Alors que, dans la première moitié du XVe siècle, les sites de production orientaux en Thrace,2 en Mer Egée à Mytilène/Lesbos (Arvanitidou 2020) et surtout en Anatolie à Phocée (Heers 1954), étaient exploités par des Génois, quelques marchands italiens se sont efforcés de trouver de l'alun, bien avant la chute de Constantinople. Ils semblent avoir initié leurs prospections dans les îles de la Méditerranée. Ainsi, dès 1402, Martin Ier accordait le droit de chercher de l'alun en Sicile à une poignée d'acteurs: Berto Belluni de Messines, Filippo de Aczano de Pouzzoles ou Andrea Carlino de Naples et le vénitien Disiato di Brolo (Dentici Buccellato 1984, 136-38). Un peu plus tard, à partir des années 1430, la République de Venise autorisait plusieurs membres de la famille Querini à prospecter en Crête (Jacoby 1987). En 1442, le florentin, Bernardo di Marco Salviati reçut le droit de produire de l'alun dans les possessions de l'ordre des Hospitaliers, en mer Egée.3 Toutefois, il est probable qu'aucune de ces initiatives n'ait donné lieu à une véritable exploitation, puisque nous n'en avons pas trouvé trace jusqu'à présent. En revanche, il est certain que les recherches se poursuivirent et s'entendirent à la partie occidentale de la Méditerranée. À partir du milieu du XVe siècle, l'alun apparaît de plus en plus régulièrement, dans les concessions minières accordées par les différents États, comme une matière première que l'on cherche à produire, au côté des métaux et parfois des vitriols. Les plus anciennes mentions, à ma connaissance, remontent: à 1451, dans le territoire siennois notamment le mont Argentario (Lisini 1935 239-42), à 1461 dans le territoire milanais (Pipino 2009, 27), à 1463, dans le territoire florentin (Pampaloni 1975, 119-23), à 1468, en Provence (Coulet 1993, 287), à 1472, en Vénétie, dans le Val Camonica près de Brescia (Braunstein 1965, 549, 591). C'est aussi le cas dans la péninsule ibérique, la recherche est attestée: en 1461, dans le royaume de Valence (Cooper 2008, 321 sq.),4 en 1462, à Paracuellos de Jiloca (Rubio Semper 1992, 199-201; Morales Gómez 2016, 543-569) et à Mazarrón en Murcie (Córdoba de la Llave, Franco Silva et Navarro Espinach 2005, 126), en 1469, dans le royaume du Portugal.5

Ces concessions s'accompagnèrent sans doute de prospections ou tentatives d'exploitation, même s'il n'est pas possible d'en trouver de nombreuses traces, notamment parce qu'elles ne furent pas toujours couronnées de succès, comme le suggèrent plusieurs auteurs qui les ont signalées. Ainsi, à Albarracín et à Ademuz, dans le royaume de Valence, les activités initiées en 1461 furent-elles vraisemblablement brèves voire infructueuses (Morales Gómez 2016, 553; Navarro Espinach et Villanueva Morte 2022, 99), peut-être un peu plus durable en 1465, dans le

2 Mentionné encore en 1440 (Hocquet 2010, 92).

3 A l'exception de Rhodes, où Zoan de la Rivera avait obtenu la même concession l'année précédente (Wright 2010).

4 À Borriol, Artena et Orpesa ou Artemuz qui se trouve aux confins avec le royaume d'Aragon (Navarro Espinach et Villanueva Morte 2020, 123).

5 «tirar e lavrar pedra-hume em todo o reino» (Peragallo 1907, 59 repris dans Guidi Bruscoli 2018, 70).

royaume de Castille, à Casacarrillo, près de Cornago dans la haute vallée du Douro (Cooper et Mirete Mayo 2001, 95). Dans le territoire génois, de vaines recherches furent engagées en 1465 (Pipino 2005, 75). Autour de Trévise, des découvertes sont mentionnées entre 1467 et 1472 (Pipino 2009, 28), mais elles ne paraissent pas avoir entraîné d'activité. En Toscane, deux découvertes sont signalées, sans résultats toutefois: en 1461, à Poggio Santa Cecilia,6 et en 1473, à Boccheggiano dans les Monts Métallifères.7

Ces efforts – qui ont été davantage soutenus que suscités par les États – et ces échecs interrogent sur la façon dont furent entreprises les recherches. Il semble que les enquêteurs aient privilégié d'abord l'observation (des paysages, de la végétation, des terrains, des roches) et qu'ils aient recherché des lieux similaires à ceux exploités ailleurs, notamment en Anatolie ou en Mer Egée. Ainsi, Pie II rapporte-t-il dans ses *Commentaires* comment Giovanni da Castro, l'inventeur présumé de Tolfa, avait été attiré par la présence sur le site d'une végétation comparable à celles d'Asie.8 Quelques années plus tard, en 1464, un citoyen siennois Francesco di Bartolomeo da Sant'Angelo se proposait de mener des recherches dans le territoire siennois, en considérant que certains endroits étaient similaires à ceux de Tolfa.9 La démarche semble donc fondée sur l'analogie – un mode de raisonnement qui est commun au moyen âge.10 Elle implique, toutefois, de la part des acteurs une connaissance des lieux antérieurement exploités. Elle explique peut-être aussi pourquoi les premières zones prospectées furent celles qui pouvaient rappeler les paysages insulaires ou côtiers orientaux, notamment le Mont Argentario,11 l'île d'Ischia…12

Le succès de l'entreprise ne reposait pas seulement sur l'identification de similitudes. Car il fallait savoir où chercher et donc disposer d'une certaine familiarité – directe ou indirecte – avec les zones à observer. C'est pourquoi – comme pour toutes les autres prospections minières (Braunstein 1993; 2003a) – les enquêteurs s'appuyaient sur leur connaissance du terrain, quand ils étaient originaires de la région à explorer ou sur les compétences des autochtones. Ainsi, peut-on s'interroger sur les conditions de la découverte de Tolfa. N'a-t-elle pas été facilitée par le fait

6 Archivio di Stato di Siena (ASS), *Statuti della città* 40, fol. 95v.

7 ASS, *Notarile antecosimiano* 687, acte du 26 avril 1473.

8 *Hic montes alti [Tolfa vetus] a mari introrsus recedunt silvis et aquis fecundi. Per quos dum Iohannes [Castrensis] ambulat, novam herbæ in montibus Asiae, qui Turchorum aerarium alumine ditant. Videt lapides albos et qui minerales apparent; mordet: salsedinem repperit; excoquit, experimentum facit: alumen producit (…) Vocati sunt artifices ex Genua, qui aliquando in Asia Turchi alumina tractavere. Li, cum loci naturam inspexissent, per omnia similem esse dixerunt Asiaticis montibus alumen ferentibus (…). Decoxere lapides, et alumen multo praestantius ac pulchrius exiit, quam illud Asiaticum. Missum est et ad Venetos et ad Florentinos, factum periculum; res ipsa opinionem superavit* (Pii Secundi 1993, 355-56).

9 «Exponsi con ogni debita reverentia per lo nostro fidelissimo servidore e cittadino Francesco di Bartolomeo da Sant'Agnolo, come da più tempi in qua et maxime da poi si scupererse l'allumiera de la Tolfa, lui ha certo per più parti del vostro contado, el quale in più luoghi pare conforme al detto paese de la Tolfa, se similie petrina et vena potesse trovare», ASS, *Consiglio generale* 230, fol. 195v-196; *Concistoro* 2155, fol. 39; *Concistoro* 588, fol. 35.

10 Sur l'importance de la notion d'analogie dans la pensée médiévale, cf. De Beaune, Hilaire-Pérez et Vermeir 2017, notamment p. 16-20. 11 Cf. *supra*, p. 260.

12 Cf. *infra*, p. 262.

336 DIDIER BOISSEUIL

que la famille maternelle de Giovanni da Castro était originaire de Corneto/Tarquinia (Sella 1944, 253; Caravale 1979; Ait 2009), à quelques kilomètres seulement des alunières? Peut-être connaissait-il déjà les lieux ou bien était-il capable de mobiliser des habitants susceptibles de le guider. C'est par exemple, dans un contexte proche, la démarche adoptée par un florentin pour engager des recherches dans le territoire siennois. En 1490, Tribaldo dei Rossi, un proche de Lorenzo dei Medici, se tourna vers les habitants du village de Magliano, à une centaine de kilomètres de Florence, pour obtenir des renseignements précieux sur la localisation d'une mine d'argent ancienne (Boisseuil 2019, 177-78).

Pour ce qui concerne l'alun, les experts locaux étaient peut-être informés de l'existence de dépôts d'aluns natifs ou de manifestations singulières – comme les sources thermales, les «soffioni», «bullicami» (Picon, Karadima-Matsa et Blondé 2016, 405-12; Di Nezza et Di Filippo 2020, 25-27; Dallai 2020, 117) – susceptibles d'indiquer la présence de gisements exploitables, puisque ces signes pouvaient être associés à la présence des roches alunifères.13 Car ce sont bien des roches et tout particulièrement l'alunite, qui furent recherchées et principalement utilisées. En effet, nombre des gisements qui furent exploités et qui donnèrent naissance à des alunières étaient composés de ce minerai, notamment dans le Latium à Tolfa, en Toscane à Massa Marittima, Montioni et Monterotondo Marittimo, en Campanie à Agnano et Ischia, en Murcie à Mazarrón (Picon, Karadima-Matsa et Blondé 2016, 411; Dallai 2020, 117; Martínez Alcalde 2020, 186). Néanmoins, les gisements qui furent mobilisés au moyen âge ne sont pas tous actuellement identifiés et il est probable que d'autres roches alunifères ont été employées avec plus ou moins de succès – comme la jarosite à Casacarrillo (Cooper et Mirete Mayo 2001, 103).14 De même, l'ampleur et la qualité intrinsèque des gisements pouvaient avoir des conséquences sur l'issue du processus de production. C'est pourquoi, les inventeurs mobilisaient leurs sens (Fritz et Duhl, 2016) et opéraient des essais – comme pour les minerais métalliques (Braunstein 1993 ; 2003a). Ainsi, Giovanni da Castro goûta-il, d'après Pie II, le minerai de Tolfa, et l'expérimenta.15 Selon le chroniqueur génois Agostino Giustiniani († 1536), Bartolomeo Pernice, après l'avoir identifié, testa luimême le minerai du gisement d'Ischia.16 C'est donc tout un ensemble de connaissances utiles, fondées sur des savoirs pratiques (comme l'expérimentation17) qui fu-

13 Même si – bien que rien ne l'atteste – on puisse concevoir, dans certaines régions, une pratique ancienne de production d'alun d'alunite, mais à une autre échelle, modeste (Picon, Karadima-Matsa et Blondé 2016, notamment 410-11).

14 Pour un aperçu plus vaste des minerais exploités en Espagne, cf. Martínez Alcalde 2020, 184-86.

15 Cf. *supra* note 8.

16 «Per questi tempi [1459] Bartolomeo Pernice, mercadante Genovese navigando in cerco l'Isola di Enaria ossia d'Ischia conobbe che nella piaggia erano molti scogli aluminosi, cioè atti per fare alume, e pigliò parte di quelli e li fece cuoecere in la fornace, e riuscitte alume ottimo; e così Bartolomeo della città di Rocco di Soria, dove aveva negoziato più anni, revocò in Italia l'arte di fabbricare l'alume, la quale già per gran spazio di tempo era morta e stata intermessa» (Giustiniani 1854, II, 418).

17 Sur l'importance de l'expérimentation dans le développement des techniques, cf. Chandelier, Verna et Weil-Parot, ed. 2017.

rent donc intensément sollicitées pour découvrir des gisements exploitables et pour créer des alunières.

#### **2. L'essor des alunières occidentales**

Ces initiatives aboutirent rarement avant 1460 et surtout 1470. Le premier site exploité en Occident fut celui proche de la Solfatara, à Agnano dans les Champs Phlégréens, actif au moins en 1452, partiellement détruit par un tremblement de terre en 1456, avant de reprendre en 1462.18 En Sicile, l'activité débuta d'abord à Paterno, en 1458 et par la suite à Fiumidinisi jusqu'en 1466 (Campagna 2020, 1084). C'est probablement en 1458-1459 aussi, que commença l'activité sur l'île d'Ischia.19 Le minerai extrait des îles de Vulcano et Lipari était exporté pour être traité en Sicile, entre 1460 et 1461 (Pipino 2009, 28).20 C'est à cette époque que débuta l'exploitation à Tolfa (avec les premières carrières)21. L'activité dans la Maremme et les Monts Métallifères fut plus tardive: l'alunière de Sasso fut créée en 1470 – mais elle fut abandonnée avant 147622 –, celles de Massa Marittima et de Monterotondo

20 La production semblait modeste et incertaine comme l'atteste une lettre du 19 juin 1463 de Piero di Dietisalvi, depuis Lipari à Giacomo Acciaiuoli: «Io sono stato alla lumera parechi dì et ò voluto intendere in quello consisteva et di quello ò compreso non scripto alla M[aes]tà del Signor Re, ò trovato che perfino a questo dì ànno lavorato circa 60 cantara d'allume che è una fraschame, ò trovato che a detto allume abino dato credito nullo et non sanno loro se l'à avere; io gli ò sollecitati che ne voglino mandare di fori in modo che una volta intendino dove si truova questa cosa in fare, n'ànno mandato la metà di questo alle galee venitiane che vanno in Aqua Morta che lo porteranno et intenderanno che credito abia avere et questo resto manderanno a Venezia et attenderanno la risposta, che fra 3 o 4 mesi l'aranno, et secondo l'aranno si governeranno; in questo mezo lavoreranno per non dimonstrare di starsi ma andranno ratenuti. Se intendono che detto allume abia uscita qui, si dimonstra materia assai da farne et con poca spesa. Siché io faccio pensieri stare patiente fino a quel tempo et tanto che vegha ordinata la cosa e poi farò pensieri levarmi di qua». Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, *mss* II-IV-416, fol. 30-30v. Selon Marie-Louise Heers, l'un des acteurs de ce commerce sicilien à Gènes était le florentin Andrea Fattini (Heers 1954, 52).

21 Plusieurs indices laissent penser que l'activité débuta courant 1461. Une première concession accordée à Giovanni da Castro et à ses parents par la commune de Corneto date, en effet, du 30 avril 1461 (Sella 1944, 252). L'activité du port de Civitavecchia augmenta considérablement à partir de la fin de l'hiver 1461 (Vaquero Piñeiro 2004, 183). Voir aussi Boisseuil, Chareille et Ait 2023. 22 Déjà en 1473, le minerai n'était plus considéré comme exploitable, comme l'atteste une lettre

adressée à Laurent de Médicis par Lutio Giugni depuis l'alunière, datée du 10 août 1473, «Io credo abiate sentito da mie' fratelli e simile da Antonio Baldinotti iscrivano da questa lumiera della qualità di che è tornata la pietra, el pocho frutto ne sie e simile di 2 monti de' tre dove si togliava quando Bernardo de Lucro ci fu», ASF, *Mediceo Avanti il Principato*, filza XXIII, n°544.

18 Pour sa localisation cf. Picon, Karadima-Matsa et Blondé 2016, 411. Il fut visité par le roi Alphonse 1er d'Aragon, (Feniello 2003, 158; 160).

19 Sans doute un peu avant, selon le témoignage rapporté par Gaetano Cestari, d'un certain Pietro Lupo. «In tempo di Re Alfonso I o vero ne la intrata di Re Ferrante I [donc à partir de 1458] da qual tempo in qua fo introducta in Iscla & Pezuolo exercitio de fare dicto alume & miniere, de qua per un genoese fu optenuto privilegio dali dicti Signuri (…) che dicto genoese se chiamasse Bartholomeo Pernice» (Cestari 1790, 20). L'alunière d'Agnano étant en activité depuis le début des années 1450, il est possible que l'initiative de Bartolomeo Pernice concerne essentiellement Ischia, même si on ne peut exclure totalement qu'il ait initié aussi celle d'Agnano. Pour la discussion de cette éventualité, cf. Pipino 2009, 24-25.

l'année suivante, en 1471 puis celles de Montioni et de l'Accesa en 1472, enfin celle de Campiglia Marittima en 1483, celle de Pietra (Castel di Pietra) plus tardivement en 1490 (Boisseuil 2014; Boisseuil 2005, 106-07). En Espagne, plusieurs sites furent brièvement exploités: à Paracuellos, vers 1461-1462 (Morales Gómez 2016, 543- 569), voire à Casacarrillo en 1465 (Cooper et Mirete Mayo 2001, 95) et sans doute Lorca entre 1459 et 1460, puis 1469 et 1471 (Navarro Espinach et Villanueva Morte 2020, 125); d'autres furent plus intensément utilisés comme Mazarrón après 1485 (bien que la première concession date de 1462, cf. *supra*) et Rodalquilar plus tardivement au XVIe siècle (Igual 2014; Navarro Espinach et Villanueva Morte 2020, 127). On aboutit donc avant 1500 a près d'une quinzaine de localités, comprenant un ou plusieurs sites plus ou moins intensément et durablement exploités, dont la plupart sont postérieurs à 1460 (Fig. 1).23

#### Fig. 1. **Sites de production d'alun exploités à la fin du XVe siècle dans le bassin occidental de la Méditerranée**

La multiplication des prospections et l'invention des sites ne sont donc pas directement liées, à la chute de Constantinople et à l'avancée de l'Empire ottoman, mais semblent davantage corrélées aux difficultés d'approvisionnement. Vers 1460, les stocks disponibles des Occidentaux en Orient paraissaient épuisés (Heers et de

23 Rares sont les sites actuellement identifiés: un seul d'entre eux a été fouillé (Monterotondo) quelques *survey* ont été réalisés ailleurs (Dallai, Bianchi et Stasolla 2020).

Groer, ed. 1978, 375).24 Certains sites de production comme ceux de Lesbos/Mytilène étaient à l'arrêt,25 mais les trafics n'étaient pas totalement interrompus notamment entre l'Anatolie et Venise.26 Le prix de la matière première semble avoir augmenté.27 En outre, les premières découvertes occidentales ont probablement joué un rôle d'entraînement. Car le risque de voir certains fournisseurs disposer d'une position dominante – voire monopolistique – semble avoir suscité l'invention de nouveaux sites ou la reprise d'activités plus anciennes. Ainsi, l'essor de Tolfa peut-il avoir encouragé la reprise d'Agnano, attestée en 1462 (Feniello 2003, 162). Il est clairement établi comme un moteur des prospections en Toscane.28 Toutefois, la création d'un cartel entre le roi de Naples et le pape – une *maona* – en 1470,29 pourrait bien avoir aussi suscité l'essor des alunières dans la région.

Quoi qu'il en soit, ces entreprises – lorsqu'elles étaient actives – semblent avoir rapidement été productives. À Tolfa, quelques mois après l'invention du site (probablement en 1460 ou au début de 1461, cf. *supra*) les premières tonnes d'alun étaient commercialisées: dès septembre 1462, la Chambre Apostolique passait contrat avec des commerçants génois et l'année suivante, avec les Médicis (Zippel 1907, 16, 19). L'alun de Mazarrón était commercialisé en Flandres en 1486-1487, alors que l'activité ne débuta vraiment que vers 1485 (Munuera Navarro 2020, 144). C'est le signe que les techniques mobilisées étaient bien rodées ou furent facilement adaptées. Elles sont connues à travers quelques textes – notamment Francesco di Balduccio Pegolotti pour Phocée (pour le début du XIVe siècle), Vannoccio Biringucci dans son *De la Pirotechnia* publié de façon posthume en 1540 – et le procédé mis en œuvre a été analysé de façon détaillée par Maurice Picon (Picon 2000). Ce dernier distingue deux moments principaux (la calcination et la lixivation) et deux types de fours: les premiers pour cuire la pierre, comparables à des fours à chaux, les seconds pour accueillir des chaudières métalliques. Quelques rares données archéologiques (Dallai et Martínez Alcalde 2022) – et quelques documents écrits (Boisseuil et Chareille 2009) – laissent entrevoir ces infrastructures. Les fouilles menées par Luisa Dallai et ses collègues à Monterotondo ont mis à jour une batterie de fours de calcination datés de l'extrême fin du XVe et du début du XVIe siècles et deux fours de lixivation (Dallai et Poggi 2012; Dallai 2020). Ces derniers ne sont pas sans rappeler par leur forme et leur dimension, des vestiges observés à Ischia (Fineschi 2020) et surtout à Lesbos (Arvanitidou 2020). Ces similitudes laissent entrevoir – à défaut d'une analyse comparée poussée – des procédés semblables. Elles suggèrent de possibles transferts techniques depuis les rives orientales jusqu'aux

24 Marie-Louise Heers soutient que les aluns orientaux et notamment les stocks de Chio étaient épuisés en 1458 (Heers 1954, 38, 52).

25 À l'inverse, certains sites anatoliens étaient encore actifs.

26 David Jacoby assure les routes des aluns anatoliens étaient encore ouvertes à la fin du XVe siècle (Jacoby 2005, 254-56). Encore au début du XVIe siècle, les Vénitiens s'approvisionnaient en Orient (Gilbert 1991, 37), même s'ils utilisaient aussi de l'alun de Tolfa (Boisseuil, Chareille et Ait 2023).

27 À Sienne, les prix évoluèrent à la hausse à partir de 1460 (Giacchetto 2023), mais aucune enquête systématique sur le commerce de l'alun ne vient confirmer cette donnée.

28 Cf. note 9.

29 Sur la création de cette société commune, cf. *infra* et Feniello 2003, 163.

terres occidentales.30 Il convient de rester prudent cependant, car les infrastructures italiennes et espagnoles ne nous sont pas toutes connues et les rares observations menées (à Monterotondo, à Mazarrón) montrent qu'elles ne furent pas uniformes ni même durables sur chacun des sites. Il faut supposer des adaptations en fonction notamment du minerai employé et de la disponibilité en matières premières: l'alimentation en combustible et en eau – que l'on perçoit mal pour les quelques sites identifiés – ont pu conditionner le gabarit des réalisations, suscité des aménagements, voire des innovations techniques que nous ne percevons pas.

Néanmoins, il existe un autre biais qui permet d'envisager l'existence d'une circulation de savoirs techniques, c'est le rôle joué par quelques acteurs privilégiés, principalement des Génois, dans l'essor de la production d'alun en Occident. L'un d'entre eux mérite une attention toute particulière: Bartolomeo Pernice (ou Pernix). Il était impliqué dans la vie politique ligure, puisqu'il fut membre du Conseil des Anciens, en janvier 1460,31 même s'il n'appartenait pas à l'une des familles les plus puissantes de Gênes au XVe siècle.32 Il aurait vécu à «Rocca di Soria» – probablement Raqqa de Syrie, c'est-à-dire Edesse (Testi 1931, 444) –, où il aurait pratiqué le commerce.33 En tout cas, il navigua et fut présent dans plusieurs des lieux où fut recherchée et parfois trouvée de l'alunite et lancée la production. En 1438, il obtint, ainsi qu'Andrea Imperiali, un sauf-conduit pour commercialiser avec les Siennois.34 En 1451, il fut autorisé à prospecter sur le Monte Argentario.35 Il est réputé avoir découvert le site d'Ischia, vers 1458-1459.36 En 1463, il était autorisé – après son échec sur le Monte Argentario – à prospecter dans le territoire siennois pour trou-

36 Cf. note 16.

30 Cette circulation des acteurs et des modèles d'infrastructures peut être soutenue par une brève allusion d'un citoyen de Volterra, Gentile Guidi, dans une lettre adressée à son frère, Mercatante, installé à Florence et datée du 1er avril 1435, où il rapporte, concernant la production de soufre et de vitriol qu'ils déténaient ensemble dans le sud du territoire de Volterra, «Qua sento e riviato alle chave [di zolfo], uno del Reame de Puzuolo di Napoli e pare chapitasse costi a te e che tu lo inviassi qua a me; non fece molto, è andato la e molto dritamente, à voluto vedere ogni cose, e preso misure di fornaci e di vaschi in modo ne ito molto contento, e mi guasto il mio disegno: mio pensiero era andare una volta a Pozuolo», ASF, *Archivio Guidi* 581, fasc. 2.

31 Toutefois, il ne siégea pas, probablement parce qu'absent, Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), Archivio Segreto, *Diversorum Comunis Ianue* 3044, Acte du 22 janvier 1460.

32 Mais présente au XVIe siècle – après la réforme d'Andrea Doria de 1528 – parmi les membres de l'Albergo des Lercari. Je souhaite remercier ici Denise Bezzina pour cette précision.

33 Cf. note 16.

34 Le 11 février 1438 (ns), *Domino Bartolomeo Pernice et domino Andree Imperiali, omnibus de civitate Genue mercatoribus et unicuique ipsorum coniuctum vel separatim et de per se cum ipsorum et cuiuslibet ipsorum mercantiis omnibus ac bonis et navi et etiam personis cunctis super ipsa existentibus, concessus est salvusconductus per tempus unius mensis proxime secuturi*, ASS, *Concistoro* 1650, fol. 15r.

35 Le 15 juin 1451, «In prima, che a decto Bartholomeio Pernixe suoi compagni e successori loro sia lecito liberamente per via d'allogagione potere pigliare, trovare e cavere per se e per altri suoi lavoranti, famegli e compagni nel Monte Argentario, isole di mare di nostro comune e in ogni altro luogo del contado, iursidictione e distretto di Siena, excepto che nel terreno e corte di Massa, ogni e ciascuna vena e minora d'ogni metallo, come è d'oro, d'arento, ferro, rame, argento vivo, stagnio, piombo e altre vene come è pietre d'ogni colore da fabricare chiese e fare musaichi, allume, terra da salnitro e vetriuolo», A.S.S. Concistoro 2118, fol. 40r-41r; A.S.S. *Consiglio generale* 225, fol. 174r-175v. Publié dans Lisini 1935, 239-42.

ver des mines d'alun avec deux associés siennois: Mino di Guido Tholomei et Francesco di Giacomo Pepi detto Germano.37 Sa compétence était reconnue, puisqu'en 1465, il fut rétribué par la Chambre Apostolique pour avoir essayé l'alunite de Tolfa dans l'un des fours de calcination.38 Quelques mois plus tard en 1465-1466, il était à Lucques et demandait à la Commune, de pouvoir chercher des minerais – dont l'alun – sur son territoire.39 En presque trente ans, il semble avoir acquis une expertise reconnue et joué un rôle dans l'essor de l'industrie de l'alun entre la Campanie et la Toscane.

Il ne fut pas le seul Génois à se lancer dans la production d'alun en Occident. Son compatriote Damiano Spinola qui trafiquait entre la Sicile et la Toscane – vers 1458, il exportait des fruits secs vers Porto Pisano (Ouerfelli 2008, 454) – participa à l'essor des alunières de Sicile, sans que l'on puisse déterminer son rôle exact (Pipino 2009, 28; Campagna 2020, 1084). En revanche, on perçoit mieux, la fonction de Biagio di Centurione Spinola puisqu'il fut le *principalem magistrum dicte minerie aluminum* c'est-à-dire le responsable de la production des alunières de Tolfa, engagé dès le mois de juin 1462 par la Chambre Apostolique à raison de 400 florins par an et ce jusqu'en 1467 (Zippel 1907, 16; Ait 2010, 248). Un autre de ses concitoyens occupe cette même fonction, l'ex-doge de Gênes, Ludovico Campofregoso, engagé

37 «Perché altra volta nel 1451, esso Bartholomeo (…) havendo esso dirizato el suo primo oggieto et pensiero al Monte Argentario dove aveva trovato la vena del ferro et del argento et d'altre cose; et sopravenendo la guerra del duca di Calabria, poi del conte di Pitigliano et quella del conte Iacomo, non pote seguire suo disegno et adviso et conveneli andare in altre parti a procacciare sua ventura (…); el detto Bartholomeo per se et suoi participi et compagni li sia concesso (…) di potere cavare et fare cavare, lavorare allume et minere d'allumi in quegli luoghi del terreno et distrecto di Siena dove li parrà et li piaccia», ASS, *Consiglio generale* 229, fol. 293-295v. Cité dans Piccinni 1999, 245; publié Boisseuil 2005, 113-115.

38 Suivent les écritures sur différents feuillets des livres de comptes conservés pour l'administration des alunières de Tolfa: «Bartolomeo Pernice da Genova de dare a dì 26 di marzo 1465, per alumi in monte et per allumi la Camera li detti per un dono per la prova fece della pietra dello allume, a k. 10, … cantara 25», Archivio di Stato di Roma (ASR), *Camerale III* reg. 2378 (fasc. A), fol. 11. «A dì 26 di marzo [1465], cantara vinticinque d'alume levato della sua lumera [Bartolomeo Framura] per messer Bartolomeo Pernice a conto della Camera Apostolica in questo, c. 228… cantara 25», ASR, *Camerale III* reg. 2378 (fasc. D), fol. 225. «A dì XXVI di marzo [1465], cantara vinticinque d'alumi consegnato per essa [Camera Apostolica] a messer Bartolomeo Pernice, della lumera di messer Bartolomeo Framura per la sua fatiga della sperientia fe della pietra dele fornace che ne fe alume. Lo quale alume sopra decto li fo decti per vigore de uno a mandato de mons*ignor* el tesariero della Sanctità de N.S. facto de dì XV de marzo 1465 a conto di messer Bartolomeo in questo … c. 225, cantara 25», ASR, *Camerale III* reg. 2378 (fasc. D), fol. 227v.

39 Le 19 septembre 1465, *auctoritas componendi pro metallis et alumina fodendis*. *Item fuit propositum quod quidam Bartolomeus Pernice obtulit Magnificis dominis velle invenire et fodere in districtu lucano multas manieres metallorum et aluminis et aliarum rerum cum certis pactis et capitulis que annotavit*… Archivio di Stato di Lucca (ASL), *Consiglio Generale* 19, fol. 103; le 29 avril 1466, *per mineriis fondendi*, «Expone con ogni debita reverentia, lo vostro fidelissimo servitor Bartolomeo Pernixe cittadino di Genova e dice come lui hae già fa circa mesi sei proximamente passati, praticato con li Magnifici Signori che dicto tempo sono seduti circa le maniere delli septe metalli, alumi, vetrioli, salnitri, sal amoniaco et ogni maniera che si trovasse sopra terra o sotto terra paleze overo secreta di potere fare cavare in nello vostro territorio per se o per altra persona che volesse per lui cavasse, et questo per anni X proximi avenire dal di che si farà di tal cosa rimaso d'accordio francamente libere et sicure sensa pagare alchuna cosa etc». ASL, *Consiglio Generale* 19, fol. 179-1.

342 DIDIER BOISSEUIL

pour diriger l'alunière de l'Accesa, près de Massa Marittima, en 1471 (Boisseuil 2014, § 12). Il est étonnant qu'un prince puisse assumer cette fonction, mais le contrat d'engagement précise qu'il n'interviendrait pas seul. Comme il avait épousé Ginevra Gattilusio, la fille de l'un des derniers seigneurs des îles de la mer Égée (Wright 2014, 181), il est possible qu'il ait été accompagné d'ouvriers ou de techniciens capables de faire fonctionner les fours provenant de cette partie orientale de la Mediterranée.40 Des Génois apparaissent aussi en Espagne, mais plus tardivement. Les frères Rey, Baltasar, Luis et Domingo, bien implantés à Valence, furent chargés de produire de l'alun à Mazarrón probablement dès 1485.41 Le rôle joué par les acteurs ligures – notamment les membres de familles puissantes, comme les Spinola, Campofregoso – suggère qu'ils ne se contentaient pas seulement du transport de l'alun oriental, comme ils l'avaient fait au cours des siècles précédents au côté des Vénitiens, mais qu'ils avaient une réelle connaissance des modes la production ou une capacité à les dominer.

Cependant, ils ne monopolisèrent pas ces savoirs – ou n'y parvinrent pas –, car nombre d'autres techniciens furent à la tête d'alunières (Arnoux et Monnet, ed. 2004; Boisseuil 2016). En Toscane, le *conductor* de l'alunière de Monterotondo en 1471 était un citoyen siennois, Bartolomeo di Mariano Allegretti (Boisseuil 2014, § 11), et quelques années plus tard, en 1507, ce fut le fils bâtard d'un grand médecin, Piero di fu Alessandro da Sermoneta (Boisseuil – Chareille 2009, 14). Francesco di Giacomo detto Germano, qui fut l'un des associés Bartolomeo Pernice en 1463 (cf. *supra*),42 était considéré comme *magister lumerie* et intervint sur plusieurs des sites toscans (Boisseuil 2014, § 11).43 À Agnano, la reprise de l'activité fut assurée en 1462, par un technicien de renom, Guglielmo Lo Monaco (Feniello 2003, 162; Feniello 2005, 199 sq.), qui était au service des Aragonais.44 En Espagne, la responsabilité technique paraît plus incertaine: Juan de Casal (ou Casals) fut reconnu comme *magister aluminis de roqua* pour tout le royaume d'Aragon et de Valence; il travailla notamment à Ademuz en 1461 et à Paracuellos de Jiloca en 1462, avec un succès mitigé.45 Ces techniciens n'avaient pas nécessairement une connaissance directe des modes de production orientaux, mais grâce à l'ampleur de leurs compétences techniques, organisationnelles, ils furent capables de mettre en œuvre une production nouvelle. Le succès de leurs activités témoigne, s'il était encore nécessaire de le rappeler, de l'importance de la circulation des savoirs techniques et du rôle des appren-

40 D'autant qu'il s'était proposé, étant doge, de soutenir les responsables de la «maona de Chio» après la prise de Lesbos en 1462 (Argenti 1958, 242).

41 Le contrat d'engagement date de 1486, pour 6 ans, mais c'est un renouvellement (Franco Silva 1995, 105; Igual Luis 2014).

42 Ce rapprochement suggère une véritable communication dans le monde du travail (Braunstein 1992; Braunstein 1999).

43 Il était aussi proche des Allegretti.

44 Sur le personnage, cf. Barreto 2011.

45 Morales Gomez 2016, 546, 548. Peut-être était-il originaire d'une famille de marchands lombards présents à Valence dans la première moitié du siècle (Navarro Espinach et Villanueva Morte 2020, 127).

tissages et des savoirs tacites,46 parmi les connaissances utiles dans l'essor artisanal et industriel de la fin du moyen âge. Il suggère davantage de coopération que de concurrence et une forme de libéralité dans la mise à disposition des procédés techniques.47 Il confirme aussi l'importance des centres urbains (comme Sienne) et des districts industriels comme foyers essentiels de la réception ou de la diffusion de ces savoirs. Surtout, la rapidité de circulation, d'adaptation de ces savoirs souligne le caractère étroitement connecté de ces espaces (entre la Campanie et la Catalogne), par le biais de la mer Tyrrhénienne notamment, particulièrement fréquentée par les marchands génois, toscans et catalans. Ce sont d'ailleurs, des marchands qui ont contribué à fonder, même s'ils ne furent pas seuls, plusieurs des alunières, selon des structures entrepreneuriales, très différentes les unes des autres, néanmoins.

#### **3. Des entreprises industrielles dirigées par des marchands**

La principale de ces entreprises était celle de Tolfa dont l'organisation est singulière. La production fut lancée – sous le contrôle technique de Biagio di Centurione Spinola (cf. *supra*) – par trois associés, désignés comme *constructores*: outre Giovanni di Paolo di Castro (Ait 2009), deux marchands l'un génois, Bartolomeo Framura et l'autre pisan, même si installé depuis longtemps à Viterbe, Carlo Gaetani.48 Les trois s'étaient engagés, vraisemblablement dès 1462, auprès de la Chambre Apostolique à fournir plus de 30 000 cantares d'alun par an (environ 1500 tonnes).49 On ignore encore comment s'organisait concrètement la production – notamment l'emplacement des premiers des fours de calcination et de lixivation – mais il existait plusieurs zones d'extraction (Vallelonga 2020). Néanmoins chacun des trois associés était responsable de ses ouvriers et devait stocker l'alun produit dans ses propres magasins à Civitavecchia (Zippel 1907, 22), dont l'enregistrement et le transport étaient assurés par des représentants de la Chambre Apostolique – ou bien entre 1465 et 1471, par les Commissaires de la Croisade.50 En 1465, la filiale romaine de la banque Médicis obtint la «depositeria» de la Chambre Apostolique et celle du Trésor de la Croisade (Zippel 1907, 403). *In fine*, l'alun acheté par le dépositaire était commercialisé en exclusivité par une société fermière51 – les Médicis jusqu'en 147652 –, mais les producteurs pouvaient aussi écouler leurs excédents en les

46 Sur la circulation des savoirs techniques et des savoirs tacites, cf. Braunstein 1999; Hilaire-Pérez et Verna 2006; Pérez et Verna 2009.

47 Plus précisément dans la péninsule italienne à la fin du moyen âge, voir Epstein et Fava 2009; Donati et Franceschi 2018.

48 Sa descendance était apparentée aux Margani (Ait 2010).

49 Nous ne connaissons que le renouvellement du contrat qui date de 1465 (Zippel 1907, 21).

50 En 1465, Paul II institua en effet, que les revenus du commerce de l'alun seraient destinés à financer la Croisade contre les Turcs et géré par une Commission composée de trois cardinaux (Zippel 1907, 24; 416; Weber 2013). Sixte IV remit la gestion des alunières de la Croisade aux mains de la Chambre Apostolique, en 1471 (Zippel 1907, 24; 418).

51 Le premier contrat de "l'appalto" date novembre 1462, le second du 20 mars 1465 (Rinaldi 1995, 15; 20).

52 Puis confiée aux Pazzi (Zippel 1907, 404).

344 DIDIER BOISSEUIL

vendant de façon préférentielle à la papauté, en les faisant vendre par la société fermière ou en assurant eux-mêmes leur exportation (Boisseuil, Chareille et Ait 2023). Pour autant que l'on puisse en juger (car les documents sont peu nombreux), le système évolua peu avant la fin du siècle,53 seuls quelques acteurs changèrent. Les Médicis remplacèrent Bartolomeo Framura au sein de la société productrice en 1466 (Zippel 1907, 404), Carlo Gaetani céda la place à son fils, Alfonso en 1479 (Zippel 1907, 424).54 Les Médicis furent évincés de la ferme en 1476, au profit des Pazzi, jusqu'en 1478, puis se succédèrent: Visconte Cigala et Domenico Centurione, de nouveau les Médicis (1485-1489), les génois Niccolò et Paolo Gentili (1489-1491) et à partir de 1492, le florentin, Paolo Rucellai (Delumeau 1962, 89-90). La production et la commercialisation semblent avoir été importante, tout au moins pendant la période où les Médicis contrôlèrent la ferme du commerce des aluns :55 il est probable qu'elle excédait les demandes pontificales contractualisées.56 Les pratiques marchandes – comme savoirs utiles – ont sans doute participé au succès et à la continuité de l'entreprise pontificale.

On connaît moins bien le fonctionnement de la société qui assurait la production d'Agnano, mais en 1462, elle apparaît comme une 'joint venture' entre Guglielmo Lo Monaco et Ferrante d'Aragon qui n'entra en action que trois ans plus tard (Feniello 2003, 160; Feniello 2005, 199).57 En juin 1470, afin de limiter la concurrence, le pape proposa de réunir la production des alunières de Tolfa à celle du royaume de Naples en ne formant plus qu'un seule «maona» (Zippel 1907, 35; Delumeau 1962, 24-26; Feniello 2003, 162). Cette dernière ne dura pas plus d'un an et la production d'Agnano se maintint sans doute modestement par la suite.58 En revanche, il semble bien que l'alunière d'Ischia ait davantage produit. Le souverain y joua un rôle moindre. Sous la direction de nombreux concessionnaires, proches des Aragonais: d'abord des marchands vénitiens résidant à Naples, puis le comte de Sarno (1481-1486). Avec l'activité de plusieurs sous-traitants napolitains (Gaspare Scozio, Aniello Pierozzi) la production se maintint et était exportée (Feniello 2003, 163).59 La quantité d'alun produit à Lipari était sans doute modeste malgré les efforts de quelques marchands florentins.60 Les alunières espagnoles, lancées par des

53 Il faut attendre la gestion d'Agostino Chigi au début du XVIe siècle, pour observer un changement dans le mode de production (Ait et Modigliani 2021).

54 Une fois mort, la gestion de l'alunière revint aux Margani puisque Alfonso Gaetani avait épousé Cristofora Margani (Ait 2010, 248).

55 C'est la seule période de la fin du XVe siècle, pour laquelle sont conservées, déposées à l'ASR, des épaves archivistiques de cette vaste entreprise (Boisseuil, Chareille et Ait 2023).

56 Carlo Gaetani aurait produit à lui seul pendant les années 1464-1465, près de 70 000 cantares d'alun (Ait 2010, 249).

57 Le contrat prévoyait la réalisation de 7 fours pour cuire la pierre et d'un édifice pour la lessiver. Guglielmo s'engageait à produire 2400 cantares/an (Cestari 1790, 26-31).

58 Elle paraissait modeste au regard de Tolfa: 200 cantares par mois (Zippel 1907, 37; Feniello 2005, 205).

59 Des outillages et chaudières neufs furent installés en 1473 (Feniello 2005, 203). Voir aussi Pipino 2009, 29-30.

60 Cf. note 20.

marchands locaux, furent peu productives,61 à l'exception de celle de Mazarrón. Cette dernière avait été concédée par Henri IV, à son favori Juan Pacecho, marquis de Villena en mai 1462 qui s'était très vite associé en 1463 à Pedro Fajardo, officier de justice. Les deux protagonistes se réservaient, pour moitié chacun, l'alun produit et cédaient à un exploitant la production. Le contrat qui intéressait leurs héritiers respectifs fut reconduit en 1480, à la suite du renouvellement de la concession royale. Il est possible que l'activité ait débuté alors. Elle fut d'abord confiée à un groupe d'acteurs locaux originaires de Murcie, mais en 1485, ils furent évincés au profit des frères Rey, des Génois, qui s'engageaient à produire 4000 cantares d'alun par an (Franco Silva 1995, 105; Córdoba de la Llave, Franco Silva et Navarro Espinach 2005, 127-128). C'est à partir de cette époque que l'alun était exporté à Valence (Igual Luis 2014) et jusqu'en Flandre.

On connaît mieux les sociétés qui œuvrèrent en Toscane. Elles étaient composées, surtout après 1480, de plusieurs investisseurs appartenant aux élites politico-économiques, essentiellement siennoises – plusieurs membres de familles influentes comme Borghesi, Tolomei, Petrucci et bancaires comme Pini, Spannocchi – et dans une moindre mesure, florentines – Médicis et Capponi (Boisseuil 2014, § 10 sq ). Par leur structure, ces entreprises étaient comparables aux compagnies commerciales. Elles s'acquittaient envers les autorités publiques – seigneur de Piombino, communes de Sienne, de Volterra, de Massa Marittima… – d'un droit d'exploitation (sous la forme d'une location) et commercialisaient directement la production, par l'intermédiaire des réseaux d'affaires qu'elles connaissaient ou animaient. Même modeste au regard de Tolfa, la production trouvait ses débouchés (locaux, internationaux). Ainsi, l'alun de Piombino voyageait-il jusqu'à Valence, en Espagne, et même jusqu'en Flandres ou en Angleterre.62

Il est difficile de savoir, faute de documents,63 si les formes organisationnelles64 déployées dans les alunières occidentales, étaient de beaucoup différentes de celles mobilisées par les Génois auparavant en Orient et si les pratiques comptables communes à tous ces acteurs économiques de premier plan (marchands et banquiers toscans notamment) ont joué un rôle important dans l'essor des entreprises européennes. Néanmoins, elles pouvaient apparaître comme des connaissances utiles qui furent, à l'égal des savoirs techniques empruntés ou adaptés, des connaissances empiriques collectées rapidement,65 nécessaires pour créer, en une décennie environ (entre 1460 et 1470) des industries nouvelles et viables.66 Ces alunières ont

61 Une cinquantaine de quintaux annuels pour Paracuellos à la fin du siècle (Morales Gomez 2016, 550). En 1462, deux chaudières de bronze sont attestées à Paracuellos (Navarro Espinach et Villanueva Morte 2020, 126).

62 Notamment en 1485-1486, à raison de plusieurs milliers de cantares par chargement, cf. ASF *Notarile antecosimiano*, 18577, fol. 10v-11r, 48v, 113-114v, 131r.

63 On a jusqu'alors repéré qu'une seule comptabilité d'alunière, datée du début du XVIe siècle (Boisseuil et Chareille 2009).

64 Notamment pour l'organisation du travail qui était un élément essentiel de la production, cf. Braunstein 2003b.

65 Sur l'importance d'apprécier à différentes échelles, de temps et d'espace, ces circulations, cf. Hilaire-Pérez 2015.

66 On connaît encore mal les structures de production anatoliennes.

très vite trouvé, grâce à la densité des réseaux marchands européens, à écouler leur production. En sorte, que déjà avant 1480, le manque d'alun redouté à l'issue de la chute de Constantinople, paraissait un lointain souvenir…

#### **SOURCES**

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHIE**

documentation romaine." *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. moyen âge* [En ligne] 135, 2 (à paraître).

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durée." In *L'artisanat en Grèce ancienne. Filières de production: bilans, méthodes et perspectives*, ed. Francine Blondé, 391-418. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion.

# Sandra de la Torre Gonzalo

*Management and governance of the kingdom's finances. Financial literacy as useful knowledge in late-medieval Aragon (1365-1515)*

This paper's primary research question is to examine to what extent changes in mechanisms and instruments of financial management proceeding from trading knowledge improved the efficiency of late-medieval polities (van Zanden *et al.* 2012). To do so, we will examine a territorial state experience in medieval Iberia.1 The Kingdom of Aragon was one of the component realms of the Crown of Aragon, a singular political entity (Barton 2021). In the mid-14th century, a greater level of sophistication in the administration of public finance all over the Crown was accompanied by the birth of supra-local polities. Aragon designed its own autonomous fiscal system which was integrated into the management of the kingdom's finances. When the newly established permanent representative institution of the realm (known as the *Diputación del Reino*) made its first steps, it needed financial accounts to keep track of revenues and to access credit, which led to the refinement of documentary practice and monitoring methods.

This study highlights the agency of accounting-trained individuals who shaped the functioning of financial institutions, using their trading knowledge to improve the efficiency of the latter in a number of ways, from budgeting to tax collecting (Silvestri 2020).2 The chief sources used here are parliamentary proceedings and the account books produced for financial auditing purposes.3 Thus, particular attention has been paid to the impact of the increasing prominence of financial numeracy on institutional accountability and governance.

FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup\_best\_practice)

The research for this paper was supported by a postdoctoral contract granted by *Convocatoria 2019 de contratos postdoctorales de la Universidad de Valladolid* (ref. POSTDOC UVA04) and the funding of *Ayudas de bolsas de viaje para intervenciones en congresos científicos de la Universidad de Valladolid 2022* (ref. AYUDBV-2022-27). It forms part of the results of the research project 'El ejercicio del poder en la Edad Media: espacios, agentes y escrituras (siglos XI-XV)' (ref. HAR2017-84718-P) and the group 'Leon y Castilla en la Alta y Plena Edad Media', led by Carlos Reglero. Additionally, this study is in line with the interests of the Aragonese Government's Reference Research Group CEMA, led by Carlos Laliena (Universidad

de Zaragoza). 1 The characteristics of the creation of a province-wide public debt system are still the subject of debate, but the realms of the Crown of Aragon were among the earliest to adopt it: Haemers 2015. 2 Literature so far has produced evidence of the emergence at the end of the Middle Ages of new

power groups (Dumolyn, 2006) in which merchants succeeded thanks to specific knowledge (Tognetti 2018; Igual 2016).

3 An exhaustive list of documentary material is offered in the systematic analysis of the institution during the reign of Ferdinand II made by J. Ángel Sesma: Sesma 1977. In 2020, I identified in the collection of the Banco de España the account book for 1436-1437: FEV-SV-M-00218.

Sandra de la Torre Gonzalo, University of Zaragoza, Spain<EMAIL_ADDRESS>0000-0002-5474-0050 Referee List (DOI 10.36253/fup\_referee\_list)

Sandra de la Torre Gonzalo, *Management and governance of the kingdom's finances. Financial literacy as useful knowledge in late-medieval Aragon (1365-1515)*, © Author(s), CC BY 4.0, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0092-9.21, in Giampiero Nigro (edited by), *L'economia della conoscenza: innovazione, produttività e crescita economica nei secoli XIII-XVIII / The knowledge economy: innovation, productivity and economic growth,13th to 18th century*, pp. 352-372, 2023, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0092-9, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0092-9

#### **1. Quod omnes tangit: the birth of territorial taxation in the Kingdom of Aragon**

In accordance with the classical legal maxim *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus comprobetur*, the representatives of the king of Aragon's realms were consulted increasingly often at political assemblies called *Cortes*. 4 All of the orders contributed in all the states of the realm, but not with the same criteria. Representatives of nobles, clergy and royal towns constituted separated orders (called *braços* or arms in Catalan and Aragonese languages), of which there were four in the case of Aragon (aristocrats and petty nobility were separated). Frequent discussions occurred regarding the methods for collecting the extraordinary contribution and distributing it between the *braços*. The application of the agreed general taxation was temporary because it was intended to prevent it from becoming permanent. It was also free from intervention by the king, his lieutenant or his officials, with each *braço* having its own treasurer responsible for the collection and management of their corresponding part of the subsidies. These aids were granted voluntarily by the *Cortes*, which meant that the conditions were laid down in an agreement (some were even provided in the form of loans).5 This arrangement was peculiar to these territories as opposed to the neighbouring Crown of Castile (Ladero 1999). Nevertheless, the monarchs resorted to private credit or appealed directly to the royal towns (de la Torre 2018a; García 2006).

The context of this great transformation (Sánchez, Furió and Sesma 2008) is a long war between the two major Iberian states in the late Middle Ages (Lafuente 2018; Kagay 2016). The king of Aragon's requests during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1369) were promptly answered due to the urgent defensive needs of the territories (Ferrer 2004). The critical situation at that time discouraged the use of traditional forms of taxation, and the representatives of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia found an alternative that exploited a new source of fiscal income with little impact on individual economies. The general gathering of *Cortes* in 1362-1363 promoted a common project that sought to guarantee the funding of the major defence expenditures. The representatives of the three territories designed a new customs duty of universal application with no exemptions, which carried the name of *generalidades* (referring to its general scope).

As a consequence, legislation was changed to overcome the traditional division by *braços*. The political role of the commissions of the *Cortes* was strengthened and new representative bodies were fostered: the period 1362-1363 is considered to be the birth of the *diputaciones*, although their formalisation as permanent institutions occurred later. The three (in Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia) shared the central concept of the *General* as a union of interests that brought together all of the inhabitants in each of the three territories, but they differed widely in their attributions and functioning (Sesma 1977; Muñoz 1987; Sánchez de Movellán 2004). Frequent gatherings provoked by the continuing military tension throughout the 1360s-1370s consoli-

4 The records of the Aragonese meetings have been published recently by the Research Group CEMA (Universidad de Zaragoza) in the series *Acta Curiarum Regni Aragonum* (ACRA).

5 ACRA V, 46-47 and 98-99.

dated these parliaments' delegations (Lafuente 2021). From 1436, when the institutionalisation of the Aragonese *Diputación* took place, its powers went beyond a merely fiscal and financial body.6 The deputies had previously assumed a greater political role in the kingdom and the Crown, but it was the reformation accomplished in 1436 which awarded them governmental functions at the highest level.

The economic functions of the *Diputación* in the Kingdom of Aragon were distributed between three management organs, which overlapped in terms of attributions and personnel. Firstly, the leaseholders of the *generalidades*, who had their own staff; secondly, the administrators of the *General*, bearers of mercantile knowledge, were also external to the *Cortes*; and thirdly, the deputies (appointed by the *braços*) who were devoted essentially to resolving issues, arranging the auction of the *generalidades*, authorising payments and auditing the administrator's account books. Initially, the management of the kingdom's finances was a mimetic reproduction of the royal administration and lay in the hands of one *escribano de ración* (paymaster) and one treasurer of the *General*. Both were chosen from among those attending the assemblies and were independent of the treasurers elected by each of the four *braços* (ACRA III, 164 and 192; ACRA IV, 288; ACRA V, 78-79).

The position of administrator distances Aragon particularly from the Kingdom of Valencia, where three deputies (representing the three *braços*) exercised this role through territorial sub-delegates (Muñoz 1987). In Aragon, the administration of the kingdom's finance was handed to an outsider linked to the leasing of the *generalidades*  (Sesma 1977). The position involved collecting the amounts pertaining to the leasing of the *generalidades* and the completion of payments ordered by the deputies. During the period of direct management of the *generalidades* (1451-1464), the administrator received a salary and was elected by sortition. The positions of main leaseholder of the *generalidades* and administrator of the *General* were fused into one person from 1465 onwards.

#### **2. The Diputación revenues**

#### **2.1 A customs duty: the generalidades**

It was said in the *Cortes* of Barcelona in 1431-1434 that the *generalidades* were the fundament of the *General* (referring to Catalonia), with the *General*'s performance capacity reliant on them and on their expeditious and prompt exaction (Ortí 2011, 120). In Aragon, also, the new general duty became the pillar of a stable tax system with a regular income, and was autonomous (ACRA IV, 291). Its revenues allowed for the design of an economic policy and thus the stabilisation of the *General*'s treasury.

It should be noted that what was conceived as an ambitious common project soon separated the three peninsular estates of the realm (Sesma 2013). Aragon was the first to adapt, in 1364, the same principles of protectionism and interventionism underlying the original proposal to its interests. A network of customs ports on the frontiers of the kingdom taxed exports, initially. Over the following years, the duty

6 This is coincidental with a reform in the Catalan body adressed in the *Cortes* of 1433: Sánchez de Movellán 2004.

was extended to imports, the fiscal network was expanded to include more customs posts, and the range of products and tariffs (*ad valorem*, 5-10%) changed over time.7

The introduction of the new taxation system in Aragon originally met with some resistance (Sesma 2015, 220). The records of the parliaments evince notable tensions between the *braços.* Hence, it was agreed that the establishment of the *generalidades*  would be valid during a very limited period and would be under the strict control of the *Cortes*. Nevertheless, the external borders of the Crown were threatened intermittently, leading the *Cortes* to vote, in 1371-1372, to pay the interest on the loan debt taken on by the kingdom (the *General*) using revenue from the customs duties. The collection of such customs duties was to be extended on a monthly basis until the total amortisation of the debt had been achieved (ACRA III, 382). In 1376, the total amount granted to the crown was not distributed between the *braços* for the first time (ACRA IV, 75, 151-153 and 283-284).

Indeed, the *generalidades* were allocated according to a fairly predictable economic pattern. Having an income that was stable and predictable prevented the kingdom from being charged excessive interest. Furthermore, the lease of the *generalidades* assured a fixed amount that was paid promptly to the kingdom's treasury.8 Unfortunately, only during the period of direct management of the customs duties did the administrator of the *General* record the tax revenues and not merely the price of the lease, which varied according to the custom's tariffs and was often affected by the threat of war.9

The *Cortes* (or very rarely the deputies) discussed the contract terms of every new lease of the *generalidades* and awarded the lease by means of an auction, the details of which were announced publicly, in advance, in the main surrounding economic centres. The lease term lacked regularity until the second half of the 15th century, when it adopted a three-year periodicity, coinciding with the deputies' cycles, as had been implemented in Catalonia and Valencia.10 One of Aragon's singularities is the fact that the collection of customs duties (including the selection of personnel, payment of management costs, etc.) depended on the leaseholder of the *generalidades*. The deputies of the *General* were mainly responsible for ensuring the free collection of the tax and for prosecuting instances of fraud.

7 The main changes took place in the years 1364, 1376, 1414 and 1436: ACRA II, 413; IV, 96-102; VIII, 413-414; IX, 191; *ibid.*, 512-513.

8 The instalments for the concession of a loan to the king in 1381 were scheduled by the Aragonese representatives according to the payments made by the leaseholders of the *generalidades*: ACRA V, 98-99.

9 J. Á. Sesma estimates that the customs tax revenues could have reached more than £40 000 in 1446-1449: Sesma, 2020. From the direct management period, the surviving account books correspond to the fiscal years 1450-1451, 1453-1454, 1456-1457, 1457-1458 and 1460-1461: Sesma 2013, 129. Although the total amount is not altered significantly, the detail of each customs post reveals the volatility of this tax: Sesma 2013, 150-55.

10 The *generalidades* were leased yearly in Catalonia until 1390: Ortí 2011, 122.

#### **2.2 Other tax revenues**

The *generalidades* constituted a common project with a common funding pot. Despite this, financial emergencies required an increase in the tax burden (Lafuente 2019) and the *Cortes* reflected a clash of interests when trying to modulate the level of fiscal pressure. The representatives of the kingdom continued to approve the traditional methods of collection and to share the amount between the *braços*. 11

A *sisa* was a tax levied on consumption and market selling (mainly on staple food products). It was the preferred method of collection by the royal *braço*. From the end of the 14th century, *sisas* were banned under penalty of excommunication, but this did not prevent their reintroduction in 1442 for the defence of the kingdom (ACRA X, 472-76). Likewise, the clergy and noble *braços* preferred the *fogaje* (a hearth tax), which allowed them to benefit from their particular privileges. The tax collection was a very slow process and a source of conflict. Each *braço* commissioned a series of

11 Different duties on consumption and trade (*vectigal* and *gabela*) which were separate from the *generalidades* were established in the first stage of the *Diputación*. Notwithstanding, the deputies feared the impact that an excessive increase in sales tax could have on trade and manufacturing production, and these formulas were soon abandoned. In this regard, in Catalonia, the leasing contract could be terminated in case of levying a *vectigal*: Sánchez de Movellán 2004, 308. 12 Sesma 2015. Data is collected from the parliamentary records. Currency: 1 pound (*libra*) = 20

shillings (*sueldos*) = 240 pence (*dineros*). For ease of reading, conversions to Jaca pounds are given, but it should be borne in mind that these exchanges depended on the currency market. The Aragonese gold florin was used frequently as a currency of account valued at 10 shillings per florin.

collectors who were usually financers who advanced the money, managed the collection process and received the interests generated. In 1484, the *General* established a levying system that merged *sisas* and *fogajes*, and was managed by the administrator of the kingdom (Sesma 1977, 140-48).

#### **2.3 Credit and the emergence of consolidated debt**

*Violarios* (lifetime annuities) and *censales* (redeemable annuities) offered much lower rates of interest than traditional forms of credit (García 2002). The widespread use of these credit instruments caused interest rates to plunge to 5% at the end of the 15th century.13 Additionally, the consolidation of public debt eventually enabled the kingdom to get rid of the royal interference exerted by the financers of the crown.14

Tab. 2. **Interest rates of annuities issued by the General of Aragon (modal value in percentage)15**

The first issues of annuities by the *General* were virtually coincidental in Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia (Sánchez 2009; Muñoz 1987). In 1376, the Aragonese assembly authorised the first issue of *censales* at an interest rate of 10%, although it was not opened to investors (ACRA IV, 108; Sesma 2015, 222). The debt was paid for with the income of the *generalidades* tax and guaranteed with the assets (and persons) of each and every one of the inhabitants of the kingdom. In these early years, the public debt system was not taken advantage of in all of its possibilities and the deputies tried to cancel the debt as soon as possible.

Four meetings of *Cortes* took place prior to the next order issuing annuities, in 1398. This state of affairs appears to contradict the claim being made at that time that the *General* was owed a lot in annuities (ACRA VI, 249). In the light of new data available, we know that new annuities were issued from at least 1391 onwards (de la Torre 2022).16 The downward trend appreciable at this stage (Tab. 2) is marked by wild fluctuations produced by new royal demands and political instability at that time (de la Torre 2018b). The plan of getting credit from purchasers of new annuities in

13 The reasons behind the decrease of interest rates in many different European territories are still subject to debate: Stasavage 2011.

14 ACRA II, 418; ACRA III, 45-48, 160-163, 185-187, 193 and 199.

15 Sources: Archivo de la Diputación de Zaragoza (ADZ), ms. 681-2, ms. 681-3 and ms. 35; Sesma 2015; Sesma 1977.

16 The issues are recorded in an inventory of the documents kept in the *Diputación*'s archive made presumably by the end of the 16th century: ADZ, ms. 5.

order to release the kingdom from its debt worked, and the interest rate was drastically reduced: bonds were last sold at 10% in 1398 and the maximum rate in 1400 was 7.69%.17

Nonetheless, due to the financial hardship that the *General* was experiencing, the *Cortes* forbade new issues of public debt in 1404 (Sesma 2015, 227). The following years are characterised by small issues of new bonds and stable interest rates. The deputies sought to generate investment confidence and offered new guarantees (ACRA VIII, 342-345). Until 1454, all assemblies ordered the issue of public debt (the average sum was £24 000) with few exceptions (Tab. 1). Good progress had been made by this point: in 1427-1428, the *Cortes* restricted the issue of new annuities to the Aragonese market and established a maximum interest rate of 6.67% (ACRA IX, 8; 273). Bonds were sold easily and the kingdom overcame the difficulties of the 1440s (Sesma 2015, 234). However, it is evident that there was a turnaround in the following decade (Tab. 2): in 1454 the deputies offered an interest rate of 6.67%. Previously, the *General* had sold a batch of annuities to the administrators directly instead of commissioning them for that purpose (ACRA XI, 793-794). It was not until the bailout of 1488 that the interest rate resumed its downward trend.18

#### **3. The Diputación expenses**

Salaries and management costs remained low, similarly to what happened in Catalonia and Valencia. The bureaucratisation of the *Diputación* in 1460-1470 increased the budget allocated for salaries and management costs (Sesma 1979, 198-199). On average, the administrator paid £3 500 in 1479-1515, representing 7.9% of revenues (Sesma 1977, 149-166).

The weakness of the described system was that the debt accumulated easily and thus the threshold of the kingdom's spending escalated. Consequently, an increase in tax income was consumed by the payment of the interest. Thus, public debt management became the financial focus of the *General* of Aragon. The first documented decision in this regard is an order given in 1394 by the deputies to use part of the price of the *generalidades* to reduce the *General*'s debt (de la Torre 2018a, 84-85). Four years later, the *Cortes* approved the introduction of extraordinary duties for the consolidation of public finances. The debt reduction plan continued in 1404 and sought to reduce the amount devoted to interest payments by redeeming the debt bonds sold at higher interest rates, or at least renegotiating a decrease in interest rates (ACRA VIII, 342-45).

17 ADZ, ms. 681-3, f. 43; *ibid.*, 46v-48.

18 Catalan deputies were also forced to offer notably higher interest rates during the Civil War: Miquel 2022, 123 and 126.

Tab. 3. **Evolution of the General's annuities (in Jaca pounds)19**

The administrator started a campaign of reductions agreed with the holders of *censales* and forced repurchases during this period, although overall figures are not

19 Pub. Sesma 1979, 202; Sesma 1977, 133 and appendix II. Data is collected from the accounting books of the *General*'s administration. I have included data for 1436-1437 from the Biblioteca del Banco de España, FEV-SV-M-00218. Despite the time that has elapsed, Hamilton (1936, 81-115) is a solid reference for approximating the impact of inflation on the Aragonese public debt. After an abrupt price spike in the second half of the 14th century, an irregular rise of prices in 1401-1444 was accompanied by monetary inflation in the kingdom (*ibid.,* 189-204). Nonetheless, this was followed by a pronounced decline and a period of falling prices in Aragon (*ibid.*, 195). Hamilton argues that the debasement of the coinage was responsible for a more stable price level in the second half of the 15th century (*ibid.*, 106). As for wages, they moved more slowly than prices from the second quarter of the 15th century (*ibid.*, 113).

available until 1417 (de la Torre 2022; Sesma 1979, 182). The budget assigned to annuity payments and the number of bonds dropped in ten years. This operation of debt reduction also affected the average interest rate to the extent that all the amortised annuities in 1421-1422 were at 6.25%.20 The leasing contract of the *generalidades*, in 1428, included the commitment to redeem £50 000 over six years (Sesma 1979, 184-185; ACRA X, 808).21 This policy exclusively affected annuities paid in Barcelona currency, some of which were lowered by 10-15% (Sesma 1979, 187). The Aragonese deputies achieved a reduction in extra costs and, most importantly, in the pressure exerted by foreign investors.

In the 1440s, the annuities paid in Barcelona currency increased by 15% and the return of capital was 180% higher than ten years earlier (Sesma 1979, 190). With the outbreak of the Catalan Civil War (1462-1472), John II banned the payment of interest to Catalan investors (Sesma 1979, 199-200). Despite the alleviation of expenses resulting from the postponement of a considerable number of annuity payments, pressure on the *Diputación* in 1480-1490 led to protectionist measures being taken. In 1483-1485 the deputies authorised the *General*'s administrator to delay the interest payments for the annuities paid to Aragonese investors by 4 months, and the ones paid in Catalonia by 7 months.22 Catalan investors, who received lower interest rates, had to be paid in Zaragoza according to the exchange rate established in the Aragonese capital, which clearly favoured the local currency over the Barcelonese. In 1490, Ferdinand II compelled the deputies to reverse the discriminatory measures taken.

The bailout introduced by the king in 1488 included a forced purchase of annuities at 5% made by the Aragonese officers of the royal court (Sesma 2015, 239-240). Equally, royal mediation resolved the issue of Catalan investors being owed annuities from many previous years. Additionally, the *General* offered its investors a reduction from 6.67-6.25% to 5%, or else the amortisation of the annuity. In the aftermath, there remained what Sesma identifies as a small group of Catalan investors who had significant business dealings with the kingdom (Sesma 1977, 134-137).

#### **4. The balance**

The most commonly used strategy for ensuring a balance in the *General*'s accounts was to keep income high and to borrow with this endorsement.23 Availability of liquidity allowed the kingdom to meet the royal petitions and progressively develop the *Diputación*'s own activity.

A decisive reform for the Aragonese treasury took place at the beginning of the 15th century, justified by the debts that beset it (Sesma 1979, 179-82). The merchant

20 ADZ, ms. 13, ff. 50v-64. Administrators did not register the capital or interest rates (*razón*) on the list of paid annuities in the account books, but they did when it came to debt amortisations. 21 As a short-term measure, £10 000 that arose from the issue of annuities in 1450 was reserved to

make the interest payments on the debt (ACRA X, 977). 22 Hereafter, the administrator negotiated a new extension to 6 and 10 months respectively, in

exchange for covering an existing deficit of £14 000: Sesma 1977, 151-152.

23 Incidentally, some efforts were made to work within the budget, using efficiency measures to keep expenses under control.

Ramon de Casaldáguila had been advancing cash to reverse an untenable situation of excessive expenditures and constrained incomes, which had been aggravated during the struggles of the Interregnum (1410-1412).24 Budgets were remodelled and the *Cortes* extended the customs duty to more products. In 1428, the deputies repeated the strategy of raising the income of the Aragonese treasury by increasing the tariffs of the *generalidades*, and established more control over the management of the kingdom's treasury (ACRA IX, 191-198).

Tab. 4. **Balance of the General (in Jaca pounds)25**

24 Sesma 2011. Casaldáguila had taken responsibility, in 1404, for the collecting of the *fogaje* implemented to inject funds into the *General*, which had not yet been completed: de la Torre 2018a, 325-26. 25 Pub. Sesma 1977, 172; 1979, 201. Figures in brackets are estimates based on fragmentary data.

Meanwhile, the intense activity of the deputies translated into an increase in administrative costs and officers' salaries, which consumed the surplus from the previous financial years on an annual basis.26 From 1445 onwards balances remained positive due to new issues of annuities, and the fact that the administrator included, in 1453, for the first time, the sums levied by the *sisa* (Sesma 1979, 196). Undoubtedly, the Catalan Civil War deeply affected Aragon, and the fiscal year 1464-1465 was the first to have a shortfall since the reforms were enacted in 1414 (Sesma 1979, 197).27 At this point (1465), the decision taken in the *Cortes* of 1446-1450 for the generalidades to be managed directly by the deputies was reversed. The leasing of the *generalidades* was reintroduced, which had the benefit of having the financial support of

26 In 1451-1453 the *Cortes* resorted to using all of the funds available in the *General* to pay the defensive troops, and the experts consulted warned that the kingdom's funds were exhausted and that the collectors would be uncapable of raising extra cash from the population: ACRA XI, 631.

27 The *General*'s administration books for the period 1461-1464 have not survived up to the present.

the *General*'s administrator, who would advance money to balance the accounts. From 1465 to 1488, the verifiable balance between expenditure and revenue is artificial given the enormous number of unpaid annuities (Sesma 1977, 202).

The establishment of the *Inquisition* in the kingdom in 1488 led to the *converso* capital flight, which was significant because such capital had been an important support for the kingdom's trading activity (Sesma 1977, 169-73). This added up to a lack of Catalan investors and market saturation within Aragon. *Sisas* and *fogajes* were simultaneously reintroduced in an attempt to balance the steady increase of the deficit due to higher ordinary expenditures and a drop-in income from the lease of the *generalidades* (conflicts translated into low prices offered at auctions). The *General*'s administrator covered a growing amount of shortfall to the extent that the advance made to the kingdom's finance was higher than the total income of the financial year and the expected revenues for the following years. A way to address this shortfall was to default on annuity payments in the last months of the year so that the money could be used to pay the past interest owed (Sesma 1977, 367-93). Thus, the kingdom avoided having old debts, which could lead to legal claims and reprisals.

Eventually, the *General* of Aragon escaped bankruptcy and the effects of the bailout approved in the *Cortes* of 1488 gradually became visible (Sesma 1977, 237- 43). The plan restrained spending and drove up the price of the leasing of the customs duties. The recovery was tangible in 1493 when interest rates of annuities were low and income increased, to the extent that in 1499 the shortfall was the smallest of the previous two decades (Tab. 4). Thus, the *General*'s solvency margin did not fall below the desired level despite the disbursement of the missed annuity payments made in Catalonia. Nonetheless, the conquest of Iberian Navarre (1512-1524) did erode the effectiveness of the measures. Once again, a military conflict brought an increase in extraordinary expenditure and weakened revenues from the customs duties, thus cancelling the trend of positive balances that had started in 1505.

#### **5. 'For the good of the kingdom': political scrutiny and mercantile action**

The management of the Kingdom of Aragon's finances merged public good and private interests. Since the beginning of the 15th century, power was concentrated in the hands of the *General*'s administrator (Viu 2022). Initially, that responsibility fell to merchants very close to the royal court.28 They were among the royal family's moneylenders and were also very knowledgeable about the territory.29 The position was tied to the leaseholders of the *generalidades*, the latter being leased as a whole, unlike in Valencia and Catalonia. Already, in 1376, there is evidence of a system by which

28 Ramón de Màrgens, a Barcelonese merchant settled in Zaragoza and the first leaseholder of the *generalidades*, was a brother of Pere, assistant treasurer to Peter IV. In 1381, the infante Martin (who would succeed his brother John I to the throne) was initially involved in the lease with the merchant Juan Donsancho: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, reg. 2071, f. 92v (Tortosa, 1383, 11 January). I owe this reference to the kindness of Carlos Laliena.

29 Juan Donsancho collected, in 1375, the amounts of the *fogaje* corresponding to the clergy: ACRA III, 573-589.

the *generalidades* were leased by a share company.30 The leasing company's shareholders were expected to reap benefits and the administrators made every effort to receive compensation for losses and to attract taxpayers (Viu 2021).31 This sort of compensation authorised by the deputies was less frequent after Juan de Mur left the *General*'s administration (Sesma 1977, 167-68).

As early as 1381, the *Cortes* started an enquiry into the management of the leaseholders. Under the accounts clearance procedure, the amounts due to the *General* were claimed from their heirs.32 Equally, the participants at the assembly denounced some payments made by the *General* which were ordered by the king, condemning this royal intrusion into their autonomy (Sesma 2015, 224). As shown above, deputies and participants at the *Cortes* made decisions concerning fiscal policies and the amount and composition of the public debt. The kingdom's creditworthiness was their responsibility and it largely depended on the punctual payment of debt interests.33 Parliamentary proceedings include frequent allusions to investor confidence, which was dependent on the kingdom's financial solvency and the debt it had accumulated. This was particularly apparent during the political instability of 1396-1398, when the Aragonese faced problems selling new annuities because the parliaments had not established the exact amount they planned to raise through the issuing of public debt. Presumably, investors distrusted an institution that, lacking control, could borrow beyond its capacity (de la Torre 2018b). The Aragonese representatives were particularly worried about foreign investors: amortisation of annuities sold in Catalonia was ordered repeatedly and some issues were limited to the domestic market.34 The price of the lease of the *generalidades* was of constant concern to the deputies.35 At the time of negotiating the terms and duration of the contracts, it was not unusual for some refinements to be made to the offered securities for the leaseholder and the kingdom.36

30 ACRA IV, 114-115. The system imitated the one used by the shipping companies. It was adapted in Aragon for the management of financial businesses: de la Torre 2018a, 156 and 169-74.

31 We know that, after a term of losses in 1423, the leasing company headed by Ramon de Casaldáguila registered a term of profits in 1426, which compensated the prior situation by an overall net gain of 15%: de la Torre 2018a, 174.

32 ACRA V, 64, 72, 81, 94. This took place in the context of a widespread phenomenon of public accountability in the Crown of Aragon at the end of the 14th century: Lafuente 2016.

33 In 1452, the *Cortes* authorised the administrators to only make the payment of arrears and the annuity payments that had to be accomplished in the current month before delivering the money to the deputies so they could pay the troops their salaries: ACRA XI, 157-58. The Aragonese representatives stated that by doing so they sought to preserve the creditworthiness of the kingdom.

34 In 1428, the deputies gave the *General*'s administrators a detailed list of annuities to be cancelled in Catalonia: AHPNZ, Antón de Salavert, 3382 (1428), no foliation. I owe this reference to my colleague Maria Viu. In 1452, the *General* was in need of cash to pay the defensive troops, but the deputies preferred asking for a loan to selling more bonds to Catalan investors: ACRA XI, 175-76.

35 Sesma 1977, 115-18. The auction was announced widely and the deputies insisted, in 1417, on the process being publicised openly so that the price could be higher, they asserted: ADPZ, ms. 773-15, ms. 750-9 and ms. 746-46.

36 The *General* of Catalonia in 1413 contemplated the possibility of commissioning the *generalidades* for a lower price in the event of not finding a leasee (Sánchez de Movellán 2004, 311-12), a measure that was never necessary for Aragon.

One of the main functions of the leaseholders of the *generalidades* in the early years was to provide credit secured against the income from the customs duties. And it was precisely this skill to obtain money more cheaply that the potential leaseholders of the *generalidades* highlighted in 1376 (ACRA IV, 128-29). In 1414, following several years when the *General*'s administrator advanced considerable amounts of money (ACRA VIII, 415-416), the reforms introduced for the kingdom's finances included new guarantees for the leaseholders. This allowed Ramón de Casaldáguila to remain

37 De la Torre 2018a, 331; Sesma 1979; Sesma 1977, 123. \* Contract not granted at *Cortes* prior to the reform carried out in 1465.

in office until his death in 1428.38 Furthermore, the following *General*'s administrators were praised by their deputies for their outstanding performance.39

The *General*'s administrators presented their arguments to the deputies in the yearly accounts (Viu 2022). The structure of the account books used by the *General'*s administration did not differ essentially from 1417 to 1515: income (payments of the leasing of the *generalidades* and remaining balance from the previous year), expenses (salaries, detailed annuity payments and any other ordinary or extraordinary costs) and balance. They were instruments which were inspected by the auditors and updated by specialised scribes, who incorporated novelties that arose after the monitoring of accounts (such as back payments). The *General*'s administrator kept economic documentation (proof of payments, payment orders, etc.) and was helped by a handful of auxiliary instruments, such as a general journal (recording debited and credited entries) or a journal dedicated to recording courier costs. Given the importance of the public debt, the *Diputación*'s notaries wrote a census (*padrón*) of the annuities to keep up with ownership changes and further amendments to the *General*'s consolidated debt.40

Aragon's finances faced cyclical financial problems. Deep reforms and even two bailouts over the course of the 15th century helped to overcome several financial crises, which might otherwise have led to the kingdom's bankruptcy.41 Extraordinary formulas were approved in 1398 to extend the income of the Aragonese treasury, but already, in 1400, the deputies were appealing for financial recovery measures that were finally launched in 1404 (Sesma 2015, 226-29). This bailout avoided the *General* collapsing. The task fell to the merchant Ramon de Casaldáguila, who went on to be put in charge of the institution's finances, combining the duties of the *General*'s treasurer with those of the administrator permanently (de la Torre 2018a, 305-307). He worked to reduce the Aragonese treasury's level of debt, thus increasing confidence in the institution, which translated into an interest rate five per cent lower than five years earlier (Tab. 2).

The administrative transformation of the *General*, in 1414, came at the beginning of the Castilian Trastámara dynasty's rule over the Crown of Aragon. This regulation sought to introduce rationalisation in expenditure and income.42 The deputies established an order regarding payments: the administrator was compelled to prioritise annuity payments and to use any surplus to amortise the annuities with higher interest

38 his associate, the merchant squire juan de mur, succeeded him and held the position for 22 years.

39 Juan de Mur received a generous incentive in 1441: £3 000 for the selling of annuities and £1 500 for the reduction of the debt: ACRA X, 93-95 and 115-120.

40 This systematic monitoring registry of annuity payments is earlier than previously thought (Sesma 1977, 127). The *Diputación*'s archive has preserved a volume containing annuities issued from 1436 to 1453, whose changes over time are recorded until the late 1470s: DPZ, ms. 35.

41 Bankruptcies of towns were not infrequent in Aragon and Calatonia in the 15th century: Ortí and Verdés 2016; de la Torre 2018a.

42 Cost control was addressed by halving the number of deputies (from 8 to 4) and reducing the salaries, travel and daily subsistence allowance, and other expenses (Sesma 1979, 179-182).

rates. The payment of salaries, debts to the administrator and extraordinary costs (up to a limit of 300 florins per year) had to adhere to this specific order.43

The institutionalisation of the *Diputación* took place in 1436 (ACRA IX, 536-39, 577-80). Just a decade later, following a recent structural reform in 1446, a new era began with the suspension of the leasing system in 1450-1464 (Sesma 2013, 402-12). Following a proposal from the king, the deputies decided to take control of the *General*'s administration and the collecting of the *generalidades*, which were also restructured. A revenues scheme was introduced, giving more power to the deputies, who were responsible for delivering the cash to the administrators for the payments (ACRA X, 970-971). The last reform of the medieval era took place in 1488, when the kingdom was effectively bankrupt and needed a cash injection (Sesma 1977, 179-243).

#### **6. Final remarks**

The medieval Crown of Aragon provides a revealing case study in which institutions do not simply develop in response to the needs of their rulers. Rather than an institutional initiative emanating from the central power, institutions develop as a result of the agency of regional power groups. In the Kingdom of Aragon, the intervention of mercantile elites contributed to the shaping the management technique of the *General*. Signs of the impact of the administrator's actions are an increase in spare capacity, the fact that investors were being attracted successfully, and the stimulation of exchanges. Increased efficiency in public administration promoted economic growth via, on the one hand, a decline in fiscal pressure and, on the other, a diminution of risks for investors and traders (Laliena 2016). Notwithstanding, the path was by no means linear. The trend of positive balances that followed the introduction of reforms was broken by cycles of excessive expenditures and wars, which severely affected Aragon's financial situation, while its representatives tested different remedies.

The series of reforms implemented in the *Diputación* led to the development of efficient and innovative practices in the management of the kingdom's finances. Behind them was a spirit of rationalisation that resulted in the involvement of merchants in public administration. Administrators were recruited from the mercantile elite. These businesspeople used their own resources and networks to cover deficits, advance the payment of subsidies and access credit. However, this created a relationship of dependence by the *General* on such businesspeople, who tended to monopolise the position of administrator. As this study has shown, prescriptive information and rigorous accounting records facilitated credit access by projecting an image of creditworthiness to prospective investors. The production of yearly financial accounts helped with verification based on periodic audits, which were expected to ensure good governance.

The individuals who were at the highest levels of power in Aragon understood the importance of keeping records of an economic nature, primarily to exploit the fiscal resources managed by the *General* more efficiently, maximising tax revenues.

43 Already, in 1427-1428, the *Cortes* agreed (with the royal *braço* voting against) to raise the limit to a maximum of 500 florins: ACRA IX, 273.

Exemplary management of the public asset was understood as a sign of good governance of the *res publica*. Taxpayers demanded rigorous control of the *General*'s treasury in response to onerous financial demands. Consequently, Aragonese deputies relied on the financial expertise of well-known merchants and their trained personnel. At the same time, they nonetheless exploited the auditing process to assert their authority over the *General*'s administrators.

The emergence of supra-local institutions affected the dialogue of power within the Crown of Aragon, and the need for an efficient tax collection and debt management stimulated both a turnaround in the system of government and a change in relations with the crown (Tracy 1985). Public authorities were aware that their capabilities were based on effective control of their finances (Béguin and Murphy 2017).

#### **EDITED PRIMARY SOURCES**

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Centuries)." *La fiscalità nell'economia europea (sec. xiii-xviii)*, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi, 99-130. Firenze: Firenze University Press.

# Richard W. Unger

*Ships, shipping, technological change and global economic growth, 1400-1800*

# **1. General purpose technologies**

Not all technical changes are created equal. Some have greater impact on the economy than others. Some have more influence on the pace, character and extent of other technical changes. Some, though very few, have shaped entire periods in history of not just the economy but the shape and character of society, politics and thought even globally. Paolo Malanima, Paul Warde and Astrid Kander, in their 2013 book *Power to the people: energy in Europe over the last five centuries,* talk about technical blocks, that is a group of innovations which defined long periods in the historical sources and uses of energy. Coal, steam and iron was a development block of the First Industrial Revolution. The internal combustion engine and petroleum formed a block in the late nineteenth century and electricity formed another in the twentieth (Kander, Malanima and Warde 2013, 159-60; 287-88; 303-05). Within each of those blocks they isolate what they call macro innovations which created the blocks dominated by the use of specific sets of energy carriers, Joel Mokyr, in his economic history of technology *Lever of Riches,* also identifies a small number of significant macroinventions (Mokyr 1990, 24-25).

The identification of certain innovations that had extensive and lasting effects on productivity and, therefore, economic growth, at least in English, may well have started with Francis Bacon in his *Novum Organum* of 1620. The context was his programme for thinking about knowledge, how it could and should be created as part of a genuine and rigorous reformation of the study of natural history which he called the *The Great Instauration*. His work encapsulated an interest in and a growing enthusiasm for technology which concentrated on the virtues of advances. In praise of technical change, he talked of:

[...]the force, effect, and consequences of inventions, which are nowhere more conspicuous than in those three which were unknown to the ancients; namely, printing, gunpowder, and the compass. For these three have changed the appearance and state of the whole world. No empire, sect, or star, appears to have exercised a greater power and influence on human affairs than these mechanical discoveries (Bacon 2014 [1620], 105).

The compass he used as a symbol of a complex of innovations in navigation, ship design and shipping.

Richard W. Unger, University of British Columbia, Canada<EMAIL_ADDRESS>0000-0002-8798-0843 Referee List (DOI 10.36253/fup\_referee\_list)

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Richard W. Unger, *Ships, shipping, technological change and global economic growth, 1400-1800*, © Author(s), CC BY 4.0, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0092-9.22, in Giampiero Nigro (edited by), *L'economia della conoscenza: innovazione, produttività e crescita economica nei secoli XIII-XVIII / The knowledge economy: innovation, productivity and economic growth,13th to 18th century*, pp. 373-393, 2023, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0092-9, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215- 0092-9

In the same spirit and part of an effort to formalize thinking about such macro inventions Dick Lipsey and Kenneth Carlaw discuss what they call «General Purpose Technologies». They followed Timothy Trajtenberg and Manuel Bresnahan who coined the term, discussing the concept in a 1995 article, and Elhanan Helpman who edited a 1998 volume that explored the effects of GPTs on economic growth (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 2005: Carlaw and Lipsey 2006: Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995: Helpman 1998). Lipsey and Carlaw try to offer an abstract model that describes how GPTs work and what their findings might imply for research and development expenditure (Carlaw and Lipsey 2006; Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 2005, 371). They define the GPT as:

A single technology, recognizable as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have many spillover effects (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 2005, 98).

The examples they offer include recognizable technologies like the automobile, the railroad and electricity. The frequency of appearance of GPTs has been increasing over time. While the nineteenth and, even more, the twentieth centuries offer a number, the period from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century offers few cases. The only two they find which qualify are printing and the three-masted sailing ship (Lipsey, Carlaw, Becker, 168-75; Mokyr 1990, 68). The latter, a product of a complex of advances in shipbuilding, qualified as a GPT because it continued to have widespread effects and had extensive spillovers and encouraged further endogenous change in newly emerging practices and improvements or adaptations of existing practices. GPTs offer opportunities for the greater use of other technologies and can even force changes in those interrelated methods of production. They also create new fields for profitable investment in varied technologies, possibly even in different fields entirely. The impact of the GPT can continue, in some cases over centuries (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 2005, 98).

 One of the facts if not the most important one that set a technical change apart and placed it in the exclusive category of GPT was that it generated economic growth. Any improvement in the efficiency of moving people and goods promotes trade, exchange of information and specialization in production. In short cheaper transportation generates what has come to be called, perhaps unjustly, Smithian growth (Kelly 1997, 939-52). Adam Smith gets the credit since he argued emphatically at the beginning of his ...*the Wealth of Nations* that the division of labour generates economic growth and that the extent of the division of labour depends on the extent of the market. For him, writing at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, «water carriage» was the greatest source of that division of labour and so improvement of skills and specialization in production (Smith 1937 [1776], 3-21). The three-masted sailing ship, through the mechanism Smith described, offered a wide range of new opportunities for economic growth.

The standard pattern of the evolution of GPTs historically in terms of adoption and impact has followed a logistic function. It is both the way to view the typical pattern of adoption of almost anything new but also the typical pattern of diffusion where there is a limit on capacity. GPTs begin as crude adjuncts to existing practices and so in their early stages are of sharply restricted use. Experiments and elaboration of the potential creates a wider range of characteristics and, with that, more uses. The spread of knowledge of the new method involves more users and so more improvements which in turn makes the GPT more efficient and more sophisticated. The advantages and greater use means a greater impact on other technologies which adjust to exploit or supplement the GPT. At the same time new activities become possible. The impact depends, then, on any interaction with other technologies which includes the decline in use of predecessors since the new way or ways of doing things are superior. The pace of adoption and hence the slope of the logistic curve depends on a number of factors, not least of which is who controls knowledge of the GPT. If no centralized control exists then there can be easy access to the GPT and more rapid recognition of complementarities with other methods. The scale of efficiency improvement introduced leads to changes in the political and economic circumstances, so easing the adoption of the new GPT. More than that, there is a greater impact on social and economic structures and more rapid adoption of other related technologies. In the entire process along with potential limits to the spread of knowledge and restrictions to adaptation of the GPT and related developments, there is always an assessment of risk that all those involved must make. The novelty or difference from past practice the harder it is to identify the level of risk (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 2005, 379-80; 409-10; 432-34).

The concept of general purpose technologies has the advantage of pointing to certain critical factors in the development of technology and the economy. It draws attention to why certain technological changes are more important than others. It suggests where to look for forces restricting or directing patterns of technological development over the long term. It indicates what to look for in examining the history of technology. It points to risk that is always important to innovators though sometimes can be difficult to calculate or assess. In addition, with all technologies there is constant uncertainty with the potential for exogenous events to destroy any sensible predictions. Uncertainty prevails and pervades all aspects of technical change and with GPTs that is especially true because of the scale and range of their impact. If nothing else, there is the threat of the emergence of a new, competing, superior GPT.

The pattern is one of slow adoption at the start with prototypes or early versions able to compete only to limited degree with existing technology, probably in certain niches in the economy. There is then rapid adoption over relatively short time along with long term spread of the new method. Then there is a levelling off as practice becomes so widespread that the users and producers of the GPT come closer to the limits of what it can do and what related technologies can do to supplement or aid in its use. At that point typically if not before another new GPT or GPTs appear to supplant the original one. The pattern applies in many ways to the three-masted ship, a congruence that unfolds in a description of the character, the pace and extent of adoption and the impact of the general purpose technology in terms of the three phases of the logistic curve. The role of seaborne transportation improvements in the general development of the economy becomes more transparent by following the central features of what Lipsey and his co-authors called a general purpose technology.

# **2. The First Phase: foundations for expansion of the scope and volume of trade**

The first phase stretched from the fourteenth century to the early decades of the sixteenth. It was marked by what, some years ago, this Canadian medievalist called «the great invention» of medieval and Renaissance maritime history: the emergence of the three-masted ship (Unger 1980, 216-30). The development of the design led over time to dramatic changes in the world economy and in geopolitics. As always, it seems the historian writing now has predecessors. The English entrepreneur and explorer Sir Walter Raleigh, in about 1605, talked of the invention of ships along with other sea-faring technologies as critical to the power of states and to economic well-being. For him:

[...]whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself (Raleigh 1829 [1605?], 325).

A new design for sailing ships emerged in the fourteenth century which evolved over the next one hundred and fifty years, coming over time to dominate longdistance seaborne transportation. There were precursors. The ability to power a vessel on water by using a sail was known for millennia and the ability to do that over open seas was known at least by 12,000 years BP. By the thirteenth century there was a range of existing technologies for shipping under all kinds of conditions and on all types of waters around the world. The melding of varied practices in different places proved to be a slow process.

The sailing ship inherited in the Mediterranean from the Roman Empire had undergone a dramatic change in hull construction in the early middle ages. The shipbuilder in charge determined the shape of the hull by the design of the principal frames. Set on the keel at the start of construction, carpenters shaped the hull planks to fit those frames. The smooth surface created lowered resistance. Carvelbuilt hulls with strength coming from the internal framing saved on labour inputs and very probably on quantities of wood required. Repairs were easier relative to other types of construction. Power to move the ship came through triangular or lateen sails, another inheritance from the classical world. The rig made sailing closer to the direction of the wind easier and decreased delays from contrary weather. The principal disadvantage was the sizeable crew needed to handle the sail type and the need, when coming about to sail in a different direction, to carry the whole sail and its long mast over the masthead. The need for that manoeuvre limited the size of the mast. The sail could not be shortened or extended. The only way to change sail area was to use a different sail and yard so ships had to carry differently sized sails or accept the limitations of having only a default sail available. By 1300 the Mediterranean sailing ship could make trips from Iberia to the Levant without stopping. They could carry hundreds of passengers from Italy to the Holy Land. For some purposes shippers used galleys which had the advantage of being able, at least for short periods of time, to rely on oars for propulsion. That was especially helpful in getting in and out of port. The vessels had low freeboard so had trouble in the open ocean in any storm. Only the largest of galleys could survive a trip from Italy to the Low Countries. Their greatest shortcoming was the high cost created by the relatively massive size of the crew (Pryor 1994; 1988, 25-86).

Northern Europe had followed a different path. There galleys had all but disappeared by the fourteenth century, especially for commercial voyages over seas. Outside the Mediterranean, tubby sailing ships powered by a single square sail dominated seaborne commerce. Shipwrights built the hull up from the keel piece by piece, overlapping the planking to assure watertightness and strength. The clinkerbuilt hull was heavy and required extensive skills on the part of each shipwright (Adams 2002, 53-58; Crumlin-Pedersen 2009, 148-60; McCarthy 2005, 55-81). The rudder was fixed to a straight sternpost, not to the side of the ship as in the Mediterranean. The cog is the best-known type of the northern European ship, coming to take a major role in shipping in the Baltic and North Seas (Crumlin-Pedersen 2000; Ellmers 1994; 2010: Jahnke 2011: Jahnke and Englert 2014; Paulsen 2016, 122-37).

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century there was increasing contact between northern and southern Europe by sea, contact that led directly to the development of the full-rigged ship. Mediterranean shipbuilders redesigned the cog, giving it a carvel-built hull. They then added a small lateen sail near the stern. This two-masted carrack had all the advantages of the northern cog with the additional attribute of being able to sail closer to the wind because of the triangular sail near the stern. The vessel was better able to hold a course and also could manoeuvre more easily. The last touch was to put a small mast near the bow and put a square sail on it to balance the lateen on the mizzen mast aft. The master of the ship had even greater control as a result. The exact date and location of the combination of earlier technologies is not known but already by 1400 builders knew the essential components. The Atlantic coast of Iberia is the most likely site for the earliest fullrigged ships.

While it existed by 1400 the design was still not able to compete with many other more traditional forms and the full potential of the full-rigged ship was not yet explored. The potential for saving labour took time to realize. The lateen sail and the still large size of the single square sail on the mainmast kept crew size up. Over the following two centuries builders divided the sail plan. The total sail area stayed the same or increased while the number of sails grew with each smaller than the typical sail of high medieval European ships. With smaller sails crews handled them one after the other and so fewer men were needed for a vessel of the same size. Smaller crews meant greater range over the oceans of the world. Over time shipbuilders developed different designs for different purposes. Carracks were tubby with a deep waist and high castles at bow and stern. Galleons, which owed features to galleys, had straight gunwales and were narrower which increased speed, eased handling of cargo and improved ability to control the vessel (Phillips 1994; Unger 2019, 44).

It is hard to measure the improvement in safety that full-rigged ships brought.1 Similarly it is hard to measure any change in the cost of transport the full-rigged ship might have brought because so many factors determined the price shippers paid at any time. At least there are measures of labour productivity, though with their own flaws. They show improvement over time, however slow, in the early days of full-rigged ships (Lucassen and Unger 2011). The limited data suggest that single-masted ships in the Baltic had manning levels that it took full-rigged ships more than another 100 years to match. The figures are solely for Europe, the only part of the world that knew full-rigged ships in the fifteenth century. That situation changed when, exploiting the greater range of the type thanks to its potential higher carrying capacity and declining crew sizes, Europeans in full-rigged ships travelled across oceans down the coast of Africa, to the other hemisphere and to and through the Indian Ocean in the late the fifteenth century.

Important to the development and success of any technical innovation is, at the least, government indifference and at best government support. The full-rigged ship, after an initial period of experimentation, enjoyed positive institutional promotion. Various states subsidized the exploitation of the design in voyages to distant and even unknown regions. In the first half of the sixteenth century there was an arms race among northern European states with kings paying for the construction of ever bigger naval vessels. The kings of France, England, Scotland and Denmark all found that there were limits to how big such ships could be. It was expensive to build the giants and also costly to find and maintain the massive crews that the vessels needed (Unger 1980, 234-35). Realizing the advantages of the type, governments also built ships which were of little use for carrying cargo but were effective as fighting platforms. Light fast galleys had long qualified as specialized warships. Through the sixteenth century governments increasingly used full-rigged ships to fight at sea, in the process exploring effective changes in design and construction (Unger 1981). In promoting voyages of exploration and, from the early sixteenth century, voyages to carry emigrants to the Americas as well as Asia governments expanded the use of full-rigged ships and also increased the numbers built. They gave shipbuilders more opportunities to hone their skills in producing the type while also giving occasions to try variants. All the time through the first phase down into the sixteenth century the design became better known, the ability to create examples of the type spread and the use of the vessels that fit the description increased not just on the open ocean but also in the Baltic and North as well as the Mediterranean Seas.

1 The McCormick et al., *Geodatabase of Shipwrecks* ends in 1500 and shows a maximum of 23 cases in the century after 1400 and 20 for the century after 1200. In both cases some of the ships may have gone down in the following century. While the figures are suggestive, the small sample size and the lack of certainty about date of loss or the design of the ships involved, among other things, drawing any conclusion would be overly ambitious.

# **3. The Second Phase: improvements and impact of the general purpose technology**

From the mid sixteenth century to the early years of the nineteenth use of fullrigged ships expanded. The areas of the world where the type was found and built increased to encompass all of the oceans of the world. The variants continued to grow with some standardization in subcategories of the full-rigged ship. Designs took advantage of the qualities of the essential features of the type while adjusting features to suit specific trades. Shipbuilders throughout Europe learned to produce full-rigged ships, in some cases hesitatingly staying attached to older practices which gradually faded away (Unger 1985; Maarleveld 1994a; 1994b). By the eighteenth century, methods of building were consistent everywhere with variations dictated by the trades, functions and places where the ships would find use. The sailing ship was a lumpy investment and while land had the greatest share of total investment it was highly divisible. The risk of loss of such a valuable capital good, a risk that was in large part determined by conditions at sea, was a brake on the pace of technological advance. Buyers of ships and so shipbuilders were leery of novelty. If that was not enough the general uncertainty which accompanies all technological change, the ability of exogenous political and social developments and spillovers from existing technologies to have an impact on the shipping sector as well as the economy at large always served as deterrents to experiment for investors and shipbuilders.

To counteract misgivings there was a varied collection of changes in full-rigged ships in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which improved their performance and so promoted the adoption of the type. The continuing success with dividing the sail plan along with the addition of sails of different types, while somewhat increasing the levels of skill needed for crew members, did improve speed, safety and efficiency. Hull shapes continued a process of increasing length relative to width. That made it possible for ships to be larger but also more seaworthy. Builders overcame the tendency of long ships to hog, that is for the ends to sag, not quickly nor completely but enough to improve efficiency in shipping. Greater use of block-andtackle on board to handle sails and widespread use of capstans to handle anchors and in the loading and unloading of heavy cargo helped in lowering crew size. Perhaps most effective in lowering costs was the emergence of vessels with features suited to one trade or one set of trades. The growth in certain exchanges of goods meant building specialized vessels with designs to suit those trades paid off for both the shipbuilder and the shipper. The Dutch fluyt which emerged in the last years of the sixteenth century was perhaps the outstanding example, at least in northern Europe. Used extensively in the grain trade to the Baltic and to southern Europe, it was longer relative to its width than its predecessors and had a simple sail plan so crew size was kept low. The type could deliver improvements on the best manning ratios of the best-performing competing designs of the end of the middle ages and so replaced them in many northern European trades while being able to compete in transoceanic ones. Dutch builders produced other specialized types and the general development extended to vessels for the fisheries and, in time, to warships (Wegener Sleeswyk 2003b).

The size of individual ships did grow though sailing vessels do not obviously or immediately benefit from increases in scale. The benefits of size may disappear if there is greater danger of loss since bigger ships increase the concentration of whatever loss occurs. It was difficult to know a priori the range of the scale economies and dis-economies, in part because of the inability to accurately assess potential for loss and in part because of the potential impact of constraints such as depth of waterways and ports. Larger ships might mean savings when holds were full but there were no guarantees that vessels would frequently if ever be at maximum cargo. In the trade to the East Indies, because of the considerable profitability, ships were full and even overloaded much of the time. Errors in shipbuilding, such as using wood not properly aged, could generate massive losses as Portuguese shippers learned in the years around 1600. Those same shippers and their government identified the problems and reduced their losses to the norm for their competitors. For all trade around the Cape of Good Hope finding the optimal ship size was something worked out through experiment. A bigger ship almost always meant greater carrying capacity. It also meant a greater investment since big ships cost more to build and apparently more per ton as well. They were often faster and had a lower ratio of crewmen per ton so there were benefits from larger ships under certain circumstances (Wegener Sleeswyk 2003b). Larger vessels required adjustments in building and in some of the materials used which helps explain the higher construction costs. There were significant changes to handling qualities and ways to sail a vessel as size grew suggesting that there was an optimal size above which returns to investment declined, a discovery made in the East Indies trade and in others over the course of the second phase (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 2005, 390; 396).

Technological improvements in the second phase were subject to constraints, some internal to shipbuilding and others external. As anticipated the gains were less dramatic than in phase one and the pace of efficiency gains went down over time in phase two. The greatest added value with general purpose technologies and very probably with any technology comes from the replacement of existing methods with the new ones. In the case of the full-rigged ship the efficiency improvements came from replacing the capital good, that is the ship itself. Over time many types such as cogs in northern Europe to lateen-rigged feluccas and xebecs in the Mediterranean became smaller and their use more circumscribed. The numbers of fullrigged ships rose in the new trades created by their versatility and efficiency but also rose in traditional trades. The use of newer technology spread as shipbuilders modified and improved their products. An obvious result was gains in labour productivity in shipping during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries which were higher than in almost any other sector (Lucassen and Unger 2011, 17-22). The potential gains attracted capital investment which also fuelled the replacement rate in ships. It also meant producing vessels that could operate in previously underdeveloped trades. The addition of gunpowder arms and the improvements in hulls so ships could carry artillery, made lighter by the end of the sixteenth century because of the introduction of iron guns on board, opened operations in dangerous trades and the possibility of intimidating competitors around the globe. Other increases in the capital invested in certain ships had less dramatic effects on the spread of full-rigged ships, though, reinforcement of hulls made possible operation in Arctic waters which opened a number of sites to whale fisheries and, in the late eighteenth century, the addition of copper sheathing among other improvements promoted longer life and higher speeds for ships operating in tropical waters in the East and West Indies (Kelly, Ó Gráda and Solar 2021; Solar 2013; van Zanden and van Tielhof 2009; Rönnbäck 2012).

#### **3.1 Spillovers**

One obvious spillover from the more extensive use of full-rigged ships, their growth in size and the prosperity of shipbuilding was the scale and stability of construction sites. Where in the middle ages there were few permanent shipyards, certainly in Europe, and what few there were served for the construction and repair of galleys in the Mediterranean. Starting at about the same time as full-rigged ships some towns in northern Europe set aside land for shipbuilding. Through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the number and size of those sites increased considerably (van der Vliet 2006). The choice was recognition of the expansion of the industry and also recognition of the greater needs of craftsmen. The greater efficiency in shipbuilding also depended on improvements in related technologies in shipyards. The use of cranes made moving timber easier but they and the greater size of the varied shapes of pieces of wood increased the space requirement. Improvements in metallurgy made the tools in use more durable. The number and variety of tools along with the permanence of sites translated into more storage space on the wharves.

The greater demand for information about places throughout the world and how to get there generated pressure for improvements in navigation. By the thirteenth century cartographers in the Mediterranean had pieced together data on compass readings and distances from port to port along with sailors' sketch maps of local areas to create large impressive portolan maps of the Mediterranean. While those valuable maps indicated the potential of cartography it was smaller and rougher maps along with books with sailing directions that made their way to sea, serving there as aids for working seamen. By the sixteenth century printed maps in collections, charts of various regions large and small as well as instruction manuals appeared and enjoyed wide circulation (Lang 1968; 198; Schilder 2017; Waghenaer 1965). There was an increasing market for the materials among students going to the navigation schools which began to spring up in port towns (Burger 1908; 1909; 1910; Craig 1982; Schotte 2019). Port towns became home to the makers of nautical instruments who improved the quality and availability of their products. The combination of better devices to measure the position of the sun and the stars and useable and increasingly accurate charts made it much easier for pilots to fix the position of their vessel at sea. Governments took an interest in tracking the latest information about distant sailing routes in the sixteenth century as Iberian sailors ventured to seas in many parts of the globe previously out of the reach of Europeans. State offices gathered the information both for the safety of ships at sea and to establish territorial claims. The commissioning of cartographic surveys and the production of maps may have had political motives but those efforts that, by the 382 RICHARD W. UNGER

eighteenth century, stretched from the Mediterranean to the eastern Baltic were the foundation for government hydrographic offices which emerged in the early nineteenth century (Lang 1968, 50-66; Unger 2010, 76-78; 99-102).

The full-rigged ship generated spillovers to the handling of cargo in port towns. Facing increasing volume of trade and larger ships, civic authorities improved the organization of handling cargo on the wharves. They established institutions to organize teams of experienced longshoremen available to handle cargo when needed. They made provision for storage on wharves and for easier access to the docks for the carts and wagons that took away cargoes. Wharves increasingly had cranes of growing size to ease the work and increase the scale of moving goods from ship to shore (Lucassen 2011; Stern 1960). All those improvements were responses to the changes in ship design. So too were the many cases of towns moving docking facilities further downstream if they were on rivers to be closer to open waters. Larger full-rigged ships with deeper draft needed more space to manoeuvre and for lighters to reach them (Unger 2006b).

The spillovers from port improvements and better navigation promoted more regular trades carried out more quickly which in turn improved communication and also promoted the development of other designs of smaller ships to supplement the long-distance trades using full-rigged ships. While sending information overland was always faster than travel by ship, in cases such as contact between the Americas and Europe or islands around the world the full-rigged ship was an invaluable source of connection. The frequency of voyages over shorter distances might not speed the transfer of urgent information but the volume and range of news expanded along major routes. Advances in specialization of ship design were already underway before the full-rigged ship emerged but the new design accelerated the process as the three-masted. and for a short time four-masted, ship took over an increasing share of longer distance trade. Those smaller boats and ships, some with only one or two sails on a single mast, served to distribute good to and from major ports to lesser ones. In some cases those craft of different design or variants on the full-rigged ship could find use in long distance trades (Unger 2019). Gains in efficiency from technical change in smaller vessels in the second phase and beyond was considerable, advances promoted by the success of long-distance commerce. The pattern of trade reorientation enhanced the tendency toward specialization in design but also among ports. The marshalling of goods at a single site shortened turnaround times and improved utilization of carrying capacity. It also meant that certain centres grew more quickly and so promoted communication and with that the potential for technological advance.

The spillovers and the effectiveness of the full-rigged ship generated a range of connected changes in commerce and settlement. The opening of new trades and trade routes led to an increase in production and also to redistribution of settlement in Europe and in many other parts of the world. It was in long distance seaborne trade where the impact was most obvious. By the early seventeenth century Dutch shippers had found ways to sail between Europe and the East Indies on a more regular basis and in shorter times. Their success and that of their English counterparts sailing to India led directly to a sharp increase in the volume of trade between Europe and Asia and the erosion of overland exchange across Eurasia (Bruijn 1990; Steensgard 1990; Lane 1940). By the 1620s, for example, Venice had surrendered the role as distribution point for Asian spices to Lisbon and Amsterdam. Spanish navigators learned enough about prevailing wind patterns in the Pacific to establish somewhat regular contacts between Mexico and the Philippines. Volumes might have been small, though, it was a novel trade and a source of the growth of Manila as a port (Giraldez 2015, 101-59).

Already in the sixteenth century exchange of goods carried in full-rigged ships led to reorientation of the trading networks of Indigenous Peoples in North America (Trigger 1986, 111-63). Over time in the Americas the arrival of migrants from Europe and Africa, often sponsored by governments in one way or another, led to implementing new agricultural practices. The trade with more distant places, at first with Europe and increasingly with other sites in the Americas, promoted specialization in crops raised. The settlements of the migrants were largely along or very near the sea coast so easily serviced by sailing ships that, for Atlantic crossings, were largely three-masted vessels. Throughout the world and especially in Europe cities on the oceans saw faster growth than those in the interior. The most prominent examples were ports in Europe such as Seville, Lisbon, London and Amsterdam (Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre 1988, 130-33; 176-88)

The development and continued elaboration of fill-rigged ship design led to spillovers in the organization of the industry that produced the capital good. The great majority of building and especially the building of smaller vessels was in the hands of private investors. By the seventeenth century, though, a few private shipbuilders were moving toward operations on a larger scale with investment in permanent yards and tools and equipment, investments made possible by the volume and value of ships built along with the rise in orders for larger ships. Dating from the late middle ages guilds of independent producers, organizations given legal status by towns, brought together the owners of wharves who were skilled labourers. Not common in areas outside northern Europe, those institutions oversaw training in the techniques of the trade and offered a rudimentary system of grading levels of accomplishment. The guilds then gave shipcarpenters an easier path to move to other towns and in the process increase their own knowledge while disseminating information more broadly. By the seventeenth century the role of those institutions decreased in importance, in part because the need to spread technological innovations declined and the scale of construction grew. The concentration of authority in the hands of the designer of the ship led to a deskilling of workers on the wharf and reduced the need for training.

That tendency was most notable with the rise of government-owned and managed shipbuilding facilities. Such yards predated the full-rigged ship with examples in the Mediterranean, most notably in the Arsenal of Venice. There were also yards in which the state had an interest in China as well in the sixteenth century and before (Moll-Murata 2008, 182-83; Lane 1973, 361-64). The expansion of the responsibilities of governments and the appearance of monopoly trading companies in northern Europe, both in part due to the changing technology of shipping, centralized work for larger ships. They also created pressure to increase the size of ships. The resulting yards, like that of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC), were among the largest industrial enterprises in the world.

# **4. The Third Phase: flattening the curve and decline, still with technological advances**

The rate of adoption of the full-rigged ship levelled off in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The prevalence of the type was so great in most parts of the world that the functions for which it was best suited were overwhelmingly dominated by vessels of that design. There may have been a slight erosion in the number of full-rigged ships in use in the part of the world where it was first developed. Newer versions of other types, influenced by the hull design, rigging and construction methods of full-rigged ships, found certain trades and uses where they could supplant the dominant type. The larger size of two-masted ships and their greater sail area along with greater ease of handling sails was a case in northern Europe where, in some trades, full-rigged ships were replaced. Ultimately it was the emergence of a new technology for the propulsion of ships at sea that led to the fading in importance of the GPT with roots in the fourteenth century.