*The use of refereed journals (internal and external) in research dissemination* is a key determinant of an academic's career progress as far as research is concerned, since publishing in journals renders individual academics visible nationally or internationally. To a large extent, this determines networking opportunities and the impact one can make in one's field/discipline. In many sub-Saharan African universities, academics have faced a number of challenges when it comes to publishing in international academic journals, such as high subscription rates and limited circulation in Africa (Gray 2009: 10). In addition, Gray (ibid.: 7) points to the quandary that many African researchers are pursuing international journals as a single measure of performance, while neglecting alternative means of disseminating their research work. One of the consequences is that journals that are produced within African universities have suffered natural deaths after the completion of donor-funded projects, or have been inactive for long periods of time. In the MAK context, internal journals have lost their vibrancy owing to a lack of funding and to poor peer-review processes. As a result, most of the research-active academics have preferred to publish in international journals for fear that their works would be rejected by the university appointments committee when seeking promotions.

Another concern is that in the long run, some academics might lose interest in doing research since many of their works are rejected by highly competitive international journals and they have resorted to using internal journals, which are still struggling to survive. Some academics highlighted that most of the vibrant internal journals are funded under donor projects but that there is always a question of sustainability, especially after the project when most journals cease to exist. MAK's research structure plan does not include a scheme through which it funds its academics to publish in local journals as a way to boost their popularity and credibility among its staff. It can be argued that MAK has a role to play in strengthening the guidelines and procedures under which internal journals run, which should be consistent with the internationally accepted guidelines and procedures for academic journals.

#### *Funding*

Although funding can be considered to be a component of an organisation and thus an organisational factor, this study categorised funding as a separate factor owing to the specific role it plays in sub-Saharan Africa. As noted by Sanyal and Varghese (2006: 2), there is a high correlation between a country's level of investment in research and development and its scientific production. As discussed above, for all sub-Saharan African countries, the level of research funding is still considerably below the level invested in the OECD countries and is mainly provided by foreign donors (Maassen 2012).

Findings of this study reveal that MAK cannot adequately fund its research function. This is in line with Cloete et al. (2011: 158), who further add that the Ugandan Ministry of Education's funding towards research in universities was inconsistent and unpredictable. Interviews with MAK academics revealed that there were no direct funding or financial incentives towards research activities. According to the university administrators, the university occasionally offered internal grants for research activities but MAK's academic staff were reluctant to apply for these since the application process had not been clearly stipulated. The university's resources earmarked for research had been channelled towards funding its academic staff's doctoral studies which in itself is an effort towards building research capacity.

With inadequate income for direct research funding, the academics have relied mainly on donor funding to support their research projects through organisations such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York (Makerere University 2013: 73). However, despite the key role played by foreign donors in building a research-active environment at MAK, donors usually have their own thematic priorities, which are often different from those of individual academics. In essence, the donors have determined the landscape of what research should look like at MAK. The downside of this is the ever-changing thematic interests and priorities of donor agencies that differ from institutional and national priorities. A number of the academics reported that on many occasions, they had found themselves leaning towards donor research interests, such as climate change, resilience and productivity enhancement. While each of these topics is of great importance in the national context of MAK, the emphasis put on them hindered the growth of individual academics since they had no funding or capacity to specialise in their own research pathways. Another challenge that was encountered regarding donor-funding was its distribution across different disciplines. In particular, donor funding at MAK has concentrated largely in science-orientated areas such as HIV/Aids, malaria, water, and information and communication technologies (ibid.: 72). This has left academics in the humanities and social sciences with less or no research support.

The dependence on donor funding for research places MAK in a precarious position since donor support depends largely on the health of diplomatic relationships between different countries. In this regard, some academics raised the issue of the potential of their funding proposals being rejected by donor agencies on the grounds of Uganda's recent stance on homosexuality; in particular, some key development partners had either withdrawn or cut the amount of aid that they had been giving to Uganda in the area of higher education, most of which had been for research capacity-building.2 Relatedly, although MAK's Directorate of Research and Graduate Training carries out a number of staff training programmes in the area of research grant proposal-writing, to enable faculty members to write better and more competitive proposals, there was still a belief that external grants were too competitive, which discouraged some staff from pursuing them. All in all there is a need for the university to devise means of diversifying income to fund research, with or without external support.

Finally, the HERANA project provided an important insight into the specific nature of research funding at MAK (Cloete et al. 2011). While the total amount of research funding for MAK is more or less at the same level as research funding at the continent's prime research university, the University of Cape Town (UCT),3 the research productivity at MAK is at a much lower level than at UCT. One important factor responsible for this is the difference in the sources of research funding for the two institutions. In 2013, almost 80% of MAK's research funding came from foreign (either national or supranational) donor agencies, while practically no research funding was acquired from competitive basic research funding programmes, coordinated by national or supranational research councils (see Figure 6.1). UCT's research funding situation is more in line with the situation at the world's top research universities; that is, a considerable part of the research income of UCT is the result of its academic staff being successful in the competition for external research funding. In many respects, the situation at MAK resembles the research funding situation at other universities involved in the HERANA project, with the exception of South Africa. Not only UCT, but also other South African universities, such as the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU), operate on a significantly different research income basis from MAK (see Figure 6.1).

As discussed elsewhere (Maassen 2012), the investments of donor agencies in research projects at sub-Saharan universities, such as MAK, have a number of characteristics that contribute to the low research productivity of these universities. First, in general, donor research funding is not distributed through an open competition, relying on peer review to select the projects that are best academically. Second, donor agencies in general do not require the academics who receive funding from them for a research project to produce academic publications. Third, most donor-funded research projects resemble more of a consultancy activity than an academic research project. Fourth, there is hardly any coordination between donor agencies when it comes to the investments in research projects in sub-Saharan African universities. Overall, the individual donor agency's programmes and ideologies seem to be a

2 This has not only been a concern faced by academics seeking research funding – see, for example, Santamaria (2014).

3 In 2013, research income at MAK was USD 85.10 million compared to USD 93.18 million at UCT (data sources: Department of Institutional Planning at MAK and Department of Institutional Planning at UCT).

more important factor in the determination of which research project should receive donor funding than national and/or institutional research policies and strategies in the receiving countries and institutions. Fifth, donor agencies prefer in general to have direct contact with the academics who receive donor research funding. A consequence of this is the 'projectisation' nature of donor research funding; that is, donor agencies invest in projects, not in institutions, despite all the recent donor programme emphasis on 'capacity building'. The situation at MAK shows how difficult it is for an ambitious African research university to realise its institutional research strategies, when almost 80% of the institutional research funding comes from donors who prefer to invest on the basis of their own programmes and ideologies in individual projects.

Figure 6.1 Makerere and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University: Research project funding by funding type (2013)

Source: Van Schalkwyk (2014)

#### *Research culture*

Research, like all other human endeavours, takes place in a social environment where individuals and groups are driven by different beliefs and attitudes towards their roles. These beliefs are often intangible or invisible and become stronger over time. Clark (1983: 72, 73) notes that every organisation possesses a 'symbolic side' that allows members to share common beliefs and stories. The symbolic side of research is usually neglected as people tend to pay more attention to the more visible and quantifiable elements, such as the number and quality of research publications, and research funds. In the context of universities in sub-Saharan Africa, it is crucial to examine the practical realities that contrast with the rhetoric in institutional strategic plans.

Although the MAK strategic plan clearly presents knowledge generation as one of its main goals, the findings of this study reveal that academics regarded the research culture as more a reflection of, and aligned to, funding opportunities than to organisational structures. The nature of research projects was mainly influenced by donor funding, which usually came with a financial reward for the academics. As such, most academics found themselves engaging in research in order to supplement their relatively low salaries with the income from donor projects. Such research was also characterised as an individualised enterprise, where the more ambitious faculty were the most research-active. Two categories of faculty members came across as active: the senior professors, who had strong donor and peer contacts, and the junior academics, who sought promotion to move up the career ladder and thus needed to be involved in research projects and to produce scholarly publications. This strongly suggests that the organisational research culture is still rather weak, thus leaving academic research in practice in the hands of a few active individuals.

Strikingly, when the administrators were interviewed with respect to their thoughts on MAK's research culture, they noted that despite the key challenges, the research output in the university was increasing. They also noted that MAK was still a 'magnet' for many foreign donors and that the number of donor-funded projects had doubled over the last five years.

## **Conclusion**

The study underlying this chapter has explored faculty perceptions and experiences with respect to the factors that influence research productivity at MAK. Of the four main factors identified – individual factors, organisational factors, funding and research culture – funding has been found to have a major impact on the nature and sustainability of research capacity at MAK and, consequently, on the university's research productivity. The contextual realities of academics, such as the low salaries, absence of incentive structures, the poor infrastructure, and the lack of a professional research management are, to a large extent, a result of the lack of consistent and adequate funding earmarked for research. This is not the result of a lack of research funding per se, since MAK's level of research income can be compared to the level of research funding at UCT. Rather, the nature and source of research funding are of relevance here. Almost 80% of MAK's research income comes from donor agencies implying that the institutional leadership has limited to no influence on how this money is invested in the institution's research activities. Consequently, unlike the situation in research universities in the OECD, or even South Africa, the institutional leadership at MAK lacks the level of institutional research income needed to build an adequate academic and infrastructural foundation for institutional research activities. This makes it very difficult for a university such as MAK to develop a collective, organisational dimension in its research activities. In practice this implies that the research funding situation at MAK is one of the main factors contributing to the weak coupling between institutional research strategies and the individual academics' research activities (or lack thereof).

Nonetheless, more can be done to stimulate the development of a stronger research culture in the institution. MAK's human resource policy should go beyond stimulating academic staff members with PhD degrees to, in the first place, engage in teaching. As for now, tenured academic staff members have no accountability to the institution with regard to engagement in research. On the other hand, the institution could stimulate the strengthening of an institutional research culture by introducing adequate incentives and rewards for academics who engage in research. The situation currently, in which MAK uses the income from tuition fees generated from privately sponsored students to pay lecturers who have additional teaching loads (evening, weekend and extra-mural), does not contribute in one way or another to strengthen the institutional research culture.

When the academics were asked to rank the four major factors (organisational, individual, funding and research culture) in terms of importance for them personally, many of them acknowledged the role of individual factors in determining the success of any academic researcher around the world. However, in their specific institutional context, funding played a greater role when it came to its impact on creating a sense of career- continuity for individual researchers. At the same time, the nature of the research funding practice at MAK was also responsible for making (and keeping) research as an individualised activity. There is hardly any collective (i.e. institutional) component in research funding at MAK, implying a loose coupling between the institutional research ambitions and strategies, and the individual academic staff members' (lack of) engagement in research activities.

## **References**

Bindé J & Matsuura K (2005) *Towards Knowledge Societies.* Volume 1. Paris: UNESCO

Bryman A (2012) *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bunting I, Cloete N & Van Schalkwyk F (2014) *An Empirical Overview of Eight Flagship Universities in Africa: 2001–2011.* Cape Town: Centre for Higher Education Transformation

Neuman WL (2000) *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon

# CHAPTER 7

# ACADEMIC INCENTIVES FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN AFRICA: CASE STUDIES OF MOZAMBIQUE AND KENYA

*Gerald Wangenge-Ouma, Agnes Lutomiah and Patrício Langa*

## **Introduction**

This chapter seeks to understand how financial incentives shape academic productivity as measured by academic publishing and the successful supervision of postgraduate students. More generally, we ask the questions: What is the role of incentives in the production of academic core products? And, can they be harnessed by policy levers to promote productivity? The paper draws its data from two countries and two higher education institutions: Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) in Mozambique and the University of Nairobi (UoN) in Kenya. The case studies examine two important and related aspects; that is, the incentives in place and the remuneration of selected public sectors in Mozambique, to establish how the professoriate is paid compared to other professions, and the incentives at the UoN and how these incentives shape academic productivity.

What drives academics to be more or less productive in their core academic activities – teaching, research and dissemination of their results through publishing? This question is frequently asked, but the answers are far from uncontested. What is most remarkable about them invariably falls into two apparently antagonistic categories. The first category provides answers in terms of the academic ethos of 'publish or perish' – a phrase devised to define the pressure in academia to rapidly and continuously publish academic work to sustain or further one's career. The idea that academics publish their work to pursue peer recognition, in a Bourdieuan sense, is also part of the academic ethos. For Bourdieu, 'each field calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest, *a specific illusion*, as tacit recognition of the values of the stakes of the game and as practical mastery of its rules' (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 117, original emphasis). In other words, traditionally, academics strive to publish more because it is part of the rules of the game of academia to compete for recognition through certain output measures, namely, number of followers, citation indexes, postgraduate students and publication in impact-factored journals. The second category of answers suggests that academics are living in an era of academic productivism characterised, in part, by the emergence of the 'evaluative state' *–* an expression that refers to strong state intervention in the social field of academia, and the liberalisation of the economy (Sguissardi 2006). According to this view, the state gives more freedom to the management of resources and processes such as efficiency and productivity, and can therefore justify a decrease in funding and create conditions for the expansion of privatisation and an entrepreneurial mindset in (higher) education (Langa 2012; Texeira & Dill 2011; Wangenge-Ouma 2008). On the other hand, the state also exerts tight control over the purposes and products of higher education institutions through evaluative mechanisms (Sobrinho 2003) via, amongst others, league tables and funding mechanisms. A key consequence of this state evaluative regime is a new accountability model that puts pressure on academics to produce more.

Our main argument is that academic incentives for knowledge production, particularly in the context of marketisation, constitute a response to the new competitive environment, particularly in the knowledge economy paradigm. That is, the academic incentives regimes for knowledge production are part of a global trend in the political economy of knowledge production and a strategy for resource acquisition and accumulation, namely, students, talented researchers, funding, prestige (rankings), and legitimacy for universities (Wangenge-Ouma & Langa 2010). Academic incentives that are instituted in various higher education and science management systems serve purposes manifest in two main forms: in explicit ways, as in capital investment and productivity strategies where, for instance, universities provide direct monetary rewards for each peer-reviewed publication or masters and doctoral graduate, and then urge academics to increase their levels of production and productivity; and in less explicit ways, where universities establish competitive research funds to promote excellence in research, and strengthen their training of masters and doctoral students. In the latter form, universities usually do not directly pay academics for research productivity but make funds available to incentivise them to increase their research productivity, mainly to enhance institutional prestige, visibility and competitiveness.

## **Theoretical perspectives on academic incentives**

When we started research on the studies reported in this chapter two years ago, the notion of incentives vis-á-vis academic productivity had not populated the internet galaxy as it has today. Jean Tirole had not yet won the Nobel Prize in Economics rewarding his work on, amongst other topics, incentives. In a 2003 paper, Tirole and his colleague, Bénabou, argued that 'a central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine "intrinsic motivation"' (Bénabou & Tirole 2003: 489). In their seminal work, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal can adversely impact an agent's perception of the task, or of his own abilities. For the authors, incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run and negative reinforcers in the long run. In their study, the two economists asked important questions pertaining to incentives (ibid.: 489):

*Should a child be rewarded for passing an exam, or paid to read a book? What impact do empowerment and monitoring have on employees' morale and productivity? Does receiving help boost or hurt self-esteem? Why do incentives work well in some contexts, but appear counterproductive in others? Why do people sometimes undermine the self-confidence of others on whose effort and initiative they depend?*

In our own research on academic production and productivity, we asked similar questions: Should academics be rewarded for publishing a paper in a journal or a book, or be paid to undertake a research project? Should academics be rewarded to supervise postgraduate students? Is it because of the lack of rewards for undertaking academic core activities that African scholars are, by and large, less productive than their counterparts in Europe, America and Asia? In our research, we examine what drives African academics to engage in or refrain from academic core activities. We are interested in investigating the financial and non-financial rewards and awards practices that are in place to incentivise academics to be more productive. Our focus is directed to the kinds of incentives in place for academics to engage in academic core activities such as research production, training of postgraduates, particularly masters and doctoral students, and dissemination of their research through journal publications. The questions we ask are informed by previous research conducted on the performance of African universities in research as part of the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA).

Data indicates that institutions like UEM and UoN, when compared to several African peers, underperform in the major 'academic core' activities. For instance, the University of Cape Town tops the rank of doctoral graduates per professor or associate professor, and research articles per professor or associate professor compared with UEM or UoN, which, as shown in Figure 7.1, are placed at the bottom of the first quadrant.

It terms of research publication, the disparity is also significant amongst the eight African universities involved in the HERANA project, including UEM and UoN. This is in line with the common understanding that African universities are lagging behind their counterparts in Europe, America and Asia in terms of knowledge production. For instance, according to Cloete (2014), publications in Africa increased from 11 776 in 2002 to 19 650 in 2008, a growth of 66.9%. Africa's world share increased from 1.6% to 2%, Latin America from 3.8% to 4.9%, and Asia from 24.2% to 30.7%. From 2000–2008, Asia's share of researchers rose from 35.2% to 38.2% and Latin America from 3.0% to 3.8%, while Africa's share fell from 2.2% to 2.1%. If Africa were a country, it would be just behind India, China and Brazil in publication output.

Figure 7.1 Ratios of high-level knowledge outputs to professors and associate professors

Ratio of doctoral graduates per permanent professor and associate professor

While economic models of compensation treat pay practices as a solution to an incentive problem, classical sociology has established 'disinterestedness' as a core value and norm of the academic enterprise. As such, disinterestedness carries with it the expectation that scientists should have no emotional or financial attachments to their work (Macfarlane & Cheng 2008). Merton (1942) assigned high moral standards of personal integrity to scientists who, he argued, were motivated and rewarded through recognition of their achievements rather than monetary gain. Scientists, according to Merton (ibid.), are interested in finding out the truth even if the truth proves the scientist wrong. For Merton, recognition is a form of intellectual property. Since science puts a premium on originality and on advancing the field, there is intense pressure on 'being first'. This is where the rewards are found; for those who are not acknowledged, their accomplishments are forgotten.

The principal-agent theory offers a counter-position to Merton's postulation on the drive for academic productivity. In a principal-agent relationship, principal(s) with a mission and organisational resources delegate tasks to agent(s) with specialised skills and knowledge to help in achieving certain goals (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Laffont & Martimort 2002; Sappington 1991). Theoretically, '(monetary) incentives work by increasing effort which, in turn, leads to an increase in performance' (Bonner & Sprinkle 2002: 304). According to Stiglitz (1987), the main challenge in this regard is devising incentive schemes that will trigger maximum effort by the agent.

The principal-agent model is based on several assumptions: namely, principals are riskneutral or risk-averse, agents are risk-averse or risk-neutral, and all parties in the principalagent relationship are rational and utility maximisers; (material) incentives are essential and sufficient to motivate employees' work; and, higher sums of monetary compensation (monetary incentives) yield higher effort (if impossible for the agents to shirk). Importantly, according to the principal-agent model following the rationality assumption, the incentive pay positively affects the agents' effort.

Source: Bunting et al. (2014b)

Inherent to this theory is the potential conflict of interest between the principal(s) and the agent(s). The agency problems may arise because each individual actor in the principal-agent relationship acts in his/her own self-interest (Laffont & Martimort 2002: 2). The principalagent model predicts that based on the notion of conflicting goals and expectations in a principal-agent relationship, the individual agents will shirk (i.e. put no effort into) a task if it makes no contribution to their economic value or is not incentivised (Sappington 1991). The model dictates that the principal will try to reduce the shirking by monitoring the actions of the agents, and by offering the agents incentives in an effort to align the agent(s)' interests with the principal(s)' objectives.

Overall, the principal-agent model suggests that incentives influence the utility of various outcomes, and effort has an effect on the possibility of attaining the outcomes. These notions are similar to the predictions of Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory that individuals will improve their effort to increase their effort if they expect outcomes (incentives) (see also Lunenberg 2011). Bonner and Sprinkle (2002: 308) emphasise that 'incentives, such as monetary [rewards], increase an individual's desire to increase performance and concomitant pay.' Bonner and Sprinkle further claim that the individuals' desire makes them put more effort into the task because more effort is likely to increase performance, and the increase in performance could result in more of the desired incentives. The above influence turns out to be a rotational process. However, empirical findings show contradictory outcomes from the use of monetary incentives (Gneezy et al. 2011). As observed earlier, the influence of money is not as linear and predictable as suggested by Bonner and others.

Applied to academics, we use the model to understand (a) how research-related incentives have shaped research behaviour, and (b) considering that academics tend to have multiple 'principals', who incentivise different outputs (research, consultancy reports, extra teaching, etc.), how the existence of competing incentives, which often require mutually exclusive responses, have affected the engendering of a robust research culture.

The use of this model in a higher education context has to consider its several limitations and implicit assumptions. The main limitation is that the model does not consider the possibility of multiple principals (Ntshoe & De Villiers 2008). Frey and Neckermann (2009: 3) correctly argue that in academic contexts 'there is more than one single clear-cut principal-agent relationship relevant for setting incentives'. Academics tend to have multiple principals simultaneously, namely, the leadership of the university at various levels – from the vice-chancellor to the head of department; the commission(s) of university education; foundations; research councils; professional societies; staff unions; and the scholars in their respective disciplines (Frey & Neckermann 2009; Ntshoe & De Villiers 2008). In this context of multiple principals, there exists the possibility of conflicting interests among the principals and conflicting incentives provided by them, which leads Shapiro (2005: 267) to ask the important question: 'how do agents understand and reconcile duties delegated to them when they are receiving mixed messages and conflicting instructions, as well as incentives from multiple principals?' Other limitations of the principal-agent model include the assumption of a perfect commitment from both the agent and principal in terms of their interests and goals; a (mis)understanding of pay (incentives) as a linear function of output; and that the agent is committed to doing only one job. The study acknowledges these weaknesses in the analysis.

## **Methodology**

The studies reported in this chapter were part of a bigger research project undertaken at four universities, namely, the University of Cape Town, Makerere University, the UoN and UEM. This chapter reports on some of the results from UEM and UoN. The two case studies utilised different methodologies given their distinct foci. While from UEM we mainly present and analyse quantitative data comparing university salaries with those of other industries, from Kenya we utilise mainly qualitative data to understand the link between competing financial incentives and research productivity. In both cases, we describe the mechanisms in place to reward academics for their work.

Data sources for the UEM case study included the National Strategic Planning for Higher Education (2012–2020), the UEM Research Policy, the UEM Academic staff career regulation, and two research reports, namely, a compilation of *50 Years of Legislation and Policy in Higher Education in Mozambique* (see Langa et al. 2014), and a *Report on the Evaluation of the UEM Strategic Plan 2008–2014*.

As for the UoN case study, data was mainly obtained using a survey and structured interviews with 50 academics and academic administrators (i.e. heads of departments, deans and directors). Only academics who had doctoral degrees, were involved in supervising masters and PhD students, and were engaged in research, were included in the study. The selection criteria were premised on the understanding that since these academics were 'research-active', they were better positioned to provide useful experiential insights on issues of incentives, knowledge production and research funding. Document analysis was also conducted. Some of the documents that were consulted include the UoN research policy (June 2008); the report of the management board committee to review policy on training, promotion and establishment (May 2006); the report of the Kenya Institute of Public Policy, Research and Analysis on wage differentials in the public-private sector (2013); and a Memorandum of Agreement between the UoN and the University Academic Staff Union regarding basic salaries and housing allowances for the academic staff.

Overall, document review for the two case studies involved institutional documents, such as research policies, reports on training and promotion, strategic plans and staff handbooks; documents on collective bargaining agreements on salaries and allowances; and reports from government departments.

## **Incentives for knowledge production in Mozambique**

Over the last two decades, higher education in Mozambique has experienced a dynamic expansion and diversification of institutions of higher learning (Beverwijk 2005; Langa 2006, 2013, 2014). From one institution in 1962, the country now has 18 public and 30 private higher education institutions. In addition to the growth in the number of institutions, the growth in enrolments has also been substantial: from fewer than 5 000 students in 1989 to more than 130 000 students in 2004 (Langa 2014).

The phenomenal growth in the number of higher education institutions and enrolments has unfortunately not been replicated with regards to knowledge production and postgraduate enrolment and outputs. Monteiro (2010) argues that the country lacks a robust research culture that is manifested, amongst others, in low research outputs (see also Bunting et al. 2014) and low postgraduate enrolments. At UEM, which is the largest university in Mozambique in terms of student enrolments, more than 95% of enrolled students are undergraduates (ibid.).

Notwithstanding the current low levels of research productivity, all major policy documents advocate for the need to 'encourage scientific research as a means of training students, solving societal problems and supporting the development of the country' (Langa et al. 2014: 142). The remuneration policy for higher education personnel constitutes a particular strategy advocated by the Mozambican government to encourage individuals to pursue academic careers and enhance research productivity. Related to remuneration vis-á-vis research productivity, the country's *Higher Education Strategic Plan* (2012–2020) emphasises the need to link progression in academic careers to academic and research performance. Equally, the country's laws governing higher education have since been amended (in 2003 and 2009) to provide for, amongst others, performance evaluation for promotions, award of grants, provision of tenure opportunities for staff, among other considerations (ibid.: 188).

In 2006, the Ministry of Science and Technology approved new regulations as part of the country's science and technology strategy that could be regarded as research incentives. These regulations provide the following specific salary supplements for researchers: a 35% exclusivity subsidy of the basic salary for full-time researchers in public research entities or a higher education institution; and a 20% risk subsidy off the basic salary linked to research activities. The regulations also make provision for innovation, scientific discoveries and inventions. According to these regulations, researchers are entitled to a share of the research income that they generate (Langa et al. 2014). However, hardly any of these incentives have been implemented. At the institutional level, the UEM's research policy (2008) makes provisions for research incentives, namely, a fund for rewarding publications in international peer-reviewed journals, and technology innovations; and a fund to support the publication of research results, extension and/or consultancy works in national or international scientific magazines. These incentives have also not been implemented.

Thus, other than the indirect incentives linked to career progression, there are no direct incentives for knowledge production and research dissemination through publications in the Mozambican higher education system, at either the national or institutional levels. It is through double-teaching (and moonlighting), particularly in the increasing number of private higher education institutions and in programmes with non-state-subsidised (fullfee-paying) students in the public institutions, that most academics can directly supplement their salaries.

This phenomenon has been examined by Mamdani (2007; see also Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 2012) at Makerere University, in what he termed the commercialisation of higher education. The distinction drawn by Mamdani between privatisation, related to the external relationship between the market and the university, and commercialisation, linked to the internal processes of knowledge production in the university, is instructive. Likewise in Mozambique, privatisation is an external relationship between the market and UEM (and other public universities) whereby the university opened up its gates to fee-paying students. Commercialisation, manifested mainly in the full-fee-paying programmes and a pervasive culture of consultancy, has had significant implications for UEM – mainly, the undermining of the possibility of establishing a research culture and the de-institutionalisation of science (Mouton 2008; Mouton et al. 2008). Following Mozambique's independence in 1975, most research took place within public institutions. However, the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during the 1990s has since changed the dominance of public institutions in research. Thus, one of the main features of the de-institutionalisation of research in, especially, public universities is a trend whereby academics establish research NGOs outside of the universities, and then utilise their international networks to secure funding from international agencies. This 'NGOisation' of science is partly as a result of inadequate academic incentives and rewards, poor salaries and, above all, a deteriorating academic and research environment.

#### *Remuneration of academics*

In the Mozambican case study, the basic salaries of academic staff in public universities were compared to those of other professionals in the civil service, in order to test the generally held view that academics in African universities were relatively underpaid, hence the low levels of (research) productivity. The public service professionals whose salaries were compared to those of academics included diplomats and tax and judicial officials. As argued by Altbach et al. (2012), universities are regarded as privileged spaces for the production and dissemination of knowledge, and university lecturers and researchers are important actors in this process. Therefore, one would expect that in a world where knowledge shapes economic development, the academic profession would be highly appreciated and generously compensated.

In this context, we only compared the basic salaries of academic staff in Mozambique with those of highly paid (by Mozambican standards) public sector professionals (see Appendix Table A7.1). Our main conclusion is that, by and large, there are no major differences in terms of basic salaries between the academic profession and the other three selected professions. As shown by Appendix Tables A7.1 to A7.4, the basic salary of a full professor is higher than that of an ambassador, across all the four salary scales. Generally, the basic salary of academics is better than that of diplomats.

The data in Appendix Table A7.5 is quite instructive. It shows that researchers1 in public universities and research institutes are underpaid compared to those hired in the teaching track. While the highest paid professor earns a basic monthly salary of USD 1 507.52, his/ her equivalent in the research track earns USD 1 020.55, a significant difference of about USD 500.2 Thus, from a remuneration/incentive point of view, it is more lucrative to follow a teaching track than a research career track. At the UEM, this is evidenced by the fact that out of about 1 700 academic staff, fewer than 100 have taken the research career track. This small number of researchers should not be surprising if, as predicted by the principal agenttheory, would-be researchers as economic agents are utility-maximisers who must 'look out for themselves'. From this perspective, choosing a research career would not be a rational choice.

# **Incentives for knowledge production in Kenya**

Higher education in Kenya has witnessed a number of important developments since 1970 when the country's oldest university, the UoN, became a fully fledged university. Currently, the country has 22 public and 36 private universities. The total student enrolment in the higher education sector has increased significantly: in 2012, the total student enrolment in public universities stood at 240 551, a significant increase from 571 students in 1963 (Nganga 2013). Other important features of Kenya's higher education system include the following:

1 In Mozambique, the academic profession in the public higher education system has two career tracks, namely, a teaching track and a research career track.

2 In comparison to the disparities between the income of senior academics and senior researchers, the difference between junior academics and researchers is negligible.

those of permanent secretaries (administrative heads of ministries) from 1963 to 2014. The comparison with the basic salaries of permanent secretaries is due to a persistent reference by Kenyan academics to the salaries earned by these civil servants as evidence that their (academics') purchasing power has consistently declined over time, while that of the permanent secretaries has significantly increased.

Source: Lutomiah (2014)

From Table 7.1 above it is evident that there was no significant difference between the paid ratios of the average monthly basic salaries of permanent secretaries and professors over the years – that is, with the exception of 1973 when a permanent secretary earned twice as much as a professor. The claims of the permanent secretaries receiving high salaries is the result of a slate of allowances (house, transport, car purchases and entertainment) and other entitlements that are offered to the permanent secretaries in comparison with the professors. As a result of the huge allowances earned by permanent secretaries, the current wage gap between the monthly gross salaries of professors and permanent secretaries stands at 7:1, hence, the regular claims of poor pay in the universities compared to salaries of other civil servants (Lutomiah 2014).

Regarding knowledge production, while Kenya is ranked among the top knowledge producers in Africa (UNESCO 2010), it remains a low knowledge-producing country. This low knowledge production is evidenced by factors such as low doctoral enrolments and outputs, and low publication outputs. For instance, a study by Cloete et al. (2011) shows low levels of publication outputs at UoN at the ratio of 0.11 per permanent academic staff, implying production of only one article in ten years.3

#### *Incentives available to academics*

Several incentives are available to academics at UoN. A typology of these incentives is provided below (UoN 2006, 2008):

3 The study considered only articles referenced in the Thomson-Reuters Web of Science databases.

As the analysis will show, the incentives described above are provided by multiple principals who, not uncommonly, drive mutually exclusive responses. The main principals are: the university itself (also made up of multiple principals – from the vice-chancellor to heads of departments); the national research council; and government and external agencies (mainly NGOs) that regularly engage academics as consultants.

## *Incentives linked to knowledge production*

There are several incentives linked to research and successful masters and PhD supervision at the UoN. These incentives are discussed in the sections that follow.

### *Promotion opportunities*

UoN policy shows that promotion is one of the incentive opportunities attached to research and successful postgraduate student supervision. A review of the promotion policy of UoN and the interview responses show that promotion was largely dependent upon the academic's research productivity and wide experience in postgraduate student supervision, which are evaluated regularly (UoN 2006). Institutional documents show that UoN has five ranks for academic appointment: tutorial fellow/assistant lecturer, lecturer, senior lecturer, associate professor, and professor. According to institutional documents, the university has clear criteria for promoting staff (ibid.: 8). For promotion to a professorial position, PhD training is a key requirement. Teaching is also an important criterion, which may involve teaching at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, research training and mentoring. Similarly, there is an emphasis on postgraduate student supervision, where the candidates need to have successfully supervised to completion a minimum of three PhDs and five masters students. Research publishing is also a key factor insofar as the academic has to have produced a minimum of six publications in refereed journals, or three publications in refereed journals and three chapters in scholarly books, since the previous promotion. Lastly, evidence of scholarly activities or contribution, such as innovations, is also rewarded at the university (UoN 2006).

While the policy document mentions several outputs that are considered for promotion

to full professorship, the academics interviewed stated that much emphasis during promotion is on peer-reviewed articles in internationally recognised journals. Significantly, respondents reported that co-authorship with postgraduate students is strongly emphasised for promotion. To reinforce the above requirement, an academic staff member in the Faculty of Arts reported that:

*I would say that one of the challenges that I had during the interviews [for promotion] is that I had not published any publications with my students. So the committee highly regards co-authorships and we are being encouraged to do that. (Interview, November 2012)*

The emphasis on publications and the successful supervision of masters and doctoral students for promotion purposes seems to have encouraged academics at UoN to pay more attention to these outputs. A dean in one of the faculties expressed his view as follows:

*Since the time that promotion was attached to student supervision – recently, just three years ago – it has led to academics scrambling for students in my department and to be available for consultations on the research projects. (Interview, November 2012)*

Inasmuch as promotions were considered to be an important driver for performance, about half of the participants interviewed felt that the promotion system was not transparent, consistent or fair, and that it took too long for one to be promoted, despite having achieved high-performance ratings and met the promotion criteria.

Based on the above analysis, notwithstanding the weaknesses mentioned in connection with promotion opportunities, there is compelling evidence that promotions to senior levels at UoN are based to a great extent on research productivity. From the interviews, it can be argued that this incentive has triggered positive responses from academics with regards to the supervision of postgraduate students and publishing refereed papers.

#### *Financial allowances for successful supervision and publications*

Inasmuch as the review of policy documents shows that the university will set aside a budget for incentives for research and supervision, it is not explicit in the documents if financial allowances are directly attached to publications and the successful supervision of postgraduate students. However, from the interview data discussed below, it can be concluded that in some instances financial allowances are attached to research publications and supervision.

Generally, respondents interviewed believed that supervision at the university was seen as a de facto responsibility of academics and thus no rewards need to be attached to it. However, there were some cases where financial rewards were attached to successful supervision of masters and PhD students, particularly in the full-fee-paying programmes (Module II programmes). One of the deans interviewed stated that:

*The staff are rewarded when they are supervising Module II students, who are tuition-fee-paying. This faculty has not developed a PhD programme that is selfsponsored – we are still on the old programme [Module I], but for the masters we have developed parallel programmes. Various departments have developed masters programmes that are self-sponsored, where students pay for supervision and the lecturer gets 30% of the total of the supervision fees. (Interview, November 2012)*

The rewarding of successful supervision of students in Module II programmes did not seem to be a university-wide practice, but one that was specific to particular faculties and departments. The provision of financial rewards for successful supervision was also practiced in cases where student funding (by external sources) provided for a financial allowance for supervision.

Other than the fact that rewards for successful supervision of postgraduate students were not systematically applied across the institution, academics expressed the view that the amounts for this reward were minimal and therefore did not have a useful impact on productivity levels. Respondents generally regarded the amount as a token, and as a lecturer in the Faculty of Arts complained: 'The amount is too low to motivate anybody; it is miserable and has an insignificant impact.'

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation has established a financial reward, ranging from USD 50 to USD 200, for academic researchers who publish their research in international peer-reviewed journals. This reward is only attached to full peer-reviewed journal articles, while other publications such as books, book chapters, editorials, comments and editor's notes are not recognised. There was no evidence of direct financial rewards by the university itself for publications.

#### *Recognition for successful supervision and publications*

The other incentives linked to research included non-monetary rewards such as recognition. Recognition may entail recognition through an outstanding researcher award at a departmental level; recognition through appointment to the professor emeritus position; and/ or pronouncement of names in public, such as during graduation ceremonies. Following the recognition in public, their scholarly works similarly earn them recognition amongst their peers and students as well, which also comes with improved status and respect. A professor in the Faculty of Agriculture acknowledged this enhanced status following the public recognition of his research productivity thus: 'There are changes in the way the students see me as a professor; for instance, you see students and my colleagues being more receptive with my suggestions and criticisms than when I was a lecturer.'

#### *Perceptions of academics towards the UoN research incentive regime*

The general perception of academics was that the existing research incentive regime at UoN was weak, discontinuous and unsystematically applied. For instance, regarding promotions, participants in the study argued that the procedures were unfair and influenced by 'politics' in the university, rather than the set criteria. As for incentives derived from Module II programmes, their application depended on the amount of revenues generated by individual programmes or colleges and, therefore, did not consistently influence desired responses. Monetary rewards attached to publications and supervision were said to be 'too little' to have a meaningful impact.

UoN academics also pointed out that inasmuch as key incentives such as promotion were linked to research publications and the supervision of PhD and masters students, research funding and heavy teaching remained a key challenge in the university. As promotion is heavily dependent upon research productivity, heavy teaching workloads (partly motivated by financial gain from Module II programmes) and inadequate research funding militates against a productive research enterprise. On the whole, while the university rewards research productivity, it had not established sufficient conditions that would encourage the maximisation of its research goals.

#### *Competing incentives*

The notion of competing incentives is derived from the understanding that academics tend to have multiple principals (Frey & Neckermann 2009; Ntshoe & De Villiers 2008), who, not uncommonly, reward different outputs such as research, consultancy reports or extra teaching. Responding to multiple principals and incentives may conflict with the incentives meant to reinforce research behaviour. Depending on the attraction to the different incentives, academics may focus on other activities that might not contribute to the mission areas of the university as intended by university principals. The data collected shows that apart from the research-related incentives provided by UoN, competing incentives existed that may not necessarily reinforce research behaviour. As discussed already, UoN academics work within an environment where multiple principals, including the university itself, the research council and the government, make attempts to reward research, although they are largely perceived to be inadequate. The same environment simultaneously rewards teaching on the Module II programmes handsomely and provides academics with consultancy opportunities. Unlike research incentives that seem uncertain and take long to materialise (e.g. through promotions), the competing incentives are fairly easy to earn. In this context, UoN academics often have to make 'trade-offs' in terms of which incentives to respond to. Some of these issues are reflected in the quotations below:

*So you are paid so little, then there is no research money and the challenges of time. So what is really an environment conducive to working? Here we are employed for two things: we teach and do research. But there is no research money and the salary for teaching is very small. So we go out to look for our own income through consultancies and teaching on Module II which tend to be attractive. (Interview, November 2012)*

*There are some people who teach evenings from Monday to Saturday … these are some of the people who may opt to teach and not do any research. And there is an attraction there because when you teach Monday to Friday you are assured of that money; when you refuse to teach and go out looking for either research money or consultancy, it's risky because you are not sure … since this is money that is assured they [academics] will want to teach more. (Interview, November 2012)*

From the above interview extracts, it appears that given the weak nature of research-related incentives, academics were attracted to other (non-research) incentives offered to them. It would seem that, contrary to Merton's postulation that scientists should have no emotional or financial attachments to their work (Marcfarlane & Cheng 2008), academics, like other economic agents are, after all, utility-maximisers who make 'rational' choices that are mostly guided by opportunity cost.

While UoN academics were making significant additional income from extra teaching on the full-fee-paying stream in the university, and also by moonlighting in private and other public universities, it also means that they were taking up heavy teaching loads. In this context, intensive research required for publishing in international peer-reviewed journals and postgraduate supervision becomes a poor competitor against extra teaching and consultancy.

## **Concluding observations**

How incentives work, and how they can be utilised to achieve intended results, remains a contested issue. From an economic point of view, from which the principal-agent theory is derived, individuals respond to incentives. In other words, incentives can be used to trigger and sustain desired behaviour. However, this reward-driven influence on desired responses is regarded by some as undesirable, counterproductive and unsustainable (Bénabou & Tirole 2003). In a higher education context, the pursuit of science driven by external rewards, especially monetary rewards, is considered by some as anathema; as going against the traditional values of science (Macfarlane & Cheng 2008; Merton 1942). However, as our two case studies have shown, the pursuit of monetary rewards in academia is a reality and has implications for the advancement of core academic activities, namely, teaching, supervision of postgraduate students and research.

In Mozambique, our analysis has shown that while the remuneration of academics is generally on a par with, and in some cases better than, that of senior professionals in the public service, no direct incentives were provided to encourage research, even though existing policies provided for such incentives. What is instructive about the UEM case study is that, contrary to the common perception regarding the poor remuneration of African academics, Mozambican academics were actually competitively remunerated by Mozambican standards. However, as our analysis has shown, there seems to be no correlation between the competitive remuneration of Mozambican academics and research productivity. Instead, and similar to the UoN case study, we see academics being attracted to more teaching, driven, of course, by financial rewards.

An important observation in the UEM case study is that responding to the often conflicting interests of multiple principals could have perverse implications for weak higher education institutions. This is exemplified by the de-institutionalisation of science at UEM whereby, for example, instead of pursuing research within the university and providing opportunities for socialising junior academics and postgraduate students into research, senior academics seem to prefer establishing entities outside of the university, which they use as vehicles to attract funding for research and consultancies. It can be argued that in this case, incentives for research (from international agencies) are applied in ways that, in fact, obviate its advancement in an institutional sense.

The key observation from the UoN case study is that there are competing incentives at the university that are provided by different principals: the university itself, the national research council, NGOs and other entities that offer consultancy opportunities to academics. These principals incentivise the production of different outputs, such as teaching on Module II programmes, publication of papers in international peer-reviewed journals, successful supervision of postgraduate students, and writing of consultancy reports. While the university places a premium on research and postgraduate supervision as evidenced in the promotions criteria, the existing incentives seem to encourage more teaching at the expense of research. This situation brings to the fore an important question posed by Shapiro (2005: 267), which is: How do agents understand and reconcile the duties delegated to them when they are receiving mixed messages and conflicting instructions and incentives from the multiple principals?

Thus, as a 'principal', UoN has not been successful in establishing an incentives regime that simultaneously encourages teaching and the maximisation of the university's research goals. As the analysis has shown, the general perception of UoN academics is that the incentives, especially those pertaining to research, are inadequate, discontinuous and not systematically applied across the university. The privileging of teaching over research should, however, be understood in the context of the university's key organisational goal of mitigating resourcedependence difficulties resulting from declining state funding. Students, through the Module II programmes, constitute the university's primary market for generating income and ensuring organisational survival. The pursuit for organisational survival has led to over-enrolment of students beyond the university's existing capacity (Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 2012), meaning that most of the university's academics have teaching commitments throughout the year. The privileging of teaching seems to make sense from a resource-dependence perspective: the university needs resources in order to exist as an organisation that can, amongst others, pursue research. So far, these resources have been derived from teaching.

Overall, from the two case studies it can be argued that while the existing incentives for research are weak and 'crowded out' by other incentives, especially those for teaching, it would also seem that the existing conditions at the universities (such as heavy teaching loads) do not encourage a thriving research culture. Thus, while incentives can be utilised to leverage research productivity, their success seems to require the presence of an institutional culture that supports research actively – be it through a consistent application of the promotions criteria, mentorship of young academics to become established researchers, research capacity-building, and/or the provision of research funding.

An instructive observation from the two case studies is the weak participation of the state in supporting and encouraging research by making resources available. Ironically, in both cases, national policy documents talk about encouraging research and utilising knowledge to advance the respective countries. This weak participation of the state in supporting research is indicative of the absence of a primary 'principal' for research in both countries. As a consequence, it is not surprising that existing incentives for research from the multiple principals are inadequate, fragmented, and are applied, as shown in the case of Mozambique, in ways that actually weaken the research enterprise in higher education institutions.

## **References**

Sappington DEM (1991) Incentives in principal-agent relationship. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(2): 45–66

Sobrinho JD (2003) *Avaliação: Políticas educacionais e reformas da educação superior.* São Paulo: Cortez Editora

# **Appendix tables**

**Note:** Amounts calculated according to Mid-Market Exchange Rates (as at 2013-08-11 08:58 UTC): MZN 1 = USD 0.0338639; USD 1 = MZN 29.5300

Source: www.meusalario.org

#### Table A7.2 Basic salaries of professionals in diplomatic careers (2013) (in USD)

Source: www.meusalario.org

#### Table A7.3 Basic salaries of professionals from the tax authorities (2013) (in USD)

Source: www.meusalario.org

Table A7.4 Basic salaries of professionals in the judicial system (2013) (in USD)

Source: www.meusalario.org

#### Table A7.5 Basic salaries of researchers in public universities and research centres (2013) (in USD)

Source: www.meusalario.org

# CHAPTER 8

# FUNCTIONS OF SCIENCE GRANTING COUNCILS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

*Johann Mouton, Jacques Gaillard and Milandré van Lill*

## **Background**

Science granting councils (SGCs) (and agencies with equivalent missions such as national commissions for science and technology, national sciences councils and national academies of science) are essential actors in national systems of innovation. In well-defined and clearly articulated systems of innovation they perform a number of crucial functions that contribute to the effective and efficient functioning of such systems, amongst others: disbursing funds for research and development (R&D); building research capacity through appropriate scholarships and bursaries; setting and monitoring research agendas and priorities; advising on science, technology and innovation (STI) policies; managing bilateral and multilateral science and technology (S&T) agreements; and assessing the communication, uptake and impact of publicly funded research. Ideally, such councils act as fair and disinterested agents of government while, at the same time, representing the interests of the scientific community nationally, regionally and internationally. They are crucial 'intermediaries' in the flow of international funding and technical support to R&D-performing institutions in a country.

Despite the significance of these organisations, few systematic studies of SGCs and related organisations in Africa have been done. This is in contrast to a growing body of scholarship about the nature, roles, functions and impacts of such bodies elsewhere in the world (see, for example, Barrier 2011; Braun 1998; Geuna & Martin 2003; Gulbrandsen 2005; Hubert & Louvel 2012; Jouvenet 2011; Laudel 2006; Lepori et al. 2007a, 2007b; Theves et al. 2007; Van der Meulen & Rip 1998).

After the decline in the 1990s in support for S&T development in Africa, there is now a renewed realisation by most role-players in recognising the importance of developing STI capacity in developing countries. High-profile reports outlining new visions, priorities and directions for African STI have emerged, particularly the UNESCO *Higher Education,*  *Research and Innovation: Changing Dynamics* (Meek et al. 2009) report, the African Union's *African Innovation Outlook* (2010) and the UN Rio+20 Report (United Nations 2012) as well as the World Bank Africa strategy in strengthening competitiveness and employment. These reports call for the international community's intervention to assist in promoting technology development, transfer and utilisation in Africa to enhance knowledge to support African countries to develop effective STI institutions, and the concomitant capacity to become global knowledge partners. The African continent is lagging substantially behind the rest of the world with regards to STI. The UN Millennium Project Report (2009) argues that STI underpins every one of the Millennium Development Goals and, therefore, becomes a prerequisite for sustainable development.

Against this background, the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology at Stellenbosch University was commissioned by the International Development Research Centre in December 2012 to undertake a study on SGCs in 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The countries included in the study were: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The original project goal was to assess the strategic priorities, objectives and practices of SGCs in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter we report on the main findings of this study.

## **Science, technology and innovation systems in sub-Saharan Africa**

SGCs are embedded in the science and innovation systems of their respective countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, the STI systems vary significantly with regard to socio-political histories, geography, political and economic (in)stability, colonial legacies and, most importantly (for this study), the degree of institutionalisation of R&D (Gaillard & Waast 1988; Mouton 2008). The R&D function of African STI systems is primarily located in universities, science councils, public research institutes and some research-based non-governmental organisations (Gaillard et al. 2005). There are few examples of well-established research institutes in the private sector or in industry.

#### *Evolution and development of STI systems in sub-Saharan Africa*

One of the first results of our study was to 'map' key milestones in S&T governance and policy development in each of the countries included in the study. These 'milestones' are presented in a comparative framework in Appendix Table A8.1, thus allowing for a comparison between each country's S&T trajectory and those of its continental counterparts.

Most African countries obtained their independence during the 1960s. But the establishment of a national ministry of science and technology (or equivalent ministry) would have to wait, in most cases, for another 20 years to materialise. In fact, in four countries (Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) there is as yet no such dedicated ministry. In most of these cases, the S&T portfolio is located in a ministry of higher education. One country, Cameroon, does not have a science policy document. These facts may point to a lack of commitment to prioritise S&T matters in these countries. On the other hand, we also found evidence of a recent commitment to prioritising S&T as illustrated by the fact that nine countries have revised their S&T policy documents since 2010.

The overarching impression that one gains from this overview of critical dates in the development and establishment of STI policies and institutions is that most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have only, in recent years, given sufficient priority to science and innovation matters. As we will see in the section below, a commitment to a science policy or ministry of science and technology is not sufficient if it is not accompanied by an investment in R&D in a country. The reality is that most governments in sub-Saharan Africa have until now only paid lip-service to prioritising S&T and allocating sufficient funding for research.

#### *Investment in R&D*

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the socio-economic development programme of the African Union. It is a high-level platform for developing policies and setting priorities on STI for African development. The STI vision of NEPAD is that of 'an Africa that is well integrated into the global economy and free of poverty' (NEPAD 2005). The overall goals are:

In accordance with the NEPAD objectives, many African governments have committed themselves to increasing their gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD), and to put in place the necessary policies to enact such decisions by 2015. GERD is generally regarded as a measure of how dedicated a specific country is to supporting research. But the reality is that most sub-Saharan Africa countries spend less than 0.5% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on R&D (see Table 8.1). Nigeria, for example, lags far behind in that only 0.20% of its GDP is assigned towards the development of R&D (*African Innovation Outlook 2010*: 37). Unfortunately, not all sub-Saharan African countries' GERD is captured in the statistics below and Table 8.1 therefore does not present a comprehensive view of GERD in the region. However, it can be assumed that sub-Saharan Africa needs a timely injection of funds into STI and R&D.

#### Table 8.1 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD)

\* Data do not include the business enterprise sector

† Data do not include private non-profit institutions/organisations

‡ Data do not include the higher education sector Ω HSRC CESTII Report (August 2013)

† We have added an additional column to include the latest available UIS statistics on R&D investment for select countries

Source: African Union (2010: 34)1

It is also worth noting what percentage of GERD is sourced from funds abroad. Table 8.2 provides the available statistics as published in 2010 for those countries that source funds from abroad. Mozambique receives almost 58% of funding available for GERD from foreign sources, while Nigeria sources 99% of funding towards GERD internally. The figures suggest that sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana, is still heavily reliant on foreign funding as a source for R&D activities.

1 Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire were not included in the survey.

Table 8.2 Dependency on foreign funding for R&D in 2010 (%) (sub-Saharan Africa only)

Source: African Union (2010: 40)

# **Research funding models**

We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the nature, status and functions of national research funding bodies (in cases where such an entity exists), while also exploring the coordination of funding within national science institutions in terms of its integration, coordination or fragmentation. The former will consider the legal status of national funding bodies (granting councils) either as an entity within a ministry, a semi-autonomous public institution outside the ministry, a private foundation, and so forth.

Appendix Table A8.2 summarises the high-level results of our analysis of national STI funding arrangements in the 17 countries of interest. A three-level classification is used, specifying the *fund or funding programme;* whether the fund is embedded within or overseen by a *funding council* or equivalent body; and the relevant *ministry* that oversees either (or both) the funding council and fund. Where applicable, an attempt has been made to also distinguish between current and proposed funding arrangements.

The salient points emerging from the summary presented in Appendix Table A8.2 are highlighted below.

#### *Differences between Anglophone and Francophone countries*

As can be seen, a dedicated science funding council is largely a feature of the STI systems of countries in the Anglophone tradition (e.g. Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). In the Francophone countries, such as Rwanda and Cameroon, there are no STI funding councils (although a project to establish a National Fund for Research and Innovation is currently being discussed in Cameroon). Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, however, do have dedicated funding agencies. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, funding systems promoting agricultural research have recently been established.

As Appendix Table A8.3 shows, the creation of SGCs and competitive research funds is of a rather recent origin in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past decade, however, we have seen an increase in either the establishment of dedicated SGCs or agencies, or the promulgation of policies which stipulate that such agencies must be established in the foreseeable future. All of this points to a general and emerging consensus as to the necessity of having such councils as part of the national science system.

#### *Separation of funding for research and innovation*

A second emerging trend is the separation of funding councils for research and innovation. This trend, which is well established in many European countries and other modern science systems, is evident in a few countries in our study. Examples of this trend are found in South Africa (with the different mandates of the National Research Foundation and the Technology Innovation Agency); Kenya (National Research Fund and the Kenya National Innovation Agency); Botswana (with a separate National Innovation Fund); and Zimbabwe (with the Research Council of Zimbabwe and the Research and Development Commercialisation and Innovation Fund). Even where funding for basic research and innovation are not separated into two different funding agencies, there is clear evidence that countries in sub-Saharan Africa appreciate the importance of separating funding for research and innovation. So, for example, countries such as Cameroon and Nigeria have proposed a national research *and* innovation fund.

#### *Different configurations of science funding agencies*

Arguably, one of the main findings of our study relates to the wide range and diversity of science funding configurations in the selected countries. Using the widely accepted principalagent framework, a number of questions presented themselves. For instance, what is the role of a principal of a fund (where a principal refers to either a ministry or STI funding council)? Does the principal only provide technical supervision or also financial supervision? Which mechanisms/structures are available to the principal to ensure that the fund is implemented according to certain guidelines (e.g. national development goals)? Moreover, in the case of STI funding councils acting as agent of a ministry (principal), it could be asked to what extent they are only conduits to channel funds and how much decision-making power they really have; for example, do they manage the funds apart from (partially or fully) administering the funds?

The following serve as examples of how these questions are addressed quite differently in different countries:

· In Ghana, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) coordinates and administers the operations of the Science and Technology Research Endowment Fund (STREFund). The STREFund is an independent funding mechanism. One mechanism by which the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology (principal) ensures that the CSIR (agent) is serving the interests of government in its administration of the fund is through co-representation. The STREFund is governed by a board of trustees of nine persons representing the CSIR, the Association of Ghana Industries, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, universities, the National Council for Tertiary Education, the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission. At the same time, it could be argued that the representative board is also a mechanism by which the fund itself (as a second layer of agent) satisfies the interests of the CSIR as its immediate principal.

## **Functions of research funding agencies**

Studies about the functions of science funding agencies typically identify three areas: selection, policy and control. We elaborate on each before discussing the empirical findings of our study.

In the *selection arena*, funding projects are selected either by anonymous scientific referees, mail review or by scientific peer-review groups. Administrators are considered to be brokers within these review groups. For refereeing, criteria are supplied by the funding agency, and there is some selection of the 'right' referees by staff of the agency. After refereeing, the proposals, review reports and other documents are put together and ranked, and authoritative decisions eventually lead to the allocation of funds. To put it briefly: 'the business of a funding agency is: proposals in, money out' (Rip 2000: 469). It is important to discuss the peer-review process as it is vital to our understanding of the decisions and processes in the selection arena.

The majority of projects selected by initial peer review are typically transferred to more encompassing scientific boards, which check for compliance with the general mission of the funding agency. While initial peer-review groups do control for scientific quality and, if need be, for pick-a-back criteria, scientific boards take account of the relevance of research projects – either for the scientific community or for external communities. Even during the check there can be no doubt that scientific quality remains the main criterion for the selection of projects; only rarely will one find projects that have been funded because they fulfil the programmatic criterion while the scientific quality was not certified (Braun 1998: 814).

There are two dominant procedures that have been chosen as peer-review procedures in funding agencies, with somewhat different implications for the selection process: the anonymous mail review by individual referees (e.g. by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in Germany and the National Science Foundation in the United States); and the peer-review group, which is the predominant form found in funding agencies. Some granting councils (e.g. the International Foundation for Science) are using both procedures simultaneously, which is particularly useful in the case of disagreement within the peer-review group. As has already been pointed out, the legitimate norms of distributing funding resources are at this stage clearly inspired by the promotion of scientific quality. There are no differences in this respect between funding agencies. This means that funding administrators do not interfere in order to claim the application of relevance norms at this stage. Thus, only the specific interests and positions of scientific referees matter with regard to the outcome of the distribution game. Criteria used in the reviews include, for example, the quality of the research design and the theories chosen; the consideration of former research; the originality of the research; its significance for the advancement of knowledge; and the qualification of the applicant (ibid.: 815).

Evaluation is also used to decide funding, following performance assessments of researchers, projects, programmes, departments and institutions. The assumption is that funds that are allocated after performance is evaluated will yield greater returns (Geuna & Martin 2003: 278). In the United Kingdom, this is the responsibility of the Higher Education Funding Councils, while in the Netherlands, evaluations are carried out by the Association of Netherlands Universities: the former use evaluation as a method of allocating funds, while the latter uses evaluation as a management tool. Different agencies also employ different criteria. They tend to focus on four typical output measures: volume, quality, impact and utility. Peer review and bibliometric measures are their main methods. In peer review, the unit of assessment is normally the 'project' or the 'individual'. However, because bibliometric analyses cannot usefully be applied across the board to all departments in a large number of universities, peer review has become the principal method of university assessment as well. When supplemented by publication and citation data and other information, this method is called 'informed peer review' (ibid.: 279).

Peer review's main virtue lies in the assumption that it is ostensibly meritocratic – rewarding success and improving quality. A performance-based system can increase efficiency in the short term while also providing greater accountability. It provides a mechanism to link research to policy, a way to shift priorities across fields, and a rational method for moving resources from less well-performing areas to areas where they can be used to greater effect. While these arguments have their merits, a performance-based system also has its drawbacks. Firstly, obtaining reliable and comparable information is costly. Assessments based on peer review are especially labour-intensive, when all a nation's universities and their constituent departments have to be judged. Nor do indicator-based approaches offer a shortcut; if conclusions are to be robust, data must be accurate and reliable. Secondly, a performance-based funding system, because it encourages competition, may also encourage a shift towards the 'homogenisation' of research, discouraging experiments with new approaches and rewarding 'safe' research, irrespective of its benefits to society. The resulting decrease in diversity may be harmful. Moreover, a system that has publication as a key criterion encourages 'publication inflation'. Some academics will almost certainly respond by 'game-playing' without necessarily improving performance. Thirdly, performance-based funding can widen the gap between research and teaching; if rewards for research are greater than rewards for teaching, academics will focus on the former at the expense of the latter (ibid.: 296).

The term *policy arena* indicates that it is the function of these boards to define the 'intermediate goals' as well as the strategies to realise them by taking into account the 'constitutional' mission of the funding agency. In the policy arena we find scientific boards responsible for the second step review and, occasionally, additional boards (Braun 1998: 815). It is within the policy arena that goal conflicts occur. Tension between basic versus applied research is a fundamental stressor that results from a convergence between academic and mission-orientated funding sources. It is also in the policy arena that we find tension between steering and aggregation (Gulbransen 2005), as will be discussed in the following section.

In the *control arena*, the majority of publicly financed funding agencies have established a political board, which functions as an interface between the funding agencies and their environment – most notably the grant-givers from the political system. Political representatives sit on the boards of the financing agencies while the research management – who are supported by scientists – defend research policy and budget decisions. It is especially in this arena where political actors may interfere with policy or funding decisions.

In summary, the literature argues that funding agencies are tasked with quality control, allocation decisions and (developing/implementing) research policy. As intermediary public agencies, they receive public funds and seek to add value to these funds by selective distribution for high-quality research. All such agencies are concerned with control for quality. All are national agencies, with national missions, albeit defined in very different ways (Caswill 2004: 8). Caswill (2005) argues that there are a eight core tasks of funding agencies that support a large variety of research council organisations and processes in the context of different sciences and national cultures. According to Caswill (ibid.), these are context-free components of the late 20th and early 21st century modern research council, which we can label as 'core essential' tasks. These include providing resources for research, maximising organisational resources, input of ideas, quality control, interconnection, national location, resource allocation, and delegation.

Our study has found that SGCs in sub-Saharan Africa perform a much wider range of functions than those identified in the literature. In fact, many of the functions that they perform are not even directly related to science funding per se. We summarise the functions performed by the science councils/funds/commissions identified in the 17 selected countries below. These functions are not derived from a strong notion of a well-functioning SGC (as found in the literature or even from studies elsewhere), but rather derived (inductively) from the actual activities in which SGCs in sub-Saharan Africa are engaged.

We have identified 12 areas in which SGCs typically operate. The first three can be regarded as different forms of science funding support and, therefore, speak to the core mission of a funding agency. But functions such as the dissemination of research findings, support for scientific publishing, and the collection of R&D data and statistics, are new functions that were also found to be performed by many of the SGCs in the selected countries. The 12 identified areas in which the SGCs were operating include the following:

#### *Disbursement of research grants (various categories)*

An important difference in the way in which different SGCs disburse funds to the scientific community has emerged from our study. Some councils function as research *granting* agencies in the true sense of the word (i.e. inviting applications, managing a peer-review process and then subsequently awarding funds on the basis of merit and other relevant criteria). Many of the funding councils included in this study disburse research grants in this way.2 For example, the Research Council of Zimbabwe (RCZ) funds research in all fields according to a set of national priority areas; the same applies to the National Research Foundation (NRF) in South Africa.

But in many countries, research is commissioned rather than supported through research grants.3 Research conducted by inter-institutional and multidisciplinary teams and including short-term training is particularly encouraged. Each research team must have at least three partners with the possibility of an associate at regional or international research organisations operating in the national territory.

### *Disbursements of scholarships and loans (mostly masters and doctoral students)*

Supporting postgraduate students (honours, masters and doctoral students) is one of the traditional functions of SGCs. The study found that this is the case in the majority of countries investigated. However, it was surprising to note that this is not the case in all countries. In countries such as Botswana, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia such scholarships are not available through the national granting councils. It is possible that another institution (such as a ministry of higher education) could perform this function in these countries. It is more likely, though, that international agencies provide the bulk of masters and doctoral scholarships in many of these countries because of the lack of such support from the local government. This is an area that requires further investigation.

## *Support for infrastructure development*

We have found few examples where SGCs provide funding and support for scientific infrastructure and equipment. The NRF in South Africa is an exception. Another example is in Côte d'Ivoire where the Inter-professional Fund for Agricultural Research and Council (FIRCA) works with the agricultural sector by providing for the training of producers and supporting sector-based organisations' structures. This involves developing process manuals and development plans, and assisting in the consolidation of the associations. FIRCA also supports associations by funding the following:

2 Grants are non-repayable funds disbursed by one party (grant-makers) (often a government department, corporation, foundation or trust) to a recipient (often, but not always, a non-profit entity, educational institution, business or individual).

3 Commissioned research is research requested by an external party in exchange for payment.

· Training and building the capacity of farmers and their organisations for greater professionalism.

### *Valorisation of results (dissemination and uptake of research reports and findings)*

SGCs are increasingly getting involved in adding value to research findings and outcomes that they fund. The international trend towards issues related to maximising research uptake and impact is also evident in Africa, although on a much smaller scale. Some examples were found in Burkina Faso where the National Fund for Research and Innovation for Development (FONRID) participates in the uptake of research results and technological innovations, by funding result-focused or uptake activities. COSTECH is mandated to take the lead in gathering and disseminating research results in Tanzania, and in Zambia, the NSTC is responsible for collecting and disseminating S&T information, including publication of scientific reports, journals and other such documents and literature.

## *Supporting scientific publishing/scientific journals*

Related to the valorisation of results is an interest in supporting scientific publishing in a country. In South Africa this function is not performed by the NRF but by the Academy of Science of South Africa (with generous support from the Department of Science Technology). In Ethiopia, in the past, the Ethiopian Science and Technology Agency (ESTA) benefitted from a generous grant from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that supported the publication of national science journals. In Burkina Faso, FONRID also funds quality scientific and technical publications as part of research projects, and the RCZ in Zimbabwe supports the publication of six national journals: the *Central African Journal of Medicine*, *Journal of Applied Sciences in Southern Africa*, *Journal of Science and Technology*, *Zimbabwe Science News*, *Zimbabwe Veterinary Journal,* and *Zambezia Journal of Humanities*. Given the precarious state of scientific journals on the African continent and the general lack of visibility of African science in international databases and indexes, this is clearly an area where SGCs could play a bigger role.

### *Advocacy for STI*

In Ghana, the proposed National Research Funding Council will be responsible for providing STI advocacy, so that the voice of the country's STI community will be represented in the country's programmes and policies at all levels. The NCST in Kenya conducted various activities aimed at creating awareness relating to STI in Kenya. An example of this is the training, conducted in 2012, of public relations and communications officers on biosafety. The intention of this training was to create a critical mass of communicators. They can then provide factual information on biosafety issues to both policy-makers and to the public. A further

example is the participation of NCST staff in the Strategic Trade Control and Security training of 2012, attended by 52 participants from 13 countries. In 2012, the NCST also participated in activities such as the micro and small enterprise innovation and technology exhibition and symposium. This event was sponsored by the NCST and aimed to create a forum to bring together innovators, research institutions, technology providers and the general public. Other examples include the 2012 and 2013 participation of the NCST/NACOSTI in the Agricultural Society of Kenya show in Mombasa and in the Nairobi International Trade Fair.

# *Collection of data and statistics on S&T and R&D*

It is imperative that reliable and regular statistical information on R&D in a country is produced. There are very different national models of how and where this function is performed. For example, in Canada, the R&D statistics are gathered and analysed by StatsCanada; in the United States, the National Science Foundation produces such data on a regular basis. In South Africa, a unit within the Human Sciences Research Council (the Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators) performs this function, although it used to be housed in the precursor to the NRF. Our research showed that the collection and analysis of R&D statistics is housed in a few SGCs. The Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) is one of the few organisations that collect and analyse scientific and technological statistics and indicators to facilitate measurement and provide advice to government. The NCST regularly evaluates sector performance using conventional and standardised STI indicators, and publishes these in the annual STI status reports.

# *Capacity-building/training of researchers*

Given the lack of research culture in the Francophone countries, many of the SGCs studied in West Africa are concerned with training of researchers, particularly with regards to proposal writing and technical support. FONRID in Burkina Faso offers support to public and private research and technological innovations, laboratory equipment or workshops as part of specific programmes of research and development approved by the Fund.

## *Policy advice*

The literature shows that some SGCs do in fact play a role in advising government on science and innovation policy. It is important to emphasise that this does not usually involve the development of policy, but more typically advising on policy (and in some cases evaluating policy). In Rwanda, the NCST is currently operational with the mandate of providing informed policy recommendations to the government and advice on human capacity-building strategies, in order to ensure that Rwanda is equipped with a critical mass of highly qualified skills in S&T to support the achievement of a competitive and sustainable socio-economic development based on STI. The RCZ in Zimbabwe is also mandated to advise the government on matters of research. COSTECH in Tanzania is the principal advisor to the government on matters pertaining to S&T and its relevance to the socio-economic development of the country. In Uganda, the UNCST is responsible for preparing policy notes to inform policymakers, scientists and the public on matters related to technology forecasting, assessment and transfer. In Zambia, the NSTC is mandated to regulate research in S&T; register institutes and centres; and advise the government on S&T policies and activities in the country.

## *Setting research agenda/research priorities*

Because of their strategic position within national science systems, SGCs typically advise government on national research priorities and new initiatives. This advice is often grounded in research projects funded and feedback from peer-review process, as well as on the basis of regular reviews of scientific fields and disciplines. The NRF in South Africa is a good example where this is regularly done. Over the past ten years it has commissioned various studies that reviewed its funding instruments, as well as evaluations of specific fields (such as mathematics and physics). The fact that the NRF also houses a directorate on 'new knowledge fields' is another indication of the role that it performs in co-constructing the national research agenda. Other examples from our study include the National Research and Innovation Council (NRIC) in Nigeria, which is mandated to set national priorities on R&D and to set direction to coordinate STI activities, including R&D, in line with national priorities; and the Zambian NSTC, which identifies and determines national R&D priorities in S&T.

### *Management of scientific collaborations and agreements*

Various bodies in the national science system are typically involved in the management of international agreements and collaborative networks. It is uncommon to find that national academies of science perform this role. In many countries this function is performed by the ministry or national department of science and technology and, as we found, also by national granting councils. In South Africa, the NRF has traditionally played a central role in managing bilateral and multilateral science agreements. More recently, it has increased its involvement in this arena by appointing 'national contact persons' to mediate between the South African scientific community and the European Union (and its various frameworks and funding instruments).

Other examples of SGCs which perform a similar function were found in our study. FONRID in Burkina Faso is responsible for, amongst others, the mediation between national partners, bilateral or multilateral structures and public or private research structures in the negotiation, development and implementation of projects or research programmes. In Uganda, the UNCST is responsible for developing partnerships and networks among different stakeholders through the creation of technical working groups to steer and oversee particular National Science, Technology and Innovation Plan programmes and projects. The NSTC in Zambia is responsible for establishing and maintaining a relationship with corresponding scientific organisations in other countries.

#### *Coordination of the national innovation system*

Finally, many of the country analyses revealed a weak or fragmented national innovation system. There has been an effort to rectify this constraint with the proposal of many new councils/funds/ commissions. An example is the National Research Funding Council in Ghana, which will be responsible for ensuring coordination and harmonisation of the country's STI policies, so that STI activities are comprehensive, complementary and reinforcing across all sectors and ministries.

## **Concluding comments**

SGCs (and equivalent bodies) in sub-Saharan Africa are at different stages of development. Some councils (e.g. in South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe) are well established, whereas others (as in Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique) are in their early stages of establishment. Francophone countries (such as Burkina Faso, Senegal and Cameroon) have very different institutional arrangements, where competitive funding and the associated practices are of a more recent origin and less well-established. In many of the countries included in the study, the national landscape is characterised by a multitude of funding agencies, programmes and instruments often organised around sectoral interests (e.g. health and agriculture). In addition, these councils face a variety of challenges (e.g. resource constraints, governance issues, lack of clarity on institutional differentiation, lack of coordination within science systems, marginalisation of influence, and so on). There is little evidence of sharing of expertise and experience amongst SGCs – often within the same country, but definitely within regions and across the continent.

The differentiated landscape of research funding models found in this study is not only the result of different histories in science policy development and different trajectories in the institutionalisation of a science ministry in the respective countries, but also reflects different science governance models. As we have seen, these governance models are related to the historical roots of these systems in the British and French models of science management. However, we have also seen that more recent trends, which include the notion of 'national systems of innovation', are reflected in the separation of funding (basic) research and innovation.

The relatively poor investment in R&D in many sub-Saharan Africa countries, which has a direct impact on the science funding models, points to different 'inscriptions' of science in different countries as well as different values afforded to science. On the one hand, some governments clearly recognise the value and importance of science and hence invest in science funding and the establishment of a national funding agency. On the other hand, many governments have not – at least until very recently – judged science to be of sufficient value and importance to invest in the establishment of a relatively autonomous agency to disburse state funds for R&D. Having said this, the fact that there has been a surge of interest in the recent past in reformulating existing science policies, as well as the establishment of a separate ministry of science, may be indicative of a change, even amongst the latter categories of countries.

# **References**

African Union (2010) *Africa Innovation Outlook 2010*. Tshwane: African Union

# **Appendix tables**

Table A8.2 Funding bodies in the 17 selected countries

#### *Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions in A frican Higher Education*

#### Table A8.3 The rise of science granting councils and competitive research funds in sub-Saharan Africa

Notes:

1. Cameroon has no national competitive research fund; FONER – despite its name – can hardly be considered as a competitive research fund

2. Acronyms indicated in *italics* can be described as funding councils/intermediaries

# CHAPTER 9

# THE ROLES OF NATIONAL COUNCILS AND COMMISSIONS IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM GOVERNANCE

*Tracy Bailey*

# **Tertiary/higher education governance and the rise of councils and commissions**

A review of the international literature on higher education governance reveals that much of the focus of research and publication over the past few decades has been on governance at the institutional level (how institutions are organised and operate internally) and on the relationship between the state and universities (see, for example, Amaral et al. 2002; Bjarnason & Lund 1999; Neave & Van Vught 1991, 1994; Van Vught 1989). There has been relatively little focus on governance at the system level and, within this, the role of semi-autonomous government agencies – although in recent years, research on the role of such agencies has begun to emerge internationally and in the African context.1

Broadly speaking, tertiary or higher education (TE/HE)2 governance at the system level refers to the institutional arrangements (frameworks, structures, resources, processes and activities) that are involved in the direction, planning, management and coordination of TE/HE institutions and the sector as a whole. Governance also relates to all those involved

1 For examples of research in this area in sub-Saharan Africa, see Lebotse (2014), Materu (2007), Mouton et al. (2014) and Saint et al. (2009).

2 Since the eight councils/commissions in this study service either their tertiary education (all post-secondary) or higher education (typically universities and polytechnics or similar) sectors, depending on their mandates, the abbreviation TE/HE is used when making general reference to this governance domain.

in policy-/decision-making and implementation and includes the state, institutions and, increasingly, other external stakeholders.

A core component of system governance is 'steering' – that is, the use of various mechanisms to move the sector and institutions in the direction of particular TE/HE (and national development) goals. Such goals might relate to increasing equity and access and the massification of the sector; the development of priority skills/competencies for the labour market; the attainment of certain standards of quality; differentiation in the institutional landscape or academic offerings; and increasing productivity in research, science, technology and innovation in identified priority areas. Typical steering mechanisms include funding allocations (in the case of public institutions); regulation (institutional and programme accreditation); quality assurance requirements (units within institutions and institutional/ quality audits); institutional strategic planning; and financial and performance reporting requirements. Furthermore, steering involves a number of governance functions including:

System-level governance and steering takes place within the context of the particular form of state-institution relationship, which is structured primarily around the prevailing norms on academic freedom, institutional autonomy and accountability. In this regard, Neave and Van Vught (1994) refer to 'state control' versus 'state supervision' in higher education. The authors describe the state control model, traditionally found in European higher education systems (and thus also referred to as the 'continental model'), as follows (ibid.: 9):

*These systems are created by the state and almost completely financed by it. The state very often also is the overarching and highly powerful regulator of the system. … In the continental model the overwhelming power of the state is combined with a strong authority at the level of the senior chaired professors, who hold considerable power at the lower level of the system.*

The state supervision model, usually associated with the higher education systems in the United States and Britain, is characterised by limited government influence and much greater autonomy and powers by the faculty guilds and trustees and administrators (vice-chancellors) at the institutional level with regard to such matters as admission policies, curricula and the hiring of faculty (ibid.: 10). The supervisory model has also been linked to the rise of the socalled 'evaluative state' which focuses on the external evaluation of quality in higher education (Maassen 1995; Neave 1988).

In Europe and other developed countries, the trend towards greater institutional autonomy, and with it increased public accountability, has seen a move away from state control and academic collegial governance towards the supervisory model. Muller et al. (2006: 301) describe the rationale for this shift as follows:

*The implicit assumption in the state control and state supervision models was that a development from state control to state supervision should be promoted because if the state had a supervisory role it would lead to the better performance of higher education than if it had a controlling role. From this perspective, state steering in the form of state supervision was the preferred alternative to the by now widely discredited, traditional, 'top-down' form of co-ordination.*

The supervisory model nowadays is characterised by 'multi-level multi-actor' governance that includes the redistribution of decision-making powers, responsibilities and accountability among external and internal stakeholders (De Boer & File 2009: 9-10; Eurydice 2008: 25; Huisman 2013). As such, system-level governance typically includes the following bodies (Eurydice 2008: 26):

Many TE/HE systems in developing countries have adopted Western models of governance, largely via transference from colonial powers – the effect of which, according to Neave and Van Vught (1994: 11, 13), 'has been the predominance of the state control model in several developing nations, often leading to rather an authoritarian governmental attitude towards higher education institutions.' This has been the case in the African context. Following a workshop on 'Creating the African University' held in Accra in 1972, the Association of African Universities declared that 'the university in Africa occupies too critical a position of importance to be left alone to determine its own priorities' and that it should therefore 'accept the hegemony of government' (Yesufu 1973: 45). This is echoed by Saint et al. (2009: 13) who observe that the 'history of African higher education has been characterized by strong government controls on institutions of higher learning' including 'constraints on institutional autonomy'; government interference, especially in one-party states and also in Francophone countries; and the relations between public universities and their governments characterised by 'conflict rather than partnership'. However, according to Moja et al. (1996: 130), the state control model in Africa was unworkable owing to weak bureaucracies that could not implement policy intentions:

*The state control model of the Accra workshop was never properly translated from a policy ideal into a workable administrative procedure. Bureaucratic management structures were never put in place to 'steer' universities according to anything like a development plan. Indeed, the weakness of higher education bureaucracies in Africa has played a large role in the inefficiency and, all too often, corruption that has plagued so many of them. The result has been a ministry with clear political intentions but with a bureaucracy ill-equipped to manage them. It was almost inevitable then that the politicians would try to intervene directly in the universities to pursue their political aims, and that the universities would cry foul and resist any and every attempt at what they saw as illegitimate interference in their autonomy.*

Moja et al. (ibid.: 150) ascribe the weak bureaucracies in Africa to the 'ethos of antibureaucracy' amongst postcolonial intellectuals which, following independence, resulted in the absorption of intellectuals into politics, universities and the private sector rather than into the public sector: 'Consequently, most post-independence countries had a rather meagre talent pool to draw on to re-build the civil service … The result almost everywhere was a weak and unprofessionalised bureaucracy perpetually under attack from the articulate intellectuals in and out of government.'

In addition to the state control and state supervision models, various authors have highlighted a third form of interaction between the state and institutions, namely 'state intervention' or 'state interference'. Such political intervention or interference in the operations of TE/HE institutions has occurred when institutions were viewed as sites of contestation or opposition and political dissent (such as the student uprisings of the 1960s in Western Europe or the anti-apartheid activities in South African universities prior to 1994) (Court 1991: 330; Lulat 2003: 29; Moja et al. 1996: 148–149; Neave & Van Vught 1991: xi–xii). In the African context, as Moja et al. (1996: 146, 149) observe, 'the government never tried seriously to impose bureaucratic control; the control exerted was political, usually mobilised to contain ideological opposition to the state' and that 'state intervention occurs despite the fact that autonomy is the official policy.' Political intervention has also occurred as ad hoc state responses to crises of institutional governance (Du Toit 2014: 18). According to Du Toit (ibid.: 16), while 'interference' is most often cast in terms of the (real or potential) violation of institutional autonomy, it is more constructively viewed as 'an insufficiently systemic practice of higher education governance at the level of state-sector relations, leading to ad hoc and arbitrary government interventions in having to deal directly with local crises of institutional governance.'

In both the European and African contexts, the establishment of statutory 'intermediary' or 'buffer' bodies (such as TE/HE councils or commissions) was seen as one way of preventing (the need for) such political interference (Du Toit 2014: 35; Neave & Van Vught 1994: pxii). The emergence of specialised, semi-autonomous government agencies was also related to broader public sector reforms widespread in developed countries since the 1980s (Caulfield et al. 2006: 1; Groenleer 2009: 15; Pollitt et al. 2001: 272, 275). Often referred to as the process of 'agencification', the creation of these bodies is usually linked to the rise of the so-called 'regulatory state'3 and to the influence of 'new public management' or 'managerialism' at the system level (Braun 1999: 1; Gilardi 2005: 84-85; Gornitzka & Stensaker 2014: 2; Groenleer 2009: 17; Maassen 2003: 33). The literature suggests a number of motives for the establishment of agencies, including demands on governments for greater efficiency, responsiveness, transparency and accountability; decreased political interference in governance matters; and enhanced technical expertise and the specialisation of functions (Caulfield 2006: 1; Gornitzka & Stensaker 2014: 8; Groenleer 2009: 18; Pollitt et al. 2001: 277). Broadly speaking, the nature and function of government agencies are diverse but have been described as being at arm's length from their parent ministry; carrying out public tasks; having a core staff comprising public servants; being (largely) financed by the state budget; and being subject to at least some administrative law procedures (Pollitt et al. 2001: 274–275).

Reforms and the emergence of specialised, semi-autonomous government agencies have also occurred within the realm of TE/HE governance in Africa. The international nature of higher education means that developments in one part of the world often have an impact on higher education elsewhere. Certain trends within the African context also made these reforms necessary including, for example, the need for more effective management at the system level in response to increasing demand for TE/HE and the growing importance of TE/ HE in national development (Fielden 2008: 2), as well as the rapid growth of these systems (massification), making them 'too large and too complex to be managed effectively from a central ministry' (Saint et al. 2009: 10). As such, the introduction of TE/HE councils and commissions in Africa can be seen as indicative of efforts to move from a state control to a state supervision model; in particular, the introduction of agencies with specialised functions and expertise, and a degree of autonomy and political independence, in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness within the governance system.

3 Broadly speaking, the 'regulatory state' is a term used to describe 'the growth of regulatory agencies to discharge a public interest on behalf of government in economic and social affairs' (King 2006: 2).

# **About the study**

One of the analytical propositions of the Higher Education Research and Advocacy in Africa (HERANA) project is that for higher education to make a sustainable contribution to development in a country, there has to be national-level coordination of knowledge policies and of the key actors in the system. The study found that TE/HE councils/commissions had been established in each of the eight countries. More often than not, these agencies were mandated to undertake accreditation and advisory functions and had, over time, assumed additional roles and functions. It became apparent to the research team that these organisations could be key players in sector-level governance, particularly in terms of steering, coordination and implementation monitoring. In addition, as highlighted above, a review of the literature on higher education governance revealed that there was a paucity of research on governance at the system level and, in particular, on the role of councils/commissions in this regard.

In order to address this gap and to contribute to the body of empirical knowledge on the role and functions of TE/HE councils/commissions in general, and in the African context in particular, the *Higher Education Councils and Commissions in Africa* project was initiated in late 2011. The study focused on the councils and commissions that were in existence in the eight countries that formed part of HERANA Phase 1. These included:

The key questions of the study were:

4 This agency was reconstituted as the Human Resources Development Council in 2013.

5 This agency was reconstituted as the Kenya Commission for University Education in 2013.

It was assumed that factors both internal and external to the organisation impact on its *raison d'être* and the way it functions and operates. Internal factors explored included the way in which the organisation was structured and composed, its legal status and powers, and the resources available to it to carry out its mandate. External factors included, amongst others, funding sources and arrangements, interaction with other actors in the system, and the agencies' legal and political autonomy in relation to external stakeholders.

The project began with the development of detailed case studies of the eight councils/ commissions during 2012/2013. Desk research was undertaken in preparation for the site visits, which included information about each country's TE/HE system and the council/ commission itself, as well as detailed overviews of the relevant legislation pertaining to the establishment, mandate and operation of these organisations. Policy documents, strategic plans, annual reports and other relevant publications, statistics and websites were also reviewed as part of the development of the case study reports. The site visits to each of the councils/commissions were undertaken by the project leader between March and October 2012, to conduct interviews with senior leadership and staff at each of the councils/commissions and with at least one key individual in the parent ministry.6 These interviews explored the historical and broader political contexts within which the councils/ commissions were created and operated, as well as the structure, composition and functions of these organisations.

The case study reports formed the basis of a synthesis report (Bailey 2014) that undertook a comparative analysis of the roles and functions of the councils/commissions. There were also two sub-components to the broader project, namely, a comparative analysis of the legislation that gave rise to and mandated the councils/commissions in the study (Chirwa 2014), and a comparative analysis of how the councils/commissions were financed, and how they carried out their funding functions (where applicable) (Mohadeb 2013).

The project was undertaken by a multidisciplinary research team with members from the participating countries, and working in collaboration with key resource people and key informants from the councils/commissions and ministries in the eight countries. The key resource people offered invaluable assistance in providing background information, negotiating with gatekeepers and scheduling interviews, responding to queries during report-writing, and attending work-in-progress seminars.

A limitation to the study was the primary focus on the perspectives and experiences of those internal to the councils/commissions concerned. It was beyond the financial and human resource capacity of the research team to extend the investigation to key external stakeholders

6 In total, interviews with 53 individuals were conducted.

which no doubt would have added valuable perspectives on the operations and functions of these agencies. However, as Pollitt et al. (2001: 288, original emphasis) observe, most of the current literature on TE/HE agencies 'is predominantly based on views from the outside – reports and other accounts by ministers, parliaments, external auditors, academics, and so on' and that, therefore, 'our knowledge of what goes on *inside* agencies is as yet fairly limited.'

It should be noted that this study was not an attempt to measure or evaluate the success, impact or effectiveness of the councils/commissions' operations or the fulfilment of their functions. To the extent that evaluative observations are made, these are based on the challenges or obstacles reported by interview respondents and in official documentation. It was also beyond the scope of this study to explore or develop a detailed picture of the overarching TE/ HE governance system in each country in terms of which organisations were fulfilling which roles. However, in discussing the roles and functions of the councils/commissions and the key challenges they were facing in this regard, it was not possible to avoid making observations about the broader governance systems, as will be seen in the concluding sections of this chapter.

# **Creation and characteristics of the councils/commissions**

There were various narratives relating to the developments, discussions and, in some cases, reviews and reports that led to the creation of the councils/commissions in this study. Most began with the (sometimes significant) expansion of the TE/HE sectors (public and/or private) since about the 1970s. Official documents and interview respondents described rapidly expanding and diversifying sectors, primarily as a result of market forces and trends locally and internationally, as well as internal or donor-driven policy initiatives to increase access and participation rates. These developments saw significant increases in student numbers. According to a UNESCO (2010: 1) report, for instance: 'While there were fewer than 200 000 tertiary students enrolled in the region in 1970, this number soared to over 4.5 million in 2008 – a more than 20-fold increase.' There has also been exponential growth in the number and range of institutional players – and particularly in the private sector – as enumerated by a World Bank report as follows (Yusuf et al. 2009: 48):

*A significant portion of Africa's enrollment expansion can be explained by the emergence of a private tertiary education sector on the continent over the past two decades. Since 1990, private colleges, universities, and tertiary-level professional institutes have been established at a far faster rate than public ones. While public universities doubled from roughly 100 to nearly 200 between 1990 and 2007, the number of private tertiary institutions exploded during the same period, from two dozen to an estimated 468.*

Together with the expansion and diversification of the TE/HE sectors in the eight countries, there

were increasing demands on TE/HE institutions for quality, efficiency and accountability, and the need to regulate and assure the quality of the new (and in some cases existing) institutions and academic programmes moved onto the TE/HE governance agenda. There was also a need to coordinate various aspects of the growing (and in some cases emerging)7 TE/HE systems in terms of, for example, the efficient allocation of funds and other resources; policy and planning for the development of the TE/HE sector, often in relation to national development objectives, and the information and expertise such policy development and planning requires; uniformity/ equivalence across academic programmes and between institutions locally and abroad; and managing the increasingly important relationships between key TE/HE stakeholders (in particular, the government, institutions, the professions, the market and industry).

Broadly speaking, then, the councils/commissions included in this study *were created in response to the need to regulate, ensure the quality of and/or coordinate their growing and diversifying TE/HE sectors.* The initial focus of the councils/commissions at the time of their establishment included one or more of the following:

Table 9.1 indicates the year of establishment of each council/commission and, where applicable, the date on which it became operational, as well as the legislation that established the agency and outlined its structure and mandate. The table also shows that, in some cases, the councils/ commissions were established as entirely new bodies, whereas in other cases they had replaced or been established on the basis of an earlier, similar body. The oldest agency in the sample was the K-CHE, established in 1985, and the newest the M-CNAQ, established in 2007. Thus, some of the councils/commissions were relatively new organisations – in terms of both their date of establishment and the fact that they were established as entirely new organisations – and were therefore, comparatively speaking, in the early stages of development.

7 In Botswana and Mauritius, the TE/HE systems were so small at the time that they comprised basically one (well-resourced) public university and a few other small post-school institutions and, therefore, there was no real 'system' to speak of.

Table 9.1 Establishment of the councils/commissions

In terms of *legal status*, all of the councils/commissions were established by Acts of Parliament as bodies corporate with separate legal personality. These Acts are either general statutes that focus broadly on TE/HE, or specific statutes that focus solely on the council/commission. The Acts also set out the mandated functions and operations of the councils/commissions, although in differing degrees of specificity.