**Preface to "New Perspectives on Nationalism in Spain"**

Nations and nationalism, as organizational principles of social life, provide individuals with a sense of who they are and where they belong. While nations are not the only form of community to serve humankind in this manner, they remain privileged due to their relationship with the nation-state, the dominant form of political organization. The Spanish nation, however, has been contested almost since its earliest existence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the Spanish nation-state has therefore been involved in almost perpetual conflicts between various nationalisms, particularly between different versions of Spanish nationalism as well as between Spanish majority nationalism and various minority nationalisms. At different times in the past two centuries, the conflicts have been revived and turned into organizing principles of the political communities in Spain, quite often as communities in conflict or contention but, nevertheless, as communities providing the Spaniards with different senses of belonging.

In recent times, both lines of contention have been activated again, both the conflict between left-wing and right-wing nationalisms about the definition of the Spanish nation as well as the majority nationalist vs. minority nationalist conflict. The conflict between left-wing and right-wing interpretations of the Spanish nation, particularly understood through the prism of former losers and winners of the Spanish civil war, has been revived since approximately year 2000 about the contentious issue of reviving or forgetting the so-called 'historical memory'. The other fault line between majority and minority nationalism has been revived even more recently (from approximately 2005) and will be the principal focal point of this volume. The main current issue related to this conflict is the rise of Catalan separatism, but only a few years prior to this, the Basque identities were just as conflictual. In addition, various other territorially-based conflicts loom in the shadow of the Catalan clash and are nourished from the eternal tensions between the demands for symmetry and demands for asymmetry that characterize the decentralized Spanish democratic state.

These Spanish conflicts should be situated in a contemporary European and global context, where anxieties about sovereignty are on the rise, causing the revival of emotional messages and strategies to mobilize the citizenry in favor of particular political communities. Both the state-wide Spanish actors and the sub-state nationalist parties and NGOs try to develop and strengthen feelings of territorial attachments to the Spanish state and political community or to the sub-state political communities, and both use emotions and feelings to ensure support and to assert or claim sovereignty for the political community in question. These questions raise a number of issues that we address in this volume.

In the first section devoted to Spain, Pablo Sanchez Le ´ on argues for a renovation in the study of ´ nationalism and the related terminology around the concepts of nation and patria by addressing the issue of the rationality underlying the decisions of citizens willing to leave their homelands. Using the example of unforced exiles from the 1939 Republican diaspora (and inner exiles as well), the chapter provides a theory of de-identification from a nation for the sake of civic commitment. Secondly, it focuses on Spanish post-Francoist historiography of the early modern period to show the imbalances of its discourse around patria and nation arguing in favor of that of nation. Subsequently, it provides a comparative overview of the scholarly interest in patriotism in modern history, relating it to the different national trajectories of the respective political cultures. Finally, it claims a methodological reorientation is needed in the study of nationalism and patriotism by distinguishing between nationand patria as terms, as concepts, and as analytical categories defining distinctive collective identities. In his chapter, Carmelo Moreno aims to analyze which indicators are most efficient for testing how the different actors position themselves facing the phenomenon of the Spanish plurinational labyrinth. He argues that to analyze the Spanish national question, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the idea of the nation and the phenomenon of nationalism on one side, and the question of political plurality on the other. The approval of the Constitutional text more than forty years ago was thus only achieved, according to the author, thanks to a delicate semantic balancing act concerning the concept of nation whose interpretation remains open. The thesis of the chapter is that Spain is a plurinational labyrinth, since there is no consensus, nor are there any discursive strategies that might help in forming an image of the country in national terms. The paradox of this labyrinth is that the political actors have accepted that the question of nationality in Spain is unsolvable without considering the plurinational idea. But, at the same time, plurinationality is not easily assumed in practical terms because the political cost to any actor that openly defends national plurality is very high. For this reason, political discourses in Spain on the national question offer a highly ambiguous scenario, where the actors are reluctant to take risks in order to solve this impasse. The chapter by Enrique Maestu Fonseca focuses on the evolution of Spanish conservative doctrine in the early years of democracy in Spain. By analyzing the concepts of 'state' and 'community' as viewed by Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Information and Tourism under the Franco dictatorship and leader of the Spanish right during the1980s, this chapter explores the manner in which the conservatives sought to "democratize" their doctrine to adapt themselves to the new party system. The study stresses the importance of this conceptual reshaping in establishing the roots of conservative Spanish nationalism. Finally, the study by Robert Gould poses a comparative analysis of the presentation of the national identity of Spain and Germany by the far-right populist parties Vox Espana and Alternative f ˜ ur Deutschland. He shows how both ¨ parties view national identity as being in a serious crisis, arising from the betrayal by old-line parties which has led to the increased influence of the European Union to the detriment of the nation-state, with negative consequences for national sovereignty, national and European culture. The parties repudiate many of the provisions of the EU treaties and are opposed to the presence of Islam in Christian Europe, viewing it as a menace to values shared by all European nations. These analyses lead to an examination of the performance of crisis by means of deliberate provocation and the use of electronic media. It shows how these parties from very different parts of Europe share remarkably close positions and use the technological achievements of the twenty-first century to attack the late-twentieth-century political and social achievements of the European Union in order to replace them with the nineteenth-century idea of the distinct ethnocultural nation fully sovereign in its own nation-state.

A substantial part of this volume is devoted to Catalonia due to the current situation of the secessionist struggle, which is a nationalist conflict by nature. But more than that, issues related to Catalan secessionism are central to current debates on European integration, nationalism, and territorial politics. In their chapter, Thomas Jeffrey Miley and Roberto Garv´ıa follow the approach originally pioneered by Juan Linz for the empirical study of nationalism. They use original survey data to situate the social division that is emerging around the question of independence within a broader context of power relations. Miley and Garvia focus on a variety of demographic, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal indicators with which this division is associated, emphasizing the special salience of language practices and ideologies in conditioning, if not determining, attitudes towards independence. More specifically, they show how the cleavages of language and class are reflected in and exacerbated by the ongoing political conflict between pro-independence and pro-unionist camps in Catalonia. Now that nearly half the Catalan citizenry has developed a rather intense preference in favor of independence, it becomes difficult for Spanish authorities to enforce the will of the Spanish majority without appearing to tyrannize the Catalan minority. The chapter by Alejandro Quiroga and Fernando Molina explores the transformations of Spanish and Catalan national identities and the growth of the pro-independence movement in Catalonia following the 2008 global recession. It argues that the Great Recession provided a window of opportunity for hot nationalism in which Catalanist narratives of loss and resistance began to ring true to large sectors of Catalan society, whereas the Spanish constitutionalist narratives seemed increasingly outdated. The authors show how the two parallel processes of mass nationalization, by either the Catalan or the Spanish governments, mutually limit each other, leading to a 'crystallization' of an identity-driven political divide between pro and anti-independence supporters which has split Catalan society down the middle and led to a sort of national identity deadlock. Carsten Humlebæk and Mark F. Hau investigate the links between the Catalan independence movement and the large annual demonstrations on the Catalan National Day, the Diada. The chapter represents the first attempt at a thorough empirical investigation of the most important political event in Catalonia using a mixed-methods approach combining historical and ethnographic analysis. The analysis shows that there has been a marked shift in the perception and organization of the Diada in recent years, which seems related to who is organizing the commemoration. When civil society organizations are in charge of the Diada celebration, the result is a more politically charged event that mobilizes a much larger proportion of the population than when politicians and political parties organize the celebration. Further, when political parties are in charge, the Diada not only mobilizes far fewer people, but usually takes on a much more cultural and festive character as compared with the explicitly political Diada demonstrations that have been organized by civil society actors since 2012. Josep M. Oller, Albert Satorra and Adolf Tobena argue that during ˜ the last decade, the Catalonian secessionist challenge has induced a chronic crisis within Spain's politics. The rapidly escalating demands for secession ran almost in parallel with the accentuation of the economic recession that followed the disruption of the world financial system in 2008–2010. The authors refute previous studies that have shown that the impact of economic hardships was not a major factor in explaining the surge in secessionist demands. In this longitudinal analysis of a regular series of official surveys from the period 2006–2019, the authors show that economic factors did play a role in the secessionist wave. The main idiomatic segmentation (Catalan vs. Spanish as family language) interacted with economic segmentations in inducing variations on feelings of national identity that resulted in the erosion of the dual Catalan-Spanish identity. Moreover, the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry were those that mostly supported secession, whereas the poorer and unprotected citizenry was clearly against it. Oller, Satorra and Tobena conclude that all the ˜ data points to the conclusion that the secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the wealthier and more well-situated people.

Although Spain and Catalonia, and political identities, are the central focus of the book, Andalusia and Galicia are also included as case studies. In her chapter, Nichole Fernandez, focuses on ´ issues of transnationalism and homeland tourism to Galicia, an autonomous community and national minority of northern Spain which is often defined by its long history of emigration. The study focuses on migrants from the municipalities of Sada and Bergondo that had uncharacteristically large rates of migration to the United States. These migrants and their children continue to sustain strong ties to the perceived homeland and engage in repeat visits. Theories of transnationalism help to explain the continuity of identity, but the qualitative interviews with homeland tourists show how

it is specifically through frequent visits to the homeland that these Galician-Americans are able to sustain ties to the homeland and create a sense of national belonging. The author shows that the frequent visits make it possible for many to create a strong Galician identity that is both transnational and yet locally situated. By looking at the way these homeland visits construct a Galician identity, the study helps to form a new perspective on Galician nationalism that is reflected in the migrants and defined by mobility.

The chapter by Pablo Ortiz Barquero investigates VOX and focuses on the region of Andalusia. For a long time, Spain was thought of as an outlier because it did not have a significant radical right movement. However, the sudden popularity of VOX among voters, first in Andalusia and then in the rest of Spain, has put an end to so-called "Spanish exceptionalism". According to the author, the rise of this radical right party is important for two reasons: its potential direct impact on the political system and the way in which it will affect other political players. By means of regression analysis, the study explores the factors that have led voters to cast ballots for VOX during the 2018 regional elections in Andalusia in order to test some of the most widely accepted theories about the radical right vote. The results show that VOX's vote is fundamentally dictated by broader sociopolitical factors related to the territorial model, ideological self-identification, and the perception of political leaders. The author thereby refutes the explanations that hold that the vote for the radical right is conditioned by economic or identity-related vulnerability.

The chapter by Daniele Conversi and Matthew Machin-Autenrieth also studies Andalusia albeit from a different angle. The ideals of tolerance and cultural exchange associated with the interfaith past of Muslim Spain (al-Andalus) have become a symbol for Andalusian regionalism and for the integration of Moroccan communities. The chapter examines the interrelationship between music and 'intercultural regionalism', focusing on how music is used by public institutions to ground social integration in the discourse of regionalism. Against a backdrop of rising Islamophobia and the mobilization of right-wing populist and anti-immigration rhetoric, both within Spain and internationally, the authors consider how music can be used to promote social integration, to overcome Islamophobia, and to tackle radicalization. The authors argue that the musical interculturalism promoted by a variety of institutions needs to be understood within the wider project of Andalusian regionalism. The preferential way to achieve this objective is through 'intercultural regionalism', envisioned as the combination of regional identity-building and intercultural interactions between communities that share a common cultural heritage. The study also assesses some of the criticism of the efficacy of al-Andalus as a model for contemporary intercultural exchange. While recognizing the continuing regional and international importance of the 'andalusi' myth, the authors thus question its integrating capacity at a time of radical political, economic, and environmental upheaval.

> **Carsten Humlebæk, Antonia Mar´ıa Ruiz Jim´enez** *Editors*

## *Article* **The Study of Nation and Patria as Communities of Identity: Theory, Historiography, and Methodology from the Spanish Case**

## **Pablo Sánchez León**

Cham Humanities Center, Nova University of Lisbon, 1069-061 Lisbon, Portugal<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Received: 4 December 2019; Accepted: 27 February 2020; Published: 2 March 2020

**Abstract:** This article argues for a renovation in the study of nationalism by addressing the issue of the rationality underlying the decisions by citizens willing to leave their homelands. From the example of unforced exiles from the 1939 Republican diaspora (and inner exiles as well), the text starts with providing a theory of disidentification from a nation for the sake of civic commitment. Having shown the relevance of jointly studying the language of nation and patria, it focuses on Spanish post-Francoist historiography of the Early modern period for showing its unbalanced account of discourse revolving around patria in favor of that of nation. Thereafter, it provides a comparative overview of the scholarly interest in patriotism in modern history as depending on different national trajectories of political culture. Finally, it claims a methodological reorientation in the study of nationalism and patriotism by distinguishing between nation and patria as terms, as concepts, and as analytical categories defining distinctive collective identities.

**Keywords:** nation; patria (fatherland); identity; patriotism; nationalism; citizenship; deliberation; self-government; Spain; early modern history; modern history; historiography

> *To my friend, brother, and American in-sile Miguel Sánchez*

## **1. Exile as Dilemma to National Identity**

2019 has commemorated the 80th anniversary of the end of the so-called Civil War extended between July 1936 and March 1939, a transcendental process in Modern History that put an end to the democratic republic established in Spain in 1931. In this occasion celebrations have centered around a dramatic sequel to the suppression of liberties resulting from the war: Exile.1 The Spanish exile of 1939 was probably unprecedented in its scope and span: Compared to other migrations and forced displacements of populations in its nearest context following World War I, the citizens who abandoned Spain in 1939 were not ethnic or confessional minorities neither belonged to the intellectual elite but actually came from a wide variety of economic, social, and cultural backgrounds (estimates for different national cases from the first third of 20th century in (Kaya 2002, pp. 17–18); on its sociological scope (Caudet 2005, pp. 235–73)). Yet this singular profile only highlights a feature common to political-ideological conflicts in modern societies: That among the consequences of the suppression of liberties one is the decision by average citizens of abandoning a national state.

In effect, a considerable proportion of the people who decide to exile do not flee form the destruction provoked by war and civil confrontation, but rather from its expected political and institutional results. In the particular case of 1939 Spain, it is unquestionable that among those who

1 Information on the creation of a commission for the commemoration of the Republican exile, in https://www.mjusticia.gob. es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/ministerio/gabinete-comunicacion/noticias-ministerio/comision-interministerial.

left their home-country many were escaping from the duress they foresaw after the victory of Franco's troops; however, the fear of repression does not exhaust motivations for exile: There is evidence of Spanish Republican exiles who considered that, should they stay, their physical and moral integrity or their legal status would not be endangered.2 By contrast, among the defeated who remained the majority feared they would su ffer repression by the authorities of Franco´s regime, which was often the case through harassment, imprisonment, and even execution. Overall, the di fferent courses of action between the two groups do not seem to have depended only on the supply of information, neither can be just pinned on the distribution of resources and opportunities nor were brought about from weighing expectations against risks: In a context of "total war" as the Spanish 1936–39 conflict (Chickering 2008), it was extremely hazardous to anticipate the consequences of decisions.

The phenomenon of exile allows signaling the presence of individuals willing to leave their country because they do not retain a sense of belonging; in other words, they have stopped feeling identified with their community of birth and socialization. The same applies as well to those who do not leave their country but stay in a sort of "inner exile", "a mental rather than material condition" which "alienates some people from others and their ways of living" (Ilie 1981, p. 7), making them carry an existence as foreigners in their own homeland. In the case of Spain after 1939, many of those who had lived under the democratic liberties of the Second Republic experienced an utter disaffection towards the values, symbols, and rituals of the Francoist *Nuevo Estado*: Actually the term "inner exile", also referred to as "in-sile" to define the experiences of exclusion suffered by many citizens ( Gómez Bravo 2013), was actually coined during Franco´s protracted regime (Salabert 1988, pp. 9–10).

To my knowledge, implications of these two mutually interrelated phenomena have not been much addressed in studies on national identity and nationalism in general, and particularly by Spanish specialists. This article tries both to question and enrich the scholarly approach to the issue of belonging in modern communities. It does so first, by providing theoretical reflection on the rationality underlying disidentification with a national community to the point of, either willing to leave the country that grants fundamental rights, or staying but feeling a stranger to it. Drawing from psychosocial and historical perspectives on the rise of modern citizenship, I distinguish between nation and patria as communities of identity, and theorize on patriotism as a distinctive kind of political sentiment that overflows the semantics of nationalism. The text then addresses the way Spanish Post-Francoist historiography has been dealing with the study of the terminology and the fields of nationalism and patriotism. I focus on the historiography of the Early modern period to signal the unbalanced treatment of these two terms and go ahead relating the scholarly preferences among historians to the historical trajectories of modern political cultures in di fferent countries. Finally, I o ffer a methodological critique to conventional hermeneutics on the language of patria and propose an alternative methodology for distinguishing between words, concepts, and categories relevant for the study of patriotism as a collective identity.

## **2. Disengaging from National Identity Out of Civic Commitment**

Among the topics of Spanish post-war culture one that stands out is a polemic on the nature of the Spanish nation engaged by two intellectuals from exile, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz and Américo Castro (Morales Moya 2013). While the former endorsed an ontological and essentialist conception of national identity, the latter argued that Spanishness was a historical product collectively built through cultural and political processes, a perspective that has eventually become commonsensical in other national historiographies (see for Britain, Colley 1992). In the wake of that debate, Castro published

2 One relevant example is Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, minister of State under the Second Republic in 1933. He left Spain during the war but argued he did so freely and not out of fear of repression but rather of disillusion with his compatriots, an argument that prompted reaction from the then President of the Republic Manuel Azaña, who tagged him an exile for convenience (Azaña 1978, vol. II, pp. 226–27, 236). Eventually, Sánchez-Albornoz would be appointed President of the Government of the Republic between 1962 and 1971.

the essay *Los españoles: Cómo llegaron a serlo* [Spaniards, how they became] (Castro 1965), from which title a complementary question can be raised: How Spaniards, or members of whatever other nation, have ceased to belong, in the sense of feeling themselves detached from their original nation.

Addressing this issue implies acknowledging that a community may deny recognition to individuals, but its members may as well end up neglecting their community of belonging (Pizzorno 1986). This general statement applies, for example, to dual national identities in stateless nations whenever people start rejecting one at the cost of another (see on the case of current Catalonia, (Oller et al. 2019)). Accounting for national disidentification requires further specification, though, since nations are at once a referent of individual and collective identity and the communitarian foundation of the modern state (Jessop 2011). Accordingly, disidentification with a nation may entail also rejecting the rights derived from naturalization as granted by a state, a sequel deeply affecting the condition of citizenship.

Normally, though, denaturalization takes place as part of a wider process of claiming re-naturalization in another nation state. From a psychosocial perspective, this push-and-pull logic can be formulated arguing that disidentification from a community implies re-identifying with another, otherwise the individual will be exposed to lose an essential emotional attachment and risk falling into anomy (Durkheim 1951; Merton 1938). In the case of transnational migrants and forced exiles, the alternative community is usually a concurring nation, and so naturalization in a different nation state, aside from providing with a sense of belonging, gives access to its appertaining rights. The abovementioned phenomena of unforced exile and of inner exile, however, foreclose reducing the issue to a choice between national communities.

As shown in the case of 1939 Spain, Republican exiles did not leave willing to be naturalized in another nation-state; rather, they flew out as they became aware their citizen rights would not continue to be upheld in their country of origin. Such awareness involves a kind of reflectivity distinctive from the acquisition of another national identity, which is normally the e ffect of rather unpolitical (Esposito 2011) socialization in cultural habits, symbols, and rituals: Instead, involved in the kind of decision epitomized by exiles there is deliberation about political issues, a procedure inherent to modern citizenship (Mou ffe 1999). On the other hand, claiming naturalization in a national state may be neither the cause nor the consequence of developing a sense of belonging: As embodied by Spanish Republican exiled who failed to adapt to the hosting national cultures (Abellán 2001, pp. 85–109), deliberation leading to exile does not necessarily entail re-identifying with another national community; much the same applies to "in-silers" who do not recreate bonds with the national state by which they feel oppressed.

The example of unforced exiles reveals limitations in conventional definitions of nation and national identity. Across the specialized literature there is a contrast between two conceptions of nation, as either founded on cultural, given referents or on political, voluntary traits (Kohn 1946; Smith 1991; critical overviews in Renaut 1991; Brubaker 1999). The experience of exiles calls attention towards allegiance to a community in exchange for commitment to political, but not voluntary referents. Deliberation is certainly involved in the decision of breaking ties with the homeland nation; yet, it only takes place after a process of disengagement or disidentification that cannot be explained in instrumental or strategic terms: As much as inner exile, unforced exile is rather an expressive kind of action (Hargreaves-Heap 2001) through which the citizen conveys the value he/she allocates to referents that provide with an identity beyond gender, class, and race—and beyond the conventional definitions of nation as well. The commitment of willing exiles is towards a distinctively civic community which, by upholding freedom and the exercise of rights, provides with a sense of belonging and well-being; and this sharing in a collective identity is priceless to the point that, under conditions, the commitment may be unlimited.

In the western tradition there is acknowledgment of such community: The fatherland or *patria*, and of its related sentiment—patriotism, as "*primarily* a political passion based on the experience of citizenship, and not on common pre-political elements derived from having been born in the same territory, from belonging to the same race, speaking the same language, worshipping the same deities or having the same customs" (Viroli 2001, p. 7). Although patriotism has been the object of historical studies and analytical reflections (see readers in (Primoratz 2002); (Bar-Tal and Staub 1999); a philosophical approach in (MacIntyre 1995)), a narrow focus on its demand for sacrifice—as inspired by the expression "To die for the fatherland"—has contributed to discredit this political sentiment as a sort of cultural transfer from ancient times to be blamed for much of the inhuman warfare and the rather lurid cult towards "the fallen" in modern history (Koselleck 2012; Tamir 1997). The example of unforced and inner exiles provides with a di fferent perspective that reinserts patriotism into the sphere of citizenship.

Despite being founded on civic values, however, as collective identity patriotism should not be confused with cosmopolitanism understood as a kind of rational allegiance to unembedded institutions and decontextualized values, no matter how political they may be (Nussbaum 1989, 2019). Much like other citizens exposed to political backlashes in modern nation states, the Spanish exiles and "in-siles" of 1939 were not committed to a supranational ideal of communitarian political life, nor were just moved by universalist mantras: Rather, they were either leaving behind or longing for the formerly free community of the Spanish Republic, to which they felt a subjective attachment and an emotional commitment independent from its foundation in universal and progressive values (see a general statement on this in Taylor 1989).

As embodied by self-persuaded exiles, patriotism is better grasped from a historical perspective as being rooted in "the political institutions and the particular way of life of the republic" (Viroli 1995, p. 37). In this sense, patria stands for an "imagined community" as powerful as the nation, yet one distinctively founded on civic referents the relevance of which marks itself at specific crossroads in the history of citizenship. Under "normal" political conditions, however, patria is a source of identity usually intertwining with nation. It is then no wonder that nationalism and patriotism own a scholarly tradition of being addressed in tandem (Huizinga 1959; Viroli 1995).

## **3. The Study of Patriotism in Spanish Historiography**

It is quite striking that the commemoration of the Spanish exile of 1939 has not fashioned reflection on the disidentification with the national community experienced by citizens who resented from the demise of democracy after the war. Equally eloquent of the state-of-the-art of Spanish post-Francoist intellectual production is the fact that the 2019 Essay Prize [Premio Nacional de Ensayo] has been awarded to a work on Spanish nationalism (see news in Huete 2019, and the essay in N úñez-Seixas 2018). Notwithstanding the relevance of the study, the decision is revealing of scholarly and cultural preferences in Spanish democracy, a profile underwritten by the awards granted also in the years 1998, 2002, and 2008 to essays on Spanish national identity or regional nationalist identities (Juaristi 1997; Álvarez Junco 2001; and Beramendi 2007, respectively) against not a single one devoted to the issues of fatherland, patriotism, or even exile.

True enough, national identity and nationalism are also star topics elsewhere worldwide, but in Spain there are further reasons which help explain such an intensive interest in nation-building, national identities, and the rise of nationalist ideologies: The relevance of national identities of regional scope in post-Francoist democracy. Yet, the influence of nationalist outlooks on the national political agenda should in principle have also stimulated interest in reflecting upon other kinds of bonding and communities of belonging in modern societies in order to meet an extended demand among citizens who feel uneasy with the social and political over-presence of nationalist identities.

This deficit points especially towards historians. The past has transmitted enough traces of political identities primarily built on communitarian referents other than ethnical, confessional, or cultural (Prak 2018). More in particular, the semantics of patria has been sharing in Western history from the acquisition of the language of politics since the Renaissance onwards (Viroli 1992). Increasingly embedded in the juridical language of the Old Regime, in many principalities of Europe the language of patria contributed to uphold political rights, despite their being often recognized not to citizens but to subjects (Lessafer 2001, pp. 200–1). Moreover, partially re-signified from its original meaning in classical Antiquity (Viroli 1995, pp. 18–22), patria conformed one of the nuclear tropes in the tradition of republican Humanism, a discursive repertoire on civic identity as

a moral virtue essential for the maintenance of polities founded on self-government (Pocock 1975). Throughout the Early Modern period, a language of patria provided with interpretive resources for disidentification with communities of belonging, especially to dwellers of self-governed cities whenever these failed to assure them a dignified civic life. In contrast, the hegemonic vision is that nations as communities of adscription do not reckon such prominent pedigree before the 19th century, being rather a modern phenomenon ((Anderson 1991); an overview of debates from the opposite view in (Smith 2000, pp. 27–51)) deeply intertwined with the rise of modern states while not necessarily with the establishment of political rights.

Spanish historiography is not balanced in its approach to this issue, though: Perspectives relating to national identity are overwhelming, even in scholarly studies on the Early modern period. Part of this situation may be justified by the available historical record: Indeed, overarching confessional referents hegemonized the language of republican civic Humanism in the territorial domains of the Habsburg dynasty (Fernández Albaladejo 1997), even reaching into an explicitly anti-republican rhetoric. However, there are other reasons involved, which have to do with the peculiar relations of modern Spanish scholars with the issue of nation and the building of citizenship, to the point that their addressing of these issues reveals an unsolved tension for historizing the nation as community of belonging.

In general, narratives on the national community are founded on a mythification of the nation as an intemporal community or of remote origin, and Spain is no exception (Wulff 2003). What is more specific to modern Spanish historiography is precisely the opposite: A recurrent reference to datable historical events for the establishment of the nation. This epistemological criterion derives in turn from the heritage of a narrative framework mimicking "sacred history": In fact, the two usual historical dates alternatively settled for defining the nation have been the conversion to Christianity by Visigoth king Recaredo in the 6th century AD, and the dynastic unification of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon under kings Isabella and Ferdinand in the wake of the invasion of the Muslim Kingdom of Granada and the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 (Pérez Vejo 2015; Boyd 1997, pp. 99–121). Far from being superseded with the demise of the Old Regime, this shaping of national history through confessional lines ended up framing Liberal historiography, which further conflated dynastic and religious unification with the forging of the nation, a metanarrative that gathered momentum under Franco´s regime when, in spite of their logical contradictions, both essentialist, ahistorical, and chronological tropes tended to be fused in conventional historical accounts.

Certainly, this whole narrative framework was put into question in the wake of the transition to democracy, displaced by a new chronology that traces the starting of the national community to the promulgation of the 1812 Constitution; however, the quest for settling a fully alternative historiography has not been rounded up by Spanish post-Francoist historians. A goal such reaches beyond questioning the mythical foundation of the inherited national history; yet it cannot either reduce itself to agreeing on alternative chronologies: It also demands re-inserting the whole narrative on the national past into a historical frame shaped by the building of citizenship.

This is far from having been achieved. In its place, what we have are usually accounts of the nation as a historical entity along with the persistence of ontological assumptions. In fact, there are readings of the past that, lingering on Francoist ideals of the nation as both diverse and united (Núñez Seixas 2014), still take for granted that Spain is an essentially homogeneous and enduring object of study to be addressed from prehistoric times to the present (García de Cortázar 1994); other post-Francoist specialists have on their part tried to rewrite genealogies of the nation reaching back to the Middle Ages (Valdeón Baruque 1982). True enough, there are approaches much more sensitive to historization and providing with prospective accounts. Among these, there stands out a literature on early modern "nation-ism" (*nacionismo*) defined in contrast to modern nationalism, as a discourse that addressed the nation as community of belonging through the Early modern period. In line with previous trends elsewhere (Armstrong 1982), this literature has aptly contributed to distinguish "the nation before the nation-state" (Fernández Albaladejo 2007) by interpreting the meaningful traces as both a discursive and identity phenomenon prior to the French Revolution of 1789 and the Spanish constitutional crisis of 1808, a period dominated by patrimonial monarchies but also hosting independent republics.

Additionally, yet even this refined thematic line still expresses the priorities among the Spanish historians from the generation who witnessed the establishment of democracy. In general, their interest in studying the rhetoric of nation and nationality before modernity is not matched by a similar attention to the communities of belonging that figured as hegemonic in the context of emergence of "nationist" discourse (see an example in Ballester Rodríguez 2010). Overall, early modern *nacionismo* is not weighed against the contribution of other territorial identities through the Old Regime. In consequence, the approach reproduces the teleology inherent to traditional historiography, somehow projecting that modern nationalism must have come after pre-modern "nationism".

One of the interesting novelties of 2019 is precisely a book that explicitly deals with the way Spanish historiography has been addressing the nation as a topic. The work was first published in English as *Speaking of Spain* (Feros 2017), a title that wanted to convey the relevance of a focus on the intellectual debates around the imagination and lexicon of the nation that pervaded the Early modern period. Instead, the book has been published in Spanish as *Antes de España* (Before Spain (Feros 2019)), an alternative title bearing witness that still in the 21st century critical historiography needs to be militant on the issue of the chronology of the Spanish nation. Other than that, the work exemplifies both the possibilities and the limits of post-Francoist historiography in overcoming stereotypes and mythifications on the issue of nation.

National identity before the establishment of the nation as political community is the topic of a work that plays out as both a monograph, a state-of-the-art, and an essay for the wider public. The book is to begin with remarkable in relating discourse on the political community with that on social groupings and especially on the ethnic and religious minorities that shaped the societies of the Hispanic Old Regime; in effect, in a rather unusual approach, Feros addresses the status of the nation vis-à-vis other infra-national referents of identity. Moreover, by integrating the transatlantic dimension of the Hispanic monarchy, the essay provides with a most uncontroversial conclusion, namely, that the only territory of the empire in which peninsular vassals were known as "Spanish" was the New World. By contrast, in the peninsula a Spanish identity owned very limited cultural status, not to mention any legal relevance—general references to the subjects of the Hispanic monarchy as a whole being normally deployed in discourse elaborated by foreigners.

Throughout the early modern era there was a "nationist" discourse in Hispanic culture, but as shown in Feros´s synthesis elaborated from numbers of critically selected researches, the overarching community of belonging remained that of the so-called Catholic Monarchy and its divine right of kings. According to this author, a Spanish nation cannot be spoken of even for the 18th century; and still then, in spite of the legal and institutional homogeneization following the suppression of the self-governing traditions in Catalonia, the cultural basis for a national community was ultimately constrained by Bourbon dynastic legitimacy. As for the previous centuries, the polycentric matrix of Habsburg rules established different relations with their diverse European and overseas possessions (Cardim et al. 2012), which implied giving recognition to subjects who did not define themselves as "Spanish" but rather primarily as Catalan, Aragonese, Valencian, Navarrean, etc. protected by specific privileged and territorial rights.

Feros´s book is also relevant in addressing the language of patria in the making of peninsular collective identities before modern history, a topic revealing of the current state of scholarly studies. Among post-Francoist historians of the Early modern period there are specialists who have committed themselves to historize the meanings and usages of patria in discourse—some even offering comparative analyses of the semantics of nation and patria in the various peninsular principalities (Gil Pujol 2004). As opposed to studies on "nationism", however, these do not depart from a distinction between early modern and later definitions of patria, assuming rather than probing that the language of patria has not experienced relevant historical changes affecting the meaning of patriotism as a political sentiment of belonging.

On top of this, among younger generations of historians a growing interest on republicanism as a transnational variety of political thought has been developed at the cost of properly specifying the

case for the Iberian peninsula. In spite of its high degree of urbanization throughout the 16th century (Sánchez León 2001, 2002), towns and cities in the Crown of Castile did not provide urban dwellers with a status as citizens with political rights; they were rather defined at once as *vecinos* (neighbours) and subjects to the king (Carzolio 2002; Herzog 2003). At the same time, the division of urban society by estates impeded the definition of a single legal community, while the hegemony of confessional identities constrained the emergence of autonomous political values (Sánchez León 2002, 2007). Overall, the cities of Castile did not result from the fragmentation of sovereignty but rather reflected a hierarchy of jurisdictional powers crowned by the monarch (Fernández Albaladejo 2017, p. 665). In such a context, the development of republican discourse was no indicator of the rise of patriotic identities but rather reflected the transnational profile acquired by Humanist rhetoric.

Urban political culture was certainly di fferent in the Crown of Aragon, a territory hosting several important ports such as Barcelona or Valencia with a tradition of urban self-government and citizenship statuses, a contrast that should have encouraged comparisons between the two kingdoms and other territories in Europe both within and beyond the domains of the Habsburg dynasty. Instead, recent approaches to civic Humanism as o ffered by Spanish historians have argued for a single frame of republican identities common to the greater cities and towns of the European continent including the Iberian peninsula irrespective of their social, political, and cultural di fferences (Herrero 2017). Inherent to this trend seems to be a "kind of faked need to convey a republican DNA" to the Southern part of the continent (Fernández Albaladejo 2017, p. 666) that not only degrades the specificity of the republican tradition but also confounds citizenship, *vecindad,* and the more extended condition of subject along the Old Regime; as a result, the complex historical relation between civic culture, patria, and patriotism is taken for granted instead of being problematized.

Summarizing, even when studying the Early modern period Spanish historiography devotes itself to the topic of the nation at the cost of patria and its related sentiment of patriotism. However, this preference in post-Francoist scholarly studies is induced by a deeper deficit in historical narratives on the longer-term building of citizenship.

#### **4. The Ebbs and Tides of Patriotism as Collective Identity in Modern History**

It may be argued that Spanish historiography on the nation is not so uncommon: After all, in other academic environments reflection and research on the topic occupies an outstanding place. However, behind formal analogies there are distinctive political cultures that need to be sorted out in order to comparatively understand the changing relations in the semantics of nation and patria, especially when dealing with modern history.

One main di fference between Spain and other Western democracies such as Great Britain, France, or the United States is that these latter have not witnessed the suppression of basic constitutional rights upholding the exercise of citizenship. In terms of the example above, these democracies have not exposed their citizens to the dilemma of Spanish Republican exiles. Accordingly, in the political cultures of those well-established democracies discourse on national identity is not originally disengaged from the narrative on citizenship building. This has not prevented these countries from distorting the republican tradition, however, by embarking in imperialist ventures that deeply a ffected their political cultures. In e ffect, the rise of imperialism brought about a tension to the inherited language of patria, which was usually reshaped into the semantics of civilization (see Mazlish 2004, pp. 1–48) and often subsumed under a rhetoric of militarism (Koselleck 2012). Accordingly, by the turn of the 19th century, the struggle for hegemony among imperial metropolises eventually had fused nationalism and patriotism in a single discourse (see an insightful analysis written in the context of World War I in Veblen 1917, pp. 31–76, "On the Nature and Uses of Patriotism"), a trend that got embedded during the so-called Second Thirty Year´s War of 1914–18 (Traverso 2016) as modern citizenship was challenged by the expansion of both reactionary nationalist and aggressive militaristic ideologies.

After World War II, the subaltern discursive status of patriotism was sealed in historical narrative. With the rise of "social history" the focus of attention became the classes and other group identities

produced by economic structures (Cabrera 2004), an emphasis placed at the cost of specifying the historical relations between overarching national or civic-patriotic identities. On their part, in Southern European and Latin American countries experiencing a belated or intermittent democratization social history strangled the potential demand for a narrative on the long-term construction of citizenship; and while the nation-state was perceived as the natural type of modern political community, the account of the historical intertwinements of patriotism and nationalism was sidelined.

In this scholarly context, the first wave of studies on the nation and nationalism took place along the fall of Soviet Socialism at the end of the 1980s, a process that was saluted as the ultimate triumph of nationalism as the ideology of modern political communities. Benedict Anderson, in a seminal work greatly inspiring this and subsequent academic fashions on national identity, underlined that "since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in *national* terms", which he characterized as "a territorial and social space inherited from the prerevolutionary past" (Anderson 1991, p. 2). Anderson questioned the Marxist theory of class struggle as a su fficient basis for the legitimacy of socialist regimes. However, his statement did not result from a comparative study on nationalism and patriotism in the o fficial discourse of Soviet regimes; and yet their self-definition as "popular democracies" strongly suggests that modern social revolutions have also been harbinger for patria as alternative political community to nation.

By the end of the 20th century, with the creation of the European Union and the expansion of globalization, nation-states have been exposed to growing pressure: The rise of nationalist outlooks is recurrently related to the emergence of new supranational entities constraining national sovereignty while increasing transnational exchanges of capital and people (Banks and Gingrich 2006). This trend has subsumed even more the language of patria into that of nation in historical narratives as much as political discourse at large. One example of the trend is the opening of the Olympic Games in London in 2012, designed by film director Daniel Boyle as a series of episodes amounting to a synthesis of the national history of the host country, Great Britain: The scenes in the show stressed that the island was "the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution and the workshop of the world", which made that historical experience certainly "hellish" but also "awesome achievements" have to be acknowledged not only in "engineering and manufacturing" but also in "big steps towards democracy, the collective selfhelp of the labour movement, and the struggle for the emancipations of women and other social revolutions" (Bryant 2015, p. 3). In the proposed narrative, this trajectory gathers momentum in the creation of the National Health Service after World War II; yet, in the guide for the event written by the author, this relevant citizenship conquest features as "the institution which more than any other unites our nation" (Bryant 2015, p. 10). Another example from the side of patriotic discourse has to do with the protectionist policies enacted by President of the United States Donald Trump. These measures have been shaped in an anti-globalization rhetoric in which patriotic identity is openly distorted as neo-imperialist national grandeur (Johnson 2004); as declared by Trump at the United Nations: "Greatness is only realised by the will and devotion of patriots" (Borger 2019).

The examples underwrite that patriotism is recurrently endangered by both nationalist and imperial-militaristic rhetoric, the combination of which makes difficult even to critically isolate it in discourse as a distinctive political identity. On the other hand, however, they also point to the enduring resilience of the language of patria as both a semantic heritage bridging between the evolution of national identities and the dynamics of citizenship, and a substratum resurfacing with variable autonomy depending on circumstances. One such context is the public sphere of early 20th-century Spain, which has witnessed a recovery of the lexicon of patria, staged by the political formation Unidas Podemos (Sola and Rendueles 2018) in the wake of the so-called 15M, the 2011 citizen protest that broadcasted collective consciousness of a crisis in post-Francoist democracy (Fernández Savater 2019).

The entry of patria into discourse in current Spanish political culture has been instrumental in confronting the hegemonic discourse on nation, and especially in opposing nationalist "*españolista*" identities. In turn, its semantics draw from previous developments in Latin American political cultures (Baron and Díaz 2016), where it has been enhanced by two historical discursive veins: An initial

republicanism shaping citizenship building through the process of colonial independence in the early 19th century ( Pérez Vejo 2015); and a recurrent anti-imperialist ideology developed already in the 19th century and especially throughout the 20th century (Gobat 2013; Knight 2008; MacPherson 2006). However, their eventual blending into the scheme of "dependency theory" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), has skewed this dual genealogy of patria towards the latter semantics. This helps explains its appealing to Left-wing Spanish ideological stances sensitive to international threats to sovereign integrity in the wake of Spain´s adjustment to the requirements of balanced budget imposed by the European Union.

The case of early 21st-century Spain confirms that in a world straddled by supranational trends, the discourse of patria is being reduced to the defense of sovereignty, a status that renders it vulnerable to nationalist rhetoric. In the western tradition of political philosophy, however, patriotic identity was reasonably expected not only in response to external attacks on the institutions of self-government by foreign powers, but was also against internal menaces by the enemies of political liberties. This dual dimension was fragmented already during the 18th century, however, following the end of religious wars and in the wake of the political reforms brought about by the Enlightenment. In e ffect, with the rise of standing, conscript armies, civic commitment to the banner of *Pro patria mori* was put at the service of the building of nation-states (Viroli 1995, pp. 140–60), while the rise of the public sphere disseminated competitive ideologies capable of fueling enthusiasm (Moscoso and León 2017). According to Reinhard Koselleck, patriotism was the first among modern concepts of movement (ending in -ism), coined before those of nationalism or imperialism (Koselleck 2012); however, in entering modern history these latter seem to have recurrently conditioned the integrity of the former. Additionally, yet, as the example of unforced exiles keeps reminding, disengagement from national communities for the sake of a commitment to civic values—patriotism—is no less a recurrent experience of modern citizens.

#### **5. Nationalism and Patriotism in Spanish Modern History: A Methodological Bedrock**

The fate of unforced and inner exiles also reveals that the triggering of patriotic attitudes and identities relates closely to contexts of civil war. Recent studies on the history of this concept have extended the scope of civil war to comprise all forms of conflicts, from coup d´états to revolutions, brought about by struggles between defenders and opponents to political freedoms (Armitage 2015, 2017). Moreover, there is a growing understanding of modern history as a succession of states of exception imposed against the will to self-government by deliberative citizens (Agamben 2005). These trends will probably spark interest on the issue of patriotism in the coming future.

So far, modern Spain appears as an outstanding case for addressing the complex relations between the languages of patria/nation and the sentiments of patriotism/nationalism as developed on the background of civil wars. Already as early as in 1808, the response to Napoleonic invasion became at once a crucible of the national community and a source of civic identities both among elites and commoners willing to curtail the unbridled powers of the Old Regime, a process that in its turn fostered a relative interchangeability between nation and patria in discourse (Vilar 1982; Aymes 2004). Interestingly enough, the memory of the so-called War of Independence defined it also as a civil war engaged between defenders and opponents of a constituent proves (Sánchez León 2008), while the return to absolutist rule in 1814 produced the first wave of political exiles in modern Spanish history (Simal 2012), some among which decided to leave the country at free will.3

Overall, Spanish Liberalism produced a definition of the nation as sovereign subject (Portillo 2000) that, although actually combining Catholic and republican semantics, eventually a ffected the status of patria in the repertoire of linguistic resources. To begin with, it allowed for its appropriation by opponents to Liberal Constitutions, who eventually deployed the word for referring to their imagined

3 One relevant example was the reputed writer and ideologist José Blanco White, who relinquished his nationality out of a deep disenchantment with Spanish traditional culture at large; see a profile following my interpretation on unforced exile in Loureiro (2000, pp. 31–63).

community, alien, and even hostile to citizenship as it was, placing it in their banner "Dios, Patria, Rey" (God, fatherland, King (Canal 2000)). Moreover, the outbreak in 1833 of a military conflict between Liberals and Traditionalists explicitly labeled as a civil war further contributed to identify the nation with modern liberties at the cost of patria (Varela 1994). On their part, the growing role of the military in the resolution of political conflicts contributed to further drain the concept of patria of civic content. On top of this, the repression of anticolonial struggles in the Caribe and later the starting of neo-colonial adventures in Africa insu fflated discourse with militaristic rhetoric, a pattern similar to other Western nation-states, with the singularity that in Spain the frontiers between colonies and metropolis was recurrently blurred both in repressive techniques and discourse (an example in (Godicheau 2014); a general overview in comparative perspective in (Fradera 2015)).

In sum, in modern Spanish discourse the terminologies on nation and on patria have tended to be interchangeable; however, both usually refer to the semantic field of the former. Instead of being reflected on, this phenomenon is rather uncritically replicated in historiography. As in the scholarly production on the Early modern period, e fforts to approach the two lexicons in comparative perspective are scant (one example is o ffered in (Fernández Sebastián 2005)). In general, research on modern history not only blatantly focuses on the topic of the nation but also takes for granted the utterances of patria as synonymous, and conflates patriotism with nationalism, a practice that bears consequences on the overall narrative of the period.

As an example relevant for the case, the 1936–39 war has been interpreted as founded in opposing, yet symmetrical nationalist identities on the two sides of combatants ( N úñez Seixas 2006). This view fits fairly well for the Francoist side, but not so well for the defenders of Republican legitimacy. This latter certainly defined itself as a nation, and deployed a mobilizing rhetoric in accordance; however, it was also founded on reference to a self-governed political community, a di fference that is at the basis of the dilemma that the prospective of a military defeat eventually produced among many citizens: Their allegiance either to the imagined community of the nation or to an alternative civic community that in the tradition received the name of patria.

True enough, Franco´s discourse also spoke of patria, but its meaning related to the tradition of militaristic outlooks, which was not central to the imagined community of exiles and Republicans at large. From a longer-term perspective, Republicans´ patriotism as collective identity alternative to nationalism was not triggered anew in the 1936 context; rather, it went back to the 19th century, when patriotic identities recurrently resurfaced in contexts of political crisis that brought about popular mobilizations against authoritarian or instituted corruption (see an example in the 1854 chronicle of the 1854 Revolution in Un Hijo del Pueblo 2018). On their part, the repression of struggles for extending the franchise resulted in recurring dilemmas between remaining or exiling up to the establishment of the democratic republic in 1931.4

This whole state of a ffairs calls for a methodological reassessment. The problem is not in the terminological interchangeability between nation and patria, or of nationalism and patriotism to be found in the sources: It is rather in the conventional practices of experts. In most of modern discourse *Patria* and *nación* are terms, but not necessarily concepts, a basic analytical distinction for a minimum methodological bedrock (Gadamer 2000). Beyond that, the case of modern Spain shows that the lexicon of patria extended through Spanish 19th-century texts is of scarce relevance for tracing the semantics of patria as a community of civic referents for citizens committed to defend self-government from the hazards of tyranny or corruption. Actually, a focus on the terminology or the semantics of *patria* and *nación* is often misleading for the purpose of accounting for the processes of identification, desidentification, or re-identification with communities of belonging experienced by modern citizens.

4 One final example of relevance in this context was the decision of reputed intellectual Miguel de Unamuno of remaining outside Spain once allowed to return after being forced to exile in 1924 in the wake of the military coup d´état by general Primo de Rivera (Del Arco López 1986). Unamuno would not leave his unforced exile until the proclamation of the Republic in 1931.

Relying just on what conceptual history o ffers on this issue (Koselleck 2012) is a self-limiting stake. A distinction between patria or patriotism as terms and as concept is surely mandatory; however, it is also required distinguishing between the wording of patriotism as inserted in the historical record and the category of patriotism as an analytical tool essential for giving meaning to collective identities disengaged from allegiance to modern nations for the sake of civic commitment.

Such methodological reorientation may provide with pathbreaking hypotheses on the rationality of patriotism. From these, the task of the historian is to search for and analyze evidence of such patriotic identity in the historical record. Here, it has been pointed out that the irruption of patriotism strongly relates to contexts that may be defined as a civil war, either by historical actors, the observer, or preferably both. On the other hand, it has also been strongly noted that, paradoxically, discourse revealing patriotic identities may not revolve around the terminology of patria or patriotism. Far from arguing in favor of the imposition of categories from the social sciences on to historical evidence, this methodological stance is committed to recover the experiences of civic subjects at large, and of unforced exiles and in-siles in particular, from current marginalization or misinterpretation.

## **6. Conclusions: Pro Patria (Ex Natione) in Exsilium Ire**

It was not by chance that the Spanish Republican exiles captured by the Nazi in France and sent to the concentration camps of Buchenwald and Mauthausen were stamped a blue badge in their clothes that distinguished them from other ideological inmates as "stateless" people (Pike 2009): They figured as expelled from their countries of origin by the new Francoist authorities, a destiny particularly shameful for the nationalist and militaristic culture of their guards. In Spanish language, however, the term for stateless—*apátrida*, meaning "without a fatherland or country"—, keeps from the original Latin the root patria, signaling the conundrum presented in this text. What Republican exiles had been deprived was actually of a nationality in the legal sense; and yet they were anything but people without patria, in the sense of a community of citizens committed to the reproduction of political virtue: Quite on the contrary, many among them had willingly abandoned their nation of origin precisely for the sake of keeping a sense of belonging to such an imagined community.

Departing from the example of the Spanish Republican exile of 1939, this text has pointed to the limits of the nation as community of belonging and on national identity and nationalism. As much as identity creation, processes of disidentification and re-identification are in themselves political, no matter which referents are involved. However, patriotism stems from processes that are political both in substance and in form. This may be predicated of nationalism as well; however, what is distinctive of patriotism is the relevance of civic consciousness, a moral dimension involved in the experience of disenchantment from national identity as much as in the deliberation for leaving or staying in one´s own country of origin, yet an instance that, in requiring active breeding by individuals, also relays on institutional environments suitable for the recreation of political virtue. In this sense, patria is a political community that concurs and combines with the nation, but under circumstances they may compete as incompatible, opposing, even antagonistic referents of belonging. As a final summary, my point would be that the issue of patriotism, apart from the banner "To die for love of the fatherland", can be addressed from the perspective of "To live without the nation" one does not love anymore.

Scholarly production in general, and Spanish post-Francoist historiography in particular, deserve a historiography capable of accounting for this phenomenon and committed to produce discursive evidence of the kind of political emotion involved. However, the issue has wider implications. Beyond nominalist debates, the perspective here o ffered may help to gain critical distance from current dichotomies on the relations between nationalism and democracy, to which scholars contribute more than usually acknowledged. Just to put an example, in an interview in the media, award-winner Xosé Manuel N úñez Seixas offered a rather normative statement: "We are all nationalists" (Huete 2019). Such an opinion is probably as radical and biased as the alternative urge for embracing cosmopolitanism. The question this article poses is how many so-called nationalists or self-assured cosmopolitans would be willing to abandon their homeland if the liberties of their countries happen to be suppressed, or as well how many would remain in their countries but feeling detached from the values of the new anti-democratic legitimacy. For it could be that some among them find out they react like patriots. Better late than never.

**Funding:** This research was funded by the Project "Aproximación interdisciplinar a los lenguajes jurídico-políticos de la modernidad euroamericana. Dimensiones espacio-temporales", grant number: Mineco HAR2017-84032-P.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.


**2.1 M2 generation**

#### **2.1.1 Chlorophyll mutations**

The chlorophyll mutants were scored from 7 to 10 days after sowing. The different types of chlorophyll mutants such as albina, xantha, chlorina and viridis were reported in all mutagenic treatments.

Amongst all the treatments used gamma radiations had induced the highest chlorophyll mutation frequency, followed by combination treatments. Prakash and Halaswamy, (2006) and Manigopa-Chakraborty *et al*., (2005) and Bolbhat and Dhumal (2009) have also reported induction of chlorophyll mutation in horsegram with GR and their combination.

The frequency of total chlorophyll mutants varied for single as well as combination of gamma radiation and EMS. In gamma radiation the average percentage of chlorophyll mutation frequency was 1.47% which was slightly higher than combination treatments (1.23%). The highest chlorophyll mutation frequency was recorded in 200Gy (1.70%). The values of chlorophyll mutation frequency were ranging from 1.09% to1.70%. Amongst all types of chlorophyll mutations, albina and chlorina types showed higher percentage (0.64 and 0.58%). The percentage of xantha and viridis was 0.41 and 0.28 respectively. The average number of chlorophyll mutations was 24.25, while the average frequency was 1.47%.

The combination treatments showed wide range of total percentage of chlorophyll mutations. The range varied from 0.74% to 1.72%. Highest chlorophyll mutation frequency (1.72%) was noted in 100Gy + 0.3%EMS.

Reddy and Annadurai (1992) claimed that chlorophyll mutation can be used as an index for evaluating the mutagenic action of different mutagens. It is also important for assessing the potency of mutagen and also can be used as an indicator of factor mutations. Chlorophyll mutations are used as a dependable index for evaluating the genetic effects of mutagens.

Albina, xantha, chlorina and viridis were found to be the most abundant type of chlorophyll mutants induced by GR and combination treatments in horsegram Bolbhat and Dhumal (2009). Manjaya *et al*., (2007) and Tambe *et al*., (2010) attributed this genes concerned with the development and expression of chlorophyll pigments.


**4. Stability of Hopfield Neural Networks**

In this section, we investigate the stability of Hopfield neural networks, which are modeled by a system of nonlinear differential equations

$$\frac{d\mathbf{x}\_i(t)}{dt} = -a\_i(t)\mathbf{x}\_i(t) + \sum\_{j=1}^n w\_{i,j}(t)g\_j(\mathbf{x}\_j(t)),\tag{27}$$

with discontinuous coefficients *ai*(*t*) and activation functions *gi*(*x*), *i* = 1, 2, . . . , *n*.

We will perform our study of the stability of neural networks (27) in two stages. The first stage includes a case with discontinuous coefficients *ai*(*t*). The second one considers discontinuity of activation function *gi*(*x*), *i* = 1, 2, . . . , *n*.

First, let functions *ai*(*t*), *i* = 1, 2, ... , *n* have discontinuities of the first kind. It is enough to restrict ourselves to the case of one point of discontinuity. Assume that the function *a*11(*t*) is discontinuous at the point *b*1, 0 < *b*1 < ∞. Without loss of generality, we suggest *gj*(0) = 0, *j* = 1, 2, . . . , *n*, |*gi*(*x*)| ≤ *αi*|*x*|, *i* = 1, 2, . . . , *n*.

Now, we investigate the stability of the zero solution of the system of Equation (27). In the interval (0, *b*1], the norm of the solution of Equation (27) for initial value

$$\mathbf{x}(0) = \mathbf{x}\_0.\mathbf{x}(0) = (\mathbf{x}\_1(0), \dots, \mathbf{x}\_n(0)),\tag{28}$$

is estimated by the inequality

$$\begin{split} \|\mathbf{x}(t)\| &\leq \exp\left\{\int\_{0}^{t} \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau\right\} \|\mathbf{x}(0)\| \\ &+ \int\_{0}^{t} \exp\left\{\int\_{s}^{t} \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau\right\} \|F(t, \mathbf{x}(s))\| \,\|d\mathbf{s}\_{\prime} \end{split} \tag{29}$$

where *A*(*t*) = {*aij*(*t*)}, *i*, *j* = 1, 2, . . . , *n*,

$$F(t, \mathbf{x}(t)) = \left(\sum\_{j=1}^{n} w\_{1j}(t)\mathbf{g}\_j(\mathbf{x}(t)), \dots, \sum\_{j=1}^{n} w\_{nj}(t)\mathbf{g}\_j(\mathbf{x}(t))\right)^T.$$

Proceeding with the Inequality (29), we have

$$\|\mathbf{x}(t)\| \le \exp\left\{\int\_0^t \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau\right\} \|\mathbf{x}(0)\| + \gamma \int\_0^t \exp\left\{\int\_s^t \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau\right\} \|\mathbf{x}(s)\| ds,\tag{30}$$

where *γ* is defined from the inequality *F*(*t*, *x*(*t*)) ≤ *γ x*(*t*) .

From the Inequality (30), using well-known methods, we have the estimate

$$\|\|x(t)\|\| \le \exp\left\{ \int\_0^t \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau + \gamma t \right\} \|\|x(0)\|\|, t \in [0, b\_1].$$

Taking *x*(*b*1)=(*x*1(*b*1), ... , *xn*(*b*1)) as the initial value and repeating the arguments given in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain the inequality

$$\|\mathbf{x}(t)\| \le \exp\left\{\int\_0^t \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau + \gamma t\right\} \|\mathbf{x}(0)\|\_{\ast}$$

which is valid for *t* ∈ [0, ∞).

From this inequality, it follows that when the condition

$$\left\{ \int\_0^t \Lambda(A(\tau))d\tau + \gamma t \right\} < 0,$$

is satisfied, the system of Equation (27) is asymptotically stable in general. Thus, the following statement has been proven.


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**9**

*1USA 2AU*

**Cochlear Implantation,**

Jahn N. O'Neil1 and David K. Ryugo1,2

*Center for Hearing and Balance, Baltimore, MD*

**Synaptic Plasticity and Auditory Function**

*1Johns Hopkins University, Dept. of Otolarygology, Head and Neck Surgery,*

The ability to hear, our perception of sound, is fundamental to how we perceive our external environment and interact with others using spoken language. Sound also plays a critical role in the normal development of the auditory system. In this review, we will discuss sound, hearing, and the role of hearing in brain development. We will examine the effect of deafness and the impact of cochlear implants on neuronal plasticity and auditory function. It is speculated that hearing evolved as a distance sense so that organisms could detect potential dangers that were not visible, such as during the dark of night or where grass or forests were too dense (Jerison, 1973). All animals have the ability to sense mechanical perturbations in the air, and in vertebrates, the inner ear is a highly developed structure that solves this problem. This sense organ consists of specialized cellular structures that

Sound is created by vibrations within a plastic medium (air, water, gas etc.) caused by the movement of molecules. The oscillations of these sound waves can be described by their rate, which is defined in cycles per second, also known as frequency. The sensation of pitch is positively correlated to the frequency of sound. The pressure (or intensity) of these vibrations is perceived as loudness. Sound in air is captured by the auricle, the external portion of the ear, and funneled through the external auditory canal to the tympanic membrane, also known as the eardrum. The tympanic membrane is mechanically coupled to the middle ear ossicles (malleus, incus and stapes) where the vibrations are amplified and delivered to the cochlea. The vibrations in air become vibrations in fluid and are transmitted to the sensory hair cells of the organ of Corti. This mechanical signal is converted to neural signals and relayed to the brain by the auditory nerve. The brain receives and interprets these signals and the result is what we perceive as

In humans, the range of hearing that is audible contains frequencies between approximately 20 to 20,000 Hz. Hearing range is variable between individuals as well as species (Figure 1). Mammals in particular have developed high frequency hearing and have the largest

transduce (or convert) sound stimuli into neural signals.

**1. Introduction**

hearing.

*2Garvan Institute of Medical Research, Hearing Research, Sydney, NSW*


**Author details**

Ming-Him Yuen Department of Neurosurgery, Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Hong Kong SAR, China

\*Address all correspondence to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, Connectome and Its Clinical Applications DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109963*


*2.3. Experimental Process*

Single point and multi-point excitation (synchronous/step-by-step) were used in the experiment, and the specific excitation steps were as follows:

(1) the action point (1~9#) was excited respectively; (2) two action points were executed synchronously or step-by-step as follows: 1# and 2#, 1# and 5#, 2# and 4# (excitation stepby-step), 6# and 7#, 6# and 8#, 7# and 8#, 8# and 9#; (3) four action points (6~9#) and five action points (1~5#) were excited synchronously and respectively.

Before the experiment, the data acquisition instrument needed to be zeroed first, and when the impact actions caused by the excitation were balanced, the data acquisition would be terminated and saved.


*2.2. The Triple Structure Siamese Network for Velocity Spectra Lateral Target Tracking*

For lateral target tracking in velocity spectra, the prior materials are the images of the energy clusters in the given windows. The tracking algorithm needs to overcome the challenges of target deformation, background interference, scale change, and angle rotation, and also needs to take into account the accuracy and efficiency. The Siamese network can find a set of parameters, so that the similarity of input images is large when they belong to the same category and small when they belong to different categories. Another advantage of the Siamese network is that the input is a pair of images rather than an image, so it can naturally increase the amount of training data and make full use of limited datasets to train, which is very important in the field of target tracking. In this paper, we improved the traditional Siamese network structure by adding an input update branch. A triple structure Siamese network for velocity spectra lateral target tracking is presented. We set the target area as a positive sample, and the background area and other morphological energy clusters as negative samples. Firstly, the tracking algorithm extracts the features of the target through a series of convolution operations and trains the classifier. Next, the well-trained classifier is used to find the most similar region in the velocity spectra of different CDP positions. Finally, the lateral extrapolation path of inversion parameters can be obtained through the change trend of the target positions. The added update branch can take the prediction result of the current position as an input and update the initial target according to the current tracking result, so as to adapt to the lateral change of the velocity spectrum.


**1. Introduction**

Photons of the soft X-ray spectral region (≈ 0.1–10 nm) have very small absorption lengths in all kinds of material due to the strong interaction with matter [1]. This fact together with the short wavelength qualifies this radiation as a tool for structuring and the analysis with nanometer resolution. An important application is the next-generation lithography that further reduces the achievable feature size in computer chip production [2, 3]. Surface analysis becomes extremely precise by means of reflectometry and scatterometry [4–6] and also the binding state of molecules can be studied by spectral investigations [7–9]. Microscopy with radiation at wavelengths in the water window (*λ* = 2.3–4.4 nm) allows highly resolved direct

© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

imaging of samples in aqueous environments [10–12]. Mostly, these applications are realiz‐ ed at large-scale facilities, such as synchrotron sources or free-electron lasers. However, the demand for beam time is always too large to be satisfied by these institutions, and thus, people endeavor to transfer experiments to their laboratories. This constitutes the need of compact beam sources as can be realized by the principle of laser-produced plasmas (LPP) that is the subject of this chapter.

In order to classify and compare the radiation of different soft X-ray beam sources, the brilliance *Br* is a commonly used quantity that is the number of photons within a narrow spectral range Δ*λ*/*λ* emitted into a solid angle *Ω* from an area *A* within the time scale *τ* (typically the wavelength range Δ*λ* is defined to be 0.1% of the central wavelength *λ*) [1]:

$$Br = \frac{N\_{ph}}{\pi \cdot A \cdot \Omega \cdot \Delta\lambda / \ \lambda} . \tag{1}$$

The value of *Br* is given in the unit 1/(s·mm2 ·mrad2 · 0.1%BW) with 0.1%BW indicating the bandwidth of 0.1%. A distinction is made between the peak brilliance, where *τ* denotes the pulse duration, and the average brilliance, where *τ* is the inverse of the repetition rate.

In comparison to synchrotrons and free-electron lasers, the brilliance of laser-produced plasma sources is several orders of magnitude lower. However, there are strategies to increase their brilliance which involve, e.g., higher power densities of the generating laser pulse. On the other hand, the density of the target material has a strong impact on the achievable number of soft X-ray photons too, whereas basically the source brilliance scales with the density. Thus, the brightest plasmas can be achieved with solids. Respective target materials are deposited on rotating cylinders [13] or quickly moving tapes [14], which provide repetition rates of up to 1 kHz. Prominent elements are gold or tin for the production of radiation at a wavelength of 13.5 nm, which is applied in EUV lithography [15]. Furthermore, there are sources employing cold gases in a solid phase, such as an argon filament that emits soft X-rays in the wavelength range 2–5 nm [16]. Achievable plasma sizes with solid targets are comparably small and on the order of several tens of μm (full-widths at half-maximum, FWHM).

A plasma of similar brilliance and extent is obtained with liquid targets, e.g., xenon [17], methanol [18], or tin [15]. A fluid jet [19] provides high target densities but might lead to size and brightness fluctuations. Going one step further to individual microscopic droplets [20], the advantage is the mass limitation such that the entire target material is converted into a highly ionized plasma state, supporting source stability. However, the drawback of solid and liquid target concepts is the inevitable production of fast particles and ions with kinetic energies of up to several hundred keV [21], which severely damage optics in the beam path. There are mitigation strategies to slow down the debris material such as repeller fields [22] or localized gas jet shields [23], but still the collector optics has a limited lifetime [2]. Contrarily, gaseous targets are almost free from debris [24]. Short gas pulses with durations of μs to ms are expanded from a pressure of several 10 bar into vacuum by a piezomechanical or electro‐ magnetic nozzle, resulting in a supersonic jet. Different target gases feature individual spectra of the resulting radiation, ranging from emitters with characteristic spectral lines (low atomic number, e.g., nitrogen) to broadband emitters (high atomic number, e.g., xenon) [25]. However, here, the conversion efficiency from laser energy into soft X-ray energy is comparably low due to the low density of the target material. Furthermore, achievable plasma sizes of several 100 μm are large. For metrology or scientific applications, though, these sources are very attractive due to their high cleanliness and versatility [8, 26].

In this study, a brilliance enhancement of laser-produced plasmas is demonstrated for gaseous jet targets, making use of supersonic effects. First, the theoretical background is provided to describe the physical properties of laser-produced plasmas as well as the gas dynamics of the related jet target. Experimental techniques are introduced that are employed to characterize the plasma and the gas jet. The effect of supersonic shocks within the target gas is investigated in both ways, theoretically and experimentally, revealing a significant brilliance enhancement for plasmas generated in respective shock regions. This chapter is based on a previous publication by Mey et al. [25] and has been revised and extended partly.