Ultimately, the distinctive features of Japanese business management, compared to that of foreign countries such as those in Europe and the United States, can be reduced to two points. The first point is "egalitarianism" or "humanism." (...) The second point is "*genba-shugi*." In contrast to American managers out of business school, who, it is said, only respect figures and are uninterested in the factory floor, Japanese managers have the utmost respect for the factory floor, beginning everything there (Japan Economic Research Institute 1987, p. 19).

In a paper written during this period and recognized as a representative example of research on engineers' *genba-shugi*, Morikawa (1988) 4 referred to his own observations of factories in the United States and the comparative research into Japanese and British factories by Dore (1987), arguing as follows:

For Japanese engineers, the factory floor (*seisan genba*) is the most important workplace. The *genba* is an object of respect, from the time when engineers receive their training at the *genba*, through their unceasing work together with the factory workers. They are governed by a system of value norms under which those who devote themselves only to deskwork such as research, design, and the composition and amendment of operational manuals are, at least, not fit to be called engineers. In this sense, "*genba-shugi*" is an aspect unique to Japanese industry, and may even be seen as one factor underlying its technical prowess (Morikawa 1988, p. 29).

Both the Japan Economic Research Institute and Morikawa contrast Japanese engineers and business management with those of Europe and the United States, juxtaposing the physical experience gained from actually using one's eyes and hands on the factory floor with theoretical knowledge acquired from figures, logic, and research.

Considering the historical background of these arguments, they were not limited to a simple comparison. Rather, they were presented in the context of trying to demonstrate the superiority of Japanese-style business management over that of Europe and the United States. The arguments of both the Japan Economic Research Institute (1987) and Morikawa (1988) emerged in an era when the Japanese economy had recovered—most swiftly of all the developed countries—from the oil crisis, and Japanese-style business management had become a major focus of international attention. Many people in Japan were becoming increasingly self-confident about the "Japanese-style" approach. Hirano (2011), analyzing the historical formation of Japanese-style business management, notes the overwhelmingly positive attitude of researchers toward Japan's corporate management during the second half of the 1970s through the 1980s (Hirano 2011, p. 138). At the same time, almost all researchers broke with previous assumptions of the Japanese-style approach as consisting of "systems and customs aimed at avoiding competition." Rather, they came to assess it as "no less competitive and efficient than those of Europe or the United States" (ibid.).

Previously, it had been thought that the internal rotation of personnel to allow them to experience various divisions and roles, a feature of Japanese companies, was inefficient, as it failed to enhance the specialization of employees. In contrast, Koike (1997), comparing factories in Japan and the United States, discovered that when problems occurred at factory production lines in Japan, managers and employees who had experience in various internal roles could meet to discuss solutions, thereby facilitating the swift discovery of ways to solve problems, including those that resulted from a combination of factors. In contrast, factory production lines in the United States had few employees with experience in multiple roles. When problems arose, there would be no discussion like those in Japan, and it would therefore take more time to discover the cause and get the line running again. Koike also found significant differences in personnel development, with the more talented employees in Japan rotated more quickly between different divisions and roles, allowing them to rise faster in the organization, while even talented employees find it difficult to achieve promotion in U.S. factories, where greater specialization limits the number of posts available (Koike 1997, 2005). Koike's and similar research by others suggested that Japanese-style business management was more efficient and competitive than that of Europe and the United States.

Japanese engineers' *genba-shugi* was thus used to explain differences between business practices in Japan and other countries, particularly European countries and the United States. In this context, *genba-shugi* became used with a sense of superiority, implying that the greater emphasis placed on the factory floor (*seisan genba)*  by Japanese engineers and companies, compared to their counterparts in Europe and the United States, led to more efficient Japanese-style business management.

#### **3 The Emphasis on Japanese Uniqueness**

In this section, I will discuss *genba-shugi* in the context of Japan's technical cooperation. Official development assistance (ODA) by the Japanese government began in 1954 with its participation in the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific. Japan commenced technical cooperation, welcoming trainees and dispatching specialists, the following year.

The focus of Japan's technical cooperation up until the 2000s was "people": *hitozukuri* (human-resource development), which is discussed in this chapter. In the Diplomatic Bluebooks published by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), phrases such as "implemented through human contacts (…) to deepen mutual understanding" and fostering those "who will shoulder the task of future nation-building (*kuni-zukuri*)" appear frequently (MOFA 1976, 1988, 1993). JICA also set forth the same policies as MOFA—human resources development (*hito-zukuri*), cooperation through human contact, and cultivating people for the task of nation-building (*kunizukuri*)—in an almost identical way (JICA 1995, p. i).5 Likewise, in papers published in academic journals, the concept of human resources development (*hito-zukuri*) was emphasized more than *genba* (Saito 1992; Hayase 1989).

From the 2000s onward, however, arguments were again made linking *genbashugi* to the traditional characteristics of Japan's technical cooperation. Discussing a revision of the Act of the Incorporated Administrative Agency-Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA Act), MOFA, which had previously used terms such as human resources development (*hito-zukuri*) and nation-building (*kuni-zukuri*), reviewed the previous three decades of technical cooperation projects by JICA as follows6:

We think that this technical cooperation represents a classic example of so-called "face-toface" genba-based assistance. Basically speaking, the image of Japanese experts—technical experts—working up a sweat on hand and brow in the genba convincingly conveys the Japanese approach to work: the sense of virtue in all forms of labor and the hardworking attitude of the Japanese people. We regard this as the reason for our outstanding reception in India, for example.7

In this statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs links *genba-shugi* in technical cooperation with the attitudes of the Japanese people, evaluating both highly.

At around the same time, academic research citing *genba-shugi* as a traditional feature of Japan's technical cooperation began to appear. For example, Matsuoka (2008) describes the "great Japanese tradition" of *genba-shugi* as indispensable for a newly proposed approach to "capacity development" that had emerged during the 1990s (Matsuoka 2008, pp. 235–236). Other researchers similarly characterized *genba-shugi*. Nakahara (2009) identified *genba-shugi* as a characteristic of the development of Japanese systems of industrial education and occupational training, and Japan's approach to international cooperation. Uotani (2012), in a case study on Ghana, portrayed *genba-shugi* as a special feature of Japanese-style technical cooperation.

These studies present *genba-shugi* as a traditional feature of technical cooperation by Japan, but provide no empirical verification of this claim. Each researcher assumes as if obvious the idea that *genba-shugi* is a feature of Japanese technical cooperation. Moreover, the meaning of the term "*genba-shugi*" is different in each study, and there is no common conception of the meaning of *genba-shugi* in the context of technical cooperation. Matsuoka uses the term to refer to the utilization of information from the *genba* in planning (Matsuoka 2008). According to Nakahara, it refers to an emphasis on on-site training in the context of industrial education and occupational training, and an emphasis on "people" over systems in Japanese policy in the context of international cooperation (Nakahara 2009). Meanwhile, Uotani uses the term to refer to the physical presence of experts on-site (at the *genba*) (Uotani 2012). In each case, however, *genba-shugi* is characterized as a feature of Japanese technical cooperation, in contrast to development assistance by European countries and the United States, which prioritizes concepts and ideals.

During the 2000s, while this idea of *genba-shugi* in technical cooperation was being expounded in Japan, aid donors in European countries and the United States were endeavoring to change their approach to technical cooperation. This represented a "significant turning point" for Japanese technical cooperation (Miyoshi 2008, p. 133) because Japan alone risked being left behind amid the emergence of a new worldwide trend in technical cooperation resulting from changes among European and U.S. aid donors and the previously mentioned appearance of the concept of "capacity development." This trend in technical cooperation arose from the criticism of the project-based style of technical cooperation, favored by Japan and observed from the 1990s through the 2000s. Berg and UNDP (1993), a leading example of this type of criticism, cite the example of technical cooperation in Africa in the 1980s, pointing out that the technology that was supposed to have been transferred was not actually used sustainably in the recipient countries. The transfer of technologies that could be overseen only by developed countries and the lack of an appropriate implementation environment for the use of transferred technologies were cited as the main causes of this failure. The focus of criticisms such as those presented by Berg and UNDP was the attempt at "capacity building" through the transfer of technology and knowledge from developed countries in total disregard for developing countries' existing ownership and other structures and systems (Matsuoka 2008; Miwa 2008). "Capacity development" was suggested by Fukuda-Parr et al. (2002) as a new assistance concept acknowledging the impact on systems and societies in developing countries, in response to the issues that had emerged in conventional technical cooperation. Meanwhile, Japan, which perceived its technical cooperation in Asia as a "success," rejected its inclusion among the developed nations criticized by Berg and UNDP, Fukuda-parr et al., and others for disregarding existing structures and systems in developing countries (Matsuoka 2008, p. 227). For example, JICA et al. (2003), in a 300-page-long report, *The Effectiveness and Challenges of Japanese-style International Cooperation,* uses specific examples to argue that this criticism does not apply to Japan.8

From the discussion above, it is clear that, in the context of technical cooperation, the concept of *genba-shugi* has been invoked to argue that Japan's technical cooperation and those who implement it are closer to the situation on the ground (*genba*) than those of European and U.S. aid donors, thereby emphasizing Japan's unique development assistance, which, it is argued, has been no less effective than that of Europe and the United States in achieving development.

#### **4 JICA's Pursuit of Autonomy**

Unlike the concepts of *genba-shugi* discussed in relation to engineers and technical cooperation, which implied comparison with outsiders, JICA's discourse on *genbashugi* emerged in a domestic Japanese context.

JICA's status changed from that of a special public institution to an independent administrative institution in October 2003. Unlike a special public institution, which is subject to detailed restrictions in terms of budgets and personnel by central ministries, as an independent administrative institution, JICA was largely free to allocate its own budgets and projects, and was accountable mainly for its medium-term targets and their evaluations. With this change, Sadako Ogata (1927–2019) became the first President of JICA from outside the government. Ogata attempted to reform the organization of JICA, based on three principles: (1) *genba-shugi*, (2) guaranteeing human safety, and (3) effectiveness, efficiency, and speed. In this context, *genbashugi* was translated into English as the "field-oriented approach," and referred to the delegation of personnel and authority from its Tokyo headquarters to local offices (JICA 2004, 2005).9 The reason why JICA adopted this policy of *genba-shugi* can be observed in the events leading up to its establishment. This following text overviews the events leading up to the election of Ogata as the first President of JICA and the path for its reform.

JICA was established in 1974 from the merging of several special public institutions under the auspices of MOFA, primarily the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) and the Japan Emigration Service (JEMIS). Behind the decision to establish JICA lay tensions between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)—both of which proposed the establishment of their own organizations to implement technical cooperation—on one hand, and MOFA and the Ministry of Finance—which hoped for integration—on the other. These tensions escalated into a political battle involving politicians and the financial world, which was eventually settled through the integration of functions into JICA (Araki 1984; Numata 1994; Hashimoto 1999; Sato 2021). Through a process of political compromise, the JICA Act was passed which, while making MOFA primarily responsible for JICA, also required the authorization of the Minister of International Trade and Industry for projects overseen by MITI and the authorization of the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries for projects overseen by MAFF. The government bureaucracy thereafter established systems to supervise and direct JICA's operations based on this general supervisory power. For example, not only was there an insufficient number of senior vice-president posts at JICA to incorporate the management staff from OTCA and JEMIS, but there were also few posts at the level of vice president or section head. All senior vice president posts and that of the president were filled by retired public officials, and JICA's operating sections were organized to correspond to the government bureaucracy. All section heads were dispatched from departments of the central government (Sugita 1999; Takashima and Miyoshi 2000).

Against this background, JICA was subject to aspects of bureaucratic stovepiping, with much of its development assistance carried out on a sector-by-sector basis. Essentially, the supply-side of development assistance—the convenience of the central government bureaucracy—was prioritized over demand-side information from the local areas where the development assistance was to be implemented. JICA's staff was aware of this issue, emphasizing an approach based on the recipient country and region from the time of JICA's establishment, and pushing ahead with organizational reforms while simultaneously giving consideration to the central bureaucracy (JICA 2019). JICA staff attempted to reform the organization—originally a miscellany of different sections answering to different bureaucracies—into an organization that could formulate assistance plans for each country and region, and implement assistance based on these plans.10 From the second half of the 1980s, they had also embarked on organizational reform aimed at strengthening local offices in order to identify the needs of local areas (Tajima 1986; Nakamura 1991; Yanagiya 1991).

The strengthening of local offices continued to be an issue through the 1990s. The reform of JICA was supported by international pressure to decentralize assistance organizations by strengthening local personnel and delegating authority to local offices. The OECD (1985) insisted that greater localization of assistance organizations led to more effective and efficient assistance. Some countries, such as Canada, even undertook parliamentary initiatives to reform assistance organizations (OECD 1985; The Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade 1987). Cooperation between aid donors had become commonplace from the second half of the 1990s (Miyoshi 2001), and the increasing importance of local negotiations between donors provided an additional reason for JICA to reinforce its local offices. However, these efforts to strengthen local offices met with obstacles, due to the internal issues within JICA described below.

While Japan's ODA budget increased five-fold from 1978 to 1997, the number of JICA staff grew by only approximately 20%.11 Moreover, JICA was unable to transfer staff arbitrarily, as it was still closely controlled by the government bureaucracy. Each bureaucratic unit in central ministries, corresponding to each of JICA's various operating departments, had the authority to determine JICA's budget. JICA's operating departments were therefore required to discuss and negotiate with the central government bureaucracy on issues such as the number of personnel in each section, the number of specialists assigned to each project, the cost of purchasing materials, and even travel expenses incurred by JICA staff. These constraints meant that local offices were unable to take any action without first contacting and confirming with JICA headquarters in Tokyo, making it difficult to respond swiftly and flexibly to emerging issues.12

The announcement to convert JICA to an independent administrative institution was published in 2001, two years before it came into effect. Simultaneously, after decades of steadily increasing ODA budgets, it was announced that Japan's ODA budget would be substantially *reduced* with the stated goal of improving fiscal health,13 and even greater efficiency was demanded from the development aid. In response to this political situation, some JICA staff, together with labor unions, conducted questionnaire surveys and other activities to develop a vision for JICA's ideal form and the ideal leader for the organization as an independent administrative institution. According to them, the local needs identified from these initiatives were incorporated into their ultimate vision for development assistance.14 Meanwhile, Ogata, who had been an overwhelmingly popular choice for the ideal leader among survey respondents, went on to become the President of JICA, leading the organizational reforms described above.

The incorporation of *genba-shugi* into JICA's organizational reforms originated not only from JICA's internal staff. Tajima (1986), Yanagiya (1991), and Nakamura (1991) illustrate that MOFA managerial personnel also supported placing *genbashugi* as a central pillar of JICA's ODA. When these texts were written, the authors were, respectively, General Manager of JICA's General Affairs Department, President of JICA, and Senior Vice-President of JICA. However, all were originally appointed from MOFA. MOFA had local diplomatic missions in developing countries. Boosting the importance of localization in ODA by advocating *genba-shugi*  effectively facilitated an attempt to wrest control from other branches of the central government bureaucracy. The greater the importance placed on the local context, the more MOFA's embassies would become the core of Japan's ODA through their local networks. When ODA budgets shrank during the 2000s, MOFA had no choice but to aim for "efficient" ODA operations through "MOFA leadership," to continue to achieve the same diplomatic effect as before. For this reason, *genba-shugi* was a crucial concept for MOFA, enabling it to ensure that it kept the initiative and maintained leadership.

From the discussion above, it is clear that the *genba-shugi* that formed one of the three pillars of JICA's organizational reform was a policy aimed at the decentralization of development assistance by transferring authority, personnel, and budgets from the Tokyo headquarters (the supply side) to local offices (the demand side). At the same time, however, it was also intended to support the leadership and initiative of JICA and MOFA themselves. In other words, *genba-shugi* was used to argue for MOFA and against other branches of the central government bureaucracy, for JICA to better control development aid policies and their implementation on the basis that it better understood local conditions.

#### **5 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have described the events and circumstances that gave rise to the use of the concept of *genba-shugi* in three different contexts: business management, technical cooperation, and JICA's organizational reforms. The concept of *genbashugi* examined in Sects. 2 and 3 was used to advocate the superiority and uniqueness of Japanese-style business management in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. These were attributed to close interaction with the *genba* by Japanese companies, engineers, and experts, compared to those of other countries. In Sect. 4, I described the background against which JICA's and MOFA's career staff used the expression *genba-shugi* to argue for their own leadership and initiative, and against control by other branches of the central government bureaucracy. JICA and MOFA possessed their own networks of local offices and embassies, leveraging the features of *genbashugi* to argue for more effective and efficient assistance based on those networks. Despite these different contexts for the use of *genba-shugi*, they share an attempt by people and organizations close to the *genba* to assert their own value.

There were also common characteristics defined in contrast to *genba-shugi*. The European and U.S. engineers, business management, and development aid, as well as Japan's centralized bureaucracy, each cited as the antithesis of *genba-shugi* in the arguments examined in this paper, were seen to approach the *genba* based on abstract "theory." Here, abstract theory refers to logic based on ideals, and the pursuit of efficiency through the centralized organizational government. These have been rationalized based on existing authorities, such as abstract "models" from developed countries in Europe and the United States, or the interests of the central government bureaucracy. Such abstract theory disregards the context of the *genba*. The "rationality" of *genba-shugi*, by contrast, seeks to achieve justification by other means. *Genbashugi* appeals to people's "intuition" by implying strong links to the *genba*, as seen in the contexts of manufacturing technology and development aid examined in this chapter. This intuition is informed by experiences common to us all: "there are some things you just have to be there to understand;" "you'll never find the solution buried in your own thoughts." The rationality of *genba-shugi* draws on these experiences for its justification.

In today's social science, where natural science methods are being actively introduced, using causal relationships between variables to create sophisticated replicable models of social phenomena is solidifying its position as the mainstream paradigm. International development is no exception. However, theories in social science cannot be as valid as those in natural science. As in the cases of self-denying prophecies or self-fulfilling prophecies, a theory about a social phenomenon, once disseminated in society, may distort social phenomena. Also, behavior, which is considered irrational in the majority of society, may be considered rational in some locality. We need to deal with theories and models carefully in the context of the phenomena at hand. Under these circumstances, *genba-shugi* focuses our attention on intuition that originates from physical and social experience.

#### **Notes**

#### **References**

**Naoki Matsubara** is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo. His doctoral research focuses on historical changes in organizations that formulate and implement Japan's international development cooperation policy and domestic development policy.

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## **Asianism: Continuity and Divergence in Japan's Foreign and International Cooperation Policy**

**Lauren Nakasato and Kazuo Kuroda**

**Abstract** Asianism has often been discussed in Anglophone literature as rhetoric used to justify Japan's imperial expansion. Yet both the genesis of the concept prior to World War II and its evolution in the post-World War II era have received less attention. This chapter examines how shifting conceptions of Asianism have influenced Japan's foreign policy stance and international cooperation development agenda. By tracing the historical roots, development and diffusion of Asianism from its origins in early Meiji Japan to present, the chapter shows how Asianism, though its influence has declined over time, has endured in the post-war era through the concept of Asian regionalism.

#### **1 Introduction**

Despite the significance of Asianism (*Ajia shugi*, アジア主義) in Japan's international relations, there has been no consensus on how to define the term. Indeed, as Yoshimi Takeuchi (1963) warns, tracing the historical development of Asianism as a term may be impossible. This chapter recognizes Asianism as encompassing various meanings and lexical iterations including Pan-Asianism (*Han-Ajia shugi,* 汎アジ ア主義*)* and Greater Asianism(*Dai-Ajia shugi,* 大アジア主義)in the pre-war and wartime period. However, what interests the authors in this chapter is not the lexical history of the term but the concepts behind it and how they have been used to define Japan's foreign and international cooperation policy from the early Meiji period to the present.

The concept of Asianism is inextricably linked to the concept of Asia. While this may seem obvious, Asia was not defined by the kingdoms and territories in the region

L. Nakasato (B)

Waseda University Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Tokyo, Japan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
K. Kuroda

Waseda University Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies and Visiting Research Fellow at the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, Tokyo, Japan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2024

J. Sato and S. Kim (eds.), *The Semantics of Development in Asia*, The University of Tokyo Studies on Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1215-1\_5

until first contact with the West in the 1600 s (Saaler and Szpilman 2011). Even then, it took 200 years and the threat of Western imperialism to solidify the concept of Asia amongst Asians (Matsuda 2011). Asian*ism*, with its origins in Japan, grew out of the conundrum of how to deal with Western expansionism. The extent to which Asian solidarity could be employed to counter Western influence and Japan's role vis-à-vis Asia have defined the various approaches to Asianism over the course of history. The Asia in Asianism has been defined by various actors both conceptually and geographically based on combinations of geographic proximity, nationality, race, language, culture, religion, spirit, history, tradition, art and civilization for purposes economic, social and political. The authors align with Hotta (2007) who suggests two fundamental features of Asianism:

While several typologies of Asianism have emerged, the authors utilize two types: Alliance-style and Leadership-style Asianism. A third ideological (Nakajima 2014) or teaist (Hotta 2007) type centers on the East–West philosophy of Tenshin Okakura and Rabindranath Tagore, promoting a spiritual, morally pure vision of Eastern high culture to counter the science- and rationality-based Western claims to higher civilization. While these spiritual-cultural conceptions of Asianism may underlie other iterations of Asianism, many of the writings of this genre were in English and were intended for an international audience and did not exert direct influence over Japan's pre- or post-war foreign policy or international cooperation policy. The following instead delineates Alliance style and Leadership style Asianism as two major types, then show how elements of each have influenced Japan's foreign policy and international cooperation policy over time, currently manifested through the concept of Asian regionalism.

Asianism has been discussed both *as* Asian regionalism and as a precursor to Asian regionalism. Yet if regionalism "involves the reorganization of political, economic, cultural and social lives along the lines of an imagined region rather than according to the standard political unit of the nation-state" (He 2017, p. 1), or "regional cooperation and integration based on a shared perception of the region's present, past, and future" (Saaler 2007, p. 1) then perhaps Asian regionalism does not exist. While Asian regional concepts, cooperation and institutions have grown in recent decades, none have attempted to transcend the nation. Indeed, a common denominator linking conceptions of Asian regionalism across Asian nations is nationalism (He 2017). Further, shared perceptions have been largely absent from Asian regionalism. Despite, or perhaps because of the heavily national character of Asian regionalism, Asianist ideas have been expressed through Japan's Asian regional concepts in the post-war era.

#### **2 Alliance-Style Asianism and Japan–China Cooperation**

Alliance-style Asianism advocating for a political alliance with China based on shared culture gained influence in academic and political circles during the early Meiji period. The East Asian Common Culture Association (*Tōa Dōbun Kai*), established in 1898, was an early proponent of Alliance-style Asianism, asserting that Japan is an Asian nation that must stand in solidarity with Asia. This represented the antithesis to the Meiji government's project of rapid modernization through emulation of Western powers. Faced with the Tripartite Intervention of Germany, France and Russia in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War, a profound sense of crisis contributed to this plea for solidarity. In the face of Western diplomatic pressure aiming to limit Japan's presence in China, the Association was established by leading Japanese politicians and thinkers who sought a political and cultural alliance with China, including Atsumaro Konoe, politician and first chairman of the House of Peers, philosopher Setsurei Mitake, former cabinet member Tsuyoshi Inukai and revolutionary Toten Miyazaki.

Konoe founded the Association based on his belief in "the Orient for Orientals" and a "racial alliance" of the "yellow race," establishing resolutions that included "protecting China," "aiding the development of China and Korea," "investigating and regulating the contemporary affairs of China and Korea" and "sparking national debate" (e.g., Kurita 2017; Fujita 2012). Thus, albeit with somewhat paternalistic overtones, the founding principle of the Association rested on the idea of a united Asia. According to Konoe, "the handling of Oriental affairs is the responsibility of Oriental people. Though the power of the Qing Dynasty has declined, this must be blamed on politics, not the people. Working hand in hand to preserve the Orient should not be a difficult task" (Takeuchi 1993, p. 423).

The rise of "Yellow Peril," the Western perception that a unified "yellow race" would threaten Western power, prompted fear of retaliation in Japan. Japanese intellectuals, politicians and educators increasingly gravitated toward Konoe's vision of establishing a partnership with China to counter the anticipated Western response to Yellow Peril. Konoe's vision necessitated support for China's modernization efforts, and there was a large, albeit temporary, swell of aid after the Sino-Japanese War from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, even as early as a few years following the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese reformers such as Youwei Kang and Qichao Liang began to turn toward Japan in the face of Russian encroachment (Smith 2022). Further, recruitment of Chinese intellectuals into the Raising Asia Society (*Kō A Kai*) and the later *Tōa Dōbun Kai* widened channels for Asianist thought to flow between Japan and China (Smith 2022). This lay the foundations for Yat-sen Sun's advocacy of Asianism in the 1910s, asserting that "after all, Asia belongs to Asia's people … Asia's peace must be protected by Asia's people, and above all Japan and China must cooperate with each other" (Saga 2020, p. 135). While Japan's eventual descent into imperialism prompted China to dismiss Japan's Asianism as an emulation of Western imperialism, China never fully rejected Asianism, instead constructing a new Asianism with China at the center (Smith 2022).

The Idea of a Japan–China partnership to counter Western power was not limited to the political sphere. The above-mentioned Toten Miyazaki, a civil rights-oriented scholar of Asianism, supported the Chinese revolution and the restoration of human rights and freedom of the oppressed in other Asian countries such as Siam and India. Jigoro Kano, a leading scholar of Japan–China cooperation, expressed his vision of the Japan–China partnership when the first government-sponsored international students from China arrived in Japan. According to Kano,

In the first place, Japan and the Qing Dynasty are just across the ocean from one another. Through the import of systems and culture from China and subsequent creation of our own ancient civilization, we were able to become an advanced country in the Orient. The close relationship between our countries is incomparable with that of Western countries. Through the protection and development of Qing China, the movement toward peace in the Orient can be maintained. Considering the interests of Russia, we can afford nothing less than our best efforts to support Qing China (Kano 1903a, p. 5).

The historic and geopolitical significance of the newly established student mobility between China and Japan and Kano's expectations for such mobility are readily apparent. Further, in his *Issues in Chinese Education* (1903b), Kano argues for the unification of the "yellow race," asserting the significance of Asian regional cooperation for world peace from the perspective of the East–West power balance:

Today's world is a racial world, a world of racial rivalry. The White race is the most powerful and the Yellow race cannot oppose it. Why is it that we, the Yellow race, must be so divided that we cannot cooperate with one another? … Let us open our hearts to our own race. Japan, Korea and Siam should be regarded as one, united in confronting the White race. Our enemies claim they will not instigate war, but by demonstrating our mutual communication and spirit, we can maintain the momentum toward world peace (Kano 1903b).

Kano's words capture the essence of Alliance-style Asianism based on Asian solidarity in the face of the Western Other.

Discussions of an Asian alliance to combat Western encroachment were not limited to Japan and China. In Korea, Asianism, together with nationalism, contributed to discussions of Korean national identity during the tumultuous period from the late 1880s to the early 1900s (Shin 2005). In line with Asianist discourse traveling from Japan and China, Korean Asianists envisioned a united China, Japan and Korea in the face of encroachment from Western imperialism. Such unity was not only considered in terms of geography but also along cultural and racial lines, with intellectuals such as Ch'iho Yun advocating for a common aim between the countries based on race, religion and writing systems, and Chunggun An calling for a "Theory of Eastern Peace" (Shin 2005). Yet such conceptions of Asianism would soon come to an end with Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 (Shin 2005). Thus, while conceptions of Asianism in Japan during this period both influenced and were influenced by developments in other parts of Asia, the rise of the Japanese empire and the cooption of Asianism for imperial gains all but silenced calls for Asian unity based on Asian equality.

#### **3 Leadership-Style Asianism and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere**

While the preceding discussion of Alliance-style Asianism depicts an egalitarian approach to Asia, this was not uniformly the case. A fluidity of ideas and thinkers supported Asianism in some form or another, and while most accepted the existence of Asia and the idea of Asian solidarity or cooperation in the face of Western encroachment, not all accepted the idea of Asian nations as equal entities. The solidification of Asianism from a loose set of ideas and ad hoc activities by disparate groups into a state ideology coincided with war. With a weakened China and Western powers encroaching, Japan was at a crossroads in its foreign relations. Is Japan a part of Asia? If so, what does this mean for Japan in the face of Western expansionism? Alliance-style Asianists may have supported Japan's equal participation in a unified struggle between Asia and Western powers, but these ideals did not play out. Neither did Japan "depart from Asia" (*Datsu-A-Ron*), breaking ties with Asia to follow the West (Iida 1997), as advocated by Yukichi Fukuzawa following Chinese defeat in the Sino-French War. Instead, Japan positioned itself as the only nation that could lead, protect and emancipate Asia in the face of Western aggression and colonization. This "Leadership-style Asianism" culminated in the unilateral creation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

While Alliance-style Asianism and the spiritual-cultural Asianism of Okakura Tenshin were primarily discussed and enacted by politicians and intellectuals, the translation of Leadership-style Asianist thought into political action can be observed in the activities of the *Genyōsha* (Dark Ocean Society) founded in 1881 and led by Toyama Mitsuru, and its offshoot organization the *Kokuryūkai* (Black Dragon Society) founded in 1901 and led by Uchida Ryohei. Core organizations of Japan's ultra-nationalists leading up to World War II, the groups were influential in their promotion of Japanese expansionism based on Asianist thinking (Takeuchi 1963). Despite contributing little to the development of the term itself, the Kokuryūkai was instrumental in translating Asianism into foreign policy through various forms of pressure on the Japanese government (Saaler 2014). At the core of Toyama and Uchida's Asianism was the idea of a strong Asia to resist Western power, and the Kokuryūkai supported revolutionaries in Asia trying to overthrow Western imperial domination (Saaler 2014).

Even within these organizations, however, there were varying views of Japan's role in Asia. One example is the 1910 annexation of Korea and alignment with Tarui Tokichi's Union of the Great East (*Daitō-gappō-ron).* While most Kokuryūkai members supported the annexation, others had advocated for an equal union between Japan and Korea more in line with Alliance-style Asianism (Saaler 2014). Ultimately the Kokuryūkai came to define the annexation of Korea rhetorically *as* a "union" with Korea (Saaler 2014). Thus, in addition to Asian unity against Western power, Leadership-style Asianism encompassed a sense of Japanese superiority that was not present, or at least not central to Alliance-style Asianism, despite invoking in the same language. Indeed, Asia gave Japan a conceptual tool not only to combat Western encroachment but also to imagine international relations outside of the existing Sinocentric order (Matsuda 2011).

Due in part to the influence of the Leadership-style Asianist-ideas of the Kokuryūkai, the Japanese government established colonies and territories across Asia from the late Meiji period. By the 1930s, Japan's imperialist ambitions to expand into the Asian continent could no longer be hidden. To counter intervention by the League of Nations, triggered by the Manchurian Incident, new Asianist ideas such as "The Asian Monroe Doctrine" emerged, asserting that issues in Asia should be solved in and by Asia. While this argument echoes Alliance-style Asianism, in practice it allowed for unilateral decision-making, justifying Japan's prewar foreign policy, including the "unification" of Japan and Manchuria and forceful "collaboration" with China. Such actions culminated in the formation of the "New Order in East Asia" by the second Konoe Cabinet in 1937. The New Order proclaimed:

The establishment of this new order shall be based on the foundation of a relationship of mutual assistance and *cooperation among the three countries* in all areas, including politics, economy and culture, and shall be aimed at the establishment of international justice in East Asia, the realization of joint defense, creation of a new culture and the realization of economic integration (Saga 2020, p. 211, emphasis added).

Thus, even during Japan's imperial expansion, Asianism continued to be framed by the government as "mutual assistance and cooperation" with a focus on "international justice in East Asia," in striking contrast to the realities on the ground.

In a final extension of Leadership-style Asianism, the "Imperial Way" was established based on Mitsuru Toyama's "Imperial Asia" principle. The principle is clearly expressed at the policy level in the "Education Policy for the Construction of Greater East Asia: Measures for the Nurturing of the Greater East Asian Nations" issued by the Greater East Asia Council during the Pacific War in the same year:

In accordance with the principle of "Eight Allies for One World" and in light of the fundamental principles of national governance and leadership, we shall establish measures for the development of the people of Greater East Asia, with the following objectives:

Thoroughly expound the world-historical significance of the construction of Greater East Asia with the Empire at its core and instill in the peoples of the world that the completion of this project is the joint responsibility of all.

Eliminate conventional notions of Western superiority and the Anglo-American view of the world, and promote the Imperial Way, while respecting the unique culture and traditions of each nation.

Strive to avoid generic blanket policies, instead making efforts to nurture those in Greater East Asia in their daily lives by through the leadership of the Yamato race (Ishii 1981, p. 8, Footnote 15).

Through this "proclamation of the Imperial Way," Leadership-style Asianism became explicit, and with the foreign policy philosophy of "imperialism at the core" and efforts toward the "leadership of the Yamato race," Japan upheld Leadership-style Asianism until its surrender at the end of the Pacific War.

In much of the Anglophone literature on Asianism and Japan, Alliance-style Asianism and Leadership-style Asianism are conflated under the umbrella term "Pan-Asianism" (*han Ajia shugi,* as in Duara 2001; He 2004; Saaler and Koschmann 2007; Peters 2019; Campagnola 2022). Such discussions have tended to gloss over the early days of Alliance-style Asianism as lacking influence or as functioning simply as a basis for the later Leadership-style Asianism. Certainly, there is continuity between Alliance- and Leadership-style Asianism through the idea of a united region or race to counter the forces of Western imperialism based on common racial and cultural origins. Nonetheless, the idea of Japan as part of Asia as an equal member versus Japan as the leader of Asia, is a crucial difference between the two. Saaler (2007) recognizes this shift in his discussion of Pan-Asianism as a concept that "had developed from a vague romantic and idealistic feeling of solidarity into an ideology that could be applied to the sphere of *Realpolitik,"* (Saaler 2007, p. 7) while Morifumi (2007) advocates for a distinction between "early" and "late" Asianism based on Japan's shifting attitude toward China as one of equality to one of nationalist expansion. However, as shown above, there was no linear transformation of Asianism from Alliance-style to Leadership-style. Instead, Japan's position in relation to Asia, whether it be in, with or for, were discussed simultaneously, until the Japanese imperialist project silenced other sides of the debate. Yet Leadership-style Asianism, despite its prominence in the literature, was but one iteration, or perhaps more accurately a perversion, of a larger concept that neither began nor ended with Japan's imperialism.

The above sections have shown that Japanese conceptions of Asianism shifted between the pre-Pacific War and wartime periods yet maintained two core elements of the existence of "Asia" as a concept and the potential for a united Asia to counter Western encroachment. The following sections will show how certain elements of Asianism have been maintained through the concept of Asian regionalism and reflected in Japan's post-war foreign policy and international cooperation efforts. The authors will argue that Japan has kept Asia at the center of its foreign and international cooperation policy while simultaneously moving away from the idea of Asia as a challenge to Western power.

#### **4 Reparations and the Commencement of Japanese ODA**

Asianism as a term disappeared from public discourse after World War II as it had come to represent the ideology underlying the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Yet far from a desire to disengage with Asia, the post-war period saw a great deal of Japanese involvement in the region through the provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Roughly 90% of Japan's ODA went to Asia in the 1970s (Kawai and Takagi 2004), and while this percentage has steadily declined since then, over 60% of bilateral aid was allocated to Asia in 2021 and Asia also topped the list of regional recipients of multilateral aid (OECD 2023). The start of Japanese ODA is officially recognized as Japan's participation in the British-led Colombo Plan in 1954 (MOFA 2022). However Japan had been providing aid in the form of war reparations since the early 1950s (Kuramoto 2003). Reparations were paid to Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam from 1955–1965 while "quasi reparations" were provided to Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia in the form of economic assistance tied to agreements to renounce claims for formal reparations (Kawai and Takagi 2004). While official reparations were never paid to China, the sizable amount of aid given to China since 1979 has been viewed as reparations from Japan's perspective (Kawai and Takagi 2004).

Japan's sustained engagement in Asian development through ODA provision can be viewed from several perspectives. An instrumentalist perspective can explain Japan's eagerness to provide ODA as an investment in Asia for the growth of foreign markets for Japan's post-war economic recovery. Indeed, the international community has criticized Japanese aid as overly opportunistic (Takamine 2006). Nonetheless, Japanese aid to Asia continued. Aside from economic rationales, there is some evidence of ideological continuity in aid provision between the pre- and post-war eras in terms of Japan's relationship with Asia. While the term Asianim has never been explicit in Japan's ODA policies past or present, Kuramoto (2003) points out the continuity between pre-war and wartime economic support to Japanese colonies and post-war provision of ODA. Not only were implementation strategies virtually the same, focusing on self-help, mutual interests and long-term, state-centered development plans; many of the people in charge of designing these strategies remained the same from the colonial to the post-war period (Kuramoto 2003). Notably, Kuramoto argues that such institutional continuity allowed for ideas to be carried over from the wartime to post-war periods, including the creation of an Asian economic bloc previously embodied by the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

When considering the creation of an Asian economic bloc in terms of He's definition of Asian regionalism, "the organization of political, economic, cultural and social lives along the lines of an imagined region rather than according to the standard political unit of the nation-state" (He 2017, p. 1), Japan's reinterpretation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in terms of Asian regionalism comes into focus. While Japan is not at the center as an imperial power, and though bloc economies have since fallen out of fashion, the idea of an Asia-centric economy became an anchor-point for Japan's Asian regionalism.

#### **5 The Bandung Conference and South-South Cooperation**

In the year following Japan's inaugural participation in the Colombo Plan, Japan sent a delegation to the "Asian-African Conference" in Bandung, Indonesia, after being invited (albeit controversially) as a member of the region. At the conference, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" (the so-called Ten Principles for Peace) was adopted by 29 participating countries. Japan enthusiastically supported the Declaration, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamoru Shigemitsu reiterated this support in a diplomatic speech in the same year, stating "it is Japan's long-cherished desire to establish friendly relations with the liberated Asian countries" and "economic and commercial relations with neighboring Asian countries are today a matter of life and death for Japan." Further, he asserted that the Japanese delegation at the Bandung Conference "widely disseminated the aims of our peace diplomacy and made meaningful proposals for economic cooperation and cultural exchange within the region" (Japanese Politics and International Relations Database). At least rhetorically, these statements echo earlier calls for Asian unity and maintain a vision of an economically integrated region. Politically, they can be interpreted as an attempt for Japan to rebrand itself as a peaceful nation, appealing to other Asian nations based on common experience while downplaying Japan's own imperialist past (Dennehy 2007).

The Bandung Conference, however, was not solely attended by countries in the Asian region as it also included newly independent African countries; however the subsequent Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which originated from ideas formed at the Bandung Conference, was not attended by Japan. Nevertheless, the Bandung Conference influenced the direction of Japanese diplomacy to a certain extent, which can be observed in the frequent references to the Conference and the "Bandung Spirit" in speeches and foreign policy documents by prime ministers and foreign ministers. Two years after the Conference, the Kishi Nobusuke administration formulated the "Three Principles of Diplomacy," which, along with "UN-centeredness" and "cooperation with liberal countries," stated that "Asia is bound to our country by deep geographical, historical, cultural and spiritual ties" and that Japan should "firmly maintain its position as a member of Asia" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1958, p. 6). This principle became the basis for Japan's policy of putting Asia at the center of foreign cooperation and promoting South-South cooperation through ODA.

Thus, while again not explicit, Japanese participation in the Bandung Conference and subsequent promotion of South-South cooperation can be considered a reengagement with some of the sentiments underlying Alliance-style Asianism while simultaneously taking a turn toward economic concerns, which would come to define Japan's stance toward Asian regionalism.

#### **6 The Fukuda Doctrine and Assistance for ASEAN**

The anti-Japanese protests that confronted the Japanese delegation during Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Southeast Asia in 1974 triggered a fundamental rethinking of Japan's policies in Southeast Asia. In 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda visited six Southeast Asian countries, ending the diplomatic tour in Manila, the Philippines. There he laid out the basic policy of Japan's new diplomatic approach in Southeast Asia in a speech which later became known as the Fukuda Doctrine:

First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community.

Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding with these countries, in wide-ranging fields covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas.

Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries, and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of the like mind [sic] outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina, and will thus contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1977).

Two observations can be made. First, while the existence of Asia and Japan's friendly relations with Asia are explicit, there is no indication of unity or solidarity between Japan and Southeast Asia. Instead, Japan vows to support ASEAN's own internal solidarity as an "equal partner." This differs from both Alliance- and Leadership-style Asianism as Alliance-style Asianism envisioned a united Asia with equal members and Leadership-style Asianism envisioned one Asia with Japan at the helm. Instead, in the Fukuda Doctrine Japan maintains distance from the region on the one hand while simultaneously pledging heavy support on the other. The Doctrine is regarded as the forerunner of Japan's diplomatic and international cooperation philosophies in Asia, delineating Japan's plan to double ODA to Southeast Asia over the subsequent five years. Indeed, support for ASEAN has become a priority of Japan's foreign policy and foreign cooperation policy in Asia.

Second, the inclusion of "other nations of the like mind outside the region" in the third pillar of the Doctrine reveals both a shift away from Asianism and a movement toward a more open interpretation of Asian regionalism. Whereas both Alliance- and Leadership-style Asianism promoted a united Asia in the face of Western encroachment, the inclusion of "other nations … outside the region" in the Fukuda Doctrine leaves the door open for wider participation. Thus, while pledging support for a united Southeast Asia and the emerging Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Fukuda Doctrine also foreshadowed an increasingly open stance in Japanese regional conceptions.

#### **7 The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept and APEC**

From the late 1970s Japan began to form and disseminate its own Asian regional concepts. Proposed by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1978, the "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" was a regional framework based on the newly formed concept of the "Pacific Basin." This new concept was based on previous regional concepts such as Kojima Kiyoshi's "Pacific Free Trade Area" concept and Foreign Minister Takeo Miki's "Asia–Pacific Regional Cooperation" concept in the 1960s and refined through discussions at the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group chaired by Saburo Okita and attended by prominent researchers such as Seizaburo Sato and Tsuneo Iida. The purpose of the group was to distill the concept of Pacific Basin Cooperation to its essence, which, as clearly stated in a report issued by the group, aimed for "open regionalism" to challenge the growing forces of bloc economies and regional protectionism. Specifically, it attempted to counter trends toward protectionism such as the single market strategy in Europe and negotiations of free trade agreements in North America (Tanaka 2007).

It is by no means an exclusive and closed regionalism vis-a-vis outside of the region. Seriously concerned over what appears to be a decline in the free and open international economic system grounded in the GATT and IMF arrangements, we sincerely hope that the Pacific countries can capitalize upon their characteristic vigor and dynamism to become globalism's new supporters (The Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group 1980, "The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept").

The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept led to the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in Canberra, Australia in the late 1980s. Leading up to the establishment of the PECC, Asia–Pacific regional economic cooperation advanced against the backdrop of deepening economic interdependence and rapid economic development in the region, as well as the need for a coordinated response to trade friction with the United States. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) later initiated a ministerial-level meeting in the region, elevating discussions beyond the PECC. The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Conference was subsequently formed in 1989 when Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke called for an Asia–Pacific ministerial meeting, including the United States. While the initiative was jointly led by Japan and Australia, Japan was hesitant to advocate directly for an Asian regional framework due to the not-sodistant memories of previous wars and control in the region, especially the promotion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Tanaka 2007). Thus, Australia was asked to take on the role of core organizer of the initiative, extending official invitations to each country.

APEC is a forum for regional multilateral cooperation in Asia recognizing the potential of the Asia–Pacific region as a center for world economic growth. Designed to liberalize and facilitate trade and investment and economic and technological cooperation in the region, the guiding principle of APEC is "open regional cooperation," a direct extension of the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept. Through such cooperation APEC aims to expand free trade in the region, eventually extending to the global stage.

APEC, which includes North America, has become the most important regional framework guiding Japan's economic diplomacy in the "Asia–Pacific," including North America. After its establishment under the leadership of Australia and Japan, APEC gradually evolved from an economic ministerial meeting to a summit meeting, and the Japanese government's strategic priorities for the regional framework similarly expanded to include policy areas beyond the economy, including Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. In the 1992 Official Development Assistance Charter, for example, APEC is mentioned explicitly: "In order to cope with transnational regional problems, Japan will cooperate more closely with international organizations and other frameworks for regional cooperation such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)" (Government of Japan 1992, Sect. 4).

While the Fukuda Doctrine foreshadowed a broader regional definition, Japan's participation in APEC further widened the scope of Japan's conception of the Asian region to include Australia and the United States. This stance was also evidenced by Japan's lack of support for Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's proposal for an "East Asian Economic Group" (EAEG) due to its exclusion of Western countries (Yunling 2005). Movement toward open regionalism diverges from the Asianisms discussed earlier in the chapter. The inclusion of Australia and the United States nullify the potential for a united Asia to counter Western power, while the idea of Asia as a region based on shared characteristics also falls out of reach. Viewed from another angle, however, the original impetus behind APEC was to protect against the threat of "Fortress Europe" or a single European market (Tanaka 2007). In this sense, although the definition of Asia was expanded to the Asia–Pacific, APEC was founded as a counterbalance to the threat of Western (in this case European) economic encroachment, in line with Asianism.

#### **8 The East Asian Community Concept and ASEAN+3**

As discussed above, until the 1990s Japan's conception of Asian regionalism was developed through two regional frameworks: Southeast Asia and the Asia–Pacific. Yet from the late 1990s, the simultaneous emergence of the ASEAN+3 framework, the East Asia Summit framework and the Trilateral Summit framework has, together with the existing frameworks of APEC and ASEAN, transformed Asia into a multilayered venue for regional cooperation.

The ASEAN+3 regional forum attended by the ASEAN member countries and Japan, China and Korea, was initiated in 1997 in response to the Asian currency crisis. The crisis has been viewed as a trigger for a "new" Asian regionalism that features a focus on economic interests, equal participation and consensus (Yunling 2005). This renewed solidarity and regional identity was built upon both a sense of shared crisis and growing disillusionment with the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), largely seen as ineffective in resolving the crisis (Kim and Lee 2004). ASEAN has been at the center of the "new" regionalism, with ASEAN+3 prompting the leaders of the three East Asian countries to attend the ASEAN Summit later in the same year.

Later, in the 2000s, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi started to advocate for an "East Asian Community" concept based on the ASEAN+3 framework. In a policy speech titled "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A sincere and open partnership" given in Singapore during an official visit to ASEAN in January 2002, Koizumi shared his vision for a new regional framework based on ASEAN+3. The new framework, based on the concept of "community," notably included Australia and New Zealand, yet diverged from the APEC framework in that it did not seek the participation of the United States or other North American countries. Further, though the speech focused on economic cooperation, it also approached cooperation from a broader perspective: "While recognizing our historical, cultural, ethnic and traditional diversity, I would like to see countries in the region become a group that works together in harmony." The focus on regional cooperation is also apparent in the Second ODA Charter, revised in 2003, which calls for the strengthening of economic partnerships in East Asia through use of ODA:

Asia, a region with close relationship to Japan and which can have a major impact on Japan's stability and prosperity, is a priority region for Japan … In particular, the East Asian region which includes ASEAN is expanding and deepening economic interdependency and has been making efforts to enhance its regional competitiveness by maintaining economic growth and strengthening integration in recent years. ODA will be utilized to forge stronger relations with this region and to rectify disparities in the region, fully considering such factors as the strengthening of economic partnership with East Asian countries (Government of Japan 2003, Sect. 4).

Following the developments observed in the Fukuda Doctrine and APEC, the East Asian Community concept viewed Japan as a "partner" with East Asian countries, rather than Asia as a unified whole with Japan as a member or leader. The strong focus on economic rationales and the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand further distance Japan's concept of Asian regionalism from previous Asianist thought.

Over the course of his tenure, Prime Minister Koizumi promoted the concept of the "East Asian Community," introducing the concept in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2004. In the same year, the "Establishment of an East Asian Community" centered upon ASEAN+3 was included in the "Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation" adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of China, Japan and Korea. The idea of establishing an East Asian Community gained further momentum in 2005 when the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 meetings were joined by Australia, New Zealand and India to form the "East Asia Summit." Further, while Chinese, Japanese and Korean leaders have convened in the ASEAN region since the establishment of ASEAN+3, the first independent trilateral summit meeting was held in Fukuoka, Japan in 2008. The summit served as a venue for the deepening of the commitment to building an East Asian Community, with ASEAN+3 again at the center of such efforts. Such momentum was maintained and strengthened despite subsequent political change in Japan. When the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009, the establishment of an East Asian Community became a top priority for Japanese diplomacy. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was an avid supporter of the concept, incorporating his own idea of a "fraternal" spirit, and even began to advocate for the establishment of a collective security system in East Asia.

Thus, Japan's support for and participation in ASEAN+3, as well as the establishment of the East Asian Community concept, can be seen as further attempts to show solidarity with the region, although much of the spirit of Asianism has been lost. On the other hand, rising competition with China for regional leadership has been a major force driving the participation of both Japan and China in ASEAN+3 (Nabers 2010). However, such leadership is a far cry from that conceptualized as part of Leadership-style Asianism. Indeed, ASEAN+3 has been considered a key structure for ensuring that neither Japan nor China take sole leadership in the region (Nabers 2010). However, Japan–China relations rapidly deteriorated with the Senkaku Islands nationalization crisis in 2011; and relations between Japan and South Korea were also strained due to disputes over interpretations of history. Thus, when political power was returned to the Liberal Democratic party in 2012, the second Abe Shinzo cabinet made no mention of the "East Asian Community" concept, and the efforts toward the establishment of an "East Asian Community" toward a policy of Asian regionalism were completely derailed.

#### **9 The Asian Gateway Initiative and TPP/RCEP**

While the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s prompted a temporary slowdown of the regional economy, by the 2000s East and Southeast Asian economies were growing rapidly, led by China. Meanwhile, Japan was stuck in an economic slump following the bursting of the bubble economy in the 1990s. Faced with this situation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (the first Abe Cabinet), who took office in 2006, proposed the "Asian Gateway Initiative" at the 165th session of the Diet. The initiative envisioned "Japan as a bridge between Asia and the world for the movement of people, goods, money culture and information" to "introduce the growth and dynamism of Asia and other foreign countries to Japan" (Office of the Prime Minister 2007). The following May 2007, the Cabinet Secretariat established the "Asian Gateway Strategy Council," for which Abe appointed Tokyo University Professor Ito Motoshige as the Chair.

In the Council's report, "The Asian Gateway Initiative" (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2007), the Initiative recognizes that "Japan's relationship with Asia was once viewed as a vertical one, emphasizing the difference between the two. The relation now becomes a horizontal and strategic one, with more emphasis on Japan's place in the region" and states a core goal "to play a responsible role in the development of Asia and its regional order" (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2008, pp. 2–4). The Initiative is anchored by three basic philosophies: "To make Japan a country that people want to visit, study, work and live in;" "To maintain and further deepen an open regional order with an emphasis on the economy" and "To establish relations of mutual understanding and trust while respecting the region's diversity" (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2008, p. 4). By creating an open Japan, horizontal relations between Asia and Japan can be formed, leading to the further development of Asia (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2008, pp. 2–4). Here too, equal partnership between Japan and Asia, the inclusion of the Pacific West and a focus on economic goals can be observed in Japan's approach to Asian regionalism.

This philosophy was maintained and carried over to the second Abe administration when Prime Minister Abe took office again in 2012. In 2015, during Prime Minister Abe's tenure, Japan's ODA Charter was revised, with the new Charter delineating Asia's importance for the Japanese economy:

In Asia, hard (physical) and soft (non-physical) basic infrastructure built with development cooperation has contributed to improving the investment climate. Development cooperation's role as a catalyst promoted private investment, which in turn has led to economic growth and poverty reduction in the recipient countries. It is important to recognize that, through these processes, Asia has developed into an important market and investment destination for Japanese private companies, and therefore, an extremely important region for the Japanese economy (Government of Japan 2015, p.12).

Further, the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 2022 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), strongly promoted by the second Abe administration and achieved through Japan's leadership efforts, were the very embodiment of the Asia Gateway concept based on horizontal relations between Asia and Japan.

#### **10 Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have shown how Asianism has developed historically as a concept influencing and influenced by Japanese diplomacy and international cooperation, and how it has appeared in and disappeared from Japan's Asian regionalism. In its modern history, Japan has proposed a diverse range of regional concepts, initiatives and policies including Japan–China cooperation, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, South-South cooperation, support for ASEAN, the Pacific Basin solidarity concept, the East Asian Community concept, the Asian Gateway concept and the strategy for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. These concepts have varied in their definition of the term "region" and have covered a wide range of goals, philosophies and sectors. Further, Japan's positioning within the Asian "region" and its relationship to regions outside of Asia (e.g., Europe) have likewise been diverse. What has held true throughout such shifts in terminology and meanings, however, is Japan's focus on Asia as the primary region of its foreign policy and international cooperation efforts.

Further, currents of Asianism run through many of these concepts, initiatives and policies, although weakened over time. At the beginning of the chapter, Hotta's (2007) fundamental elements of Asianism were introduced. They are:

During the pre-war and wartime periods, both elements were visible in Japan's foreign policy while in the post-war period both elements have slowly been eroded over time with the increased involvement of the US and other Western states in economic and security policy. This shift from closed to open regionalism signifies a move from regionalism based on inter-regional competition to regionalism supporting the transition to globalization, including cooperation and partnership with the social economies of Europe and the United States. Adherence to the existence/ creation of a distinct Asia with shared characteristics has also weakened over time. At the Japanese government-sponsored Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Kenya in 2016, Prime Minister Abe announced the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy," a direct response to Chinese President Jinping Xi's "One Belt, One Road" Strategy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy advocates for regional cooperation linking Africa and Asia across the Indian and Pacific Oceans to ensure the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade and economic partnerships. While the FOIP does not explicitly exclude China, it is seen as a US-Japan-led attempt to challenge China's economic and political rise through the redefinition of Asia based on democratic principles and has overshadowed previous regional concepts influencing Japan's foreign policy. Further, the concept of the "Indo-Pacific" has been promoted by Japan at international conferences since 2017 and has begun to permeate the foreign policy of the United States and Australia. Though tentatively accepted by some other nations in the region, it has also been eyed with suspicion by ASEAN nations wary of the US's confrontational stance toward China (Shoji 2021).

While Asianism has informed Japanese conceptions of Asian regionalism in the post-war period, recent developments and redefinitions of Asian regionalism have weakened the influence of Asianism on Japanese foreign and international development policy. In the recently revised ODA Charter (MOFA 2023), the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" has replaced any mention of Asia; indeed, the term does not appear in the Charter. This idea of a new, "Asia-less" Pacific region can perhaps be seen as a step away from Asian regionalism and toward internationalism.

#### **References**

**Lauren Nakasato** Lauren Nakasato is a recent graduate of the Waseda University Graduate School of Asia–Pacific Studies Ph.D. program in International Studies. Her doctoral research examined the impact of the internationalization of higher education on the global citizenship learning of Japanese university students. She has held positions as a research assistant at the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development and as an adjunct lecturer for the Global Studies in English Program at Kyoritsu Women's University. She holds a B.A. in Sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles and an M.A. in International Relations from Waseda University.

**Kazuo Kuroda** Kuroda is Professor at the Waseda University Graduate School of Asia–Pacific Studies and Visiting Research Fellow at the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development. He holds degrees from Waseda University (B.A., 1989), Stanford University (M.A., 1993) and Cornell University (Ph.D., 1996). He has been interested in the internationalization of higher education in Asia and the global and regional governance of education. He held positions at the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C. and Hiroshima University before coming to Waseda. His most recently authored book is *A History of Japan's International Cooperation in Education* (University of Tokyo Press, 2023).

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## *Hito-zukuri***: It is Not Just Human Resources Development**

**Noriyuki Hashimoto**

**Abstract** This chapter aims to examine and clarify the Japanese concept of *hitozukuri*, paying attention to international and internal development policies of the Japanese government. *Hito-zukuri* has been generally translated as "human resourses development" related to technical cooperation in the context of international development. However, *hito-zukuri* also includes an element of formal and nonformal moral education to nurture "Japaneseness" both for Japanese youth, especially historically in the postwar high economic growth period, and for people in developing countries through international development and cooperation. *Hito-zukuri* holds two types education: technological and moral. In *hito-zukuri*, practitioners see its targets for education not only as technologically but also as morally developing people. Therefore *hito-zukuri* cannot be translated directly as human resources development without extensive qualification. Moreover, the restriction of *hito-zukuri* operations to the developing world betrays a stratified perspective on who is in need of moral development, which is problematic given the particular aim of moral education to promote "Japaneseness."

**Keywords** *Hito-zukuri* · Education · Japaneseness · Morality · Stratification

Those who demand that others keep the social order should, if they are grateful for this order, aspire to improve and develop it (Watanabe 1993, p. 198)

*Hito-zukuri*: Fostering people useful for society (Matsumura et al. 1992, p. 1090).

#### **1 The Concept of** *Hito-zukuri*

The term *hito-zukuri* can be broken down into *hito* and *zukuri*; *hito* means people or human, and *zukuri* suggests making, forming, building. *Hito-zukuri* is often translated as "human resources development" in English, and is used in the context of

N. Hashimoto (B)

Department of International Studies and Communications, Yamanashi Prefectural University, Kofu, Japan

e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
J. Sato and S. Kim (eds.), *The Semantics of Development in Asia*, The University of Tokyo Studies on Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1215-1\_6

international development, assistance and cooperation in Japanese. The term itself conveys a sense of action aimed at bringing about some form of change in a population or class of people. Some people may perceive *hito-zukuri* as desirable, with its implied associations with *mono-zukuri* [craftsmanship] and *machi-zukuri* [community design]. However, if we stop and think for a moment about the actual meaning of *hito-zukuri*, we realize that the term is not so clearly defined. It is therefore far from certain whether *hito-zukuri* can actually be translated directly into English as "human resources development." In this chapter, I aim to examine and clarify the meaning and structure of *hito-zukuri* as a concept, paying attention to foreign and domestic development policies of the Japanese government.1

This effort to uncover the reality of the *hito-zukuri* concept reflects a focus on the Japanese government's basic approach to international assistance and cooperation. This is because *hito-zukuri*, together with concepts such as "self-help," the "requestbased principle," and "human security," is an ideal pursued by the Japanese government in its assistance and cooperation efforts. Japan's 1992 Official Development Assistance Charter sets forth a policy of extensive *hito-zukuri* predicated on the basic approach of supporting self-help efforts by developing countries to achieve socioeconomic development (MOFA 1999). The Charter states that "A priority of Japan's ODA will be placed on assistance to human resources development [*hito-zukuri*] which, in the long term, is the most significant element of self-help efforts towards socioeconomic development and is a basic factor for the nation-building [*kuni-zukuri*] of developing countries" (MOFA 1999). Likewise, the 2003 Official Development Assistance Charter states that "The most important philosophy of Japan's ODA is to support the self-help efforts of developing countries based on good governance, by extending cooperation for their human resource development [*hito-zukuri*], institution building including development of legal systems, and economic and social infrastructure building, which constitute the basis for these countries' development" (MOFA 2004). This emphasis on human resources development [*hito-zukuri*] is reaffirmed as one of the "foundations of self-help efforts and self-reliant development" under the latest 2015 Development Cooperation Charter (MOFA 2015). The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japanese government's international assistance and cooperation implementation agency, concentrating on technical cooperation, has also characterized its own stance in terms of "*kuni-zukuri*, *hito-zukuri*, and interpersonal connections," hoping to build trust with people in developing countries (JICA 1994). When the appropriateness and consistency of the Japanese government's assistance and cooperation ideals are criticized (Udagawa 2017), only *hitozukuri* is defended as consistent with the global dominant trend in international assistance and cooperation (Shimomura 2018, p. 502). This championing of *hitozukuri* seems to indicate that it will continue to be one of the ideals for the Japanese government in the future.

The inclusion of human development in aid and cooperation ideals publicly communicates the importance of people in development. It sounds attractive. However, the brightness of an ideal does not guarantee the consistency of its underpinning concepts. Sometimes a dazzling ideal can obscure the substance of the concept. Even JICA, which characterizes its own initiatives as *hito-zukuri*, has pointed out the ambiguity of the term and has persistently engaged in efforts to clarify the concept, focusing on such aspects as its relationship with the concept of human resources development (JICA Institute for International Cooperation 1987, 1989, 1997, 1999). However, this fails to shed light on some aspects of *hito-zukuri*, such as its propensity toward moral education based on the Japaneseness and the stratified limitation of its object as discussed in the main part of this paper. Moreover, while these other aspects have been discussed elsewhere, existing studies have not sufficiently referred to the Japanese context. That is, efforts to define *hito-zukuri* in the existing literature have been far from systematic. In this chapter, I define *hito-zukuri* in the context not only of international development but also that of domestic development, which is more firmly structured in the Japanese society, and illuminate the unique characteristics of this concept. In Sect. 2, I trace *hito-zukuri* in Japanese government foreign policy, and in Sect. 3 I track it in its domestic policy. In Sect. 4, I synthesize these two aspects to further clarify what *hito-zukuri* is. Finally, in Sect. 5, I discuss what *hito-zukuri*  should be.

#### **2 The Popularization of** *Hito-zukuri*

The first official use of *hito-zukuri* by the Japanese government in foreign affairs is said to have been at the fifth meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in May 1979 (Yamada et al. 2019, p. 169), when then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) advocated the need for "international cooperation for the purpose of *hito-zukuri*," as follows.

I want to emphasize that "*hito-zukuri*" is the foundation of "*kuni-zukuri* [nation building or national development]." Looking back over the history of Japan, during the past century our efforts to achieve modernization have focused on education amid scarce natural resources. We have made *the development of human resources* the pillar of Japan's "*kuni-zukuri*." [...] When attempting to transfer technologies to developing countries and ensure that they take root there [...] we consider it a priority *to enhance basic school education and train specialist technical personnel who can directly undertake development* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA 1980); author's emphasis).

Three points can be discerned from Ohira's speech. First, *hito-zukuri* is not a goal in itself, but rather a means to accomplish *kuni-zukuri* [nation building or national development]. Second, the Japanese government is attempting to rely on Japan's own experience of development to guide its international cooperation. It could be said that Ohira presents a theory of modernization, of sorts, where Japan's experience is considered the model of development. Third, *hito-zukuri* carries two connotations: enhancing basic school education and training specialist technical personnel.

The first two points formed the baseline for the subsequent development of the *hito-zukuri* concept. In the case of the third point, however, the emphasis on basic school education faded in foreign policy discourse, and *hito-zukuri* became synonymous with the training of specialist technical personnel with scientific and technological education. In the ASEAN *hito-zukuri* cooperation project proposed by the Japanese government in 1981, for example, the perception that economic development depended on human resources development in fields such as agriculture, industry, and energy was used as a reason to advocate the *gratis* provision of funding and technical cooperation to promote *hito-zukuri* (MOFA 1981).

According to JICA, *hito-zukuri* was already being implemented in the form of scientific and technological education even prior to the speech by Prime Minister Ohira in 1979 (JICA Institute for International Cooperation 1999, pp. 23–26). The Japanese government became directly involved in developing technical personnel after joining the Colombo Plan in 1954.2 It subsequently implemented systematic local personnel development initiatives, such as the ASEAN Human Resources Development Center. From around 1990 onward, it became necessary to "diversify" *hito-zukuri* from a concept targeting purely economic development into one that included basic education development3 and social development, in view of the "worldwide trend towards emphasizing basic education" (JICA Institute for International Cooperation 1999, p. 27). It was as if Ohira's ideals had been reinstated.

Since the 1990s, the profile of the *hito-zukuri* concept has grown and shrunk in accordance with the political standpoint of those using it. At a social development summit in 1995, for example, then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama of the Japanese Socialist Party called for "social development that prioritizes human beings" over the economy and emphasized "the importance of *hito-zukuri* to develop the abilities of each individual citizen, including the socially disadvantaged such as those with disabilities, in the context of *kuni-zukuri*" (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and The University of Tokyo Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia 2023).

In general, Ohira's political stance is regarded as conservative, and Murayama's as liberal. They both make use of the *hito-zukuri* concept, but with different connotations. Certainly, both politicians use *hito-zukuri* as a means to achieve the greater goal of *kuni-zukuri*. However, Murayama shifts the focus of *hito-zukuri* onto people themselves, encouraged by the "worldwide movement" towards "human development" advocated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990 (JICA Institute for International Cooperation 1999, p. 32).

In 2001, however, then LDP Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi advocated "the importance of education in *kuni-zukuri*" at the Genoa Summit, which led to the emergence within the Japanese government of "the perception that investment in education based on self-help was the most effective way to reduce poverty and promote economic growth in developing countries" (MOFA 2002). The Japanese government announced its policy of *Basic Education for Growth Initiative (BEGIN)*  in the following year, emphasizing its focus on basic education from the perspective of "*hito-zukuri* for the sake of *kuni-zukuri*" (MOFA 2002).

In the context of *BEGIN*, "*hito-zukuri* for the sake of *kuni-zukuri*" is contrasted with the human development concept. Here, human development is understood as "the acquisition by each individual member of society of the knowledge and skills needed to live a fitting life for a human and autonomously choose their own future (empowerment)" (MOFA 2002). Human development, which emphasizes people rather than countries, recalls Murayama's concept of "*hito-zukuri* to develop the abilities of each individual citizen," and suggests that Murayama and Koizumi used *hito-zukuri* with more or less opposite connotations. The *hito-zukuri* concept allows for a certain fluidity of meaning.

From 2000 onward, the "human security" perspective, introduced partly through the involvement of the Japanese government, also became a point of reference in the context of *hito-zukuri*. "Japanese aid to the African region increased swiftly from 2010 onward, partly as a result of the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV), with the implementation of vocational training for discharged soldiers in countries that had experienced conflict, and basic vocational training for socially disadvantaged people" (Shimazu and Tsujimoto 2021, p. 115).

In this way, the features of *hito-zukuri* have changed in line with global policy movements and political standpoints. It is a very malleable concept that can be adjusted to suit the intentions of the speaker. This adjustment has led to a proliferation of different meanings for the *hito-zukuri* concept. *Hito-zukuri* not only implies basic school education and vocational training but is also used to refer to concepts such as human development and human security. However, the more meanings are attributed to a concept, the weaker its fundamental essence becomes—reduced, in the extreme case, to a common theme of being "related to humans" in the case of *hito-zukuri*—and the more ambiguous it becomes.

The increasingly enigmatic tendency of *hito-zukuri* is also partially attributable to the fact that it is used to refer not only to the object of assistance and cooperation but also to the method employed. "*Hito-zukuri* as an object" refers to assistance and cooperation directly aimed at developing various human abilities, through education and vocational training, for example. On the other hand, "*hito-zukuri* as a method" refers to the transfer of skills and techniques considered necessary for the purpose of assistance or cooperation, whether it be in the medical field, the media, or elsewhere (Yamada et al. 2019, pp. 167–168). From the perspective of "*hito-zukuri* as a method," any involvement in development by the Japanese government could be called *hitozukuri* (Kayashima and Kuroda 2019, p. 401). If everything can be referred to as *hito-zukuri*, however, then it becomes unserviceable as a concept. Is *hito-zukuri* a floating signifier? Or does it have a hidden and common meaning?

#### **3 The Domestic Origin of** *Hito-zukuri*

Japan was defeated in World War II in 1945, and regained independence in 1952. In the 1956 Economic White Paper, the Japanese government stated that "the 'postwar' period is over" with the completion of rebuilding and revival after defeat in 1945, and proclaimed the launch of development under the name of "modernization" pivoting to economic growth (Economic Planning Agency 1956). Japan was a "developing country."

The LDP's Hayato Ikeda, who became Prime Minister in 1960, initiated a plan aimed at economic growth, referred to as the Income Doubling Plan. To achieve this plan, he also focused on measures such as the training of personnel to undertake industrialization. In August 1962, Prime Minister Ikeda used the word *hito-zukuri*  for the first time in an official context in his general policy speech at the Diet (Ito 1962, p. 119). This was approximately 17 years before Prime Minister Ohira used it in a foreign relations context.

I am determined to strive to *promote and renew education*, and to make every effort for *hito-zukuri*, which is the foundation of *kuni-zukuri*. [...] I intend to implement education for our children that cultivates *moral virtues*, fosters *a sentiment of love for the motherland*, gives them the knowledge necessary for the progress of the times, and *builds even finer and more outstanding Japanese nationals*, able to contribute to Japan's prosperity and promote world peace (National Diet Library 2022a; author's emphasis).

*After use by Ikeda, hito-zukuri* became a popular term. While it succeeded as "a catch-phrase" (Itō 1962, p. 117), it also conveyed a nuance of "molding people into the desired shape" (Nagasu 1962, p. 101), probably associated with the underlined sections in the quote above. The people were to be strongly positioned as a means for *kuni-zukuri* [nation building or national development].4

In his policy speech of January 1963, Ikeda went on to attribute the "success" of Japan's economic growth to "the ingenuity and innovation of the Japanese nationals," arguing that "we have proven that the fate of a nation is determined not by the size of its territory or how much money it possesses but rather by our determination and diligence as Japanese nationals." This, he claimed, "gives clear hope to the emerging countries still at early stages of development."At the same time, however, he cited issues within Japan, such as income inequality and delays in the completion of social infrastructure, as well as a lack of "respect and affection for the Japanese nation, race, and tradition" and a lack of "public spirit," advocating further efforts not only aimed at "promoting scientific and technological education" but also "enhancing moral education" (National Diet Library 2022b). On the one hand, Ikeda's vision demands scientific and technological education to provide the knowledge and technology to contribute to economic growth and promote ingenuity and innovation. On the other, it demands moral education to encourage moral virtues such as determination, diligence, public spirit, and respect for the nation.

This relationship between *hito-zukuri* and education becomes even clearer when Ikeda's *hito-zukuri* policies are considered in conjunction with his cabinet's education plan. This education plan is presented in "The Ideal Image of the Japanese [*Kitaisareru Ningenzō*]," an appendix to the Central Council for Education's report "Expanding and Enhancing Upper Secondary Education," dated October 1966. The council bemoans the emergence of "egoism" and "hedonism" among "the Japanese people"—"a situation where only material desire grows without spiritual ideals" precipitated by economic growth and technological innovation (Central Council for Education 1966). Not just compulsory skills development for individuals but also the promotion of moral or collective virtues such as "public spirit" and "authentic patriotism" are proposed as means to overcome this situation (Central Council for Education 1966). The goal of economic growth itself is left unchanged. Instead, the council prescribes the medicine of moral education to correct its perceived ailments. This can be described as "Japaneseness", a morality that aims to recover spiritual ideals.

The logical structure of *hito-zukuri* becomes clearer when viewed against "The Expected Product of Education." In other words, in order to achieve *kuni-zukuri*, including economic growth and industrialization, more was required of *hito-zukuri*  than simply training industrial personnel. Ikeda's concept of education that "cultivates moral virtues" and "fosters a sentiment of love for the motherland" was also indispensable (cf. Lee 2002). Scientific and technological education was an effective way to develop human resources to contribute to the economy and industry in the first case, while moral education was effective to cultivate moral virtues and sentiment—"Japaneseness"—in the second.5 The structure of the *hito-zukuri* concept can be presented in diagrammatic form, as shown below (Fig. 1).

However, *hito-zukuri* is still used as a catchphrase even today, without any clear, systematic explanation from those who use it. For example, in the Technical Intern Training Program for foreign nationals launched in 2016 under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), *hito-zukuri* is used in the following way.

The Technical Intern Training Program is aimed at transferring skills, technology, and knowledge to developing countries and cooperating in the *hito-zukuri* of those who will undertake economic development in developing countries, to fulfill Japan's role as an advanced country and facilitate the harmonious development of international society (MHLW 2022).

No more explicit explanation of *hito-zukuri* is provided.6 The Act on Proper Technical Intern Training and Protection of Technical Intern Trainees, which formed the legal basis for the Technical Intern Training Program, does not use the word *hito-zukuri*. Article 1 states the purpose of the Act as follows: "promoting international cooperation through the transfer of skills, technique, and knowledge […] to developing countries and other regions through human resource development."

*Hito-zukuri* could be expected to refer to moral education as well as scientific and technological education. However, whether intentionally or otherwise, the Act contains no mention of morality. This phenomenon—the omission of moral education—also occurs in the context of international development. Given Japan's history

**Fig. 1** Structure of the concept of *hito-zukuri* (prepared by the author)

as a colonial power, Japan is not in a position to openly advocate education in morality for other countries, precisely because of its links with culture and value perceptions.

#### **4 The Distinctiveness of** *Hito-zukuri*

If *hito-zukuri* were synonymous with personnel training limited to skills, techniques, and knowledge, then it would overlap with the concept of human resources development. Human resources development, with its background in human capital theory, is generally explained as "both the aim and specific methods used to grow human resources, including the development of human abilities, skills, and techniques, and the fostering of leadership" (International Development Journal 2014, p. 165). Human resources development is the same as *hito-zukuri* in terms of its involvement in human skills and techniques, and in the way it perceives humans as resources for development. It is also possible to regard *hito-zukuri* as identical to the concept of capacity development (JICA Institute for International Cooperation 1995, p. 48). Certainly, recalling the case of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Center (the "ASEAN *Hito-zukuri* Center" in Japanese), both *hito-zukuri* and capacity development share the feature of "including not only personnel training but also the development of organizations and systems" (JICA et al. 2013, p. 2).

Regarding Japan's domestic development, however, *hito-zukuri* has a different meaning from terms such as human resources development and capacity development. *Hito-zukuri* contains an element of moral education that is absent from human resources development and capacity development. In fact, this difference has been pointed out before in the context of practice and research on international development. *Hito-zukuri* "cannot necessarily be fully understood in terms of human resources development from an economics standpoint. It is a uniquely Japanese concept, connoting multi-faceted elements;" it emphasizes personal interaction and mutual understanding in assistance and cooperation activities (Kanda and Kuwajima 2005, pp. 3–6). Moreover, *hito-zukuri* embodies "Japan's traditional techniques and spirit" or "the experiences and feeling of pride in history that Japan has fostered" (JICA et al. 2013, p. 163). This spirit and feeling can be conveyed only through personal interaction. *Hito-zukuri* is further characterized as "the integration of *practical learning*, linked directly to work and life, with *moral education* as a member of the nation and society" (Yamada et al. 2019, p. 167; author's emphasis). Its aim is summarized as "the *acquisition of practical knowledge and techniques* as well as *character building*" (Yamada et al. 2019, p. 167; author's emphasis). *Hito-zukuri*  aims to improve the recipients of assistance and cooperation, not only technically but also "morally" (Yamada 2016, p. 194).

The international development debate was not, in fact, based on the historical background of *hito-zukuri* in the context of Japan's domestic development. Nevertheless, the international and domestic development debates concur on two points. First, they both emphasize involvement in the internal, or psychological, life of recipients—including spirit, morality, and character—in addition to skills, techniques, and knowledge, and both summarize *hito-zukuri* in terms of education, using Japan's experience as a model. As far as "models" are concerned, it is also possible to view *hito-zukuri* as the transmission of case studies in the "failure" of Japanese domestic development. Within Japan, *hito-zukuri* was glorified in hindsight to make up for development "problems." Therefore, internationally, it could be proposed to avoid these "problems" before they arose.7

Second, in both cases, *hito-zukuri* does not simply target people in general but, specifically, those seen as undeveloped or uncivilized. In the context of domestic development, this term was attached to children, youths, and others who fell below certain threshold of independence. In the context of international development, *hitozukuri* targets so-called developing countries, not G7 nations. In 1964, *hito-zukuri*  was used in the context of policies for foreign students (Saitō 2011, p. 7), but in this case, it was students from Asian countries, not the United States, that the policymakers had in mind. The Technical Intern Training Program, although ostensibly targeting all foreigners, is in fact an international cooperation policy targeting developing regions. French nationals, for example, are not the "foreigners" envisaged by the program's authors. Yet nobody would suggest that developed countries no longer engage in economic growth and technological innovation. One can only conclude that, in terms of the selection of targets, a system of stratification is at work in *hito-zukuri*.

Recalling the fact that *hito-zukuri* comprises both scientific and technological education and moral education, it is therefore implied that the Other at whom *hitozukuri* is targeting not only has an insufficient level of skills, techniques, and knowledge but is also considered to be morally insufficient. At the same time, *hito-zukuri* is predicated on the assumption that the initiator is able to improve the target, not only in terms of skills, techniques, and knowledge but also in terms of morality. The content of the skills, techniques, and knowledge, and also of the morality—the "Japaneseness"—is derived from Japan's own experience of development. It is expected, then, that *hito-zukuri* based on this content will be implemented not only through school education and vocational training but through all aspects of the Japanese government's assistance and cooperation efforts. If one were to rephrase this in the form of an implicit *hito-zukuri* ideal, then it would be something along the lines of "become like a Japanese person."

#### **5 When the** *Hito-zukuri* **is Justified: An Ethics of Development**

The meaning of *hito-zukuri* in Japanese boils down to the combination of education in science and technology and education in morality. However, the term "*hitozukuri*" is not used interchangeably with "education." Given Japan's history as a colonial power, education is not something that can be openly promoted in other countries. Moreover, the moral education incorporated into *hito-zukuri* is rooted in specific culture and value perceptions. The substance of this morality is "Japaneseness," which means not only valuing private exchange and mutual understanding in development activities and respecting Japanese experiences and technology, but also paying homage to the Japanese collectivist spirit.8 This is not something that Japan can advertise as its guiding motivation. It is for this reason that the moral education aspect of *hito-zukuri* is not openly explained in the context of international development and international cooperation. The difficulty in translating the term *hito-zukuri* lies precisely in this enigmatic, two-sided nature: the blending of education in science and technology and education in morality, with the morality aspect obscured. *Hito-zukuri* is not simply human resources development; nor is it capacity development. Translating *hito-zukuri* as such further obscures its morality aspect. Morality is the semantic condition that defines the term *hito-zukuri* against alternatives such as human resources development.

The target of *hito-zukuri* could be added as an objective condition. Although *hitozukuri* contains the word *hito*—people in general—in the international context it actually refers specifically to people in *developing* countries. The adult populations of *developed* countries—including Japan—are excluded. A tacit limitation exists on who is eligible to receive *hito-zukuri*. In this chapter, I have called this limitation a "stratification." People in developing countries lack not only skills, techniques, and knowledge, but also morality, and the Japanese government can supplement this lack—this is the premise on which *hito-zukuri*, with its morality and stratification, is established.

Based on these two empirical conditions, semantic and objective, I would like, in conclusion, to propose one more normative condition for *hito-zukuri*: an ethical one. If one understands "morality" as a term used by the group to force individuals to adapt to its dominant behavior, and "ethics" as resistance by individuals to group morality (Ebisaka 1997; Tsurumi 1997), then *hito-zukuri* is indeed moral. It is not, however, ethical. Of course, neither development nor education is ethical per se: both, to a greater or lesser extent, look at the other by one's own standard, and seek to bring the other up to that standard (Hashimoto 2018). *Hito-zukuri* is not unique in this sense. However, *hito-zukuri*'s morality and stratification make it prone to a heightened attitude of self-righteousness originally found in development and education. It is precisely because of this fact that, when targeting others with assistance and cooperation in the name of *hito-zukuri*, it is vital to constantly review the desirability of one's own standards. We must question the ethics of *hito-zukuri*: not of those who receive it but of those who deliver it. When we discuss and practice *hito-zukuri*, we should not be satisfied with pointing empirically that *hito-zukuri* has morality and stratification; each of us must normatively reflect what the ethics of *hito-zukuri* is for oneself.

#### **Notes**

#### **References**

**Noriyuki Hashimoto** is Associate Professor in the Department of International Studies and Communications, Yamanashi Prefectural University. He specializes in the philosophy of education and international development assistance with a specific focus on the capabilities approach, ethics of care and postcolonialism. He received academic awards from the Japan Comparative Education Society and the Japan Society for International Development in 2019. He serves on the editorial board of *Educational Studies in Japan*, the English-language journal of the Japan Educational Research Association (2020–2024). Hashimoto holds a Ph.D. in Education from University of Tsukuba.

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## **Endogenous Development: Situating Kazuko Tsurumi's Work in International Development**

#### **Kanako Omi**

**Abstract** Endogenous development theory (*naihatsuteki hattenron*) by Kazuko Tsurumi frequently appears in Japanese development discourse. However, although the idea of endogenous development has been discussed in international development discourse as well, the specifics of Tsurumi's theory have not been widely adopted. This chapter reviews the genealogy of endogenous development both in the West and Japan. Through its comparison, the chapter presents the features of Tsurumi's endogenous development theory rooted in the Asian development experience. It then discusses how the theory might be applied in the contemporary development context and concludes by making a case for Tsurumi's *naihatsuteki hattenron* in international development research and practice.

**Keywords** Endogenous development · Another development · Modernization · Social change · International development

#### **1 Introduction**

The concept of endogenous development, or development from within, frequently appears in Japanese discourse on development. Endogenous development, as used in Japan, is usually traced to the work of sociologist Kazuko Tsurumi, who theorized it as *naihatsuteki hattenron* (endogenous development theory, 内発的発展論)*.* Tsurumi's *naihatsuteki hattenron* has been applied in a wide range of fields in Japan, including economics and rural studies, and has served as a reference point for carrying out international development cooperation and community development in Japan (Inui 2017; Matsumoto 2017).

Conversely, this theory is little known internationally (Sato 2011). This is also the realization of the author, who studied development at a graduate school in England. Needless to say, concepts and ideas similar to endogenous development have often been discussed in Western development theory. Most symbolic, for example, was

K. Omi (B)

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, International Christian University, Mitaka, Japan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2024

J. Sato and S. Kim (eds.), *The Semantics of Development in Asia*, The University of Tokyo Studies on Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1215-1\_7

the criticism of modern industrialization under the idea of "another development" proposed by the Dag Hammarkskjold Foundation (1975). Although not referring to the works of Tsurumi, Holocombe (2014) has called for an endogenous development approach in development assistance projects in Africa, defining endogenous development as a process in which the regions and people of developing countries take the initiative in their development. Moreover, this perspective has similarities with other concepts of development approaches such as participatory development approaches, which emphasize and place importance on local residents taking the initiative in development projects. While it may seem difficult to recognize clear differences between these existing development concepts and theories, Miller (2014) suggests that endogenous development is unique in that it emphasizes consideration for the natural environment and the use of local traditional culture and traditional knowledge.

During the 1970s, adverse effects of modern industrialization, such as environmental pollution and human rights violations, were becoming evident throughout the world. Criticism towards development policies that focused solely on economic growth was becoming increasingly strident in international discourse. Under such circumstances, Tsurumi proposed *naihatsuteki hattenron* as a theory of social change, seeking a third path, separate from both modernization theory born in the West and the dependency theory that critiqued it (Tsurumi 1989). The theory was based on the idea that communities should be able to seek diverse development paths in line with their natural ecosystems and traditional cultures and lifestyles. While the meaning of development was often recognized as synonymous to Western modernization in those days, the development (*hatten*) in Tsurumi's *naihatsuteki hattenron* does not hold such a connotation. Tsurumi explains that in her theory, development does not refer solely to Western modernization, but should be based on the presumption of multiple systems on a global scale (Tsurumi 1989). Today, more than half a century later, the significance of Tsurumi's *naihatsuteki hattenron* seems even more relevant.

This chapter organizes and compares Tsurumi's *naihatsuteki hattenron* in terms of how it is rooted in the Asian experience, how it differs from similar Western ideas on endogenous development, and in what ways it offers a new perspective. It also discusses considerations for applying the theory in contemporary development context and concludes by making a case for "translating" and "updating" Tsurumi's *naihatsuteki hattenron* to build on her work in international development research and practice.

#### **2 A History of Endogenous Development**

#### *2.1 Endogenous Development in International Development History*

The usage of the term "endogenous" can be traced to the work of American sociologist Talcott Parsons in *An Outline of the Social System* (1961), where he presented a typology consisting of endogenous and exogenous changes as a conceptual tool for analyzing social change. Drawing on Parsons's work, sociologists—particularly those based in the West—began classifying societies into two types based on whether industrialization in a given society was instigated domestically (endogenous change) or in imitation of a process elsewhere (exogenous change). Britain, the cradle of the industrial revolution, the United States, and Western European countries, which followed in Britain's footsteps, were placed in the endogenous development category and labeled as developed nations. Other nations were classified under the rubric of exogenous development and were assumed to be able to catch up with the West by imitating the Western development model.

This typology of social change was influenced by the modernization ideology widespread in the West at that time. Modernization theory was proposed by various Western researchers. A particularly well-known example was Rostow's (1959) social development model, which proposed five stages of economic growth: (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high mass consumption. These stage development models to social change served as reference points to view Western modernization as the sole model of development.

The emergence of endogenous development ideas could also be traced back to the nineteenth century. When Britain became the "factory of the world" in the nineteenth century, the liberalism and universalism of British political economics began to engulf the world, Nishikawa articulates that endogenous thinking emerged as an opposing ideology in areas such as Germany, France, and the United States (Nishikawa 1989). Samuel Smiles' work *Self-Help* (1859) is also considered influential in promoting endogenous thinking in the nineteenth century. Smiles' idea of self-help suggested that one's progress is not dependent on laws and institutions but on the independent and self-reliant actions and efforts of each individual.

Furthermore, ideas that forged endogenous development thinking are found in the movements of the "third world" countries in the early twentieth century, in particular in Zedong Mao's slogan of "self-reliance" in China and Gandhi's philosophy of "Swaraj" in India. Mao adopted the thought of socialist revolution, which has its origins in and against Western societies, and translated the idea to fit to China's indigenous conditions using the Buddhist term "self-reliance" (Nishikawa 1989). In India, Gandhi critiqued the Western modernization process critically in 1908 for not expanding people's well-being but as exaggerating people's thirst for materialistic needs. He talks of "Swaraj," meaning "self-rule," as the foundation for India's freedom from British colonial rule.

It is Swaraj when we learn to rule ourselves. It is, therefore, in the palm of our hands […] But such Swaraj has to be experienced, by each one for himself (Gandhi 1908, pp. 68–69).

Regardless of the emergence of ideas related to endogenous development as stated above, the presumption that development is synonymous to Western modernization was strengthened further after World War II due to the international situation, which directly influenced international development policy. The establishment of U.S. hegemony, the Cold War structure, and the independence of Asian and African former colonies led Western countries in the 1950 and 1960s to emphasize development assistance as a "containment" strategy to prevent the expansion of communist power in emerging countries (Suzuki 2001). The modernization theory supported this strategy. The development strategies based on the modernization theory established along these lines were dominated by an approach that transplanted the Western experience of modernization directly to developing countries. It was claimed that if developing countries succeed in modernization through development, they would be able to "catch up" with the advanced societies of the West (Suzuki 2001). Therefore, development projects took the approach of technology transfer under the assumption that developed countries had advanced technology and knowledge. This approach often lacked consideration for local communities' point of view and natural ecosystems.

Aid recipient nations were critical of this approach, and post-development theorists were vociferous in their criticism. In the midst of this discourse, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation1 presented a report, *What Now*, on the occasion of the Seventh Special Session on Economics of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975 (Dag Hammerskjold Foundation 1975). According to Nishikawa (1989), this report was the first to frame endogenous development in the context of international development cooperation. It defined endogenous development as follows:

If development is the development of man, […] it cannot but stem from the inner core of each society. It relies on what a human group has: its natural environment, its cultural heritage, the creativity of the men and women who constitute it, becoming richer through exchange between them and with other groups. It entails the autonomous definition of development styles and of lifestyles. This is the meaning of an endogenous and self-reliant development (Dag Hammerskjold Foundation 1975, p. 34).

The Foundation's report referred to development that is endogenous and based on self-reliance as "another development,"2 and advocated seeking alternatives to conventional approaches to development. This was consistent with trends in discourse on development, such as Seers' *The Meaning of Development* (1969) and the *Limits to Growth* report by the Club of Rome (1972). Behind this "another development" also lay the fact that colonized nations such as Tanzania and Indonesia had begun to take steps toward independence under the banner of self-reliance, seeking to take the lead in developing their countries (Sato 2021). The initial concept of endogenous development, which was regarded as virtually synonymous with self-reliance, strongly implied a situation in which developing nations became independent from their dependency on advanced countries and development aid institutions.

Since the publication of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation report, the concept of endogenous development attracted greater attention in the international development community, particularly at the United Nations University (UNU) and UNESCO. At UNESCO, research projects on issues regarding cultural aspects in endogenous development took form in the late 1970s and published various reports on the issue3 (Nishikawa 1989). Similarly, at the UNU, an international symposium "Asian Symposium on Intellectual Creativity of Endogenous Culture" was held in 1978 (Mushakoji and Tsurumi 2004). In 1979, the research project *Endogenous Intellectual Creativity and the New International Order: with Special Reference to East Asia* was launched in UNU (Nishikawa 1989). However, despite the shared interest by academia, especially from the developing countries, the endogenous development concept did not take root or become widely accepted as an international development strategy in the following years (Mushakoji and Tsurumi 2004).

Esteva attributes this to the fact that its emphasis on recipients' autonomy runs counter to the premise of the need for outside intervention upon which international development is based (Esteva 1992). Furthermore, in response to the deteriorating global economic outlook beginning in the late 1970s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment policy began that adopted strict conditionalities on financial aid to developing nations (Suzuki 2001). Inevitably, the very limited scope left for autonomous initiatives by developing nations also stymied the mainstream debate of endogenous development.

Nevertheless, the concept of endogenous development was not entirely forgotten. In early 1990s, a joint platform known as the COMPAS network was created, with endogenous development as its main focus. Universities, non-governmental organizations, and community organizations from Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America participated in the COMPAS network (COMAPS 2007). Each project engaged in research and conducted a broad spectrum of rural development and community development projects worldwide reflecting the endogenous development approach.

Building on existing initiatives and programmes of these organisations, the Compas network and its partners have been experimenting since the mid 1990s with ways to develop effective approaches and methods to support endogenous development in interaction with local communities and their leaders (COMPAS 2007, p. 2).

Endogenous means 'growing from within'. Endogenous development is, therefore, development based on people's own resources, strategies and initiatives. The available resources and solutions developed at the grassroots include material, socio-cultural and spiritual dimensions. It is local people with their own resources, values, knowledge and organisations who drive local development. Support to endogenous development aims at strengthening the resource base of the local population, enhancing their ability to integrate selected external elements into local practices and to broaden the options available to the people, without romanticising their local views and practices (COMPAS 2007, p. 1).

Their endogenous development projects formulated various community based activities. For example, there were projects to create manuals compiling traditional knowledge aimed at preserving the local environment. Another was a governance-strengthening initiative that respected a region's traditional feudal system. As its rationale for undertaking this kind of endogenous development, COMPAS cited the lack of respect for traditional customs, culture, and knowledge exhibited by many conventional international development cooperation projects (COMPAS 2007). In order for local regions to achieve development by capitalizing on their own resources, COMPAS called for policy dialogue and skills development on the adoption of an endogenous development approach (Boonzaaijer and Apusigah 2008).

The COMPAS network as a program ended in 2011. The accumulated knowledge from their community-based activities across the globe has contributed to spreading the idea of endogenous development especially in certain community-based international NGOs and universities.4 Holcombe (2014) has utilized this lineage to advocate endogenous development in Africa. Her work highlights the effectiveness of the endogenous development approach in international development practice and emphasizes its potential in the African context.

Voices from Africa may call for endogenous approaches to development, meaning variously African-defined and led development or more specifically development, particularly at the community level, that is based on community values and customs. There are multiple barriers within the African environment to moving towards any of these dimensions of endogenous development. Key among these are weak governance at all levels, and the focus of endogenous development on the local as opposed to the national (Holcombe 2014, p. 757).

#### *2.2 The Concept of Endogenous Development in Japan: Tsurumi's Contribution and Its Impact*