New divisions are emerging in how much control people enjoy over their working lives. There are signifcant differences by level of education as well as between occupations, with public-sector professionals in healthcare and education as well as the police having the least control over their work. Alongside the classic gender divide, new divisions are emerging between workers who are able to combine their careers with informal care-giving and those who cannot because they have no say over the time and place of their shifts.

## *5.6.3 Three Core Developments*

The three developments at the heart of this book – the automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of labour – may well have negative consequences for the quality of work in the coming years. One danger is that the wider use of robots and artifcial intelligence will further limit workers' autonomy, reduce their wages and increase the fexibility expected *of* working people. But this need not happen; technology can also contribute towards good work.

While the intensifcation of work can exacerbate burnout and absenteeism, this need not happen if people retain suffcient control over their working lives. While the fexible labour market reduces people's control over their earnings, the risks are diminished if there is adequate social-security provision and if *all* workers enjoy greater opportunities for professional development.

## *5.6.4 Policy Choices*

Whether or not work improves will depend primarily on decisions made by employers, who can support workplace learning and professional development and ensure that workers have adequate control over the organization of their tasks and the space they need to harmonize their lives at work and at home. This is also a matter for the government. Good work is supported by public policies for training and social security (Chap. 3), by legislation governing working conditions and its enforcement, and by protecting and promoting the rights of workers.

#### **A Day at Work: The Retail Floor Manager**

Although the shop does not open until 10 am, Cathelijn is there at 9. There is plenty to do, including cleaning up and checking the till. But frst a cup of coffee. De Prael is a small brewery with a pub and shop in the heart of old Amsterdam. In addition to the 17 varieties of De Prael beer, the store also sells local or sustainable delicacies such as wine, liqueurs, cheese, nuts, chocolate and coffee to take away. Cathelijn, 49, works here as "foor manager" four days a week, between 9 am and 2 pm.

In the meantime, Atone (pronounced Ah-ton) has arrived as well, a cheerful 65-year-old man of Senegalese descent with a history of drug addiction. He works here one or two days a week on a voluntary basis. De Prael is a social enterprise employing dozens of people "distanced" from the labour market, either unpaid but with benefts or on subsidized wages. Some are making real progress. Cathelijn began here 5 years ago as a volunteer; for the past 2 years, she has been earning a regular salary through a sheltered employment scheme. For others, like Atone, it is enough that they have somewhere they are expected to be.

Cathelijn vacuums the store and Atone follows her with a mop. Sales were good yesterday, meaning there are empty spaces on the shelves to be replenished. At 10 am Cathelijn opens the door and Atone inserts the company banners into their holders outside. He used to attend an addiction clinic, he says, and was not the easiest of clients. "I didn't listen", he laughs out loud. "But now I do." He is full of praise for Cathelijn: "She has motivated me."

Cathelijn has a university degree and used to work as a researcher, but 10 years ago suffered a nervous breakdown. "For years I spent my days in bed." She fnally realized she had to do something and ended up at De Prael after being referred there by the mental health service. First in administration, later in the shop. "The depression slowly subsided, and the work helped. Structure. Cycling to work in the morning, along with all the other people doing the same. Keeping busy, but at your own pace. You can do that here." Cathelijn no longer needs much supervision, although she did at the beginning. "That's not structured guidance – here, you get what you ask for."

Two Asian tourists enter the store, look around and leave. A young woman comes in for a cappuccino. A couple, clearly in love, pick out a selection of beers. Cathelijn takes their money. Atone jumps in to help, wrapping each bottle in a sheet of newspaper. Otherwise they will clink in the bag, he explains.

Two years ago, Cathelijn's case manager asked if she would like to convert her volunteer position into a paid job under the sheltered work scheme. She jumped at the chance. Before she could make the move, the Employee Insurance Agency had to assess her ftness for work. That was "very confrontational". De Prael now pays her in line with the results of the assessment, with the city council topping it up so that she is earning the statutory minimum wage. She loves not being on benefts anymore. "They're just hassle and stress. They can try to make you work somewhere, and maybe I wouldn't be able to handle that."

The pressure at De Prael is lower than elsewhere but the laws of economics still apply. The shop is not bringing in enough money. Because its future is uncertain, Cathelijn has been looking around for other work. She has made three applications, for both regular and sheltered jobs, and two have been accepted. But she is not sure what to do. "Change is hard. I know what I have here, and I don't know what I might get."

Cathelijn has lunch at 12:30 pm. What she calls "the canteen" is a goodsized kitchen with dining tables laid with bread, milk, boxes of chocolate sprinkles and family jars of peanut butter. Two quiet older ladies keep them topped up, clear away the used dishes and wash up. A dozen or so workers from the brewery are eating. Cathelijn does not know them all, or how they came to work here. "That's not important." She thinks everyone deserves a paid job. "Not everyone is productive enough, but it's important that you have opportunities to grow. There has to be hope that you can make progress."

Atone leaves just before 2 pm. He gives Cathelijn a hug. A little later she puts on her coat as well. Five years ago, she would come home exhausted after half a day at work. Now she has energy to spare.

*Sheltered employment is meant for people who need extra guidance and a suitable workplace due to an occupational disability. They have a contract and are paid at least the statutory minimum wage. There were approximately 3000 sheltered positions in the Netherlands as of mid-2019, a number which should eventually increase to 30,000 under agreements between the central government and local authorities who are responsible for managing the schemes. Sheltered employment is one of many participation-enhancing interventions consistently shown by research to strengthen self-reliance and enhance social participation. But very few sheltered employees move into regular work.*

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part II Work for All**

# **Chapter 6 Everyone into Work**

Despite successive Dutch governments emphasizing "jobs, jobs, jobs", thousands of people who want to work have no jobs at all, never mind good jobs. More than 1.6 million people in the Netherlands live entirely on benefts. In 2017, some 810,000 were claiming benefts for disability and another 378,000 for unemployment, while 442,000 were receiving a basic subsistence beneft. One million individuals in 2018 possessed "unused labour potential", including approximately 600,000 unemployed who would like to work and 400,000 underemployed eager to work more. These numbers will only increase with the Covid-19 crisis.

Are the automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of work leading to more or fewer people fnding and retaining jobs? Who is benefting or suffering the most from these developments? According to the oecd, 1 the Achilles' heel of the Dutch labour market is its lack of inclusiveness; although the vast majority of the population is working, specifc groups are marginalized in the labour market. Are new technologies, fexible contracts and the intensifcation of work helping or hindering vulnerable groups to stay in work – in good work in particular? Is the changing labour market opening new opportunities? What are the prospects for the future? Are new vulnerable groups emerging?

This chapter seeks to answer these questions while analysing what is already being done to provide good work for all. We address, in turn, the automation (Sect. 6.1), fexibilization (Sect. 6.2) and intensifcation of work (Sect. 6.3) before discussing the need for active labour-market policies (Sect. 6.4) and presenting our conclusions (Sect. 6.5).

1oecd (2018a).

## **6.1 Technological Developments**

The end of paid work and the working class has been a recurring prophecy in modern western history.2 But despite the introduction of the factory assembly line in the nineteenth century, the personal computer and the global internet in the twentieth century, and mobile phones, robots and artifcial intelligence in our own era, both dreams and nightmares about the coming end of human labour have come to naught.

Although a much-discussed 2013 study by Frey and Osborne3 provoked fears that robots would eliminate 47% of jobs in the United States over the next two decades, little remains of the doom and gloom just a few years later. Some studies even warn that there will be too *few* people for all the new jobs created by AI, robots and cobots.4 But these latter studies, too, remain speculation; many are based on the subjective expectations of ceos and technical experts, which we need to take with a grain of salt.

#### **Box 6.1 Robots Sacked**

We have all heard predictions of the impending robot apocalypse which could cost up to half of all workers their jobs in the near future.5 But the revolution is not proceeding as quickly as some expected. A hotel in Japan put hundreds of robots to work in 2015; half of them, due to malfunctions, were "sacked" in 2019.6

Treatises on machines replacing people have recently become more nuanced and realistic. Approaching jobs as bundles of tasks, they focus on which *sub-*tasks are amenable to automation. This does not mean that the machines are taking over as all kinds of other considerations, power relationships and preferences remain.7 Human beings do not only work to make money but to structure their days, gain self-esteem, enhance their identities and feel a part of society.8

Although technology can take over specifc tasks, this is less the case for entire jobs; no profession can be reduced to a set of tasks that can be done by machines alone. Much depends on the specifc applications of the technology and the choices made about their implementation.

2Keynes (1932), Gorz (1994), Rifkin (1995).

3Frey & Osborne (2013).

4See, for example, Nakamura & Zeira (2018).

5See also Smulders & Oeij (2019).

6Tates (2019, January 17).

7Hueck (2018, April 3).

8See also Valenduc & Vendramin (2019).

Few people perform only a single task at work.9 Although it may be possible to automate certain subtasks, whether this actually happens depends not only on the (often overestimated) capabilities of the new technology but on the structure of specifc frms and sectors, and on the economic, social and political stakes involved. Studies by the Dutch government's three largest employment-related executive agencies for the *National Labour Market Analysis 2018–2025*10 show that the time freed by partial task automation can be used to increase production, ease workloads, improve production quality, undertake other activities or use fewer people to produce the same amount – or some combination of the above.

As many frms have discovered, not all work can be done by computers and robots. Hal Varian, chief economist at Google, notes that many jobs are more complicated and much harder to automate than is often believed.11 Although many driving jobs may seem obvious candidates for automation, anyone who regularly rides a bus or talks to a trucker knows better.12 It is also doubtful whether we want to rid ourselves of the humans in our midst; bus drivers, tram conductors and train guards also attend to passenger safety.

Governments, employers and trade unions all have infuence over how new technologies are implemented in the workplace.13 While millions of workers have indeed seen their tasks change under the infuence of new technology – a trend that will continue into the future – we need to focus on human-machine complementarity within specifc applications of technology and on restructuring the labour market, both to increase productivity and to improve the quality of work.

#### **Box 6.2 Robots in Cleaning?**

The 2017 collective agreement for the Dutch cleaning sector included provisions for a pilot project in which employers and trade unions study the possibilities of developing robot technology which is good for both cleaners and companies. Although we do not yet know what will come of it, this initiative – based on the principles of complementarity, co-creation and co-ownership – suggests a way forward for other sectors wishing to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by robots, cobots and artifcial intelligence.

9Nedelkosta & Quintini (2018).

10Brennenraedts et al. (2019).

11Snyder (2019, March 11).

12Broussard (2019, April 3).

13 ter Weel (2018); Went et al. (2015).

## *6.1.1 Job Polarization*

Which jobs are particularly vulnerable to automation? Although unemployment is highest among people who only have high-school diplomas, their prospects have not declined. Fig. 6.1 shows that unemployment among this group declined from 7.3% in 2003 to 6.6% in 2018.14

Scholars have predicted that automation will lead to "job polarization" – the disappearance of jobs such as routine administration in the middle segment of the labour market.15 The phenomenon has affected the Netherlands less than many other countries (Fig. 6.2).16 The proportion of Dutch jobs requiring only low skills – or conversely, high skills – has risen by about 5 percentage points over the past two decades, whereas jobs requiring post-secondary vocational education has declined by around 10 percentage points. According to the Netherlands Bureau for Economic

**Fig. 6.1** Unemployment rate by level of education, 2003–2018 Source: cbs StatLine. (https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/cbs/nl/dataset/82922NED/table?from statweb)

14See also de Beer (2018a).

15Goos et al. (2009), Graetz & Michaels (2015).

16Smits & de Vries (2015).

**Fig. 6.2** Employment shares by skill content of occupations (percentage points), 1995–2015, oecd countries Source: oecd (2018a)

Policy Analysis, this is creating a new divide among workers with post-secondary vocational qualifcations17: some have moved down in the labour market, working jobs below their nominal skill levels, while others have moved up into jobs for which they are not formally qualifed. The biggest changes are taking place *within* sectors and professions. Secretaries who previously used to type and distribute faxes are now involved in planning and project management.

It is not a foregone conclusion that technological changes will hollow out the middle class. Many routine white-collar tasks have already been automated, while it is conceivable – and at times already apparent – that tasks traditionally performed by university graduates can be done more effectively by, or together with, smart machines; consider how radiologists, accountants and lawyers are aided by algorithms in their work.18 What this means for existing professions – and what new jobs may appear in the manufacture and maintenance of new machines or due to entirely new possibilities – is impossible to predict in advance (see also sect. 6.2).

17 van den Berge & ter Weel (2015b).

18Ford (2015).

## *6.1.2 Switching Between Jobs*

Good work allows people to adjust to advances in technology. Everyone needs to be able to learn on the job as emergent technologies may alter or eliminate their current tasks or create new ones. Having the space and support to cope with these changes – "learn while you earn" as *The Economist* calls it – is crucial for preserving work or, if necessary, for switching careers. The independent think tank DenkWerk estimates that Dutch employers will have to invest €4–7 billion a year in on-the-job retraining and refresher courses if the country is to make the most of the opportunities offered by new technology.19

Technological change within companies does not take place overnight. Supporting people into new lines of work cannot wait until they are declared redundant; the Employee Insurance Agency and its partners must get involved before lay-offs occur.20 Workers need to be protected during such transitions, not least by the social-security system.21

## *6.1.3 Technology for Inclusivity*

New technologies can aid current workers to learn new tasks, help people with occupational disabilities to fnd work, and to make the labour market more inclusive.22 Technologies such as virtual reality can help workers learn new tasks in felds such as manufacturing, maintenance and medicine (e.g. wound care), while several organizations in the Netherlands are dedicated to using technology to help people with occupational disabilities fnd and retain work. Higher wages for low-paid workers in the United States has led some companies to automate their jobs out of existence, while other frms have turned to new technologies to make their workers more productive, thus justifying higher pay.23

New technologies will change the demand for labour and the nature of work. But how their application will affect the quality of work is neither a foregone conclusion nor a process we can leave to the market alone. As frms, institutions and governments often make decisions that undermine good work, these choices must be monitored. Machines can be deployed to replace people but also to help them work better, collaborate more effectively and to be more productive. New technologies can be

19Think tank Denkwerk (2019) calculates that 3 million people need their digital skills upgraded, at an estimated cost of €4–4.5 billion. Moreover, 400,000 specialists in the front line of digital innovation are seeing their skills rendered obsolete due to technological advances. Bringing their knowledge up to date will cost an estimated €2–2.5 billion.

20One example is the Mobility Centre launched in 2019 by trade-union federation fnv and the Employee Insurance Agency to guide redundant workers into new jobs following the announced closure of the coal-fred Hemweg Power Station in Amsterdam.

21Borghouts-van de Pas et al. (2019).

22oecd (2018b).

23Kopf (2019, January 18).

used to offer people currently marginalized in the labour market new prospects as well as to give lower skilled workers new tasks and opportunities.

## **6.2 Flexible Labour Market**

It is often claimed that the fexibilization of the Dutch labour market has created jobs and allowed more people to keep working. It enables employers to remain agile, to lay off staff when necessary and recruit more readily in good times. But it could also be argued that fexible work undermines workers' incentives to innovate,24 creates costs for companies through staff turnover, and exerts downwards pressure on wages, consumer spending and thus economic growth.25 According to the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), the question of whether fexible work creates jobs or simply replaces permanent jobs with more insecure ones cannot be answered with certainty: "From an economic perspective, it cannot be said which type of employment relationship is preferable or what proportion of fexible relationships within the working population is ideal."26 In other words, this is a decision society has to make. How much do we value everyone having access to good work? As the CPB points out, the fexible labour market differentially affects segments of the workforce. Fully 45% of people with a low level of education had fexible jobs in 2018 (Fig. 6.3).

## *6.2.1 Permanently Temporary*

At frst sight, fexible labour markets may seem to favour people with occupational disabilities and outsiders such as migrants. Employers are disinclined to take risks and temporary contracts entail few obligations – certainly in the Netherlands. The oecd27 credits temporary contracts and the fexible labour market for the comparatively high proportion of individuals with severe mental disorders working in the Netherlands. Others argue that employers will be more inclined to give refugees a chance if they can do so without longer term obligations.

Finding work is not the same as keeping it, as more and more people fnd themselves trapped in the labour market's ever-expanding "fexible shell". High-school graduates, ethnic minorities, migrant workers from Eastern Europe and people with chronic medical problems are more likely than others to have temporary jobs, which

24 de Spiegelaere (2017).

25oecd (2018a).

26Euwals et al. (2016: 13).

27oecd (2015a).

**Fig. 6.3** Working people by type of contract and level of education, 2008 and 2018 Source: Statistics Netherlands

are now spreading among other segments of the population, most notably the over 25s and people with post-secondary qualifcations.28

A temporary contract is now rarely a stepping stone to a permanent position, especially for on-call and casual staff.29 Very few people hired on a temporary basis in the period 2010–2019 had a permanent position 1 year later; despite economic growth, this percentage has been falling since 2010, down to 14% in 2019.30 It is common for temporary contracts to be strung together so that a worker is effectively employed on a "permanently temporary" basis.

## *6.2.2 A Revolving Door in Social Security*

Labour market fexibility has opened a revolving door in the social-security system as people alternate between temporary work and unemployment. The proportion of fexible workers still working after 2 years is 10% lower than for employees with permanent contracts.31 As shown in Fig. 6.4, temporary workers are far more likely to claim unemployment or subsistence benefts. Due to the high rate of economic inactivity caused by intermittent periods of unemployment, these workers place a

28 van Echtelt et al. (2016).

29Euwals et al. (2016).

30 cbs (2019f, 2019g, October 24).

31 van Echtelt et al. (2016).

**Fig. 6.4** Beneft claims by type of contract previously held, 2014 Source: Van der Werff et al. (2016)

heavy burden on the social-security system. Most jobs found by beneft claimants are temporary,32 meaning their reintegration into the labour force is also only temporary.33 Finding a job rarely means a job one can keep.

While even temporary work is generally better than no work at all, repeated bouts of short-term employment interspersed by applications to the benefts offce mean a succession of demotivating disappointments, attacks on one's self-esteem, stress and fnancial uncertainty ("If my contract expires this month, will I receive money from the benefts agency next month?"). Research from the uk shows that people who can only fnd a succession of insecure jobs suffer deteriorating health.34 The fexible labour market questions the very concept of "reintegration".

## *6.2.3 Less Training*

Employers invest less in workers with temporary contracts.35 This applies especially to formal training courses, from which temporary personnel are generally excluded. The difference is most marked for workers with post-secondary qualifcations or university degrees, while high-school graduates have fewer learning opportunities,

32uwv (2015).

33Bannink (2018), Ruitenbeek et al. (2019).

34Chandola & Zhang (2017).

35Dekker (2017).

formal or informal, across the board.36 Although training is crucial for people to be able to stay in work and to change jobs when necessary, the weaker responsibility relationships between employers and employees in the fexible economy renders it unusual.

Our era demands that everyone – regardless of their form of employment – has access to additional training or retraining to stay in work. Flexible workers should be able to make use of the sectoral training and development funds and the personal learning budgets from which they are now largely excluded. While individual learning accounts can increase participation in training, their use needs to be encouraged among groups that currently make scant use of such opportunities.37 Such individual funds should be part of a contract-neutral social-security system (see sect. 3.1 and Chap. 8).

## *6.2.4 Protection*

The fexible labour market poses additional problems for people with chronic health problems. The "fexicurity model" of the Netherlands and Denmark, which combines fexibility with good social-security provision, offers them few job opportunities.38 Since the mid-1980s, the gap between less skilled workers with and without health problems has grown enormously in both the Netherlands and Denmark; Sweden has performed better, especially when protections against dismissal were more robust. A European comparative study likewise concludes that stronger contract protection leads to more people with occupational disabilities working.39 Permanent contracts protect vulnerable workers more effectively as employers are legally obliged to take responsibility for them. The fexibilization of employment relationships thus contributes to the long-term marginalization of the "least productive" workers.

Both employers and employees would beneft from permanent staff having greater opportunities to switch tasks and positions, either in their current company or elsewhere in a pool of collaborating frms. This "internal fexibility" can to some extent replace "external fexibility". Both the trade-union movement and one of the main Dutch employers' organizations, the awvn, advocate making greater use of such arrangements.

36Boermans et al. (2017).

37oecd (2019b).

38McAllister et al. (2015).

39 van der Zwan & de Beer (2019).

## *6.2.5 Opportunities Through the Hybridization of Work*

Other forms of fexible labour such as self-employment or working through online platforms can offer vulnerable people an alternative into the world of work. "Hybridization" – the concurrent pursuit of different activities under different types of contract – can also increase opportunities in the labour market. More than half a million multi-jobbers in the Netherlands already combine two or more (generally part-time) positions; some of them would be unable to make ends meet otherwise. Some multi-jobbers choose hybridization as a way to transition into other work, either because they want to or they must.40

For some groups, self-employment may be the answer. People with physical or mental disabilities may fnd it easier to work from home and to adapt their daily schedule to their own needs, gaining the control in life which comes from being their own boss. Ethnic and religious minorities sometimes choose – or are more or less forced into – self-employment because no-one will hire them or because they would rather work for themselves than in an unwelcoming organizational environment where they face discriminatory or aggressive behaviour from colleagues and managers.41 Such discrimination often takes subtle forms such as "jokes" about terrorism, religion or crime, alienating them from the workplace.42 To gain greater control over their work, some choose entrepreneurship.

Nevertheless, self-employment is no panacea for an inclusive labour market. Problems arise when people claiming benefts try to make money with freelance activities on the side; it is also much more complicated to be self-employed than on a payroll. The chances of success are often limited. Those working for online platforms or in the arts struggle more than most to pick up assignments. Combined with structurally low rates of pay, this often exposes them to poverty (see Chap. 3). Turnover is high in individual self-employment; while many register with the Chamber of Commerce as freelance workers each year, the number of deregistrations is considerable.43 Those who move successfully from benefts into selfemployment are indeed a select group; they tend to be young, with post-secondary or higher education or past freelance experience.44

In sum, the fexibilization of the labour market has led to more people in the Netherlands working, but not always in good jobs – especially for people with chronic health conditions, for many frst, second and third generation immigrants, and people with no more than secondary education. This is not only detrimental to them; it also strains the social-security system (see sect. 3.1). Flexible workers have fewer opportunities for professional development and training and are less

40Dorenbosch (2017).

41Hooftman & Houtman (2017).

42Waldring (2018).

43kvk (2019). In 2018, 128,021 people registered and 70,300 deregistered as self-employed.

44Mevissen et al. (2013); Kok et al. (2018).

protected. To counter these adverse effects, employers and the government should invest more in these workers and in the more fexible apportioning of tasks within frms and organizations. Although juggling several part-time positions may allow workers to spread the risks and possibly provide stepping stones to other work, this is often wishful thinking for the most vulnerable groups.

## **6.3 Intensifcation of Work**

Is the intensifcation of work creating new labour market vulnerabilities? Both the faster tempo and greater mental and emotional demands on the job can make work more challenging and interesting. But they are also linked to increased stress, emotional exhaustion and burnout.45 The intensifcation of work can effectively push people out of the workforce and make it harder for specifc groups to remain in or return to work.46

## *6.3.1 New Vulnerabilities*

Workers who must deal with constant emotional pressure – for example because they interface with clients, customers and patients – are at higher than average risk of burnout. The same applies to those with heavy workloads or who work under severe time pressure (see Fig. 4.2). While many people can handle short periods of intensive work, long-term exposure to stress is unhealthy in many ways.47

The number of Dutch workers suffering symptoms of burnout is on the rise. Between 2007 and 2018, the proportion saying they are emotionally exhausted at least once a month rose from 11.3 to 17.5% .48 Highly educated individuals, women and young people aged 25–35 suffer the most; the self-employed fare better. Experiencing some of its symptoms does not necessarily mean that a worker is suffering from full-blown burnout. Nevertheless, more and more reports to the Netherlands Centre for Occupational Diseases mention excessive strain and burnout, which now outnumber reports of work-related physical illnesses.49 The intensifcation of work is accompanied by new forms of absenteeism. Almost half (46%)

45Korunka & Kubicek (2017).

46German sociologist Hartmut Rosa (2016) argues that societal acceleration leads to depression and burnout, and highlights the structural exclusion of workers unable to keep up with the fexibility and speed demanded by modern economic systems.

47 van den Broeck et al. (2010), Bierings & Mol (2012); Schaufeli & Bakker (2013a), Smulders et al. (2013).

48Houtman et al. (2020), tno (2019).

49ncvb (2018).

of all sick leave in the Netherlands is now due to conditions at work, the highest since 2007. The majority of affected workers (60%) attribute their problems to psychosocial workload – excessive stress or emotional pressure, problems with managers, customers and so on.50 Workers are also suffering from higher levels of mental illness. It is precisely such problems that cause longer-term withdrawal from the labour market; over half of disability beneft claimants receive them for psychological conditions.51

Intensive working need not lead to emotional exhaustion and absenteeism (see also Chap. 2).52 Suffcient autonomy and consultation in the workplace, alongside support from managers and colleagues, can ease the burden. If homecare workers, for example, were allowed to schedule their own shifts and to work to their own standards, they would be better able to cope with the tempo, workload and demanding clients. Whether the intensifcation of work leads to new vulnerabilities thus depends on whether the work is good. Especially young people and women experience less autonomy at work than their older and male counterparts; their work is also on average faster-paced and more emotionally demanding. These trends explain why young people and women are more likely to fall victim to burnout.53

Workers' domestic circumstances are crucial. Children with problems, fnancial worries or the lack of a supportive partner means there is no respite. Single people are more likely to report symptoms of burnout54 as many are unable to unwind and recover at home.55 Workers can also better cope with more exacting demands if they can keep their professional and personal lives separate.56 The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands57 fnds that intensive domestic care duties, especially looking after young children, makes it more diffcult for employees to cope with demands at work.

The intensifcation of work is placing more people at risk, including groups who were previously not particularly vulnerable such as single and highly educated persons. While unceasing pressure or emotional strain is hard on anyone, it helps to have a degree of autonomy at work and support at home. Good work makes the intensifcation of work more manageable.

50 tno (2019).

51 van Echtelt (2020).

52Houtman et al. (2020).

53 tno (2018), see Chapter 3.

54 tno (2018).

55Chandola (2010), Meijman & Zijlstra (2006), van Echtelt (2014).

56Korunka & Kubicek (2017).

57 ser (2016a).

## *6.3.2 Exacerbating Existing Vulnerabilities*

A demanding labour market makes it more diffcult for workers limited by health conditions or occupational disabilities – any form of physical, visual, mental or psychological condition that affects the individual's ability to work. This defnition extends well beyond the traditional notion of a disability as a visible impairment to include for instance people struggling with depression or the aftermath of cancer. Everyone – young or old and whatever their level of education – can experience an occupational disability at some point in their life.

The Netherlands lags behind many European countries in keeping people with occupational disabilities in work.58 Despite the policy focus, their workforce participation has declined (Fig. 6.4). Many lost their jobs or found it diffcult to work in the wake of the 2008 fnancial crisis; only after the 2013 Jobs Accord between employers' organizations, trade unions and the government did the number of employed persons with disabilities tick slightly upwards. Under this social contract, 125,000 jobs will be created for people with occupational disabilities by 2026, including 25,000 jobs in the public sector. Before the Covid-19 crisis, their workforce participation had not returned to pre-crisis levels; the disparities between this group and the rest of the population remain substantial.

People with physical disabilities have slightly better access to the labour market than people with mental disabilities59 – the category of people most excluded from the labour market. Only one in fve persons with a severe mental condition are currently working,60 while the intensifcation of work poses particular challenges for people already struggling psychologically. For people with chronic illnesses or occupational disabilities, intensive activity or complicated, emotionally demanding work with a lot of human contact can generate unbearable stress (Fig. 6.5).

The intensifcation of work poses particular diffculties for people with mild intellectual disabilities. An estimated 1.4 million persons in the Netherlands – many of whom receive benefts61 – have an iq between 50 and 85 and experience problems with self-reliance. While low-skilled work certainly exists in the Netherlands (see Table 6.1), much of this work is now out of reach as requirements have changed: the pace has quickened while workers need to be able to work independently or in tightknit teams, whereas persons with a mild intellectual disability typically beneft from a calmer tempo, less complexity, plenty of security and continuous guidance.62 The intensifcation of work is increasingly distancing even basic work from the needs and capabilities of this group.

58Versantvoort & van Echtelt (2016), van der Zwan & de Beer (2019), oecd (2018a).

59Nivel (2018, 2019).

60Schaafsma et al. (2015).

61 van den Berg et al. (2013).

62Woittiez & Putnam (2016), Woittiez et al. (2014), Sebrechts (2018).

#### 6.3 Intensifcation of Work

There is thus a widening gulf between the labour market and workers with mental, psychological or medical disabilities (see Table 6.1). Many researchers have concluded that this gulf can only be narrowed if jobs are more individually tailored. Many vulnerable people simply do not ft available vacancies. It would be better to focus less on the requirements of the work organization and look more at the skills, working speed and qualities of the aspiring worker.63

**Fig. 6.5** Labour-market participation of people with and without disabilities, 2003–2017 Source: Statistics Netherlands (With thanks to Paul de Beer)

Sources: Van den Berg et al. (2018), Woittiez et al. (2014), Beukema and Kuijpers (2018)

63See, for example, Adelmeijer et al. (2015, 2017).

## *6.3.3 Reintegration Is More Diffcult*

The intensifcation of work can make reintegration into the labour force more diffcult for people who have taken time off. Because people are now working into old age and illnesses such as cancer are often recurrent, their reintegration in the workplace has become a pressing issue. While staying in work or returning to the same job works well in many cases, reintegration rarely unfolds smoothly and is often accompanied by complaints such as fatigue and concentration problems.64 If the pace of the job has accelerated or old know-how has become obsolete, this only raises the barriers to a successful return.

#### **Box 6.3 Working with an Occupational Disability**

Ms. O, with rheumatism, osteoarthritis and deafness in her right ear, says that she is happy working at retailer X. "The nice thing is that there is no time pressure. The work I do is facing, making sure that the shop looks good by placing the different products in the right place. From time to time I can take the moments of rest I need, and I set my own working pace. That's important to me because it's what enables me to keep going."65

Many people who have been away from work for a long time have or develop complex problems. Half of all subsistence beneft claimants report that they are "sick"66 – a catch-all term for a variety of ailments and issues. An estimated 40% of people on unemployment or subsistence benefts must deal with a multiplicity of problems in their lives.67 Joblessness is rarely the sole problem; it goes hand in hand with debt, health complaints, family issues, language defciencies and lack of social support. These problems also hinder their search for work, especially now that it has intensifed.

Employers are reluctant to recruit people who are distanced from the labour market. Long-term unemployment in the Netherlands is higher than in many other countries; once workers have been side-lined, especially older and less skilled people tend to remain out of work for long periods.68 For many employers, long-term unemployment is in itself a red fag for a person best avoided.69 Having an occupational disability is an invitation to have doors slammed in one's face. Only one in

64See also Polder (2017).

65Beukema & Kuijpers (2018): 7.

66 cbs (2017a, October 7).

67Bosselaar et al. (2010).

68 de Graaf-Zijl et al. (2015).

69 de Hek et al. (2018).

fve employers claim they are willing to hire people with a (preferably physical) disability; an even smaller proportion actually do.70 Although support from colleagues and managers is crucial during reintegration, productivity targets get in the way. Not everyone has the time to explain yet again how the computer system works, or to jump in when a returning colleague is unable to complete a task.

## *6.3.4 Limits to the Intensifcation of Work*

There is a human limit to the intensifcation of work: "Just as an extension of the length of the working day is bounded by the number of hours in the day, so human physical and mental capacities do not allow an endless expansion to effort."71 The question is whether the Netherlands has reached this limit. Absenteeism due to psychosocial complaints is increasing; people who were not previously vulnerable are falling ill – highly educated young women, for instance, who are reporting symptoms of burnout in ever-higher numbers. The intensifcation of work has placed many people who were already vulnerable at an even greater distance from the world of work. Clearly, people are better able to cope with intensive work if they have some autonomy in the workplace and control in their private lives. Again, the quality of work is crucial.

## **6.4 Policies to Help People into Work**

"Work, work, work" has been a key policy objective in the Netherlands for decades. But is enough being done to ensure that everyone can fnd and keep a good job? To combat many thousands of people dropping out of the workforce, prevention is more effective than any cure. This section asks whether the Netherlands' labourmarket policies are suffciently active to help people fnd and retain work in the age of its automation, fexibilization and intensifcation.

70Adelmeijer et al. (2015, 2017). The Netherlands Institute for Social Research notes only 11% of employers expect to hire (more) people with occupational disabilities in the next 2 years, the same as in 2015/2016 (Van Echtelt et al. 2019a, b).

71Green (2004): 615.

#### **Box 6.4 Starting Points for a Preventive Labour-Market Policy**

Figure 6.6 summarizes how we can keep the automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of work from exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and creating new ones. There are a number of starting points to achieve positive change.

The use of new technologies in the workplace can beneft working people, even vulnerable ones, if it focuses on complementarity: encouraging cooperation between humans and machines, both in the development of applications and in their implementation.

Flexible labour markets require responsible employers who actively invest in their employees. So long as "permanently temporary" employment does not become the norm, temporary contracts need not be a problem. But the employer must invest in its temporary staff, including those with disabilities.

To mitigate the negative effects of the intensifcation of work, greater worker autonomy is essential. When people have a real say over what they do and when and where they do it, they are better able to be highly productive and to deal with emotionally challenging situations. Being able to co-ordinate the professional and the personal helps.

All of these aspects of good work offer greater protections against joblessness and are crucial ingredients within actively preventative labourmarket policy.

## *6.4.1 Limited Investments*

Recent attention has focused on containing costs in the Dutch social-security system and on imposing obligations on its benefciaries.72 In contrast, little has been invested in people who have left the labour market. At the beginning of this century, the Netherlands was second only to Denmark in its investments in active labourmarket policy (Fig. 6.7). In the past decade, spending in this area has nearly halved, dropping to 0.6% of gdp in 2017.73 This is the same as in Germany, less than in France and Belgium (0.9%), and much less than in Sweden (1.3%) and Denmark (2.0%). While Denmark maintained and Sweden increased support for the unemployed during the 2008 economic crisis, the Netherlands cut back – although research shows that active policies have the greatest effect and are most needed during crises.74

oecd statistics provide an overview of the various components of active labourmarket policy. Compared to other European countries, investments in vocational education and training are particularly low in the Netherlands, amounting to just

**Fig. 6.7** Spending on active labour-market policy as a percentage of gdp, 2004–2017, in the Netherlands and other European countries Source: oecd database. (https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=lmpexp#)

72Vrooman et al. (2017).

73Eurostat fgures show a similar pattern. See also Koning et al. (2017), cpb (2015).

74Kluve (2010), Card et al. (2017).

0.07% of gdp in 2017 – far less than in Denmark (0.46%) or France (0.28%).75 This limited attention to training is striking, especially in light of the technological developments affecting the workplace and the intensifcation of work – the more so when we see that the majority of people claiming subsistence benefts in the Netherlands lack even a basic educational qualifcation. The Netherlands also commits less resources to job search assistance than the Scandinavian countries, France and the United Kingdom. Many unemployed persons thus fall through the cracks.76 A signifcant proportion of those without work rarely see a case manager or anyone from the Employee Insurance Agency.77 In contrast to the 1990s, virtually nothing is now spent on directly creating work.

Why has the Netherlands not maintained the active labour-market policies it initiated in the 1990s? There are three explanations. First, the focus of government policy, particularly labour-market policy, has shifted away from public provision towards individual self-reliance.78 In the 1990s, the emphasis was on enforcing social-security rules and sanctioning non-compliance; now, the unemployed are expected to fnd the shortest route into work. Unlike the "human-capital" or "trainfrst" approach, this "work-frst" approach best serves people who fnd it relatively easy to move into work. In other words, the policy primarily targets those who least need it.79

A second explanation is administrative decentralization and the Participation Act of 2015, which transferred responsibilities for the labour market reintegration of subsistence beneft recipients to local authorities. At the same time, supporting budgets were cut dramatically.80 Local governments had little expertise in guiding people into work and were slow in taking up their new tasks. An evaluation of the Participation Act found that it led, at best, to a slight increase in workforce participation. In some respects it has had no effect or even reduced participation, most notably among people previously in sheltered employment who are now more likely to be at home than in work.81 For "classic" social-security claimants, the chances of fnding a job have risen by just 1 percentage point. Young adults with occupational disabilities are now more likely to be working, but their jobs are often poor, parttime and/or temporary; they can barely make ends meet, let alone build a meaningful life.82 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, which conducted the

75oecd database.

76oecd (2017).

77 Inspectie szw (2014).

78See Veldheer et al. (2012).

79Martin (2014).

80Berenschot (2018).

81For people previously qualifying for sheltered work, the chances of fnding regular employment have fallen from 50% prior to the law's enactment to 30% (Sadiraj et al. 2018).

82Kok et al. (2019).

evaluation, concludes that the objectives of the Participation Act have not been achieved.83

Finally, academic research has contributed to the weakening of active labourmarket policy.84 Doubts have been raised, especially by economists, about the effectiveness of active labour-market policies, often due to contradictory fndings.85 This is often due to limitations in the research itself; it is diffcult to gauge the effectiveness of interventions as conditions in the real world of work are hard to keep constant. There is often a degree of partiality in participant selection (or self-selection), while the interventions – a training course or a conversation with a case manager – differ.86 If we look at the evidence in more detail, some instruments work better than others; it also matters who the intended benefciaries are. For example, active policies are more effective for those with the fewest opportunities such as the less skilled, the long-term unemployed and people with occupational disabilities.87 We also know little about whether interventions help people feel healthier or more valued, even when they do not directly lead to fnding a job.

## *6.4.2 What We Know*

Meta-analyses of research on hundreds of programmes88 suggests that imposing obligations on beneft claimants and penalizing them for non-compliance has some effect on people who are not already distanced from the labour market. Education and training have less immediate success, but achieve modest results after 2 or 3 years.89 The most effective form of intervention is instruction in specifc skills currently in high demand, especially in the private sector90 – preferably in the form of learning on the job. Temporary wage subsidies tailored to the individual benefciary also have some positive effect.91 Although digitization has penetrated the Dutch

83 van Echtelt et al. (2019a).

84Kluve (2010), Koning et al. (2017).

85Martin and Grubb (2001) fnd that paying bonuses works better than imposing penalties. This is not apparent for Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2013). See Card et al. (2010).

86See cpb (2016). Policy experiments in the Netherlands and elsewhere have sought to measure the effectiveness of interventions; see for example Knoef and Van Ours (2016) and Groot et al. (2019). Koning (2011) argues that it remains diffcult to measure and stabilize the factors determining effectiveness.

87Card et al. (2017).

88Card et al. (2010, 2017), Martin (2014), Kluve (2010); see also cpb (2016).

89Lammers & Kok (2017). This applies more to people with lower educational levels.

90See also Martin & Grubb (2001).

91Card et al. (2010).

job-placement sector,92 face-to-face meetings with a professional adviser helps to fnd a paid job sooner; even one conversation can make a big difference.93

Instruments are best tailored to the type of jobseeker.94 While exhortations and penalties may suffce for people who are ready to work, they are pointless for people with very limited employment potential, chronic health problems or some other form of occupational disability. They need a different approach, one that is personal, intensive and long-term.95 This is at long last being recognized in the Netherlands, as can be seen in the additional resources channelled to the Employee Insurance Agency following successive cutbacks, and by local authorities again focusing on personal contact with subsistence beneft recipients.96 In 2016, the City of Amsterdam introduced a programme for refugees involving specialist case managers who focus on understanding their problems, building personal relationships, civic integration courses and labour-market guidance. The result has been higher workforce participation than in the city's past and in the rest of the country – although Amsterdam's thriving pre-pandemic economy has helped as well.97

The intensive approach means more personal contact with qualifed professionals and a process attuned to the jobseeker's potential rather than to the brute fact that he or she is claiming benefts. Good work means work tailored to the individual in such a way that they gain greater control in life. People with limited work prospects often face a web of problems, at home and/or with their health; case managers need to look beyond the boundaries of labour-market guidance and work with, for instance, debt-counsellors and healthcare professionals. Although it has long been known that the unemployed are more likely to be ill and vice-versa, "care cannot be used for reintegration and reintegration cannot be used for care".98 Academic studies furnish evidence to develop more personalized interventions.

## *6.4.3 What About Employers?*

Most employers are reluctant to hire if applicants do not ft the profles for available vacancies.99 They are afraid to incur additional costs due to job and workplace adaptations, greater needs for supervision, sickness and absenteeism.100 Research shows that potential health issues play a larger role in hiring and retention than age.101

92Martin (2014).

93Koning (2006), Koning et al. (2017), Heyma & van der Werff (2014), Lammers et al. (2015). For research in Denmark, see Van den Berg et al. (2012). For research in Switzerland, see Schiprowski (in press). For research on contact with beneft recipients, see Van der Valk and Fenger (2019).

94 cpb (2016), Kok & Houkes (2011).

95See also CPB (2016), Lub (2017).

96Kremer et al. (2017b).

97Oostveen et al. (2019).

98Einerhand & Ravesteijn (2017); see also oecd (2014).

99See, for example, van Berkel et al. (2017).

100Adelmeijer et al. (2015, 2017), van Echtelt et al. (2019b).

101Houtman et al. (2013).

Predictable, stable fnances are a prerequisite for employers. Targeted wage subsidies are more effective for enrolling vulnerable workers than general wage subsidies, which also beneft people who would have found work anyway.102 The Netherlands, like most European countries, makes scant use of these instruments.103 Other schemes to help people into work include wage dispensation and the appointment of a jobs coach. Different fnancial and legal regulations apply to each category of beneft recipient; many employers claim they are unaware of the regulations.104

The job-placement landscape in the Netherlands is fragmented and opaque. Figure 6.8 shows just how complicated the current system is. The roles played by the local authorities and the Employee Insurance Agency, employers' organizations

Work and Income Implementation Structure (SUWI)

WIA/WGA WW VWNW

*Banenafspraak* jobs deal scheme

Subsistence benets PW Wajong

102Card et al. (2017).

103See also CPB (2016).

104 cpb (2015).

and trade unions differ across situations. Many jobseekers and employers have no idea where to turn.

Financial incentives do not suffce to persuade employers to hire as organizations must often change to accommodate different types of workers. Those that have made "diversity" part of their mission recruit more people from vulnerable groups; so do large frms (with over 100 employees), frms that already employ less skilled staff and the government.105 Things are often more challenging for small and medium-sized frms. Active public labour-market policies must back employers' own hr. policies106 to guide and support individual jobseekers while making the necessary adjustments within the organization to create space for them. Tailoring jobs for vulnerable workers often requires the involvement of the entire organization.107 Effective activation requires long-term commitment from both sides.108 The challenge is to innovate in such a way that more vulnerable workers are able to join the workforce.109

#### **Box 6.5 Individual Placement and Support**

An approach known as Individual Placement and Support is often used for people with severe mental impairments. Together with the jobseeker, a jobs coach determines what kind of work and tasks the person can handle. A suitable position is then created in a regular work organization, a process known as "jobcrafting". The new employee receives work, care and guidance for an extended period – sometimes even permanently. Shown to be effective, the approach is now being tried more widely among subsistence beneft recipients. The key is close attention to "the whole person" as well as to the work environment, where they are likely to need intensive internal supervision. Not only workers need coaches; so do their employers, managers and colleagues.

## *6.4.4 Good Basic Jobs*

While active labour-market policies need to target both potential employers and employees, it does not suffce for people without realistic prospects of fnding paid work. This is why "basic jobs" are back on the agenda, now championed by many

105 In the "100,000 Jobs Plan" for people with disabilities, supported by employers' organizations vno-ncw and mkb-Nederland, private sector employers are ahead of those in the public sector; tno (2015).

106 van Berkel et al. (2017).

107A Danish scheme using Public Employment Service funds allows paying colleagues to act as job coaches.

108See also oecd (2018a), Froyland et al. (2019).

109Blonk (2018), Nijhuis & Zijlstra (2015).

sociologists, lawyers, economists and several Dutch political parties.110 The same discussion is taking place in other European countries. Basic jobs are a response to the changing face of work, to the "demanding and uncertain labour market" which offers insuffcient opportunities for one million people in the country.111 "The reintegration into work of the unemployed no longer offers any guarantee of a sustainable, fully-fedged job."112 To some extent, basic jobs are also an answer to the campaign for a basic income. If work is so important to people mentally and socially, society should, instead of providing them with income, offer good work.113

Dutch cities such as Amsterdam and The Hague have been experimenting with basic jobs for people on subsistence benefts for some time.114 Sweden has its own variants such as the 1000 "Stockholm Jobbs" its capital city is hoping to create. Similarly, "one-euro jobs" in Germany entail work in the social sector with the retention of benefts plus a bonus of 1 euro per hour.115 The idea is that there is a lot of socially useful work to be done and that the fnancing of benefts may as well be converted into wage subsidization to create paid work.116 Although these schemes incur organizational and supervision costs as well as additional social insurance contributions, the local authorities believe that general well-being is enhanced, that healthcare spending will fall and that community cohesion will beneft when everyone is able to be part of the workforce (see also Chap. 2).

The Netherlands has previous experience with subsidized jobs. The best known are the 40,000 "Melkert jobs" created in 1994 by the then Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Ad Melkert. To avoid competing with regular work, these positions – paid 120% of the statutory minimum wage – had to be complementary; the idea was that the "Melketeers" would eventually move into "real" work. Half of these jobs were with private frms; the other half were in the public sector, where city wardens and school caretakers were supposed to improve the quality of

110Klosse & Muyskens (2011, November 4); Schippers et al. (2016). de Beer (2015) sees potential benefts but is more sceptical. The research unit of the co-governing Christian Democratic party (Siegmann 2018), the opposition Labour Party leader Lodewijk Asscher (Asscher 2019), and the economists Dankbaar and Muysken (2019) all advocate basic jobs, while Verhoeven and Wilthagen (in Wilthagen 2019) call for a "parallel labour market" in which money earmarked for benefts is used to fund workers. The proposals differ in how they organize the scheme. Most involve local authorities (which administer subsistence benefts) employing people and if necessary, seconding them to other workplaces. Verhoeven and Wilthagen favour public-private mixes.

111Wilthagen (2019).

112Klosse & Muyskens (2011, November 4).

113This does not alter the fact that customization is necessary and that the well-being of people entitled to subsistence benefts is bolstered by the security these payments provide. The "trust experiments" under way in several towns and cities give them the space they need (Groot et al. 2019). Some people gain more from doing voluntary work while retaining their entitlement to benefts. In other cases, the quid pro quo for payments from the public purse is best converted into a basic job.

114 van Dodeweerd (2016).

115 van der Meer & Kremer (2018, January 17).

116Schippers et al. (2016) calculate that an extra €8000 is needed to close the gap between subsistence benefts and wages. This excludes such factors as guidance supervision costs.

society.117 The Melkert scheme was replaced in 1999 with "id jobs" (from the Dutch abbreviation for "entry-level and step-up"). The central government abolished these positions with the decentralization of subsistence support in 2003. Many local authorities were unwilling or unable to make the investments necessary to maintain them and all subsidised labour eventually disappeared. Secretary of State Jette Kleinsma saw this as a positive development "because the ultimate goal of reintegration is to obtain regular, non-subsidized work".118

The basic jobs being proposed now are not meant as a path to regular work, although this may at times happen.119 They are primarily for individuals lacking realistic prospects in the mainstream labour market who would otherwise remain dependent on benefts for extended periods. According to the alderman of The Hague who frst tabled the idea, the main purpose of basic jobs is to prevent "people entering a downward spiral, at high cost to them individually but also to society."120 The jobs should provide good work – and so not be temporary – thereby shielding their holders from the vagaries of the labour market and giving them some modicum of control over their work and in their lives.

In sum, the Netherlands is suffering from a qualitative mismatch between employers and jobseekers. People who have been out of work for a long time simply do not ft the available vacancies. Overcoming this predicament requires change, commitment and support from all sides. But even as the automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of work make this urgent, there is scant public investment in active labour-market policy. Renewed policies in this area should focus on good work for all, with tailored strategies for different groups of jobseekers and good basic jobs as the fnal piece of the puzzle.

## **6.5 Conclusion: New Vulnerabilities, New Policy Challenges**

Dutch policy jargon includes the frequently heard term "people distanced from the labour market". But in many cases it is the market that has distanced itself from the people. How will the three developments at the heart of this book – the automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of work – affect those looking for and trying to stay in paid work?

117Laid down in the 1995 Regulations on Additional Work Opportunities for the Long-Term Unemployed.

118Aanhangsel Handelingen ii 2009/2010, No. 664.

119Meta-analyses (e.g. Card et al. 2017) invariably show job creation schemes to be ineffective. This is due to the "lock-in effect" – additional subsidized work does not lead to regular employment because the taught skills do not match those required in the rest of the labour market. Like the trust experiments with beneft recipients, we need to study the long-term effects of basic jobs on health and well-being.

120Baldewsingh (2016).

All three developments have the potential to make all workers more vulnerable, not only those already on the margins. In this respect, the dividing lines between social groups are becoming less clear-cut. Automation, robots and artifcial intelligence have already increased insecurity for some white-collar workers. The intensifcation of work likewise affects society more broadly; although burnout still affects more women and university graduates, it can happen to anyone. Temporary employment, too, is no longer reserved for classic vulnerable groups as the "fexible shell" has penetrated to the core of the labour market.

Vulnerable groups including high-school graduates and people with occupational disabilities may encounter even higher obstacles to labour-market participation. Once a person has been out of work for some time, it is harder to re-enter the workforce; in the jargon, one's distance from the labour market has increased. Here, the automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of work are largely exacerbating the divide between highly educated, healthy and productive workers and less productive, less confdent people. For specifc vulnerable groups, the gulf between the demands of the labour market and their own needs is widening; the long-term unemployed fnd it almost impossible to keep up with the changing world of work. As a hectic working environment is no place to attempt a gentle re-entry into active life, this puts the whole notion of reintegration to the test.

Prevention is better than cure, but the question is whether Dutch labour-market policy is preventive enough.121 Keeping everyone in work is an important aspect of the quality of work; focusing on good work is the best preventive labour-market policy of all.

Technology can serve vulnerable groups and help their members to fnd and retain work. Economist Tony Atkinson122 in *Inequality, What Can Be Done?* argues that the "direction of technological change should be an explicit concern of policy makers, encouraging innovation in a form that increases the employability of workers". This does not happen automatically; focusing on complementarity – on people working with machines – is crucial. For their own protection, workers need to be involved in transitions and to be able to prepare for them.

Elements of the fexible labour market such as self-employment can offer some people opportunities to fnd and stay in work. Temporary contracts can in theory offer fexible workers stepping stones towards greater security – although in practice revolving-door unemployment is more common. Flexible working offers scant protection for people with health issues or occupational disabilities. Investing in greater "internal fexibility" – the ability to move into different work within the same frm or within a pool of frms – may be a reasonable response to eroded corporate responsibility.

121oecd (2018a).

122Atkinson (2015).

The intensifcation of work is more manageable when people have suffcient autonomy and support at work. The high rate of work-related absenteeism and burnout would be mitigated to some extent if people enjoyed more control over their work and a healthy work-life balance.

Although new technologies and the fexibilization and intensifcation of work open new possibilities for active labour-market policy, the Netherlands in recent decades has halved its budget in this area. As a result, the country now lags behind the rest of Europe. To reverse the tide, active labour-market policies should focus not only on personal training but on the entire work organization. Basic jobs can be a solution for people who are still unable to fnd work.

The three key developments we analyse in this book do not have predestined effects on working people; there is no question of technological or economic determinism in their outcomes. The automation, fexibilization and intensifcation of work can be infuenced, adjusted, stimulated, inhibited and offset. The next chapter looks at how much scope the government, companies and institutions have to invest in better work: good quality work for people who are already working and for the unemployed who want to work.

#### **A Day at Work: The Chartered Accountant**

David is a chartered accountant at one of the major accounting frms in the Netherlands. Its offce block is tall with lots of glass; the entrance is elegant and access is limited. One needs a pass to open the building's many gates.

David shares a room on the sixth foor with a colleague. He starts his day with coffee as he browses his e-mails. An accountant's core task, he explains, is to provide certainty about the client's fnancial situation. Companies and organizations are legally obliged to have their annual fnancial statements and other regular reports audited by accountants as a true representation of their situation so that other parties – investors, suppliers, the tax authorities and so on – trust them. "Accountants have a social function," David says, "because without trust every transaction would fall through."

David is a partner in the frm and thus a co-owner. Partners receive a share of the profts instead of a salary. They are personally responsible for the quality of their own work and that of the junior accountants under them. If something goes wrong, they can face disciplinary proceedings with legal force.

David's frst task today is to consult a colleague for advice about a client with overseas subsidiaries in a complex ownership structure. They outline the situation on a whiteboard, discuss the options and decide which is most realistic. He then dashes to his next appointment. Five minutes late, David storms into a meeting room where 12 people are sitting around a large table with a speaker for teleconferences in the middle and a screen on the wall. They are all partners – predominantly male, white and between 40 and 50 years old – each sitting behind a laptop and a stack of papers. The atmosphere is relaxed, the tempo punishing, the language impenetrable with acronyms and English jargon. Someone explains the items on the agenda; much of the meeting concerns quality improvement. One topic is how to respond to the frm's forthcoming inspection report by the Financial Markets Authority. The session goes on for 3 h with a short toilet and telephone break half-way through. Lunch is set out and eaten while talking.

At 1:30 pm the meeting is still not over but David has to leave. In his own room, he has a Skype chat with a client about a quote for an annual audit. When the client tries to negotiate a lower rate, David is willing to think about it, although it has already been adjusted once. After half an hour he has to break off and go to another appointment in yet another meeting room. He discusses a quality problem with four partners. One of the frm's main competitors is ahead on this point, they note jealously. They at least need to reach the same level.

At 3 pm, David is back at his desk. Only now does he fnd out that his scheduled call has been postponed. He uses the spare time to check his e-mails again – 15 new messages since this morning, which is not so bad – to listen to his voicemail and to fll in his timesheet. He quickly scans the latest fnancial news on his phone.

At 3:30 pm he calls a fellow partner who will be leaving the frm shortly about the handover of his clients and projects. This is followed by another scheduled call, this time with someone from his own team. David fnds the solution being proposed acceptable but warns his colleague not to take on too much work.

At about 5 pm, David sinks back into his chair. It has been a hectic day but not a stressful one. There are also days when he must check reports compiled by his junior accountants, which means spending hours on end behind his computer. The dynamism is why he likes his work – alongside accountancy's social function, which makes it a diffcult profession. After a number of recent scandals, supervision by the Financial Markets Authority has become stricter; the bar for audits has been raised. This has increased costs for clients and the competition between accountancy frms is ferce. "We try to compensate by working smarter", says David. Ultimately, the pressure falls on the auditing accountants who must deliver high quality in as few billable hours as possible. While software to review standard fnancial data is advancing, everything else needs to be done by people, including the communication with clients.

At 5:15 pm, a colleague offers David a lift home. Once there, he will spend another half an hour answering e-mails.

*Accountant, like notary and lawyer, is a regulated profession in the Netherlands. Practitioners must be registered with the Royal Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants. There are currently more than 21,000 active accountants, 80 per cent of them men. Most hold university degrees*  *(chartered accountants), a smaller number higher vocational qualifcations (certifed accountants), in both cases followed by practical training. The remuneration varies according to their qualifcations, workplace and experience, in the range of €3000–9000 gross per month. As co-owners of their frms and thus entrepreneurs, partners are in a separate category and sometimes earn many hundreds of thousands of euros a year. The average (modal) income in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 per month, excluding holiday pay. Accountants are in great demand and there are high rates of turnover in the large frms. Recent research by Nyenrode Business University points to heavy workloads in the profession, especially for young accountants, both in terms of hours (an average of eight hours of overtime a week) and quality requirements. New technologies including automated data analysis are expected to change the profession, rendering some human tasks unnecessary.*

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Part III The New Societal Mission**

# **Chapter 7 Room to Choose Good Work**

Economic globalization and technological development are often presented as inevitable trends to which people and nations can only adapt. By this reasoning, national governments no longer have the room to make choices and companies cannot provide good jobs due to the pressures of international competition. But is this really true? Is it realistic to pursue good work for everyone who can and wants to work?

The economist Anna Salomons argues that the digital revolution will not make existing work organizations superfuous. We should instead refect on how we can develop ourselves, our institutions and our machines in such a way that human work remains human: "if employees are treated like robots, that hinders the productivity gains to be achieved by introducing *real* robots."1

David Weil concludes *The Fissured Workplace* by analysing what the fragmentation and outsourcing of work has meant for employees: greater insecurity, worse terms of employment, fewer on-the-job training opportunities and restricted opportunities for advancement. Yet he is hopeful. We are emerging from a long period during which pay, conditions and standards of *fairness* in the workplace did not improve. But by taking advantage of new ways of organizing production, better work can be had for all.2

Other experts have argued along similar lines. But is their optimism realistic? Are companies and governments really still able to prioritise creating good work for everyone? This chapter frst addresses globalization (Sect. 7.1) and technological developments (Sect. 7.2) before turning to the choices open to companies (Sect. 7.3) and the government (Sect. 7.4).

1Salomons (2015).

2Weil (2014).

## **7.1 Globalization with Policy Space**

Economic globalization has transformed the world since the late 1970s. There is now greater process interdependence across national borders; the international trade in goods and services has blossomed while fnancial fows have become faster and more extensive. Companies are now more likely to operate internationally, producing and assembling goods and delivering services through cross-border value and production chains. Many frms have subsidiaries, affliates and production units abroad; about 15,000 Dutch businesses have a foreign parent company.3 The Netherlands, a medium-sized nation with an open economy, now earns approximately 34% of its GDP abroad4 – a proportion which has remained stable for many years. Domestic economic activity thus still accounts for almost twice as much income as the international trade on which the country prides itself.5

## *7.1.1 Winners and Losers*

Globalization has long been presented as a development over which we have no control. But recent years have shown that its rules can and do change.6 The International Monetary Fund has become less doctrinaire about controls on capital movements; many international organizations have published reports on the need to make globalization more inclusive. In any case, the world economy is nowhere as globalized as it could theoretically be,7 and there is scant likelihood that economic globalization will receive renewed impetus in the near future. New technologies may well make it more attractive to organize aspects of production closer by, while some in the affuent world have high hopes for "reshoring" – the return of production previously outsourced to emerging economies.

Ever since the Brexit referendum in the uk and Donald Trump's election in the usa, analysts have been warning about the backlash to globalization – perhaps the end of the phenomenon as we know it.8 No-one any longer denies that globalization

3Boorsma (2018).

4 cbs (2019d).

5Hueck and Went (2016, January 9); wrr (2013a).

6Rodrik (2017).

7Ghemawat and Altman (2016).

8 van Bergeijk (2019); Bremmer (2018); King (2017); Rodrik (2017).

has losers as well as winners – although they are not always easy to identify.9 The obvious candidates are people who lose their jobs when production moves abroad and workers who fnd their pay and conditions undermined by foreign competition. Entire communities can suffer losses in income and well-being when a local company closes its doors and shifts its activities to a cheaper location.10

For people, work is much more than a source of income; not even generous beneft payments can offset its loss. How does one measure and compensate for the impact on families and communities of a company closure or relocation?11 According to researchers at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Dutch losers of globalization are better off than in many other countries. In a recent policy briefng on inclusive globalization, they observe that "we are seeing shifts in employment across sectors, but unemployment remains low and the levelling effects of the tax system, along with the social-security safety net, are mitigating the sometimes painful transition effects of globalization."12 This is of course not the case everywhere, which is one of the reasons why alarming analyses of how robots will devastate the future landscape of work in the United States are often used to justify calls for a basic income there.13

## *7.1.2 The Political Trilemma of the World Economy*

Concerns about the workings and future of globalization and the revival of nationalism have fuelled debate on more inclusive ways of organizing the international economy, national economies and the welfare state.14 "The question today is what type of globalization there will be," writes Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the oecd. "It doesn't have to be the one we've had. We must return people's well-being to the centre of our focus, and ensure that the benefts derived from further interconnectedness of our economies, societies, institutions and cultures are more equally shared."15 At issue is whether and how the policy space available to national governments should be expanded so that they are better able to pursue domestic priorities. Small emerging economies have been hamstrung by globalization much more than large, rich economies like the United States or even advanced medium-sized economies like the Netherlands.

9Nolan (2018, August 3); Rodrik (1997); Rodrik (2011); Stiglitz (2002); Went (2017).

10Collier (2018); Rajan (2019).

11Cass (2018); Goldstein (2017); Rodrik (2018, November 9).

12Euwals and Meijerink (2018).

13Ford (2015).

14See, for example: Block (2018); Collier (2018); Corneo (2017); ippr Commission on Economic Justice (2018); Mazzucato (2018); Rajan (2019); Raworth (2017); Rodrik (2017); Went (2018).

15Gurría (2017, June 6).

**Fig. 7.1** The political trilemma of the world economy Source: Rodrik, 2007

Dani Rodrik's "political trilemma" posits that it is impossible for far-reaching globalization *and* democracy *and* nation states to co-exist (see Fig. 7.1); we must choose which two of the three we consider more important. In the post-war Bretton Woods era, international trade was promoted but brakes were placed on the globalization of capital movements (see the lower axis in Fig. 7.1). The idea was that national priorities, such as lowering central-bank interest rates to boost employment, should not be hindered by (the threat of) capital fight. Since the 1980s, greater efforts have been made to achieve far-reaching globalization (the left-hand axis). As globalization limits the options and policy space available to individual nations, Thomas Friedman calls this "the golden straitjacket".16 The third choice (the right-hand axis) is technically possible but implies something like a world government and global democracy that go far beyond the many forms of "global governance" we know today. In practice, these choices involve gradations.17

National governments largely retain the ability to make their own policy decisions.18 Torben Iversen and David Soskice even argue that "the autonomy of the advanced nation-state has increased even as globalization and mutual dependence have risen."19 The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands argued in 2008 that states should use this policy space to help companies and workers losing out from globalization.20 Countries, conclude imf researchers, are in a position to choose to make economic growth more inclusive and less uneven.21

16Friedman (1999).

17Rodrik (2007, June 27); Rodrik (2011); Derbyshire (2017, July 28).

18See, for example: Rodrik (1997); Rodrik (2011); Rodrik (2017); ser (2008); Went (2018).

19 Iversen and Soskice (2019): xii.

20 ser (2008).

21Ostry et al. (2019).

## *7.1.3 Lasting Differences Between Countries*

Researchers of the "varieties of capitalism"22 have analysed the differences between so-called "liberal" market economies like the us, the uk and Australia and "coordinated" economies like Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. What is striking is that all of these countries have continued to develop without converging towards an average or lowest common denominator. Despite the steady advance of globalization, there remain signifcant institutional differences between nations in areas such as social protection and the taxation of labour. Even a cursory glance at the statistics for oecd or eu member states shows that they remain as dissimilar as ever on numerous indicators, despite – or perhaps in part because of – globalization.23

While Sweden and Japan both have highly open economic borders, "it is diffcult to maintain that these countries have made identical political choices when it comes to issues such as taxes, distribution of income, education or social security".24 In the realm of work, Germany, Belgium and France proportionally have fewer fexible and self-employed workers than the Netherlands. These enduring differences between countries facing similar pressures from globalization are the result of their histories, traditions and preferences – in other words, of path dependencies, institutions and policy choices.25

## *7.1.4 The Same Picture in the Globalization of Production…*

One important difference between the current wave of globalization and the previous one, between about 1870 and the First World War, is that the production of goods and services has now also gone global – at least in part. Firms have divided their activities into tasks and subtasks which are then organized into production or value chains. This gives them choices. According to Stoker and Garretsen, globalization has enlarged the decision space available to ceos: "In a world of open borders in which markets have largely been liberalized compared with the frst few decades after the Second World, ceos and corporate boards have huge strategic discretion."26

22Hall and Soskice (2001).

23 "Although corporations are now organized with greater fexibility and are more decentralized … [r]edistribution and welfare states, while they have changed over time, remain different across advanced capitalist democracies" (Iversen & Soskice, 2019: 39).

24Stoker and Garretsen (2018).

25Admiraal (2018, October 16); de Beer and Verhulp (2017); Kremer et al. (2017d).

26Stoker and Garretsen (2018).

Most jobs in the Netherlands are with companies and institutions serving the domestic market; pay levels and the quality of work are generally determined nationally, not internationally. But local autonomy may be limited by foreign owners or shareholders demanding returns on investment, and by frms favouring an international strategy or division of labour as they compete.27 For the 15,000 foreignowned businesses in the Netherlands, the Dutch employers' organization awvn fnds that it matters where the parent company is based: "A Japanese frm is very different from an American or a French one. French companies often allow a fair degree of local freedom: as long as you pay your own way and keep the money coming in, you can do pretty much as you like. Japanese companies tend to be characterized by strict conventions and a methodical way of working, with plenty of protocols."28 Statistics Netherlands and the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientifc Research report that Dutch local employees of us multinationals work more overtime and experience higher workloads and greater levels of mental fatigue than staff at non-multinationals.29

## *7.1.5 …and of Labour*

The globalization of labour also has its limits. Immigration to the Netherlands over the past decade has largely been due to agreements made within the European Union, whose member states have decided that people, like goods and services, should be able to move freely across the continent's internal borders. While only a small percentage of Europeans (2.5% in 2010) use this right, Eastern Europeans do so far more than others. The largest group of recent immigrants to the Netherlands comes from Poland, currently totalling an estimated 370,000 people.30

We again see signifcant differences between European countries, with some drawing many more migrant workers than others. In the Netherlands, labour migration is encouraged by active temporary employment agencies31 and constrained by collective labour agreements, high (minimum) wages, and barriers to temporary working and self-employment – especially the enforcement of existing rules and regulations.32 Under European agreements about working conditions, wages and

27See also Koster (2020).

28Boorsma (2018).

29 cbs (2019b, March 31).

30Heyma et al. (2018).

31McCollum and Findlay (2015).

32Ruhs (2012); Holtslag et al. (eds.). (2012).

training, employers and member states have great latitude in determining what work is offered, and to whom; the institutions regulating national labour markets have replaced the customs posts of yesterday.

Research shows that labour migrants rarely steal jobs from native populations. Migrant workers mostly arrive in times of economic growth. There is in effect a dual labour market, with newcomers doing the work locals are unable or unwilling to do.33 In economically precarious sectors or work organizations, this may lead to less investment in training, downwards pressure on wages and fewer opportunities for collective action (Box 7.1).34

#### **Box 7.1 What About Flexibility?**

Globalization and technological advances allow the monitoring and adjusting of production and stock levels in real time and the breaking up of manufacturing processes so that they can be organized as effciently as possible. But these developments, which have encouraged the growth of the fexible labour market, do not on their own explain the rapid rise in Dutch self-employment. The oecd in its report for the Netherlands Independent Commission on the Regulation of Work agrees.35 If globalization and technology were the sole drivers of fexible work, there would be fewer differences between countries. Can fexible working then be tied to cultural trends? People increasingly value having say over their work; the growing number of working women means that more people want to combine work with care, while the rise of selfemployment can in part be explained by freelance workers wanting more freedom and control over their own time. The fexible labour market does not only emanate from the top down – pushed by globalization and new technologies – but from the bottom up. That said, Dutch self-employment is not always a free choice; nor is the Netherlands so different culturally from places like Germany and the Scandinavian countries where self-employment is much less common. The number of fexible jobs and self-employed individuals in the Netherlands is then primarily the result of domestic political decisions, regulations and policies: everything from dismissal law and collective agreements to the system of taxation and social security. These are summarized in Fig. 7.2.

While economic integration can indeed set limits on countries trying to avoid capital fight in a crisis, economic globalization does not eliminate the ability of countries to defne preferences and to act on them. Politicians in many parts of the world have become more aware of this in recent years. With the downsides of

33 van den Berge et al. (2018); Berkhout et al. (2014); Portes (2018, April 6).

34Ruhs and Anderson (2010); Ruhs (2012).

35oecd (2019a).

**Fig. 7.2** Causes of fexibilization in the Dutch labour market Source: Kremer et al., 2017d

economic globalization becoming more readily apparent, there is growing international interest in how the policy space available to nation-states can be utilized more effectively.

## **7.2 Technology Does Not Just Happen**

Like globalization, technological development is often seen as a force we can only prepare for and adapt to, not shape. Although its momentum may seem unstoppable to individuals, as the many bank staff who have lost their jobs to computers can testify, the bulldozer effect does not apply across the board. Politicians, governments, companies, engineers, technology workers, stakeholder organizations, social movements and others all help defne how technology is developed and applied. "The future is not something we arrive at so much as something we create through our actions in the present" (Box 7.2).36

36Rushkoff (2019).

#### **Box 7.2 Technological Revolutions**

We know from previous technological revolutions that the rollout and application of general-purpose technologies is a lengthy process of trial and error, correction, adjustment and adaptation.37 While these technologies have great potential, realizing them requires a great deal of investment and, often, organizational change. Processes must be developed, management must gain experience, employees must be trained, software must be adapted and so on.

There is nothing inevitable about how new technologies are applied; it is not something society must simply accept. Over time, we have seen changes in the (initially mostly positive) attitude towards disruptive online platforms such as Uber and Airbnb. Around the world, platforms are now being challenged by new interest groups, networks and co-operatives formed by their workers. Cities such as New York and Barcelona and states such as California have begun subjecting platforms to stricter requirements, for example by limiting the number of vehicles allowed to operate on behalf of Uber, Lyft and similar companies, or by imposing requirements for drivers' pay, safety and working conditions.

Many communities are now responding to protect local residents and hoteliers from Airbnb's explosive growth. Amsterdam is working with other major tourist destinations such as Paris and Barcelona to limit the number of days homes can be rented out and to obtain more data from Airbnb about tenants and landlords. Governments are not powerless against platforms: it is possible to regulate them and to respond to their unwanted effects and side-effects through policy and enforcement.

## *7.2.1 Humanizing Work*

New technologies were already threatening the quality of work in 1776 when Adam Smith wrote that the government should act to prevent the occupations of the working poor from being reduced to simple, monotonous operations which make people "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become".38 While new technologies can give workers more autonomy and control over the organization of their tasks, all too often the opposite happens.39

Digital technology need not lead to the surveillance or control of workers through machine-generated feedback.40 There are many examples of robots and "cobots" in

37Freeman and Louçã (2001).

38Best (2018).

39 de Stefano (2018).

40Head (2018, May 24).

construction and the automobile industry making work for humans safer, more varied and less physically grinding. There are also inspiring initiatives to help people with physical or mental disabilities to fnd work or to function better in their current jobs; many expect such possibilities involving technology to increase in the future. Fred Block41 argues that, in principle, the ability to automate repetitive tasks creates more room for work requiring human judgement, creativity, problem-solving, interaction and contact in felds such as healthcare and care for the elderly.42

Economists similarly argue that algorithms will make forecasting cheaper and thus increase the importance and value of human judgement.43 Paul Daugherty and James Wilson at the consultancy Accenture point out that while humans have long had to adapt to the rhythm of machines, artifcial intelligence now offers opportunities to rehumanize work and to alter the nature of human-machine interactions to increase both workers' productivity and well-being; in the coming age of AI, they anticipate huge demand for creative workers with people-skills able make decisions within new, fully thought-out work processes.44 This will not be the case everywhere, and it may have to be fought for, but it is one of the possibilities offered by new technology.

## *7.2.2 The Economics of Robots and ai*

Whether and how robots and algorithms enter the workplace – and what impact they will have on the quantity and quality of work – will depend on numerous factors and decisions. To successfully introduce robots to automate routine subtasks, companies will need both adequate fnancial resources and employees able to assess the available technologies. When a company decides to adopt robots or cobots, it is often not clear in advance what this will mean for the number of jobs. In theory:

In practice, the balance between the above mechanisms will determine whether the demand for human labour increases or decreases.45

The story is similar for ai, with parallel predictions for how its entry into the workplace will affect functions and subtasks. Again there are many factors at play and decisions to be made: about what is or seems technically possible, about what actually works and about what is pursued in practice. Although how AI will affect the quantity and quality of work has been the subject of intense speculation,46 so far

41Block (2018).

42See also: Colvin (2015); Davenport and Kirby (2016); Dekker and Freese (2018).

43Agrawal et al. (2018).

44Daugherty and Wilson (2018).

45 ter Weel (2018).

46See: Agrawal et al. (eds.). (2019b); Mateos-Garcia (2019, October 7).

there is scant hard evidence. In theory, the use of algorithms can have many possible consequences47:

In practice, the overall balance between the above mechanisms will determine their consequences for both the quantity and quality of work.48

Just as the introduction of robots is happening more slowly than enthusiasts once hoped, the widespread application of ai is not going to happen overnight; practical problems need to be solved and adjustments will take time.49 A 2018 report on robot-based process automation in *The New York Times* described how "companies are eager to promote the bots as helpful assistants instead of job killers. The technology, they say, will get smarter and more useful, liberating workers rather than replacing them".50 Others warn that ai is no panacea: "To a certain type of technocrat, innovations offer an irresistible opportunity to do a lot more talking at the expense of doing."51 If the culture, people and working practices of an institution are not ready for ai, the chances of success are small; time and space will be needed for trial and error.

## *7.2.3 Co-creation*

Many experts argue that companies and institutions will beneft most when humans and machines complement each other and work as allies. One example is the robot *Moxi*, developed to make the lives of nurses easier after frst carefully studying what nurses actually do on the job.52 By focusing on machine-human collaboration, it is possible to take advantage of their "complementary strengths".53 As a Japanese

47Agrawal et al. (2018).

48See: Daugherty and Wilson (2018); Bughin and Manyika (2019, July 25).

49Cass (2018).

50Lohr (2018, August 5).

51Greenway et al. (2018).

52Schwab (2019, August 7).

53Daugherty and Wilson (2018).

saying has it, people give wisdom to machines.54 It is about encouraging co-operation with machines in a way that is good for people, society and the economy.

Technological applications should aim to make people function better; for this reason, they should be developed through "co-creation" wherever possible. The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands underlines the importance of frms frst consulting with the workers who will be using the applications.55 Without their input – as well as that of clients and consumers – frms may end up with technologies no-one wants or which undermine people's control over their working and personal lives.56 Jacques Bughin and James Manyika of the consultancy McKinsey argue that efforts with ai "won't succeed unless they beneft employees" (Box 7.3).57

#### **Box 7.3 The Human Factor**

Anna Salomons argues that "new technologies are not being introduced in a vacuum. A company which installs a computer or a robot in a workplace does not see automatic increases in productivity: that also requires a change in its way of working. For example, the division of labour amongst staff or teams may change. Or the physical layout of the workspace may have to be adjusted. Or the technology may enable the introduction of new products or services, which frst need to be invented. Changes of this kind to the production process require adaptability and risk-taking, because fnding the best new working method and developing novel or improved services do not happen of their own accord."

The academic literature on how new technology impels adjustments in the workplace "shows that the human factor is indeed of vital importance. Employees' involvement and the way in which their work within a company is organized determine the extent to which new technology generates improved productivity."58

How technology is used and the measures taken to reduce its social costs will ultimately depend on decisions made by employers and politicians.59 It is up to policymakers to ensure that new technology leads to more prosperity for everyone, as this will not happen on its own. "Economists tend to place great trust in the market's ability to allocate resources in the most effcient way. But most experts recognise that the market's star does not shine as brightly when it comes to innovation. There are several reasons for market failures in innovation in general, as well as some specifc reasons that are important in the context of ai."60 One is that the market does

54Kochan and Dyer (2017).

55 ser (2016b).

56Melis (2019, February 13).

57Bughin and Manyika (2019, July 25).

58Salomons (2015).

59Gallie (2017).

60Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a).

not price in the social benefts of work, for instance that "employed people are happier and become better citizens".61

In sum, we need to recognize that technology does not just happen to us. Robots and AI will not determine how humans organize work in the future, how working people will interact with machines and algorithms, or whether workers will have more or less freedom of movement or control over their work. Ultimately, it is people who decide how technology is used and what it means for the quality of our work. If we want everyone to beneft from technology, engineers, entrepreneurs, employers, trade unions, civil society organizations and governments all have a role to play.62

## **7.3 Investing in Good Work**

The responsibility for investing in good work rests primarily with the management boards of companies and institutions.63 Firms make strategic choices within their sectors,64 about terms of employment and about whether and how to automate (by replacing human labour or by increasing its productivity). Investing in workers by paying them well and giving them more room to organize their own tasks should result in higher engagement65 and productivity as well as less workplace friction and spending on the recruitment and training of new staff66 (see also Chap. 2).

In the Netherlands, a case study of 19 companies providing low-skilled work in labour-intensive agriculture found both "precarious" employers treating their staff as disposable and "socially responsible" frms investing in their workers and trying to keep them for longer. There were signifcant differences in personnel and remuneration policies and in employer-staff relationships, which could only be the result of deliberate choices by management as the economic environment in which these

61Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b, March 29).

62Markoff (2015); ter Weel (2018); Went et al. (2015).

63 "Going beyond formal rules governing the labour market, the future of work and the actual quality of jobs depends on the working environment at the frm level. Hence creating 'good' and healthy jobs depends on employers' initiatives to organize work in a sustainable and productive way. While standards can be set by legislation and collective agreements, and while this can be supported by incentives given to frms, the ultimate responsibility lies with individual employers and management in day-to-day activities. Using different forms of effective employee representation and participation can help develop good working environments" (Eichhorst et al. in press).

64One Dutch example is the retail chain Mediamarkt, which for years competed on price. In late 2018 it implemented a "complete change of culture" to focus on quality (van der Velden & Polman, 2018).

65Economists also call this an "effciency wage". See for example the explanation at https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Effciency\_wage

66Research by economists at banking group ABN-AMRO on staff turnover in the Dutch hospitality industry shows that replacing a full-time cook costs almost €30,000 and a full-time server over €15,000. The costs incurred due to staff turnover equal 6% of the sector's entire sales income (Driessen, 2019).

companies operate is more or less the same.67 In another Dutch example, Frank Pot studied the position of workers in short-cycle labour, typical in sectors such as cleaning, agriculture and horticulture, meat and fsh processing, and in production lines and distribution centres. This kind of work generally "involves repetitive movements and its pace is often machine-led, with all the risks of rsi [repetitive strain injury] and stress that entails". Although the 1989 Working Conditions Act encourages employers to reduce short-cycle labour, few frms have made appreciable progress; some "seem to prefer class struggle over the co-creation to which the Dutch employers' association awvn is committed".68

Ferry Koster69 concludes from his review of the literature on labour deployment that "fnancialization and competition may well put pressure on the labour factor" but that this competition can be met "by choosing the 'high road' rather than reducing labour to a simple cost item to be cut back as far as possible". A lot of research has addressed the "low-road" versus "high-road" choices companies face in their employment relationships, with those choosing the high road offering their staff better pay, terms and conditions than are strictly necessary.70 Jeffrey Pfeffer concludes that employers who implement practices good for the well-being of their personnel reduce "their own costs from employee medical expenses, absenteeism, workers' compensation insurance costs and the productivity loss from having employees who are physically at work but not 'really there'". These employers also reduce "the costs to society from people's poor physical and mental health and the harm done to individuals".71

Zeynep Ton's study of how us retail chains in highly competitive sectors treat their employees concludes that certain practices "allow retailers to break the presumed trade-off between investing in employees and maintaining low prices".72 Successful chains like QuikTrip, Mercadona and Trader Joe's invest heavily in their staff but still have the lowest prices, achieve solid fnancial results and offer better customer service than their competitors. Such companies show that, even in segments where the lowest price is king, "bad jobs are not a cost-driven necessity but a choice". Ton chose to focus on these frms because they employ millions, because they have a reputation for paying low wages and because many people who value good work believe it is impossible in such companies. To managers, company directors and entrepreneurs who want to offer good work but are deterred by the costs, Ton points out that "offering good jobs can in fact reduce costs and increase profts, as long as it is combined with operational excellence".73

Paul Osterman,74 who has written extensively on the high and low-road approaches to industrial relations, similarly concludes that "companies can do well

67Kroon and Paauwe (2014).

68Pot (2018a).

69Koster (2020).

70See Koster (2020).

71Pfeffer (2018).

72Ton (2012, January–February).

73Ton (2014).

74Osterman (2018).

if they do good". Nevertheless, evidence for the proftability of the high road alternative is thinner than one hopes. While virtuous employment policies may be possible in many low-wage industries, there is scant evidence "that the 'high road' is generalizable or that it will be a viable alternative for any randomly chosen company". Osterman argues that the government should use regulations and tenders to prod employers down the high road. Former US President Barack Obama deliberately visited companies with better working conditions to boost their business while ordering federal contractors to adhere to "high-road practices".75 Osterman further advocates empowering stakeholders and trade unions to make it more diffcult for fnancial markets to insist on proft maximization.

## **7.4 A Task for Government**

If creating good work is in the interests of employers, why do so many fail to do so? Many researchers struggle with this question.76 The business literature points to numerous instances of management being unaware of the problems, of not knowing what to do, or trying but failing to transform the organization accordingly.77 In contrast, economists Dani Rodrik and Charles Sabel trace the shortage of good work to systemic failures of the market: the benefts of good work accrue more to society as a whole than to individual employers, for whom providing good work may be costly.78 In other words, good work has positive externalities and the government has a clear role to play.79

Laws and regulations to safeguard better work are advocated by the research institute affliated to the Dutch Christian Democratic Party. Its report on bringing greater certainty to the labour market claims that making fexible work more expensive – which the third Rutte government, in power since October 2017, has already done to some extent – might even fnd broad support among employers. The report refers to the "hockey helmet" mechanism, described by Thomas Schelling in 1973, who observed that most ice-hockey players at the time did not wear helmets during matches but nevertheless favoured their mandatory introduction: "They did not want to play in them voluntarily, because their peripheral vision was obstructed. But with a requirement, everyone would suffer the same disadvantage and the risk of

75Osterman (2018).

76See, for example, Pfeffer (2018).

77Presentation sheet by Steven Dhondt in 2018, based on Gibbons and Henderson (2013).

78Rodrik and Sabel (2019).

79 "If the labor market settles on an effcient outcome in which large segments of the population lack meaningful work, our response can't be to say 'thanks, understood' and then to wait for those displaced people suddenly to transform themselves into something else, or simply to give them government aid. Our response must be 'that needs to change'" (Cass, 2018: 53).

head injuries would also be limited." This may also apply to the labour market: "Employers themselves want better, fairer regulations for permanent and fexible staff. So that those who are already socially aware do not suffer any disadvantage."80 The government can ensure that frms that do the right thing are not undercut by frms that do not.

But laws and regulations to improve the quality of work are not enough; more is possible and necessary. So-called soft regulation encourages companies and institutions to focus on better work. "Economically non-optimum management styles are often tenacious in their survival", observes Frank Pot in an article on how the Dutch government, employers' organizations and trade unions previously sought to infuence technological and organizational change. The government's task is "to promote productivity, innovation and quality of life, and hence also quality of work" – which requires different forms of organization81 (see Box 2.6).

Harry Garretsen82 points out that "in view of all kinds of external effects", it is plausible that "markets left to themselves generate a suboptimum (= too low) level of innovation". Garretsen sees a role for government intervention, for "supporting companies, perhaps through pilot projects, to initiate or step up innovation aimed at achieving better, smarter management and work". To successfully apply new technologies in the life sciences, nanotechnology, AI and robotics, public policy must consider the "complementarity between hard and soft technologies; … between technological and social innovation".83

Tuomo Alasoini84 has studied the conditions under which workplace development programmes actually lead to better work in ten European and East Asian countries, including 16 projects in Finland between 2004 and 2010. He concludes that innovations in the workplace are rarely achieved through hard regulation, let alone deregulation, but through soft regulation – policy frameworks and recommendations, information on best practices, the training and education of managers and employees, advisory and consulting services, benchmarking tools, and grants and

80Siegmann (2018). Lodewijk Asscher, leader of the Dutch Labour Party, also discusses the importance of new certainties in *Opstaan in het Lloyd Hotel* ("Awakening in the Lloyd Hotel"): "For decades we have heard that it is a good thing that citizens no longer rely upon a protective government. Of course everyone knows that not all the old certainties can survive. But is it not now time for new certainties, instead of always having to manage by yourself?" (Asscher, 2019: 140). 81Pot (2019b).

82Garretsen (2019, September 26).

83See also wrr (2013a).

84Alasoini (2016).

subsidies to companies.85 The Finnish government, for instance, prioritizes new forms of workplace organization and better quality work, as do high-tech programmes in Germany.86

Better work does not come about automatically. Market failings, management styles, lack of information, insuffcient knowledge and under-resourcing can all hinder its emergence. But because societal interests – general well-being and economic productivity – are at stake, the government is justifed to step in through hard and soft regulation. For starters, this would entail working with employers' associations and trade unions to embrace the importance of good work.87 The government can also create incentives for stakeholders to reach agreements and take initiative (see Box 7.4).88 The state is also a major employer and can lead by example, prioritizing good work for its own personnel and ensuring through socially responsible procurement that public tenders are competitive not only in price, but in sustainability and compliance with quality-of-work requirements.89

85 Innovation vouchers worth €7500 distributed by drawing lots among Dutch smes in 2004 and 2005 made "a structural contribution to the advanced innovation activities of small and mediumsized enterprises" (Lemmers et al., 2019).

86Pot (2019b).

87 In *For the Sake of Security* (Kremer et al., 2017d), we highlighted Koen Caminada's suggestion that a moral appeal be made to individuals and businesses employing other people. He believes "that it is simply obvious that the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment should let the Netherlands know what a socially and morally acceptable minimum rate is. When making an agreement with a local contractor, if you then communicate that if they go below x you will enter into a contract with them, that is not ok and you are not acting morally. I think that will help" (Houweling & Sprengers, 2016: 404–405). Economist Samuel Bowles (2016) shows that standards and societal and moral preferences matter in the economy.

88See Mazzucato (2018) on the value of government and of mission-driven public policy.

89On www.pianoo.nl, a website featuring expertise on public procurement from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, we read: "Organisations that adhere to the principle of social return reach purchasing agreements with contractors concerning the creation of additional jobs, workexperience jobs or internships for people who are disadvantaged within the labour market. These include the long-term unemployed, people who are partially disabled or young people with a disability. By creating additional jobs in this way, the target group can participate according to their ability, making use of extra productivity that would otherwise remain unused. Social return is not intended to supplant existing jobs." The site provides further advice, examples and guidelines.

#### **Box 7.4 The Importance of Standards, Laws and Regulations**

What constitute normal, acceptable or just working conditions is less clear than what laws and enforcement protocols defne. This is one of the reasons why workers and their representatives must be involved in decision-making about automation90 and the organization of work.91 These are also key issues for politicians, trade unions, employers' associations, and professional organizations in areas such as education and healthcare. Legislation and regulations, collective agreements and social contracts all defne conditions and performance requirements, enforced as necessary by regulators and inspectors. What society wants to regulate and possibly restrict to guarantee the quality of work is constantly evolving, as are laws, regulations and standards.92 We need ongoing dialogue at the company, sector and national levels.

In sum, frms and institutions choose how to treat their workers; their choices are not imposed by globalization, technology or existing labour-market institutions. While good work benefts workers, the economy and society as a whole, it does not always come about on its own. There is thus a role for government (see the recommendations in Chap. 8).

## **7.5 Conclusion: Room for Choice**

"The future of work", concludes the oecd, "is in our hands and will largely depend on the policy decisions countries make.… With the right policies and institutions, the future of work can be one of more and better jobs for all."93 The fndings in this chapter support this assessment. Robots, algorithms and global competition have not eclipsed the Netherlands' ability to pursue its own priorities. Companies and institutions are able to focus on creating better work for more people.

The government can promote good-quality work both through "hard" regulation (and its enforcement) and "soft" regulation. It can create incentives for stakeholders to reach agreements and take initiative. As an employer and contracting body, the government can also lead by example, by providing better work for its own staff, by purchasing sustainably and by imposing quality-of-work requirements in its tenders.

90As long ago as 1968, the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands spoke out in favour of involving employees in automation: "It is apparent from the hearings that, in most cases, the information was provided at the time of the decision or later, and that only a few companies had consulted in advance about the automation before a particular decision was made. [In those cases] staff were engaged and so encouraged to help think about the technical innovations and the means of their implementation. In principle, the Council regards this form of consultation as the most appropriate" (quoted in Pot, 2019b).

91 de Stefano (2018); Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2017); Oeij et al. (eds.). (2017).

92awvn (2018); Kremer et al. (2017d).

93oecd (2019a).

#### **A Day at Work: The Homecare Worker**

"You shouldn't do it for the money", says 22-year-old Bouchra, wearing trainers, casual trousers and a Muslim headscarf. "It's for the heart. If I leave people happy, my day is complete." Bouchra has been a care worker for 2 years now. She ended up in the job by accident; being her mother's main care-giver, she was unable to complete her training as an administrative assistant. She started as a domestic help but is now a homecare worker.

She reaches her frst client at 7.30 am. "Home care", she says through the intercom. The door swings open. Behind it is a man in his bathrobe, with a walking frame. Bouchra has come to wash and dress him and put on his support stockings.

The man is 93 and, much to his own delight, still has full control over his mind. Almost a century, he says, "but I hope I don't make it that far". Bouchra is taken aback: "But I'll miss you!" The elderly gentleman is very pleased with Bouchra. "Some people have problems with a headscarf. They say, 'Take that thing off your head.' Incomprehensible. She's very good." Within 35 min the man is clean, dressed and sitting in the armchair in his living room. "Is there anything else I can do for you?", asks Bouchra, a cup of tea in her hand. "She always asks that now", he says. "And I always say, 'No, Bouchra, everything's just fne.'" She then explains that she is not coming tomorrow; Marja will be here instead. She will be back again on Tuesday. It does not quite seem to get through.

Bouchra rushes to her next appointment. "Clients are always upset if you're in a hurry. You should never look at the clock if they can see it." On her phone she checks who is next on her round and what she has to do for them: support stockings 15 min, washing 20 min. Her tasks and time allocations are set out in the care plan drawn up by the district nurse – the insurance company is watching. Despite repeated attempts by successive health ministers to abolish minute-by-minute registration, home care is still all about time.

Later that morning she has some crackers for lunch at the door of her fourth client, a water bottle within reach. It is now noon. "This is a quiet day", she says. This man is her last client of the morning. She rings the doorbell, but nobody comes. So she calls the client's landline. No answer. She calls the offce. No answer. She checks her phone to see if someone else has already called by. No. She looks to see if there is a contact person she can call. No-one in the system. "I'll have to report that to the offce, it's useful to have." Bouchra often fnds herself on her own in this job. Finally, a neighbour opens his door.

After much knocking at the door and ringing the bell, they fnally hear noises inside the fat. The man opens up, confused and wearing only incontinence pants. "Hello sir", Bouchra says gently. She shakes his hand. "Were you in the shower?" She stays until he is sitting comfortably at his table, has found and taken his pills and is eating a bowl of cereal. "Someone else might have just left, but I wanted to make sure everything was OK. Otherwise I wouldn't feel at peace."

This gentleman really belongs in a nursing home, says Bouchra, but there are no vacancies at the moment. Everyone is expected to live at home for as long as possible. "You have to have serious dementia to be admitted." As a result, many of her clients have multiple and complex problems. "And sometimes they're angry. Especially when I'm late. If I'm due at 9:30 but don't reach them until 10:30. Because of that they almost miss an appointment at the hospital, or their legs are completely swollen because they've been wearing their support stockings for too long." When people yell at her, Bouchra tries to stay calm. She understands their frustration. She has never been on a course on how to deal with angry clients, but she has taken one about time registration on her phone.

Bouchra's next call is not until 4.45 pm. She hates these split shifts, as do her colleagues. The rosters are tailored to the clients' wishes. It would be nice if her route suited her better and there was not such a long break in the middle of the day. But she is happy that she fnally has a permanent contract. They had promised her one after the frst year, but it never materialized. Earlier this year she asked again, and this time it came. Bouchra is very pleased about this because it gives her stability and security. It means she can fnally dream about buying a house of her own.

*About 400,000 people, mainly women, work in home care in the Netherlands. While a small proportion are qualifed nurses with a professional degree or Level 4 vocational qualifcation, the great majority are classifed as care workers, social assistance workers or domestic helps, mostly with lesser qualifcations. Their gross monthly salary is generally between €1400 and €2750, or slightly higher – up to €3300 – for graduates. The average (modal) income in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 per month, excluding holiday pay. Most homecare workers (80*%*) have a permanent contract and work part-time, although half take on extra shifts because the sector is now growing again following a period of contraction between 2012 and 2016. Absenteeism and perceived workloads are high.*

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