Meanwhile, Israel was looking to promote the various compensation claims at a summit meeting of the four major powers, where they were scheduled to discuss the future of Germany. Eban wrote to Byroade in early March that Israel hoped the issues of restitution, indemnification, and reparations would be included in the summit's agenda.28 Byroade replied only in late March, saying this would not be possible, among other reasons, because the major powers planned to discuss only general matters concerning Germany's future.29 As far as Israel was concerned, this response constituted yet another stinging indication of the Western powers' lack of desire to acquiesce to Israel's requests regarding the compensation issue.

This state of affairs led Sharett to conclude that "in light of the lack of any assurance of a positive response by the major powers [to the reparations claim], we thought it inadvisable to reject Bonn should it approach us." 30 And it was thus that the diplomatic circumstances – the Western powers' negative stance coupled with Adenauer's overture – led Israel's two leading statesmen to respond positively to the German initiative.

At the same time, there were two background factors that contributed to this decision. The first and most important of the two was the catastrophic state of the Israeli economy, which urgently required a substantial influx of capital (in the form of reparations). The second factor was the rehabilitation process. Reports of the rapid pace of West Germany's rehabilitation were virtually pouring into Jerusalem. In a discussion held by World Jewish Congress official Alexander Easterman with Lord Henderson on January 11, 1951, the latter surmised that the Western powers were "at the penultimate stage" of fully recognizing West Germany as an independent and sovereign state.31 Gideon Rafael, the Israeli delegation's advisor at the United Nations, warned Eban of Washington's overly positive attitude toward "the revival of [West] Germany," concluding that "on the subject of [West] Germany, Israel's political position is diametrically opposed to the United States' inclinations." 32

The German rehabilitation campaign reached a significant milestone on March 6, 1951, when the HICOG announced changes in the occupation statute. This was a genuine revolution in the status of West Germany: the FRG was granted almost complete

USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/3-651, H. Byroade to the Secretary, March 16, 1951.

USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/3-651, H. Byroade to A. Eban, March 26, 1951.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 114, M. Sharett to the Israel Embassy in Washington, April 8, 1951.

BGA, GCD, Report of Conversation between Lord Henderson and Alexander Easterman, January 11, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/17, G. Rafael to A. Eban, February 19, 1951.

independence when it came to internal affairs and, in terms of foreign affairs, the change likewise signaled the lifting of multiple limitations – among other things, West Germany was permitted to establish a foreign ministry headed by Chancellor Adenauer (which it did on March 15).33 Parallel to these steps, and in direct correlation with them, the FRG was invited to join five other Western European countries to form a new and highly influential economic-political organization – the European Coal and Steel Community.34 The only bright spot from an Israeli-Jewish perspective was the powers' decision to continue to hold, for the time being, supreme judicial authority over the issue of restitution.35

The "rehabilitation train" continued to barrel down the tracks at full throttle even after modification of the occupation statute. Back in December 1950, the three Western powers had decided to start searching for an alternative footing on which to base relations between themselves and the FRG, one that would replace the occupation statute. In essence, they were seeking to complete the process of restoring West Germany's independence. An intergovernmental study group, made up of representatives from the three Western powers, was formed In London with the aim of drawing up proposals for a Contractual Agreement between the Western powers and the FRG. In May 1951 the study group submitted its conclusions to the three governments,36 conclusions that would then serve as the foundation for discussions between them and the Bonn government. The Jewish world followed these developments with trepidation, and in April senior officials in the JRSO rushed to Washington to learn about the recommendations of the study group.37

In the meantime, the campaign to rehabilitate the FRG transgressed the confines of the western arena. In the spring-summer of 1951, West Germany was accepted as a member of a string of international institutions, including the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and UNESCO.38

It appeared that there was no longer any place for "Germany's rehabilitation" to be a factor within the framework of Israel's considerations. The process of the FRG's full return to the family of nations, first and foremost as a legitimate member of the Western bloc, seemed literally on the cusp of consummation. Bonn did not have to make any gestures to the Jews (in terms of material compensation) to pave its way toward political independence. Despite this, Foreign Minister Sharett believed that Bonn would still be interested in placating the Jews, particularly at

Grosser, Germany in Our Time, 294.

Schumacher, "From Occupation to Alliance," 91.

ISA, MFA 43/10, Re: Germany – Compensation, November 28, 1951.

ISA, MFA 181/1, E. Nathan to Israel Legation in Paris, November 25, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/4, E. Livneh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 1951.

ISA, MFA 1809/4, Jewry and Germany: A Survey of Developments, 1949–1952, March 1952.

this juncture, with its rehabilitation almost complete, in order to remove any possible impediment that might stand in its path.39 Sharett's theory, however, seemed somewhat out of touch with reality. It was plain there was nothing stopping or even slowing down the rehabilitation process. Nevertheless, Jerusalem continued to take the rehabilitation factor into account, even though its weight in the sum total of factors influencing Israel's position on the question of compensation had narrowed to the point of disappearing almost entirely over the following months.

The refusal of the Western powers to intervene on Israel's behalf on the matter of reparations stemmed from a number of factors, some of which came to light in the course of March–July in talks Israel's representatives conducted with their Western counterparts. During these discussions, it was the American emissaries who demonstrated the most negative attitude to the issue. For Israel this was a cardinal stumbling block, since Washington's position was of pivotal importance. The US was the leading power in the world – certainly in the Western camp – and the magnitude of the economic, military, and political support it supplied to Bonn was unrivaled among the nations.

The main factor in the Western powers' decision not to get engaged in the reparations issue was political and inextricably linked with the Cold War. In their view, the West German economy was not strong enough to pay the sum stipulated in the Israeli reparations missive.40 Imposing such a fiscal drain on the FRG would be a blow to its economy and weaken the German state. Such a development was absolutely contrary to the strategic interests of the West, since an economically-weakened West Germany would be in no position to meaningfully contribute to the Western bloc's military-economic efforts to counter the growing Soviet threat.41

The second factor, emanating from the first, was economic in essence. The major powers argued that if they were to impose a reparations agreement on West Germany, they themselves would be forced to bear the burden of payment – either directly or indirectly, in part or entirely, since they did not want the German economy undermined. The United States, the primary source of any such future aid, was quick to clarify to Israel that it should not expect the American taxpayer to foot the bill for compensation funds.42

ISA, MFA 2417/6, Israel's Claim for Reparations from Germany, April 17, 1951.

KA, Meeting of the Finance Committee, May 14, 1951, 12–13.

FRUS, Vol. V, 631, Memorandum of Conversation, by Alexander F. Kiefer of the office of German Economic Affairs, April 10, 1951; BGA, GCD,A. L. Easterman to E. Elath, April 12, 1951; ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, May 2, 1951, 7–9.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to B. Browdy, June 12, 1951; ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, May 2, 1951, 7; FRUS, Vol. V, 667–669, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, May 8, 1951; FRUS, Vol. V, 725, The Secretary of State to the U.S. Representatives on the P.C.C., June 19, 1951.

The third factor, also an economic one, regarded the matter of the FRG's external debts.43 The Western powers promoted a move designed to reach an agreement regarding [West] Germany's external debts accumulated prior to and after the war. These debts stood at billions of Ameriacn dollars, and the primary creditors were countries in the West, above all the three major Western powers. Simple math showed that if Bonn accepted the Israeli claim for reparations, there was a risk that the FRG would not be able to financially guarantee its debt payments to the Western powers and their allies.44

The fourth factor related to public opinion in West Germany. The major powers feared that imposing a large compensation claim on Bonn was liable to alienate the German public from the Western camp. The powers were not eager to allow this to happen at a time when they were laboring strenuously to integrate the FRG into the Western bloc.

Finally, the fifth and last factor concerned the Middle Eastern arena. In their efforts to prevent Soviet penetration into the region, Washington and London were investigating the possibility of establishing an anti-Soviet defense alliance with countries in the Middle East. Naturally, Arab countries – and primarily Egypt, the most powerful among them – occupied a key place in such a military alliance.45 Consequently, the Western powers felt they could not intercede on behalf of Israel in such a weighty economic issue as reparations from Germany. Any intervention of this kind was liable to provoke the ire of Israel's neighboring foes, and it was unlikely that the Arab states would respond affirmatively to a call to join a regional defense pact following such a move.46

As noted, Adenauer's initiative to arrange an Israeli-German meeting with the aim of discussing the reparations claim was received positively in Jerusalem. All that remained was to pen the official Israeli reply to the invitation and, no less importantly, to decide what position would be presented by Israel's envoys. Due to the secrecy shrouding this diplomatic move, only about half a dozen people, most of them from the IMFA, were involved in preparing the response to Adenauer's invitation and the meeting itself. A key figure among them was Consul Livneh. He

See Chapter 9.

BGA, GCD, M. Perlzweig to A. L. Easterman, June 26, 1951; ISA, MFA 2417/2, Germany's Response to the Claim of Compensation by Israel, June 5, 1951; Lavy, Germany and Israel, 10. Onozawa, "Formation."

Walichnowski, Israel, 32; Lavy, Germany and Israel, 10.

prepared position papers prior to the meeting, and the recommendations they contained regarding the line Israel should adopt were, for the most part, endorsed by Sharett.47

The Israeli plan of action was laid out in the letter sent by Avner to Maurice Fischer on April 6. He was informed that it had been decided to send a missive to Adenauer (through Altmaier) proposing a meeting between the Chancellor and minister Fischer in Paris "to conduct a secret and preliminary discussion" on the reparations issue. Fischer was instructed to use this meeting to try and achieve a number of objectives regarding the reparations question. The most cardinal of them was "to convince the Chancellor that before it was possible to conduct official negotiations, we [the Israeli government] must receive from the government in Bonn a general [public] declaration" that would include: 1. the acknowledgement that a horrific crime had been committed by the German people against the Jewish people during the period of the Third Reich, as well as an expression of horror and revulsion with regard to this crime; 2. a vow that it was "the everlasting duty of the German people to ensure that no German government could ever again perpetrate similar crimes against humanity"; 3. the recognition of the duty of the German people and their government to rectify the terrible injustice done to the Jewish people, as much as possible, by giving them reparations, as well as speeding up processes in the areas of restitution of property and indemnification.

The German declaration was designed to pave the way for direct, official and public negotiations between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic. In other words, it was meant to legitimize, in the eyes of Israeli-Jewish public opinion, a step that stood in blatant contradiction to the sacred principle of boycotting Germany and its people for eternity. "To conduct negotiations with the Germans without prior receipt of a declaration from them of a profoundly moral nature," Avner clarified to Fischer, "is paramount to placing a red-hot iron on this wound and provoking terrible emotional turmoil among the Jewish people throughout the world."

It is unclear to what an extent Ben-Gurion, Sharett and the IMFA officials put their faith in the power of one German declaration, even if penned appropriately, to cause a genuine metamorphosis in the Israeli-Jewish outlook vis-à-vis Germany so as to allow for open negotiations. It would seem that they were merely cautiously hopeful in this regard for, at the end of the day, as Avner wrote, "the murder of 6 million Jews [. . .] is an element etched deeply into the Jewish consciousness." 48

ISA, MFA 2543/3, E. Livneh to G. Avner, March 23, 1951; ISA, MFA 2543/4, [Without Title], April 4, 1951.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 109, G. Avner to M. Fischer, April 6, 1951.

At any rate, the importance of the declaration was so great in the eyes of those at the helm that Leo Cohen rushed to send Fischer an additional letter that same day (April 6), where he underscored just how essential it was to obtain in his meeting with Adenauer "an impressive declaration" that could sway Israeli public opinion.49

The notion of a "German declaration" was not one hatched on the eve of the historic meeting. It had been raised repeatedly over the preceding six months by IMFA officials favoring direct Israeli-German contact,50 and by Jewish functionaries, such as Noach Barou, who were involved in the compensation issue.51 Egged on by officials in his office, Foreign Minister Sharett asserted in the cabinet meeting of February 8, 1951 that "it is clear that the German government must issue [. . .] a declaration of conciliation." Only then could Jerusalem begin to speak to Bonn on the matter of reparations.52

Livneh, who was requested to word Israel's reply to the Chancellor's invitation, did so and submitted the letter to Altmaier, who then passed it on to Adenauer. The Chancellor expressed satisfaction with the missive's content.53 In the course of the following days, Fischer made contact with the West German minister in Paris, and they agreed to conduct the meeting on the afternoon of April 19 in the Hôtel de Crillon in Paris, where Chancellor Adenauer would be staying.54 In Jerusalem in the meantime it had been decided that the director-general of the Ministry of Finance, David Horowitz, would speak on Israel's behalf, with Fischer there to accompany him. This choice was almost a given, considering that it was Horowitz, together with Leo Cohen, who had written the Israeli diplomatic note on reparations.

On the appointed day, the two Israeli envoys arrived at Adenauer's hotel suite. Present in the room was also Herbert Blankenhorn, the Chancellor's political advisor and director of the Political Department in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn. In the conversation, which was conducted in German, Horowitz spoke at length about the matter of Germany's declaration. "What is required," he asserted, "is a public statement of guilt as a formal ceremonial act." As for the claim itself, he clarified that the sum demanded by Israel in its March 12 missive

ISA, MFA 1812/12, L. Cohen to M. Fischer, April 6, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2539/1, M. Amir to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 13, 1950; ISA, MFA 2417/ 1, G. Avner to M. Sharett, February 26, 1951.

Gilead, "The Reparations Agreement," 104; Sagi, German Reparations, 69.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, February 8, 1951, 31.

ISA, MFA 2543/4, E. Doron to G. Avner, April 8, 1951; ISA, MFA 2543/4, E. Livneh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 10, 1951.

The German leader had come to Paris to carry out diplomatic talks with the French leadership.

represented but a small portion of the huge scope of assets lost to the Jews of Europe, and that it would be designated for the rehabilitation (in Israel) of survivors of Nazi persecution.55

According to a report that reached the IMFA, the Chancellor had refrained from responding when the declaration issue was raised. On the other hand, he "did not see any problem" in accepting the Israeli claim for reparations as a basis for negotiations.56 Horowitz claimed in his memoirs that the Chancellor was attentive to both issues and responded to them positively.57 Similarly, Horowitz told the Israeli cabinet in its meeting at the beginning of May that "we are receiving information from very reliable sources in [West] Germany through unofficial channels," indicating "that they [the West Germans] are taking our claim seriously." It never occurred to the ministers that the aforementioned "sources" were the German Chancellor himself.58

Israel's activity via the German channel did not mean that they had given up on the Western channel. On the contrary, despite the cold shoulder with which the US, Great Britain and France met Israel's claims, Jerusalem was determined to continue its attempts to move them to take action on the question of reparations. Their involvement was important even if the German channel continued to operate (that is, the continuation of behind-the-scenes contact between representatives of Bonn and Jerusalem), and all the more so if it turned out to be a dead end. In the first case, the powers' role would be to convince the Germans to open formal negotiations with the Israelis and to spur Bonn into adopting an obliging and positive attitude in these future negotiations. As Ambassador Eban told Byroade a number of days before the Israeli-German meeting in Paris, there was "evidence" that Bonn was willing to go forward on the reparations question and that western pressure on Germany would transform German "willingness" into "concrete action." 59 About a month after the meeting in Paris, Sharett instructed Eban to inform Secretary of State Acheson of the unfolding events and to point out that Washington could "solidify" the emerging German track by telling the Germans that they must pay and that settlement of the reparations matter was a vital conditional for any progress in the rehabilitation of West Germany.60

Horowitz, In the Heart of Events, 87–88.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 171, M. Sharett to A. Eban, May 13, 1951.

Horowitz, In the Heart of Events, 87–88.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, May 2, 1951, 11.

FRUS, Vol. V, 630, Memorandum of Conversation, by Alexander F. Kiefer of the office of German Economic Affairs, April 10, 1951.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 171, M. Sharett to A. Eban, May 13, 1951.

The powers' involvement would be all the more critical in the event that the German route failed to deliver. Israel knew such a possibility existed. At this stage it was impossible to know whether Bonn was serious in its intention to proceed on the long and rocky road toward the payment of reparations. Chancellor Adenauer's initiative was merely a harbinger, but it did not necessarily herald the arrival of spring. And even if the FRG demonstrated genuine willingness to move forward on the issue, the German channel could still prove fruitless due to internal Jewish discord: namely, the Israeli-Jewish public's opposition to any contact between Jerusalem and Bonn.

The main maneuver that Israel employed to convince the Western powers, first and foremost the US, to take action on the reparations question was linked to the economic domain. In essence, Jerusalem sought to thoroughly refute the central argument of the powers – that the West German economy did not have the fiscal means to bear the burden of reparations payments. In the estimation of Israeli officials, voiced since mid-1950, the FRG's economy was recovering rapidly.61 These assessments became more and more frequent in the course of 1951.62

In early May, the IMFA approached Livneh to update him about the upcoming campaign to convince the Western powers to come on board and to request that, as Israel's envoy in Munich, he provide statistical data on the West German economy.63 Livneh fulfilled the request,64 and, at the end of the month, the data he provided was sent by the IMFA to the Israeli embassy in Washington. The IMFA hoped the materials provided would aid embassy staff in their endeavors to demonstrate to the American administration the robustness of the West German economy and its capability "to take on this burden [of reparations]." 65 The embassy found the data insufficient, and in consultation with the IMFA, raised the suggestion that Livneh spend several weeks in Washington in order to assist embassy staff in the campaign to convince the Americans. The IMFA updated Livneh

ISA, MFA 1783/9, E. Livneh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29, 1951; BGA, BGD, February 5, 1951.

The roots of West Germany's 'economic miracle', as it was oft labeled around the world, lay in the monetary reform introduced in June 1948. In the years 1950–1951 its first harbingers had appeared. Plumpe, "Opting for the Structural Break."

Already in the course of April, Israeli officials had been telling the Americans that West Germany was capable of paying reparations; however, this assertion was not backed by economic research at that point. FRUS, Vol. V, 630, Memorandum of Conversation, by Alexander F. Kiefer of the office of German Economic Affairs, April 10, 1951.

ISA, MFA 534/1, E. Livneh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 17, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/2, G. Avner to the Israel Embassy in Washington, May 30, 1951.

of the plan, and requested that he "begin immediately [. . .] to collect reports, statistical material and so forth" on the West German economy.66

At the same time, Horowitz was busy preparing a brief memorandum on "The economic Conditions in Germany and the Payment of Reparations to Israel." 67 The five page memorandum, based on an abundance of data, demonstrated that the West German economy was in the midst of a tremendous growth spurt: exports had spiraled and the deficit in balance of payments had fallen. The conclusion drawn from the data was clear: the reparations claim was not such a burden as "to affect the economic future of that country [the FRG] to a fundamental degree." 68 The memorandum was disseminated amongst Israeli diplomatic missions in the West, first and foremost in the capitals of the Western powers, in order to allow them "to use the arguments, figures and facts for [the purpose of] diplomatic propaganda regarding reparations." 69 Israel's representatives abroad did indeed make use of this economic survey. The envoys in Washington went so far as to employ the data in every meeting they had with American officials concerning the reparations issue.

Nevertheless, the memorandum prepared by Horowitz was found lacking by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his staff. They wanted a far more comprehensive survey. Sharett and his people were eager to prove to the Western powers that the German economy was indeed capable of bearing the yoke of reparations, and therefore they sought to produce a broad study proving this fact. This time, the IMFA's Economic Research Department was recruited for the task.70 After weeks of intense research, the Department produced a booklet over eighty pages long titled "Israel's Claims against Germany: The German Economic Background," which addressed a broad spectrum of topics relating to the FRG's economy, including the state of agriculture and industry, the state of the foreign currency, as well as the balance of payments and foreign trade. This survey too showed that the economic status of West Germany was improving at an astonishing rate and therefore that it had the capability to satisfy the Israeli claim.71 Similar to Horowitz's memorandum, widespread use of the booklet was made for the purposes of Israel's publicity blitz.

ISA, MFA 2543/5, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to E. Livneh, June 7, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/2, Information for Israeli Missions Abroad: Reparations from Germany, June 17, 1951.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 243, Aide-Memoire from the Government of Israel to the Government of the United States, June 29, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/2, D. Horowitz to M. Sharett, May 14, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/5, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to E. Livneh, June 7, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/21, Israel's Claims against Germany: The German Economic Background, July 1951.

However, there were those in the IMFA who thought even this would not suffice. Fischer and Livneh felt there was still uncharted territory to cover and proposed that a private economist be hired to fill in the blanks. Livneh surmised that the completion of such a task would cost a thousand USD, and he turned to Horowitz to request that the Ministry of Finance allocate the sum.72 Finance Minister Kaplan was inclined to approve the expenditure,73 and an Israeli economist named Zvi Weizmann, who had business ties in West Germany, was charged with executing the study.74 Gershon Avner rushed to instruct Weizmann to go over Horowitz's memorandum and the Economic Research Department's booklet so that his work would not deal with matters that had already been covered. In Avner's opinion, Weizmann would be best advised to limit his research to the possible means of transferring reparations funds to Israel.75

Certain officials at the IMFA thought that it was a mistake to hire Weizmann. They feared that the findings of an Israeli or Jewish economist, however competent he might be, would not be acceptable to the Western powers. They doubted the research objectivity of such an economist. In the opinion of these officials, it would have been appropriate to hire a "non-Jewish [and] independent economist," 76 a "world renowned" person and above all an American who would be acceptable to the State Department. Its cost, one of the officials estimated, would be about 20,000 USD.77 The offer was accepted and the search for an economist with these qualities began. However, the searchers failed to achieve their goal. "It turned out to our surprise," wrote Moshe Keren, a counselor at the Israeli embassy in Washington, to Horowitz, "that it is not at all easy to find here a person of a high caliber who is willing to take on such a task." 78 It is interesting to note that Israel's representatives in the American capital made sure to inform the State Department that they intended to hire a "reputable" economist to examine the state of the West German economy. There was a clear attempt here to signal to Washington, and through it to its two allies, that Israel was determined to prove to them that their economic argument was without any basis.79

ISA, MFA 2543/5, G. Avner to D. Horowitz, July 11, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/6, E. Livneh to G. Avner, August 21, 1951.

ISA, MFA 181/1, An Inquiry Program to Establish our Claims from Germany, July 19, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/6, Re: The German Economic Inquiry, August 12, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Reparations, September 13, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, S. Rosenne to W. Eytan, August 20, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to D. Horowitz, August 10, 1951; ISA, MFA 2543/6, M. Keren to G. Avner, September 7, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 3, 1951.

Efforts to convince the Western powers that the FRG's economy was strengthening remarkably slowly died down after July 5, when the powers had issued their response to the Israeli diplomatic note on reparations.80 The replies testified, as could have been expected, that Washington, London, and Paris were adamant in their refusal to intervene on Israel's behalf when it came to the reparations issue. This negative response took the wind out of the sails of the lobbying campaign. The prevailing feeling was that no economic rationale, even if backed up with compelling evidence, could move the major powers from their recalcitrant position. Moreover, the entire effort suddenly seemed pointless. "It is entirely bizarre," stated one official in the IMFA, "that we have to prepare such [economic] material for the Americans." 81 His colleague joined him in adding that "it is obvious that the Americans have much more [economic] information than we do." 82 In a similar vein, Horowitz wrote to Sharett succinctly that "the fiscal state of [West] Germany is well known to the occupying authorities." 83

The problem was, certainly, not a lack of information (the major power had an abundance of data) but rather a failure to conclude from it that the German economy was strong enough to handle compensation. As far as Horowitz was concerned, the fact that the German economy was stronger than its Israeli counterpart was reason enough for Bonn to pay reparations. After all, it was out of the question, he stated, that the country that had perpetrated the Holocaust be in better shape economically than the country that had absorbed so many Holocaust victims.84

The responses of the three Western powers were identical, having been coordinated in advance.85 The diplomatic notes opened with an expression of abhorrence at "the monstrous crime" committed by the Third Reich against the Jewish people, a

AIG, Document 10, United States Note of 5 July 1951 in Reply to Israel Note of 12 March 1951 Concerning Reparations; AIG, Document 11, United Kingdom Note of 5 July 1951 in Reply to Israel Note of 12 March 1951 Concerning Reparations; AIG, Document 12, Note from France of 5 July 1951 in Reply to Israel Note of 11 March 1951 Concerning Reparations.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Reparations, September 13, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, S. Rosenne to W. Eytan, August 20, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/2, D. Horowitz to M. Sharett, July 27, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 3, 1951.

A British official admitted that "it was agreed that the three governments [of the three Western powers] should reply on broadly similar lines." UKNA, FO 371/93516, R. B. Stevens to Lord Henderson, June 25, 1951. Coordination of the answers is evidenced in a host of documents in Department of State files. See, for example: USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/5-1551, Israeli Reparation Claim against Germany, May 15, 1951; USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/5-1751, Israeli Reparation Claim against Germany, May 17, 1951; USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/6-2951, Transmitting Revised British Draft of Reply to Israeli Note, June 29, 1951; USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/7-551, Israeli Note of March 12 1951 Regarding Reparations, July 5, 1951.

crime unparalleled in centuries of human history. However, the singular horror of the Nazis' crime did not move them to assist the Jewish state in its struggle for reparations. Just the opposite: the powers announced explicitly that they had no intention of intervening in the issue. When it came to justifying this position, the three powers refrained from using the economic argument, a line of reasoning their representatives had often employed in talks with Israeli diplomats carried out over the preceding four months. Rather, they decided to base their position on a specific judicial-political rationale. This argument was tied to the reparations agreements signed immediately after the close of World War II. At the Potsdam Conference in July–August 1945, it was agreed that the three Western powers, along with additional Allied countries,86 would extract war reparations from the Western occupation zone in Germany.87 In December of that same year, at the initiative of the three Western powers, eighteen Allied countries who were entitled to war reparations from the western part of Germany convened in Paris.88 The participants decided that, due to Germany's economic state at the time, the sum of reparations that would actually be paid would be limited in scope and that the eighteen nations would not present additional claims for war reparations until a final peace treaty between Germany and the Allies was signed.89 Thus, the Paris Conference "tied the hands" of the Western powers from a legal-political standpoint. It prevented them from presenting any new claims for war reparations in the foreseeable future, in their names or in the names of any other country. This state of affairs was clarified to Israel in all three diplomatic notes. The major powers expressed their deep sorrow for their inability to take action on the issue.90

 In the following months, Israel formulated its reply to the diplomatic notes of July 5, and on November 30, 1951, the Israeli reply was submitted to the three Western powers. Israel argued that the reparations claim was not a regular claim seeking compensation for damages caused as a result of a war. The Israeli claim was unique since it rested on the unprecedented onslaught the Third Reich had carried out against the Jewish people, a campaign that exceeded in its scope, its intensity and its duration those the Third Reich had conducted against any of the other Peoples in Europe, and therefore it was right that it should be satisfied. AIG, Document 16, Israel Note of 30 November 1951 in Reply to United States Note of 5 July 1951 Concerning Reparations; AIG, Document 17, Israel Note of 30 November 1951 in Reply to United Kingdom Note of 5 July 1951 Concerning Reparations; AIG, Document 18, Israel Note of 30 November 1951 in Reply to the Note from France of 5 July 1951 Concerning Reparations. The reply from the Western powers arrived in January 1952 when Israel and the FRG were already on the brink of opening reparation negotiations between them. The powers felt their intervention was no longer required and notified Israel that they would await the outcome of the talks with "sympathetic interest."

Not including the USSR and Poland.

Edmonds, "Yalta and Potsdam," 212.

See the Introduction.

Fisch, "From Weakening an Enemy," 273.

The powers' decision to base their rejection of Israel's request to intervene in the reparations issue on legal-political rather than economic grounds remains unexplained in the documents at our disposal. One can surmise that there were two main reasons for this decision. First of all, it is possible that the Israeli publicity blitz regarding the FRG's recovering economy forced the Western powers to admit among themselves that the economic argument did not hold water. That is, one could not argue that the FRG was unable to bear any reparations claim, whatever the scope, when all the economic parameters attested to a dramatic and sustained improvement in its economy. Secondly, it could be that the three powers understood that from the perspective of public opinion at home it was preferable to reject the Israeli claim, one that they had already recognized as a morally just claim,91 on a pretext in the realm of international law, rather than clothing it as an economic-utilitarian issue.

The major powers' negative reply was accompanied by a piece of diplomatic advice of great significance: to create a direct communication channel between Jerusalem and Bonn on the reparations question. Lord Henderson had raised this option in a discussion he conducted with Alexander Easterman from the World Jewish Congress, two weeks prior to the arrival of the powers' diplomatic notes.92 A week later, on June 29, Ambassador Eban met with Byroade to discuss the reparations issue. The State Department official clarified to his guest that the replies of the three Western powers were almost ready, but that they would not be to Israel's liking. Nevertheless, he suggested that the contents of the diplomatic notes remain confidential, so as not to create the mistaken impression in Bonn that the Western powers rejected the idea of reparations hands down. In other words, the reparations question could still be solved via direct Israeli-German contact.93 Secretary of State Acheson lent his support to the idea of keeping the notes' content under wraps,94

AIG, Document 23, United Kingdom Note of 10 January 1952 in Reply to Israel Note of 30 November 1951 Concerning Reparations; AIG, Document 24, United States Note of 24 January 1952 in Reply to Israel Note of 30 November 1951 Concerning Reparations. The reply of the three powers was coordinated among them, as had been the case with their other replies. USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/12-2851, British Reply to Israeli Note on Claims against Germany, December 28, 1951.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, May 2, 1951, 9; ISA, MFA 355/15, S. Bendor to the Embassy in Washington, May 24, 1951; ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to B. Browdy, June 12, 1951; BGA, GCD, A. L. Easterman to E. Elath, April 12, 1951.

BGA, GCD, A. L. Easterman to M. L. Perlzweig, June 21, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 3, 1951; USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/6-2951, Israeli Claims against Germany, June 29, 1951.

FRUS, Vol. V, 741–742, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, July 3, 1951.

and George McGhee from the State Department confirmed as much in a discussion he held with Teddy Kollek, Israel's minister to Washington, where the American response letter was officially presented. In order not to jeopardize the possibility of direct negotiation between Jerusalem and Bonn, he informed his guest, the three powers had decided not to make the contents of the diplomatic notes public.95 In the days that followed, officials in the State Department continued to emphasize their support for direct Israeli-German negotiations on the reparations question in addressing the Israeli diplomats.96

This was brought to the attention of the government in Jerusalem in a July 18 cabinet meeting. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sharett told his colleagues about the negative content of the powers' diplomatic notes and the "oral messages" to the Israeli envoys in London and Washington suggesting "we communicate with [West] Germany directly." In light of this stance, Sharett felt that "it is possible we shall have to discuss making direct contact with [West] Germany." He proposed, however, to examine this matter after the Knesset elections (being held on July 30), with a new government in place. The Minister of Foreign Affairs' dramatic suggestion did not evoke even the slightest protest among those present, a striking change from the stormy reaction the idea of sending an Israeli delegation to the FRG had received in the cabinet meeting of December 27, 1950, when it was raised by IMFA officials. It would seem that opponents of direct negotiations had begun to recognize that their previously staunch position was no longer practical. Two factors contributed to this realization. First, there was the adamant refusal of the Western powers to get involved, as expressed in their diplomatic notes, which closed the door on channels other than direct contact. And secondly, the state of the Israeli economy continued to deteriorate and was in dire need of a significant source of incoming capital.97

The powers' recommendation to create a direct communication channel with Bonn carried their implicit accord that the FRG should pay reparations to Israel. This was a sensational change considering that in the months preceding the submission of the reply missives one could deduce that the Western powers opposed the very idea of reparations for the Jewish state in any shape or form. What had led to this sudden change of heart? It is possible that Israel's intensive campaign to demonstrate the robust state of the West German economy had persuaded them to reexamine their appraisal of the negative impact of the reparations claim

FRUS, Vol. V, 751, Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, July 5, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/5, G. Avner to E. Livneh, July 9, 1951; DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 265, M. Keren to the United States Division, July 12, 1951.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, July 18, 1951, 8–12.

on the FRG. While they certainly did not share Israel's outlook vis-à-vis the strength of the German economy, policy-makers in Washington, London and Paris knew this economy was on an upward trajectory, which enabled the FRG to pay reparations. In addition, their willingness to accept the possibility of Bonn paying reparations did not amount to a green light for the West German polity to pay any sum demanded of it. They were prepared (as would be confirmed later during the Israeli-German negotiations) for the Germans to pay a significantly smaller sum than that demanded by Israel. The sum was also supposed to be spread out over a relatively lengthy period of time. Both the scope of the payment and its disbursement over time were designed to minimize the blow to the FRG's economy. Finally, Chancellor Adenauer's initiative, backed by several German cabinet ministers, to promote Israeli-German negotiations forced the Western powers to consent to the possibility that the treasury in Bonn would be paying material compensation to the State of Israel out of its coffers.98

Yet, in light of the powers' acceptance of Germany's payment of reparations to Israel, even if limited in scope, we might ask why they refused to assume the role of a mediator-facilitator, as Israel had requested from the beginning of March. There were several reasons for that. First of all, as the powers had clarified in their official response letters, this was impossible from a legal and political perspective. Secondly, their involvement was liable to alienate public opinion in two camps: in West Germany and in the Arab world. But it seems that the core reason for their decision was the desire to bring Jews and Germans together for all the world to witness. Leadership in the three Western capitals was keen to see this dramatic and unprecedented spectacle – a Jewish-German gathering – take place before the eyes of their astonished citizenry. Such a display would transmit to public opinion in the US, Britain and France, as well as other western countries, a message of rapprochement between the most bitter of enemies – victim and victimizer. This would go a long way toward improving the problematic image of the Germans and it would ease the task of the Western powers' leadership in moving the FRG's rehabilitation process forward (in essence to complete it).99

From late June 1951, the Americans began to hint to Israeli diplomats that they were willing to accept the possibility of Bonn paying reparations. ISA, MFA 2543/5, G. Avner to E. Livneh, July 7, 1951; DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 292, Meeting: E. Herlitz, M. Keren – G. Lewis, July 26, 1951; FRUS, Vol. V, 751, Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, July 5, 1951.

In light of this, one can understand the American call to Israel to establish diplomatic ties with Bonn and thus ease the solution of the reparations question. USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–- 1954), 262.84A41/11-151, Compensation from Germany, November 1, 1951.

And what was the fate of the Israeli reparations note to the Soviet Union?100 Israeli officials did not hang much hope on the success of the reparations claim in the USSR and its East German satellite. This was chiefly due to the fact that Moscow and Berlin had already demonstrated a hostile attitude to the two other categories of compensation: restitution of property and indemnification. In the course of 1947–1949 the Russians and the East Germans exhibited a certain degree of willingness to make progress on compensation to survivors of Nazi persecution, including Jews. East German personalities made declarations sympathetic to the right of survivors to compensation and a number of laws in the realm of restitution of property were enacted in the GDR. However, such declarations were sporadic and lacking any genuine foundation and accordingly, the legislation ensured that, in practice, the majority of property looted during the Nazi period (including Jewish property) would remain in the hands of the regime.101 From the second half of 1949, and all the more so in the following year, it became increasingly evident that the seeming willingness of Moscow and Berlin to make progress on the compensation issue had vanished into thin air. As already noted, Mendelsohn's mission in the spring of 1950 to Berlin had achieved nothing.102 The diplomatic note to Moscow on restitution and indemnification, sent on January 16, 1951,103 met a similar fate; that is to say, the Kremlin ignored it entirely. And as if that were not enough, the East German parliament passed an outrageous piece of legislation in the fall of 1951 stipulating that the property of survivors of Nazi persecution living outside the country would be passed on to the government.104

This same categorical hostility applied to reparations as well. Moscow's reply to the Israeli diplomatic note on reparations arrived only in late March 1952, more than a year after it had been sent, and was essentially negative.105

Moscow's position toward the issue of compensation was based, among other things, on cold, hard economic considerations. The Russians feared that if Berlin paid any substantial compensation sum – whether in restitution, indemnification, or reparations – to the Jews and to Israel (as well as to other parties, persons and polities injured by the Nazis), the treasury in Berlin would be emptied and

On the issue of reparations from the GDR, see: Jelinek, "East Germany"; Pinkus, 'Special Relations', 377–380; Timm, Jewish Claims against East Germany, 81–86; Tovy, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front"; Trimbur, "L'attitude de la RDA."

Lorenzini, "Reparations Measures," 98–113; Maser, "Juden und Jüdische," 407–409; Timm, Jewish Claims against East Germany, 27–29, 68–72.

See Chapter 2.

See Chapter 3.

Tovy, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front," 81. See in this context: Goschler, Schuld und Schulden, 369. Pinkus, 'Special Relations', 379.

Moscow would be unable to extract compensation from the GDR for itself. The USSR believed that, more than any other entity, it was entitled to material compensation considering that it had suffered the most severe losses among all the Allied nations in the course of the Second World War. Beyond this, Moscow's attitude to reparations was also motivated by political factors. After a short honeymoon between the Soviet Union and Israel in the years 1948–1949, relations between the two cooled considerably, driven first and foremost by Israel's steadily increasing closeness with the Western bloc, led by the United States. Moscow began to exhibit a negative stance toward the Jewish state, which manifested itself in a variety of forms, one of them its position on the matter of reparations. Publicly, Moscow and Berlin argued vehemently and vociferously that the GDR was not heir to the Third Reich, since politically and ideologically the anti-fascist Communist regime was the diametric opposite of the Nazi regime. Berlin, therefore, had no obligation to take upon itself the moral or financial responsibility for the criminal acts of the Third Reich.106

Thus, the negative response from Moscow to Israel's reparations note came as no surprise. At the same time, a consensus formed in the IMFA that it would be best for Israel to tread lightly on the reparations question with the USSR-GDR while the West German channel was taking shape. Their main apprehension was that Moscow and Berlin's negativity could rub off on Bonn.107 Consequently, up until the fall of 1952, when the Reparations Agreement was signed between Israel and the FRG, Jerusalem allowed the reparations issue to stagnate in Moscow and Berlin. Afterwards, political activity renewed with vigor, however, to no avail.108 The GDR never paid reparations to Israel.109

Tovy, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front," 78–79.

Tovy, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front," 83.

Tovy, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front," 87–96.

Trimbur, "L'attitude de la RDA," 605–607.

## Chapter 5 The German Declaration, September 1951

Senior officials at the IMFA believed that the Western powers, the US chief among them, could aid in the advancement and success of the German-Israeli channel. They could do so in two key ways. First, they could apply pressure to the Bonn government to acquiesce to the Israeli demand regarding the issuance of a formal declaration on the subjects of the Holocaust and material compensation to the Jews. As noted, this was the Israeli precondition for the opening of negotiations between the two states. At the end of June 1951, Eban presented the request to the US High Commissioner in the FRG, John McCloy,1 and about a month later Israeli diplomats had the chance to discuss the issue with Jeffrey Lewis.2 The Americans' response was positive: they promised to press Bonn to deliver the declaration.3 And indeed, McCloy broached this matter with Chancellor Adenauer on several occasions.4 The second line of action the IMFA officials wanted the powers to undertake was to express public support for the principle of reparations. Such an announcement on behalf of the West, these officials believed, would very much strengthen the Israeli cause in future negotiations with the Germans.5 Nevertheless, some voices in the foreign service opposed this idea. The Israeli embassy in Washington argued that the powers would refuse to show their support for the Israeli claim, mainly to avoid ruffling feathers in the Arab world, and to keep public opinion in Germany on their side. Israel's efforts in this regard would be in vain and would result in the postponement of progress via the German channel.6 A similar caution was sounded from Rosenne's office.7 These warnings must have convinced enough people at the IMFA, since the matter was quickly dropped from Israel's agenda.

While this diplomatic activity was taking place, the IMFA also took internalorganizational step aimed at optimizing its efficacy in managing the reparations

ISA, MFA 2543/5, G. Avner to E. Livneh, July 7, 1951.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 292, Meeting: E. Herlitz, M. Keren – G. Lewis, July 26, 1951; USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/7-2051, Israeli Note on Reparations and our Reply, July 20, 1951. ISA, MFA 2417/3, G. Avner to E. Herlitz, August 15, 1951.

UKNA, FO 371/93455, British Legation in Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, September 17, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, G. Avner to D. Horowitz, August 9, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to F. Shinnar, August 14, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Y. Tekoah to S. Rosenne, July 31, 1951.

Open Access. © 2023 the author(s), published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110982534-006

issue. On August 1, 1951, Felix Eliezer Shinnar was appointed to the position of "Foreign Ministry Counsel on Israeli Claims". 8 His role was to "coordinate all matters relating to Israel's reparations claim from Germany and handle them." 9 The necessity of creating such a position was pointed out by IMFA officials, who bemoaned the lack of a central body that would oversee activity pertaining to the reparations issue.10

The main piece of business on Shinnar's desk over his first weeks in office, as well as the desks of all the other Israeli officials involved in the reparations matter, was the question of the German declaration. A dramatic development in this respect took place in the second half of July. Noah Barou, chairman of the European Executive of the World Jewish Congress, met with Herbert Blankenhorn and asked him directly about West Germany's plans concerning the said declaration. The inquiry is likely to have been linked with Israel's own maneuvers in this regard. Blankenhorn surprised his interlocutor by announcing that Bonn would be making such a public declaration in the near future.11 It is possible that the Americans' involvement made an impact on the Germans' decision. At the end of the discussion the two agreed to hold a second meeting wherein Barou would receive a written draft of the declaration. This meeting took place a few days later, and the draft was given to Barou as promised.12 He immediately sent it to Nahum Goldmann, acting president of the World Jewish Congress and chairman of the American wing of the Jewish Agency's Executive.13 He, in turn, directed the document to the desk of Foreign Minister Sharett, whence it was distributed among senior IMFA staff. It would seem that the draft left a less-than-favorable impression on its readers.14 Goldmann, for one, was disappointed by the fact that the declaration did not explicitly touch on the matter of reparations. He added a paragraph on the subject to the

From fall 1949 to early 1951 Shinnar had served as financial advisor at the Israeli Legation in London.

ISA, MFA 181/1, W. Eytan to M. Sharett, July 8, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Re: Shilumim, June 22, 1951; ISA, MFA 344/21, G. Rafael to W. Eytan, July 10, 1951.

Behind the scenes in Bonn, at the time, the leadership was intensely focused on the subject of the declaration. President Theodor Heuss made a public statement at the end of July, saying that Chancellor Adenauer was seriously considering issuing an official declaration on the subject of compensation. Jelinek, Deutschland und Israel, 109; Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 223. See also: De Vita, Israelpolitik, 22.

See in this context: Lustick, "Negotiating Truth," 58.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Abridged Summary from the Meeting on the Subject of Shilumim, August 12, 1951; Rosensaft, "The Early History," 24–25.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, G. Avner to W. Eytan, August 4, 1951.

document and asked Barou to deliver the amended draft to Blankenhorn.15 Barou complied and Blankenhorn presented the correction to Chancellor Adenauer, who agreed to the inclusion of Goldmann's paragraph. It is important to note that Goldmann's actions – his revision of the declaration draft and the recruitment of Barou as a go-between – were carried out with the knowledge and approval of Foreign Minister Sharett.16

The IMFA wished to make sure that Bonn was indeed working to change the wording of the declaration. Avner instructed the embassy in Washington to petition the Americans to make sure that the text of the German declaration reached Israel's eyes before its publication, so that Jerusalem could "negotiate any slight changes [with Bonn] in order to render the declaration satisfactory." To be found satisfactory, the declaration had to contain the following three items, as detailed in Avner's April 6 letter to Fischer: an acknowledgement of the horrific criminal act perpetrated against the Jewish people by the German people during the Third Reich period and its denunciation; a vow that such appalling events would never reproduce themselves on German soil; and an agreement to issue material compensation to the Jewish people, including reparations. Anything less, warned Avner, would be "in jeopardy of missing the target" – i.e. legitimizing Israeli-German negotiations in the eyes of the Jewish public – and "arousing vociferous criticism in the Jewish Diaspora and in Israel." In such a scenario, "the Government of Israel could not enter into negotiations even if it wanted to." 17

The embassy in Washington, however, had reservations about Avner's proposal. In their view, there was danger inherent in "any attempt to influence the formulation of Adenauer's declaration in advance." "Imagine," wrote the counselor at the embassy Moshe Keren to Avner, "if the declaration should be received with particularly scathing criticism by the Israeli and international press and Israel's government should have to admit it was aware of its contents in advance and gave it its seal of approval." It would cause a veritable public and parliamentary uproar in Israel, the scope and outcome of which was unforeseeable.18 Avner, however, dismissed the warning. Israel, he maintained, would admit that it gave its seal of approval "only to those changes that we [. . .] manage to insert into the declaration." 19 Shinnar, as part of his new function, followed the above

ISA, MFA 344/15, Abridged Summary from the Meeting on the Subject of Shilumim, August 12, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, E. Livneh to G. Avner, August 26, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, G. Avner to E. Herlitz, August 15, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/6, M. Keren to G. Avner, September 7, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/6, G. Avner to M. Keren, September 21, 1951.

exchange and endorsed Avner's position.20 He suggested that it would be unwise to rely on Washington alone, and that it would be best to contact Adenauer directly, through Israel's consul in Munich, Livneh, in order to influence the content of the declaration.21 Avner, on his part, proposed recruiting two Jewish figures to this end: Bundestag member Jakob Altmaier and High Commissioner McCloy's deputy, Benjamin Buttenwieser.22 At the same time, he contacted the Foreign Ministry in London and asked for its assistance in Israel's efforts to obtain a declaration that was "as forthcoming as possible" from the West Germans.23

While Israel toiled to obtain the text of the declaration, it came to light that Blankenhorn had transferred an amended draft to Goldmann through Barou toward mid-September.24 Goldmann hastened to make additional changes to the draft and sent it off to Bonn.25 The Israelis were satisfied with this turn of events, even while reiterating their request to view the final version and to retain the right of final approval before the public announcement.26 Over the next fortnight, the declaration draft went back and forth between German and Jewish hands. Goldmann, Barou, and Altmaier, as well as the IMFA staff who set eyes on the draft mainly through the mediation of the aforementioned threesome, made sure to amend it so as to make it compliant with Israel's demands. The Germans examined the proposed changes with great attention, accepting some and rejecting others.27 On September 24, upon the arrival of yet another draft from Bonn, Jerusalem came to the conclusion, not without some minor disappointment, that this version was "the best of what is possible to get." 28

On September 26, the Israeli government held a special deliberation on the subject of the upcoming German declaration. In the absence of Foreign Minister Sharett, who was sojourning abroad, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stepped up to lead the discussion. The shroud of secrecy cast over the West German-Israeli talks from mid-March remained in effect and, therefore, the ministers knew nothing of the diplomatic game of tag that had taken place around the declaration draft.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, F. Shinnar to E. Herlitz, September 12, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Shilumim, September 13, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, G. Avner to E. Livneh, September 10, 1951.

UKNA, FO 371/93455, British Legation in Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, September 17, 1951.

According to Blankenhorn, he met with Barou "at least a dozen times" while working on the declaration draft. Deutschkron, Bonn and Jerusalem, 31.

ISA, MFA 344/20, N. Goldmann to M. Sharett, September 14, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, F. Shinnar to E. Livneh, September 12, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, E. Livneh to G. Avner and F. Shinnar, September 20, 1951; ISA, MFA 2543/6, M. Fischer to W. Eytan, September 21, 1951; Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe, 123–125; Avihar, "Awakening," 73.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, G. Avner to E. Livneh, September 24, 1951.

"We have news," Ben-Gurion informed those present, "that the head of the West German government, Dr. Adenauer, is about to make a declaration about the relations between the [. . .] German people and the Jewish people." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he added laconically, has received the text of the planned declaration. The full content of the draft was then read out loud to the ministers, in a Hebrew translation. The IMFA, Ben-Gurion continued after the reading, has already prepared a proposed response to the German declaration, which has been sent to Israel's diplomatic missions around the world. The response was also communicated to the ministers.

We shall discuss the two documents presented by Ben-Gurion in detail further on, however, for the purposes of assessing the government's stance on the German channel, it is worthwhile for now to pause on one specific element contained in both. The Chancellor's declaration made a proposal to Israel and world Jewry to open direct and official negotiations on the subject of compensation. The IMFA's response, while refraining from addressing this invitation directly, did not reject it out of hand. In other words, Israel was about to publicly announce to the international community that the possibility of direct and official negotiations between itself and West Germany on the question of reparations was not off the table, as far as the Jewish state was concerned. This would, by all accounts, be a momentous historic event. The German channel, embarked upon only six months earlier, was beginning to show the first glimmers of a light at the end of the tunnel. The majority of the cabinet ministers found no objection with the proposed response, and therein gave their de facto approbation to the prospect of pursuing direct German-Israeli negotiations (an attitude already on display at the July 18 cabinet meeting).29 The only members to voice any kind of reservations were two ministers from the religious-Orthodox camp. Their concerns were heard but not heeded, and the cabinet approved the IMFA's proposed response.30

On September 27, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer went before the Bundestag plenum and made his declaration.31 Its first half was dedicated to the Bonn government's efforts, both legal and educational, to prevent the recurrence of the Holocaust. Immediately after it followed the paragraph that was supposed to contain Bonn's recognition of the heinous crime perpetrated by the German people

See Chapter 4.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, September 26, 1951, 2–8.

Before its public proclamation, the Chancellor showed the declaration to representatives of the leading factions of the parliament. He likewise made sure to get president Heuss's approval. Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World, 14. On September 26, one day before the historic speech, the Bonn government unanimously approved the final text of the declaration. Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe, 125; Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 226.

against the Jewish people and its denunciation. Those listening in Jerusalem expected to hear harsh and explicit words to this effect, yet their anticipation proved to be in vain. "The overwhelming majority of the German people," determined the Chancellor, "detested the crimes perpetrated against the Jews and had no part in them." Not only that, but "many" Germans had risked their lives to come to the aid of their Jewish fellow citizens. From this narrative, one could surmise that two separate, if not conflicting, entities had existed during the Third Reich period: the Nazi regime (which persecuted the Jews) and the German nation (which did not participate in the atrocities).32

Nevertheless, "unspeakable crimes were committed in the name of the German nation" and they "necessitate the moral and material compensation" of the Jewish people. In this regard, the Chancellor mentioned the two existing categories of compensation: indemnification and restitution of property. On both these counts, he reminded his listeners, "first steps have been taken," though "very much remains to be done." The government, he clarified, will work toward improving the existing legislation in the field of indemnification and forge ahead with its activities in the field of restitution. When it came to the third category, that of reparations, the Chancellor employed rather vague language: "The Federal Government is prepared, jointly with representatives of the Jewish people and of the State of Israel, which has absorbed so many homeless Jewish refugees, to bring about a solution of the problem of material compensation." One can see this sentence as knowingly hinting at the subject of reparations due to the Chancellor's

Having perused the final text of the declaration on the eve of its public pronouncement, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that Adenauer "will speak neither of guilt nor of responsibility." BGA, BGD, September 25, 1951. Foreign Minister Sharett voiced similar words in the Israeli Parliament. KM, Vol. 10, November 4, 1951, 278. The German scholar Frank Stern determined in this context that the declaration carried no "sense of guilt" and did not constitute a taking of responsibility. Stern, Im Anfang war Auschwitz, 325. Likewise, Ian Lustick argues that the declaration "seem to offer very little in the way of acknowledged [historical] truth." Lustick, "Negotiating Truth," 58. A similar insight is expressed by Markus A. Weingardt, who qualifies the declaration as "very weak" in terms of its historical content. Weingardt, Deutsche Israel und Nahostpolitik, 80. See also: Ferdinand and Wild, "'. . . Not by the German People." Some scholars, on the other hand, chose to emphasize the positive sides of the declaration. Thus, for example, Nava Lowenheim argues that the Chancellor's pronouncement was the first time West Germany expressed apology (for its war crimes) and was therefore groundbreaking. Lowenheim, "A Hunted Past," 533. According to Anson Rabinbach the declaration was an important milestone in terms of recognizing that the Holocaust of European Jewry was unique among the other atrocities perpetrated by the Third Reich. Rabinbach, "The Jewish Question," 168. Ruth Amir claimed that, from the historical perspective, Adenauer's declaration marked the beginning of progress toward conciliation in Israeli/Jewish-German relations. Amir, Who is afraid of Historical Redress?, 74.

use of the same expression – "the absorption of Jewish refugees" – that had been employed in Israel's March 12, 1951 diplomatic missive to the powers to justify its reparations claim and rationalize its scope. One could also argue that, in light of the fact that Israel had raised only one claim for compensation – the reparations claim – the mention of "problem of material compensation" in reference to Israel could really only have referred to this claim. Still, it was impossible to view the Chancellor's words as a clear-cut announcement or admission of Israel's right to reparations. In fact, all Adenauer did was invite Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora to come to the negotiating table in order to discuss the various categories of compensation, which may or may not include the question of reparations. At the end of his speech, the Chancellor signaled to the Jewish-Israeli parties that they must not expect too large an amount, since Bonn's payment capacity was limited due to "the bitter necessity of having to care for the innumerable [German] victims of the war and having to maintain the [German] refugees and expellees." 33

A representative of the Jewish Agency present at the Bundestag at the moment of the declaration reported that the parliamentary plenum had been packed wall-to-wall. Adenauer pronounced his words in a voice filled with emotion and the audience stopped him multiple times with thunderous applause.34 All factions, including those on the right side of the German political spectrum, approved the Chancellor's announcement and the meeting came to a close with all those present standing for a solemn moment of silence to honor the memory of the victims of the Holocaust.35

The declaration got a positive reception outside of Germany as well. The Washington Post proclaimed the Chancellor's speech to be "the best thing to come out of Germany since 1933," while the Manchester Guardian claimed this signaled a change of direction for the German people.36 Similarly-minded reactions were printed in several press outlets around the world.37

Israel, however, found it difficult to applaud Adenauer. Having analyzed it thoroughly, IMFA staff came to an obvious conclusion: the declaration fully met only one out of Israel's three fundamental demands – the vow to do everything in Germany's power to prevent a second Holocaust. The admission and denunciation of the German people's crime against the Jews were lacking at best, while the pledge to pay reparations was stated too vaguely to be considered as such.

AIG, Document 13, Declaration by the West German Chancellor before the Parliament in Bonn on 27 September 1951 Concerning Restitution, Indemnification and Reparations.

ISA, MFA 2539/2, E. Livneh to F. Shinnar, September 27, 1951.

For the reactions of the different factions see: Vogel, The German Path to Israel, 33–35.

Buettner, "Germany's Middle East Policy," 121.

Balabkins, West German Reparations, 91.

Shabtai Rosenne was the first to maintain that the declaration was "rather nebulous," especially when it came to reparations.38 His colleague, Yaacov Robinson, turned Rosenne's attention to the fact that the declaration was not categorically addressed to Israel (and therefore was not unequivocally addressing its reparations claim).39 In the West European Division of the IMFA, officials similarly determined that "the declaration contains no explicit commitment to the payment of reparations." 40 Among the few who opposed this viewpoint was Consul Livneh.41 He was, first and foremost, content to hear West Germany declare itself "ready to accept the responsibility for the actions of the Reich and to reach a positive [compensation] settlement." 42 He also gave considerable thought to the German word Wiedergutmachung, which translates literally to "make good again" or, more applicably in our context, amend – by way of material compensation, among other things – a wrong done unto others.43 The Chancellor employed this word every time he touched upon the issue of material compensation in his declaration. Some among the IMFA staff claimed that Adenauer had in fact limited the literal meaning of the word to refer only to the existing two categories of compensation: indemnification and restitution. Livneh, on the other hand, argued that this word "must be interpreted in its broadest sense," as "encompassing all the fields of compensation of the victims of the Nazi regime," including reparations.44

A few hours after Adenauer had made his declaration, the Israeli government published its response. Jerusalem expressed its satisfaction regarding Bonn's initiatives to uproot Nazi trends and attitudes from among the German nation. According to its impression, the West German government "unreservedly acknowledges that unspeakable crimes were committed in the name of the German people," and recognizes that the nature of these crimes "implies an obligation to make moral and material reparations, both individually and collectively." The response ended with a statement that "the government of Israel will study the German Chancellor's declaration and will in due course make its attitude known." The implication was that Israel would announce its official position vis-à-vis the Chancellor's invitation

ISA, MFA 1809/1, S. Rosenne to Y. Robinson, October 1, 1951.

ISA, MFA 1809/1, S. Rosenne to F. Shinnar and E. Livneh, October 29, 1951.

ISA, MFA 1809/1, West European Division to a Series of Addressees, October 12, 1951.

His opinion was apparently shared by several Israeli diplomats abroad. Trimbur, De la Shoah à la Réconciliation?, 42–43.

ISA, MFA 1809/1, E. Livneh to G. Avner and F. Shinnar, November 21, 1951.

See in this context: Frohn, "Introduction," 2.

ISA, MFA 1809/1, E. Livneh to West European Division, October 19, 1951. Adler-Rudel held a similar position. CZA, S43/240, S. Adler-Rudel to B. Locker and L. Eshkol, September 28, 1951.

to inaugurate Israeli-Jewish-German negotiations on the matter of compensation. One may rightfully ask why this position was not included in the present announcement. It would appear that the two co-captains, Ben-Gurion and Sharett, wished to see how the German declaration would be received by Israeli public opinion and political circles before they ruled in favor of direct negotiations.45

When we compare the government response prepared by the IMFA on the eve of the Chancellor's speech and the reactions of IMFA officials once the declaration was made public, we notice a significant disparity in content. According to the official response, Bonn had fully acquiesced to all three of Israel's demands, the one pertaining to reparations chief among them. Yet, as we have seen, this was far from the actual opinion that prevailed at the Ministry once Adenauer had made his announcement. Based on the sources at our disposal, this discrepancy was the result of last minute changes to the declaration text. The IMFA had prepared Israel's official response based on the draft received from Bonn on the 24th of the month, or thereabouts. The Israelis had found this version of the declaration acceptable, albeit not fully satisfactory. The Germans had even gone so far as to promise an additional amendment of the paragraph on the subject of reparations, one that would adhere more closely to Israel's specifications. However, two days before the Chancellor spoke before the Bundestag a new version – "much worse than its predecessor" – had arrived. Avner, who had received the text from the minister in Paris, Fischer, suggested that Livneh contact Adenauer immediately and ask him to revert to the previous draft. Yet the new version remained unchanged and became the final text of the public declaration.46 For some reason, the IMFA neglected to alter the Israeli response accordingly and it too remained unchanged, irrelevant as it was to two out of the three points raised by Jerusalem.47

Nonetheless, the leadership in Jerusalem could let out a satisfied sigh of relief. Israel's demand for a public and official German declaration that would address the horrors of the Holocaust, as well as the issue of material compensation had been achieved. It was a significant achievement for Ben-Gurion and Sharett, as well as for the IMFA, the latter having pushed for the settlement of the

AIG, Document 14, Statement by Israel Government Spokesman of 27 September 1951 Following Upon the Declaration of the West German Chancellor.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, G. Avner to G., September 25, 1951.

Director-general of the IMFA, Walter Eytan, tried to excuse Israel's irrelevant response to Sharett, who was sojourning in New York at the time. "The latest draft revisions," he wrote, "were unknown to me. We were therefore unpleasantly surprised when we got the text from Paris." ISA, MFA 2330/2, W. Eytan to M. Sharett, September 28, 1951.

compensation question via direct negotiations for some time. However, as stated previously, the declaration failed to satisfy all of Israel's demands in full, most notably with regard to the matter of reparations. The circumstances, therefore, were still not ripe for the Israeli leadership to approach the negotiations table. For that to happen, it would require a tangible German guarantee to pay reparations, which is what the IMFA would strive to obtain over the following weeks.

## Chapter 6 Mobilizing the Nation: The Making of a Conference

Around the time the reparations letter had been dispatched to the Western powers (March 12, 1951), Israel also launched a campaign to mobilize public opinion among the Jewish communities in the West in support of its claim.1 These publicity efforts yielded substantial results. A long string of mostly American Jewish organizations contacted their respective governments to express unequivocal support for Israel's reparations claim.2

In late May 1951, IMFA officials suggested that world Jewry should once again be mobilized to show their support, and thereby hopefully give the claim yet another push in the right direction.3 The subject was discussed in detail at a meeting dealing with various aspects of the reparations claim held at Foreign Minister Sharett's home on June 19, with the participation of senior IMFA officials and the director-general of the Ministry of Finance, David Horowitz. The latter proposed organizing a conference of the world's prominent Jewish organizations in late fall, with the aim of "demonstrating the support of the entire Jewish world for Israel's demand to receive reparations from Germany." Those present embraced the notion wholeheartedly, with Sharett proclaiming it "an important idea, the possibilities of which must certainly be investigated." 4

The topic of the conference came up again during a senior IMFA officials' meeting on July 26. Most of the attendees reiterated their favorable opinion on the matter. However, during the weeks that had passed since the idea was first brought up, a small but adamant resistance – made up of Gershon Avner and Gershon Meron – had formed against it. The two argued that the proposed conference would not only fail to provide Israel with the kind of positive publicity it sought, but possibly even prove detrimental to its ambitions. The reparations issue, they explained, is a bone of "rather bitter" contention between Israel and the leading Jewish organizations in the West. How then could Israel hope to "achieve general consensus in [this] demonstrative conference" on the subject of

ISA, MFA 344/15, S. Bendor to the Embassy in Washington, May 24, 1951.

See Chapter 3.

USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/7-651, Israeli Reparation Claim, July 6, 1951; USNA, DoS, RG 59, CDF (1950–1954), 262.84A41/5-1851, J. Pool to the Department of State, May 15, 1951; ISA, MFA 2417/2, Our Claim for Reparation from Germany, March 22, 1951; JTA, April 18, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/2, Meeting summary, Without Date; ISA, MFA 344/15, Shilumim, June 22, 1951.

the reparations claim? Should the conference come to a close without a statement in support of Israel or with one that was perhaps hollow or vague, it would reveal the various disagreements between Israel and the world's Jewry, causing tremendous harm to Israel's chances of winning its claim in the process.5 Israel would be better off, in their opinion, setting the whole conference idea aside and preparing, instead, a written declaration in support of its reparations claim. Jerusalem could then take the necessary steps behind the scenes in order to try and convince the Jewish organizations to sign it.6

The "contention" mentioned by Meron and Avner had been hanging over Jewish-Israeli relations since the summer of 1950, when the question of reparations first started making its way onto the IMFA agenda. It became more palpable shortly after Jerusalem had submitted its claim to the powers in the spring of 1951. The organizations supported the move in public, of course, but under the surface they raised "difficult questions about the right of Israel to speak for the entire nation" on the matter of reparations and, consequently, about its right to file the claim in the first place.7 A particularly obdurate stance on the matter was held by the American Jewish Committee.8 When asked for his opinion on the conference idea by Ambassador Eban, the president of the Committee, Jacob Blaustein, responded that he was inclined to view it positively, provided that Israel recognize it was not the sole representative of the Jewish people on the matter of collective reparations (and therefore cannot be the sole claimant of reparations).9 The American Jewish Committee's position was of the utmost importance since it was considered one of the leading Jewish organizations in the world and, therefore, wielded substantial influence over the other organizations.10 Starting in March, their rejection of the idea that Israel alone could speak for the Jewish people as a whole on the subject of reparations led representatives of several Jewish organizations to call, albeit sporadically, for the filing of a second reparations claim, this time by Diaspora Jewry.

Although the problem of representation was the main point of dispute between Israel and the Jewish organizations in the context of reparations, it was not the only one. A second issue had in fact emerged around the same time. Washington had made it clear to senior officials at the JTC and the JRSO that the Israeli

ISA, MFA 2417/3, G. Avner to E. Herlitz, August 15, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, S. Bendor to the Embassy in Washington, July 27, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, G. Avner to E. Herlitz, August 15, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/7, E. Herlitz to F. Shinnar, November 23, 1951.

DEPI, Vol. 6, Document 306, A. Eban to the United States Division, August 3, 1951; Shafir, Ambiguous Relations, 165.

Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World, 51.

reparations claim could hurt badly the restitution and indemnification claims. The overall capital West Germany had allotted for the payment of all the various compensation claims, the Americans explained, was limited, and Bonn's acceptance of the Israeli claim would hamper the ability of its treasury to settle claims of the other two kinds.11 The FRG would therefore have no choice but to postpone the transfer of property restitution and indemnification funds until a final settlement was reached in the reparations claim – in other words, until the amount Bonn must give to Jerusalem was decided.12

The Jewish organizations in the West were incensed: they were deeply involved in the domain of restitution claims for heirless property, mainly due to their participation in the JTC and the JRSO. On July 11, they arranged for their representatives to meet with Eban and Keren in order to hammer out the issue.13 To properly elucidate the scope of the problem, the JRSO had prepared a memo which showed that the total sum of current and future property restitution and indemnification claims might be as high as five billion DM (roughly 1.2 billion USD).14 This was an enormous figure and Keren warned of the possibility that the three kinds of compensation claims may be "headed for a straight-on and very damaging collision." 15 Avner hastened to support his colleague's assertion.16 Israel, now comprehending the problem, tried to convince the American government that there was "no connection whatsoever" between the Israeli claim and the other two types of claims.17 Yet, if the Jewish organizations expected Israel to take any drastic steps to amend the situation – retract its reparations claim, postpone it to a later date, minimize the claim amount or declare to the powers that the reparations claim did not take precedence over the other two kinds of claims – their hopes were in vain. At a September 5 meeting of the higher-ups in Jerusalem on the subject of reparations, a meeting attended by Foreign Minister Sharett, Finance Minister Kaplan, and the heads of the Jewish Agency, among others, it was stated unequivocally that "our reparations claim must be viewed as the foremost claim, one that trumps all other claims in scope and importance." 18

CZA, Z6/529, N. Robinson to N. Goldmann, July 13, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/21, S. Rosenne to A. Eban, July 26, 1951.

ISA, MFA 1782/6, G. Landauer to G. Meron, June 27, 1951; ISA, MFA 1782/6, E. Livneh to the Economic Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 4, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, Memorandum, without Date.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, M. Keren to F. Shinnar, August 3, 1951.

ISA, MFA 534/1, G. Avner to E. Livneh, September 12, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, M. Keren to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 3, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/6, F. Shinnar to E. Livneh, September 10, 1951; CZA, A376/204, Memorandum, October 14, 1951.

These were, thus, the main two points of contention between Israel and the Jewish organizations on the matter of reparations, and the reasons why it would be impossible to hold a pan-Jewish conference that would be of any publicity value to Israel, according to Avner and Meron. The IMFA was sympathetic to this view, even if they did not fully accept it. Subsequently, at the meeting of the IMFA's top brass on July 26, it was decided that political advisor Leo Cohen would prepare a statement draft expressing support for the Israeli claim to be sent out for the approval of the Jewish organizations prior to the conference. This preliminary maneuver would guarantee that when the conference did take place, "an appropriate statement supporting our claim for reparations" would be "unanimously accepted in a show of absolute unity by the entirety of world Jewry." 19

On August 5, a meeting was held at the IMFA with the participation of Sharett, Eytan, Horowitz, Leo Cohen, Shinnar, and Goldmann, where it was decided to hold the conference on October 17. The task of inviting the organizations was delegated to the Jewish Agency, rather than the government, for "understandable reasons" – the Israeli government would have looked rather ridiculous summoning a Jewish display of support for its own cause.20 The meeting attendees concluded that "the goal of the conference is to create a united Jewish front supporting Israel's claim," and that "the conference has to be directed at the powers – mainly the United States government, as well as the Bonn government." 21 In other words, the conference was aimed at urging these countries' leaderships to start taking concrete actions toward the establishment of the Israeli-German negotiations channel and ensuring that this route would quickly yield a favorable outcome for Israel.

Cohen set to work writing the text of the statement, completing the task in early September. It was then dispatched to Goldmann by Shinnar, together with the conference plan the latter had drafted. The event was to last "no longer than one and a half to two hours" and by the end of it produce a favorable statement.22 Goldmann was taken aback. He found it hard to fathom how Shinnar could have thought it possible to "arrange a conference as streamlined as you indicate,

ISA, MFA 2417/3, Re: Discussion on the Problem of Shilumim from Germany, August 1, 1951; ISA, MFA 2417/3, Shilumim: Protocol of the Discussion held on July 26, August 5, 1951; ISA, MFA 2417/3, Protocol from August 1, 1951 on the Discussion of the Problem of Shilumim from Germany held on July 26, 1951, August 13, 1951.

ISA, MFA 533/5, W. Eytan to Israel's Representatives in a number of Western Capitals, September 14, 1951.

ISA, MFA 344/15, Abridged Summary from a Meeting on the Subject of Shilumim, August 12, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, F. Shinnar to N. Goldmann, September 12, 1951.

which will last two hours, adopt a resolution prepared by you and then the people who came from Australia, South-Africa, etc. will just fly home." Such a procedure, Goldmann asserted, was unacceptable, especially if over fifteen different organizations were to take part in the conference. To his mind, the event had to take place over at least two days. He also doubted the likelihood of getting the organizations to sign off on the statement prepared by Cohen, which expressed absolute and unquestioning support for the Israeli reparations claim. Their representatives, he warned, would insist on discussing the controversial issues, such as who would lead the negotiations with the Germans on the question of reparations and what the attainment of reparations would mean for the fate of the two other categories of compensation.23

Director-general of the IMFA, Walter Eytan, was also critical of the proposed statement draft. He felt it failed to reflect the full extent of the horror inflicted upon the Jewish people by the Nazi regime. At a meeting he held with IMFA officials involved in the reparations issue, it was decided to ask Cohen to add a paragraph that would elucidate the subject at length.24 Cohen, however, had fallen ill in the meantime, and it was Fischel, Shinnar's assistant, who ended up making the requested adjustment.25 Once Cohen had regained his health, he perused the amended statement and rejected it in its entirety. Some of the Jewish organizations, he clarified to Eytan, had already reached their own agreements with Bonn over various aspects of the compensation question. These organizations might be unwilling to sign any document that used excessively harsh wording against the German people due to its Nazi past. He therefore advised going back to the original text he had prepared.26

Cohen's suggestion was indeed implemented, to a certain extent at least, but not because of his own vociferous objections; rather it was Chancellor Adenauer's declaration on September 27 that swung the pendulum his way. This historic speech provoked doubts among several IMFA officials regarding the necessity of holding a Jewish conference. If the purpose of this public display was, among other things, to bring about the establishment of a channel for Israeli-German talks, the Chancellor's declaration already included a proposal to this effect. Shinnar was among the first to express this view. "We must take into account," he opined, "that the publication of the German declaration [. . .] is a factor that somewhat diminishes the importance of the conference." 27 The financial advisor at the Israel legation in London

ISA, MFA 2417/3, N. Goldmann to F. Shinnar, September 14, 1951.

ISA, MFA 533/5, F. Shinnar to L. Cohen, September 16, 1951.

ISA, MFA 533/5, W. Fischel to W. Eytan, September 19, 1951.

ISA, MFA 533/5, L. Cohen to W. Eytan, September 25, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2417/3, F. Shinnar to N. Goldmann, September 26, 1951.

raised a similar point.28 Avner made his position known rather bluntly when he recommended to Shinnar to call off the conference immediately.29 And yet, the policy makers refused to give up the idea. The Chancellor's pronouncement did indeed increase the chances of opening direct Israeli-German negotiations. However, it was far from being a fait accompli. Nor did the speech make any guarantees that Israel would obtain its financial recompense through these talks. Nevertheless, it was felt in Jerusalem that the criticism of the German nation over its actions under the Nazi regime needed to be toned down. Bonn was liable to be offended by such a verbal attack and might reconsider its willingness to establish direct talks with Jerusalem. It was therefore decided to take out the majority of the language emphasizing the heavy burden of guilt weighing on the German people from Fischel's draft. In addition to that, it was decided to add a paragraph addressing Adenauer's declaration.30

Shinnar and Fischel set to work and, on October 8, presented a new amended draft.31 However, the new version of the statement would not do either. The legal advisor of the IMFA, Shabtai Rosenne, turned the authors' attention to the presence of what he saw as problematic turns of phrase, from the political and legal standpoints.32 A far more scathing criticism of the new draft was expressed by the Jewish organizations. This reaction was fueled, in part, by the Chancellor's speech, which, as Sharett put it, "had whet [their] appetite." 33 As mentioned previously, Adenauer's declaration had increased the likelihood of a direct talks channel opening up between Israel and West Germany, and with it, the probability of reaching some kind of settlement on the matter of reparations. The dispute over representation was thus rendered tangible and pressing. One must also recall that the Chancellor himself had expressed Bonn's interest in resolving the compensation question "jointly with representatives of [World] Jewry." The organizations became more vocal and explicit than ever about their intention to submit

ISA, MFA 533/5, The Economic Counselor at the Legation in London to F. Shinnar, September 28, 1951.

ISA, MFA 533/5, G. Avner to F. Shinnar, October 5, 1951.

ISA, MFA 533/5, G. Avner to F. Shinnar, October 5, 1951.

ISA, MFA 2543/7, Draft Resolution to be adopted by the Conference of Jewish Organizations to be held in Washington in October 1951, October 8, 1951.

ISA, MFA 1809/1, Alterations Suggested in Draft Resolution to be adopted by the Conference of Jewish Organiztions to be held in Washington in October 1951, October 19, 1951.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, October 25, 1951, 35. See also: ILPA, 2-932-1950-56A, Meeting of Mapai Members with Moshe Sharett, April 17, 1952.

a second collective reparations claim as soon as Israel commenced its direct and official negotiations on the subject of reparations with the FRG.34

This position was made abundantly clear in a meeting held on October 11 between Sharett and senior officials of the Israeli embassy in Washington, on the one hand, and representatives of the major American Jewish organizations, on the other, at the Jewish Agency's offices in New York City. Sharett did everything in his power to convince his American-Jewish interlocutors of the misguidedness of their stance. "I argued," he told the ministers in their weekly cabinet meeting, "that showing up before the Germans with two monetary claims is, first and foremost, a disgrace, and also not a wise or worthwhile move financially speaking." He recommended that, in the future negotiations with the West Germans, Israel focus on reparations while the Jewish organizations deal with the various legislative issues related to the other two kinds of claims. His words, however, fell on deaf ears.35

The Jewish organizations demanded that the concluding statement of the conference express their view on the reparations issue, which Shinnar and Fischel's latest draft, like all others preceding it, did not. The reparations claim, according to all the versions composed thus far, was an exclusively Israeli territory. Furthermore, they made only passing mention of the other two types of claims. It is therefore not surprising that the organizations protested Israel's proposed statement.

The Israeli-Jewish conflict over the question of reparations was discussed during three addition consultations held in the second half of October. All attempts to reach a compromise proved futile, despite a promise made by the organizations' representatives to their Israeli counterparts that if the FRG should acquiesce to a second reparations claim (that of Diaspora Jewry), most of the compensation amount would be handed over to Israel. Left with no other choice, the two sides decided to continue hashing out the issue during the conference. Nonetheless, in the interest of keeping their disagreements out of the public eye, it was agreed to hold the discussions behind closed doors.36 During these three consultations, the parties did finalize the administrative details: the conference program, the exact place and time it would be held, and the list of participating organizations. The latter consisted of twenty-two major Jewish organizations representing

Blaustein, president of the American Jewish Committee, made it clear to Goldmann in mid October that Adenauer's declaration had fundamentally changed the rules of the game and it now required a compensations settlement with West Germany "on the part of the Israeli government and Jews in other parts of the world as well." AJCA, Online, AJC – Minutes of the AdministrativeCommittee, December 12, 1951.

ISA, Meeting of the Cabinet, October 25, 1951, 34–39.

ISA, MFA 2543/7, E. Herlitz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1951.

the Jewish communities in the West.37 Goldmann sent out the invitations to these organizations on behalf of the Jewish Agency.38 No Jewish organizations from Eastern Europe or the USSR took part in the conference due to the respective authorities' refusal to allow their representatives to leave the country in order to attend it.39

The morning of October 25, 1951, saw the inauguration of the Jewish conference at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York City. Goldmann, who had been chosen to lead the conference plenum meetings, made the opening remarks, followed by Ambassador Eban, speaking for the Israeli government, and Israel Goldstein, speaking for the World Jewish Congress, each taking their turn to address the assembly. The ensuing meetings included speeches made by representatives of the various organizations as well as experts on the subject of compensation. The following day, October 26, the conference closed with a ceremonial assembly attended by members of the Jewish and foreign press, where the concluding statement of the conference was made public.

The divergences between Israel and the organizations on the matter of reparations were reflected in the speeches. Jacob Blaustein underscored that Israel's claim was not the only one on the table and that it was imperative to promote all other claims on behalf of the Jewish people.40 Goldmann presented the reparations category as a "pan-Jewish" issue and avoided mentioning the fact that Israel was claiming sole responsibility over it. Eban, on the other hand, implored his listeners to accept Israel's exclusive custody of the reparations claim and expressed concern over a second claim that would compete with Israel's efforts and most likely hamper them.41

The contention between the two sides was likewise manifest in the final statement that closed the conference. A decisions committee, composed of one representative from each organization, assembled at the end of the day on October 25 to discuss the statement draft concocted by Shinnar and Fischel "the length of an entire evening." In Israel, the hope was that the organizations would eventually concede and

Among the organizations that took part in the conference were: The American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Board of Deputies of British Jews, Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF), Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas, Canadian Jewish Congress, Executive Council of Australian Jewry, South African Jewish Board of Deputies, World Jewish Congress, The Jewish Agency.

Blumenthal, Right of Reparations, 53.

CZA, Protocol of the Zionist General Council Session in Jerusalem (May 7–15, 1952), 9th Meeting, May 12, 1952, 152.

Rosensaft, "The Early History," 28.

CAHJP, CC 16600, Minutes Foundation of the Conference on Jewish Claims against Germany, October 25–26, 1951.

accept this draft as it was, with slight corrections at most, but this hope was destined to be dashed. The committee made critical alterations to the Israeli draft. And, as if that were not enough, upon presentation of the altered text to the conference plenum, this larger forum decided to subject it to a few more "minor changes." 42

The concluding statement opened by stating that "this conference was called together for the sole purpose of considering Jewish material claims against Germany." In other words, Jewish leaders in Israel and the world were clarifying that they had no intention of reconciling with Germany if and when the compensations claims should be settled. In direct accordance with this, the statement went on to specify that the material compensation being claimed from the Germans could in any way make amends for "crimes of the nature and magnitude perpetrated by Nazi Germany against Jews." These two paragraphs were overtly aimed at neutralizing elements within the Jewish public who opposed any contact with the Germans. Further on, the statement described the Holocaust of European Jewry briefly and in restrained terms, so as to avoid rattling the Bonn government. For the same reason, the statement did not include an appeal to the Western powers to apply pressure to Germany on the issue of compensation, nor the demand that the rehabilitation process be halted until this issue was settled. The resolution did mention the Chancellor's historic September 27 declaration, highlighting the fact that it had been approved by the Bundestag.43

The statement ended with three resolutions. The first expressed unreserved support for the Israeli reparations claim. The second determined that the conference likewise demanded the satisfaction of all other Jewish compensation claims. These, of course, included property restitution and indemnification claims, but also a claim for the "rehabilitation of the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution," which referred in fact to the second reparations claim the Jewish organizations were planning to submit. The third resolution consisted of an emphatic reiteration of the importance accorded to the satisfaction of restitution and indemnification claims, as well as an expansion of the legal frameworks to accommodate them.44

Hence, the concluding statement faithfully reflected the Jewish organizations' positions on their two points of contention with Israel: it was made clear that there was room for a second reparations claim, and ample emphasis was placed

ISA, MFA 2543/7, E. Herlitz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1951.

An Israeli diplomat who was covering the conference wrote that the mention of the Bundestag was meant to "hold any [West German] government that might come after Adenauer" to the contents of the declaration. ISA, MFA 2543/7, E. Herlitz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1951.

AIG, Document 15, Resolutions of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany on the Subject of Material Claims from Germany, New York, 26 October, 1951.

on the importance of the other two types of compensation claims. Israel had no choice but to swallow the bitter pill. The organizations were, for the time being, unbending in their position, and any attempt to impose a different stance upon them could have resulted in a resounding collapse of the conference. Were this to occur, the damage inflicted to the public image of Israel and its reparations claim in the international arena would have been unimaginable.

Emotions at the IMFA were understandably mixed. On the one hand, they were extremely content to have the world's prominent Jewish organizations give the State of Israel "full support of our claim." On the other hand, apprehensions of their plans to launch a second reparations claim were growing.45

And rightly so. The Jewish organizations came away from the New York conference with one fundamental intention: to institutionalize their relations by establishing a pan-Jewish organization to handle all property restitution and indemnifications claims, as well as the second reparations claim.46 The vision of the pan-Jewish organization became reality as soon as the conference had come to an end, with the establishment of "The Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany," or the "Claims Conference" for short.47 This body initially consisted of two committees: a Policy Committee, whose membership consisted of representatives of all the organizations who had taken part in the New York conference, and an Executive Committee where only the most prominent of the organizations at the conference were represented. Nahum Goldmann was elected chairman of the Claims Conference.48 The important role the Claims Conference was destined to play in the German compensation saga would come to light over the following months, and with it, the challenge that it would to pose to Israel's ambition of obtaining reparations.

ISA, MFA 2543/7, E. Herlitz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1951.

The idea of establishing wide-reaching cooperation on the matter of material compensation had been in the air for almost six month. The Jewish Agency had already initiated a conference in Paris in May 1951, with the participation of the major Jewish organizations in the West, with the aim of consolidating inter-organizational relationships with regard to the various compensation claims. CZA, A376/204, Follow-up Proceedings on the Complex of Jewish Property Restitution in Germany,March 28, 1951; ISA, MFA 534/1,AJDC-JAFP-Successor Organizations Conference on Restitution and Related Matters held on May 8 and 9, 1951 at Paris, June 12, 1951; AJJDC, AR NY 45/ 54 File 374, Summary of Meeting on Specific Transfer Questions, May 10, 1951; AJJDC, AR NY 45/54 File 1397, Coordination of Restitution and Related Problems among Interested Jewish Organizations in Various Countries, August 25, 1951.

The name of the organization was intended to emphasize its focus on material compensation claims alone, rather than the horrific crime that was the murder of six million Jews – an act for which there could be no recompense. Yaakov, "Fifty Years," 22.

ISA, MFA 2543/7, E. Herlitz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1951.

## Chapter 7 Chancellor, We Need a Clarification

Israel's leaders, Ben-Gurion and Sharett, hoped that Chancellor Adenauer's declaration to the Bundestag would legitimize, in the Jewish public's opinion, the dramatic turn toward direct, official and public negotiations between Israel and West Germany on the subject of reparations. In other words, it would legitimize a significant violation of the principle of the sanctified boycott of Germany. However, the reaction of the Israeli public and political system to the Chancellor's speech was decidedly negative. Needless to say, the same sentiment applied to the idea of opening talks between the two countries.

An accurate reflection of this can be found in the Israeli press from the time. The papers were finding it hard to believe that the Chancellor's words were based on any deep moral feeling or demonstrated a sincere desire to atone for past sins and with it a true willingness to pay reparations. "It is questionable," speculated the unaffiliated Ha'aretz, "whether or to what extent one can see the declaration as an expression of the spirit of 'repentance.'" The article went on to determine that the Chancellor's speech was inspired by cold utilitarian considerations, namely, the German desire for rehabilitation.1 Similarly, Ha-Olam Hazeh, a weekly paper with strong anti-establishment leanings, wrote that "there is no doubt that the Chancellor's gesture was not spontaneous, but a thoroughly calculated political move [. . .] intended to pave the way for Germany's return to the Western family of nations." 2 Another unaffiliated newspaper, Ma'ariv, shared this view, drawing from it a very clear conclusion: "the chances of obtaining real reparations, of significant sums, are very slim." 3 The organs of the opposition parties presented analogous outlooks. The mouthpiece of the left-wing Mapam party, Al Ha-Mishmar, maintained that the Chancellor's declaration was "far from been an expression of fundamental change in the attitudes of the ruling elements in West Germany." 4 The paper reiterated this claim even many days after the declaration.5 Kol Ha-Am, the paper of the Israeli communist party, Maki, did not mince words when it came to attacking the West German leader's "purity of intentions." As one of its journalists pondered, "is there a single soul in Israel who seriously

Ha'aretz, October 3, 1951.

Ha-Olam Hazeh, October 18, 1951.

Ma'ariv, October 4, 1951.

Al Ha-Mishmar, October 4, 1951.

Al Ha-Mishmar, October 14, 1951.

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accepts and believes in the sincerity of the owners of this extended [German] hand?" 6 The communist party organ continued to emphasize this point in subsequent issues.7 The leftist factions found an unlikely ally in Herut, the paper affiliated with the right-wing party by the same name, which likewise cast doubt over the genuineness of the Chancellor's words.8

Newspapers affiliated with the coalition parties had their own, albeit less adamant, reservations about the declaration. The mouthpiece of the ruling party, Mapai, the daily Ha-Dor, pointed out in an editorial that one would be hard pressed to find any novelties in Adenauer's speech, since much of its content had been heard from other German sources previously.9 Mapai's long-standing weekly, Ha-Poel Ha-Tzair, mused: "many among us are wondering whether this announcement stems out of sincere remorse" or rather calculations based on self-interest.10 Davar, the paper of the Histadrut,11 which was also associated with Mapai, wasted no time on deliberations and was quick to assert that Adenauer's declaration was a product of utilitarian motives. Nonetheless, it was willing to wait and see if this turn of events would yield any "practical value." 12 According to the newspaper of the Religious Zionists, Ha-Tzofeh, Davar will have to wait quite a long time: "Adenauer's announcement is still a substantial distance away from any actions of value." 13 The Shearim paper of the Orthodox Poalei Agudat Israel faction ran an opinion piece on the subject with the unambiguous headline: "The Adenauer Declaration – No Signs of Regret." 14

Two newspapers – one partisan, the other unaffiliated – chose to take a slightly more balanced approach to the German statement. Ha-Modia, the paper of the Orthodox Agudat Israel party, questioned Adenauer's moral conviction but felt that, nonetheless, "this declaration is of great political importance for the Jewish people." 15 Adopting a similar tone, the unaffiliated Hungarian-language newspaper Új Kelet opined that Adenauer's announcement was the first step toward settling the matter of compensation between Israel and Germany.16

Kol Ha-Am, October 19, 1951.

Kol Ha-Am, September 28 and October 5, 1951.

Herut, October 4, 1951.

Ha-Dor, September 28, 1951.

The only press outlets to view the Chancellor's historic speech in a positive light were two unaffiliated, widely-circulated German-language newspapers: the daily Neueste Nachrichten and the weekly MitteilungsBlatt. Their readership consisted of German-speaking Jewish immigrants who had settled in the State of Israel.17 This segment of the Israeli population had an obvious vested interest in obtaining indemnity and recovering Jewish property throughout the territories of the former Reich. Likewise, their memories of their past in the German homeland were still vivid in their minds. There was therefore powerful motivation among a large percentage of this German-speaking community to see direct contact made between Israel and Germany, at the very least on matters of compensation. Accordingly, the MitteilungsBlatt published a long opinion piece, headlined "Bonn and Israel," in which it asserted that Adenauer's declaration was "an important moral step," one that constituted significant progress, from the Jewish perspective, and should serve as the foundation for future negotiations between the two sides.18

Alas, the German-language newspapers were vastly outnumbered. As already stated, the overall sentiment toward the Chancellor's proclamation was distinctly negative, sealing the fate of Israeli-German negotiations for the time being. Not only was there no positive change in the Israeli public's aversion to contact with Germany, on the contrary, following the statement, resistance to the idea dramatically intensified in certain circles.19

Leading the charge were the three opposition parties in the Knesset: the leftwing Mapam and Maki and the right-wing Herut party. They were joined, in the course of the winter of 1951–1952, by various extra-parliamentary bodies, the most notable among which included Poalei Agudat Israel in Jerusalem (Pagi), the Sulam group, a circle of intellectuals and public figures, organizations of Holocaust survivors, and a students' union, as well as the unaffiliated newspapers Ma'ariv, Yedioth Ahronoth, and Letzte Nayes. The latter was a Yiddish-language paper circulated among the hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants who had come to Israel from Eastern and Central Europe, most of them Holocaust survivors.

These political, extra-parliamentary and media elements believed that Jerusalem was about to embark on direct talks with Bonn on the issue of reparations. As

Most of them had immigrated to Israel from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia following these countries' surrender to the Nazis.

MitteilungsBlatt, October 9, 1951.

IMFA official Chaim Yahil wrote on the subject to his colleague: "Immediately following Adenauer's declaration, a resistance movement arose in Israel opposing any contact with Germany [. . .] There was a feeling that the great majority of the country was hostile to the very idea of negotiations." ISA, MFA 43/10, Information Division to Israel's Minister to London, January 7, 1952.

evidence, they referred first and foremost to the government's official response to Adenauer's declaration, which did not reject out of hand the Chancellor's invitation to commence negotiations. "The Israeli government," warned Kol Ha-Am on September 28, "is laying the groundwork for the recognition of and negotiations with the Nazi Bonn government [. . .] That much is implied by the response of the Ben-Gurion government's spokesperson to the Chancellor's declaration." 20 Herut voiced a similar sentiment in writing that "the Israeli government's spokespeople's response to Adenauer's announcement contains explicit approval of the content, and what is worse, the spirit of the announcement." 21 Yedioth Ahronoth mused that "the Chancellor had barely finished his speech" before Israel replied in the positive.22 The Letzte Nayes cried out, using rather stark language, that "there are signs of negotiations brewing over the blood of the Jewish people." 23 Even Ha-Modia admitted that "Israel's initial response does not push the [Germans] away empty-handed." 24 Suspicions regarding Jerusalem's intention to open talks with Bonn were elicited not only by the content of the response, but also by the speed with which it had been issued. The government published its reaction within a few hours of the Chancellor's speech at the Bundestag. The anti-negotiations camp saw this as an indication that the two governments must have been in prior contact regarding the declaration text, contact that was bound to develop into future negotiations.25 Details leaked over the course of the following weeks, both in Israel and in West Germany, regarding the exchanges preceding the declaration bolstered these misgivings.26 Even the New York conference of the twenty-two Jewish organizations, held nearly a month after the Chancellor's speech, was seen as corroboration of the conjecture that secret moves were being made toward the establishment of an Israeli-Jewish-German diplomatic channel. Herut was quick to sound the alarm that "there is a humiliation being prepared for us this very moment in New York – a sit-down at the table with the murderers of our People." 27

The Israeli leadership's plans regarding the question of negotiations with Bonn were made clear in a government announcement on October 27, addressing the Chancellor's September 27 invitation to inaugurate Israeli-Jewish-German negotiations on the matter of compensation:

Kol Ha-Am, September 28, 1951.

Herut, October 4, 1951.

Yedioth Ahronoth, October 3, 1951.

Letzte Nayes, October 5, 1951.

Ha-Modia, September 28, 1951.

Ma'ariv, October 5, 1951; Ha-Olam Hazeh, November 1, 1951.

Ma'ariv, October 31, 1951.

Herut, October 28, 1951.

It would seem that we must examine carefully whether the German government is willing to make good on Adenauer's declaration by way of a quick and effective settlement of our claim. Only if it should turn out, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the Germans intend to reach such a settlement, can we consider the question of our participation in direct negotiations, which will be limited to a discussion of our demands alone [. . .] We must remain calm and act with determination to collect what is coming to us. If direct negotiations are required in order to attain it, we shall have to accept this burdensome role.28

If anyone needed further evidence of the direction in which the Israeli government was proceeding, Foreign Minister Sharett29 and, a short while later, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion,30 issued a series of statements attesting to their fundamental willingness to enter negotiations with the FRG over the question of reparations. The various elements – political parties, extra-parliamentary bodies, and the unaffiliated newspapers – that had been ringing the alarm bells about this very possibility, thereby received a clear and official green light to continue and intensify their campaign to win over public opinion.

The right-wing Herut party played a central – in many ways leading – role in the developing offensive.31 At the end of September 1951, its affiliate youth movement, Betar, made a resolution at its fifth world congress to oppose all Jewish (-Israeli)-German contact. Betar, the resolution stipulated, "rejects any attempt by Jews to forgive the German people in exchange for 'reparations' 32 and considers this as national crime." The movement would fight "relentlessly" against the possibility of such a scenario.33 It should be noted, parenthetically, that Betar's anti-German line was consistent and firm over the years. Betar was the first of all Jewish-Zionist youth movements to liquidate its branches in Germany, and it forbade its members to travel to or to live in Germany.34 This right youth movement also took to the streets: its activists held demonstrations in front of the Prime Minister's house, the Foreign Ministry building and the Jewish Agency headquarter,35 held protest vigil

ISA, MFA 2417/3, Our Claims from Germany: For Broadcast via Kol Israel Radio on October 27, 1951.

Ha'aretz, October 28, 1951; ISA, 7562/11 A, Meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, October 29, 1951, 14; KM, Vol. 10, November 4, 1951, 278, 281.

ISA, 7562/12 A, Meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, November 20, 1951, 10.

A senior figure in the movement reported to a colleague in the first half of October that Herut already has a "broad action plan" for "the war against negotiations with Germany." JIA, H1 – 1/2/ 3, Yaakov Rubin to Jeremiah Halpern, October 14, 1951. Despite the general mobilization, there were those who felt that the movement could have done more in the campaign over reparations. Ozacky, "An Oppositional Voice," 22, 25–26.

Apostrophes in the original.

JIA, B3 – 2/2/19, Resolutions of the Fifth World Congress, September, 1951.

JIA, B3 – 1/2/19, General Actions: Boycott on Germany, September, 1951.

Herut, October 19, 1951.

against the idea of Israeli-German contact,36 and even demonstrated in front of the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York City during the conference of the 22 Jewish organizations.37 On the 19th of October, the Herut newspaper inaugurated a new section entitled "Remember what Amalek did unto thee." 38 The section printed articles dedicated to detailed and graphic descriptions of the horrors of the Holocaust. Other items tried to demonstrate that Nazi ideology, along with anti-Semitism, were once again rearing their ugly heads in West Germany. The purpose of the section, according to its editor, was "to educate" the nation to hate the German "enemy" in order to prevent "the danger of the unprecedented disgrace the [Israeli] government is about to foist upon us," meaning "the opening of direct negotiations with the German slaughterers." 39 The Herut newspaper also printed an abundance of articles and opinion pieces arguing firmly against the idea of negotiations.40 The efforts of the right-wing party were not limited to its affiliated press outlet; in fact, it enlisted every possible means in order to spread the message. Its spokespeople passionately condemned the idea of negotiations at political rallies held in Jerusalem41 and in Tel Aviv,42 and Herut representatives in various municipal councils worked to put the issue on the agenda.43 Activists working under the cover of night plastered building walls with eye-opening placards44 denouncing forgiveness for Germany and those "speculating on the blood of the six million." 45 The party even considered taking legal action. A lawyer acting on its behalf was charged with finding out whether there was any likelihood of stopping future Israeli-German negotiations by appealing to the High Court of Justice.46 Having examined the issue, the lawyer informed the Herut leadership that there was no possibility of legal recourse on this matter.47 In late November, after two action-packed months, one of the senior movement members proudly reported to a colleague that "we are undergoing a serious awakening" and that "our ranks are eager for action and ready to join in

Ha-Tzofeh, November 12, 1951.

Herut, November 11, 1951.

In reference to Deuteronomy 25:7.

Herut, October 19, 1951.

Herut, October 23, 25 and 26 and November 2 and December 4 and 7, 1951.

Herut, October 28, 1951.

During this period there was widespread use in Israel of Holocaust-themed posters. Tal, "The Holocaust," 2.

ISA, MFA 43/10, Information Division to Israel's Minister to London, January 7,1952; Herut, October 24, 1951; Ha-Olam Hazeh, November 1, 1951; Davar, January 1, 1952.

JIA, H1 – 1/2/3, Yaaokv Rubin to Eliyahu Meridor, December 10, 1951.

JIA, H1 – 1/2/3, Eliyahu Meridor to Yaacov Rubin, December 24, 1951.

the effort." In his estimate, if the movement was in possession of more significant funds, "there would probably be a lot more we could do." 48 Two months later, the same party member complained again about the lack of resources and warned that the movement would not be able "to carry on at the same work pace." 49 It is indeed possible that their financial straits had prevented the Herut movement from pursuing a few of the initiatives on its agenda. One of these consisted of launching a petition, to be signed by "hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens," demanding that the government refrain from entering into negotiations with the Germans.50

As mentioned previously, Herut was not alone in leading the charge. On October 18, the Political Committee of Mapam decreed that the party's fundamental position demanded that Israel obtain reparations but at the same time rejected negotiations with the Germans.51 A week later, its representatives at the World Jewish Congress sent a telegram to the acting president of the Congress, Nahum Goldmann, asking him that no future decision in favor of negotiations with the Bonn government be taken at the Jewish organizations' conference in New York.52 The party's Central Committee issued a statement of strong opposition against any such negotiations,53 and its daily, Al Ha-Mishmar, published scathing articles denouncing the idea.54 The communist Maki party also published a manifesto demanding that the government cease all contact with "the neo-Nazi Bonn government," 55 while Kol Ha-Am attacked furiously the Israeli leadership for its willingness to conduct talks with Germany.56

Support for this position was likewise expressed by the General Zionists, a center-right opposition party. On November 10, its activists held a convention in Tel Aviv, during which one of its Knesset members declared "we are willing to declare a hunger strike if direct negotiations between Israel and the German government should take place." 57 Nevertheless, despite this dramatic pronouncement, the General Zionists did not play a significant role in the other three

JIA, H1 – 1/2/3, Yaakov Rubin to David Bukszpan, November 25, 1951.

JIA, H1 – 1/2/3, Yaakov Rubin to David Bukszpan, January 18, 1952.

JIA, H1 – 1/2/3, Yaakov Rubin to David Bukszpan, November 25, 1951.

HHA, (9)120.90, Meeting of Mapam's Political Committee, October 18, 1951.

Al Ha-Mishmar, October 26, 1951.

Al Ha-Mishmar, November 1, 1951.

Al Ha-Mishmar, November 4 and 11, 1951.

Kol Ha-Am, October 21, 1951.

Kol Ha-Am, October 5, 1951.

Ha-Tzofeh, November 11, 1951.

opposition parties' offensive on the negotiations initiative. An all-out mobilization of this party for the benefit of the cause would have been very impactful since its parliamentary power was almost equivalent to that of Herut, Mapam and Maki combined.58

The opposition waged their battle in the parliamentary arena as well. At the closing of a political debate held in the Knesset on November 4, the Mapam, Maki and Herut parties submitted summary proposals that called for the government to refrain from engaging in negotiations with Bonn under any circumstances. The General Zionists adopted a more moderate tone in a summary proposal stipulating that the government must not initiate any action on the matter of reparations before holding a special discussion of the topic in the Knesset plenum.59