The main clause of verse 22, *ὅς ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ θεοῦ*, is widely held to be derived from Psalm 110:1, which is used in several NT passages (e.g. 1 Cor 15:23–28; Heb 2:5–9; Eph 1:20–23) with reference to Jesus' exaltation (see above, Chapter 4).141 In this psalm the king is raised to a place of honor and power as God's representative, bearing divine authority, and his enemies are subjected to him. The wording may also echo, more distantly, the enthroning of YHWH's anointed in Psalm 2:6–9, by which he receives universal kingship and exercises dominion over the hostile nations.142

It follows that this clause refers to "Christ's position of royal dignity and authority alongside God the Father, as a result of his resurrection,"143 in which he is given "God's eschatological dominion in relation to the cosmos."144 The right (hand) of God is a place of his favor and honor, which implies Christ's exercise of divine sovereignty as God's vicegerent; he abides in the presence of God and administers the power of God over all things.145 The present-tense verb *ἐστιν* is a general, stative present denoting Christ's continuing state.

The first participial phrase, *πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανὸν*, designates Christ's going to the presence of God in the highest heaven. His present place at God's right hand presupposes such a prior journey146 to the place where divine authority is administered.147 This account of Christ's "ascension" is paralleled in Ephesians 4:8–10, where it is also associated with his rule over the world and the subjecting of his enemies.148 The reference indicates that the author also stands within the strand of NT tradition that sees the event as distinct from the resurrection (which is mentioned separately in v.21) rather than identical with it;149 here he posits a temporal sequence of resurrection—heavenly journey—enthroned status.150

The second participial phrase, *ὑποταγέντων αὐτῷ ἀγγέλων καὶ ἐξουσιῶν καὶ δυνάμεων*, may draw upon Psalm 8 (in addition to Psalms 2 and 110), which is used elsewhere in the NT to refer to the subjection of all things to Christ in his place of divine authority.151 But whether or not a conscious allusion is intended,152 the phrase declares the prior subordination of the *ἀγγελοι καὶ ἐξουσίαι καὶ δύναμεις* to Christ as a further presupposition of his current position of authority.153

In light of verse 19, these three terms most likely refer to cosmic spiritual powers opposed to God, of which the spirits in prison are the primal archetype and origin, and which are the ultimate cause of the readers' experience of persecution and hostility at the hands of their pagan neighbors.154 There is no evidence elsewhere in the letter that the author sees these forces as anything more or different, and he never identifies them with human beings or authorities, whether political or social, despite having a ready opportunity to do so in 2:13ff.155 The link with verse 19, and the rhetorical purpose of the whole section, also undermine the claim that the forces need not be evil or hostile.156 Although each of the words has its own nuance, the author does not differentiate the spirits any further and so may not see them as three distinct groups; he probably uses the threefold designation as a comprehensive term for all such hostile powers.157

The whole phrase is a genitive absolute construction employing a passive participle. This indicates that Christ is not the (ultimate) agent of the subordination, and the participle should probably be understood as a "divine passive" in which God is the subordinating agent;158 this interpretation also fits with Psalm 8, in which it is YHWH who puts all things under the feet of human beings.

The occasion of the subordination is most naturally taken as the heavenly journey of Christ mentioned in the previous phrase. The author appears to be working with the Jewish tradition of tiered heavens; Christ has ascended through the lower heavens, which are the realm of supernatural powers in enmity to God, in order to reach the highest heaven, the dwelling-place of God. That is to say, he has visited the realm of the *ἀγγελοι καὶ ἐξουσίαι καὶ δύναμεις*, where these forces were subordinated to him, on the way to his position of divine authority.159

This understanding is supported by its close correspondence with the interpretation of verse 19 proposed above. It means that the participle *πορευθεὶς* refers to the same event in both verses: it is in his ascension that Christ proclaimed and effected the final defeat of the imprisoned spirits; and in that announcement which has the force of a performative royal proclamation—God has also brought all other hostile spiritual forces into subjection under Christ's control.160

The above studies on the meaning of subordination in 2:13,18; 3:1,5; 5:5 suggest that when *ὑποτάσσω* appears in sections of exhortation and in the middle or passive voice, it enjoins the readers to recognize the divinely given order and voluntarily to subordinate themselves to their superiors within it. But in 3:22, in a didactic section with God as the implied subject of the passive participle, the term denotes the involuntary subordination of the hostile spiritual forces to Christ.161

This means that through Christ's heavenly journey and his proclamation of victory, the *ἀγγελοι καὶ ἐξουσίαι καὶ δύναμεις* have been forcibly returned to their places within the divine order, so as to be in subjection to Christ as God's vicegerent. This subordination is not deferred until his final revelation; it is an accomplished fact that follows inevitably from his triumph over the forces of cosmic disorder in his suffering and resurrection.162 It also does not point to the redemption of the powers;163 the construction *ὑποταγέντων* not only implies involuntary subordination, but may also connote a subjection to be followed by their eventual destruction.164

This interpretation of 3:22 is further confirmed by the rhetorical intention of 3:18–22 as outlined above. The resurrection and exaltation of Christ have restored the cosmic order; in these events he has triumphed over the evil spiritual forces opposed to God and broken their power. The subordination of those forces to Christ entails that they now operate only by his permission and in subservience to his saving purpose.165 In the present the struggle continues between God's people (2:10) and their persecutors, who are agents of the cosmic forces (5:8–9), but its outcome is already determined; the victory won by Christ will be shared by his followers when he is revealed (4:12–19).166 Just as he has suffered unjustly and then been exalted, so also the suffering Christians will be exalted in the future; in baptism their destiny has been joined to his.167 His subordination of the hostile spirits thus guarantees the salvation of his people and encourages them to stand firm in the face of hostility.168

So this passage describes the subordination to Christ of the evil cosmic powers that are opposed to God and ultimately responsible for the readers' trials. This event has taken place as the climax of Christ's saving work, on the occasion and as a means of his exaltation to the place of divine and universal authority, when he passed through the realm of the imprisoned spirits of Noah's time and proclaimed his victory to them. It involved God's forcibly bringing all hostile spiritual powers under Christ's dominion and thereby restoring the cosmic order. Its effect is to make certain the ultimate salvation of Christians; thus it provides a basis for their persevering in doing good.

## **Implications**

The investigation of these texts confirms the provisional conclusion of Chapter 5 that the author requires subordination to one's superiors within hierarchical and authoritative structures. This includes that of slaves to masters, wives to husbands, and "younger" or junior church members to "elder" household heads who exercise leadership in the Christian community because of their position. In all these contexts it appears to involve the recognition of others' higher status and the deference and obedience due to it (obedience is explicitly included in 3:6), and is therefore one-sided; thus it is different from honor, which may be given from superiors to inferiors, and from humility, which is a mutual obligation. The motivations to which the author appeals in exhorting his readers suggest that as with the subordinate structure of the *πόλις* in 2:13–17, he sees that of the *οἶκος* as ordained by God; indeed, 5:1–5 indicates that he has even assumed it into the ecclesial relationships of the divinely ordained household (*οἶκος*) of God.169

The subordination is required because of the superiors' position within the divine order, not because of their individual qualities. The author acknowledges (explicitly) that some masters may be harsh and (implicitly) that some husbands may be intimidating, and the instructions to elders in 5:2–4 suggest at least that some may lead with the wrong motives. Thus the normative status of the hierarchical order exists independently of the character of any individual within it.

It is widely acknowledged that the subordination required in these passages has apologetic, missionary and pastoral purposes. Respect for the superior position of masters and husbands is clearly intended to reduce hostility, not only to slaves and wives but to the Christian community as a whole, and not only within the home but within society generally; at least in the case of husbands, this process may extend even to their conversion. And the submission of the *νεώτεροι* will also promote the unity and cohesion of the Christian communities and enable them to stand firm in the face of persecution. Some scholars therefore see these calls to subordination as a purely pragmatic device for the purpose of community self-preservation and growth.170

However, such a view fails to take sufficient account of the extensive evidence from the passages that the author also regards these forms of subordination as a divine imperative. Whether in the various words and phrases employed, or in the appeal to Christ's sufferings and the examples of OT women, or in the defining of submission in terms of qualities pleasing to God, or in the grounding of the role of elders on Christian norms, he indicates that subordination is something required by God as well as by society. And while these factors in principle also relativise his calls for subordination to human authorities, such qualifications are only implicit at most.171 He appears to assume a close correlation between God's will and what society approves, according to its best norms guaranteed by the established structures; this is confirmed by his repeated use of *ἀγαθοποιέω* (2:20; 3:6) and his employment of the *Haustafel* form (see above, Chapter 5). Therefore there will usually be no conflict between the demands of God and those of one's superiors, such that insubordination to the latter, even if sometimes necessary, will be exceptional.

Undoubtedly the wider content of the author's exhortations require their outworking in a distinctively Christian way:172 the address to slaves and wives as fully responsible people, the wives' status as joint-heirs of the grace of life, the duties laid on husbands and elders, and the call to mutual humility. But these elements only condition the hierarchical relationships that he commends; they do not undermine them.173 Any elements of equality co-exist alongside a continuing subordination of inferiors to superiors as something expected by God.

Alongside these similar uses of *ὑποτάσσω* (and *ὑπακούω*), the statement in 3:22 of the subordination of the hostile cosmic powers to Christ stands somewhat apart. Not only is its immediate context non-parenetic; it also relates to heavenly rather than earthly agents, and to involuntary rather than voluntary subjection. Unlike the other passages, moreover, it is intended to provide reassurance to the readers that the evil forces that drive their persecutors have been defeated and that their final salvation is therefore secure.

But the common language of subordination and its underlying conceptuality of order strongly suggest that this passage should not be seen in isolation from those (including 2:13–17) that require the subordination of the readers to their political and social superiors. Christ's subjection of the evil cosmic forces has restored the God-given order, and since God's people are called to reflect and embody that order, not least in their internal and external relationships (see above, Chapters 4 and 5), the author's commands to be subordinate are most naturally understood as a means to this end.

This conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of 3:(18–)22, which is to support the preceding exhortation (3:13–17) to persevere in doing good (*ἀγαθοποιέω*); in 2:13–15 this has been shown to include the practice of subordination. That is to say, the subordination of the heavenly powers to Christ demands that of the readers to their political, social and ecclesial superiors. By taking their appropriately inferior places (subjects to rulers, slaves to masters, wives to husbands, "younger" to elders) within the structures of the state, the household and the Christian community, the readers also take their proper subordinate place below Christ in his position of divine authority within the restored cosmic order.174 Thus all the instances of *ὑποτάσσω* in 1 Peter are united by the theme of the restoration and maintenance of God-given and authoritative order.

Chapter 7 will complete the exegesis of key passages in 1 Peter by considering those—apart from 2:13–17—that relate to the concept of freedom.

## **Notes**

common to slaves *and* those common to Christians, the Christian slaves would also have struggled severely with the incompatibility of these two statuses. "Il s'agit bien d'un conflit qui comporte le risqué de perdre la foi, ou bien en se conformant à l'environnement paien, ou bien en le fuyant et en s'enfermant dans un monde sectaire."

(Harrisburg, PN: Trinity Press International, 1998), 282, 285; D. G. Horrell, *1 Peter* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2008), 81–82; Horrell, "Conformity," 230.

35 BDAG, 220.

#### 196 | *Restored Order*

simpler view (F. J. van Rensburg, "Sarah's Submissiveness to Abraham: A Sociohistoric Interpretation of the Exhortation to Wives in 1 Peter 3:5–6 to Take Sarah as Example of Submissiveness," *Hervormde Teologiese Studies* 60, no. 1–2 [2004]: 252, 257) may be right: that the author has simply ignored the wider context of Gn 18:12 and focused on the one word (so also Campbell, *Rhetoric*, 158–59). Donelson (2010, 92) argues that Sarah's calling Abraham "lord" in this verse may connote her hiding her true self and laughing, but this appears an unlikely allusion in light of 1 Peter's concern to encourage order and harmony in the household.

*1 Peter*, 288–89; Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 331. (For a more recent defense of this view, see Hillyer, *1 Peter*, 141.)

Tradition in 1 Peter 3–4," *New Testament Studies* 63 (2017): 566. Beasley-Murray's claim (G. R. Beasley-Murray, *Baptism in the New Testament* [Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997], 257–58) that the author is seeking to illustrate the universal scope of Christ's redemption and proclamation arguably puts the emphasis in the wrong place; the passage declares Christ's universal *victory*, in virtue of which he is able to save his people completely from cosmic powers that might otherwise control and harm them.

164; D. G. Horrell, " 'Already Dead' or 'Since Died'? Who are 'the Dead' and when was the Gospel Preached to Them?" in *Becoming Christian: Essays on 1 Peter and the Making of Christian Identity* (London and New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 74.

extremely awkward, and it disregards the probable link between Christ's heavenly journey and the subjugation of the forces; on this see further below.

may not be inferred from this that his demand for slaves to be subordinate confers a holy and unchangeable status on the institution. See further below, Chapter 8.

# **Freedom in Other 1 Peter Texts**

7

In Chapter 1 it was noted that the vocabulary and concept of freedom in 1 Peter are limited and secondary by comparison with those of subordination. The *ἐλευθερία* word-group appears only in 2:16 (cf. the six instances of *ὑποτάσσω*), which, although it significantly illuminates the author's understanding of freedom in the context of 2:13–17 (see above, Chapter 5), is a very small foundation on which to build a hypothesis. Moreover, while the idea of subordination is foundational to the author's parenesis and reflects his view of authoritative divine order, the reference to freedom in 2:16 appears merely to modify the first call to subordination in 2:13 and is not further developed in the immediate context.

There is however one other clear use of freedom-related language in the letter, namely the reference to redemption (*ἐλυτρώθητε*) in 1:18. Although the author elaborates on this only briefly, it further develops his idea of freedom and may clarify the meaning of 2:16. It also forms part of the first of the three "formulaic Christological statements"1 in the letter (1:18–21; 2:21–25; 3:18–22; see above, Chapter 6) that draw on traditional material to narrate and interpret the story of Jesus and so support the author's parenesis.2 There is reason to think that all these sections provide material from which the author's view of freedom can be constructed and inferred, and more specifically that certain verses from them (1:18–19; 2:24–25; 3:18,21–22) recount a single process that can properly be described as one of liberation.

This chapter offers an exegetical investigation of these verses in the context of the three christological texts, which is intended to define the contribution they make to the author's concept of freedom. As in the previous chapter, an introduction to each section is provided; this will not only outline its teaching but also demonstrate the similarities of content, function and form between the three passages that justify their being treated together. In each case there will follow a detailed discussion of the specified verses, illuminated as necessary by the wider passage; in explaining their message this will also establish the reasons for regarding them as varied descriptions of the same basic event. On the basis of these exegetical arguments, a concluding section will summarize the ways in which the texts fruitfully supplement and elucidate 2:16 as further expressions of the author's understanding of freedom.

## **1:18–21**

First Peter 1:18–21 is part of a longer section (1:13–21) that draws out the ethical implications of the author's preceding statements. In verses 3–12 he has described the Christian hope, and from verse 13 he calls on his readers to work this out in a transformed way of life. Thus where previously they have been at home with the passions that drive much of their society, they are now alienated from it (*παροικία*, v.17) by their conversion and must live in a different way (vv.13–14).3 Their lives must be characterized by a holiness (vv.15–16) and reverent fear (vv.17–21) that expresses proper obedience to God as his children.4

But this longer section does not consist solely of exhortation; the author also includes elements of proclamation, of which verses 18–21 are the prime example.5 This passage supports the preceding parenesis with reference to various elements of early christological confession—Christ's pre-existence, eschatological appearing, resurrection, exaltation, and especially his redeeming death6—and explains their salvific implications for the readers.

The statement is somewhat formalized and is widely believed to draw extensively on common Christian traditions, which are in turn partly dependent on OT language and concepts; the traditions may have formed part of basic Christian instruction for converts.7 But commentators appear generally less confident of the earlier view that the fragments belonged to fixed liturgical units, or at least that it is possible to reconstruct these with any confidence.8 The author's creative recasting and interweaving of diverse material here and elsewhere suggests that this passage (and 2:21–25 and 3:18–22) is best read as a unified whole.9

Verse 18 contains the freedom-related concept of ransom or redemption (*ἐλυτρώθητε*), and with verse 19 it describes the nature of the bondage from which, and the means by which, the readers have been liberated. Verses 20 and 21 then set this divine redemption in the wider context of the totality of God's action in Christ.

In line with the above comments, the opening perfect participle of verse 18, *εἰδότες*, is best understood causally, "because you know." The christological statements that follow, including those relating to the readers' redemption/liberation, provide the reason for the author's immediately preceding appeal (v.17), and perhaps for his whole exhortation from verse 13. Verses 18 and 19 fulfil this function by contrasting the readers' former life with the reverence and holiness to which they are now called, and by declaring their freedom from that life through Christ's death. The verb of knowing suggests that the content of these verses is familiar and uncontroversial to the readers and points to its grounding in pre-Petrine tradition.10

The aorist verb *ἐλυτρώθητε* should probably be taken as consummative, stressing the cessation of the action and implying its completion; the passive form has God as its implied subject.11 The word *λυτρόω* has a range of related meanings. In Greco-Roman literature it can be used for the ransom of prisoners of war, the freeing of indebted slaves, and the procedure of sacral manumission ("involving a fictive 'sale' to a deity, return of the price to the owner, and freedom for the slave").12 In the LXX it may denote the redeeming of property (Lv 25:26,33,48–49), payment for faults (Ex 21:30), the ransoming of the firstborn (Ex 13:12–13) and the atonement price (Ex 30:12–16);13 some of these uses may also be found in Philo and Josephus.14 In all these cases the redemption (and sometimes liberation) of the person or property is achieved by the payment of a price.15

However, the LXX also employs *λυτρόω* in a metaphorical sense, to refer to salvation from enemies, sin and death (Pss 106:2; 129:8; 33:23), and particularly for God's rescue of Israel from slavery in Egypt (e.g. Ex 6:6; Dt 8:8) and his promised deliverance of the people from exile in Babylon (e.g. Isa 45:13; 52:3).16 In these cases, where God is the actual or implied subject of the verb, the idea of a ransom-price is usually lost, and in Isaiah 52:3 the future redemption is specifically said *not* to involve the payment of a price: *ὅτι τάδε λέγει κύριος Δωρεὰν ἐπράθητε καὶ οὐ μετὰ ἀργυρίου λυτρωθήσεσθε*. 17 Verse 18 probably includes a deliberate allusion to this statement.

#### 208 | *Restored Order*

The verb *λυτρόω* appears in only two other places in the NT (Lk 24:21 and Ti 2:14), but its cognates and related concepts are often used metaphorically, and Christ's death is frequently presented as a means of redemption (e.g. Mk 10:45; Rom 3:24–25; Heb 9:12).18 This suggests that the author is drawing on a pre-existing Christian tradition, and that the most probable background for his use of *λυτρόω* is its metaphorical reference to the OT deliverance of Israel from restriction and confinement, and specifically from their Egyptian bondage and Babylonian captivity.19 The allusion to Isaiah 52:3 confirms this connection, through the association of this text with Israel's return from exile20 and its statement that the readers' redemption takes place without the payment of a monetary price,21 but also by its linking the divine act of liberation to the suffering of the Isaianic servant who dies on behalf of his people (Isa 53:4–12).22 The author thus combines in this verse the idea of his readers' freedom from an enslaved and imprisoned past23 with that of Christ's blood as a ransom-price paid to secure that freedom.24 The rest of verses 18 and 19 expands on these themes.

The prepositional phrase immediately following *ἐλυτρώθητε* indicates the nature of the imprisonment from which the readers have been separated (*ἐκ*) and thus freed by Christ: *ἐκ τῆς ματαίας ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς πατροπαραδότου* (v.18b). The noun *ἀναστροφή* is defined by BDAG as "conduct expressed according to certain principles *way of life, conduct, behavior*";25 it refers to the entire pattern of conduct associated with the readers' former ignorance (v.14), to the pagan lifestyle that stands in sharp contrast to the holiness and reverence for God that is now required of them.26

The first adjective used to describe this lifestyle, *μάταιος*, may have a particular reference to Greco-Roman religious traditions, specifically participation in the idolatrous pagan cults.27 As J.N.D. Kelly comments:

It is scornfully applied in the LXX to the gods of the heathen, in contrast to the one living and true God (e.g. Lev. xvii. 7; 2 Chron. xi. 15; Jer. viii. 19; x. 15), or else to those who have never known Him (e.g. Wis. xiii. I) or have apostatized from Him (e.g. Jer. ii. 5). NT usage is in line with this; cf. Acts xiv. 15; Rom. i. 21; viii. 20; I Cor. iii. 20; Eph. iv. 17 (the Gentiles walk "in the futility [*mataiotēs*] of their minds").28

If so, it suggests the uselessness and dishonorable nature of the pagan gods and their associated worship; these have no value for salvation (or anything else) and confer no hope on their devotees.29 But the possibility that the author is extending the Jewish language of anti-pagan critique to pre-Christian Jewish traditions should not be excluded.30

But if *μάταιος* is a negative term used by Jews and Christians in anti-pagan polemic, the second adjective qualifying *ἀναστροφή*, namely *πατροπαράδοτος*, is normally a positive term used by pagans for their own practices. The term is employed in Hellenistic rhetoric to denote what is traditional, venerable and trustworthy, reflecting the widespread conviction in the ancient world that a pattern of conduct handed down from one's ancestors is wise and right, and even binding on present and future generations. But 1 Peter redeploys the word in a negative sense; the author regards inherited "Greco-Roman paganism and its associated unethical practices"31 as futile and shameful, a lifestyle from which God has freed the readers through Christ.32

At the same time, the identification of this lifestyle as "the *whole* of behavior determined by their former cultural values,"33 or as "*high* hellenistic culture and its values,"34 is seriously misleading. Chapters 5 and 6 have provided reasons to think that the author sees a general congruence between Christian values and the *highest* norms of society, which are guaranteed by the structures of state and household.35 The latter must be carefully distinguished from the mores of pagan society at large, denoted in 1:14 by the phrase *ταῖς πρότερον ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ ὑμῶν ἐπιθυμίαις* and briefly described in 4:2–4 under the rubric of *ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμίαι*. In contrast these are wholly *in*consistent with Christian imperatives as well as fundamentally *dis*orderly, and—given the close connection of 1:14 and 1:18—it is they from which the readers have been liberated. (For further reflections on this critical distinction, see below, Chapter 8.)

The statement identifying the bondage from which the readers have been freed is enclosed by two instrumental dative phrases that indicate the means by which this freedom was achieved: *οὐ φθαρτοῖς, ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ* … *ἀλλὰ τιμίῳ αἵματι ὡς ἀμνοῦ ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου Χριστοῦ*. The author contrasts metals,36 which are material and transitory37 and so cannot produce permanent effects, with Christ's blood, which achieves a lasting deliverance for the readers and is therefore more valuable. Silver and gold may be regarded as precious, but they are defective and inferior relative to the blood of the flawless and faultless lamb.38 The purpose of the contrast is to highlight the value of the readers' liberation through Christ by underlining the price at which it was achieved, a price that by comparison renders the costliest metals of no worth.39

According to the OT, blood has atoning and salvific significance (e.g. Lv 4:25–26; 16:15–19; 17:11; Ezk 43:18–20), and this concept is applied by the author (and other NT writers) to Christ's suffering and death. In this context it probably stands for a purification offering that cleanses from sin,40 and specifically that sets the readers free from their sinful and idolatrous pagan lifestyle.41 Christ's blood has this effect (and is therefore precious) because of who he is, an unblemished and spotless lamb.42

In light of the clear allusion to Isaiah 52:3 in verse 18a, the mention of a lamb (*ἀμνóς*) is probably to be traced first to the following chapter of Isaiah and the suffering servant of YHWH, who is likened to a lamb (*ἀμνóς*) (Isa 53:7) and whose representative suffering makes his people righteous (Isa 53:11). The use in this passage of the language of the sin-offering (*περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, Isa. 53:10 LXX) and the Petrine author's choice of the adjective *ἄμωμος* (see below) suggest a further reference to the OT sacrificial system in which pure lambs were offered as purification for sin (Lv 4:32–35; 14:10–20; Nm 6:14).43

In view of the exodus imagery of redemption, many scholars also see here an allusion to the lamb of the Passover offering.44 But this is more debatable: van Unnik's point that the Passover lamb did not effect Israel's deliverance from Egypt is well made,45 and as Achtemeier adds, "The blood of the lamb had apotropaic rather than redemptive value."46 Moreover, the allusion of the redemption language in 1:18 is not necessarily confined to the exodus (see above). So while it may be hard to deny some reference to the Passover lamb in 1:19, it seems wise to conclude that it is neither exclusive nor primary.47

The purity of Christ is expressed in the two adjectives *ἄμωμος* and *ἄσπιλος*. The first of these is a cultic term associated with the flawless character of acceptable Israelite sacrifice, while the second (which is not used in cultic contexts) is a physical and then moral term denoting a faultless condition and character.48 Their complementary but distinctive meanings fit well with the suggested double allusion of *ἀμνός* to the pure sacrifice of the sin-offering and the innocent sufferer of Isaiah 52–53, both of whose deaths provide cleansing from sins. This reading of verse 19 as a whole also confirms the above interpretation of verse 18b as referring to the liberation of the readers from their sinful pagan lifestyle.49

In verses 20–21 the author further grounds his appeal to the readers in the wider act of God in Christ of which their redemption is part. Christ has had a predestined role in the divine plan from before creation (v.20a),50 and he has now appeared51 in the final period of history because of believers (vv.20b– 21a);52 the purpose of his disclosure is evidently their liberation through his blood described in verses 18–19. He has also been raised and exalted by God, so as to be a secure basis for their faith and hope in God (v.21b),53 by which that liberation is appropriated. Their life as God's people is thus to be determined by the story of Christ narrated in these verses, because the freedom on which that life is grounded is the fruit of God's primeval and eschatological purpose realized in him.54

So 1:18–21 can rightly be taken as a component part of the Petrine author's understanding of freedom. It declares that the readers have been decisively liberated from the bondage of their past through a ransom-price that was paid on their behalf. That past is defined as the useless and disreputable lifestyle inherited from their ancestors, of which pagan idolatry and its attendant sinfulness lie at the heart. That price is defined not in the monetary terms of precious metals, but as something so valuable that it renders even these of no worth: the blood of Christ, whose death as a flawless sacrificial lamb and as God's righteous servant purifies his people from their sins. The worth of their freedom is further underlined by its location within God's total purpose, fulfilled in Christ, from before creation to beyond consummation.

This passage thus supports the author's exhortation to reverence and holiness from his readers by a concise statement of the nature and value of the freedom that is theirs through Christ. That statement is further illuminated by the two parallel sections to be discussed below, but it is clear enough already that the author's understanding of freedom in these verses is essentially moral, involving deliverance from a sinful lifestyle governed by the futility of paganism; it neither requires nor involves any change in the readers' political or social circumstances. Moreover, the precious means and eternal context of divine redemption as described may well indicate that this is the author's *fundamental* conception of freedom, to which any other dimensions must inevitably be secondary.

## **2:21–25**

As discussed in Chapter 6, the second christological formula in 1 Peter is part of a longer section (2:18–25) that exhorts slaves to be subordinate to their masters, even in the face of harsh and unjust treatment at their hands. Verses 18–20 set out the principle and provide the first set of motives, which comprise fear and awareness of God and the desire for his favor. Then in verses 21–25 the author provides a further reason for subordination: God approves the slaves' (and other believers') acceptance of unjust suffering because it is part of their Christian calling, based on the exemplary and salvific55 suffering of Christ as the servant of YHWH described in the book of Isaiah, specifically 53:4–12.56

So like 1:18–21, 2:21–25 includes elements of christological confession and focuses on Christ's death, though in the context of his general sufferings rather than that of God's eternal purpose. Again, it highlights the saving consequences of these events for the readers, particularly in relation to sins, though it expounds these also in terms of righteousness, healing and turning to Christ rather than faith and hope. And it supports a preceding section of parenesis, though in this case by an appeal to Christ's example as well as to his saving work.

Again as with 1:18–21, it is no longer common for scholars to identify this section as a citation (or citations) from an established creed or hymn.57 But like its forerunner, the text is partly formalized (if only by the author), and there is widespread agreement that it incorporates traditional materials, of which the most obvious in this case are elements from Isaiah 53.58 The passage also displays knowledge of the passion story and its interpretation, specifically Jesus' character and actions as disclosed there; according to David Horrell, these provide "a character sketch and a concise Passion Narrative, both of which are expressed using a framework of phrases drawn from scripture."59 Thus the author articulates and "scripturalizes" this early Christian tradition in terms of the Isaianic servant to draw out its significance for the readers.60

Horrell's categories of character sketch and passion narrative helpfully highlight the dual appeal of this section, to Christ as both model and enabler for the prescribed conduct of the slaves, both the pattern and the basis for Christian living, and specifically to his sufferings as both exemplary and salvific.61 Within this appeal, verses 21–23 relate to Christ as example, and verses 24–25 to Christ as savior; the latter describe how his sufferings are effective for salvation. The various similarities with 1:18–21 raise the strong possibility that this passage too may shed light on the author's concept of freedom, though it is in its second section (which contains the closest parallels) that any teaching on this theme is most likely to be located. The following exegesis will therefore focus mainly on these two verses.

The conjunction *γὰρ* (v.21a) indicates that verses 21–25 are the basis for the preceding exhortation to the slaves to be subordinate. They are called to endure unjust suffering inflicted on them by harsh masters (*τοῦτο*; cp. v.20) because Christ also suffered for them.62 Some commentators claim that the phrase *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* identifies Christ's death as an atoning sacrifice;63 if so, this verse as well as verses 24–25 would bear directly on the theme of freedom. But given that the most probable reading of the preceding verb is *ἔπαθεν* rather than *ἀπέθανεν*, 64 others have argued persuasively that atonement should not be read into the passage at this point. It may be hard to exclude any representative sense65—that Christ suffered on behalf of the slaves (and all Christians)—but its significance here is that he therefore suffered unjustly, because of their sins rather than his own.66 It is because his circumstances resemble theirs in this respect that he is an example for them in their adversity.67

In any event, the significance of verses 21b–23 is explicitly exemplary: Christ is said to leave the readers an example (*ὑπογραμμὸν*) by his suffering so that they might endure it in the same way (*ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτοῦ*).68 The author draws on Isaiah 53:9 to demonstrate that Christ was innocent in both conduct and speech, so underlining that his suffering was undeserved.69 His consistent responses were not to repay reviling in kind and not to threaten divine vengeance for his suffering;70 instead he entrusted judgment71 to God, the just judge who guaranteed him vindication over his persecutors.72

The material in these verses is not obviously or directly connected to the author's concept of freedom. At the beginning of verse 24, however, he leaves behind his presentation of Christ as an example for the readers and begins to explain the salvific significance of Christ's suffering. His first move is to combine elements of Isaiah 53:4 LXX (*τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν*) and 53:12 LXX (*αὐτὸς* [*ἁμαρτίας πολλῶν*] *ἀνήνεγκεν*) to describe Jesus' representative act in terms of the Isaianic servant of God. The combination of these verses serves to personalize the quotation for the readers.73

The switch from second to first-person address74 in this verse has occasioned some comment. It has been suggested that the author is expanding his reference from the slaves to all believers75 or to everyone,76 or that he is including himself with the readers,77 or Jews with Gentiles.78 There may be no more reason for the change than the use of the first person in Isaiah 53,79 but the retention of this appears to express the author's belief that Christ's suffering is effective for all his people.

The statement *ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν* may be understood as cultic language, portraying Christ as a sacrificial victim who acts on behalf of sinners, taking the consequences of their sins upon himself in suffering and death and thereby carrying those sins away.80 Thus his passion is both representative of and effective for others.81 This interpretation reflects the wider context of the Isaiah verses, in which the sacrificial language of sin-offering and purification are found (53:7,10–11).82 The reference in verse 22 to Christ's having committed no sin and spoken no deceit, although primarily exemplary, may also allude to his unblemished nature and consequent acceptability as a sacrifice.83

Christ's act of sin-bearing is qualified by two prepositional phrases: *ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ* and *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον*. Both of these recall the reference in Deuteronomy 21:23 to not leaving the body of an executed criminal on the tree overnight, and could thus be interpreted as connoting punishment and curse.84 But unlike Paul in Galatians 3:13–14, the Petrine author does not incorporate these concepts in any positive way into his understanding of Christ's death;85 he seems concerned only to show that this seemingly shameful episode was actually the means of salvation. So the first phrase underlines that Christ carried away the sins of others through his bodily suffering and death, thus reinforcing the Isaianic and sacrificial allusions of the main clause, and the second identifies that experience with his crucifixion.86

The purpose of Christ's bearing of our sins is then stated: *ἵνα ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν*. The participial phrase *ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι*87 is the clearest reference in the passage to the concept of freedom and explicitly articulates the idea of the carrying away of sins implicit in the preceding sacrificial imagery. The effect of Christ's death is to remove sins from the sinners so as to separate the one from the other.88 The remainder of verses 24–25 provides three reasons to think that this separation denotes cleansing from the power of sin rather than forgiveness of its guilt.

Firstly, the participle *ἀπογενόμενοι* is dependent on the verb in the following clause *τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν* and is most naturally taken as causal: because Christ's death has separated the readers from their sins, they may now live justly in accordance with God's will; that is, they are now free to live a new life dedicated to righteous conduct. In other words, the goal of Christ's suffering is that sinners might be freed to renounce wrongdoing and to do what is right instead.89 It is "freedom from the control of sin … resulting in the power of a transformed life,"90 or a righteousness that belongs "to the new life of freedom."91 This act of liberation, associated with the death of Christ, so closely resembles that described in different terms in 1:18–19 that they are most naturally seen as the same event.

Secondly, in the final part of verse 24 the author quotes again from Isaiah 53, this time from verse 5: *οὗ τῷ μώλωπι ἰάθητε*. He reverts here to the secondperson address of verses 18–21, perhaps in order to re-focus on the slaves whom he is particularly addressing;92 it is possible that his choice of this verse with its reference to a *μώλωψ* (a bruise or welt caused by blows or a whip) is intended to reflect their experience of beatings (v.20), and even to connect it to the whipping of Jesus.93 In any event, the purpose of the clause is apparently to restate the previous assertion in appropriate language drawn explicitly from Isaiah, where the sinless sin-bearer makes many righteous (53:11) by healing them.94 In the context of this verse the metaphor of healing probably refers to what Green calls "cleansing for holiness,"95 or restoration to the moral health of righteousness from the moral sickness of sins.96 It therefore serves as another appropriate description of the freedom bestowed on the readers through Christ's suffering and death.

And thirdly, in verse 25 the author indicates that the healing of the readers results from (*γὰρ*) their proper orientation to Christ. Their past estrangement from God is described using the imagery of straying sheep (*ἦτε* … *ὡς πρόβατα πλανώμενοι*), which is employed in Isaiah 53:6 directly after the statement that the servant's wounds effect healing.97 It implies a lack of proper direction or purpose, which in the Isaianic context must be taken as specifically moral.98 Opinions vary as to whether the construction is periphrastic or appositional, but either way the sense is much the same.99

But now the readers have been turned away100 from their unbelief and sin and towards *τὸν ποιμένα καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν*. 101 Most scholars identify this figure with Christ because of the messianic associations of the shepherd metaphor,102 though some include God within it.103 Among the various images connoted by the language, those of protective care and guiding oversight appear to be dominant.104 By his defense and leadership Christ prevents the readers from wandering again into evil and directs them into ways of righteousness; the adjectival phrase *τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν* probably denotes the whole person or life.105 That is to say, having turned to Christ the readers are now enabled by him to live out the new life of freedom that his death has secured for them.

In light of this evidence, most Petrine scholars have understood the process of separation from sin outlined in these verses as effecting freedom from the power of sin.106 It is therefore also reasonable to see it as equivalent to the readers' redemption from the realm of sinful conduct in which they were previously enslaved; that is, as the release from captivity to a sinful pagan lifestyle described in 1:18–19. Marie-Louise Lamau links the two passages accordingly:

Le verb *ἀπογίνομαι* utilisé par Pierre est un *hapax* biblique; il signifie la séparation, le départage .… Elle est l'expression la plus profonde de la libération acquise par le croyant, grâce 'au sang précieux de l'agneau sans reproche et sans tache, le Christ (1, 19).107

So there is good reason to believe that 2:24–25 attests to another part of the Petrine author's understanding of freedom; indeed, that it recounts the same process of liberation as that described in 1:18–19, albeit without using the freedom term *ἐλυτρώθητε*. This conclusion is grounded partly in the formal similarities between 1:18–21 and 2:21–25: their character as christological confession, their specifying of its salvific implications, their support for preceding ethical exhortation, and their formalizing of traditional material. But it is also based on the conceptuality of emancipation embedded in the argument of these two verses.

#### 216 | *Restored Order*

The author's language of representative sin-bearing drawn from Isaiah 53 presents Christ as a sacrificial sin-offering who purifies all his people by carrying their sins away through his suffering and death on the cross. By this means they have been separated from those sins, set free from their controlling power to live in a manner approved by God; they have been healed, liberated from the disease of sinfulness into moral well-being. They have entered into that freedom through their turning to Christ, their shepherd and overseer, whose protection and rule allows them to live in it.

Putting the two passages together, then, 2:24–25 can be seen as further explaining how the slaves addressed in this passage, and the readers generally (for whom their experience is paradigmatic), as part of God's total purpose, have been redeemed from their futile inherited paganism into obedience to God, through the ransom-price of the sanctifying blood of Christ, who is both atoning sacrifice and suffering servant, and are enabled to actualize that liberty by his care and supervision of them. In this context even 2:21–23 can perhaps have a related function, of defining certain elements of the life into which they are set free. But be that as it may, the passage confirms the view drawn from 1:18–21 that the author's basic understanding of freedom is moral, and independent of the readers' social and political conditions.

## **3:18–22**

An introduction to and initial exegesis of this passage have already been provided in Chapter 6, focusing mainly on the use of *ὑποτάσσω* in 3:22. This section recapitulates some general points from that discussion that are especially relevant to this one, while the following exegesis concentrates primarily on verses 18a and 21, with some further reference to verse 22.

The passage shares with 1:18–21 and 2:21–25 certain features of content, function and form. Like them, it is a christological formula focusing on various events in Christ's story, in this case his journey from the cross to heaven, in which he has triumphed over all hostile spiritual powers. Again, these events have salvific implications: by subordinating those forces to Christ, God has ensured his people's vindication after the trials that they must currently endure for his sake. And this eschatological section too serves to ground an exhortation (3:13–17), here to persevere through unjust suffering and persecution; because the readers' ultimate salvation is certain, they can stand firm in the face of pressure. (It is also the basis for a subsequent parenetic section in 4:1–6.)

Moreover, this passage too is widely regarded as a creative and partly formalized combination of Jewish and early Christian tradition. The author draws on Psalms 2, 8 and 110 from the LXX, on Jewish traditions regarding the flood, especially that of the imprisoned spirits found in the Enochic literature, and on common Christian teachings relating to Christ's death, resurrection and exaltation to the place of authority.108 Thus while these verses were also probably not a preformed unit, like the earlier passages they draw on traditional elements to recount and explain the key gospel events.109

These close resemblances between the three passages suggest that 3:18–22 may also shed light on the author's understanding of freedom. There are certainly some links between the description in these verses of Christ's salvific work and those in the earlier sections, where it was presented as emancipatory, even though the language of freedom does not appear (not even indirectly as in the use of *ἀπογενόμενοι* in 2:24). Verse 18a picks up the language of the sin offering and representative righteous sufferer from Isaiah 53 that is found in both 1:18–21 and 2:21–25. Verse 21, although it is complex and difficult to interpret, can be read as reflecting and expanding upon the conception of freedom implied by the first two passages by relating it to baptism, in which Christ's liberating work is appropriated by the believer. And the description of Christ's victory over the cosmic forces of evil in verse 22 and its implications for the readers may entail their liberation from the powers in some sense. The following exegesis will confirm these connections.

The opening *ὅτι* of verse 18a indicates that this section provides the reason for the exhortation in verses 13–17: the readers are not to fear their persecutors but to resist attempts to bully them into renouncing their faith, because of the work of Christ on their behalf.110 The conjunction *καὶ* suggests a comparison between the sufferings111 of Christ and those of believers who are ill-treated for doing good, which gives the verse an exemplary significance similar to that of 2:21.112 But here this must be seen as only a secondary theme, since the rest of the verse is focused on the uniqueness of Christ's afflictions.113

The statement that these sufferings are *ἅπαξ* underlines their completeness and sufficiency for their given purpose.114 They are also *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*, language that again recalls both the Isaianic servant (Isa 53:10) and the sin-offering that makes atonement for the people (Lv 5:6).115 A further Isaianic reference is found in the phrase *δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων* (Isa 53:11–12), which points once more to the representative significance of Christ's work; he is the innocent servant who suffers on behalf of the sinful (a group that included the readers in their pre-Christian state).116 Verse 18a is therefore a restatement and elaboration of both 2:21 and 2:24a and refers to the same liberating event.117

The purpose of Christ's sufferings was *ἵνα ὑμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ θεῷ*. The verb *προσάγω* suggests a reference to the bringing of the readers before God's throne in glory; this interpretation also reflects the language of verse 22, where Christ is said to have gone into heaven and to be beside God.118 If this is correct, then the clause denotes the readers' final salvation, when they will fully share in Christ's victory over the cosmic powers and their own persecutors; it refers to their future journey to heaven, following Christ.119 It will be shown below that this reading also fits well within the passage as a whole.

It was argued in Chapter 6 that verses 18b–20 refer to Christ's proclamation, in his resurrected state, to the rebellious angels from Noah's time. In light of verse 22, this was held to have taken place during Christ's exaltation to heaven and to have comprised the announcement of his victory over all hostile cosmic powers. The placing of the spirits' disobedience in Noah's time (verse 20) allows the author to posit a typological relationship between various elements of the flood story and the readers' experience of salvation in Christ. For example, it implies that in each case divine judgment threatens, God waits patiently, but only a few people are saved. The most detailed parallel, however, is drawn between the waters of the flood and the water of baptism, and this is worked out in verse 21.

The syntax of the first part of this verse, *ὃ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σῴζει βάπτισμα,* is particularly awkward and has generated numerous alternative readings.120 Constraints of space forbid a detailed consideration of the options. The interpretation followed here is that of Achtemeier, which not only appears textually and grammatically sound, but which also generates a coherent meaning for the statement.

This verse is joined to its predecessor by the relative pronoun *ὃ*, which, together with *ἀντίτυπον* ("antitype") and *βάπτισμα* ("baptism") serve as a compound subject of the verb *σῴζει*. It is the interrelationship of the pronoun and the two nouns that constitutes the syntactic problem of the first phrase of the verse. If, as seems likely, the relative pronoun is the subject of the verb, then the two remaining nouns stand in apposition to it.121

Thus the basic sense of the syntax is that "as Noah and his family were saved through water, so Christians are saved through the water of baptism,"122 that baptism being related to the flood waters as an antitype (see further below).

Two significant objections to this line of interpretation have been voiced by Elliott and Pierce.123 The first, that the uncertain relation of the two nouns *ἀντίτυπον* and *βάπτισμα* necessitates the addition in translation of a linking term (such as "as") that is not in the text, is not compelling, since an epexegetical relationship between substantives is also acceptably translated "which is" or "namely."124 More serious is Elliott's claim "that this construction of a relative pronoun with an epexegetic substantive introducing a new idea has no Greek precedent"; but this may be countered by appeal to the entire statement's acknowledged straining of the normal rules of syntax. In any case, the counterinterpretation of Elliott and Pierce requires recourse to a textual amendment (of the nominative pronoun *ὃ* to the dative *ᾧ*) that has minimal manuscript support. Nevertheless, their taking of *ἀντίτυπον* as an adjective qualifying *βάπτισμα* renders much the same sense as Achtemeier's reading.125

There is also some disagreement over the antecedent of the relative pronoun *ὃ* with which the verse begins. Its agreement with the neuter *ὕδατος* at the end of verse 20, and the obvious connection of water with baptism, persuade many commentators that this noun is the antecedent.126 Others, perhaps concerned not to have the author ascribe salvific efficacy to water, have argued that the antecedent is the whole event of salvation through water mentioned in the previous statement.127 But the concern is probably misplaced given the appositional relation of *ὃ* to *βάπτισμα*; if the antecedent of *ὃ* is *ὕδατος*, this is a synecdoche standing for the *event* of baptism, and it is to this, not to the water in itself, that the author attributes salvation.

Another objection to this view is that water cannot be viewed as the means of salvation in verse 21 since *δι' ὕδατος* in verse 20 is locative and not instrumental; in other words, Noah and his family were saved *through* the flood waters in a spatial sense, not *by* them in an instrumental sense.128 But this presupposes that the author sees Noah as being saved from the flood, whereas the context of the verse, and particularly its relationship to verse 21, suggest that he has in view the salvation of Noah from his sinful world, in which case *δι' ὕδατος* is properly taken as instrumental.129

The term *ἀντίτυπον* is drawn from the language of typology, which presupposes that there is a correspondence or continuity in God's dealings, and that OT phenomena and events are therefore models or counterparts of NT ones.130 It can refer to an inferior copy of an original (as in its other NT usage in Heb 9:24),131 but it may also denote a fuller reality foreshadowed by something in the past.132 The second sense appears more likely in this context: the author is establishing a correlation between the past (*ποτε*) salvation of Noah and his family through water and the present (*νῦν*) salvation of believers through baptism, and the former is the lesser (proto)type that points to the latter as "antitype."133

This technical discussion suggests that the author probably intends to make a connection between the nature of salvation in the two events as well as the means by which it was effected. As Noah was delivered from his sinful world, so Christians are delivered from theirs; their baptism guarantees their ultimate salvation from affliction and oppression at the hands of their opponents, both cosmic and human, when Christ is revealed.134

Given that this salvation is achieved through new birth (1:3–5; 2:2), and that both new birth and baptism are said to be empowered by the resurrection of Christ, it seems likely that the two events are connected as result and means.135 And since new birth is supposed to generate a transformed lifestyle (1:13–17,22– 25), the author probably also sees baptism as the event in which the liberation described in 1:18–19 and 2:24–25 is made effective: it accomplishes the believers' freedom in the present from their futile and inherited pagan lifestyle, their separation from the governing power of their sins into a new life of righteousness under Christ's lordship.136

This tentative conclusion finds further support in the next part of 3:21, which describes, by means of two appositional phrases, how baptism carries out its salvific (and liberating) function. The first statement is negative: *οὐ σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις ῥύπου*. The basic idea here is that baptism is not an external cleansing of the body as distinct from an internal change.137 This point might seem too obvious, but the reference may well be to Jewish and pagan ritual acts of cleansing, and be intended to distinguish these from the moral purification and liberation effected in baptism.138

The author then describes baptism positively as *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς θεόν*. This phrase presents two exegetical difficulties, of which the first is the meaning of *ἐπερώτημα*. The word-group originally referred to an enquiry, and then to a request or appeal, and some commentators argue that it should be taken in this sense here, as an appeal for (or from; see below) a good conscience.139 But its use as a technical term in later contracts, to refer not only to the contractual question but to the transaction as a whole, convinces many that its meaning here is "pledge."140 France and Elliott offer the weightiest argument for the second view: that the identification of baptism as an appeal or petition to God is unparalleled in the NT or the early church, whereas it was seen as a pledge at an early stage, and possibly even in the NT (Rom 10:9; 1 Tm 6:12).141

The second exegetical question presented by this phrase is whether *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς* should be taken as a subjective or an objective genitive. The noun *συνείδησις*

does not refer merely to conscience as a moral compass,142 but (in Achtemeier's words) to "a good and loyal attitude of mind that eventuates in sound behavior … a consciousness of what God wants that will lead one to do it."143 While some commentators claim that the pledge (or appeal) is made by or out of a good attitude of this kind (subjective genitive),144 it is more commonly seen as made for or to the end of a good consciousness (objective genitive).145 The fact that baptism is characteristically prospective rather than retrospective is a strong argument for this latter view; the pledge looks forward to a particular kind of life rather than being based upon it.146 The words *εἰς θεόν* indicate that the pledge is made to God.147 The whole phrase may therefore be rendered, with Dalton, as something like "a pledge made to God to maintain a right attitude,"148 which generates an appropriate lifestyle.

Finally, the author adds an adverbial prepositional phrase asserting that the saving power of baptism comes *δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Although some commentators suggest that it unites believers with the risen Christ,149 this Pauline idea is not obviously present in 1 Peter. However, it is clearly the resurrection power of Christ that enables believers to fulfil their pledge made in baptism; and it probably does so by mediating through the rite the rebirth mentioned in 1:3,23 and the consequent freedom from the power of sin.150 Salvation may be through baptism, understood as a human pledge of a good consciousness, but it is still an emancipatory act of God through the resurrection of Christ.151 Or to put the same point differently, "the event of Christ's resurrection is present and active in the rite of baptism."152

Seen in the light of this reading of the passage, the concluding statement in verse 22 of Christ's subordination of the evil cosmic forces (see above, Chapter 6) further attests to, and expands upon, the liberation of the readers. Since the author sees these powers as lying behind the persecution that the Christians are enduring,153 he must also regard the former as the inspiration of the latter's previous sinful lifestyle. It follows that the readers' liberation from that lifestyle, by the power of Christ's resurrection effective through their (new birth in) baptism, includes freedom from the moral control of the powers that determine it. Christ's dominion in the heavenly sphere entails that the powers are now incapable of preventing those who pledge themselves to maintain a right consciousness of God from successfully renouncing their former ways and living in obedience to God's commands.154

Any interpretation of a passage so full of exegetical problems must properly be cautious. But according to the above reading, the text may most plausibly be read as a guarantee of the readers' eschatological vindication and triumph over their cosmic and human enemies (which 1 Peter denotes by the verb *σῴζω* in 3:21). This assurance is threefold: firstly, Christ's suffering as the innocent Isaianic servant and sufficient sin-offering, on behalf of the sinful, to make atonement for them (v.18a); secondly, the readers' baptism, not as a mere ritual cleansing but as a pledge to maintain a proper consciousness of God's will, by which they access Christ's resurrection power to fulfil it (vv.20b–21); and thirdly, Christ's own exaltation to heaven, in which he proclaims his victory to evil cosmic powers and God thus subordinates them to him, so freeing the readers from their moral control (vv. 18b–20a,22).

If this interpretation is at least on the right lines, then this passage both confirms and expands upon the author's understanding of freedom articulated in 1:18–21 and 2:21–25. The atoning suffering of Christ (v.18a) and the baptism of the readers (v.21) may be seen as respectively the basis and the instrument of both their redemption from their futile inherited lifestyle (1:18–19) and their separation from sins to live for righteousness, their moral healing to live under Christ (2:24–25). That freedom is further articulated here in terms of God's subordination to Christ of the cosmic powers that determined their former existence, but which are now no longer able to control their behavior (v.22). There is therefore good reason to think that this text recounts the same liberating event as do the other two, albeit in different language and with some different emphases. And like them, it contains no references, explicit or implicit, to freedom from political or social authorities.

## **Implications**

The three passages considered above have been shown to possess various common features of content, function and form. Between them they include all the key elements of Christ's work; they spell out the salvific significance of these events for the readers; and they support the parenesis that immediately precedes (or follows) them (1:13–17; 2:18–20; 3:13–17; also 4:1–6). Moreover, they are all fairly formalized (though probably not preformed) christological statements, and they draw extensively on early Christian traditions. It is very likely that three such similar passages have some major themes in common.

The first passage, 1:18–21, includes the only unambiguous use of freedom language in the letter apart from 2:16: *ἐλυτρώθητε* in 1:18. With 1:19, this verse describes the freeing of the readers, through Christ's death, from a previous way of life controlled by sin. The second text, 2:21–25, while using different terms, evidently describes the same liberating event, which here includes the readers' separation or healing from sins to live in a way pleasing to God and obedient to Christ (2:24–25). In the third section, 3:18–22, the idea of freedom is only implicit, but it may reasonably be inferred from the references to Christ's atoning death (3:18a), the saving efficacy of baptism (3:21), and the subordination of the cosmic powers to Christ (3:22). These close conceptual affinities, conjoined with the common features listed above, strongly suggest that all three passages reflect elements of the author's understanding of the freedom identified in 1:18.

In view of the different interpretations of the *ἐλευθερία* language in 2:16 (see above, Chapter 5), the most significant point to be drawn from this investigation is that the freedom described in these sections is entirely moral. It is freedom from a worthless inherited way of life (1:18), from sins and their attendant moral sickness (2:24), and from the control of evil cosmic powers (3:22); it is freedom for righteousness (2:24), for life under Christ's leadership (2:25), and for the maintaining of a proper consciousness of God (3:21). This understanding fits well with the apparent purpose of 2:16, to encourage the readers to resist their disorderly impulses and to render obedience to God by subordinating themselves within divinely created structures.

There is also evidence in these texts that the author regards this moral liberation as fundamental to his view of freedom. Firstly, he grounds it explicitly in the gospel events recounted in christological confessions: the suffering and death of Christ (1:19; 2:21,23–24; 3:18) and his resurrection and exaltation (e.g. 1:21; 3:18–19,21–22). Secondly, he sets it in the wider context of God's primordial and eschatological purpose expressed in the predestination and exaltation of Christ (1:20–21). And thirdly, he appears to see it as a precondition and means of the readers' ultimate salvation, their exaltation to God's presence (3:18,21–22). Any other concept of freedom found in the letter is therefore likely to be secondary to this one.

However, the moral freedom articulated in these passages is clearly independent of the readers' outward circumstances and needs no specific social or political conditions for its fulfilment.155 And the only sense in which it can be seen as liberating Christians from those in authority, in the state or the household, is by enabling them to resist demands to do what they should not (demands that the author in any case appears to regard as exceptional; see above, Chapters 5 and 6). There is no suggestion in any of these texts (or anywhere, including 2:16) that the readers are free from obligation to the authorities as such, or of any political or social dimension to freedom that would justify reading the words *ἐλεύθεροι* and *ἐλευθερία* accordingly.

#### 224 | *Restored Order*

Of course the other freedom texts do not prove conclusively that the *ἐλευθερία* word-group *cannot* bear a political meaning in that one verse. But they do show that there is no reason outside 2:13–17 to interpret it in this way, and that to do so leaves it as a loose end, unrelated to all the other freedom conceptuality in the letter. This is a further argument for understanding it in a moral rather than a political sense.

This chapter completes the exegetical section of the work. Chapter 8 will bring together the conceptual and exegetical material and draw some conclusions about the meaning, interrelationship and significance of subordination and freedom in 1 Peter.

## **Notes**

of price as part of a broader instrumental meaning. The use of sacrificial language in verse 19 (see below) tends to confirm this interpretation.

also L. Morris, *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross*, 3rd ed. (London: Tyndale Press, 1965), 39–40.

#### 228 | *Restored Order*

25. "Redemptive" is avoided here so as not to beg the question, in advance of the exegesis, of whether and how far this passage relates to freedom. The use of "salvific" and its cognates should also not be taken as a prejudgment of the relationship between 2:24–25 and 3:18a,21–22, especially the verb *σῴζω* in 3:21 (see further below).

and nowhere in the NT is the cross presented as one (Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 202; Elliott, *1 Peter*, 532).

underlying ideas are certainly similar, the Petrine metaphor is different and should not be absorbed into its Pauline counterpart.

has not won general support: the key terms are used for this rite nowhere else, and the author shows no other interest in contrasting Jewish and Christian practice. See Elliott, *1 Peter*, 678–79.

## **Synthesis and Conclusions**

The first main section of this work (Chapters 2–4) examined the concepts of subordination and freedom in the Greco-Roman, early Jewish and early Christian thought of the first century CE, in conjunction with the related topic of order. Their use by the author of 1 Peter must be intelligible against this background and represent a restatement, development or critique of its component parts. The second section (Chapters 5–7) provided detailed exegesis of the texts from the letter that address these two themes most explicitly, again with some reference to that of order, to sketch a provisional view of the author's usage. This final chapter synthesizes the external and internal evidence and draws conclusions regarding the conceptuality of subordination and freedom expressed by the letter.

The synthesis will be set out in three sections below, one for each of the three concepts.1 Each of these relates the background materials to the exegesis, both to clarify the themes of subordination and freedom in 1 Peter and further to illuminate the relevant texts. A final section then summarizes the findings of the work regarding the meaning and interrelationship of the concepts and reflects briefly on their significance within the letter and the wider NT.

## **Order**

### *Cosmic Order*

The concept of order appears prominently in all three of the intellectual traditions that shape the thought-world of 1 Peter. Although it is most explicitly and systematically developed in Greco-Roman writings, early Jews and Christians also affirm or presuppose that the various elements of the cosmos are ordered both rationally and morally. Most Greco-Roman schools also relate this order to their ideas of the divine, and in Judaism and Christianity it is deemed to derive from, depend upon, and reflect the nature of God and/or Christ; it therefore bears divine authority.

It follows that this cosmic and divine order is held to have a normative status; it defines how the world ought to be as well as how it is. Moreover, in both Greco-Roman and Jewish schemas the divine and human realms correspond, such that the human task or calling is to conform to the order given by nature and g/God; this seems also to be assumed by early Christian authors. The work involves the shaping of one's own life in line with the existing order, and usually the preservation and (sometimes) advancement of that order in the world. The idea is expanded in various ways, but in early Judaism it is related especially to the particular responsibility of God's people Israel to live according to his law. Some Jewish sources also extend the task of promoting the order to heavenly powers; again, this idea is also implicit in some early Christian texts.

There are good reasons to suppose that the author of 1 Peter accepts this idea of cosmic order, in a Jewish and Christian form. Firstly, it is pervasive and largely uncontested in the first-century CE world: in Greco-Roman writings most of the principal schools affirm it strongly and none denies it, while for early Judaism and Christianity it is grounded in the Hebrew Bible, acknowledged in a wide range of literature, and (among Christians) related to the key themes of christology and soteriology.

Secondly, although in the absence of extended christological statements (which provide the context for most NT reflection on the theme) the author never explicitly articulates the notion of a divinely created order, at no point does he deny it, directly or indirectly. More significantly, his acceptance of the other elements of early Christian teaching on order strongly suggests that he simply assumes this one.2 This combination of external and internal evidence indicates that he believes in a rational and moral cosmic order, created and sustained by God and embodying his character, and therefore divinely normative, which human beings (especially God's people) and angelic powers are required to reflect and promote.3

#### *Disrupted Order*

In much Greco-Roman thought, however, the divine order is reflected only incompletely or imperfectly in nature, owing to limitations or failings in the cosmos or the gods. Early Jewish and Christian sources go further, claiming that the cosmic order has been disrupted by the wickedness of human beings and angelic powers who influence them. Since both are called to be agents of God's ordering rule on earth, their failure properly to reflect the divine order has made them into instruments of cosmic disturbance and futility instead. The existence of evil and unruly heavenly powers is sometimes ascribed, especially within the apocalyptic traditions, to a primeval angelic revolt supposedly described in Genesis 6; the fallen angels (or Watchers) are now imprisoned, but their offspring are still active in the world as evil spirits that cause disorder.

The subordinate gods who have been appointed by God to rule over the pagan nations are included by some early Jewish authors among the disruptive cosmic powers, along with the human kingdoms and authorities that are their earthly counterparts. But this connection is by no means universal in Judaism, and it is not found among authors whose views of pagan authority are generally positive. While the author of Revelation includes earthly authorities among the powers, nowhere else in early Christian writings are these associated so clearly or directly with unruly spiritual forces, and in some places (notably the deutero-Pauline Colossians and Ephesians) there appears to be no link at all. In fact, in early Christianity human rulers are mainly seen as agents of order, not disorder.

The author of 1 Peter evidently shares the widespread view of all the traditions that the cosmic order is currently deficient or defective, and the conviction of many early Jews and Christians that it has been dislocated by both human evil (such as that described in 4:2–4; cp. 2:11) and angelic rebellion in the time of Noah (3:19–20,22; cp. 5:8). This dual responsibility is further clarified in his implicit linking of the disruptive spirits with the persecution experienced by his readers at the hands of their pagan neighbors (by connecting 3:13–17 with 3:18– 22); again he endorses the Jewish and Christian view that sinful human beings live under the control of evil heavenly powers.

But 1 Peter never includes the heavenly rulers of the nations among these powers; on the contrary, the author's very positive attitude to Gentile government appears to align him with those Jewish authors who do *not* present these gods as

#### 238 | *Restored Order*

disruptive. And as in Colossians and Ephesians, the evil forces are never identified with human authorities either; there is no reason to think that the author sees them as more or other than supra-human spiritual powers. For him as for many early Christians, political and social structures as such are bulwarks *against* disorder, not complicit in it.

### *Restored Order*

The divine restoration of the cosmic order is both anticipated in early Judaism and affirmed in early Christianity. In the former, this involves the overcoming of all disorderly forces, both earthly and heavenly, and the liberation of Israel from their control. In the latter, it results from the exaltation of Christ to share God's reign, in which the unruly powers are subordinated to him and believers are liberated from slavery to sin. While some Christian authors place this subordination primarily in the future, Colossians and Ephesians portray it as a present reality, even if the powers continue to be active.

Various Petrine texts (e.g. 1:18–19; 2:24) indicate that the author shares this early Christian belief in Christ's defeat of the forces of disorder, but it is expressed most clearly and explicitly in 3:18–22. In his death, resurrection and ascension (3:18–19), Christ gains the victory over hostile spiritual powers: he proclaims his triumph to the disobedient spirits of Noah's time (3:19), and God subordinates all such authorities to him (3:22). As a result their destructive effects are undone among believers, who are liberated in baptism from their control and its attendant moral impurity (3:20–21). As in the two deutero-Pauline texts, the subjection of the powers has already taken place; conflict continues (5:8–9), but its outcome is already settled (4:12–19).

Thus it may safely be concluded on the basis of this passage that for the author of 1 Peter a "new order [is] established in the cosmos as a result of Christ's resurrection,"4 that in Christ's exaltation "heavenly order has been reestablished."5 This affirmation of restored order locates him firmly within both early Jewish and early Christian tradition on this subject, and it also serves as a basis for his practical exhortations, including those requiring subordination to political and social superiors.

## *Order among God's People*

In early Judaism, the liberating of God's people as part of the coming restoration of the divine order will enable them to fulfil their role as its guarantors and agents. And for some deutero-Pauline authors, the cosmos as re-ordered in Christ is currently manifested and accessed in the community of believers, including its relationships within itself and with outsiders.

First Peter also stands in this early Jewish and Christian tradition in presenting the Christian community as the place where the restored cosmic order is at present reflected and experienced. The extensive evidence for this claim includes the close connection of ecclesiology with christology (2:6–7), believers' corporate identity as a new temple (2:5) and therefore a microcosm of the cosmos, their status as God's people over whom he reigns (2:9–10; 4:17; 5:2),6 and their corresponding privileges and responsibilities (e.g. 1:2–3,13–16), not least their liberation from the powers and from sin.

The various parenetic sections of the deutero-Pauline letters that instantiate this view are naturally understood as defining the conduct and relationships that belong to the restored order. The same is true for 1 Peter, and the author stands closest to 1 Timothy in his emphasis on the relations of believers with those outside the community,7 which underlines that the order is to be expressed in the political and social as well as the ecclesial spheres.

## **Subordination**

#### *State and Household*

Within Greco-Roman thought before and in the first century CE the *πόλις* and the *οἶκος* are widely regarded as microcosms of the divinely structured and normative cosmic order and are therefore supposed to embody it. Human responsibility for order thus includes the proper placing of individuals within god-ordained civic and domestic relationships. These ideas are often expressed within the civic *τόπος* of *περὶ πολιτείας* and the parallel Aristotelian *περὶ οἰκονομίας* tradition of household management.

The *περὶ οἰκονομίας τόπος* is also found in early Judaism, and although most Jewish authors have a less articulated theory of state and household, their frequent appeals to divine motivations for subordination to political and social superiors confirm that they too generally see these as bearing divine authority. Several NT texts affirm that government is established by God, and this principle may be extended by implication to the household; again, divine motives for submission are often cited in both contexts. Moreover, the *Haustafel* form used in the deutero-Pauline writings is often believed to reflect the *περὶ οἰκονομίας* and *περὶ*

*πολιτείας* traditions, and effectively absorbs the order of the household and the state into the relationships of the church. It seems that for many early Christians the subordinate relationships within these established structures have a continuing role in the restored cosmic order.8

The Petrine author appears to accept not only the general conviction of the three traditions that civil and domestic authority is given by God (as evidenced by his repeated appeals to divine motives for subordination), but also the specific Greco-Roman understanding of state and household. By adopting the *Haustafel* form for his exhortations to subordination (2:13–3:7, perhaps also 5:1–5), he both implies that these structures are ordained by God as an integral part of the cosmic order and confirms "that the new life in Christ is to be lived within the framework of existing natural and social orders."9

The author's apparent acceptance of Greco-Roman views of state and household also sheds further light upon the exegesis of the difficult phrase *πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει* in 2:13. It was argued in Chapter 5 that the internal evidence of the text marginally favors a reference to human structures of authority set in place by God. This interpretation is rendered much more probable by the implications of the *Haustafel* form, which attributes a divinely normative status to particular structures and portrays them as part of the framework for relationships within the cosmic order. So the structural reading is better integrated than its alternatives with the conceptuality that underlies the passage and is to be preferred for this reason too.10

#### *Romans 13*

However, the idea that 1 Peter requires subordination to "created entities in accordance with the position that God has given them,"11 and in particular that "civil authority may be considered as instituted by God … the state is viewed as deriving from God's appointment,"12 is often dismissed by scholars because of perceived differences between Romans 13:1–7 and 1 Peter 2:13–17. As indicated in Chapter 4, these lead many to conclude that for the Petrine author political powers are not founded by God and do not bear divine authority, and that his motives for subordination are primarily functional rather than theological.

But in addition to the points already made, this study has provided three further reasons to suppose that the differences between these two passages are frequently overstated and misinterpreted. Firstly, the above investigation of Greco-Roman, Jewish and Christian backgrounds to 1 Peter uncovered few precedents in first-century CE thought for a merely functional interpretation of civic responsibility, and none at all for the placing of the state (or society) into a secular space unrelated to the divine. In any case, 1 Peter's calls for subordination are replete with divine and not merely pragmatic motivations (see below).

Secondly, it was argued in Chapter 4 that the literary relationship between Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 is not one of redaction, but the remodeling by the latter of a tradition to which the former was only one contributor. Thus their principal significance lies in their common features, and their differences are explicable by their respective historical contexts without appeal to different conceptions of the state or the basis of subordination to it. Thirdly, the drawing of this sharp distinction between the passages is at best an argument from silence, which is a weak basis for countering the positive arguments advanced above. And if the exegesis in Chapter 5 is correct, then the supposed Petrine silence is illusory anyway: like Paul's *ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις* … *ὑπὸ θεοῦ τεταγμέναι* (Rom 13:1), the phrase *πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει* refers to structures of authority ordained by God; and again, like Paul the author appeals to divine motivations for subordination alongside pragmatic ones. So in fact a comparison of 1 Peter 2:13–17 with Romans 13:1–7 reinforces rather than undermines the view that for the Petrine author the established political and social structures bear divine authority13 and provide part of the context for normative Christian living within the cosmic order as restored in Christ.14

### *Hierarchy*

It is further assumed in much Greco-Roman thought of the time that the state and the household embody inherently hierarchical relationships, requiring the submission within each of the ruled to the rulers. Subordination is therefore understood as the right placing of oneself in relation to one's superiors within these graded systems. This appears to be universally expected in early Judaism and early Christianity too.

The above exegesis of 1 Peter's subordination texts reveals that the author shares this general view; he requires his readers to take their inferior places below their superiors within the hierarchical structures of the state and the household. Thus they must all submit to the governing authorities (2:13b–14), slaves to masters (2:18), and wives to husbands (3:1,5). The call for subordination of *νεώτεροι* to *πρεσβύτεροι* (5:5) anticipates the Pastorals in its assumption of the *οἶκος* into even the ecclesial relationships of the household of God; subordination to leaders within the Christian community is to certain household heads who exercise that leadership in virtue of their position. When these exhortations are placed in the context of such established and graded relationships, interpretations of subordination (and the *ὑποτάσσω* word-group) in entirely non-hierarchical terms must be seen as highly implausible.15

Thus although "subordination" appears never to be formally defined in the literature of the time, in all three traditions it includes such responses as recognition of the authority of one's superiors and deference to their judgment. Despite the various suggestions to the contrary, there is also no good reason to exclude from it the idea of obedience; even in Colossians and Ephesians, where *ὑποτάσσω* is used for wives and *ὑπακούω* for slaves and children, the former probably highlights the different nature and context of obedience within marriage rather than allowing wives to dispense with it.

The Petrine author's understanding of subordination appears to include the standard elements of acknowledgment and deference within hierarchical relationships. Here, however, there should be no doubt that obedience is also part of it: the godly OT wives who are presented as examples of subordination (*ὑποτασσόμεναι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν*; 3:5) include Sarah, who obeyed (*ὑπήκουσεν*; 3:6) her husband Abraham. But subordination is not the same as either honor or humility, which are due to equals and inferiors as well as to superiors.

## *Equality*

In Greco-Roman, Jewish and most Christian writings subordination is entirely one-sided, reflecting its hierarchical nature. In Ephesians and 1 Clement, however, the authors call for mutual subordination within the Christian community, while at the same time continuing to require the usual one-sided kinds. It was argued in Chapter 4 that this idea reflects the new principle of the equality of believers in Christ, and that this conditions, but does not subvert or obliterate, the traditional hierarchical distinctions. The wider background confirms this conclusion.

In all three traditions, prescribed subordination is not always of exactly the same sort. It is often shaped by the character of specific relationships, and even the same kind of relationship may be configured in different ways or on different grounds. So expectations of subordination are sometimes flexible, according to (for example) the correlative responsibilities of superiors and even particular circumstances. These traditions thus provide a context in which hierarchy and subordination are normative but also conditioned by other factors.

In the same way, the equality of believers in Christ in early Christian thought co-exists with the hierarchies of state and household and becomes a mode for their expression. The deutero-Pauline codes in particular affirm and even reinforce patriarchal structures, but develop these with reference to the mutuality of Christian relationships. Conduct appropriate to the restored cosmic order contains egalitarian principles such as humility and service (designated by Ephesians and *1 Clement* as mutual subordination) and therefore involves responsibilities for superiors as well as inferiors. But it also includes hierarchical norms such as acknowledgment and compliance and therefore still requires the one-sided subordination of inferiors to superiors.

First Peter reflects its context in affirming both the requirement of subordination and its conditioning by Christian norms, and aligns itself with the deutero-Pauline configuring of hierarchy and equality. Thus the author elevates the status of wives and slaves by his direct address and particular statements to them (e.g. 2:18; 3:1), lays duties on husbands and elders (3:7; 5:2–3), and calls for honor for all and mutual humility (2:17; 5:5). But despite the transformative potential of these injunctions, they do not subvert the unequal character of the structures; rather they co-exist with the continuing and divinely normative subordination of inferiors to superiors.16

As was noted in Chapter 5, scholars who interpret *πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει* in 2:13a universally (as "every human being") sometimes draw a parallel between this passage and Ephesians 5. In that chapter general subordination to one another in v.21 is juxtaposed with specific submission of wives to husbands in v.22ff., just as in 1 Peter (on this view) general subordination to everyone in 2:13a leads straight into specific submission to rulers in 2:13b–14.17 And since the subordination in Ephesians 5:21 is mutual, this parallel might suggest that subordination in 2:13a should also be understood in egalitarian rather than, or as well as, hierarchical terms.

The parallel is imprecise, however. Most obviously, subordination to one another within the church is not the same as subordination to every human being, whether Christian or not. But more significantly, as argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the basic (participial) instruction *ὑποτασσόμενοι* in Ephesians 5:21 is followed by *both* egalitarian (*ἀλλήλοις ἐν φόβῳ Χριστοῦ*) *and* hierarchical (*αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ*) examples, while the examples of the foundational Petrine imperative *Ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει*, both in 2:13b–14, and elsewhere in the letter, are *all* hierarchical; every one is located in a traditionally unequal relationship. It follows that the subordination of v.13a is best understood as only hierarchical, not egalitarian. (In Chapter 5 this was also a primary argument for the structural reading of *πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει*.)

#### 244 | *Restored Order*

This difference suggests that 1 Peter moves beyond Ephesians to reflect the greater emphasis on hierarchy found in 1 Timothy. By *not* using the language of egalitarian (or mutual) subordination, the author emphasizes the one-sided character of the concept,18 and by more clearly designating the authoritative relationships of state and household as divine creations, he reinforces the claims of their superior partners to obedience. His expectation that the graded character of the divinely ordained household will be replicated within even the ecclesial relationships of the house of God confirms this conclusion (5:1–5).

#### *Status not Qualities*

In much Greco-Roman thought, the relative positions of individuals within the normative structures are supposed to be determined by nature. Authority in state and household should ideally be held by those who excel in reason and virtue. Although this principle is expressed less directly in early Judaism, rightful Jewish rulers are held to have qualities that entitle them to govern the people. In both traditions husbands and fathers are often assumed to be inherently superior to wives and children and therefore to have the right to their subordination.

Some philosophical schools theoretically affirm that all people are equal, and many Greco-Roman and Jewish authors acknowledge that sometimes those in authority are no better rationally or morally—and perhaps worse—than those whom they rule, while particular political systems may also be seen as defective. Yet it is striking how rarely these perspectives are allowed to subvert or even qualify the requirement of subordination; the mere holding of an inferior position in the order usually demands this response, even if the qualitative distinctions between rulers and ruled are minimized, compromised or eradicated.19 Similarly, in early Christian writings subordination is never said to be conditional on the qualities of rulers; it is due to them because of their status within the hierarchical structures.

First Peter is as clear as any contemporary document in its grounding the duty of subordination in the standing of superiors in the divinely given order rather than in their personal qualities. It indicates explicitly that some masters may treat their slaves harshly (2:18), implies that some husbands may intimidate their wives (3:6), suggests that some elders may exercise their oversight for the wrong reasons (5:2–4), and probably hints that the emperor may ask for responses due only to God (2:17); yet in every case it still requires their inferiors to be subordinate. For the author, as for most of his contemporaries, the normative status of the structures exists independently of the character of those who administer them; even when superiors fail as individuals to embody the norms of the cosmic order, the hierarchical relationships of state and household still do so (if only imperfectly) and must be honored accordingly.

#### *Dual Motivation*

Many in early Judaism have a negative view of pagan and irregular Jewish rule. For some of them (especially the militants), although they may frequently practice subordination to authority, this can scarcely be seen as more than a practical and prudential strategy. Pragmatic motives for subordination to superiors are also found in various early Christian sources, including the civil and household codes, where it is presented as a means of avoiding human hostility.

First Peter stands with these sources in directing its calls for subordination to apologetic, missional and pastoral purposes. By fulfilling the requirements of their political rulers, believers will provide no basis for charges of subversion or for conviction in the courts (2:15); submission to masters and husbands can also be expected to reduce hostility and may even lead to the latter's conversion (3:1–2); and deference to elders will keep the Christian communities united and cohesive in the face of persecution (cp. 5:1–5 with 4:12–19 and 5:6–11).

Yet in the Greco-Roman world of the first century CE, subordination is almost always regarded as normative because of its grounding in the divinely given natural order. Many Jews also see themselves as obliged by God to submit to their rulers in the state and the household, even to pagan or irregular Jewish authorities, and even when they regard these negatively. In any case, Jewish hostility to such regimes should not be overstated; especially in the Diaspora, pagan authority is also widely affirmed. And in early Christian writings subordination is never presented as *merely* pragmatic, but always as also a principled fulfilment of divine obligation.

The foregoing argument has demonstrated that the Petrine author shares this perspective. For him subordination is also a divine imperative, on the grounds that the hierarchical structures of state and household are God-given components of the normative and restored cosmic order.20 But even if this were not enough, the point could still be proved by his appeal to a remarkable list of divine motivations. This includes numerous words and phrases (*διὰ τὸν κύριον*, 2:13; *τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ*, 2:15; *ώς θεοῦ δοῦλοι*, 2:16; *ἐν [παντὶ] φόβῳ*, 2:18; 3:2; cp. 2:17; *χάρις [παρὰ θεῷ]*, 2:19,20; *διὰ συνείδησιν θεοῦ*, 2:19; *κλέος*, 2:20), his use of Christ's sufferings (2:21–23) and the lives of OT women (3:5–6) as examples, his defining of subordinate conduct in terms of qualities pleasing to God (3:1–4), and his basing the authority of elders on Christian principles (5:1–4).

Two further features of the text confirm this dual motivation for the author's calls to be subordinate. The first is his frequent use of the *ἀγαθοποιέω* word-group (2:14,15,20; 3:6,17; 4:19), which apparently refers to doing good according to both divine and human standards. The second is his employment of the *Haustafel* form, which in all its NT instances encourages both a pragmatic conformity to society's (highest) values and a principled recognition of divine authority.

So it is extremely implausible to regard subordination in 1 Peter as a merely pragmatic strategy.21 Not only must its theological and ethical motivations be recognized too; there is also no indication that these are secondary to the apologetic, missional and pastoral ones.22 Indeed, the seemingly absolute character of the former may suggest the reverse: that the beneficial practical results of subordination are a by-product of its grounding in divine authority.

### *Coincident Demands*

The normative character of subordination in Greco-Roman and (much) early Jewish thinking, and especially its dual motivation in much early Judaism and most of early Christianity, often reflect the belief that the values and demands of the divinely given order are usually coincident with those of political and social superiors. This view is less than universal: in addition to the widespread hatred in Judaism of pagan (and some Jewish) governors, some Christian writers—most obviously the author of Revelation—can also see them negatively. But in general the NT appears to evaluate the authorities positively, in a variety of texts and contexts, and most clearly in the deutero-Pauline codes.

Standing in this affirming tradition, the author of 1 Peter too sees a close correlation between the will of God and that of superiors within the authoritative structures. This is evidenced not only by the normative status and double motivation that he attaches to subordination, but also in his stated and implied view of the civil authorities: they are God's agent of punishment and praise (2:14) and can be expected usually to fulfil this function.23 Thus as Bo Reicke says, in 1 Peter "[B]lamelessness before God or Christ and people are intimately connected and are two sides of the same thing,"24 and again this principle is reflected most obviously in its civic and household code.

The widespread first-century CE conviction that the requirements of the cosmic order and g/God mostly coincide with those of superiors in state and household appears to be so much assumed as not usually to require explanation. But 1 Peter itself points to a justification for its positive view of the authorities that fits well not only with Greco-Roman, Jewish and wider Christian thought, but also with several other aspects of its own teaching on subordination.

#### *Distinction of Values*

The introductory verses to the Petrine code (2:11–12) necessitate a distinction between lower social values that the readers must repudiate (also described in 1:14,18 and 4:2–4) and higher ones that they are to exhibit (such as those in 3:1– 4);25 the latter are evidently held by the author to coincide with the will of God. This distinction reflects that frequently drawn by Greco-Roman authors between a life of reason and virtue that promotes stability and harmony in the community, and one driven by the baser human impulses that is socially disruptive; this appears to have been a basic feature of much political and social commentary in the ancient world.

Then by following these verses immediately with 2:13–3:7, the Petrine author appears to identify the authoritative structures of politics and society with the second, higher group of values. The hierarchies of state and household are given by God (2:13) to exemplify and secure these standards, against the evil and disorderly forces that embody the lower ones. This idea fits with elements of all three traditions: the Greco-Roman conviction that these structures embody (albeit imperfectly) the cosmic norms of reason and virtue; the belief in some sections of (especially Diaspora) Judaism that its norms largely coincide with the highest principles of Greco-Roman society, represented by civil rulers; and the general affirmation in early Christianity of a broad correspondence between the best values of that society, guaranteed by state and household, and the requirements of Christian living.

This distinction of values, and the ascribing of the higher form to the given structures, help to explain the dual motive for subordination: by submitting themselves to their superiors within these structures, Christians both generally align themselves with God's will and provide themselves with maximum protection against the evil designs of their pagan slanderers.26 Furthermore, it clarifies the reason why subordination is required even to rulers of bad character: as part of the divine order, the structures provide a mainly effective check on the evil dispositions of such people to make decrees that their inferiors should not obey, since the preservation and functioning of the state and household are dependent on their guaranteeing the best social norms, those that are consistent with the divine will.

Such an understanding of the authoritative structures is in any case required by the Petrine author's understanding of the vocation of the Christian community to reflect the cosmic order as restored in Christ. In this context it can be right for believers normally to be subordinate within the state and the household only if the latter are themselves instruments of that order and not of the disorder opposed to it, and not merely as an ideal but also in practice. They can fulfil this function only if they represent the higher and not the lower values of society.

All of this need not entail that 1 Peter adopts uncritically and entirely the contemporary Roman view of these structures. The author's implicit denial of divine honors to the emperor, noted above, indicates that he sees nothing sacrosanct or unalterable about the particular forms they have taken in his own time and place.27 Also the function he ascribes to governors in 2:14 is limited and by no means covers all the imperial government's claims for itself. And although he in no way denies the authority of political and social superiors, he does at least implicitly relativise it (see below).

Nor is the letter's view of the authorities so optimistic as to exclude the possibility of their being in some respects malicious, oppressive or persecuting. It is quite consistent with superiors' being of bad character themselves, or going beyond their responsibilities and making excessive demands, or imposing savage punishments on the rare occasions when Christians must withhold their subordination from them. Indeed, it has already been shown that the letter directly or indirectly acknowledges the potential failings of those in authority. But these are quite consistent with the author's claim that the requirements of God and those of one's superiors will generally coincide, and that subordination to the latter is therefore the norm.

First Peter's distinction between lower and higher values also has the potential to resolve some of the apparent tension between its apparent calls for both conformity and distinctiveness, which underlie the Balch-Elliott debate and its subsequent development. The author calls for *conformity* to the higher norms of society, represented and safeguarded by the authoritative structures (because these generally correspond with God's will); but he also requires *distinctiveness* from the lower norms expressed in the lives of his readers' pagan neighbors and persecutors (because these do not).28 The imperative of subordination is part of the former demand, but it also inevitably entails the latter.

#### *Relativized Authority*

Even while calling for subordination, all three traditions admit that it may sometimes be right to reject a superior's demand. In some Greco-Roman writings the claims of the cosmic order and of virtue are recognized as supreme, though the authors seldom explicitly encourage insubordination on this basis, confirming that they regard it as necessary only in exceptional circumstances. Early Judaism insists on the prior claims of the Jewish law, and principled dissent is more widely favored, though its incidence is infrequent, especially in the Diaspora. Early Christian authors also relativise and limit the demand for subordination under the supreme authority of God, but they too rarely do so directly, again suggesting that they do not expect many conflicts.

The Petrine author also appears to recognize that believers' ultimate loyalty to God takes precedence over the demands of human superiors. The divine motivations for subordination listed above may also be seen as relativizing the authority of political or domestic rulers; one cannot be subordinate to someone according to God's will if that person requires one to do something contrary to it. In such potential cases of conflict between the demands of superiors and those of God, the author would evidently expect his readers to obey God.

But the principle is never explicitly stated, and the oblique nature of these references suggests that it needs no emphasis, but rather is largely taken for granted by author and readers alike. At most they provide an obvious and secondary qualification of the imperative to be subordinate, which it is their primary purpose to *strengthen*. So while insubordination to human authority may occasionally be necessary, the author's reticence in emphasizing the principle, conjoined to the general congruence of divine and human demands, suggests that it will be exceptional at most.

Thus it should probably not be inferred from 1 Peter that its readers are facing a serious problem of pressure to participate in the imperial cult. If this were so, the imperative not to worship the emperor would naturally be explicit and primary, with any call to subordination (in other matters) only implied and secondary, but the author's emphasis is clearly the reverse. The juxtaposition of the last two imperatives in 2:17 may indeed be intended to indicate that the emperor should not be accorded fear (or worship), even if he asks for it, and the use of the adjective *ἀνθρώπινος* in 2:13 may make the same point incidentally by placing him in the human sphere. But in these verses the author's primary concern regarding the emperor is to call for honor and subordination to be given to him, and this is only secondarily and conventionally qualified by the early Jewish and Christian parenetic principle that fear/worship is only for God. Moreover, by immediately following his call to fear God in 2:17 by an unequivocal one to honor the emperor, the author even reinforces the requirement of subordination in 2:13 and implies that the two activities belong together. No valid inference can therefore be drawn from these texts regarding the extent of the demands being placed on the readers by the imperial cult.

This study also calls into question postcolonial readings of 1 Peter in which the author is particularly concerned to distance his readers from the Roman empire. It has revealed no evidence that the letter is *intentionally* subversive of the current political and social order or sees this as essentially opposed to the Godgiven and normative ordering of the cosmos. Some alleged examples of critique or resistance are mere subsidiary by-products of the author's deliberate affirmations (not least regarding the imperative of subordination), while others are repudiations of popular values to which he believes the God-given structures of state and household also stand opposed. And on the contrary, as shown above, he places those structures firmly *within* the cosmic order created by God and renewed in Christ. So 1 Peter's almost complete social and political conformism is not a cunning plan designed subtly but deliberately to undermine the Roman ordering of government and society, but a straightforward reflection of its author's convictions and values.29

## **Freedom**

## *Political Freedom*

This study has shown that while the concept of political freedom was highly important in the Greek city-states during the classical period, and in the later Roman republic, by the first century CE it has gone into decline. The eclipse of freedom in Greece under the Macedonians, and much later in Rome under the empire, through the concentration of political power in the hands of absolute rulers, has ensured that the political sense no longer corresponds to the reality of the Greco-Roman world and has led to the redefinition of freedom largely in other terms.

This process is less advanced in early Judaism. Before the first Jewish revolt, hopes for national and political liberation are still dominant in Palestine, though their importance is sometimes overstated. But after AD 70, and long before in the Diaspora, this idea has been relativized and diminished by other concepts of freedom, which will survive the near-eradication of Jewish political aspirations after the Bar Kokhba revolt.

In early Christianity, in contrast, the language of freedom (especially the crucial *ἐλευθερ-* word-group) is never clearly associated with political liberation, and the most extended treatment of the concept (by Paul) develops it in an altogether different direction. So the picture across the three traditions at the time of 1 Peter is that of a concept whose political sense has lost or is losing ground to other visions of freedom.

The author shows no sign of wanting to resist this trend. Although it is often suggested that *ἐλεύθεροι* and *ἐλευθερία* in 2:16 have a political sense, advocates of this view seem insufficiently to acknowledge the purpose of these references within the logic of the passage, which is to reinforce (not limit) the imperative of subordination in verse 13. Similarly the phrase *θεοῦ δοῦλοι*, like the other divine imperatives in the text (see above), also appears intended principally to strengthen the readers' obligations to their superiors. These terms are used to define the character of the readers' existence and so to demonstrate that submission within the authoritative structures of the state and the household is appropriate for them. There is also no indication in any of the letter's freedom texts that Christians are free from obligation to the authorities,30 only (by implication) that they are now able to resist any (probably exceptional) demands from superiors to do what they should not.31

In any case, in all the principal Greco-Roman schools political freedom is not conceived in terms of insubordination to civil authority. In fact, a politically free person is necessarily subject to all his/her superiors within the given order; otherwise his/her freedom is mere license. And while much early Judaism does equate political liberation with freedom from obligation to obey a foreign power, no-one aspiring to this seems to think it could co-exist in any way with subordination to such a power. The latter may be a pragmatic strategy for the present, but by definition it cannot be required after liberation.

It is therefore very doubtful whether the idea of a political freedom that (in some sense) liberates people from obligation to the government but (in another sense) still requires subordination to it has any precedent in the first-century thought-world. Moreover, its very intelligibility is doubtful given the conceptual and exegetical inadequacy of the principal attempts to square this circle (believers are to be subordinate because God so wills, not because their superiors do; subordination is voluntary and not compelled). And such convoluted attempts to give a political sense to 2:16 are unnecessary when another concept of freedom is readily available, one that is externally supported, internally coherent, and properly integrated with the foregoing discussion of order and subordination.

#### *Moral Freedom*

By the first century CE a philosophical or moral meaning of freedom as selfmastery and inner autonomy has become dominant in the world of Greek philosophy and may be gaining ground among Romans too. In early Judaism, similarly, hope for liberation (at least in the present) is increasingly being located in a moral freedom grounded in obedience to Torah. For the early Christians the concept almost always includes freedom from slavery to sin and cosmic powers, though it can also involve liberty from sin's other associates and its consequences. For Paul, who writes most on the subject, it is thus the freedom to live in line with God's will and from the compulsion to act against it.

Every reference to freedom in 1 Peter, whether direct or indirect, is consistent with this moral interpretation of the concept, and with the Pauline tradition in particular.32 In 2:16 the author contrasts his readers' freedom as *θεοῦ δοῦλοι* with the freedom of license; they are liberated from slavery to evil to live for God as their master instead. The other passages relating to the concept all present it in exclusively moral terms: whether as freedom from the bondage of a sinful lifestyle (1:18), the power of sin and moral sickness (2:24), or evil powers (3:22); whether for righteousness (2:24), life determined by Christ (2:25), or proper consciousness of God (3:21). Furthermore, in these passages the author grounds this freedom on the work of Christ and in God's eternal purpose and presents it as a condition and means of salvation, suggesting that moral liberation is fundamental to his concept.

Such a view is not only distinct from political understandings of freedom; in all its forms in the first century CE it also makes freedom independent of any political and social circumstances. The idea that one can be subject to an absolutist king or in legal slavery to a master yet still be free is especially associated with the Stoics, but it is endorsed in various forms by all the Greco-Roman traditions. The early Jewish understanding of moral liberty through Torah can also co-exist with the continuing domination of pagan or irregular Jewish rulers. And in Pauline thought one's position in life (including its subordinate relations) is the proper sphere of one's service to God, but it also has no bearing on one's status before him and capacity to live for him. This concept of moral freedom apparently evolved in place of hopes for political liberation, and by this time such liberation is often not even mentioned in connection with it.

Similarly the moral freedom described in various places in 1 Peter appears to be wholly independent of the political and social conditions experienced by the readers. They can enjoy it as subjects of Rome, as those enslaved to masters (even harsh ones), as married women, and as junior community members under the authority of elders. There is therefore no reason for the author to introduce in 2:16, as an irrelevant and disconnected aside, the idea of a political liberty that would make no difference to their status as free people.

#### *Requires Subordination*

It is notable that for the Greco-Roman authors who promote this moral freedom, it requires its recipients to take their place within the cosmic order, and for several of the schools this includes subordination to one's superiors within the normative structures of state and household. For the early Christians too (at least as represented by Paul), this freedom carries an obligation: they must refuse to be ruled by sin or its agents, and so reject any inappropriate demands from their superiors, but must fulfil their responsibilities under God and towards others within the restored cosmic order, which normally include subordination to their human rulers. Early Judaism appears not to have articulated these ideas explicitly, but its growing affirmation of moral freedom is conjoined with a quietist praxis that also implicitly endorses subordination.

This general context confirms the nature of the relationship between freedom and subordination revealed by the exegesis of 1 Peter 2:13–17. The readers' liberation in Christ does not release them from responsibility to their superiors; on the contrary, such subordination is an inescapable obligation resulting from their freedom. That is to say, their moral freedom not only *enables* but also *requires* them to be subordinate to human authority.

## **Conclusions**

From the above synthesis of the background materials in Chapters 2–4 of this work with the exegetical insights of Chapters 5–7, a clear picture has emerged of the meaning and interrelationship of the concepts of subordination and freedom, with that of order, in the exposition and paranesis of 1 Peter. This may be summarized as follows.

#### 254 | *Restored Order*

#### *Meaning*

The Petrine author assumes the general view in the first century CE that the cosmos embodies a rational and moral order, divinely authorized and normative but also deficient or defective, that humans are to reflect and promote. He endorses the Jewish and Christian idea that its dislocation has resulted from the sin of its human and angelic agents, but also that God has undertaken to restore it. And he accepts the Christian teaching that this restoration has been put into effect in God's exaltation of Christ and subordination of the cosmic powers to him, and in his liberation of his people from their destructive power.

On the more controversial issues, the author appears to side with those Jews who do not place the heavenly rulers of the nations among the disruptive cosmic powers, and with those Christians—particularly the deutero-Paulinists—who do not associate human authorities with them. He also favors the (especially) deutero-Pauline view that the restoration of order is a present reality, and that the lifestyle and relationships of the Christian community are meant to embody it; with 1 Timothy, he particularly emphasizes his readers' external relations.

The author shares the common view that the authority of superiors in household and state is given by God, and his use of the *Haustafel* form reflects the Greco-Roman idea (also found in Hellenistic Judaism and the deutero-Paulines) that these structures are part of the divinely given cosmic order; they are thus to be incorporated within the relationships of the Christian community. As for almost all his contemporaries, subordination is for him always a hierarchical relation, which includes obedience as well as recognition and deference, although it may be conditioned in various ways by other factors. He also agrees with the widespread conviction (rejected only in some parts of early Judaism) that it is due to superiors merely because of their standing in the order.

First Peter is aligned with most early Christian and some early Jewish tradition in appealing to both pragmatic and divine motives for subordination, and in its view (also held by Greco-Roman authors) that the demands of superiors and those of God are largely coincident. Drawing on the Greco-Roman distinction between higher and lower social norms, and standing with the same Jewish and Christian thinkers, the author also appears to believe that the political and social structures (as such) are representative of the higher values. Thus although (as all the traditions acknowledge) there may still be conflicts between the demands of the authorities and the supreme requirements of God, necessitating the readers' insubordination, these circumstances are exceptional.

The letter also reflects the general early Christian view that subordinate relationships are conditioned by the equality of believers in Christ, and it closely resembles the deutero-Pauline tradition in its outworking of this principle. But it stands closest to 1 Timothy in its greater emphasis on hierarchy, and especially in its incorporation of the household model into even the ecclesial relationships of the Christian community.

The Petrine author's idea of freedom exists in contexts where the political concept has been largely eclipsed (Greco-Roman), or is fading (Jewish), or has been excluded (Christian). In all three traditions, freedom has been re-envisioned in terms of moral liberation, and in early Christian writings (especially those of Paul) this involves release from the control of sin and evil cosmic powers to obey God's will. All 1 Peter's freedom texts are consistent with this understanding: the readers have been freed by the work of Christ from bondage to their previous sinful lifestyle and the disorderly heavenly forces, for life as slaves of God. Like other current concepts of moral freedom, the author's is independent of political and social conditions and renders these irrelevant to Christians' status as free people.

Where the concept of moral freedom exists, it is consistent with and even (for Greco-Roman and Christian authors) demands subordination to human authorities. Again 1 Peter stands fully within this tradition, presenting subordination as an obligation arising from freedom. This point leads naturally into a summary of the interrelations in the letter between the three concepts.

### *Interrelationship*

Within the teaching and exhortation of 1 Peter the concepts of order, subordination and freedom are interdependent and mutually illuminating. Firstly, the divinely ordained cosmic order has been restored through God's subordinating of the disruptive angelic powers to Christ. The believing community is the present earthly locus of that restored order, and the readers' prescribed subordination to their superiors within the God-given structures of household and state forms part of their fulfilment of that role. Thus God does not set aside the regulatory political and social arrangements that he has previously set in place, but rather incorporates them into the restored order effected in Christ, and requires his people to reflect that order by taking appropriately subordinate places within them.33 Order and subordination in heaven demand them on earth.

Secondly, for the Petrine author the effects of Christ's victory by which the cosmic order is restored include the freedom of believers from the control of the evil angelic powers and their own previous, and corresponding, sinful lifestyle. Before their redemption they were agents of disorder in the world, like their selfindulgent, hostile and persecuting neighbors; but now they are liberated to live a life of righteousness determined by Christ and in a proper consciousness of God, and to discharge their responsibility as agents of the restored order.

Thirdly, the author's understanding of freedom is configured within the boundaries of the authoritative and hierarchical structures in which subordination is due. Thus the readers' liberation does not release them from their obligation to their political and social superiors; that kind of *ἐλευθερία* is to be rejected as license. On the contrary, it both enables their subordination, freeing them from the compulsion to ignore or resist authority, and requires it as part of their divine vocation, within the restored order, that they have been redeemed to fulfil.

### *Significance*

The conceptual framework described above thus serves as a vehicle for one of the rhetorical purposes of the Petrine author: to call his readers to subordination within the authoritative structures of the state and the household. This is not merely a pragmatic strategy to diminish or nullify persecution—though this motive is certainly present—but is also a part of their divine vocation, to embody on earth the restored order of the heavens effected by the subordination of the hostile cosmic powers to Christ. The letter's teaching on freedom is principally intended to reinforce this exhortation; the readers' liberation from slavery to sin and the heavenly powers makes their subordination both possible and necessary.

In the wider context of the NT and earliest Christianity, it is hard not to see 1 Peter as a highly conservative document both politically and socially. It places existing hierarchical (and patriarchal) structures firmly within the restored and divinely normative cosmic order, and although the new life of believers in Christ transcends and conditions these, it does not undermine or overthrow them. Conflict between the demands of superiors and those of God, requiring insubordination to the former, is regarded as exceptional, while reform of the structures is rendered inappropriate or irrelevant. So Hans Windisch is right in his judgment that the repeated use of *ὑποτάσσω* in 1 Peter is "ein deutliches Zeichen für den durchaus patriarchalischen, auch nicht im entferntesten reformsüchtigen oder gar revolutionären Charakter des Urchristentums,"34 or at least of one important tradition within it.