In a survey conducted in summer 2021 in Geneva and Lausanne, we explored the general evolution of cycling practices with the pandemic, the effects of covid cycle lanes on cycling, and residents' opinions of the new cycling infrastructure. A total of 552 individuals in Geneva and 1290 in Lausanne responded to the online questionnaire (see Rérat et al. 2022 and Schmassman and Rérat 2022 for more details on the methodology).

Overall, cycling increased with the pandemic. Only a minority of respondents (11% in Geneva, 9% in Lausanne) reported cycling less often (mainly due to teleworking), while the other respondents either cycled as much as before the pandemic (42%/58%), more often (44%/27%), or even (re-)started cycling (5%/3%).

The majority of cyclists state that the covid cycle lanes make them feel safer (81% agree or strongly agree in Geneva, 73% in Lausanne, although 50% and 53% respectively still do not feel safe overall while cycling in these cities). The lanes have also provided a more convivial experience (77%/67%) and made journeys take less time (63%/53%). Many cyclists have also changed some of their routes (64% in Geneva, 44% in Lausanne) in order to benefit from covid cycle lanes.

We identified the factors explaining the propensity to find covid cycle lanes useful among both cyclists and non-cyclists, using logistic regression to mitigate the potential bias of the snowball sample. A strong influence was found with regard to mobility practices: those who cycle frequently are more likely to find the covid cycle lanes useful than those who ride a bike occasionally and those who never cycle. All things being equal, car-less households are more likely to be positive than motorized households. Political opinion has a very strong influence: the more to the right people's political views are, the less likely they are to find covid cycle lanes useful. Women are more inclined to find the new cycle lanes useful than men, and the same goes for people with a tertiary degree. The other variables in the model—age, income, employment or household type—have no significant effect. The results are very similar to the ones obtained from a representative sample of Switzerland used to analyse the results of the national vote to put cycling into the Constitution (Rérat and Ravalet 2022). They reveal the reluctance or opposition of certain groups to (re)allocate road space from the long-dominant system of automobility to the expanding system of vélomobility.

#### **5.3 Implementing COVID Cycle Lanes in Geneva and Lausanne**

This chapter explores which elements of tactical urbanism can be identified in the implementation of COVID cycle lanes, why the local authorities resorted to this unusual way of creating the city, and how the new cycle lanes have been received.

#### *5.3.1 Elements of Tactical Urbanism*

Four elements distinguish the implementation of COVID cycle lanes in Geneva and Lausanne from regular processes: the use of tactics and the speed, materiality and flexibility of these interventions. We argue that these four dimensions mark these policy measures as top-down tactical urbanism,9 as it is an original, unprecedented application of the legal framework by the local authorities.

Municipal and cantonal governments have applied tactics to 'play' with the Swiss federal laws (or the laws of those in 'more' power) by using the room for manoeuvre inherent in these laws. The usual procedure for implementing cycle lanes is the following: first, planning applications are published to give the population the opportunity to oppose the motion by lodging an appeal, and measures are put into practice only after a given deadline. The urgency of the situation during the coronavirus pandemic led Geneva and Lausanne to find a way—legal but unprecedented—to quickly put bike lanes in place by applying in a new way Article 107 of the Federal 'Ordinance on Road Signalization' (ORS). The article states that—should road safety demand it—municipal or cantonal authorities are allowed to install signalization for local traffic orders *before* giving official notice and for a maximum duration of 60 days. While usually used to facilitate the implementation of safety measures during road and construction works, in this case the article enabled the installation of temporary cycle lanes.

The municipal governments defined the context of the pandemic as a potential threat to safety, requiring urgent action (see Sect. 5.3.2). This unprecedented implementation of Article 107 of the ORS had to be authorized by the cantonal authorities, but still simplified and sped up the process considerably. While the Federal Roads Office (the national authority for road infrastructure) seems not to have been pleased with this unintended application of Article 107, in response to a parliamentary interpellation in July 2020, the Swiss government confirmed that this inversed procedure was indeed permitted.

9 Some of our respondents referred to the term 'tactical', but 'temporary' or 'transitional' were more frequently used.

The cities applied the article 107 of the ORS for implementing COVID cycle lanes in 2020. From 2021 on, the usual planning procedures had to be followed again.

In Geneva, after the initial 60 days, the cantonal authorities renewed the application of Article 107, in some cases for several periods. The Department for Infrastructure gave official notice of these orders, even though there was no obligation to do so. The last orders, however, extending the duration of the measures beyond 60 days, followed the usual procedure and were thus subject to possible appeals.

The Canton of Vaud, where Lausanne is situated, not only permitted municipalities to make use of the procedure stated in Article 107, but actively encouraged them to do so. Lausanne, following this call, implemented new cycle lanes temporarily for 60 days and then published official notices to maintain them. In the ensuing 30 days, one appeal was lodged but was found to be inadmissible by the cantonal court (Morel 2021, p. 25), resulting in the conversion of all temporary cycle lanes into permanent ones.

Together, the re-opening after weeks of lockdown (and consequently low levels of traffic), the limitation of 60 days imposed by Article 107 and a state of uncertainty caused by the pandemic created a window of opportunity10 for the rapid implementation of new cycling infrastructures.11 However, contrary to the image of improvisation that the sped-up procedures might have instilled, the departments in charge were far from inventing something out of the blue. In both cities, the changes in the external conditions triggered the quick implementation of long-held plans, thus advancing broader strategies that had already been conceived pre-COVID. Even though the terms 'temporary', 'provisional', or 'transitory' were frequently used in official communication, in both cities it was quite clear from the start that they served as in vivo tests for more permanent solutions.

The element of speed is present in two ways in the implementation of COVID cycle lanes. First, a sense of urgency due to the pandemic, combined with uncertainty about the duration of the temporary measures, necessitated a speedy conception and execution of plans. This initial phase, characterized by urgency, was followed by the realization that the COVID cycle lanes could—almost as a side effect—instil momentum into the implementation of cycling policy in general, facilitating and speeding up long-held plans. When asked whether there were any other objectives to the temporary measures than dealing with the pandemic, one of the interviewees emphasized that there was no hidden agenda, but that developing infrastructure for active mobility was in the Canton's Action Plan for Active Mobility (*Plan d'actions de la mobilité douce*) and in its Masterplan for the Road Network (*Plan directeur du réseau routier*), "so it [the temporary measures] was in fact really in line with what we wanted to do".

10 Similarly, a panel of mobility experts has identified the pandemic as an window of opportunity that should be seized to promote cycling (Büchel et al. 2022).

11 In Fribourg, one covid cycle lane was removed after 60 days. The city authorities followed the standard planning procedures in 2021 to re-install it.

The pandemic not only accelerated formal procedures, but also served as a catalyst removing obstacles in hitherto deadlocked projects. According to this cantonal official in Geneva, the temporary nature of the measures, and the option of backing out should they fail, encouraged the implementation of cycle lanes on roads where no adequate solutions for cycling had yet been found:

[…] we struggled with the Boulevard Georges Favon, for example, because we couldn't find a solution to creating cycling infrastructure in that place. Everything is very narrow with trees on both sides and the tram passing in the middle […]. We had planned to fall back on the streets next to it, […], and then, with covid, we said, well, let's try it to test what we've never actually dared to do.

As Article 107 only allows for temporary road signalizations and not for road construction works, implementing new bike lanes required a flexible handling of norms and recommendations. This had an impact on the materiality of the cycle lanes. As it was unclear how long the measures were going to be installed, the authorities needed a quick and reversible solution. Thus the authorities in Geneva simply turned car lanes into bike lanes, which required neither planning permission nor much redesigning of the demarcation lines. Adding the low level of traffic, this somewhat radical measure was suddenly feasible.

Opponents in Geneva held the view that the COVID cycle lanes lacked quality, were much too broad, and violated norms due to an overly quick implementation. For example, instead of using conventional yellow, the city authorities used pink to mark the COVID cycle lanes, a move that was later criticized by the Canton of Geneva, who insisted on it being repainted. This example of trial and error is exemplary of a willingness to play with norms and regulations.

In Lausanne, COVID cycle lanes were implemented mainly in place of car parking spaces, marked out with painted lines. Due to time constraints, less-than-perfect solutions were implemented, against the city engineering departments' better judgement or usual habits:

We still have measures […] that we need to improve […]. We have tried to work according to the basics of tactical urbanism, so to be fast, efficient, but it's not always beautiful or with the level of security that we would like to have.

The materials used in Lausanne were mainly new, simple, and inexpensive. Prototyping on a low-cost basis was seen as lowering the threshold for getting started, with the possibility of scaling up if the project was a success, as stated by a city official:

[…] we left kerbs, we put up bollards, markings… We did things that are not expensive at all. If we have to go back, we won't have lost a lot of money. But we have tried something, and if we realize that it works well, we can perhaps go even further […].

This quote also points to flexibility, a key aspect of tactical urbanism in the face of urban complexity, where solutions are difficult to agree upon or hard to predict, as was the case after the first lockdown. The advantages of top-down tactical urbanism with its flexible approach to planning have been experienced first-hand. Even though the window of opportunity for the application of Article 107 shut at the end of 2020, this experience is likely to have an effect on future urban projects, as most interviewees concurred. In Lausanne, for example, a member of the local authority plans to use the principle of "testing, evaluating, adjusting, making it permanent" as a means of promoting active mobilities in the future.

#### *5.3.2 Why Resort to Tactical Urbanism to Implement Cycle Lanes?*

At the lifting of lockdown restrictions, as mobility was supposed to increase again, there were fears of a growth in motorized individual traffic because physical distancing was difficult on public transport. Retrospectively, resorting to COVID cycle lanes might seem like an obvious response from authorities. However, as this cantonal official from Geneva observes, decisions about traffic measures in the context of a worrying modal shift were marked by contingency and a lack of experience in the face of a pandemic:

[…] in fact, no one had a very clear vision of what could be done […]. Do we increase the offer of public transport? Do we reduce traffic lights for cars? Or do we do something for bicycles?

In Geneva and Lausanne, there was political pressure to implement temporary cycling infrastructure, taking inspiration from other cities around the globe. Pressure came from political parties and organizations with an agenda concerning traffic, environment, and neighbourhood life on the one hand, and on the other hand from institutions like universities demanding safe access to their campuses.

Claims for pop-up cycling infrastructures were also expressed elsewhere, and the window of opportunity opened by the pandemic was more or less the same for all Swiss cities. Why did only the cities of Geneva and Lausanne create COVID cycle lanes? We have identified four explanatory factors: (1) a sense of urgency, (2) the low quality of existing cycling infrastructures, (3) the successful cooperation between 'political champions' on both municipal and cantonal levels, and (4) a (pre-)existing political will to promote cycling.

A first factor may lie in the fact that the French-speaking part of Switzerland particularly Geneva—was heavily affected by the first wave of the pandemic, as it is located between the two regions—Northern Italy and Eastern France—that were the first to be badly hit in Europe. Mortality rates in the cantons of Geneva and Vaud were more than three times higher than the Swiss average (Kuhn et al. 2021), and so Geneva and Lausanne authorities had a strong sense of urgency to pre-emptively act when lockdown measures were lifted.

A second explanatory factor can be found in the low quality of pre-existing cycling infrastructures in Geneva and Lausanne, in comparison to almost all Germanspeaking Swiss cities except for Zurich (see Sect. 5.2.2). Hence there was greater necessity to make up lost ground in terms of cycling infrastructure.

As a third factor, it can be argued that in Geneva and Lausanne there were 'political champions' on both the municipal and the cantonal levels who seized the window of opportunity to promote cycling.

In Geneva, COVID cycle lanes were supported by Serge Dal Busco, the Canton Councillor for Infrastructure, and Rémy Pagani, Municipal Councillor in charge of the Department for Planning, Construction, and Mobility. Dal Busco, a centreright politician and engineer by training, systematically defended the COVID cycle lanes in the media, notwithstanding critiques coming from his own political side. As Pagani, a far left politician, was coming to the end of his term of office, one interviewee speculates that "there was an aspect of courage [to Pagani's actions], not recklessness, which was due to the end of his reign".

Similarly, in Lausanne, the temporary measures were made possible by two leftwing politicians at the municipal and cantonal levels: Nuria Gorrite, president of the Vaud State Council and minister for Infrastructure and Human Resources, and Florence Germond, municipal councillor and head of the Department of Finances and Mobility in Lausanne. Both publicly defended the new developments. It is interesting to note that while Florence Germond is known for her favourable position regarding cycling, the other three political champions supported the idea of sustainable mobility in the context of public transport, but had so far not specifically advocated for cycling.

A fourth factor is that political champions were able to base their cycling advocacy on a consolidated political will in favour of cycling. In both cities, strategies and plans to increase the modal share of cycling already existed, and the electorate had expressed its approval of these policies in several votes and elections in the years before the pandemic. The political champions were certainly ambitious, but it can be argued that the risk they took was well calculated given that there already existed a political alliance supporting the promotion of cycling and favourable to the substance of the temporary measures, the reallocation of road space. However, the fact that political champions played a key role shows that even though these policies are supported, reinforcing them and turning them into action still relies on individuals.

The political champions' position was strengthened by external circumstances that changed due to the pandemic. During the first lockdown, the need to encourage cycling (and walking) was considered obvious even by those who usually oppose the promotion of active mobilities when it implied the reallocation of space from cars, such as the car lobby TCS Geneva: "We were in favour of it [the temporary measures], in principle. We thought it was perfectly legitimate, we even thought it could almost have been done earlier, when there were really no cars anymore". Although this can be explained by the almost empty streets and the resulting absence of competition between automobility and vélomobility, it shows that debates around the promotion of cycling took place under different circumstances.

Nevertheless, the political champions' achievements must be measured against the stamina and political legwork involved in implementing policies in a government consisting of various parties not bound by coalitions. The implementation of COVID cycle lanes can thus be seen as the result of a farsighted seizing of opportunity by resorting to unusual ways of planning. This predominantly top-down urbanism involves one bottom-up element, pressure from stakeholders, as shown by the way COVID cycle lanes were received.

#### *5.3.3 Reception of COVID Cycle Lanes*

The new cycle lanes provoked heated debate between their proponents and critics. Both sides used a broad range of means to advocate their cause: petitions, demonstrations, mobilization via (social) media, numbers, and statistics.12 In Geneva in particular, expressions of opinion were numerous and often antagonistic. For a demonstration in favour of the COVID cycle lanes in the Plainpalais plain on 18th May 2020, it is estimated that more than two thousand cyclists gathered, and its counter-demonstration had around five hundred participants, many of whom were on motorcycles—at a time when large public gatherings were still restricted.

The debates resembled something of an arm wrestle, with right-wing politicians claiming that congested roads due to the COVID cycle lanes would add to the burden of retailers and businesses during times that were already difficult, while politicians on the left and centre-right (under Dal Busco) argued that the COVID cycle lanes were solving the problem rather than creating it. The organized opposition stemmed primarily from three interrelated groups that are typical sources of opposition to cycling infrastructure (Wild et al. 2018): right-wing parties, car lobbies, and retailers.

The procedures inspired by tactical urbanism provided several targets for critique. As an example, the TCS Geneva claimed that it was not opposed to the idea of testing infrastructure, but doubted that the right conclusions could be drawn because of a lack of a benchmark against which to evaluate it:

The problem is that they came and said we're going to intervene here and here […]. But we had no idea of the situation beforehand, and now we should be able to judge the success, the success of a measure without knowing the situation before…

Critiques also formed around the legitimacy of the cycle lanes. Local authorities were criticized for de-prioritizing consultation, as this representative of a retailers' association in Lausanne explains:

[…] there are a lot of people who were disappointed that the municipality did not consult them to discuss, to see how things could be done. They just came and removed twenty parking spaces […]. What's more, it was done in the middle of summer when the people weren't there, […] which wasn't a very elegant move.

12 The way in which numbers have been used by both sides is illustrated by a newspaper article which promises to "do the maths" concerning the removal of parking spaces in Lausanne ("Mobilité. Les places de parc, victimes collatérales du Covid-19", 24 heures, 17 August 2020, p. 9). The seemingly high numbers of different types of parking spaces that were removed are carefully listed. Only at the end of the paragraph are these numbers put into context: "The authorities point out that 608 parking spaces represent only 2.5% of the 23,600 public spaces available in Lausanne (not counting the 70,000 private spaces)".

According to the city officials, however, the complaints led to a constructive dialogue through which a compromise was found after implementation. In certain cases, this resulted in a revision of the original infrastructure or in abandoning the measures altogether.

Critiques also focused on the substance, i.e. the fact that car lanes and parking spaces were sacrificed. One cantonal official observed a NIMBY (not in my backyard) reaction from retailers and car lobbies: "it was like, 'I agree in principle, but do it elsewhere'". Thus the TCS Geneva, for example, states that it agrees in principle with the promotion of cycling, on one condition: "[…] we have to be careful that it's not just a discouragement to use the car". Consistently, it was also the same opponents—retailers and car lobbies—who lodged an appeal against some of the COVID cycle lanes.

Although the public had not been consulted beforehand, written complaints or requests during and after the process of implementing the cycle lanes, as well as the official appeals lodged at later stages, indicate that public opinion was divided, but less so than might have been expected judging on the debates in the media. According to a Lausanne city official, about half of the letters were complaints, while the other half congratulated the authorities and asked for similar infrastructures in their neighbourhood. In Geneva, the new bike lanes were well accepted on the whole: "in fact, we thought there would be significantly more appeals", as one official states. In retrospect, it can be said that the battle was fiercely fought, but the proponents prevailed on most COVID cycle lanes after a relatively short time. Debates around one COVID cycle lane rekindled after the court's decision to uphold the TCS Geneva's appeal in April 2022, and it is not known at the time of writing who will emerge victorious.

#### **5.4 The Absence of Temporary Measures: Zurich and Lucerne**

Just as in Geneva and Lausanne, in Zurich and Lucerne there was pressure from cycling groups and local MPs, who demanded the implementation of COVID cycle lanes. We could call this bottom-up pressure for top-down tactical urbanism.

In May 2020, as a reaction to the government's inertia, cycling activists implemented their own pop-up cycle lane in the centre of Zurich by cordoning off a lane used by cars and spraying bike signs on it. The movement's catchy slogan was "*Velowäg poppe—Corona stoppe*" (*Create pop-up lanes, stop COVID-19*). Their cycle lane was removed by the police after only half an hour, but despite this, bottomup pressure was and has continued to be kept up in Zurich, where monthly demonstrations are still held for better cycling infrastructures. In March 2021, one year after the initial demands, an open letter demanding pop-up cycle lanes signed by 19 political parties and environmental and cycling associations was published in a newspaper.

Despite bottom-up pressure and formal requests by MPs, the Zurich and Lucerne governments rejected the demands, acknowledging the importance of improving cycling conditions but emphasizing that efforts should go towards long-term measures. Behind this objection to temporariness, three other reasons for the nonimplementation of COVID cycle lanes can be identified: (1) a weaker sense of urgency, (2) the absence of political champions, and (3) the division of power between cantons and cities.

As mentioned above, the German-speaking part was less affected than the Frenchspeaking part by the first wave of the pandemic. It can be hypothesized that political decision makers therefore did not feel the same urge to actively prevent an increase in motorized individual transport and to foster cycling to guarantee physical distancing while travelling. It was not possible to test this hypothesis with our data, however.

Moreover, the system of vélomobility was already much more developed in the two German-speaking cities compared to Geneva and Lausanne, and there may therefore not have been further measures that could be implemented quickly and easily. This view suggests a concern in the French-speaking part to 'catch up' in terms of cycling infrastructures which may have made local authorities more open to measures of tactical urbanism.

Even though the councillors in charge in Zurich and Lucerne were in fact all from left or green political parties, none of them was willing to take on the role of a political champion or leader and to promote cycling during this window of opportunity. According to our pro-cycling interviewees, the practical constraints listed by the authorities as reasons for which they could not fulfil the demands were comprehensible, yet not fully convincing. The interviewees speculate that the tactical way of planning and implementing was simply not part of the set of operating modes of the administration, and that the aspirations of the political heads of departments to promote cycling were not strong enough. As one Lucerne MP states, "I think they like to do it correctly, which I understand. […] Of course, you can't say as an administration, we don't care about federal law. But yes, they lack a bit of courage [to just try it]".

While the absence of political champions may seem surprising in cities where policies aiming at promoting cycling or improving the safety of cyclists were already in place, their lack is easier to understand considering the more right-wing political orientation on the cantonal level in Zurich and Lucerne, as cycling is (still) an issue marked by a right–left political gradient (Rérat et al. 2022; Rérat and Ravalet 2022).

In most Swiss cities, part of the road network lies in the domain of the canton, on the main traffic axes. While the exact division of rights and duties between cantons and municipalities on these streets is too complex to be elaborated here, suffice it to say that cities depend on the canton's consent when adjusting the cantonal roads on their territory. Since the roads where pop-up bike lanes would have had the biggest impact are mostly cantonal roads, the reluctance to try out temporary measures can be partly attributed to this division of power.

As the political orientation of the cantons Zurich and Lucerne is much more conservative than that of their capital cities, COVID cycle lanes would have required active lobbying, and the chances of success were considered slim. Here again, the lack of political will or courage to challenge the cantons by negotiating a similar application of Article 107 as was done in Geneva or Lausanne can partly explain the inaction of the Zurich and Lucerne authorities. One interviewee states that "to put it bluntly, the canton has done the work for the car lobby". While it should be acknowledged that the political orientation of the cantonal government is certainly a real barrier according to the proponents of pop-up bike lanes, it is also a convenient excuse for authorities to avoid dealing with (car-oriented) opposition.

The responses of the authorities in Zurich and Lucerne can be summed up as an attitude of agreeing in principle with the demands but disagreeing with their temporary nature and the process of implementation. Interestingly, there have been temporary extensions of outdoor dining areas for restaurants and cafés in both cities (as in many other Swiss cities), showing that the temporary reallocation of space is not per se impossible and not due to cultural differences in governance between the linguistic regions. However, this reallocation was almost uncontested and in this regard very different from the reallocation of road space. It suited all political parties as it supported businesses in need, did not require 'playing' with the legal framework and would thus not be considered tactical urbanism in our interpretation.

#### **5.5 Discussion**

The COVID-19 pandemic presented a unique window of opportunity that was used to push for more cycling infrastructure in cities around the globe. Although most Swiss cities did not seize this window of opportunity, those who did take action did so via an original, unprecedented application of the legal framework, displaying elements of top-down tactical urbanism (Andres et al. 2021; Lydon and Garcia 2015).

What made it possible for cycling infrastructure to be implemented so swiftly? Our study supports the idea that a political champion is needed (Wilson and Mitra 2020) when cycling policy has not been fully established and consolidated. This person, typically holding a position in a government, is characterized by the political capital and stamina to promote cycling policies and defend it against opposition.

As local authorities—and not citizens or grassroots movements—were the main drivers behind the measures of tactical urbanism, the case presented here differs from the way literature generally portrays tactical urbanism. Nevertheless, this top-down approach was partly spurred on by local groups and associations, adding a more bottom-up element. This highlights that tactical urbanism interventions can be led by a range of actors, from individual citizens, more organized movements, local associations, developers and planning firms through to local governments.

Measures of tactical urbanism initiated by authorities are bound by a legal framework and might therefore be considered less original or 'tactical'. We argue, however, that tactical urbanism is mainly characterized by pursing long-term objectives by unconventional means. The aspects of playing with higher law and the unmistakable aspirations to a sustained transformation of road space in Geneva and Lausanne are thus very much in line with tactical urbanism. The temporary nature of the cycle lanes, and the possibility of adjusting or undoing that goes with this temporariness, encouraged city officials to tackle projects that are difficult to accomplish in compliance with the standard norms and to turn to more radical solutions such as reallocating entire traffic lanes to cycling.

The unconventionality of the local authorities' actions—the element of tactics in the Swiss case and distinguishes it from instances of temporary urbanism observed in cases where COVID cycle lanes or other measures related to public and traffic spaces resulted from a more classic top-down process (see Chaps. 2, 3, 6, and 7). Topdown tactical urbanism might take various forms depending on the legal and political leeway provided to the authorities. As this also affects the creativity and unconventionality of the interventions, the results of local authorities' tactical urbanism may look and feel different to grassroots initiatives. We therefore identify a need for literature on tactical urbanism to also focus on governments and the tactical elements in their way of acting.

Moving from the process to the substance, it should be noted that there was fierce opposition, or 'bikelash' (Wild et al. 2018), against the COVID cycle lanes, particularly in Geneva. This shows that the system of automobility is still dominant, especially where the distribution of road space is concerned. Transitioning towards a more complete system of vélomobility thus requires a political will and strong alliances between different actors and parties. Most importantly, because these policies are still fragile, their implementation depends on political champions willing to personally advocate for cycling (Wilson and Mitra 2020).

#### **5.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that Geneva and Lausanne have used tactical urbanism to rapidly implement COVID cycle lanes in Spring 2020. We identified the conditions that made such measures possible: urgency, the low quality of existing cycling infrastructures, 'political champions', and a desire to develop cycling.

Even though the way the authorities played with higher law was uniquely tied to the context of the lifting of lockdown measures, there are some lessons that can be (and in some cases already have been) drawn in the domain of planning in Switzerland in general.

In Lausanne, one member of the executive described the idea of flexibility in planning as "a novel paradigm". This new way of testing and rapid implementation, which was discovered in the first phase of the pandemic, has left its marks in all four of the cities under study. Lucerne, for example, has implemented a procedure to support residents in establishing pop-up parks as a "planning instrument to revitalize public space" (Celi 2021), clearly indicating a broader purpose typical of tactical urbanism. Similarly, the city of Zurich ran a project during summer 2021 where three sections of neighbourhood streets were temporarily closed to individual motorized traffic (Wolfart et al. 2021).

Although the aforementioned reference to a new paradigm might represent a departure from tactical urbanism because it implies more formal, institutionalized practices of governance, the idea of responding quickly by prototyping persists. We conclude that instances of experimentation (Evans et al. 2016) or temporary urbanism (Andres and Zhang 2020) might become more common practices of governance extending beyond the window of opportunity presented by the pandemic.

Our analysis shows that temporary measures have their rightful place in the registers of action of local authorities, in particular in cases where the advancement of long-term goals necessitates a substantial change of the status quo that cannot be sufficiently planned or modelled. Negotiations then take place over 'manifested' plans and tested measures instead of abstract plans on paper or in electronic format.13 By extension, experimental or temporary urbanism can also play an important role in the context of the climate crisis by helping to reframe debates on sustainable mobility, accelerating the transition towards it and overcoming obstacles.

#### **References**

13 This can be (and has been) criticized either as a democratic deficit or as contributing to the democracy of processes, since 'tactile proposals' are more accessible than regular plans (Denis and Garnier 2021).

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# **Chapter 6 Temporary Urbanism in Pandemic Times—Disruption and Continuity of Public Action in Montreal**

**Florence Paulhiac Scherrer**

**Abstract** Faced with the COVID-19 pandemic, the City of Montreal and its boroughs quickly deployed temporary facilities aimed at sharing public space and promoting active mobility (cycling and walking). This so-called strategy of "temporary urbanism" is common to North American cities from the spring of 2020. Several inventories of such measures demonstrate this. However, few of these databases open up the black box of the decision-making processes and levers that the actors have implemented to deploy this urbanism. Thus, the chapter is devoted to these processes, explaining the Montreal case in detail. It reveals the main characteristics of Montreal's public action. As such, it highlights the local particularities of it, considered at the same time as agile, a source of numerous conflicts but also very adaptative. To conclude, we emphasize on two dimensions. First, the pandemic demonstrates that Montreal public actors had resources to respond to the crisis, rooted in action routines but also in a capacity for innovation. Secondly, that this incremental dimension of temporary urbanism is now considered by public actors as an opportunity to implement sustainable changes, in the longer term, through the deployment of a "transitory urbanism".

**Keywords** Active mobility · Public space · Temporary urbanism · Montreal · COVID-19

Starting in the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 health crisis and its public management disrupted the daily travel habits of most people. The declaration of a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11 then marked a real turning point. In numerous countries, confinement meant closing down non-essential activities and relocating certain activities to the home. The succession of confinement and deconfinement measures that followed over many months thereafter, along with the barriers created by social distancing, indeed modified the daily mobility patterns of

© The Author(s) 2024

F. Paulhiac Scherrer (B)

University of Quebec in Montreal, Montreal, Canada e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
N. Ortar and P. Rérat (eds.), *Cycling Through the Pandemic*, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45308-3\_6

inhabitants. It also affected the reasons people travelled, mostly by restricting mandatory and non-mandatory travel, the conditions of travel (due to mask-wearing and physical-distancing requirements) and the time and location of travel (since people were encouraged to stay close to home). Moreover, in the face of this unprecedented crisis, many organizations issued recommendations promoting the use of active mobility. The WHO also recommended that people get outside every day and stay active, for both their physical and mental health (WHO 2022). Municipalities, who found themselves on the frontlines during the health crisis, were therefore faced with significant challenges. They were responsible for ensuring that, for their health and well-being, people could get around safely and had access to essential services.

An overview of cities around the world shows that the latter rapidly adopted similar strategies, primarily based on the concept of temporary urbanism, practically all at the same time (Nikitas et al. 2021; Paulhiac Scherrer 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic, this so-called "temporary urbanism" is used to organize the use and redevelopment of open spaces, whose original vocation is partially or totally obsolete for a while (Law et al. 2021). In this way, public interventions generate new uses, practices and values in these places, for a given time. As such, this chapter begins by providing a brief review of the main characteristics of this crisis-based urbanism (Part 1). Quickly implemented and reversible, this type of urbanism rests upon low-cost interventions aimed at sharing public spaces using a different approach that promotes active mobility (cycling and walking). Despite their commonalities (principles of intervention and intervention techniques), these municipal facilities also have a wide range of names, locations, duration and even uses. Through this overview of the measures, we emphasize the decision-making processes and levers that stakeholders were able to implement in order to react to the situation so quickly. This raises the question of the relevance of these measures and their impact in the longer term. More broadly, an examination of public action processes and instruments brings to light the specific characteristics of local contexts in the management of a global crisis.

To illustrate the governance processes at work, it continues by using Montreal as a case study. The analysis goes beyond simply describing the facilities (Part 2) to addressing how public action is taken in this situation, which was unprecedented for municipal management. We shall pay close attention to the manner in which temporary urban planning interventions are connected to existing public practices and prior policies. We will also highlight the innovative approaches used by public stakeholders as well as the impact of crisis-based urbanism in the medium term. Viewing crisis management as part of the public policy trajectory allows us to more accurately describe urbanism in Montreal within the context of a pandemic (Part 3). As we will see, public action in Montreal focused on agile urbanism as well as conflict urbanism. However, the municipality's ability to rapidly adapt to the evolution of the situation in the face of opposition also points to incremental urbanism. The municipality has harnessed the transformative nature of this experience, which it can apply to future urban policies. As such, temporary urbanism in pandemic times could well be described as transitory urbanism in the longer term (Conclusion).

#### **6.1 Temporary Urbanism as a Municipal Response to Managing the COVID-19 Pandemic in North America**

We begin with a summary of international municipal responses to the mobility challenges raised by the pandemic. First off, these measures share a common frame of reference (Muller and Jobert 1987) even if they are implemented in different ways depending on the context. In fact, starting in March 2020, numerous cities around the world quickly implemented urbanism measures to control traffic in public spaces and ensure residents had access to essential services and businesses. These interventions allowed for a given period of time (sometimes undetermined), a new sharing and occupation of the public space. They created safe travel conditions and promoted physical activity among inhabitants. Such measures can be defined as practice of "temporary urbanism". This notion emerged in the academic literature during the 2000s (Haydn and Temel 2006) and became established in the operational field from the 2010s onwards (Pradel 2010), eventually being widely used to describe certain methods of planning public spaces during the pandemic (Andres and Zhang 2020; Law et al. 2021). From a theoretical point of view, the new uses must make it possible to enhance vacant places, to test occupations or even to encourage new appropriations in the short but also the long terms (Madanipour 2017; Pradel 2010). But the temporality and the design of these non-permanent developments varies greatly depending on the location and the issues and so are their impacts. Thus temporary urbanism can be deployed cyclically or not (Hayden and Temel 2006; Pinard and Morteau 2019; Pradel 2010). Thus, the concept of temporary urbanism is distinct from that of "tactical urbanism", which refers to activist and citizen interventions to compensate for shortcomings in public action (Lydon and Garcia 2015). It can, however, join that of "transitory urbanism" when these punctual interventions lead to new permanent installations, uses and values (Pradel 2019). The following Table 6.1 summarizes these notions.

The concurrence of such practices on an international scale has sparked an interest in examining the specific interventions undertaken, whether these interventions take the form of constituting an inventory of measures or producing guides for municipal action. These inventories were created in March 2020 and expanded along with the municipal interventions undertaken over the course of several months. As such, in the

**Table 6.1** Concepts of temporary, tactical and transitory urbanism

spring of 2020, we documented and analysed 17 inventories that included mobility and urbanism projects related to the health crisis.1 Of these inventories, 10 were open databases whose main purpose was to produce an exhaustive list of public measures deployed by cities and transport agencies in response to the pandemic, relying on the collaboration of various stakeholders around the world. The remaining inventories were best practice or monitoring guides, which incorporated some examples and illustrations of key developments.

#### *6.1.1 Brief Overview of Inventories*

Stemming from various sources, these inventories varied significantly in form and content. They were initiated by associations, non-profit organizations and expertise centres as well as professional urban planners or researchers in the fields of transportation and mobility. Most were developed in North America, specifically in organizations and research centres based in the U.S. A case in point, the National Association of City Transportation Organization (NACTO), together with City Transportation Action Updates, proposed the creation of the biggest database in terms of number of cases (a little over 900 during the summer of 2020).2 In comparison, the databases provided by Combs (University of North Carolina), Lyndon and Sitzoglou included over 1100 cases combined. While they were essentially open to the world, the North American inventories mainly included data on American and Canadian cities. The inventories produced by the National League of Cities and Bloomberg Philanthropies (120 cases), Smart Growth America (176 cases) and Lyndon, for their part, only dealt with the United States. In Europe, it was essentially the inventories of French public organizations ADEME (*Agence de l'environnement et de la maîtrise de l'énergie*) and CEREMA (*Centre d'études et d'expertise sur les risques, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement*) that were taken into consideration along with those of Eco-compteur and Yespark. Although these resources differ insofar as they include fewer cases, they are nonetheless documented in much more detail (more in the form of a guide for best practices).

In any case, the primary mission of these inventories is to provide information. The inventorying of urban planning practices in pandemic times, on a larger scale, reveals the measures put in place at the different stages of crisis management—from confinement to deconfinement. The majority of inventories categorize interventions based on their set objectives (respecting social distancing measures, safe travel/movement, access to recreational activities or to businesses, providing shuttle services for employees in essential sectors, etc.). Certain inventories, however, instead categorize interventions by type of public space facility (and the local names

1 A list of these inventories is included at the end of the chapter (Table 6.3).

2 This inventory is completed by a second called *Streets for Pandemic Response and Recovery,*  which presents a few typical cases (approximately 20). In 2022, the *City Transportation Action Updates* inventory was no longer current*.*

these are given). Note that classifying interventions in this manner does not always take into consideration their key challenges or desired objective. On a final note, it is worth emphasizing that while certain inventories aim to document opportunities that exist for implementing the measures in the cited contexts, others opt for a more militant stance that promotes the development of certain facilities over others (cycling, for example).

Once we established an overall portrait of the existing databases, we developed our own typology of the measures, regardless of their context or inventory, while keeping in mind that North American contexts are overrepresented. As such, our objective was to define the main characteristics of the measures implemented by local authorities during this unprecedented crisis, without examining the comprehensiveness of these interventions. This typology was developed by taking into consideration the targeted objectives and the anticipated impact of the measures. Based on this, we identified two categories of measures in these inventories: those related to the development of public spaces in accordance with temporary urbanism—which promotes the use of active mobility and the respect of social distancing measures; those aimed at the adaptation and continuity of pre-existing urban transportation systems based on how mobility practices evolve during the pandemic. The next table (Table 6.2) summarizes the two types strategies. As we will show, the Canadian context is representative of this typology.

**Table 6.2** Typology of the cities' strategies during COVID-19 pandemic

**Table 6.3** Inventories used

**Table 6.3** (continued)

**Table 6.3** (continued)

**Table 6.3** (continued)

#### *6.1.2 Redevelop Public Spaces to Promote Active Mobility*

The first category of measures includes interventions frequently used by cities in every context documented by the inventories. From a public health perspective, public spaces dedicated to mobility (roads and sidewalks) are key locations where the risk of spreading COVID-19 can be managed. Moreover, the decrease in motorized traffic creates a great opportunity to redevelop these spaces, which are usually reserved for cars, in favour of other modes of transportation and road users. As such, during the confinement period at the start of the pandemic, cities around the world reacted in many similar ways, creating new and temporary amenities on roadways and parking lots and extending existing trails and paths in an effort to ensure the safe circulation of pedestrians and cyclists. These measures generally targeted a combination of objectives: enforcing social distancing, promoting alternative transportation for employees in essential sectors, ensuring a better connectivity to essential services and promoting physical activity. The facilities resulting from these measures were quickly designed and developed, at minimal and flexible costs (construction fixtures, paint for markings on the ground, etc.). The shape these facilities take and the names they are given vary by City. In Canada, different types of facilities have emerged in large cities (Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver) and, to a lesser extent, in other urban centres such as Halifax, Edmonton and Calgary.

This category of measures includes complete or partial road closures. Such closures go by a variety of different names when they concern residential streets (healthy streets, quiet streets, shared streets, etc.). Partial or complete closures also concern roads surrounding parks, green spaces and waterways within the territory. The objective in the latter case is to facilitate access to areas where people go to relax or enjoy outdoor spaces. These measures also include so-called sanitary corridors or multi-functional circulation corridors. The Slow Street programme in the City of Oakland (USA), which was launched in April 2020, is one such example. The programme aims to convert residential (and commercial) streets into spaces for pedestrians and cyclists. The goal is to encourage social distancing (6 feet), reduce the risk of crowding and promote universal accessibility while safely using all of the space available on designated streets and ensuring good traffic flow. Streets are closed to cars (with the exception of local traffic) and open to cyclists and pedestrians thanks to what is referred to as soft closure—which involves installing gates, road signs and traffic cones. New York City has implemented these measures with a programme called Open Streets through which streets are closed to vehicular traffic between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. and reserved instead for other users. This generally occurs on streets that are adjacent to parks and green spaces, commercial strips or residential areas.

The measures identified generally emphasize safe travel conditions but also address the issue of maintaining economic vitality by ensuring access to businesses. In fact, the addition of delivery areas or temporary outdoor patios on high-traffic streets were also identified. In Oakland, the Flex Streets initiative, introduced in June 2020, provided support to businesses by permitting them to use public areas to expand their business activities. Cities in Canada also adopted the same strategy. In Toronto, for example, CaféTO allowed coffee shops and restaurants to serve their customers outdoors in public areas (sidewalk cafés or curb lane cafés). In partnership with economic development corporations and local business associations, the programme enabled over 600 restaurant or café owners to set up patio spaces in front of their businesses.

During the deconfinement period, the focus was clearly on active mobility and the safe coexistence of different modes of transportation, with a view to promoting the recovery of activities (cultural, recreational, economic and commercial). Different mechanisms were added or modified to facilitate circulation in more crowded commercial areas and encourage customers to visit businesses or, to promote recreational and summer activities.

#### *6.1.3 Adapting the Transport System to New Mobility Methods*

The second category of measures concerns adapting the existing urban transportation system in response to the profound changes that affected mobility. Beginning in March 2020, there was an overall decrease in commuting in North American and European cities overall. The introduction of confinement measures, the hiatus on certain activities and the implementation of teleworking meant that people had fewer reasons to travel on a daily basis. This also resulted in the decreased use of public transportation. Needless to say, social distancing measures also reduced ridership and caused some users to feel less confident about using these modes of transportation.3 There was also an increase in driving or walking among those who continued to commute to work or access essential services. Moreover, in the U.S., Apple's report on mobility trends showed that driving increased by 33% and walking by 30% while use of public transportation decreased by 44%. Comparatively, in major Canadian urban centres, driving increased by 56% and walking by 52% while using public transportation decreased by 40%.4

Public transit corporations (TCs) therefore faced new operational challenges. They had to continue providing transportation services to those who did not have access to other methods of transportation, specifically when these were employees in essential sectors or members of the public who required access to essential services. However, the decrease in business revenue, increase in cleaning costs and the need for restructuring that stemmed from this context created a heavy financial burden that was difficult for public transit corporations to bear. This resulted in service cutbacks and temporary layoffs for many of these corporations. Some transit corporations adopted strategies focused on providing better access to essential services by prioritizing specific routes and itineraries. Certain bus routes were therefore modified while others were temporarily suspended. Demand-management measures included free fares (complete, partial or targeted), frequent cleaning, boarding the bus using back doors as well as information/awareness campaigns aimed specifically at maintaining services and protecting both employees and passengers.

#### *6.1.4 Understanding the Political Dimensions of Managing the Crisis*

This typology of measures addresses the question of the political context in which these strategies were deployed. The vast majority of databases provide a relatively detailed description of the solutions put forth and information on the types of networks targeted or facilities implemented. At the same time, we examined the inventories from the perspective of the institutional and decision-making framework in which these measures are deployed. This framework refers in particular to the scale of intervention, the actors involved, the decision-making processes, the resources mobilized and, finally, the timeframe for implementing the interventions.

It is clear from our review that information on these specific dimensions is rarely recorded as part of the inventories. Where the scale of intervention is concerned, several inventories documented the location of the facilities (naming the neighbourhood, block or intersection) without providing information on the sector or on the selection criteria for the locations in question. Concerning stakeholders, only cities and transportation agencies or corporations were cited as being responsible for said

3 The TC sector is not the only one that was hard hit by mobility-related changes. Indeed, the pandemic also greatly affected shared-mobility services.

4 This data was consulted at https://covid19.apple.com/mobility in the spring of 2020.

measures. The inventories made no distinction between the different teams responsible, their specific roles within the concerned institutions or the processes at play (planning, implementation, financing, follow-up/evaluation). In no case did an inventory systematically document the connection between temporary urban interventions and any prior or future public action. At the same time, notes included along with certain inventories have alluded to the acceleration of certain transportation policies or programmes that were already planned—however, was a rare occurrence. Lastly, there was no mention of any reactions (support or opposition) to any of the measures.

As such, when it comes to the political dimensions of the interventions, there are three types of blind spots in these inventories. First, there is very little data on the decision-making processes or the instruments used by stakeholders in order to implement these rapid responses. In fact, none of the inventories mentioned the specific levers of public action used during this period of crisis. Second, there is no mention of prior knowledge or pre-existing resources that could have been mobilized to facilitate the implementation of rapid responses adapted to local situations. Lastly, above and beyond temporary urbanism responses, there is no way of knowing if the management of the crisis helped accelerate projects that had already been initiated. Hence, to answer these questions, we conducted an analysis of political processes underlying temporary urbanism during the pandemic in Montreal, the results of which the rest of this chapter is based.5

#### **6.2 Temporary Urbanism in Montreal in Response to the Pandemic**

To help stop the spread of the virus and curb the pandemic, the City of Montreal and its boroughs quickly implemented a series of emergency measures in partnership with the Montreal Public Health.6 The goal of these temporary urbanism interventions was to provide Montrealers with safe conditions for active mobility, as well as efficient access to essential resources in different neighbourhoods, directly from their homes. Viewed this way, these interventions can easily fit within the first category of measures identified in the inventories, as part of our previous typology.

5 The following results are drawn from the analysis of 8 interviews (professionals from the City of Montreal and boroughs) and public documents (2020–22).

6 The Montreal Public Health is the regional district of the provincial Ministry of Public Health and Social Services.

#### *6.2.1 Active Mobility at the Heart of Emergency Measures*

Let's return to the regulatory context of the municipal intervention in Montreal. On 12 March 2020, the Government of Quebec (Canada) declared a state of health emergency throughout the province, which officially lasted until 1 June 2022. This measure gave public health authorities in particular exceptional powers to contain the pandemic. Consequently, starting on this date, a confinement period of 13 weeks was imposed upon Quebecers, which resulted in a partial economic shutdown (suspension of non-essential activities) as well as a massive increase in teleworking and online classes at all education levels. It is also worth noting that higher education institutions maintained teleworking and online classes for 18 consecutive months. Companies that were able to do so kept employees working from home for even longer.

Cities were forced to manage this crisis in an unprecedented regulatory framework based on emergency measures. In fact, on 27 March 2020, the City of Montreal exercised its power to declare a State of Emergency (Civil Protection Act), which ended on 19 May 2022. In this context, the authority normally granted to the executive committee was delegated to the Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC), which has extraordinary powers regarding the protection of persons and health. As a result, all of the City's decisions and financing allocated to municipal interventions were assessed and made by the ECC.7 This allowed decision-making processes within the municipal administration to be decompartmentalized for a given period of time. In this particular context, mobility was at the heart of emergency measures and management of the health crisis.

The modification of activities—most notably related to work but also to leisure and purchasing goods and services—resulted in a radical transformation of the daily mobility patterns of the population. People had fewer reasons to leave the house and, when they did, they travelled shorter distances since they kept most of their activities close to home. Several macroscopic indicators also provided evidence of the major changes to automobile traffic. Namely, in June and July 2020, in Montreal, individuals spent 59% of their time at their usual workplace and 41% of their time elsewhere—mainly at home (Shearmur et al. 2020). According to the data provided by Apple, road traffic in the Greater Montreal Area dropped by 80% in April of 2020 (Apple). And, according to the TomTom application, traffic in this sector decreased by 31% between mid-March and late June 2020 (TomTom).8 For its part, the use of public transit plummeted by 90% in April and May 2020 (according to the Transit application).9

7 The ECC is therefore "responsible for the analysis, approval, financing and coordination of the strategic measures to be implemented in such a context, at the City level". (Montreal Ombudsman 2020, p. 18).

8 Data acquired from TomTom (2020). 2020 Traffic Index (https://www.tomtom.com/en\_gb/trafficindex/ranking/).

9 Data acquired from Transit (2020). *Coronavirus: quel impact sur les transport collectifs* (https:// transitapp.com/coronavirus).

There were also other factors that placed conditions upon people's movement and travel. Health Canada, for instance, imposed social distancing measures through which individuals were required to stay 2 m apart in public areas in an effort to help stop the virus from spreading and curb the pandemic. These measures, however, in no way prevented people from travelling to access businesses and essential services. Moreover, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and Quebec Public Health encouraged daily physical activity, both for mental health and overall well-being (in reference to the ECC's recommendations). The public was therefore invited to go outdoors and get active every day—by walking or biking, for example. In this regard, Montreal was much like the rest of Canada insofar as access to public spaces and areas was not restricted. In fact, the use of parks soared to new heights, resulting in the latter being overrun and overcrowded. The challenge then became ensuring that everyone had access to public spaces and facilitating travel to and from the City's parks and green spaces.

Needless to say, health challenges and the ensuing changes directly affected the City of Montreal which, like other cities around the world, saw itself as obligated to act quickly. The municipality also wished to prevent a mass return to driving, which could result in car travel being viewed as safer than public areas and public transportation, both associated with health risks. With this in mind, the City focused on the temporary reconfiguration of public spaces. The objective of this was twofold—creating new spaces in which pedestrians and cyclists could share the road differently, and implement a walkable network connecting the City's parks. These reconfigurations stem from two levels of decision making and intervention—the boroughs and the central government (the City of Montreal). Indeed, they were both inspired from many guidelines published in spring 202010 but also from their own internal experience for years.

10 During spring 2020, different North-American organizations published guidelines dedicated to Pop-up infrastructures and temporary public space sharing (e.g. "Reallocating street space in the context of COVID-19—How to temporarily redesign streets for the physical and mental health, safety and well-being of citizens" by the Canadian Federation of Municipalities). When interviewed, professionals from the City of Montreal stated that the resources posted online by NACTO ("Streets for Pandemic—Response and Recovery guide") were used to inform their thoughts on which urban planning initiatives to undertake, as well as French CEREMA's resources ("Temporary cycling facilities: testing for sustainable development" and the online training).

#### *6.2.2 Interventions in Public Spaces at Two Levels*

Within the context of the health crisis, boroughs11 are the first to quickly intervene by setting up sanitary corridors to ensure safe access to essential businesses and services on the streets they are responsible for. These corridors are generally marked off by metal gates, transforming a few parking spots into pedestrian pathways or bike paths in some instances. Certain neighbourhoods take this reallocation of public areas even further by completely or partially closing off some of their streets to use them instead for outdoor recreational activities located close to living areas. As such, Family Streets, Active Streets and Play Streets were implemented over the course of the summer 2020 period. These temporary amenities were also created using metal gates as well as panels, construction materials, paint for markings on the ground and even flower boxes.

The central municipal government provided support to boroughs through the creation and distribution of a guidebook. But this particular guidebook contains all of the information that might prove useful in helping with decision making and quickly setting up temporary facilities, while still ensuring that the latter are effective. One of the main challenges is ensuring a certain level of consistency among interventions. The guidebook is intended to act as a lever to ensure a connectivity between the facilities set up by the boroughs and those the City plans to implement within its territory. It also guides interventions from a safety perspective. It suggests methods for choosing streets where intervention is a priority and provides approaches that can be used to re-divide streets according to the situation. As such, each type of redeveloped street (slow, family, shared, etc.) can be adapted to the environment into which the project must be integrated. The guidebook also provides more technical information on rephrasing traffic lights, adapting road markings, ensuring universal accessibility, managing waiting lines and dealing with outdoor patios located near sanitary corridors. From an institutional standpoint, it is the *Service de concertation des arrondissements* (the borough collaboration department) that is mandated with "coordinating tactical action" (Montreal Ombudsman 2020: 18). In this context, an "ECC liaison officer" is appointed to ensure the coordination between "the ECC's strategic decisions and the tactical decisions of the departments and boroughs concerned" (Montreal Ombudsman 2020: 18).

Along with this, the City of Montreal also launched a City-wide municipal action plan in May 2020—an ambitious temporary urbanism plan for the summer season through which it proposed the creation of 112 kms of "Safe Active Roads" (SARs). But the plan also recalled that 88 km of streets redeveloped for the benefit of pedestrians and cyclists by the boroughs; it added to this the new permanent cycling infrastructures already planned for the summer (24 km of the *Réseau express vélo*

11 The municipal structure has two components: first, the City of Montréal with an elected mayor and councilors and, second, the 19 boroughs, also headed by a mayor and elected councilors. City and boroughs have respective competences. The boroughs are responsible for the local road network, while the City is responsible for the higher road networks. Thus, boroughs had been able to intervene in the redevelopment of several streets in the districts during the COVID-19 pandemic.

(REV); 33 km of the non-REV cycling network; 70 kms of local cycling network, planned by the boroughs). The mayor's announcement was therefore resounding, proposing 327 km of new pedestrian and bicycle lanes.

The *Direction de la mobilité* (mobility directorate), part of the City's Urban Planning and Mobility Department, was entrusted with creating and implementing the SARs. The plan's strategy focused on the reallocation of public space to benefit pedestrians, cyclists and Montreal residents in general. The objective was to promote safe active travel for everyone and encourage users who had abandoned public transit in favour of active modes of transportation. In keeping with the scale of the plan, SARs were designed to be part of a larger interconnected network to facilitate the daily mobility of Montreal residents and promote outdoor activities, these pathways were created to connect residential streets to larger parks and green spaces. SARs were also intended to support economic recovery by facilitating access to local shops and businesses.12 As such, portions of these pathways are located or connected to commercial areas.

#### *6.2.3 Strategic Cycling Facilities*

Actually, far from the announcement, the plan for SARs resulted in the creation of 24.5 km of bike paths and 13.5 km of pedestrian paths during the summer of 2020. Focused primarily on cycling, SARs proposed enhancing the bike path network (by doubling the number of bike paths, specifically between high-travel areas) and creating new paths among those included in Montreal's Bike Plan (2019). This Bike Plan outlines future paths to be implemented based on a political consensus reached between the boroughs and the City. It was therefore mobilized by the *Direction de la Mobilité* in 2020 to be used as a guide for prioritizing interventions.

Incidentally, it should be noted that "regular" urbanism remained on track, despite the health crisis. In fact, the City successfully completed one of the flagship projects of its mandate, the first portion of the Express Bike Network (*Réseau express vélo* or REV). Keep in mind that, when Valérie Plante and her *Projet Montréal* party took office for the first time in 2017, it marked a major turning point. Often referred to as the "sustainable mobility mayor", Ms. Plante has many projects to transform the mobility of Montrealers (extension of the bike path, new metro line, Vision Zero policy, etc.). Accordingly, Mayor Plante was quickly able to secure the adoption of the Express Bike Network project, a dedicated sustainable infrastructure made up of 17 new bike paths spanning 184 km in total. Considering the health and active mobility challenges related to the pandemic, the municipal team decided to stay

12 During the summer of 2020, businesses with direct access to the outdoors were permitted to set up waiting or pick-up zones in public areas. Restaurant owners also had the option of setting up temporary patios on sidewalks or in parking lots and occasionally on the car lanes of certain streets.

the course when COVID began in 2020. It therefore did everything in its power to complete the first portion of the Express Bike Network—namely, 8.7 km of separate lanes built on either side of Saint-Denis/Berri/Lajeunesse streets in the summer of 2020.

#### **6.3 Agile Urbanism, Contested and Incremental in Nature**

In Montreal, as in numerous other cities, temporary urbanism in response to the pandemic is characterized by how quickly solutions were developed and implemented. A mere month after the routes covered by SARs were planned out, they were already implemented. In this section, we are opening the black box of governance tools and processes that fuelled this urban planning initiative, the details of which have yet to be documented. The objective is to highlight the levers that local stakeholders have at their disposal to achieve agility in their interventions, but also to continually adapt facilities to ensure the needs of the population are met to the greatest possible extent. While this agility was fuelled internally through the municipal administration's assets (expertise, previous plans), it was also the result of unprecedented experimentation. The incremental nature of the interventions, for its part, was the result of follow-up methods applied over time. Keep in mind that this ongoing stepby-step adaptation process was also a reaction to the many criticisms the municipal administration was forced to contend with in the summer of 2020.

#### *6.3.1 Assets for Tailored Crisis Management*

As mentioned above, the establishment of the ECC involved an unprecedented decision-making process. All of the chosen SARs required prior approval from the centre, which would be financing these specific routes once approved. It should be noted that each of these routes had to be justified by the health crisis. In this particular context, all of the measures employed are considered unusual and temporary.

Although this was an entirely new situation for municipal authorities, they nonetheless mobilized several of the municipal administration's internal levers. In fact, the *Direction de la Mobilité* had possessed a great deal of internal expertise regarding active mobility for quite some time, and this knowledge was put to use very quickly. Several professionals used a programme aimed at implementing shared pedestrian roads (*Programme d'implantation des Rues piétonnes et Partagées* or PIRPP), launched in 2015, as a reference point. This small-scale temporary urbanism summer programme provided an opportunity to test out and evaluate road-sharing and pedestrianization projects. The City's internal expertise was also sourced in technical documents such as the guide for the sustainable development of Montreal streets—*Guide d'aménagement durable des rues de Montréal* (which consists of several theme-based parts and has been published regularly since 2010). Thanks to its expertise, the City was able to quickly produce and distribute the guide in order to support the temporary urbanism processes of its boroughs. Moreover, recently updated plans were used for the purpose of identifying the best routes. For instance, Montreal's Bike Plan, adopted in 2019, made it possible to quickly choose specific SARs to be used for cycling. Using a pre-existing plan is also a great strategy that certain boroughs can use to create their own facilities. At this level, local mobility plans are used if they already exist.

Despite these assets, it is important to keep in mind that this is a rather unprecedented situation to which municipal teams must adapt in record time. Strategically speaking, the inherent challenges and solutions that need to be provided are unlike anything experienced before. For instance, pre-pandemic temporary urbanism practices (PIRPP) were basically only deployed on a smaller scale. The pandemic, however, required an urbanism response on a much larger scale—namely, for the Island of Montreal overall. The solutions were developed to be part of a network that runs from one shore of the island to the other. Furthermore, the urgent nature of the situation meant that the City had to work quickly and put continuous monitoring mechanisms into place to validate the effectiveness of the solutions. At the same time, these interventions have been the subject of considerable criticism in the media as well as in political and legal circles. This directly impacted the type of action taken by the City and played a key role in the short and medium-term evolution of municipal interventions.

#### *6.3.2 Dealing with Public, Political and Legal Criticism*

It goes without saying that the ECC's mechanisms and the issues to be addressed disrupted traditional decision-making processes. These processes tend to be spread out over time and rest upon consultation and collaboration with different stakeholders. However, in this very specific context, the City was not required to consult with any other party, including the public. Hence, the SARs were implemented at a speed that drew criticism from various sources, the repercussions of which was tremendous.

Some of this criticism originated first and foremost from the City's partners. Specifically, boroughs felt like they were backed into a corner due to the fast-paced and centralized decision-making process that immediately imposed SARs upon their neighbourhoods. Keep in mind that boroughs are on the front lines when it comes to managing the reactions of local populations and road users.  Unhappy residents also saw street parking spots near their homes disappear from one day to the next, without prior notice. These sometimes vehement criticisms received extensive media coverage, both locally and nationally. They were also backed by the interim leader of the opposition party, *Ensemble Montréal*, who adopted a strong stance from the outset of the project, which he claimed was imposed upon Montrealers. His main objections were the lack of prior consultation and the

excessive priority given to cycling facilities. According to him, such facilities negatively impacted residents and merchants by causing traffic and encroaching upon parking spaces on many residential streets and commercial arteries (Agence QMI, 15 May 2020).

To take things a step further, many opponents of the development opted to take the legal route of filing a complaint with the City of Montreal's Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is "*an entity (…) independent from the municipal administration that offers citizens who (feel that they) have been adversely affected by the decisions, actions or omissions of the City of Montréal recourse that is easily accessible and free. (…)"*. 13 When receiving a complaint, the Ombudsman evaluates any possible harm and investigates the case when required. Depending on the results, the Ombudsman then makes recommendations to the City in order to "change the decision or correct the situation".14 During the summer of 2020, 240 admissible complaints (out of 300 received) were processed.15 These complaints concerned three types of interventions: the temporary facilities put into place by three boroughs, five SARs implemented by the City, and the first portion of the REV that was in the process of being built in the summer of 2020. Those who filed the complaints were cyclists, seniors, persons with reduced mobility and members of families that owned cars. Note that, in the end, few complaints were made by businessowners.

In her report, the Ombudsman emphasized that the main reasons for the complaints were safety, universal accessibility and communication with citizens.16 Some of the complaints also concerned the absence of a consensus between the City and boroughs. In the wake of these findings, which are widely documented in the report, recommendations were made while specifying the timeframes and responsibilities of interventions in an effort to improve contentious situations. Where the safety of facilities is concerned, the report includes a request that the City make certain adjustments in a timely manner, in collaboration with different stakeholders. The Ombudsman also issued recommendations for similar facilities in the future, specifically where the decision-making processes and collaborations between different levels are concerned. She also recommended better communication and transparency of information exchanged between the different decision-making levels and the public. The complaints received and the Ombudsman's report had a significant impact on the action taken by the City. Due to the high tension, the City reacted on several fronts, as we will examine in the next section.

13 Source: City of Montreal Web site: https://ombudsmandemontreal.com/a-propos-de-nous/l-omb udsman-de-montreal-en-bref, consulted on 2 May 2022.

14 See footnote 13.

15 Note that the Ombudsman also received 80 messages from citizens who were satisfied with the implemented solutions.

16 The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over decisions related to chosen roads or the removal of parking spaces. She cannot investigate decisions related to the addition of bike paths or the removal of parking spaces, etc. She can, however, investigate aspects of administrative management by virtue of the Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities.

#### *6.3.3 Ongoing Adaptation Process*

First and foremost, it is important to emphasize that SARs were officially accompanied by an ongoing adaptation process, both within the City and within boroughs. This monitoring was mainly the result of a need to respect public health measures. It also resulted in changes that needed to be made over time to ensure that the facilities remained safe and comfortable for users and respected the aesthetics of the surroundings. In addition to the criticisms mentioned earlier, the *Direction de la mobilité* was under tremendous pressure to ensure the safety of the facilities from the very start. As such, the Vision Zero municipal policy17 remained the framework for action throughout the process and road engineers were mandated with creating unprecedented temporary facilities. In addition, a major institutional monitoring system was implemented. Starting in April 2020, several working committees were created within the central municipal government (City of Montréal) in an effort to bring together all of the organizations affected by the temporary facilities (regional public health department, police services, fire department, public transit, highway infrastructure services, the *Service de l'urbanisme et mobilité* (SUM), boroughs and communications employees). Meetings were frequent and focused on recurrent on-site observations. Members of the working committees were invited to report problems and propose solutions. Interventions were mediated and carried out accordingly. The City also promptly made the changes requested by the Ombudsman over the course of the summer and even initiated its own changes while providing the Ombudsman with a continuous follow-up.

It should be noted that no other evaluation of SARs (of their uses or user satisfaction) was initially planned as part of the ECC's decision-making process.18 However, in the face of criticism and opposition, the SUM finally decided an evaluation would be opportune. A steering committee—composed of members from the various departments of the SUM, the *Service de l'expérience citoyenne et des communications*  (citizen experience and communications department), the *Service du Développement économique*, the design bureau and firms (Segma, Eco-compteur) as well as university researchers and economic development corporation representatives—was established. Five evaluation exercises were carried out to measure the impact of the temporary facilities: monitoring and evaluation of the safety of facilities; an evaluation of the use of the facilities and user satisfaction (survey); an evaluation of the universal accessibility of the facilities; an economic portrait and an evaluation of the satisfaction of those who own businesses on pedestrianized streets (survey); and, an evaluation of the design of facilities based on 5 projects. The results of these evaluations, however, were poorly publicized, with the exception of some data concerning the satisfaction of SAR users that appeared in the press. Despite being highly criticized, SARs were highly frequented during the summer of 2020, meeting local and

17 This policy aims to achieve a target of zero road deaths and serious injuries by 2040, through actions such as the redesign of public spaces for example.

18 For reasons related to safety and management of the crisis, the ECC does not finance evaluation measures other than those included as part of the ongoing monitoring.

active mobility needs as a result. Satisfaction surveys showed that the users' level of satisfaction was high, specifically with regard to the safety and user-friendly aspect of the temporary facilities. Despite this, the City preferred not to disseminate these studies, perhaps to avoid additional criticism.

Due to the status and regulatory framework of the emergency measures, all temporary facilities were required to be dismantled starting September 2020, as planned by the ECC. However, in the spring of 2021, the City resurrected a temporary urbanism initiative in favour of active mobility. Through this renewed initiative, the City demonstrated its ability to use everything it had learned from the 2020 experience to significantly redirect its plan for the summer. The Ombudsman's report was used a key reference for this shift, with several of its recommendations guiding decision-making processes and implementation of measures.

#### *6.3.4 Temporary Urbanism Decentralized in 2021*

Similar to the 2020 plan, the summer 2021 plan was based upon a temporary urbanism approach that promoted active mobility. The objective in 2021, however, was to boost economic recovery by supporting local businesses. Consequently, the temporary facilities fell under the responsibility of the *Service du développement économique*  rather than of the SUM and the *Direction de la Mobilité*. 19 These facilities were included as part of the 2021 municipal economic recovery plan entitled *Acting Now to Prepare Recovery.* Note that cycling was now no longer considered as a separate entity with regard to the facilities. The strong criticism against SARs and the REV as well as the outcome of the November 2021 municipal elections definitely affected the situation. While the Mayor had been demonstrating her support for active mobility for several years, she now also had to assume her role as an economic leader. Note that, at that particular time, challenges related to the pandemic were somewhat less daunting—the 3rd wave was at the tail end in Quebec and the vaccination campaign was progressing fairly well. Municipal governments shifted their focus to economy recovery, most notably as it pertains to the local businesses, who had suffered a great deal.

In order to promote greater social acceptability as well as peaceful collaboration between the various stakeholders involved, the City proposed that these temporary development projects be initiated and managed by the boroughs themselves. This decentralization was considered a better option for ensuring more effective supervision, communication with the population and monitoring of developments. A call for proposals from the City, along with funding, allowed boroughs and local business

19 The department is responsible for preparing and submitting the project presentation file and having the project evaluated by one of the City's committees. This is a relatively short process. The selection committee is composed of representatives from different municipal departments and can make recommendations to improve the proposed projects.

development corporations (BDCs) to submit projects that focused on pedestrianizing major commercial arteries in their neighbourhoods.20 The proposed project did, however, have to meet a few requirements. The design needed to be based on developing spaces for relaxation and spaces that allowed for the use of soft mobility in safe surroundings, both for residents and visitors. Projects also needed to be preapproved by at least 50% of affected businessowners. To do so, boroughs and SDCs were required to obtain formal agreements from the majority of affected businessowners and the members of the SDC. Finally, the projects had to include a process for disseminating information and consulting local populations.

With all of the conditions for success in place, all that was left to do was get the boroughs on board before decentralizing the project design process. The City indeed recognized that boroughs possessed expertise with regard to temporary urbanism. In fact, certain boroughs or projects had already taken advantage of the pedestrian and shared-use streets programme or, more recently, the SARs in 2020. Conditions were also greatly improved in terms of communication with citizens. The boroughs were closer to the population and their communication strategies were generally more adapted and effective than those of the central municipal administration. In the end, 13 projects were selected and implemented by the boroughs—mainly central boroughs, which are well known for this type of project and have readily embraced the approach. Note that certain boroughs face more significant political challenges and that some teams have been impaired by the effects of the COVID-19 crisis.

Several methods were used to monitor and evaluate projects. The City's evaluation methods were expected to be integrated with those of the stakeholders so as not to overburden citizens and consumers. It should be noted that merchant associations were quick to launch their own customer surveys. The City, seeing these facilities as a new opportunity to experiment in vivo, implemented a new monitoringevaluation system. The hope was that the experiences of the summer of 2021 (like those of 2020) would serve as a lever for implementing development objectives into the future Urban Planning and Mobility Plan (UPM) to be adopted in 2023. Several themes were examined as part of this exercise: the behaviour of users (same questions as previous years along with additional questions for the 13 territories concerning traffic, parking accessibility and public transit); the involvement and experiences of businessowners (specifically related to delivery and supply); integration of design (via the design firm) and universal accessibility (via boroughs)**.** The City's objective was to be transparent in communicating its goals and how temporary projects were developed and funded. Evaluation results, however, were more difficult to compile and report due to the proliferation of follow-up programmes. The information gathered essentially served as an internal monitoring instrument for the teams involved. Regardless of any issues, the results were certainly very encouraging since, in 2022, the City launched a three-year pedestrianization programme. Hence, in the spring of

20 These projects are jointly funded by the City, which provided \$3.77 M, or up to \$400,000 per project.

2022, the following was posted to the City's Web site: "*Following the resounding success of the pedestrianization projects over the last two years, the City of Montreal is pleased to announce that projects can now be financed for a period of three years, thereby providing commercial arteries with the predictability they seek. This initiative will simplify the process for boroughs and commercial development societies who wish to pedestrianize their arteries during the summer*".21 A budget of \$12 M22 over 3 years has been earmarked for this policy and, starting in 2022, a total of 10 projects will be able to benefit from the financial assistance.

#### **6.4 Conclusion**

In North America, the case study of Montreal well highlights the processes of "temporary urbanism" focused on "redeveloping public spaces to promote active mobility", in response of the COVID-19 pandemic. It illustrates the similar facilities implemented in Montreal compared to other North American cities revealed through our analysis of inventories (Sect. 6.1 of the chapter), but also the weight of the local context in the modelling of such a strategy. Thus, the analysis contributes to better understand the decision-making process underlying this kind of strategy. As elsewhere in Canada (e.g. Toronto, Vancouver), the public response taken in Montreal to deal with this crisis was clearly reactive and ambitious in nature, not to mention the fact that it took place in an unprecedented regulatory framework dictated by emergency measures. Several instruments were mobilized to ensure the proper integration of temporary urbanism measures in local contexts as well as their consistency and continuity, given their application to a largescale network. Our analysis of this agility demonstrates the importance of mobilizing different resources within municipal administrations using pre-existing knowledge and know-how as well as previously adopted road maps. But such a case study also allows us to conclude that the local crisis' governance presents unique characteristics.

While numerous North American cities opted to make some solutions they introduced a permanent fixture, Montreal completely dismantled the facilities. It chose to apply its pedestrianization programme solely during the summer for three years.23 Furthermore, the decision to promote active modes of transportation during the pandemic varies in magnitude. For instance, cycling was a particularly important part of SARs in 2020 but no longer in the years that followed. We show that the

21 Quoted from a source on the following Web site (consulted 7 June 2022): https://projetmon treal.org/nouvelles/animation-estivale-montr%C3%A9al-sinvestit-dans-la-vitalit%C3%A9-com merciale-et-confirme-le-financement-pour-des-projets-de-pi%C3%A9tonnisation-pour-une-dur% C3%A9e-de-trois-ans.

22 This represents approximately e8 million.

23 As a matter of fact, one justification is the winter weather pattern in the Quebec province and the snow removal issue. During winter, Montreal faces an average of 190 cm of snow precipitation.

local context (political, social) and, more specifically, the conditions surrounding the governance of the health crises, largely influences the solutions put forth. It also sheds light on the forms of action taken, specifically by illustrating their strengths and weaknesses.

Otherwise, in the face of technical challenges and opposition, actors were forced to lower their ambitions. For instance, while it had initially anticipated implementing 80 km of temporary roads in boroughs, boroughs only completed 30 km in the end. The situation was similar for SARs, but it is worth noting that this did not compromise the initial plan. The criticisms and requests made by the Ombudsman, for their part, generated a swift response. Not only did the City immediately make the most important changes, it also decided to take things further. In fact, the implementation of SARs was quickly viewed as a unique opportunity. The *in-situ* observations and data collection were intended to be used as post-pandemic steering instruments. For instance, certain observations gave rise to new experiments in 2021 concerning the cohabitation of cyclists, public transport users and pedestrians as well as safety and universal accessibility at certain bus stops. As such, the integration of SAR bike paths is considered as a potential vector for accelerating the implementation of the Bike Plan. This does not mean, however, that the Plan is without criticism. In fact, it is often condemned for lacking a detailed assessment and a ranking of actions to be taken. The pandemic, it would seem, has impaired the teams' ability to complete these two aspects of the plan.

Another major local challenge during the pandemic has been to implement the first portion of the REV when the project appears inopportune to some. In fact, businessowners impacted by the work being done were unhappy with having to deal with yet another obstacle during the economic crisis. Moreover, the project could just have easily failed due to the fact that municipal resources had to be reassigned due to other more pressing issues. Concurrently with the implementation of SARs, the design of the REV needed to be finalized, calls for tenders issued and the REV completed (inauguration in October). Indeed, an enormous amount of work was done internally to get the project off the ground. However, in doing so, temporary urbanism (SARs) combined with regular urbanism (REV) promoted cycling practices among Montreal populations. Although this particular achievement allowed the Mayor to confirm her leadership in the area of active mobility, it in no way provided her with carte blanche to develop other cycling infrastructures. It did not mark a major turning point in favour of cycling either. In fact, in May 2022, a number of critics raised the issue of the limitations of the Bike Plan's 2022 budget, namely 17 million dollars or approximately 3% of the overall municipal budget.

Lastly, this case study raises the issue of the long-term impact of the temporary urbanism. Indeed, from the City's point of view, the lessons learned from it are expected to feed the process of the first Urbanism and Mobility Plan, which will be adopted in 2023. In this perspective, the temporary urbanism (2020–21), perpetuated by the three-year seasonal pedestrianization programme (in 2022) can be seen as the premise of a transitory urbanism, as defined at the beginning of this chapter. Such an urbanism allows for testing and prefiguring future uses in a location or site to be updated. It also promotes the long-term transformation of spaces through successive phases with a view to creating new sustainable facilities. Nevertheless, the attention given to transitory urbanism should not overshadow other important issues which quickly became apparent during the pandemic—such as the public transport crisis. All while being considered important levers in Montreal's ecological transition, TCs are currently experiencing an unprecedented crisis in terms of ridership dropfall, resulting in major financial issues.

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Chapter 7 Pop-Up Bike Lanes and Temporary Shared Spaces in Vienna During the COVID-19 Pandemic**

**Harald Frey, Barbara Laa , and Ulrich Leth**

**Abstract** Similar to many cities, Vienna (Austria) implemented measures to provide more space for pedestrians and cyclists during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this chapter, the implementation process of the temporary shared spaces and "pop-up" bike lanes is described, and the evaluation results regarding their usage as well as the political decisions of their early removal are presented. With video recordings and manual counting, we found that pop-up bike lanes were well adopted by cyclists, but temporary shared spaces have largely failed to attract pedestrians. The possible reasons are discussed as well as the criteria for better implementation of temporary walking and cycling infrastructure in the future. Drawing on the multiple streams theory, we link the decision of suspending all temporary infrastructures to the political situation at the time with pop-up bike lanes as a highly controversial issue before the local elections in October 2020 and a change of government afterward. We conclude that this presents a lost opportunity to permanently redistribute road space for active mobility, but future initiatives could learn from the Vienna case by thinking more strategically about political aspects.

**Keywords** Tactical urbanism · Transport policy · Cycling politics

H. Frey (B) · B. Laa · U. Leth

TU Wien, Institute of Transportation, Research Unit Transport Planning and Traffic Engineering, Vienna, Austria e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
B. Laa e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
U. Leth e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
#### **7.1 Introduction**

In spring 2020, the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe led to far-reaching containment measures and a strong decrease in motorized traffic (Shibayama et al. 2021). Most people avoided public transport due to perceived infection risks while the number of cyclists increased significantly. Outdoor amenities such as parks and playgrounds were closed. This increased the importance of local mobility and the role of public space in residential areas. In the meantime, some reregionalization occurred—at least temporarily. In order to give people enough space and to enable them to keep the required minimum distances, short-term temporary measures were taken worldwide, such as "pop-up bike lanes", extended sidewalks, or temporary shared spaces. These temporary measures are also called "light individual transport (LIT)" infrastructure (ITF 2020).

Cities made use of tools that are usually applied in "tactical urbanism" in a more bottom-up manner (Lydon 2020; Lydon and Garcia 2015; Silva 2016). Existing resources such as traffic cones, bollards, and markings were used to reclaim street space from motor vehicles for pedestrians and cyclists quickly and with low cost. After cities such as Berlin, Bogota, Mexico City, and New York started building temporary infrastructures for active mobility in mid-March, many others around the world followed. In Seville (Spain) and New York City (USA), such resources have previously been used to create extensive networks of bike lanes (Combs 2020; ITF 2020; Lydon 2020).

In past crises, bicycles have proven to be a resilient means of transportation. After major earthquakes in Mexico City in 2017 (de Jong 2017; García-Franco 2020) and in Tokyo in 2011 (Steele 2012), bicycles and motorcycles proved to be the safest and most effective means of transportation. The oil crisis of the 1970s produced iconic images of people cycling and walking on highways. In the Netherlands, the bicycle has never lost its great importance as an everyday means of transportation (Reid 2017). Socially, this first break with the car-oriented transport system was borne out of its ecological side effects and the rapid increase in traffic fatalities; it was also manifested through civil society movement ("*Stop de Kindermoord*"). In response, the Dutch government initiated, among other things, a massive bike path construction program that continues to this day (Reid 2017).

Cities have long been trying to bring about similar developments (increase the shares of cycling and walking modes) in the transport system in the interests of climate and environmental protection as well as social equity. Certainly, the circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis are exceptional and not desirable, but at the same time, are disruptive to the established practices and allowed for acting upon the longheld objectives of redistributing road space to more sustainable transport modes. The COVID-19 pandemic opened a window of opportunity to provide more space for active mobility in a short period of time. This chance was taken by many cities worldwide, which made those changes permanent and accelerated the envisioned shift to sustainable urban transport. Unfortunately, Vienna failed to use this opportunity and suspended all temporary infrastructure after only a few months—and therefore presents an interesting case study to analyze.

The Mobility Agency of Vienna (100% owned by the city) commissioned and funded a study to analyze the effects of introducing temporary infrastructure for active mobility. The objective was to find out if and how people used the pop-up bike lanes and temporary shared space streets as well as to identify deficiencies and success criteria for the implementation. The results have been published in a report in German by Frey et al.(2020) and present the basis for our analysis.

In this study we document the process of implementing temporary shared spaces and pop-up bike lanes in the city during the first wave of COVID-19, use traffic counting to assess the usage of these infrastructures and analyze possible reasons for their suspension. We focus on the "supply side" intervention of infrastructure provision rather than addressing "demand side" interventions such as education, skills acquisition, and community uptake of cycling. Although out of scope of this study, we acknowledge the importance of such interventions and their interrelations with political decisions (Batterbury and Vandermeersch 2016; Cox and Koglin 2020).

Our analysis is based on the framework introduced by Cox (2020) to describe the politics of cycling infrastructure, in combination with Kingdon's multiple streams theory (Kingdon 1995), which has been applied for the assessment of pop-up bike lanes in Sydney by Harris and McCue (2022). Following Gartner (2016), Cox (2020) describes three approaches to infrastructure development: the technocratic, the interventionist, and the critical, with the first two being the dominant perspectives. While the "technocratic" is focused on material value and provision of physical infrastructure to increase cycling, the "interventionist" also views infrastructure as instrumentally valuable but only for achieving broader objectives such as increasing public health or protecting the environment. Due to their shortcomings in terms of political dimensions, Gartner proposes the "critical" approach arguing that infrastructure objects symbolize existing power struggles and can be seen as the material output of social-political relationships.

To further assess this political dimension, we use the multiple streams theory (Kingdon 1995), which encompasses the three streams of (1) problem recognition, (2) formation and refining of policy proposals, and (3) politics. The problem stream addresses the agenda setting of what is seen as a problem. The policy stream deals with solutions to problems and the politics stream with the political will, where elected officials, lobbying groups, and other political players affect the decision. Harris and McCue (2022) highlight the following factors for increasing the likelihood of a policy solution to receive political consideration: technical feasibility, resource adequacy, and value acceptability. Kingdon (1995) described the political stream as being composed of "*such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of administration*" (p. 145). For a new policy to be implemented, all independent streams must align to form a policy window when a new policy can be successfully implemented.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the case of Vienna is described in terms of previous transport policy and COVID-19 measures. After that, the implementation process of temporary infrastructure for active mobility is described. In Sect. 7.3, the survey methods for traffic counting, followed by their results are presented. In Sect. 7.4 the political situation and interpretation of survey results are discussed. Conclusions are presented in Sect. 7.6.

#### *7.1.1 The Case of Vienna*

Vienna is the capital of Austria with 1.92 million inhabitants (Statistik Austria 2021). Even though the city has a relatively low share of car traffic (26% car trips in 2021 (Wiener Linien 2021)) and has been praised for its sustainable transport policy (Buehler et al. 2016), there have been substantial shortfalls in the past years. The share of car trips stagnated and cycling rates are low compared to similar cities in Europe. Between 2013 and 2019, the share of cycling in Vienna was 7% and increased to 9% in 2020 (MA 18 2015; Wiener Linien 2018; Wiener Linien 2021) while the share of cycling in a comparable city, Hamburg, Germany was 15% in 2017 (Follmer et al. 2019).

Strategically, the city has been calling for redistribution of road space in favor of active mobility and aimed at increasing cycling rates since the 1990s. With the latest Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan "STEP 2025" (MA 18 2014) and associated concepts (MA 18 2015; MA 18 2018) being carried out, the City of Vienna has formulated clear objectives for the future development of mobility in Vienna: among others, the reduction of the motorization rate to 250 private cars per 1000 inhabitants by 2030 (now 371 cars per 1000 inhabitants) and the increase of the modal split of active mobility and public transport to 80% in 2025 and to 85% in 2030.

Nevertheless, only a few projects for the redistribution of road space have been realized up until now and no substantial effort has been made to implement a citywide concerted concept. Most of the projects have been controversial before their realization, such as converting Mariahilfer Straße, Vienna's largest shopping street into a pedestrian zone in 2014 (Bartenberger and Sze´sciło 2016; Lankhorst 2020), or the creation of a 400 m long cycling path closing a gap in the cycling network at Naschmarkt in 2019.1

Measures for containment of the COVID-19 pandemic in Austria from mid-March 2020 included the introduction of working from home on a large scale, bans on entering pubs and stores, the closure of schools and kindergartens, and a call to use public transport only for journeys to work or to help someone. These measures were also referred to as the "1st Lockdown". This greatly reduced the number of trips made

1 Fahrrad Wien (2019) "Endlich! Ein Radweg auf der Wienzeile", URL: https://www.fahrradwien. at/2019/05/07/radweg-wienzeile/.

outside the home, by about 60–80% (Frey et al. 2020). After the measures were relaxed, there was a gradual increase, but to varying degrees for different modes of transportation. In motorized private transport, the share has bounced back to the previous level by the beginning of June, while in public transport—where it was compulsory to wear a face mask from April 14—only a maximum of 80% of passengers had returned by the end of June. At bicycle counting stations, strong increases over previous years were observed in the months leading up to the COVID-19 outbreak. In March, there was an overall decrease of only 2%, while at individual counting points far more people were counted even during the lockdown [e.g., + 15% in Lassallestraße (Frey et al. 2020; Nast Consulting 2020)].

An international online survey by Brezina et al. (2020b) asked about changes in everyday mobility during the COVID-19 crisis. A non-representative sample from Vienna contains a total of 1304 individuals who participated in the survey between March 23 and May 12, 2020. A large part of the survey participants were working from home or were not working at the time (70% in total). For the remaining 30%, the share of public transport usage dropped massively (from 49.5 to 2.3%) while the car as a means of transport remained almost the same (7.7% before COVID-19, 6.2% during measures) and the shares of those who walked or biked to work dropped to a lesser extent (from 5.9% to 3.2% and from 23.8% to 8.4%, respectively). The remaining 10% did not answer the question of commuting during the time of lockdown. Further results for Austria were published in Brezina et al. (2020a).

In Vienna, measures were taken to create more space for pedestrians and cyclists in April 2020, in order to enable people to keep the recommended safety distance according to temporary COVID-19 regulations and to create a better situation for pedestrians and cyclists in the immediate living environment. Two types of measures were taken: the introduction of temporary "shared space" streets and the so called "pop-up bike lanes". The implementation process of these two types of temporary measures will be introduced in the next section.

#### **7.2 Implementation Process of Temporary Infrastructure**

To describe the process of installing pop-up bike lanes and temporary shared space zones ("*Begegnungszone*" according to the Austrian road code), we used personal communications with city authorities in the form of e-mails and personal discussion in this study, as well as the collected information from press releases, newspaper articles, and on-site visits. No formal interviews have been conducted but the implementation process has been documented in the report by Frey et al. (2020) in collaboration with city officials.

#### *7.2.1 Implementation of Temporary Shared Space*

The legal basis for shared space ("*Begegnungszone*") has been introduced in the Austrian road code in 2013.2 While in other countries pedestrians have the right of way in shared space zones, in Austria, all road users are supposed to be equal. The road code states that pedestrians are allowed to use the whole driving lane, but they are not allowed to "willfully impede vehicle traffic".3 Since its introduction, more than 80 streets have been declared as shared space in Austria, with 8 of them in Vienna.4

During the first COVID-19 wave in spring 2020, the Austrian federal government passed an amendment to the Road Code,5 making it possible to temporarily open lanes for pedestrians and therefore also for creating temporary shared space streets. This allowed the city to designate conventional streets as shared space zones for a limited period of time. The City of Vienna implemented 23 such shared space zones throughout the city.

Before deciding to introduce shared space zones, the city reviewed alternatives for giving more space to pedestrians such as ordinances of driving bans, physical barriers for cars to enter or changing streets into pedestrian zones or residential streets ("*Wohnstraße*") where cars are permitted to enter at low speed but not to drive through. There are no official publications documenting the assessment and decision making. The authority (MA46—municipal authority for traffic organization, personal communication) claims that the alternative options were examined regarding the necessary time for implementation, space gained for pedestrian traffic, access and passage for cars and public transport as well as for garbage and emergency vehicles, necessary car parking markings and the overall traffic situation. Other factors that influenced the decision included the effects on traffic organization, the costs, and the need for and availability of traffic signs. According to city officials, the shared space zone was identified as the best option, as it is a more moderate measure than driving bans and pedestrian zones. (MA46—municipal authority for traffic organization, personal communication).

The city authorities determined the criteria for a street to be suitable for a temporary shared space zone as follows:

2 StVO §53 9e/f.

3 StVO §76c Abs. 3.

4 http://www.begegnungszonen.or.at/bezo.php?sort=gemeinde\_asc.

5 BGBl. I Nr. 24/2020 URL: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2020/24/20200404.

• Existing markings for parking spaces (as parking spots have to be indicated with painted lines in a shared space zone).

The first temporary shared space street was implemented on April 10, 2020 (Rechte Bahngasse), and the last ones were suspended by the end of the year on December 31, 2020 (streets in the 15th district).

According to the Viennese constitution, transport planning and traffic organization fall under the governance of district mayors and district councils—with the exception of main routes for cycling (WStV, LGBl. Nr. 28/1968, § 103). Therefore, the decision on where temporary shared spaces were implemented had to be reached in agreement with the districts. Although there were guidelines by the municipality (see above), the district mayors did not need to follow those and could decide on their own where to implement shared space streets.

Table 7.1 shows the locations of temporary shared space zones and characteristics of the streets, with their locations shown in Fig. 7.1. The selection of the individual street sections was made together with the city council for transport and the district authorities.

Some temporary shared space zones were implemented despite not meeting the criteria recommended by the public authorities (marked *italic* in Table 7.1). The criterion of parking space markings is met by all but two of the selected streets. The criterion of narrow sidewalks did not apply to about half of the street sections. In some cases, the selected street sections contradicted the criteria of traffic compatibility, or the high adjacent population density. There were no traffic lights within indicated shared space zones, however some zones have been divided into sections with interruptions at intersections with traffic lights. Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show the physical implementation of shared space on five different streets.

#### *7.2.2 Implementation of Pop-Up Bike Lanes*

The implementation of pop-up bike lanes in Vienna started in the beginning of May 2020 at Praterstraße. They were introduced at four streets in three of the 23 districts with a total length of 2.4 km (see Table 7.2). These temporary bike lanes made use of former parking lanes or lanes for motorized traffic and redistributed those areas for dedicated cycling infrastructure. The new bike lanes have been separated from motorized traffic with orange painted lines and mobile elements such as bollards, construction site beacons or Jersey barriers (modular concrete barriers) to create protected bike lanes. They were either located directly next to existing, highly used but narrow bike infrastructure or in one case in a three-lane street that previously did not offer dedicated cycling infrastructure.

**Table 7.1** Temporary shared space locations and characteristics

*AP* angular parking

*PP* parallel parking

The decision on locations was based on existing plans for building cycle paths. Even though the city council has the decision competence for main cycling routes, the implementation decision was also made together with local district mayors (the 2nd and 9th district cooperated whilst the 22nd was against it). All of the temporary bike lanes have been suspended within 6 months, see Table 7.2.

Figure 7.5 shows the locations of pop-up bike lanes and existing cycling paths. The existing network is made up of 169 km of dedicated cycling paths and 170 km of mixed walking and cycling paths (Stadt Wien, n.d.). Figures 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 show pictures of the four pop-up bike lanes.

Figure 7.6. shows the physical appearance of the pop-up bike lane on Praterstraße. While construction site beacons provided a sense of safety in the inner area, this visual separation was missing in the outer area due to the preservation of the parking lane. The start of the pop-up bike lane was not very recognizable, which could have been placed one intersection before, at Aspernbrückengasse.

The one-way bike lane in the direction out of town on Lassallestraße (Fig. 7.7) was implemented using physical separation with construction site beacons and the elimination of parking spaces along the lane. The signage at the beginning was not very visible and there were no beacons at the end, where the lane ended abruptly in mixed traffic.

Figure 7.8 shows the one-way pop-up bike lane in Hörlgasse, which was implemented instead of one of the three car lanes. There were also construction site beacons for separation from car traffic. Similar to Lasallestraße, at the end of the lane, beacons were missing, and cars often used the lane for right turns.

Wagramer Straße is one of the main arteries connecting residential and recreational areas in outer districts across the river Danube with the inner city, in extension of Praterstraße and Lassallestraße. At some sections of the street, there are cycle paths. The section where the pop-up bike lane was implemented (between Kagraner Brücke

**Fig. 7.1** Temporary shared space locations, surveyed locations shown in orange (Base layer: city map of wien.gv.at with district borders in purple; shared space locations and text: by authors)

**Fig. 7.2** Temporary shared space Kettenbrückengasse 11.05.2020 (left) and Schaumburgergasse 11.05.2020 (right). *Credit* Ulrich Leth

7 Pop-Up Bike Lanes and Temporary Shared Spaces in Vienna During … 149

**Fig. 7.3** Temporary shared space Rechte Bahngasse 13.05.2020 (left) and Schopenhauergasse 13.05.2020 (right). *Credit* Ulrich Leth

**Fig. 7.4** Temporary shared space Hasnerstraße 13.05.2020. *Credit* Ulrich Leth

**Table 7.2** Implementation and duration of pop-up bike lanes

and Arbeiterstrandbadstraße) leads over an old branch of the Danube. Before implementing the pop-up bike lane in that section, cyclists used the existing infrastructure which is situated below the car lanes (an area closed to vehicles except for bicycles) together with pedestrians. The temporary infrastructure is shown in Fig. 7.9. The bi-directional pop-up bike lane was separated from the car lanes by concrete walls

**Fig. 7.5** Map of existing cycle paths and pop-up bike lanes in central Vienna (Base layer: city map of wien.gv.at; cycle paths: OGD dataset https://www.data.gv.at/katalog/dataset/stadt-wien\_radfahr anlagenwien; pop-up bike lanes and text: by authors)

**Fig. 7.6** Pop-up bike lane on Praterstraße 07.05.2020. *Credit* Ulrich Leth

and was only 1.55 m wide (national guidelines require a minimum width of 2.00 m). Visibility of the into-town branch was poor at first but was improved later on.

7 Pop-Up Bike Lanes and Temporary Shared Spaces in Vienna During … 151

**Fig. 7.7** Pop-up bike lane on Lassallestraße 09.06.2020. *Credit* Ulrich Leth

**Fig. 7.8** Pop-up bike lane on Hörlgasse 03.06.2020. *Credit* Ulrich Leth

**Fig. 7.9** Pop-up bike lane Wagramer Straße 27.05.2020. *Credit* Ulrich Leth

#### **7.3 Survey Methods and Results**

The value of tactical urbanism is derived from testing assumptions through physical design. Literature recommends the build-measure-learn process to test projects (Lydon and Garcia 2015). The empirical part of this study was about measuring the success of temporary infrastructure for active mobility in Vienna. The key metrics against which to judge success have been defined as bicycle and pedestrian volumes using the new infrastructure and the share of cyclists using pop-up bike lanes compared to the cyclists who continue to use existing infrastructure.

We chose direct observational methods (Richardson et al. 1995), manual traffic counting for the pop-up bike lanes and manual analysis of video recordings for temporary shared space streets. For the shared spaces, it was of interest to find out how many and how cyclists and pedestrians used the infrastructure. This includes the share of people that were taking advantage of the new legal rule and were walking on the driving lane instead of the sidewalk or crossing from one side to the other. In order to be able to assess these different aspects, we decided to use video recordings of the streets for the manual analysis.

Concerning the pop-up bike lanes, the main interest was to find out if cyclists preferred the existing infrastructures or adopted the parallel temporary lanes for cycling. For this, we chose to count traffic at the intersections of the streets with popup bike lanes. In the case of Hörlgasse, there was previously no cycling infrastructure. But at two parallel streets (Berggasse and Maria-Theresien-Straße) there are cycle paths. Therefore, we also conducted traffic counts in those parallel streets on one occasion.

Traffic count surveys on particular days are only single data points of traffic that varies from day to day (cf. Richardson et al. 1995). Given resource constraints, we conducted the observations at each location on two different dates and chose weekdays as well as weekends or holidays to increase the diversity in the data inputs. We are aware this still covers a small sample, which has to be considered when interpreting the results.

#### *7.3.1 Traffic Counting at Temporary Shared Spaces*

Video recordings were made at five locations in temporary shared spaces to survey traffic volumes by mode, interactions, and lane crossings. This set of locations was chosen because of their heterogenous street and cross sections characteristics and the technical possibilities for video recording. There were several constraints such as the uncertainty for what time period the temporary shared spaces would be implemented by the city administration and preparation and installation time of the technical survey infrastructure.

The pedestrian behavior was categorized in 3 types:

	- Sidestep of the pedestrian
	- Vehicles got out of the way of pedestrians
	- No requirement to get out of the way because there was enough space
	- Pedestrian reduces walking speed and waits on the sidewalk to avoid collision
	- Pedestrian changes to lane to avoid collision.

Each of the recordings took place on a weekday and a Sunday or holiday. Weather conditions were also documented, see Table 7.3. Automatic evaluations of motor vehicles and bicycle traffic volumes were conducted for the entire survey period (7.00 a.m. to 9.00 p.m.) and evaluated at 15-min intervals. Pedestrian actions and the percentage of pedestrians walking on the lane were also evaluated manually for three times of the day ("morning": 7.00 a.m.–8.00 a.m., "noon":12.00 a.m.–1.00 p.m., "evening": 5.00 p.m.–6.00 p.m.).

Figures 7.10, 7.11 and 7.12 present the results of traffic analysis. In Fig. 7.10, traffic volumes of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorized vehicles are shown. Figure 7.11 shows crossings of pedestrians and interaction with other modes. The share of pedestrians crossing and walking in the driving lane in temporary shared space streets are summarized in Fig. 7.12.

**Table 7.3** Recording dates of temporary shared space