious freedom, *but only for us*.

Young Australian's and Canadians are often questioning their own religious, spiritual and/or non-religious identities, and these are fluid, and changing over time, similar to characteristics McGuire (2008) and Woodhead (2012) have observed regarding contemporary religious identity and participation. In addition, young Australian's and Canadians were most likely to question religious freedom when it impacts on others' rights, particularly rights pertaining to sexual and gender diversity and equality. This demonstrates their capacity for critical reflexivity and a sense of care pertaining to these issues, and particularly for LGBTQ persons, who may be subject to negative judgements and discrimination and impacted by state-sanctioned religious exemptions. Strongly religious young people, with anti-LGBTQ views, also provide evidence of questioning the dominant social norms of their peers, who largely favor LGBTQ equality. In all of the above cases, these are indubitably issues that young people take seriously.

#### **7. Conclusions**

This paper has explored how all three research projects, the Interaction, RGSY and the AGZ studies, revealed three main themes that young Australians and Canadians have a far from 'whatever'/ambivalent attitude toward religion, and that their worldviews are characterised by hybridity and questioning. We also revealed that young Australians and Canadians negotiate their worldview identities in complex, critical and caring ways.

Halafoff and Gobey (2018) found that the Interaction participants questioning did affirm narratives of individualism, as they were 'reflexively constructing, reevaluating, and reconstructing their own religious, spiritual and non-religious identities'. Concurrently, they noted that these young people's choices weren't simply made individually, as they were highly influenced by socialising agents such as their parents, peers, schools, and media. They thereby concluded that these young Australians religious, spiritual and/or non-religious identities were 'fluid, changing, and in many cases contain[ed] significant reflexive pauses' and that 'hybridity, mobility, commitment, questioning, and interconnectivity' characterised these young people's religious identity formation and interfaith youth engagement.

Shipley (2018, p. 200) also emphasised that the 'RGSY respondents are carefully negotiating these multiple aspects and possibilities' of being religious, spiritual, non-religious and/or questioning'. She added:

Being self-identified as questioning, spiritual but not religious (SBNR), or religious does not define in strict terms their identities or place them in neat boxes ... And the limited language could be a factor in widespread assumptions regarding youth's disinterest or apathy toward religion, beliefs and spirituality ... The language of religiosity is evolving and ... youth studies regarding religious identity lay bare the linguistic restrictions.

Shipley (2018, p. 205) also concluded that 'the evolving nature of belief, faith, identity and practice' of the RGSY religious and non-religious respondents, is 'thoughtful and considered', and influences the 'clear choices' they are making in 'their notions about social justice, kindness, compassion, and honesty'. Issues of sexuality equality, in particular, have had a profound impact on how they engage or chose not to engage with conservative religions.

The AGZ study's six worldview types provide further empirically robust evidence of religious complexity in Australian society, and evidence that only a minority, 15%, of AGZ teens are indifferent regarding religion and spirituality, and only 20% are nominally religious. This-worldly AGZ teens have strong opinions about religion and chose not to be identified as religious—this is a considered position. Similarly, spiritual but not religious teens have decided not to identify as religious, but rather as spiritual, and are engaged in a variety of spiritual practices and hold spiritual worldviews. Religion certainly plays an important role in the religiously committed teens' lives. Moreover, the AGZ focus group and interviewee data are rich with examples of religious hybridity and critical reflexivity when it comes to identity and debates on religious freedom, and the impact this may have on the rights of others and especially of LGBTQ persons. Whether they respected sexual diversity or not, AGZ teens really cared about these issues and, for the most part, thought that religious rights should not triumph over the rights of others.

The findings of these three studies on young Australians' and Canadians' worldviews, and particularly the three themes of a lack of ambivalence/'whatever' attitudes, hybridity, and questioning, as well as the three complex, critical and caring ways in which they negotiate their worldview and identities, align with McGuire (2008), Ammerman (2013), Woodhead (2012) and Furseth's (2018a, 2018b) studies. They also highlight the need for a greater awareness of the complexity of young people's lived realities when it comes to religion, spirituality and non-religion. This is of great significance when it comes to education, health and wellbeing policies, curricula and practices for young people, which are still often informed by outdated and limited understandings or biases when it comes to religion. Our findings may also inform other scholar's research on religion and young people in diverse contexts, and research on religion in contemporary society more broadly.

Finally, young Australian and Canadian's exposure to public debates involving religious freedom and other rights – notably sexuality rights – and their cognizance and criticisms of religions' capacity to impinge upon the rights of others, is having a profound effect on shaping young people's identities and worldviews. This may indeed be a significant factor related to future decline in religious affiliation. The opinions of young people must be considered in these debates, as the majority of them will not abide with religious rights being able to triumph over and above the rights of others, and certainly not when it comes to sexuality rights. Consequently, we argue that current policy and legal debates on LGBTQ rights, religious freedom, and religious exemptions, heed the complex, critical and caring voices of young people.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, A.H., H.S., P.D.Y., A.S., M.L.R., G.B.; formal analysis, A.H., H.S., P.D.Y., A.S., M.L.R., G.B.; writing—original draft, A.H., H.S., P.D.Y., A.S., M.L.R., G.B.; writing—review and editing, A.H., H.S., P.D.Y., A.S., M.L.R., G.B.; All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** The Interaction study was supported by Deakin University's Central Research Grants Scheme; The RGSY research was supported by the Religion and Diversity Project (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Major Collaborative Research Initiative, led by Lori G. Beaman); The AGZ research was supported by the Australian Research Council, ARC Discovery Project: DP160102367.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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McGuire, Meredith. 2008. *Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life*. New York: Oxford University Press. Possamai, Adam. 2009. *Sociology of Religion for Generations X and Y*. London: Equinox.

Rasmussen, Mary Lou. 2006. *Becoming Subjects: Sexualities and Secondary Schooling*. New York: Routledge. Ron, James. 2010. "Canada Adrift in Religious World. *The Star*, July 29.

Vertovec, Steven. 2007. Superdiversity and its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30: 1024–54. [CrossRef]

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