## **National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

**Timea Spitka**

## National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

## Timea Spitka National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Timea Spitka Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University Ottawa, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-3-031-20389-3 ISBN 978-3-031-20390-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20390-9

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*I dedicate this book to my four children: Amir, Ariel, Yannay and Yasmin*

## **Acknowledgements**

This work was supported by Operational Programme Research, Development and Education - Project "Postdoc@MUNI" (No. CZ.02.2.69/0.0/0.0/16\_027/0008360).

First, I would like to thank Masaryk University, in Brno, Czechia and the sponsors of my post-doctoral fellowship in politics and security for making it possible to research and write this manuscript. Due to the generous fellowship, this book is also open access, making the research readily available to anyone who wishes to read it.

Secondly, I wish to thank my children: Amir, Ariel, Yannay and Yasmin for their love and support. Through no fault of their own, they were born into the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The property of the Israeli army since the age of 16 and a half, Amir and Ariel have had to make the difficult choice between serving in the IDF, spending time in Israeli prison or leaving the country. Yannay and Yasmin still have time until they need to make this difficult decision and I will support whatever path they choose, and I hope they will make ethical choices along the way they will never regret. I would also like to thank those who read though the draft of the manuscript and gave me valuable feedback including the reviewers, my supportive partner Pierre Gratton and friend Nettie Boivin. I hope the research will contribute to the possibility of change of the status quo and a political solution, which is unlikely without a more effective external intervention.

## **Contents**

## **1**

## **Introduction: The Myth of Protection**

Traditional notions of security have focused on the protection of civilians by the state. Although the state is perceived as and is expected to be the primary provider of protection, governing authorities in a violent conflict may not necessarily feel obligated to provide protection for all of the population living within its territory. Apartheid, settler colonialism, ethnic cleansing, war atrocities and genocide can all be perpetuated by a state or governing authority against the civilians it's supposed to protect. What are the gaps between international norms and realities in national protection of civilians, and what is the potential roadmap towards bridging them? Who is the protector, who are the protected and who lacks protection? To what extent does national or group security provide protection for all civilians? Protection is commonly in the hands of a small national elite with the military and private companies under its control, while the vulnerable population can remain unprotected and at times exploited. This is especially the case within violent civil conflict, where responsible authorities generally blame the opposing group for the lack of civilian protection and can feed off public insecurities to justify their own positions. Thus, for hard-line leadership, public insecurities may be beneficial, even necessary to maintain political control and power.

T. Spitka, *National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20390-9\_1

Protection can be provided by the state, a group, a non-governmental organization, or a local, regional or an international entity. Each entity can be attempting to provide protection for a group, specific segments of the population or all of the population within its territory or under its jurisdiction. In recent years, much of protection has fallen into private hands. In a context of conflict, a weak state can also appeal for protection to an external intervener. Civilian protection can range from being *effective, selective, ineffective, belligerent and exploitative.* This manuscript will explore the differences between the provision of individual, group and national protection. It will examine the challenges in national security and protection of civilians related to; power dynamics, dependency and expected loyalty to the protector and the potential for violations and exploitation.

Absence and abuse by national or state protection have brought international global actors to the forefront of altruistic attempts to enhance civilian protection. International protection norms, namely *Responsibility to Protect (R2P ),* have normatively given diplomatic precedence to human security and civilian protection over state sovereignty. Although R2P and human security are part of today's discourse and have evolved into an international norm, it has failed to become operationalized. Although there is an international agreement on its principles, within divided conflicts regional and international bodies are commonly paralysed and have little impact on protection of civilians in the midst of a divisive context.

As noted by Canadian PM Justin Trudeau, 'The number one job of any government is to keep their citizens safe' (Trudeau 2017). However, states in violent conflict commonly engage in a myth of protection where security measures designed to 'protect' further expose the most vulnerable, rather than provide for their security. Indeed, traditional notions of national security commonly fall victim to the myth of protection where national authorities and the military, ostensibly used to protect the vulnerable population, not only fail to protect but also to exploit their superior position to remain in power. Amending international security approaches from state to individual human security suggests the use of non-lethal tools and a deeper emphasis on inclusion and resilience (Chandler 2012). Although security and protection regimes that emphasize human security and resilience have shifted international protection norms, these have been applied seldomly and selectively.

Absence of civilian protection is a key public policy issue and concern studied by gender scholars, security specialists and conflict resolution experts in many contexts and conflicts including within the Middle East. Feminist scholars looked to human security as one way to include gender in the security discourse (Hagen 2016, p. 316). Human security is a term introduced by 1994 UNDP human development report essentially focused on 'people centered security' (Hagen 2016). Human security places individual security ahead of that of the group and the state, which can make some individuals or groups expendable. A key challenge in national security is the relationship between protector and protected, which is by definition asymmetric, since one has access to legitimate force, while the other is dependent on its delivery. This creates a dependency that can be problematic since it does not necessarily provide incentives to the protector to deliver worry-free protection. There is an implicit bargain between the protected who submit to a security order and the protector, who in return expects obedience and loyalty (Young 2003). The dependency can open up potential space for abuse of power as well as lack of accountability. In addition, national protection can be based on a membership of a group and which encompasses protection for only a certain proportion of the population. Thus, the most vulnerable part of the civilian population is commonly not part of the national group and has access to least protection.

This manuscript has selected to examine protection in a single conflict-ridden contested space to illuminate on some of the gaps of national and international security and protection strategies. Although highly complex due to the various national and international authorities and entities, the Israeli/Palestinian case provides a wide array of experiences of protecting and protection. Within the same case, it is possible to examine protection by a strong state, a weak or a failed state, national groups, private organizations and various international interveners. Differentiating between the different areas within Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, it's also possible to distinguish between *instances of: effective, selective, ineffective, belligerent and exploitative protection.* Violence

and protection or its absence is closely monitored and reported on within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, providing rich data for analysis. This research is based on years of analysis of documentation, surveys and dozens of interviews with Israeli, Palestinian and international actors monitoring or responsible for aspects of civilian protection.

Examining security and protection within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, this study will analyse national and international security strategies as they apply to the protection of Israeli and Palestinian civilians. Although security has been on the top of the Israeli agenda, how does this translate into protection for all civilians? 'It's a national security issue' is the code for civilians and outsiders to unquestionably accept protection strategies from national authorities. How secure is the population with the current strategies of protection? Actions in the name of security have justified severe security measures but have they had a positive or an inverse effect on not only Palestinian but also the protection of Israeli civilians? What can be revealed about the effectiveness of Palestinian national protection strategies by Hamas in Gaza and Palestinian Authority (PA) in areas of the Occupied West Bank? UN, EU and other external programmes and missions have poured funding and assistance to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza; however, how effective has this been in contributing to the protection of Palestinian population?

Various labels and terminology have been associated with realities of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and Israel's actions in the Occupied Territories including: intractable conflict, ethnic conflict, ethnocracy, settler colonialism, apartheid, ethnic cleansing, war atrocities, war crimes and genocide. The conflict is divisive and the terminology, though commonly contested, is relevant to different aspects of the realities within the conflict. The state of Israel has commonly been described as an *ethnocracy* (Yiftachel 2006). As noted by Yiftachel, the term not only means the dominance of a specific ethnic group but also denotes the prominence of ethnicity, most notably religion, in all aspects of communal life (Yiftachel 2006, p. 295).

Increasingly, Israel has also been described as an *apartheid* state, especially by INGOs and Israeli NGOs monitoring the politics and human rights within the state and the Occupied Territories. The crime of apartheid is perpetrated when particular serious human rights violations are committed with the 'purpose of establishing and maintaining a system of domination by one racial group over another and systematically oppressing them' (UN Apartheid Convention 1973). According to a 2021 Human Rights Watch Report, Israeli authorities are 'committing crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution' against Palestinians living in the occupied territory including East Jerusalem (Human Rights Watch 2021). Many critical Israeli NGOs have also begun to use the term apartheid referring to policies within Israel, East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. In 2021, B'TSelem 'reached the conclusion that the bar for defining the Israeli regime as an apartheid regime has been met after considering the accumulation of policies and laws that Israel devised to entrench its control over Palestinians' (B'TSelem 2021). Amnesty International's 2022 report, 'Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity', noted that Israeli authorities must be held accountable for committing the crime of apartheid against Palestinians (Amnesty 2022). Israel reacted strongly against all the accusations, labelling the reports and organizations as antisemitic. However, thirteen key Israeli human rights organizations publicly defended Amnesty's report, noting that 'the debate around the crime of apartheid of which Israel is accused … is not only legitimate, but absolutely necessary' (Human Rights 2022).

*Ethnic cleansing* has been used to describe systematic and commonly violent Israeli eviction practices in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Richard Falk, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, noted that: "The continued pattern of settlement expansion in East Jerusalem combined with forcible eviction of long residing Palestinians are creating an intolerable situation that can only be described, in its cumulative impact, as a form of ethnic cleansing" (Falk 2021). *War atrocities and war crimes* have been used to label Hamas or other Palestinian militant groups targeting Israeli civilians, as well as Israel's indiscriminate targeting of Gaza with rockets or shooting of unarmed Palestinian civilians. Subsequent to the latest round of bombardment of Gaza during May 2021, the UN launched an investigation, condemning Israel and Hamas for indiscriminate firing and killing of civilians. As noted by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet who called for the investigation, 'If found to be indiscriminate and disproportionate in their impact on civilians and civilian objects, such attacks may constitute war crimes' (Hughes 2021).

Some observers have even gone as far as to label Israeli policies in Gaza as attempts at *genocide*. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe defined the Israeli policy towards the Gaza Strip as an incremental genocide (Pappe 2014). According to the 1948 Genocide Convention, genocide means any of the following acts: committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as killing members of the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (UN Genocide 1948). Examining different realities within Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, this manuscript will discuss ethnocracy, apartheid and ongoing incidents of ethnic cleansing and other war atrocities. The evidence gathered in this book does not support reasoning for the term genocide. Although Israel is deliberately inflicting on a Palestinian's conditions of life to bring about its partial destruction, the manuscript refrains from referring to Israel's policies as genocide, even an incremental one. First, the label of genocide was created in the context of the Holocaust which may diminish the significance of the brutal killing of over 6 million Jews. The label of genocide was also given in the context of Rwanda where a million people were killed and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbia and paramilitary groups not only killed and displaced the Muslim Bosnian population but also systematically erased any evidence of their history and culture including levelling and destroying all Mosques and cultural artefacts (Spitka 2014). Although many red lines have been crossed, Israel has still tended to, for the most part, respect the cultural and religious rights of the Palestinian population. The terminology above including apartheid, ethnic cleansing and war atrocities is severe enough, without bringing in the most severe accusation of genocide. Although there is much debate on the subject, using appropriate terminology is important not only because of the associated meaning behind the terminology but also because of its implication and relevance within the international arena.

Much of the scholarly literature and practitioners' debates have tended to reflect the divisions in the Israeli /Palestinian conflict by placing the blame either on Israel or Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Focusing on national protection, the bulk of the studies focus on national security and fail to address gaps in strategies and practices that have an adverse effect to providing protection to all civilians. This research unravels some of the complexities and contradictions in traditional national and security studies and focuses on the promises, the delivery and the gaps in protection of civilians. Examining security and civilian protection strategies in a single case study, this manuscript reveals some of the realities and myths about national and international protection. *To what extent do national security strategies prioritize the protection of all civilians? To what extent are international norms and international presence including: humanitarian missions, monitoring missions, international police and military observers' contributing to civilian protection?* The subsequent sections will introduce the nature and responsibility for protection, national protection strategies, international protection norms and practice before delving into examining protection of civilians under the umbrella of Israeli, Palestinian and international authorities within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

## **What is Protection and Who is Responsible?**

Protection of the individual is the most basic human need and the most fundamental responsibility for a state. The primary entity responsible for protection of its population is the state. Max Weber defined state as an entity which has a 'monopoly on the use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber 1972). Robert Rotberg noted that the ability to provide human security is the central political good for a state (Rotberg 2003). State protection of a population can come from numerous sources including the police, the military, rule of law and the judiciary. However, the state does not necessarily provide protection for all who reside on its territory. The state may provide protection for only a portion of its population, be failing in providing protection, may privatize protection or rely on external protection. In a violent conflict context, international protection is commonly requested, offered or at times imposed and can come from numerous types of protection-focused operations including: humanitarian aid, state-building, monitoring missions, peacekeeping, police training or restructuring or military missions. The state remains the main entity responsible for the allowance to realize basic human needs and the well-being of a person.

The first challenge in protection is defining it. Protection can be defined as simply the safety and security of an individual or may be based on a wider definition focused on the well-being of a person including their freedom of movement, freedom of speech and other liberties. Definition of protection by humanitarian and human rights actors goes beyond physical protection and includes all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law (UN DPKO 2009). This study understands protection to be connected to human security and the realization of basic human needs. *Human security* is based on the normative claim that the ultimate referent for security ought to be the human individual, not the state or some other collective (Bellamy 2016).  Johan Galtung has identified four *basic human needs*: freedom, identity, survival and well-being (Galtung 2005), of which all are non-negotiable and necessary for the well-being of a person. In this research, I define protection as an aim to enhance human security of a person in line with the attainment of basic human needs.

## **State Protection**

States commonly attempt to have a monopoly on protection tools within their borders including the army, police, border guards, intelligence and the judiciary. Elites at the helm of the state may have differing interests on protection as they are related to other priorities, such as economic security, managing diversity, military engagement or build-up or reelection that can work in tandem or clash with security and protection of the country's civilians. One of the fundamental questions in analysing security versus protection is who does the state protect and who does it not protect? Populations left out of protection, particularly in conflictual contexts, can include: civilians perceived as belonging to the enemy, noncitizens, minorities or groups regarded as hostile, divergent populations, such as political opponents and activists, gender minorities and women.

Power dynamics between the protector and the protected become more pronounced when the protectors are made up of different ethnonational groups than the protected. Who makes up the military and who is represented in the police force has a major impact on the perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness of protection. In Northern Ireland, few Catholics in the police force prior to the Good Friday Agreement made the police less legitimate and effective in providing protection to all residents. Restructuring the Northern Ireland police involved a 50/50 recruiting quota, so that half of new officers came from Catholic backgrounds. By 2011, up to 30 percent of the force was Catholic, from just around 8 percent prior to the peace agreement. With current levels still hovering around 30%, the debates over the makeup of the police force continue to be at the top of the political agenda (Moriarty 2019). In Bosnia, the military and the police were engaged in war efforts and were all ethnically divided at the time of the signing of the Dayton peace agreement. The creation of a single unified military was a fundamental step towards state security and protection. The creation of a mixed Bosnian police force has been a 20-year-long UN and EU effort, which is yet to be completed in Republika Srpska. Proportional ethno-national and gender representation within security forces, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, can be one of the fundamental elements of effective policing.

State protection varies in its effectiveness and selectivity. In many states, protection is not necessarily made available equally for all civilians, most notably the vulnerable segment of the society that includes visible and invisible minorities. State protection can be effective in protecting certain groups, while ineffective, malignant or exploitative towards other groups. State and politicians at its helm can feed on insecurities of the population that feel vulnerable and dependent. For nationalistic leadership, providing the assurances of full protection might undermine their position as the needed protector. While the population is dependent on the state for its protection, the state is in a position to demand loyalty in return for its services. States often justify their expectations of obedience and loyalty by appealing to their role as the protector of the citizens (Young 2003).

Vulnerable populations commonly include those which are not part of the majority, populations that were vulnerable before the conflict, and populations that lie on the fringe of society. These may include ethnic or visible minorities, migrants, dissidents, women, gender minorities (LGBTQ+), disabled, elderly, children and teens. Children and teens are not only vulnerable in situations of violent conflict; they are also susceptible to exploitation and recruitment by extremists or the state. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, children and teens living within a violent conflict are easy targets for exploitation by militants or by the military establishment of the state. Social media has made it easier to reach and recruit pre-teens and teens. The relative ease in the recruitment of teens compared to older adults makes them also a prime target for detentions and strong security measures.

In current conflict contexts, civilians are commonly intertwined with the perpetrators of the conflict. As noted by critical security scholars, in modern times, the borders of war are blurred in both time and space, and it is difficult to pinpoint when and where the war starts and ends (Harel-Shalev 2018; Gregory 2018). New technologies including lighter weapons, smart weapons, remote battlefields, surveillance and social media are changing the perpetrators and victims in conflict. It is questionable whether the tools of protection have caught up with the new realities. Even under altruistic intention to protect, effectiveness of protection regime can be difficult in complex, contested settings and runs the risk of unintended effects.

Protection is clearly problematic when it comes at the cost to freedom and civil liberties. The practice of surveillance, intimidation, detention and repression of criticism and dissent cuts into civil liberties, yet have all been justified as part of the costs incurred as a benefit of protection. Much has been written about the post-9/11 curtailment of civil liberties that were cut at the expense of increased security which questionably increased the protection of US civilians. National protection, however, does not take place in a vacuum but rather is integrated within a regional and an international context that can contribute to, or alternatively may jeopardize, civilian protection. When a state fails to provide protection, it can also request assistance or members of the international community can propose and offer some type of external intervention. However, as can be witnessed in many ongoing conflicts, such as the Israeli/Palestinian or the current occupation by Russia of Ukraine, international protection is limited.

## **International Protection**

International intervention that attempts to contribute to protection can come in many forms including: humanitarian assistance, policing missions, military monitoring or other forms of diplomatic, economic and military intervention. Even under the umbrella of altruistic intervention, external intervention is challenging since it requires consensus and pushes the boundaries of sovereignty. Agreed to by the largest gathering of the heads of states in 2005, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provides the latest and arguably a crucial roadmap towards international intervention focused on protection. According to supporters of the norm, R2P may be the most significant normative development of our time, since it has managed to finesse the tensions between sovereignty and protection from atrocity crimes (Thakur and Weiss 2009). Sceptics, however, rightly point to R2P as being applied selectively and only when the interests of the great powers align (Mamdani 2010). While R2P has become integrated into the formal international normative agenda, the operationalization of the norm has been difficult especially when the interests of the great powers do not align. R2P is also only relevant in cases when a state or groups are engaged in atrocity crimes, notably: ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. While R2P has failed to prevent atrocities in some of the most volatile and divisive conflicts, the concept that civilians have a right to protection within any internal boundary has received widespread international support (Western and Goldstein 2013).

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm was created to prevent the failure of non-intervention in cases of war atrocities in conflicts such as Rwanda and Bosnia (BiH). In both conflicts, gangs of armed thugs, supported by a state and leadership of ethnic groups, systematically pillaged, raped and killed civilians, while the international community failed to reach a consensus on minimal measures to end the atrocities. R2P stands on three pillars and acts as a normative framework for intervention to prevent war atrocities. Under Pillar I, the state is primarily responsible for protecting the population from war atrocities, and Pillar II encompasses the responsibility of the international community to assist states to meet this obligation. Under Pillar III, it is the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive collective action when a state is 'manifestly' failing in meeting this obligation. Activation of Pillar III, triggered by the failure of national authorities to fulfil their protection responsibilities, has been the source of most contention due to fears of abuse and the potential for unintended effects. Implementation is also selective and challenging given the divisions within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The shift from a normative discourse on prioritizing protection of individuals vulnerable to atrocity crimes, to operationalization of R2P in the most difficult conflicts, has been problematic. There are currently many cases of violent conflict and internal atrocities such as in the Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, Darfur as well as in Israel/Palestine, where Pillar III of R2P may be applicable, however, the international community has been challenged to reach a consensus on appropriate tools that prioritize protection for those vulnerable to war atrocities. Effective operationalization of protection under R2P is dependent on a common international consensus on the realities of the conflict, common agreement on the culpability for atrocity crimes and a construction of a collective framework for a protection regime. Although the international community is more commonly able to reach a consensus on providing humanitarian aid, such as the creation of a humanitarian corridor or sending investigators or observers, military or policing missions that prioritize protection are far more difficult to establish.

The full potential of protection tools is directly linked to consensus among interveners. Whether it's a military intervention, policing mission, boycott or sanctions, none are effective if intervention is divided, especially if key powers are working on opposing sides. The veto rights of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, US, China, Russia, France and UK, have been obstructive in advancing protection in the most volatile conflicts including the Ukraine, Syria and Israel/Palestine. Sixty-three states as well as the EU have called for reform of the Security Council outlining restraint on the use of veto in mass atrocity situations (Adams 2015). France proposed that the Security Council develop a conduct where the permanent members agree to refrain from using a veto when it comes to mass atrocities (Adams 2015). These measures, however, are far from the realities of the current divisive international context. The subsequent sections will outline relevant international law and protection strategies under the different types of authorities operating in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, namely Israeli, Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas and international, in order to examine the challenges of effectiveness and expose some of the gaps and myths in protection.

## **Israeli/Palestinian Conflict and International Law**

The current Israeli/Palestinian conflict rose out of the ashes of the Holocaust against the Jews and the subsequent Nakba [catastrophe]—the violent expulsion of Palestinian civilians. The extermination of more than 6 million Jews in European concentration camps created circumstances sympathetic to Jewish suffering and the creation of the Jewish state of Israel. The Jews killed represented around one-third of world Jewry and about two-thirds of European Jewry (Holocaust Encyclopedia 2018). Even prior to the Holocaust, due to antisemitism and violent persecution, the creation of a Jewish Homeland gained some sympathy internationally with Britain noting: 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' (Balfour Declaration 2017). "A land without a people for a people without a land" became a widely cited phrase associated with the Zionist settlement movement to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The British controlled Palestine oversaw an influx of Jewish settlement and a succession of protests and revolts between the Jewish and the Palestinian Arab communities. After a quarter of a century under the British Mandate, Great Britain washed its hands of the issue and submitted what had become "the Palestine problem" to the United Nations on the ground that the Mandatory Power "was faced with conflicting obligations that had proved irreconcilable" (UN Question 2022).

In 1947, the newly created UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, recommending a plan to partition Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as a separate entity to be governed by a special international regime. Subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly recognizing Palestinians as a people with national rights and their right of return have been consistent with the basic conception of partition and two States in Palestine (Mallison and Mallison 1979). Resolution 181 contributed to an intensification of fighting between the local Jewish and Palestinian population, and six months later, Israel's unilateral declaration of independence sparked regional invasion and the first Arab–Israeli War. Israel defeated the Arab incursion, expelling not only the foreign armies but also more than 750,000 Palestinian civilians living within Palestine. The territory was divided into three parts: the State of Israel, the West Bank under the control of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under the control of Egypt.

However, in the 1967 Six-Day war, Israel gained military control over the territory of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Old City of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The territory under Israeli military occupation is the area with greatest vulnerabilities for civilian populations and ongoing infringements of international law. A key area of concern is the illegal Jewish settlement, which is a source of violence and escalations. Article four of the Geneva Convention prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of persons living in Occupied Territories. "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive" (Geneva Convention 1949). There have been many subsequent objections and resolutions that have condemned ongoing infringements of international law. The 1988 UN Resolution S/19443 called on Israel 'to abide immediately and scrupulously' by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of war and to abstain from policies and practices that are in violation of the convention (UN Secretary General 1988). Israeli violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention have been frequently also noted in NGO and INGO reports including of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As noted by the ICRC, the violations have included attempts to alter the status of Jerusalem, the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, deportations of Palestinian civilians from the Occupied Territories, collective punishments and destruction of homes (UN Secretary General 1988).

Acts of terrorism by Palestinian armed groups including Hamas have also been condemned for breaches of international law including: indiscriminate targeting, the use of human shields and exploitation of civilians including youth for violence and terrorism, which are considered war crimes. Hamas has also violated the Geneva Conventions including: conflicting parties must "distinguish between the civilian population and combatants"; prohibition of indiscriminate attacks where the "method or means of combat cannot be directed at a specific military objective"; and parties must "avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas" (Geneva Convention 1949). As noted by the head of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, heavy rocket barrage towards Israel by Hamas and other armed groups also constitute "a clear violation of international humanitarian law" (UN News 2021).

The 1990 UNSC Resolution 681 created the scope to discuss international protection to Palestinians in the OPT, under the aegis of UNRWA (UNSCR 681 1990). The resolution urged the Government of Israel to accept the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention 'relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War' (UNSCR 681 1990). Resolutions also condemned incitement and the construction of the barrier. In 2000, the Security Council deplored the provocation carried out at Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem and the subsequent violence that resulted in more than 80 Palestinian deaths. The 2003 General Assembly Resolution (ES-10/13) noted that the barrier was "in contradiction to international law" and demanded that Israel "stop and reverse" its construction (UN General Assembly 2003). Israel called the resolution a "farce". In 2004, the United Nations passed the issue to

the International Court of Justice which ruled that the portions of the Israeli West Bank barrier that are located within Occupied Palestinian Territories are illegal under international law (International Court 2004).

Commissions of UN inquiries examining the legality of Israel's military occupation have led to condemnation, but with no effect. On 27 May 2021, the UN Human Rights Council held a special session on "the Grave Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem" and adopted a resolution "Ensuring respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel" (UNGA 2021). The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, was given the mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of international human rights law leading up to and since 13 April 2021 (UN Inquiry 2021).

The Commission of Inquiry Report concluded that 'some of the policies and actions carried out by the Government of Israel that are leading to permanent occupation and therefore to de facto annexation may constitute elements of crimes under international criminal law' (International Commission 2022, p. 26). The Commission Chair, Navi Pillay, noted that "By ignoring international law in establishing or facilitating the establishment of settlements, and directly or indirectly transferring Israeli civilians into these settlements, successive Israel governments have set facts on the ground to ensure permanent Israeli control in the West Bank" (UN News 2022).

The report also noted that since the occupation began, Israel has used military justifications to issue permanent and temporary closure orders for vast areas in the West Bank (International Commission 2022). In practice, much of the land has not been used for military purposes but for the construction of settlements. Israel has declared approximately 18 percent of the West Bank closed military zones, including in Area C. Over half of Area C (1.765 million dunams) has been officially designated as closed military zones. Israeli settlers have cultivated over 14,000 dunams of land in closed military areas, some of which is on private Palestinian land. UN Secretary-General also noted that measures such as the closure of Palestinian towns and villages following attacks against Israelis "may amount to collective punishment" (UNSG 2017). Security Council Resolution 242 emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war", referring to the legal status of areas captured by Israel in 1948 and 1967.

The Palestinian population living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is protected by international humanitarian law. As noted by the UN Human Rights Council, 'as the occupying power, Israel has the duty to protect the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to uphold public order and safety' (UN Human Rights 2017, p. 4). Israel's military occupation and control over Palestinian civilians, illegal Jewish settlements and Palestinian displacements and deportations, permanent and military checkpoints, violent incursions and daily discrimination, hardship and violence have deprived the Palestinian population of basic human rights (Amnesty 2022). In 2022, an UN-appointed Commission of Inquiry stated that "Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory is unlawful under international law due to its permanence and the Israeli government's de facto annexation policies" (UNGA A/77/328 2022). As noted by the Inquiry, to date 14 settlements have been established in East Jerusalem with a total population of more than 229,000 persons. Restrictive planning and zoning regimes in East Jerusalem have obstructed adequate housing, infrastructure and livelihoods for Palestinians, contributing to shrinking space for Palestinians (UNGA A/77/328 2022). Israel has consistently taken the position that it does not formally accept the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention but that it has decided since 1967 to act in accordance with "the humanitarian provisions" of that Convention.

When it comes to what it perceives as a threat to its own security, Israel has not abided by international law. Sympathy, guilt and ongoing accusations of antisemitism have prevented a tougher stance against the violation of international laws by Israel and side-lined united international action. Lack of accountability and violent actions with impunity have become a source of international condemnation. UN's Human Rights Council noted; "the failure to ensure accountability creates an environment of impunity where victims and families have little or no redress, which may encourage further abuses on all sides… Accountability for violations committed by all parties would be key to breaking the cycle of violence" (UN Human Rights 2017). Systematic discrimination against Palestinians has also become institutionalized. Apartheid is an increasingly frequently utilized label used to describe the current state of Israel. Apartheid is 'considered a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to international peace and security' (UN Apartheid Convention 1973). As genocide, piracy, enslavement, torture and wars of aggression, apartheid is considered a peremptory norm of international law, which means that no state may withdraw from its obligation.

## **Protection of Civilians Under Israeli and Palestinian Authorities**

Since the birth of Israel, security and protection of the civilian population has been the stated priority of the state. Under Israeli authority, protection is very selective with the highest degree of protection for Jewish Israelis, and ineffective or malignant protection for minorities, most notably Palestinians living within Israel or under its military occupation. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, malignant protection is most evident for residents of East Jerusalem, Area C of the West Bank and Gaza. The key question is to what extent are Israeli security strategies and measures designed to protect the civilian population? Wars and cycles of violence have been the reality for the population residing within Israel as well as the Palestinian population living under the military occupation. Israeli civilians are impacted by terrorism and rocket attacks that indiscriminately target along border areas and increasingly beyond, and in Israeli eyes serve to justify the Israeli military crackdown on the Palestinian population. Although the number of Israeli civilian casualties compared to that of the Palestinian population is very low, rocket fire and terrorism aimed at civilians and civilian infrastructure create anxiety and infringe on human security. Palestinian security infringement by extreme groups has been utilized to justify a system of apartheid, which discriminates against and collectively punishes the Palestinian population. Collective punishment of the Palestinian population living under the occupation, ethnic cleansing, executions, destruction of Palestinian homes and the failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants are some of the violations of the Geneva Convention (UN 2020).

Escalations and cycles of violence have resulted in Israel using draconian security measures that impact on the security of individuals, particularly Palestinians living in Occupied Territories or those who are already part of vulnerable groups. Within Israel, weapons are carried by police, border guards, members of IDF (Israeli Defence Forces), members of private security companies, many settler groups as well as private individuals. Thirteen percent of Israeli households have some sort of weapon, and since 2005, Israel is the country to have the most significant global increase (57%) in the proportion of homicides committed by firearms (Aharoni, Lewin & Saar, TBP 2019). Many Israelis express personal security fears at the hands of their state institutions. In a 2016 survey conducted by the Israeli Knesset on the Status of Women, more than 59 percent of women and 54 percent of men polled were concerned about being harmed by state institutions (Survey 2016). Most concerned were Palestinian/Arab women, of whom 74 percent worried about damaging behaviour by state agencies that would negatively affect their personal security (Survey 2016).

Critical politicians, such as MK Dov Khenin from the Joint List, have noted that Israeli society lives in fear and 'unfortunately, there are those who build their politics on fear' (Knesset Press Release2016). Within the state of Israel, protection is selectively effective for Jewish Israelis and ineffective for minorities and vulnerable populations and malignant for Palestinians living within the contested spaces such as East Jerusalem. Political incitement, influence of social media and vigilantism have all contributed to the lack of security that has been particularly hard on teens. Children, especially teens, have been on the front lines of this conflict, subject to harsh realities, political manipulation, extrajudicial killings, detentions and other severe security conditions (Spitka 2018). Several members of the Israeli government praised extrajudicial killings by police, private security guards and vigilante civilians.  Most Jewish Israelis support the harsh security measures and select leadership who are perceived to provide the greatest sense of security.

Palestinians (Israeli-Arabs) are particularly vulnerable in East Jerusalem where the inadequate security is compounded by lack of final status agreement, institutional isolation, non-citizenship and lack of police or security force considered legitimate by the population. Lack of access to institutional protection has left Palestinian residents of Jerusalem vulnerable to harsh collective security measures, institutional and domestic violence, expulsions, abuse by Jewish settlers and private and public security personnel. This gap in protection has been felt particularly deeply by vulnerable minorities, teenagers and women. Jerusalem Women's Coalition, which includes NGOs and East Jerusalem Feminists, in October 2015 issued an urgent request for international protection. "We …call upon the international community to protect our families, community, and children. We are calling for the protection of our bodily safety and security when in our homes, walking in our neighbourhood, reaching schools, clinics, work places, and worships venues" (Woman's Coalition 2015). Despite some progress in Area A in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has been building a security apparatus that has been used to squash dissent and abuse journalists and protestors. The Hamas authority has used civilians as human shields and encouraged children to participate in violent activities. In Gaza, children, minorities and women are particularly vulnerable since they are susceptible to exploitation and have no one to turn to for protection.

Under international law, specifically the Geneva Convention, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, Israel is responsible for the protection of the population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which includes East Jerusalem (GA/PAL/1186, 8 March 2011). Measures that were designed to be temporary and transitional under the Oslo Agreement, including the divisions of West Bank into Areas A (under Palestinian Authority), Area B (Joint Israeli/Palestinian Control) & Area C (under Israeli Military Authority), have become a permanent reality contributing to the complicated protection arrangement. In Areas 'A' of the West Bank, it is the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian security and police, who are responsible for providing protection. Lack of security is most evident in Area C, where Palestinian civilians live under Israeli military rule without access to Palestinian police or any form of national or international protection. Serious gaps in protection also exist in East Jerusalem where Palestinian residents are not Israeli citizens, do not trust the Israeli police or other Israeli public and private security organizations, whose general tasks are not to provide for their protection but rather to quell dissent (Volinz 2018).

The protection of the civilian population is the most problematic for those residing in Gaza where none of the responsible authorities, Israel, Hamas or the PA can be said to be providing protection. The 2014 hostilities including the massive bombardment of Gaza, which was a response to rocket fire and a terrorist incident against an Israeli youth, destroyed residential buildings and schools, resulting in many civilian deaths, destruction of infrastructure and a displacement of close to a third of the population of Gaza. An investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) found serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by both Israel and Palestinian militants that are being investigated as war crimes (UNHRC 2015). The UN report noted that of the 2251 people killed in Gaza, 1462 were civilians. Non-governmental organizations have estimated that 241 women and 370 children were killed while inside their own homes (UNHRC 2015). The International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor has opened a formal investigation into alleged war crimes in the Palestinian territories.

Israeli justification for the military campaign was the ongoing rocket fire launched by armed groups from Gaza. Between July and August 2014, Palestinian militants indiscriminately fired 4881 rockets and 1753 mortars towards Israel, killing 6 civilians (UNHRC 2015). Alarms and safe rooms prevented loss of more Israeli lives. The protection of the civilian population was essentially non-existent for residents of Gaza. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) claimed that measures such as leaflets recommending evacuation, automated telephone calls and small blasts on the roof served as warnings for people to evacuate buildings targeted for destruction. The IDF warnings were confusing and were contradicted by Hamas which recommended to its population to ignore the warnings. IDF in turn considered anyone who ignored its warnings and remained in areas or buildings a voluntary shield. In addition, many civilians had nowhere to flee; no location in Gaza was considered safe, and those areas that were designated as "safe", such as UN schools, were also targeted.

Protection measures have also been malignant for Palestinian demonstrators, most notably in Gaza. The widespread Palestinian demonstrations in Gaza since May 2018 have resulted in more than 130 deaths and 3000 injuries from shots fired by IDF snipers. The lethal use of force against unarmed Palestinian civilians has been condemned by most countries and human rights groups, however justified within Israel. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that lethal force against demonstrators who posed no imminent threat to life may amount to war crimes (Human Rights Watch 2018). In addition, according to HRW, Palestinians in Gaza are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions as an occupied people and any wilful killing of them would constitute a war crime. In May 2018, Kuwait circulated a draft Security Council Resolution condemning Israel's use of force against Palestinian civilians, calling for the establishment of a UN protection mission in Gaza. The resolution was, however, vetoed by the US.

Although the international community is widely involved in protection issues within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the engagement is mostly in humanitarian assistance, monitoring, investigating, naming and shaming and diplomatic attempts to prevent further escalation. Individual states also contribute military arsenal to opposing sides which escalates the conflict. Divisions within the international community have prevented robust initiatives that may have strengthened protection of civilians. The United Nations, the Quartet, the EU, the Arab league as well as individual states have all faced divisions within the organizations as well as between them that have weakened an international response and made interventions beyond humanitarian aid and monitoring implausible or ineffective. Since 2000, the US has used its veto rights in the UN Security Council to block almost every UNSC resolution including: sending unarmed monitors to West Bank and Gaza, Condemning Israel for acts of terror against civilians in the Occupied Territories (2001), cessation of Israeli settlement activities (2011) and condemning Israel for its massive violations of international law in Gaza and the West Bank (2015). The resolutions that did pass were largely ignored.

## **Conclusion**

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, there exists a wide gap between international norms and principles of protection, national and international strategies and the realities of civilian protection. In today's conflict settings where much of the conflict takes place in urban areas and perpetrators of violence can be the state or actors who hide among the population, the tools of protection are not designed to provide protection for civilians. Even under the best intentions, the military, particularly foreign military, does not have the capacity, the tools nor the training to deal with civilian populations. As noted by some practitioners, emergencies that do not warrant international military intervention may benefit from a less intrusive and more effective police-keeping strategy (Day and Freeman 2005). Although the police have more effective training and tools than the military, without the support and engagement of local communities, the police can also be a part of the problem. State security institutions, including the police, may also not be providing protection for all civilians. Indeed, the state may be deliberately targeting the civilian population, and in some cases, may stand to politically benefit from fostering insecurities.

Top-down security, such as those from the national governments or international organizations, often does not address the security needs of those from 'below' (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). Civil society and human rights organizations are commonly on the front lines in the protection of civilian population. However, there is a growing trend towards the criminalization and targeting of humanitarian and human rights work. With a focus on the individual, human security encourages the integration of non-state and bottom-up perspectives to security (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). Inclusive participation, including domestic institutions, civil society, the community policing and independent judiciary, is fundamental towards constructing an effective protection regime. Participation in peacemaking, disarmament, demobilization, the security sector and judicial reform can work towards reparations and non-recurrence (Day and Freeman 2005). In recent years, scholars and practitioners have also recommended that protection should switch from the paradigm of liberal interventionism to the paradigm of resilience (Chandler 2012). As noted by Chandler, "the resilience paradigm clearly puts the agency of those most need of assistance at the centre, stressing a programme of empowerment and capacity-building" (Chandler 2012, p. 216). Far more effort, however, must be made to support and protect human rights defenders.

Ineffective intervention in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict goes beyond the lack of domestic willingness and poor application of effective tools and is linked to the lack of international willingness to stand up against Israeli transgressions. Settler colonialism, apartheid, ethnic cleansing and war atrocities are all ignored by Israeli allies who have turned a blind eye to ongoing breaches in international law and violent actions with impunity. Although international protection and intervention are also limited in other conflicts, such as the ongoing occupation by Russia of Ukraine, there is far more international unity, fierce condemnation and strong sanctions against Russia. Despite the urgent need to change the current reality, there is also little attempt to bring about a political solution. However, as will be discussed, a focus on protection of civilians could create a working roadmap towards a resolution of the conflict. Inclusive protection tools and participation can also make solutions far more feasible.

## **References**

Adams, Simon. 2015. Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council, March 2015 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, http://www.glo balr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper\_final.pdf. Accessed July 15, 2022.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **2**

## **Israeli National Protection Strategies and Realities**

Security and protection of Israelis has officially been the largest priority for Israel and its leadership. *However, to what extent do Israeli national security strategies and practices protect the civilian population under its authority? Who is deemed worthy of national protection and who doesn't fall under the umbrella of state protection?* This chapter will examine the *principles, the practices, and the perceptions of Israeli protection*. Who are the protectors and how effective is the protection of civilians? Unpacking strategies of the protectors, the realities of the unprotected and the perceptions and legitimization of non-protection, this chapter examines and analyses the current strategies and gaps in the Israeli protection regime and the justifications of their absence.

It is worth noting that some of the principles behind Israel's security strategies were already established when the state was founded. Zeev Jabotinsky's "Iron Wall," written in 1923, provides some of the underlying guiding principles still valid today. According to Jabotinsky, it is 'utterly impossible to obtain the voluntary consent of the Palestine Arabs for converting "Palestine" from an Arab country into a country with a Jewish majority' (Jabotinsky 1923). Since Palestinians will not accept Jewish colonialism, 'the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to

T. Spitka, *National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20390-9\_2

abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present' (Jabotinsky 1923). As noted by Jabotinsky, Zionist colonialism can proceed and develop only under the protection of a strong power behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach.

The founder of the state of Israel and the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion outlined two fundamental principles for Israel's security; first, shifting combat onto enemy soil and, second; achieving military decision in the shortest possible time (Eisenkot and Siboni 2019, p. 30). Both principles have also remained in place—the first through Israel maintaining an impenetrable border with fierce retributions on attempts at breach; The second, achieving as much as possible in the least amount of time. As noted by Eisenkot and Siboni, rapidly shifting the fighting onto enemy soil and achieving victory as quickly as possible, applies today as much as ever (Washington Institute 2019). The socalled Gaza wars are a good example of this. The time element is crucial because of the social and economic difficulty of a reserve force in extended combat and the difficulty of preserving legitimacy within the international community for the use of force over time.

According to Washington Institute, Israel's security strategy has officially focused on the four D's—Deterrence, Detection, Defence and (Military) Decision-making (Washington Institute 2019, p. 34). Israel considers itself to be an anomaly in a predominantly hostile region. The country's security narrative is commonly focused on regional threats, stemming from challenges from Iran's nuclear military capability and its regional engagement with neighbouring Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. With Israel's vast military superiority over its neighbours and unconditional support from the world's military superpower the US, the threat has been exaggerated. One can differentiate between real threats, perceived threats and hyped-up existential threats. *Existential threat*, or a perceived fear of the potential annihilation of existence of Israel and its people, is frequently publicly elicited and is intended to heighten fear and rally support for a policy or a national leader. Several members of the Israeli military establishment noted that it's often money and politics, rather than security, that push the fear of an imminent attack or hyped-up existential threat against Israel. Although much of the narrative is focused on regional threats, the daily tasks of the Israeli military establishment are focused on management of the Palestinian civilian population living under its military occupation.

Fearmongering, or relying on hyped-up threats that impact the civilian population hasve in recent years been a common way for Israeli national leadership to remain in power. Former Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon referred to Benjamin Netanyahu as a fearmonger. As noted by Yaalon, Netanyahu and his top ministers stoked ethnic and religious hatreds, exaggerated the security threats to cling to office and distract people from real challenges (Booth 2016). The former Director-General of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission also noted that the defence establishment commonly sent out false alarms in order to grab a bigger budget (Halpern 2010). Critical scholars have pointed to common Israeli policies of promotion of fear and insecurity among Israeli and Palestinian civilians (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015). Although some of the fearmongering rhetoric had been slightly toned down when Netanyahu was out of power, the 2022 Israeli elections brought to the forefront even more radical and conflictual elements. In order to come back to power and prevent being persecuted for corruption, Netanyahu aligned himself with the what has been described as 'the most extreme right-wing, racist, homophobic and theocratic coalition in Israel's history' (Haaretz 2022). With an increase in hard-line rhetoric, rise of incitement and severe security measures against Palestinian demonstrators and insurgents, and little chance of a political solution, the realities subsequent to the 2022 elections are predicted to become even more violent and volatile.

Israeli emphasis on security has been studied and discussed extensively (Freilich 2018; Peters and Pinfold 2018; Cohen and Klieman 2018). Known globally as a security specialist, Israel's sale of military knowledge, expertise, cyber and military equipment provides the country with a significant proportion of its income (Freilich 2018). There are over 150 active defence companies based in Israel with combined annual revenues of more than 3.5 billion USD (AICE 2021). During 2020, Israel's military exports hit \$8.3 billion USD, the second highest-ever total (*Times of Israel* 2021). European military imports from Israel, focused on terrorism, borders and cyber security, have also been on an all-time high (*Times of Israel* 2021). In recent years, Israeli military expertise has shifted from hardware required in fighting wars against armies, to tools utilized to monitor opposition and civilian populations. Particularly sought after though increasingly controversial has been the software Pegasus, spyware developed by the Israeli cyber-arms firm NSO Group. Pegasus has been used with increased frequency around the world to monitor government officials, opposition, critical NGOs and activists.

Although Israel's military industry and its security expertise haves been a source of ample revenue, its security measures, especially the treatment of the Palestinian population under military occupation, haves been a source of much condemnation. Human Rights Watch noted that security has been abused to justify ethnic cleansing and a system of apartheid. Many policies, such as: 'the denial of building permits in Area C, East Jerusalem, and the Negev in Israel, residency revocations for Jerusalemites, or expropriation of privately owned land and discriminatory allocation of state lands, have no legitimate security justification. Others, including the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law and freeze of the OPT population registry, use security as a pretext to advance demographic objectives' (Human Rights Watch 2021). Israeli protection strategies have been designed to partially shield Israeli society from the effects of the occupation while maintaining control over the Palestinian population and hindering change. As will be discussed, political change has been viewed with hostility within Israel, as the potential cost of political change or a peace agreement is perceived as an unnecessary risk and a greater threat than the status quo (Sheizaf 2014).

Scholars, observers, diplomats and practitioners have been increasingly critical of Israel's harsh security measures related to its military occupation and increasing numbers of injuries and fatalities of Palestinian civilians (Thrall 2017). Even ardent supporters of Israel have become critical of draconian security and anti democratic measures put in place by Netanyahu's coalition government elected in 2022 (Bloomberg, 2023). Recent studies examining fatalities within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have pointed to evidence of risk transfer, where Israel transferred risk from its soldiers to Palestinian civilians (Levy 2017). Although Israel blames the Palestinian Authority and terrorist organizations for

placing Palestinian non-combatants in harm's way, what are Israeli principles and practices regarding the protection of non-combatants? To what extent do Israeli security institutions distinguish between combatants and non-combatants? Are the growing number of civilian casualties linked to shifting principles and policies? This chapter will outline the role of protectors, the protected and those in need of protection, examining the principles, practice and perception of protection under Israeli authority. The final section will examine the justifications for the lack of protection.

## **The Protected**

The population under varying degrees of the Israeli protection regime can be differentiated most significantly between those living within current Israeli borders and Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation beyond the green line. The green line is the demarcation line or the pre-1967 line separating Israeli territory from its neighbours and the territory occupied by Israel (see Map 2.1). The civilians living under Israeli protection within the green line comprise of: Jewish Israelis including Ethiopians and Russians, Muslim Palestinian Israelis (Israeli-Arabs), Christian Palestinians, Drews, Bedouins and other minority groups. Refugees and others who are living within Israel temporarily or permanently but without citizenship, also fall under Israeli civil authority including the civilian police. Outside of the green line are included Christian and Muslim Palestinians living under Israeli military authority and Jewish Israelis living in guarded settlements under Israeli civil authority. East Jerusalem residents, who for the most part do not hold Israeli citizenship but have access to Israel's social services including healthcare, fall in a distinct category. The degree of protection offered and the perception of the protection varyies widely between the different ethno-religious groups, and particularly between the populations living inside or outside of the green line.

The most dramatic differentiation in protection can be made between the protection of Jewish civilians living under Israeli authority within Israel, and Palestinian civilians living under Israel's military occupation

**Map 2.1** Israel & occupied Palestinian territory (*Source* UNISPAL—The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine [2022] UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, https://www. un.org/unispal/data-collection/)

outside of the green line. Although the distinctions have been fundamental to how the Israeli government and security establishment perceive and justify their policing tools, the distinction in the perception of many Palestinians is are not as significant. In the eyes of many Palestinians, whether living within or outside of the green line, Israeli protection is perceived as a contradiction of terms.

Distinctions in protection can also be made among specific vulnerable populations including visible minorities, persons with disability and youth. The vulnerability of youth and children, particularly Palestinian children, will be discussed in Chapter 4. In recent years, vulnerability has also been exacerbated for vocal state critics of the Israeli regime, including human rights activists, who have been publicly declared to be enemies of the state (Gordon 2014). Human Rrights organizations have been increasingly monitored and targeted with offices ransacked, the heads of critical organizations threatened, arrested and/or deported. Members of the newly elected 2022 Israeli government made a vow to target those who do not support the state. Religious Zionism head Bezalel Smotrich said that human rights organizations are "an existential threat to Israel" and the incoming government must deal with them by "seizing their funds" and acting against them with all legal and security measures (Shpigel 2022).

However, the least protected population are Palestinian civilians living beyond the green line under the Israeli military occupation who are a target of aggression and in some areas do not fall under the umbrella of any protection. The following sections will outline those in need of protection under Israel's de facto authority including East Jerusalem and beyond the green line in areas B and C in Occupied West Bank and within Gaza.

#### **East Jerusalem**

Jerusalem is the disputed capital of Israel and Palestine and remains largely divided between West Jerusalem, integrated within the Israeli protection sphere, and East Jerusalem, the home to mostly Palestinian residents, the majority of whom are stateless and do not fall under any protection regime. Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem (and the surrounding West Bank territory) in 1967 has not been recognized by the international community (IC) but is a de-facto reality. UN and other international and regional bodies consider East Jerusalem an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territory and its Palestinian residents as persons protected by international humanitarian law (OCHA 2014). Israel considers East Jerusalem under its own authority but its treatment of East Jerusalem is far from equal and protection for East Jerusalem residents runs from poor to non-existent. The majority of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem lack Israeli citizenship and do not trust or rely on Israeli authority and protectors including the police. There are no Palestinian police forces operating in East Jerusalem and, in most neighbourhoods, the residents prefer to approach traditional Muslim elders for disputes on issues. Border police are sent into East Jerusalem to deal with security concerns for Israel but not as protectors for the local population.

The degree of animosity between East Jerusalem residents and Israeli police varies between the different Palestinian neighbourhoods. Wealthier neighbourhoods such as Beit Hanina have fewer security issues and some residents have limited trust in Israeli police. Poorer neighbourhoods, particularly those with ongoing evictions of Palestinian residents and growing presence of extreme Jewish settlers such as in Sheikh Jarrah, have daily or weekly skirmishes and a very troubled relationship with Israeli security. Moves to evict Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah had been one of the key issues in the 2021 escalation of violence culminating in 2021 May's Gaza war. Since 2019, Issawiah has also been a focal point of ongoing demonstrations and violent clashes between its Palestinian residents and the Israeli police.

## **Occupied West Bank**

Beyond the green line, the territories of the West Bank are under Israeli military control and, with the exception of the Jewish settlements, have not been incorporated into Israel's political and civilian administrative system. Since the 1990s Oslo Peace Accords, the West Bank has been divided into Areas A, B and C (see Map 2.1). Contested spaces notably Area C (and East Jerusalem) offer the least protection for civilians. Area A, constituting 18% of the West Bank, is the most populated region and includes the main cities of Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem, Tulkarem, Nablus, Qalqilya and Jenin. Area A is under Palestinian administrative control with Palestinian military and police forces and thus will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter. Israeli citizens are officially forbidden from entering Area A, however, Israeli forces conduct regular incursions. Although incursions into Area A have been officially coordinated with the Palestinian aAuthority, cooperation in security has been suspended since 2020, and is generally ignored in times of tension.

Area B, composing of 21 percent of the West Bank, is under Israeli military control, while the PA retains some control in education, health and the economy. Area C comprises of about 60 percent of the Palestinian territory and is completely under Israeli military control. Thus, all protection in Area C, including policing and judiciary, is under Israeli military authority, which leaves the Palestinian residents living in Area C completely devoid of protection. Israel controls and monitors all movement between the different areas including economic trade. Area C also contains the highest number of forced evictions of Palestinian residents. During 2020, the demolition of homes resulted in the displacement of 570 people (OCHA 2021).

#### **Gaza**

Cycles of violence, including Israeli bombardment campaigns and incursions into Gaza, have directly affected the majority of the Gaza population that has nowhere to flee. Rockets fired into Israel have been the justifications for the incursions and bombardment campaigns. Hamas has also adopted new tools such as use of kites and balloons to deliver incendiary and explosive devices. Economic blockades, severe fuel and water shortages, and Israeli restrictions on many items including basic construction materials have left much of the population vulnerable to not only violence but also natural elements. Controlled and governed by Hamas with Israel controlling land and sea borders, Gaza is the home of the least protected population in the world. This is especially the case since the 2006 election of Hamas, a terrorist organization that maintains *belligerent* control of the population. Israeli security, in turn, has been focused on creating an impenetrable border, containment of the population within Gaza, firing at demonstrations who approach the border and bombardments from above, subjecting all Gaza residents to collective punishment for electing Hamas. Since Israel treats the civilian population as an enemy or collateral damage, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in Gaza is negligible. In Gaza, Palestinian and international NGO's efforts have also been hindered by Hamas, especially assisting women and LGBTQ given their limited rights and protection under Sharia law.

## **The Protectors**

To begin with, who are the protectors, who is and who is not being protected under the umbrella of the various Israeli protectors and why? Including the areas under Israel's military occupation, the official protectors can be said to consist of: the state leadership, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the police, the courts, border guards, and private security companies, Israeli intelligence agencies including the Shin Bet and Mossad and non-government organizations (NGO's). Each of these entities perceive protection and who is to be included and excluded under the umbrella of Israeli protection differently. Israeli security forces and police are officially charged with protection all civilians; however, security becomes progressively more militaristic in Palestinian/Arab-dominated areas within Israel and takes on a malignant rather than a protective role in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Lethal force without just cause is utilized almost exclusively against Israeli minorities and Palestinians and a majority of the cases of abuse by the police are never investigated (Halbfinger and Rasgon 2020). While Israeli police are focused on security problems within Israel, border guards and private security companies have in recent years gained increased importance operating within Palestinian Occupied Territories.

*The Government*: Although Israel's leadership has the responsibility for the protection of all civilians under its territory, this protection generally does not apply to the Palestinian population. Standards on protection of civilians are widely different depending on the identity of the civilian and their location. The Palestinian population living within the green line inside of Israel is commonly considered the fifth wheel, an undesired population that is commonly publicly threatened with eviction. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted that Israel is "the national state, not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people" (*NPR* 2019). For the Palestinian population living under the Israeli occupation, particularly in Gaza, there is little to no distinction between a civilian and terrorist. Lack of protection of Palestinians, within or outside of the green line, is generally blamed on the Palestinian leadership. All violence is blamed on incitement of the Palestinian leaders.

In general, incidents involving security guards, the IDF or border guards where Palestinian civilians are killed are commonly not investigated and politically justified. As an example, when discussing heightened violence within Israel, listing all attacks against Israelis while ignoring attacks against Palestinians, the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs noted that 'the series of attacks against Israelis is the direct result of incitement by radical Islamist and terrorist elements, calling on Palestinian youth to murder Jews' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). In 2015, the Mayor of on Palestinian youth to murder Jews' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). In 2015, the Mayor of Jerusalem asked those with guns to wear them and—"shoot to kill anyone carrying knife or screwdriver" (Hasson 2015). More recently, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett also asked those who have a licencse to carry a weapon 'should do it now' (Breiner and Kubovich 2022).

 Although Israeli intelligence is challenging to pin down because documents are seldomly declassified, it plays a significant role in protection. Israeli leadership have used intelligence for targeted assassinations regionally and within Gaza. The 2004 assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was one among many Hamas leaders to be targeted and killed in Israeli operations. Avraham Shalom, the Head of Shin Bet between 1980 and— 1986, noted: "In a war against terror, forget about morality, find morals in terrorists first" (Gatekeepers 2013). The majority of intelligence today is gathered remotely, mainly by hacking computers and cellphones. The shift from *Humint* to *Sigint* intelligence has affected both the ability of spy agencies to gather information as well as protection of individuals. Humit—human intelligence—is the collection of information from human sources such as clandestine operations. *Sigint* intelligence refers to intelligence that is gathered by interception of signals. The multiplicity of security cameras backed by facial recognition technology and biometric passports has made it harder for intelligence agents to move around, infiltrate or travel undercover (Harrel 2022c).

Traditionally, Israeli intelligence units have been highly valued for providing exact intel on potential local and regional terrorists. Part of the strength of relatively effective Israeli intelligence has been the successful recruitment of Israel's Palestinian Arab population including the Drews. The recent death of Mahmoud Kheir el-Din, who was killed in friendly fire in an intelligence gathering Gaza operation, spelled another step towards the end of risky secret operations (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Intelligence has also been used to monitor and expose vulnerable populations, such as LGBTQ, women and men engaged in socially unacceptable behaviours. Homosexuality in Gaza remains illegal and is punishable by death. The gathering of details on civilians' sex lives for use in blackmail operations has heightened vulnerability that has been exploited by Israel. In 2014, forty-three former members of the elite IDF intelligence Unit 8200, including officers, wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying they would refuse to do reserve service because of Israel's "political persecution' of the Palestinians. The unit noted that the information that is gathered and stored in the army's systems "harms innocent people. It is used for political persecution and to create divisions within Palestinian society by recruiting collaborators and driving parts of Palestinian society against itself " (Cohen 2014).

*Israeli Police Force* The Israeli police force operates throughout Israel, Occupied East Jerusalem, Area C of the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Within Israel, the police are commonly criticized for mistreatment and discrimination against visible minorities. Waves of demonstrations by young Ethiopian Israelis during 2015 and 2019 that followed racialized incidents haves led to a push for internal investigations and police reforms. For Israelis of Ethiopian descent, institutional racism and troublesome policing are a major impediment to their sense of equality and full citizenship (Abu and Ben Porat 2021). Israeli police have also come under fire from women's rights groups for failing to address the rising number of cases of violence against women. Minority women face the double bind of "gendered racism" and "racialized sexism" from the communities and police. For example, according to studies, Israeli police have been noted to more readily accept Arab men's excuses for violent outbursts or turned a blind eye to battering incidents (Adelman et al. 2003).

Israeli police also operate in East Jerusalem and beyond the green line within Palestinian areas under Israel's military occupation;, however, they usually deal with security breaches and not protection of Palestinian civilians and the police generally used are special militaristic units such as the border police.

*Border Police:* Border police, whose main tasks are maintaining public order and fighting terrorism, currently constitute about 22% of the operational forces in the Israel Police. The border police are made up of special police forces from the IDF and recruited volunteers. According to the Ministry of Public Security, there are 68 diverse units including operational battalions, units responsible for maintaining routine security, the YAMAM special counter-terrorism unit, the undercover YAMAS unit, units for the security of essential facilities, the 101 units, an antiriot unit and a k-9 unit (Ministry of Public Security 2014). They do not necessarily wear a uniform and operate mostly in Occupied Palestinian territories as well as along the border areas. They receive counter terrorism and combat training and tend to have a very poor reputation for protection of civilians or accountability. The border police operate more as soldiers and are known for being quick to use lethal force against suspected terrorists including youth and unarmed civilians. Incidents between the police and Palestinian civilians outside the green line are commonly not reported or investigated. Palestinian civilians, including minors, are also commonly arrested and held without being charged.

The border police are the most prominent public security actor in East Jerusalem, however, generally their role is not to protect the local Palestinian population. According to police reports, there have been many incidents where Israeli Border policemen initiated "friction" with residents of East Jerusalem to provoke a violent response (Hasson 2016). Israeli border police operating in East Jerusalem have also been known to instigate rather than prevent violence. In an infamous incident in Issawiah, an Israeli police officer planted a M16 rifle in an East Jerusalem resident's house for a Docudrama. The discovery was staged by policemen in the Jerusalem District, with the purpose of promoting themselves and presenting Isawiyah residents as a security risk (Hasson 2019). Although the police issued an apology, this incident and others like it did not result in any disciplinary actions.

International and national NGO's have reported widespread violence and abuse against Palestinian civilians by border police units. Despite having a track record of abusive policing, border police have been strongly supported by the government. In 2021, Netanyahu exclaimed that the Israeli border police should not be afraid of investigations. "We hear talk of apprehension over [future] commissions of inquiry, investigations, inspections – we will give you all the tools to protect yourself and the citizens of Israel," adding, "You have our full backing, do not be afraid" (Human Rights Watch 2021). As noted by NGO observers, the lack of accountability has contributed to their behaviour to act with impunity.

*Israeli Defence Force—(IDF):* It has been said that rather than a state with a military, Israel is military that has a state, attributing to the power of the military. All Jewish, Christian and Drew male and female Israelis are drafted into the IDF at the age of 18. For Jewish Israelis, the IDF is the most respected and trusted institution within Israel (Democracy Index 2019). Ninety percent of Israeli Jews and 41% of Israeli-Arabs (which includes Drews and Christians) trust the army. In comparison, trust in the Israeli parliament—the Knesset—is 30% among Jews and 24% among Israeli-Arabs. For the Palestinians living under the military occupation, the IDF is the key tool of the occupation controlling daily movement and life. While all armed forces value the lives of their soldiers, Israel considers its soldier's lives to be more valuable than the lives of enemy civilians (Erakat 2019). Israel's aversion to soldier casualties leads it to liberally apply force such as airstrikes and massive indiscriminate fire in order to guarantee force protection (Erakat 2019, p. 198).

There are hundreds of different units within the IDF including paratroopers, engineering, infantry, intelligence, miliarymilitary police and special forces, many utilizing different tools and rules of engagement. Some units, such as the Duvdevan, often wear civilian clothing to disguise themselves among the local Arab populace. They operate independently and engage in special operations including targeted killings. Targeted killings have commonly been under the auspices of Mossad and Shin Beit;, however, the IDF has increasingly been tasked or given the green light for targeted assignations (Bergman 2018). The 2022 killing of prominent Palestinian Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh by the Duvdevnan unit has drawn international condemnation and investigation by the international criminal court.

#### **Security Guards**

Armed security guards work at all entrances of buildings whether malls, transportations, businesses, education or entertainment facilities within Israel. According to estimates, there are about 135,000 security guards in Israel, approximately 50,000 of whom bear arms (Who Profits Research Centre 2016, p. 27). Considered a very basic job requiring little or no training, half of all security guards are new or old immigrants from the former USSR, who are paid minimum wage. Checkpoints along the green lines, however, are generally run by selected private security companies.

*Private Security Companies* (PSC) Private security companies have become increasingly important particularly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, controlling the Palestinian population, manning checkpoints and protecting Jewish settlers on Occupied Palestinian land. Critics have noted that Israel has employed non-state actors to do the 'dirty work' required to ethnically cleanse the Palestinian population and build and maintain the settlements (Volinz 2019). The privatization of checkpoints along the seamlines between Israel and the military occupied territory and withing the territories began in 2006. Every year, additional checkpoints have been transferred to PSC (Who Profits Research Centre 2016). At least 14 checkpoints have been privatized and transferred to PSC including: 12 checkpoints in the West Bank and 2 checkpoints between Gaza and Israel (Erez and Kerem Shalom) (Who Profits Research Centre 2016). More are being privatized.

The outsourcing of security to private companies has made the Israeli state less accountable towards the protection of civilians. As noted by a local Jerusalem politician: 'to recruit private security companies instead of relying on the police force can save us a lot of headaches. It means that the authorities don't take full responsibility […] it means that accountability is scattered into so many different bodies so that in the end no one takes charge. […] it allows us to be bold in our projects, in our ambitions. I can see it growing' (Volinz 2019).

## **Judiciary Within Israel**

Traditionally Israeli civilians, including Palestinians, had turned to Israeli courts for protection. Israeli courts including the Supreme Court haves had significant rulings on evictions, location of the separation wall, human rights and shootings of unarmed demonstrators. Increasingly, due to political appointments under the Netanyahu administration, the Supreme Court has been less inclined to rule in favour of Palestinians. In 2002, Israeli Supreme Court justices rejected an appeal filed by 104 residents of the East Jerusalem area of Silwan to overturn a decision by the Custodian of Absentee Property to "free" the land on which they have lived for decades (B'Tselem 2018). The land was taken from Palestinian residents by a group affiliated with Ateret Cohanim, a settler association that works to Judaize East Jerusalem. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that targeted killing is a legitimate form of self-defence against terrorists, and outlined several conditions for its use. The Court of Justice adjudicated on the issue of targeted killing deciding that 'a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization …commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, loses his immunity from attacks "for such time" as he is committing the chain of acts'" (Erakat 2019, p. 201). Shooting live ammunition at unarmed demonstrators was another court case which was filed by human rights groups. However, in May 2018, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected two petitions filed by human rights groups and fully adopted the Israeli military's position, giving a green light to its continued use of snipers and live fire against Palestinian protesters in the Gaza Strip.

#### **Israeli Military Courts (Occupied Territories)**

Palestinians living in any of the areas within the Occupied Territories and accused of security incidents are tried in Israeli military courts. The military courts have jurisdiction over two types of offences; security offences and threat to public order such as traffic violations and criminal offencses. Thousands of Palestinians, including minors as young as 12, are brought before military courts on various charges including: entering Israel without a permit, stone-throwing and membership in an illegal association. While the courts offer an illusion of proper judicial conduct, they mask one of the most injurious apparatuses of the occupation (B'Tselem 2017). In the military courts, the judges and prosecutors are Israeli soldiers and Palestinians do not have legal representation. The Palestinian defendants are convicted in 99 percent of the cases thus defendants commonly enter a guilty plea to avoid a lengthy trial during which time they are forced to remain in custody. As such, the military courts are neither impartial nor neutral.

#### **Militias and New National Guard**

There are several Jewish militias linked to far-right settlement groups that operate inside Israel and the West Bank. The escalating violence and terrorist attacks have served as a justification for the rising number of militias. The militias commonly cooperate with Israeli police or IDF units, gain funding from private organizations, local councils or the government and operate with little supervision or consequences. During the unrest in May 2021, Israeli authorities made use of Jewish militias to target Palestinian citizens in coastal cities, including Lod, Jaffa, Ramla, Haifa and Akka (Wated 2022). Armed militia called "the Guardians of Lod" have been supporting extremist Jewish settlements and ethnically cleansing Palestinians from the city of Lod (Wated 2022). Made up of volunteers and right-wing activists linked to extremist leadership, the militias have been able to take violent actions against Palestinian civilians living within Israel without legal consequences. International and Israeli observers have voiced concerns that Israel is losing control of the private militias (Wated 2022).

In May 2022, subsequent to a string of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced the creation of a new "civilian national guard" to fight terrorism (Breiner and Kubovich 2022). The national guard, according to the currently discussed plans, would be the body that would have a key role in dealing with disturbances in mixed cities. According to Bennett; "The urgent need to strengthen the personal security of the citizens of Israel was born a year ago during the events of Operation Guardian of the Walls, mainly in the mixed cities, and it is more urgent than ever in the current wave of terrorism" (Keinon 2022). The use of militias, as with private security, can also absolve the state from responsibility for its actions.

## **Principles of Security and Protection**

The new way of waging war in recent years has been commonly characterized by transfer of risk from soldiers to enemy civilians with limited discrimination between combatants and civilians (Levy 2017). This is a consequence of the type of conflict, the challenge of recruitment of soldiers and militants hiding among civilians. Indeed, in recent years, the Israeli state has adopted new measures and tools to minimize risk to Israeli soldiers. Some of these have included increasing use of heavy aerial bombardments, unmanned drones and vehicles and moving through Palestinian homes, conducting violent operations in Gaza and the West Bank which do not risk the safety of soldiers. Security measures have tended to prioritize protection of Israeli settlements and Israeli soldiers, with little emphasis on the protection of vulnerable civilians. The distinction between civilian and combatant is to be established on the basis of whether the person is directly engaged in hostilities. The Geneva Convention expressly prohibits inhumane treatment of protected persons including: individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of civilians, the destruction of property unless as an absolute military necessity (Darcy 2003).

The ongoing military occupation of Palestinian areas is focused on intimidation, control and severe military measures that made little distinction between combatants and civilians. The protection of lives of soldiers not only comes at the cost of Palestinian civilians but also ahead of lives of Israeli civilians. Rating the death hierarchy, Levy notes that due to lack of choice and political consequences of exposure to death, the reservist soldiers are the most protected segment of the population. This is because the Israeli army is dependent on the reservists during escalations such as Gaza wars. According to Levy, order of hierarchy for protection is: (1) Reservists; (2) Citizens from privileged groups; (3) Middle-class conscripts; (4) Conscripts from peripheral groups; (5) Peripheral citizens; and (6) Enemy civilians (Levy 2010, p. 352).

Since Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) rely on recruitment of 18-year old's straight out of high school and reservists, willing to leave their families to serve, their safety is of primary concern. According to Levy, the declining motivation among privileged groups to serve in the military is the key to how soldiers' lives have become more valued than civilians (Levy 2010, p. 346). The 2003 IDF ethical code of conduct noted that 'where the state does not have effective control of the vicinity, it does not have to shoulder responsibility … that persons who are involved in terror operate in the vicinity of persons who are not…jeopardizing combatants rather than bystanders during a military act against a terrorist would mean shouldering responsibility for the mixed nature of the vicinity for no reason at all' (Kasher and Yadlin 2005, p. 18). In other words, protecting the lives of IDF soldiers is more important than the lives of innocent bystanders.

On the lowest scale of value of a civilian life, the hierarchy can be broken down further into territory where the person is residing. As noted by the 2022 UN Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, there are stark differences between the legal systems in Israel and the West Bank, in particular with regard to criminal law, with significant implications for the rights of Palestinians (UN Commission Report 2022). For example, if a Palestinian living under the military occupation is shot and killed by Israeli security forces, there is little chance of investigation or repercussions, even if the victim is a child. Daily military incursions, house demolitions, targeting of civilians and even shooting of unarmed civilians can all be justified in the name of security. As an example, "Under military law, holding and waving Palestinian flags during demonstrations and assemblies of Palestinians is regarded as a security threat, so that Palestinians' freedom of expression and freedoms of peaceful assembly and association are severely restricted" (UN Report 2014). Forcible removal of Palestinian flags has recently resulted in a pushback by Israeli police who have publicly taken a stance noting that it's not good use of police time, and the removal of Palestinian flags usually results in escalation and not deescalation (Police 2022). Shortly after taking office, Israel's new National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has ordered Israeli police to ban Palestine flags from public places in the latest crackdown by the country's new hard-line government, calling the Palestinian national symbol an act of "terrorism" (Aljazeera 2023).

Israel considers the territories of the West Bank and Gaza under belligerent occupation where the state exercises military and legal control, but fails to take the responsibility to protect the civilian population. As noted in a 2005 Israeli Supreme Court ruling, "This court has ruled in a long list of judgments that Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip are under belligerent occupation of the state [of Israel]. They are not part of the State of Israel" (Adalah 2020). Considered the most dangerous and hostile territory under Israeli occupation, civilians living in Gaza are offered no protection by Israel. Israeli case law declared Gaza to be an 'enemy entity', and designated its population as 'enemy aliens' (Adalah 2020). In 2007, Israel's security cabinet voted to declare the Gaza Strip an enemy entity, a move that gave Israel the power to cut off all vital supplies including water and electricity (Jerusalem Post 2007). Collective punishment of the population of Gaza has become an accepted national strategy.

#### **2 Israeli National Protection Strategies and Realities 49**

The guiding principle of minimum risk to the soldiers at the cost of harming innocent civilians has been integrated into IDF practice (Levy 2017). Hannibal Directive is one example in which if an Israeli soldier(s) is under threat of kidnapping, IDF have a policy of indiscriminate firing to prevent an abduction. The directive was used most recently during the 2014 war in Gaza as soldiers were given leeway in Rafah, Shujaija to shoot at any target to prevent a potential kidnapping of a soldier. In Rafah, where two Israeli soldiers were killed and one was suspected of being kidnapped, every person and moving vehicle became a potential target (Human Rights Council 2015). The directive was officially cancelled by the military in 2016 following heavy criticism. The criticism was not because of the deaths of Palestinian civilians, which numbered in the hundreds, but due to the criticism of a policy of shooting one's own soldier, preferring a dead rather than an abducted soldier.

The shooting and killing of Palestinian protestors along the Gaza border has been the subject of investigations and much debate on the rules of engagement. According to the IDF, 'Hamas has used the violent riots as another means for carrying out military attacks against Israel using the cover of the Gazan population' (IDF Document 2019). The United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the protests found that the use of live ammunition by IDF against demonstrators was unlawful, as the protestors did not pose any threat to the lives of Israeli soldiers or civilians (UN Inquiry 2019). In its 2019 investigation, the commission found reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli forces intentionally used lethal force against civilians, including children, medical personnel, journalists, and persons with disabilities (UN Inquiry 2019). However, Israeli politicians, IDF and the Supreme Court all justified the actions. A February 2019 IDF document reiterated that soldiers may open fire with live ammunition on "key instigators" or "key rioters" even when they are at no longer participating in the protest or are resting (Adalah 2019). This policy is applicable in Gaza and the West Bank.

The rise of violence in 2022 has also resulted in acceptance of more lethal tools. Subsequent to the 2022 killing of an IDF soldier in Jenin, the Israeli military proposed to revamp the West Bank defensive strategy by using helicopters and drones to secure ground troops through the use of 'deterrent fire' (Kubovich 2022a). In September, the chief of staff gave officers of IDF Central Command "a green light to carry out targeted assassinations" in the West Bank (Harrel, September 22, 2022c). For the first time, in case of operational need, IDF is also allowing the use of drones to kill wanted Palestinians by long-range fire (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). In 2022, Israel's army also introduced artificial intelligence-powered robotic guns on top of a guard tower overlooking the crowded al-Aroub refugee camp in the occupied West Bank (Min 2022). The robotic guns are faster than humans once they lock on a target and currently can fire tear gas, stun grenades and sponge-tipped bullets. All of these new measures have been sharply criticizsed by international organizations and human right groups and will likely result in more deaths of civilians.

## **Practice of Protection**

For Palestinians living under the occupation, there are few boundaries between the conflict and people's lives which can be shattered at a moment's notice. "Imagine it - you're sitting in your living room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal . . . . And, suddenly, that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders.  The children are screaming, panicking. . . Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, twelve soldiers, their faces painted black, submachine guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall" (Weizman, 2006). The story is not a unique one describing the realities of the movement of soldiers through people's homes even when those individuals are not the target. The soldiers blasted their way into the residence above and continued through the family's home to blast into the neighbour's house. Officially referred to as a military strategy of "swarming" or "infestation", moving through walls was designed to protect the lives of soldiers.

Described by a commanding officer as: I ordered my troops: …If until now you were used to moving along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls! …We were thus moving from the interior of homes to their exterior in a surprising manner and in places we were not expected, arriving from behind and hitting the enemy that awaited us behind a corner' (Weizman, 2007). Eyal Weizman 'Lethal Theory' Anyone No. 7 (Winter/Spring 2006), pp. 53–77.

This section will examine the practices of civilian protection outlining instances of *effective, selective, ineffective, belligerent and exploitative protection*. Within Israel, the protection can be categorized as selective as it is very dependent of the national group and their location. Vulnerability extends to women, visible minorities, youth and people with disabilities. Beyond the green line in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli protection of the Palestinian population is belligerent. Israeli security forces are responsible for the majority of injuries and fatalities. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has noted that since 2008 there have been more than 6036 Palestinian fatalities, the majority of which have been killed by air-launched explosives (Gaza) or live ammunition (OCHA 2023). During the same period, there have been more than 138,040 injuries among Palestinians, mostly from tear gas inhalation, rubber bullets and live ammunition. Among Israelis within the same time period, there have been 124 fatalities and 5913 injuries (OCHA 2023).

Despite billions of dollars of expenses on security including police and military, there are few instances of effective security for even the Jewish population within Israel. Most vulnerable are visible minorities, persons with disabilities, gender minorities and youth. Persons with disabilities are killed by Israeli forces, mostly because they do not hear or understand instructions, including those with hearing and sight impairment or are individuals with mental disabilities. Palestinian women with head scarfs express the deepest security concerns within Israel, doubtless because the militaristic society has not given many a sense of security. The Israeli industry of fear targets not only Palestinian anti-occupation and antiviolence protesters, but also Israeli dissidents, anti-war protesters, human rights activists and other political activists (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, p. 8).

Israeli occupation measures have also included targeted assassinations, collective punishment, administrative detentions, house demolitions, deportations, checkpoints, closures and the construction of a security wall. Within the West Bank and East Jerusalem, children and youth participating in actions, such as demonstrations, throwing stones or attempted assaults, have been subject to maiming, arrests, detention and extrajudicial killings. Subsequent to the 2014 Gaza war, angry Palestinian youth within Israel incited by social media sought to take vengeance on Israeli civilians by attacking them with household objects including knives, scissors and screw drivers. The so-called 'knife' or 'children's' intifada led to approximately 166 stabbing attacks and 89 attempted stabbings and resulted in 38 Israelis and 235 Palestinians being killed and 7,955 detained (Shabak 2015). A majority of the attacks (60%) took place in Area C and from those that took place inside Israel, 72% took place in Jerusalem (Weissbrod 2018, p. 33). Some of the attacks were conducted by Palestinian youth as young as 12 years old. A political directive to kill the perpetrator on the spot led to outrage by human rights groups. Israeli NGO Adalah noted that 'Politicians and senior police officers have not only failed to act to calm the public climate of incitement, but on the contrary have openly called for the extrajudicial killing of suspects' (Adalah 2015).

In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, key protection concerns have been linked to settler violence. Israeli settler violence refers to acts of violence committed by illegal Jewish settlers against Palestinian civilians with the intention to threaten and intimidate. Condemned widely by the international community, settlement violence has been on the rise. Settlements are illegal under international humanitarian law as they violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of the occupying power's civilian population into occupied territory. Settler violence includes harassment, intimidation, physical violence and property damage to homes, religious buildings, commerce and agriculture. The number of yearly incidents ranges in the thousands with between 30 to over one hundred Palestinians dying each year. At times, Jewish settler violence as well as Palestinian violence against settlers is part of a cycle of violence where one incident sparks retribution or a 'price tag'.

Beyond the cycle of violence, the most significant issue is the immunity and lack of accountability for the Jewish settlers, protected by Israeli state institutions including the IDF. OCHA noted that between 2005 and 2016, over 90% of the investigation files on settler attacks against Palestinians and their property filed with the Israeli Police were closed without an indictment of a suspect (OCHA 2017). Civilian security forces are appointed by the settlements' regional and local councils and they represent their interests. The civilian security coordinators (CSCs) and the civilian guards that operate in the Israeli settlements on the West Bank are among the most problematic. The CSCs are agents of the army, in that they are subject to the Military Justice Law and hold policing powers, but they are appointed by the settlements and see themselves as representing the settlements' interests (Hareuveni 2014). They are permitted to conduct searches, detain suspects and to use force. Although the military order grants the settlement guards substantial policing powers, it does not require them to wear a name tag, as required of Israel Police personnel (including Border Police) and other Israeli officials who hold policing rights (Hareuveni 2014). Thus, not only is there illegal confiscation of Palestinian land by Jewish settlers, there is 'the transfer of law enforcement and policing powers in the settlements to a quasi-military civilian force, including the possibility to use injurious means, exercise force, deprive liberty, restrict movement, and search and seize property' (Hareuveni 2014, p. 48).

The intimate connections between the illegal Jewish settlements, the police, the army and the government are very clear. Brig. Gen Roi Zweieg, commander of the Israeli army's Samaria brigade, noted: "It has often been said that the army and the settlements work together. I disagree with that, I think the army and the settlement enterprise are one and the same" (Shezaf 2022). The cooperation takes place not only in the occupied territories but also within Israel. For example, in Israel's mixed city of Lod, the mayor Yair Revivo is leading the fight against the Palestinian presence in Lod through harassment and intimidation. The actions include the policy of encirclement of Palestinians in all public spaces, with the aim of forcing them to leave under duress (Wated 2022). Proliferation of militias, such as Sayeret Barel, in the Negev, known to Palestinians as Naqab, has increased fears that the Israeli authorities and police are losing control over the rise of the fascist right (Wated 2022). One of the Palestinian members of the Lod municipality, Fida Shehadeh, noted that the far-right has become a kind of "state within a state" (Wated 2022). With the 2022 election of right-wing leadership coming from Israeli settlements, the strength of the militias and the special relationship between the army, settlers and the government are likely to only grow stronger.

Targeting of human rights activists and journalists has been another area of concern. Palestinian journalists have been accidently or purposefully targeted by Israeli soldiers. According to the Committee to Protect (CPJ), at least 19 Palestinian journalists have been killed since 2000 (CPJ 2022). On 11 May 11th, 2022, a veteran Palestinian-American journalist Shereen Abu Aqleh who was working for Al Jazeera was shot in the neck and killed while reporting on an IDF incursion into Jenin. Every indication seems to be that she and other journalists, who were all wearing well-marked press bullet proof wvests and helmets, were directly targeted by Israeli soldiers, who repeatedly fired at them and prevented their escape or medical attention. IDF commando unit Duvdevan (unit 217) was conducting a 'sweep and arrest' operation in close to Jenin refugee camp. The initial investigation into the shooting led by Col. Meni Liberty, the head of the Commando Brigade (to which Duvdevan is subordinate), found six instances of IDF gunfire near Abu Akleh and additional journalists. In one of them, a Duvdevan fighter returned fire from inside an armoured jeep while the jeep was about 190 meters from the reporter. It is during this incident that the army fears Abu Akleh may have been shot (Harel, May 18, 2022a). Duvdevan is responsible for undercover operations in urban areas, during which the operators commonly wear civilian clothing and disguise themselves among the local Arab populace (Duvdevan Unit 2021). The unit can operate independently and performs high-risk and complicated operations, including targeted killings.

Israeli army police stated, however, that they are not going to investigate the killing because it would become a criminal investigation, which would be unpopular with the Israeli public (Harel, May 18, 2022a). Ammar Himazi, Assistant Foreign Affairs for the Palestinian Authority (PA), noted that the refusal to investigate is no surprise. Palestinians do not trust the system which is meant to subjugate and punish them. Palestinians have decided to conduct their own investigation which they intend to forward to the International Criminal Court. A member of the Israeli ruling coalition resigned which, at the time of writing, resulted in the collapse of the current government. Israel refuses to cooperate with any independent mission. The NGO Yesh Din (There is Law) said the decision not to authorize the military police to investigate the incident showed that "the army law enforcement mechanisms no longer even bother to give the appearance of investigating. Eighty percent of the complaints that are submitted are dismissed without a criminal investigation" (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c).

The protection of civilian population under Israeli authority in Gaza is essentially belligerent. The most recent Gaza wars of 2008/2009, 2014 and 2021 have resulted in heavy loss of civilian Palestinian residents. Israeli justification for the military campaign in Gaza was the ongoing rocket fire launched by armed groups from Gaza. Between July and August 2014, Palestinian militants indiscriminately fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel, killing 6 civilians (UN News 2015). Aggressive fire policy allowed for a ground operation by reducing the exposure of IDF soldiers to risk. However, the severe bombardment came at the expense of heavy losses to Gazan civilians. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) claimed that measures such as leaflets recommending evacuation and a small blast on the roof served as warnings for people to evacuate buildings targeted for destruction. The warnings were confusing, while Hamas recommended to civilians to ignore IDF warnings and Israeli security considered anyone who remained a voluntary shield. Also, many civilians had nowhere to flee; no location in Gaza was considered safe, and those areas that were designated as 'safe' such as UN schools were targeted. According to interviews with IDF soldiers who took part in the operation, the rules of engagement in 2014 were quite lax. The Hannibal Directive, which gives leeway to Israeli soldiers for shooting at all targets in order to prevent the abduction of soldiers, was reportedly activated in Rafah and Shujaija (Breaking the Silence 2018). In Rafah, where two Israeli soldiers were killed and one was suspected of being kidnapped, every person and moving vehicle became a potential target.

Beyond the periodic bombardments that cause significant deaths, injuries and destruction, borderline areas between Israel and Gaza have also become an area of ongoing demonstrations. The widespread Palestinian demonstrations began in March 2018 have resulted in more than 200 deaths and 3000 injuries from shots fired by IDF snipers. The vast majority of the persons killed or injured were unarmed and posed no threat to the soldiers on the other side of the fence. A UN Commission of Inquiry, which examined the shooting of the Gaza demonstrators, concluded in 2019 that in the tens of cases it had examined, none of the protestors were armed or posed an imminent threat to life or limb, and thus the use of force was unjustified (UN Inquiry 2019). The UN Commission also found 'reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli snipers shot at journalists, health workers, children and persons with disabilities, knowing they were clearly recognizable as such', (UN Inquiry 2019). However, Israel justified and whitewashed the investigation. Israeli officials noted that the open-fire regulations would allow the use of lethal fire against instigators or anyone who tried to damage the fence or even approach it (B'Tselem 2018). As noted by B'Tselem, 'Israel conducted "investigations" into certain specific cases of shooting by snipers. But no one investigated – and no one in Israel will – the rules of engagement themselves' (El-Ad 2022).

The practice of protection is also affected by the politics of the day. The months just prior to Israeli elections tend to be more volatile as the government commonly flexes its muscles. Intensive military confrontation in the West Bank, with a rising Palestinian death toll, is also liable to bring down the voting rate among the Arabs in Israel, increasing the proportion of voters from the Israeli right. As noted by Harrel, 'That's a fact known to everyone who follows the developments in Israel and the territories – from Hamas and the PA to Likud, Yesh Atid and the National Unity Party' (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Israeli police have also noted that recent election campaigns have been accompanied by unprecedented radicalizsation in social media discourse (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Thus, violence in the Occupied Territories tends to benefit the right-wing parties both because Israeli votes shift to the right and fewer than 48 percent of Palestinians or Palestinian Israelis bother to vote in the elections.

## **Perceptions of Security and Justifications of Lack of Protection**

There is a wide differentiation between the realities of protection for civilians and the sentiment of safety. Safety and perception of safety are directly related to national identities. Minorities also perceive their status within Israel and beyond the green line based on their own safety. As noted by Guy Ben Porat, minorities evaluate their status in the state's citizenship regime through their interactions with the police, thereby emphasizing the 'heavy symbolic load' policing carries in shaping communal and collective identities (Abu and Ben Porat 2021). In East Jerusalem and Palestinian or mixed areas within Israel and in occupied territories, this would be also based on their interaction with border police, private militias and the IDF. Anger and threat tend to increase hawkish predispositions, such as ethnocentrism, intergroup animosity and militarism and are is more likely among those that experienced violence first-hand (Yakter 2022).

In the escalation of violence subsequent to 2014 Gaza War, most Israeli civilians expressed fear of personal security at the hands of state institutions. In a 2016 survey conducted by the Israeli Knesset, more than 59 percent of women and 54 percent of men polled were concerned about being harmed by state institutions. Most concerned were Palestinian/Arab women of whom 74 percent worried about damaging behaviour by state agencies that would negatively affect their personal security (Survey, Knesset, 2016).

In a 2018 survey of Jerusalem residents, safety and protection was the primary concern for Palestinian respondents while only a minor concern for Jewish respondents (Jerusalem Survey 2018). In the survey, 73 percent of the Palestinian residents living in East Jerusalem said that they witnessed violence between security forces and local residents in the past 6 months. On the other hand, 15% of Jewish residents of West Jerusalem had heard of or witnessed violence between security forces and local residents in the past 6 months (Jerusalem Survey 2018). After the 2022 string of terror attacks, a poll found a bleak security outlook with 83% of Arab Israelis and 64% of Jewish Israelis feeling no personal security (Democracy Institute 2022). Only 16% of Arab Israelis and 33% of Jewish Israelis said they felt a very large or fairly large degree of personal security (Democracy Institute 2022).