In Chap. 5, we considered which options are currently available in each of the three dimensions of variation. Within the internal market, variation in policy content currently consists of minimum harmonisation, open standards, and higher levels of protection in certain Member States. Regarding the second dimension, variation in decision-making, the internal market illustrates how the special legislative procedure (in the form of the open method of coordination) concerns not the harmonisation of national legislation but rather the coordination of national policies (without mandatory standards). Member States cannot be outvoted in this decision-making method because decisions are only taken unanimously.

The internal market's legal framework is so flexible that both the legislator and the Court can weigh economic market interests against other public interests, the former from a political and the latter from a legal standpoint. That is because the organisation of the internal market reflects the explicit pursuit of a social market economy and the view that fundamental rights and the principles of solidarity, proportionality and 'mainstreaming' (which mirror public interests) are important principles of market organisation under the Treaty. Moreover, the Treaties assume that the functioning of the internal market will contribute positively to the public's well-being and standard of living.

There are also objections to variation. Variation between the guiding principles of the internal market and closely associated policy domains raises problems when it comes to establishing a social market economy. Variation in the way the Member States interpret the four freedoms could also pose a major risk not only to the economic completion of the internal market but also to the safeguards afforded to the associated social and public interests. The general principles of Union loyalty and effectiveness of Union law limit such variation, in any event. At the same time, however, we also see that the broad spectrum of principles underpinning the internal market does, in fact, offer more scope for national variation, especially where no EU legislation applies. These principles allow for variation by permitting Member States to apply certain rules and practices that protect certain public interests in preference to the interests of the internal market.

Existing variations within the internal market inspire variation options within other policy domains, such as EMU and asylum, migration and border control, two controversial and divisive topics within the European Union. We discuss these below.

#### 9.5 Variation in EMU and the Euro

Chapter 7 on variation in EMU and the euro outlined various possibilities for variation. Here, variation requires different, co-existing arrangements. Elements of the current governance of the euro that can be included in variation without further ado are:

This list begins with the option of variation in policy content, but that does not exclude the possibility of variation in membership and decision-making.

What are the options that arise working with the above elements (on the understanding that we do not immediately assess their feasibility)? Below, we discuss two potential routes to variation, by which we mean different arrangements that can co-exist. They are:

In addition, we discuss variation as a form of macroprudential policy as it currently exists and as explained in Chap. 7.

#### Re 1. Variation by means of market discipline and IMF involvement going forward

One option is for some Member States to exercise market discipline and submit to the IMF's recovery programmes in the event of difficulties while other Member States establish a common fund providing mutual insurance. The market discipline/ IMF arrangement is appropriate for countries that are committed to taking responsibility for their own affairs. The fund arrangement, in turn, requires a large measure of trust between the Member States that choose to participate (e.g. in an EMF). An EMF may be of particular value as an emergency fund, but Article 122 (2) of the Treaty already provides for the possibility of financial assistance to Member States in such cases. As an interpretation of this clause, an EMF could take the form of an ex ante fund and/or (mutual) borrowing capacity.

In the case of mutual borrowing capacity, variation is possible in policy design (and possibly also in decision-making and degrees of participation). That would certainly be true if such organised borrowing capacity can be applied in tandem with pre-existing IMF funds (formed by euro-area countries). Specifically, this could mean, for example, that euro-area Member States whose government deficits regularly test the boundaries of the rules and agreements would be more likely to request assistance from an EMF and/or the IMF, and do so more frequently, than other euro-area Member States.

Variation can be built in by pegging risk premiums to this fiscal behaviour, for example by applying SGP criteria. Another option would be to make the establishment of an emergency fund optional for Member States: those that want to arrange joint coverage contribute to the fund (and can rely on it in crisis situations); those that do not, do not contribute and must rely on themselves (and the IMF) in crisis situations. As a result, the basic fund, in which everyone participates, may be limited or very limited. Variation in this sense may also imply less integration, for example with regard to fiscal rules.

The Dutch Council of State has also examined this approach, noting that if this more 'decentralised' trend were to be continued, three elements would be important: (1) completion of the banking union, (2) certain financial safety nets, (3) European enforcement of fiscal and economic rules in special circumstances.4 This is in keeping with the main thrust of the analyses in this section and the previous chapter of this book.

#### Re 2. Variation by means of an EMF

An EMF could function as a stabilisation mechanism for the monetary union. The single currency as it now stands offers starting points for a move in that direction. For example, the European Stability Mechanism could form the basis for a permanent stabilisation fund. The set-up of the fund can remain intergovernmental in nature. Within that set-up, all sorts of variation options are conceivable (in policy content), and more scope can be created for democratic control and/or economic 'conditionality' as prerequisites for such a fund. The latter can be intergovernmental in nature or involve a hybrid blend of intergovernmental and Community elements (variation in decision-making).

An EMF could bolster the monetary union by allowing for variation in short, medium and long-term measures, as well as in overarching conditions of democratic control and economic robustness. It could also mean that euro-area Member States whose government deficits regularly test the boundaries of the rules would be more likely to request assistance from an EMF or the IMF, whereas others would not have to. It then becomes possible to build variation into the architecture of an emf, for example by charging different premiums on such fiscal behaviour.

An EMF would be an outgrowth of the ESM that is already in place, and would align with the institutional paths trodden in response to the euro crisis: excluding Treaty amendments but including the structural involvement of the IMF. In certain respects, this would also fit in with the next phase of the programme to strengthen the euro area—following the acute crisis management of recent years—which will need to focus on reassessing national and European responsibilities for the single currency going forward. This will be part of a broader approach to the underlying problems that stem largely from the lack of appropriate coordination mechanisms for dealing with major differences between economies.

#### Variation in the form of macroprudential policy

Finally, with reference to EMU and the euro, this book briefly mentioned an existing example of variation in the form of macroprudential policy. As it now stands, a conscious choice has already been made to let national authorities chart their own course in this policy area, given that financial cycles can vary widely between Member States. This policy should be positioned alongside the existing macro-economic imbalances procedure and the enforcement of price stability, a task entrusted to the ECB. The case for developing a macroprudential policy of this kind stems from the increasingly decisive role that financial factors play in the functioning of EMU and the euro. The options for institutional design range from intergovernmental to supranational.

#### 9.6 Variation in Asylum, Migration and Border Control

Chapter 8 on asylum, migration and border control outlined several examples of existing variation and also described other options. The statutory provisions concerning the treatment of asylum seekers laid down in the Geneva Convention on Refugees, Article 3 of the ECHR, and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establish a clear-cut minimum level of uniformity in European asylum policy. Only refoulement—forcibly returning people to a country where they are likely to be exposed to persecution or degrading treatment—is in any case prohibited. This obligation is incumbent on both the Member States and the Union as a whole. Even so, this human rights standard need not lead to a completely uniform asylum policy; in fact, it even allows scope for variation in the way in which asylum is ensured. In other words, in all further questions of policy and legislation, the point is to assess the most appropriate model of action.

We can assess variation in the fulfilment of European public tasks concerning asylum and migration in part by considering whether such variation strengthens democratic support for migration policy. Social and political differences between the Member States suggest less unity, but the nature of the problems may in fact require more.

In 2016, the Advisory Council on International Affairs recommended creating more scope for variation in migration policy within the circle of Schengen countries.5 The AIV drew attention to the possibility of closer cooperation as defined in the EU Treaty (Article 20 TEU) between Member States wishing to implement the Schengen Agreement within the framework of a fully functioning common asylum system, including similar forms of reception and integration, the acceptance of distribution keys, sharing information on abuses, coordination with the UNHCR on resettlement, and agreements with safe countries outside the EU regarding the return of migrants. This is an example of variation in membership. Other Schengen countries would maintain open internal borders under normal circumstances and share responsibility for external borders and the common visa policy, provided that they agree to share costs, jointly manage external borders and perform selective checks at internal borders, all of which points to 'flexible solidarity' towards the resettlement of asylum seekers, as suggested by a number of Central European Member States. This proposal allows for societal differences between Member States and includes trade-offs within a policy domain—in other words, variation in policy content. After all, there is little point in forcibly transferring a refugee to a Member State that does not want to take in asylum seekers. In terms of the EU's own development, it is important that this variation does not jeopardise the socio-economically valuable single market.

Variation in the decision-making method is conceivable, for example when treaties are concluded by departing from the usual decision-making procedure (e.g. by means of intergovernmental decision-making within the European Council). It is crucial that minimum thresholds, such as the principle of non-refoulement reaffirmed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are fully respected. Anticipatory policy must set the stage for what follows in all cases. That can only be entrusted to a European Union that pursues international policy towards countries of origin and takes action to prevent new crises.

#### 9.7 Perspective on Change

The capacity for change and adaptation has always been a critical force behind European integration. It is vital that we rediscover that capacity, because if the EU itself cannot change, then circumstances will at some point force inevitable changes upon it. The main objective is not to amend the Treaty, but rather to adopt a different attitude towards the Treaties and their application. This will also lighten the burden on new Member States that are caught between the political will to accede to the Union and the real obstacles to their immediate and equal participation in all areas. Nor is it necessary to make a binary distinction between Member States and non-Member States in relation to associated countries and territories. The same applies to the distinction between overseas countries and territories, including the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the 'outermost regions'.

The functional rationality that has long been a powerful driver of European integration is not inviolable. History has made that more than evident. The (1) unique momentum of market integration, (2) spill-overs between sectors, i.e. the 'dissemination' of integration practices from one policy domain to another, and (3) their consolidation by supranational institutions that uphold the supranational rule of law, are, moreover, processes that cannot be maintained under altered circumstances. European cooperation and integration have often been the result of negotiations or major external events that required a response. To forge a covenant between peoples is not to narrow that covenant down to an institutional narrative.

How can the Member States continue to chart a course on the basis of self-determination? The notion of 'demoicracy' put forward in this book is based on the assumption that the 'demoi', the political peoples of Europe, should be regarded in plural. This would, for example, be possible if national parliaments not only had negative powers, such as the yellow card procedure, but also the right to initiate European policy and legislation, including variations in that policy. What we are emphasising here is that there are no hierarchical but rather cooperative relationships between EU and national institutions. The EU's current system is in fact not modelled on the structure of the national state. In that context, legislative, policy-making, administrative and judicial competences are derived from the power structure shaped by history. The exact opposite is true in the European Communities and now in the EU: the need for a partly common legal order led to the creation of institutions by treaty.

What this implies is that, at European level, the principle of democracy takes on a different meaning. The European order is a legal order, an economic order and, in a certain sense, a political order, but it is not a democracy in the same manner as a state. The EU provides a structure for cooperation, to offer protection and build a future lived in freedom; based on those goals and the common values in which they are rooted, however, it is also a structure for taking and overseeing joint decisions. In this European context, citizens exercise their influence primarily through their national elections, and it is there that the EU must seek its basis of support.

In addition, by being more self-aware and proactive in its approach to variation, the EU can better reflect the diversity of 'demoi', and the different interests and aspirations arising from it, in legislation and policy. To involve the 'peoples' more closely in the EU, it must have a closer relationship with the national parliaments. It should also be more aware that each and every parliament represents a people who want space and protection for their life plans and those of future generations. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can serve as a guideline in this respect. The Charter does not refer specifically to the division of tasks between European and national governments, but it does identify and protect the fulfilment of public tasks as indispensable to the pursuits of citizens, their organisations and businesses.

The 'logic of consequences', i.e. the question of what costs and benefits are at stake, is inextricably bound up with the 'logic of appropriateness', i.e. the question of what moral considerations play a role. After all, cooperation within the Union is always based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms, including social rights and the right to protection against persecution.

These requirements are particularly important when it comes to the protection of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. If we accept variations as a feature of the European Union, we must face up to the question of what the Union's essential common features are. Only then will it be possible to appreciate differences while maintaining sufficient cohesion. Too often, the European Union stands accused of straightjacketing its Member States and showing no regard for their individuality. Such dissatisfaction indicates a fundamental cross-border appreciation for individuality in diversity. Respecting this means seeing people not as separate individuals, but as persons who engage with others on the basis of their culture, beliefs and traditions. That is the view of humanity that underpins the notion of human rights.

The scope for variation sought in this book and recommended with a view to future developments must not endanger the above vision of human society; in fact, it is precisely this vision that has inspired our call to abandon the forced pursuit of uniformity. Respect for individuality is manifest—or, indeed, lacking—at various levels. In each case, what is at stake is the rights and responsibilities of people as citizens: as citizens of their town or village, as citizens of their country, and as European citizens. No variation in the allocation and fulfilment of public tasks should lose sight of that. It is expressed in the scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 51 as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Justice).

The variations that we have recommended therefore do not limit the fundamental values set out in Article 2 of the EU Treaty, let alone cast them aside. Only by recognising that these values—which include democracy, the rule of law and human rights—are closely bound up with the EU and European citizenship can an EU of variation maintain and act upon its vision of a shared future. While the effect may vary depending on local and national circumstances, the democratic rule of law must be regarded as inviolable. We therefore endorses the AIV's recommendation6 in its report The will of the people? The erosion of democracy under the rule of law in Europe that respect for diversity in states' democratic functioning should be paired with efforts to prevent the erosion of the rule of law.

Another important aspect of the perspective offered in this book is that, regardless of the level of policy diversity or uniformity, the EU's internal relationships must be equal to the challenges posed by the outside world. The EU and its Member States are dealing with external forces, forces that affect international trade, security, data transmissions and even the integrity of democratic procedures. The nature and intensity of European integration must be able to adapt constantly to these forces.

#### 9.8 The Dutch View of the European Union

What is the significance of the variation perspective for the Netherlands? The main purpose of this book is to consider a particular approach to European cooperation. The options put forward in different policy domains in the previous chapters provide examples. However, our most important message here is that the fundamental openness of the European project should be perceived as a space for creativity and imagination. In other words, variation should not be a mere last resort when compromise is required and differences are simply unavoidable.

Variation does not offer carte blanche to Member States, including the Netherlands. The significance of the 'variation' perspective for the Netherlands is evident in two areas, namely the area of interests and the area of values. This distinction—which is rife with interdependencies in the real world—corresponds to the logic of consequences (interests, cost-benefit) and the logic of appropriateness (normative perspective), discussed earlier.

The 'logic of consequences' has become even more important for the Netherlands, in part because Brexit has brought about an intensification in Franco-German cooperation. The economic, cultural and technical evolution of the Netherlands is inextricably bound up with that of these important neighbouring states. In its relationship with these and other Member States, the Netherlands must regard its place in the European Union as a given, but alterable, reality. To deny this would lead to further democratic alienation and involve portraying matters as if nothing could be changed about European integration.

It is therefore necessary for the Netherlands to express its political commitment to Europe in words and deeds, and it is equally necessary for this commitment to be reflected in the form of the EU at the same time. Both manifestations of political commitment are essential, all the more so because the political organisation of the EU is highly specific and its democratic embeddedness is extremely complex. In today's reality, we see this in the position of the prime minister, for example, who has increasingly also taken on the role of 'Minister for European Affairs', partly owing to his or her position as a member of the European Council—a role that can go to improve the visibility of European affairs.

Public tasks are not merely the outcome of a process of give and take, of wheeling and dealing. They are fundamental because they arise against the backdrop of shared history, geographical proximity, trade, and political ideals. The creation of the European Communities and, later, of the European Union was, of course, the result of negotiations and agreement reached between states as sovereign actors, but this particular process of international coordination differed from ordinary negotiations in two respects. It was compelled by the insight that the governments of Europe, and the peoples they represented, had more to gain than a mere trade-off of interests: the experience of destruction that preceded the coordination process taught them that they shared an important interest in the relatively small continent of Western Europe, where close relationships had always abounded. That meant finding an arrangement on which citizens and their organisations and businesses could depend across national borders. That is the essential feature of the European Union.

A parallel can be drawn in this sense between the discussions on the future of 'the Netherlands' and those on the future of 'Europe'. Both in the European context and in the Netherlands, there is a need to flesh out the 'big words' that are needed so that the outcomes of cooperation are not reduced to a trade-off of interests. Those outcomes may be better than expected or disappointing, which is why they are always debatable. In that sense, the debate on the Netherlands and the EU is the same: it requires a discussion about long-term reliability in the fulfilment of public tasks.

The 'logic of consequences', i.e. the question of what costs and benefits are at stake, is inextricably bound up with the 'logic of appropriateness', i.e. the question of what moral considerations play a role. Cooperation within the Union is always based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms, including social rights and the right to protection against persecution.

If we accept variation as a feature of the European Union, we must, time and again, face up to the question of what the Union's essential shared features are. The common foundations are set out in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Cooperation within the Union is always based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms, including social rights and the right to protection against persecution, and the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Respect for individuality is manifest—or, indeed, lacking—at various levels of organisation. At each level, what is at stake is the rights and responsibilities of people as citizens: as citizens of their town or village, as citizens of their country, and as European citizens. Variation in fulfilment is crucially important because the desire for personal responsibility is something that connects people across borders.

#### Notes

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## Appendix A Applying the Matrix

#### Possibilities and Impossibilities of European Public Tasks

In this appendix, we apply the matrix described in Chap. 4 to some recently proposed policy instruments. Our examples illustrate the centrifugal forces now at work in European cooperation. They are: the quota system for relocating asylum seekers among the Member States, adopted by the Council in 2015 on a proposal from the European Commission, (Decision (EU) 2015/1601); the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624), which succeeded FRONTEX; and a controversial proposal in 2016 to revise the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive (com(2016)0128—Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services) in accordance with the principle of 'equal pay for equal work in the same place'.

Our discussion proceeds as follows:

Research for Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32893-1

© The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) 2020

E. Hirsch Ballin et al., European Variations as a Key to Cooperation,

prioritisation of the same. It thus becomes clear why the fulfilment of European public tasks has become so difficult, but we also see new opportunities emerge.

#### Tensions Associated with the Influx of Refugees: Relocation of Asylum Seekers by Means of a Quota System

#### Background and content

The changing geopolitical landscape and the many 'hotspots' along European border regions have driven large groups of migrants across the Mediterranean and Aegean to the European continent since early 2015. In that year alone, more than a million migrants arrived in the EU, many fleeing persecution and war, some also to escape bleak economic prospects. A significant proportion of these migrants applied for asylum in the hope of obtaining refugee status or secondary protection. This had a disruptive impact on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Combined with the closing of the Balkan route by national measures, the Dublin Regulation led to large numbers of asylum seekers being detained in the first country of arrival (Greece or Italy), but also to some of them moving on to Western Europe, in particular to Germany.

To manage the flow of refugees and to alleviate the pressure on Greece and Italy and their already shaky asylum systems, the European Commission announced a plan in 2015 to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers from these two countries to the other EU Member States in a two-year period.1 Germany was particularly supportive of this plan. The Council of Ministers voted in favour of the proposal by qualified majority. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania voted against it. This was noteworthy, as the Council usually seeks consensus for sensitive decisions.

The asylum quotas established on the basis of a distribution key were mandatory. For the Netherlands, this meant receiving approximately 7,000 asylum seekers who would be obliged to go through the asylum application procedure there. The four Member States that had voted against the proposal were also allocated a number of asylum seekers. An appeal against this decision was rejected by the Court of Justice on 6 September 2017.2

#### Position of the relocation decision in the matrix

The asylum quotas are meant to get all the Member States to share the considerable burden bearing down on the southern Member States. The relocation mechanism also forces the Member States to share responsibility for safeguarding the fundamental rights of asylum seekers, based on Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This obligation is also in line with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and also applies to all Member States individually by virtue of international conventions.3

At the very least, the relocation of asylum seekers requires 'calculation based on European interest' as a basis for collective action. For this proposal to function in the longer term, however, recourse to the principle of interstate solidarity may also be necessary. The Commission's proposal reflects this. It means that Member States share the responsibility and absorb individual losses in pursuit of a higher intangible goal, namely to safeguard human rights and the fair sharing of burdens. This does not imply, however, that it is impossible for the objective of relocation to be based on other motivations for collective action, for example reciprocity (see Sect. 3.1).

Given the critical circumstances and the existing institutional order applicable in this policy area, including opt-outs for the uk, Ireland and Denmark, the final Commission proposal was designed as a flexible arrangement, in line with the CEAS within which the quota plan had been proposed.

In the relocation decision, the 'logic of appropriateness' provides the decisive arguments for cooperation, with the asylum quota plan being based on normative considerations of interstate solidarity. The decision is therefore politically charged, increasing the risk that some Member States will regard the relocation of asylum seekers as coercive and undemocratic.4 It is therefore not inconceivable that cooperation with like-minded Member States can be raised to a higher level. First, however, it is necessary to explore the opponents' motivations and whether a compromise is possible that gets everyone on board: can a form of variation be conceived that does not immediately lead to variation in membership, including new opt-outs and lead groups (Fig. 1)?

Fig. 1 Position of Commission's asylum quota proposal

#### Notable political positions of some EU Member States

The asylum quotas quickly met with fierce resistance from a number of Central European Member States that did not wish to implement the decision. Partly as a result, the plan soon ran aground. Hungary and Slovakia even took their case to the Court of Justice to challenge the mandatory relocation. In their petition asking the Court to annul the relocation mechanism, they argued as follows:

These arguments can be read as a demand for respect for the autonomy of the Member States. The Court of Justice ruled that Hungary and Slovakia should comply with the Council Decision adopted on the basis of the Commission's proposal.6 The fact that these Member States, together with Poland and the Czech Republic, nevertheless refuse to implement the decision places them in the 'autonomy'/'intergovernmental' cell in the matrix.

In defending the relocation mechanism, the southern Member States Italy and Greece invoke the 'principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility … between Member States' as set out in Article 80 of the TFEU. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands argue the issue mainly by referring to the fair distribution of costs. On that basis, and recognising the uk, Ireland and Denmark opt-outs, Italy and Greece are positioned in the 'solidarity/flexibility' cell, while the Netherlands and Germany are in the 'calculation based on European interest/flexibility' cell (Fig. 2).

#### The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Formerly FRONTEX): 'Flexible Solidarity'?

#### Background and content

In December 2015, the Commission presented a proposal to create a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, giving new impetus to the existing agency, FRONTEX, which had proved inadequate to managing the refugee crisis. After brief resistance from Hungary and Poland, the regulation was adopted on 14 September 2016 and the new agency became operational the following month. The

Fig. 2 Commission's asylum quota proposal, position of Member States

implication was that the Member States and the EU would need to cooperate more closely to secure the EU's external borders.7

The new regulation significantly increased the powers and tasks of the European border and coast guard. For example, the agency sees to it that EU legislation on border management is implemented correctly. It is notable that it is allowed to intervene even when not requested to do so by the relevant EU Member State, in any event when the proper functioning of the Schengen area is at risk. In other words, the agency has become more supranational in nature, and the borders of Member States situated on the EU's external borders have since become the external borders of all EU Member States. The policy autonomy of the EU Member States located on the EU's external borders has thus been further reduced.

The joint securing and protection of the EU's external borders is a critical component of the EU's political response to the tensions surrounding the influx of refugees. It is an attempt to join forces in controlling migration, improve the EU's internal security, and restore the Schengen system of free movement of persons. It is further regarded as a move towards the Member States and the EU sharing responsibility and towards a more inclusive European asylum system.

#### Position of the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the matrix

Both FRONTEX in its old form and the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency are organisations that deliver collective benefits to the EU through the

Fig. 3 Position of Commission's European Border and Coast Guard Proposal

pooling of forces. The basis for collective action is therefore the prospect that such cooperation will serve the greater good of the Union as a whole, i.e. internal security and the free movement of goods and persons. Since the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, individual Member States situated at the EU's external borders, such as Poland and Hungary, have lost out by surrendering their autonomy over their national border controls.

Whereas FRONTEX was a non-binding intergovernmental alliance, the new agency is much more supranational in nature because it can intervene in exceptional situations without being asked to do so by the Member State in question. It can also recommend the reintroduction of internal borders if a Member State refuses to cooperate. Like other policy instruments in the domain of migration and asylum, this instrument is flexible. There are opt-outs for directives and regulations under the CEAS, which is based on reciprocity and the convergence of different asylum systems within the EU (Figs. 3 and 4).

Notable political positions of some EU Member States

In May 2016, the Commission put forward a controversial proposal to impose a 'solidarity contribution' on Member States that refused to implement the asylum seekers relocation plan. The fine could mount to as much as 250,000 euros per refused asylum seeker and would be spent on the reception of refugees in those Member States that did respect the asylum quota. The Commission's idea was to prevent Member States such as Hungary and Slovakia from blocking an asylum

Fig. 4 Position of CEAS

policy based on solidarity. This opened the door to the idea of 'flexible solidarity', which the Central European Member States used to introduce a new perspective on both flexibility and solidarity in October 2016 (in the sense of 'trade-offs' within or between policy areas).

The principle of 'flexible solidarity' included new forms of solidarity as an alternative to the relocation mechanism for asylum seekers. One specific example is the deal between Austria and Slovakia whereby the latter temporarily receives migrants who, under the Dublin Regulation, must ultimately apply for asylum in Austria. Reinforcing the European Border and Coast Guard or freeing up more development funding also fall under 'flexible solidarity'. Central European Member States add their support to such trade-offs by arguing that security should take precedence as a European public interest. As a result, Slovakia and Hungary have shifted to the same position on the matrix as Germany and the Netherlands, namely 'calculation based on European interest'/'flexibility' (see Fig. 5). European ministers, but also the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, took this idea on board, recognising that flexibility was needed in this instance to reach a compromise. The result was variation in cooperation by permitting trade-offs within the asylum policy domain, with Member States being allowed to decide for themselves which public interest was most important to them.

The European Commission has reconsidered this issue since then and, bolstered by the Court's ruling, has demanded that the Central European Member States also

Fig. 5 Shift in Position of Hungary and Slovakia on Asylum Quotas

participate in the relocation mechanism. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, then asked that greater understanding be shown towards the Central European Member States and called for the mandatory asylum quotas to be withdrawn. Estonia, which held the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2017, presented a compromise proposal based on quotas but allowing exceptions. As tensions mount in response, the question is what forms of variation within the asylum policy domain can help the parties involved reach a compromise. It is a question that has become more relevant, emphasised by the fact that, by accepting 'flexible solidarity', the different Member States and the Commission are moving towards the same cell of the matrix (Fig. 6).

#### Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive According to the Principle 'Equal Pay for Equal Work in the Same Place'

#### Background and content8

In March 2016, the European Commission submitted a proposal to revise the Posting of Workers Directive 96/71/EC. The directive lays down rules on the posting of workers when providing services in another EU Member State. The

Fig. 6 Position of 'flexible solidarity'

Commission's aim in proposing the revision is to promote a level playing field, that is to say fair competition. It argues that in a competitive internal market, competition should be based not on labour costs but on quality of service, productivity and innovation. The proposed amendment aims to promote the free movement of services by clarifying the applicable terms and conditions of employment.

After two years of intensive debate, the Member States and the European Parliament reached an agreement in principle on the Commission's proposal in March 2018. The agreement stipulates that the same collective agreement will apply to posted workers as to workers in the host country in question. Previously this was the case only in the construction sector, but the rule is now to be extended to all other sectors (except transport). It has also been agreed that a secondment may last for a maximum of 12 months, with a possible six-month extension. Once this period has elapsed, the host Member State's employment law also becomes effective. Social security contributions may still be paid in the home country for up to 24 months, however.

#### Position of the Commission's proposal in the matrix

The revised version of the Posting of Workers Directive mainly aims to create a level playing field by harmonising labour costs. The motivation for collective action is therefore reciprocity. This position can also be presented as 'calculation based on European interest', since it can be argued that all EU employees benefit in this way.

Fig. 7 Position of the Commission's proposal for a Posting of Workers Directive

The overall objective of the revision is to stimulate the internal market through better management of the free movement of services. In the current EU system—in which the integrity of the internal market is a shared general principle—Community cooperation is the obvious course of action. Legislation can be produced within the framework of the internal market that weighs free movement against other interests, but this would then apply to all members. Structural invalidation of the four freedoms would make free-rider behaviour possible. After the 'Better Deal for Britain', however, this became an increasingly distinct possibility; after all, the EU showed itself prepared to negotiate with the uk about the social security entitlements of EU migrants (Fig. 7).

#### Notable political positions of some EU Member States

From the outset, the Netherlands was in favour of revising the Posting of Workers Directive. To encourage the Commission to take the initiative, the Netherlands and six other like-minded Member States—France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria—wrote a letter to the European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility in June 2015 in which their ministers of Social Affairs argued in favour of reforming the Posting of Workers Directive. In response, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria sent a letter opposing the revision. These Member States were initially against further harmonisation of posting policies in the EU.

In essence, both sides are standing up for their own employees. Some countries oppose more stringent requirements for posted workers because this would deprive them of their competitive advantage. After all, Central and East European workers benefit by offering cheaper labour than workers in the host country. On the other hand, workers from Northwest European Member States benefit from equal pay for the same work because they are then less likely to be driven out by the competition. All of the Member States have therefore taken up the position of 'calculation based on national interest', albeit in defence of different public interests (free movement versus social policy).

The two sides have different ways of bringing their views to bear. The main proponents, including the Netherlands, are calling for the creation of a level playing field and fair competition within the European internal market and the associated reciprocity. Their approach to reciprocity takes the working conditions of EU employees as its starting point. They regularly pay lip service to the social objective of improving the working conditions of all EU employees (in that case, the rationale for their position is 'calculation based on European interest'). The opponents want the existing situation to continue. They invoke the optimal functioning of the economic freedoms, in the sense of mutual access. In the matrix, the proponents are positioned in the 'reciprocity' and 'calculation based on European interest'/ 'Community' cell. The opponents, on the other hand, are positioned in the 'reciprocity/Community' cell (Fig. 8).

#### Member States' Different Positions

This appendix analyses some recent policy instruments related to two major European issues (i.e. the future of the free movement of persons and services, and the tensions surrounding the influx of refugees) using the matrix introduced in Chap. 4. The instruments analysed are the Decision to relocate asylum seekers according to established quotas, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (the successor of FRONTEX) launched in 2016, and a proposal in 2016 to revise the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive.

We see that the Commission's proposal on asylum quotas follows the 'policy rationality' described in Chap. 2, which often tends towards deeper European integration to deal with problems and which increasingly invokes motivations for collective action that are normative in nature, such as 'calculation based on European interest' and 'solidarity'. Because the refugee issue is politically charged, the relocation mechanism is a divisive force in European politics. It is therefore a prime example of the politicisation of European public tasks, and it is no surprise that the decision itself reflects contrary trends in the EU, i.e. 'policy rationality' versus 'democratic alienation'. The establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency also calls for deeper European cooperation with supranational aspects, to which 'the logic of consequences' is admittedly more applicable. The EU straitjacket of reciprocity and Community cooperation—as described in

Fig. 8 a A position of the member states on the posting of workers directive. b B position of the member states on the posting of workers directive

Chap. 2—is clearly in evidence in the proposed reform of the Posting of Workers Directive.

There is variation, however, in the position of the EU Member States. A demand for more variation is emerging, most explicitly in the demand for 'flexible solidarity', which encourages a different way of looking at the EU and what is possible. Specifically, 'flexible solidarity' is not only about variation in form, where discussions about flexibility often get bogged down in the traditional question of which Member States will or will not participate. Instead, variation here concerns the question of how much policy discretion the Member States can be given to weigh up the various European public interests, values and objectives themselves. The matrix shows that, as long as we continue to look solely at the form, based on institutional order and the number of participating Member States, the different Member States may indeed appear to view an issue from a similar perspective but will still not be able to resolve it, and no progress will be made on designing European public tasks.

#### Notes

## Appendix B List of Interviewees

E. Hirsch Ballin et al., European Variations as a Key to Cooperation,

Research for Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32893-1

## Bibliography

Research for Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32893-1

#### Legal Sources

#### Treaties

#### Jurisprudence

Legal acts

#### Other European Union documents


**Author details**

Petar Piljek1 , Marko Pranjić2 , Denis Kotarski2 \* and Tomislav Petanjek3

1 Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia

2 Karlovac University of Applied Sciences, Karlovac, Croatia

3 DOBA Business School, Maribor, Slovenia

\*Address all correspondence to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*Autonomous Aerial Robotic System for Smart Spraying Tasks: Potentials and Limitations DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.103968*


**Author details**

Haseeb Anwar1 \*, Shahzad Irfan1 , Ghulam Hussain1 , Muhammad Naeem Faisal2 , Humaira Muzaffar1 , Imtiaz Mustafa1 , Imran Mukhtar1 , Saima Malik1 and Muhammad Irfan Ullah3

1 Department of Physiology, Government College University, Faisalabad, Pakistan

2 Institute of Pharmacy, Physiology and Pharmacology, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan

3 Department of Pathobiology, Faculty of Veterinary Sciences, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Pakistan

\*Address all correspondence to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


**Meet the editors**

Editor, Dr Aleksandar B. Nikolic received his BSc, MSc, and PhD degrees in Electrical Engineering in 1991, 1999, and 2009, respectively, from the School of Electrical Engineering, University of Belgrade, Serbia. He worked 10 years in industry, and since 2005, he is with Electrical Engineering Institute "Nikola Tesla," Belgrade, Serbia, as a principal technical associate. In 2013, he was elected

for a position of Institute's Scientific Council President. His special fields of interest include power quality and energy efficiency, control of induction motor drives, and industrial automation. He has published over 120 papers and is a reviewer of several international journals. Presently, he is an IEEE senior member, a member of Board of the Serbian Power Electronics Society, and the president of CIGRE-Serbia committee B4.

Co-Editor, Zarko S. Janda was born in 1960. He received his Dipl. Ing., MSc, and PhD (power electronics) degrees in 1984, 1989, and 2004, respectively, from the School of Electrical Engineering, University of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, all in Electrical Engineering. He has been with the EE Institute "Nikola Tesla," Belgrade, since 1984. He was an associate fellow at School of Electrical Engineering, Uni-

versity of Belgrade, Serbia, between 1993 and 2004. He was a professor at the High School of Professional Studies in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Belgrade, Serbia, between 2003 and 2010. Presently, he is a chairman of Serbian IEEE PES Chapter, chairperson of CIGRE-Serbia committee B4, and member of Board of the Serbian Power Electronics Society.


**7.1 Trenching**

This requires the digging of trench along the length of the road on either side or both sides of it in accordance with the specification. Either of motorized excavator or manual labour can be used in the exercise depending upon availability, cost and size of the project. The excavated materials can be disposed as waste or reused depending upon the properties of the soil.


*1.3. IGO Strategic Management Challenges*

With increasing demands for more services provision, IGOs have been mandated by their member states to pay consistent attention to planning, developing and dynamically adjusting their strategic plan, which consequently entails the effective management of change. This is especially true when member states require the IGOs to reposition their strategic model to entail an increasing level of business/commercial activities as a response to the changes in the external environment and reduced funding.

The current strategic planning framework derived and applied to the private sector may not be suitable for the public sector, as it might neither be applicable, nor be able to meet the expectations, of IGO agencies. Moreover, Safi and Mahmood (2022) reported that many public strategic management scholars and practitioners agree that it is very difficult to apply strategic management principles from the private sector to the public sector. Using a number of studies, they further explain and support that this is due to the large gap that exists between the private sector's goals of profit and competitive advantages, and the IGO's purpose of serving its constituency.

Faced with these old and new strategic management challenges, IGOs today have to be strategy oriented, dealing primarily with strategic management (which entails intent, planning and formulation) external institutional pressures (primarily political factors) and change management. In doing so, they would develop the capabilities and maturity to establish a strong yet agile environment, setting the cornerstone for adaptive performance and sustainable change management.

#### *1.4. Motivation and Purpose*

We highlight that many perceive public institutions in general, such as the UN, to be well protected and not particularly vulnerable to internal or external pressures and threats, despite the fast changing global geopolitical, environmental and technological conditions. However, managers, such as section chiefs and bureau directors, in those institutions continue to struggle with their role of managing change, organizational decline and performance. The body of research in the area is lacking guidance to those managers as most of the relevant strategic management models derived from the private sector and scholars and practitioners alike agree that they have limited applicability when it comes to meeting the expectations and context of public institutions. Consequently, the elements of most strategic models including planning, development and implementation are not well suited for public institutions (IGOs) (Giblin and Nowacki 2018; Peretz 2021; Safi and Mahmood 2022). Accordingly, in this study, we aim to achieve two primary goals, namely to clarify the current situation specifying external and internal drivers of strategic management in public institutions, and to underscore how the present situation can be improved. We achieve those goals by empirically investigating strategic management factors and their inter-relationships in the context of IGOs.

#### *1.5. Structure of the Paper*

In this paper, we set out to investigate empirically strategic management in the context of inter-governmental organizations, a member of the public administration organizations family. In our endeavor to understand the context and due to the lack of empirical research in the area, we adopted relevant concepts developed for the private sector, validated them in our context and refined them into an IGO strategic management conceptual model. Our journey towards the final model included a literature review of the body of knowledge in the area of strategic management, as discussed in Section 2. In that section, we revised theories of interest and cross examined the good criteria for strategic management proposed by Courtney (2013) against the context of the IGO, in order to get a better understanding of how the private and public sectors compare. In Section 3, we elaborated on the theoretical background constituting the foundations of our study hypotheses and formulated four research questions, identifying the factors for IGO strategic management, their inter-relationships, cause–effects and mediation. In the following section (Section 4), we presented our methodology describing our sample and procedure and presented the questionnaire used for our study. Section 5 focused on the results and analysis in the same strategic sequence as the research questions, performing an exploratory factor analysis to identify the factors, conducting a confirmatory factor analysis to explore inter-relationships, propose a conceptual model and run a cause–effect analysis via a structured equation modeling approach, and testing for mediation. In the last section (Section 6), we engaged in discussion and conclusions presenting our findings, implication to theory and practice, limitations and recommendations for future research. The references are provided at the end.

#### **2. Literature Review**

In Section 1.2, we elaborated on the extant work, briefly discussing the classical and modern approaches to strategic management. Classical perspectives were developed when the pace of external and environmental conditions was slow. Modern approaches were an evolution of the strategic management theories as an attempt to adapt to the significant increase in the changing pace of organizations' environments (Brown 2010). However, considering IGOs as the public organization of our study, we find that classical models for their strategic management provide a better fit for analysis than the modern approaches. This is due to the following: (1) Today, IGOs still perform at a relatively slower pace than the private sector and are still closer in operations to IOs. Therefore, they are not suitable in environments where conditions change at a fast pace (as they still plan on a triennium basis with a fixed static strategic management plan), (2) due to the nature of their business, IGOs remain static, with limited abilities to adapt in time (and for all intents and purposes, they do not need to), (3) IGOs continue to ignore the external environment (and one of the issues studied herein as institutional pressures), (4) due to their source of funding coming from voluntary contributions of member states, IGOs continue to depend on those contributions remaining relatively stable over time, despite today's geopolitical challenges, and (5) IGOs persist on being linear by continuing to make every effort to avoid uncertainty in their strategy management approach as a mitigation and negotiation tactic towards the council. Based on the above, we used the classical models of private firms to explore and adapt their application to the IGO context. Moreover, new models largely ignore external variables

such as institutional pressures. The following literature review therefore focuses on those IO strategy theories.

Höglund et al. (2018) identifies a small but growing research field that, for the past decade, has studied strategy work in the public sector context and the possible consequences of strategic management. Of this group of studies, some have investigated the application of SM (Andrews and Walle 2013; Boyne and Walker 2010; Bryson 2018; Bryson et al. 2010; Ferlie and Ongaro 2015; George 2017; Höglund and Svärdsten 2018); however, only a few studied the use of tools for the practical application of SM to realize strategic intent (Schmidt et al. 2017; Elbanna et al. 2016; George and Desmidt 2018; Höglund et al. 2018, 2021; Johnsen 2016; Lane 2008; Poister 2010). Even fewer studies were performed to determine which tools are used in strategic making (George et al. 2016, 2017, 2018), with none, to our knowledge, in the public or IGO context (Höglund et al. 2018).

As mentioned earlier, IGOs are faced with significant external governmental pressures that influence their strategic management and change processes. Considering institutional pressures, organizations' strategies and change management may vary depending on the nature of the conflict and the motivation of organizational groups to see one of the competing demands succeed (Pache and Filipe 2010). Oliver (1991) highlights that strategic choices vary from active resistance (i.e., manipulation of rules and expectations) to a passive or neutral response (i.e., to acquiesce and fully conform to institutional pressure and expectation). Goodstein (1994) proposed that strategic choices for conformity or resistance are made to cope with institutional pressures. Boon et al.'s (2009) study on strategic human resource management demonstrates the presence of different institutional pressures. However, this does not necessarily mean that organizations see that institutional environment as restrictive. Organizations can create more leeway in choosing a human resources system themselves (Boon et al. 2009). Finding the correct degree of adaptation to institutional mechanisms can be a source of organizational success, even if it operates in a highly institutionalized context (Oliver 1997). Early institutional theory often overlooked this role of active agency and resistance in organization–environment relations (Oliver 1991), which reintroduced agency, interests and power into institutional analyses of organizations (Garud et al. 2007).

New institutionalism, which is distinguished by Meyer and Rowan's (1977) classic paper and followed closely by DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) study, refers to a view of institutions as collective cognitions that acquire a degree of social concreteness and compel organizational behavior. While old institutionalism focused its attention on processes that occur inside the individual organization, new institutionalism focused on interactions among organizations, a level of analysis common in the organizational field (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tohidfam and Touserkani 2021; Naveed et al. 2021). The organizational field refers to a recognized institutional network: regulatory agencies, key suppliers, resource and product consumers and other organizations that produce similar services and products (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Today, new institutionalism has been profoundly impacted by both globalization changing patterns and governance movements, where countries and IGOs find themselves facing irresistible and novel pressures. With significant reforms, political changes and widespread IGOs activities, mechanisms for governance, strategic management and change management are timely (Hossain 2022).

Institutional theory advocates that organizations active in social networks perceive institutional pressures to be significant for achieving social legitimacy and the acquisition of rare resources, essential for acceptable organizational performance (Zucker 1987; Scott 1995), sustainability (Teo et al. 2003; Oliver 1997), and strategic management. Such pressures can be in the form of coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism is a result of political influences and the problem of recognizing legitimacy; mimetic isomorphism is a result of responses to uncertainty; and normative isomorphism is associated with professionalization and trade association. As such, these institutional pressures impact strategic management processes of IGOs.

In the organization strategy domain, strategic planning has long been adopted to revitalize privately owned corporations and government-owned public agencies. With the increase in global political instability, economic uncertainty and the accelerated pace of digital innovations and social change, there seems to be some disillusionment with strategic management efforts that cannot adapt to the fast-paced environment, leading to increased skepticism about its overall effects. Some IGOs make significant efforts to find the best mechanism to optimize their strategic planning and development processes, with the goal of maintaining their organizational effectiveness and relevance. However, due to their inherent complexity, strategic planning efforts and processes have proven to be difficult to implement and pointless, with no/weak measured outcomes.

The primary culprits were unclear expectations, unrealistic goals, ill-defined action steps that were not explicit and a lack of stakeholder groups engagement. Moreover, strategic goals and strategic choices are often mixed with member states' agendas, economic interests and program priorities, which further blur the organization's vision and mission.

Looking at how strategy is addressed in the literature, we find a wide range of its definition and treatment. Reviewing this is outside the scope of our research; however, focusing on our context, we map, in Table 1, our analysis of IGO strategic processing elements to Courtney's (2013) criteria. Table 1 shows thirteen criteria identified by Courtney (2013), which are necessary to consider in the strategic planning process. However, IGOs, in general, do not pay attention to all of them. For example, IGO Secretariat, Development and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) address only criteria 6, 7 and 4 (the first column from left in Table 1), and in many cases only address them partially.

In general, we observe in Table 1 that IGOs in practice do not follow Courtney's (2013) criteria and have the tendency to manage their strategy in different notions that consist of more than one of the criteria. It is difficult to find out the reasons for that, and if those managers are aware of the strategic management process elements, but it is clear that doing so dilutes the original intent of the fundamental theories and makes it difficult (if not impossible) to measure the criteria—an exercise that is necessary for strategic planning and organizational performance.

**Table 1.** Strategic planning process: Mapping between good strategy criteria and IGO processes.

**Table 1.** *Cont.*

In their article, Bailey et al. (2000) captured the major strategic development factors in an integrated, multidimensional conceptual model that can be used to measure strategic development styles. Based on previous strategic development research, and in particularly that of Hart (1992), they produced the following six discrete factors for organizational strategy development: (1) command (Bourgeois and Brodwin 1984), (2) planning (Ansoff 1965), (3) incrementalism (Lindblom 1959), (4) political (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), (5) cultural (Johnson 1987) and (6) enforced choice (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Bailey et al.'s (2000) multidimensional conceptual model is in line with Hart and Banbury's (1994) criteria which, in general, elaborate on the factors of strategy development, in that they should represents elements (1) where vertical interactions between organizational managers are essential, (2) such that these managerial interactions represent capacities and abilities of the organization and (3) exemplify those interactions as routines reflecting the nature of the organization's strategy-making philosophy and process.

It is noteworthy in this line of research to point out that there is evidence on the diversity of strategic management which reveals typological commonalities with calls for the integration of the different approaches. Consequently, we draw attention to the strong link between Bailey et al.'s (2000) model and DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) institutional pressure framework. As mentioned earlier, Bailey et al.'s (2000) command, political and enforced choice elements can be considered as representative of coercive pressures. Coercive pressures, in turn, mainly entail the capacity to establish rules and enforce conformity via the manipulation of rewards or sanctions (Scott 1995). From a cultural perspective, it is equivalent to mimetic/cognitive pressures, whereby individuals take compliance for granted due to common social belief structures (Scott 1995). The original target of Bailey et al.'s (2000) model was organizations in general, without any specific considerations to the public sector or INGOs. The model is distinguished from others in that it incorporates various aspects of strategy planning, development, implementation and incremental and formal planning modes. These elements found in Bailey et al.'s (2000) model meet most of the current IGO strategic planning processes needs and are the reason for its adoption herein.

#### **3. Theoretical Background and Research Question**

Diverse theoretical and empirical research studies related to strategic management concur that the strategy development process is multidimensional in nature (Fredrickson and Iaquinto 1989; Derkinderen and Crum 1988; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992; Bailey and Johnson 1996). Considering the IGO context of our study, we find the research from Hart (1992) and Bailey et al. (2000) to be the most appropriate and potentially representative, especially since they both focus and demonstrate the multidimensional nature of strategic management. Hart (1992), through his analysis of previous research on the strategy making process, identified five dimensions, which were command, symbolic, rational, transactional and generative; while Bailey et al. (2000) elaborated on strategic management as consisting of the following components: strategic planning, strategic development and strategic implementation, including a model for institutional pressures.

Therefore, based on Hart (1992), Bailey et al. (2000) and evidence from Fredrickson and Iaquinto (1989); Derkinderen and Crum (1988); Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) and Bailey and Johnson (1996), we adopt and adapt to the context of our study, the six dimensions, namely command, planning, incremental, political, organizational and enforced choice. We elaborate on these dimensions below as they are reflected in the IGO context.

*The command dimension*: this dimension represents the Secretary General (S.G.) and IGO Governing Body (equivalent to the Chief Executive Office in the private sector. This represents the degree of control or power exercised). In the IGO sector, top executives can either shape and foster an entrepreneurial environment where initiative and risk-taking behavior is nurtured and rewarded (Birkinshaw et al. 1998; Kanter 1985; Pinchot 1985); or create strong leadership conditions that others can mimic via ambidexterity, decisive action Dess et al. (1997) and unilateral decision making, thereby improving responsiveness (Eisenhardt 1989). In an IGO context, however, the latter executive style may prove to be impossible to attain, since the governing body (for example, the council with representatives from member states) has an equal, if not more powerful influence on strategic direction adopted by the Secretariat.

*The planning dimension*: The question concerning strategic planning influence and value to the organization's performance continues to be debated, with inconclusive evidence ranging from tenuous to weak (Boyd 1991; Capon et al. 1994; Miller and Cardinal 1994; George et al. 2019; Spano 2009). Brews and Hunt (1999) found that the planning theory provides conflicting advice. Some studies found that formal strategic planning and organizational performance management are associated in dynamic environments (Hart and Banbury 1994; Miller and Cardinal 1994; Miller and Friesen 1983), while other research revealed that strategic planning performs better in environments that are stable and predictable (Fredrickson and Iaquinto 1989; Mintzberg 1983). In a comparative analysis between stable and unstable environments, Brews and Hunt (1999) observed that unstable environments strategic planning is managed under increased uncertainty and therefore requires less formalized structures that will allow managers to flexibly and organically adapt to the changing internal and external conditions.

*The incremental dimension*: The incrementalism approach (another approach to strategic planning) to strategy development and management is based on general strategic goals (Bailey et al. 2000). Incrementalism, compared to formal planning, is more flexible and focuses primarily on the various aspects of strategy implementation (Grant 1995; Menon et al. 1999; Nutt 1993). This approach (incrementalism) suggests that the nature of planning should be flexible and that strategic plans are fluid and change over time. This type of planning management environment promotes the intensity of the entrepreneurial spirit (Barringer and Bluedorn 1999). Moreover, incrementalism encourages experimentation and is more appropriate for dynamic environments (Brews and Hunt 1999).

*The political dimension*: The political dimension is central to the IGO context, where the board of governors consisting of representative of member states and the Secretariat, which is responsible for the strategic management and operations of the organization, engage in a continuous play of power dynamics and shifting alliances. This dimension pertains to interaction dynamics and negotiations between the council members and managers in the Secretariat constituting the formation of coalitions pursuing shared interests, agendas and objectives. Political power dynamics, as part of this dimension, suggest that the organizational strategy and its strategic management framework will reflect the interests of the dominant political group, as rightfully expressed by Bailey et al. (2000), and that the dominant political party is one that holds resources which the organization depends on.

*Organizational culture*: Organizational culture can be defined as shared values and beliefs regarding the understanding of organizational functioning (Deshpande and Webster 1989). Studies have shown that culture and entrepreneurial orientation are associated and are mutually reinforcing (Covin and Slevin 1991; Cornwall and Perlman 1992). Moreover, Covin and Slevin (1991) found that entrepreneurial posture influences the way organizational culture develops.

When entrepreneurship is lacking as part of the organizational strategic goals, the culture does not support risk taking, opportunity seeking and innovation, whereas a strong cultural commitment may increase organizational members' willingness to buy into the organizational strategic management processes, increase the level of consensus, and strengthen managers' decision making (Menon et al. 1999; Iaquinto and Fredrickson 1997, Cornwall and Perlman 1992).

*The enforced choice dimension*: Internally originating enforced structures, such as direct development and imposition of strategy direction, results in the opposition of strategic plan and implementation creating barriers in the internal environment of the organization, limiting its operations and strategic choices. The external environment can also impose strategic constraints. These consist of coercive practices of regulatory organizations, competitive industrial sectors and global economic and normative pressures, which are considered as obstacles and barriers to growth (Bailey et al. 2000). Based on the latter six dimensions, we empirically study their validity in the IGO context. Therefore, the following research questions are posited:

*Research Question 1 (RQ1): What are the factors that influence strategic management in IGOs? Research Question 2 (RQ2): What relationships exist between the strategic management factors. Research Question 3 (RQ3): What conceptual model can be derived from the resulting relationships. Research Question 4 (RQ4): Are there any strategic formulation mediation effects on the relationship between strategic intent and strategic change?*

#### **4. Methodology**

#### *4.1. Sample and Procedure*

A survey methodology approach was followed using the questionnaire presented in Table 2 below. The online survey tool utilized in this study was '*Qualtrics*', which enabled us to ensure confidential and quick distribution to participants via a link and allowed us to manage the surveys in a cost-effective and time-efficient manner. The sample data entailed completed surveys from 117 participants from different IGOs in the United Nations system. The questionnaire was based on validated survey items and adapted to meet the context of IGOs.

The survey started with a short opening statement explaining the research setup, including its purpose, survey guidelines, confidentiality and ethics, their rights to ask any questions of concern, the participant's right to withdraw at any time and an offer to leave an email address if interested in seeing the results when available. Then, the survey continued to capture demographic information, followed by the validated and adapted questions from the sources mentioned above.

#### **Table 2.** Survey used in this study.

The process began with an email to each chief information officer (CIO) or head of information technology department of ten IGOs, encouraging them to participate in the study. Seven responded that they would like to participate and that they were willing to help share the surveys within their organization. Three gently declined to participate due to their internal legal concerns. After that, the link to the surveys was shared, and up to three reminders were sent (one week apart) to follow up on those who had not yet completed the survey.

Due to sensitivities in relation to the context of the IGOs and participants, such as expected concerns related to reputation risk to their employer, anonymity was guaranteed. The time trend extrapolation test suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977) was used to examine non-response bias, and the results suggest that non-response bias is unlikely to be a problem. After data cleaning, a sample of 108 usable records was retained for analysis.

Demographic analysis shows that participants were relatively well distributed across gender, at a ratio of 2 males to 1 female. Around 63% of participants had less than five years of IGO experience, 14% of them had more than five years but less than ten years of IGO experience and more than 23% of participants had more than a decade of IGO experience. All participants had at least a university degree.

## *4.2. Questionnaire*

The survey constructs and items for the strategic planning and development analysis in our study were adapted from Bailey et al. (2000). A 7-point Likert scale ranging from '*Strongly Agree*' (1) to '*Strongly Disagree*' (7) was utilized for all items. The six constructs, planning, incrementalism, cultural, political, enforced choice and command, including 24 items, are presented in Table 2.

#### **5. Results and Analysis**

Our goal in this study is logically stated in our four research questions. At this point, it is worth recalling our goals, which are to empirically study Bailey et al.'s (2000) constructs and test their validity for the IGO context. Moreover, through our analysis, we would investigate the relationships between the constructs/factors and aim to optimize the measurement instrument. Finally, using the validation results, we would derive a causal relationship that can help explain strategic management planning and development for IGOs.

To that effect, the analytical strategy used on the data collected and to meet our research questions entailed performing an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the constructs with factor reduction in mind (RQ1). We then performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to identify and confirm relationships with additional optimization (RQ2). Finally, we used the last set of data to perform a causal analysis of our proposed research model using structural equation modeling (RQ3). We conducted one final analysis to test any mediation effects (RQ4).

Our analysis (performed using SPSS 22, AMOS) was based on Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) proposed two-step approach to theory testing and development entailing exploratory factor analysis (EFA) followed by a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Firstly, the EFA was used to estimate the measurement model, and secondly, the CFA was performed to test the relationships between the latent variables. It is common in such type of empirical studies to use the maximum likelihood estimation method during both the EFA and CFA steps. Conducting the EFA allows us to better understand the grouping of the latent variable, represented by the items/questions; how these groups (referred as factors) relate to each other (evaluated via the CFA); and what these groups reflect from a contextual perspective. Since in this study, we are seeking to establish a causal structural model to help us better understand the strategic phenomena in the IGO context, our analysis in the CFA assessment included dimensionality, convergent validity, construct reliability and discriminant validity.

The CFAs results were analyzed to assess the model fit by considering goodnessof-fit indices, namely NFI, CFI, RMSEA, SRMR and Chi-square/degree of freedom. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient of internal consistency was used to test for the reliability of aggregated scales, which was calculated to be acceptable (>0.70) at 0.79.

#### *5.1. Sample and Procedure*

Our data set was first tested to determine if it is appropriate for the EFA. This was achieved using the Bartlett test of Sphericity (BTS) and the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO). Results from both tests (BTS: Chi-square = 1246.306; DF = 276; sig = 0.000, and KMO = 0.818) confirm that the data are appropriate to use for exploratory factor analysis.

#### *5.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis, EFA*

The EFA process is iterative, with the goal of finding the optimum number of statistically acceptable factors. At first, we relied on theory to determine the number of factors, and in our case, seven factors were specified for analysis, representing the constructs described in the theoretical section. The seven-factor solution was specified using the Promax rotation with Kaiser Normalization, resulting in 70.928% of the variance that could be explained. The rotated factor solution was interpreted using both structure and pattern matrices. While the structure matrix represents a factor-loading matrix with the overall variance in a measured variable explained by a factor, the pattern matrix contains coefficients, which just represent the unique contributions of each factor. Subsequently, these matrices help us progress through the next iterations to optimize the EFA final solution.

Factors with a loading greater than 0.5 were retained for further analysis. Our factor reduction iterations resulted in removing items SM4, SM5, SM8, SM10, SM12, SM14, SM15, SM16, SM20 and SM21 due to either low factor loading or cross-loadings (loading difference between factors is less than 0.2). The resulting solution included an optimized four-factor solution shown in Table 3. For the final solution, the KMO measure is above the accepted

level with the value of 0.797 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Chi-square = 671.288; DF = 91; sig = 0.000). Additionally, all items have factor loadings well above 5.0. Therefore, all identified items used in this EFA were retained for CFA analysis.

**Table 3.** EFA results.

The output from the EFA resulted in not only the reduction of the items by approximately half, but the regrouping of the items in the questionnaire—an expected outcome due to the model's application to a context different from its original intended design. Consequently, we revisited the items for further interpretation of our context. After placing the items into more appropriate groupings, we identified the following four factors/constructs that are more suitable to the IGO context: institutional pressures (IP), strategic intent (SI), strategic formulation (SF) and change (C), as shown in Table 4.

**Table 4.** Definition of new constructs.

The four factors identified above need to be reinterpreted in the IGO context. Institutional pressures in the IGOs context are of special interest and are not to be taken lightly. This is due to the fact that two bodies of equal but different powers govern over the IGO. One includes the counsel representing the member states/governments and funding, while the other entails the executive committee (Secretariat) responsible for running the business.

Fulfilling critical positions, especially in the case of seats on central governing bodies such as the Human Rights Council and the Security Council, is a case in point. The institutional theory advocates that perception of strong pressures (such as coercive, normative and mimetic pressures) to conform is an act of acquiring social legitimacy and rare resources. Going against those pressures may jeopardize organizational performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) and sustainability (Teo et al. 2003; Oliver 1997). Oliver (1997), combining institutional and strategic responses, elaborates that institutional context encompasses decision-makers' norms and values (1) at the individual level, (2) organizational culture and politics at the intra-organization level and (3) regulatory pressures and industry-wide norms at the inter-organization level (Greenwood et al. 2011; Nakrošis et al. 2020).

In the same vein, institutional pressures in this study can be considered at the intraorganizational and inter-organizational levels. In consideration of the internal institutional pressures from the council and senior management, the external institutional pressures from member States and other IGOs both negatively influence the Secretariat's overall strategic intent, formulation, and program implementation at all levels. In this study, we adopt Bailey's model and institutional pressures to examine these effects and test whether they are significant enough to influence the strategic planning process, including strategic intent and formulation, in the IGO context.

Strategic intent can be understood as the philosophical base of the strategic management process. It points to the purpose that an organization endeavors to achieve (Hamel and Prahalad 1989). It is a statement that provides a perspective of the means which will lead the organization to reach the vision in the long run. Institutional pressures are recognized that make organizations obligate external parties' regulation and requirements to gain legitimacy in the organization field. In addition, Oliver (1991) argues that the new institutional theory has neglected the role of organizational self-interests in organizational responses to institutional pressures. Organizational self-interests as endogenous factors would impact organization strategy intent.

Strategic formulation, in this study, is based on strategic intent, which emphasizes the development of a performing environmental and organization appraisal process, the consideration of alternative strategies, the undertaking of strategic analysis and the preparation of a strategic plan. Since strategy formulation is the consequence of strategic intent, it would be negatively associated with institutional pressures as well.

Moran and Brightman (2001) define change management as "the process of continually renewing an organization's direction, structure, and capabilities to serve the ever-changing needs of external and internal customers.", which by association extends to the evolving nature of the strategic management process. Strategic change comprises strategic evaluation and control, performance evaluation, exercising control and recreating strategies. In the strategic planning process, once strategic formulation is set up and strategy is implemented, it subsequently leads to strategic control and evaluation. In Bailey et al.'s (2000) model, the element of incremental dimension is highly associated with the concept of strategic change. It is expected that strategic intent and formulation will impact strategic change. Since strategic intent is usually the ultimate goal of an organization, it should be more stable and would not change easily as a part of the strategic planning phase, but it will positively influence strategic change.


**Preface to "Transition Metal Catalyzed Cross-Coupling Reactions"**

Transition metal-catalyzed cross-coupling reactions, such as Suzuki–Miyaura, Mizoroki–Heck, Negishi, Sonogashira, Kumada–Tamao–Corriu, Migita–Kosugi–Stille, Tsuji–Trost, and Buchwald–Hartwig reactions, have proved to be powerful tools for carbon–carbon as well as carbon–heteroatom bond formation in the development of synthetic methodologies for applications ranging from pharmaceuticals to materials. Intensive research efforts continue to be made to find ways of improving and expanding the scope of the processes, and the development of more efficient catalytic systems is a hot research topic of enormous academic and industrial interest.

This book, consisting of an editorial, two reviews and two articles, focuses on recent promising research and novel trends in the field of cross-coupling reactions, employing a range of different catalysts. The review by Kostas and Steele provides a survey of the research in the area of cross-coupling catalytic reactions with transition metal complexes based on the thiosemicarbazone unit and a discussion of the prospects for future developments. The other review by Polychronopoulou, Shaya and co-authors describes the progress made over the 21st century concerning the utilization of C(sp3 )–organoboranes as partners in metal-catalyzed C(sp3 )–C(sp2 ) cross couplings, such as B-alkyl Suzuki–Miyaura reactions. The article by Waldvogel, Breinbauer and co-authors demonstrates for the first time the synthetic potential of combining the electro-oxidative dehydrogenative cross-coupling of ortho-substituted phenols with Pd-catalyzed cross-coupling reactions. In the second article, Stˇ epni ˘ cka and co-workers describe the preparation of palladium ˇ catalysts deposited over silica gel-bearing composite amide-donor functional moieties on the surface, which were evaluated in the Sonogashira-type cross-coupling of acyl chlorides with terminal alkynes.

In summary, this collection of publications represents some of the progress and recent trends in the expanding field of transition metal-catalyzed cross-coupling reactions. Special thanks are, of course, given to all the contributing authors and to the reviewers for their assessments and recommendations concerning the submitted manuscripts. I would also like to thank my colleague Dr. Barry R. Steele and the editorial team of *Catalysts* for their kind support and fast response.

> **Ioannis D. Kostas** *Editor*