The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a tremendous impact on history writing, and especially on dealing with the past in the form of memory. It provoked a great many new studies and especially new interpretations. What had been the official truth in the GDR, writes historian Tony Judt in *Postwar,* was now "discredited root and branch".30 The Western European narrative of history was challenged, Nazism after all had not been the only totalitarian system.31

The difficulty of confronting a "double-burdened past" in Germany was mentioned by Wolgang Thierse, then president of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, in a commemoration speech before the *Bundestag* on 27 January 2000. The speech was held in the presence of Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize laureate and Auschwitz survivor, on accession of the *Gedenkstunde* (commemoration) of the German Bundestag related to the Day of Remembrance for the victims of National Socialism.32 Besides the difficulty of facing the burdened pasts, Thierse also mentioned the advantage that now at least a historical consciousness could be developed without ideological or political pressure. However, he also acknowledged that many Germans grew tired of memory and commemoration, who called special days of commemoration "empty rituals" or even a "crusade" against forgetting. How Memorial Days could keep their significance was therefore a matter for further discussion. Thierse noted that indeed a lesson could be learned from history: that it is fatal for a democracy if the majority does not take action when foreigners are attacked or anti-Semitic violence takes place. Obviously referring to current debates he mentioned that the strength of a democracy is evidenced by how "we live together with people who are "foreign", who constitute a minority, or live at the fringes of society".33

29 Judt, *Postwar,* 639-643; Bozo, Frédéric. "'I Feel More Comfortable with You': France, the Soviet Union, and German Reunification", *Journal of Cold War Studies* 17, no. 3 (2015): 116–58.

30 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, New York, NY etc.: Penguin Press, 2005. 824.

31 See for the role in European politics: Laure Neumayer, "Integrating the Central European Past into a Common Narrative: The Mobilizations Around the 'Crimes of Communism' in the European Parliament," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 344–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.1001825.

32 27 January is the day that Soviet troops liberated the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, Roman Herzog, then president of the Bundestag, had established this national day of commemoration by proclamation in 1996. In 2005 the General Assembly of the UN designated January 27 as the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust.

33 Wie fest das demokratische Bewusstsein in unserer Gesellschaft verankert ist, das erweist sich darin, wie wir mit den Menschen zusammenleben, die hier "fremd" sind, die in der Minderheit sind

Naturally, coming to terms with the past because of the Holocaust was not restricted to Germany. The collective amnesia that had existed in many countries, for instance regarding the question of how many people in fact had collaborated during the Second World War only slowly changed into recognition. Judt pointed to another issue, the role that the Holocaust gained as "the very definition and guarantee of the continent's restored humanity".34

Judt was right in this analysis, if one takes a look at how the Holocaust gained importance in creating a European memory. Lliljana Radonić for instance demonstrates how post-communist memorial museums in East-Central Europe tell stories about the important but very complicated history of the 20th century: the occupation first by Nazi Germany and later by the Soviet Union, collaboration, the Holocaust and the accession to the European Union. She shows how "Europeanization of memory" took place and points especially to the very large influence the Holocaust has gained as "a negative founding myth". The example of the museum in Budapest is a case in point: even though there was nothing on display yet, the museum was opened a few weeks before Hungary's official succession to the European Union.35

Noticing that memories and histories are not the same in Europe does not say much. But there is more to it than just difference; scholars have also pointed to how earlier established "mental maps", especially during the Cold War, are still influential. Sociologist Benoît Challand for instance refers to the dominance of the Western European perspective: Western Europe provided not only "the right model to follow" in the Holocaust discussion but this dominance is also prominent in literature about democratization and the promotion of civil society.36

Very prominent is the tendency to turn a negative past into something positive: like Thierse did in the earlier quoted speech: how to ensure that the established democracy remains a democracy, learning from and not forgetting the past. Germany's policy has even become a template for other countries to follow.37 In any case this is true for the EU as a whole, if one considers the calls in research projects on history and heritage, and policy statements on remembrance and history.

34 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 19*45, (New York, NY etc.: Penguin Press, 2005), 824.

35 Ibid., 804. Ljiljana Radonić, "Post-Communist Invocation of Europe: Memorial Museums' Narratives and the Europeanization of Memory." *National Identities* 19, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 269–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1264377.

oder an den Rand der Gesellschaft gedrängt wurden", Speech W. Thierse, 27 January 2000, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, nr. 09-1, 17. February 2000.

https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2000/09-1\_Thierse.html, (accessed November 2017).

36 Benoît Challand, "1989, Contested Memories and the Shifting Cognitive Maps of Europe," *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 3 (2009): 399–403.

37 Aline Sierp, *History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions*, Routledge Studies in Modern European History 23 (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 151.

"The Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism of 2 April 2009" of the European Parliament for instance calls upon the Commission and Member states to strengthen the teaching of European history and "to underline the historic achievement of European integration and the stark contrast between the tragic past and the peaceful and democratic social order in today's European Union". In the same document the wish to come to a "common view of its history" is mentioned as a precondition to become a truly united Europe, and obviously, since this was the motivation of the resolution, history and the memory of victims of totalitarian regimes should play a key role.38

The resolution was related to the then very recent enlargements of the EU with former communist states in the eastern part of Europe. Judging from the quotes above it might also seem as if the European Parliament was promoting a *single* view of European history. Yet, that interpretation is not correct since it also explicitly stated that "official political interpretations of historical facts should not be imposed by means of majority decisions of parliaments", and "a parliament cannot legislate on the past".39 The preceding joint Motion for a resolution referred directly to the historical profession: on the one hand the impossibility to arrive at fully objective interpretations of historical facts, but on the other hand the use of scientific tools by professional historians in order to study the past and "try to be as impartial as possible". This document contained the provision as well that no political institution or party had a "monopoly on interpreting history".40

This statement was highly relevant since earlier established "mental maps", especially during the Cold War, had remained influential. Sociologist Challand pointed for instance to the dominance of the Western European perspective: Western Europe provided not only "the right model to follow" in the Holocaust discussion. In literature about democratization and the promotion of civil society the Western perspective dominated as well.41 Yet more and more recognition was gained for different memories of the past in Eastern Europe, especially for what Stalinism had meant.

The 2009 resolution of the EP was the culmination of previous ones on for instance European memory, the future of Europe sixty years after the Second World War, the Holocaust, Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, to name but a few. The European Parliament's expressed ideas were in line with views of the European Commission and Council on this matter. In other words, one could speak of a

38 "European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism", P6\_TA(2009)0213. http://www.europarl.europa.eu.

39 Ibid.

40 "Joint Motion for a resolution", 30 March 2009. RC-B6-0165/2009, http://www.europarl. europa.eu, (accessed October 2017).

41 Benoît Challand, "1989, Contested Memories and the Shifting Cognitive Maps of Europe," *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 3 (2009): 399–403.

genuine European Union remembrance policy.42 Remarkably, in those earlier statements the terms memory and remembrance were used far more often than history.43

Yet the term remembrance policy does not mean that there necessarily exists a common understanding about what constitutes a genuine "European" memory. Overcoming the tensions between the various national memories has proven to be difficult. Since memory plays a crucial role in identity construction, it has important political connotations. Hence also constructivist scholars in international relations are addressing this field more and more.44

The European remembrance policy was apparent in various projects aiming to find common ground. This contained attempts to construct a broad encompassing historical narrative. Examples are the "Active European Remembrance Programme which was Action 4 of the Citizenship Programme 2007-201345 and the New Narrative for Europe as part of Cultural Heritage.46

The House of European History museum in Brussels, that opened its doors in May 2017, had a comparable intention. Since in 2007 the president of the European Parliament proposed its establishment, the project underwent important changes; most important perhaps is the decision to devote less space in the museum to European integration, since this element had drawn public criticism. The museum focuses on the 19th and 20th century. Visiting the museum in October 2017, I thought the museum tried to give a balanced and nuanced view of European history, in which the "black pages" in history, such as colonialism and racism, were not forgotten. The idea, according to Andrea Mork, coordinator for the permanent exhibition since 2011, was to give multiple perspectives, showing "diversity, con-

42 Markus J. Prutsch, *European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives*. Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, European Parliament, 2013. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/513977/IPOL-CULT\_NT(2013)513977\_EN.pdf. , p. 20-21 (accessed 8 December 2017). 43 Ibid., p. 11-12.

44 See for instance Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, *Identity and Foreign Policy : Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration* (Farnham, England: Routledge, 2009), http://search.ebscohost.com.proxyub.rug.nl/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=271349&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

45 See: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/programme/action4\_en.php (accessed November 2017).

46 "New Narrative for Europe", https://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/new-narrative\_en; Wolfram Kaiser, "Clash of Cultures: Two Milieus in the European Union's 'A New Narrative for Europe' Project," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 364–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2015.1018876.; Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, "The EU Politics of Remembrance: Can Europeans Remember Together?," *West European Politics* 35, no. 5 (September 1, 2012): 1182–1202, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.706416; Oriane Calligaro, "Legitimation Through Remembrance? The Changing Regimes of Historicity of European Integration," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 330–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2015.1054794.

trasts and contradictions".47 Wolfram Kaiser, who recently analysed the development of this museum project under the telling title "limits of cultural engineering" is rather critical about the end result.48 He especially regrets the prominent space for Eastern European memory culture since other forms of fragmentation, such as between the 'core' and various peripheries in Europe and the EU were omitted.49

One of the recent calls of the European Commission about history is called *Improving mutual understanding among Europeans by working through troubled pasts.*50 To quote:

Of particular importance is to survey and investigate comparatively how discourses in civil society and the media, including social and digital media, are informed by such legacies, [troubled pasts, JdJ] and how in turn civil society and the media conduct such discourses. Research needs to unearth how national narratives are influenced by difficult pasts and how civil society, politics and the media constructed discourses, and which factors and acts such as commemorations, apology, reconciliations, reparations but also non-action informed both the construction and the evolution of such narratives. (…) Of interest are also discourses in the profession of historians in the post-war/post-authoritarian period and how they might have evolved over time.

These kind of calls have also drawn criticism, because it might lead to overly positive studies about the EU.51 Indeed in the project above there was also a political aim involved: gaining more knowledge on the significance and impact of commemoration and how public discourses might affect civil societies. But this does not necessarily make the research biased by definition.

47 Andrea Mork, "Constructing the House of European History', in *European Commemoration. Locating World War I*, IFa edition Culture and Foreign Policy. Edgar Wolfrum a.o. eds., (2014), 233, https://historia-europa.ep.eu/en/publications/constructing-house-european-history. (accessed October 2017).

48 Wolfram Kaiser, "Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the European Parliament's House of European History Project," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 3 (2017): 518–34.

49 Ibid., 534.

50 Horizon 2020, work programme 2016-2017, Pillar Societal challenges, Europe in a changing world –inclusive, innovative and reflective societies. Topic: "Improving mutual understanding among Europeans by working through troubled pasts". http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants /portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/cult-coop-02-2017.html. To avoid any misunderstanding: I did not submit a proposal in this call, nor was involved in it in any capacity.

51 Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, *Imagining Europe Myth, Memory, and Identity* (New York [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 62,176-177. Hagen. Schulz-Forberg and Bo Stråth, *The Political History of European Integration : The Hypocrisy of Democracy-through-Market*, 1 online resource (233 pages). vols., Routledge Advances in European Politics ; 62; Routledge Advances in European Politics ; 62. (Abingdon, Oxon ; Routledge, 2010), ebrary http://site.ebrary.com/id/10881699.

Research into the "troubled past" and the discourses about it remains highly relevant. The earlier narrative of Europe as a project of peace was naïve. There are so many radical differences in the national and regional perception of the war that European history and memory remain divided.52 Stressing only the differences, however, is also getting it wrong. When Joll discussed the possibility in 1979 that the Cold War might come to an end, he stated:

If the Iron Curtain were to be torn down, then we would begin to realize how much of eastern Europe, and even Russia itself shared a common European tradition and how it does not really make sense, historically at least, to talk of a Europe which does not include Konigsberg and Cracow, Breslau and Budapest, or even for that matter Goethe's Weimar.53

At that time the western and eastern part of Europe indeed seemed worlds apart and Joll was right in pointing to the many ties and traditions that have existed and were overlooked during the Cold War. Today it seems as if the opposite is the case. It is perfectly possible to discuss both: what binds and what keeps apart.

Political scientist Jan-Werner Müller points to two options regarding the possibility to arrive at a European memory: either a commitment by European nations to work through the past, in other words similar ways to deal with the different pasts, or a genuinely shared European memory with similar contents and not just shared practices. The last option seems simply impossible. Not only because their pasts are different, but also because it would hardly lead to more agreement.54 The dividedness does not need to be a problem. I agree with sociologist Gerard Delanty who suggests to focus on comparative analyses, since the European cultural heritage is formed 'out of the entanglements of different memories" both within Europe and outside.55 But maybe it would be a bigger problem if European memory would seem to have a similar content. It could never be a historically correct version.

Many myths have been constructed about European history and the European integration project. The tendency to make new versions of recent history is always there, because every country has parts in its history it would rather like to forget. Judt already in 1992 noted that Europe after 1989 was "being built upon historical sands at least as shifting in nature as those upon which the post-war edifice was

52 Ibid. 61.

53 ibid.18.

54 Jan Werner Müller, "On "European Memory" Some Conceptual and Normative Remarks" in Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, *A European Memory? : Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, Studies in Contemporary European History ; Volume 6; Studies in Contemporary European History ; Volume 6. (New York : Berghahn Books, 2010), 27.

55 Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage: A Critical Re-Interpretation* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 16.

mounted".56 References to the past have often been and still are problematic and even irresponsible. If anywhere, here lies a special task for historical researchers to check and if necessary "speak truth to power".57

### **Conclusion**

Historians might indeed help "shape, revise and create a Europe that is safe, inclusive, prosperous and, perhaps above all, hopeful" by constructing balanced and nuanced histories. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s writing about European integration or about common European values and civilisation, there was a tendency by those writing about European history to overlook the parts that did not fit in the positive "peace" narrative. This in the end is doing a disservice.

Of course research on what European peoples have had and still have in common is perfectly legitimate and important. Let us not forget that in Europe there are many similarities and common elements as well. Historians should not be naïve and be aware of the political importance of their work, without letting this knowledge guide their research. In other words, it remains important to speak "truth to power". The point is that it is not possible to go forward without a proper view on what has been going on in the past. Historians therefore are badly needed.

As Jo Guildi and David Armitage argue in their *History Manifesto*: "The sword of history has two edges, one that cuts open new possibilities in the future, and one that cuts through the noise, contradictions, and lies of the past". 58 My intention was to deconstruct and contextualise some of these lies and myths of the past, and to indicate where alternative approaches or perceptions might be of use. And yes, this 'cutting open' of new possibilities in the future of course does entail hope.

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# **Has the Economic Crisis Eroded Trust in Political Institutions in Europe? A Comparative Analysis from 2008 to 2012**

Lluís Coromina, Edurne Bartolomé Peral

### **Introduction**

A great body of literature coincides with the relevance of political support and particularly, trust in state institutions for a healthy and working democracy. But, at the same time, processes such as cognitive mobilization, increasing political efficacy on the citizens' side, alongside with poor economic and political performance on the side of those in office, have had as a consequence a generalized decline of institutional trust in western democracies.

Citizens' support for political systems, and particularly, trust in institutions is a key element for a working democracy1 in the sense that strong political trust also contributes to a structured and stable system of voting2 , and it reinforces citizens' compliance with norms and duties towards society.3

Due to the financial and economic crisis affecting Europe and the world, trust in institutions in European societies has suffered a strong decline since 2008. In some cases, this decline of trust in public institutions has been identified as one of the most evident and shared symptoms of the crisis, moving beyond the economic sphere and becoming a legitimacy issue, particularly in those contexts where the crisis has been particularly severe.

The main aim of this article is to answer to the following questions: a) To what extent have the levels of trust in political institutions in European democracies changed during the financial and economic crisis? b) Do levels of trust in institu-

1 Hofferbert and Klingemann, "Remembering the Bad Old Days: Human Rights, Economic Conditions and Democratic Performance in Transitional Regimes."

2 Zmerli and Hooghe, *Political Trust. Why Context Matters*.

3 Rudolph and Evans, "Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government Spending."

tions show relevant variations over time? c) Has the crisis caused the same reaction among European citizens in countries affected differently by the crisis? and d) Does trust in public institutions rely on the same factors during the crisis?

Studying trust in political institutions is highly relevant to studying democracy, in the sense that it is crucial when analysing the circumstances in which trust in political institutions is under threat and which aspects may be endangering the success of the relationship between citizens and their institutions and democratic governance. Analysing those elements affecting trust in institutions in comparative terms and over time is also relevant.

Thus, we have studied a number of European democracies hit by the financial and economic crisis in different ways. Trust in political institutions is analysed using three time periods: 2008, 2010 and 2012. This allows us to assess citizens' trust in public institutions in different European economic contexts.

The article is structured as follows: first the theoretical framework and hypotheses are introduced. Then, the results are presented followed by an analysis of the predictors on trust in institutions. Finally, conclusions are derived from the results.

### **Trust in institutions, relevance and consequences of decline**

Political trust is defined as a "basic evaluative orientation toward the government, founded on how well the government is operating according to people´s normative expectations".4 Political trust is therefore considered an orientation towards State institutions and incumbents, which is based on performance and expectations on performance and good will by those in office. In this sense, trust in institutions refers not only to legitimate power (e.g., in the parliament), authority (e.g., in the government), or the economy (e.g., in the mode of production), but also to procedures and basic practices.

As mentioned above, literature provides quite a number of explanations for the decline of trust in institutions.5 Cognitive mobilization and citizens' higher level of sophistication and political efficacy, in terms of information, interest in politics and educational level 6 are in the core of those individual transformations due to modernization, democratization and massive access to education in westerns societies. These sophisticated, or critical citizens7 would tend to have higher expectations of

4 Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," 791.

5 Zmerli and Hooghe, *Political Trust. Why Context Matters*; Bowler and Karp, "Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government"; Newton, "Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society, and Political and Economic Performance"; Rudolph and Evans, "Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government Spending"; Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust"; Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*.

6 Klingemann, *Klingemann, H. D. (1998). Mapping Political Support in the 1990s. A Global Analysis*; Norris, *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*.

7 Ibid.

their government, but this would not mean any danger or damage in their support for democratic principles.8

Policy performance seems to be at the core of some explanations regarding lower levels of political trust, such as poor economic or political performance, scandals or failed expectations.9 In this sense, economic performance and economic outcomes are the main dimensions of policy performance when it comes to trust in institutions.

Hetherington explains the important role of citizens' material sacrifices in order to explain a decreasing trust in institutions.10 Failed expectations combined with those personal material sacrifices and grievances significantly affect institutional trust.11

### *Predictors for trust in political institutions*

As pointed out above, several factors lead to a generalized decline in trusting political institutions, and this has been widely studied, particularly in advanced western democracies. Taking this as a starting point, we aim to study this phenomenon in the context of Europe, during a specific time period when the recent financial crisis had a clear impact. One aim of the article is to analyse the levels of trust in institutions and trends in trust during a relevant period of financial crisis. We also examine how trust in institutions is affected by relevant explanatory factors, and take into account that the recession has affected European countries in different ways. Trust in institutions, understood to be a clear measure of public support, is expected to rely on a set of correlates measuring citizens´ opinions and attitudes, observed at different points in time. The effect of these variations and variables across time are expected to differ significantly, depending on how the crisis has affected citizens in different countries.

Economic satisfaction is one of the first factors to be taken into account when analysing trust in political institutions. According to several authors12, political trust

8 Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*; Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support"; Newton, "Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society, and Political and Economic Performance"; Zmerli and Hooghe, *Political Trust. Why Context Matters*.

9 Levi and Stoker, "Political Trust and Trustworthiness"; Criado and Herreros, "Political Support. Taking into Account the Institutional Context"; Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970."

10 *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*.

11 Kinder and Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," 497.

12 Cohen, "Economic Perceptions and Executive Approval in Comparative Perspective"; Anderson and Guillory, "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems"; Listhaug, "The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians"; Hofferbert and Klingemann, "Remembering the Bad Old Days: Human Rights, Economic Conditions and Democratic Performance in Transitional Regimes."; Rohrschneider, *Learning Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany*; Mishler and Rose, "What Are The Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies."

is likely to strongly rely on satisfaction with economic and personal performance, based on personal experiences and an evaluation of each individual situation. When evaluating their own personal situation, (mainly economic situation), individuals tend to articulate their judgements and trust towards institutions. As a consequence, a positive personal situation would be expected to have a positive effect on trust in institutions, whereas a negative personal situation would tend to decrease trust.

Short-term government performance is also considered a relevant factor in explaining institutional trust. According to Anderson and Guillory13 and Anderson and Tverdova14, institutional trust can be predicted by the degree to which citizens participate in the electoral process through voting, and the level of agreement with election results. In addition, satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent in government would tend to increase institutional trust.

According to the literature, long-term factors, understood as lasting aspects that persist in a society, are key explanatory factors for institutional trust. These persistent elements are considered an outcome of religious tradition, history, and the values on which the state and political system have been established. They shape the relationship between individuals and their political system, and therefore shape trust in state institutions. These factors determine a set of values and attitudes shared by the citizenry, and are perceivable through the way citizens establish their views of political community, regime and authorities. These shared aspects, transmitted and learnt through socialization, are established in society over time. In this regard, there are several cultural elements inherent in political systems, both formal and informal. These can be identified as long-term characteristics, since these factors establish culture and values in a country's constitution, or the so called "Constitution in Operation".15 Generalized trust is a very important factor in this explanation.16 It refers to the extended trust people have in others who they do not necessarily know, and measures the trusting links in a society beyond family ties.

Other key indicators of the long-term explanation are political efficacy, measured in this article by interest in politics17, and life satisfaction18 among others.

13 "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems."

14 "Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies."

15 Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*.

16 Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies."

17 Craig, Niemi, and Silver, "Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items"; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, "Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study"; Finkel, "Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis"; Gabriel, "The Impact of Values."

18 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*.

Control variables such as gender, age, level of education and ideology are included in the analysis. Age is considered a relevant factor in terms of political attitudes, where young people are more susceptible to political change as they have less experience of a specific political system.19 Education also plays a central role in explaining political trust, as it is part of the winner-loser theory.20 According to this theory, the better educated, the more satisfied, and the wealthier tend to have higher levels of trust in people and institutions due to their successful life experiences. Ideology, measured as self-placement on a left-right political scale, is related to institutional trust in terms of group-related beliefs or particular group interests. In addition, in some European democracies, the extreme right and the extreme left may represent a profoundly dissatisfied group since they feel their demands are almost never fulfilled.21

### **Hypotheses**

The main claim is that individual levels of institutional trust, expressed as a latent variable, have changed over time as a consequence of the economic crisis. Factors affecting trust in institutions are also analysed. We hypothesize that correlates of trust in institutions differ significantly across European countries, depending on the level of impact the financial crisis has had on each country.

The first hypothesis contends that the levels of trust in political institutions are expected to be significantly lower in those countries most affected by the economic crisis (H1). The literature explains how evaluation of performance may affect trust in institutions. Taking this into account, we expect that those citizens most affected by the crisis will evaluate the political and economic performance of their governments more poorly, and therefore, trust in their institutions will tend to be lower.22

The second hypothesis relates to the effect of economic crisis and trust in institutions over time. It is expected that levels of trust in institutions will tend to decrease over time, due to the effect of the crisis in all countries, although those countries most affected by the crisis will have a sharper decline (H2).

Moreover, we expect that the correlates for trust in political institutions will not be constant over time, and that the changing context significantly affects this

19 Dalton, *Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choice: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 483.

20 Zmerli and Newton, "Social Trust and Attitudes toward Democracy."

21 Lubbers and Scheepers, "Explanations of Political Euro-Skepticism at the Individual, Regional and National Levels."

22 Weatherford, "How Does Government Performance Influence Political Support?"; Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government"; Anderson and Guillory, "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems."

variation (H3). Consequently, the changing context and the situation of crisis over time would therefore lead to unequal levels of trust in institutions.23

Furthermore, we argue that there are significant differences in the effect of explanatory factors as a consequence of an unequal impact of the crisis on countries (H4). We expect predictors to affect trust in institutions differently, depending on the depth of the financial crisis. Short-term correlates would therefore have a stronger effect on trust in institutions when the economic crisis is more acute, and long-term correlates would tend to have stronger effects if the economic crisis is less acute.

## **Data and methods**

Firstly, multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) and invariance testing are explained. Finally, a measurement of the predictive variables for trust in political institutions is described.

In our analyses we use European Social Survey (ESS) data, for three different time periods (2008, 2010 and 2012) and eight countries (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The data is used to test the hypotheses related to trust in political institutions. Table 1 shows the sample size used in each period and country.

Table 1: Sample size for each country and period

The countries selected have been differently affected by the economic crisis during the period studied. Although all European countries have been affected by the economic crisis, there is a significant difference in severity of the crisis in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. These countries have stronger austerity measures and

23 Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*.

significantly higher unemployment rates than other European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Norway or Sweden.

### *Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis*

Multiple group confirmatory factor analysis -MGCFA-24 is generally used for cross-cultural comparison in order to test if a latent variable of interest is comparable across groups, countries and/or years, and takes measurement invariance into account. In the case invariance holds, relationships and/or means of the latent constructs can be compared across groups (countries and time periods).

Thus, trust in political institutions will be measured as a latent factor with three reflective indicators, using structural equation modelling, SEM.25 A specific SEM model, known as confirmatory factor analysis -CFA-26 is used to estimate the measurement model, shown in a generalized form in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Generalization of CFA model

Where *yi*'s are three observed indicators, τi is the intercept of each of the three observed indicators, j is the latent variable, ij is the factor loading or slope from the *j* latent variable to the *yi* observed indicator and ei is a random measurement error for the responses for each of the three indicators. Covariances between the

24 Bollen, *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*; Ariel and Davidov, "Assessment of Measurement Equivalence with Cross-National and Longitudinal Surveys in Political Science"; Davidov, Schmidt, and Billiet, *Cross-Cultural Analysis: Methods and Applications*; Meredith, "Measurement Invariance, Factor Analysis and Factorial Invariance"; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, "Assessing Measurement Invariance in Cross-National Consumer Research"; Cieciuch et al., "The Cross-National Invariance Properties of a New Scale to Measure 19 Basic Human Values: A Test Across Eight Countries"; Davidov et al., "Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research."

25 Bollen, *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*; Kline, *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling*.

26 Brown, *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*.

latent variable (i) and the error variance (ei) or among the error variances themselves are constrained to zero.

The estimation of each observed variables is based on the general equation:

yi= τi+ ijj + ei (1) which in this case can be decomposed into the following three equations for each of the two factors:

In this article these indicators are obtained from the ESS questionnaire using the specific question: "on a score of 0-10 how much do you personally trust each of the institutions? 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust". The institutions are the country's parliament (namely 'trust in parliament'), the legal system (namely 'trust in the legal system'), and politicians (namely 'trust in politicians). Each of these three institutions represents a different type of political institution. Parliament generally represents the classic institution of state representation; the legal system accounts for effective rights and public sector performance; and politicians represent the articulation of people´s ideas and options in the political sphere through political organizations. Thus, these three indicators are used in the MGCFA model with 'trust in political institutions' as a latent variable (see Figure 1).

By establishing measurement invariance, we can draw meaningful comparisons of the latent means and detect the effects predictor variables have on the latent construct of interest, at the same time ensuring that the latent construct has the same meaning and scaling across groups (regions and/or time periods). When using MGCFA analysis, three hierarchical levels of measurement invariance - configural, metric and scalar-27 are generally tested. Thus, invariance across groups can be studied.

In the case that a small number of groups are analysed, MGCFA can be used adequately, but when many groups are involved, it becomes difficult to manage and can prove problematic 28 as it requires many manual adjustments to the model specification. Fit indices, expected parameter changes, or modification indices for each previous model all have to be taken into consideration. In these cases, strict

27 Davidov et al., "Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research."

28 Asparouhov and Muthén, "Multiple Group Factor Analysis Alignment"; Muthen and Asparouhov, "New Methods for the Study of Measurement Invariance with Many Groups."

or even partial invariance is often not sufficient and some information regarding groups is generally taken out of the analysis. This inhibits analysing all groups of interest, and so the comparison has to be done with fewer groups.

### *Predictive variables for trust in political institutions*

The effect of theoretically studied factors on trust in political institutions is also evaluated. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) will be carried out in order to identify significant factors effecting trust in political institutions over time in different countries. In order to study those significant causal relationships on trust in political institutions, factor scores for the latent variable trust in political institutions will be computed and used as a dependent variable.

The measurement for the predictive factors is the same for each time period and country. The variable '*Trust in others*' is posed as: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful when dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'you can't be too careful' and 10 means that 'most people can be trusted'. '*Satisfaction with life*' is asked as: "On the whole, how satisfied are you with your life in general?", on a score of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Variables related to evaluation of performance are '*satisfaction with country's economic situation'* ("On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?"), asked on a score of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) and '*satisfaction with government'* ("Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?"), asked on a score of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Variables related to politics are '*interest in politics'* ("How interested are you in politics?") asked in four categories (Not at all interested; barely interested, quite interested; very interested); whether citizens *voted* or not in the last elections [vote] and their '*political ideology'* ("In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale?; where 0 means on the left and 10 means on the right"). This variable is measured using a left-right scale. Control variables such as *age* (5 categories of age from 15-29 years old; 30-44 years old; 45-59 years old; 60-74 years old; and over 75 years old), *gender* and *level of education* (4 categories from 'Less than lower secondary education; Lower secondary education completed; Upper and post secondary education completed; and tertiary education completed').

### **Results**

This section shows the factor means using the alignment method for the 23 groups analysed. In order to draw a comparison with the traditionally used MGCFA, a MGCFA is also carried out for the 23 groups, and factor means for both methods

compared. Finally, results show the trend and the effect of the predictive variables for trust in political institutions for each country in 2008, 2010 and 2012.

Table 2 and Figure 2 show the results of the factor means of trust in institutions, estimated using the alignment method for all eight countries, in three time periods. Results show that Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway present the highest levels of trust in institutions, whereas Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain show the lowest. This suggests that those countries less affected by the financial crisis show higher levels of trust in institutions, supporting H1.

Table 2. Results for Factor Trust in Political Institutions

Figure 2. Levels of trust by country and year

Furthermore, trust in political institutions in Norway increases over time (as it does in Sweden between 2008 and 2012), before returning to the level it initially had in 2012. The Netherlands shows stable trends, and Germany a slight decrease in 2010, with levels of trust increasing sharply in 2012. Conversely Greece, Spain, and Portugal show a clear decrease in their levels of trust in institutions between 2008 and 2012 and Ireland a slight decrease. These data reflect the fact that the countries most affected by the crisis show lower levels of institutional trust, and that levels of trust continue to decrease as the economic crisis continues in these countries. Thus, these results support H2.

### *Predictors for trust i*n *political institutions*

Trust in political institutions is first analysed, then its predictors are studied. In this case, the interest is to study the effect of theoretically related factors (voting behaviour, interest in politics, satisfaction with life, age, and gender, among others) on trust in political institutions over across time for eight European countries.

From the results of the analysis in Table 3 we can see how predictive variables have different effects on trust in institutions, depending on the country and also across time. The first three independent variables in Table 3 (interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and interest in politics) refer to the long-term explanatory factors. Satisfaction with economy and satisfaction with government are variables which respond to short-term factors based on the evaluation of political and economic performance. Voting corresponds to people's participation in the political process and ideology, age, gender and education are included as control variables.

Interpersonal trust is a relevant correlate in all countries, particularly in those less affected by the economic crisis, showing stronger positive effects than in those countries more affected. Along the same lines, political efficacy, measured by the interest shown in politics, has a stronger effect in the countries less affected by the

financial crisis. In those countries where the economic and financial crisis has been more acute, the effect of political efficacy is weaker, and also decreases over time. A third group of predictive variables are called long-term aspects, for instance, life satisfaction, which measures the overall satisfaction with living conditions. Data show that life satisfaction is not a relevant factor, except for some countries, in some time periods. However, this effect disappears as the crisis worsens.

Satisfaction with the economy is a clear relevant measure of evaluation of performance. This measurement is low to begin with in those countries less affected by the economic crisis, even being non-significant in countries like Germany or the Netherlands initially. As the crisis deepens, these evaluations turn into significant predictors, although they are weak. In those countries where the economic crisis was more serious, short-term evaluations of economic performance have a stronger and more significant effect, increasing with time in countries such as Spain and Ireland.

Satisfaction with political performance, measured by the variable of satisfaction with the performance of government, shows a strong and stable effect in all countries. There is practically no difference whether they have been affected by the crisis or not.

Voting in the election is included in the analysis in order to measure whether individuals participate in the political process, or whether, to the contrary, they feel alienated from it. In those countries less affected by the crisis, direct participation in elections through voting has a positive effect on trust in institutions, with the exception of Sweden, and in part, the Netherlands, where it is not shown to be significant. In Greece and Spain it is only significant in the first years.

In terms of the effect of the ideological position on trust in institutions, those who are more right-wing show a higher level of trust in institutions in most countries. The only exception to this pattern is Spain in 2012. This is probably due to the change of Government in 2011, when left-wing citizens were more critical with institutions in order to punish a government led by the conservative People´s party.

Control variables only seem to be significant in those countries less affected by the economic crisis. Age has a negative effect in Germany, the Netherlands Sweden and Norway, which means that people lose trust in institutions as they age. However this variable is not significant in those countries more affected by the crisis, with the exception of Greece, where the pattern is reversed. In Greece, younger people distrust institutions more, most likely because younger generations have felt particularly deprived and frustrated as a result of the crisis. Gender has practically no effect, and education has a positive effect, although it is rather weak. This is mostly in those countries less affected by the crisis, with the exception of Portugal and Ireland. The positive effect of education confirms winner loser theory, which claims that those who are better educated and better located in the socioeconomic spectrum tend to be more trusting, because being successful in society makes them trusting.29

From these results we can also confirm Hypothesis 3, which claims that the effect of correlates shows no constant pattern over time. We assert that the changing context of economic crisis over the periods analysed have reshaped the effect of correlates on trust in institutions. According to this hypothesis, trust in institutions is explained differently in situations of economic crisis.

Hypothesis 4, which predicts significant differences in the effect of explanatory factors as a consequence of the impact of the crisis on countries being unequal, is also confirmed by the analyses, as shown in the results. The effects of both long and short-term factors shape institutional trust differently, depending on the extent to which the country observed has been affected by the economic crisis.

Table 3: Estimates for trust in political institutions

\*p-value<.05;\*\* p-value<.01

Table 3 (cont): Estimates for trust in political institutions

29 Newton, "Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society, and Political and Economic Performance."

\*p-value<.05;\*\* p-value<.01

Table 3 (cont): Estimates for trust in political institutions

\*p-value<.05;\*\* p-value<.01

### **Conclusions**

We have provided evidence showing that the decline has been more visible in those countries most affected by the crisis than in those where the crisis has not been so severe.

Moreover, we have examined the main factors explaining trust in institutions and have observed different patterns across countries and over time. Levels of institutional trust have fluctuated significantly in some of the countries studied. Impacts of explanatory factors have also changed significantly over time, as our hypotheses claims.

According to our results, we can offer some conclusions regarding our hypotheses: Data analysis provides evidence that helps to confirm the first hypotheses. From the latent means we can conclude that levels of trust in institutions are different across countries, depending on whether those countries have been more or less affected by the crisis. It is clearly observable from the latent means that the levels of trust for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland are clearly lower than the ones in Germany, Sweden, Norway or Netherlands.

The second hypothesis can be also confirmed. There is a clear pattern that institutional trust decreases over time, particularly in those countries more affected by the crisis. This supports our claim that trust in institutions is being eroded by the economic crisis.

The third hypothesis concerns how predictor variables affect trust in institutions over time. We can observe that the effects on trust are not constant over time, showing that the explanatory capacity of correlates for trust in institutions varies over time and circumstances. We can conclude that the existence and intensity of economic crisis reshapes the effect of explanatory factors for trust in institutions.

Additionally, as asserted in Hypothesis 4, we can also confirm that the effect of correlates varies across countries. In those countries where the crisis is more acute, short-term correlates tend to have a stronger effect than in those countries less affected by the crisis. Conversely, long-term factors have a stronger effect in those countries where the crisis has not been so serious.

As discussed previously in this article, the relevance of institutional trust is a crucial element for a functioning democracy and governance. System´s legitimacy and the quality of its democracy rely on a trusting relationship between citizens and their state. It has been widely argued in the literature that political trust and institutional trust have noticeably declined in western democracies. There are several reasons for this in the relevant literature, some related to a rise in cognitive mobilization and political sophistication, due to a persistent socialization of democratic values 30. Evaluation of performance is also highlighted as one of the main reasons for increasing people's distrust in state institutions.

In this regard, even if democratic values and democratic support are not questioned by citizens in the short run, the unequal consequences of political and economic performance would lead to unequal levels of institutional trust. Our findings suggest that a situation of severe and lasting economic crisis may have serious consequences for institutional trust, and therefore may put a system´s legitimacy at risk if it persists. This article shows that economic and political performance do not only affect the support for specific incumbents in office, but they also damage the public´s trust in institutions, which is highly sensitive to short term evaluations when in situations of economic crisis. Even if democratic principles and values are well established in European democracies, we can see how personal grievances and sacrifices in the economic sphere can put institutional trust is serious jeopardy.

30 Norris, *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*; Klingemann, *Klingemann, H. D. (1998). Mapping Political Support in the 1990s. A Global Analysis*.

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# **Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right in Poland and the Migration Crisis**

Natasza Styczyńska

### **Introduction**

Despite being a beneficiary of European funds with a high level of public support for European integration, Poland is reluctant to accept some EU policies and proposals for joint actions. One example of this might be its contestation of the possible creation of a common European Union (EU) migration policy, as well as opposition to mandatory quotas in the refugee relocation programme proposed by the EU in 2016. It seems that the rise of populism and Euroscepticism is fuelling anti-European stances, bringing xenophobic discourse into the mainstream of politics and strengthening anti-immigration rhetoric. It is possible for this to happen as the Europeanisation process in Poland is far from complete, and discontent with the transformation and liberal order is overlapping with disappointment with politics in general.

In this paper I will present a general background of Poland–EU relations regarding relocation of refugees and the proposal of joint actions in the area of common migration policy, as well as the arguments of the radical-right parties that contest these solutions. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the concept of populist radical right (PRR) and the parties in the Polish political arena that can be seen as part of the PRR family. In the second part I will analyse *the way* populist radical-right parties in Poland are using the migration crisis in order to present their views on the future of Europe and mobilise the electorate. Two parties and their rhetoric will be examined. The first one is the Congress of the New Right (*Kongres Nowej Prawicy –* KNP), which won four seats in the European Parliament elections of 2014 and is the only openly Euro-reject party in Poland, to use the classification proposed by Kopecký and *Mudde.*1 *The second grouping presented is*

1 Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, "Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: The Czech and Slovak Republics", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 16/3 (2002): 63-84.

Kukiz'15, which gained 8.81% of votes in the 2015 parliamentary election (cooperating with the far-right National Movement). The party claims that Islam is a danger to the cultural (Catholic) Polish identity, and calls asylum seekers "culturally foreign". Kukiz'15 is calling for a referendum on the refugee quotas that the EC proposed to introduce in 2015. The main aim of the paper is to analyse who is contesting the idea of redistribution of refugees around all member states of the EU and why, as well as criticising the proposal of a common migration policy. After analysing the party documents and rhetoric of the leaders (during the period from March 2015 to October 2017), I argue that the rhetoric is demonstrating many stereotypes and stigmatisations that are used in the political discourse and political agenda, but also simplifications and fears that very often go deeper. Most visible are identity-based arguments, including the one claiming that if refugees are to be accepted they need to be "like us". Security and economic fears are also visible, and used by the mentioned parties in order to consolidate the electorate and gain political capital.

### **The migration crisis – the view from Poland**

Despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was supposed to facilitate the establishment of the EU migration policy, member states are yet to come to an agreement. The refugee crisis, the apogee of which came in 2015, meant that the debates on the need for and shape of this joint policy returned with redoubled force. Owing to the Brexit negotiations, of great importance to all member states, as well as the signing of the EU-Turkey refugee deal and the relatively smaller number of refugees arriving in Europe, this topic has become much less frequent in the public discourse. Yet the problem has not gone away – such states as Italy, which struggle to cope with the largest number of arrivals on account of their location, are continuing to appeal for constructive solutions at EU level as well as the support of other member states. A response to these appeals was supposed to come in the form of the refugee relocation system, which assumes that each European Union member state will accept a specific number of refugees. This number was to be calculated on the basis of a given country's wealth and population. Yet this solution was criticised in several member states – especially the Visegrad Group and Austria. In May 2016, the European Commission (EC) announced financial penalties for those countries that fail to meet their designated quota of refugees. The Polish government consistently refuses to satisfy this requirement, and criticises the relocation programme.

The issue of accepting refugees became the subject of heated political debate in Poland in 2015, particularly between the parties Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO). During its time in government until 2015, PO initially rejected the possibility of accepting refugees, before agreeing to Poland's admitting around

7,000 relocated individuals.2 The PiS government rescinded this decision after coming to power in October 2015, citing security issues and Poland's engagement in helping refugees from war-affected areas in Ukraine. They made it clear that, especially after the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, Poland was unable to accept any refugees who might represent a danger to citizens' safety.

Poland was not the only country that did not agree to the quotas set by the EC, consistently refusing to accept even the smallest number of refugees. In light of this refusal, in December 2017 the EC decided to refer Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Court of Justice.

The migration crisis has been the subject of debates in the Polish parliament, including, notably, two important speeches on 16 September 2015, by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz and PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński. These addresses resonated in the media, with the arguments the two leaders invoked, such as fear of the Islamisation of Europe, becoming a permanent fixture in the public discourse. In October 2016, the Polish parliament's European Affairs Committee proposed a resolution concerning compulsory relocation of refugees. According to this resolution, the European Parliament and EU Council decree on the mechanism of mandatory relocation of refugees does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity described in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.3 This resolution reflects the dominant mood in Polish society, the vast majority of which does not support the idea of accepting refugees – according to a public opinion poll carried out in December 2017 by CBOS, 63% of respondents do not agree to Poland accepting refugees from countries where military conflicts are taking place, 33% are of the opposite view, and 4% do not have an opinion.4

Poland's refusal to accept refugees has been widely discussed not only within EU institutions, but also in domestic and international media. A common question has been why a state whose citizens have often been forced into emigration (during communism, for example), but also who emigrate en masse in search of better living and working conditions, dissociates itself so unequivocally from the idea of showing solidarity in sharing a problem faced by certain member states. The aversion to refugees is often explained by fears over their cultural and religious differences. Interestingly, there has been hardly any mention in the discussion of the issues resulting from the direct experience Poland had in the 1990s when admitting several tens of thousands of Chechens. As Muslims, these refugees might also have been perceived as a threat to Polish identity, yet this argument also failed to appear

2 Refugees in Poland, facts and myths, URL: https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/ aktualnosci/uchodzcy-w-polsce-fakty-i-mity.html (accessed 8 December 2017).

3 The Sejm committee against the mechanism of mandatory relocation of refugees, URL: http://www.parlamentarny.pl/wydarzenia/sejmowa-komisja-przeciw-mechanizmowi-przymusowejrelokacji-uchodzcow,16007.html (accessed 8 December 2017).

4 CBOS, *Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców* ("Attitude towards accepting refugees"), no. 163/2017.

in the Polish public debate of the time. The refugee question appears to have become politicised, and is used, albeit in different ways, by all political factions. The political discourse is divided into camps – those who call upon Poland to carry out its duties resulting from solidarity with other EU member states, but also its Christian duty, and those who refuse to accept refugees, citing the need to defend the Christian Polish identity from the influx of Islam.

### **The Polish populist radical right**

Defining a party of the populist radical right causes a number of problems, mostly because the very concept of populism is broad and vague, and can be used by differing ideological groups. Researchers point to the characteristics of populism, which claims the right to represent "the people", contrasting it usually with the corrupt elites,5 thus creating two antagonistic groups within society. Ivan Krastev, meanwhile, explains that "the priority given to building capitalism over building democracy is at the heart of the current rise of democratic illiberalism in Central and Eastern Europe".6 In part, Polish populism, as in other countries of the region, is characterised not by right-wing or left-wing rhetoric, but nationalist discourse, proclaiming the need to revisit the period of transformation.7 At the same time, most researchers agree that populist rhetoric appeals to citizens' fears and frustrations, exploiting their unfamiliarity with how the mechanisms of politics function. For the purposes of this article, I will use Cas Mudde's definition of the populist radical right, which stresses that for populists, politics should express the *volonté générale* – the will of the people as the supreme value.8

In analysing the radical right, it is important to emphasise the characteristics that distinguish it from the extreme right. Above all, the radical right criticises the existing democratic system; it is not anti-system as such, though, as it operates within the system and accepts its rules. Radical-right parties are usually anti-European and oppose the trends of modernisation. According to Roger Griffin, the radical right is also characterised by aversion to individualism, as well as to upholding human rights (and especially minority rights).9 Mudde underlines that the radical right is characterised by nationalism and xenophobia, and also places an

5 Andreas Schelder, "Anti-Political Establishment Parties", *Party Politics*, 2/3(1996); Margaret Canovan, "Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy", *Political Studies*, 47,1 (1999) also in Paul Taggart, *Populism*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000.

6 Ivan Krastev, "The strange death of the liberal consensus", *Journal of Democracy*, 18,4 (2007).

7 Radosław Markowski, "Populizm a demokracja: ujęcia, dylematy, kontrowersje", in Radosław Markowski (ed.) *Populizm a demokracja*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ISP PAN, 2004, 23-24.

8 Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Parties in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 23

9 Roger Griffin, "Afterword: last rights?", in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

emphasis on law and order, in order to construct a monocultural state.10 It is noteworthy that in ethnically homogeneous countries such as Poland, where ethnic divides are practically invisible, right-wing parties rally against the enemy in the form of incomers – immigrants, people of a different religion or value system. Lenka Bustikova notes that, paradoxically, the mobilisation of the radical right in Eastern Europe against refugees "westernized the eastern European radical right in the opposition to Islam and migrants".11 The tendency of mainstream parties (such as PiS and Fidesz in Hungary) to adopt some of the demands of radical-right groupings also causes problems with the classification of parties of the radical right.12 The populist radical right is therefore a complex concept that is hard to define. Mudde points out that the radical right is a form of nationalism, yet whereas all radical-right parties are nationalist, not all nationalists are part of the radical right.13 Similarly, not every radical-right party is populist. In this article, I am only interested in the relevant parties of the radical populist right currently active on the Polish political scene – the Kukiz'15 movement, which invited activists from the National Movement to be on its lists, and the Congress of the New Right, present in the European Parliament (as well as the splinter party KORWiN/Liberty).

Table 1: Polish elections 2014-2015

 10 Cas Mudde, *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*, Manchester–New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, 177

11 Lenka Bustikova, "The Radical Right in Eastern Europe", in: Jens Rydgren (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

12 Cas Mudde, *The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave*, C-Rex working paper series, 1(2016), University of Oslo.

13 Cas Mudde, *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*, op. cit., 30.

Source: National Electoral Commission www.pkw.gov.pl

### **Congress of the New Right and KORWiN-Liberty**

The party founded by Janusz Korwin-Mikke in 2010 is the continuation of his political activities stretching back to the beginning of the democratic transformation in Poland. The founders of the Congress of the New Right were activists of the party Liberty and Lawfulness (*Wolność i Praworządność*), as well as politicians of the Real Politics Union (*Unia Polityki Realnej*). The party is conservative-liberal and Euro-hostile, advocating the abolition of the European Union. The Congress of the New Right **(***Kongres Nowej Prawicy*) programme declares that it is the "only consistently and uncompromisingly anti-EU party in Poland".14 In economic issues, the party calls for far-reaching liberalism, declaring a market free from any intervention as a foundation of economic progress. In ideological questions, the KNP is a conservative party that stresses the Latin roots of European civilisation, and criticises civil partnerships, abortion and IVF, as well as the policy of multiculturalism. Until 2015, the face of the party was its leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and its rhetoric is viewed as controversial, containing xenophobic and anti-Semitic elements and with a view of history based on conspiracy theories.

The party electorate comprises mostly young people, generally residents of large cities, 75% of them men.15 The Congress employed new media to conduct an effective campaign targeted particularly at young voters. In the European Parliament elections in 2014, it achieved a result of 7.15%, taking fourth place and winning four seats. Notably, the party's result among Poles voting abroad was considerably better than at home. In Ireland, it gained some 39.36% of valid votes, in the United Kingdom 37%, and in Iceland 30.25%.16 Some analysts have argued that the KNP electorate is made up of so-called protest votes which the party managed to mobilise in 2014. Neither the party, nor its former leader in presidential elections, has yet been able to win a significant number of votes. In 2015 Korwin-Mikke, the party founder and its most recognisable and active politician, founded a new party named KORWiN (an acronym of his name meaning Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic Liberty and Hope). It did not win any seats in the Polish

14 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014).

15 Adrian Koładka, "KW Kongres Nowej Prawicy", in Michał Dulak (ed.), *Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego w Polsce 2014*, Kraków 2014, 72.

16 Electoral results, National Election Commission, URL: http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl /pl/wyniki/gminy/view/149901 (accessed 6 December 2017).

parliament, but retains two MEPs (one a member of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group, and the other unattached) elected from the KNP list, as well as one member of the lower house of the Polish parliament, the Sejm (elected from the Kukiz'15 list). In 2016, the KORWiN party changed its name to Liberty (*Wolność*), but the party structure and programme remain unchanged.

### **Kukiz'15**

In formal terms, the Kukiz'15 movement is a parliamentary group in the eighth term of the Sejm, as well as an association constituting the structure of the movement established by the musician Paweł Kukiz for the parliamentary elections in 2015. The movement included members of the nationalistic National Movement and the All-Polish Youth, also a nationalist organisation invoking the tradition of a similar organisation operating in the inter-war period. In the 2015 presidential election, Kukiz received 20.8% of votes, putting him in third place.17 Owing to the ideological diversity of its members, the movement is characterised by an eclectic programme, in which the major points include the creation of single-member constituencies, refusal to accept even the smallest number of refugees from Syria and other countries affected by war, and criticism of EU bureaucracy, as well as a proposal to deregulate European law. At present, Kukiz'15 has 30 seats in the 460 strong Sejm.

In 2016, the Kukiz movement set up the website dzienreferendalny.pl ("referendum day"), to promote the idea of a referendum on Poland's acceptance of refugees. This idea stemmed from the belief that, as stated on the website, "The host in Poland at present is no other power, but the citizens. It is the citizens who should decide whether we allow anyone into our Homeland, and whom".18 Alongside the form for collecting signatures, the website also features a poll asking: "Are you in favour of Poland accepting refugees as part of the system of relocation in the European Union". In Poland, the Sejm can decide to put a particular issue to referendum based on the initiative of citizens gaining the backing of at least 500,000 people. Despite the involvement of various organisations in the collection of signatures (including fans of football clubs), as yet the minimum number has not been reached.

17 Presidential Election results 2015, National Election Commission, URL: http://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/319\_Pierwsze\_glosowanie (accessed 7 December 2017).

18 Referendum Day webpage, URL: http://dzienreferendalny.pl (accessed 6 December 2017).

### **"Refugees not welcome" – the rhetoric of the Polish populist radical right**

The system of relocation of refugees and proposals for EU-wide solutions to the migration crisis are contested at various levels – the most commonly raised issue is the threat to identity posed by incomers, and their associated religious and cultural differences, but economic issues and security are also important.

The first rhetorical device used by politicians of the radical right concerns vocabulary – in their speeches they seldom use the word "refugee", replacing it with "immigrant", "Islamic immigrant" or "economic migrant". Their objective is to focus attention on the economic aspect of migration, and away from the question of war and political, ethnic and religious persecution. By highlighting economic aspects, they depict the European Union as a source of profits, and people trying to reach it are attributed with solely economic migrations. Robert Winnicki, leader of the National Movement, calls refugees "invaders",19 arguing that refugees registered in Greece, for example, upon moving to another EU member state become merely economic migrants. It is worth mentioning that referring to new arrivals as false refugees took place in other European countries in the early 1990s with the inflow of immigrants from the East, when the idea of "undeserving asylumseekers" portrayed as "disguised economic migrants" appeared in the public discourse of the countries of the so-called old EU.20

Analysis of the position of parties of the populist radical right reveals a host of references to economic issues. The politicians of these parties argue that Poland cannot afford to accept people arriving from the Middle East or Africa, and that the help offered by the European Union is minimal, sufficing for no more than a few months' stay.21 The economic motives of refugees leaving, for example, Lebanon and Turkey for EU states is also stressed; according to Kukiz'15, such individuals should be treated as economic immigrants.22 Janusz Korwin-Mikke's stance is that refugees heading to Europe are attracted only by benefits: "if we were to abolish benefits, there wouldn't be any people coming to Poland and the whole of Europe".23 Korwin-Mikke also repeated his argument during a debate in the European Parliament on the European migration programme, emphasising that those

19 "Manifestacja 'Przeciw islamizacji Europy'. Winnicki: 'To nie uchodźcy, to najeźdźcy'", *Polska The Times Warszawa*, 7 February 2016, URL: http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/9371803,warszawamanifestacja-przeciw-islamizacji-europy-winnicki-to-nie-uchodzcy-to-najezdzcy-zdjecia,id,t.html (accessed 14 December 2017).

20 Robin Cohen, *Migration and its Enemies: Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the Nation-State.* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 88.

21 Position of the Kukiz'15 movement on "refugees", published on the Facebook page of Paweł Kukiz, 16 September 2015, URL: https://www.facebook.com/kukizpawel/posts/958933797507674 (accessed 15 December 2017).

22 Ibidem.

23 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 8 September 2015, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7CQkivQNQI (accessed 8 December 2017).

coming to Europe do not want to work, and that by offering high benefits, the EU does not give them an incentive to do so.24

Security issues crop up frequently in the public debate, although usually in combination with cultural issues. Islam is seen as a threat not only to identity, but also to Poles' immediate security. During a debate in the Sejm, Robert Winnicki from the National Movement demanded "zero immigrants, zero refugees, zero terrorists in the Polish state".25 Equating refugees with terrorists has become a permanent feature of the radical right's rhetoric. In Kukiz'15's declaration, we can read that "among immigrants, for example in Hungary, Islamic State militants have already been identified. There will be more and more of them, because they make it clear that their next objective is an 'assault' of terrorists on Europe. Europe has immersed itself in chaos and ethnic and religious conflicts".26 Media reports on the New Year's Eve attacks on women in certain cities in Germany also reverberated in Poland, with female MPs from Kukiz'15 and KORWiN writing a letter to Prime Minister Beata Szydło on 14 January 2016 stating that "the increase in the number of Islamic immigrants is linked to cases of harassment, attacks and rapes of women, which we shall not accept, we will not allow the safety of Polish women to be any kind of bargaining chip".27 In 2016 a proposal was made to build a fence between Poland and Ukraine in order to protect the eastern border.28

The next, and perhaps most visible issue is that of religious- and culture-based arguments – refugees, especially Muslims or those from countries where Islam is dominant, are seen as culturally different and unacceptable. Before the Second World War, Poland was a multicultural country populated by Poles, Jews, Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Tatars and Lemkos, among others. Following the border shifts, the Holocaust and mass population transfers, Poland became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in Europe – today, 94% of inhabitants see themselves as "ethnic Poles"29 and 93% declare themselves

24 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 7 June 2016, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IORwEe2fWQA (accessed 8 December 2017).

25 Robert Winnicki, 15th session of the Sejm, 1 April 2016, 241.

26 Position of the Kukiz'15 movement on "refugees", op. cit.

27 "Działaczki Kukiz'15 i KORWiN nie chcą w Polsce ani jednego 'uchodźcy'! 'Wzrost ilości imigrantów islamskich wiąże się z przypadkami molestowania, bicia i gwałcenia'", *wPolityce.pl*, 14 January 2016, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/278176-dzialaczki-kukiz15-i-korwin-nie-chca-wpolsce-ani-jednego-uchodzcy-wzrost-ilosci-imigrantow-islamskich-wiaze-sie-z-przypadkamimolestowania-bicia-i-gwalcenia (accessed 10 December 2017)

28 "Ruch Narodowy chce ogrodzenia na granicy polsko-ukraińskiej", *Parlamentarny.pl*, 25 February 2016, URL: http://www.parlamentarny.pl/wydarzenia/ruch-narodowy-chce-ogrodzeniana-granicy-polsko-ukrainskiej,6077.html (accessed 12 December 2017).

29 *Wyniki Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2011*, Warsaw, March 2012, URL: https://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lu\_nps2011\_wyniki\_nsp2011\_22032012.pdf (accessed 12 December 2017).

to be Catholics.30 For the radical right, this ethnic, cultural and religious uniformity of Poland is a virtue and a wealth that must be defended.31 Owing to this ethnic uniformity, as well as the country's isolation during the years of communism, foreigners in Poland, especially those representing different cultures, are treated with reserve, and often also fear. The discourse based upon insisting on Catholicism as an intrinsic attribute of Polishness is also affected by the myth of Poland as *Antemurale Christianitatis* – the bulwark of Christendom – and Poland's role in defending Christian Europe from Eastern influence.32 The idea of Poland being the only country in the European Union to be founded on Christian values often appears in the statements of radical-right politicians. They regard Catholicism as the essence of Polishness and the foundation of Polish national identity, and hence in need of protection. This was what led the National Movement to stress during a plenary debate in the Sejm that "we want Poland to stay Christian (…) we don't want the errors of multiculturalism Western Europe is making, and of which it is experiencing the tragic consequences".33 During another debate, Kukiz'15 MP Anna-Maria Siarkowska said that Poles are "a hospitable nation, but don't want culturally alien representatives of the civilisation of Islam, a civilisation that doesn't assimilate, but imposes its way of life and thinking on others – it imposes its religion and its laws".34

The question of religion appears very frequently in the discourse, also in the context of whom we should help – there has been a proposal to help only Christian refugees, as those with whom Poles are connected by shared values. Here too, the argument was raised pointing to the primary needs of Poles living outside of the country – in Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Belarus. The Kukiz'15 leader's declaration emphasises that in Kazakhstan, Siberia and Ukraine there are "at least several tens of thousands of Poles and the descendants of Poles waiting for repatriation. There is no need to assimilate them, they won't make terrorist attacks. And yet for 25 years we have not brought them over".35 This argument is also raised by other parties, including the ruling Law and Justice, who also point to the large number of citizens of Ukraine living in Poland as refugees from conflict-hit areas.

The debate over the solution to the problem of refugees arriving in Europe also became a forum for criticism of the institution of the European Union, which

30 CBOS, *Zmiany w zakresie wiary i religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II* ("Changes in the Belief and Religiosity of Poles since the Death of John Paul II"), Komunikat z badań BS/49/2012, Warszawa 2012.

31 Robert Winnicki, Posiedzenie Sejmu, 9 February 2016, URL: https://videosejm.pl/video/ 4787-posel-robert-winnicki-wystapienie-z-dnia-09-lutego-2016-roku (accessed 10 December 2017).

32 Janusz Tazbir, *Polska przedmurzem Europy*, Warszawa: Twój styl, 2004.

33 Robert Winnicki, 15th session of the Sejm, 1 April 2016, 242.

34 Anna Siarkowska's speech during Sejm session on 11 February 2016, video recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\_continue=33&v=S3nW-RWgNRw (accessed 14 December 2017).

35 Position of the Kukiz'15 movement on "refugees", op. cit.

on the one hand is seen as ineffective, yet on the other hand is accused of excessive interference in the internal affairs of member states. Most parties of the populist radical right are Eurosceptic or hostile to the European Union, and the Polish example is no exception here. Both Kukiz'15 and the Congress of the New Right (as well as KORWiN) criticised the refugee relocation mechanism, and they were also active in passing the resolution in the Sejm rejecting mandatory relocation. Sylwester Chruszcz from Kukiz'15 supported the proposed resolution, maintaining that the Polish side would not agree to "the EU diktat imposing upon us by force a limit of citizens of third countries or stateless individuals".36 He added that this position was in accordance with the Polish national interest, as "we are a sovereign state which itself decides upon issues fundamental to us".37 The European Union is accused of lack of action to bring an end to the conflict in the Middle East, as well as providing insufficient aid in the countries in question. A common stance is the idea, included in the Kukiz'15 declaration, that refugees (the word "immigrant" is used in the declaration) "should be helped, but in the countries from which they come", and that the EU ought to "provide active support for ending conflicts in such countries as Syria and Libya".38 Kukiz believes that a "new Marshall Plan" should be proposed to the Middle East and North Africa.39 Criticism of the solutions offered by the European Union has also become a motivation for collecting signatures for the initiative to hold a referendum, in which Kukiz's movement wants to ask the question: "Are you in favour of Poland accepting 'refugees' within the relocation system in the European Union?"40 The programme of the KOR-WiN party,41 founded after the split within the KNP, cites as the absolute priority of Poland's foreign policy "regaining the possibility of making sovereign decisions on Poland's immigration policy",42 refusing to countenance the interference of the European Commission in Poland's internal affairs. The Congress, the only Polish party to advocate abolition of the European Union, announced in 2014 that it would vote against all initiatives in the European Parliament aiming to increase the competences of EU institutions, and thus against all community initiatives.43 In a controversial speech in the European Parliament, Korwin-Mikke criticised the Dublin Regulation, comparing refugee camps to concentration camps and claiming

36 Artur Bartkiewicz, "Sejm za uchwałą odrzucającą przymusową relokację uchodźców w UE", in *Rzeczpospolita* 21 October 2016 URL: http://www.rp.pl/Uchodzcy/161029860-Sejm-za-uchwalaodrzucajaca-przymusowa-relokacje-uchodzcow-w-UE.html (accessed 8 December 2017).

37 Ibidem.

38 Position of the Kukiz'15 movement on "refugees", op. cit.

39 Ibidem.

40 Referendum Day webpage, URL: http://dzienreferendalny.pl (accessed 6 December 2017).

41 The KORWiN party changed its name to Wolność (Liberty) on 8 October 2016.

42 *Dumna, Bogata Polska, Program Partii KORWiN Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja*, Warszawa 17 October 2015.

43 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014).

that EU policy is one leading to "Europe being flooded with human garbage […] that does not want to work"; this policy, he argues, will lead to the "downfall of Europe".44

### **Conclusions**

Contemporary Polish identity is based on culture, language and religion, and particularly the last of these played an important role in the time when the Polish nation was subjected to external oppression (the partitions and the communist period). The Catholic Church has often been perceived as the guardian of Polish identity as well as the bastion of freedom. It is therefore no surprise that arguments about endangered identity are cited in the debate on accepting refugees or the common EU migration policy. The fear of outsiders, often representing a different religion and culture, is fomented and reinforced by the discourse of the populist radical right. As Krastev notes, this type of rhetoric "exploits and strengthens the sense of division into 'ordinary citizens' and the 'elite', which only safeguards its own interests".45 In these conditions, success is enjoyed by parties and their leaders who succeed in persuading society about the existence of a threat, as well as their commitment to defending ordinary citizens, their identity, way of life and wellbeing. Analysis of the rhetoric of radical right-wing parties in Poland leads to the conclusion that both economic arguments and those related to security have an extra agenda in the form of identity-based arguments. Activists of the radical right view ethnic and religious uniformity as a virtue. In order to be accepted, refugees should be the same as inhabitants of the country in which they are arriving. As a result, if one is to even consider accepting them, then this should only be on condition that they must be Christians. Islam is presented as "the other", a threat for Polish and European identity, and the migration crisis is interpreted as an attempted "invasion of Europe", an alien civilisation attempting to take control. The European Union is criticised for approaching the crisis too liberally, for its excessive openness and undue protection of its citizens, as well as for its misguided policy of multiculturalism, which, according to the radical right, results in ethnic ghettos and terrorist attacks. The Polish radical right therefore has the mission to safeguard not only Polish society from Islamisation, but also Europe. This is the subject of one of the points in the Congress of the New Right's programme: "we believe that only restoration of European values – Latin Civilisation and Western Universalism – can change the present Europe under occupation of the EU from an area of permanent crisis into a space of freedom, well-being and the principles that once built the power of the Old Continent".46 The new Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz

44 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 8 September 2015, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7CQkivQNQI (accessed 8 December 2017).

45 Ivan Krastev, "The strange death", op. cit. p. 60.

46 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014).

Morawiecki, has also joined this rhetoric, speaking of the need for the re-Christianisation of Europe.47

A characteristic of the radical right in Eastern Europe is mainstream parties' tendency to appropriate their rhetoric; this occurs in Hungary (where Fidesz adopted some of Jobbik's xenophobic rhetoric),48 as well as in Poland, where the ruling Law and Justice party often uses exactly the same arguments against acceptance of relocation of refugees as Paweł Kukiz and Korwin-Mikke. An example might be the statement of Foreign Affairs Minister Witold Waszczykowski, who asserted that Poland could potentially accept Christian refugees, as only they would have the chance for assimilation. Commenting on the EU Justice Tribunal's decision pronouncing that the refugee relocation mechanism is a legitimately adopted EU law binding in all countries (including Poland), Waszczykowski stated that it is not refugees who are in question, but economic immigrants.

The rhetoric of the radical right, through the simplicity and clarity of its message and with the help of the (especially social) media, reaches a broad range of recipients and influences their perception of the migration crisis and solutions proposed by the European Union. This rhetoric influences not only the radicalisation of the language of politics, but also attitudes in society, leading to acts of physical violence.49 This causes profound social division in Poland, but the question also divides European societies and has an impact on EU unity. In 2016, Ivan Krastev said of the divisions that opened up in the EU before the recent crises: "the financial crisis split the EU into creditors and debtors, tearing open a divide between north and south. Now the refugee crisis is dividing Europe between East and West […] We are not just experiencing a lack of solidarity […] we are experiencing the clash of conflicting solidarities: between national, ethnic and religious solidarity and our duty as human beings".50 It seems that it will not be easy to head off the crisis over the failure to secure acceptance for the decision to relocate some refugees, especially after the European Commission's decision in 2017 to refer Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Court of Justice.

 47 Mateusz Morawiecki, interview for TV Trwam, 8 December 2017, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng4nkvx6Yy4 (accessed 14 December 2017).

48 Lenka Bustikova, "The Radical Right", op. cit.

49 According to a report on the OKO.press website, in Poland in 2016 record numbers of hate crimes were recorded, meaning those motivated by supposed religion, nationality, sexual orientation or skin colour. URL: https://oko.press/waszczykowski-powtarza-przekaz-pis-uchodzcy-czylimigranci-czyli-terror-a-przeciez-przyjmujemy-ukraincow/ (accessed 8 December 2017).

50 "Refugee crisis: 'Not the same values in East and West'", *Die Welt*, 8 March 2016, URL: http://www.dw.com/en/refugee-crisis-not-the-same-values-in-east-and-west/a-19102868 (accessed 8 December 2017).

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# **Europeanisation of Culture as an Effect of EU Cultural Policy. Wrocław ECOC 2016 Research**

Bożena Gierat-Bieroń

### **Introduction**

This article presents the results of social empirical research1 conducted in the Polish cities competing for the title of European Capital of Culture (ECOC) 2016. The Polish ECOC competition took place between 2007 and 2012.2 Eleven urban conurbations entered, six of which proceeded to the final round. In the end, Wrocław was selected (along with San Sebastián in the Basque Country) as European Capital of Culture. The empirical research focused on the seven cities which, on the basis of a cooperation agreement, founded the so-called Coalition of Cities to support Wrocław's artistic activities in 2016. We worked on the assumption that the competition process for choosing the ECOC in Poland took place in an atmosphere of high levels of engagement from creative communities and urban movements, which were, through the organisation of the competition and then implementation of the ECOC 2016 festival, counting on a fundamental change in the artistic and social space, improved quality of government and governance of the city,3 and the opportunity for modernisation of the cultural infrastructure. The research employed qualitative methods using in-depth narrative interviews, participant observation and analysis of secondary sources, in this case mostly the bids made in the competition by the seven ECOC candidate cities selected for the study: Gdańsk, Katowice, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin and Wrocław. One of the approaches to the research assumed that the dynamic of the analysed changes is fundamentally influenced by a change in the discourse, understood as the rela-

1 The specific results of the entire research process are presented in the book Paweł Kubicki, Bożena Gierat-Bieroń, Joanna Orzechowska-Wacławska *Efekt ESK. Jak konkurs na Europejską Stolicę Kultury zmienił polskie miasta,* Nomos, Kraków 2017.

2 Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin, Toruń, Warsaw, Wrocław.

3 I follow Michael Foucault in distinguishing between government and governance.

tions in power regulating the forms of speaking and thinking about a specific reality and determining the "regimes of truth".4 A key role in shaping discourse viewed in these terms is played by opinion leaders, who concentrate significant symbolic resources, impose the rules of the game, and decide who will have the privilege of being listened to.5 For this reason, opinion leaders from the various cities were interviewed. First and foremost, these were people directly involved in preparing the ECOC competition application, members of the campaign team and those responsible for cultural policies (local government officials, employees of local government culture departments). Second, they were the leaders of local urban movements, local media journalists and bloggers. A total of 60 interviews were held.6

The discourse of this article focuses on the question of Europeanisation as a phenomenon explaining the processes of integration in culture. Given the European nature of the ECOC competition, as a form of implementation of European Union cultural policy, it was necessary to verify the impact of the Europeanisation mechanism on the design of a large international festival/event from an artistic and social perspective. Since the interviews were conducted with the people preparing the application forms, during the research the discussion on the ECOC remained within the confines of the plans for the future they nurtured at the time. In keeping with the methodology of political science discourse, in this article I employ the methodological tools for theoretical analysis used in European studies and check the empirical application of the defined concepts. I also verify the influence of the impulses for integration, in terms of the European Capital of Culture programme objectives, on the dynamic of city-forming movements and cultural transformation in Poland. I assume that in Polish culture a certain "change" has taken place, reflecting integration trends, i.e. shaping pro-European mechanisms. This is suggested by the statements of cultural operators and competition entrants in Poland.

In this article, the issues of Europeanisation are divided into three topics: Europeanness, the European dimension, and Europeanisation per se. I defined the concepts, before asking respondents about their use in the concept for the European Capital of Culture for the various candidate cities. "Europeanness" is a noun defining a feature characteristic of something (like Polishness or Germanness, it does not exist of its own accord, but characterises something). Usually, Europeanness refers to the European axiology, meaning the set of values, norms and beliefs (human rights, democracy, tolerance, solidarity) at the basis of the integration process and constituting the foundation of the European socio-political community. The concept of "the European dimension" is a normative and practical one. It is a

4 Michael Foucault., *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, Pantheon Books, New York 1972.

5 Alain Touraine, *Thinking Differently*, trans. D. Macey, Policy Press, New York 2009.

6 The quotations given in this chapter were first printed in the book: Paweł Kubicki Bożena Gierat-Bieroń, Joanna Orzechowska-Wacławska (2017), *Efekt ESK…* op. cit.

specific European Commission guideline in the ECOC competition rules, accepted in Decision 1622/2006 EC7 This term is also widely used in EU documents on culture. Europeanisation is a term used in European studies on the basis of political science and international relations. In most discursive practices, it refers to the specific details of the processes of integration in its political dimension. There are at least 10 theories of Europeanisation.8 In this study I employed the "topdown/bottom-up" conceptions of the German theoreticians Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse.9 The Europeanisation mechanism is part of the Europeanising processes observed in broader terms.

### **Europeanness**

Let us examine the main concepts more closely: Europeanness, the European dimension and Europeanisation. The Polish European studies scholar and identity analyst Wiesław Bokajło10 sees Europeanness as the dichotomous suspension of axiological systems between the Christian and secular tradition of humanism. According to Bokajło (a view shared, for instance, by Cris Shore and Gerard Delanty), the Christian idea of human dignity and freedom as the highest humanistic value was transferred, so to speak, from the sphere of the sacrum to that of public life, i.e. incorporated into the lay legal systems that comprise the secular canon of human rights, democracy, solidarity and freedom. Europeanness is the position of individual and collective identification of Europeans (regardless of nationality or country of origin) with fundamental European laws, as well as conscious use of freedom, perceived as a higher value than local traditions and customs. Europeanness is the right to freedom of speech and of intellectual and creative expression. It is also being accustomed to freedom-based standards of cultural expression, artistic sophistication, the cult of literary virtuosity and artistic genius (but also artistic rebellion and respect for avant-gardes), as well as, in the pragmatism of working life, professional management of culture based as much on protection of elite val-

7 Decision No 1622/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2007 to 2019, OJ L 304, 3.11.2006**.**

8 The best-known are the concepts of the British scholars Helen Wallace and Robert Ladrech, the American political scientist James Caporaso, the Italian British-based professor Claudio Radaelli, and the Norwegian researcher Johan P. Olsen.

9 My arguments are based on the publications: Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse,, "When Europe hits home: Europeanisation and domestic change", [in:] *European Integration*, online paper, no. 4 (15), 2000, and the article: Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse, T., "Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of EU Politics", [in:] *The Sage Handbook of European Union Politics*, eds. Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack, Ben Rosamond, London 2007, pp. 483-504.

10 Wiesław Bokajło, "Europa i europejskość: idee i pojęcia", [in:] Wiesław Bokajło, Anna Pacześniak (eds), *Podstawy europeistyki. Podręcznik akademicki*, alta 2, Wrocław 2009.

ues as on egalitarianism in access to art and culture. Other scholars (Klaić,11 Fisher,12 Gudrun,13 Purchla14) perceive Europeanness in terms of international or regional cooperation between multiple entities. They define it as the standards of proper governance of cultural institutions, strategising of cultural actions and processes, a high level of urban cultural policies or protection of cultural heritage. Others see in Europeanness the threat of cosmopolitanism and denationalisation as well as mythicisation (Klocek di Biasio, Michalski, Münch15). Europeanness has also been perceived as inclusive multiculturalism, or as a method of constructing socio-cultural consciousness (Piasecki, Woroniecki16). Andrzej Chodubski's17 discussion of contemporary civilisation sees the emergence of global civil society in Europe as lying in European and integrational transformations. The characteristics of European society in the era of globalisation indicate a tendency for Europeans to reflect on Europeanness. This concept assumes the formation of a participatory democracy and a participative approach. It also assumes decentralisation and deconcentration, resulting in the empowerment of society and crystallisation of a sense of autonomy towards the central structures. Modern European societies are eschewing a philosophy of "rule" in favour of harmonious and horizontal coexistence, searching for alternative, non-traditional organisational structures without hierarchies and authority. The pluralist co-existing societies are open to various systems of values and demonstrate understanding towards immigration as a phenomenon of civilisation. These attributes of social change are often called the essence of Europeanness.

11 Dragan Klaić,., *Mobilność wyobraźni. Międzynarodowa współpraca kulturalna. Przewodnik*. Fundacja nowej Kultury Bęc Zmiana, Narodowy Instytutu Audiowizualny, Warszawa 2011.

12 Rod Fisher, (ed.), *Art Networking in Europe*, The Arts Council of England, London 1997

13 Pehn Gudrun, *Networking Culture. The Role of European Cultural Networks*. Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1999.

14 Jacek Purchla, Magda Vášáryová. (eds), *Modele mecenatu państwa wobec integracji europejskiej*, MCK, Kraków 2008; Jacek Purchla, *Dziedzictwo a transformacja*, MCK, Kraków 2005.

15 Beata Klocek di Biasio, Bogdan Michalski, Felix Münch, (eds), *What Europeanness Means Today? European Identity and Its Multicultural, Economic, and Social Dimensions*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2015.

16 Ryszard Piasecki, Jan Woroniecki*,* "Europeanness: A Path to Unity Within The European Union", [in:] *Comparative Economic Research*, Vol. 19/1, 2016, pp. 45-63.