The next subsections will address the interaction between different actors in the 'South Holland wind energy arena' and describe transactions that influenced the outcome or, using the terminology of this thesis, the 'planning approach to wind energy'. In the South Holland case, planning decisions were divided over three levels of policy-making: the national level, the South Holland (provincial) level, and the local level*.* The South Holland arena therefore comprised three (sub)arenas: the conclusion of covenants at the local level, the review of provincial location and implementation policy and, simultaneously, the search for zoned areas for largescale (national concern) developments.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Aggregated results of interviews: participants in the South Holland planning arena

The following pages will summarize the results of interviews about the actors who participated in decision-making as part of the South Holland planning approach.

Table 3 provides a comprehensive list of parties who participated in the South Holland planning arena according to expert information and document analysis. The organisations have been categorized into 'core' and 'shell' actors and into 'planning' (yellow cells) and 'implementation' actors.

Table 3. Planning and implementation actors in South Holland, 2012-2014 Source: aggregated results of interviews

Legend:

Planning core actor

Acronyms: AD administration, CI civil society, EC economy, IM intermediary, PO politics

The findings show that actors at different levels and within several divisions of government as well as various local implementation actors were involved in the planning process. The predominance of planning actors at the national level is particularly striking. On the one hand, this mirrors the initial task of central government, which was to achieve the vertical coordination of national and provincial interests; on the other hand, it provides insights into the still highly institutionalized system of Dutch planning at the national level (see Section <IP_ADDRESS>, p. 45).

Alongside public administration officials and professionals who occupied an intermediary position (mostly consultants), several organisations representing economic interests were involved, such as the Port of Rotterdam Authority and The Netherlands Wind Energy Association (NWEA). In addition, some actors literally formed the core of the arena while others were involved to a lesser extent. Furthermore, several organisations were both 'planning' and 'implementing' actors, which means that they were involved in planning decisions and, at the same time, participated in local-level wind energy development.

In order to understand the negotiating stance of parties involved in the South Holland wind energy arena, it is necessary to detect the motives and competences that drove the ways in which parties interacted. The next text passages will be dedicated to this topic. Attention will then be paid to the generation of knowledge that supported decision-making during the planning phase of national and

provincial wind power policies. The section concludes with a graphical interpretation of the actors' positions and interactions within the South Holland planning arena.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Actors and their positions

#### National authorities

At the national level, planning authority for wind energy has been divided over two ministries, with the Ministry for Economic Affairs being responsible for the implementation of the national wind energy target. In this position, it has facilitated periodic energy agreements between various governmental levels and other key stakeholders. One important agreement in this context was the Dutch Energy Agreement (2013). The Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment, in turn, has had to facilitate a coordinated approach to the spatial planning of largescale wind energy generation. The two ministries thus shared the authority to implement wind parks at a strategic level, but their opinions clashed when considering how this authority should be applied in practice:

*At the national level, a discussion took place between two ministries: the Ministry for Economic Affairs wanted to allow the market a lot of freedom. Why, then, should it be necessary to determine exactly where these things had to be? On the other hand, there was the Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment, which stood for spatial quality. Large-scale wind parks are a national concern, and therefore, the Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment asked for a specific spatial framework.* (Expert 03, administration, 2016)

This discussion revealed an interesting power play between the two ministries. The Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment argued that clear spatial principles were necessary to approve (or reject) project applications for large-scale developments. The Ministry for Economic Affairs, on the other hand, was more concerned about market freedom.

Another bone of contention concerned what exactly was meant by 'large-scale development'. It had to be a coherent spatial development that would add up to 100 MW. However, several wind energy initiatives could be involved in a single development. Still, the threshold of 100 MW left room for interpretation about who would be responsible for which kind of development.

*The national government says: more than 100 MW is 'for us'. And then it also depends on the definition of 'wind park'. The entire Rotterdam port area has several wind parks. In fact, there are not so many national projects at all.* (Expert 01, administration, 2016)

Is the wind energy covenant of the Rotterdam port zone considered to be a 'large-scale wind park' by the national government? *Yes, possibly. Because a written agreement exists between the parties. If implementation does not go well, the national government is legally competent to intervene in this area.* (Expert 03, administration, 2016)

#### Interprovincial Association

The collective interests of the Dutch provinces are represented by the Interprovincial Association (IPO). IPO maintains close contact with the Dutch government, national authorities, and non-profit organisations; it plays an informative and guiding role during the formal policy preparation process. In this position, IPO guided the negotiation process with the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment about large-scale wind project implementation on provincial territories.

The task of IPO was to represent provincial interests within the context of two interlinked agreements with the national government. These agreements concerned the adoption of provincial wind energy targets (intended implementation) and earmarked land (intended locations). The latter concerned the preferred areas on which wind energy projects should be implemented from a provincial perspective. The former related to the intended contribution of each province to the national wind energy target. One topic of discussion was the time span during which the provinces had to implement large-scale wind projects.

*The provinces kept temporising about the finalisation of their plans. Couldn't it be moved to 2018? But the national government wanted to be on the safe side. It wanted to have all wind energy areas designated by 2016, so that a sufficient number of projects could be realised by 2020.* (Expert 03, administration, 2016)

Another IPO task concerned the alignment of provincial location policies for wind energy. As described in the previous section, these were highly different. While South Holland and several other provinces had already zoned wind energy, other provinces had to start from scratch. This means that these varied positions and plans had to be streamlined before proposing locations for large-scale wind parks to the national government.

#### South Holland authorities

Among South Holland authorities, the departments of spatial planning and the department had a decisive influence on wind energy development. In the case of wind energy, they represented the interests of landscape conservation and renewable energy.

The province of South Holland had to suggest areas for large-scale wind parks to the national government. These earmarked land areas were strongly linked to the outcome of negotiations between the national government and IPO on 'capacity distribution targets'. This again involved the risk of an increased 2020 provincial wind energy target (which until then had been an installed capacity of 720 MW).

Another issue was integrating hitherto operational wind energy zones of the *Nota Wervelender* into national policy. After all, South Holland had been mired in former agreements, which made location changes difficult. It was necessary to trade off

existing plans and local initiatives against national priorities. Thus, the adoption of a new spatial policy offered a chance to transfer as much of the burden of public resistance as possible to the national government.

*100 MW apparently could not be made to fit into the smaller zones. Thus we did not integrate them into the National Policy. I had the impression that the province of South Holland would have been glad if the national government had taken them over, for in this case the position of the province towards affected residents would have been far more comfortable.* (Expert 03, administration, 2016)

#### The Netherlands Wind Energy Association

The Netherlands Wind Energy Association (NWEA) was founded in 2005 and subsequently acquired a strong position as a representative of the interests of the wind energy sector. The organisation lobbies the Dutch government on behalf of the whole sector: manufacturers, developers, operators, and consultants. A general aim is to exert influence on national and regional policy-making. This is usually done by submitting viewpoints during participation procedures but also by carrying out consultant work for planning authorities. NWEA had previously advised South Holland concerning location choices presented in the *Nota Wervelender*.

By 2012, when the planning process for national and provincial earmarked land had started, NWEA had to fight on several front lines. Increasing local opposition considerably weakened the willingness of local authorities to implement wind projects.

*Residents living near wind turbines were the first who got organised. At that time, we were not very much inclined to do something about it. But when the smoke signals were received by local government we were told: 'but you had not communicated your plans to the neighbourhood'. This was the point when we realised that we were very vulnerable.*  (Expert 18, economy, 2016)

On the other hand, the commitment of national authorities to authorizing largescale developments in a top-down manner was not strong either. In this unfavourable context, NWEA lobbied for capacity agreements on how to distribute the national wind energy target across provincial territories and for concentrated development. The idea was that concentration, instead of dispersion, would allow more large-scale wind parks, to which the national fast-lane approval procedure could be applied. In the case of South Holland, the association refrained from interfering because the province had already adopted ambitious energy targets.

#### Affected municipalities: Rotterdam and local authorities in the Rotterdam region

Affected municipalities were local authorities that were directly involved in wind energy policy implementation. There were, however, two types of involvement, depending on whether a municipality had earmarked land on its territory, or

whether it had to deal with nearby wind power projects on the territory of a neighbouring municipality. The first type of municipality were given the option to sign covenants with the provincial government in order to gain more power in land-use decisions concerning wind energy. The scope of action of the second type was generally reduced to influencing plans by lodging complaints.

The municipality of Rotterdam belonged to the first category. The municipality agreed to two wind energy covenants: the covenant Port of Rotterdam (2009) and the covenant Rotterdam City Region (2012). This meant that Rotterdam had to deal simultaneously with two capacity growth agreements and with two sets of contractual partners.

The implementation of the 2009 agreement was mainly in the hands of the Port Authority. The 2012 agreement was a more complex arrangement, enabling the combined efforts of fifteen municipalities to coordinate wind energy development. In the context of the City Region covenant, the position of Rotterdam varied for every project, depending on whether land for development was in hands of the city or not. It comprised the organisation of the dialogue with the local residents and/or coming to an agreement with wind energy operators on, for instance, local participation and reinvestment.

#### Port of Rotterdam Authority

The Port of Rotterdam Authority acted as an intermediary between public authorities and private actors. The company is owned by the municipality of Rotterdam and the Dutch government but operates, at least where wind energy deployment is concerned, highly independently.

The covenant of 2009 launched a considerable expansion in wind energy infrastructure*.* In addition, the long-term development strategy of the Rotterdam Port – the 'Port Vision 2030' (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2011) – defined targets for renewable energy. The objectives of these two policy documents were slightly different: the covenant aimed to install 150 MW additional capacity by 2020, but did not set a total amount of MWs installed. This would include wind energy projects that were already in existence before the agreement. The Port Vision, instead, formulated an overall goal of 300 MW capacity installed by 2020.

One main task of the Port Authority is to lobby for the interests of industrial firms based in the port area. This includes preserving transport access and safety. For instance, wind turbines might damage (underground) infrastructure, disturb radar controllers or impair the value of land for industrial purposes. Other risks, however, go beyond the borders of the Rotterdam harbour. This involves keeping in good terms with neighbouring municipalities.

*I sometimes say: the Port Authority is the 'stage director' of the area. Of course, the primary focus is on the port area and its businesses, the interests of the port. Our first concern is to combine these interests. And then, we are also aware that we have a responsibility towards*

*the surrounding area. We really want to have a good relationship with the neighbouring municipalities. This again is necessary to keep developing the port. (Expert 19, economy, 2016)*

Port interests can be pushed through in allocation of land, when the Authority carries out the land transaction for a wind energy project. As most of the land is in public hands and managed by the Port Authority, the latter can essentially set the terms that a future developer has to cope with. Land is thus offered under the pretext of favourable conditions for the port.

#### Consultants

Selected consultants played a key role in the South Holland planning arena because they provided expertise that shaped, or even directed, planning choices. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that these were consultants from various fields of expertise, and that long before, several had been involved in decisions for the *Nota Wervelender* plan. The primary role of consultants was to investigate the possible drawbacks of specific planning options, thereby assisting national and provincial authorities in the decision-making process.

The organisations involved were closely associated with the authorities and ranged from advisory boards and NGOs to private companies. According to the persons interviewed, within this diverse group of consultants three groups were particularly important:

Nature and environmental organisations, on the other hand, were hardly mentioned by experts. This is indeed rather curious but says something about the knowledge that, at that time, was considered incomplete. The main emphasis in the improvement of knowledge lay on landscape-related qualitative aspects and on achieving 'a high enough MW output'. In particular, it was deemed essential to arrange wind turbines in the strongest synergy with landscape features.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Interactions between actors

The planning phase took place, as mentioned before, from 2012 to 2014. Previous actions and decisions that had been taken in connection with the *Nota Wervelender* policy were interlinked with this process. This means that the South Holland planning arena stretched not only across three levels of policy-making (from national to local) but also across two phases of planning.

#### Decision-making at national level

At national level, a task group (*kernteam*) was set up, with representatives of both ministries. The task group steered the spatial planning coordination process between Dutch provinces (represented by IPO), municipalities (represented by VNG) and national authorities.

*We had a task group with representatives of both parties. The Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment constantly involved the Ministry of Economic Affairs. […] The task group consisted of six to ten professionals from the two ministries, from fields of expertise that were relevant for wind energy: landscape architects, legal experts, … . Around these people, we organised a kind of 'shell' that consisted of even more experts.*  (Expert 03, administration, 2016)

The 'shell' refers to communication and transactions with a wider group of professionals that supported the task group with their knowledge and advice. There were two categories of involved parties:

Knowledge was exchanged between the task group and the actors named above in a semi-structured process of individual and collective meetings.

#### Decision-making at provincial level

In contrast to the wide-ranging group of actors involved in planning decisions at the national level, a comprehensive discussion was avoided in the province of South Holland. Provincial actors combined their efforts to introduce the siting areas of the *Nota Wervelender* policy into the new provincial Structure Plan. The purpose behind this was to make as few changes as possible. It is therefore necessary to pay some attention to the planning of *Nota Wervelender,* which took place during 2009-2010 in a comparatively confined setting.

*The development of the 'vision statement for wind energy sites' was an internal process inside the department of Spatial Planning and Environment. We consulted the provincial adviser for spatial planning. A wind energy firm was involved and we commissioned a number of firms to carry out detailed studies.* (Expert 01, administration, 2016)

Eventually, *Nota Wervelender* land-use decisions were largely integrated in the intended Structure Plan of the national government and provincial authority.

#### Creation of knowledge

According to interviewed experts, South Holland adopted the *Nota Wervelender*  siting areas without screening the locations through a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). The province opted to skip this procedure because it was not necessary from a legal point of view. The choice of locations was therefore based on an assessment study for the Rotterdam Port area and (in other areas) various consultant studies. Consultant work, according to interviewees, concentrated on landscape impacts, thus assessing locations mainly from a spatial-qualitative point of view and not so much from a technical/environmental point of view.

*Some landscape offices conducted research that explored possible zones for wind energy and coupled these to an indicatory amount of MW. In fact, they were taken up in the provincial Structure Plan, by location and sometimes by region. Then you arrived at as much as 800 MW, whereas our ambition was 735.5 MW. This actually means that it was taken into account at an early stage that some locations might drop out.* (Expert 06, administration, 2016)

The Port of Rotterdam Authority and the NWEA held a different opinion: energy calculations were too optimistic and they argued for extra space.

*During the creation of the regional wind energy pact we had already said: 'what you have noted down is far too optimistic, it is not possible.' They took no notice of us. Because — you see that happening again and again — one wants to write down the fantastic targets that will be achieved by wind energy, even though they are not based on realistic assumptions.*  (Expert 19, economy, 2016)

The next map (Fig. 14) shows the potential locations for wind parks (marked in green and orange) according to the port covenant analysis. The locations were part of the agreement, though taking into account 'technical and political considerations'.

A comparable, though less detailed, map of potential locations was adopted in the covenant for the Rotterdam City Region (Fig. 15). The capacities in MWs per location were estimated by these authorities and added up to, in total, 180 MW.

Figure 14. Location analysis concerning wind energy in the Rotterdam port area Figure by the author, location data from Bosch et al., 2009

Figure 15. Potential locations for wind energy in the Rotterdam city region Figure by the author, location data from *Covenant Realisatie Windenergie Stadsregio Rotterdam*, 2012

A combined technical assessment of the city region's locations did not take place. The locations were too small to accommodate national (large-scale) wind energy developments and therefore fell under provincial planning authority. Still, the expected wind energy capacities of locations in the city region were counted among South Holland's 'contribution' to the national wind energy target of 6000 MW.

In contrast to *Nota Wervelender* zones, the intended wind energy zones in the SvWOL were subjected to a Strategic Environmental Assessment. Their wind energy potential was examined by a technical advisory company possessing specialized knowledge on the environmental impact analysis of wind parks. These fairly technocratic studies eventually indicated a specific number of MWs per location. In addition, since some locations could possibly affect flood protection measures, authorities in charge of water systems gave advice on how to treat wind energy infrastructure within flood defence areas (Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment and Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2014).

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Map of the South Holland planning arena

We end this section on the Planning arena with an actor map of the constellation of participants (Fig. 16). This summarizes the information presented in previous subsections and shows the positions of planning and implementation actors according to the five relevant actor dimensions and three spatial-organisational levels. Connecting lines between different actors symbolize interactions between them.

Figure 16. Actor map of the South Holland planning arena, positions and interactions of participants

The black lines relate to the intensity of interactions between different participants. Figure by the author

The figure shows that a striking number of national-level actors actively participated in the South Holland planning process. This mirrors the planning task of interweaving national and provincial interests into land earmarked for largescale wind energy development. Furthermore, we can single out several parties, who organised the reconciliation of interests between planning and implementing actors, between different levels of government (vertical coordination), and between the sectoral goals pursued by energy and spatial planning authorities (horizontal coordination). These were:

## 3.1.4 Planning approach

The main components of the South Holland planning agenda for wind energy were formalized by three policies. These were (in chronological order): the national-level stipulations in the Energy Agreement (*Energieakkord*, 2013) and the Structure Plan for Onshore Wind Energy *(SvWOL* or *Structuurvisie Wind Op Land, 2014)* and, one level below, the implementation rules of the provincial Structure Plan (*VRM* or *Visie Ruimte en Mobiliteit*, 2014). These plans and agreements formally confirmed the intention of South Holland to strive for the implementation of the national wind energy target on earmarked land.

Table 4 presents the components, or planning decisions,<sup>18</sup> of these plans in greater detail. In keeping with our theoretical framework, the table differentiates between the *spatial strategy* (rules governing location choice) and the *implementation strategy* (rules governing implementation). For example, an agreed wind energy target or preferred land-use mixes were stipulated in the spatial strategy. Requirements that belong to the implementation strategy centre on practices that would support wind energy initiatives and enhance public support.

<sup>18</sup> Stipulations do not necessarily have to be new. In fact, the South Holland planning approach includes 'unchanged' (conditional) rules and regulations.

Furthermore, attention is paid to the planning *options* that were considered during the decision-making process. For analytical purposes, it is indicated whether these options relate to economic (E), territorial (T), social (S) or governance issues (G). This will help later on to summarize the priorities of the planning approach in each case study. Section <IP_ADDRESS>, where the main findings of the three cases will be summarized, will reflect on the total set of available options for all case studies.

Table 4. South Holland planning approach to wind power 2014: planning decisions and levels of policy making

The table presents compulsory planning requirements at all three spatialorganisational levels (macro, meso, and micro), whereby decisions at macro level clearly dominate. Zoned areas for wind energy were enacted at every level: national areas for large-scale development (SvWOL zones) overrule provincial zones for wind energy (VRM areas) which, in turn, overrule municipal and intermunicipal plans.

One characteristic of the planning approach is that it contained fairly specific compulsory requirements concerning the economic task of earmarking enough land to achieve wind energy targets. Capacity growth agreements that would guarantee the promotion of the 2020 wind energy target were concluded in a topdown manner; the national target was divided into provincial targets and these, in turn, were subdivided into local targets for selected areas.

In contrast, compulsory planning requirements related to implementation, in particular the issue of local participation and compensation, were rather noncommittal. More attention was paid to creating commitment within local government to a timely implementation of zones for wind energy generation. Topdown approval of wind turbines needed to be avoided. The VRM explicitly stated that the province preferred to transfer approval competences to local authorities.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Spatial strategy: preserving open green landscapes by bundling wind parks and other infrastructure

The VRM spatial strategy allocating wind energy projects is chiefly composed of earlier decisions published in *Nota Wervelender*. The siting areas that had been adopted then were, in essence, re-adopted as VRM wind energy zones. Strategic land-use choices pursued the territorial goal of concentrating wind park sites on, or in close vicinity to, industrial and transport infrastructures.

However, one main difference with the previous policy was that the VRM constituted a comprehensive scheme for various kinds of spatial developments, whereas the *Nota Wervelender,* like the SvWOL, dealt with wind energy alone. In consequence, the forty pages of *Nota Wervelender* were reduced to two brief sections on 'wind energy' in the VRM. Thereby, although it adopted practically the same locations, the VRM neglected the wider spatial framework of *Nota Wervelender*, its social considerations of landscape aesthetics and terms for protection, and its safeguards for negative zones. As a result, former 'safeguarded areas' became part of the undefined area outside of VRM zones for wind energy. Although wind energy developments on formerly safeguarded areas were thereby still prohibited, the VRM was based on merely one side of the landscape narrative: the limited logics of 'where can it go' instead of the approach combining positive and negative land-use criteria.

*The exclusion principles (…) are actually still part of the provincial Structure Plan, but the framing, or wording, is different. The positive zones were more or less taken over, but the negative part, the safeguarded areas, was left out.* (Expert 06, administration, 2016)

In addition to the decision to reduce *Nota Wervelender* earmarked land to positive zones, the VRM contained compulsory planning requirements to build wind turbines in such a way that they would improve the visual experience of landscapes. Both VRM and SvWOL paid particular attention to the social concern of 'landscape scenery' and stipulated setting up wind turbines in an orderly, compact way and at a respectable distance from the next development.

Considering the dimensions and scale of the latest generation of wind turbines, other elements in the landscape, such as tree-lined avenues, villages, and even rivers, seem to shrink beside a large-scale wind park. It is therefore essential – as suggested by Feddes, the national landscape adviser – to achieve intelligibility by arranging the park in such a way that it connects to a spatial pattern involving a larger scale. An additional factor that strongly influences the perception of an energy landscape is the internal positioning of wind turbines and the distance between wind parks.

(Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment and Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2014, p. 28)

From an economic point of view, a main goal was to obtain a sufficient amount of land for wind energy. The Dutch Energy Agreement had set a target of 735.5 MW by 2020 on South Holland territory, which was slightly more than the previous target (720 MW). Nevertheless, as confirmed in the interview quote below, VRM land requirements for wind energy were altogether less expansive than the former siting areas.

*Changes after the VRM were marginal. It was not an important topic during the planning process for the Structure Plan, but it had been a lot more important for the old vision.* (Expert 01, administration, 2016)

Most of the provincial target was to be achieved in two zoned areas: the Port of Rotterdam and the island municipality of Goeree-Overflakkee. The SvWOL designated these territories as 'zones for large-scale wind energy development' (Fig. 18). Together, the two (SVWOL) zones would guarantee about two thirds (525 MW) of the provincial target. The remaining energy target (201.5 MW) would be allocated to smaller zoned areas distributed over South Holland. Many of these zones lay in the southern part of the province, in the surroundings of the municipalities of Rotterdam and Dordrecht (Fig. 17).

Figure 17. Wind energy zones in the South Holland Structure Plan (VRM) of 2014 Figure by the author, location data from Province of South Holland, 2014

Figure 18. National Structure Plan for Onshore Wind Energy (SvWOL) of 2014 Retrieved from Evers, Nabielek and Tennekes, 2019, p. 65. Copyright by PBL, 2019, *Wind-on-land*: *lessons and experiences.* The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Implementation strategy

Next to compulsory spatial rules, the VRM and SvWOL plans contained a set of requirements guiding the implementation process. The overall objective of the provincial and national governments was a 'maximum implementation of zones for wind energy' (Province of South Holland, 2014a, p. 78). This was promoted by the fact that provinces and national government had the power to license wind parks top-down.

The VRM responded to this (conditional) rule in a more nuanced way and specified the conditions under which South Holland would exercise its authority to approve wind parks. It announced that the province intended to take up a monitoring rather than an executive role. If local authorities did 'want to collaborate' (Province of South Holland, 2014a, p. 78), the province would transfer its competence to take land-use decisions to lower levels of government.

*If a promoter wants to develop a location that is part of the provincial Structure Plan, the province can always make use of its authority. Even if the affected municipality does not agree with wind energy development. But in cases where the municipality does agree, then, please, do it by yourself!* (Expert 06, administration, 2016)

South Holland thus followed its chosen course, namely avoiding top-down decision-making and building up the commitment of municipalities. Commitment would be secured in the established way, i.e. by signing wind energy covenants. But since the wind energy issue was urgent, a date was set by which local government could make up their minds. If municipalities submitted proposals for wind energy locations in local development plans by 31 December 2015, the province would refrain from taking executive action. In this context, municipalities could, if necessary, slightly adjust zone boundaries according to local conditions (Province of South Holland, 2014b).

In addition, though rather vaguely, the VRM contained stipulations concerning local participation in wind energy development. Wind turbine operators were expected to create opportunities for financial participation and compensation for the 'direct environment' (Province of South Holland, 2014a, p. 78) of wind turbines. The SvWOL, too, stressed the importance of public support and participation, and announced that it would facilitate planning participation by 'mapping local interests' (Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment and Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2014, p. 28); but it refrained from issuing rules concerning financial compensation: this should be left to market players.

In the Energy Agreement, it is assumed that a fair distribution of gains and losses (compensation and participation) between developers and the local community is essential to increase support. The developers of wind energy project (associated in the NWEA) committed themselves to organising support by actively involving the local community. (Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment and Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2014, p. 28)

## 3.1.5 Effectiveness

This final part of the Dutch case study will discuss the statements of interviewees about the 'effectiveness' of the planning approach.

Table 5 summarizes the main planning decisions; it presents desired and undesired, intended and unintended effects.

Table 5. Desired and undesired/intended and unintended effects of South Holland planning decisions

Source: aggregated results of interviews Note: *Expected* effects are indicated as (x)

The effects presented in the table above relate to the spatial and implementation strategies used in the South Holland approach. The detailed compulsory requirements concerning both parts of the regional planning approach to wind energy were described in the previous section. In the following passages, the effects observed and/or expected by interviewed experts will be examined carefully and related to the overall objectives: a sufficient amount of land for wind energy, resource-aware treatment of land, social acceptance, timely implementation, and local benefits.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Restored growth, insufficient amount of land: desired and undesired effects of spatial decisions

Concerning the economic goal of producing 735.5 MW by 2020, implementation so far has turned out below expectations. Although the annual capacity installed has increased, the amount of earmarked land proved to be insufficient. Only one year after the adoption of the VRM zones for wind energy, South Holland started to search for alternative locations. As a result, implementation was delayed or halted. The formal process involved in revising a provincial Structure Plan requires more than one year. Under these circumstances, the RVO (2017, p. 36) considered it very unlikely that the 2020 target would be met on time. There was uncertainty around an installed capacity of approximately 200 MW<sup>19</sup> – more than a fourth of the overall provincial target.

Interviewees, however, observed some differences in the implementation process between SvWOL zones and other (provincial) zones. There is a consensus among experts that the targets of the two SvWOL zones (the Port of Rotterdam and Goeree-Overflakkee) will be – albeit with some delay – met. On these zones, one unintended but positive effect was that the territorial strategy of concentrated development on large-scale areas had compelled authorities (national, provincial and local) to coordinate their action with implementation parties (landowners, local authorities, developers). The confined setting helped achieve the preferred wind turbines set-up, i.e. compact.

A real shortage of space was encountered in smaller (provincial) zones. Most problems were situated in the Rotterdam area, where the implementation of the 150 MW city-region wind energy covenant had stalled. Here, according to interviewed experts, development was severely limited by unforeseen 'technical constraints'.

<sup>19</sup> By the end of 2015, 335 MW wind energy capacity had been installed. This is equivalent to 46 per cent of the province's 2020 target. Of the remaining 54 per cent (323,6 MW), a large-scale wind park of more than 100 MW in the Rotterdam port area is still expected to be completed on time (RVO, 2017).

One unintended consequence of the search for new sites was that it might require abandoning the landscape narrative, which protected open green landscapes. At the time when interviews were conducted, potential 'alternative' zones were located in previous safeguarded areas. In this context, interview partners argued that this might have a domino effect on South Holland's credibility in the field of spatial planning:

*Officially and legally our negative zones are now missing. If there are upcoming new locations we have to accommodate them, even if they do not fit in with the current spatial guidelines. It gives the impression that the province randomly selects locations. (*Expert 01, administration, 2016)

As regards the social goal (selecting accepted locations), experts considered that the land use combination of wind farms with industry and infrastructure was rather successful. In particular, this relates to support by wind energy operators for the chosen zoned areas. In contrast, experts had to admit that a sufficient level of acceptance by the local population had not been reached. The VRM and SvWOL zones – though complex locations from a functional (programmatic) point of view – may have fitted in with the general interests of market players and higher-tier authorities; but they directly bordered on residential neighbourhoods and recreational areas. According to interviewees, many projects in the Rotterdam Port zone were seriously constrained by the resistance of local residents in neighbouring communities.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Vanishing partner, domino effect on consensus: desired and undesired effects of implementation rules

Figure 19. Wind energy implementation in Rotterdam harbour Photograph taken by the author

The implementation strategy that consisted of concluding wind energy covenants with local authorities had diverging effects, at least in the opinion of the experts interviewed. On the whole, positive experiences outweighed negative (undesired) ones. At the time when the interviews were conducted, three (out of the planned four) pacts had been enacted: the Port of Rotterdam, the Rotterdam City Region, and the municipality of Goeree-Overflakkee. In the Port of Rotterdam and Goeree-Overflakkee the covenants had succeeded in creating pressure to achieve 'maximum development':

*There is indeed no formal obligation; in the sense of 'if it's not possible, then don't do it'. It is an ambition, a commitment to make the effort. But the political side exerts dreadful pressure to achieve the Convenant goals. Because we have become so attached to fulfilling our ambitions.* (Expert 19, economy, 2016)

The Port of Rotterdam Authority and Goeree-Overflakkee facilitated coordination between public and private partners quite differently. While the Port Authority focused on the interests of the port industry, Goeree-Overflakkee was more

focused on the interests of local residents; it promoted local economic benefits, public participation, and compensation by labelling itself an 'energy island'.

In the region of Rotterdam, an important institutional change seriously affected implementation, indeed delaying it. The regional authority (Rotterdam City Region) was abolished in 2015 and thus one of the most important covenant partners of the province vanished*.* <sup>20</sup> The absence of leadership caused local government to draw back from wind energy promotion and earmarking local land. Consequently, the provincial authority had to take over a politically sensitive discussion: if zones fell away, which municipalities would take the blame and accommodate alternative locations so that the provincial energy target could still be achieved?

*Now we have to search again for locations. What if these new locations lay within our municipal borders, do we then have to install 380 instead of 350 MW?* (Expert 05, politics, 2016)

The success of the intermunicipal wind energy covenant was thus highly constrained by changes in local and political opinions about wind energy development. In addition, experiences involving the Rotterdam City Region showed that the covenant strategy was rather inflexible if cooperation failed and a 'plan B' was needed.

In comparison, the national government's top-down approach as regards the location choice for large-scale wind parks succeeded in developing 'difficult' locations despite local disputes. So far, however, there is no wind energy project in South Holland that reaches the threshold for national involvement (100 MW). Experience gained with planned large-scale project 'Maasvlakte 2' shows that the threshold rule may lead to a shifting of responsibilities: Maasvlakte 2 changed in size during the planning process and, consequently, the authority in charge of approval oscillated between the national and provincial levels, creating uncertain conditions concerning the division of responsibility.

The last strategic choice discussed in this section relates to provincial stipulations concerning local participation and compensation. The statements of experts showed hardly any correlation as regards the way in which operators had organised communication and participation in South Holland's zones for wind energy. Local compensation and participation succeeded in some selected projects, but that was not the result of provincial or national rules; rather, it greatly depended on the willingness of the developer concerned and the demands of the local (approving) authority that were issued during a project's planning.

<sup>20</sup> Partner responsible for implementation of the city region's wind energy covenant (Convenant Wind Energie Stadsregio Rotterdam). See section on conditions, Table 2.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Effects of planning arena transactions: insufficient knowledge about spatial constraints

A couple of statements by interviewed experts addressed the effects of transactions between actors during the planning phase of *Nota Wervelender*. At that time, zones for wind energy were defined within a confined group of professionals. 'Non-experts', especially local implementation actors, were largely absent from decision-making.

The impact of this was twofold: economic experts stated that, by defining zoned areas in a top-down way, wind energy developers were treated as 'the big bad wolf' that had come to destroy an environment valued by the local population. Moreover, implementation actors' (e.g. affected municipalities and local population) restricted access to planning decisions resulted in a lack of knowledge concerning local motives for opposing or embracing wind energy development.

## 3.1.6 Conclusions

The wind energy planning approach of the Dutch province of South Holland was essentially based on considerations of landscape aesthetics. The approach was adopted in 2014 and framed by a landscape narrative that focused on the spatial orchestration of wind parks according to the provincial wind energy target of 735.5 MW installed capacity by 2020. The expectation was that a compelling narrative integrating wind energy growth and the main characteristics of the Dutch landscape would provide spatial focus and enjoy public support.

Hence, the South Holland planning approach was spatial-geographic, i.e. based on specifying the geographical setting in which it would be desirable to install wind turbines. Preferred areas were large-scale industrial sites and transport infrastructure, as well as transition areas between water and land. In the course of the planning process, however, provincial zones for wind energy were introduced into a national spatial plan for large-scale wind energy implementation and, as a result, the province had to abandon the wider spatial framework for safeguarded landscapes.

#### Planning approach: national and provincial zones, covenants with local partners

The South Holland zones for wind energy were identified by combining positive (allocation) criteria (with provisos for protection) with negative (exclusion) criteria functioning as safeguards. The criteria were based on two main considerations: the promotion of wind energy in areas 'where we would want it' versus the safeguarding of landscape 'where it would be unacceptable'. Local technical and societal constraints were not considered at the very first stage in order to avoid early showstoppers. Rather, the landscape narrative was created as a generic planning launch pad based on the expectation that conflict levels around wind energy would be low in industrial environments and in transition zones between agricultural land,

natural areas, waterbodies, transport infrastructure, and urban areas. This resulted in distinctive domains of planned spatial aesthetics: large-scale concentrations of wind parks and smaller locations distributed across the provincial territory.

The distribution of power in Dutch spatial planning enabled the province of South Holland, and partly also the national government, to overrule local land-use plans if these concerned projects of more than 5 MW (two large wind turbines). This, however, could lead to a rather tense political climate between province and municipalities. The province therefore sought to achieve an optimum understanding with local communities by using the agreed wind energy covenant as an instrument enabling local communities and other parties to arrive at mutually agreed location decisions.

The covenants are rather economics-oriented and nail down a specific unit size in megawatts to be reached by 2020 in the targeted zone. In exchange, the authority to approve wind parks is delegated to the local authority in the affected town or village. However, in case of obstruction and non-cooperation, the province can resort to top-down licensing and approval processes, but this is only used to avoid complete standstill.

The wind energy covenant is usually an agreement between main stakeholders within public administration; beyond this instrument, the South Holland planning approach provides little guidance concerning local participation and compensation. Exact terms for the involvement of the population in areas surrounding wind energy zones were largely left to the wind energy developer and local authority involved.

#### Conditions before 2014: government discourse and stagnating growth

From the perspective of the Dutch wind energy sector, renewable energy growth in the Netherlands was long hampered by a piecemeal approach to national spatial planning, which allowed Dutch provinces to adopt a wait-and-see attitude as regards wind parks. Whilst the national government strove to achieve consensus on the siting of large projects, development was delayed by negotiations between the Dutch state and its provinces for several years.

The province of South Holland, in contrast, had already adopted a proactive approach to wind energy. Nevertheless, the sector's growth was painfully slow. By introducing a 2020 wind energy target that entailed tripling the installed capacity of 2009, the province had manoeuvred itself into a precarious position. There was an urgent need for a comprehensive spatial planning scheme that would reach a compromise between the ambitious renewable energy goal and the very constraining implementation conditions in one of the most densely populated regions of Europe. The province finally decided in favour of positive zones and adopted a corresponding spatial policy in 2011.

From a governance point of view, the province of South Holland could exert substantial influence on wind energy decisions through top-down planning. The Dutch Electricity Act apportioned permit-giving powers concerning wind energy developments according to project size: each administrative level was responsible for a specific output range (expressed in megawatts): the national government had to facilitate project proposals concerning an installed capacity of at least 100 MW; the twelve Dutch provinces were responsible for wind parks of 5 to 99 MW. Local authorities, at least from a formal point of view, could thus hardly influence largescale developments.

#### Planning arena: national government dominates spatial decisions

The South Holland wind energy arena was largely characterized by internal discussions between different levels and sectors of government, in particular between national government and Dutch provinces, and between the ministries in charge of spatial and energy policies. The Dutch government attained a dominant position in the decision-making process when it decided to establish a national spatial planning policy for large-scale wind parks in 2012. At the national level, the main interest was to create stable conditions for the implementation of the national wind energy target. In consequence, each province had to provide the relevant surface area to meet an agreed wind power sub-target. What followed was an intensive discussion at national level between policy-making bodies, consultants, and market players.

Following the launch of the national government's wind park policy in 2012, the province of South Holland had to adjust its own spatial policy, which had only come into force a little more than one year before. During this process, most of the adopted positive zones were kept, since the province was bound to wind energy covenants that had been concluded with local authorities. However, two elements of the landscape narrative — negative zones and the wider spatial framework for safeguarded landscapes — were abandoned.

#### Effects of planning decisions after 2014: scarce land, insufficient growth

The South Holland landscape narrative has widely safeguarded polder areas from wind turbine blight, while achieving strong development on industrial land and along coastal areas. By 2017, however, the implementation of the South Holland 2020 wind energy target was seriously delayed and it became clear that significantly fewer wind turbines than expected could be installed in wind energy zones. The province of South Holland had recognized the limits of the chosen spatial strategy in terms of wind power output and announced a revision of selected zones.

The major roadblock to achieving the original goals were unforeseen spatial constraints in established smaller zones that largely fell under the jurisdiction of the province. In contrast, large-scale development in national zones for wind energy, the Rotterdam harbour, and the island Goeree-Overflakkee, was more promising. The planned adjustment of the South Holland planning approach to wind energy will then likely lead to less stringent criteria for conserving valuable landscapes.

Expectations concerning the influence of the landscape narrative on public support for wind energy were also disappointed. In particular, unexpected resistance came from the communities surrounding the Rotterdam harbour. One point of contention was the erection of wind power generators on the harbour boundaries, directly bordering on residential neighbourhoods. Furthermore, there was increasing local political opposition in the greater Rotterdam region, notwithstanding that the communities in question had already signed a covenant to implement designated wind energy zones. The prescribed land-use criteria, however, were largely supported by market players, spatial and landscape planning professionals, and nature and environmental NGOs.

Despite disappointing developments in the Rotterdam region, the covenant as an instrument had powerfully influenced the implementation of other zoned areas. Interview responses indicate that although the covenants were declarations of intent rather than legally-binding contracts, the political pressure to reach set targets was high.

Wind energy covenants, however, became a barrier when South Holland decided to search for alternative locations. Territorial bargaining for a lower MW output has occasionally started between the various involved partners and public authorities. This is particularly the case when a regional development scheme is missing and discussions on alternative locations have come to a grinding halt. The interviewed experts blamed the technocratic approach by which agreements were established in terms of MW output to be reached by 2020. The wind energy pact strategy is therefore strongly dependent on the organisational structure, the authority, and the assertiveness of the involved partners. This worked well with the Port of Rotterdam Authority, which manages the harbour area independently, but less so with regional partners.

The South Holland decision to leave standards of local compensation and participation to market players and local authorities resulted in substantial differences in the quality of environmental management and the size of local participation. In the worst case, inadequate communication of projected plans to the neighbouring population led to residents lodging damage claims and to serious damage to the image of the municipality involved in the licensing process.

#### Drivers and barriers: planning arena and knowledge

The South Holland zoning strategy facilitated the preparation of coordinated plans by wind energy developers and the compact siting of wind turbines. An essential parameter was the area size of a wind energy zone; for instance, the large-scale zones of the Rotterdam harbour area and the Goeree-Overflakkee island provided more room to define the detailed location of a wind energy project than smaller (provincial) zones. Furthermore, the establishment of regional wind energy pacts was an essential driver for the achievement of energy targets. This, again, was especially the case as regards the Rotterdam harbour zone and the Goeree-Overflakkee island.

Drivers within the planning arena are related to the chosen type of interaction between planning participants and the generation of knowledge to support spatial decisions. At a national level, one important driver of wind energy decisions was the emphasis on 'a wide discussion' between planning and implementation actors. The planning arena, however, largely prevented non-professional actors, such as residents and municipalities, from having a say in wind energy issues.

One factor that had a negative influence (barrier) on the implementation of the South Holland wind power policy was the somewhat negligent generation of knowledge during the planning phase. The province based its land-use decisions on limited knowledge concerning local land-use constraints, having taken the decision *not* to screen the wind energy resources of selected zones through a strategic environmental assessment.

In this context, a wider implication of the approved positive zones was that zoning started to hinder, rather than promote medium-term wind power growth, when the provincial authority announced it was searching for alternative locations. The formal procedure to review the areas concerned was to last at least two years. By zoning wind energy, the province had created expectations among local authorities and residents about places where wind energy was not allowed. Besides, wind energy covenants had largely set the amount of MWs to be installed in the relevant areas. In this regard, the province clearly missed the spatial guidelines of the previous (abolished) policy that had also endorsed negative zones. These guidelines would have provided the necessary assessment criteria and arguments in the discussion about alternative locations.

Concerning local support for wind energy, one last main barrier was the top-down planning approach, which created little opportunity for affected residents to participate and state their opinions. Furthermore, local participation and compensation (e.g. benefiting from a share in a wind energy project) largely depended on the willingness of the wind park developer at the implementation stage.

## 3.2 Zoning wind energy through generic rules: the case of Lower Austria (Austria)

## 3.2.1 Introduction

Austria became a forerunner in the installation of renewable energy supplies thanks to favourable conditions for hydropower and the early cancellation of nuclear energy plans. In 2009, the Austrian government adopted a wind energy target of 3000 MW by 2020 provided that 'enough sites are available' (GEA, 2012). At that time, the country already had an installed capacity of 1000 MW. However, the issue of site availability for some 700<sup>21</sup> additional wind turbines had never been investigated properly. Political agreement on wind park allocation at the national level did not exist — the national government refrained from intervening in the wind energy plans of the country's nine states. In consequence, regional wind power planning policies varied considerably between states, from fairly restrictive to pro-active, supportive approaches.

The state of Lower Austria belonged to the latter category: it supported wind energy. The state government had adopted an ambitious energy roadmap that set a goal of 1900 MW installed wind energy capacity by 2020 and 3200 MW by 2030 (Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2011). Lower Austria would thus implement almost two-thirds of the national 2020 wind energy target.

Pro-active support for wind energy resulted from a long-standing tradition. Ever since the *Hainburg Movement<sup>22</sup>* of 1984, the state had set its sights on wind energy. At that time, large-scale hydro energy projects had become increasingly unpopular and, clearly, the time was ripe for wind. Former *Hainburg* activists founded pioneering wind energy companies that were co-owned and co-financed by local residents. These early energy cooperative ventures grew into mediumsized firms and became the main employers in parts of the state that were structurally lagging behind.

At the beginning of the 2000s, wind energy was hardly viewed as a national or state spatial planning issue: the main responsibility for spatial decisions was placed on local government. This changed when considerable dissent about land use grew at the local level. The rapidly developing sector, supported by government subsidies, created an overflow of project applications in regions with favourable wind conditions and, along with it, impacts that exceeded the scope of local planning. Increasingly higher wind turbines in one municipality started to hinder

<sup>21</sup> Own estimation.

<sup>22</sup> In Hainburg, environmental activists prevented the construction of a large hydro energy plant in the floodplains of the river Danube. This is seen as one of the most important environmental movements in Austria, since it placed landscape values above green energy supply.

other forms of development in neighbouring municipalities. The adjacent state of Burgenland, which was experiencing a similar wind rush, took a pro-active attitude in spatial planning and introduced zoned areas.

The state of Lower Austria, in contrast, continued to favour municipal autonomy in wind energy decisions. Sporadic spatial planning efforts to zone wind power in the form of *kleinregionale Konzepte* (microregional schemes) were not approved by the state government. Zoning would exclude a number of municipalities from the fair chance to profit from wind energy, i.e. financial contributions by operators for the use of local infrastructure, which provided a steady income. Consequently, instead of adopting zoned areas, as in Burgenland, the state of Lower Austria decided to enact strict minimum distances from residential areas. This strategic choice would enable local authorities to expand these areas undisturbed by nearby wind turbines.

One unintended effect of the new policy was that wind energy increasingly clashed with nature and landscape protection interests. Innovations in wind turbine technology made it possible to generate wind energy in hitherto untouched areas, such as Alpine areas and forests in the eastern and northern parts of the state. A second effect was that developers were courting local politicians instead of competing for sites that were suitable from a higher-tier point of view (as was the case in Burgenland). This caused heated local political discussions about the municipal 'business case' for wind energy.

By 2013, wind energy turbines had spread to Radlbrunn, the hometown of Lower Austria's state governor, and thereby also entered the spatial planning agenda of the state government. Public criticism of the liberal spatial policy was hanging like a dark cloud over forthcoming state elections. At that time, some 300 wind turbines (700 MW) had already been installed and haphazard development affected large parts of the Lower Austrian landscape. Municipalities were divided into two camps. Community polls — whether residents were mainly 'against' or 'for' wind power — became common practice. In addition, environmental protection organisations — such as the national bird agency (Birdlife Austria) were filing complaints in the course of approval procedures. In 2013, to calm things down, the Lower Austrian government finally enacted a temporary stop to the licensing of projects and announced the creation of zoned areas for wind energy.

The decision to zone wind energy led to a paradigm shift in spatial planning for wind energy in the state of Lower Austria and radically changed development conditions. The following sections of this chapter will discuss the emergence and impact of the Lower Austrian planning approach, using a structure similar to that applied in the previous case study.

The first part (Section 3.2.2) will introduce the 'conditions', i.e. the factors that significantly influenced spatial decisions concerning wind energy. The presented evidence is based on interview data and complemented by document analysis. The subsequent part (Section 3.2.3) will focus on interaction between the main participants within the Lower Austrian wind energy planning and implementation arena. The third and fourth part (Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5) will discuss the components of the Lower Austrian planning approach and the effectiveness of planning decisions related to wind energy. The conclusions of each sub-question will be summarized in the final part of this chapter.

## 3.2.2 Conditions

This section outlines the factors that influenced spatial decisions concerning wind energy in Lower Austria. The findings are based on insights gained from expert interviews; these were verified and complemented by written evidence collected during document analysis, including strategic policy papers, announcements in the Austrian media or the position papers of interest groups.

The findings from the document analysis were arranged in chronological order to identify the main events related to wind energy within Lower Austrian spatial planning. These events were then compared to the wind energy implementation process and to future growth targets, expressed in: annual growth of MW capacity installed (in Lower Austria and Austria) and the 2020 targets of the state and the national government. This exercise was summarized in the 'timeline' of Lower Austrian wind energy planning and implementation (Fig. 20).

Figure 20. Wind energy growth and planning phases in Lower Austria Figure by the author, wind energy data from: Austrian Wind Energy Association 2014; 2016; 2017; Office of the State Government of Lower Austria 2011; 2014a

The reconstruction of the timeline reveals two important wind power-related events in Lower Austrian spatial planning. The first (2002-2003) concerned the creation of minimum distances between wind turbines and wind-vulnerable landuse categories. This so-called 'distance regulation' was adopted through an amendment of the Lower Austrian Spatial Planning Act*.* Ten years later, a second planning period (2013-2014) earmarked land (or positive zones) for wind energy that were formalized by the Lower Austrian Sectoral Spatial Planning Ordinance for Wind Energy Utilization (*Sek ROP Wind*) of 2014. The planning phases for both

policy changes were remarkably brief (one year), considering that the surface area of Lower Austria is by far the largest of all our three case studies<sup>23</sup> .

Meanwhile (2004-2015) wind energy implementation in Lower Austria oscillated between vigorous and slow growth rates. It had been very successful: by 2015, the *Bundesland* provided roughly 40 per cent (Austrian Wind Energy Association, 2016) of the 2020 Austrian wind energy target (3000 MW). In particular, growth spurts took place during 2006 and 2007 (two years after the first planning phase), and during 2013 and 2015 (during/shortly after the second planning phase).

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Aggregated results of document analysis: developments in spatial and energy planning in Austria and Lower Austria before 2014

#### National context

The Austrian state has three levels of government: the national level, the *Bundesländer* (states), and the municipalities. The federal constitution assigns responsibility for local planning to municipalities. Under the constitution, however, other aspects of planning remain unmentioned. Thus wind energy — just like other Austrian spatial planning issues — falls mainly under the responsibility of the nine Austrian states and their many municipalities (OECD, 2017).

Although the national government lacks formal authority to govern spatial planning, it has managed to exert substantial influence on wind energy development. For instance, it has approved national laws and launched plans in the fields of nature protection and aviation that affect the spatial distribution of wind energy projects. The national government has also approved financial support schemes that promote the generation of renewable energy. The most powerful law in this respect is the Austrian Green Electricity Act (GEA), adopted in 2012, which launched a significant expansion of wind energy. This concerned 2000 MW capacity, in addition to the already operational Austrian capacity of 1000 MW (2012). The (brief) stipulations related to wind energy are as follows:

Wind power: 2000 MW (corresponds to an additional average annual green electricity generation of approx. 4 TWh) provided that sites are available (GEA, 2012).

Site availability is the only reference within the document to potential spatial constraints that might develop from tripling the wind energy capacity installed. There has been no initiative at the national level to secure enough space for wind energy generation. Nevertheless, the GEA and its predecessors implicitly involved far-reaching spatial impacts. It maintained the existing mode of financial support (feed-in tariff or FIT) and established a stable framework for wind energy growth through to 2020 (Maringer and Krenn, 2015).

<sup>23</sup> Roughly 19 km2, or more than 6 times larger than the South Holland (2.8 km2) and East Flanders (3 km2) case studies.

In addition to sectoral laws driving wind energy implementation, there was also an attempt to achieve vertical coordination in spatial planning. Indeed the national government is a key actor of the ÖROK institution: the *Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning*. ÖROK can be described as a mechanism that enables collaborative efforts by national, state, and local planning actors (OECD, 2017). In this capacity, the ÖROK issues the ÖREK *Austrian Spatial Development Schemes* every ten years; these are '*primarily a voluntary agreement*' on medium-term '*scopes of action*' (ÖROK, 2011a). The ÖREKs are collectively drawn up by representatives of the three levels of government, as well as by business and civil society associations.

The most recent version of the ÖREK strategic documents addressed the long-term goal of energy self-sufficiency. It emphasised the task of securing land for renewable energy production and distribution:

The generation of electric power by hydropower plants and wind farms as well as the use of solar power (…) require provisions in spatial planning. Taking environmental criteria into account, suitable locations for wind farms (…) are to be identified in order to achieve the expansion of renewable energy generation. (Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning, 2011a)

The ÖREK recommended the creation of positive zones for renewable energy but it did not specify which land-use combinations would be suitable from a supraregional point of view. Instead, it referred to the planning approach of the Austrian state of Burgenland (2010) as a good practice:

'It has reduced the assessment efforts of regional and local authorities and, at the same time, has increased the planning security for wind park operators.' (Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning, 2011b)

Burgenland has adopted *Eignungszonen* (suitable zones) for wind energy and has created integrated regional schemes for wind parks since 2002. Thus the state has been a pioneer in comprehensive planning for wind energy. At that time, regulatory frameworks in most Austrian states were very restrictive (see Table 6). Five out of nine states had adopted spatial policies, but these rules did not necessarily promote wind energy. In fact, most Austrian states had neither defined wind energy targets, nor completed a large number of projects.

Table 6. Overview of spatial planning policies concerning wind energy in Austrian states, 2013 Sources: Office of State Government of Burgenland, 2012; Felber and Stöglehner, 2014; Office of State Government of Upper Austria, 2014; Austrian Wind Energy Association, 2014.

\*relates to the distance between wind turbines and permanently inhabited areas; the exact definition of wind-vulnerable residential use varies across the nine Austrian states.

\*\* Vienna has much fewer opportunities for development in comparison to other states. It is by far the smallest state in surface size and the most densely populated one.

#### Energy and spatial policy in the state of Lower Austria

Like its neighbour Burgenland, the state of Lower Austria has been promoting wind energy for a long time. The Lower Austrian renewable energy policy was introduced in 2011 under the motto 'renewable, regional, and self-sufficient'. It pursues the goal of regional energy self-sufficiency by relying mainly on renewable sources. Medium-term (2015, 2020) and long-term (2030) energy goals have been formalized in the *Niederösterreichischer Energiefahrplan 2030* (Lower Austria Energy Roadmap) of 2011. Like other renewable energy sources, wind energy seemed a promising option to achieve these:

Our country is largely blessed with superb wind conditions. No other technology can substantially increase the generation of green electricity at comparably low costs. The state will prioritise the utilisation of this resource and support its expansion by all available means. (Knoll et al., 2014)

This strategic roadmap adopted a pathway towards generating 100 per cent of Lower Austrian energy demand from renewable sources by 2050. Medium and long-term goals were expressed in quantitative targets for each renewable source. For wind energy, the adopted targets were 1900 MW installed capacity by 2020 and 3200 MW by 2030 (Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2011).

The degree of precision with which wind energy was given a role in a comprehensive, long-term strategy did not apply to spatial planning policies. Lower Austria, just like most other Austrian states, lacked a comprehensive spatial scheme for wind energy. The state government had only enacted generic rules that regulated the location of wind turbines. These rules were listed in an *Abstandsregelung* (Distance Regulation), as an addition to the Lower Austrian Spatial Planning Act of 1976. It set minimum distances between wind energy generators and specific (vulnerable) land-use categories. These are:

The Distance Regulation was published in 2003, when a basis was urgently needed to monitor the compliance of local land-use plans. Around that time, wind energy had created considerable intermunicipal conflict, especially when turbines were sited in close vicinity to a neighbouring municipality.

In Austrian states, municipalities have the power to designate land for wind energy. States act as a supervisory authority and may reject plans, but this has to be well-argued. It was therefore necessary to create guidelines (at a higher governance level) for the reasoned rejection of wind power developments. Lower

<sup>24</sup> May be reduced to 1.2 km.

Austria considered two options that would produce suitable rules for the approval of wind energy plans: a planning approach à la Burgenland (zoned areas) or stricter 'rules of the game' (minimum distances).

The first option enjoyed little political support within the Lower Austrian government. Between 2003 and 2008, there were several attempts to create wind energy zones for selected, intermunicipal areas. These plans were not approved by the state government. They concerned *Kleinräumliche Konzepte* (microregional schemes) for the areas of Bruck an der Leitha, Marchfeld, Mistelbach-Gaweinstal-Sulz and Waldviertel Ost (Knoll et al., 2014). One main reason for the rejection of the plans was that they would reduce the opportunity to reap financial benefits from wind energy:

*These microregional schemes had been shelved by the politicians. The Council of the State Government wanted local councils to decide whether or not they wanted wind energy. Each municipality should have the opportunity to acquire funding for their municipal budgets.*  (Expert 11, administration, 2016)

The second option, enforcing minimum distances, seemed to strike the right balance between local planning autonomy and top-down zoning. Minimum distances were defined in accordance to those land uses that needed protection. The distances from residential land within neighbouring municipalities were particularly generous. The reasoning behind this was that the dimensioning must allow for future expansion of residential cores. If distances were solely based on emission standards (noise, shadow), once a wind turbine was permitted, other developments would have to comply with this type of land use:

*There is this physical emission boundary of 800 metres and, in addition, I need a distance of 400 metres to projected residential development because the opportunity for a municipality to authorize residential land use should be kept open. Once a wind turbine has been allowed, residential development will be constrained. To keep a buffer space for development, we had defined a distance of 400 metres. This rationale has been embedded in legislation and is still valid.* (Expert 09, mediators, 2016)

The Distance Regulation constituted an initial zoning approach, even though there was no comprehensive spatial plan. The zones were: unsuitable areas (excluded by minimum distances and other laws that prevent wind energy generation) and grey, intermediate areas (i.e. in-between unsuitable areas) where development could potentially take place. Since large parts of Lower Austria are highly suburbanised, excluded areas cover the outskirts of towns and villages, as well as areas where the spatial structure is dominated by detached buildings. As a result, wind parks were structurally channelled into green (unbuilt) areas: agricultural land and other rural settings that were not protected by law.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Aggregated results of interviews: factors influencing the Lower Austrian planning approach to wind energy

Following the document analysis of national and state policies, and of the spatial planning system, we will now turn to interview findings. The aim of this section is to identify the rules-in-use, or factors, that influenced the Lower Austrian planning approach to wind energy, in the opinion of interviewed experts. Whether these factors had a positive (or negative) impact on wind energy deployment will be discussed later on in the Section 3.2.5 of this case study chapter, which will present evidence concerning the effectiveness of the Lower Austrian planning approach.

The findings of this section are based on interview statements that were compiled and classified into fourteen main factors. Table 7 presents the results of this exercise; it describes the territorial, social, and economic conditions that prevailed as regards wind energy before and after the adoption of the Lower Austrian planning approach.

Before discussing in greater detail the territorial, social, and economic factors that constrained the Lower Austrian planning approach, two observations can be derived from this table.

The first observation is that social factors were considered highly important in the Lower Austrian case, in particular the attempts of earlier, bottom-up initiatives to construct zoning plans for wind energy in selected areas of the state (microregional schemes) and the notorious opposition of NGOs to wind turbines in bird-sensitive areas. These community aspects decidedly differed from those found in South Holland where, according to interviewees, wildlife protection and bottom-up planning initiatives were not among the factors that greatly influenced planning decisions. Equally, one economic factor (financial contributions by operators for the use of local infrastructure) is a specific, contextual rule.

The second observation concerns the changeableness of factors over time. In Lower Austria, conditions for wind energy deployment were altogether relatively stable. Events indicating change that are highlighted in the table were of an economic or social nature, such as the country's green energy support regulation, the market parties involved in developments, and the political attitude towards wind energy.

Table 7. Factors influencing the Lower Austrian planning approach to wind power Source: aggregated results of interviews

#### Territorial conditions

The formal rules and regulations that we identified, such as the Lower Austrian Distance Regulation and the distribution of power in spatial planning, have already been explained at length in the previous subsection (pp. 90ff.). In addition, there were three biophysical attributes that influenced wind energy deployment according to interviewed experts.

The first attribute concerned innovations in wind turbine technology that had a physical impact on other forms of land use. According to this expert, increasingly large wind turbines started to hinder urban expansion on the outskirts of towns and villages despite the adopted minimum distances:

*However, priorities have shifted owing to larger wind turbines. In the current situation, we need our 1200-metre gap solely for the emissions. Or more specifically: the 400-metre buffer, which was originally intended for municipal development, has increasingly been needed to compensate for the increased size of wind turbines.* (Expert 09, mediators, 2016)

However, the criticism of the higher emission impacts caused by higher wind turbines is somewhat misleading and demands further explanation.

This criticism concerns the generic, higher-tier Distance Regulation rather than project-level rules for health and safety standards in environmental law (i.e. noise and shadow flicker by operating wind turbines). At the time when the distance rule was devised, according to interviewees, the high-impact area of a wind energy project was delimited at a generic distance of 800 metres. The remaining 400 metres served as a buffer for future (residential) development. According to the evidence collected for this thesis, the size of the impact area is debatable (cf. Felber and Stöglehner, 2014). Although scientific proof could not be acquired in the course of our research, some interviewed professionals shared the opinion that 500 metres would usually cover the undesirable emissions of modern wind turbines.

Hence, the generous 'impact area' illuminates the basic notion behind the Distance Regulation, namely, to steer wind energy towards areas where it certainly would not hinder residential development. Because wind turbines had increased in size, the line of thought was that their impact would automatically affect a larger (than 800 metres) area and this, in turn, was constraining local plans — in the worst case, the plans of a neighbouring community. The above quote therefore refers to the emerging attitude among administrative and political actors that wind energy had reached the limits of its growth.

The second biophysical attribute illustrated in the table was the state's diversity of natural landscapes. Lower Austria has a surprising variety of geographical structures, which range from plain, hilly landscapes in the northeastern part to Alpine ranges in the southwestern part. Territorial (and social) conditions presiding

over wind energy vary greatly from one Lower Austrian *Viertel* (district) to another:<sup>25</sup>

The third attribute is connected to the second (variety of the Lower Austrian natural landscape), namely: habitats for protected bird species. This factor will be explained in greater detail in the next part on social factors.

#### Social factors

The Lower Austrian government did not exert any influence on the wind energy policies of local authorities but, rather, searched for a pragmatic approach to calm down local disputes. The chosen instrument of reconciliation, the Distance Regulation, meant that wind parks were mostly installed in green areas. Combination with other land uses, for instance industrial, commercial, or transport infrastructure-related, was equally constrained. <sup>26</sup>

Wind energy production on fields, grasslands, and forests, even at a due distance from populated areas, did however provoke opposition from another quarter, i.e. the national bird protection NGO:

*The Distance Regulation was not beneficial as regards bird protection and this resulted in the very same problem having to be dealt with simultaneously under ten different legal proceedings. This increasingly led to wind energy becoming discredited in the eyes of the general public.* (Expert 17, mediators, 2016)

<sup>25</sup> The term *Viertel* (district) describes the division of the state's surface in four main regions: Industrieviertel, Mostviertel, Waldviertel, Weinviertel. These are insignificant in terms of formal planning rules, but they do prescribe established natural habitats and cultural entities with strong identities.

<sup>26</sup> Commercial and industrial districts usually fell within the area excluded by the distance regulation.

Lower Austria was blessed with habitats and transit corridors for protected bird species that happened to compete with potential wind energy locations. By 2013, the national bird agency (Birdlife Austria) and other ornithological organisations were increasingly getting involved in local wind energy affairs, lodging complaints during approval procedures. <sup>27</sup>

Besides conflicts that evolved from the Distance Regulation with respect to bird protection, the interview quote illuminates another undesired impact: although wind energy had been perceived as a common good ever since the *Hainburg Movement* (p. 86), local residents increasingly turned against it. Local opinion polls had become common practice. Referenda for or against wind energy projects meant that the issue was settled through a majority popular vote rather than a unilateral local-level political or expert decision.

#### Economic conditions

The Lower Austrian wind energy industry was a highly influential economic sector, both within the state and beyond. Many operators had their origins in Lower Austria, where they had developed from pioneering, private initiatives into medium-sized companies. These locally well-connected stakeholders were, by 2013, important employers in the eastern and northern parts of the state. In addition, global investment firms increasingly held shares in Lower Austrian wind energy companies.

Besides the creation of jobs, and the growing influence of the sector in general, interviewed experts put income opportunities (financial benefits) for local communities high on the agenda of economic 'conditions'. Wind parks provided income for municipalities because they had to pay compensation fees for the use of local infrastructure. This income was the source of a rising conflict between prowind and anti-wind communities because it led to the accusation that local approval was 'bought' by wind energy developers:

*There have been cases where it was alleged that land use designations had been purchased from municipalities by operators. This is a strong accusation that is connected with the negotiation around the infrastructure cost contribution; this is payable for every wind turbine site, every year. Essentially, the municipality has a financial incentive in having wind power generators in its catchment area.* (Expert 04, mediators, 2016)

These payments were, in fact, co-financed by national subsidies for wind energy. The financial support consisted of an obligation to buy renewable electricity supplied to the national grid through fixed payments (feed-in tariffs or FITs). FITs are guaranteed payments that were periodically adjusted by ordinance of the Austrian government. The level of the FIT is a powerful factor of wind energy growth and therefore its adjustment has led to strong fluctuations in wind energy

<sup>27</sup> Certain bird species can be killed by the rotating blades of wind turbines.

investment. The most recent subsidy programme (GEA, 2012) created a solid basis for wind energy growth until 2014. It led to a (record) increase of 300 MW per annum from 2012 to 2014 (Austrian Wind Energy Association, 2014).

However, there are restrictions for new projects independently of the FIT. Projects are only granted a purchase commitment and a FIT if they obtain a contract with the OeMAG institution. <sup>28</sup> The OeMAG fund for project contracts decreases every year.

## 3.2.3 Planning arena

We can date the emergence of a Lower Austrian planning arena for the creation of wind energy zones in 2013, when the state governor ended the building permission procedure for wind power projects, stating that there had been an 'uncontrolled growth of wind power in the region which has to be stopped' (Pröll, cited in Die Presse, 2013).

Once the decision to draft a comprehensive plan for wind energy had been made, the state government wished to frame it in a neutral way. The adoption of exclusion zones did not fit in with the pro-active energy policy. On the other hand, positive zoning had certain drawbacks as well. For instance, it might suggest that the state of Lower Austria was trying to impose wind energy developments on affected local authorities. Another possible evil was that by introducing (more) spatial constraints, long-term targets in the state's energy roadmap would be put at risk. The spatial planning approach of the state of Lower Austria therefore became a tightrope walk between economic interests (wind energy promotion) and spatial interests, i.e. preventing haphazard development.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Aggregated results of interviews: participants of the Lower Austrian planning and implementation arena

Table 8 presents the planning and implementation actors in Lower Austria's wind energy arena. They were selected on the basis of interviews and, if necessary, their relevance was verified through document analysis. Just as with the South Holland and East Flanders case studies, the position of the different actors was interpreted on the basis of expert opinion and structured according to five topics: actor level, spatial-organisational level, core position, planning, and implementation.

<sup>28</sup> OeMAG stands for *Ökostromabwicklungsstelle*; it is the Austrian organisation in charge of buying green energy at the FIT and selling it to electricity traders.

#### Table 8. Planning and implementation actors in Lower Austria Source: aggregated results of interviews

Legend:

Planning core actor

Acronyms: AD administration, CI civil society, EC economy, IM intermediary, PO politics

The information in the table illustrates the central position occupied by actors from the state's public bodies and government within the planning process. In addition, consultants identified within the fields of spatial planning, landscape planning, and environmental protection exerted substantial influence on planning decisions.

On the other hand, national and local actors were largely uninvolved in spatial planning decisions, excepting the national bird agency (Birdlife Austria) and some local councils; in particular, the influence of mayors was emphasised by interviewed intermediary-level experts.

Some actors identified during the case study were positioned both in the planning and implementation processes. These actors were:

As regards implementation actors, one striking feature of Lower Austria's wind energy arena is the large number of national environment and wildlife protection NGOs. The main economic implementation actors were, in addition to the Austrian wind energy association (IG Windkraft), the group of 'active developers'. These are wind developers who actively acquired land utilisation rights by concluding licence agreements with landowners in the various regions of the state of Lower Austria.

Following this brief introduction to the structure of Lower Austria's planning and implementation arena, we will now turn to the core actors in the planning process.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Actors and their positions

#### State of Lower Austria

The main actors in the state of Lower Austria came from state agencies (*Landesbehörde*) as well as from the political side, the state government (*Landesregierung*). The differentiation between bureaucracy and politics is important in the case of Lower Austria, because administrative and political actors sometimes acted according to divergent motives, which had to be attuned within the planning arena.

The planning approach was shaped by two departments of the state in charge of energy and spatial planning: the *Abteilung Umwelt- und Energierecht* and the *Abteilung Raumordnung und Regionalpolitik*. Political direction for both these departments came, according to interviewed experts, mainly from one actor: the *Landesrat für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Energie* (State Minister for the Environment, Agriculture and Energy). On the other hand, the then-*Landeshauptmann* (state governor) kept a close eye on the planning process, since wind energy had been a central issue during the 2013 state government elections:

*It was of paramount importance to generate a map that showed which objections have been voiced, how many, and where they were coming from. Politicians always want to know who exactly their opponents are, and where they are located; this was an important step in the internal discussions.* (Expert 10, administration, 2016)

The government had enacted a building stop until the earmarking of land for wind power had become effective. This was a strategic choice to calm down the locallevel political discussion about wind energy. The wind rush in previous years had considerably damaged relations between the state and local politicians. In this context, the state governor had put landscape blight caused by sprawling wind turbine development on the spatial planning agenda of Lower Austria:

In many communities, operators had secured prior claims on plots by obtaining the permission of landowners for development. In consequence, nobody knew exactly how many wind generators would be developed and where exactly. It is precisely this uncontrolled growth that shall now be stamped out. (Pröll, cited in Die Presse, 2013)

All the same, local planning should still enjoy a high degree of autonomy, as this interview quote suggests:

*There was certainly the political will to give the matter a positive slant. And not merely to say: 'There and there, nothing should happen'. But to announce: 'These are the areas where the state prioritises wind power generation, but municipalities that oppose this kind of development may decide not to make use of them.' Municipalities still had to ensure the availability of these areas for future wind energy use and avoid encroaching residential development.* (Expert 11, administration, 2016)

Hence, the energy and spatial planning departments of Lower Austria had to achieve consensus around three goals that stood in contrast to each other: the energy goal, the environment/landscape protection goal, and the political goal. The objective in terms of renewable energy was to safeguard the ambitions of the adopted *Energiefahrplan*. In environmental terms, it was to safeguard landscape and wildlife assets. In political terms, it was to appease feelings within the local communities.

#### Consultants

Consultant work within the Lower Austria planning arena was strongly focussed on environment and wildlife protection issues. Participants were already exasperated by project proposals and political lobbying for wind energy in natural settings. In the opinion of the *Fachleute* (experts), general environmental protection legislation offered too little protection:

*All experts were irritated by absurd questions: 'Is wind power possible here?'. An increasing number of financial investors were emerging on the Lower Austrian wind energy market, who had been told repeatedly: 'It is not possible' — e.g. in nature parks. All the same, they made financial offers to municipalities. And thus the local mayor would approach the Minister of the state: 'I still want to have it, regardless'. And then we had to explain once again why it was not possible.* (Expert 09, mediators, 2016)

During the course of the interviews, it emerged that three professional actors deserved particular attention.

The first was a private spatial and landscape planning consultancy that had developed the principles defining the Distance Regulation. Being the

acknowledged author of the hitherto applied approach, a critical evaluation of its impact was not in its interest.

The firm represented two fields of expertise at the same time (spatial and landscape planning, see quote below) and was commissioned to execute the laborious process of zoning the vast surface area of the state. The consultant was also commissioned to set up the *Umweltbericht,* which documented the SEA*<sup>29</sup>* of the adopted policy:

*The consultant represented two disciplines at the same time: spatial planning and landscape planning. Thus they were not dealt with separately. Decision paths were mostly rather idiosyncratic.* (Expert 17, mediators, 2016)

The consultancy captured a key position in the planning arena because the energy and spatial planning authorities only assessed (instead of devising) fundamental decisions during the planning process. It elaborated the main method and principles that led to zone selection. In addition, the firm was responsible for the interpretation of consultancy work carried out by other professionals and for the fairly technical procedure involving the mapping of potential zones on the Lower Austrian territory. This was described as such:

*For this purpose, we developed a zoning method based on 'unbundling'. The state wanted positive zones — so we developed positive zones by separating them from negative ones. That is to say, we did not search for zones 'where it can be done', but for zones 'where it can't be done'.* (Expert 09, mediators, 2016)

In addition to the spatial and landscape planning consultancy, two other professional organisations took up a main position in the planning arena: the NGO BirdLife Austria and the *Umweltanwaltschaft Niederösterreich*, an institution close to the authorities that represents the public interest, especially as regards nature and environmental protection. The latter had a formal role in the SEA. It had to approve proposed plans and was therefore jointly responsible for the outcome.

Together with the spatial planning and landscape consultancy, and the relevant authorities of the Lower Austrian government, the *Umweltanwaltschaft* determined the 'scoping' <sup>30</sup> of the strategic assessment of zones for wind energy. In this role, the *Umweltanwaltschaft* mediated between community interests (local residents' initiatives, NGOs) and higher-lever political goals. It closely exchanged knowledge with universities and other environmental NGOs.

The third main consultant, BirdLife, was commissioned by the *Umweltanwaltschaft*  to define bird exclusion areas on a sound functional basis*.* As an umbrella

<sup>29</sup> According to Lower Austrian law, the set-up of such a plan demanded screening by strategic environmental assessment. In this context, the office was commissioned to create the 'environment report', which documented the knowledge exchange that eventually led to earmarked land.

<sup>30</sup> The term scoping describes the formally required procedure to set the scope of a Lower Austrian strategic environment assessment.

organisation, BirdLife enabled knowledge exchange with locally active ornithological groups. Birdlife was also a major actor in the wind energy implementation arena. It considerably constrained wind energy deployment by lodging complaints during the approval procedure. A second argument in favour of involving the agency in the planning process was that it maintained elaborate data about bird species, hatching, and behaviour:

*We were integrated and contributed our expertise, partly as a consultant but above all we possessed a vast amount of data. Our great strength is our extensive database in the field of ornithology.* (Expert 17, mediators, 2016)

BirdLife (2011) objected to wind turbines in Alpine ranges and other elevated areas in the northern and western parts of Lower Austria (*Waldviertel, Mostviertel*) which, at that time, were becoming increasingly popular for wind farms (see Section <IP_ADDRESS>). But it also objected to development in more traditional places. Among these were large parts of the *Weinviertel*, in particular the *Marchfeld* area, and wide areas along the national border with the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

#### Austrian Wind Energy Association

The Austrian Wind Energy Association *IG Windkraft* is the lobby organisation for Austrian operators, developers, and other supporters of wind energy. The interest group operates at national level, but has nevertheless strong professional links to Lower Austria. Major wind energy companies have their headquarters in Lower Austria, out of which they operate across the whole of Austria and even internationally. In addition, the EVN Lower Austrian utility company, which is mainly owned by public authorities (EVN, 2017), is one of the largest wind energy operators in Austria.

The IG Windkraft (and its members) was not necessarily against the proposal to zone wind energy – the Burgenland approach seemed to work rather well in the opinion of this expert:

*At the beginning of the 2000s, the state of Burgenland convened the stakeholders and started earmarking areas for wind energy. Everybody came together and the main consideration was: 'We want to achieve the energy transition and if that is the case, how can we do it in the most tolerable way.'* (Expert 16, economy, 2016)

The main concern of the agency was the very serious loss of political support at higher governance level and how this would affect spatial decisions. Altogether it was not a favourable time to *'*seize the moment' of higher-tier interference in local decision-making for the benefit of wind energy. After all, the overall political message was to introduce restrictions and serve local interests:

*First of all I need determination, really wanting to achieve the energy transition. For if I stuck to a zoning plan along the lines: 'So now we'll just ditch every damn'd place where it'd get in the way' well then, nothing would be left at the end of it.* (Expert 16, economy, 2016)

The grey-zone location policy of the Distance Regulation had, until then, evened out local opposition rather well. In search for development locations, one municipality could be played off against the other. But now, the reduction of available space would entail fewer options for locations. In many parts of Lower Austria local support had hit rock bottom, and there was no indication whatsoever that the state authority would promote implementation in planned zones by intervening in local affairs.

#### Active developers

Active developers were wind energy initiatives that had secured plots for potential developments and/or lobbied for local support in a certain area. Because the state government usually did not interfere in local land-use decisions or in the planning approaches of market parties to developing sites (i.e. communication and participation of local population), the combined efforts of active developers centred on persuading local politicians to back wind energy. Promising strategies to achieve local support ranged from trade-off deals (e.g. by paying for the use of infrastructure or offering a share in the business<sup>31</sup>) to intensive communication efforts to convince affected residents. This had become increasingly important because political decisions were often motivated by the results of community polls.

Active developers who had established strong relations with local authorities were far from happy with the decision to zone wind energy. This mostly concerned regions where several companies had a long tradition of producing wind power and had developed from a grassroots movement to a major employer. In other regions, according to interviewed experts, wind park operators were more inclined to favour the idea of zoning wind energy because it was more difficult to influence local decision-making.

Another important factor that justified the presence of active developers in the Lower Austrian planning arena is that they represented a considerable knowledge source as regards assessing regional wind energy potential and impacts on protected wildlife. Before entering into local negotiation/communication processes, developers had usually already acquired some preliminary knowledge about wind conditions, site availability, and environmental impacts.

#### Local authorities and politicians

Local authorities cherished the power that they wielded as regards land use for wind energy. At the same time, the impact of wind parks went well beyond the

<sup>31</sup> Many operators pursued a business model which enabled private persons to profit from development. Indeed Austrian citizens hold a considerable amount of shares in wind energy companies, be it in the form of stocks or as limited partners.

reach of local control. For instance, green areas that were valued for their recreational significance came into consideration for development. These local values were not sufficiently protected by legislation. In particular the *Waldviertel*  had specialised in a form of tourism that promoted a traditional lifestyle and untouched landscapes. The utilization of the 'common good' of landscape energy source versus local, touristic asset — became a point of contention in local land-use planning.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Interaction between actors

Having presented the main interests of core actors, this part turns to interactions within the Lower Austrian wind energy arena. These took place within a comparably confined group of professionals originating from state authorities and consultancies:

Interaction between these actors was widely reduced to the exchange of knowledge through written documentation or data. Participating administrative actors did not actively take decisions but rather checked whether proposed solutions were in line with state interests. Particular attention was paid to landscape, nature and wildlife protection, the promotion of recreational land use, a 'regional balance' in the distribution of zones, and the wind energy targets of the *Energiefahrplan*.

Planning choices rather lacked in transparency according to this consultant:

*The positive zones were not identified collectively, it was just that our data was incorporated. Where our advice was heeded, areas were excluded and where not, we were ignored.* (Expert 17, mediators, 2016)

Relevant implementation actors such as active developers, community organisations, and local government were consulted, but they were not invited to actively take part in planning decisions. The general reason for avoiding a wide discussion with implementation actors was the need to concentrate on energy and spatial planning goals at a higher governance level. Professionals were to produce sound solutions that would satisfy general rather than local interests. The creation of zones for wind energy was therefore largely executed without the involvement of those affected:

*You definitely would not be able to take decisions by involving the affected parties. This was clearly an expert planning issue. Neither operators, municipalities nor the State Minister can be asked. The latter had the political wisdom not to interfere. You have to shoulder the responsibility as an expert – just as a surgeon operating on a knee would.*  (Expert 09, mediators, 2016)

A rather curious transaction developed between BirdLife and private wind energy developers. Locally active developers had gained considerable knowledge about environmental constraints in the context of *Machbarkeitsstudien* (feasibility studies). To accelerate decision-making, developers agreed to share their knowledge and co-finance the creation of bird protection areas. This knowledge was then recorded in the BirdLife database.

*The resources available to execute our task of defining exclusion areas were insufficient. Operators knew that they would make no headway if they did not pay — i.e. they financed their own consultants in order to provide data. That was not an easy process, because when operators make a financial contribution they also want to have a say. We partly accepted that, but we also told them: 'There is no point concluding things now that will come again through the back door anyway'.* (Expert 17, mediators, 2016)

#### Creation of knowledge

Knowledge creation during the planning phase was strongly constrained by time pressure. The formal requirement was that the *Sek ROP Wind* had to enter into force within one year (2013-2014). Hence it was a rather Herculean task to take precise decisions within a short time that would cover an extensive territory.

The most time-efficient approach was to generate wind energy zones by pooling knowledge about conflicting land uses, supported by GIS methods for combining data with geographical references. The accumulation of conflicting land uses, or negative criteria, then provided for 'exclusion areas'. These areas were subtracted from the total Lower Austrian territory.

The resulting leftover space was theoretically suitable for wind energy generation, at least from the perspective of the state. The professional term for this rather technical exercise is *Abschichtungsverfahren* (unbundling procedure).

*GIS technology enables us to take decisions in an elegant way — suddenly, only 15% of the state surface needs to be considered. (…) by pressing a button I can print out a 'What would happen if…' decision. And I can directly see its impacts, I can compute area balance sheets, which goes some way towards energy objectives. This means that planning decisions can be compared with energy goals. We have only been able to do this type of zoning since we have had GIS.* (Expert 09, mediators, 2016)

Knowledge about conflicting land uses concerned two categories:

Data for the first category were largely generated by digital geographic datasets and in consultation with representatives of affected fields in public administration. These were: spatial planning, energy, traffic, aviation, nature protection, environmental law, and forestry (Knoll et al., 2014).

The creation of knowledge about the second category of conflicting land uses was more labour-intensive. It concerned the identification of areas where considerable opposition was to be expected. Most of the knowledge was gained from the database of Birdlife Austria. Other applied sources were the zoned areas in microregional schemes (see Section <IP_ADDRESS>). On the subject of valued landscapes, several NGOs, mostly community initiatives, had submitted position papers and studies (Knoll et al., 2014). Finally, there were also implementation studies by wind energy developers that included knowledge about conflicting land uses.

The unbundling procedure quickly produced a first selection of potential zones (see Fig. 21). Roughly eighty per cent of the total Lower Austrian territory was excluded by applying the Distance Regulation. Leftover areas were then screened for their wind energy potential on the basis of archived project proposals and consultation with local developers.

The last step involved the presentation of pre-selected zones for wind energy to the public. This was a step formally required by the SEA; it enabled affected parties to react to, and influence the proposed policy. According to submitted positions, wind energy zones might be abolished, made smaller or expanded. According to this expert, local government considerations were strongly taken into account:

*We received 1500 objections after the publication of the programme. It was, of course, difficult to fight them off, politically-speaking. We attempted to classify them: to correlate objections with project areas; in this way, pretty soon it became clear that only a few areas were being contested, where there were protest marches with petitions. And there were also many objections requesting additional areas. But we could not take these into account, except in a few rare cases.* (Expert 10, administration, 2016)

Figure 21. Exclusion areas suggested by BirdLife Austria and pre-selected wind energy zones Adapted from Knoll et al., 2014

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Map of Lower Austria's planning and implementation arena

The final subsection about Lower Austria's wind energy arena presents a map of participants involved in planning (yellow) and implementation (white). Interaction between the different parties is indicated by lines. Just as with the South Holland and East Flanders case studies, line thickness indicates the intensity of the exchange.

As explained before, Lower Austria's wind energy arena consisted of a limited number of participants, compared to the other case studies. The circle of experts involved in planning decisions was intentionally kept small. Public authorities at the national level played hardly any role in spatial decisions, excepting the ÖROK

Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning that advised lower-tier authorities on how to create zoned areas for renewable energy.

The main actors in Lower Austria's arena were positioned at administrative, political, and intermediary levels (Fig. 22). Politicians, in particular local politicians, had a strong influence on planning and implementation. The main planning actors were the state departments for energy and the environment, and for spatial planning, along with selected consultants. The main implementation actors were the Austrian Wind Energy Association and BirdLife Austria, which operated at the national level. At the local level, implementation actors involved affected local residents, active developers, and landowners.

The information in the figure also casts some light on crucial participants who enabled interaction between other actors. These were:

On the other hand, the figure shows vacant spaces, or missing links, in the vertical coordination of planning and implementation. Interviews revealed little interaction between national and state spatial planning institutions as regards spatial decisions concerning wind energy. Although the general advice of the ÖROK to zone renewable energy was implemented, the state obviously did not pursue an approach 'à la Burgenland'. Besides, there was no apparent formal coordination in wind energy planning at a regional (intermunicipal) level. Emerging cooperation between local communities in the context of microregional wind energy schemes was, according to interviewed experts, the result of bottom-up initiatives. At each level, administrative actors altogether acted highly independently from one another.

Figure 22. Lower Austria wind power planning arena

Positioning participants according to five actor dimensions and three levels of wind energy policy-making

The black lines relate to the intensity of interactions between different participants. Figure by the author

## 3.2.4 Planning approach

In 2014, the state of Lower Austria adopted 68 zones for wind energy. The zoned areas were to reconcile the conflict about land use, in particular friction between economic interests, wildlife protection, diverging local political goals, and largescale landscape blight. Steering a middle course to deal with a highly controversial issue was certainly the main reason behind the emergence of the Lower Austrian planning approach.

Just as with the South Holland and East Flanders case studies, Lower Austrian decisions did not always refer to the latest adopted policy. Hence in this analysis, attention was also paid to resumed, 'unchanged' decisions based on earlier policies. In the case of Lower Austria, the state's planning approach is composed of ordinances from three regulatory frameworks:

The specific decisions that were formalized in the above-mentioned laws and policy documents are presented in the previous section (p. 114). The information is arranged in the same manner as for the South Holland and East Flanders case studies.

The listed decisions refer to a specific *spatial-organisational level* (macro, meso, and micro). Furthermore, we have differentiated decisions belonging to the planning approach's *spatial strategy* from those belonging to its *implementation strategy*.

According to the conceptual framework of this thesis, spatial strategy focuses on the creation of zoned areas. Implementation strategy, on the other hand, focuses on the process-oriented task of governing wind energy development.

Again, specific attention has been paid to the *options* that were considered during the planning phase. These choices relate to economic (E), territorial (T), social (S) and governance issues (G). Section <IP_ADDRESS> will then reflect on the total set of available options detected in all case studies.

On basis of the information presented in Table 9, we can single out the main characteristics of the Lower Austrian planning approach to wind energy. The planning approach is rather confined to the spatial-organisational level of the *Bundesland.* This absence of a multilevel approach to wind energy was for the most part predetermined by the characteristics of the Austrian planning system, which only provides limited opportunities for higher-tier authorities to coordinate the wind energy initiatives of lower levels of government, in particular as regards coordination between national government and state authorities. Furthermore,

concerning the coordination between the state and municipalities, Lower Austria did not actively apply informal methods to achieve the local coordination of wind energy development. For instance, a wider application of microregional schemes for wind energy would have been possible, but this was not suggested by the state authority.

Table 9. Lower Austria's planning approach to wind power of 2014: planning decisions and levels of policy making

## <IP_ADDRESS> Spatial strategy: creation of zones through generic rules

In the Lower Austrian case study, positive zones were generated by subtraction, or exclusion, of areas that were considered 'unacceptable'. Planning choices therefore clearly concentrated on the definition of land-use constraints, instead of defining desired land-use combinations. This strategic choice, together with the applied 'unbundling' method, drastically reduced the area available for development (see Section <IP_ADDRESS>).

While previously, in theory, roughly 15 per cent of the Lower Austrian surface area was suitable for wind energy, the *Sek ROP Wind* reduced this to 1.5 per cent (Knoll et al., 2014). This reduction placed the state of Lower Austria in a difficult situation, since it affected the framing of the planning approach in relation to the task of 'positive zoning'. Although the political message should have been a positive one (wind energy growth), combined planning efforts came from the opposite direction (spatial constraints). In consequence, instead of 'priority zones' or 'implementation locations', a more neutral label came into play:

*The labelling of Lower Austria's wind energy zones is '§19 zones' instead of 'suitable zones'. This communicates the fact that zones still have to be reviewed in detail. At state level, it is obviously not feasible to state: 'Exactly here, is it possible'. The state of Burgenland had labelled its wind energy zones 'suitable zones' which, by the way, also have to be reviewed. Nevertheless, the authority is more strongly committed.* (Expert 04, mediators, 2016)

The '§19 zone' label was meant to communicate that, considering the vast territory of the state and the relatively short planning period, it was necessary to review the zoned areas and specify their exact boundaries – i.e. local authorities had to precisely define the siting of a wind energy project. But a more positive labelling would have involved a stronger commitment of the state authority to promote implementation. This was undesirable from a political point of view, considering that the pro-active wind energy policy had received much criticism during the previous years.

Figure 23. Regional distribution of wind energy zones across Lower Austria. The majority are situated in the northern and eastern parts (regions of Waldviertel and Weinviertel)

Adapted from Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2014b

Figure 24. Wind energy zones in the Weinviertel region.

The shape of the zone is determined by a 1200 m distance from residential functions. Figure by the author. Land use data from Copernicus Land Monitoring Service, 2019; wind energy zones from Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2014b

#### Negative land-use criteria

The most important strategic choice was to retain the Distance Regulation. Thus*,*  although the *Sek ROP Wind* enacted the notion of zones for wind energy, it did not cause a paradigm shift in spatial planning. On the contrary, it built on decisions that had been applied for more than ten years. The establishment of wind energy zones thus resulted for the most part from generic minimum distances:

The designation of these zones is essentially based on the distance regulations to wind power-sensitive land uses, the interests of nature conservation, ecological value of areas, the visual appearance of towns and landscapes, tourism, the protection of Alpine space, the network infrastructure, the expansion possibilities of existing wind parks and a regional balance of wind power development. (Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2014b, p. 1)

Besides the Distance Regulation, other adopted generic distances that greatly influenced the spread of wind energy locations were:

Other negative land-use criteria of the *Sek ROP Wind* concern valued natural areas and landscapes insufficiently protected by law, such as landscape scenery valued by the local community, wildlife corridors, and bird habitats.

#### Positive land-use criteria

Besides exclusion principles, a number of positive criteria influenced the creation of wind energy zones as well. The most important criterion was the safeguarding of a sufficient amount of land to meet the state's wind energy target. Zones had to be spacious enough to accommodate the adopted goal of 3200 MW capacity installed by 2030.

The aim of the spatial ordinance programme is to define zones that enable the deployment of a sufficiently large number of wind turbines in order to meet the targets of Lower Austria's Energy Roadmap 2030. (Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2014b)

In addition to wind energy targets, expansion opportunities for existing wind parks were taken into account as positive land-use criteria (Knoll et al., 2014). Other criteria referred to more qualitative goals. The principle of '*Regionale Ausgewogenheit*' should provide for a fair distribution of zones across the four main districts of the state. However, the application of this principle was effectively constrained by the different biophysical conditions prevailing in each *Viertel*. The Mostviertel (5 zones) was most difficult because it was highly suburbanised. Wind energy zones therefore favoured the Waldviertel (18 zones), Industrieviertel (17 zones) and Weinviertel (28 zones). In addition, the plan introduced a minimum size of 40 hectares (8 wind turbines) as a selection criteria (Knoll et al., 2014). This was meant to facilitate concentrated development.

The last positive criteria that was used to define Lower Austrian wind energy zones concerned sites that had already been agreed under microregional schemes. Although it was not possible during research on this case study to ascertain whether these locations were fully adopted in the final version of the plan, according to the SEA report (Knoll et al., 2014), they constituted important selection criteria.

#### <IP_ADDRESS> Implementation strategy: setting up the framework and laissez-faire

Lower Austria's implementation strategy includes few strategic decisions. These mainly relate to the intensity with which the state government sought to influence decisions at the local level.

In terms of an active attitude to wind energy implementation, the planning approach did not enact any rules that would impose development on affected municipalities. Nor did the state of Lower Austria interfere in the local practices of developers concerning public participation and compensation. In principle, local authorities can still decide whether they want wind energy or not. This attitude of 'laissez-faire' already made itself felt in the labelling of wind energy zones ('§19 zones', see previous subsection on spatial strategy).

Government action was reduced to setting up a framework introducing spatial conditions that would rather favour development. One issue in this context was to create 'acceptable' space (see first quote below). Another measure of precaution was to restrict the approval of land uses that would limit land availability for wind energy in §19 zones (see second quote):

Thanks to the clear positioning of many municipalities and the highly committed consultation procedure, the end result was wind energy zoning with a higher implementation probability, and accordingly, a lower implementation risk. This will also lead to greater planning security and faster procedures. (Knoll et al., 2014, p. 1)

Within the wind energy zones specified in Appendixes One to Four, the initial designation of building land for housing purposes, (…) is not permitted. (Office of the State Government of Lower Austria, 2014b)

## 3.2.5 Effectiveness

From the beginning, the Lower Austrian planning approach to wind energy has been Janus-faced. While its spatial strategy (positive zones) suggested support for wind energy, its implementation strategy neither attempted to influence local decision-making nor did it seek to facilitate maximum development. It seemed that Lower Austria had already reached saturation point and, consequently, planning efforts concentrated on spatial restrictions.

Just as with the South Holland and East Flanders case studies, this study evaluates the effectiveness of the Lower Austrian planning approach in terms of economic, territorial, and social goals, as well as implementation goals. And, again, the main findings are based on interview statements verified by written evidence collected during document analysis. In addition, effects were compared with autonomous developments, which shaped implementation independently from spatial planning decisions. These conditional developments are presented in Section <IP_ADDRESS>.

Table 10 summarizes the desired and undesired effects of the Lower Austrian planning approach to wind energy identified during the case study. Not all results could be measured, hence some rely on expert evaluation. These are indicated by (x).

Table 10. Desired and undesired effects of the Lower Austrian planning approach Source: aggregated results of interviews

Note: *Expected* effects are indicated as (x); 'not applicable': effects that cannot be accounted for by interviews.

This overview shows that undesired effects of the planning approach largely result from local opposition to wind energy development. This matches the findings about conditions, i.e. that after 2014 the pro-active political attitude changed to a reserved attitude towards wind energy growth. In addition, economic experts stated that there was a bottleneck in the issuing of green energy certification, which caused delays in implementation.