Such ambiguity has been at the core of contestations as to whether South Africa is really doing anything in Somalia, whether there is even the will by Pretoria to live up to the foreign policy pledges and pace previously set in Burundi, the DRC, and South Sudan. As a result, the perceptions about South Africa are varied. And justifiably so, because South Africa's track record as demonstrated in the case of the DRC and South Sudan has been visibly large and impressive—thus begging the question why a change in the case of Somalia. Is it resource scarcity? Is it an absence of geo-strategic importance? These notwithstanding, when asked to identify specific activities that South Africa has supported, an interviewee stated that "South Africa gives seminars and gives some money but it is not enough."5 Another view was that "South Africa's support has been through the Gift of the Givers and partnerships with educational institutions."6 But the recurrent sense of more was expected from South Africa seemed like the country had set its commitment to the continent higher than it could respond to. In spite of this, there is a strong African desire to strengthen ties with South Africa and to develop a mutually beneficial relationship.

Another cause for concern about South Africa's continued peace efforts on the continent was its decision to draw down its troops from Sudan in April 2016. Whereas this decision was part of a broader austerity measure to respond to domestic economic challenges, it also exposed an often undervalued precondition for peacebuilding: the indispensability of resources*.* The existence of political will and policies are not enough to drive peace support operations. There is a fundamental need for resource availability, a stable domestic economy and a politically stable and mature democracy which sees value in humanitarianism and global peace endeavors for peace support to flow. It may seem that South Africa, itself 20 years into a process of post-conflict recovery and democratization, overcommitted itself and started experiencing fault-lines that in other states have triggered relapse.

Before now, South Africa's support to other states has been sourced from its African Renaissance Fund (ARF). The dispensing of development assistance through the ARF almost created the unintended contemplation that South Africa had graduated from a developing country and joined the ranks of developed countries. But recent economic challenges, widening inequality, and soaring unemployment were stark reminders of the need for South Africa to reconfigure its intervention framework. Against this backdrop, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) was conceived to address the shortcomings in the management and implementation of development projects experienced with the ARF. SADPA would use development cooperation as a tool to advance South Africa's foreign policy goals, while the newly created South African Council of International Relations (SACOIR) decide on foreign policy priorities as indicated by the National Development Plan. The SACOIR and SADPA are therefore two new organs designed to balance national interest and foreign policy. While the SACOIR underscores and promotes practical opportunities for cooperation, to tackle the problems of poverty, inequality, and unemployment, SADPA would offer development assistance where the opportunity for South Africa's interest are not undermined to the detriment of its people.

## Conclusion

As South Africa continues to consider the future of its involvement in seeking solutions and stability in the complex and old crisis in Somalia and finding finality to the drawn-out assistance to the never-ending crisis in the DRC, three issues come up sharply in respect of the country's post-conflict interventions. The first is the fact that all interventions derive their success or failure from the objective conditions in the crises which South Africa responds. Where the situation is ripe for mediation and stabilization, the country's approach succeeds in a limited time. But where the intervention occurs in an ongoing conflict with no conditions for subsiding, as in Somalia and the DRC, it gets drawn out. The second is that South Africa's interventions are generally framed by the broad thrust of South Africa's foreign policy and worldview. Thus, its commitment to stabilizing Africa and enable a renaissance that will benefit South Africa's diverse economy underpins its decisions on interventions. Thirdly, South Africa is laden with the responsibility of playing a lead role among other countries in achieving the shared goals of the continent on account of its own benefits from African solidarity during the anti-colonial, anti-apartheid struggle and on account of its relative capacities.

Among the lessons evident from engagements like the DRC and Burundi is the fluidity of the concepts of mediation, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding as South Africa applies them. South African peacekeepers and the domestic mission support team which includes civilians play divergent roles in helping the state to recover. These roles are often not just military but a blend of military, civilian and police.

South Africa's peacebuilding initiatives in Africa highlights important novel approaches promoted, while offering vital lessons for all stakeholders to improve upon. Among the lessons learned are the need to avoid adopting a narrow security prism to interventions in complex conflicts and refrain from attaching conditions to aid. It is also the need to avoid the use of many middle men in such interventions as some major actors do in order to avert security risks. It is important to engage local partners, inquiring from them about the conditions and solutions as well as directly responding to their needs. It is also wise not to overcrowd or the host country's vital bureaucracy, but have interventions that can be done in partnership with assisted countries within their capacity.

The case Somalia affirmed that there is still room for improvement in the sense that the bilateral engagement with NGOs like ACCORD, without taking cognizance of the Somali government priorities or allowing the latter to control the funds and define what they should be used for seemed like funds with strings can generate negative perceptions about using own institutions and exporting solutions. This single example suggests that South Africa is more successful in those cases where it was directly involved from the conceptualization of the peace process like mediation. This in part could explain the heavy investments in the DRC and Burundi processes. In these two cases, South Africa demonstrated high-level political commitment, familiarity with the issues, and felt sufficiently involved as part of the key stakeholders to the process, which is in contrast to Darfur and Somalia, where its involvement is in solidarity with the international community and thus a posture in engagement of actors, and less political commitment.

Today, with the South African Council of International Relations put in place to lead on discourses around foreign policy, there is lieu and time to broaden this discussion and work with the government toward addressing its challenges in policy implementation evidenced in the case of Somalia where a neat balance needs to be struck between meeting foreign policy objectives and responding to domestic challenges in manners where intervention is appreciated externally and its dividends well received by the South African populace.

## Notes

## References

Besharati, Neissan Alessandro. 2013. South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development Packages for Africa? *Economic Diplomacy Program Research Report* 12. Accessed March 15, 2016. http://www.saiia.org.za/ doc\_view/347-south-african-development-partnership-agency-sadpa-strategicaid-or-development-packages-for-africa

Zondi, Siphamandla. 2012. South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series*. http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/mosambik/09403-no-8.pdf

**Charles Nyuykonge** is Senior Researcher at The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Durban, South Africa.

**Siphamandla Zondi** is Head of the Department of Politics, University of Pretoria, South Africa.

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# Case Studies

# Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: India's Role in Afghanistan

## *Shakti Sinha*

## Introduction

The gradual shift in the economic and political gravity towards the Global South, particularly the Indo-Pacific, is also reflected in the increased role of these rising powers in stabilising countries emerging from conflict. While in terms of amounts of financial resources deployed by them, aside from China whose assistance figures are ambiguous, may not appear very large, the question to be addressed is whether these new actors have brought a different approach to issues of peacebuilding, more especially with reference to projects being demand-driven and owned by recipient societies.

China, and to a lesser extent India, is accused of tailoring its assistance to take advantages of natural resources available in African countries. This criticism is further buttressed by the conviction that such flows from 'emerging donors might increase the recipients' debt levels, ignore environmental and social impacts, and focus on extracting resources … resulting in an erosion of the progress that has been made in the traditional aid community in these areas' (Dornsife 2013). On the other hand, these rising powers do not see themselves as donors but as development partners;

S. Sinha (\*)

Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India

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their assistance may be tied but has no policy conditionalities attached to them, are demand-driven and are premised on non-interference in the affairs of recipient countries (Dornsife 2013; Roopanaraine 2013).

Going deeper, what are the strategic goals and interests of these rising powers? What motivates them to extend assistance to other, developing countries? And are these motivations different from that of traditional donors? Do they differentiate between 'normal' development and peacebuilding? Does peacebuilding imply a sequenced approach with securing peace as the first priority, followed by state-building and then development? And are the projects taken by these rising powers perceived to be successful by the governments and people of the recipient countries?

The emerging powers generally, and India specifically, because they see themselves as partners and not donors, are driven by a different set of motivations. Having suffered from colonialism which involved not just pauperisation but also loss of political agency, the emerging powers focused on the need to become economically self-sustaining, though in the age of globalisation this is a more nuanced view. Sharing experience and technology was seen as the best way to overcome the lack of capital. A primacy to national sovereignty and hence non-interference in the internal affairs of each other meant that the concept of conditionality was not accepted though tied aid was—both to overcome the need to import from the developed countries and in the spirit of mutual gain. Like traditional donors, political and strategic considerations cannot be ignored, even if the approach is context-specific.

A critical look at India's role in Afghanistan would be used to examine these sets of questions dealing with the role, innovations and effectiveness of the rising powers in building peace. India has been the fifth largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan, and the largest outside the developed countries. This offers a unique opportunity to study the performance of a non-traditional donor in a conflict-affected country; it can be no one's case anymore that Afghanistan is a country that is 'actually' emerging from conflict, and yet the country over the past 14 years has made tremendous strides in many fields, for example, school education, health coverage, communications, role of civil society, growth of a free media and holding regular elections including a peaceful transition of power.

The format of the chapter is that, after a brief introductory section, the second section will trace India's emergence as a donor, examining its driving principles and the evolution of its instruments. This too needs substantial elaboration since there is general lack of knowledge, as well as misconceptions, about the size of India's development assistance as well as misgivings about India's presence in this field, hitherto the preserve of donors from developed countries. The third section will look at India's role in Afghanistan, its development initiatives, the strategic factors driving its Afghan policy and will briefly compare India's development interventions with that of the United States. The fourth section will look at how India's development partnership is perceived in Afghanistan and whether it contributes to peacebuilding, or is divisive and exclusionary. The concluding section will attempt to draw lessons from India's development engagement with Afghanistan with a view to strengthening peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from conflict.

## India as Donor1

Contrary to general perception, bolstered by the fact that India is the largest borrower from the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), India has been involved in bilateral, and multilateral, development partnership since the early days of its independence. In 1949, the newly independent Burma (now Myanmar) faced a serious crisis in its balance of payment. Prime Minister Nehru organised a meeting of Commonwealth countries that raised six million pound sterling on concessional terms for Burma; India's own contribution was one million pounds. In addition, India extended a bilateral special concessional loan of Rupees five million to Burma to buy rice from India.2

India was an active participant in the setting up of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia during 1950–51. Though the Colombo Plan was initially designed within the traditional developed country donor-developing country recipient framework, it soon evolved as the pioneer instrument of South–South cooperation centred on 'technical cooperation and sharing of development experience.' During these early years, India extended technical cooperation partnership under Colombo Plan as well as extended financial assistance to its neighbours, for example, 'loans of around 200 million rupees to Myanmar and 100 million rupees to Nepal' in the 1950s (Chanana 2009).

From the outset, India's approach was quite different from that of the traditional donors (developed countries). For India the driving force was development partnership, and it did not see itself as a donor even when it extended concessional loans, advances in Indian budgetary parlance. India saw itself as a part, albeit leading one, of the group of developing countries emerging from decolonisation with under-developed economies. The common history of colonisation and emphasis on economic growth bound these countries together. Anti-colonialism meant that egalitarianism and partnership, not aid, should be the focus. What further made India adopt its own path was the Cold War that threatened to divide the world into two, opposing camps. Loath to lose their independence and freedom of action that they interpreted joining either camp meant, India and the others sought their space. The adoption of Panchsheel, or five points, at the Bandung Afro-Asian summit in 1955 was the result, to be followed in 1961 with the launch of the nonaligned movement. Panchsheel committed these countries to respect each others' sovereignty and not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

While recognising the political cause of their under-development (colonialism), in the circumstances India felt it necessary to work with its partners on addressing the economic cause of such under-development through technical cooperation and the sharing of experiences. The driving principles of India's development partnership with other developing countries were expanded to include egalitarianism, country ownership, demand-driven and lack of conditionalities (even where there was tied financing). The latter is significant as mutual respect for sovereignty ruled out imposing any conditions as lenders do. However, the lack of hard currency and desire for self-sufficiency meant that tying aid to purchases from lending country was accepted. Separately this refusal to join either camp enabled India and others to access financial and technical assistance from both camps and from multilaterals.

India did not set up a dedicated agency for external development partnership; instead it was run and coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) which drew on expertise of the relevant line ministries. India formalised its technical assistance efforts by establishing the India Technical and Economic Cooperation programme (ITEC), again located in MEA. ITEC has six main channels:

For government of India, ITEC was about partnership and learning from each other, quite different from traditional aid. To quote MEA (2012), ITEC's basic proposition is that '…cooperative efforts of the developing countries were as important as assistance from developed countries and international organizations.' The training component has grown very substantially, and in 2012, it covered 200 different training programmes, of varying durations, at forty training institutions with a total of 5000 training slots (Ministry of External Affairs 2012) ITEC Program has evolved and grown over the years and MEA (2012) reports that ITEC and its sister programme, Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP) has covered 161 countries in Asia, Africa, East Europe, Latin America, Caribbean as well as Pacific and Small Island countries, and is funded by government of India. It is estimated that by 2010, there were 'more than 40,000 alumni of the ITEC program around the world' (Ramachandran 2010).

India's development partnership programmes in general, including ITEC, are dollar-for-dollar of much greater value since these are overwhelmingly incurred within India and its developing partner countries adjusting for purchasing power parity. In other words, India's external development budget of US\$1.3 billion for 2013–14 would actually translate into effectively 4/5 times larger amount for a developed donor country.3

India's development assistance has also been increasing at a reasonably fast pace, particularly since 2000, 'increasing seven-fold between 2000 and 2014. In 2014, Indian development assistance stands at about \$1.3 billion' (ICRC 2014). This amount may be a slight underestimation as there are other items not fully caught in the budget documents. ITEC is the single largest component, US\$589 million out of this amount. Figure 7.1 tracks the growth in India's development assistance in recent years. The Indian government also makes sizeable contributions to multilateral organisations, including the World Food programme, U.N. Development Program and the World Health Organization.

In fact, this tripling over five years is unprecedented, but even at the lower 2012–13 levels, India's development assistance budget 'was comparable to Austria's foreign aid budget for the same year and higher

**Fig. 7.1** India's development assistance, 2009–2014 Source: *Indian Government* Note: *Excludes line of credit*

than the foreign assistance of four of the 23 DAC countries in 2011' (OECD 2012). India's development assistance budget for the year 2015–16 includes a grant element of US\$878 million and US\$180 million earmarked for capacity development (including formal university education in India). There is also a target for extending Letters of Credit (LOCs), US\$2 billion for Africa and US\$500 million for other countries.4

Earlier, Indian financial assistance was limited to its immediate neighbourhood but that has since changed, though the former still dominates the flow of funds. In fact, but for developments in Afghanistan, discussed later, and the opening up of Myanmar which made these two countries receive larger and larger amounts of assistance, the share of the neighbourhood would have been considerably less. Myanmar received US\$83 million in 2013–14, a steep jump from just US\$10 million four years earlier. Significantly, India's aid to Africa has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 22% over the past ten years (Ramachandran 2010). The top three aid recipients of India's development cooperation are Bhutan (49%), Afghanistan (9%) and Nepal (6%).5

Realising that the government would be unable to meet from its budget the increased call from its development partners for assistance, India shifted gears over the years 2003–4, spanning two different governments. First, India would be discontinuing the system of offering concessional loans, learning from the HPIC experience where it had to write off advances to Guyana and others, it shifted to outright grants, and also introduced a new instrument, LOCs administered by India's Exim Bank with government picking up a major part of the interest charges, allowing partner countries to pick up highly concessional loans for investments in areas of their choice. This has allowed India to expand its development partnership portfolio considerably without a concomitant charge on its budget, with government's own commitment limited to the interest subvention charges. Exim Bank raises its capital from international bond markets since it needs hard currency for its borrowers. LOCs are tied instruments and as a rule, a minimum of 75% of goods and services procured under the LOC (with a relaxation of up to 10%) must be sourced from Indian companies. However, there is a very substantial grant element, varying from 56.4% for HPICs, 37.3% for low-income countries/LDCs and 34.4% for middle income countries (Arora and Mullen 2017).

The process starts with request received from borrower countries for specific projects. MEA's Standing Committee decides whether to move ahead, and if so, the amount of exposure and recommends the case to the finance ministry. The finance ministry checks availability of budgetary resources and finalises the terms and conditions, based on the borrowing country's income classification. The LOC is operated through EXIM bank, but the procurement process followed is that of the borrowing country. There is no oversight of this by India at all, respecting their sovereignty.

LOCs have become extremely popular and high-level diplomatic visit to such partner countries most often result in announcement of new/ enhanced LOCs. Exim Bank has now in place 226 Lines of Credit, covering 63 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Oceania and the CIS, with credit commitments of US\$16.9 billion; the total amount of contract approvals is US\$7.18 billion, and amount disbursed, US\$5.77 billion (Mathew 2015). Annex I has an illustrative listing of projects.

Doubts have been raised whether these credits should even be thought of as development assistance since LOCs are seen to be promoting the exports of Indian goods and services. However, the level of tied credit, at 75% of these loans is 'comparable to the de facto tied aid given for example by the US Agency for International Development. Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on what is to be considered as 'soft loans' categorises such concessional Government of India-backed and Exim-bank distributed LOCs as development assistance.6

Africa has become the largest user of Indian LOCs, 52% of actual disbursals and 45% of amount committed (Mathew 2015). At the recent India–Africa summit (Oct 26–30, 2015), attended by 41 heads of State/ government out of 54, 'India promised \$10 billion in new credit and \$600 million in grant aid to African countries, over five years' (Gupta 2015). India–Africa Development Fund would get an infusion of \$100 million and India–Africa Health Fund of \$10 million. The grant would also include 50,000 scholarships in India over the next five years.

Utilising its strength in the IT and IT enabled services (ITES) sector, India would spend a total US\$125 million in setting up the Pan-African e-Network project. It is meant to assist Africa in capacity building by way of imparting quality education to 10,000 students in Africa over a five-year period in various disciplines from some of the best Indian Universities/ Educational Institutions. Besides, this would provide Tele-Medicine services by way of on line medical consultation to the medical practitioners at the Patient End Location in Africa by Indian Medical specialists in various disciplines/specialties. India would cover the cost of supply, installation, testing and commissioning of hardware and software, end-to-end connectivity, satellite bandwidth, O&M support, and providing the teleeducation and tele-medicine services to 53 African countries for five years.

Forty seven countries have signed up for it. The first phase of the Pan-African e-Network Project, inaugurated in February 2009, covered 11 countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Seychelles. The twelve countries launched in 2010 included Botswana, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia.

Regular Tele-Medicine and Tele-Education services have already been started on this network. The Tele-Medicine consultations are regularly being conducted from Super-Specialty Hospitals from India to the African countries on need basis. In addition, regular Continued Medical Education (CME) sessions have started (2009) from 11 Indian Super-Specialty Hospitals. Regarding Tele-Education services from India, more than 2000 students from Africa have enrolled in five different top-ranking universities in India in various disciplines (Pan-African 2016). India has also contributed US\$200 million to NEPAD and is involved in other African-led initiatives.

India's guiding principles, though not formally articulated at one place, is reflected in its approach to development partnership generally. That India's development assistance flows primarily to countries in its neighbourhood should not be a surprise. The subcontinent continues to have the largest numbers of poor people in the world, though not in percentage terms. State formation in many of these countries, or parts within, is still challenged by insurgencies, terrorist violence and weak capacities. As India seeks to emerge as a global power, its own economic achievements and military capability would not compensate for any disarray or state failure in its immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to seeing others as similarly placed on account of historical reasons and consequently as partners in economic development, India has to sufficiently invest in its neighbourhood to ensure that they too are able to grow economically. This is seen as an important factor in successful State-building. Politically, India cannot be seen to be located in a troubled region. This adds strength to India's basic ethical approach to development partnership. An analysis of Indian development assistance to Afghanistan will show whether or not it is driven by these general principles.

## India's Development Partnership with Afghanistan

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Kabul on December 25, 2015, to jointly inaugurate with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani the parliament building built by the Indian government. His visit was a big hit in the Afghan media, especially the social media. The government of Afghanistan decided to name one of the blocks of the building after former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who had offered to build this powerful symbol of democracy as a sign of Afghanistan–India friendship and partnership. It was in his time that India re-engaged with Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US intervention that dislodged the Taliban in late 2001. The pace of engagement accelerated almost immediately, and despite fatal attacks on Indian targets including diplomats, development staff and projects, has maintained its momentum.

That India has emerged as major development partner, arguably the fifth largest bilateral donor over the 14-year period, to Afghanistan should not have come as a surprise to analysts who have worked on Afghanistan

**Fig. 7.2** India's development cooperation with Afghanistan: commitments and expenditures, 2002/03–2013/14 Source: Rani Mullen.2014

"IDCR Report: The State of Indian Development Cooperation."

New Delhi: Indian Development Cooperation Research, (Spring)

on the ground. India's development partnership with Afghanistan goes back to the 1950s, and till transit trade through Pakistan was not an issue, was Afghanistan's largest export market for dry fruits. The civil war (1992–96) and subsequent Taliban rule caused a break, though India did extend humanitarian assistance through UN agencies (Mullen 2013) (Fig. 7.2).

India's total commitment for the reconstruction of Afghanistan is US\$2 billion, with more than half disbursed. It has funded/co-funded three very important infrastructure projects, the construction of the 218 km road from Delaram to Zaranj which gives Afghanistan access to an alternate port, Chahbahar in Iran; it has reconstructed and expanded the Salma Dam which would produce 42 MW of power and irrigate 75,000 hectares of land when fully commissioned by mid-2016; it has co-funded and built transmission towers over the Hindu Kush as part of the Northern Electric Power System (NEPS) that has brought electricity to Kabul and other areas. Some of the key Indian projects are the following:

(Annex II has a comprehensive listing of all Indian development and humanitarian initiatives in Afghanistan.)

It would be useful to look at a few of these initiatives to better understand what India brings, and does not bring, to the table of State-building/ peacebuilding before comparing the Indian approach with that of traditional donors.

India's biggest humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan, supply of 1 million tonnes of wheat in the form of High Energy Biscuits (HEB) distributed to 2 million school children across Afghanistan, also has a strong development impact. Midday meals are shown to be strong motivational factors in increasing enrolment. The World Food Program (WFP), a UN agency is the implementing partner. This supply to Afghanistan was done despite the logistical hurdles posed by Pakistan which had to be overcome. Similar hurdles had to be overcome to deliver 250,000 tonnes of wheat as humanitarian assistance, by technically making delivery to Afghanistan at an Indian port, so that it could travel overland from the Pakistani port of Karachi to Afghanistan.

While the reconstruction and renovation, and subsequent further upgradation of Afghanistan's only children hospital, the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health, initially built with Indian assistance about 4 decades back, was a visible intervention in the health sector, what earned the Indian government considerable goodwill all over the country was the stationing of Indian medical missions in cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar and Herat. However, after attacks on Indian doctors in Kabul leading to fatalities, most had to be shut down. In the decade that they operated, they treated hundreds of thousands of patients every year. India is also involved in upgrading medical training and diagnostics facilities. India also accepted the Afghan request to support the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) to treat Afghan children suffering from Congenital Heart Disease (CHD). Financial assistance of US\$5 million would be given to ARCS over a period of five years beginning 2015, with the first tranche of US\$1 million already released. Financial assistance provided by India will be utilised for the ongoing treatment by ARCS of Afghan Children at Artemis, Max and Fortis Hospitals in New Delhi. These hospitals have also offered special concessional rates for treatment of these children.

In order to increase the 'visual' presence of the government all over Afghanistan, India supported the expansion of the national TV network by providing uplink from Kabul and downlink in all the 34 provincial capitals, a force multiplier for national integration. Similar consideration drove the upgradation of telephone exchanges in 11 provinces.

Recognising that the Afghan government's lack of capacity could seriously constrain its ability to deliver services to its citizens, a key requirement for building peace, India initially offered 500 short-term training annually slots under ITEC, a figure since increased to 675. At the request of President Karzai for deployment of Indian civil servants as mentors in Afghan ministries, India tied up with UNDP's Capacity for Afghan Public Administration (CAP) programme and deputed 30 Indian civil servants who were placed in different ministries. This was a rare occasion where government of India partnered with another bilateral/multilateral agency in the actual implementation of any development partnership programme; in this case, there were other bilateral funding programme too. This was continued when CAP was modified and became the National Institutional Building programme.

However, capacity building exercises like training and deputing experts as mentors have their limitations. Afghanistan, as a war ravaged country has serious issues with higher education. India, initially offered 500 annual long-term university scholarships for undergraduate and post graduate degrees. This was increased to 675 scholarships in 2009, and to 1000 in 2012–13. And since 2014, 20 of these scholarships are also offered for pursuing PhD programmes in different subjects. The entire selection process is done by the Afghan government, in line with India's policy of no conditionality. It has been estimated that since 2001, 'more than 10,000 Afghan students have studied in India on ICCR scholarships, with some 7,000 returning home armed with an education and technical skills, which they are using to drive Afghanistan's stabilization and development.' In addition, 'some 8,000 Afghan students are pursuing self-financed degrees in different fields across India' (Haidari 2015). During his recent visit, Prime Minister Modi announced 500 long-term scholarships for children of security personnel who have lost their lives on duty.

India has also accepted the Afghan government's request to set up a full-fledged agriculture university at Kandahar, a priority for a country where the majority of their labour force is in agriculture, but where due to war, productivity levels are a fraction of what they were pre-1979. Separately, India has made available 614 Agriculture scholarships (BSc, MSc and PhD). India has also involved its private sector for running vocational training in Kabul, and funded a reputed Indian NGO, Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) to train 1000 Afghan women in different skills and vocations.

After many stops and starts caused by insecurity and supply bottlenecks, the Indian assisted reconstruction of the Salma dam in Chishti district of Herat province is almost completely commissioned. The dam work and its supply lines were frequently attacked, allegedly at Iran's instance as the power generated by the dam (42 MW) would eliminate Herat's dependence on Iranian supply, as well as by the Taliban (*Plot to* 2013). At the height of the construction work, there were more than 2000 workers in three shifts, including around 700 Indians.7 The total cost of the reconstruction is US\$200 million.

As referred to earlier, India partnered with other bilateral and multilateral donors to bring electricity to Kabul, and many other areas in planning and executing NEPS. This is one of the largest, and definitely the most technologically challenging infrastructure projects ever undertaken in Afghanistan. Besides India, the other partners were the ADB, the United States, Germany, Japan, WB and Islamic Development Bank, a rare instance of so many internationals working in a coordinated manner led by the government of Afghanistan. Over four years, more than 1300 massive pylons were erected to hold transmission lines stretching from the Uzbekistan border to Kabul. The most difficult stretch was over the perennially snow-bound, avalanche-prone Hindu Kush Mountains, towering more than 3800 metres above sea level, was planned and executed by India. Further, an Indian company was the common contractor installing the transmission towers and lines. To add to the complication, the company manufactured most of its materials in India, but due to transit issues, the entire material 'had to be shipped from India to Iran, and then driven through Turkmenistan, into Uzbekistan, and finally into Afghanistan at Hairatan, in the north' (Asian Development Bank 2009). India has also set up three substations and is setting up one more. India's share of the project cost is US\$120 million.

India was able to demonstrate both its technical expertise as well as the ability to deal with, and work together, with multilateral agencies and bilateral agencies notorious for working alone. The project not only earned the government of Afghanistan much goodwill by providing electricity to upward of 4 million people but suddenly improved their quality of life, a huge gain for government's credibility. Paradoxically, though USID was an integral part of NEPS, it separately executed many redundant (in view of NEPS) and non-viable power projects including generating stations that had no fuel linkage or would produce expensive power (McCloskey et al. 2015).

In a rare departure from its practice of directly executing its projects, though taken up at the request of the host government, India has partnered with the government of Afghanistan (Ministry of Economy) in implementing the community-based Small Development Projects (SDP). It would also be useful to compare the SDP with Afghanistan government's flagship National Solidarity Program (NSP), which is also community-based.

The SDP was launched in 2006 initially covering seven insecure, underdeveloped border provinces in 2006, with a view to allowing local communities to invest in their priority needs and in the process better connecting with the Afghan government.8 It has since been expanded to all provinces. Government of India initially allocated US\$10 million in phase one, which was supplemented by US\$20 million in phase two. The third phase signed in November 2012 when President Karzai visited India substantially hiked the allocation to US\$100 million, to be utilised by 2016. SDP's priority is to target the most vulnerable but as these are mostly in insecure areas, implementation becomes an issue. The Ministry of Economy (MoE) is the nodal ministry at the national level and its provincial directorates act as nodal points in their respective provinces. The steering committee has representatives from all concerned line ministries as well as the President's office. Specific proposals from communities are endorsed by the Governor and the Provincial Development Council (PDC) and sent to the MoE, which in turn then sends them for vetting to the concerned line ministries, on whose budgets these proposals are borne. Till the time of writing, the Embassy of India had approved 124 proposals, with another 185 proposals in different stages in the pipeline. Some of these approved projects have been completed, while others are in different stages of implementation, which is difficult in insecure areas. The health sector dominates with 67 approved projects followed by small, rural development projects (21) and education (17).

Review meetings are held every two weeks and the Council of Ministers is briefed every two months. Based on difficulties faced in implementation, more powers are being given to provincial governors. Presently all procurement decisions are taken by the line ministries and often small mistakes by provincial staff leads proposals being returned for rectifications or fresh processing. MoE is working on improving capacities at local/ provincial level. There is a high local ownership from the community up to the ministers' level. The Afghan government convened a national conference on SDPs in end-2012, attended by 400 participants from across the country, representing civil society, provinces, ministries and so on. The conference laid down the criteria for allocation of funds to provinces keeping in mind the need for balanced growth. The intensive consultative nature of SDP policy formulation and implementation does slow down the process but ensures ownership.

It is worth comparing the SDP to another flagship project of the government, the National Solidarity Program (NSP). )The latter was far bigger, comprehensive in its coverage and in operation for much longer than the SDP. The NSP is a community-based recovery programme created to help in the recovery from decades of conflict, initially through rebuilding rural infrastructure, inspired by the success of Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Program. The actual choice of the project in NSP is left to the community. A community development cluster (CDCs) of around 25 households is established through secret ballot (mixed and single sex) by the facilitating partner (FP), often an NGO. The Government releases block grants to each CDC whose representatives in discussion with their facilitating/implementing partners chooses the specific intervention that is of the highest priority to them. NSP has since covered most of the country and is funded from the general development budget of the country, which in turn receives budgetary support from donors, both multilateral and bilateral. Within the government, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation (MRRD) runs the programme. The programme was considered very successful as it contributed to improving rural connectivity and agricultural productivity. MRRD's capacity was also strengthened, and it is regarded one of the star performers of the government.

Both the NSP and the SDP have their strengths and weaknesses. While NSP is quite participative at the community level, and creates the basic units of democratic choice, though doubts have been expressed about it in practice in different parts of the country, it operates outside the government system. The facilitating/implementing partner gets the credit, not the government as a whole. Its biggest lacuna is the complete absence of ownership outside MRRD, quite unlike SDP. At the same time, NSP has created considerable local, economic assets that are very useful to the community. However, leading from this, its second basic problem is inability to scale up and create projects that bring about sustainable, favourable economic outcomes. Third, what happens to the CDC once the project is over or when the NSP winds down? The resulting frustration could produce cynicism and reversion to more atomised behaviour patterns.

The SDP could do well to replicate CDC-like consultative mechanism. It would also do well to look at additional resources, including by diverting from non-productive programmes and by attracting other donors. Better tracking would improve accountability and lead to better outcomes.

Both the SDP and the NSP emblemise a different approach to peacebuilding and development than that exhibited by many traditional donors in Afghanistan. Reflecting the belief that 'State-building and peacebuilding are primarily internal processes,' (DFID 2010) then-finance minister Ashraf Ghani 'demanded that assistance was to be channelled through the ministries, and aligned with national plans and priorities' (Strand 2014). Many donors including the USAID, Japan and most UN agencies, preferred to execute projects themselves, often without even coordination with the government. The international military in particular with their Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) spent very substantial sums of money, for example, US\$80 million in three quarters of 2005, aimed at 'winning hearts and minds' (Karp 2006). Unfortunately, tactical considerations such as rewarding friendly individuals and groups, or the need to 'deliver development' drove such investment decisions. This was true at both the battalion as well at national levels. In the bargain, basic 'principles for assistance were set aside for military and political objectives, leading to nepotism and corruption as the Kabul Bank scandal illustrates' (Strand 2014). The ISAF and PRT approach, though called 'winning hearts and minds,' was a top-down process that did not address an imbalance between areas receiving lots of resources and others that received little or none. They also reflected 'quick fixes' that were less effective than longer-term development approaches. Ghani's position recognised that peacebuilding and state-building are intrinsically linked and must be internally driven.

Indian development partnership is highly valued in Afghanistan, even though the total amount committed and disbursed is miniscule compared with that of the traditional donors. This is because it is in response to felt demands articulated by the Afghan government and as response to them shows in line with the needs of the people, is value for money and appropriate to the local conditions. It compares very favourably with the performance of a donor like the United States (USAID, military, Department of Agriculture etc.), as detailed in Table 7.1 (compiled mainly from analysis in McCloskey et al. 2015).

#### **Table 7.1** Appraisal of US aid to Afghanistan

'In just six years, the IG has tallied at least \$17 billion in questionable spending. This includes \$3.6 billion in outright waste, projects teetering on the brink of waste, or projects that can't—or won't—be sustained by the Afghans, as well as an additional \$13.5 billion that the average taxpayer might easily judge to be waste'

Afghanistan SIGAR has only examined a small percentage of the \$110 billion effort to rebuild and remodel

'Super colonial' attitude … the American military dismissed a local NGO in Kunar as unimportant because it was 'just Afghans working there'

Before concluding this section, it is important to point out that India's development partnership extends beyond funding and implementing projects in Afghanistan, and is guided by specific, regional factors, namely peace and stability in its neighbourhood. In the past, the development of jihadism as a strategic instrument to confront the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had negative consequences for India once the Soviets went home. The jihadis were simply diverted to India, especially to Jammu & Kashmir, which saw a raging insurgency that soon degenerated to terrorism. The collapse of the Afghan State allowed the sponsors of such jihadi groups to run training camps in Afghanistan for such groups, allowing them both the space to do so and the scope to deny any role in supporting terrorist groups. India simply cannot see a failed State in its neighbourhood or a State under the control of jihadi terrorists. India 'recognises that social and economic development of Afghanistan is vital to regional security' (Price 2013). Consequently, India was instrumental in pushing for Afghanistan's membership of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Its membership was approved at the 13th SAARC summit in Dhaka (2005), and Afghanistan formally joined at the 14th Summit in New Delhi (2007) (Al-Madani 2005). The price India had to pay for this was the admission of China as Observer, along with Japan, the United States, South Korea and the European Union. This emphasis on regional cooperation has two implications. One is that India wants much greater economic ties between countries in the region, leading to mutual interdependence. Two, recognising that it is overwhelmingly the biggest economy in the region, India realises its responsibility to achieve this; hence India's active role in Afghanistan. As a result, the total value of trade between the two countries reached US\$280 million in 2010, from just US\$80 million in 2001. India 'represents Afghanistan's fifth largest source of imports, and India accounts for 20 per cent of total Afghan exports' (Al-Madani 2005).

As demonstration of India's motivations, at the '2012 Kabul 'Heart of Asia' conference, India offered to lead two confidence—building measures, intended to support Afghanistan and integrate it into the regional economy.' This included linking chambers of commerce, recognising that trade and investment was about private entrepreneurs taking the initiative. Within India there is confidence that it can 'take a lead in facilitating trade and commercial opportunities for Afghanistan and the region' (Sachdeva 2012).

With this is mind, government of India facilitated the hosting of an Investment Summit on Afghanistan in New Delhi (June 2012). The Indian foreign minister highlighted certain emerging sectors as being potentially very productive, namely 'mining, infrastructure, telecommunications, agro-based and small-scale industries, health, pharmaceuticals, education and information technology' (Price 2013).

Development partnership and peacebuilding can never be divorced from politics, but to be sustainable must be mutually beneficial, which the India–Afghanistan partnership has shown to be. It would, therefore, be correct to say that 'India has been an important economic assistance partner for Afghanistan, and can help in other fields to prevent destabilization' (Ayres 2015).

## Afghan Perception of India's Development Partnership

Discussions with a cross-section of decision makers, civil society representatives, strategic community in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, surveys conducted from time to time by different agencies as well as articles in the Afghan media all lead to the unambiguous conclusion that India is the most liked country, that Indian projects are favourably looked upon and that these are seen as contributing to peace building since they meet the 'felt-needs' of the Afghan people and society. As a respondent commented—any project that contributes to upgrading the economy automatically contributes to peace building. He added 'Indian projects are unique and varied.' On peacebuilding, another respondent said that 'helping our economy and facilitating daily lives of the people through better roads, communications, the Salma Dam and humanitarian assistance has contributed to peace building in its own way.'

Specifically, responding to local pressure from the Herat region, the government of Afghanistan has renamed the Salma Dam as the India– Afghanistan Friendship Dam. This project is seen as hugely liberating western Afghanistan from dependence on foreign supply, will ensure reliable and consistent electric supply and has the potential to economically transform the region.

Similarly, the naming of one of the blocks of the new parliament building as Atal block in honour of former Indian prime minister is symbolic in a country where symbols are very important. A photo tweet showing the parliament building as India's gift and another photo showing the destroyed Dar-ul-Aman palace in Kabul as Pakistan's gift went viral in the Afghan social media.9 The present writer has worked in Afghanistan for years with the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMA), later as a consultant for UNDP, was frequently told by Afghans across the country and classes how they appreciate India's development assistance as it was primarily targeted at education, health and in establishing democratic institutions. And in responding to local needs. As former Deputy Minister of Energy Ahmad Wali Shairzay said 'The government wanted to import power, but they needed investment. That's when ADB and the Government of India came in' (Asian Development Bank 2009).

India is seen as a model partner in terms of dollar value and Indian projects were not seen as divisive. A respondent who has had a lot of experience dealing with donors compared NATO/ISAF assistance unfavourably with India's. According to him, the former constructed roads to meet their needs of supplies and to avoid attacks on their camps. He was particularly critical of their quick impact projects (QIPs) and CERP as these were tactically driven, including to be seen as 'rewarding' local commanders or strongmen, which has been divisive. Indian aid has not been divisive. Respondents reminded that Indian development partnership began in the 1950s, and post 2001, India is the largest regional development partner, by contrast China's support till date has been only US\$125 million. Many respondents pointed that India has not indicated any priorities and left it to the government. SDP was seen by a few who mentioned it as better than NSP, which was not sustainable. India's higher education scholarship was much appreciated since human development is an Afghan priority. One respondent was critical of the choice of subjects; according to him, Afghanistan needed graduates in mining, engineering, IT, MBBS, and not so many political scientists or sociologists. Capacity building, particularly in technical fields was seen to have benefitted from ITEC. Ministry of Energy and Water officials rating it very useful and pointed out that a number of their staff had gone to India for masters' degree. In the course of implementing NEPS, the Indian state-owned enterprise, Power Grid Corporation had trained their Afghan counterparts, which was much appreciated. And the government of India in the Salma Dam contract, has made the contractor responsible for running the plant for one year, handholding the take-over process so that at the end of the year, Afghan staff would be in a position to take over.

Regarding cooperation and coordination with international development partners, the Afghans pointed out that the WB and ADB route their support through the budget and there is good coordination. Regarding India and KFW (Germany), the support is off-budget but coordination is good. The USAID support is off-budget and the coordination is not so good. In the selection of projects, the European Union selects and implements on its own but they coordinate with the government. Branch offices of line ministries in provinces are involved. However, they operate in the safe areas in the north. WB and ADB support projects selected, and designed by the government. Both institutions fund such mutually agreed projects but monitor them rigorously. In the case of KFW, the government proposes but they have own priority; procurement is by them, but there is close coordination with the government. The government proposes projects to India, which then implements it.

Afghanistan has seen high, if fluctuating, growth rates since 2001. This has created jobs in the service sector. However, necessary skills are at a premium, so there are limitations to growth being driven by it. This is particularly so since external agencies and external financial support is being retrenched. Since literacy rates are still very low, only agriculture and related activities like food processing, dairy and so on can drive growth. A number of respondents suggested that India should step up its support for this sector. With China's recent decision to gift Afghanistan a few hundred tractors, one respondent wanted joint India–China support for agricultural development.

Many specifically referred to India as Afghanistan's 'best friend' and the general expectation of respondents that it should do more, specifically 'just keep helping us in every possible way.' Besides the general comments were some specific examples and suggestions that could be used both to influence India's approach to development assistance specifically as well help evolve global consensus on facilitating peacebuilding and State-building.

India's record in executing big projects, other than NEPS, was seen as something that needs improvement, even accounting for the insecure areas where Indian projects were (eastern Herat, Farah, etc.) and problems of transit through Pakistan. The reliance on Indian state-owned enterprises was identified as the reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs. Lack of supervision and monitoring along with lack of discretionary decisionmaking with the Indian Embassy in Kabul were also issues, for example, once Delhi tightened the screws and accepted greater local discretion both the Salma dam and the parliament building project picked up momentum and finished far faster than what its progress till date had shown possible.

The Indian performance in executing the difficult task of laying transmission towers over the Hindu Kush has been much appreciated by both Afghans and international partners. This was a technically complicated project, made more difficult by the fact that though it is an integrated one, its different components were executed by different agencies using different decision-making processes, different funding routes, different reporting norms, different monitoring and so on, and yet it worked well. And yet, other than NEPS and a few other projects, India prefers to act alone, and it simply refuses to pool money together with other donors. While it does extend budgetary support to Nepal and Bhutan, these are for historical reasons and an exception. This has two disadvantages that actually militate against India's approach to development partnership. One, it deprives countries like Afghanistan the benefit of large projects which require multi-donor support, particularly where Indian technology and approach would be most appropriate and cost-effective, for example, the Indian contractor who built the transmission line from the Uzbek border to Kabul could only come in because an Indian entity was tasked with part of the work. Absent the Indian presence, work funded by the other donors could conceivably have been executed but more expensively. Two, if more untied funds were extended to the Afghan government, it would be able to be seen as exercising more sovereign functions and also directly meet more of its citizens requirements. This point, however, cannot be over-stressed since India would not in the near future have the economic wherewithal to really contribute by way of 'cash' support.

The present writer can speak from personal experience that quite often India is seen as a role model in Afghanistan, both for firmly establishing democracy and for its economic achievements. As part of developing their national development strategy, the government and donors had jointly established broad sectoral consultative groups and narrower, subject-wise, working groups. Having attended many such meetings across sectors and subjects, the common feature that was clear was the desire to learn from India. The request would be to speak from the Indian experience, and not as a representative of the UN, as it was felt that such experience was more relevant to the local context. In a similar vein, the present writer underwent driving lessons in the United States with an Ethiopian lady as the instructor. She remembered and named her Indian school teachers (Mr Gupta and Mr Sharma) and said that her superior, another Ethiopian who was a senior academic in his country, also had Indian school teachers. A former Indian ambassador to Ethiopia mentioned that during the call on, the then President (Meles Zenawi) remembered his school teacher, an Indian named Mr Nair. There is a lesson in this for both India and for major donors. India effectively discontinued sending school teachers to developing countries, particularly low-income, and now restricts ITEC to technically qualified personnel. Similarly major donors could think in terms of collaborating with India to send such, relatively lower technically skilled personnel to low-income countries. This would be major costs savings with much better development outcomes. In Afghanistan, the USAID and a few others did use Indian training institutions for capacity building of Afghans for the same reasons, but this could be expanded.

Similarly, while supporting institution building, instead of trying to superimpose models of mature, high income democracies, donors could look at relevant experience from not just India, but Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and so on. This would have greater resonance and lead to more sustainable outcomes. Development partnership should be more broad based to be effective.

This section cannot be complete without referring to an issue of major disappointment among many Afghan respondents, and that was in India's diffidence in supporting the Afghan national security forces (ANSF). A number of respondents expressed frustrations about India's refusal to step in a big way in supporting ANSF beyond a few training slots, and supply of relative less defensive equipment.10 There was visible disappointment that 'India's response to our request for supply of arms and equipment has not been what we expected' despite the fact that the 2011 India– Afghanistan Strategic Partnership does include security cooperation.' As a result, Afghanistan was 'forced to look elsewhere.' A number of respondents were emphatic that 'India must do much more in forcing Pakistan to curb down its terrorism … India has a good dialogue with the United States and should use that opportunity to leverage the US to put pressure on Pakistan.' Another respondent was clear in his prescription that 'India should not look at Afghanistan through the prism of Pakistan.'

This is a subject where it would be difficult to find agreement. On the one hand, India was the earliest to point the finger at Pakistan for using terrorism as an instrument of State policy, well before the rest of the world would even consider it. Logically, as an Afghan respondent told us that since both India and Afghanistan have suffered from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, India should more actively support Afghanistan's efforts to combat terrorism. On the other hand, there is the view that though India 'can do more, but New Delhi's concerns about poking a Pakistani hornets' nest have limited the security partnership' (Ayres 2015). The jury is still out whether India's more active security support to Afghanistan would have helped the process of stabilisation in that country, and the region, or made it worse.

Afghan interlocutors were also asked about their perception of China as a stakeholder in Afghanistan, and not just as a development partner. There was general acceptance that China was a powerful neighbour and had played an active role in training and arming the Mujahideen against the Soviets. They had established contacts with various leaders, groups, tribes and so on and these were kept alive even after the withdrawal of the Soviets.

China's principal interest in Afghanistan was perceived to prevent the destabilisation of Xinjiang province and that it would participate in economic reconstruction only where it advances its own economic interests. There was general agreement that China was not interested in domestic economic and social issues affecting the Afghans and would not mind Taliban coming to power or sharing power. And that it would stay away from direct military involvement. On Aynak where a Chinese firm won a global tender to develop the world's largest copper deposits, a respondent predicted that China would not begin work in Aynak Copper mines till 2019, and that 'nobody knows that they will do so even after that date.'

India's role in Afghanistan was seen as a security threat both by China and Pakistan. Respondents were in agreement that 'there is no comparison between the development assistance provided by India and China. Nobody would write about what happened to the various projects undertaken by China after 2002.' There was a specific reference to the highways built that were of poor quality and required resurfacing within no time. Consequently, the Chinese companies concerned had to leave because of widespread criticism. There was another reference to the hospitals in Kabul which were repaired and opened had to be closed the following day, due to the scale of construction defects. Not one patient was treated there. In support, the respondent gave a news item (Smith 2012). Afghans also mentioned that even Chinese brothels had to close down and that 'every Afghan knows about it and it was in the media too.'

A respondent was apprehensive that while China was powerful by itself but when combined with Pakistan, 'it was awesome and the Afghans know what it means to be at the receiving end of this combination.' Many suggested that both, China and Pakistan have been in touch with the Taliban—together as well as independently. It was stated that after the ouster of Taliban from Afghanistan, the Chinese met the Taliban in the gold mines being developed by China in Balochistan (they could not provide any specific details on this.) As regards arming the Taliban, they were emphatic in saying that the Chinese provided not just small arms but also HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles, mines, components for IEDs and how to fabricate them, and rocket-propelled grenades. As per the Afghans the Americans were aware of this and had even raised the issue with the Chinese. But when it came to arming the ANSF, the Chinese are hesitant to provide anything other than some token small arms.

## Conclusion

India's emergence as a donor is yet to impact on the global development assistance framework and systems. However, India's impact in Afghanistan, and other neighbouring countries as well as the creeping presence in Africa can potentially lead to making the system more accountable and ensure more cost-effective delivery. At this moment of time, India and the traditional donors are on parallel tracks and as in monetary terms, India's contribution is miniscule even compared to China's, and it really does not matter. Fears about China's and India's takeover of Africa are grossly exaggerated in so far as India is concerned. Its present LOC exposure in Africa plus the targeted US\$10 billion over the next five years would still be under US\$18 billion. Its importance lies in its local impact that helps technologically upgrade the local industry and unleash agricultural potential, cost-effective and value for money. But in the larger interest of peacebuilding, both India and the traditional donors can learn from the other, and in some ways, seem to be doing so.

India has just overhauled its LOC guidelines, moving closer to the western model of development assistance but still respecting such partnership as being demand-driven. A number of weaknesses came up after a detailed review of past projects funded by LOCs (Mathew 2015)

The new approach provides for evaluation of long-term economic benefits, highest standards for ethics, Integrity Clauses in loan agreements, inspection of all documents, wide publicity of all procurement, system of pre-qualification of contractors/consultants, vetting of contract documents (milestone-linked payments, performance guarantee, retention money, penalty for delay, ethics and integrity clauses). Country classification would also follow IMF norms, and repayment schedules and element of concession have been further liberalised. Additionally, if there is a joint venture with an Indian entity, the borrowing country could use the concessional loan as its equity in the project, allowing both for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and large infrastructure projects. For African countries, the requirement to use Indian goods and services has been brought down to 60%. However, there is no requirement to use anything but the borrowing countries' own systems, so respect for sovereignty remains.

The international community is also moving towards greater flexibility, value for money and respect for national systems. Following SEWA's successful skilling project for Afghan women, USAID gave it funds to run similar programmes for Afghan women, and USAID's use of Indian training institutions increased. Similarly, the WB has changed its conditionality on using its own procurement policy if it is satisfied that the borrower's processes are robust, for example, it has declared India's Power Grid as one such entity, so henceforth if Power Grid were to be the recipient of any WB loan, it can use its own processes.

The international community must also accept that India would primarily be involved in its own neighbourhood. In terms of LOCs, the order of exposure is Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Sudan and Mozambique. The two largest single loans are to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka but since both are recent, and being transport focussed, have long gestation periods, disbursements are still relatively less. But India is sensitive to its neighbourhood and readily adopts flexible approaches, for example, 'in 2010, India extended a US\$ 1 billion LOC to Bangladesh for transport infrastructure, requiring that 85% of procurement of goods and services be from India. This was modified in 2012, bringing down Indian content to 30%. And US\$ 200 was converted into 'non-conditional grant.'11 Similarly it extends financial support to Sri Lanka, both for building 50,000 houses for IDPs affected by the civil war as well as for the rehabilitation/reconstruction of three main rail lines.

The way forward for India would be to increase its engagement with OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It does take part in some dialogue but not enough. It neither follows DAC's development assistance classifications nor does it report its assistance figures to DAC. It must give up its fears about being swamped by big, traditional donors and display greater confidence. India has much relevant experience to offer, and to learn. Similarly, the insular world of traditional donors must walk the talk on country ownership and demand-driven assistance. The road to effective peacebuilding would continue to challenge all involved and constant learning is the minimum required.

## Annex I: Illustrative List of Projects Funded by Letters of Credit

## Annex II: India–Afghanistan Development Partnership

(List and figures taken from the Embassy of India website http://eoi.gov. in/kabul/?0707?000.)

Cumulative level of Indian assistance in Afghanistan amounts to US\$2 billion—a very significant amount for a developing country, largest for any neighbouring country, and the fifth largest bilateral donor.

It has been India's endeavour to act in conformity with the best aideffectiveness principles, taking fully into account the local government priorities, in coordination with other donors, using local sub-contractors and materials as far as practical, and with minuscule proportion of budget on security and salaries. These 'overhead costs' are significantly lower in case of Indian projects than in those undertaken by other donors.

Four areas of support.

The above list is not exhaustive.

d. *Small Development Projects, community-based*, in vulnerable border areas, in the fields of agriculture, rural development, education, health, vocational training and so on. that can have direct and visible impact on community life, and with focus on local ownership and management. The Small Development Projects were implemented in two phases—the first in July 2006 comprising projects worth US\$11,216,179 and the second in June 2008 comprising projects worth US\$8,579,537. Sixty-five per cent of the projects are reported to be 100% complete. Some of them are awaiting final clearances of concerned authorities for completion certificate. Seventy-six projects have been completed, 34 projects are ongoing, 6 projects await tender finalisation with Afghan line Ministries, while ten projects await MEA approval. Till date, US\$13.135 million has been released to our Mission under phases I and II of Small Development Projects. The implementation of the projects is done entirely by Afghan government agencies (with advisory inputs from Indian Embassy), which helps in building local capacity towards project management. A MoU for implementation of the third phase of the SDP scheme was signed during President Karzai's visit in November 2012 with an additional provision of US\$100 million. Administrative and financial approvals for 60 projects, at an estimated cost of USD 14.223 million, under the third phase of the SDP scheme have been received from MEA in June 2013. The MoUs (in English and Dari) for each of these 60 projects have been finalised and waits signing. The third phase of SDPs is to be completed by 2015–16.

The future contours of the Indian assistance programme in Afghanistan were illuminated during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, in May 2011. The PM had announced a further increase in India's aid commitment to Afghanistan by USD 500 million, thus raising the cumulative Indian commitment to US\$2 billion.

## New Schemes

• Donation of 1000 buses for the Kabul and other municipalities with provision for maintenance support, training and infrastructure. Afghanistan has selected Delhi Integrated Multi-modal Transit System (DIMTS) as the Consultant to manage the process of procuring the buses and creating the structures for their maintenance and running. DIMTS has submitted a revised proposal.

In pursuance of the decision of Prime Minister of India and President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to support the ARCS to treat Afghan children suffering from CHD, Government of India has decided to grant financial assistance of US\$5 million to ARCS over a period of five years beginning 2015. Financial assistance provided by India will be utilised for the ongoing treatment by ARCS of Afghan Children at Artemis, Max and Fortis Hospitals in New Delhi. These hospitals have offered special concessional rates for treatment of these children. The first tranche of US\$1 million has already been disbursed to ARCS and additional disbursement would be made over the next four years.

## Annex III: List of Persons with Whom the Afghanistan–India Partnership was Discussed

(Team consisting of Lt Gen PK Singh (Retd), Lt Gen PC Katoch (Retd), Maj Gen BK Sharma (Retd) and Mr Shakti Sinha at Herat, October 2/3, 2015; Kabul September 3/4 and November 21/22, 2015, and Mazar-e-Sharif, December 17/18, 2015)

Plus many members of the media, think tank researchers, senior officials in ministries of economy, energy and water, agriculture, finance, independent directorate of local governance, independent administrative reforms and civil service commission, Ambassador of India and his staff.

## Notes

	- 2. Mullen, *op cit.*
	- 3. Mullen estimates that a thousand dollars would easily allow for a person's three weeks' training in India.

ment's own commitment limited to the interest subvention charges. Exim Bank raises its capital from international bond markets since it needs hard currency for its borrowers.

## References

**Strand, Arne.** 2014. Maintaining Development Momentum or Just Providing Aid. *ISPI Analysis* 261. https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5194-http-wwwispionline-it-sites-default-files-pubbl.pdf

**Shakti Sinha** is Director, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Thinking Outside the Compound: Turkey's Approach to Peacebuilding in Somalia

*Onur Sazak and Auveen Elizabeth Woods*

## Introduction

Turkey's engagement in Somalia is one of the most visible examples of a rising power's approach to a conflict-affected country. Since its highprofile intervention during the height of the famine in 2011, Turkey has elevated its level of engagement with Somalia and has committed to robust humanitarian assistance, development aid, and civilian capacity to resuscitate the fragile state. Over the years, a "Turkish model" of engagement has emerged. It is characterized by the quick delivery of assistance and programs with Turkish personnel on the ground. The Turkish model is also noted for its emphasis on soft power attributes such as business interests and cultural affinity such as Turkey's Muslim identity. This approach is in contrast to other "traditional donors" in Somalia who are often accused of being overly bureaucratic, slow, and isolated, either bunkered in the airport in Mogadishu or providing aid remotely from other neighboring countries (Wasuge 2016).

However, there are a myriad of actors with different interests and objectives engaged in the country. These range from the neighboring states of

C.T. Call, C. de Coning (eds.), *Rising Powers and Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60621-7\_8

O. Sazak (\*) • A.E. Woods

Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2017 167

Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, to traditional donors such as the United Nations and the UK, as well as more recent regional actors such as South Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey. Despite the longevity and level of financial investment, none of these actors have received the level of international attention that Turkey has since its high-profile intervention in the country in 2011. This chapter seeks to shed light on Turkey's activities in Somalia, particularly its approach to peacebuilding. It draws on interviews with Somalis to explore their perspectives on Turkey's engagement, while also placing these activities firmly in the context of other external actors in the country and Somalia's conflict dynamics.

## Somalia Context

On February 8, 2017, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) was elected as the ninth president of the Federal Republic of Somalia. He has inherited a weak and fractured state, with the previous government failing to achieve many of the benchmarks it set for itself when it came to power in 2012 (Arman 2017). Much of the lack of progress stems from the fragile nature of the state—as one recovering from a long civil war. This is a point put succinctly by the Finnish Minister for International Development, Pekka Haavisto: "When fragile states lack legitimacy and the trust of their own people, rapid state-building efforts can actually work against rather than for peace building, inspiring resistance from those who fear how state authorities will wield their new power" (Menkhaus 2014). On top of that, Al-Shabaab continues to launch attacks on the government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), upon which the government is dependent upon for its existence. Adding to the government's challenges is the high number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country. There are an estimated 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia, with 369,000 people thought to be displaced in and around Mogadishu alone (UNHCR 2016). Most are headed by women. About 4.9 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2016). Additionally, there are third-generation Somalis in refugee camps in Yemen, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya who are slowly returning to the country and pose a unique security risk as a vulnerable group. There is also continued animosity among the different clans and regional administrations such as Puntland and Jubaland, who simply do not trust the fledging federal state.

The root cause of Somalia's current predicament was the collapse of the Somali state infrastructure in 1991. While there had been increasing interclan warfare and atrocities since the late 1970s, the overthrow of the Siad Barre government (1969–1991) and the destruction of state institutions instigated over two decades of conflict and fragility that the country has yet to recover from. In the absence of an effective government, warlords and armed groups loosely affiliated to clans have vied with each other for power and dominance throughout the country. The current structure of the Federal Government is still based on the exclusionary 4.5 formula. This equally distributes seats among the four major Somali clans (the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and the Digil and Mirifle). The minority clans, who are sometimes referred to as the Fifth Clan, are together allotted just half the number of seats of one whole clan receiving 0.5 percent representation. This is a deeply unequal system that sidelines all minority class, regardless of their population size.

The two main sources of conflict in Somalia are the clan structure of Somali society and competition over resources and their distribution (Somali Peace Line 2016). This has been particularly prevalent regarding the role of the state and its resources. Clans are a source of patronage, security, and justice for most Somalis—a status that has only been heightened in the stateless paralysis of the country. On the one hand, there is a strong culture of blood revenge or alternatively blood compensation (*Diya*) that can further heighten conflict. On the other hand, the clan system is also the source of traditional Somali conflict-resolution methods such as the *Shir Beeleed* (clan assembly), led by the clan Elders or Guurti. The *Shir Beeleed* is a slow and time-consuming negotiation and dialogue technique that can last for weeks or even months (Balthasar 2013).

This delicate balance between peace and conflict in the clan system has been further exacerbated by international interventions and meddling by neighboring countries, ostensibly due to security concerns. Since the Cold War, development and humanitarian aid has been diverted into the Somali war economy, first under President Siad Barre and later by clans. In the early 1990s, a series of UN-led peace operations attempted to support a statebuilding process and provide security for aid workers in the spiraling insecurity and famine ravaging the country. These missions, however, quickly became mired in the politicization of aid and became targets of the worsening interclan and warlord infighting (Harper 2012). The situation continued to escalate, culminating in the infamous Black Hawk Down incident in 1993 and the withdrawal of USA and other troop-contributing countries.

The result of these debacles has been enduring. A decade would pass before the next generation of peacekeepers arrived in Somalia with the launch of AMISOM in 2007. Meanwhile, the neutrality and security of humanitarian aid workers were compromised by these events, forcing donors to relocate their headquarters and international staff away from Somali communities and adopt a hands-off approach. This often meant operating outside the country, for example, in Nairobi, and employing intermediaries inside Somalia to deliver aid. The result of this approach meant that Somali recipients were burdened by a slow, bureaucratic aid system with little to no consultation with communities and the frequent diversion of aid into local war economies. This long-distance approach is the modus operandi that developed for many traditional donors working on Somalia. Traditional donors are often identified as state agencies or international NGOs from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), such as Norway, the USA, Italy, and Canada.

Since the mid-1990s, Somalia has been the site of proxy wars among Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti, all of whom have, at times, allied with various Somali clans, regional administrations, or political groupings in order to destabilize a rival or gain access to a resource. Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 to oust the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in southcentral Somalia. While this was achieved quickly, Ethiopia was forced to stay until 2009 to prop-up the unpopular but internationally recognized Transitional Government of Somalia. It was in response to the harsh counter-insurgency operations employed by Ethiopia that Al-Shabaab emerged (International Crisis Group 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya continue to align with regional administrations in Somalia to support a federal system with a weak central Somali state. The decision to add Ethiopian and Kenyan soldiers to AMISOM alongside Ugandan and Burundian troops has been considered a controversial move given the hostility and suspicion most Somalis feel toward both countries (Geeska Africa Online 2015).

## Turkish Foreign Policy Priorities: Explaining Turkey's Involvement in Somalia

Much has been made of Turkey's high-profile intervention into the devastating 2011 famine that stalked south central Somalia. The perceptions regarding this singular event often belie the historical relations between the two countries and the growing interest of Turkish authorities in Somalia in the years preceding it. Turkish and Somali officials have emphasized the historical relations between both countries, which stretch back to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. At the height of World War I, the Ottomans armed Somalis in their rebellion against the British. Despite a cessation in Somali–Turkish relations for much of the Cold War, Somalia was nonetheless one of the few locations in Africa where a Turkish embassy was opened, in 1979. The embassy remained active until its closure in 1991 at the beginning of the country's civil war. It was reopened on November 1, 2011. With the exception of General Çevik Bir as force commander for UN Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 1993, the Turkish state had no relationship with Somali authorities until the visit of President Sheikh Sharif of the Transitional Federal Government in 2009, which began to pique the interest of Turkish authorities.1

There are a number of factors that underpin Turkey's engagement in Somalia. Humanitarianism was the underlying motive behind Turkey's initial engagement in 2011. At the height of the famine, which coincided with the holy month of Ramadan in August 2011, a period of fasting and charity, a huge public awareness campaign was run by Turkish NGOs and celebrities showing images of emancipated women and children. The impact of this campaign was decisive in mobilizing the Turkish public and state attention on the plight in Somalia. An estimated \$57 million was raised from private donations alone (TIKA 2013) while around 500 Turkish nationals arrived in Mogadishu to help deliver aid (Lough 2012).

Humanitarian aspirations remain a motivation for Turkish engagement in Somalia. In March 2011, Turkey gave \$122 million work of humanitarian aid to Somalia (Daily Sabah 2017). Turkey's broader activities, however, should also be seen within the broader foreign policy priorities context, in particular Turkey's image as rising power. Over the past few years, Turkey has pursued a range of activities such as gaining a seat at the UN Security Council (2009–2010), high-profile events like the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and increased commitment to aid and security support in general. Between 2012 and 2014 alone, Turkey's Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased by nearly 30 percent from \$1.2 billion in 2012 to \$3.6 billion in 2014 (TIKA 2014). Turkey's desire to promote its image as a rising power is succinctly highlighted by a 2012 Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) report that states, "In 2012, there has been a decrease in the amount of development assistance provided by traditional donors; whereas Turkey's development assistance increased by 98.7% in one year. In this framework, Turkey is now defined as an "emerging donor" and strengthens its "donor" role each passing year" (TIKA 2013, 21).

In many ways, Somalia has become an opportunity for Turkey to illustrate not only its commitment to addressing shared international issues, but also to project its image as a rising power. Turkey's discourse reflects these aspirations. At the UN's High-Level Partnership Forum on Somalia in Istanbul in February 2016, President Erdoğan said, "Somalia, which was on the verge of destruction and totally hopeless back in 2011, is rising to its feet with the efforts we and our international partners make… With Somalia, the Turkish model of aid has gained recognition in literature" (Presidency of the Turkish Republic 2016). Such discourse is aimed not only at the international community but also at Turkey's own citizens. Turkey's engagement in Somalia, for example, has boosted the image of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Tayyip Erdoğan, appealing in particular to the Party's constituency of conservative and religious voters (Sucuoglu and Stearns 2016).

In addition to being an example of Turkey's rising power status, Somalia should also be seen in the context of Ankara's efforts to expand its economic and political relations. Over the past decade, Turkey has expanded its engagement in areas beyond its traditional sphere of the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In 2014, Turkish ODA reached 29 African countries (TIKA 2016). Like other rising powers, economic interests are intricately linked to Turkey's foreign policy and its aid. In what has become a template replicated in other countries, the Turkish state's presence in Somalia was accompanied by the opening of a new embassy, TIKA offices, new Turkish Airlines routes, and an influx of development programs and commercial activities. Turkish exports to Somalia have increased from an estimated \$3.5 million in 2009 to \$115 million in 2016 (Turkish Statistics Agency 1996–2017). Turkish Airlines has a lucrative route to Mogadishu, and Turkish companies have secured numerous contracts in Somalia.

In February 2016, President Erdoğan and then-President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud co-hosted a Private Sector Investment Conference in Istanbul to promote Turkish investments in Somalia across a range of areas such as energy, information and communications technologies, and agriculture. There has also been interest in Turkish companies expanding beyond Mogadishu to Puntland in the north and Juba in the south (Sucuoglu and Stearns 2016). Additionally, Turkish state aid, which focuses on technical assistance and infrastructure development, combines both economic and development opportunities for Turkey and the recipient country. Rebuilding of infrastructure such as roads and construction of hospitals and mosques has created jobs for both local Somalis and Turkish companies (Achilles et al. 2015). Somalia offers not only an untapped market for Turkish businesses but also a gateway into other African countries. Interviewees from Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan have all expressed interest in Turkey's activities, highlighting its work in Somalia (Rising Powers Conference 2016).

The top three donors of gross ODA for Somalia between 2014 and 2015 were the USA with \$205.4 million, followed by the UK at \$195 million and Turkey, which provided \$194 million (OECD 2015). EU institutions were the fourth largest donor to Somalia with \$180 million and Sweden the fifth with \$72 million (OECD 2015). Turkey is among one of the top donors to Somalia and is the only non-DAC member of this group. Yet its engagement in Somalia differs remarkably.

Soft power has underpinned Turkey's engagement in Somalia. Its image as a relatively prosperous democratic Muslim-majority country with historical ties to the country distinguished Turkey from traditional donors and made it an attractive partner. The visible engagement by Turkish officials and Turkish projects on the ground, and the high visibility of their projects such as from refurbishing buildings, has supported its positive image. Finally, the high-profile visits of President Erdoğan, the opening of Turkey's huge embassy in downtown Mogadishu, and the establishment of direct flights between Mogadishu and Turkey have all bolstered the ties between the two countries. In addition to this use of soft power and cultural affinity, Turkey's engagement in Somalia is characterized by the high visibility of its projects and their quick and direct delivery of aid on the ground. Turkey has a holistic approach, engaging in diplomacy, humanitarian relief, and development programs simultaneously in Somalia.2 The Turkish model is also noted for its emphasis on business interests. Interviews with Turkish aid officials, NGO representatives, and beneficiaries on the ground have revealed three central principles that seem to drive Turkey's success. These are unconditionality, bilateralism, and non-securitization of aid and personnel.

Securitization has become more visible in the twenty-first century. Commonly referred to as the "securitization of personnel" or "compounding of aid" (Duffield 2010), representatives of international humanitarian agencies and relief organizations are confined to heavily fortified living and working quarters in conflict zones. These render agents of traditional actors immobile and alien to the needs of beneficiaries on the ground. This bunkered mentality has been particularly prevalent in traditional donors' approaches to Somalia since the 1990s. For many years, international diplomats and other personnel that worked on Somalia have been based in Nairobi and fly into the Mogadishu airport for a few hours, staying in the compound, and turn around and depart the same day.

By contrast, Turkey's engagement in Somalia has, in part, been defined by the presence of officials and personnel on the ground. While security is taken seriously with guards at Turkish offices, Turkish personnel still live in Somalia. Turkey has built one of its largest embassies in downtown Mogadishu, where Ambassador Olgan Bekar and other officials live. Turkey's consulate in Hargeisa, Somaliland, is occupied by a Turkish representative. Turkish aid groups, teachers, and others who work on Somalia continue to be based in the county, despite the fragile security situation (Wasuge 2016; Sucuoglu and Stearns 2016). This approach has a number of advantages over the bunkered practices of traditional donors. One is that it reduces the cost of programs by reducing the expense of brokers that are so frequently used by traditional donor agencies and country missions. Their presence on the ground also means that Turkish officials and personnel can react more quickly to changing dynamics. They can better monitor programs and consult with recipients on the quality and relevance of programs. Contrary to traditional donors, Turkey does not have rigid procedures or systems of delivery that must be adhered to. The daily flights provided by Turkish Airlines facilitate greater transportation of products and personnel when necessary.

Turkey works with a number of multilateral initiatives on Somalia. These include signing up with platforms like the New Deal for Somalia, hosting international meetings and supporting AMISOM. Despite this, however, bilateralism in general is still the defining attribute of Turkey's engagement to recipient countries. Roughly 90 percent of all Turkish aid efforts globally are coordinated directly between Turkey and the donor recipient country. For example, in 2014, just 2.4 percent of Turkey's ODA (\$88 million out of \$3.6 billion) was provided through multilateral contributions (TIKA 2016, 11). The main reason why Turkey prefers bilateral arrangements is the effectiveness of this model in expediting the process and delivering tangible results, according to the Turkish officials who have frequently commented on this issue.

There has often been criticism of Turkey for failing to coordinate with donors in Somalia and acting unilaterally. But there are a number of reasons for Turkey to work outside multilateral institutions. Speed and efficiency are highly valued by Turkish officials who are output orientated (Sazak et al. 2015, 9). In contrast, Western donors and multilateral institutions focus on processes and systems. Such an approach, while intended to ensure that things are done correctly, is criticized by both Turkish officials and Somalis interviewed, for being too slow and bureaucratic. For example, Turkish diplomats apparently felt frustrated when they attempted to collaborate with AMISOM on training Somali soldiers in 2013. Their plan was met with resistance from some AMISOM partners such as the USA (Wasuge 2016). Frustrated with the lack of progress, Turkey decided to start working with the Somalia National Army bilaterally. Similarly, with the exception of a brief hiatus in 2013, Turkey has provided direct budgetary support to the Federal Government of Somalia. The payments have ranged from \$4.5 million to \$6 million in recent years (Olgan Bekar's speech, Rising Powers Conference 2016). This is an aspect of the New Deal that other donors have failed to do, citing concerns with transparency (Hearn 2016).

Some respondents noted that traditional donors' overly bureaucratic approach, with multiple offices, systems, and officials to work with, often overwhelmed and stifled the functioning of the recipient country's fragile state institutions.3 Bilateral engagement seems to be more manageable for recipient states. However, the bilateral model also brings out a number of serious coordination problems, especially in the areas of personnel deployment (level of expertise and personnel insurance packages), absence of a reliable monitoring and evaluation model and language constraints. Turkey, nonetheless, remains acutely aware of the international analysis of global dynamics but prefers bilateral development assistance arrangements.

## Turkey's Approach to Peacebuilding in Somalia

Since 2011, the majority of the Turkish state's activities have been engaged primarily in Mogadishu. This remains the case as officials interviewed for this study point out that it is the area with greatest need. Over these years, Turkey has, however, expanded its political engagement to include Somaliland, Kismayo, Puntland, Galkayo, Baidoa, and Beledweyne, among others (Olgan Bekar's speech, Rising Powers Conference 2016). There is no general framework or policy document publicly available that guides such activities or outlines the annual goals of Turkey's work in Somalia. Rather than having their own specific priorities, officials state that they try to develop projects in consultation with Somalis while conscious of their own available capacity and strengths.4

While each project may not be conceptualized in terms of a grander peacebuilding goal or "reconstruction" as Turkish officials term it,5 Turkey's approach to Somalia, particularly south central, falls into two categories: statebuilding and social peacemaking. According to the Turkish Ambassador to Mogadishu, Olgan Bekar, providing humanitarian assistance, development aid, and statebuilding support simultaneously is key to lasting peace and stability in Somalia:

"Peacebuilding and state building in Somalia require a comprehensive approach. This comprehensive approach also requires a humanitarian approach, humanitarian aid, political engagement, security and development assistance… A purely humanitarian approach to protracted conflict areas and conflict-affected countries offers only a short-term solution. Assisting affected countries simultaneously and in tandem with long term development tools increases the resilience and capacity of the beneficiaries. This in the long term reduces the vulnerability and increases the capacity of the recipient local actors to respond to humanitarian crisis themselves." (Rising Powers Conference 2016)

Dr. Kani Torun, Ambassador Bekar's predecessor in Mogadishu, also underlines the indispensability of statebuilding for peace in Somalia:

State building is very important, because I have seen the kind of destruction that can happen to a society without a functional state as a result of a civil war … [Therefore] state building was our priority; we worked with the state particularly to improve the way in which the state operated … one area we worked with the government closely was the security area. Turkey worked with the police and army to build strong security forces to provide security. Security investment and other things will come. Even aid is related to security. (Rising Powers Conference 2016)

Turkey's holistic approach encompasses a wide range of projects. This includes rehabilitation of infrastructure such as buildings, institutional capacity building, social service support in communities, and direct engagement on social relations through education initiatives and cultural events. Ambassador Bekar illustrates the virtue of this approach with the Digfer hospital (renamed Erdoğan General Hospital in 2015) in Mogadishu:

We demolished the old Digfer hospital and built a new Mogadishu research and training hospital. This was a big improvement with 220 beds. Then we equipped it and sent doctors and nurses and other personnel to run the hospital. But we did not run it on our own; we developed a good partnership with the Somali side and established a joint management with the Somali management staff. Today we provide internships and trainings for young Somali doctors. (Rising Powers Conference 2016)

At the international level, Turkey has been engaged in a number of multilateral initiatives on peacebuilding issues in Somalia. It has participated and hosted peace processes and donor conferences, including the Istanbul I and II conferences with the UN in 2010 and 2012, respectively. The 2012 conference focused on Somalia's post-transition future and brought together over 300 Somali civil society groups (International Crisis Group 2012). Turkish state representatives, including President Erdoğan, have also frequently pushed Somalia up on the international agenda through speeches and statements at UN meetings. Turkey is also a participating state in the Somali New Deal, has hosted its High-Level Partnership Forum in 2016, and is a co-chair with the USA on the working group on security. Signed in March 2013, the New Deal was meant as a guide for external actors engaging in Somalia and outlined a threeyear statebuilding and peacebuilding roadmap (2014–2016). Of the seven states that have signed up to New Deal agreements, Somalia is the only country where the framework has been most successful, being used to define national priorities and align budgets. Prior to this, there were no existing frameworks or strategy agreements with donors, and the Federal Government of Somalia took early ownership of the New Deal to try to assert its burgeoning authority (Hearn 2016, 8).

At an interstate level, there are a range of Turkish ministries, and state and semi-state agencies working in Somalia. These range from TIKA, the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), to a myriad of State Ministries in the areas of health, education, and defense. Each of these ministries and state agencies are capable of enacting their own bilateral projects. In addition to these actors, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister have been involved in mediation attempts. There is a disagreement between burgeoning regional administrations such as Puntland, Garowe, and the central government in Mogadishu. The Turkish government has played a role in facilitating talks.

The most high-profile mediations facilitated by Turkey are ongoing discussions between the Somaliland government and the Federal Government in Mogadishu (Garowe Online 2016). Some of these mediation attempts have been overseen by former ambassador Dr. Kani Torun, who has initiated talks between the Federal Government and Somaliland. Describing his approach, Dr. Torun says, "When I talked to them, I did not talk the way career diplomats talk … by the book, if you will. I instead talked as if I were one of them. When they saw my sincerity as well as my open and frank engagement in discussion, they had trust and initiated the talks with the federal government" (Rising Powers Conference 2016). Progress has been slow, but Turkey has succeeded in getting representatives of the Federal Government and Somaliland to talk to each other more often.

Alongside this consistent intra-state engagement, Turkey's programs and approach to Somalia have evolved. Most of the Turkish state aid until 2013 can be classified as humanitarian assistance.6 Turkish humanitarian aid dropped from \$77 million in 2011 to \$27 million two years later in 2013 (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014). This aid was largely in the form of emergency food, medical services, and supplies to IDP camps in and around Mogadishu area. Since 2013, the Turkish state engagement in Somalia has focused on capacity-building and technical assistance programs. For example, in 2013, both the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Central Bank began to provide technical assistance and training to their Somali counterparts (Sazak et al. 2015). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affair had been helping its counterpart to establish its own internal server.7 Since 2014, Somali diplomats have also participated in bilateral and international training programs with Turkey's Diplomat Academy in Ankara. These exchanges have been accompanied by greater cooperation and training between the Turkish and Somali Armed Forces through two agreements signed in 2010 and 2014 (Today Zaman 2012). Such activities are closely associated with statebuilding and peacebuilding for Turkish officials who argue that fundamental services and institutional capacity need to be strengthened to provide legitimacy to the Federal Government and, therefore, counter the allure of extremists.8 Many of these state capacity programs are intended to improve local security and social services.

At a local level, Turkey's education programs such as scholarships, sponsorship of orphanages, and religious–cultural initiatives are specifically aimed at changing dynamics and conditions in local Somali society.9 In particular, Turkish officials view education programs as important peacebuilding initiatives that can challenge the allure of extremist narratives. Since 2011, Turkish officials estimate that nearly 3000 scholarships have been provided to Somali students from both state and NGOs.10 The presence of these initiatives, through the Turkish offices in the country or personnel directly delivering support to communities, also challenges one of the central conflict drivers in the country—brokers. According to one Turkish Red Crescent official, "Our representatives have always delivered their supplies to the recipients' camps on their own without involving any brokers. If the security situation is not conducive for us to go to a certain site, we don't go there, but we also do not entrust our supplies to some third entity who we know would not deliver it to the address it was supposed to go and would make profit out of it by selling it."11 Ongoing security challenges that have targeted them have caused Turkish personnel to be more cautious. And yet, Turkish officials and personnel remain the most visible foreigners in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, through their offices and projects (Wasuge 2016).

Since 2013, Turkish peacebuilding in Somalia has also adopted a visible military presence. Turkey's pledge of financial and military training assistance to AMISOM indicated that its activities in Somalia would no longer be limited to humanitarian and development assistance. At the time, Turkey had committed \$1 million financial support to AMISOM and had undertaken the training of a modest number of Somali troops and policemen in Turkey (Achilles et al. 2015). Furthermore, the Turkish military is opening a training facility for the Somali Armed Forces in Mogadishu in 2017. This is Turkey's first military base abroad. Reportedly, to be run by the Turkish Armed Forces personnel, the academy will have up to 200 Turkish officers and is expected to train over 10,000 Somali National Army troops as well as soldiers from other African nations (Hurriyet Daily News 2016). The academy is envisaged as a center for excellence for training missions encompassing the entire continent.

There was another marked shift in Turkey's approach to Somalia in 2015. Turkish public–private enterprises that characterized the frenzied environment until 2013 had evolved. Improvement in domestic security had been accompanied by an increase in private Turkish companies that won contracts in a number of key sectors. Mogadishu's Aden Abdulle International Airport is managed by Favori LLC (Favori LLC Website), as is Mogadishu Port by Albayrak (The Somali Investor 2015). There are also strong signals from bilateral investment conferences and meetings between officials from Turkey and Somalia that Turkish businesses intend to explore new opportunities in provinces such as Puntland (Sucuoglu and Stearns 2016, 25).

Since 2015, the capacity-building programs of the Turkish state have entered their second stage with a greater emphasis on sustainability and local ownership. This involves the transfer of responsibility and administration of Turkish programs to their Somali counterparts. An example of this is the garbage collection program in Mogadishu. The Turkish government has delivered equipment so that it will be run solely by Somalis.12 Similarly, Sifa Hospital in Mogadishu, which is run by the Turkish Health Ministry, is being co-administered with the Somali Ministry of Health. Today, civil training programs are administered either on the ground in Somalia or more often in Turkey partly due to the continued insecurity in the country.13

Somalia is still the largest recipient of Turkish aid in Africa, but this is changing. The focus on collaboration and capacity-building programs has resulted in a decline in the spending and projects allocated to Somalia. Turkish officials, however, argue that this does not signal a declining commitment by Turkey.14 In 2014, nearly 70 percent of TIKA's \$8.3 million budget in Somalia went on health sector-related projects while administrative and civil infrastructure was at 20.5 percent (TIKA 2016, 136). This is equivalent to \$5.7 million and \$1.6 million, respectively. These numbers do not include spending from Turkish NGOs. Turkish officials highlight President Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu in January 2015 and on June 3, 2016. To them, these visits illustrate the importance of Turkey–Somali relations to Erdoğan's administration and signal the country's strong commitment to Somalia.

## Response and Perceptions of Somalis

The Somali response to these myriad of Turkish activities and actors has been generally positive. Turkey's approach is seen as practical; their projects are tangible and of good quality, say most Somalis. "They brought orphanages, education. The best hospital was built by them. They train and build capacity, service delivery and business."15 Through such projects, people feel that Turkey has contributed to the rejuvenation of the war-torn Mogadishu: "Look at the airport, for a country that has been out of touch for 25 years to have that kind of airport … They are planning to build- have built roads, the Turkish. They brought this town back."16 This sentiment is shared by many interviewees. The Somali Ambassador to Turkey has stated that the "(Turks) ha(ve) returned a sense of normalcy to people, which is necessary."17 Turkey's activities are credited with helping to change the narrative around Somalia as a failed state and the image of Mogadishu as a no-go-area. In particular, Turkey's approach has challenged the Nairobi-based model of long-distance aid that many traditional donors and international organizations have used for Somalia.

From a Somali perspective, Turkey is distinguished from other actors, even African states, by its impact on the ground, "The Turkish move around freely with no protection, no guns, nobody else can do that."18 The visibility of both Turkish projects and personnel on the ground is perceived as a successful aspect of their approach, "They (the Turkish) are not politically visible, they are in the community and that is the most important aspect—a community-centered approach."19 The communitycentered projects of Turkey are felt to positively contribute to peacebuilding. According to a Somali civil society actor, Turkey "provides for basic needs. Terrorists recruit younger people with no hope for the future but through providing the basics, the Turkish help to mitigate the allure of what the terrorists promise."20 This sentiment is reiterated by the Somali Ambassador to Turkey, who believes that Turkey's maximum value is in scholarships and programs which have provided opportunities for Somali youth.21

Despite the expansion of some projects to other parts of the country, Turkey's engagement in Somalia remains overwhelmingly focused on Mogadishu. With few exceptions, the benefits of these programs have been felt primarily by residents in Mogadishu. If the goal of these projects is to support the legitimacy and stability of the Federal Government, then it is geographically limited. Given the historical perception of Mogadishu as the center of patronage and oppression is still potent, Turkey risks being perceived as biased toward the capital. The potential negative implications of this have already been felt with Somaliland parties implying Turkey favoritism of the Federal Government's goal of a united Somalia.

In Somalia, Turkish nationals were seen through the prism of fellow coreligionist and not as another foreign power pursuing its own interest. This has started to change. A criticism levied by Somalis is that Turkish state agencies and business could do more to hire local people, "They are all Turkish companies not Somali private sector, we have nothing to do with it."22 While there are no numbers to verify these claims, the perception that Turkish entities are excluding Somalis is significant. If Turkish state agencies and companies were importing Turkish workers to work on Turkish projects, it would create an insular dynamic that does not benefit local communities or youth. While such an approach may avoid some local conflict actors such as gatekeepers, it would also deprive communities of economic opportunities that could support peacebuilding and undermine the capacity-building efforts of Turkish state actors.

Somalis also highlight interstate conflict at the international level between Turkey and other states. In particular, the specter of the Somali state as a source of personal patronage reemerges in the minds of Somalis regarding the controversy over the awarding of Mogadishu Port tender to a Turkish company: "There was no transparency in the procurement of the tender for the port, which resulted in suspicions of foul play by the West. The Turkish were criticized as not being honest."23 While donor officials stress that there is and must be international cooperation on Somalia, this does not allay the perception among Somalis that "(t) here is no coordination between the West and the Turkish which creates conflict."24 International rivalry over business and contracts is a legitimate concern for Somalis given the history of the country and its susceptibility to regional and global shifts.

## Other Actors in Somalia

There are a range of actors and countries engaged in Somalia. These include neighbors, donors, as well as new actors. When asked, however, which states they believe were conducting peacebuilding activities in Somalia, interviewees identified only Turkey. Other notable countries such as the UAE and, to a lesser extent, China were identified by interviewees as relatively new actors working in Somalia but not on peacebuilding. China is a relatively new actor, opening a small Embassy in the Jazeera Palace Hotel in Mogadishu in 2014. While China's activities in Somalia are minor compared to its ventures in other African countries, it has allegedly signed a number of trade deals, mostly recently with Puntland, to conduct oil explorations (Garowe Online 2016).

The Gulf States, in particular the UAE, were identified as another set of actors that are increasingly influential.25 The UAE is reported to be focusing on the provision of basic commodities and services, similar to Turkey. However, there exists a perception that the UAE is attempting to compete with Turkey in order to gain influence and visibility (Somali Peace Line 2016). This has allegedly meant that although actors from the UAE are welcome, many are wary of their motives. The UAE's activities in Somalia have not been without controversy. It is alleged that it has been providing heavy ammunition to Puntland, Jubaland, and South West State.26 The UAE plans to establish a military base in Somaliland and has signed a 30-year contract to manage its largest port, Berbera (Maina and Ibrahim 2017). This has been criticized as contradicting the sovereignty and integrity of Somalia (Radion Dalsan 2017), in which Somaliland is seen as a region of the country.

Local Somali actors that were interviewed clearly distinguished between the activities of states and non-state actors. In describing the activities of organizations such as the World Bank and the European Union, it was stated that they are service providers and focus primarily on systems.27 Examples of these systems were cited as human rights, accountability, transparency, and good governance. This was contrasted to the approach of states that are perceived to be more practical in their engagement.28

Somali civil society members interviewed stated that the support from African states is not as welcome as that from Turkey, the Gulf States, and some Asian countries. In fact, it was stated in one interview that often other Africans are grouped with state actors from the Global North.29 The main reason for this appears to be the historical tensions between Somalia and her neighbors, especially Ethiopia and Kenya. It was stated that local dynamics come into play and while on paper it appears that Al-Shabaab is being undermined, recruitment levels remain high. According to interviewees, Somalis feel betrayed by the African continent, particularly the African Union, which has permitted perceived interference from these regional actors who are believed to be pursuing anti-Somali agendas. Somali interviewees allege that the presence of peacekeepers from these regional powers has created a conflict of interest.30

AMISOM is considered a controversial force by many Somali respondents. Established in 2007, its mission, among others, is to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab and provide security to enable stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding processes in Somalia. The inclusion of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops has proved controversial and is a source for the distrust around AMISOM. However, in some instances, AMISOM itself has become a source of conflict.  For example, in July 2015, AMISOM troops were accused of killing six family members, as they were celebrating a wedding in the coastal city of Merka (Human Rights Watch 2015). These actions have made AMISOM unpopular in Somalia (Somali Peace Line 2016). Some AMISOM tactics have also alienated the mission from the very people they are supposed to protect. Somali interviewees mentioned that AMISOM troops frequently target Somali youth, particularly young men in Mogadishu, rounding them up and interrogating them on whether they are part of Al-Shabaab. Somali respondents noted that these actions have in fact turned some youth toward the group (Somali Peace Line 2016).

Perceptions are important, and they matter even more in fragile environments such as Somalia. As in most conflict-affected states, a large number of external actors are engaged activities in the country. Much work has been done to improve the livelihoods of Somalis. The effect of these many activities, initiated by different actors with divergent motivations and goals, can be very damaging given the conflict dynamics in Somalia. The motives behind the delivery of this support are not always transparent, and consequently benign intentions can be negatively perceived, as some of observations from Mogadishu confirm.

## Conclusion

It is clear that the situation in Somalia is extremely complex and fragile. There are many latent issues that are not easily perceived from the outside. Statebuilding efforts in Somalia, which are an inherent conflict-riddled process, are a source of tension with disagreement over the structure of the Somali state. Another latent issue is the fragility of state institutions themselves that are unable to contain and address conflict through processes and systems. This leads political or business disagreements to spread to the public sphere. The inability of the Somali state to protect and support its citizens is also another issue which pushes civilians to seek alternative sources of power and survival.

In this complex and fragile context, the number and diversity of actors working in Somalia, from states to international institutions, and NGOs, with different values, approaches, and priorities, can cause harm. Based on the information gathered from the interviews, the approach of some actors in Somalia, such as the UAE, Ethiopia, Kenya, and AMISOM, is distrusted by Somalis.31 A noteworthy point is the fact that rather than being the most welcome in Somalia, some actors from other African states are often the least welcome. This is important in highlighting that the sentiments and perceptions of the local population in environments emerging from conflict play a big role in the success of peacebuilding initiatives.

Not all activities conducted in the name of building peace appear to be contributing toward this objective. In the crowded donor environment and the fragile security situation in Somalia, the level of coordination and cooperation required for donors to be conflict sensitive is almost impossible without stifling the efficiency, aptness, and therefore effectiveness of programs. This is one of the main differences in the approach of traditional donors and that of other recent actors in Somalia. As previously mentioned, while traditional actors are said to focus more on systems, checks and balances, new actors such as the UAE and Turkey appear more concerned with the quick delivery of products or services. One interviewee stated that Somalis value tangible projects, and the problem for traditional donors is that systems cannot appear overnight and as a result of their focus on this, less is expected from them.32

Turkey's peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia highlight important alternative approaches, while offering vital lessons for all stakeholders to improve upon. The Somalia case study reveals several best practices, implemented by the Turkish state and its agencies that may be applied to other post-conflict reconstruction settings. Deployment of personnel in conflict-affect areas, consulting and responding quickly to stakeholder's and recipient's needs, refraining from securitizing and attaching conditions to aid, avoiding middle-men or brokers in order to avert security risks, engaging local partners, and not overcrowding the fragile institutions of the host country's vital bureaucracy are some of the approaches that Turkey brings to the spectrum. Some of these modes of engagement are similar to those espoused by traditional donors. However, while traditional donors appear to become stalled in the processes of ensuring principles are followed Turkey shows more flexibility and openness to changing procedures to meet the goal.

The Somali case study has also affirmed that there is still room for improvement for Turkey's peacebuilding activities in Somalia. The bilateral engagement on the ministerial level with Somali entities, without informing other Turkish state organizations, leads to overcrowding of the theater and waste of resources. Although Turkey has taken concrete steps to address some of these issues by coordinating some of its efforts with the international community and organizations, on a domestic level interagency cooperation still lags. Worse, institutional and legislative remedies to unravel this knot linger. Therefore, Turkey should use the Somalia case to single out some of its coordination issues and devise a solution that can be generalized to uproot similar problems that recur in Turkey's other overseas missions.

Turkey's diplomatic and humanitarian presence in Somalia demonstrates more than anything the resolve of rising powers to supporting fragile states in reconstruction. Somalia, contemplated by many as risky for humanitarian work, indicates the resolve of new actors in hedging the risks and intervening not just where there is peace to keep. This is quite in line with recommendations from the UN Advisory Panel for the review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, which posits that peacebuilding should cut across the conflict spectrum and not only come when normalcy has been established.

## Notes

## References

**Onur Sazak** is an advocacy and coordination manager at Support to Life and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Sabancı University, Istanbul.

**Auveen Elizabeth Woods** is a researcher, Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University, Istanbul.