in the recovery process. The HDCC identified the lack of access to capital early on in the post-tsunami business recovery process. Concrete action was taken, i.e. plans for a credit guarantee fund was pursued for a period of five years (pers. comment, HDCC staff). The plans were coordinated with the Norwegian Embassy as the donor, a process that was finally approved after extensive modifications. Unfortunately, the program failed to launch due to undisclosed legal complications. Nonetheless, this shows that HDCC's strategy appears to be consistent with our findings in terms of the identified need for guarantors of loans for capital investment in the business community. Businesspersons who had seen their properties, homes and inventories decimated were sometimes refused loans due to lack of collateral for which to secure the loan upon. This led to the question of loan guarantees, which the HDCC had identified as a priority issue, but had not been able to solve. A third issue was the detachment of the business community from the political/governance system. As a consequence, a new trade association had been formed in competition with the HDCC.

# Trade-associations and NGOs response

In total, six out of 17 Tsunami affected small-scale business owners were critical of the NGOs response in the relief and recovery process. Some said that some NGOs came in and "threw money at people." This made the situation on the ground even worse as it caused inflation for a period. However, four respondents acknowledged having received a house from an NGO. Dissatisfaction with the NGO response is also perceptible in the existing literature:

*"There was a large influx of local and international NGOs to conduct recovery operations who were in competition with each other and worked under pressure to achieve fast results in an uncoordinated manner resulting in a disjointed recovery effort"*

(Boano, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009; cited in Mannakkara . & Wilkinson . 2013, p. 114).

One NGO has, however, distinguished itself by the quality of assistance provided to victims of the Tsunami. Tzu Chi Foundation was positively described by several respondents that appreciated the effectiveness and the appropriateness of their interventions. Their modus operandi was that they first interviewed the victims and identified their needs before responding accordingly. In 2005, they began building and a village of 649 homes, 100% free of charge, finishing in 2008 with full occupancy. The village includes a community centre, a school, a medical centre and a vocational clinic.

#### Strength of the business community

The study revealed that only six out of the total 21 respondents considered the business community cohesion in Hambantota to be stronger now than it was prior to the Tsunami. This study cannot give any clear indication that the reasons for this were related to the Tsunami. However, 11 people said they are currently suffering from the negative economic consequences due to the seaside development project (including the closure of the old main road), which demolished their businesses. In addition, six people responded that the current, large, scale construction schemes are poorly coordinated, with negative consequences for local businesses.

After analysing the data, a concern has been raised that some of the intended meaning behind the question: "Do you consider the local business community to be stronger now than prior to the 2004 Tsunami?" got lost in translation. The reason behind this suspicion is that many of the respondents seemed to be unified in their critique of both the aid received after the Tsunami, as well as the aforementioned development projects. There were also eight people who had positive feedback about HDCC's "Back to Business Workshop", which also focused on building stronger networks within the local business community.

#### Conclusion

This conclusion will answer the research questions identified at the outset of this report, by reflecting on the main findings and analysis.

First, the failure of the government to address the local business community's needs and ignoring them in the recovery, planning process was the factor given the highest attention throughout the report. It has been argued that these findings, which are supported by secondary literature, have had a negative impact on the recovery of the business community.

Secondly, the report suggests that the financial infrastructure was inadequate to meet the needs of the business community, especially in the first years of the post-tsunami recovery process. Still, it is not completely deficient; several respondents show how banks supported the business recovery process with personal guarantees, low interest rates and longer repayment plans. Yet, without the central element of loan guarantees to provide for those who had lost their security, the analysis shows that these efforts were insufficient, short-term solutions.

Third, the NGO and civil society responses have been varied. Generally, with some exceptions, the NGOs involved in the recovery process had largely failed to coordinate their activities, and as the report has demonstrated, this has negatively affected the business recovery. However, the NGO's role remained vital throughout the recovery process. Hence, the broad criticism of NGOs is not fully justified, due to misinterpreted responsibilities and low capacity. NGOs were under pressure to act quickly, but most did not invest in bottom up business recovery work in a longterm perspective. This could have strengthened the self-sustaining abilities of the Hambantota business sector.

In sum, these three factors, which represent the main challenges that the business community have experienced, lead to the conclusion that the business community has not fully recovered ten years after the Tsunami. But, here it must be added that many businesses have been negatively impacted by the huge government initiated development projects which have constrained the local business sector without creating the positive effects promised. Not only were many businesses damaged during the Tsunami, but also many have sustained new impacts after the Tsunami from e.g. closing the main road to make the area available for the new harbour construction, and tearing down the shops and businesses on the seaside of the town to clear the area for an amusement park and a volley ball ground. The factors that crippled business recovery efforts have continued to retard both short term and long-term business recovery and development.

## References

# Appendix: A Case study of a Hambantota businessman ten years after the Tsunami

# *Case study: Textile business owner*

The subject case is a member of HDCC and engaged in small textile trading. He is 44 years old and started his business before the Tsunami. He is living in the city cent, behind a Hambantota mosque, with his parents and three children in the home. He is the only breadwinner in the family, and his business enterprises are vulnerable.

He was at his home when the Tsunami waves hit Hambantota city. Fortunately, he did not have any casualties in his home, but his business was totally knocked out by the Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004. The Tsunami affected his existing customers, suppliers and nothing remained of his inventory. A well-off businessperson was suddenly without customers, money, location, stock or suppliers. He could not reopen his business immediately because institutions were primarily assisting people with clothes. Now, after ten years he says: "*I couldn't recover my business from my Tsunami losses*".

He was affected not only by the Tsunami, but two other government mega projects in the last ten years, which seems to be the major factors influencing his business recovery. Loss of customers due to the demolition of his location was a significant loss in 2007 because of the seaport construction under the Greater Hambantota development project. However, he stated that business communities were told to believe that new jobs and better location would be provided by these projects. He did not have enough money to import the same products, so with a personal loan he imported used products from the USA and other countries. He was surviving with his reduced business, but due to the seaport project, he was again forced to move to a new location. He then moved to a popular marketplace near the ocean with his small inventory. But, once again, this area was demolished due to the beach volleyball park project. He was promised a place to relocate, but it was never delivered. His shop is now a small table in his home. He is a dislocated businessperson now because he did not get support from any organization to recover after the Tsunami.

Money was the primary challenge during the recovery process, as he did not get any financial support from any institution. He said that HDCC essentially represented only the larger businesspersons in town, but he appreciated the emotional healing and inspiring role of HDCC through their "back to business" program. However, he says there were many businesspersons suffering from lack of collaterals, guarantees, or reinvestment funds. These businesspersons are the potential entrepreneurs of the business community of Hambantota, but they have the same list of challenges that he has, which could be making the community weaker than it was before. But he said the business community is stronger than before due to a new trade association and high registrations in the HDCC. He said he had applied for a loan at the HDCC, but was not eligible for the loan because he was too old. Today, he is not able to feed his family with the textile business, so he began installing electrical lamps in his village of Kirinda11 under a reduced payment scheme.

He is aware of Tsunami risks now, and prefers to hold an insurance. Speaking from his present site of employment in the village of Kirinda, he had some interesting observations regarding future risk reduction activities. He did, for instance, point out that there are certain questionable issues connected to the new Tsunami siren that has been installed at the new school, such as, for instance, language and ignorance. Regarding language, police issue warnings in Singhalese after the siren, but there are many families in the community who do not understand Sinhalese as Malay and Tamil is very common in Kirinda. Regarding ignorance, on several occasions people ignore the test alarm, believing that as it is only a test they do not respond to it at all. These conditions make it a less effective mechanism for disaster risk reduction in the community.

11 Kirinda is situated about 25 km from Hambantota town and is a part of Tissamaharama municipality.

# Part III

Lessons learnt and what's next

# Chapter 9

# Comparing Findings

How do findings from the Ten Years After study compare with the international and national evaluations of the disaster response and recovery process after the Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOT) 2004?

*Arne Olav Øyhus*

# Evaluation of the IOT relief and recovery assistance: The general level

In the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami a lot of international reports were written covering various aspects of the relief and recovery activities conducted by national and international agencies (Birkmann et al., 2006; Fritz Institute, 2005; UNOCHA, 2014; Telford et al., 2006).

Several reports were critical about both the governments and the agencies' post-tsunami recovery activities. One often mentioned critique in these reports was that recovery poses a particular problem for agencies normally working with relief, among which a huge number were attracted to the scene of the Tsunami. As Telford et al. (2006) notice, whereas the goals of relief are usually more direct, explicit and measurable, intending to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during, and in the aftermath of disasters, recovery concerns post-disaster development activities with a broader perspective, and with a more vague goal of restoring a population to at least its pre-disaster situation.

Among the international reports, perhaps the most authoritative and influential, are the various reports coming from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), comprising five thematic reports, and one synthesis report (Telford et al., 2006)12 reflecting the most important findings from the thematic reports.

The synthesis report (Telford et al., 2006), was written 11 months after the Tsunami. It raised and discussed a series of items and issues regarding the relief work during the emergency period, and the following period of recovery activities. Although revealing a great number of failures, weaknesses and shortcomings, we have to recall that the complexity and scale of constraints that the local people, national authorities and international agencies and organisations had to face were enormous. One serious weakness that has been pinpointed on several occasions was the lack of disaster management capacity and competence both among national authorities and local communities before the on-set of the event. Of particular importance was the complete lack of early warning systems: "Unlike the tsunami warning system in the Pacific, set up after a tsunami killed 159 people in Hawaii in 1946, no tsunami warning system had been installed in the Indian Ocean" (Telford et al., 2006, p. 40). It took more than an hour and-a-half after the earthquake happened before the shores of Sri Lanka were hit, more than enough time for a warning message to reach the threatened areas, but nothing happened (Telford et al., 2006, p. 41).

For the international agencies involved in the relief and recovery process, a large number of activities and efforts were needed: taking care of the victims, construction of shelters, risk reduction and livelihood recovery work. Under the prevailing circumstances, such activities were necessarily both slow and complex, and frequently involving factors outside the organisations' control. In addition, many agencies had neither the technical, social nor cultural competence needed. What, therefore, appeared on the ground was a fragmented approach comprising a great variety of international agencies with various structures, competences, ideologies and approaches. This limited the effectiveness of the recovery activities (Telford et al., 2006, p. 17).

Despite these limitations, an enormous amount of aid supplied the impacted communities with resources to rebuild their societies, structures and institutions. Within some months, there were clear signs of recovery in many areas. Children were back in school and health facilities were back in service. Economically, it could be observed that in Sri Lanka, more than 80 percent of damaged fish markets,

12 The TEC synthesis report was prepared by J. Telford, J. Cosgrave and R. Houghton (2006), with the title: *Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report,* Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), London. The synthesis report is based on five thematic reports: (1) TEC Funding Response Report (2006); (2) TEC LRRD Report (Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response) (2006); (3) TEC Capacities Report (2006); (4) TEC Coordination Report; (5) TEC Needs Report. TEC is a multi-agency initiative in the humanitarian sector established in 2005.

boats and fishing equipment were rapidly restored, and over 70 percent of affected households report that they have regained a steady income (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, ref. in Telford et al., 2006).

A very important fact emerging from the post-disaster evaluation reports is that the disaster response directly following the event was mostly conducted by the local people in the affected communities themselves. Almost all immediate life-saving actions and emergency support in the first couple of days after the disaster was provided by local people: "In Sri Lanka and Thailand, life-saving and immediate relief during the first two days was led almost entirely by the general public from adjacent areas (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, ref. in Telford et al., 2006). Few, if any of the international agencies, managed to save significant numbers of lives. As an example; in the Aceh province, Indonesia, it took one week before the first international relief operation was received (Telford et al 2006, p. 55). At that stage the acute situation was over, diseased people buried, wounded under treatment, and under ad-hoc shelters. A lesson learnt was that the role of local response and host families is often both under-valued and overlooked. The quality of the international response was most effective when enabling, facilitating and supporting local actors.

A typical feature during the relief phase was the pressure among international agencies to spend money both quickly and visibly. This was, however, not effective regarding the best utilization of local and national capacities. Few international agencies lived up to their own standards with regard to the respect for and support to local and national ownership: "Local ownership…was undermined and some local capacities were rendered more vulnerable" (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, ref. in Telford et al., 2006). The post-tsunami situation was characterised by the fact that activities, knowledge, and capacities of locals and nationals were largely marginalised by a flood of international agencies (as well as hundreds of private individuals and organisations) controlling enormous amounts of resources. It was an uncontrolled growth of international agencies involved in relief activities. "Well-resourced agencies and very small ones, competent and incompetent, well prepared and unprepared, secular and faith-based, reputable and disreputable, household names and unknown, ambitious and humble, opportunistic and committed, governmental and non-governmental, national and international, bilateral and multilateral, well-established and just-formed – they all turned up" (Telford et al., 2006, p. 55).

The TEC LRRD Report (2006, p. 10) notes: 'A tragic combination of arrogance and ignorance has characterised how much of the aid community…misled people .' (p83); Some…interventions may actually undermine future development [.] For instance, lack of information to local community's about reconstruction plans greatly limited their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects' (ref. in Telford et al., 2006).

A lot of assistance was 'supply-driven', and not in accordance with local needs and demands, for instance inappropriate housing designs and livelihoods solutions. Some groups and categories were discriminated and neglected, for instance women, fishermen, small farmers and small entrepreneurs. The consequences were greater inequalities, gender- and conflict-insensitive programming, cultural offence and waste. Quite often local authorities, local communities and local organisations were brushed aside. Local competent staff were sidelined, while poorly trained international staff with no, or little, local competence were given power and authority. It was a 'misrecognition' of local capacities resulting in inefficient implementation of project activities, 'poaching' of staff from national and local entities, and limited participation of the affected-population. (Telford et al., 2006). Local people frequently complained that NGOs dealt only with village officials and that poorer people were marginalised. At best, the international response restored the status quo before the tsunami; at worst, it strengthened those who were better off and/or more articulate.

According to the TEC Report 2006, the 2004 Tsunami disaster response was the most rapidly and generously funded disaster response in history. An amount of more than US\$13 billion was pledged or donated internationally for emergency relief and reconstruction; including more than US\$5.5 billion from the general public in developed countries. This funding was too much to handle properly and cautiously for the international aid system. One effect was that new and inexperienced NGOs were attracted to the scene of the disaster, a scene where they had no, or limited, competence (Telford et al., 2006). Governments and international agencies from several countries failed to ensure that their activities and funding were based on local needs. The result was imbalances, assistance not driven by local demands, and also supporting NGOs based in a donor's own country, regardless of whether they had any competence or not. "Poor 'end-user' traceability and inadequate monitoring were evident among official donor responses" (Telford et al., 2006).

#### Evaluation of the IOT relief and recovery assistance: Sri Lanka

Several post-disaster studies conducted in Sri Lanka report that it was a general satisfaction among Tsunami affected communities for the assistance received during the initial, relief stages of the Tsunami response. It seems, however, that the satisfaction with the relief phase changed during the recovery phase. This was possibly a consequence of people's expectations that now moved away from the allocation of relief-items to longer-term recovery opportunities. After only some few months, it became clear that moving away from relief operations to a broader and more encompassing reconstruction process was not that simple, bringing forth a complex set of non-anticipated challenges. Many reports from the recovery process indicate that there was a growing frustration among people with the speed and direction of efforts, but also lack of local participation. In a dissertation written four years after the Tsunami, Kamal Hoshi Kapadia argues that the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts in Sri Lanka have failed as it has not reduced economic vulnerability and poverty, that coastal poverty is on the rise, and that the Tsunami affected people are still largely worse off, economic wise, than before the Tsunami (Kapadia, 2008:20). It has also been argued that aid was used mainly on the rich. Naomi Klein (2007) argued that the Tsunami gave big business the opportunity to take over the Sri Lankan coastline.

Most of the critique in Sri Lanka has not primarily been directed against the international assistance. For example, a claim-holder survey conducted in Sri Lanka indicated that affected communities felt that their local leaders had failed them in ensuring equity and inclusion (Telford et al., 2006). The Fritz Institute found that "85% of the affected families surveyed ranked international NGOs highest in terms of quality, maintenance of dignity, and fairness in distribution of aid" (Fritz Institute, 2005: 7).

The main target of the criticism was the government of Sri Lanka. Possibly, the most important piece of criticism, especially from international quarters, was the lack of an early warning system. Information of the impeding catastrophe was actually available, but could not be utilized due to lack of a system for analysing and distributing the warning messages. Athurkorala and Resosudarmo (2005) write that already at 7.05 hrs in the morning of the disaster, seven minutes after the earthquake erupted, a tremor was felt by the Director of the National Geological Survey and Mine Bureau (GSMB). A seismological station transmitted the data one minute later, but the GSMB did not have the capability of analysing the data. At around 10.00 hrs, GSMB received the necessary analysis of the data from the University of California and the US Geological Survey (USGS), but by then it was too late. Governmental failures did also characterise the later recovery activities. A household study performed in Ampara and Hambantota by Duyne Barenstein (Barenstein, 2013), states that post-tsunami recovery activities increased inequalities both between people and regions. An important issue in this context was connected to the government's resettlement programme. Originally, the government decided that no new reconstruction would be allowed within a 100-200 metre buffer zone from the coast in order to reduce the vulnerability of the coastal communities for future disasters. Very little consideration was given to the people depending on the beach and the coast for their livelihood. Due, however, to practical difficulties, finding the right amount of land, but also due to the negative sentiments among local people, the government reduced the buffer zone to 55-100 metres from the sea. There are many NGOs and civil organisations that have questioned the real motive for the government to enforce this policy, as they saw that the consequence of this policy was that while poor, coastal communities had to leave the very valuable beaches, the luxury hotels were allowed to remain (Barenstein, 2013). According to this author, "Sri Lanka's reconstruction policy was characterized by continuous amendments and lack of transparency" (Barenstein, 2013: 220). Lack of institutional continuity, clarity and accountability was utilized by political leaders and powerful persons to forward their own interests. They forced, for instance, local administrators to include on the list of people needing assistance persons who were neither poor nor residents of the area. "We also learned that, in several settlements, members of parliament had forced agencies to give at least 20% of the houses to their supporters" (Bernstein, 2013: 220).

The problem with a plethora of humanitarian agencies, a great portion of them lacking both local knowledge and experience, and operating more or less on their own, was also an important constraint for Sri Lankan recovery process. The government allowed an enormous amount of humanitarian agencies to take on huge reconstruction projects, but there was little or no mechanism for coordinating the activities between the agencies, or between the agencies and their own activities. "Thus a mismatch between the GO and the NGO actors emerged" (Ahmed and Charlesworth, 2015: 432). Many of the NGOs, both national and international, were – due to their lack of experience – rather powerless against political interference. While some of them adapted to the claims from the political actors, others withdrew from Sri Lanka before completing their projects.

#### Evaluation of the IOT relief and recovery assistance: The Local Level

To properly and adequately assist disaster-affected communities, it is of fundamental importance to understand the affected communities' structures and institutions, and also the local people's knowledge, their cultural and religious beliefs. The Ten Years After (TYA) study gives us some important facts in this regards, for instance that the fishermen in Hambantota, who are mainly Muslims, strongly believed that the Tsunami, and everything that takes place on earth, is an act of Allah. We see similar aspects among the Buddhist population who referred to Karma when explaining why the misfortune of the disaster affected some more than others. Some months after the disaster, I did an interview survey in some villages close to the southern town of Matara, about 50 km west of Hambantota. One of the interviewees was a man whose family was very much hurt by the disaster. He told in detail how the waves came upon them, how they tried to flee, and when the wave caught them how he tried to hold on to his youngest daughter's arm while trying to climb up on a roof. Eventually he lost his grip and had to see that she was caught by the waves and washed away. When I asked him why he thought that exactly this daughter had this destiny while his other children survived, he answered with one word: Karma. During this survey, and the Ten Years After study, this explanation was repeatedly given, underlining that from a local perspective, cultural and religious factors are crucial for explaining both the causes behind disasters, but also who will suffer. This understanding must be in place in the planning and management of future disaster and risk reduction activities.

#### Lessons learnt from the case studies

### Hambantota Fishermen

But there are other important lessons that have been learned as well. The fishermen had, both before and after the Tsunami, a general lack of trust towards government authorities. This attitude had in many ways been strengthened by what took place during and in the direct aftermath of the disaster. One example is when the fishermen were asked to fill in forms to report their losses. Many of them did not so because they were not sure how this information would be used.

Seen from the fishermen's perspective, the relationship between the aid agencies and the local fishing communities was characterised by lack of communication and local participation, the agencies' lack of competence and use of corruptive practises, resulting in a situation where the assistance rendered to the fishing community was quite often misplaced, for instance by distributing the wrong types of boats and equipment. In addition to the aid delivery being disorganised, it was also distributed unequally and unfairly. The fishermen sincerely believed that aid was primarily given to certain persons in high positions, relatives to the people in charge of the distribution, and so on. They were also very displeased with the relocation of their new post-tsunami homes as this process did not take their livelihood situation into consideration, and also made everything much more difficult and expensive for them.

When interpreting the views and perspectives of the fishermen, we must understand their position in the society. Sri Lanka is still in many respects a cast society, and the fishermen cast belongs to the lowest levels in the cast hierarchy. Still, some fishermen can be rather well off economically. In Tangalle, for instance, there are rich fishermen owning ocean-going trawlers. But the great majority of fishermen in Hambantota town are small and rather poor fishermen, living mainly from a hand to mouth basis. In addition, these fishermen are mainly Muslim with a Malay or Moor origin. Hence, both religious and ethnic wise, they belong to a small and marginal minority, comprising between 2-3 per cent of the population in Hambantota District although comprising a much larger segment of Hambantota town, percentage wise. As they feel discriminated against by government authorities, they also look upon these authorities with suspicion. Concretely, they believe that they are over-ruled by government authorities regarding the price on fish, which they think are set all too low on purpose in order to supply urban people with cheap food.

Very much in correspondence with the TEC Report (2006), the fishermen claimed that emergency activities were planned and organised over their heads, as there was no participation of local people in planning and implementing recovery activities. In many ways, we must admit that this was a two-sided concern: there was a lack of initiative to involve local fishermen to participate in emergency activities, but it was also a lack of interest among the fishermen to involve themselves in communal emergency activities, or activities beyond their local families and neighbourhoods. Applying the concepts of bonds and bridges (Nayaran, 1999; Newman and Dale, 2005) for the fishing community in Hambantota town, the bonds – for instance family ties – were very important both in the emergency and recovery phase, whereas the bridges were shaky and narrow.

#### The village of Kirinda

The situation was quite different in Kirinda where the local people, the majority being Muslims, organised themselves and established a communal coordination committee to be a part of the emergency work. Perhaps the fact that the Muslims are a majority population in Kirinda can be an explanatory factor for this communal engagement, but also the "class" system could have had an impact in Kirinda. Kirinda is basically a fishing village, but the fishing fleet consist of many bigger boats; boats that are rare among the Hambantota fishermen. This leaves the impression that the people in Kirinda, are living at a higher socio-economic level.

Kirinda represents a very interesting case regarding the emergency phase after the Tsunami as a coordination committee was quickly established. Why exactly this happened here is not known, but it seems that there were a couple of civic "entrepreneurs" who took the initiative, among them the schoolmaster at the time. By forming this committee, they managed to have a say in the emergency and recovery work. We may say that they managed to utilize bonds comprising local institutions and networks to create a fund of social capital used in the construction of bridges to external agencies. Here, we must admit that it is not easy to define where bonds end and bridges begin, for instance regarding the ties to their neighbours in the town of Tissamaharama. Kirinda got a lot of support in the first instance after the Tsunami from individuals and groups from Tissamaharama (most often called Tissa), laying some kilometres into the interior – and spared from the waves. This assistance was not in any respect connected to religious favouritism, as the people of Tissa are mainly Buddhist. The people from Tissa and other surrounding areas did a great job, bringing food and water, organising rescue operations both at sea and on land, comforting people in deep grief, etc.

The fact that the people of Kirinda managed to establish a local coordination and consequently participated in the emergency and recovery activities, does not imply that they felt that they were in control of the situation The general opinion we could detect among local people was that when the outside organisations and agencies entered the scene, they themselves were more or less brushed away. During the relief operations, the committee was, to a certain extent, listened to, and it was also participating in the relief distribution. But later, especially when the government authorities were in position, and the NGOs and INGOs really launched their operations in full, the committee become more and more marginalised. According to the local people's perception, many negative things then started to happen, for instance that many representatives from the local, public authorities did their best to exploit the situation for their own advantage. They distributed relief, money, boats and equipment, and houses unequally and unfairly. The local people's trust in the government came to an absolute low.

The NGOs fared much better: at least most of them did. Even though the NGOs, in general, did a good job, they also committed many failures, most of them because they communicated rather poorly with the local people, did not respect the local culture, and because they were rather reluctant to open for local participation. Due to this, the NGOs started projects and activities that were not adjusted to local material and immaterial conditions, and which, in the long run, could be counter-productive to a sustainable development process. A vital concern for the community was that the various NGOs treated people differently, e.g. various NGOs did various things for various people. If you were so lucky enough to be in the "colony" of a well-functioning and prosperous NGO, you could get a very nice house and many other valuable items. But then it was *visa versa* for people belonging to poor and ill-functioning NGOs. This implied that people in this community, a community that to a certain extent could be characterised as homogenous and harmonious before the disaster, were treated unequally and unfairly. Families who were not very much affected by the disaster, and thus did not "deserve" a lot, got plenty, whereas families who had lost almost everything, and therefore deserved a lot, got almost nothing. Here, we must add that we should not exaggerate the aspect of homogeneity and harmony in the disaster affected communities, neither before nor after the disaster. All of these communities were heterogeneous regarding power, wealth, gender, age, religion, family relationships etc. before the disaster struck, and also ten years after. Even if we saw that individuals and families were fighting for their own interest, this did not, however, exclude the communal sentiment, and a sense of justice and fairness. The social capital created to a large extent by the network of bonds, did absolutely not serve everybody equally, but still played an invaluable role in the local setting, both directly after the disaster, and ten years after.

Kirinda, due both to internal motivation and hard work and a strong influx of external assistance, has today been completely rehabilitated, even at a substantially higher standard regarding such issues as education, health, housing and infrastructure facilities. Some even call the Tsunami "a golden wave". But perhaps this golden wave can be a blessing in disguise, because what one can be a bit more uncertain about is the invisible structures and conditions. We know for sure that many people are struggling with mental issues after the Tsunami. Many fishermen are afraid to go out for fishing when the sea is rough, even if they now have bigger and better boats. Several people mention that their mental condition has not been healed. This we can rather easily understand. Despite this negative aspect, I believe that the most significant feature of the Kirinda recovery process is the role of the bonds. It was the networks and relationships between neighbours, friends and families that came to the rescue on December 26th 2004, proving their strength and effectiveness. A central question we have to ask is if these bonds are as strong today, or have the incidents and events that took place in the relief, recovery and rehabilitation phases after the Tsunami weakened these life-saving networks and relationships. The short answer is, we do not know, and quite possibly, only a gigantic disaster in the future can give an answer to that question.

#### Tangalle tourist industry

The town of Tangalle, the most important beach tourist destination in Hambantota District, was damaged enormously by the Tsunami. Hundreds of people died, several hundred were injured, and many thousands were left homeless. Not only was the big fishing harbour destroyed – with big trawlers found several hundred metres inland, but also the whole town centre was destroyed, as was also the case with almost the entire tourist industry.

Quite interestingly, the hotel industry has proved to be highly resilient. The process of rebuilding the tourist industry was a task that most of the hotel and restaurant owners managed to complete within two to three years. But it was not before the end of the civil war in 2009 that the hotel industry was in full swing, with a much higher level of guests than ever before. As with the general, material situation in Kirinda, the tourist industry in Tangalle came back with an improved standard compared with the conditions before the Tsunami. Hotels were modernised and expanded, and built with higher quality materials. In most ways, this is a success story. But here there are also lessons to be learnt. Perhaps the most interesting lesson is that according to the majority of hoteliers, the most important obstacle in the recovery and rehabilitation process has been the government with its rules and regulations. The government made laws that were impossible to follow if you wanted to continue your business, for instance the 100-200 meter buffer zone law. According to this, you were not allowed to build the new hotel at the same site as before, as previously there had been only a 30-metre buffer zone regulation, i.e. the hotel buildings had to be a minimum of 30 metres from the seashore at tide. With the 100-200 metre buffer zone, the hotels were to be built on land that the hoteliers did not own, and where there was no infrastructure, for instance there were no roads. Obviously, the hoteliers could not abide by this regulation, but tried to build as far from the shore as possible, but within the limits of their property. This meant that some built almost at the same site as before, while some pulled back to about 60 metres if their property extended that far. In doing this, they have been threatened by the government, who have said that their hotels would be demolished. This has not yet happened.

Also, it was a general complaint that the government has not contributed with infrastructure; mainly roads, from the main road and out to the hotels at the beach. In addition, the government did nothing to train people so that they would be suitable for employment at the hotels, and it was impossible to get a license to sell alcohol to tourists, which of course was a necessity if you wanted to survive. This meant that beer and wine had to be served in secret. Several hoteliers said that the only way to acquire a license for selling alcohol was through bribery.

Then again, the hoteliers felt positively about the role played by both national and international NGOs, both. Not only were the NGOs important agencies in the general recovery and rehabilitation process for Tangalle as a town; they also carried out an important job for the hotel owners, for instance by contributing with both grants and loans. Since they also made use of the few hotels that were not destroyed to stay in during their recovery operations, it meant that they brought some important income as guests as well. Quite interestingly, the people most negative to the NGOs, arguing that they were corrupt and used money for their own benefit, were not hotel owners, but workers. Perhaps this attitude was connected to the fact that they personally received few benefits from the NGOs.

#### Hambantota business community

The business community in Hambantota town had, understandably, many of the same grievances as the hotel owners in Tangalle as they were generally in the same situation. They were almost unanimous in their criticism of the government. Not only were they denied loans to rebuild their businesses after the Tsunami, the government also promoted a lot of efforts and projects after the Tsunami that ran against the interest of the business community. Very importantly, here was the 2009 closure of the New Tangalle Road, the main road through Hambantota where a lot of businesses were situated. The closure of the road was done in order to enable the construction of the huge seaport, a project none of the business people saw as of value to for their own businesses. Then later, after they had moved away from the closed New Tangalle Road and established themselves along the seaside of Hambantota town, they again had to hastily evacuate, as all buildings at this site were to be demolished to open the area for an amusement park and a volleyball pitch. For both these incidents, the business people were promised compensation, and new premises to open their businesses, but none of this ever materialised. The business people felt that small businesses were of nil value to the government, even if they gave employment to many people.

The business community felt that they had received very little support from the government during and after the disaster. They were, however, as were the business people in Tangalle, much more satisfied with the assistance they had received from NGOs, including the local Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC), which in many ways acted as a representative for the business community in the whole district. Besides giving both financial and practical assistance on their own, HDCC often operated as a mediator between national and international NGOs and the local business community. There were, of course, also business people that were not entirely satisfied with the role played by either the NGOs or HDCC perhaps because they felt that the assistance they received did not live up to expectations. Some were also sceptical about HDCC's "neutral" role in distributing relief and loans. This was most probably the main reason why a new business association was established in competition with HDCC.

## Summary of findings

The ten years recovery process has in most instances been a success. The communities are basically back on their feet, most of them at an even higher material level than before the disaster. New roads, new schools, new hospitals have been erected in many communities. But there are individuals and groups who are still struggling, for instance business people. While we can see that the hoteliers in Tangalle, in general, have managed to re-establish their businesses, many even at a higher level than before, many business people in Hambantota are still struggling. But here we can not only refer to the post-tsunami recovery process. Whereas many Hambantota business people have been negatively affected by the government's huge infrastructure projects, the Tangalle tourist sector experienced a substantial boom after the end of the civil war in 2009. Also, the Hambantota fishing community is not that happy with their present situation, feeling that they are in a more difficult position than before. But again, this is not only connected to the recovery process. The government's price policy, combined with lesser catches and high fuel prices, have made their living conditions more vulnerable.

The Ten Years After study reveals that the general perception among local people in Hambantota district is that the government was the weak partner in the recovery process, some were also of the opinion that the government's activities were counter-productive. The study ca not state clearly if this perception is mainly directed towards policies and activities of the national government in Colombo, or the district or municipality councils, or if it is a consequence of some government officers and servicemen that did a poor job. It could also be that the expectations were too high. We did, however, discern a common feeling of mistrust towards government authorities, both at the national and the local level. Very often, we heard in conversation with local people that the government was plagued by corrupt practices, practices that you can also frequently read about in the national newspapers. It was a general sentiment that during the recovery process, people working in the government apparatus were utilizing their position to take substantial portions of the incoming aid for their own benefit. And, obviously, knowing about all the privileges accrued by the members of the parliament and in government offices, you can easily understand people's feelings. Future governments have to make some extraordinary achievements if they want to overcome what we could call the "public-private" divide, and create synergies between themselves and civil societies for a more sustainable development of the country.

The Hambantota people, in general, recognised the positive role played by civil organisations, mainly those we call NGOs (or INGOs). Some of them did a very good job, for instance the Tzu Chi Foundation from Taiwan, while many others were recognized as giving aid and assistance that really benefitted the communities. However, there were some that should never had been allowed to take part in the recovery process due to their lack of local knowledge, competence and skills, interest, motivation and funds. The main criticism raised against the NGOs was that there were quite often (more often than not) a lack of communication with local people or institutions both in the emergency and the recovery phases after the Tsunami. This had two main negative effects. Firstly, many projects were misplaced, poorly planned, or did not take into consideration local cultural, religious, social or environmental concerns. Therefore, they were not as time and cost effective as they could have been. Secondly, aid and assistance distributed was sometimes unjust, unfair and unequal. Houses, boats and other goods were often distributed to people who did not "deserve" it since they were not that much affected by the event, while others that really "deserved" it were given little. With limited communication, there was also a limited local participation. Even the *ad hoc* coordination committee established by the local people themselves in Kirinda, and which played a certain role in the relief phase, was gradually put aside when the bigger recovery projects were planned and implemented.

# The role of faith

In a summary of findings from this study, it is not possible to avoid the issue of faith. During the discussions with the victims of the disaster, it soon become clear that faith was not only important, faith was fundamental. It seemed that faith could rationalize, explain, and even give meaning to the seemingly meaningless. Two of the groups we studied were mainly Muslim (the Kirinda village and the fishing community in Hambantota) and mainly Buddhist (the Tangalle tourist sector, and the Hambantota business community). Although religion and faith were not major ingredients in our study, their importance always shone through. Among the Hambantota fishermen, this was very explicit, as – according to their perception – the Tsunami was an act of Allah. The role of faith does not only have an impact on how people interpret events, such as disasters, it also explain why they take place, and what can be done to avoid them, or actually, why disasters are unavoidable. Allah uses disasters to inform people about his will and his powers, and if Allah wants to cast a disaster over us, there is nothing we can do to escape it. The only protection we may try to build is to be faithful and

follow his commands, but even that is not a guarantee against unlucky events. Even faithful, strong believers can be exposed to disasters, if Allah wants it so.

When raising the issue of faith with Buddhists, the situation was somewhat the same, but also somewhat different. Buddhists do not have a God. Lord Buddha is a teacher, a messenger, a purified human being. His teachings can allow us to live according to the highest principles. We should not be so occupied with earthly activities, but try to live a full, ethical life. We have to look into ourselves, and try our level best to avoid thoughts and activities that can negatively impact on ourselves, or others. Here, Karma is important. Karma is basically connected to morality; it explains that the inequality between people has a moral causation. When something good happens to a person, it has a moral foundation, the same if something evil happens. In this sense, Buddhism is very individualistic or personalised. Nothing happens to a person, good or bad, which that person does not deserve. The cause for this happening can be more or less invisible, and is not only confined to how the person has lived his present life, but also how he has lived his former lives. Karma is the accumulated result of actions in past and present lives. In this way, it is we, each and any of us, who are responsible for our own destiny, our own happiness or sorrows. We can create our own heaven, but also our own hell.

In the same way as with the belief in the act of Allah, the belief in Karma gives to Buddhist a perfectly rational explanation of the "destiny" of the people affected by the Tsunami: why some died, some survived, some were injured, and some were completely unharmed. According to our interpretation of the responses from the Tsunami affected people, people's faith makes it is easier to tackle life after a disaster, as what happens to you or your dearest is explainable. If this interpretation is correct, it will be essential to incorporate such beliefs in future disaster risk reduction programmes as they will have a bearing on how they should be planned and organised according to a community based approach. As Cannon (2008) argues, we must understand people's cultural and psychological factors to understand the insiders' perspective. Since a society's vulnerability to disasters, such as the Tsunami, is socially constructed, we must understand people's values and choices to see how vulnerability can be reduced. These values and choices will always, although to a higher or lesser degree, be faith based.

# Conclusion

Perhaps the most important lesson from the Ten Years After study regards the role and importance of local communities themselves, individuals, structures, networks and institutions, what we often denote as social capital. In the villages along the coast, from the moment when the first wave hit their shores, and for the first twoto three days later (for some communities even up to a week) the local people, struck by an event beyond any imagination, were more or less left on their own. Many people had been carried away far into the sea, others carried away to the hinterland, death, and dying people everywhere. All over, there were people screaming, people in deep shock, people running around and calling for their loved ones. It was a completely terrible situation, not possible to describe. But help was to come, and very fast. Local people less harmed started to carry people found in sea, dead or alive, into safety. They started comforting people in grief, carried the wounded to schools, temples, mosques and churches not destroyed by the waves. They brought what amount of food and water they had to the injured and cooked for them. Then, less than an hour later, people from adjacent communities started to appear, running to the zone of disaster as fast as their feet could bear them. They did whatever they could to help the hurt, injured and harmed.

The waves came cracking down on them an early Sunday morning. Two days later, except for enormous amounts of debris, mud, broken trees, and rubble, stones, glass and pieces of furniture from the broken houses, the scene was very much improved. Dead people had been buried, injured people had been brought to safe places, wounds had been treated to the best of their ability and the availability of medicines and other health care products, broken limbs had been preliminary mended. Individuals with dead family members were consoled.  When I, in my 2006 survey, visited a small village close to Matara, I asked a local person who had lost several family members: "what about the local government, what did they do?" He replied that an officer from the local government came on a motorbike, had a look around, and then left again. But what in actual fact could the local government do? The situation was so overwhelming, and their resources so few. This was only a small community, a village, in the midst of a great number of other small communities, and many bigger towns.

In the bigger towns, the situation was quite different. As the damages were so massive, the local people were not able to cope with the situation, but they did what they could do. Luckily, however, several groups of volunteers, individuals and organisations, local as well as non-local, came and started rescue operations within a couple of days. The towns had institutions that could be activated quickly, such as hospitals, fire squads and police forces, but also private companies and civic organisations could be engaged, and they were. According to my understanding, listening to people, reading books and seeing photographs and videos, the synergy between the local people and these organisations, i.e. the combination of bonds and bridges, was the success factor salvaging the situation in the Tsunami affected towns of Sri Lanka.

#### References

Ahmed, I., and E. Charlesworth (2015) Housing and Resilience: Case Studies from Sri Lanka. In Shaw, R. (ed.), *Recovery from the Indian Ocean Tsunami: A Ten-Year Journey*. Tokyo: Springer

Athukorala, P. and B. P. Resosudarmo (2005) 'The Indian Ocean Tsunami: Economic Impact, Disaster Management and Lessons'. *Asian Economic Papers*, 4(1), pp. 1–39

Barenstein, J.E.D. (2013) Post-Tsunami Relocation Outcomes in Sri Lanka: Communities' Perspectives in Ampara and Hambantota. In Barenstein, J.E.D. and E. Leeman (eds.), *Post-Disaster Reconstruction and Change: Communities' Perspectives.* London: CRC Press

http://www.urban-response.org/resource/5602 (accessed 6 October 2015)

UN-OCHA (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2014) Sri Lanka: Taking forward the lessons from the Tsunami. UN-OCHA: http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/sri-lanka-taking-forward-lessonstsunami (accessed 15 December 2015)

# Chapter 10

# The next chapter

Managing natural disasters and sustaining local development: The importance of building robust communities – a quest for human security

*Arne Olav Øyhus and Kim Øvland*

## Introduction

The Indian Ocean Tsunami came as a shock. Even Indonesia, where natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and volcano eruptions are regular features almost on a daily basis, was caught by surprise by the magnitude of this hazard. Both the human and socioeconomic costs of the disaster were so enormous that they were far beyond imagination. Even though the immediate effects were of a catastrophic nature, the damaged societies are today largely "materially" restored, but there are deep cutting psycho-social effects that most probably will never be resolved among the present population. The problem is that such disasters are bound to re-appear, but we do not know where and when. What we know is that the impacts of such disasters can be reduced.

As a point of departure, we must accept that about half of the present global population lives in areas that are exposed to natural disasters, and the number of people affected by natural disasters has increased year by year for the last 20 years. From 1994 to 2013, EM-DAT recorded 6.873 natural disasters worldwide causing 1.35 million deaths, an average of almost 68.000 deaths per year. In addition, 218 million people were affected by natural disasters on average per year during the same period. While the frequency of geophysical disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions and landslides) were almost constant in this period, there was a steady rise in climate-related events (mainly floods and storms), increasing the total number of natural disasters significantly. Since 2000, EM-DAT have recorded an average of 341 climate-related disasters per year, a 44% rise from the 1994-2000 average, and well over double the level in 1980–1989 (CRED, 2015).

It is generally accepted that natural disasters have an adverse effect on development gains, and that they are most damaging for poor and vulnerable communities (UN, 2004; WB, 2006). To reduce the impact from disasters, it is important to make the disaster-exposed communities more robust. This can be done by applying various mitigation measures aimed at local communities, and by an increased support for community based disaster management (CBDM) activities. Local communities can potentially be the main actors to manage both acute disasters and long term sustainable development. In many respect the Tsunami was a disaster completely beyond the imagination of both the Sri Lankan authorities and the public, but still simple precautions such as a functioning early warning system and communities prepared for disasters could have reduced the impact of the disaster profoundly, and saved many lives. Improved mitigation and preparedness systems would also have made the reconstruction process more effective. In this respect it is disappointing to read a UNDP report that while UNDP assisted the Disaster Management Center (DMC) to design and implement many activities, including early warnings systems and preparedness plans, 'little attempt has been made to maintain those activities' (UNDP, 2011: 6).

## The present global scenario

As indicated by Webster et al. (2009) the increasing interconnectedness of world economic and political systems and the effects of climate change on natural processes have made disasters more complex and destructive than ever before. In the Bali Action Plan, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have identified disaster risk reduction strategies as tools for adaptation and mitigation (UNFCCC, 2007), and these tools are meant to pay special attention to the poorest most vulnerable communities (UN/ISDR, 2007*c*). This means that investments in mitigation and preparedness efforts should be made so that they provide for the long-term welfare of poor communities (Somers and Svara, 2009:181). This is very much in accordance with UNDP's recommendations for DMC's DRR activities in Sri Lanka, arguing that disaster management should be linked to the development and promotion of local people's livelihood patterns that could empower disaster-prone communities to cope with natural hazards and help poor people to survive disasters. This item was, however, not adequately considered in the projects implemented between UNDP and DMC (UNDP, 2011, 48).

According to Webster et al., the intensity and frequency of disasters will increase, hence far more resources will be required to maintain even the existing levels of preparedness and response, which is only about 50–70% of what is actually appealed for (Webster, 2009:20). In addition to more resources, future disaster management needs to be more efficient, flexible, holistic and participatory. This means that both present and future high-risk countries and communities need to increase their coping capacity to put in place effective measures to reduce risk, such as early warning systems, community based disaster management activities and sensitive local development plans (BCPR/UNDP, 2009). This could be done in different ways, e.g. through multi-scalar, multi- -sectoral or multilateral processes, with crucial emphasis on local involvement and participation. In Sri Lanka, the government has now developed structures and policies along this line. In May 2005, they enacted the "Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 2005" establishing the foundation for a Disaster Risk Management (DRM) system in the country, simultaneously the Act establishes the National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) chaired by the president. They have established a Ministry of Disaster Management, a Disaster Management Centre (DMC) with the mandate to implement disaster management programmers in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action, and a National Disaster Management Coordination Committee (NDMCC). NDMCC is a multi-stakeholder committee comprising people from the government, parliament, universities, civil societies, etc., with the aim of mobilizing knowledge, skills and resources to strengthen disaster, risk reduction activities (NDMCC, n.d). NDMCC are pointing to climate change as the main cause behind possible future disaster risks, emphasizing the possibility for an increased frequency and intensity of climate related disasters, and sea level rise. In collaboration with the UNDP the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) in December 2005, published a comprehensive report called "Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: Road Map for Disaster Risk Management" only one year after the Tsunami. The Road Map incorporates seven thematic components that will support plans both in disaster risk management and development planning. Among the seven components we will mention the following three strategical areas; *Multi-hazard Early Warning System*; *Mitigation and Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) into Development Planning*; and *Community-based Disaster Risk Management* (DMC/UNDP, 2005: xiv). Quite interestingly, the Road Map argues: "Communities bear the primary impact of disasters, yet the first and continued response to disasters comes from community members. Well prepared and protected communities are the first line of defence against disasters and a key to reducing vulnerability and increasing disaster resilience" (DMC/UNDP, 2005: 47). Along similar way of thinking we find the following three propositions among ten from the UN's Special Envoy for the Tsunami Recovery, former president W.J. Clinton: *Proposition 1: Governments, donors and aid agencies must recognize that families and communities drive their own recovery*; *Proposition 2: Recovery must promote fairness and equity*; and *Proposition 3: Good recovery must leave the communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience* (Clinton, 2006).

# Community Based Disaster Management

The importance of local community involvement in disaster management activities

According to the Yokohama strategy (UNDP, 1994) preventive measures should involve local community participation in disaster risk reduction activities. In practice, however, CRED argues that the dominant approach has been to focus on the post-disaster phase. Little funding and policy priority have been given to issues such as community preparedness. This is true of both national government activities and policies, and the policies and practices of UN and other development institutions (Guha-Sapir et al., 2004).

National models of mitigation and preparedness have often been too topdown and technology driven to make much impact on local vulnerability reduction (IFRC, 2002), and central governments in developing countries often possess narrow power structures with limited concern for local issues. This was also very much the case in Sri Lanka. Silva (2009), for instance, claims that funds for the disaster-affected people were seriously mismanaged by political interference at various levels. Comparing the Muslim dominated Ampara along the eastern coast and the Sinhala dominated Hambantota on the southern coast, he argues that while Ampara suffered 24% of total homes damaged, they only received 14% of total pledges, whereas Hambantota, the home district of the then president, received almost five times the requirements, and that in one housing scheme more than 30% of the recipients were political nominees of the president not at all affected by the Tsunami (Silva, 2009: 70). Regarding Sri Lanka, Silva also supports the suggestion that disaster management has often been too top-down and technology driven, as it does not build on existing social processes, or "leave behind any viable entities that add to the resilience and coping mechanisms of the affected populations" (Silva, 2009: 71).

According to Somers and Svara (2009) there is also a chance that local government leaders will pay more attention to other issues when the prospects of a crisis seem remote, meaning the need for disaster management does not become obvious before a crisis occurs.

Presently, among agencies working with disaster management, priority is given to increased support for more community-based approaches to disaster management, supporting the suggestion to let community-driven projects and programs developed by NGOs be the main contributor of local disaster management initiatives. "Such an approach to risk management is not guaranteed to be comprehensive, but applies directly to identifiable needs and the empowerment of local populations" (Freeman et al, 2003: i). What is important when one talks about empowerment, or agency, is that the participation that takes place should focus not only on processes but also on content, meaning local communities should not only follow a process but also be enabled to shape the process. This will create a greater sense of ownership for the disaster management activities, which is important for a lasting impact and sustainability. Regarding the post-tsunami recovery process in Sri Lanka, UNDP (2011) forwards the same message regarding Sri Lanka, arguing that since communities are the lowest and most basic and effective entity for disaster management in any society, there are inherent strengths in these communities. They have local knowledge and networks (bonds), they are aware of locally available resources, material as well as spiritual. In other words, they can command the social capital that can be utilized to form the basis a functioning disaster management system. In a majority of disasters, the local communities proves their agency in the sense that they are utilizing their networks to respond, and they have the best knowledge of local risks and vulnerabilities, but also of available capacities and coping mechanisms. The local communities prove that they have the social capital necessary to enact agency, i.e. the possibility to engage actively in emergency activities (Newman and Dale, 2005). Regrettably, neither the social capital, nor the agency of the local communities and authorities, have been properly involved in the disaster management structures and systems of Sri Lanka (UNDP, 2011). The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), citing several influential organisations, e.g. the World Bank (2006), UN/ISDR (2007), and IFRC (2004) advocates for the view that decisions that can be made and actions conducted close to the individual- and community-level have more immediate and significant effects than do more distant ones. This implies that the appropriate management level for certain kinds of disaster management activities should be at the local level. Among the various actors at this level, we may find civic organisations such as fishing and farming associations, faith based organisations, women's groups, small business cooperatives, etc. These organisations possess local social-, demographic- and economic knowledge and can easily spread information, and thus they have the possibility to identify and share information regarding projects and activities that may increase or decrease hazard vulnerability. By utilizing both the bonding and bridging relationships existing among the civic organisations emergency and recovery activities can be both broader and better, and, hence, more efficient. Then you have local government institutions, and well-functioning local government institutions will have experiences related to local structural and management issues as well as an understanding of local conditions that can guide local vulnerability reduction efforts through policies and technical assistance. The last type of organisations we can mention that belong to this local context, is locally established and based disaster committees. Given the "bonds, i.e. their local ties, networks, and knowledge, local disaster committees represent an important form of social capital that can be utilized for implementing plans and activities described by national and international disaster organizations in a more context specific and appropriate way than organizations anchored at higher levels.

The Sri Lankan government do, at least rhetorically, adhere to such a local community approach. One of the "Primary Activities" of NDMCC is to "Initiate the Community Based/led Disaster Management" (CBDM) approach at the national level to strengthen community's decision-making processes and implement CBDM. Despite this promising attitude, we learnt from the Ten Years After case studies from Hambantota district that the local people were not very much acquainted with this government policy. This may reflect that it is a long way from theory to practice, or from politics to implementation.

According to Bristow (2004), heightened communication with first responders and communities at risk is one of the most important ways to minimize the effects of a disaster (cited in Kapucu, 2008: 247), and conducting this communication prior to a disaster is a key aspect of truly effective community preparedness and response (Tobin and Montz, 1997). The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), of which Sri Lanka is a member, emphasises the importance of CBDM as:

*(Torrente, E., Zhang, J. and T. Le-Huu , 2008: 9–10).*

Based on their post-tsunami experiences from Sri Lanka and Aceh, Kennedy et al. (2008) also discuss the necessity of community involvement in relief and reconstruction, emphasizing the importance of communication between the agencies and the local communities. For them, community involvement implies that communities inform and are informed about resources available for reconstruction options and the consequences of choosing each option. The basic principle of community involvement is to exchange information necessary for relief and reconstruction. They present a very important point of view when they argue that inadequate communication on issues such as resource availability and timeframes led the Tsunami affected people to have too high expectations of settlements and shelter, expectations that were not possible to meet, leading to frustration and tension among the victims (Kennedy et al., 2008).

The importance of disaster resilience for a robust community

If a community is to become more robust, one must map and acknowledge its risks and vulnerabilities and try to reduce them, and at the same time utilize and strengthen its capacities, i.e. its agency. This is not an easy task, but it is necessary in order to make the community more resilient. It is the relationship between a community's vulnerability and its coping capacity that establishes the community's ability to cope with stress, and sets its level of resilience, and – in the last instance – determines whether a hazard will turn into a disaster or not.

*Source: UN/ISDR, 2004a; Freeman et al., 2003.*

Resilience; a question of vulnerability

Westgate and O'Keefe (cited in Jeffery, 1982:38) were among the first to recognize the importance of vulnerability by defining disaster as "the interaction between extreme physical or natural phenomena and a vulnerable human group".

Vulnerability may be described as the conditions which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. These vulnerable conditions are determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors (UN/ISDR, 2004*a*). This makes vulnerability one of the key determinates of disaster (Alexander, 1997), one which is often correlated with underdevelopment and poverty (Blaikie et al., 1994). According to David Alexander, however, natural disasters are less salient problems for those really poor people than for people who are not so poor. The reason for this is that poor people have a higher *total vulnerability* given their "precariousness of life in general" (Alexander, 1997:292), and disasters will not fundamentally change poor people's situation, they merely magnify the existing social and economic trends (Kates, 1977), which again obviously undermines any existing development activities and makes it less sustainable.

The IFRC (2005) suggests that instead of focusing on needs and vulnerabilities, one should focus on building capacity and resilience, i.e. strengthen agency. This means putting emphasis on the strengths and capacities rather than the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a community (Twigg, 2007). No community can be totally safe from hazards, but its capacity to absorb stress and destructive forces, its capacity to maintain and manage community functions and structures, and its ability to 'bounce back' after a hazardous event, describes its level of resilience (Twigg, 2007:p.6). A disaster resilient community may be described as "the safest possible community that we have the knowledge to design and build in a natural hazard context" (Geis, 2000). In their discussion on 'building back better' in Sri Lanka (and Aceh), Kennedy et al. (2008) are very explicit on the importance of capacity building as they claim that the only way to address natural hazards is in the wider context of building sustainable communities. Many organisations working with post-tsunami relief and recovery projects in Sri Lanka did not build local capacities for planning and decision-making in order to ensure proper exit or hand-over strategies. Lack of local planning and decision-making capacities can cause a continuation of disaster vulnerabilities, even aggravating such vulnerabilities (Kennedy et al., 2008).

There is, however, no one-size-fits-all approach to how we can design or build a robust and resilient community. Preparedness, response and recovery plans must take into account the temporal and spatial changes in social vulnerability; if not the mitigation efforts may turn out to have little effect when it comes to improving local resilience to hazards (Cutter and Emerich, 2006:p.102). This means that whereas it is fairly easy to prepare for the physical aspects imbued by a disaster by studying data produced based on historic events, the temporal and spatial vulnerability impacting the social aspects are harder to prepare for (Cutter and Emerich, 2006). What we should recognise is that in many developing countries shortsighted policies and practices may actually increase societal vulnerabilities (Holmes, 2007).

Two researchers, Jørn Birkman and Nishara Fernando (2007), have tried to measure the differences in vulnerabilities between two coastal communities in Sri Lanka, Galle – a Sinhala dominated town along the southern coast, and Batticaloa – a Muslim dominated town along the eastern coast. Their main argument is that sustainable recovery and development of coastal communities in Sri Lanka require a systematic approach for reducing vulnerability and risk. In their analysis they use the concept of revealed and emergent vulnerabilities, and argues that the identification and assessment of 'most vulnerable' areas, groups and infrastructures are of crucial importance, especially after a disaster, in order to safeguard a recovery that will be sustainable, instead of just rebuilding the structures that have proven to be vulnerable (Birkman and Fernando, 2007). When defining vulnerability, they propose that vulnerability has two main dimensions: susceptibility (the likelihood of an extreme event) and coping capacity (the ability to recover from an extreme event). Within this frame, they accept, for instance, that poor people are the most vulnerable (susceptible) in a disaster, but these people also have various resources or capacities to cope, for instance social networks (social capital). Therefore, how a hazard affects a society is a combination of both the negative characteristics (susceptibility) and the positive characteristics (coping capacity). In their actual study, the authors focused on different susceptibility factors among households and on different coping factors, such as, for instance, formal and informal networks. We will not go into details regarding the findings from their study, but will mentioned that that factors such as age, gender, education, employment and location were significant susceptibility factors, whereas informal networks was the most important coping mechanism (Birkman and Fernando, 2007).

# Managing disasters, sustaining development: A shared responsibility

More than 20 years ago, the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World (UNDP, 1994: 2) claimed that, "disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and relief are four elements which contribute to and gain from the implementation of sustainable development policies". Here, the direct connection between disaster management and sustainable development is made explicit. The fact that development theory has become more focused on multi-scalar partnerships and multilateral cooperation, and putting more emphasis on informal channels (Pieterse, 2001), means that there is increased recognition that development is best achieved if different actors share the responsibility. But this is also a vital concern for disaster management. We must admit that both the causes for disasters and disaster management in itself are complex issues which must be defined in a holistic setting, and "new initiatives (should be) found in order to ensure that a disaster is viewed as a shared responsibility" (Trim, 2004:219). Various factors that are strengthened by globalisation, such as capitalism, marginalisation of the poor and politicised relief in developing countries have created more complex realities where fewer fixed assumptions can be permitted now than before (Alexander, 1997:299). This

means that we must rethink and adapt the way we conduct disaster management and support communities facing disasters. Increased community involvement is a good start. Based on their collaboration with DMC, the UNDP (2011) in their "Recommendations for Future Programming of DRR activities" in Sri Lanka write that disaster management should be linked to development activities aiming at promoting local livelihood patterns, structures and capacities that can empower disaster-prone communities to cope with hazards, and enable livelihood systems that will help poor people to survive disasters (UNDP, 2011: 48). To achieve this, the present Sri Lankan disaster management system must, according to UNDP, change their top-down approach to development into a more integrated and holistic approach that gives priority to disaster risk reduction as a development concern (UNDP, 2011).

In order to create a linkage between sustainable development and disaster management, we may outline the following process; poverty reduction (a sustainable development issue) means reduced vulnerability, and reduced vulnerability means reduced impacts of disasters on development (a disaster management issue) (Alexander, 1997). It is a problem, however, that theories that link, e.g. emergency relief and development assistance, are rarely manifested in practical situations and activities (Larsen, 2005).

According to the UN/ISDR (2005), it is important that disaster risk reduction is integrated into development activities, as disasters associated with natural hazards are fundamentally an issue of development. How failed or unsustainable development planning and investments contribute to development is made evident after each natural disaster, and the reasons for connecting disaster management and sustainable development thinking becomes clear, as does the fact that disasters associated with natural hazards are fundamentally an issue of development. This linkage has also in principle been accepted by the Sri Lankan government, as we can see from the report "Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: Road Map for Disaster Management" (DMC/UNDP, 2005).

How people and communities, as well as professionals and practitioners working in the field of disaster management, handle the pre-, per-, and post-disaster phases will affect the sustainability of existing development processes in a society. At the same time, prospective sustainable development initiatives can affect disaster management actions, both in the pre-, per- and post-disaster phases. If one is working with, and focusing on, pre-disaster activities, it is important that one does not forget or ignore post-disaster efforts, or assume that the pre-disaster initiatives are so well implemented and functioning so that post-disaster work is less important. International organisations, such as the World Bank and UN, are advocating for the view that it is more beneficial or effective to invest in preparedness and mitigation, rather than focusing resources on response. This will also be the most cost effective disaster management approach in the future, given the projected increase in frequency and intensity of disasters (World Bank, 2006; UNDP/BCPR, 2004; FIC, 2009: 21). Thinking and planning ahead is essential.

Not only are disasters and development closely linked, so also is poverty and environmental degradation (UNEP, 2002) and "there are clear signs that this exacerbates the impact of disaster" (Alexander, 1997:287), hence flawed development activities drives disasters (IFRC, 2002:11). At the same time, destruction by natural disasters typically has disproportionate impacts on the poorest and most vulnerable populations including women, children, youth and the elderly (UNDP/BCPR, 2004).

If we are to experience increased resilience and sustained development for poor communities, facing reoccurring natural disasters, the status of such communities must be heightened (McEntire, 2001). The social, political and economic status of poor individuals is obviously undermined, as their resources are inadequate when handling disasters and politicians more often than not, overlook or even hinder the chances of the most vulnerable to cope with the threats of disasters.

The magnitude of disaster impacts increases more in poor developing countries, than in more developed countries, and as long as preparedness and prevention remains inadequate, disasters will remain a major unsolved problem for sustainable development in developing countries (Basher, 2008). Natural disasters are not a category of events that can be separated from the broader issues of development as natural disasters create serious setbacks to the development process (CRED, 2004:13). Therefore, it is important that development efforts, especially those initiated by the international community "aspire to promote social, political and economic advances and minimize the possibility that such progress may be nullified by disaster" (McEntire, 2001:194).

David A. McEntire emphasises that vulnerability must be understood and directly addressed if the effects of disasters are to be reduced (2001). He refers to what he calls *invulnerable development*, which is a sustainable development thought that also encompasses the concept of vulnerability reduction in all development decisions and activities. At the same time as development activities should be linked to vulnerability issues, the capacity, cooperation and effectiveness of people and organisations working with vulnerability reduction and disaster management needs to be increased, if the disastrous threat to development is to be limited (McEntire, 2001). This underlines the need for good management in the work towards making communities more resilient. A problem however is that many disaster management engagements do not have a longterm view, but are often put aside by shortsighted initiatives aimed at economic growth, rather than societal stability and sustainability. This does not comply well with what Monday describes as one of the six principles of community sustainability: "Incorporate disaster resilience and mitigation into actions and decisions" (Monday, 2002, in UN/ISDR, 2004*b*:18). In their "build back better" article on Sri Lanka, Kennedy et al. (2008) absolutely support this view, stating that we need to place environmental hazards into the broader context of building sustainable communities and avoid re-creating vulnerabilities. If we do not address the root causes of vulnerability, we may risk that reconstruction efforts may leave the community in the same situation as before the disaster, or even worse (Kennedy et al., 2008). In this regard, Shaw et al. (2012) are very much critical of the post-tsunami relief and recovery activities in Sri Lanka, saying that relatively few relief efforts were connected to the long-term development activities. Likewise, Silva (2009) writes that disaster response activities in Sri Lanka did not leave behind structures that enhanced the affected communities' resilience and coping mechanisms.

## So where are we?

One of the strategic goals of the UNISDR's Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA)13 is the integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning, and substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015. Since the publication of the reports *Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge to Development* (UNDP/BCPR, 2004) and *Disaster Risk Reduction: A Development Concern* (DFID, 2005), mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development planning, and that disaster risk accumulates within inappropriate development has gained recognition (Pelling, 2007). The Sri Lankan disaster management system, through the Ministry of Disaster Management has implemented the policies and principles of HFA.

The UNDP/BCPR14 report from 2004 focused among other things on bringing disasters and development together, as "a developmentally informed perspective on disasters lies (between) development planners and disaster risk reduction practitioners" (UNDP/BCPR, 2004:17). The end of the previous millennium and the start of the current one saw several major disasters occur in all corners of the world. This led to a more articulated and serious consideration of the disaster-development relationship and discussions surrounding the social and economic causes of disaster risk. The result was that reducing disaster risk was acknowledged as a long-term engagement with processes of international development (UNDP/BCPR, 2004). Also in the ISDR publication *Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives* (UN/ISDR, 2004*b*) the issues of disaster mitigation and sustainable development came together.

Disasters undermine hard-won development gains and have devastating effects. But through integrating natural disaster programs with overall development objectives, governments and communities may minimize their losses (UN/ ISDR, 2007*b*). Because of the enormous development losses suffered around the world from disasters, "development banks and international assistance institutions now increasingly place importance on integrating risk reduction into development policies and practices" (UN/ISDR, 2007*b*). An inconvenient truth, however, is that development programmers often neglect the importance of disaster reduction due to the absence of convincing analyses of trends and estimated losses.  As a result, disaster prevention activities often appear costly (CRED, 2004:13)

A central question which comes to the surface when working with disaster management issues is; can humans reduce disasters? Vulnerability is an important element of the effects and outcomes of disasters, and the most probable disaster "cause" humans can control. Therefore, vulnerability should be a focal point when working with disaster management and disaster reduction in poor communities. Education regarding risk and vulnerabilities is perhaps the most important disaster management activity for disaster-exposed communities. It is emphasised by professionals that education about disaster triggering factors and the understanding of vulnerability should be top priorities (McEntire, 2001); emphasizing the importance of training local people and helping them to understand and map their own vulnerabilities related to possible disaster triggering agents. The issue of education is also raised as a core issue by Shaw and Krishnamurthy (2009) who argues that education must play a key role in future disaster risk reduction planning, and that there is a need to enhance the efforts to bring disaster education into the curriculum both in schools and higher education (Shaw and Krishnamurthy, 2009: 636). Universities should engage both in education and research on disaster management, but make sure that this is linked with field practices to support human security in the local communities.

It is important to keep in mind that the experiences people have made and the threats they are facing vary from situation to situation. Disasters are often characterized by generality rather than uniqueness (Alexander, 1997), but when it comes to finding ways of supporting communities in their effort to reduce the effects of disasters it will be important to understand the societal distinctiveness in order to sustain development while managing disasters. Different communities located nearby each other geographically, may still tell different stories and face different problems. This indicates that the probability for succeeding with disaster management activities is heightened if the process is sensitive to social and cultural idiosyncrasies since sustainable development is best achieved when the local community is involved as an active and influential participant, and the local natural, social and cultural context is taken as the point of departure.

## The quest for human security

Accepting the future scenario as presented by the IPCC, UN, the World Bank and other international agencies, disaster management will become one of the most important – perhaps the most important – global issues in the years to come. Consequently, disaster management needs to be mainstreamed in all its connections and relationships from pre-disaster, through per-disaster, to post-disaster issues. Shaw and Krishnamurthy (2009) suggest that all disaster related activities need to include human security, a concept that is concerned with reducing and, if possible removing the insecurities that are threats to human livelihoods. In a sustainable development perspective, human security is directly concerned with the interface between society and the physical environment – the nature. Emphasizing human security implies that we cannot plan for a future sustainable development process without taking the management of the environment into our plans, but recognise the fact that such plans may be futile if we do not include plans and policies for disaster risk reduction. We might argue that the quest for human security is basically a question of disaster risk reduction.

Human livelihood depends fundamentally on the environment and the access to natural resources. We can easily see that some societies depend directly on environmental resources for their livelihood, but even sophisticated and ultra-modern urban societies depend on food, water, energy, construction materials etc. to sustain their livelihoods. There is always a connection between human life and the environment: for some societies, it is more critical and direct, for other it is more obscure and indirect. But as environment and human life is interlinked, so is the environment and disasters. Environmental degradation has an impact on both natural and social processes; it affects the natural resource base and increases vulnerability. It weakens a community's resilience and threatens traditional coping mechanisms: environmental degradation enhances vulnerability and leads to a stronger human insecurity. According to Shaw and Krishnamuthy (2009) there is a need to reinforce environmental concerns in the whole disaster management cycle from pre- to post-disaster efforts and to integrate environmental concerns into all phases of disaster management planning.

Quite regularly, when a community is exposed to a huge disaster, even to the degree that it is almost physically eradicated – as Aceh after the Tsunami, or Kashmir after the earthquake in 2005 – we as outside observers cannot understand how this community can survive and continue without being completely reconstructed from scratch with the utilisation of assistance from outside agencies, be it from the national government or international organisations. Then we learn that after some years, the community is back on its feet. During the last 30-40 years we have repeatedly received bad news from the African continent telling us that millions of people are threatened by drought and/or desertification, and that they will surely die if aid in sufficient amount, and at the earliest possible time, will not reach them. We have even experienced this personally during the great Sahelian/Ethiopian hunger in 1984/85. But aid never does reach the poor people in time and in sufficient amounts, still people never die in millions. Why? Because communities have "hidden" means. In times of crisis communities manage to mobilize local resources, structures, systems, institutions and knowledge to tackle the crises, if not fully, at least partially. We have some, but very few examples during the last decades where a community succumbs to a crisis, but – as far as we know – never to a natural disaster. Sometimes a disaster-ridden community receives a substantial amount of outside assistance, other times only limited assistance is made available, but basically a community demonstrates strength and resilience by depending on its own resources. This indicates that any community has indigenous coping mechanisms, or what is called a "culture of coping with crisis" (Shaw and Krishnamurthy, 2009: 636). Consequently, disaster management efforts, for instance risk assessment, should include the participation of local communities, and take into close consideration their perceptions on vulnerability, their estimates on their coping capacity, and their structures and knowledge applicable to a disaster event. Since the community-based approaches are best suited to cover the issue of human security, they should be given both a national and international priority, as for instance stated in the Hyogo Framework of Action.

## Conclusion

In the quest for human security, we cannot avoid the challenges brought about by climate change, implying that in the planning of disaster risk reduction activities the possible effects that climate change will imply for local communities must be put into consideration (Shaw and Krishnamurthy, 2009). Here, a particular emphasis should be given to local communities in poor, developing countries since natural disasters have an adverse impact on them, undermining the lives and livelihoods of the people in these communities. Sometimes, it can be difficult today to discern between a natural disaster and the impact from climate change as the impact from climate change can be observed and interpreted as a slow moving natural disaster. When the effects of climate change lead to an increased level of poverty and a more vulnerable pattern of livelihood, i.e. to enhanced human insecurity, this is a disaster for the people affected. We have discussed how local communities have indigenous knowledge and traditional structures that they can utilize in times of need, but these items will quite possibly not be enough in a future scenario characterised by the insecurities brought about by climate change. To ensure human security, new knowledge, new structures and new practices are needed to adapt to climate change, and thereby to sustain the livelihood of the vulnerable communities.

#### References

*Recovering from a disaster*