Various topics may attract the gaze of historians of linguistics, typically specific works or theories, or the entire œuvre of a particular linguist or school of thought. In this essay I wish to focus on a different kind of historical object: a specific strategy of scientification – a technique of transmuting knowledge into scientific knowledge. Scientification strategies may differ from one another in their distinctive epistemological practices, styles of reasoning, methodologies, models or operative concepts. With the rise of modern science and the celebration

Lin Chalozin-Dovrat. 2020. Spatialization of time as a scientification strategy: Beauzée, Guillaume and the conceptual school of cognitive linguistics. In Émilie Aussant & Jean-Michel Fortis (eds.), *Historical journey in a linguistic archipelago: Descriptive concepts and case studies*, 51–66. Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI: 10.5281 / zenodo.4269411

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of classical mechanics as science's ultimate exemplar, the most diverse domains have experienced pressures to develop forms of knowledge akin to those of the natural sciences (Bod et al. 2014). Hence, scientification strategies are characteristic of the humanities and the social sciences in the post-Newton era. Grammar, no exception, has employed a gamut of strategies to devise knowledge in ways generally considered scientific. These strategies of scientification, I will argue, merit their own genealogies.

Time, or what we today call TAM (Tense–Aspect–Mood or Modality), is a salient domain in grammar, particularly dominant in the study of Indo-European languages, where it is visible through elaborate systems of verbal tense. Time is also a traditional object of metaphysics, natural philosophy, mechanics, and modern physics. The history of TAM theories shows that tense, particularly the systematic ways in which tenses co-relate, enabling speakers to establish order relations between events and the moment of speech, associated more readily with physical and mathematical theories than did mood or aspect. Tense relations construed as order relations are easy to represent using graphic representations emulating Euclidian geometry. This is one manifestation of the spatialization of time: the depiction of grammatical tense (or other expressions of temporal cognition) via graphical representations, reimagining temporal notions as relations in space. The theorization of time may also engage with spatial concepts via terminology that we recognize as "spatial." Whether in verbal or graphical forms, the spatialization of time invariably relates to a more or less explicit claim (depending on the theory) that linguistic time is in some manner spatial, or that we perceive time through the spatial categories of the mind. Such claims, most common in cognitive linguistics, often motivate diachronic and synchronic explanations highlighting spatial terms and metaphors or using geometry-like illustrations.1

The spatialization of time relies on the prevailing conception of space as a dimension conditioning metric relations among objects. This presently common idea of space, "the unlimited expanse in which everything is located," entered the

1Building on previous research in linguistics and psychology, John Lyons designated as "Localism" "the hypothesis that spatial expressions are more basic, grammatically and semantically, than various kinds of non-spatial expressions," and "that they serve as structural templates […] for other expressions" (1977: 718). In fact, Lyons' work helped popularize the "localist hypothesis" to which he fully subscribed (for a short history of localism, see Fortis 2018 and the chapter by the same author in this volume). Thus, we should not confound "Localism" and "Spatialization." While the term 'localism' refers to a semantic phenomenon (i.e. the alleged primacy of spatial cognition in language and thought), 'spatialization' refers to a phenomenon in the field of science: The tendency of certain scientific theories, notably in the language sciences, to represent time via spatial concepts. To the extent that localist trends in the late twentieth century seem to co-occur with specimens of spatialization of time (which are often used to promote scientification), localism is what a theory of spatialization may study.

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general lexicon following the propagation of Isaac Newton's work in the eighteenth century (Chalozin-Dovrat 2019b). This was also when the modern notion of space began shaping grammatical thought. The term probably first appeared in the context of grammatical theory in James Harris's *Hermes* (1751) but did not evolve into a grammatical category until the twentieth century (e.g. "spatial prepositions"). Hence, understood as a meta-scientific object of study – pertaining to scientific theories – the spatialization of time is a modern phenomenon originating in modern conceptions of space first inculcated by classical mechanics and later by the theory of relativity.2

This essay discusses in tandem three seemingly unrelated moments in the history of linguistics: the work of the Enlightenment grammarian Nicolas Beauzée (1717–1789), the typically modernist "psychomechanics" of Gustave Guillaume (1883–1960), and the scientific project of the conceptual school of cognitive linguistics emerging in 1970s America through the works of Leonard Talmy (b. 1942), Ronald Langacker (b. 1942) George Lakoff (b. 1941), Elizabeth C. Traugott (b. 1939), and others. While Guillaume was most probably well familiar with Beauzée's work (Fournier 2013), and Traugott (1975) designated Guillaume a prime reference on the spatialized nature of grammatical time, these three theoretical moments do not derive one from another in any significant historical sense. However, as I shall argue, despite their obvious differences these three theoretical gestures share similar scientific motivations and deploy similar tactics in realizing them. Thus, Beauzée, inspired by both Cartesian and Newtonian perceptions of natural philosophy, enlisted the metaphysics of time and space to reproduce the successes of physical science in the field of grammar. Guillaume's theory of the spatialization of time emerged in the heyday of relativity theory, when physical theory aroused considerable public interest. Applying the interchangeability of time and space to grammatical phenomena, Guillaume hoped to devise a theory of the psychological mechanisms behind linguistic temporality. Finally, relying on its close relations with other theories of human cognition (such as language acquisition or cognitive psychology), the conceptual school of cognitive linguistics strove to construct its theories on general cognitive principles. Grounded in research on spatial cognition, the spatialization of time bolstered the scientificity of cognitive grammar while enhancing its affinity with the general project of cognitive science. In the conclusion, I shall suggest that this retrospective genealogy

2Twentieth-century cases of time spatialization often blend different physical theories of space, theories of spatial perception, and various modern and premodern conceptions of space, place, location, distance, and extension. Such fusions, combining the most diverse theories and concepts, may reflect attempts to reach an effective scientification strategy.

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of the spatialization of time uncovers a distinct form of continuity in the history of linguistics (Auroux 1980; Colombat et al. 2010) reproducing and regenerating not only past ideas, theories, and concepts, but also successful scientification strategies.

### **2 Nicolas Beauzée (1717–1789)**

In 1756 Beauzée, a grammar professor in the *École royale militaire*, joined the cohort of writers for Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (Le Guern 2009). Over the following decade he contributed more than 140 entries to the *Encyclopédie* on various grammatical concepts, including a substantial article presenting his renowned theory of tense (Beauzée 1765). As was customary, the *Encyclopédie* treated grammar as a branch of the communicative arts (D'Alembert & Diderot 1751), while Beauzée sought to elevate grammar to the rank of science. Enthused by his era's scientific achievements and inspired by natural philosophy, he aspired to salvage grammar from its status as a premodern form of knowledge primarily associated with rhetoric and pedagogy. Building from the Port-Royal *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* (Arnauld & Lancelot 1660), Beauzée both revived the notion of general grammar and strove to upgrade it to "grammatical metaphysics:" a sure foundation for a science of grammar modeled upon Cartesian precepts (Chalozin-Dovrat 2019a).

His quest for "grammatical metaphysics" represented Beauzée's hope to attain in the study of grammar the scientific rigor and clarity achieved by natural philosophy. Fully adopting the Cartesian model establishing metaphysics as the necessary foundation for any science, Beauzée asserted that "only metaphysics, that is, the most thoughtful and analytic examination of abstract ideas," can discover the true principles of general grammar (Beauzée 1767: vol.1: xxxiij–xxxv). Hence, some objects of inquiry, such as tense, could not fit within grammarians' "confused notions," but required, Beauzée advocated, the light of metaphysics (Beauzée 1767: 96). Time was a traditional object of metaphysics and natural philosophy and understandably necessitated a scientific mode of inquiry. While Beauzée did not overtly claim that grammatical time and natural time were one and the same, his tense theory implicitly depended on the presumed identity between tense and time. "Let me resort here to the blazing torch of metaphysics," he implored in opening his entry on grammatical tense, "the only one that can indicate all the ideas comprehended in the nature of *tenses*" (ibid.).

Beauzée obtained the metaphysical basis for his theory from the definition of time by the Cartesian academician Étienne Simon de Gamaches. "Time is the

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very succession attached to the created being's existence," postulated Gamaches in his work of astronomical physics (1740: 28), a formulation Beauzée converted into a geometry-like theoretical apparatus. "[T]he successive existence of beings," he argued, "is the only measure of time that is within our reach" (Beauzée 1765: 96). Measuring this successive motion required breaking the free flow of existence using fixed points of reference, which Beauzée termed "epochs" (*époques*) – from the Greek *ἐπέχειν* 'to stop'. The portion of time demarcated between two such "stops" – between beginning and concluding epochs – he termed a "period," bounded, he asserted, on all sides "just like a space around which one can turn" (ibid.). This graphic depiction led Beauzée to a general definition of tense as a system of reference in which "tenses are verb forms expressing different existential relations to the various epochs that one can imagine in time" (ibid.).

Beauzée's analysis relied on three basic distinctions or "divisions" characterizing the different tenses:

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These basic distinctions allowed Beauzée to analyze the entire French tense system as a complex reference system *à la* geometry, establishing order relations between the period, or its two demarcating epochs, and the moment of speech. This three-layered reference system (Auroux 1991; Fournier 2013) determined the full tableau of time relations characterizing each verb form. Ultimately, Beauzée's notion of tense equals a "constellation" of time relations: a typical arrangement of the possible reference points and their respective positions. Conceptualizing each tense as if it were an astronomical constellation, representing a specific configuration of temporal relations (distinct from other tenses' configurations) necessitated a complex procedure of spatialization to transform the complete tense system into an array of such constellations. While Beauzée's precise concept of space remains tacit, this strategy of spatialization, reimagining tenses as configurations of positions and relations, is the key to his tense theory.

Beauzée's mastery of time spatialization demonstrates his theoretical agility, transposing one type of knowledge into a different epistemological setting in a meaningful way. The great originality of Beauzée's tense theory resides in his selecting the epoch of comparison – the point of reference that enables us to break the free flow of existence and situate events and actions in time – as the main point of reference calibrating the system. This choice may seem counter-intuitive, as traditional theories of grammar construe tense in relation to the moment of speech – that is, in relation to the speaker rather than to metaphysical notions such as time or existence. "I believed," admitted Beauzée, that "I should treat the principles of language as we treat those of physics, geometry, those of all sciences" (1767: xvi, vol. 1). Abandoning the privileged point-of-view of the speaker while relying on the spatial example of astronomical physics allowed Beauzée to analyze the tense system as an objective natural phenomenon, entitled to its own genuine science.

### **3 Gustave Guillaume (1883–1960)**

Guillaume's unconventional career path – transforming him from a young bank clerk into a groundbreaking linguist (Valin 1982) – gives a human face to his original but somewhat eccentric work.3 Guillaume's theory, "The psychomechanics of language," aspires to uncover the "systematic totality" (Guillaume 1965 [1945]: 15) behind language – the psychological machine underlying the linguistic sys-

3Often considered opaque, Guillaume's work has nonetheless acquired many disciples. The resources list at the *Fonds Gustave Guillaume*'s site testifies to the rich on-going research on Guillaume's theory. See: http://www.fondsgustaveguillaume.ulaval.ca/

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tem. Guillaume's major theoretical challenge was thus providing a glimpse into that which cannot be seen: the mechanisms conditioning language without leaving direct evidence in discourse. While Guillaume was Antoine Meillet's protégé and heir to a structuralist lineage, his ambition to expose the systematic apparatus behind observable linguistic facts links his theory to cognitive trends in linguistic research (Puech & Savatovsky 1997). As contemporary historians of linguistics have commented, it seems "Guillaume merely lacked the term *cognition*" (Bottineau 2006: 41).

The production of linguistic temporality – the way linguistic systems construct and express time – stood at the center of Guillaume's work (Joly & Lerouge 1980). Indo-European linguistics has traditionally considered verb and time inseparable, thus facilitating immediate association between the notions of verb, time, and action. Building on this conceptual nexus, Guillaume aspired to ascertain the psycholinguistic mechanisms transforming abstract notions of time into verbal images. "Time is so abstract," maintained Guillaume in his first book on psychomechanics, *Temps et verbe* (1929), "that its simple rendering as a clear image already suggests powerful concretization" (Guillaume 1965 [1929]: 7). Through his notion of "time-image" (*l'image-temps*) Guillaume conceptualized verbal time as a dynamic tension between time's abstract nature and the visual concretization of temporality in language. This psycho-mechanic procedure, consisting in visualizing time, is accomplished, according to Guillaume, by means of spatialization:

The human mind is thus made that it has the experience of time but does not have its representation. It must seek it through constructive and descriptive means which are spatial in character. The linear representation of time that flees is one of these means: it is already in its primary and […] fundamental simplicity a certain *spatialization of time*. (Guillaume 1965 [1945]: 17)4

Guillaume's "spatialization of time" is a psycholinguistic mechanism converting the abstract experience of time into concrete spatial representations – geometric relations encoded in language. Guillaume's use of the terms 'concrete' and 'abstract' requires elucidation, as it marks a break from a tradition comprehending these notions as semiotic modalities. Accordingly, considering an object and

4 "L'esprit humain est ainsi fait qu'il a l'expérience du temps, mais n'en a point la représentation. Il lui faut la demander à des moyens constructifs et descriptifs qui sont de l'ordre de l'espace. La représentation linéaire du temps qui fuit fait partie de ces moyens : elle est déjà dans sa simplicité première et […] fondamentale […] *une certaine spatialisation du temps*." (Guillaume 1965 [1945]: 17; emphasis is mine, LCD)

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its mode united, as the senses experience them (e.g. *the white paper*, *the round box*), would yield the "concrete sense," while abstracting the mode from the object or the object from the mode (e.g. *whiteness, paper*) would produce the "abstract sense."5 Guillaume, however, employs the terms 'abstract' and 'concrete' as properties: time is thus inherently "abstract" and space "concrete," which ultimately signifies "visual" – perhaps because classical mechanics often uses graphical illustrations to represent mathematical relations in space.

Figure 3.1: The Latin spatialization of time on three dimensions. From Gustave Guillaume (1965 [1945]: 37).

Guillaume translated his ideas about the relations between time and space into vigorous geometry-like instruments, purportedly reconstructing the mental apparatus of psycholinguistic temporality. According to Guillaume's diagrams, pre-verbal time comprises *n* dimensions, just like physical space. In this diagram, for example (see Figure 3.1), Guillaume presented his thesis about the spatial relationships between tenses and moods in Latin. The diagram's top section shows the infinitive forms: the present infinitive *amāre* 'to love' and below it the perfect

5Eighteenth-century cognitive theory did not use these terms as properties (e.g. "time is abstract;" "space is concrete"), but as modalities. We can conceive a body without its form, or whiteness without a body (*res absque modo* or *modus absque re*) explained French linguist César Chesneau Dumarsais in his cognitive theory of tropes (1730). Employing the terms 'concrete sense' and 'abstract sense' as semiotic modalities allowed Dumarsais to understand abstraction as "a sort of separation made by thought" (1730: 260).

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infinitive *amāvisse*. The central section represents the subjunctive, a binary relationship between two tenses and two aspects: the present and perfect subjunctive (*amem* and *amāverim*), and on top, the same relationship between the anterior actions: the imperfect *amārem* 'I would love to', and the pluperfect *amāvissem* 'I had loved to'. The lower section of the diagram represents the indicative, the basic form of the verb, with the simple (*amo*) and perfect (*amavi*) forms. The same order relations appear in the past (to the left: the imperfect *amabam* and the pluperfect *amaveram*) and the future (to the right: the future *amabo* and the future perfect *amavero*). The diagram as a whole represents *chronogénèse*: the mental operation of generating time-images. Each section stands for a *chronothèse* (initial, medial, and final): the static aspects of the chronogenetical dynamics, fixing the mental time-imagery (Boone & Joly 1996).

Guillaume's inventive terminology, highlighting the dynamic dimension of language, borrowed extensively from physics, geometry, biology and physiology (Bottineau 2006). As Valette (2003) has shown, starting in the 1920s, around the time he expressed his first ideas about psychomechanics, Guillaume gradually adopted more and more scientific terms at the expense of his formerly more richly philosophical vocabulary. The spatialization of time, with its architectonic illustrations and mechanical allure, was the focus of much of Guillaume's effort to devise an expressly scientific theory of the systematic apparatus underlying language. It allowed Guillaume not only to illustrate the structure of tense systems as he understood it, but also to theorize the cognitive mechanisms motivating grammatical time. In that sense, the spatialization of time, construed here not as a cognitive mechanism but as a strategy of scientification, enabled Guillaume to formulate a proto-science of psycholinguistics.

### **4 The conceptual school of cognitive linguistics (1970s to the present)**

By 1975, as similar ideas about the spatial nature of grammatical time were gaining currency among various linguistic schools, the "spatialization of time" was no longer an oddity. "[T]he spatial nature of temporal expressions in many languages is widely recognized," stated the American linguist Elizabeth C. Traugott in a widely cited article (1975: 207). Inspired by the pioneering works of Eve V. Clark (b. 1942, in 1971) and Herbert H. Clark (b. 1940, in 1973) on children's language acquisition – establishing that the same principles that guide general perception determine the acquisition of temporal and spatial vocabulary – Traugott brought together time-honored diachronic methodologies and novel cogni-

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tive sensibilities. Well versed in the writings of Continental structuralists, she selected a quote by Guillaume for her article's epigraph, the same quote I cited above.

Building on existing diachronic datasets, Traugott argued that the grand majority of English prepositions derive from locatives, thus demonstrating "[t]he locative character of temporal relations" (1975: 209). Thence, she embarked on ascertaining "whether there are any constraints on the selection of spatial terms for temporal relationships" (1975: 207). This undertaking, attempting to determine the cognitive logic behind the time/space nexus in language, relied on a definition of linguistic time ("the expression of our experience of time") that Traugott distinguished from both physical and calendrical time (1975). Equipped with a distinct scientific object and a well-defined scientific task, Traugott's adaptation of the "spatialization of time" theme set an example for future research in the functionalist and cognitive trends.

Prepositions also attracted the attention of other linguists, such as Leonard Talmy, for whom spatial cognition is a "fine structure", a fundamental conceptual subdivision of language (1983: 225). Talmy used topological schemata to extrapolate the cognitive principles accounting for the constraints on the distribution of prepositions. Emphasizing the role of spatial cognition in semantics enabled Talmy and other theoretical linguists to connect their work with general cognitive principles, thus linking it to other domains of cognitive science and particularly to research on visual perception and motion.

For George Lakoff (1993) the relations between our notions of time and space are determined by conceptual metaphor. Together with Mark Johnson, he established metaphor as an all-pervasive cognitive mechanism producing concepts and governing semantic change (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). According to their theory of conceptual metaphor (CMT), we conceptualize common abstract concepts, such as TIME, ACTION, or CAUSATION via metaphor, generating non-figurative ideas according to concrete experiences. "Abstract reasoning," argued Lakoff, "is a special case of image-based reasoning," mapping mental images from concrete experiential domains onto abstract ones (Lakoff 1993: 229). Conceptual metaphor builds on visual principles, projecting the structure of one domain onto another, reproducing concepts in new domains, and eventually generating new knowledge. According to Lakoff, the same cognitive mechanisms participate in conceptualizing time: Lacking a biological "detector" of time, we perceive it in terms of objects, locations, and motion in space (Lakoff 1993: 218).

I employ the term "conceptual school of cognitive linguistics" to refer to those linguists who place concepts and conceptualization at the center of their theoretical work. Cognitive linguists generally portray space not as an abstraction or as

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a set of cognitive faculties but as a natural concept. Ronald Langacker's theory, titled *Space grammar* (1982; 1987), is a case in point, treating space as a general conceptual apparatus governing grammatical rationality. For Langacker the priority of space is all-encompassing, applied – but not limited – to grammatical temporality. Langacker proposed a particularly elegant specimen of time spatialization when he attempted to provide a semantic construal of lexico-syntactic differences. Hence, the following pair of sentences:

exemplifies, according to Langacker, two modes of temporal perception governed by a differential visual mechanism (1987: 146, example 19). The verbal form in (1) expresses *sequential scanning*: a series of event images whose continuous progression replaces one temporal configuration with another. The nominal form in (2) stands for a procedure of *summary scanning*: an additive progression of the event image which is accessible simultaneously. While the cognitive modality of sequential scanning simulates a consecutive series of snapshots, during summary scanning snapshots instantly add up to form one visual synthesis. The conceptual difference between conjugated verbs and nominalization, proposes Langacker, is essentially visual: the verbal form expresses the perception of a series of images as a moving sequence (like a motion picture composed of still frames), whereas the noun sums up the complete spatial information in one image. In fact, the semantic difference between the two lexico-syntactic forms reflects the distinction between two general principles underlying spatial cognition and event processing.

As Langacker has explained, the power of space – both as an epistemic, explanatory principle and as a comprehensive cognitive mechanism governing grammar – stems from its special status in perception:

[I]t hardly seems appropriate or feasible to consider three-dimensional space as a concept definable relative to some other, more fundamental conception. It would appear more promising to regard the conception of space (either two- or three-dimensional) as a basic field of representation grounded in genetically determined physical properties of the human organism and constituting an intrinsic part of our inborn cognitive apparatus. That is, our ability to conceive of spatial relationships presupposes some kind of representational space creating the potential for such relationships, but it is doubtful that conceptual analysis can go beyond positing this representational space and elucidating its properties. (Langacker 1987: 148)

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Hence, according to Langacker, space is a primitive concept that no other more fundamental idea can ascertain or define. Genetically determined, the conceptual apparatus of space is itself a "representational space," enabling us to represent spatial relationships. Mirroring its representational competence in a sort of *mise-en-abyme*, this "representational space" is an innate feature of our cognitive mechanisms grounded in our physiology. This convoluted theory of representation, apparently self-reflecting to infinity, has one clear boundary: the theory's concept of space begins and ends with the biological necessities constraining the species' physical and cognitive properties, permitting no further conceptual analysis.

Cognitive semantics has evolved significantly since the late 1980s, popularizing the idea that linguistic temporality is based on spatial perception. Attempts to advance the thesis of the spatial nature of temporality in language and cognition have often proclaimed subsidiary theoretical goals – such as ascertaining the universality of temporal experience (e.g. Alverson 1994); advancing a refined research program for linguistic typology (e.g. Haspelmath 1997); or demonstrating the affinities between language, thought, and cognitive functions such as motor action (Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008). In its various forms, spatialization of time has also served as a more general strategy to enhance grammar's authority as a scientific form of knowledge.

### **5 Conclusion**

Beauzée's metaphysical tense grammar; Guillaume's "psychomechanics" of verbal time; late twentieth-century theories about spatial cognition's role in linguistic temporality – these three theoretical gestures emerged in very different historical and epistemological contexts. Within these multifaceted contexts the spatialization of grammatical time changed in its foci, forms, and functions. Yet one purpose remained unchanged throughout the centuries: to promote and enhance grammar's scientification.

Beauzée was an activist for the cause of the scientification of grammar at a time when the sole established science, in the modern sense, was classical mechanics. Manipulating the similitude between natural and grammatical time, Beauzée conceived his theory of tense with the ambition of changing the course of general grammar. With the example of astronomical physics in mind, Beauzée reconstructed the tense system as a multilayered system of reference, theorizing each tense and the entire tense system as if they were objective constellations, natural phenomena disengaged from discursive considerations. Thus, spatializing

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time was for Beauzée a strategy for transforming "an old problem," such as the coherence of the tense system, into "a new science."

Guillaume's scientific project developed amid a functioning modern disciplinary environment. However, his interest in the dynamics of psycholinguistic mechanisms ill-fitted the existing framework of normal science, necessitating, in Guillaume's view, a new scientific language. The idea of time as the fourth dimension of spacetime was then attracting considerable public attention, especially following Einstein's visit to Paris in 1922 (Biezunski 1987). The growing interest in modern physics most probably also inspired Guillaume's increasingly science-based terminology. Thus, Guillaume's "spatialization of time" tied up many loose ends: his interest in the dynamics of verbs and the linguistic expression of time; the need for a psycholinguistic mechanism to associate linguistic temporality with mental images; and the desire to articulate the general laws of language production in a scientific way.

By the 1970s the stakes were very different. The main theoretical concerns of cognitive linguists in the conceptual trend arose within the context of the "Linguistics Wars." For those hoping to shift linguistic theory's focus from syntax to semantics, conceptual paradigms like that proposed by the time/space nexus in language came in handy. Space had another significant advantage in the competition between linguistic theories: It linked theoretical linguistics with other fields of cognitive science, enhancing both its empirical and its theoretical standing. Spatializing time allowed cognitive semantics to demonstrate how general principles of cognition propose semantic explanations while reshuffling traditional distinctions like that between lexicon and grammar.

There is wide agreement among historians of linguistics as to the high degree of continuity in the history of linguistic ideas and the discipline's low "rewriting rate" (*taux de réinscription*) – a concept Sylvain Auroux (1980) introduced to emphasize that linguistics progresses without eradicating past theories via paradigmatic change. The continuity traced in this study is not historical per se: it is difficult to measure the degree of influence Beauzée's work had on Guillaume's "spatialization of time," and Traugott's reference to Guillaume was clearly superficial. Yet, I would like to argue that this genealogical study of the spatialization of grammatical time suggests that the history of scientificity (Auroux 1990) and scientification cannot solely rely on isolated evidence documenting the transmission of knowledge by individuals. It must also be attentive to scientific motivations and to the concrete webs of interests wherein these motivations are situated. Such a theoretical framework could enrich our understanding of the modes of continuity and progression typical of linguistics and the way it functions as a

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scientific discipline. This study of time spatialization shows that, whenever the modern concept of space was available to them, linguists employed the novel practices and opportunities it opened up to promote the scientification of grammar. Understood as a strategy, spatialization of time may illuminate the ways by which scientific memory persists and prevails.

### **References**

### 3 Spatialization of time as a scientification strategy

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## **Chapter 4**

## **Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams: Clark (1847) and Reed-Kellogg (1876)**

Nicolas Mazziotta

Université de Liège

This paper shows that the authors who first used diagrams to represent syntactic structures chose graphical conventions that constrained the way they could represent their analyses. Some graphical conventions may look similar despite following different rationales. Conversely, they may also look different and yet be grounded in the same logic. This second possibility becomes obvious when comparing the diagramming systems proposed by Clark (who uses aggregated bubbles) and Reed & Kellogg (who use strokes). Nevertheless, two-dimensional objects such as bubbles offer more varied layout possibilities for drawing diagrams than one-dimensional objects such as strokes do. Consequently, authors have to add the representation for abstract concepts such as inclusion by means that are compatible with the basic objects they use.

### **1 Introduction**

This paper focuses on the graphical depiction of syntactic analysis. I will compare two early diagramming systems in order to show how graphical formalisms put constraints on what can be expressed, because of the spatial properties of the graphical units. I will focus on two aspects: how graphical devices represent linguistic units and how these graphical devices interact on the plane. The diagrams under study were created in the United States, and date from the 19th century (Brittain 1973), thus preceding the advent of modern syntactic trees that

Nicolas Mazziotta. 2020. Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams: Clark (1847) and Reed-Kellogg (1876). In Émilie Aussant & Jean-Michel Fortis (eds.), *Historical journey in a linguistic archipelago: Descriptive concepts and case studies*, 67–81. Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4269413

### Nicolas Mazziotta

are in use today. The introduction of syntactic diagrams occurred at a time when grammatical description in America had undergone a paradigm shift from wordcentric to syntactic analysis.1 Scholars began to focus on the "deep structure" of the sentence. Pioneers made extensive use of diagrams to encode the structural order of syntactic relations and discarded the linear succession of words.

In section §2, I will introduce the formal and semiotic concepts that I use to describe the diagrams. In section §3, I will present early diagramming systems, especially the ones produced by Stephen W. Clark (1810–1901) on the one hand, and Alonzo Reed (d. 1899) and Brainerd Kellogg (1834–1920) on the other hand. Section §4 compares the graphical representation of three specific structures in these two systems.

### **2 Visual depictions of syntax**

Visual depictions of syntactic analyses are diagrams, i.e., icons that represent relations and allow for creative thinking (Peirce 1994 [1931–1935], cf. Chauviré 2008: 36–42). Syntactic diagrams represent words and grammatical concepts, and depict the way they interact. Since words and grammatical concepts are just *thoughts* (albeit highly organized ones), they cannot be expressed without a way of making them perceptible. Syntactic diagrams achieve this goal by graphical means. In section §2.1, I introduce the concepts of *reification*, *graphical entities* and *spatial configurations*, which I rely on to describe the way linguistic analyses are graphically represented. Section §2.2 illustrates the variety of diagrams.

### **2.1** *Semiotic concepts***: Reification, graphical entities, spatial configurations**

To begin with, let us consider Figure 4.1, depicting a classical immediate constituent analysis ("ICA") of (1).2

(1) The fur warms a bear.

Each word is represented by itself (by self-reference) in the form of concatenated letters. Conceptual units such as constituents are represented in the same

1Aarts & McMahon (2006: 76). Arguably, such a paradigm-shift is already achieved in the works of several French scholars at the beginning of the 18th century (see Mazziotta 2020).

2The sentence is taken from Clark (1870: 44) for comparison purposes, but the analysis is mine. It should be noted that the diagram depicts a simple ICA in order to illustrate the grounding rationales of such a representation for comparison purposes. Figure 4.1 is not seen here as a state of the art representation.

### 4 Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams

Figure 4.1: Sample ICA tree

way. On the other hand, strokes represent part-whole relations. I call *reification* such a discrete representation of a concept (*to reify* 'to turn into an object'; Kahane & Mazziotta 2015). When a concept is reified in a graphical environment, it becomes a *graphical entity* (Groupe µ 1992), i.e. a sign that we are able to perceive, to delimit, and to describe from a visual point of view. Graphical entities are thus bound to conceptual units.

Graphical entities interact with one another by forming *spatial configurations*: in Figure 4.1, one can understand that *warms* and the second NP are immediate constituents of VP because they are both placed below VP, and they are each connected to VP by a stroke.3 Spatial configurations express conceptual relations in the diagram.

### **2.2 Variety in the graphical representation of analyses**

It is well known that there are various ways to represent the relations between words. The same conceptual units/relations can be reified in different ways. Moreover, graphical entities and spatial configurations are competing means of expressing analyses of the same kind. To illustrate this, I will compare the two diagrams in Figure 4.2: (a) is the very first syntactic diagram, proposed by Gustav Billroth (1808–1836) in 1832 (the analysed sentence can be literally translated as: 'Miltiades, leader of the Athenians, restored nearly suppressed freedom to the entire Greece, in the battle at Marathon'); (b) is a diagram from *Graded lessons in English* (1879 [1876]) by Alonzo Reed and Brainerd Kellogg.

Despite the fact that both diagrams represent words and the way they interact in the sentence, and despite the fact that both diagrams make use of concatenated

3 For the sake of simplicity, unless otherwise stated, I will use shortcuts such as "NP" for "the graphical entity that reifies NP".

Nicolas Mazziotta

(b) Reed & Kellogg (1879 [1876]: 43)

Figure 4.2: Various values of strokes

characters and strokes, their rationales are very different. In Figure 4.2a, words are reified by concatenated characters, whereas in Figure 4.2b, words are reified by a combination of concatenated characters and strokes below them, i.e. *labeled strokes*. Both diagrams express how words are grouped into larger structures, such as phrases and sentences. In Figure 4.2a, strokes reify the grouping of words in a way that we are very accustomed to: many diagrams of all sorts use similar conventions. On the contrary, unless we learned to read Figure 4.2b at school, it takes a while to get accustomed to the fact that strokes in Figure 4.2b do not reify syntactic relations as they do in Figure 4.2a. Actually, in Figure 4.2b, relations are mostly represented by the relative positions of the words, i.e., by spatial configurations.

This comparison demonstrates two important features of graphical entities. Firstly, they are complete signs with a specific form of expression and a value: using the same form of expression does not automatically entail that the same value is implied, and *vice versa*. The configurational properties of the entities differ accordingly: in Figure 4.2a, strokes are drawn *between* words, whereas in Figure 4.2b, they are drawn *under* the words. Secondly, it is up to the creator of

### 4 Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams

the diagram to choose between reifying his analysis or representing it by means of configurations. Comparing Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.1 delivers another piece of evidence for the demonstration: in Figure 4.1, part-whole relations are reified independently by strokes. Consequently, some diagrams may look similar but are conceptually very different indeed, and conversely, some diagrams that look different are actually similar. Formal and semiotic description helps identifying units inside a given system and comparing units across systems.

In the next sections, I will focus on diagrams that share similar rationales with the ones in Figure 4.2b. In section §3, I will show how similar rationales are shared by diagramming systems that make different representation choices. In section §4, I will show that graphical choices constrain what part of the analysis can be expressed, and further force the reification of abstract concepts.

### **3 Early syntactic diagrams in the United States: Basic rationales**

Most diagramming systems from the 19th century reify words, but hardly any relation. Section §3.1 describes the fundamental rationales of the first of these diagramming systems, proposed by Clark in 1847, and compares it with the Reed & Kellogg system. Section §3.2 briefly illustrates the continuity between the two systems with intermediary diagrams that were proposed by other authors.

### **3.1 Clark's seminal** *Practical grammar* **and the successful Reed-Kellogg system**

In Clark's system (1847; see Mazziotta 2016), words are reified by means of labeled bubbles that aggregate with one another (Figure 4.3). The syntactic relations between words are expressed by the relative positions of the bubbles.

(2) The king of shadows loves a shining mark.

In Figure 4.3, which depicts the analysis of (2), horizontally arranged bubbles express that the sentence is a combination of a subject, a predicate and, optionally,

Figure 4.3: Sample bubble diagram (Clark 1847: 23)

### Nicolas Mazziotta

an object. These elements can be complemented by adjuncts, which are represented by vertically connected bubbles. Note that adjuncts can also have adjuncts of their own: the representational convention is recursive. As it can be observed at the bottom left of the diagram, the representation of the terms of prepositional phrases combines two ways of aggregating bubbles. Prepositional phrases are a combination of a preposition (called the *leader* in Clark's terminology) and a noun (the *subsequent*). The leader is represented by a bubble that connects the phrase complements vertically to the word, and is horizontally arranged with its subsequent.

Similar ideas were adopted in the manuals written by A. Reed and B. Kellogg, albeit with alternate graphical means of expressing the analyses. As already highlighted in section §2.2, Figure 4.2b is a diagram containing words reified by labeled strokes that aggregate with one another. The sentence is a combination of a subject, a predicate and, optionally, an object. It is represented by horizontally arranged strokes. These elements can be complemented by modifiers, which are reified by vertically connected strokes. Prepositional phrases are a combination of a preposition and a noun: a vertically connected stroke for the preposition, which in turn is horizontally arranged with the noun.

### **3.2 Continuity between Clark (1847) and Reed & Kellogg (1879 [1876])**

The theoretical assumptions in Clark (1847) and Reed & Kellogg (1879 [1876]) are roughly the same: both systems acknowledge a distinction between principal parts and adjuncts/modifiers, and posit a hybrid status for prepositional phrases. From a graphical perspective, both systems reify words by means of labeled geometric shapes that aggregate with one another either horizontally or vertically. Such similarities demonstrate some continuity between the diagramming systems. Additionally, there was a huge variety of diagramming systems that were proposed by different authors between Clark's grammar and the *Graded lessons of English* of Reed and Kellogg. Many of them relied on variations of the same principles, demonstrating the popularity of Clark's ideas. Figure 4.4 illustrates this with diagrams collected by Brittain (1973: 37, 56, 75).

It is striking that each author chooses a different geometric shape to reify words, but the way the entities are arranged remains mostly identical as far as the basic structures are concerned (horizontal arrangement of the principal parts and vertical arrangement of the adjuncts). The core descriptive stance of these diagrams is *sparsity*: whenever it is possible, only the words are reified, and any other piece of information is expressed by configurational conventions.

Bubbles, open boxes, closed boxes, and strokes are theoretically equivalent. However, strokes are one-dimensional entities, whereas bubbles and boxes are

### 4 Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams

Figure 4.4: Various diagrams

two-dimensional ones. The initial choice of basic entities has consequences for the depiction of more complex constructions. This will be demonstrated in section §4 by comparing Clark's system to the one developed by Reed and Kellogg.

### **4 The logic of space: Case studies**

In the following subsections, I will study the graphical means at use to represent three kinds of syntactic relations in Clark's system and in Reed & Kellogg's diagrams, namely: the relation between the subject and the predicate (§4.1), coordination (§4.2), and subordination of the subject clause (§4.3). All three relations somewhat break the sparsity of Reed & Kellogg's model by introducing additional entities.

### **4.1 Subject-predicate relation**

A fundamental relation that every syntactic diagramming system has to depict is the one that holds between the subject and the predicate. This relation has already been illustrated in §§2.2 and 3.1.

Nicolas Mazziotta

Figure 4.5: Visual models for the subject-predicate relation.

Figure 4.5(a) is a *visual model*: it represents the configurational rules in Clark's grammar: Clark simply connects two bubbles from left to right. Bubbles clearly delimit their perimeters without any possibility of confusion, and their relative positions are sufficient to express the role of the words they contain. Therefore, only words are reified and only two entities are necessary.

In Reed & Kellogg's approach, the stroke corresponding to the subject and the one corresponding to the predicate in the graphical model (Figure 4.5(b)) could not have been joined by a mere concatenation. Because of the one-dimensionality of the strokes, the resulting configuration would have been a single line, with no means of distinguishing between syntactic roles. Reed and Kellogg understood this shortcoming only too well:

I will draw on the board a heavy, or shaded, line, and divide it into two parts [. . . ]. I will consider the first part as a sign of the subject of a sentence, and the second part as a sign of the predicate of a sentence. (Reed & Kellogg 1879 [1876]: 17)

They use a vertical dash to part the subject from the predicate, which yields the model in Figure 4.5(b). From a visual point of view, this vertical dash is an additional entity that does not correspond to a word. Paradoxically, using a graphical device to *separate* two units creates an entity that corresponds to the grammatical relation that *unites* them. For this reason, three entities are necessary: one for the subject (a horizontal stroke), one for the predicate (a second horizontal stroke), and a third one for the relation between the subject and the predicate (a vertical dash).

The hierarchy between the subject-predicate relation and the predicate-object relation is not obvious in Clark's diagrams, nor in the text that accompanies the diagrams.4 Some diagrams that contain a subject and a predicate as well as an object were interpreted by some contemporary authors (Jewell 1867: 30) in a way that conceptualizes equivalent structural positions. By contrast, diagrams such as Figure 4.6 suggest a visual hierarchy. Reed & Kellogg state several times that the *object complements* "complete" the predicate: "You will see that the line

4 See Mazziotta (2020: §5.3.2).

4 Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams

Figure 4.6: Objects in Reed & Kellogg's system

standing for the *object complement* is a continuation of the predicate line, and that the little vertical line only touches this without cutting it" (Reed & Kellogg 1879 [1876]: 54).

(3) Fulton invented the first steamboat.

Again, the use of a stroke to separate the verb from the object complement is actually an entity that reifies the relation that unites them. This graphical convention corresponds to a hierarchical analysis whereby the object is part of the predicate. This ICA-like analysis is related to the entities used to render the words and their relations: aggregated bubbles alone would allow for such a reification of part-whole relations only by inclusion.

### **4.2 Coordination**

Traditional grammatical theory posits that coordination adds complexity to syntactic structures by allowing for several units to share the same grammatical role.5

In Clark's system, words that are coordinated aggregate with the surrounding bubbles in the same way as they would if they were not. In Figure 4.7(a), *the heaven* and *the earth* are both objects of the predicate *created*, and they are connected to it horizontally. The coordinative conjunction *and* unites them by aggregating vertically with both. Should the conjunction be absent, Clark would use the symbol × to express that it is implied. The model in Figure 4.7(b) provides a synthesis of the entities at use: there are four of them, one for each word. The two-dimensionality of the bubbles makes them extensible vertically and horizontally. Therefore, the size of the bubbles may be altered to facilitate the marking of connections with no change in their values.6

5 Some modern approaches prefer to assume that the conjuncts have asymmetric syntactic roles. This difference is expressed by the way the conjuncts are encoded in the syntactic structure – see Mouret (2007) for such examples in constituent trees and Polguère & Melʹčuk (2009: 50–51) for an example of asymmetric dependency-based description.

6 There are several other examples of such alteration in Clark's work and most of them are coordinations.

Nicolas Mazziotta

Figure 4.7: Coordination in Clark's system

The one-dimensional strokes of the diagrams by Reed and Kellogg do not have the same properties: the only ways they can be manipulated is by changing their thickness (which does not really add another dimension), their slope, or their continuity (using dots instead of a continuous line). They cannot be extended vertically. Therefore, the authors had to create a device to represent coordinations. They describe the first example given in Figure 4.8(a) as follows:

The short line following the subject line represents the entire predicate, and is supposed to be continued in the three horizontal lines that follow, each of which represents one of the parts of the compound predicate. These lines are united by dotted lines, which stand for the connecting words. The × denotes that an *and* is understood. (Reed & Kellogg 1879 [1876]: 47–48)

Figure 4.8: Coordination in Reed & Kellogg's system

The graphical model of coordination in Figure 4.8(b) shows that the number of strokes exceeds the number of nodes. The slanted lines, which are thinner than the horizontal ones, represent the part-whole relation between a syntactic unit taken as a whole and its component (the conjuncts). The notation integrates three additional entities that aggregate with the words: two of them are used to

### 4 Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams

represent the part-whole relation, and the third one represents the larger syntactic unit. In the case of coordination, using strokes with a specific slope offers no other solution but to introduce additional entities: one for each part-whole relation between the conjuncts and the group they form, and, of course, one for this very group.

### **4.3 Subordinate clauses as subjects**

Subordinate clauses are not handled in a consistent way, either in Clark's grammar (see Mazziotta 2016: 319–322 and 328–329) or in the diagrams by Reed and Kellogg. Adjunct clauses are not represented with the same graphical conventions as the ones introduced by complementizers as objects or as subjects.7 I will focus on the latter, which Clark names "auxiliary sentences". Auxiliary clauses assert "dependent proposition[s]" (1870: 187).

(4) That good men sometimes commit faults cannot be denied.

Figure 4.9: Subordinate subject in Clark's system.

In Figure 4.9(a), the subject clause, *that good men sometimes commit faults* is wrapped in half an ellipsis that represents an abstract subject – I will not comment on the position of the complementizer. The spatial configuration that expresses the relation between the subject and the predicate (cf. §4.1) is not sufficient to represent complex structures that are used as subjects: the subordinate predicate *commit* is already aggregated to the right of the subject *men*, and to the left of the object *faults*. There is no room left to its right for another predicate, for the structure would then concatenate five bubbles without any means of distinguishing the predications from one another. The introduction of an additional entity establishes a hierarchy between the predications. It does so by a specific configuration: an inclusion layout that is made possible by the two-dimensionality

7This may be due to the heterogeneous treatment of dependents of the verb, since neither Clark nor Reed & Kellogg overtly acknowledge verb-centrality (§4.1).

### Nicolas Mazziotta

of the entity. There are two important consequences to this choice of representation: (i) the part-whole relations between the subject and its constituents are iconic; (ii) the combination of this wrapping bubble with the predicate *can be denied* operates exactly in the same way as if it were a single word.

Due to the one-dimensionality of the lines, the corresponding representation by Reed & Kellogg does not use inclusion.

(5) That stars are suns is taught by astronomers.

Figure 4.10: Subordinate subject in Reed & Kellogg's system

The description of the diagram in Figure 4.10(a) clearly identifies a special device used as a "support" for the subordinate clause: "As this [sentence] subject cannot, in its proper form, be written on the subject line, it is placed above, and, by means of a support, the [sentence] diagram is made to rest on the subject line" (Reed & Kellogg 1879 [1876]: 107).

Since the configurational rationales of the combination between the subject and the predicate are the same as in Clark's system (horizontal connection), it follows that lines offer no other possibility but to introduce an additional entity in such cases. This entity could have been a wrapping device much as Clark's or a connecting entity. Reed & Kellogg chose the latter. The one-dimensionality of strokes does not allow the depicting of inclusion in an iconic way. As a result, what is expressed by this entity is a relation of equivalence between the abstract subject and its realization as a clause – interestingly, the subordinate clause is connected via its predicate to the abstract subject.

### **5 Conclusions**

Diagrams are graphical means of representing syntactic analyses. There are several ways to visually represent words and analytic concepts. The first distinction

### 4 Grammar and graphical semiotics in early syntactic diagrams

is between *entities* and *spatial configuration*: as shown in section §2.2, grammarians may choose to represent relations between words with entities that reify them (Figure 4.2(a)) or by their layout (Figure 4.2(b)). When different grammarians choose to reify the same units, they may use different entities to express similar analyses (cf. §3). However, the material choice of different shapes (bubbles in the case of Clark, and strokes for Reed & Kellogg) as diagrammatic entities has consequences for the spatial configuration of the entities, and on the amount of entities needed to express the analyses. In the case of the relation between the subject and the predicate, Clark could use a simple configurational convention at his disposal to arrange the bubbles representing a subject and a predicate, whereas Reed & Kellogg had to introduce an additional entity. In an indirect way, this additional entity can be interpreted as a representation of the relation between the subject and the predicate. Similar means can be used to identify the verb-object relation, thus leading to a model that decomposes the sentence into two strata of relations (cf. §4.1). A related issue concerns the representation of coordinate constructions: since conjuncts share the same positions in the syntactic structure, diagrams should represent this feature. With two-dimensional entities, it is possible to do so in an iconic way, whereas the use of strokes implies the use of additional entities that reify abstract units representing the combination of the conjuncts (cf. §4.2). The representation of subordinate subjects (or objects) also implies the introduction of abstract entities in all kinds of diagrams, be they a wrapping entity or a connecting one (cf. §4.3).

From these observations, it appears that diagrams making use of one-dimensional objects are less minimalistic. The use of one-dimensional strokes forces the reification of abstract units that are not words, but rather represent part-whole relations or the integrity of complex structures considered as wholes. Indeed, current constituent trees (Figure 4.1) constantly and consistently represent this kind of syntactic arrangement. A similar tendency was already developing at the time when Alonzo Reed and Brainerd Kellogg were drawing their first diagrams.

Graphical entities chosen to express the analyses always constrain what kind of relations can be represented. More often than not, they imply the creation of *artefacts*, i.e. graphical objects that are not part of the knowledge transmitted by the analysis, but entirely pertain to the graphical formalism that encodes it.

### **References**

Aarts, Bas & April McMahon (eds.). 2006. *The handbook of English linguistics* (Blackwell handbooks in linguistics). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

## **Chapter 5**

## **Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français : la formation du concept**

### Bruno Courbon

Université Laval

For at least 80 years, the name of Michel Bréal has been both associated with the development of the field of semantics within French linguistics and with the invention of the term and concept of *polysémie* (polysemy) in the 1880s. The present contribution deals with the origin of the concept of polysemy, when Bréal used it for the first time. Although Bréal contributed to define polysemy thoroughly, neither the idea, nor the term were new. In the first place, the term was coined by Joseph Halévy ; secondly, dictionary makers and 19th century linguists often conceived of lexical meaning in terms of polysemy.

> […] la pratique métalinguistique des lexicographes pose le problème de l'émergence des notions avant leur dénomination. Le fait de nommer des concepts permet de circonscrire des portions de réalité, de reconnaître des séquences de problématisation et de questionner des phénomènes que l'acte de dénomination vise à cerner.

> > (Bisconti 2016 : 23)

Bruno Courbon. 2020. Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français : la formation du concept. In Émilie Aussant & Jean-Michel Fortis (éd.), *Historical journey in a linguistic archipelago : Descriptive concepts and case studies*, 83-96. Berlin : Language Science Press. DOI : 10.5281/zenodo.4269415

### Bruno Courbon

### **1 Introduction**

La polysémie peut être considérée comme un cas emblématique dans l'histoire des idées linguistiques.1 Il s'agit d'abord d'un phénomène intuitif, dont les sujets parlants font consciemment l'expérience lorsqu'ils remarquent qu'une même forme lexicale sert à parler de réalités différentes que relie une impression commune.2 Dans un second temps, cette expérience donne lieu à des propos qui indiquent la conscience d'un « fait sémantique ». Les lexicographes usent ainsi depuis longtemps d'une terminologie discrétisante pour parler de la pluralité sémantique des formes lexicales (« ce mot a plusieurs sens », « le mot *X* reçoit plusieurs acceptions »…). Cette vision analytique du sens lexical est clairement exprimée depuis le XVIIe siècle dans la tradition métalinguistique de langue française.3 Il faut pourtant attendre la fin du XIXe siècle pour que l'idée intuitive qu'à une même forme lexicale puissent correspondre plusieurs significations prenne la forme abstraite du concept de *polysémie*. Ce concept est forgé à une époque où les questions relatives au sens linguistique font l'objet d'un examen attentif, qui s'affranchit de l'habitude consistant à observer d'abord les effets de sens spécifiques à des discours particuliers.4

1Ce texte s'inscrit dans le prolongement d'un précédent travail (Courbon 2015). On y trouvera moins de développements relatifs à ce qui fait la spécificité du point de vue de Joseph Halévy (1827-1917) et de Michel Bréal (1832-1915) sur la polysémie ; cependant, l'accent est mis sur deux aspects : 1) d'une part, la continuité entre a) la conception générale de ce qui est intuitivement perçu comme de la polysémie et b) la conceptualisation nouvelle que rend possible l'importation du terme *polysémie* en sémantique, et, d'autre part – et dans une moindre mesure –, la distribution entre l'usage du terme chez Halévy et l'utilisation conceptuelle spécifique qu'en fait Bréal ; 2) l'appartenance du concept de polysémie à une mythologie des fondations (celles de « la sémantique » comme discipline), qui n'aurait sans doute pas déplu à Bréal, mythologue et découvreur de talent.

2Ces éléments appartiennent toujours à la définition du concept de polysémie : « un mot polysémique (un polysème) est un mot qui rassemble plusieurs sens entre lesquels les usagers peuvent reconnaître un lien » (Nyckees 1998 : 94).

3Nous ne voulons pas dire par là que l'idée de ce qui est désormais appelé « polysémie » n'existerait pas avant le XVIIe siècle, mais seulement souligner le fait qu'au moment où le terme *polysémie* est forgé, cette conception était chose relativement banale dans les pratiques de description du français, notamment en lexicographie. En fait, cette conception remonte sans doute bien avant les premières attestations qu'on en trouve dans l'Antiquité : qu'une forme lexicale à valeur référentielle spécifique puisse servir à parler de choses relativement différentes bien qu'en partie apparentées est en effet un phénomène suffisamment fréquent et saillant pour que les sujets parlants en aient conscience assez tôt dans leur expérience linguistique.

4Cette contribution ne présentera pas l'évolution conceptuelle qu'a connue l'étude des questions de sens au cours du XIXe siècle. Il est toutefois évident que la focale change, et que l'on se préoccupe davantage, dans la deuxième moitié du siècle, du sujet sémantiseur, qu'il soit « cognitif », « psychique » ou social… Explicitement présenté comme intersubjectif, le sens linguistique est de moins en moins conçu comme un pur effet discursif (sens sémiotextuel).

### 5 Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français

Le fait d'étudier la « cristallisation » du concept de polysémie dans la période charnière durant laquelle la sémantique reçoit son nom moderne présente un double intérêt : d'une part, en ce qui concerne l'histoire des idées relatives aux faits de signification linguistique ; d'autre part, en ce qui concerne la sociologie des sciences linguistiques. Pour ce qui est de l'histoire des idées sur la langue, resituer la genèse du concept de polysémie dans le contexte intellectuel de l'époque contribue à éclairer quelques-uns des enjeux liés à son utilisation. De plus, du point de vue de la sociologie des sciences du langage, l'histoire de ce concept participe d'un mythe fondateur associé, dans le monde francophone, à la constitution de « la sémantique » en discipline. Dans ce mythe originel, l'aura symbolique du père fondateur se surimpose à la complexité des formes de contribution. Bien que ce soit à Michel Bréal (1832–1915), alors ténor de la linguistique institutionnelle, que l'on attribue couramment la paternité du terme et de la notion de « polysémie », nous verrons que la situation dans laquelle le concept s'est développé est loin d'être aussi simple, et l'affaire sans doute plus délicate qu'elle semble à première vue.

Même si elle n'est pas formellement nommée, l'idée que recouvre le concept de polysémie est souvent énoncée dans la linguistique francophone du dernier tiers du XIXe siècle. Nous verrons aussi que c'est à l'orientaliste Joseph Halévy (1827–1917), et non à Michel Bréal, que l'on doit les premières utilisations du terme *polysémie*. Étant donné que Bréal et Halévy se côtoyaient régulièrement, on peut faire l'hypothèse que le contexte théorique général en linguistique, comme, en particulier, la conception halévienne, ont pu exercer une influence sur l'interprétation que Bréal donna à la notion de polysémie. Nous reviendrons dans la présente contribution sur cette « erreur » d'attribution de la paternité du terme et de la notion de polysémie à Michel Bréal, en tâchant de les resituer de façon sommaire dans le contexte de l'époque (i.e. à partir des années 1860–1870).5

5L'un des relecteurs d'une version antérieure de ce texte résume, à juste titre, qu'il y est fait état d'une « querelle de paternité ». À notre avis, cette « erreur » d'attribution est moins grave qu'on pourrait le croire. En revanche, il nous semble qu'elle devrait intéresser l'histoire et la sociologie de la linguistique à plus d'un titre : 1) au plan de la circulation des termes « consacrés » : son origine oubliée, le terme *polysémie* est devenu, une fois repris en sémantique, un puissant instrument conceptuel ; 2) au plan de la genèse des concepts métalinguistiques, ici clairement située entre conception commune et intuitive, tradition descriptive et proposition dénominative réussie ; 3) au plan de l'effet sociologique que peuvent exercer les sphères d'appartenance et les réseaux d'influence sur la fortune de certaines conceptions en linguistique (un autre relecteur anonyme note que les projets respectifs de Bréal et d'Halévy qui sous-tendent l'utilisation qu'ils font du terme *polysémie* s'opposent nettement : Bréal, dans une optique laïque, utilise ce concept pour illustrer les progrès de l'esprit humain ; Halévy, au contraire, utilise le concept de polysémie pour défendre une thèse d'ordre religieux – outre l'influence personnelle et institutionnelle de Bréal à l'époque, sa position est sans doute plus adaptée au contexte intellectuel français de la fin du XIXe siècle).

### Bruno Courbon

### **2 En amont de la polysémie comme concept dénommé**

Les sujets parlants ont l'intuition de ce que l'on a pris coutume de nommer « polysémie (d'un mot, d'une expression) ».6 Assez tôt dans l'histoire des descriptions de la langue française des sujets experts ont exprimé cette conception plurisémantique. Parmi les façons de traduire l'intuition ordinaire qu'une forme particulière peut « comporter » plusieurs significations, deux d'entre elles semblent se dégager au fil de l'histoire :

Dans la tradition française, l'idée que l'on puisse donner à un mot une pluralité d'« acceptions » est clairement formulée au moins depuis le XVIIe siècle. La sous-entrée ACCEPTION de la réédition du *Dictionaire* [sic] *universel* de Furetière (1619–1688) (Furetière 1701) en témoigne : « Sens auquel un mot se prend. Ce mot a plusieurs *acceptions*. Dans sa première & plus naturelle *acception*, il signifie & c. » (ibid.). À cette même époque, divers auteurs parlent d'un mot ou d'une proposition en disant qu'ils « ont » ou « reçoivent » « plusieurs sens » ou « plusieurs significations ».7 Voici quelques exemples de ces propos :

6L'expression *concept dénommé* est ici redondante. La position adoptée dans cet article est la suivante : tant que le terme *polysémie* n'est pas utilisé, il existe certes une idée intuitive de ce que l'on nomme aujourd'hui « polysémie », ses manifestations peuvent être décrites par les sujets parlants, la réalité notionnelle correspondante peut même être exprimée de diverses autres façons (cf. *pluralité de significations*) ; pour autant, le *concept* de polysémie n'existe pas encore à proprement parler. Il ne commence à circuler qu'à partir du moment où la dénomination spécifique de *polysémie* est utilisée. Parler de concept de polysémie avant la création du terme est donc une forme d'anachronisme.

7Un examen systématique montrerait certainement que la question de la pluralité des sens glisse en partie, entre le XVIIe siècle et le XIXe siècle, du texte vers le mot. Alors que les domaines

### 5 Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français

Avant l'emploi du terme *polysémie* en linguistique, la conception qui consiste à voir dans l'unité lexicale une pluralité de significations est explicitement formulée, notamment dans des contextes didactiques :

(6) « La recherche des sens divers d'un même mot, complète […] les études nécessaires pour arriver à la connaissance de la signification exacte des mots et de la propriété de l'expression. » (Michel 1858 : 252).

Ces quelques exemples montrent que des francophones expriment l'intuition qu'ils ont de ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui « polysémie », et ce bien avant la création du terme.8 Non seulement ces discours révèlent la conscience qu'ont certains auteurs de cette intuition, mais ils indiquent aussi la représentation que des sujets experts se faisaient de la signification linguistique, représentation qui se teinte des idées du temps : avec le développement, au XIXe siècle, des études sur l'histoire de la langue française, l'intérêt pour la diversité sémantique tend à

originellement associés à la question des « sens divers » relevaient de l'herméneutique et de l'exégèse (droit, théologie, philosophie), le phénomène est progressivement mis en valeur dans les arts du langage (rhétorique, grammaire, lexicographie, puis histoire de la langue).

8 Il est certain que ce type d'intuition n'est pas propre aux francophones. Une recherche approfondie devrait couvrir une période plus large et inclure d'autres langues (dont des langues sans tradition écrite). En restant sur le plan des constituants morphologiques du terme, on remarque que l'adjectif *polysemous* est employé en anglais dès 1853 dans un sens proche de celui qu'on lui connaît encore : [à propos de la gestuelle en Italie] « […] he [un homme napolitain, avec un ami] shakes his head and hands, uttering […] the monosyllabic but polysemous exclamation "Eh!" which, like a Chinese word, receives its meaning from its varying accent. » (Wiseman 1853 : 534).

### Bruno Courbon

passer de l'analyse de textes (effets de sens et usages) à une conception abstraite de l'unité sémiosémantique. Émerge une conscience aiguë du développement de nouvelles significations (ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui « néologie sémantique »).

La préoccupation pour la « multiplication des significations » est présente dans les premières utilisations que Michel Bréal fait du terme *polysémie*. Mais elle figure aussi dans les textes de quelques-uns de ses prédécesseurs immédiats, comme Émile Littré (1801–1881) et Arsène Darmesteter (1846–1888).9 Darmesteter (1874 : 11–12) parle de « transformation » ou de « succession des sens dans les mots » (cf. Darmesteter 1876 ; voir aussi Bailly 1874), Littré (1880 : 1) de « mutations de signification ». On relève, dans l'*Histoire de la langue française* de ce dernier (Littré 1863), les germes de la vision « polysémiste » de la signification lexicale. Bréal connaissait suffisamment l'œuvre de Littré pour qu'elle pût inspirer sa réflexion. Dans le premier texte où il présente le concept de polysémie (Bréal 1887), il fait référence au travail du lexicographe. Bréal est également à l'origine de la réédition posthume de l'opuscule de Littré « Pathologie verbale ou lésions de certains mots dans le cours de l'usage » (Littré 1880), auquel il préfère donner le titre de *Comment les mots changent de sens* (Littré 1888).

Les liens entre les deux « sémantistes » que sont Darmesteter et Bréal sont plus marqués encore. Arsène Darmesteter engage dès le début des années 1870 une réflexion sur la signification lexicale. On peut souvent lire, en filigrane des analyses de Bréal, la présence de Darmesteter. On remarquera aussi que les premières occurrences du terme *polysémie* chez Bréal (au nombre de 3) sont publiées dans un texte intitulé « L'histoire des mots », paru en 1887 en réaction aux éléments de substrat organiciste que Bréal relève dans l'ouvrage « éminemment suggestif » de Darmesteter (Meyer 1888 : 469), *La vie des mots étudiée dans leurs significations* (sur ce point, voir Delesalle 1987). Dès le titre s'affrontent deux conceptions. L'une historiciste (« histoire des mots »), l'autre naturaliste (« vie des mots »). Le point de vue de Darmesteter, cependant, est plus nuancé – et sensé – que Bréal ne le laisse entendre. Dans sa thèse sur la néologie, parue en 1877 (soit dix ans avant le texte de Bréal), Darmesteter s'interrogeait déjà, dans les termes suivants, sur les mécanismes à l'œuvre dans l'extension de la signification :

Ce mot [*carré*], compris de tous, a des significations multiples ; pour en faire le nom de l'objet nouveau, le peuple [parlant de l'objet du jardin anglais] sera obligé de faire un travail intellectuel qui, par une extension dans la signification, approprie le mot à la chose […]. (Darmesteter 1877 : 33)

9Auteurs que Nerlich (2001a : 1605) considère comme les prédécesseurs immédiats de Bréal en « sémantique » (le terme est alors anachronique).

### 5 Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français

Écrit dix ans avant que Bréal n'emploie le terme *polysémie* pour la première fois, ce texte montre l'existence d'un questionnement sur la multiplicité des significations. L'idée de polysémie est en germe.

### **3 Autour de l'invention du terme** *polysémie* **dans les années 1870–1880**

Même les théories plus ou moins bien connues et souvent discutées ne sont pas connues dans leurs connexions historiques. Ainsi, par exemple, on attribue presque toujours à Saussure les distinctions entre *langue* et *parole*, entre *signifiant* et *signifié*, entre *synchronie* et *diachronie*, toutes distinctions que Saussure a retrouvées dans la tradition, qu'il a, sans doute, reformulées et auxquelles il a donné en partie une interprétation nouvelle, dans le cadre d'un système cohérent, mais qu'il n'a pas été le premier à formuler. (Coseriu 1967 : 74)

Le propos de Coseriu (1921–2002) au sujet de distinctions systématisées par Saussure peut s'appliquer à nombre de notions devenues des concepts-clés en linguistique, et dont la création est attribuée à des « fondateurs » (d'une discipline, d'un domaine, d'un courant…). Ainsi en va-t-il de la notion de polysémie : Bréal (1897), fondateur officiel de la sémantique en France, reprend des idées anciennes à propos de la multiplicité des sens, idées qu'il développe et systématise d'une façon singulière, et qu'il nomme en (ré)utilisant un terme (*polysémie*) employé depuis plus d'une décennie par un confrère qu'il côtoie, écoute, et dont il commente les travaux présentés dans divers cercles savants du Paris des années 1870–1880.10

### **3.1 Joseph Halévy : l'inventeur du terme** *polysémie*

Contrairement à une croyance répandue, ce n'est pas à Michel Bréal, mais à l'orientaliste Joseph Halévy que l'on doit l'invention du terme *polysémie* en français.11 C'est dans le but de démontrer l'origine sémitique de la langue transcrite au moyen de l'écriture cunéiforme que J. Halévy a l'habitude d'employer ce terme,

10École pratique, Société de linguistique, Académie des inscriptions, etc. À ce sujet, voir Courbon (2015).

11Pour une présentation plus détaillée du sens que donnent Halévy puis Bréal à la notion de polysémie, voir Courbon (2015 : 5–7).

### Bruno Courbon

qui correspond à un concept central de son œuvre. Halévy présente la polysémie comme l'une des « particularités les plus saillantes du système graphique assyro-babylonien » (Halévy 1876 : 298).

Ce terme renvoie alors à la multiplicité de valeurs sémantiques que revêtent les signes cunéiformes. Celle-ci peut être exprimée par l'intermédiaire de signes linguistiques différents. Le concept de polysémie se rapproche ainsi du concept classique de synonymie,12 mais comporte déjà, chez Halévy, les principaux traits que nous lui connaissons encore : pluralité de significations associées à un signe (ici, un idéogramme) et proximité relative des différentes « lectures » de ce signe. Halévy décrit sa conception de la polysémie dans une communication donnée en 1878 :

[C]haque signe envisagé comme idéogramme est en général rendu par plusieurs mots […], ce qui revient à dire que le signe comporte à la fois plusieurs sens, qu'il est polysème. (Halévy 1883 : 275)

La polysémie, qu'Halévy décrit comme la multiplication de sens équivoques, est consubstantielle au système d'écriture cunéiforme :

[L]'accumulation infinie d'équivoques dans l'accado-sumérien, caractérise celui-ci comme un système idéographique, ou [sic] la polysémie des signes est un principe fondamental et inéluctable. (Halévy 1883 : 276)

L'idée de la pluralité des significations d'un signe idéographique se trouvait déjà cinquante ans auparavant chez Champollion (1790–1832) (1828 : 311–312), mais elle ne recevait alors pas d'autre nom que celui, classique, de « signes synonymes » (ibid.).

### **3.2 Une « erreur » d'attribution : « Michel Bréal, inventeur du terme** *polysémie* **»**

L'attribution à la personne de Bréal de la paternité du terme de *polysémie* – ou, quelquefois, du concept correspondant – est présentée dans différents textes : Firth (1957 [1935] : 15), Ullmann (1952 : 199), Ricoeur (1975 : 147), Delesalle & Chevalier (1986 : 286), Delesalle (1986 : 89 ; 1987 : 300–305), Nerlich (1993 : 22 ; 2001b : 1625), Peeters & Eiszele (1993 : 169–170), Peeters (1994), Desmet & Swiggers (1995 :

12Sur la proximité conceptuelle entre synonymie et polysémie à cette époque, voir Delesalle (1986).

### 5 Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français

27), Branca-Rosoff (1996 : 118), Victorri & Fuchs (1996 : 11), Surcin (1999 : 16), Auroux & Delesalle (2000 : 215), Siblot (2000 : 156), Nerlich & Clarke (2003 : 4), Girardin (2004 : 131), Piron (2006 : 51), Cusimano (2008 : 55), Larrivée (2008 : 22), Thibault (2009 : 116), Mazaleyrat (2010 : 10), Pauly (2010 : 23), Jakimovska (2012 : n. p.), Fr. Rainer, dans Lieber & Štekauer (2014), Derradji (2014 : 59), Sorba & Cusimano (2014 : 6), Bisconti (2016 : 23), Bruns (2016 : 4), De Palo (2016 : 103).

Les dictionnaires contemporains perpétuent cette croyance. Ainsi, la date de première attestation du terme présentée dans le *Petit Robert 2018* et dans le *Trésor de la langue française* est 1897, année de parution de l'*Essai de sémantique* de Bréal (1897), plus de vingt ans après son utilisation courante par Halévy. Cette erreur d'attribution (donc de datation) s'explique par le succès rapide qu'a connu l'*Essai* de Bréal. Halévy, quant à lui, n'est pas associé à l'histoire de la sémantique, au contraire de Bréal, dont le nom est associé à la constitution de la sémantique en champ disciplinaire, ainsi qu'à l'usage du terme *polysémie* (le terme, lui, est associé dès 1887 : Baale 1887).

La valeur générale du terme *polysémie* envisagée par Halévy est proche de celle que Bréal définit en 1887. Toutefois, l'association de ce terme à un domaine de la linguistique en émergence, et à celui que l'on considère comme son fondateur, prévaut sur la chronologie des faits et sur la paternité réelle de la dénomination.

### **3.3 La polysémie : un concept unificateur dès les débuts de la sémantique**

La place (deux chapitres de l'*Essai*) et la valeur particulière que Bréal accorde au concept de polysémie indiquent son importance.13 En utilisant une dénomination simple pour parler d'un ensemble de phénomènes sémantiques relativement complexes, Bréal souligne la puissance significative des formes linguistiques, qui résultent parfois d'une réduction (cf. le rapport qu'établit Bréal entre polysémie et « ellipse »). En outre, par ce geste d'objectivation de phénomènes sémantiques intuitifs, Bréal assoit la légitimité de prendre le sens lexical comme objet d'étude à part entière, contribuant ainsi à consolider le projet de fonder la « sémantique » en un champ de réflexion et de connaissances spécifique.14

13Selon Nerlich, le concept de polysémie constitue le « point focal de [l']œuvre » de Bréal (Nerlich 1993 : 22).

14« [L]'avènement de la Sémantique et le surgissement de la polysémie » vont de pair, écrit Delesalle (1987 : 83). Sur les relations étroites, pendant cette période, entre la lexicographie et la sémantique « naissante », voir Bisconti (2016).

### **4 Conclusion**

Créé en français par J. Halévy dans les années 1870, le terme *polysémie* est réemployé par M. Bréal une dizaine d'années plus tard. L'audace terminologique de J. Halévy, en dehors des préoccupations propres à la linguistique historique, permet d'appréhender de façon plus stable le problème de la pluralité sémantique. La solution dénominative qu'offre Halévy à la communauté des linguistes ne comporte qu'une faible valeur conceptuelle. Cette proposition ne s'insère pas directement dans le champ de réflexion contemporain sur le sens linguistique. Mais, la création du terme simple et relativement transparent de *polysémie* contribue à attirer le regard sur une série de problèmes qui, tout au long du XXe siècle, n'ont eu de cesse d'être (re)posés. Il faut reconnaître à Bréal d'avoir insufflé à ce terme, en le plaçant parmi les éléments cardinaux de sa sémantique, une valeur particulière.

L'histoire primitive de la « polysémie » – entre idée générale, dénomination simple et stabilisation conceptuelle – illustre l'interdépendance constitutive entre histoire des idées linguistiques (plan conceptuel) et histoire des réseaux de circulation des idées linguistiques (dimension sociale). Se dessine, à travers cette histoire singulière, l'effet, sur le long terme, du sociosymbolique sur le cognitif, à travers notamment la forte influence d'un sémantiste de renom, Michel Bréal, considéré dans le monde francophone comme le « père fondateur » de la sémantique. L'histoire primitive du concept de polysémie, telle qu'on la rencontre depuis près d'un siècle, appartient au mythe originel de la discipline.

Bréal avait pour ambition de faire de la sémantique une « science nouvelle ». Il a insisté sur les nouveautés de sa démarche (fonction promotionnelle caractéristique des discours de fondation). Le concept de polysémie fait partie des fondements conceptuels de ce mouvement épistémologique. Dans l'entreprise fondationnelle, la référence au néologue Halévy, créateur du terme *polysémie*, aurait sans doute compliqué le tableau. On l'a oublié. Dans les faits, la nouveauté qu'apporte Bréal tient plus à l'articulation d'ensemble qu'aux phénomènes discutés ou aux termes employés et parfois présentés comme neufs. Contrairement à Halévy, dont les préoccupations intellectuelles sont différentes, Bréal présente dans son *Essai* une somme théorique, dont la force réside dans la cohérence des développements et dans la consistance des exemples. Bien qu'il pût avoir l'intuition de l'effet que produirait l'aboutissement de ses réflexions de sémantiste, Bréal ne pouvait, dans les années 1880–1890, connaître l'avenir de cette discipline dont il jetait explicitement les bases en lui donnant un nom en français. Il n'imaginait sans doute pas l'effet, sur les générations suivantes, de ses propos relatifs à la

### 5 Aux origines de la notion de polysémie en français

nouveauté du terme *polysémie*. Une autre histoire reste à écrire, qui consisterait à suivre les voies par lesquelles le mythe fondateur d'un Bréal inventeur du terme et/ou de la notion de polysémie s'est installé durablement dans le paysage de la linguistique française.15

### **Références**

15Je tiens ici à remercier les deux relecteurs anonymes pour leurs commentaires constructifs sur une précédente version de ce texte.

## **Chapter 6**

## **The unfixed status of fixed expressions: Past and present approaches to a pervasive linguistic feature**

### T. Craig Christy

University of North Alabama

Fixed expressions figure pervasively in speech, and have attracted much attention in language learning, translation and stylistics, yet linguistic analyses have been sporadic and inconclusive. Even Saussure offered little by way of accounting for how or why these "locutions toutes faites" suffuse language. In this study I contrast fixed expressions with other varieties of idiomaticity and discuss their importance in usage-based accounts and second-language learning. I also relate the traditionversus-freedom dialectic to Saussure's anagram studies.

> You shall know a word by the company it keeps. (Firth 1957: 11)

### **1 Terminology**

It would be hard to conjure a better candidate for illustrating the fuzziness of linguistic theory than what I am here exploring under the term "fixed expressions". That the phenomenon remains ill-defined and poorly understood is attested by the many rubrics under which it is researched, each of which, to greater or lesser extent, reveals a weighted emphasis in this or that direction of analysis. These rubrics include, alongside "fixed expressions", "lexical bundles", "multi-word expressions", "formulaic language", "set expressions", "formulaic sequences", "mul-

T. Craig Christy. 2020. The unfixed status of fixed expressions: Past and present approaches to a pervasive linguistic feature. In Émilie Aussant & Jean-Michel Fortis (eds.), *Historical journey in a linguistic archipelago: Descriptive concepts and case studies*, 97–111. Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4269417

### T. Craig Christy

ti-word chunks", "memorized lexical phrases", "institutionalized utterances", "ritualized phrases", "prefabricated patterns/phrases", "ready-made constructions", "entrenched collocations", "phraseologisms", "phrasemes", "complex lexical units", "-grams", "idiomatic sequences", as well as, in French, "expressions toutes faites", "locutions figées", Bally's "locutions phraséologiques", and, perhaps most widely known, Saussure's term, in the *Cours*, "locutions toutes faites", to which I will return. For simplicity's sake, "fixed expressions" will be the default generic term in this paper.

### **2 Notable approaches**

Bally's (1865–1947) emphasis, for example in his *Le langage et la vie*, was on the role these fixed expressions play in stylistics, specifically the way they enable the telegraphing of emotive nuances in the communication of ideas (Bally 1952 [1913]: 141).1 That recurrent experiential moments should become thus ossified as fixed expressions is both economical, from the point of view of memory, for instance, and unsurprising.2 Fixed expressions facilitate the spanning and linking of informational units within pragmatic, discourse analytic, and speech act-specific contexts, as Bally observes early on in his emphasis of the influence emotive elements exert on the crystallization of fixed expressions:

Un grand nombre de tours syntaxiques sont nés de l'action du sentiment. …Il s'ensuit que plus l'expression est affective, plus elle tend vers une forme ou synthétique ou disloquée. (Bally 1952 [1913]: 68)

Saussure (1857-1913), in his brief discussion of syntagmatic relations in the *Cours*, acknowledges the classificatory challenges which are posed by invariable ready-made phrases ("locutions toutes faites"), and concludes that

Where syntagmas are concerned …one must recognize the fact that there is *no clear boundary* separating the language, as confirmed by communal usage, from speech, marked by *freedom of the individual*. In many cases it is

1As Bally (1952 [1913]: 68) argues, "…les éléments émotifs de la pensée tendent à immobiliser les articulations de la phrase logique, c'est-à-dire analytique. …Il s'ensuit que plus l'expression est affective, plus elle tend vers une forme ou synthétique ou disloquée. …l'association avec une forme ayant même sens que le groupe entier finit par faire oublier l'analyse des parties du groupe."

2Richards & Schmidt (1983: 191) also underscore the pervasiveness of this process. The Appendix offers a few representative examples taken from colloquial English.

### 6 The unfixed status of fixed expressions

difficult to assign a combination of units to one or the other. Many combinations are the product of both, in proportions which cannot be accurately measured. (Saussure 1986 [1916]: 123, emphasis mine)

In their functioning as units of meaning, fixed expressions appear to belong to the lexicon, yet, for the most part, they also show both regular (e.g., *hold your horses*, *scratch the surface*, *when the dust has settled*) and irregular (e.g., *all of a sudden*, *believe you me*, *once upon a time*) syntactic patterning.3 For Saussure, the whole issue seems weighted toward determining to what extent the speech of an individual exhibits freedom of choice versus conformity to automated, situationally-triggered prefabricated constructions. It is precisely this tension between the gravitational harness of tradition, versus the freedom to intentionally mold and steer the elements of language, that suffuses Saussure's vexingly haunting "anagram" studies.4

More recent approaches to the analysis of fixed expressions have mainly focused on theorizing and typologizing idiomaticity, the many varieties of which are reflected in the multiplicity of terms used to refer to fixed expressions. Building on the work of Bolinger (1907–1992, in Bolinger 1976), Fillmore (1929–2014) and coauthors (1988), Makkai (1972), Richards & Schmidt (1983), Sinclair (1933– 2007, in Sinclair 1991) and others, and taking inspiration from Construction Grammar, Warren (2005) proposes "A Model of Idiomaticity" in which fixed expressions are seen as learned combinations that are just as integral to language competency as the lexical items and rules that dominate traditional accounts. These fixed combinations, acquired experientially through immersion in a language, figure prominently in usage-based accounts. In Warren's model fixed expressions figure as one type along a continuum of word-phrase-sentence idiomaticity. Gries (2008), speaking specifically of "phraseologisms", provides another useful survey of recent developments along with a proposed six-parameter rubric for differentiating among the various types and degrees of idiomaticity which fixed expressions exhibit, thus making it

…possible to define a variety of interrelated concepts from different frameworks including, but not limited to, idioms, word-clusters, n-grams, collocations, collostructions, constructions, patterns, fixed expressions and phraseologisms. (Gries 2008: 21)

3Cf. Wood (2002: 2–3), who cites Richards & Schmidt (1983: 36) on this point.

4On Saussure's anagrams, see Christy (2007), Christy (1999b), Christy (1999a) and Carr et al. (1999). On the relation of the homophonic principle to proper names in the anagrams, see Christy (1995).

### T. Craig Christy

The sheer fact that fixed expressions have commanded the attention of scholars in a broad spectrum of fields, ranging from theoretical linguistics, lexicology, lexicography, discourse analysis, psycholinguistics, and speech act theory, to applied linguistics, pragmatics, computational linguistics, corpus linguistics, natural language processing, machine translation, and second language learning underscores the pervasiveness, and importance, of the phenomenon. Given the predominant emphasis, in linguistic theory and practice, on the operation of rules on well-defined units – typically single, grammatically pigeonholed words – it's not altogether surprising that the status of, by comparison, messy and often intractable "fixed expressions" should have remained wobbly at best.

### **3 Fixed expressions in second language learning**

While the jury's still out as regards how best to situate and interpret fixed expressions within linguistic theory, their mastery has long been recognized as indispensable for achieving fluency in second language learning. In her article "Formulaic language in learners and native speakers" Alison Wray settles on the term "formulaic sequence" to signal any

…sequence, continuous or discontinuous, of words or other meaning elements, which is, or appears to be, prefabricated: that is, stored and retrieved whole from memory at the time of use, rather than being subject to generation or analysis by the language grammar. (Wray 1999: 214)

Estimates of the number of such formulaic sequences or fixed expressions all trend towards the high end: Jackendoff (1997: 156) observes that "There are vast numbers of such memorized fixed expressions", and, using a list of over 500 multiword expressions his daughter culled from the popular Wheel of Fortune game show, where contestants guess words and phrases on the basis of minimal clues, he concludes that his own "…extremely crude estimates [of candidate expressions for the show] suggest that their number is of about the same order of magnitude as the single words of the vocabulary." "Multi-word expression", or MWE, is the term most used in computational linguistics and work on natural language processing, where it refers, specifically, to a combination of two or more words that acts as a single unit that can exhibit syntactic and/or semantic idiosyncrasies. Multi-word expressions cross word boundaries, and lie at the interface of grammar and lexicon. They fall on a continuum that extends from transparently compositional combinations to opaque, non-compositional frozen constructions including idioms proper. Though some might think Jackendoff has cast the net too

### 6 The unfixed status of fixed expressions

widely in including all manner of compounds ranging from adjective-noun, nounnoun, participial, verbal, idioms, proper names, clichés, titles, quotations, foreign phrases, and more, the plain truth is that nothing stands out as more awkward in L2 speech than collocational combinations that stray from the beaten path. \*"I'm not large on sweets" and \*"He had a pain in the little of his back", though grammatically correct, are clearly not felicitous stand-ins for "I'm not big on sweets" and "He had a pain in the small of his back", to cite some examples from the transparent, compositional end of the continuum. Similarly, we speak of *fast food* and *strong coffee*, not \**quick food* and \**powerful coffee*. In these cases it is the asymmetrical distribution of synonyms, whose values (*valeurs*) diverge, that throws the issue of collocational fixity into sharp relief. Again, the sheer number of words appearing in set combinations makes this both a pervasive feature of language, and a prerequisite to fluency.

### **4 The turn to data**

The technology-driven rise of extensive corpora of language usage has been a major boon to the analysis and quantification of fixed expressions. In his overview of the current state of the relatively new field of computational phraseology, Ulrich Heid (2008: 348) points out that "In WordNet [a dictionary-thesaurus of English used mainly in artificial intelligence applications], roughly half of the entries are MWEs. Current research," he goes on, "suggests that these figures are rather low estimates, and that the number of MWEs in our languages is much greater than that of single words." In their widely discussed research into nativelike fluency, Pawley & Syder (1983: 191–192) argue

…that fluent and idiomatic control of a language rests to a considerable extent on knowledge of a body of "sentence stems" which are "institutionalized" or "lexicalized" …[and] whose grammatical form and lexical content is wholly or largely fixed; its fixed elements form a standard label for a culturally recognized concept. …The stock of lexicalized sentence stems known to the ordinary mature speaker of English amounts to hundreds of thousands.

Referring to the pioneering corpus linguist John Sinclair's (1933–2007)5 "idiom principle" – that a large number of prefabricated or semi-preconstructed phrases

5 Sinclair's efforts, dating back to the 1960s, to track statistically relationships between lexical units and meaning in spoken English prefigured corpus linguistics in the big-data sense in which it is now understood (cf. Stubbs 2013).

### T. Craig Christy

are available to speakers – other researchers have suggested that fully half of fluent native text is constructed according to this principle (Erman & Warren 2000: 29). The methodology of corpus linguistics brings statistical precision to the task of identifying co-occurrences that happen with a greater-than-chance frequency. The distribution of these co-occurrences across time can also be tracked, which at once gives some indication of the "life span", so to speak, of specific expressions. Notable corpora for English include, for example, the American National Corpus, the Collins Corpus, Bank of English, the Oxford Hector Pilot Corpus, and the British National Corpus. For ease of use, the Google Books -gram viewer is hard to beat as a means of getting a quick snapshot of an expression's usage data over time. Even so, its potential limitations may yet render it less reliable than others. These limitations include:

	- (1) Their houseplants *died* while they were away on vacation.
	- (2) Their houseplants *bit the dust* while they were away on vacation.

While (1) is matter of fact, (2) is marked by a colloquial casualness typical of a register used to signal solidarity with an interlocutor: (2) furthermore conveys that the speaker is rather glib about this turn of events, and not particularly saddened. In other words, the fixed expression evokes not only a meaning, but also a mood;

4. the data on usage of fixed expressions that are frequently cited in research literature (e.g., *spill the beans*, *skating on thin ice*, *kick the bucket*) may accordingly be skewed. Thus an expression that might otherwise be considered dated might rise in the frequency ratings just by dint of having been recently studied.

### 6 The unfixed status of fixed expressions

Despite its limitations, the Google Books -gram viewer still, I think, gives an overall sense of usage patterns and frequencies associated with fixed expressions. Looking at a few fixed-expression -gram charts (see Figures 6.1–6.3) can offer a glimpse of insights that could be buttressed or rendered more accurate using other available corpora.

Figure 6.3: -gram of *in a jiffy*

### T. Craig Christy

It should probably come as no surprise that the majority of high-frequency fixed expressions tend to show usage patterns that link the present to the past two or three generations: that is, our speech most closely tracks that of our parents, grandparents, and, perhaps, great-grandparents. The semantic unity of fixed expressions – which is to say their lexicalization – furthermore offers a staging ground for grammaticalization: think of *manage to*, *going to*, *couldn't help* + present participle, *bound to*, and so on. In other words, fixed expressions have an enhanced probability of being the nexus for nascent language change, which makes sense given that they evolve and function in the formative interface between grammar and lexicon, or, in Saussure's terms, between *langue* and *parole*. In their functioning as units of meaning, they appear to belong to the lexicon, yet, for the most part, they also show both regular (e.g., *hold your horses*, *scratch the surface*, *when the dust has settled*) and irregular (e.g., *all of a sudden*, *believe you me*, *once upon a time*) syntactic patterning.6

### **5 The rise of usage-based accounts**

In contrast to the prevailing linguistic view that the rules of language are acquired and then applied to the lexicon to generate grammatically correct novel utterances, according to the usage-based view, which aligns well with grammaticalization theory,7

…most language is [in fact first] acquired lexically [in the form of prefabricated lexical chunks] and then broken down and reassembled in new combinations. It is formulaic speech that provides the basis for the creative ruleforming processes by which the syntactic system is mastered. (MacKenzie 2000a: 174)

In second language teaching this concept of language acquisition has given rise to the "lexical approach", which sees fixed expressions, not words, as the real units of language.8 In this view, "…language consists of grammaticalized lexis, and not lexicalized grammar" (MacKenzie 2000b: 63). Because fixed expressions are entrenched in long-term memory, ready for deployment when prompted by situational cues, they are closely associated with actual, or at least seeming,

6Cf. Wood (2002: 2–3), who cites Richards & Schmidt (1983: 36) on this point.

7 See Christy (2010) for a detailed comparison of the usage-based grammaticalization theory with that of generative grammar.

8Cf. Lewis 1993.

### 6 The unfixed status of fixed expressions

fluency in a language, and are frequently even referred to as "fluency devices" (MacKenzie 2000a: 174; Wood 2002: 3): thus *you know*, *and so on* and similar frequent fixed expressions routinely crop up in the target-language sentences of English-speaking language learners.9 Fixed expressions seem furthermore to survive, and even surface with increased frequency, in impaired speech, yet further evidence of their entrenchment and quasi automation (Granger & Meunier 2008: xxiv). That fixed expressions figure importantly in both second language learning and impaired speech underscores their primacy in language. In Sinclair's (2008: 409) view, "…the normal primary carrier of meaning is the phrase and not the word; the word is the limiting case of the phrase, and has no other status in the description of meaning." Sinclair sees words as comparable to phonemes: both are basic units involved in encoding meaning but, by themselves, are of insufficient magnitude to transact meaning, a function he assigns to the phrase. This view of the primacy of the phrase has given rise to the claim that grammatical competency emerges from a database of fixed expressions, a claim that has not gone unchallenged, with linguists in the generative tradition arguing just the opposite, namely that "…formulas do not appear to constitute the relevant input for the acquisition of syntax, and do not constitute a bootstrapping mechanism into grammar" (Bardovi-Harlig & Stringer 2017: 85).

"Memorized fixed expressions", to use Jackendoff's term, are stored in longterm memory and are processed more quickly as chunks. Precisely because they efficiently encapsulate specific high-frequency meanings, situations and attitudes, their use allows the speaker to compose longer stretches of speech than could otherwise be supported by working memory.10 Examples of fixed expressions include, in English, *by the way*, *all of a sudden*, *be that as it may*, *in the long run*, *for the most part*, *for the record*, *before long*, *by all means*, *at any rate*, *so to speak*, *first and foremost*, and many more: in French we have, for instance, *à quoi bon?* ('what's the use?'), *tout de suite* ('immediately'), *tout à fait* ('totally'), *quand même* ('still'), *à peu près* ('approximately'), and so on. These serve as handy sentence connectives and stream-of-thought facilitators: for all intents and purposes, they behave as individual words, though, at least in orthographical perspective, the spaces separating their components disqualify them for official "word" clas-

9As Wood (2002: 7) observes, "A great proportion of the most familiar concepts and speech acts can be expressed formulaically, and if a speaker can pull these readily from memory as wholes, fluency is enhanced."

10Bolinger (1976) also underscores the value of prefabricated phrases in relation to memory constraints.

### T. Craig Christy

sification.11 In Sinclair's (2008: 410) formulation, "…the meaningful units do not coincide regularly with the units of the orthography …". In the language of natural language processing and machine translation, fixed expressions present a "tokenization" challenge: that is, the challenge is how to represent and process them. The typical solution is to represent them as single items, "words", within processing algorithms, but that alone does not solve the problem of recognizing the semantic uniqueness of fixed expressions in the first place, of detecting the shift from compositional to non-compositional formulation. One promising approach is based on identifying topic transitions within a text, abrupt departures from the dominant theme as would be the case when, say, ice-breaking would pop up in a description of a meeting (*break the ice*) or bucket-kicking in a narrative about a person or animal (*kick the bucket*).

Despite the indisputable importance of such fixed expressions to fluent speech and writing, and their acknowledged importance in language learning, "…the concept of phraseology is still notably absent from studies on translation theory and practice" (Granger & Meunier 2008: xxiv) – and, unfortunately, from most language teaching materials as well. Surely no foreign language teacher has been spared the consequences of students not being aware that what they are translating bit by bit is in fact an idiomatic, and idiosyncratic, fixed expression: thus, to cite a few German examples, \**bei dem Weg* is frequently used, instead of the correct *übrigens*, to render English 'by the way', just as \**für diesen Grund* ('for this reason') is used to translate what should be *aus diesem Grund*: these infelicitous translations are made "…because L2 learners make faulty assumptions about the transferability of restricted collocations …" (Kim & Kim 2012: 833).12 In other words they are simply not sufficiently aware of what is and is not idiomatic and fixed since, in their native language, there is no need for a speaker to be particularly attentive to these categories.

11As Moon (1998: 43) points out, hyphenated chains of words similarly behave like single units: "Hyphenation is an indicator of the process of institutionalization and lexicalization …The catenation of strings into quasi-single words signals the writer's intention to consider a string as a unit …".

12Howarth (1998: 34) suggests that "…second language learners have trouble figuring out which of a range of collocational options are restricted and which are free" (cited by Kim & Kim 2012: 833).

### **6 Concluding remarks**

In this brief study I have tried to highlight some of the major issues associated with fixed expressions, and challenges that accommodating these issues to linguistic theory presents. These include:

While I have only scratched the surface, clearly these are all complex questions whose resolution will require close collaboration across disciplinary lines. I think you get the picture: there remains an indisputable need to bring clarity to the current unfixed status of fixed expressions.

### **Acknowledgements**

This research was supported by funding from Dr. and Mrs. William R. Welborn, and by the University of North Alabama.

## **Appendix**

### **References**

### T. Craig Christy

6 The unfixed status of fixed expressions

## **Part II**

## **Fields, authors and disciplinary commitments**

## **Chapter 7**

## **Language history from below: Pidgins and Creoles as examples**

### Michelle Li

Caritas Institute of Higher Education, Hong Kong

This paper argues for pidgins and creoles as examples of a relatively new perspective to historical sociolinguistics called "language history from below," which focuses on the language use of ordinary people. While recent research on major European languages adopting this perspective has produced some significant results, a "from below" perspective of pidgins and creoles has not yet been explored. Focusing on Chinese Pidgin English data from various historical sources, this paper shows how its evolution, groups of users, and the linguistic variation of the preposition *long* exemplify the idea of "language history from below."

### **1 Introduction**

One of the greatest challenges to the development of historical linguistics is the problem of bad data which "may be fragmentary, corrupted, or many times removed from the actual productions of native speakers" (Labov 1972: 100). Given this incompleteness of information presented by historical data, Labov (1972: 101) argues that linguistic research should adopt the uniformitarian principle, which states that "the linguistic processes taking place around us are the same as those that have operated to produce the historical record." This principle proposes that linguistic changes that occurred in the past can be explained by observing changes in the present (on the antecedents of this principle, see Christy 1983). A consequence of this approach is an emphasis on the use of synchronic data and quantitative methods for interpreting linguistic and social variations. In recent decades, historical linguistics has made significant progress due to technolo-

Michelle Li. 2020. Language history from below: Pidgins and Creoles as examples. In Émilie Aussant & Jean-Michel Fortis (eds.), *Historical journey in a linguistic archipelago: Descriptive concepts and case studies*, 115–128. Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4269419

### Michelle Li

gies such as digitalization, which allows for the construction of large historical corpora. The fast-developing field of historical sociolinguistics has opened new avenues for discussion of theoretical and methodological concerns in the field, the problems and challenges of using historical data, and the value of written historical sources (Hernández-Campoy & Schilling 2012; Russi 2016).

In addition to the major languages, pidgin and creole languages also feature significantly in historical research because, as Romaine (2005: 1696) states, "language is both a historical and social product, and must therefore be explained with reference to the historical and social forces which have shaped its use." As the evolution and linguistic structure of pidgins and creoles are products of special sociohistorical contexts, these languages are prime examples for the study of language historiography and historical sociolinguistics.

This paper is organized as follows. §2 introduces recent developments in historical sociolinguistics and the concept of "language history from below." §3 argues for the relevance of pidgins and creoles within the "from below" approach in language history. Focusing on Chinese Pidgin English (CPE), spoken on the China coast, §4 presents the major groups of CPE users. In §5, linguistic variation in the use of the preposition *long* in different historical sources will be examined. §6 concludes the paper.

### **2 The "from below" approach to language history**

The linguistic data used in historical linguistics often come from written texts. As mentioned above, there are various problems with the value and quality of such written data. Hernández-Campoy & Schilling (2012) summarize the seven major problems with data in historical sociolinguistic research as representativeness, empirical validity, invariation, authenticity, authorship, social and historical validity, and standard ideology. These problems are all related to the quality of written texts and the data derived from them. However, one should not discard the value of this medium of communication simply because of the problems and limitations it presents. Compared with speech, writing is often viewed as asynchronous and more formal. Romaine (1988: 1461), however, argues that, from the point of view of a stylistic continuum, writing and reading do not necessarily represent the formal end of the continuum. Moreover, like speech, written data can also show sociolinguistic variation and can be used to reconstruct diachronic variation, such as in her study of the linguistic variation of Middle Scots (Romaine 1982). The impression that written language represents the educated elite, scholarly literature and standard language is partly due to historical linguists'

### 7 Language history from below: Pidgins and Creoles as examples

traditional bias towards the use of data from the most formal end of writing styles. Milroy (1999), for example, shows that, from approximately the 16th century onward, research on the history of English has almost always referred to the standard variety.

The notion of "from below" was first applied in the discipline of history (Thompson 1966), focusing on points of view or accounts offered by ordinary or common people rather than scholars or the higher social classes. A parallel approach called "language history from below" is developing in historical linguistics. This new interest in the language use of the lower social strata is partly due to the historical reliance on the standard variety of a language for linguistic data. Oesterreicher (1997: 198) points out that the traditional view of language history has favored the elaborate, socially exclusive and distance-orientated variety, usually the standard, which has resulted in only partial descriptions of the history of a language.

The "from below" approach highlights two sources of linguistic data: (i) language use by ordinary people and (ii) selection of texts showing speech or vernacular features (Elspaß 2007). Although who or what is considered "below" may vary from study to study, the term in general refers to ordinary people (Hailwood 2013), who are important to study because while constituting the majority of any population of language users, their language use is often neglected (Elspaß 2007). The types of materials selected for examination are mainly texts with a resemblance to speech, including ego-documents such as personal letters, diaries, autobiographies, and catechisms, rather than literary works or formal documents. In discussing the features of different types of written texts, Elspaß (2012) devises a continuum and argues that at one end lie texts of "distance" such as legal documents, whose language is mainly literate, formal, and planned, and at the other end are texts of "immediacy," which have an oral, informal, and unplanned nature similar to speech. Other types of ego-documents showing varying degrees of vernacular features include trial proceedings, diaries, travelogues, drama texts, sermons, and proclamations (Van der Wal & Rutten 2013). Ego-documents have been employed as sources in the study of the grammar and spelling of private emigrant letters written by Germans (Elspaß 2007; Elspaß et al. 2007) and letters written in seventeenth-century Dutch (Nobels 2013).

### **3 Pidgins and creoles as examples of "language history from below"**

The formation of pidgins and creoles was mainly a solution to the immediate communication barrier between indigenous people and Europeans under differ-

### Michelle Li

ent contact circumstances. While many languages undergo standardization at different levels of language use, the formation of pidgins and creoles is the result of negotiations and compromises on the spot among the groups of users concerned. Therefore, standardized usage was not the principal concern of the users. So far, works within the "language history from below" approach have mainly focused on major languages like English, German, and Dutch. In the following, I will argue that pidgins and creoles are ideal examples of languages of the common people.

From the 16th century onward, the European trading and political conquests in Africa and Asia created an environment where intercultural communication was commonplace. These languages of mixed sources are often depicted as marginal, makeshift, baby talk, or corrupted and broken versions of their European superstrates. Their use was mainly restricted to informal domains, and the speakers were mainly those of a lower social class. As such, few have cared about standardizing pidgins and creoles, but it is exactly this lack of attention that gives them room for innovation. The "creole continuum" (Stewart et al. 1965, Bickerton 1975), where we find different varieties of a creole, ranging from the least to the most similar to a standard, is a manifestation of the richness of linguistic and social variation of contact languages. In sum, we can see that the concept of "language history from below" can be applied both socially and linguistically to understand the history of pidgins and creoles in language contact settings.

Pidgins are used for restricted communication, such as trade, and thus have limited vocabulary and employ simpler grammatical structure (Holm 2000: 5). One of the best-known examples of pidgin is Chinese Pidgin English (CPE), which was initially used as a lingua franca for trading first in Canton and Macau in the 18th century and later in other treaty ports in China after the opening of foreign trade in the 19th century; it gradually declined in the first half of the 20th century (Matthews & Li 2013). The vocabulary of CPE consists mainly of English words with some borrowings from Portuguese, Malay, and Chinese; grammatically, it shows substantial influence from Cantonese, the local Chinese dialect spoken in Canton (Ansaldo et al. 2010). Social and political circumstances also played a part in the development of CPE. Officially, foreigners were prohibited from learning the Chinese language, and there was mutual hostility between the Chinese and foreigners (Baker 1990). These factors provided a space for CPE to develop as a lingua franca for interethnic communication. While negative views on pidgins and creoles abound, praises of their usefulness such as the one on CPE given by the old China hand William Hunter are harder to find.

### 7 Language history from below: Pidgins and Creoles as examples

In the Canton book-shops near the Factories was sold a small pamphlet, called *Devil's Talk*…I have often wondered who the man was who first reduced the "outlandish tongue" to a current language. Red candles should be burnt on altars erected to his memory and oblations of tea poured out before his image, placed among the wooden gods which in temples surround the shrine of a deified man of letters. (Hunter 1882: 63)

Carl Crow, a long-term resident in China, also recognized the effectiveness of CPE as a means of communication:

In no language could the conversation have been any more definite and in none could fewer words have been used. In spite of its barbarous nature pidgin was quite sufficient for all commercial transactions and in default of any other means of communication could cover a wide range of subjects. (Crow 2011 [1940]: 31)

As with studying other historical languages, data on CPE are small and fragmentary, though they come from a wide variety of sources. CPE recorded in the English language appears in diverse sources, including travelogues, journals, memoirs, newspaper and magazine articles, guide books, etc.

In Chinese language sources, which are mainly instructional materials, CPE is transcribed in Chinese characters. Various versions of anonymously written socalled redhaired phrasebooks containing a vocabulary of about several hundred essential words or phrases in pidgin English, like the one mentioned in Hunter (1882), were sold in Canton (Bolton 2003). It is clear that these coarsely made, cheap phrasebooks were prepared by and for ordinary people. A notable instructional manual source is called *The Chinese and English Instructor* 英語集全 (Tong 1862). Note that the "Chinese" in the title refers to the local dialect, Cantonese instead of Mandarin. Apart from Cantonese and English, what makes the book a valuable source is the inclusion of pidgin equivalents of Cantonese and English dialogues in some parts of the book. Due to the comprehensiveness of its content and the systematicity of the transcription, this source is of great importance to the grammatical analysis of CPE. The compiler of the *Instructor* was a prominent Cantonese merchant called Tong Ting-kü 唐廷樞 [1832–1892]. In traditional Chinese society, the merchant class was considered the lowest in the Chinese social hierarchy, and many of them had no or limited formal education. Tong was an exception, having attended the Morrison Mission School in Hong Kong, and was highly praised for his proficiency in English. Most of the CPE examples from the Chinese-language sources are taken from this book.

Michelle Li

### **4 The users of CPE**

Accounts from historical sources indicate that the users of CPE, Chinese and foreigners alike, came from the non-elite, lower social class, thus were people "from below." This section will look at the major groups of users constituting the speech community of CPE.

### **4.1 European traders and other foreigners**

The foreign community in the old Canton city was multinational, so the immediate challenge was to find a common language for communication with the Chinese. Therefore, economic, social, and political factors contributed to the rise of CPE as the lingua franca. The need to be familiar with CPE was evident in John Robert Morrison's [17 April 1814–29 August 1843] book *A Chinese commercial guide consisting of a collection of details respecting foreign trade in China* (1834) where a "glossary of words and phrases peculiar to the jargon spoken at Canton" was found. The jargon mentioned here referred to the Canton pidgin. Some examples in the glossary are as follows.

(1) *Can do?* 'Will it do?'

*Chop-chop* 'quick, fast', as *too muchy chop-chop* for 'very quick'

In the 19th century, the function of CPE expanded as families of foreign traders were allowed to reside in China and there was need to hire Chinese servants to help them in their housekeeping. The dialogue in (2) is a communication between a European master and a Chinese boy.

(2) Boy: *You makee ling?* 'Did you ring, sir?' Master: *Yes, sendee catchee one piecee tailor man.* 'Yes, send for a tailor.' Boy: *Just now have got bottom side.* 'He is below at present.' Master: *Show he come top side.* 'Tell him to come up.' (Anonymous 1860: 43)

### **4.2 Chinese**

### **4.2.1 Merchants and compradors**

As Chinese government officials did not trade directly with foreign traders, merchants and compradors functioned as their intermediaries. In order to perform their duties, "[t]he comprador[s] … speak a broken English mixed up with Portuguese, some Dutch, and French, the same as most of the Chinamen who come

### 7 Language history from below: Pidgins and Creoles as examples

about the ship. It is rather difficult to understand them at first, but one soon gets used to hearing them" (Tyng 1999: 29).

Though of the lowest class, a merchant could become rich and influential through his familiarity with Westerners and Western cultures; "through his expertise in pidgin English and his knowledge of the West, he became a middleman between East and West, not only economically but also socially, politically, and culturally" (Hao 1970: 180). A good example is the author of the *Chinese and English Instructor*, Tong Ting-kü, who was highly respected by the Chinese as well as Westerners.

### **4.2.2 Interpreters**

Another group of Chinese who had close connections with the foreign community were interpreters, also referred to as linguists in the 18th and 19th centuries (Hunter 1882; Van Dyke 2005: 50). Like merchants, interpreters were indispensable partners of foreign traders. Linguists were appointed by the Hoppo (administrator of Canton Customs) to act as interpreters. Apart from providing translation services for the Chinese and Westerners, their duties and functions were various, including managing the daily activities of the foreigners (Chin 2016). In the early 18th century, as many interpreters came from Macao, they tended to also speak (pidgin) Portuguese. The example in (3) is a linguist's translation of a speech in Chinese to "China Anglish."

(3) *Yeckhing, chin chin the gentleman alla proper. Yeckhing very much oblige to soupcarg, who have wantchee buy him cargo pigeon. He chin chin gentlemen good voyagee, hopee go home his country No.1 good, and catchee many per cent.*

'Yeckhing thanks the gentlemen assembled, for their polite attention, and is very much obliged to the supercargo who bought his chop; he wishes him a pleasant return voyage, and hopes that he will derive a handsome profit on the purchase.' (original translation, Tiffany 1849: 126)

### **4.2.3 Domestic servants**