# Napoleonic Governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany Conquest, Incorporation, and Integration

Martijn van der Burg

# War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850

Series Editors Rafe Blaufarb Florida State University Tallahassee, FL, USA

> Alan Forrest University of York York, UK

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The series aims to the analysis of the military and war by combining political, social, cultural, art and gender history with military history. It wants to extend the scope of traditional histories of the period by discussing war and revolution across the Atlantic as well as within Europe, thereby contributing to a new global history of confict in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

For more information see: wscseries.web.unc.edu

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14390 Martijn van der Burg

# Napoleonic Governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany

Conquest, Incorporation, and Integration

Martijn van der Burg Open University of the Netherlands Heerlen, The Netherlands

ISSN 2634-6699 ISSN 2634-6702 (electronic) War, Culture and Society, 1750 –1850 ISBN 978-3-030-66657-6 ISBN 978-3-030-66658-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66658-3

© The Author(s) 2021. This book is an open access publication.

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# Acknowledgments

The research underlying this publication has been facilitated by the support from numerous institutions and individuals. At the start, the University of Amsterdam's Department of History and European Studies kindly supported the development of an initial research proposal. Subsequently, the Open University of the Netherlands has generously made extra research time available, within the 'Waarde en waardering van cultuur' and 'De veilige stad' research programs. Over the years, many colleagues, too many to thank all of them here individually, gave valuable advice, read draft chapters, or otherwise had a positive effect on the research process. Without Annie Jourdan's inspiration, Matthijs Lok's impeccable sense of timing, Helmut Stubbe da Luz's hospitality, Pierre Karila-Cohen's collegiality, and Bart Verheijen's teamwork, the present publication would not have existed in its current form. Also, Joke Roelevink made many useful suggestions; her passing away is a great loss to historical scholarship. Furthermore, I owe thanks to Katherine Aaslestad, Michael Broers, and Johan Joor for their willingness to read the fnal manuscript. And it is with generous support from the Daendels Foundation, and from the Open Access Fund of the Open University of the Netherlands, that it was made possible to publish this work in open access. I am very grateful to abovementioned sponsors and colleagues, as well as friends and family alike.

# Praise for *Napoleonic Governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany*

"Van der Burg presents an innovative trans-regional study of Napoleonic governance in the often-overlooked northern periphery of the Empire. This book carefully examines the Empire's administrative structure in the north, focusing on the heterogeneous community of prefects and subprefects as 'tools of incorporation', binding the regions to the central state. His rich comparative analysis highlights the incomplete integration of the north and makes important contributions to our understanding of the Empire and its legacy of state building."

—Katherine Aaslestad, *West Virginia University, Morgantown, USA*

"Martijn van der Burg makes a vital contribution to the burgeoning scholarly literature on Napoleonic Europe in this well researched, carefully constructed volume. His analysis of this somewhat neglected, but important, part of Napoleon's hegemony will become essential reading for all students and specialists of Napoleonic Europe. Van der Burg brings the riches of recent Dutch and German scholarship on the Napoleonic period, hitherto denied to an Anglophone readership, to say nothing of his own insight into Napoleonic rule in these complex regions. He delineates the course of Napoleonic rule here with clarity and acute attention to detail. This is a worthy addition to the Napoleonic renaissance in historiography."

—Michael Broers, *University of Oxford, UK*

"A thorough, transparent and important comparative study into the content, dynamics, limits and results of Napoleonic governance, and the role of the (sub) prefects here within, in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. Original, wellwritten and a very welcome contribution to the historiography of these still understudied areas in the Napoleonic years, as well as to Napoleonic historiography in general."

> —Johan Joor, *International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands*

# Contents

# List of Maps

# Introduction: Napoleonic Governance and the Integration of Europe

**Abstract** This study is concerned with the ways in which the present-day Netherlands and Northwest Germany were integrated into the Napoleonic Empire, by replacing local institutions and traditional governing practices with French ones. This process of running the Empire is referred to as Napoleonic governance. Traditionally, little attention was given to the dynamics of French rule in conquered Europe. Nationalistic tendencies long obstructed a neutral view of Napoleon's treatment of conquered Europe, certainly when it came to the Dutch and Northwest German regions. It was assumed French reforms were accepted unconditionally by local populations. Recent research shows that in newly acquired lands, offcials often had to proceed differently. However, the northern periphery of the Napoleonic Empire is not yet fully explored. The premise of this study is that a (trans)regional perspective can lead to new interpretations. Napoleonic governance is analyzed by distinguishing between the phases of conquest, incorporation, and integration. In a broader sense, the study aims to gain a better understanding of the diffculties that have been inherent to workings of the Napoleonic Empire.

**Keywords** Napoleonic governance • Netherlands • Northwest Germany • Historiography • Empire-building

© The Author(s) 2021 1 M. van der Burg, *Napoleonic Governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany*, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66658-3\_1

# Empire-building and Its Limits

By 1810, the Napoleonic Empire, almost at the height of its power, encompassed much of Continental Europe. The vast European Empire was the outcome of more than a decade of French power politics. Soon after general Napoleon Bonaparte had seized power in 1799, he strove to unite Europe under the leadership of the French. Initially, he formed alliances and founded vassal states, but increasingly he sought to bind the nations of Europe to France by conquering them and transforming them into French departments.1 Napoleon continued a policy that was developed earlier by French revolutionaries. Present-day Belgium and the German territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine had already been conquered by French forces and incorporated into the French Republic. After that, large parts of Central Europe and Italy gradually followed. As his Empire grew, Bonaparte began to fantasize about a unifed Europe an entity organized according to his principles. His desire to rule from above and to destroy local diversity was a recurring element in his policy.2 Admittedly, Napoleon never had a defnite masterplan for Europe, but undeniably he did start to regard uniformity as essential.3

In the North, the Kingdom of Holland and the Hanseatic cities and principalities of Northwest Germany, in 1810, were not yet incorporated into the Empire. Although they were within the Napoleonic sphere of infuence, Napoleon Bonaparte long believed a certain autonomy for these regions was in his interest. Other measures, like military pressure and invoking *coups d'état*, were considered suffcient. Nevertheless, driven by ambitions and growing fears of British interventions at the North Sea Coast, he eventually put an end to the Dutch state, Hanseatic city-states, and many German principalities in Northwest Germany. Soon after, Catalonia and the Illyrian Provinces in the northern Balkans, would also, albeit briefy, be incorporated, expanding the French Empire to its maximum territorial extent, comprising no less than 130 departments.

Throughout his reign, Napoleon's reforms focused on the construction of a centralized bureaucratic state, characterized by uniform and rational

1 Jean Tulard, 'Les politiques européennes de Napoléon', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 427–429.

2Annie Jourdan, *L'empire de Napoléon* (Paris 2000) 125.

3Thierry Lentz, 'Imperial France in 1808 and beyond', in: M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerá ed., *The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture* (Basingstoke 2012) 34–35.

structures in the French style. On the one hand, it was simply effcient for the governability of the Empire to introduce French institutions and personnel in the newly acquired territories.4 On the other hand, many French offcials were convinced that they were the sole driving force behind the 'modernization' (understood as 'Francization') of Europe.5 Certainly, hardliners among them felt contempt for local traditions. The intended export of the French model was without doubt partly an expression of feelings of cultural superiority.6 However, it was tremendously diffcult for the Napoleonic government to immediately create support for the formation of a new modern state without taking into account local circumstances and wishes. Although scholars disagree over the extent to which the central government was willing to compromise, for the French offcials 'the price of collaboration was', in the words of historian Stuart Woolf, 'the acceptance of limits'.7

# Napoleonic Governance in the Regions

This study discusses the ways in which Napoleon tried to integrate the present-day Netherlands and Northwest Germany into the French Empire, by replacing local institutions and traditional governing practices with French ones. More specifcally, it deals with the imposition of a French system of governance on the conquered Dutch and German territories. By *Napoleonic governance* I do not narrowly refer to the administrative structures of the Empire, but more broadly the process of governing this entity—or less abstractly: the ways in which the expanding Napoleonic Empire was run, not merely at the top, but also in the regions. Recent scholarship increasingly emphasizes that governance goes beyond the authority of the central state, and acknowledges the diversity of governing practices in past and present. To quote scholar Mark Bevir: 'Governance is explained by the narratives that the relevant actors frst inherit as historical

4D. G. Wright, *Napoleon and Europe* (Harlow 1984) 65–67.

5 Stuart Woolf, 'Napoleon and Europe revisited', *Modern & Contemporary France* 8 (2000) 471. https://doi.org/10.1080/713685288

6Michael Broers, 'Napoleon, Charlemagne, and Lotharingia: Acculturation and the boundaries of Napoleonic Europe', *The Historical Journal* 44 (2001) 178. https://www. jstor.org/stable/3133664; Aurélien Lignereux, *L'Empire des Français: 1799–1815* (Paris 2012).

7 Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe* (London and New York 1991) 115.

traditions and then revise in response to dilemmas', which, according to Bevir, gives governance a greater explanatory power than other terms.8

This approach sets *governance* apart from *regime*—a term that is frequently used when referring to the rule of Napoleon and his collaborators. I have chosen *Napoleonic governance* over *Napoleonic regime*, since governance explicitly sees the running of a state as a dynamic process, with multiple actors, and not as a somewhat static set of regulations dictated by an omnipotent leader—the latter being the more institutional approach stressing the primacy of the central government. Moreover, in daily speech, the term regime carries a negative connotation, implying a position in scholarly debates on the nature of Napoleonic rule. Such an a priori assumption might yield biased results. Instead of stressing the, unquestionably very authoritarian, leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, I focus on lesser-known individuals who were tasked with empire-building in the regions. Undeniably, there has been large-scale suffering because of Napoleonic measures and exploitation; but my primary objective is analyzing how those measures reached the regions, were interpreted there, and interacted with existing governing practices.

Finally, using the governance concept has a practical reason. Working in four languages brings the problem of false friends. 'Administration/ administratie' and 'gouvernement/government' have different meanings in Dutch, English, French and German. Nor do these fully correspond to Germanic equivalents like 'Regierung/regering', 'Verwaltung', or 'bestuur'. And the concept of police/politie/Polizey could also be included, since it was not until the Napoleonic period that these concepts gradually became distinct from each other.9 'Governance' circumvents such translation diffculties.

Territories conquered by French were faced with the introduction of an extremely hierarchical and top-down state model. Yet, as Michael Broers has argued, the Napoleonic Empire was actually centralized like a 'spider's web'. There were fve main lines along which the central government in Paris attempted to assert its power over the farthest corners of the Empire: the Ministries of the Interior, General Police, War, Finance, and Justice. These branches of government were frmly separated; each branch had its

8Mark Bevir, *A theory of governance* (Berkeley 2013) 1–5.

9 Igor Moullier, 'Police et politique de la ville sous Napoléon', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* (2007) 117–139. https://doi.org/10.3917/rhmc.542.0117

own competencies, spheres of action, and mechanisms of self-regulation.10 In this study, I explore a signifcant line from Paris: the prefectoral system. This branch was part of the Ministry of the Interior and, in theory, the vehicle of choice for state power. So-called *préfets* (prefects) were the heads of a department, the main administrative units within the French state, and delegated tasks to the *sous-préfets* (subprefects). Conversely, local information had to come back to the ministries fast; the prefectoral system has been called 'the interface between a centralized state and a local society'.11

Complicating matters, Napoleonic offcials in many incorporated territories often had to deal with an intermediary governance body set up by the French government, for instance in Hamburg and Amsterdam. Such intermediary *gouvernements généraux* had an ambiguous place within the structure of the Empire.

Emphasis on these specifc aspects of the functioning of the Napoleonic state also relates to current discussions on the nature of Napoleonic interventions in Europe. Regarding the French treatment of the incorporated lands and subject states, there are essentially two opposing interpretations. Historians either stress, often depending on their geographical area of study, the positive reforming infuences of Napoleon's system of governance, or underline the negative effects of severe exploitation and harsh domination. Geoffrey Ellis has summed it up as the 'continuing debates of the kicks and kindnesses of French rule'.12

For instance, Alexander Grab has stressed that Napoleon was more than an exploiting dictator and his reform programs left a great, often constructive impact on Europe, especially the export of the modern central state.13 Similarly, Brendan Simms has pointed out positive consequences of the Napoleonic experience. Napoleonic offcials in Europe 'created some of the preconditions for a capitalist, legally equal, religiously

10Michael Broers, 'Pride and prejudice: The Napoleonic Empire through the eyes of its rulers', in: U. Planert ed., *Napoleon's empire: European politics in global perspective* (Basingstoke 2016) 309; Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London and New York 1996) 54–55.

11Gavin Daly, *Inside Napoleonic France. State and society in Rouen, 1800–1815* (Aldershot 2001) 64.

12Geoffrey Ellis, *The Napoleonic empire* (2nd ed.; Basingstoke 2003) 93–94. For the German case see T. C. W. Blanning, 'The French revolution and the modernization of Germany', *Central European History* 22 (1989) 109–129. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0008938900011468

13Alexander Grab, *Napoleon and the transformation of Europe* (Basingstoke 2003) 205–206.

tolerant and rationally governed bourgeois society', a requisite for the formation of the nation-state.14 Michael Broers, however, has underscored the harshness and rigidity of Napoleonic personnel. Not denying the pragmatism (or even reasonableness) of individual Napoleonic state servants, according to Broers it was with the repressive forces, such as military and police, that power really lay. These men were hardly concerned with appeasing and enlightening the newly conquered subjects—certainly not during the closing years of the Empire.15 And Pierre Horn, who has more recently investigated the cultural distance between French authorities and the populations of East Belgium, West Rhineland and Luxembourg, points to increasing exhaustion of the *pays réunies* and economic crises (such as poor harvests, infation, taxation, and declining international trade). Horn's study suggests that many offcials may have been willing to listen to local concerns, but could not thwart negative measures from the imperial core.16

More historians could be quoted here—but the main point is that the perspective of researchers (top-down or bottom-up, center or periphery) plays a role in their position in the debate on 'the kicks and kindnesses of French rule', and thereby their evaluation of Napoleonic governance. The imperial authorities in Paris are often taken as the starting point for a study, not actors at a lower level in the hierarchy. But as Stuart Woolf has argued, Napoleonic representatives in the regions, such as prefects and their collaborators were 'closer to the ground' than other authorities. Due to the range of their responsibilities they provide good information on the local responses to French governance. Given the wide powers of the prefects and their role as the 'eyes and ears' of the central government, their archives harbor a wealth of information about local reactions to centralist measures, which unfortunately are not often used by historians.17

14Brendan Simms, *The struggle for mastery in Germany, 1779–1850* (Basingstoke 1998) 88.

15Michael Broers, 'Cultural imperialism in a European context? Political culture and cultural politics in Napoleonic Italy', *Past and Present* (2001) 152–180. https://doi. org/10.1093/past/170.1.152; Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815*, 67.

16Pierre Horn, *Le déf de l'enracinement napoléonien entre Rhin et Meuse 1810–1814: l'opinion publique dans les départements de la Roër, de l'Ourthe, des Forêts et de la Moselle* (Berlin 2017).

17Woolf, 'Napoleon and Europe revisited', 474.

# Historiography on Napoleon and Europe

Napoleonic governance, or administration in general for that matter, has never really captured the hearts and minds of historians the way, for instance, statesmen and generals have done. Compared to other aspects of Napoleonic history, there is little literature on the European dimension of Napoleonic governance. Up until the late 1980s, historiography on the Napoleonic Empire was dominated by military history, or by biographical studies of Bonaparte. Whether past historians criticized or admired Napoleon, many emphasized the vision of one man. Moreover, many publications were rather francocentric, assuming that French restructurings were accepted unconditionally by local populations. Little attention was given to the dynamics of French rule in conquered Europe. Since the 1990s, however, there has been a shift toward studies focusing on coreperiphery relations and on the dynamics of integration into the Empire. It has become clear that there, French had to act differently, often more cautiously.18 By exploring the impact of Napoleonic rule in Europe, scholars reveal responses of the Europeans to French imperialism.

Stuart Woolf's pioneering study *Napoleon's integration of Europe* or *Napoléon et la conquête de l'Europe* (1990/1991)—note the differences in title—is often cited as one of the frst studies that examined the fundamental problems with Napoleonic attempts to force the heterogeneous European societies into a single mold.19 It was intended to encourage historians to breach away from the excessive attention given to Bonaparte and metropolitan France. Woolf argued that the Napoleonic Empire could and should be examined by looking beyond the Emperor. Instead, integration attempts are explored by looking both through the eyes of the central government and at responses of local communities to Napoleonic measures. Woolf encouraged European historians to look beyond their national borders; regretting the 'hegemony [of] deep-rooted political and national imperatives of European historiography'.20

Historian Isser Woloch also contributed to a different understanding of governance in the Napoleonic Empire, by moving the attention given to

18 Steven Englund, 'Monstre sacré: The question of cultural imperialism and the Napoleonic Empire', *The Historical Journal* 51 (2008) 216–217. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0018246X07006656

19 Stuart Woolf, *Napoléon et la conquête de l'Europe* (Paris 1990); Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe*.

20Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe*, 477.

the Emperor, toward the men in the imperial entourage. Those have been infuential and not necessarily staunch supporters of Napoleon.21 And in *The New Regime*, Woloch calls for a shift from a 'top-down' to a 'bottomup' view on the French state. Woloch questions the extent to which the state could impose its will on local communities. By studying state formation from the bottom up, Woloch argues that Napoleon (and his Revolutionary predecessors) succeeded mainly by pragmatism and negotiation—a legacy he left to the Restoration monarchs.22

Likewise, Oxford historian Michael Broers has examined (dis)continuity in his infuential studies *Europe under Napoleon* (1996) and *Europe after Napoleon* (1996).23 The Emperor was well aware of diversity in Europe, and, Broers argues, this understanding entailed a form of cultural imperialism.24 Broers has suggested that the Napoleonic Empire consisted of a well-integrated 'inner empire', an intermediate zone, and an 'outer empire' where Napoleon's rule was constantly contested. Broers argues that many of the incorporated territories were, in fact, better integrated into the Empire than large parts of the French rural areas.25

Many scholars have embraced the 'New Napoleonic History'. Geoffrey Ellis, Annie Jourdan, Alexander Grab, and Aurélien Lignereux (to name but a few) have written well-documented, studies on the Empire from a European viewpoint.26 However, in monographs and conference volumes, the imperial North Sea coast and its hinterland are not well represented, certainly not when it comes to Napoleonic governance. Partly this can be contributed to historians' scant knowledge of Dutch or German, but even in German-language and Dutch-language scholarship, relatively few studies have been published on the period of French rule. Long, both in Northwest Germany and in the Netherlands, the infuence of traditional anti-French historiography was signifcant. The period was seen as an interlude, which at most would have served as the starting point of a modern national

24Broers, 'Cultural imperialism'.

25Broers, 'Napoleon, Charlemagne, and Lotharingia'.

26Ellis, *The Napoleonic empire*; Jourdan, *L'empire de Napoléon*; Grab, *Napoleon and the transformation of Europe*; Lignereux, *L'Empire des Français*.

21 Isser Woloch, *Napoleon and his collaborators: The making of a dictatorship* (New York 2001).

22 Isser Woloch, *The new regime. Transformations of the French civic order, 1789–1820s* (New York 1995).

23Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815*, 4; Michael Broers, *Europe after Napoleon. Revolution, reaction, and romanticism, 1814–1848* (Manchester 1996).

consciousness. This characterization is a legacy of nineteenth-century historians who emphasized the foreignness of the Napoleonic period.

#### *German Historiography*

In Germany, the creation of a unifed state under Prussian leadership intensifed the neglect of the Napoleonic period. The creations of federal states under Napoleon (the so-called Confederation of the Rhine) and after Napoleon (the German Confederation) were considered historical 'errors' that did not ft national history.27 However, more and more historians aim to approach the period more neutrally, recognizing the diversity of German experiences.28 When it comes to a possible reappraisal of the Napoleonic era in Northwest Germany, the main diffculty has always been the territorial and geopolitical reordering, contributing to a historiographical fragmentation (see also the problems with archival sources, below). There has been little institutional continuity before and after the years 1806–1814, therefore studies on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era in North(west) Germany tend to focus on specifc towns or regions.

In the early 1970s, Antoinette Joulia wrote a well-documented doctoral thesis on the Ems-Supérieur department and several articles on the Hanseatic departments.29 Concurrently, Jean Vidalenc, who primarily worked on Old France, published two articles on Napoleonic governance in the Hanseatic departments.30 In 1981, the frst edition of Elisabeth Fehrenbach's *Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongress* was published, presenting a thorough and concise analysis of the Revolutionary Period in Germany. She shifted emphasis from Prussia to the Confederacy of the

27Andreas Fahrmeier, 'Centralisation versus particularism in the 'Third Germany", in: M. Rowe ed., *Collaboration and resistance in Napoleonic Europe. State-formation in an age of upheaval, c. 1800–1815* (Basingstoke 2003) 107–120.

28For example, Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson ed., *The bee and the eagle. Napoleonic France and the end of the holy roman empire, 1806* (Basingstoke 2008).

29Antoinette Joulia, 'Les institutions administratives des départements hanséatiques', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 17 (1970) 880–892; Antoinette Joulia, Le département de l'Ems-Supérieur 1810–1813. Étude de la mise en place du système administratif en milieu allemand (Ph.D. thesis Strassbourg 1972); Antoinette Joulia, 'Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)', *Osnabrücker Mitteilungen* 80 (1973) 21–102.

30 Jean Vidalenc, 'Les notables des départements hanséatiques', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 17 (1970) 777–794; Jean Vidalenc, 'Les 'départements hanséatiques' et l'administration napoléonienne', *Francia* 1 (1973) 414–450.

Rhine, with some coverage of Northwest German areas outside the Confederacy. The book also explored the study of cultural transfer in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period—an early transnational approach that received an impetus, late twentieth century.31 Concurrently, Thomas Nipperdey published his *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866* (1983) in which Napoleon' impact received serious attention, starting with the sentence: '*Am Anfang war Napoleon*' ('In the beginning was Napoleon').32

From an urban-historical perspective, in his study *Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons*, Burghart Schmidt examined many aspects of Hamburg in the time of the French Revolution and Napoleon. He wanted to go beyond a simplistic interpretation German-French relations, stating that previous historians were too much infuenced by national(ist) interpretations. Schmidt wanted to distance himself from the strong distinction between 'victims' and 'oppressors' that is present in traditional historiography. Schmidt acknowledges that Germans suffered under many harsh measures taken by the French authorities, but he also points to the positive effects of modernization, and to cooperation.33

Of great interest is the work of Katherine Aaslestad on Northwest German culture in the Napoleonic period, with an emphasis on the citystate Hamburg, specifcally its impact on local, regional and national identity formation. In her book *Place and politics*, Aaslestad investigates transformations in civic culture and republicanism, against the background of socio-economic changes. In the Napoleonic period, local identities remained important, but also regional ones emerged, within the context of German national thought.34 Her research provides insights into how local populations responded to Napoleonic governance, in a time of

31Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongress* (4th ed.; München 2001); Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink and Rolf Reichardt ed., *Kulturtransfer im Epochenumbruch: Frankreich-Deutschland 1770 bis 1815* (Leipzig 1997).

32Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (München 1983) 11.

33Burghart Schmidt, *Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons (1789–1813)* (Hamburg 1998) 741–743.

34Katherine Aaslestad, *Place and politics: Local identity, civic culture and German nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Leiden 2005) 10–11; Katherine Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, '1806 and its aftermath: Revisiting the period of the Napoleonic Wars in German Central European historiography', *Central European History* 39 (2006) 547–579.

economic crisis and military exploitation. Aaslestad argues that reactions to Napoleon's measures were, frst and foremost, motivated by local circumstances. State interventions actually 'generated new forms of regionalism', such as a broader Hanseatic identity, simultaneously such regional tendencies would inspire nineteenth-century national thinkers.35

Lastly, Helmut Stubbe da Luz, an expert on civilian-military relations, has worked on occupation, during the Napoleonic period in Northwest Germany, but also in a broader sense.36 Stubbe da Luz has extensively published on the three Hanseatic departments as a whole. His *'Franzosenzeit' in Norddeutschland* is one of the few monographs on the matter, and it devotes ample attention to Napoleonic governance.37 Importantly, in his edited volume *Statthalterregimes*, Stubbe da Luz initiated a comparison of different intermediary governments in Italy, the Netherlands and Germany (the *gouvernements généraux*) in Napoleonic Europe. Basing himself on several case studies written by international historians, Stubbe da Luz analyzes the diffusion of the *gouvernement général* as an instrument of integration, though he prefers the term *Besetzung* (occupation) as the lens to study cases through.38

#### *Dutch Historiography*

There are notable differences and similarities between German and Dutch historiography on the years of Napoleon's rule. An obvious difference is, of course, the continuity between the Dutch departments and the later Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Belgium, opposed to the discontinuity in Germany. Virtually all Dutch departments were converted into provinces and, apart from the rupture between North and South in 1830, state borders changed little. This stability facilitated the emergence of a national historiography. Strikingly similar to Germany (taking Prussia as *pars pro toto*), the establishment of the new monarchy in 1814–1815 was

35Katherine Aaslestad, 'Paying for war: Experiences of Napoleonic rule in the Hanseatic Cities', *Central European History* 39 (2006) 675. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0008938906000215

36Helmut Stubbe da Luz, *Okkupanten und Okkupierte: Napoleons Statthalterregimes in den Hansestädten (6 vols.) 2004–2013* (München 2004).

37Helmut Stubbe da Luz, *'Franzosenzeit' in Norddeutschland (1803–1814). Napoleons Hanseatische Departements* (Bremen 2003).

38Helmut Stubbe da Luz ed., *Statthalterregimes—Napoleons Generalgouvernements in Italien, Holland und Deutschland (1808–1814)* (Hamburg 2016).

accompanied by a process of collective amnesia. Only events that could be interpreted as a prelude to the nineteenth-century nation-state with the House of Orange-Nassau were remembered. The Napoleonic period did not ideologically ft in with the newly constructed Dutch monarchy. Historian Matthijs Lok has made clear how from 1813 onward, the Napoleonic period was simply ignored. This was somewhat more straightforward than in Germany since, in contrast to Germany, there was a single monarch, William I, whose government pursued an unoffcial policy of 'forgetting'. Many of the actions during the Napoleonic period were blamed on the French, and the contributions of the Dutch forgotten or glossed over.39

Due to this historical amnesia, until the twenty-frst century, there were only two monographs on the Napoleonic period in the Netherlands. Firstly, Johanna Naber's well-received book *Overheersching en vrijwording* (frst edition 1909; revised edition 1913) which offered a nuanced view of the period.40 Naber carefully investigated many aspects of the years of integration and the end of Napoleon's rule in the Netherlands. A few years later, *Inlijving en opstand* (1913) was published by Herman Theodoor Colenbrander. According to Colenbrander the Dutch under Napoleon had been characterized by a state of passivity. Colenbrander, a nationally orientated historian, focused on the House of Orange and its connections with Dutch history. The Napoleonic period was interpreted as merely a prologue to the establishment of the Dutch nation-state.41 Colenbrander seems to have based signifcant parts of his book on *Overheersching en vrijwording*, without really acknowledging the work of Naber. Colenbrander's book was also less thorough, but as a Leiden Professor his prestige was greater than the women's rights activist Johanna Naber, therefore his evaluation of the Napoleonic period in the Netherlands would long be infuential.42

The 1960s and 1970s saw a wave of new research into the years of Revolution and, to a much lesser extent, the Napoleonic period in the

39Matthijs Lok, *Windvanen: Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse restauratie (1813–1820)* (Amsterdam 2009) 166–167.

40 Johanna W. A. Naber, *Overheersching en vrijwording: geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de inlijving bij Frankrijk, juli 1810-november 1813* (Haarlem 1913).

41H. T. Colenbrander, *Inlijving en opstand* (Amsterdam 1913) 127.

42Maria Grever, 'Naber, Johanna Wilhelmina Antoinette', *Digitaal Vrouwenlexicon van Nederland* (2015). http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/vrouwenlexicon/lemmata/ data/Naber

Netherlands. For instance, studies by Robert Palmer, Simon Schama, and C. H. E. de Wit—who all agreed the French model during the long Dutch Age of Revolution (c. 1780–1815) was less dominant than had been portrayed.43 In the 1980s, new research focused mainly on late-eighteenthcentury political thought: new research by historians like Niek van Sas, Wijnand Mijnhardt, Renger de Bruin, Stephan Klein, and Joost Rosendaal cleared the way for new scholars of Napoleonic history to re-evaluate the position of the Dutch within the Napoleonic Empire.44

Since 2000 more serious attention has been given to Napoleonic Netherlands. Johan Joor, in his *De Adelaar en het Lam* (*The Eagle and the Lamb*), made clear that the Dutch contested Napoleonic rule. Joor showed that in every corner of the Kingdom of Holland (1806–1810), and later the Dutch imperial departments, inhabitants challenged Napoleonic measures. Dutch uprisings were primarily local in nature, but such protests successfully destabilized the state. According to Joor, previous historians neglected these struggles because they only looked for conficts that were explicitly pro-Orange and anti-French.45 Literary scholar Lotte Jensen works on Dutch resistance literature, and its impact on Dutch national thought. According Jensen, certain forms of protest or opposition did contribute to national feelings under Napoleon. She states that from a cultural and literary viewpoint, protest was embedded in a national context.46

Bart Verheijen's book *Nederland onder Napoleon* (*The Netherlands under Napoleon*) echoes the title of the earlier-mentioned work by Michael Broers. Verheijen studies political-cultural identity formation, and has shown that Frenchmen not necessarily worked together in good harmony, and, conversely, Dutchmen were certainly not all preoccupied with

43R. R. Palmer, 'Much in little: The Dutch Revolution of 1795', *The Journal of Modern History* 26 (1954) 15–35. C. H. E. de Wit, *De strijd tussen aristocratie en democratie in Nederland, 1780–1848: kritisch onderzoek van een historisch beeld en herwaardering van een periode* (Heerlen 1965). Simon Schama, *Patriotten en bevrijders: revolutie in de Noordelijke Nederlanden, 1780–1813* (Amsterdam 1989).

44For example, N. C. F. van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit, 1750–1900* (Amsterdam 2004).

45 Johan Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam: onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de inlijving bij het Franse keizerrijk (1806–1813)* (Amsterdam 2000).

46Lotte Jensen, *Verzet tegen Napoleon* (Nijmegen 2013).

proto-nationalism.47 By taking political debate as a point of departure, Verheijen deepens the insights of Johan Joor, as well as those of Lotte Jensen: for instance, he links regional rural upheaval concerning national taxes with national thought of writers and poets.

Many aspects of the Dutch Napoleonic experience deserve further attention. Joor, Jensen, and Verheijen have given valuables insights into popular protest, state repression, identity formation and public debate, yet a critical study on how the Empire was constructed and run is lacking.48 To quote Matthijs Lok: 'A study of the administration of the Dutch provinces as part of the huge Napoleonic empire, which integrates the Dutch case in international research on this topic and does not regard the years 1810–1813 from the perspective of its outcome, is therefore urgently needed'.49 This can also be said for the even lesser studied Hanseatic departments.

### *Transregional Perspectives*

As noted above, the history of the area under scrutiny was long written from nationally defned viewpoints, sharply discriminating between presumed 'oppressors' and 'victims'. Consequently, neighboring Netherlands and Northwest Germany have often been studied in isolation. Changing spatial frameworks can however lead to new insights, both transnational and transregional, thus questioning the nation-state as a unit of analysis.50 Particularly, a transregional study of Napoleonic governance can be relevant. Until recent, there have been few studies concerning its reception at lower levels, certainly not in conquered Europe. Yet the scope of Napoleon's centralist reforms can perhaps best be measured regionally, since 'Paris' specifcally wanted to destroy traditional diversity. Serious

47Bart Verheijen, *Nederland onder Napoleon: partijstrijd en natievorming 1801–1813* (Nijmegen 2017).

48An indispensible overview of institutional changes, literature and archives is Joke Roelevink, *Onderzoeksgids bestuur en administratie van de Bataafs-Franse tijd, 1795–1813* (Den Haag 2012). http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bataafsfransetijd

49Matthijs Lok, 'The bicentennial of '1813–1815' and national history writing: Remarks on a new consensus', *BMGN—Low Countries Historical Review* 130 (2015) 118. https:// doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10148

50Eric Storm, 'The spatial turn and the history of nationalism. Nationalism between regionalism and transnational approaches', in: S. Berger and E. Storm ed., *Writing the history of nationalism* (London 2019) 215–238.

clashes must have occurred between the pursuit of Napoleonic governance and the wishes of communities. Fortunately, fresh studies on state-building from the bottom-up provide new images of Napoleonic rule in the regions.

Historians increasingly pay attention to alternative regional narratives, such as Katherine Aaslestad and Michael Rowe, who stress the importance of regional approaches to nuance the one-sided image of Napoleonic times as only a period of burgeoning national consciousness. Transregional is Aaslestad's 'Lost neutrality and economic warfare', which treats the Napoleonic Netherlands, Northwest Germany, and Southern Denmark as a whole. She argues that around 1800, North Europeans were not unfamiliar with (economic) warfare and exploitative occupations, but the scale and scope were unprecedented. In combination with the legacy of Napoleonic governance, such dramatic events fostered regionalism.51

This goes for many regions. For instance, Michael Rowe has examined the connections between regional and national identities in the German Rhineland. Rowe has shown how a regional identity did not form in opposition to the French, but how 'Rhenishness', primarily after the years of Napoleonic rule, had a problematic relationship with Prussian concepts of German identity. The Rhenish elites used the Napoleonic framework to secure their position, taking advantage of the problematic nature of Napoleonic governance.52 Similarly, Brecht Deseure and Diederik Smit have demonstrated for post-Napoleonic Low Countries how the Restoration government took regional variations into account, for example, by reintroducing the provinces. For the new rulers, the appropriation of early modern institutions and sentiments was a key instrument in the creation of a new unifed state, as long as regional differences were acknowledged.53

Lacunae in national or regional historiographies should also be considered in relation to the availability and completeness of regional archival material. In the Netherlands, thanks to the relative institutional continuity

51Katherine Aaslestad, 'Lost neutrality and economic warfare. Napoleonic warfare in Northern Europe, 1795–1815', in: R. Chickering and S. Förster ed., *War in an age of revolution, 1775–1815* (Cambridge 2010) 394.

52Michael Rowe, 'Between Empire and home town: Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814', *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999) 643–674. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0018246X9900850X

53Brecht Deseure and Diederik Smit, 'Pre-revolutionary provinces in a post-Napoleonic state', *BMGN—Low Countries Historical Review* 133 (2018) 98–121. https://doi. org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10589

between the Napoleonic departments and the current Dutch provinces, most historical offcial records are well preserved in national, provincial, and regional archives.54 In contrast, continuous redrawing of Northwest German borders dispersed regional archival sources. Regrettably, the German situation is also complicated because of twentieth-century war damages. The archives of the Ems-Oriental department are in Aurich, but unfortunately incomplete. The well-preserved records of the Ems-Supérieur department are in Osnabrück. Since the department of Bouchesdu-Weser was split in 1815 between Hannover and Oldenburg, its archives are divided between Bremen and Oldenburg. Sadly, Bouches-de-l'Elbe's archive was damaged in 1942 due to Second World War bombings. Most of the Lippe department's archival material can be consulted in Münster.55

In view of the limitations of this study, use has been made mainly of secondary literature, published sources, and a limited selection of archival material, such as correspondence between offcials (regional and local), formal reports, memoranda, newspapers, and memoires. Given the fragmentation of German source material, the analysis of the German departments is, in comparison to the Dutch departments, relatively more dependent on literature and published source material.

# Questions of Definition

This study is concerned with the 13 imperial departments which nowadays are part of the Netherlands and Germany and were integrated in 1810–1811. I have tried to transcend national histories by looking at the French departments in the present-day Netherlands and Northwest Germany in conjunction—territories which were referred to as the *départements de la Hollande* and the *départements (h)anséatiques*, respectively. Unfortunately, these terms can be confusing. Napoleonic plans to integrate both areas entailed the (re)defnition of Dutch and German territories. Offcials in Paris not seldom had a hard time distinguishing between the two regions; consequently, even some contemporary historians

54 See https://www.archieven.nl/

55 See Archive in Nordrhein-Westfalen, https://www.archive.nrw.de/; Archive in Niedersachsen und Bremen, https://www.arcinsys.niedersachsen.de/; Staatsarchiv Hamburg, https://www.hamburg.de/staatsarchiv

accidentally mix up the two areas. Vague distinctions between 'Dutch' and 'German' complicate the evaluation of Napoleonic governance.

Administratively, the government in Paris discriminated between the departments of *Hollande* (which corresponded with the *Gouvernement général* of Charles-François Lebrun in Amsterdam), the Hanseatic departments (supervised by General-Governor Davout in Hamburg), and three Dutch and German departments that did not fall under the authority of Amsterdam or Hamburg (Map 1.1).

Not all territories part of the *départements de la Hollande* were actually Dutch. Ems-Oriental (the present-day region of Ostfriesland) was a former Prussian province that had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Holland in 1807. Nevertheless, this 'Dutch' department fell under the Imperial Court in Hamburg. Furthermore, the lands that would later make up the Lippe department were initially part of three adjacent Dutch departments, thus part of the *départements de la Hollande*. But resistance from the local elite in Münster led to the creation of a separate German-speaking Lippe department, not under the supervision of the French in Amsterdam or Hamburg (more on this in Chap. 5). Nevertheless, some actors within the Empire (for instance, the *gendarmerie*, and to a certain extent the

**Map 1.1** Administrative division of the Dutch and Northwest German departments

intermediary government in Amsterdam) treated Lippe as part of 'Holland', and sometimes it was viewed as 'Hanseatic'. Lippe can also be seen as an extension of the bordering departments of the Rhineland. For instance, it fell under the Imperial Court in Liège, and not the one in Hamburg.

Conversely, some parts belonging to the former Dutch Republic became an integral part of the Empire. The departments south of the Rhine—Bouches-de-l'Escaut (formerly the Dutch province of Zeeland) and Bouches-du-Rhin (Dutch Noord-Brabant) were not qualifed as Dutch. The district of Breda was even merged with the existing Belgian department of Deux-Nèthes, probably due to its strategic value between the estuaries of the rivers Scheldt and Meuse.56 In offcial discourse, the French presented the river Rhine as their natural border, therefore in the eyes of the Ministry of the Interior, these former Dutch territories were not part of 'Holland'. In brief, ad hoc decisions based on cultural-linguistic aspects on the one hand, and pragmatism, on the other hand, redrew subnational borders in a complicated manner.

Given these imprecise defnitions, a distinction is made between 'German' and 'Dutch' departments (Map 1.2), based on various considerations. Firstly, as a matter of convenience, 'Dutch departments' are defned as the departments that formerly belonged to the Dutch Republic, were predominantly Dutch-speaking and would later form the present-day Netherlands. '(Northwest) German departments' are defned as the largely German-speaking lands, including Lippe and Ems-Oriental/Ostfriesland, which formerly belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and today are part of Niedersachsen or Nordrhein-Westfalen. Secondly, when I refer to actions of the intermediary governments in Amsterdam or Hamburg these concern, of course, specifcally the departments under their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, when interpreting French offcial documents of the time, it should be borne in mind that *Hollande* denotes the seven departments supervised by General-Governor Lebrun, and *départements (h)anséatiques* usually refers to the three departments which General-Governor Davout oversaw from Hamburg.

Another question of defnition concerns the key terms 'conquest', 'incorporation', and 'integration'. In the past, the Napoleonic period in the Netherlands and Northwest German has often been referred to simply

56 Since the district of Breda was added to the department of Deux-Nèthes, it is excluded in the present study.

**Map 1.2** 'Dutch' and 'German' departments as defned in this study, with *préfectures* (departmental seats of government)

as *inlijving*/*Einverleibung* (incorporation) or *bezetting*/*Besetzung* (occupation). Here, I differentiate between 'conquest', 'incorporation', and 'integration'.

Firstly, *conquest* is characterized by a change of power, whether or not by force, making one country controlling, partially or fully, the territory of another country. This is not necessarily a defnitive violation of a nation's sovereignty, since it does not mark the legal transfer of power. In the early modern period this notion largely overlapped with 'occupation', in the sense of *occupatio bellica*. 57 As said, particularly German historians have made use of the notion of 'occupation' as analytical concept. However, I choose 'conquest' over 'occupation', frstly, because of Napoleon's frequent referrals to *pays conquis* and his preoccupation with *droit de conquête*. Secondly, many of the earlier-mentioned historians have already extensively explored the concept of occupation. And thirdly, Stuart Woolf doubts the explanatory value of 'occupation', as it does little justice to

57Peter M. R. Stirk, 'The concept of military occupation in the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars', *Comparative Legal History* 3 (2015) 64. https://doi. org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041726

sincere efforts many administrators made to build a new state and society, albeit with mixed results.58

Secondly, *incorporation* entails the constitutional transfer of sovereignty. I favor 'incorporation' as an analytical concept to 'annexation' because of its resemblance to Dutch *inlijving*, and German *Einverleibung*. In many ways incorporation is a legal act, often an imperial decree, on an exact date. Incorporation does not imply that all state institutions are straightaway imposed on the incorporated territory, let alone that new authorities are genuinely accepted.

In contrast, *integration*, to complete the trichotomy, does aim to render incorporated lands integral parts of the Empire, by extending the central government's authority, and with it, implicitly or explicitly, reducing the mental distance between core and periphery. Unlike incorporation, integration was not a well-defned, single legal act, but a continuing process of molding *pays conquis* into *pays réunies*. It does so primarily through the implementation of imperial institutions and governing practices. In this perspective, Woolf speaks of Napoleonic integration as 'a model of government and administration, an updated and far more powerful version of the mainstream ideals of Enlightenment writers and the practical reforms of some Enlightenment rulers and administrators'.59 Such an idea of integration implied a strong opposition between local diversity and 'modern' uniformity, which affected the policies pursued in Europe. Although Napoleonic administrators did not use the term 'modernization', they regarded themselves as the modernizing force of Europe. Their view of the modern state consisted of the concentration of the exercises of power in the hands of state servants, to the detriment of traditional, less specialized institutions.60 In other words, in this study, integration and modernization are strongly associated with the introduction of Napoleonic governance.

Obviously, historical developments are never linear and boundaries between abovementioned phases can be contested. As a matter of fact, one

58 Stuart Woolf, 'Napoleon: Politics of integration?', *Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom* 127 (2013) 22.

59 Ibid., 23.

60 John Breuilly, 'Napoleonic Germany and state-formation', in: M. Rowe ed., *Collaboration and resistance in Napoleonic Europe. State-formation in an age of upheaval, c.1800–1815* (Basingstoke 2003) 135–142; Michael Rowe, 'Napoleon and the 'modernisation' of Germany', in: P. Dwyer ed., *Napoleon and his Empire. Europe, 1804–1814* (Basingstoke 2007) 205.

of the main conclusions of this study, as will be elaborated on in the fnal chapter 'Incomplete integration', is the lack of agreement between Napoleonic authorities on the timing and intensity of integration.

In sum, by proposing a comparative and (trans)regional approach to Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany, this study will hopefully fll a lacuna in the Dutch-German body of scholarly literature. Going beyond national historiographies is easier said than done, but nation-states should not be taken as the natural starting point for historical investigation.61 Of course, cross-national history entails many practical and methodological issues, yet I believe its benefts outweigh the diffculties.62 The overarching goal is to gain a better understanding of Napoleonic governance in its entirety, shedding light on the endeavor of Napoleonic France to create a modern Europe shaped in its own image.

61Peter van Dam, 'Vervlochten geschiedenis. Hoe *histoire croisée* de natiestaat bedwingt', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 125 (2012) 96–109. https://doi.org/10.5117/ tvgesch2012.1.dam

62 Jürgen Kocka's argument for the comparative method is essential reading for all academic historians. See Jürgen Kocka, 'Comparison and beyond', *History and Theory* 42 (2003) 39–44.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# Revolution and Warfare: The North Before Conquest

**Abstract** This chapter lays the foundation for an understanding of Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. Dutch and German lands were governed in many different ways in the early modern age. During the eighteenth century attempts at reform were made in both areas, with varying results. The French Revolution was both admired and feared, especially as it became clear that the 'liberation' of Europe entailed aggressive expansionism. France's growth showed the diffculties of imposing rules and practices on a hitherto foreign population. Which policies were effective, which not? True, German secularization and mediatization (the historic *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* of 1803), and repeated *coup d'états* in the Batavian Republic, restructured governance on the right bank of the Rhine. Yet, both in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany, the combination of awe of, and fear for, the French Empire strengthened identity formation, whether local, regional, or national, which was not necessarily benefcial for future integration into France.

**Keywords** Absolutism • Republicanism • Revolution • Warfare • Identity formation

© The Author(s) 2021 23 M. van der Burg, *Napoleonic Governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany*, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66658-3\_2

# Warfare and the Shaping of Nation-states

French interventions in Northwestern Europe in the years leading up to Napoleon's ascension to the imperial throne, caused drastic reorganizations of countries and societies. Millions of people changed state, and would repeatedly do so until after the defnitive fall of Napoleon. During the process clashes occurred between longstanding traditions and revolutionary novelties. Yet, well before the Revolutionary period, the Netherlands and Northwest Germany were affected by waves of reformist thought. There were, however, signifcant differences in the extent of each region's revolutionary fervor, and the ways ideas translated into actual reforms. Political conjuncture, international relations, and the perseverance of traditional structures, thwarted change.

Dutch and German internal affairs were greatly complicated when Revolutionary France redefned warfare. Under the creed of ridding the peoples of Europe from 'despots', liberation, conquest, and exploitation went hand in hand. The old modes of military confict and diplomacy gave way to new types of forms, in which nation-building and empire-building came to the fore.

Smaller states within the borders of France, such as Nice and the former papal enclaves, had been incorporated at an early stage, but when Revolutionary France went on the offensive, major geopolitical transformations ensued. The northwest corner of continental Europe had further acquainted itself with French expansionism around 1795, when the French troops conquered many parts on the Left bank of the Rhine and started incorporating present-day Belgium and the Rhineland. The integration of both areas is especially signifcant given the fact that the French experiences in these newly conquered lands would affect how Napoleonic governance would be later introduced in the Dutch and Northwest German departments.

By discussing the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods in the lands north of Old France, this chapter lays the foundation for a proper understanding of Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany.

# Absolutism and Republicanism

Present-day Netherlands and Northwest Germany were very heterogeneous during the early modern period. The origins of the Dutch state can be traced back to the revolt against Habsburg rule. When loyalty to the Spanish king Philip II was formally renounced, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, or Dutch Republic (1579–1795), was set up as a confederation of seven autonomous provinces. The provinces enjoyed a substantial degree of self-rule. Each sent delegates to the States-General in The Hague. Initially, the States-General became responsible for chiefy military and foreign matters. But quickly, their decisions came to apply to a wider sphere of government. Apart from the Provinces, the Dutch Republic also comprised so-called Generality Lands, ruled by the States-General. No delegates from these areas—with a predominantly Catholic population—were represented in The Hague. In practice, contrary to the republican ideal of equality, not all Provinces were equally powerful. The States of Holland dominated the Republic. And within the Province of Holland, Amsterdam soon became the most infuential city.

Another binding factor were the Stadtholders. These nobles had been originally representatives from the Habsburg Emperor. One of them, William of Orange, had played a major role during the Revolt. From that moment, as no monarch could mediate between provinces, the individual Provincial States appointed Stadholders. These offcials—often provinces chose different Stadholders—commanded the army, but also functioned as highest offce-holders. In many towns the Stadtholder selected urban magistrates. In short, the Dutch Republic at a frst glance was a league of sovereign provinces, but in fact was a unique political entity which operated as a powerful federal state.1

Meanwhile, the area that would later become the Northwest German part of the Napoleonic Empire, was still distributed over many independent states. The largest state was Hanover, or the Electorate of Brunswick-Lüneburg, which stretched from the North Sea to Central Germany, and also governed adjacent areas, such as the County of Bentheim. The British king ruled Hanover and the United Kingdom in a personal union. The Duchy of Oldenburg, around the city of the same name, was also a personal union, namely with the Prince-Bishopric of Lübeck. During the eighteenth century, the Kingdom of Prussia had acquired more and more territories in the West, such as the province of Ostfriesland and the County of Lingen. The Prince-Bishopric of Münster, was an ecclesiastical state, ruled by a bishop, who not only exercised spiritual power but also secular

1 Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness, and fall. 1477–1806* (Oxford 1998) 276–306.

power. The same applied to the slightly smaller Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück. Geographically much smaller, but long-time economic and political power factors, were the three Hanseatic cities (the Free Imperial Cities) of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. In each, power was distributed between a Senate and Citizen's Councils. Notwithstanding subtle differences between cities, Hanseatic government, as in the Dutch Republic, was in essence collegial government, dominated mainly by urban merchant families.2

Unlike the Dutch, most of the inhabitants of Northwest Germany were affected by enlightened absolutism, which emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century. It envisaged a rational government safeguarding internal socioeconomic conditions. The idea of the *droit divin* gave way to a more secular approach to princely power, in which the promotion of societal happiness was the most fundamental task of the state.3 Ambitious enlightened monarchs also tried to profle themselves internationally, continuing the earlier absolutist pursuit of a large and effcient army and civil service. For example, King Frederick William I had already reformed governance in his kingdom, severely curtailing the autonomy of provincial and local rulers. King Frederick II retained his father's effective state apparatus and increased Prussia international standing. The state grew in importance, and therefore that of its embodiment: the prince, who could maintain absolute control to monitor the greater good. This notion of governance has been characterized as a 'teleocratic style of governance'.4

In Northern Germany, Hanseatic city-states were islands of republicanism. There, civic tradition, Protestant aversion to exuberance, and new enlightened ideas went hand in hand, culminating in a variety of enlightened reforms. Respect for the city's history was part of civic communitybuilding and republican self-identifcation. This had a strong anti-aristocratic character, even more so than in Dutch republicanism

2Mary Lindemann, 'Voluntarism in social welfare and urban government: The case of Hamburg, 1700–1799', *Journal of Urban History* 36 (2010) 316–331. https://doi. org/10.1177/0096144209359143

3Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongress* (4th ed.; München 2001) 55.

4H. M. Scott, 'Introduction: The problem of enlightened absolutism', in: H. Scott ed., *Enlightened absolutism: Reform and reformers in later eighteenth-century Europe* (London 1989) 1–2, 16; Michael Spicer, 'Public administration: The history of ideas, and the reinventing government movement', *Public Administration Review* 64 (2004) 356. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00379.x

which—unlike the Hanseatic city-states—did not have to position itself vis-à-vis enlightened absolutist Princes.5

While many European states experienced centralizing tendencies, the Dutch Republic maintained its local particularistic state structure—a tightknit network of urban communities. Things changed at the end of the eighteenth century, with the Patriot movement of the 1780s. Following the military and economic decline of the Republic, republican patriots tried to reclaim what they thought were traditional rights. Having little say in political matters, the Patriots focalized their attention on the civic militias. Throughout the Republic, militias that had been dormant for decades, or centuries, were revived as symbols of civic pride. Middle-class patriots demanded that civic corporations, like militias and craft guilds, had to be consulted by the city government in public matters. Also, Patriots called for the election of urban councilors and town offcials, as well as the right of (legislative) initiative.6

As many Dutch towns, the Hanseatic city-states developed a vivid public sphere, in the form of neutral enlightened societies, coffee houses, and reading societies, where citizens came together to discuss social issues. Gradually they formed a breeding ground for early democratic ideas. The most prominent enlightened society was the Patriotic Society (1765), in Hamburg, which was in close contact with the urban government, contributing to the reform of Hamburg's governance. Similar societies were established in many towns in Northwest Germany.7

As more and more Dutch towns and provinces embraced the Patriot cause, the Republic effectively was in a state of civil war. Following repressive actions of Stadtholder William V, factions within the Patriot movement started to call for popular sovereignty and new liberties, thus developing a new democratic republican discourse. This led to a rupture between moderate Patriots and democratic Patriots who increasingly attacked the perceived 'aristocratic' system of governance.8 In September

5Katherine Aaslestad, *Place and politics: Local identity, civic culture and German nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Leiden 2005) 58–59, 67.

6N. C. F. van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit, 1750–1900* (Amsterdam 2004) 214.

7Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 68–75, 108–109.

8Mart Rutjes, 'Onderdrukt onbehagen. Het ontstaan van de repressieve staat in Nederland', in: P. van Dam, J. Turpijn and B. Mellink ed., *Onbehagen in de polder. Nederland in confict sinds 1795* (Amsterdam 2014) 25.

1787, the Stadtholder—thanks to a military intervention of his Prussian brother-in-law Frederick II—regained his power. The unorganized Patriot militias were no match for a standing army. Urban governments and militias were purged of Patriots; many of whom fed to the Southern Netherlands or France, which caused a fight of capital.

Twenty years later, the counter-revolution played a part in discussions on the incorporation of the Netherlands. That William V had needed help from Prussian troops to overthrow the Patriots and re-impose his authority, was seen by Emperor Napoleon as a justifcation to incorporate the Netherlands. Effectively, the Dutch had already been conquered in 1787, Napoleon would argue (see Chap. 3).

Despite its military might, the Orangist counter-revolution of 1787 was not a real victory. In the long run, the repressive actions of the Stadholder only served to give the Patriot ideals more support. Remaining Patriots went underground in so-called reading societies. In spite of feelings of national solidarity, individual revolutionary groups were local in nature.9 This made more and more Dutch Patriots realize that a national movement was of great importance.

The enlightened German citizens called themselves 'Patriots', but Katherine Aaslestad has argued that 'public moralists' is a more precise term, since their point of view was mainly ethical, or moral in nature.10 Partly this also applies to the Dutch Patriots, but they gradually became more politicized, especially as some of them began to embrace progressive ideas about popular sovereignty. Dutch Patriots also had to take an explicit stance on the issue of local or provincial autonomy versus federal or national uniformity. Such an issue was one that hardly concerned Northwest German Patriots in 1780s.

While Stadholder William V was helped by his Prussian brother-in-law, French King Louis XVI struggled with political-theoretical criticism of *philosophes*, opposition to social and economic inequalities, and a mounting debt burden. This necessitated the convening of the *États généraux* (States-General) for the frst time since 1614. The Third Estate called for a single assembly in which the citizenry would have a numerical majority, adorning itself with the title *Assemblée nationale*. The reluctant Louis XVI initially hesitated to intervene. In July and August, popular uprisings

9 J. G. M. M. Rosendaal, *Tot nut van Nederland: polarisatie en revolutie in een grensgebied, 1783–1787* (Nijmegen 2012) 237–238.

10Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 97.

showed the weaknesses of the monarchy. Louis XVI's reluctance hindered the establishment of a new constitutional framework. Due to his failed attempt to fee, in the summer of 1791, lack of unanimity among the revolutionaries, and constant war threat, the government steadily lost its grip on the population. Louis XVI, like Stadholder William V, had tried to appeal to the band of brothers-in-law to restore his authority, in his case Austrian Emperor Leopold II. The constitutional monarchy lost its credibility. After the adoption of the frst French constitution in October 1791, dissatisfaction grew. When armed civilians entered the *Palais de Tuileries* on 10 August 1792, the constitutional monarchy was moribund.11

Subsequently, the brutality that characterized the rule of the powerful Committee of Public Safety, with Maximilien Robespierre as its most prominent member, culminated in an outburst of violence that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of French people, including Louis XVI and his family. The Terror had a decisive infuence on the course of the French Revolution. Nationally, it made many people long for a defnitive end to the revolution. Foreign sympathizers rarely could reconcile themselves with the extreme turn that the Revolution had taken.12 This was at odds with France's growing ambition to rid Europe of the Old Regime 'despots'.

For instance, in 1789 many educated German citizens had initially greeted the French Revolution, due to widespread dissatisfaction with the situation in Germany. There were also close personal ties with French revolutionaries and Hamburg in particular was a lively meeting place for international 'Jacobins', as conservatives derogatorily, called revolutionaries.13 On the one hand, there was a disappointment at the waning momentum of enlightened absolutism; on the other, worsening social conditions caused dissatisfaction. In particular in Northern Germany, which was a center of journalism and book publishing, a radical revolutionary movement arose that no longer only demanded freedom but also equality. While the Hamburg merchant citizenry was close to the Girondins, intellectuals and craftsmen sympathized with the Montagnards. For example, Jacobin Georg Conrad Meyer from Flensburg, in his periodical *Der neue Mensch*, propagated the equal distribution of goods, however nowhere in

11Annie Jourdan, *La Révolution, une exception française?* (Paris 2004) 49–50.

12 Ibid., 371–374.

13Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 118–122.

Northern Germany were any genuine attempts made to put the principles of the French Revolution into practice.14

Although the Revolution was admired from afar, there was also fear for its potential consequences. Skepticism prevailed. The German lands were said not to be ripe for a revolution. Even Heinrich Würzer, one of Northern Germany's most famous 'Jacobins', understood revolution to be nothing more than reform. Civil disobedience was acceptable, but a bloody uprising had little to do with a real revolution, he argued.15 The violence of the First French Republic confrmed to civic Northwest Germans that the French lacked morality, and thus strengthened their belief in their own superiority.16

Dutch Patriots who had fed from the Republic to France, did not react unequivocally to the radicalization of the revolution. A small number of ultra-revolutionary exiles were in close contact with French kindred spirits, and united in the *Comité Révolutionnaire Batave*, hoping to reform the Dutch situation along French lines. However, Robespierre believed that the Dutch would not beneft from the French model as each people had its own customs and habits. Moreover, early 1793, the French had declared war on the Stadholder, thus justifying the war without compromising Dutch popular sovereignty. The majority of government members called for the usefulness of an independent Dutch Sister Republic. A small minority within the National Convention, however, believed that the Netherlands could simply be incorporated.17 Many Dutch Patriots therefore lost their enthusiasm for the French cause during this period. Conversely, many Jacobins were suspicious of, the in their eyes *bourgeois*, Dutchmen.18

14Fehrenbach, *Vom Ancien Régime*, 65.

16Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 127–129.

17Marc Belissa, ''Faire la guerre au Stadhouder ou à la nation Hollandaise?': Le débat politique autour de la déclaration de guerre (décembre 1792–mars 1793)', in: A. Jourdan and J. Leerssen ed., *Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française* (Amsterdam 1996) 69–80.

18 Joost Rosendaal, ''La liberté est une garce!' Les Bataves à Paris (1787–1795)', in: A. Jourdan and J. Leerssen ed., *Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française* (Amsterdam 1996) 66–67.

15 Ibid., 61–63.

# Exporting the Revolution

With the demise of the French monarchy, a long series of wars began that no longer involved the traditional balance of power, but placed the nation on a pedestal. The novelty of this concept of war lay in the fact that foreign policy could no longer be separated from domestic policy. Warfare acted as a nation-building instrument in a politically and socially divided France, turning into an outlet for internal tensions. Successive French revolutionary governments, prolonged and increased warfare, with growing missionary zeal. Defensive warfare turned into a war of liberation and conquest. The French threat was, however, not immediately recognized by European diplomats who only knew international power politics.19

In November 1792 French troops invaded the Austrian Netherlands, hoping to establish a Sister Republic. Offcially, the Constitution of 1791 had determined that France renounced 'the undertaking of any war with a view to making conquests, and [would] never use its forces against the liberty of any people'. And also in the years that followed it was offcial policy that 'liberated' peoples should, in principle, retain existing laws and institutions. But the actual behavior of generals and offcials in conquered lands was not always in line with that.20 The French thought that the Belgians, who were dissatisfed with their Habsburg sovereign, would be enthusiastic. Initially, Revolutionary France was indeed seen as a liberator, but it soon became apparent that opinions differed widely. Like the Dutch patriots of the 1780s, Belgians attached great value to the restoration of old, local privileges as protection against a centralist monarch. However, the French National Convention dismantled traditional bodies in December 1792 with the aim of an organization based on the French model.21 Moreover, in the North, military advances of General Charles-François Dumouriez and Dutch exile Lieutenant-General Herman Willem Daendels were halted, and local support was meagre, forcing withdrawal.

After a brief restoration of Austria's power, French troops fnally prevailed in July 1794. A new *Conseil de gouvernement*, headed by

19Fehrenbach, *Vom Ancien Régime*, 42–46.

20Peter M. R. Stirk, 'The concept of military occupation in the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars', *Comparative Legal History* 3 (2015) 69–74. https:// doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041726

21Brecht Deseure, "Etre libre de nom et esclave de fait'. De Brabantse constituties tijdens de Franse periode (Zuidelijke Nederlanden)', *Noordbrabants Historisch Jaarboek* 29 (2012) 349–369.

Commissioner Louis-Ghislain de Bouteville, replaced extant governmental institutions and was to look after the implementation of the French system of governance in the nine 'Belgian' departments. Legal and administrative integration started, leading to rigorous reforms. Old Regime practices and institutions were abolished, and an end was put to all prerogatives of the Church. Consequently, many members of the Belgian elite lost their positions. With the introduction of elections, in 1797, the number of local administrators and magistrates increased, which somewhat improved the reputation of French governance and stimulated its acceptance. And when, with Napoleon's rise to power in 1799, the Commissioner in Brussels disappeared, the Belgian departments were truly organized along French lines.22

Concurrently, the German Rhineland was conquered. The Peace of Basel, of 5 April 1795, stated that the French would occupy the Rhineland momentarily. When peace would return, a defnite arrangement would be made. However, the secret articles of the treaty prescribed that Prussia and France would eventually come to an exchange. The French relatively quickly insisted on obtaining the Rhineland, something that the French monarchs had never demanded so explicitly. The Prussian king would give up his rights in the Rhineland in return for territorial compensation elsewhere, which would have to be specifed at a later date.23 A demarcation line was drawn, to the north of which all German states would remain neutral. The French promised not cross this line, thus increasing the infuences of Prussia in Northern Germany.

In November 1797, four 'Rhenish' departments were established, with François Joseph Rudler as Commissioner to oversee their organization. From Parisians desks, the departments were further divided into districts, cantons, and municipalities, by the summer of 1798.24 What made the situation in the Rhineland complicated, was that unwilling local elites were not eager to support French rule, and French were uncertain how to deal with traditional prerogatives and social inequalities. Hesitations on the

22Dirk Heirbaut, 'De Franse overheersing in België', in: A. Berkvens, J. Hallebeek and A. Sirks ed., *Het Franse Nederland: de inlijving 1810–1813. De juridische en bestuurlijke gevolgen van de 'Réunion' met Frankrijk* (Hilversum 2012) 17–23.

23 Josef Smets, 'Le Rhin, frontière naturelle de la France', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 314 (1998) 686–687, 697. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahrf.1998.2206

24Bernd Wunder, 'L'administration territoriale des départements allemands annexés par l'Empire napoléonien', in: M. Pertué ed., *L'administration territoriale de la France (1750–1940)* (Orléans 1998) 349–350.

side of the French, combined with local resistance, led to a slow start of integration, creating an uncomfortable situation for the intermediary French administrations.25 Collaboration was not necessarily a signal that the population was fully accommodating to French rule. The French authorities had to comply with older patronage networks for strategic reasons. The French learn that existing practices could survive within the new system of governance.26 Effective governance was extra welcome when late 1798, drastic French measures, such as the restriction of the power of the Church and the introduction of conscription, led to popular resistance in Belgium and the Rhineland, the *Boerenkrijg* or *Klüppelkrieg*. Given the different local circumstances, the Belgian and German regions were incorporated in different tempi. It was not until 1801, when the great powers ratifed the Treaty of Luneville, that the left bank of the Rhine was permanently incorporated.27

# Revolutionary Republicans in the North

The Dutch Patriots, or 'Batavians' as they were increasingly called, witnessed how the French emerged as conquerors in Belgium and Germany, and expressed doubts about French intervention. Alexander Gogel (later member of the Napoleonic intermediary government in Amsterdam) recognized, on the eve of the Batavian Revolution, that support from France was indispensable, but was keen to prevent the Netherlands from being regarded as a *pays conquis*; in his eyes, wherever possible Dutchmen had to take the lead.28 With the invasion of French-Batavian troops (this time led by Jean-Charles Pichegru, with Dutch assistance by Daendels and Jan Willem de Winter) and in January 1795, Stadtholder William V fed to England, and all over the Dutch Republic, provincial and city governments were purged of Orangists. After the proclamation of the Batavian Republic, major differences of opinion emerged about what the new state should look like. Because of the devastating defeat that ended all patriot

25 Smets, 'Le Rhin'.

26Michael Rowe, 'Between Empire and home town: Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814', *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999) 643–674. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0018246X9900850X

27Kees Schaapveld, *Bestuur en bestuurders in Nedermaas, 1794–1814: met bijzondere aandacht voor het lokale bestuur in het kanton Wittem/Gulpen* (Hilversum 2017) 44.

28 Jan Postma, *Alexander Gogel (1765–1821): grondlegger van de Nederlandse staat* (Hilversum 2017) 32–39.

experiments in 1787, and the French Revolution, nearly all Batavian revolutionaries demanded a true unitary state.29 However, there was continual disagreement about the degree of participation of citizens and about how the state should be centralized. Paradoxically, the very democratic ideals that had mobilized the revolutionaries formed an obstacle for political reform.30

The optimism of the Dutch revolutionaries was tempered when the question of the future of the Batavian was raised. The French demanded compensation for their efforts: the Batavian Republic lost part of its territory in the South, it had to pay a sum of 100 million guilders to France, and maintain a French force. Mutual irritations soon caused dissatisfaction from both sides. Batavians wanted a friendly and commercial alliance, but were faced with a military alliance. They were offended by the French fnancial and military requirements which they saw as an attack on their autonomy. The French treated their revolutionary brothers with a high degree of prejudice and had little regard for the political sensitivities within the Batavian Republic. They often let their own interests prevail. However, the Batavians were also opportunistic, turning French interventions to their own advantage.31

In the years following France's expansion, the Hanseatic city-states benefted from their neutral status. Trade fourished. Especially Hamburg became an economic and fnancial center, at the expense of notably Amsterdam. But citizens realized that neutrality, without being backed by military power, was fragile. That Bremen was briefy occupied by Hanoverian and English troops demonstrated this, as did the growing Prussian ambitions in Northern Germany. That the cities were formally part of the anti-French Holy Roman Empire did not help either. On 11 May 1795, representatives from Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck convened in the frst *Hansetag* (Hanseatic Conference) since 1669. The aim was to ensure Hanseatic neutrality, by emphasizing its positive effect for all European states, as a platform for free trade and prosperity. The

29 Stephan Klein, 'De sprong naar '95. Van patriots naar Bataafs republikanisme', *De Achttiende Eeuw* 28 (1996) 39–46.

30 See also Thomas Poell, The democratic paradox. Dutch revolutionary struggles over democratisation and centralisation (1780–1813) (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam 2007). https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/22668

31Annie Jourdan, 'Le rôle des agents français dans la constitution batave de 1798', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 351 (2008) 99–119. https://doi.org/10.4000/ ahrf.11367

cooperation forced by common dangers was accompanied by a program of regional identity formation.32

On 18 *fructidor* year V (5 September 1797) in France republicans seized power with the help of the army to counter the growing power of royalists. This coup, which showed the extent to which the army was becoming a decisive factor, prompted Dutch sympathizers to seek secret contact with the French. Supported by French troops, Batavians from the camp of the radical unitarians staged a coup d'état on 22 January 1798. The French ambassador Charles Delacroix had planned the coup together with mainly Amsterdam radicals. Moderate political opponents were imprisoned. Following an undemocratic referendum, a radical constitution was accepted that turned the Batavian Republic in a 'one and indivisible' unitary nation-state. Although the radical democratic government realized the ideals of a unitary state and civic liberties, at the same time it alienated a large part of the people from politics. In June 1798 the government was purged of radicals, and moderates regained power, yet the revolutionary constitution, and its accomplishments, were kept.33

# The First Consul and Europe

General Bonaparte, after his Italian and Egyptian campaigns, came to power on 18 *brumaire* year VIII (9 November 1799). In the preceding year, Bonaparte became convinced he was the one who could regenerate the French Republic. Like many French citizens he was disillusioned with the Directory, given the defeats in the War of the Second Coalition, problems with conscription, and economic issues; to name but a few diffculties that severely hindered the effectiveness of the Directory. Politicians from different factions longed to revise the constitution but were in disagreement on how exactly to go about this. Together with Director Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, who strived for a stronger executive without destroying the Republic, Napoleon Bonaparte had planned the *coup d'état*. Much has been written on 18 *brumaire*, for instance, on the role played by brother Lucien Bonaparte, the newly elected president of the Council of Five Hundred, who arranged the council's 'consent' that was needed to legitimize the *coup*. The coup showed that the military leader possessed

32Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 204–210.

33Martijn van der Burg, *Nederland onder Franse invloed. Culturele overdracht en staatsvorming in de napoleontische tijd, 1799–1813* (Amsterdam 2009) 44–45.

political talents and was capable of appeasing different groups within society while pursuing his own program.34

The new French constitution of the year VIII, 25 December 1799, foresaw a supposedly democratic government. But Bonaparte was able to curtail democratic institutions, not least because he was supported by an antiparty, technocratic elite; a group which would form a rich source of Napoleonic state representatives.35 From the coup of *brumaire* on, legislation was made primarily in the newly created *Conseil d'État*, whose members were selected by Bonaparte. The *Conseil d'État* also nominated all high offcials, such as prefects. The constitution introduced tricameralism; three legislative or parliamentary chambers were created: the *Sénat conservateur*, the *Corps législatif* and the *Tribunat*. Members of the highest and most important chamber, the Senate, were appointed for life by Bonaparte. Senators were mostly moderate veterans of the Revolution. They had at their disposal the procedure of *sénatus-consultum*, or *sénatus-consulte* which allowed the loyal Senate to approve constitutional changes proposed by the First Consul and thus bypass the already weak Legislative body and the Tribunate.36 Importantly, the instrument of the *sénatusconsulte* would be used frequently during the process of empire-building, specifcally a *sénatus-consulte organique* which amended the constitution.

Via a plebiscite held on 7 February 1800 the French citizens entitled to vote offcially accepted the new constitution, although the government tampered with the fgures. Together with Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès and Charles-François Lebrun, Napoleon became Consul of the French Republic. As First Consul, Napoleon effectively ruled alone. Cambacérès and Lebrun had a purely consultative role. Cambacérès advised Bonaparte on legal matters, Lebrun on fnancial matters. In these two domains, the First Consul could use the assistance of experienced public servants.37

Napoleon inherited the ideological warfare policy of the Directory. Under the Directory, the idea of liberating Europe from feudal despots

34Annie Jourdan, *L'empire de Napoléon* (Paris 2000) 45–51; D. G. Wright, *Napoleon and Europe* (Harlow 1984) 16–18.

35Lynn Hunt, David Lansky, and Paul Hanson, 'The failure of the liberal republic in France, 1795–1799: The road to brumaire', *The Journal of Modern History* 51 (1979) 758–759. https://doi.org/10.1086/241988

36Geoffrey Ellis, *The Napoleonic empire* (2nd ed.; Basingstoke 2003) 24–25.

37 Isser Woloch, *Napoleon and his collaborators: The making of a dictatorship* (New York 2001) 122–123.

had changed into the wish to extend France to its presumed natural borders. In his days as general, Napoleon had been an ardent supporter of expansionist measures. As First Consul, his ambitions grew larger and increasingly ignored long-accepted frontiers.38 The notion of the Rhine as a natural border of France was not new. Long before the French Revolution, the idea existed that France could make historical claims on the (alleged) homeland of the Gauls, situated between the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine, from 1792 onward was brought to the forefront again.39 The year 1799 saw the consolidation of French rule in annexed territories, like a protective layer shielding Old France. Plus, the First Consul took over from the Directory a seasoned army, an effcient system of conscription and an organized *corps diplomatique*. All this enabled him to develop his European offensive politics, disguised as defensive (protecting the Republic from foreign threats).40

The First Consul faced little opposition from within the government. Napoleon's Minister of the Exterior Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand (who had been appointed under the Directory, in 1797) was comfortable with the First Consul directing foreign policy. He was primarily interested in commercial and fnancial aspects. For instance, it was not him but Joseph Bonaparte who had a large role in the peace negotiations of 1800–1802. Nevertheless, during the incorporation of northern Italy, Talleyrand did object to the continuing expansion of the Empire. France had to perfect its system of governance before imposing it on Europe; better yet, France needed allies, not more territory, he argued.41

In the Netherlands, revolutionary politicians from different parties, at frst welcomed 18 *brumaire*. Some saw it as a return to the original liberal ideals of the Revolution, and assumed the former general, as a head of state, would pursue lasting peace. However, the First Consul primarily assessed the Dutch sister republic on its fnancial and military potential. Within a few weeks, Bonaparte demanded a fnancial contribution from the Sister Republic; in return, he would stimulate Dutch commerce. The First Consul was in great need of funds. In the end, the deal failed and

38 Jourdan, *L'empire de Napoléon*, 113–114.

41Emmanuel de Waresquiel, 'Talleyrand, une vision européenne', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 134–135.

39 Smets, 'Le Rhin', 676.

40 Jacques-Olivier Boudon, 'L'Europe en 1800', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 80–81.

Napoleon would never forget the 'arrogance' of the 'wealthy' Dutch.42 During his entire reign, Napoleon, taking no notice of the miserable state of the Dutch economy, assumed that the Dutch were almost literally sitting on millions of guilders but refused to fulfll their fnancial duties. This misassumption dated back to the early French Revolution.43

Napoleon's rise to power also had its effects on Northwest Germany. The Hanseatic city-states struggled with their neutrality in 1799. The question of neutrality was considered of great importance for the future well-being of the urban communities. Politicians were greatly aware that neutrality, in practice, was only possible if the French and the British were convinced that their neutrality program served their own interests as well. The Hanseatic city-states were stuck between British and French demands and tried to offend neither party. For the time being, France was willing to respect their neutrality, as long as it was benefcial in (economic) warfare.44

In July 1800 a confict started between the United Kingdom and neutral Denmark. The British demanded the right to search Danish vessels in open seas. Persuaded by 19 British warships in the Sound the Danish had to agree, whereupon Napoleon considered them to be unable to remain neutral. Napoleon urged Denmark to join forces with other neutral countries.45 Russian Tsar Paul I, seeing an opportunity to enlarge his sphere of infuence, encouraged the Danish and Swedish governments to discuss matters, and also Prussia was invited to join Russia. Problematic was that the three smaller countries involved were traditional rivals and had serious conficts of interest. Thus, on 16 and 18 December 1800, the three countries signed bilateral Neutrality Conventions with Russia, establishing the League of Armed Neutrality intended to resist British interference.46 The British, not amused, planned a preemptive naval attack on Copenhagen.

42François Crouzet, 'Aspects fnanciers de la relation franco-batave', in: A. Jourdan and J. Leerssen ed., *Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française* (Amsterdam 1996) 56; Annie Jourdan, 'La république batave et le 18 brumaire: la grande illusion', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* (1999) 763–764. https://doi.org/10.4000/ ahrf.301

43Annie Jourdan, 'Les Gaulois en Batavie: des relations diplomatiques machiavéliques', in: A. Jourdan and J. Leerssen ed., *Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française* (Amsterdam 1996) 102.

44Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 214.

45Eric Lerdrup-Bourgois, 'Napoléon et le Nord. Le Danemark-Norvège et la Suède', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 343–346.

46Ole Feldbæk, 'The foreign policy of Tsar Paul I, 1800–1801: An interpretation', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 30 (1982) 21–26.

British military superiority and the decease of Tsar Paul on 23 March 1801 made the league fall apart.

In their confict with the British, between 29 March and 5 April 1801 Danish troops occupied Hamburg, Lübeck, and Travemünde and confscated some British goods in the warehouses. However, after some weeks Prussia demanded the Danish withdraw, while the Prussians themselves intensifed their presence in Northern Germany.47 Although brief, the Danish intervention ignited the public debate on the sustainability of neutrality. Several internal tensions came to the surface, which were linked to the question of whether or not to openly choose a side in the European wars.48

In the Netherlands, unease grew with the hostile tone of Napoleon. When the Batavians repeatedly proved unable to meet his demands, the First Consul decided to intervene. An orchestrated coup in September 1801 met with little resistance. Both French and Dutch hoped in particular that a new constitution would be sustainable and thereby guarantee peace. Napoleon rejected the idea of simply copying the French Constitution; to stress the autonomy of the Batavian Republic, the constitutional change had to be presented as genuinely Dutch, and aimed at political reconciliation. As in France, legislative power transitioned from the members of the Legislative Body to the executive, the collegial *Staatsbewind*—or 'Regency of State', consisting of 12 directors. This collegial government was in line with administrative tradition. The state was renamed 'Batavian Commonwealth', to give it a somewhat less revolutionary ring. Early modern symbols and institutions reappeared; for instance, the pre-revolutionary borders of the provinces were restored. Old elites also re-emerged. When former Stadholder William V gave up his claims to the Netherlands for a fnancial or territorial compensation, the way was paved for appeasement between moderate revolutionary and Orangists. Despite appearances, '1801' was not a radical break from the revolution. Although democratic institutions were largely abandoned, the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality were still praised by Dutch politicians. Moreover, the central government succeeded in frming its grip on local and provincial administrations.49

47Ole Feldbæk, *The battle of Copenhagen 1801: Nelson and the Danes* (Barnsley 2002) 230. 48Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 220–221.

49L. de Gou ed., *De Staatsregeling van 1801: bronnen voor de totstandkoming* ('s-Gravenhage 1995) XX–XXVI.; Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg, 'The Dutch case: The

The idea of introducing a single head of state, in contradiction to Dutch tradition, was seen as unwanted. French ambassador Charles-Louis Huguet de Sémonville noticed the Batavians' aversion to a strong executive power. Governance in the Netherlands was not to be too 'French', Talleyrand and the First Consul stressed.50 Napoleon certainly remained keen to entice the Batavians to cooperate, as oppose to the use of force. He welcomed the new Batavian Ambassador Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck with great pomp and circumstance, as did the Cambacérès and Lebrun; the latter would a few years later become a key player in the integration of the Netherlands into the Napoleonic Empire.51

# The Reorganization of Germany North of the Rhine

Concerning the German lands, Bonaparte's approach was unconventional, certainly compared to the more prudent Talleyrand. Disregarding traditions, he developed many geopolitical redesigns in rapid succession following his victories on German soil. Of great importance was the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss*, passed by the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire (*Reichstag*) on 25 February 1803, which was ratifed a month later by Francis II, the last Holy Roman Emperor. This decision of the Diet, made under pressure from France and Russia, was a direct consequence of the French annexing of the Rhineland. Prussia and Austria had accepted the loss of these German lands but insisted that the princes who had been deprived of their lands would be compensated elsewhere in the Holy Roman Empire via the secularization of ecclesial possessions. During his Consulship, Napoleon actively intervened in the rearrangement of Germany prior to the Imperial Recess. Instead of merely secularizing German land, all ecclesiastical principalities were disbanded and Germany was 'mediatized'. Mediatization meant that almost all German states lost their 'imperial immediacy' (*Reichsunmittelbarkeit*). Prior to 1803, many free imperial cities and states had been placed under the immediate authority of the Holy Roman Emperor, without interference of

51Edwina Hagen, *President van Nederland: Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, 1761–1825* (Amsterdam 2012) 171, 182.

Kingdom of Holland and the imperial departments', in: M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerá ed., *The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture* (Basingstoke 2012) 100–111. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271396\_10

50 Jourdan, 'Les Gaulois en Batavie: des relations diplomatiques machiavéliques', 107; L. de Gou ed., *De Staatsregeling van 1801*, XX–XXIII.

local princes. Given the political weakness of the Emperor, these states were virtually autonomous. The *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* ended this traditional, feudal, mode of imperial governance, which for decades had been a thorn in the eyes of enlightened critics. Another goal was to draw borders more logically and create less dispersed states. For the time being, only the Hanseatic towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck remained independent city-states, in addition to Augsburg, Frankfurt am Main and Nuremberg.52

Without a doubt, Prussia benefted from the restructuring. It received the northern parts of the former Duchy of Kleve (the parts on the left bank of the Rhine had been incorporated into France). In Northwest Germany the largest ecclesiastical state was the Prince-Bishopric of Münster. The *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* secularized the region and divided it between the Duchy of Oldenburg (ruled by an uncle of the Tsar) and Prussia. Hanover was occupied by French forces. Two signifcant new principalities were established in the Northwest: the Duchy of Arenberg-Meppen was created, to compensate the Dukes of Arenberg who lost all Rhenish possessions to the French, which was also the case with the principality of Salm, ruled by the House of the same name. The Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück was awarded to Hanover. Therefore, the British king also benefted, even though he had not lost any possessions on the left bank of the Rhine whatsoever. More to the South-east, Prince William Frederick of Orange, the son of the former Stadholder, received the former ecclesiastical principality of Fulda and some (even smaller) possessions, as a territorial compensation for the losses of the House of Orange due to the Batavian Revolution and the enlargement of France. Much to the disappointment of William Frederick, who had become an admirer of Bonaparte, his family would not receive fnancial compensation, nor was he awarded a more substantial principality.53

At frst, mediatization did not seem all that harmful to the Hanseatic cities since their constitutional status remained virtually unchanged. However, they failed to get their neutral status recognized internationally. In May 1803, war broke out again between Great Britain and France. Hanover was occupied by French forces in June 1803, a clear violation of the North German demarcation line. Commander Jean-Baptiste

52Michel Kerautret, 'Les Allemagnes napoléoniennes', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 325–328.

53 Jeroen Koch, *Koning Willem I, 1772–1843* (Amsterdam 2013) 125–135.

Bernadotte, future king of Sweden, was appointed Governor of Hanover. Prussia would briefy gain Hanover as a reward for not siding with the Russians and Austrians during renewed hostilities.54 The French violated the neutrality of the Hanseatic cities, by seizing the district of Ritzebüttel, upon which Britain blockaded the Elbe, Weser, and Eider. This proved disastrous for the economy. Nevertheless, collectively the Hanseatic citystates continued to display their neutrality and peacefulness, hoping to stay out of harm's way.55

# Blueprints for Napoleonic Governance in Europe

French revolutionary expansionism was an expression of interconnected ideas on nation, universal rights and the state, but revolutionary warfare in Europe also blurred the lines between 'liberation' and 'conquest'. The enlargement of France showed the diffculties of imposing rules and practices on hitherto foreign populations. The extent to which France had to impose itself was not determined. In the long term, Revolutionary France's expansion showed multiple ways in which *pays conquis* could be incorporated and integrated. Which policies were effective and which were counterproductive depended on local circumstances, but also on its implementation by various French actors. Thus, in an improvised manner, various types of governance blueprints were gradually conceived.

Europe was no *tabula rasa*. Well before Napoleonic interference, Dutch and Germans pondered how to improve state and society. Lack of consensus, or lack of means, had long obstructed durable changes. However, both for the Netherlands and for the Hanseatic city-states can be said that many foundations for later reforms were laid before the French intervened. The actions of Dutch Patriots, the open public sphere and discussion culture in Hamburg, and the willingness of local governments to learn, made that (urban) governance was certainly not 'archaic'. Differences were that the disputes in the Netherlands were more explicitly political in nature and more closely related to French developments. And, evidently, the question of centralization was much less prominent in Northwest Germany.

54Wright, *Napoleon and Europe*, 48.

55Aaslestad, *Place and politics*, 222–224.

Meanwhile in France, Napoleon Bonaparte won people over to his cause and managed to secure the instruments for increased state-building. During the Consulate, he had assured Austrians and Prussians France would not to intervene in German affairs, in return for recognition of French rule on the left bank of the Rhine. And as long as neutral Prussia kept behind its side of the North German demarcation line, Napoleon allowed Prussian territorial expansion in the East. Also, Napoleon's interventions in the Netherlands initially took place mainly in the background. For the time being, the First Consul seemed satisfed with indirectly infuencing other states by increasing the French sphere of infuence. The historic *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss*, and successive *coup d'états* in the Batavian Republic, restructured governance North of the Rhine suffciently, to his taste. Actual incorporation of Northern and Central Europe was not yet in France's interest. But progressively, supposedly natural borders in Europe became less relevant, which made the status of the Netherlands and Northwest Germany far from certain. Concurrently, the military was assigned a more pronounced role in the territorial ambitions of Napoleonic France.

In Belgium and the Rhineland, the French learned that foreign supporters were not ready to immediately accept all their beliefs. Given the drastic French measures, initially not too many locals were willing to collaborate. It had also become clear that hesitations could lead to delays. Winning the trust of the political elite was a pre-requisite, but also the general population could pose a threat, as became apparent when in both areas popular uprisings took place. In the frst decade of the nineteenthcentury, new institutions would rather successfully be introduced, and a new generation would grow accustomed to them. On their turn, 'Belgian' and 'Rhenish' Frenchmen would later be sent to the Netherlands and Northwest Germany to promote integration. But frst, the North had to be conquered and incorporated. The manner in which Dutch and Northwest German autonomy was lost, and its consequences for the subsequent implementation of Napoleonic governance, will be explored in the next chapter.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# Conquest and Incorporation: *Pays Conquis* or *Pays Réunies*?

**Abstract** This chapter investigates how the (nominally) independent states in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany were slowly but surely seized by French troops, and subsequently incorporated by imperial decree. The conquest and incorporation of the northern lands brought about radical political changes, as well as dilemmas. How were new territories to be ftted in: as dependencies taken by force (*pays conquis*), or as new departments on equal footing (*pays réunies*)? And to which extent did 'on equal footing' mean eradicating regional diversity within the Empire? Whether uniform structures were imposed too promptly, or not, was contested. The Emperor sent confdants northbound, to investigate existing conditions. Vice versa, Northerners visited Paris, to exert infuence on the status of their projected departments. For Dutch and German dignitaries it was of the utmost importance to acknowledge Napoleon's *droit de conquête*, while lobbying for an integration form that did justice to local circumstances. Eventually, both areas were given a full status within the Empire, taking into account national peculiarities to a certain extent, but only as long as that did not harm the interests of Old France.

**Keywords** Right of war • Conquest • Incorporation • Imperialism

© The Author(s) 2021 45 M. van der Burg, *Napoleonic Governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany*, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66658-3\_3

# Between Coercion and Cooperation

Although Napoleon, during his fnal years exiled on Saint Helena, stressed the civic gains of his rule, such as his legal heritage, most Europeans vividly remembered the intrusion of military aspects in dayto-day life as a defning feature of the Napoleonic state. Enlargement of Empire was not seldom preceded by warfare, with disastrous effects for the local populations. However, the transition to 'modern' governance in Europe (equating 'modernization' with 'Francization') would have been more diffcult without preparatory work by the military. Signifcantly, military offcials increasingly received governing tasks, which blurred the lines between civil and military aspects of Napoleonic governance.1 The conquest and incorporation of present-day Belgium and the German Rhineland had shown the French how foreign territories could be integrated into their state. Whereas the French Directory was led by the belief that Greater France had clear natural limits (in the north, the river Rhine), during the Consulate, after a brief period of consolidation, the French again looked beyond their borders. As Napoleon's might grew, so did his desire for interventions in Dutch and Northwest German matters.

Transitions from one government to another, driven notably by international political considerations, coupled with the growing prominence of the Napoleonic system of governance. Its gradual introduction conficted with local conditions. Age-old governing practices and the legitimacy of administrative traditions were challenged by the French. The establishment of the Empire in 1804 intensifed this process, eventually leading to the construction of the Kingdom of Holland and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. A general wish for a stable, albeit less 'democratic', organization of state and society facilitated (coerced) acceptance of the Napoleonic system of governance. Cooperation appeared to be the most productive way of satisfying different actors' needs under the given circumstances. For pragmatic reasons, attempts were made to render the French model applicable to Europe, which did not mean that extant ways of governing were easily put aside. This chapter shows how the Netherlands

1Alan Forrest, 'La guerre, les perceptions et la construction de l'Europe', in: F. Antoine et al. ed., *L'Empire napoléonien. Une expérience européenne?* (Paris 2014) 84–96.

and Northwest Germany lost the remainders of their independence, focusing on ideas about the status that the new areas should be given within the Empire.

# Emperors and Kings

On 18 May 1804 the French Empire was proclaimed via *sénatus-consulte*. Bonaparte, thanks to his charisma and successful propaganda, was seen by many as a guarantee of law and order. Two years earlier he had been proclaimed Consul for life. Signifcantly, Article 55 of the 1802 Constitution had already stipulated that Napoleon, when circumstances required, could place departments 'outside' the Constitution, which could be used to treat incorporated departments in a different manner. Proposals and support of the legislative chambers gave an air of legality to the gradual transition from republic to Empire. During the enlargement of Revolutionary France, the term 'empire' had come into use to designate French hegemony. Also, General Bonaparte became presented as *imperator*, a title awarded by the Romans to victorious generals. With Napoleon's installation as Emperor, a new political constellation was created which combined revolutionary achievements with concepts from the *ancien régime*. 2

The new imperial constitution did not bring much change to the executive, apart from a (theoretical) strengthening of the control of the Senate.3 However, one truly new feature of the new constitution would later affect the way in which Napoleon shaped his Empire, namely the introduction of the *grandes dignités de l'Empire*, the Grand Dignitaries, many of whom would later play a role in the enlargement of the Empire. Theses honorifc titles where bestowed on important men in the close circle of Napoleon, such as his brothers (in-law). They received some (representative) tasks, notably *archichancelier* Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès, who replaced Napoleon in offcial meetings was in the absence of the Emperor.4 Former Third Consul Charles-François Lebrun was appointed *architrésorier*.

2Annie Jourdan, 'Le Premier Empire: un nouveau pacte social', *Cités* (2004) 51–64. https://doi.org/10.3917/cite.020.0051

3Aurélien Lignereux, *L'Empire des Français: 1799–1815* (Paris 2012) 86.

4Nicole Gotteri, *Grands Dignitaires, Ministres et Grands Offciers du Premier Empire. Autographes et notices biographiques* (Paris 1990) 10.

In 1805 the French government asked the Batavian ambassador in Paris, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, to draft a new constitution and become *Raadpensionaris* (Grand Pensionary) of the Batavian Commonwealth. 'President' Schimmelpenninck's reign left little room for popular sovereignty, but it was a guarantee for the Batavian autonomy, which was still the most important consideration. Moreover, Napoleon did not support a direct copy of the French constitution either in 1801 or in 1805. He was convinced, on the one hand, that the Dutch national identity was too different from the French, and on the other hand, that he had an interest in letting the European powers continue to regard the Batavian Republic as an independent state.5 Schimmelpenninck appointed both moderate and radical revolutionaries to prominent positions, among them Alexander Gogel as Minister of Finances. One of his achievements was the introduction of new fscal legislation, drawn up by Gogel, which entailed economic reforms in the spirit of the revolution. A notable success was the creation of a new system of primary education, based upon progressive pedagogical ideas. Both reforms would be long-lasting.6

Soon after, being dissatisfed with Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, Napoleon decided the Batavians had to 'invite' his brother Louis to become king. The foundation of the Kingdom of Holland was fraught with diffculties: a centuries-old republic, with a strong tradition of decentralized institutions, had to be transformed into a hereditary monarchy. During the negotiations in Paris between the Batavians diplomats and Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the Dutch had already argued that monarchy was incompatible with Dutch national identity. Louis Bonaparte was certainly no enthusiast of republicanism, and convinced that monarchy was a superior form of government. Louis stressed that the Dutch had to be persuaded to accept monarchism. He believed his government could unify the Dutch nation.7 Given the poor circumstances, Louis Bonaparte's

5Martijn van der Burg, *Nederland onder Franse invloed. Culturele overdracht en staatsvorming in de napoleontische tijd, 1799–1813* (Amsterdam 2009). Cf. https://hdl.handle. net/11245/1.272472

6Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg, 'The Dutch case: The Kingdom of Holland and the imperial departments', in: M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerá ed., *The Napoleonic Empire and the new European political culture* (Basingstoke 2012) 100–111. https://doi. org/10.1057/9781137271396\_10

7Martijn van der Burg, 'Transforming the Dutch Republic into the Kingdom of Holland: The Netherlands between republicanism and monarchy (1795–1815)', *European Review of History* 17 (2010) 164–165. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507481003660811

reign was rather effective. By authoritarian means, he implemented and consolidated many reforms which dated from the revolutionary era, such as national cultural institutions. Also, he initiated new reforms, such as the codifcation of civil law, and introduced French institutions, and uniformity in subnational administration. Often, French examples and Dutch tradition were aligned.8 Against all odds, Louis' monarchy functioned, albeit not in the way the Emperor wished.

Simultaneously, Napoleon was initiating considerable transformations in Germany. In theory, most German lands still formed part of the Holy Roman Empire, but in actual fact, the age-old Empire was a hollow shell. Anticipating the dissolution of Germany, the Habsburg Emperor Francis II had created the Austrian Empire out of his Central European lands in 1804. Napoleon had further rendered the Holy Roman Empire irrelevant by creating the Confederation of the Rhine, consisting of 16 sovereign German states, of which he became the 'Protector'. Within two years, the Confederation doubled in member states.9 Emperor Francis II abdicated on 6 August 1806, which signifed the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire.

Between 1795 and 1805 Prussia had remained a neutral power. In return, Napoleon supported Prussian territorial growth in the East. However, internal power struggles, and growing problems with other states, led to escalation. Moreover, it became clear during peacenegotiations that Napoleon was willing to return Hannover to the British crown, even though Prussia had annexed Hannover. On 26 September 1806, Frederick William III presented Napoleon with an ultimatum: French troops should leave German lands north of the Rhine immediately. But within three weeks, on 14 October, the inferior Prussian armies were defeated at Jena and Auerstedt (by Marshal Davout, the later Governor in Hamburg). People in Northwest Germany realized that now France could do as it pleased. The following year, Prussia was forced to sign the

8Martijn van der Burg, 'Cultural and legal transfer in Napoleonic Europe: Codifcation of Dutch civil law as a cross-national process', *Comparative Legal History* 3 (2015) 85–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041727

9Michel Kerautret, 'Les Allemagnes napoléoniennes', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 330–331.; Bernhard Struck and Claire Gantet, *Revolution, Krieg und Verfechtung, 1789–1815* (Darmstadt 2008) 103.

humiliating Peace of Tilsit; all territories in Northwest Germany came into French hands.10

On 21 November 1806, exactly one year after the destruction of the French-Spanish feet at Trafalgar, which had made Great Britain the dominant naval power, Napoleon implemented the *Blocus continental* (Continental System). The Continental System is essential for a proper understanding of Napoleon's European politics. In essence, this trade embargo against Britain was a form of commercial warfare. Napoleon legitimized the Blocus by his interpretation of the *droit de guerre*, or *droit de conquête*. 11 Although Napoleon often considered himself to be above the law, or at least was able to interpret legislation as he pleased,12 he did give weight to law during wartime, the *jus in bello*, and incriminated the British. His dominance on land was legitimized by (his conception of) the law of war. French troops respected the *jus in bello*, he claimed. In contrast, Great Britain was supreme on sea and therefore, in his view, did not adhere to the law of nations, as maritime dominance violated the freedom of the seas.13

Thus, Napoleon gave a new meaning to commercial warfare. Gradually, the Continental System was forced upon many peoples that did not belong to the Empire or states ruled by the Bonaparte family. Secondly, the Continental System had a distinctly offensive character. Eventually, all ships having stopped over in British ports, as well as their cargo, were confscated, regardless of their nationality, as the Emperor considered them to be 'denationalized'.14 Apart from that, the Continental System can also be seen as an attempt to create a common European market of which the Empire could beneft. By boycotting British imports, Napoleon believed France could become the main economic center in Europe. But he probably overestimated the fragility of the British economy.15

10 Jeroen Koch, *Koning Willem I, 1772–1843* (Amsterdam 2013) 165–168; Struck and Gantet, *Revolution, Krieg und Verfechtung*, 103–104.

11 Silvia Marzagalli, 'Le Blocus continental pouvait-il réussir?', in: T. Lentz ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris 2005) 103–105.

12Donald R. Kelley, 'What pleases the prince: Justinian, Napoleon and the lawyers', *History of Political Thought* 23 (2002) 288–302.

13Bruno Colson, *Napoleon on war* (Oxford 2015) 28, 38.

14 Silvia Marzagalli, 'Napoléon, l'Europe et le blocus continental. Application et réactions à partir de l'étude de trois villes portuaires: Bordeaux, Hambourg et Livourne', in:

J.-C. Martin ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe. Colloque de la Roche-sur-Yon* (Rennes 2002) 71–90.

15Martijn van der Burg, 'Napoleonic wars', in: K. Hendrickson ed., *The encyclopedia of the industrial revolution in world history* 3 (New York 2015) 657–659.

With the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the question arose of what to do with the former free imperial cities. Legally, they had become sovereign states, but the new French Empire was to take over the constitutional void.16 Hoping to preserve their independence, the Hanseatic towns joined forces and formed the Hanseatic federation. However, soon after, French troops took control of Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg.17 In the South of Germany, the free imperial cities were awarded to Napoleon's allies: Augsburg and Nuremberg to the new Kingdom of Bavaria; Frankfurt am Main to the Principality of Aschaffenburg. Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck however, received the status of *pays réservé*, a territory of which the future status was still undecided. Merging the towns and their surroundings into a single North German member state of the German Confederation was highly probable.18

Concurrently, Napoleon decreed a territorial restructuring of newly conquered Prussian lands between Rhine and Elbe. In the interim, the territories were reshuffed into fve temporary administrative units, headed by a *gouverneur* or *gouverneur général*—as Napoleon tended to designate the Governors. Like the Hanseatic cities, the lands became *pays réservés*. The Governors, all generals, administrated from the towns of Braunschweig, Erfurt, Minden, Münster, and Fulda (taken from Dutch Prince William Frederick who had sided with his Prussian family members). Each was aided by an *intendant* who oversaw fnancial matters. Next to the *pays réservés* established on 23 October 1806, there were many more, some very short-lived, *pays réservés* in this period.19 Subsequently, as part of the creation of a new European state system, the Grand Duchy of Berg and the Kingdom of Westphalia were established. Both were mergers of the above-mentioned former bishoprics, Prussian territories or other minor (ecclesiastical) states.

16Barbara Dölemeyer, 'Frans recht in Noord-Duitsland. De inlijving van de noordwestelijke gebieden van Duitsland bij het Franse keizerrijk', in: A. Berkvens, J. Hallebeek and A. Sirks ed., *Het Franse Nederland: de inlijving 1810–1813. De juridische en bestuurlijke gevolgen van de 'Réunion' met Frankrijk* (Hilversum 2012) 35, 41.

17Katherine Aaslestad, 'Lost neutrality and economic warfare. Napoleonic warfare in Northern Europe, 1795–1815', in: R. Chickering and S. Förster ed., *War in an age of revolution, 1775–1815* (Cambridge 2010) 379–380.

18 Swantje Naumann and Helmut Stubbe da Luz, *Die französischen Besatzer in Hamburg. Zeugnisse zu den Jahren 1811–1814* (Hamburg 2013) 31.