**Springer Proceedings in Physics 291**

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino Micah Lowenthal Luciano Maiani Enza Pellecchia Editors

# Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War

Proceedings of the XXII Edoardo Amaldi Conference, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, Italy, April 6–8, 2022

# **Springer Proceedings in Physics**

Volume 291

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Paolo Cotta-Ramusino · Micah Lowenthal · Luciano Maiani · Enza Pellecchia Editors

# Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War

Proceedings of the XXII Edoardo Amaldi Conference, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, Italy, April 6–8, 2022

*Editors*  Paolo Cotta-Ramusino University of Milan Milan, Italy

Luciano Maiani Dipartimento di Fisica Sapienza Università di Roma Rome, Italy

Micah Lowenthal CISAC National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Washington, D.C., USA

Enza Pellecchia University of Pisa Pisa, Italy

ISSN 0930-8989 ISSN 1867-4941 (electronic) Springer Proceedings in Physics ISBN 978-3-031-29707-6 ISBN 978-3-031-29708-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29708-3

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# **Preface I**

In 1980, the US National Academy of Sciences established CISAC (Committee on International Security and Armament Control), to open bilateral contacts with an analogous group at the Soviet Academy of Science. Among CISAC components there was Wolfgang Panofsky, eminent physicist, founder and first director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.

In January 1986, the CISAC meeting on International Security and Armament Control was extended beyond the limitation of a direct link between the USA and the USSR. The possibility of establishing in Europe a group of scientists with a role analogous to CISAC was discussed. As a consequence, in 1987, Edoardo Amaldi sets up SICA (a working group on International Security and Arms Control), at Accademia dei Lincei.

A first informal Workshop was held in Roma, Lincei 23–25 June 1988 under the title *International Security and Disarmament: The Role of the Scientific Academies*. A second meeting followed in 1989.

On 5 December 1989, while preparing the third Meeting, Edoardo Amaldi, then President of Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, unexpectedly died. The third meeting was held few months later, in June 1990, under the Chair of Giorgio Salvini who had succeeded Amaldi at the Presidency of Lincei. The title was: *Security in Europe and the Transition Away from Confrontation Toward Cooperation*. Participants to the third meeting decided to dedicate future meetings to the memory of Edoardo Amaldi, hence the name Edoardo Amaldi Conferences.

From 1991 to 2011, the Edoardo Amaldi Conferences have been regularly held at Lincei and elsewhere in Europe, essentially as triangular meetings involving scientists from Europe, the United States and URSS, later the Russian Federation. In 2015 and 2017, with the support of Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Edoardo Amaldi Conferences have been extended to important participation from Countries in the Middle East and Asia (China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, Japan, Pakistan). SICA (Accademia dei Lincei) and CISAC (US National Academy of Sciences) have Coorganized the 21th and the present, 22nd editions.

As in the past, the 22nd Edoardo Amaldi Conference provides a forum where eminent scientists, diplomats and policymakers will be able to compare national perspectives and international collaborations. It is a badly needed occasion, given that the past five years have seen a dramatic escalation in the danger of nuclear conflicts. The Conference updates us about the situation on the critical areas (Iran, India-Pakistan, North Korea) and on the important treaties that will come under discussion in the near future, Non-Proliferation, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The international panorama has worsened considerably after the unilateral denunciation of the US Administration of the Iran agreement (JCPOA) and the cancellation of the USA-Russia treaty on intermediate range missiles (INF, Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces). Difficulties in the periodic, five year, review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have arisen, due to disagreements between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States about how to make progress in the reduction of nuclear armaments.

The only positive light has come from the renovation of NewSTART (STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between Russia and US, March 2021, that indicates the willingness of the two signatories to consider fruitful the dialog initiated in 1991 by Reagan and Gorbacev and continued with New Start by Obama and Medvedev.

On all that, on February 24 the Russian invasion of Ukraine deflagrated. There is no need to add comments to the horror we saw since then.

The menace of a third, nuclear world war has been evocated several times, a circumstance that leads us to close this presentation with the worlds of the Russel-Einstein Manifesto (July 9, 1955): … *we urge the governments of the world to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them*.

In conclusion, I would like to thank

Rome, Italy Luciano Maiani

# **Preface II**

On behalf of the President of the US National Academy of Sciences Marcia Mc-Nutt and the Chair of the Academy's Committee on International Security and Arms Control Raymond Jeanloz, I want to thank Lincei President Roberto Antonelli, Conference Chair Luciano Maiani, and Profs. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Enza Pellecchia who have organized this conference much more than we have.

The National Academy of Sciences had a role in the genesis of the Amaldi Conferences. We have been fortunate to participate in these conferences since the beginning, in some cases helping organize them. More than ever, our academy has been actively engaged in recent conferences for several reasons. First, Dr. McNutt has consciously led our Academy to step up international engagements, even as many governments withdrew from internationalism and focused more inwardly. Second, Prof. Luciano Maiani and Prof. Wolfango Plastino have done excellent work in organizing recent conferences. Third, and more pointedly, there is an urgent, growing need for the scientific community to address international problems, both long-term, chronic problems, such as climate change; and emergent problems, such as the displacement of whole populations due to conflict.

The Russian government's attack and ongoing war on its neighbor Ukraine has caused a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and a refugee crisis in Europe. Our Academy has launched an effort with the Polish Academy of Sciences and others to support Ukrainian researchers who have fled their country. Through this Safe Passage Fund and our Academies' Scientists and Engineers in Exile or Displaced (SEED) initiative, which helped evacuate and resettle a group of Afghan researchers following the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, we are working with others in concrete ways on these immediate issues.

Sadly, nuclear arms and related international security issues remain as long-term chronic concerns, yet they are also punctuated by emergent conditions and even crisis. It is crucial at this time for our scientific and technical communities to hold thoughtful, informed, reasoned international discussions on these issues, including with colleagues having policy, military and other important perspectives. It is also necessary for us in the technical domains to inform our governments of any insights in understanding, and opportunities to improve outcomes. As Prof. Antonelli said, this is especially the case because we in the scientific community are used to working together, communicating and collaborating internationally, while in many cases our governments can find it difficult to talk with each other directly.

Underlying all of these objectives is the observation—and conviction—that well documented facts and reliable analysis serve to improve human society's capabilities and policies. Communication and collaboration is our mission in these three days of the Conference, while we address major issues in international security now confronting society.

We have an outstanding set of speakers, and opportunity for discussions. I don't wish to delay hearing from our distinguished participants, so I will end by reiterating the welcome and thanks of the Academies.

Washington, D.C., USA Micah Lowenthal

# **About the Conference**

# **The Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei**

Founded in 1603, the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei is the oldest scientific academy in the world which included, among many other prestigious names, Galileo Galilei. The Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei is within the sphere of the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage and is considered the highest Italian cultural institution. The Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei is a scientific consultant to the President of the Italian Republic and has recently been granted his High Permanent Patronage. The Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei mission is to promote, coordinate, integrate and spread scientific knowledge in its highest expressions, in the frame of cultural unity and universality. To this end, the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei organizes national and international conferences, meetings and seminars.

# **The National Academy of Sciences**

Established by an Act of Congress signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863, the National Academy of Sciences is charged with providing independent, objective advice to the nation on matters related to science and technology. The National Academy of Sciences is committed to furthering science in America, and its members are active contributors to the international scientific community. Nearly 500 members of the National Academy of Sciences have won Nobel Prizes, and the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, founded in 1914, is today one of the premier international journals publishing the results of original research. The National Academy of Sciences also encourage education and research, recognize outstanding contributions to knowledge and increase public understanding in matters of science.

# **A Brief History of the Edoardo Amaldi Conferences**

In 1980, the United States National Academy of Sciences established a Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). During the 1980s, with Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky as Chairman, one of CISAC's main purposes was to maintain bilateral contacts with an analogous group at the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. In January 1986, CISAC organized in Washington, D.C. a meeting and about ten scientists from European countries participated. In this meeting questions connected to arms control were discussed, together with the possibility of establishing in Europe a group of scientists with a role analogous to that of CISAC. Discussions on international security and armament control were extended beyond the limitation of a direct link between the USA and the USSR.

Francesco Calogero and Carlo Schaerf took part in this meeting and then reported to Edoardo Amaldi, then Vice President of the Academia Nazionale dei Lincei. He was very much in favor of this initiative and set up a Working Group on International Security and Arms Control (SICA).

The first informal meeting was held in Rome at the Academy on 23–25 June 1988 and was entitled *Workshop on International Security and Disarmament: The Role of the Scientific Academies*. Participants from Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA were present at this meeting. On that occasion it was decided to hold an international conference the following year and to invite participants from other European countries, including the Soviet Union.

The second meeting was entitled *International Security and Disarmament: The Role of the Scientific Academies* and was held in Rome in June 1989.

The third conference, entitled *International Conference on Security in Europe and the Transition Away from Confrontation Toward Cooperation*, was held again in Rome in June 1990. The title, the programme, and the specific items had already been established by Edoardo Amaldi (who was President of the Academy at the time) and the SICA group when he died unexpectedly on 5 December 1989. Professor Giorgio Salvini was elected to succeed him as President of the Academy and decided to continue the Amaldi's initiative on disarmament and arms control. The third meeting was devoted to problems of peace, environmental cooperation and measures of effective disarmament in the new international climate. It was at this meeting that the participants decided to dedicate all future conferences to the memory of Edoardo Amaldi, hence the name *Amaldi Conferences*. Since then the Amaldi Conferences continued on a yearly basis up until 2000, and later periodically.

Latest Conferences:

*Atoms for Peace and Development—EURATOM Treaty*, organized by the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the European Commission—Joint Research Centre (Rome, 9–10 October 2017).

● XXI Edoardo Amaldi Conference on *International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation*, organized by the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the National Academy of Sciences, USA (Rome, 7–8 October 2019).

# **Edoardo Amaldi (1908–1989)**

Edoardo Amaldi was an Italian Physicist who started his research in Nuclear Physics in collaboration with Enrico Fermi. He has contributed substantially to the current knowledge on artificial radioactivity induced by neutrons and properties of slow neutrons and gave first direct experimental evidence of the diffraction of fast neutrons by nuclei. After the Second World War, Amaldi was instrumental in the reconstruction of the post-Fermi School of Physics in Italy and was co-founder of the Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN), of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO).

Amaldi supported the Working Group on International Security and Arms Control (SICA) from its inception, organizing the first conference on "International Security and Disarmament: The Role of the Scientific Academies" in Rome from 23 to 25 June 1988. The third conference on "Security in Europe and the Transition away from Confrontation toward Cooperation" was held again in Rome in June 1990. The title, the programme and the specific items had already been established by Edoardo Amaldi (President of the Academy at the time) and the SICA group when he died unexpectedly on 5 December 1989. Participants at this meeting decided to dedicate future meetings to the memory of Edoardo Amaldi, hence the name Amaldi Conferences. Since then the Amaldi Conferences have continued on a regular basis.

# **Contents**

# **Part I**

#### **Part II**

# **Contributors**

**Wael Al Assad** Ambassador (Ret), The Pearl, Doha, Qatar

**Hussain Al-Shahristani** Former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq

**Alexey Arbatov** Moscow, Russia

**Nadezhda Arbatova** Head of Department on European Political Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

**Paolo Cotta-Ramusino** Dipartimento di Fisica, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milano, Italy

**Ambassador David Danieli** Former Deputy Director General, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, Tel Aviv, Israel

**Robert Floyd** Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Viennam, Austria

**Barbara Gallo** IRIAD, Paris, France

**Rose Gottemoeller** Steven C. Házy Lecturer Chair. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University, Palo Alto CA, USA

**Anton Khlopkov** Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow, Russia

**Piero Martin** Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia "G. Galilei", Università di Padova, DTT S.C.a R.L. and Consorzio RFX, Padua, Italy

**Steven E. Miller** Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, US

**Götz Neuneck** Institute for Peace and Security Policy, University Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

**Giorgio Parisi** Department of Physics, Rome University la Sapienza, Rome, Italy

**Emilio Parisini** Latvian Institute of Organic Synthesis, Riga, Latvia; University of Bologna, Department of Chemistry "G. Ciamician", Bologna, Italy

**Alessio Pecorario** Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development, Vatican, UK

**Eliezer Rabinovici** Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

**R. Rajaraman** Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

**Tariq Rauf** IAEA, Former Head of Verification and Security Policy, Vienna, Austria

**Ali A. Salehi** Iran's Academy of Science, Tehran, Iran

**Naeem Salik** Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Tatsujiro Suzuki** Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Nagasaki, Japan

**Guglielmo Tamburrini** DIETI - Department of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Università di Napoli Federico II, Naples, Italy

# **Part I**

# **Chapter 1 Science and Society**

**Giorgio Parisi**

I would like to start quoting a sentence that sometimes is ascribed to Richard Feynman (he was one of the greatest physicists of the century and perhaps the most popular one). Physics is like sex: sure, it may give some practical results, but that's not why we do it.

This phrase reflects very well the subjective passions of scientists. Science is a huge puzzle and every piece that is put in the right place opens up the possibility of placing others. In this gigantic mosaic, each scientist adds tiles, with the knowledge that he has made his contribution, and that when his name is forgotten, those who come after will also climb on his shoulders to see further. The more we explore the universe, the more we discover new regions to explore, each discovery allowing us to formulate so many new questions that previously we were unable to formulate.

But beyond these considerations, it is crucial for scientists to have fun trying to solve the puzzle. My teacher Nicola Cabibbo often said, when discussing what to do, "Why should we study this problem if we're not having fun?" Often among scientists, there is almost an amazement at being paid to do the very thing you most want to do.

However, except in the rare cases in which the scientist was from a wealthy family and research was conducted during long periods of idleness (e.g. Pliny the Elder, Fermat), the scientists always had the problem of finding resources for living and the applications of science were essential for this purpose. Just think of one of the first sciences, in order of time, astronomy. It is difficult to imagine, now that we live in well-lit cities, the enormous prestige and power of those who controlled the flow of the seasons, the motion of the stars, and who knew how to predict the eclipses of the moon (not to mention the terrifying phenomenon that are the eclipses of the sun).

© The Author(s) 2023

G. Parisi (B)

Department of Physics, Rome University la Sapienza, Rome, Italy e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
P. Cotta-Ramusino et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War*, Springer Proceedings in Physics 291, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29708-3\_1

Even if the motivations of the patrons could only be cultural or of social prestige, certainly the importance of practical applications did not escape the scientists: for example, Galileo proposed to use the occultation of Jupiter's satellites as a method to determine the absolute time without the need of precision clocks and then determine the latitude. Actually Galileo's proposal was too complicated to be used in practice and the problem was finally solved in the next century with the precision chronometer which crowned more than a century of research.

With the passing of the years, science becomes more and more useful to society (economic development is based on scientific progress), but it also becomes more and more expensive and requires more and more complex facilities and organization. World War II marks the first stirrings of mass-based science ("big science"): Vannevar Bush coordinated the war efforts of six thousand American scientists and at the same time fifty thousand people worked on the construction of the first atomic bombs.

 This point of view was expressed very clearly by the Soviet delegation at the congress on the history of science and technology held in London in 1931. Bukharin (a political personality of the first rank, extremely popular in the USSR, who was later one of the most illustrious victims of the Stalinist purges) wrote that "the idea that science is an end in itself is naive: it confuses the subjective passions of the professional scientist, who works in a system of a very strict division of labor (…) with the objective social role of this kind of activity, as an activity of practical importance."

All of us here realize that technological development is not possible without a parallel advancement of pure science. Pure science not only provides applied science with the necessary knowledge for development (languages, metaphors, conceptual frameworks), but it also provides another more hidden role of no less importance. Basic scientific activities also function as a gigantic circuit for testing technological products and stimulating the consumption of high-tech goods.

# **1.1 Science as Culture**

Science must be defended not only for its practical aspects but also for its cultural value. We should follow the courageous example of Robert Wilson who, in 1969, in response to an American senator who insistently asked what the value was in building an accelerator at the Fermilab, near Chicago, and, in particular, if it was militarily useful to defend the country, replied "(…) It only has to do with the respect with which we regard one another, the dignity of men, our love of culture. It has to do with those things. It has nothing to do with the military. I am sorry. (…) Otherwise, it has to do with: Are we good painters, good sculptors, great poets? I mean all the things that we really venerate and honor in our country and are patriotic about. In that sense, this new knowledge has all to do with honor and country but it has nothing to do directly with defending our country except to help make it worth defending. (…)".

#### 1 Science and Society 5

To promote science as culture, it is necessary to make the population (at least the educated population) aware of what science is, and of how science and culture intertwine with each other, both in their historical development and in today's practices. It is necessary to explain in a non-magical way what living scientists do, and what the challenges of our times are. It is not easy, especially in the hard sciences where mathematics plays an essential role. However, with some effort, excellent results can be achieved.

It is often said that the hard sciences are not easily understood by those who have not studied mathematics. But the same problem also exists with Chinese poetry, which is an inseparable mixture of literature and painting: the original manuscript of poetry is a picture where the individual Chinese ideograms are the pictorial elements that are represented each time differently. This pictorial dimension is completely lost in the translation and its beauty cannot be appreciated by those who do not know Chinese well. Just as it is possible to make people appreciate the beauty of Chinese poems in Italian, it is also possible to make people who do not know mathematics and have not studied science understand the beauty of hard sciences.

Now, it's clear that we have to defend the culture on all fronts and we must avoid losing our ability to pass our culture to the next generation. If we lose our culture, what remains of our civilization?

# **1.2 The Refusal of Science**

This deep integration between science and technology might suggest that science has a bright future in a society that is becoming increasingly dependent on advanced technology (the mobile phones widely used today can reach a computing capacity of hundreds of billions of arithmetic operations per second, like the mammoth supercomputers of twenty-five years ago).

Today the opposite seems to be true: there are strong anti-scientific tendencies in today's society, the prestige of Science and the trust that has been placed in it are rapidly diminishing, astrological, homeopathic and anti-scientific practices are spreading widely, along with voracious technological consumerism. For example the NoVax movement before COVID or the denial of Xylella as the origin of the disease that struck the Apulian olive trees).

Now, we have also seen during COVID, the tragedies that happened to people that were negating COVID in denial. They refused to vaccinate despite millions of deaths. This came from the refusal of science.

It is not easy to fully understand the origin of this phenomenon: this mass distrust in science may also be due to a certain arrogance of scientists who present science as absolute wisdom, compared to other debatable knowledge, even when it is not the case. Sometimes, the arrogance is not in trying to bring to the public the available evidence, but in expecting an unconditional assent based on trust in experts.

The refusal to accept limitations can weaken the prestige of scientists, who sometimes flaunt unfounded excessive security; a stance which the public may somehow perceive as partial or limited. Sometimes bad propagators present scientific results almost as superior witchcraft, which is understandable only to a selected few. In doing so, non-scientists may be put in a position to take on an irrational viewpoint towards science which is perceived as inaccessible magic and therefore, in turn, have unreasonable expectations: if science becomes pseudo magic, why not choose the real magic rather than its surrogate?

But perhaps the current difficulties have deeper origins that must be understood in depth so that they can be counteracted. We are facing a period of pessimism concerning the future, originating from crises of different natures: economic crisis, global warming, depletion of resources, and pollution. In many countries, there are also increasing inequalities, insecurity, unemployment, and war. While it was once thought that the future would inevitably be better than the present, the faith in progress, in the magnificent and progressive fortunes of human beings has eroded: many fear that future generations will be worse off than the present ones. And just as science received the merit for progress, it now receives the blame for its decline (regardless of whether it is real or just perceived). Science is sometimes deemed to be a bad teacher who has led us in the wrong direction, and changing this perception is not easy. There is great dissatisfaction with all those who have led us into this situation and scientists do not escape reproach.

Science sometimes is deemed to be a bad teacher that leads us in the wrong direction. The change in this perception is not easy. We should not take for granted that the development of science is unstoppable: it is a mistake to think that technological development can always rely on scientific development. The Romans preserved Greek technology without much consideration for Greek science and the Christian fanatics, led by Bishop Cyril of Alexandria, quietly tore to pieces the body of mathematic-astronomer Hypatia, without worrying much about the long-term consequences, and indeed rejoicing at the disappearance of a profane knowledge, considered useless if not harmful.

# **1.3 The Future of Humanity**

There are some practical consequences of science that are very, very important. Science is making great advances and many of the world's problems could be solved using the tools of science put in front of us.

In these days humanity must make essential choices; it must stand firm against climate change. For decades, science has been warning us that human behavior was laying the groundwork for a dramatic increase in the temperature of our planet. Science alone is not enough. Political decisions are needed, especially on the part of the rich countries. We need to go beyond short-sighted national self-interest to solve global problems in the spirit of whatever it takes. COVID has taught us that we are all connected, and what happens in game markets or in the Amazon forest deeply affects all of us.

#### 1 Science and Society 7

Unfortunately, the actions taken by governments have not been up to this challenge and the results so far have been extremely modest. In recent years, the effects of climate change are there for all to see: the floods, hurricanes, heat waves, and devastating fires of which we have been astonished spectators are a timid foretaste of what will happen in the future on a much larger scale. Now that climate change is beginning to affect people's lives, there is perhaps a more resolute reaction, but we need much stronger measures and we must not limit ourselves to just saving our conscience. From COVID's experience, we know that it is not easy to take effective measures in time. We have seen how often measures to contain the pandemic were taken late, only at the moment when they could no longer be postponed. I remember one head of government being told "we can't do a lockdown before the hospitals are full, the citizens wouldn't understand".

We all know that the pitiful doctor made the festering sore: we have a duty not to be pitiful doctors. Our generation has to pass through a road full of dangers. It's like driving at night: the science is the headlights, but then the responsibility to not go off the road lies with the driver who must also take into account that the headlights have a limited range.

Even scientists don't know everything. It is laborious work during which knowledge is accumulated one after another and pockets of uncertainty are slowly eliminated. Science makes honest predictions on which a scientific consensus slowly forms. When the IPCF predicts that in an intermediate scenario of reduced greenhouse gas emissions the temperature could rise between 2.1 and 3.5 degrees, this range is what we can best estimate from current knowledge. However it must be clear to everyone that the correctness of climate models has been verified by comparing the predictions of these models with the past; if the temperature increases more than 2° we enter an unknown land where there can be other phenomena that we have not foreseen that can worsen enormously the situation: for example colossal forest fires like the Amazon that would introduce catastrophically enormous quantities of greenhouse gases, but when would they happen? The oceans are currently absorbing many of the greenhouse gases we emit, but will this phenomenon continue in an earth two degrees warmer? The temperature rise is not only controlled by direct emissions but is mitigated by a lot of regulatory mechanisms that could stop working as the temperature rises. While the 2° lower limit is something we can be pretty sure about, it is much harder to figure out what the most pessimistic scenario is: it could be much, much worse than what we imagine.

We are facing a huge problem that needs decisive interventions not only to stop the emission of greenhouse gases, but we also need scientific investments: we must be able to develop new technologies to conserve energy by transforming it into fuels, non-polluting technologies based on renewable resources: not only we must save ourselves from the greenhouse effect, but we must avoid falling into the terrible trap of the exhaustion of natural resources.

Energy saving is also a chapter that needs to be tackled decisively: for example, as long as the internal temperature of our homes remains almost constant between summer and winter, it will be difficult to stop emissions.

Blocking climate change successfully requires a monstrous effort by all: it is an operation with a colossal cost, not only financial but also social with changes that affect our lives. The policy must ensure that these costs are accepted by all: those who have used the most resources must contribute more, to affect the bulk of the population as little as possible; the costs must be distributed fairly and equitably among all countries: decency requires that the countries that currently affect the planet's resources must make the greatest efforts.

# **1.4 Science and Peace**

We must build ties, and bridges among people of different countries, and stress what unifies all human beings beyond nationalism. Science is a worldwide enterprise at it is very well suited. Of course, it takes time, but these are long time process and we have to think from a long-term perspective, which will be the situation 10–20 years from now.

This happened in the past. Europe is a cultural creation done by humanist philosopher scientists that created the European cultural space. Starting from the clerici vagantes (wandering clergy), the foundation of the Universities, Europe has been characterized by a class of highly cultivated people that were in contact among themselves, and moved from one place to the others. In this construction a very important role was played by the scientific academies that were founded in Europe (they still dominate the scientific scene) as the Accademia dei Lincei in 1603, the Royal Society in 1646, the Académie des Sciences in 1666. Let me mention also the American philosophical society that was founded in 1743. This Academy is particularly interesting, it was founded by Benjamin Franklin with the state of the purpose of promoting useful knowledge.

Much time later CERN was founded by 12 European countries in 1954, 3 years before the Rome treaty, where the European Economic Community was founded, with only 6 of the 12 countries of CERN. It is clear that science was ahead of politics also if we consider that many countries, also on the other side of the curtain wall participated in the experiments done at CERN.

Now, we have in recent times, we have seen the creation of Synchrotron-Light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME), a remarkable laboratory, located in Jordan, that was founded by a few meddle Est countries: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the Palestinian Authority and Turkey, that have a quite different political stance.

Unfortunately not always science is being used for peace: it could be used for war as we have seen in the past. There are still problems at present. Let me recall a declaration of the Academic G7, that happened in Paris in 2019, where there was an important declaration on autonomous weapons signed by all the seven Academies.

AI opens new possibilities for military applications, particularly concerning weapon systems with significant autonomy in the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets. Such autonomous weapons might lead to a new arms race, lower the threshold for war or become a tool for oppressors or terrorists. Some organizations call for a ban on autonomous weapons, similar to conventions in the chemical or biological weapons realm. Such a prohibition would require a precise definition of weapons and autonomy. In the absence of a ban of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), the compliance of any weapon system with International Humanitarian Law should be guaranteed. These weapons should be integrated into existing command and control structures in such a way that responsibility and legal accountability remain associated with specific human actors. There is a clear need for transparency and public discussion of issues raised in this area.

This year we face an enormous tragedy, not only the military killed but also a large number of civilians. We are witness of an incredibly high number of refugees, so high I cannot compare with anything that I have seen. This tragedy should stop now, but we need also to think in the long term We are returning to cold war times and we have heard again the menace of using nuclear arms. Cold war, a confrontation that went on for more than 40 years, was not only cold, but it had also hot periods with millions of deaths. It and I think that now that cold war times are coming back, we should ask a very fundamental question. Why we are alive? Why we have not dyed in the Third War that could be unleashed?

Much of the credit comes from the realization that uncontrolled escalation must be avoided, and that it was essential that the armies of the Warsaw Pact and NATO did not clash militarily. One was and is in a situation of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in the case of the atomic war. We are still in the same situation, the 2000 or so strategic warheads of NATO and the 1600 Russian warheads are capable of completely devastating the northern hemisphere. It was crucial to defuse the conflicts before it came to an armed clash between the respective armies.

Science had a direct role in building peace. "Track II Diplomacy" had a very important role. The first example of this kind of diplomacy where Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Pugwash played a useful role in opening communication channels during a time of otherwise-strained official and unofficial relations. It provided background work to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), the Biological Weapons Convention (1972), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993). Former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has credited a backchannel Pugwash initiative with laying the groundwork for the negotiations that ended the Vietnam War. Mikhail Gorbachev admitted the influence of the organization on him when he was the leader of the Soviet Union. In addition, Pugwash has been credited with being a groundbreaking and innovative "transnational" organization and a leading example of the effectiveness of Track II diplomacy.

As you all know, Amaldi conferences are also another example of the effort in the same way as the "Colloquia on Science and Diplomacy" (program ideated by Wolfango Plastino) that our Academy, is organizing with great success from 2020.

I am very confident that the discussions here (without public) will be extremely useful in constructing a mutual understanding, as can be seen from the proceeding of the previous Amaldi conference and you will see from that the proceedings of this one.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Chapter 2 25 Years of CTBTO**

**Robert Floyd**

I would like to thank the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei for inviting me to speak at this XXII Edoardo Amaldi Conference on Nuclear Risks and Arms Control, Problems and Progress in the Time of Pandemics and War. The theme of this year's conference is timely.

We are at a pivotal moment in history. The situation in Ukraine continues to be of grave concern. We have heard of nuclear weapons being put on high alert. Fears that the conflict will further escalate and expand are all too real. These events have put our efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament into a most sobering context and caused me to reflect on the poignant statement of The Elders, a group of world leaders of great renown. They said: "*As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, it is inevitable that they will someday be used, whether by design, accident or miscalculation.*"

Today, this message is especially resonant, and it is one we should all heed. The road to nuclear disarmament may be long and winding, but I believe that there are simple steps that we can take now that will lead us to a world free from nuclear weapons. One essential step that will bring us ever closer to the world we all aspire to is the CTBT, which will provide a legally binding and verifiable prohibition on nuclear testing.

This keynote address is a journey of 25 years through the history of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO),1 including the scientific and technical framework behind its verification regime, starting with an overview of the CTBT.

1 https://www.ctbto.org/.

The XXII Edoardo Amaldi Conference (Rome, April 2022).

R. Floyd (B)

11

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Viennam, Austria e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

P. Cotta-Ramusino et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War*, Springer Proceedings in Physics 291, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29708-3\_2

The CTBT is an important achievement as one can discern by looking at the number of nuclear tests conducted each year between 1945 and the actual signature date of the CTBT. Between 1945 and 1996 more than 2000 nuclear tests were carried out at over 60 locations throughout the world. These had a serious impact on human health and the environment. During this time, the average explosive yield of nuclear tests per year was equivalent to nearly 1,000 Hiroshima sized bombs. Since the CTBT opened for signature in 1996, less than a dozen tests have been conducted by only three States. Only one State has conducted several nuclear tests in this century. This proves to be a remarkable accomplishment that demonstrates the powerful contribution that the Treaty has made to international peace and security.

The journey towards the CTBT was not an easy path. More than four decades passed between the first call for a nuclear testing "standstill" agreement by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 and the adoption of the Treaty in 1996. In the current international security context, I believe it useful to reflect upon the experience of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This event prompted world leaders to recognize the need to address the inherent risks of nuclear weapons. One such proposal was in fact a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

While a CTBT proved too difficult at that time, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was adopted in 1963 banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space. It did not, however, prohibit underground nuclear tests and did not include a verification mechanism. Concerns grew about the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the 1960's, which resulted in the negotiation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While some States wanted to include a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing in the NPT, differing views prevented such an outcome. However, the determination to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests is mentioned in its preamble.

There are three pillars of the NPT: Non-proliferation, Disarmament, and Peaceful use of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT obligates all States to take effective measures leading to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. The duration of the NPT, which initially was prescribed for 25 years, was extended indefinitely by States Parties during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. One of the crucial elements in a package of agreements that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT was that a CTBT be negotiated no later than 1996.

Three intense years of negotiations took place at the Conference on Disarmament, which were preceded by a decades-long effort by a multilateral Group of Scientific Experts to lay the foundation of a verification regime. The CTBT was finally adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996 and opened for signature on 24 September 1996. We should today be grateful for the result of this long process and efforts which put in place an effective, non-discriminatory verifiable measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The CTBT has established a near universal global norm against nuclear testing, and its entry into force will constitute an essential step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Summarizing the basic obligations of the CTBT (Article I, Paragraph I):

Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

#### 2 25 Years of CTBTO 13

There are now 186 States Signatories2 to the CTBT, out of which 177 have ratified. However, the Treaty will enter into force only when all States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty ratify it. States listed in Annex 2 are 44 States that possessed nuclear power or research reactors at the time of the final stage of negotiation of the Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1996. As of today, there are eight remaining Annex 2 States that still must join the CTBT. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the US have already signed but not yet ratified the Treaty while the DPRK, India and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified.

The success of the CTBT is in large part a reflection of the successful build-up of the Treaty's verification regime. The CTBT verification regime has three pillars: the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Centre (IDC) and On-Site Inspections (OSI).

The IMS, when completed, will consist of 337 facilities worldwide to monitor the planet for any sign of a nuclear explosion. More than 90 percent of these 337 facilities are in place and sending data to the IDC. The IDC at the CTBTO headquarters in Vienna receives the data in near real-time from IMS stations. The data are processed and distributed to CTBT States Signatories in both raw and analysed form. The OSI pillar is being built up to be ready for when the CTBT enters into force. This will enable the dispatching of inspectors to an inspection area of a suspected nuclear explosion to conduct inspection activities and use inspection techniques. Thus, the sole purpose of an on-site inspection will be to clarify whether a nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty. Any decision to launch an OSI and decision whether any non-compliance with the Treaty has occurred will be made by the members of a future CTBTO Executive Council, which will serve as the executive organ of the CTBTO. The verification regime also encompasses a Consultation and Clarification process and Confidence-Building Measures.

The IMS employs four technologies—seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide. Currently, 153 out of 170 seismic stations are certified (certified means a station was installed and meets specific technical requirements). All 11 hydroacoustic stations have been certified. 53 out of 60 infrasound stations are certified and 72 out of the 80 Radionuclide Particulate Monitoring Stations are certified. Of these 80 stations, 40 will have an additional capability for detection of Noble Gas Isotopes, which is an indicator particularly useful for detecting underground nuclear tests. 25 of the Noble Gas monitoring systems have already been certified. The IMS also comprises 16 Radionuclide Laboratories, of which 14 are certified. Italy hosts one seismic station in Valguarnera (Sicily) and Radionuclide Laboratory number 10 at the Italian National Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ISIN) in Rome.

The IMS collects data from each of the four types of monitoring stations and provides a near real-time picture of the entire globe. The data is processed at the IDC and goes through an automated analysis, after which alerts would be triggered with respective staff at all hours of the day and night should a suspicious event occur.

<sup>2</sup> Status as of 6 June 2022. At the time of the Conference, the number of States Signatories was 185.

**Fig. 2.1** Vertical seismic motion produced by the six DPRK nuclear tests, recorded more than 5000 km from the test site by the IMS Auxiliary Seismic station in Aktyubinsk (Kazakhstan). The curves are all plotted on the same scale. The time axis indicates time relative to the origin in hours:minutes:seconds

I continue to be amazed by how effective the CTBT verification regime is at detecting nuclear tests. All one must do is look at the response of the system during each of the six announced DPRK nuclear tests (Fig. 2.1). Within hours of the event occurring, the IDC processes the data and makes initial information available about the location, magnitude, and time of these Treaty-relevant events to Member States. Over the years, the number of stations detecting these events went from 22 to 134 as the IMS build-up progressed, and the body wave magnitude computed by the IDC increased from 4.08 to 6.07 for these events (Table 2.1). It's noteworthy that the size of the area within which the event is located with 90% confidence, called the confidence ellipse, obtained with less than half of the IMS network in place at the time of the first DPRK nuclear test in 2006, which was estimated to be less than one kiloton, was only 880 km2. The size of this area is well within the 1000 km2 Treaty requirements for launching an OSI. In 2017, with the IMS nearly 90% complete, the confidence ellipse improved to 109 km2 (Fig. 2.2). Numerous small seismic events, tectonic in nature, and known to have originated near the DPRK nuclear test site at Punggye-ri after the 2017 test have been detected and localized by the IMS and have continued until recently (as of June 2022).

The extraordinary sensitivity of the sensors deployed at the more than 300 IMS stations strategically located all around the globe allows us to achieve a detection capability far better than expected from the original design. But what I find particularly exciting about the verification regime is the vast potential for the data to be used in civil and scientific applications. It is so encouraging that the CTBTO has agreements for providing reliable real-time IMS data to tsunami warning centres in 19 States Signatories. The tsunami related agreement with Italy was signed in 2019.

**Table 2.1** Dates, seismic body wave magnitude, number of IMS stations detecting and 90% confidence ellipse parameters for each of the six DPRK tests

**Fig. 2.2** Graphical representation of the six DPRK test detection confidence ellipses

I expect that more and more countries will take advantage of this opportunity to benefit from additional uses of our monitoring data.

Our seismic technology contributes to studies on earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, seismic hazard assessments, studies on the internal structure of the earth, the melting of glaciers, and tsunami warning systems.

Hydroacoustic technology contributes to the monitoring and location of underwater volcanic events and undersea earthquakes, some of which trigger tsunamis. Another exciting area where hydroacoustic technology can be useful is monitoring changes in sea temperature and signs of global warming through variation in acoustic signal travel time (ocean acoustic thermometry studies). There is also extensive research being undertaken on ocean processes and marine life.3 I was particularly intrigued by the discovery of a new population of pygmy blue whales by researchers studying the acoustic signals collected by our hydroacoustic network.,4 ,5

Hydroacoustic data from IMS Hydrophone stations were also used to assist the Argentine Authorities when the submarine ARA San Juan was lost on 15th November 2017.6 Tragically, all crew members lost their lives. Upon request from the Argentine Authorities, the CTBTO provided assistance, analysing its data in search of any signal which could be potentially related to the disappearance of the submarine. An impulsive hydroacoustic signal was detected by two IMS hydrophone stations, the location calculated for this event was not far from where the submarine had its last contact with the base. The time of the event determined from the acoustic signal travel time was also not long after the submarine had its last known communication. The two stations which detected this signal were located about 6,000 km and 7,700 km from the event, respectively. After a long search operation, on 17th November 2018, Argentine Authorities confirmed that the San Juan was found on the seafloor at 900 m depth, at less than 20 km distance from the event location estimated from CTBTO hydroacoustic data.

Infrasound technology contributes to the detection of volcanic eruptions which can have significant effects on civil aviation. It can also be used to support atmospheric and meteorological studies, tracking of storms, detection of meteors disintegrating in the atmosphere, and studies of signals generated by avalanches, among others.

Many of you will recall in January this year the explosive eruption of the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha'apai volcano in Tonga. This catastrophic explosive eruption and tsunami generated infrasound, seismic and hydroacoustic signals that were recorded by the IMS.7 What you might not be aware of, is that this eruption was the largest event ever detected by the IMS infrasound network. As the pressure waves created by this violent interaction of magma and seawater spread throughout the atmosphere, our infrasound stations, all around the world, began to light up one by one. Before long, every one of the 53 certified infrasound stations recorded signals from the

<sup>3</sup> J.L. Miksis-Olds, et al. "Two unit analysis of Sri Lankan pygmy blue whale song over a decade," J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 144 (2018).

<sup>4</sup> E.C. Leroy, et al. "Multiple pygmy blue whale acoustic populations in the Indian Ocean: whale song identifies a possible new population," Nature Scientific Reports 11:8762 (2021).

<sup>5</sup> N. Pinto, T.K. Chandrayadula, "Long-term frequency changes of a potential baleen whale call from the central Indian Ocean during 2002–2019," J. Acoust. Soc. Am. Express Letters 1, 021,201 (2021).

<sup>6</sup> P.L. Nielsen, et al. "CTBTO's Data and Analysis Pertaining to the Search for the Missing Argentine Submarine ARA San Juan," Pure and Applied Geophysics 178 (2021).

<sup>7</sup> S. Matoza et al., "Atmospheric waves and global seismoacoustic observations of the January 2022 Hunga eruption, Tonga," Science 10.1126/science.abo7063 (2022).

event. But this is not the most impressive part. The IMS infrasound stations recorded pressure waves generated by this event that propagated around the globe for at least the first four days after the eruption. This breath-taking example of the sensitivity of the system testifies to both its incredible nuclear test detection capability, as well as its enormous value for civil and scientific applications.

The CTBTO Radionuclide network is also an incredible resource. The CTBTO is a member of the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), a network that facilitates and coordinates cooperation between relevant international organizations to respond effectively in the event of an emergency such as a nuclear accident in which radioactive materials are released8 , our radionuclide network is always ready to support in the response to radiological emergencies, such as was the case in the aftermath of the Fukushima (Japan) nuclear accident in 2011. Furthermore, data from radionuclide stations can help to increase understanding of the long-range exchange of pollutants, monitoring the stratosphere/troposphere exchange and validating global climate models, and determining the quantity of dust and pollens present over a certain period of time.

One aspect of Radionuclide technology-related scientific applications that I find especially noteworthy is the study of the Beryllium-7 (7Be) Isotope in relation to meteorological phenomena.9 This research has contributed to understanding longterm global change in the atmosphere, and even predicting the onset of monsoons with a lead-time of about 30 days.10 To briefly explain this latter example: this isotope is generated in the upper layer of the atmosphere, and "seeps" through adjacent atmospheric circulation cells to reach the earth's surface where it can be measured. When the circulation of these large atmospheric cells changes, this causes the 7Be concentration measured at two IMS Radionuclide Particulate Stations in Russia & Australia to change. Detection of these changes makes it possible to predict the onset of the monsoon in India with about 30 days lead-time ahead of meteorological forecasts.

To conclude this technical part of the keynote, let me give you a quick impression of the data flow: data collected from stations are transferred by satellite to Vienna. From there, the information is also passed on to all authorized users in the National Data Centres. In Vienna, the data are analysed by the IDC processing data-stream and reviewed by teams of human analysts. Automatically generated and humanreviewed event bulletins are produced and distributed to Member States. Italy has a National Data Centre (NDC) for waveforms located in a facility of the Italian Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) in Rome, and one NDC for Radionuclide data at the National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Development (ENEA) in Bologna. There are currently more than 1700 authorized users

<sup>8</sup> https://www.ctbto.org/our-work/civil-andscientific-applications/nuclear-emergency-response

<sup>9</sup> L. Terzi, et al. "Radioisotopes demonstrate changes in global atmospheric circulation possibly caused by global warming," Nature Scientific Reports 10:10,695 (2020).

<sup>10</sup> L. Terzi, et al. "How to predict seasonal weather and monsoons with radionuclide monitoring," Nature Scientific Reports 9:2729 (2019).

in 143 countries. Data from our sensors are also available free of charge for scientific research to scientists and researchers via the virtual Data Exploitation Centre (vDEC).<sup>11</sup>

The examples provided here highlight the additional value of the verification regime beyond the core mission of nuclear test monitoring. Be it tsunami early warning, contributing to earthquake detection or climate change research, the range of applications of these data is astonishing. I believe we are only scratching the surface on how these data can be utilized for the benefit of humanity.

To conclude on a high-note: let us have a look at where the CTBT is at after 25 years. There is near-universal adherence to the CTBT's prohibition on nuclear explosions. The norm against nuclear testing established by the CTBT is strong, but until the Treaty enters into force and is universal, the risks of nuclear testing will persist. Every ratification counts and I believe that everyone has a role to play. The 25th anniversary year of the Treaty is a time for us to engage and create momentum towards universalization to put an end to nuclear testing by anyone, anywhere, for all time. We are undertaking strategic and multi-tracked outreach to advance the goal of universalization and I have set a target for us to achieve at least five additional ratifications by the end of the anniversary year this September.

Thank you.

**Acknowledgements Disclaimers** The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations that the authors represent.

The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the Commission as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

<sup>11</sup> https://www.ctbto.org/specials/vdec/.

# **Chapter 3 The Nuclear Conundrum in the Ukraine Crisis**

**Rose Gottemoeller**

Dmitri Medvedev, former President and Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, took to social media on February 25, 2022 to post a chilling message: Russia may be ready to give up the New START Treaty, and it may be ready to cut diplomatic ties with the United States and other Western countries. As Medvedev said, "*As for diplomatic relations, well, there is no great need for them… It's time to hang huge padlocks on the embassies. We can continue our contacts looking at each other through binoculars and gun sights."*

Medvedev certainly did not post without checking whether the message would be welcome. His words, therefore, presage the possibility that Russia will cut itself off from everything that it has accomplished to control and limit nuclear weapons. Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, sixty years ago this year, the USSR and then the Russian Federation have played a proud and generally positive role in preventing nuclear proliferation, halting nuclear testing, and reducing nuclear stockpiles. Even as Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, experienced Russian negotiators in Vienna were working with the United States and other partners to resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. Another irony of this blazing crisis.

It is not too much to say that Russia has been a giant of the nonproliferation regime. The major treaties of the twentieth century have all benefitted from the skills of Russian negotiators and the intellect of Russian experts. The Non-Proliferation Treaty itself was the product of problem-solving ideas from senior Soviet and American diplomats, Ambassadors Roland Timerbaev and George Bunn, at a time when the United States and USSR were otherwise facing off over the Middle East and Vietnam. Tensions were so high that in 1967, the U.S. nuclear alert level was raised during

R. Gottemoeller (B)

© The Author(s) 2023

Steven C. Házy Lecturer Chair. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University, Palo Alto CA, USA e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
P. Cotta-Ramusino et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War*, Springer Proceedings in Physics 291, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29708-3\_3

a solar storm. Somehow, no matter how bad the crisis, the two countries continued talking to get nuclear weapons under control and prevent their spread.

Now, on the back of the invasion of Ukraine, this proud tradition is breaking asunder. What can we expect? The main options seem to be two: First, Russia isolates itself, becoming a pariah state unwilling to play any responsible international role. This seems to be the message of Medvedev's threat to leave the New START Treaty and shutter the embassies in Moscow. Alternatively, Moscow picks some arenas where it wants to continue to pursue its objectives with mutual benefits to its partners at the negotiating table, for the sake of global stability and its own security.

Let's consider the options as they relate to nuclear diplomacy. If Russia isolates itself, then further progress on nuclear non-proliferation becomes difficult. The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference, repeatedly postponed due to the COVID pandemic, is now scheduled to take place in August 2022. Normally, Russia would join the four other nuclear weapons states—US, UK, France and China—to defend its record and bolster continuing progress on the disarmament pillar of the treaty. Just in January 2022, the P 5 nuclear weapons states joined in reiterating the statement of Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This was meant to be the centerpiece of a positive P 5 disarmament agenda at the review conference, which would also extend to bolstering action on nuclear nonproliferation and supporting peaceful uses of the atom. We will have to see if the P 5 can hold together to pursue these goals.

China's role will be an interesting one, and vital. China has hidden behind Russia and the United States for many years, arguing that the much larger U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals handed Washington and Moscow the leadership of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regimes. Now China's own strategic arsenal is growing and it seems inclined, at least in the context of the NPT nuclear weapon states, to play a leadership role.

If Russia absents itself from nuclear diplomacy, will China be willing to step up to help lead? And will the United States be willing to admit it to leadership, given the animus between Washington and Beijing? The two capitals should be pondering these questions now, while we watch the disaster unfold in Ukraine. Of course, it is still a fact that the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are a lot larger than China's, and China's ongoing modernization will not change that fact any time soon.

Therefore, the primary purpose of cooperation between the United States and China in the immediate period should be to work together closely to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and ensure a successful review conference. They should also work to preserve other existing mechanisms such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Otherwise, Russia may begin to play a wrecking role.

The United States and China might also consider working to constrain weapon systems where they have some equality of capability, such as INF missiles or direct ascent anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris announced a unilateral U.S. ban on testing destructive ASAT systems in April 2022 and invited other countries to join. China may wish to take up that offer, in order to convey a responsible attitude toward sustaining space operations. If China and the United States can show early ability to work together and produce results, then the world will breathe a collective sigh of relief that we are not heading into a free-for-all involving weapons of mass destruction and other critical systems.

However, I have to say that with Vladimir Putin threatening nuclear use in the Ukraine crisis, a productive NPT review conference in August seems a faint hope. If Putin decides to proceed to nuclear use, then we are entering territory untrodden since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, over seventy- five years ago.

If this happens, then the global community would react with horror. It would doubtless scramble to minimize the damage, succor the victims, and up the deterrence ante to prevent escalation. The moral burden of using nuclear weapons in wartime would land squarely on Russia, shifting from where it has rested since 1945, on the United States.

If stability is somehow restored, the question will then come: what next? Is it even worth trying again to ensure nuclear peace at the negotiating table?

In the first place, I believe that we will have to work hard to preserve the Nonproliferation Treaty regime, because the horizontal proliferation pressures emanating from the crisis will be strong. Again, the P 5 should try to hold together to preserve the NPT, with China perhaps taking a more prominent role than it has in the past.

If Russia refuses to play, then it will be setting itself up as a very large nuclear pariah state.

Let us hope for the other option, i.e., that Russia draws back from the nuclear brink and wants to return to the negotiating table, working with the P 5 to preserve the nonproliferation regime. In this situation, other countries, the United States included, will have to consider whether the benefits are worth the costs of dealing with Moscow.

Let me address this question as follows: Where nuclear weapons are concerned, the U.S. and its allies have tried for real progress at the negotiating table since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. That crisis brought home the alternative—the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose. A Russian nuclear use in 2022, sixty years later, would renew that urgency and presumably, the necessity of negotiating with Russia. It would be an existential necessity, not a reward to Russia for its bad behavior.

Looming over all these considerations is Vladimir Putin and his role as chief Russian decision-maker in the continuing crisis. The President of the United States has called him a war criminal, and the Kremlin has shot back that such language is unwarranted and unforgivable. Although war crimes are a matter for the international courts to decide, the civilian deaths in Ukraine—at Bucha, Mariupol and other sites are accumulating much evidence.

In these circumstances, the return of Russia to any negotiating table will be hard, never mind a bilateral nuclear one with the United States. First and foremost, the two Presidents will have to be willing to resume nuclear talks, even if they are not willing to engage each other directly. They will have to issue instructions to their negotiators.

Then, confidence will have to be renewed between the negotiators themselves. The negotiators know each other and have been working steadily together, for example, on renewing the Iran nuclear deal, so perhaps renewing confidence will not be insurmountable.

In my view, and I stress I am speaking only for myself: before nuclear talks resume, first, a stable ceasefire must be in place in Ukraine; second, the withdrawal of Russian troops behind a ceasefire line agreed with the Ukrainians must be complete; and third, the reconstruction of Ukraine must be underway. In other words, a peace process must be well in train before we return to nuclear stability talks with Russia.

A Russian nuclear use in the Ukraine crisis would heighten these dynamics and cause the United States to think long and hard about what it can achieve at the negotiating table. In my view, as always, the U.S. national security interest must be paramount. If nuclear negotiations serve it in countering this existential threat and preventing a nuclear arms race, then the United States should be ready to talk.

In the end, the crisis in Ukraine may be the sharp shock that boots us into redoubling our efforts to constrain nuclear weapons. If we do not seize the chance, then we may be heading back to Cold War nuclear arms racing. Vladimir Putin has been threatening a crisis worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis. He meant it.

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# **Chapter 4 Ending the 'Perpetual Menace' of Nuclear Weapons: The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty**

**Tariq Rauf**

Hiroshima Peace Memorial, Photo: © Yuko Baba, UNITAR Hiroshima (used with permission)

XXII EDOARDO AMALDI CONFERENCE Nuclear Risks and Arms Control: Problems and Progress in the Time of Pandemics and War. ROME, 06 April 2022.

T. Rauf (B)

© The Author(s) 2023

IAEA, Former Head of Verification and Security Policy, Vienna, Austria e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
P. Cotta-Ramusino et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War*, Springer Proceedings in Physics 291, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29708-3\_4

# **4.1 Introduction**

On 16th July 1945, at 05:29 AM, the secrets of the atom were unlocked by detonating the world's first nuclear explosive device dubbed "The Gadget". Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific leader of the multinationally staffed and supported Manhattan Project to develop atomic weapons, lamented that, "*We knew the world would not be the same*. *Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds*", and his colleague Leó Szilárd1 remarked, "*That night I knew the world was headed for sorrow*".1

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a mere three weeks later, on 6th and 9th August 1945, respectively, clearly demonstrated the revolutionary and catastrophic power of nuclear weapons on human beings and the environment and ushered in a dramatic revolution in military affairs that legitimized attacking civilian targets that was later formalized as "nuclear deterrence". However, one may recall that civilian targeting was proposed by General Giulio Douhet in his seminal treatise, "The Command of the Air" (1921)2 and the related concept of the independent air force that reached its zenith in the fire bombings of cities such as Dresden, Hamburg and Tokyo – the fire bombing of Tokyo remains history's deadliest air raid exceeding in prompt fatalities even those of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Returning to the Trinity test of 16th July 1945, nuclear scientist Leó Szilárd observed that, "*Almost without exception, all the creative physicists had misgivings about the use of the bomb*" and further that "*Truman did not understand at all what was involved regarding nuclear weapons*".

Later Szilárd recalled that "*In March 1945, I prepared a memorandum which was meant to be presented to President Roosevelt. This memorandum warned that the use of the bomb against the cities of Japan would start an atomic-arms race with Russia, and it raised the question whether avoiding such an arms race might not be more important than the short-term goal of knocking Japan out of the war*?".

Following the death of Roosevelt, Szilárd drafted a petition to President Harry Truman opposing on moral grounds the use of atomic bombs against the cities of Japan.

Several years later, Szilárd astutely observed, after the atomic bombing of Japan's two cities, that the United States lost the argument of the immorality of using atomic bombs against the civilian population.

Once the concept of atomic fission had been scientifically demonstrated and its application utilized to destroy cities in Japan, Albert Einstein belatedly took full responsibility for the dire consequences of the letter of 2nd August 1939 that he and fellow scientist Leó Szilárd had jointly sent to US President Franklin Delano

<sup>1</sup> Leo Szilard was a Hungarian-American physicist and inventor. He conceived the nuclear chain reaction in 1933, patented the idea of a nuclear fission reactor in 1934, and in late 1939 wrote the letter for Albert Einstein's signature that resulted in the Manhattan Project that built the atomic bomb.

<sup>2</sup> Giulio Douhet observed that no longer can areas exist in which life can be lived in safety and tranquillity, nor can the battlefield any longer be limited to actual combatants. On the contrary, the battlefield will be limited only by the boundaries of the nations at war, and all of their citizens will become combatants, since all of them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of the enemy.'

Roosevelt warning against the dangers of Nazi Germany developing atomic weapons and recommending that the United States initiate a nuclear weapon development programme–that led Roosevelt to commission the Manhattan Project.

Less than a year after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Einstein lamented that, "*The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe*". Later Einstein called it "*the greatest mistake*" and in 1947 he told Newsweek magazine that "*had I known that the Germans would not succeed in developing an atomic bomb, I would have done nothing*".

# **4.2 Promoting Nuclear Disarmament**

Emerging from the ashes of the Second World War, the very first resolution adopted in 1946 by the newly formed United Nations called for the "elimination of atomic weapons".

Thus, the first seeds were planted warning about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of the use of atomic weapons and the first call issued to prohibit nuclear weapons.

To atone for his mistake, Einstein joined with philosopher Bertrand Russell and other atomic scientists to issue the "Russell-Einstein Manifesto", on 9th July 1955, that issued a clarion call:

"Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war? No one knows how widely lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race. Although an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments would not afford an ultimate solution, it would serve certain important purposes".

Despite efforts by many scientists to abolish nuclear weapons, other scientists unfortunately were successful in persuading their political leaders to develop thermonuclear weapons with much greater destructive force than simple atomic weapons. Indeed, in 1958 there even was a short-lived US effort, Project A-119, to detonate a thermonuclear nuclear device on the surface of the Moon. The rationale was to produce a very large mushroom or radioactive cloud and a brilliant super flash of light clearly visible from Earth—that would be an obvious show of strength to the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the project was cancelled, the Moon was spared and the "Moon Treaty" of 1979 prohibits all types of nuclear tests on the Moon and other celestial bodies. This to highlight just one of the follies of humankind to misuse nuclear energy for destructive purposes and the ever-present risks of nuclear weapons. Today there are more than 13,000 nuclear weapons, held at 107 locations in 14 States—nine nuclear-armed States and five non-nuclear-weapon States.

Today, some seven decades after the end of the Second World War, we again are facing a situation where nuclear weapons use is being threatened and again a country—this time Ukraine—has been invaded. Mohamed ElBaradei, former IAEA Director General and 2006 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, in this regard recently commented that, "*A global order that is shaky, selective, and full of holes and double standards has brought us to this point*".

This is not the first time that nuclear weapons use has been threatened; during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the survival of the world was put at risk by two nuclear armed-States, nuclear weapons were invoked again during the 1973 Middle East war, and threats of "all options on the table" made repeatedly against some States (in particular Iran and North Korea). In this regard, we have been lucky to have escaped thus far nuclear weapons use by accident or misadventure over the past seven decades.

The Elders, former internationally respected world leaders, have warned that, "*As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, it is inevitable that they will someday be used, whether by design, accident or miscalculation*". United Nations Deputy Secretary General, Jan Elliason has remarked, "*There are no right hands for wrong weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction are simply wrong*".

Today, four months before the 77th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and two years after the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is important to recognize that no sentient human being who has met or seen the *hibakusha* (survivors), or visited the hypocentre, or looked at the photographic evidence of the destruction of the two devastated Japanese cities, can avoid being shocked and horrified by the devastation that nuclear weapons inflicted on those two unfortunate cities.

During the next decades more than 2,050 nuclear test detonations were carried out in all environments: In the atmosphere, on the surface of the Earth, underwater, underground and even in near space, and tests carried out at national test sites (Nevada, Semipalatinsk, Lop Nor, Pokhran, Chagai, Punggye Ri) and in indigenous peoples ancestral lands in Australia, Algeria and the South Pacific led to radiological contamination of vast swaths of lands and seas, as well as long lasting genetic damage to humans and the environment. As the CTBTO Executive Secretary Robert Floyd said at the Conference on Disarmament last month, "*our collective efforts to further increase adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will continue to strengthen the Treaty, and solidify the already powerful international norm against nuclear testing*".

It is surprising and deeply disappointing that leaders of the "cabal" (and I use the term advisedly) of nine (9) countries with nuclear weapons and their "allies" more appropriately the "captive nations" of nuclear deterrence—still continue to blindly ignore the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, are not fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT, and blatantly reject the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) supported by 122 States pursuant to a UN General Assembly resolution, now signed by 86 and ratified by 60 States.

On a positive note, the TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021 and thereby establishes a *jus cogens* rule (fundamental principle under international law) creating an *erga omnes* (obligation) for all States to renounce nuclear weapons. In this context we might recall Einstein's prophetic words that, "*Our defence is not in armaments,* *nor in science…Our defence is in law and order*"—something in short supply today at the international level.

The first meeting of States parties to the TPNW will be held in Vienna on 21st-23rd June 2022 and preceded on 20th June by the fourth international conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons—the first was in 2013 in Oslo, second in Nayarit (Mexico) in 2014 and third in Vienna in December 2014. It is encouraging that chinks are appearing in the phalanx of opposition in NATO to the TPNW, as Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Norway and reconsidering their position and likely will attend the TPNW conference in June much to the consternation of other alliance members.

This "cabal" of 'nuclear' States and the "captive nations" of nuclear deterrence now also are back-tracking from measures agreed to implement nuclear disarmament and risk reduction consensually agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences.

# **4.3 Impact of COVID-19**

The unfortunate coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has clearly and unambiguously shown misplaced priorities and wasteful investments on nuclear deterrence and military interventions amounting to trillions of dollars by the "axis" of nuclear-armed States and the "captive nations". Their historic severe under-investments in health care have led to the unacceptably high levels of infections and fatalities in most of their countries. It is truly tragic and contemptible that some of these States have selfishly opposed generic variants of effective anti-corona vaccines developed with tax-payer funding, commandeered excessive quantities of corona medical supplies and instead of collaborating internationally to jointly develop an effective and affordable vaccine they engaged in tribalism, bitter competition and propaganda that amounts to "vaccine nationalism" and "vaccine tribalism" of "my country first" (*über alles*, with all its perverse implications!). This is not surprising because just as the advocates of nuclear weapons and deterrence lack the mental acuity to comprehend the global catastrophe of any use of nuclear weapons, they also fail to understand that defence against a pandemic cannot be contained within any one country.

It is obvious that those non-nuclear-weapon States that did not waste national resources on nuclear weapons and foreign military interventions are the ones that have been coping much better with the pandemic.

# **4.4 Collapse of Nuclear Arms Control**

Unfortunately, the vision of ridding the world of nuclear weapons is receding as the nuclear arms control architecture patiently built up over the past 50 years is collapsing before our eyes.

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) still not in force, also is under threat of resumption of explosive nuclear testing and re-opening Pandora's Box of nuclear weapon test explosions. The supporters of the CTBT have miserably failed to make it a requirement for India—a non-proliferation pariah—when they were giving it an "exception" in 2008 to enable it to buy nuclear technology and fissile material in flagrant contravention of UN Security Council resolution 1172 of 1998 and of the so-called "guidelines" of the self-anointed Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

In the negotiations and discussions on the denuclearization of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, again no requirement was stipulated for North Korea to accept the CTBT.

The bi-annual CTBT "facilitating entry-into-force conferences" have become a sad joke of repetitive platitudes.

Thus, the prospects of the CTBT ever entering into force recede with each passing year and the likelihood of this treaty becoming a fossil of nuclear arms control are enhanced.

The architecture and fundaments of bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control have been eroded by the United States withdrawal in 2002 from the crucial Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty followed by the Russian Federation.

On 2 August 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the 1987 Treaty on Shorter- and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)—foreshadowed in July 2019 by the Russian Federation suspending its compliance with the treaty. Under the INF Treaty, by May 1991, 2692 ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kms had been verifiably eliminated, 1846 by the USSR and 846 by the United States under mutual verification—and nearly 5000 nuclear warheads removed from active service.

This leaves only one nuclear arms reduction treaty in force between Moscow and Washington—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)—that was signed on 8 April 2010, entered into force on 5 February 2011. By 4 February 2018 both Russia and the United States had verifiably met the central limits of 1550 accountable deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed launchers (land-and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers). In fact, on 1 July 2020, under New START, Russia had 485 deployed launchers carrying 1326 nuclear warheads, and the United States had 655 warheads on 1372 launchers warheads; the latest data from September 2021 shows that Russia had 1458 warheads on 527 deployed launchers, and the United States had 665 on 1389 deployed launchers.

New START set to expire on 5 February 2021, was extended on 3 February this year for five years until 2026 by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States. New START involves mutual intrusive verification and technical weapons data exchange modalities for transparency, which is an important area of cooperation between especially in these times of heightened tensions.

For the first time in the history of Soviet/Russian-United States nuclear arms control not only have existing agreements been dismantled but both sides are modernizing nuclear arsenals unchecked and have lowered the threshold of nuclear weapon use in their declaratory and operational policies. Furthermore, in blatant disregard of important Cold War risk reduction measures such as the Agreements on Nuclear Accidents (1971), Prevention of Incidents at Sea (1972), Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), Dangerous Military Activities (1989), De-targeting and Information Sharing (1994), over past years and continuing today air and naval forces of NATO and Russia, and the United States and China, have been engaging in dangerous and provocative actions especially in areas adjacent to territorial wars and airspace. Though there are attempts at deconfliction the danger of accidents remains high, especially now in the European and Arctic theaters of operations. It is time to recall the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference and take steps to hold a similar conference as soon as possible.

Doctrines of some nuclear-armed States now posit first or early use of nuclear weapons. The United States Defence Department's new nuclear weapons guidance, *Nuclear Operations* (11 June 2019) clearly posits that "using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability."

For its part, Russian military doctrine envisions what some have called "escalation to de-escalate" in countering superior NATO conventional forces, that is early but limited use of nuclear weapons.

In South Asia, both India and Pakistan also contemplate use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict. Recently, India is under pressure domestically to invoke its nuclear capabilities to defend against China in the context of their revived conflict in the Ladakh region in the high Himalayas.

It is highly disturbing that when nuclear weapon use is discussed, the vocabulary used is very often conveniently sanitized. The destruction by thermonuclear war and resulting humanitarian and environmental consequences are downplayed and substituted by antiseptic concepts of nuclear deterrence. Alfred Wohlstetter in analyzing *The Delicate Balance of Terror* in 1958, noted that the existence of nuclear weapons does not automatically prevent a nuclear war but increases the danger of accidental wars particularly during a crisis, although this risk can be mitigated by arms control measures.<sup>3</sup>

Worrisomely, it is the view of many erstwhile defence experts, such as William Perry, former United States defence secretary, among others, that in today's world the dangers of inadvertent, accidental or even deliberate use of nuclear weapons is higher than it was during the height of the Cold War. Perry published his new book in July 2020 entitled, *The Button*, because in his words, "*Our nuclear weapons policy is obsolete and dangerous. I know, because I helped to design it, and we have to change it before it is too late*." He warns that the "*awesome ability to launch hundreds of thermonuclear weapons in mere minutes*" creates grave dangers of blundering into Armageddon.

This year the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* set the clock (which puts into context how close we are to nuclear catastrophe) at 100 s to midnight; closer to catastrophe than any year of the Cold War, one of the darkest years of the Cold War, when it was set at two minutes.

<sup>3</sup> Alfred Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," P-1472, RAND Corp., 1958, https://www. rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html.

In January, UN Secretary General Guterres in his message to the NPT review conference noted that, *"….the end of the Cold War also left us with a dangerous falsehood: that the threat of nuclear war was a thing of the past. Nothing could be more mistaken. These weapons are not yesterday's problem. They remain today's growing threat. The risk that nuclear weapons will be used is higher now than at any point since the duck-and-cover drills and fallout shelters of the Cold War … The nuclear landscape is a tinderbox. One accident or miscalculation could set it alight*.

The Gorbachev-Reagan understanding of December 1987 that a "*nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought*" is no longer in the forefront of the minds of today's leaders and nuclear war planners. On 3 January 2022, in the current climate of hostilities we were surprised to see a *Joint Statement by the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races*. Correctly the Joint Statement was labelled as from the Five Nuclear-Weapon States, and not P-5 States—though the US issued is as from the P-5 and then hastily corrected its mistake. The Joint Statement noted *inter alia* that France, China, the Russian Federation, the UK and the UK "*consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities. We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war*".

While the five NWS affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, they did not affirm the full complement of the Reagan-Gorbachev commitment that: (a) they should not fight any war between themselves nuclear or conventional; and (b) for none of the NWS to seek nuclear or military superiority. The Joint Statement repeats the language from Article VI of the NPT, and it reaffirms the importance of complying with their bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements and commitments; though in reality some of their actions do not support such a reaffirmation claim. The five NWS then say that they have the "*desire to work with all States to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all*"; repeating the buzz words and undefined concepts of "creating a security environment" and "undiminished security for all" with the "ultimate" aim of a nuclear-weapon free world. Nor are their actions thus far conducive to "creating a security environment" for nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Belatedly, one hopeful sign emerged with the initiation of direct discussions held in Vienna between the Russian Federation and the United States in June and August 2020. The NSVT (nuclear, space and verification talks) focused on three baskets of nuclear arms control issues cover: nuclear weapon doctrines; space weapons and arms control; and transparency and verification.

Following the June 2021 Putin-Biden meeting in Geneva, the two sides set up a Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD), that met in July and September last year and in January this year. After the September dialogue, two working groups were established, one on "principles and objectives for future arms control" and the other on "capabilities and actions with strategic effects".

Both sides are divided over the inclusion of China as preferred by the US; and inclusion of France and the UK if China is included as preferred by Russia. None of the other three nuclear-armed States—China, France, and the United Kingdom have expressed any enthusiasm in joining Russia and the US in starting multilateral talks.

The United States and Russia appear to have different priorities for the dialogue. The US wants to focus on the very complex set of nuclear arms issues that face the two countries, such as what may come after New START, how to deal with Russia's new nuclear systems, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and space and cyber weapons. Russia wants to address strategic stability including nuclear and non-nuclear and offensive and defensive weapons, as well as missile defence. How to deal with strategic non-nuclear weapons is an important matter not on the table.

Given the risks of nuclear weapons, some States and civil society actors have been promoting the concepts of "no first use" of nuclear weapons; and "sole purpose" that is to use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. The USSR claimed to have a no first use policy, but the United States never gave it much credence. Among the five nuclear-weapon States, only China has a longstanding non first use policy—none of the other eight nuclear-armed States endorses it.

In 2017, Joe Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and, if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack, and as president he would "work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and US allies".

Now, late last month, as President, Joe Biden has stepped back from his campaign promise and approved a National Defence Strategy (NDS) that includes the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that reaffirms an old Obama-era policy that allows for a potential nuclear response to deter conventional and other non-nuclear threats in addition to nuclear ones.

For its part, Russia's nuclear strategy also calls for nuclear retaliation to threats against the existence of the State.

In my view, while both no first use and sole purpose policies are good at the declaratory level, but at the operational level there is no way to verify or to assure that these policies are implemented. Expending effort on them would not lead to one less nuclear weapon or a lowered alert status; rather the nuclear-weapon States could score an easy political win by declaring support without necessarily reducing nuclear dangers. Fewer and eventually zero nuclear weapons are the best assurance for non-use.

# **4.5 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference**

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) marked its 50th anniversary in July 2020; given the perilous relations between nuclear-armed States alarm bells have been ringing warning about impending failure of the 10th NPT review conference postponed (four times thus far) now scheduled to be held from 1st to 26th August this year because of the SARS COVID-19 pandemic.

With regard to nuclear disarmament in the context of the NPT, the field is now crowded with several disorganized competing approaches: the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) NPT States favour a three-phase time bound "plan of action", in contrast the Western States stand by a "step-by-step" approach which has been slightly modified by a cross-cutting group called the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) that calls for "building blocks"; while another such group, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) supports a "taking forward nuclear disarmament" approach; Sweden has proposed "stepping stones"; and the United States has advanced the concept of "creating the environment for nuclear disarmament" (CEND).

A sober assessment of the CEND approach suggests that this initiative is geared to transfer the focus and responsibility for the "environment" and "conditions" for nuclear disarmament from the nuclear-armed to the non-nuclear-weapon States. In fact, the dystopian CEND approach and nuclear policy as presently formulated is serving the cause of "creating conditions to *never* disarm".

It would be appropriate to characterize CEND approach as being based on "dreaming of rainbows, butterflies and unicorns to appear magically and sprinkle fairy dust leading to a new fantasy world of nuclear arms control". Faithfully implementing nuclear disarmament obligations in the framework of the NPT is the only way forward to salvation.

The Stockholm Initiative on stepping stones to nuclear disarmament started off on a good footing but has lost steam as it prioritizes nuclear risk reduction over nuclear disarmament. The NPDI no longer attracts much support as it largely has been overshadowed by the Stockholm Initiative. As for the Non-Aligned Movement's time bound framework for nuclear disarmament, opposition by the nuclear-weapon and allied States deprives it of traction.

# **4.6 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**

Since the last NPT review conference, there now is an "elephant in the salon" of the NPT and this is the TPNW that opened for signature in September 2017 and entered into force in January 2021. It has become something of a lightning rod between its proponents and opponents at the NPT Preparatory Committee sessions in 2018 and 2019 and will be so at the review conference in August.

The opponents of the TPNW have raised a number of concerns and shortcomings and critics claim that the TPNW does not:

on nuclear disarmament, in parallel with the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the bilateral USSR/Russia-US treaties such as 2010 New START, 1987 Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) even though these were concluded for national security not NPT reasons; and the five nuclear-weaponfree zone (NWFZ) treaties operational in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia; the NPT is not a selfimplementing treaty, it requires enabling actions, for example, safeguards agreements by NNWS with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA to verify non-proliferation commitments under Articles II and III of the NPT; NWFZ treaties are required to implement Article VII, while nuclear cooperation agreements are needed to implement Article IV of the NPT on peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

Other criticisms, for example, include that:

# **4.7 Attacks on Nuclear Facilities**

Armed attacks on nuclear facilities are not new—on 30th September 1980, Operation Scorch Sword, was a surprise airstrike carried out by Iran Air Force on an almostcomplete nuclear reactor (Osirak) near Baghdad; eight months later on 7th June 1981, the Osirak reactor was destroyed by Israel (Operation Opera). In retaliation for Iran's raid on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, Iraq attacked the Bushehr nuclear power plant seven times during the war, leaving the plant in ruins.<sup>4</sup>

On 6th September 2007, Israel bombed a site et al. Kibar (Dair al Zour) (Operation Outside the Box / Operation Orchard) in Syria that later the IAEA concluded was "very likely" a nuclear reactor (though not operational). In Iran over the past few years, acts of sabotage involving use of explosives and cyber attacks have been carried out at uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, for which Iran blames Israel—the last such sabotage, a year ago, at the TESA Karaj centrifuge assembly plant completely destroyed one IAEA surveillance camera and damaged another one.

Now in Ukraine, the Chornobyl and Zaporizhye nuclear power stations are in the midst of military hostilities. The reactors at Chornobyl are decommissioned but spent nuclear fuel is in wet and dry storage and there are many tonnes of highly radioactive corium in the destroyed Unit 4. At Zaporizhye there are six operational nuclear power reactors—it is the largest nuclear power station in Europe.

This matter of attacks on nuclear facilities has been taken up by the IAEA Board of Governors and at the review conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM), both last month, and most assuredly will feature at the upcoming NPT review conference. Although Article 2.4 (c) of the CPPNM affirms that "nothing in this Convention shall be construed as a lawful authorization to use or threaten to use force against nuclear material or nuclear facilities States failed to strengthen the Convention used for peaceful purposes", the States Parties failed to strengthen this provision.

Attacks against nuclear facilities have been prohibited under several resolutions of the IAEA General Conference as well as by NPT States Parties in their 1995/ 2000/2010 review conference agreed documents.

In late February, the IAEA Director General stressed that the Agency's General Conference—the annual gathering of all the organization's Member States—had adopted a decision in 2009 on the "Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction" that affirmed that "*any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency*".<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The nuclear installations in Bushehr were attacked on the following dates: 24 March 1984; 12 February 1985; 5 March 1985; 12 July 1986; 17 November 1987; 19 November 1987; and 19 July 1988. For more on the history and effects of attacking nuclear installations, see Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 2 (2011): 161–87, http://

dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.559021.

<sup>5</sup> IAEA GC(53)/DEC/13, "Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction", Decision adopted on 18 September 2009 during the eleventh plenary meeting.

# **4.8 Nuclear-Powered Submarines and IAEA Safeguards**

A looming challenge for Agency safeguards is that of safeguarding the naval nuclear cycle in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) in force. Presently, nuclear reactors for naval propulsion are either under development or envisaged for nuclear-powered submarines in at least three CSA States—Australia, Brazil and South Korea—and also could be considered in the future by additional States such as Argentina, Canada, Iran and Japan among others. Paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153/ Rev2 type safeguards agreements allows for the "Non-Application of Safeguards to Nuclear Material to be used in Non-Peaceful Activities", generally interpreted to refer to nuclear-powered ships and submarines, military space vehicles, and nuclear reactors and radio-thermal generators (RTGs) for military bases or isolated radar stations, etc. However, there is no definition or concept of "non-peaceful or nonproscribed nuclear military activities" as this has never been tested at the IAEA Board of Governors or at NPT Review Conferences.

The IAEA Board of Governors has had fractious discussions on this matter in late November 2021 and early March 2022, involving Australia, China and Russia. The Board missed an opportunity to set up a consultation process with its member States and experts to define what is needed to safeguard naval nuclear fuel; and whether the "loophole" should be closed in the Agency's comprehensive safeguards agreements that allows for "non-application of safeguards" on "non-proscribed" military activities such as nuclear-powered submarines. Despite the objections of States involved in the contemplated sharing of naval nuclear propulsion technology, it is now clear that this matter will be controversial at the Tenth NPT Review Conference in August 2022 in discussions in Main Committee II on IAEA safeguards.

# **4.9 Eleventh NPT Review Conference in Vienna**

It is sometimes not well understood that NPT review conferences are *not* UN conferences—rather, they are conferences of the States parties to the NPT, paid for by them separately from UN membership dues and are governed by their own rules of procedure (RoP). Thus, while the President-designate and States parties need to take into account the advice of the UN secretariat which is always given in good faith, they are not bound in any way to accept it and are fully empowered to make their own decisions under the RoP for NPT review conferences taking into account international political developments.

Contrary to popular belief in some circles, the UN formally has nothing to do with the NPT as it was written and adopted in 1968—this is not a criticism of the UN which does valuable work internationally but merely a factual observation. The only international organization to which the Treaty accords a formal role is the IAEA—the role of implementing safeguards or verification of the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties (article III). The inalienable right of States parties (article IV) to utilize nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes by NNWS, especially developing countries, in practice has come to be implemented through the technical cooperation programme of the IAEA.

The IAEA is an autonomous international organization subject to its own governance structure, and like most international organizations the Agency has a relationship agreement with the UN on a common system for personnel management and related administrative functions.

The UN capably and professionally has been providing services to review conferences and PrepCom sessions, such as, secretary-general of the conference, meeting rooms, interpretation, summary records, and secretarial services including officers to support the president and the chairs. While the UN provides the official secretary to main committee I (nuclear disarmament), credentials and drafting committees, and prepares the elements of their draft reports; the IAEA covers main committees II and III (non-proliferation and peaceful uses) and prepares their draft reports—though the UN also covers items such as regional issues, universality, and the review process, but it is not the secretariat for the NPT, nor is one needed.

In 1995, the NPTREC was moved to New York on the claim that all UN Member States have representation there and thus would enable the maximum number of States parties to participate in the conference's main objective—to decide on the Treaty's extension. A review of the record of participation by States parties shows that in various years up to 30 or more States do not take part or only show up for one or two sessions in order to be registered in the list of participants. Therefore, the argument of participation is not a sufficient reason to keep the review conference in New York.

Starting in 2007, the first session of the PrepCom was moved to Vienna (from New York) in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the IAEA and its contributions to the implementation of the NPT. The UN has successfully organized PrepCom sessions in Vienna in 2007, 2012 and 2017—thus there is no compelling reason why it would be unable or find it difficult to organize the review conference in Vienna with the assistance of the conference services offices of the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV) and of the IAEA at the Vienna International Centre and its adjoining Austria Center Vienna.

The accountability for compliance with the NPT's non-proliferation obligations is not done in the NPT review process but it is done in Vienna by the IAEA and the assessment is released in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report—the latest report was issued by the IAEA in April 2021 and the next one likely will be issued later this month or in early May this year. The IAEA's annual reports on nuclear safety, nuclear security, technical cooperation programme, and nuclear technology are reviewed in Vienna at the Board of Governors meetings in March and April each year and also in the General Conference in September.

The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) is the logical venue to discuss any issues related to nuclear weapon testing, even though the CTBT has yet to enter into force.

The reality is that of the present 173 member States of the IAEA, 165 are NNWS party to the NPT. Though some in the EU are propagating the claim that peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not well known or appreciated; the fact is that currently, at the IAEA there are 848 active technical cooperation projects underway covering development priorities in areas such as human health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and the environment, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear power generation, nuclear waste disposition, nuclear sciences, industrial applications, nuclear knowledge development and management, and legislative assistance (nuclear law); as well as to develop solutions for future energy needs, and standards for radiation safety and nuclear security worldwide. Presently, the Agency is assisting developing Member States with real time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (real time RT-PCR) methodology for detection of COVID-19 infections in people—previously, RT-PCR technology was utilized by the IAEA to diagnose diseases such as Ebola, Zika, MERS-Cov, SARS-Cov1 and other major zoonotic and animal diseases.

Given its direct relationship to the NPT, it is now time for NPT States parties to relocate the review conference to Vienna to be closer to the Agency without whose verification and technical cooperation programme the NPT would be reduced to a hollow shell. The Eleventh NPT Review Conference likely will be held in 2026 and the Twelfth NPT Review Conference in 2030. Now it is imperative for NPT States Parties to regularize NPT review conferences in Vienna where they logically belong, starting in 2026.

# **4.10 Possible Recommendations: NPT 2022**

The following is a non-exhaustive list of possible recommendations.

tested; clarification on doctrines; and understandings on not using cyber capabilities to target or interfere with nuclear weapon command and control systems and associated early warning networks, among other such measures as proposed at recent review conferences.

# **4.11 Epilogue**

General Lee Butler, former commander of the US Strategic Air Command, insightfully observed that nuclear proliferation cannot be contained in a world where a handful of self-appointed nations both arrogate to themselves the privilege of owning nuclear weapons and extol the ultimate security assurances, they assert such weapons convey.

At an event that I attended in Ottawa (Canada), on 11 March 1999, addressing the Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons, as noted in the header (to this article), General Butler cited WWII General Omar Bradley, who had said on Armistice Day 11 November 1948 that, "*We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants, in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We have solved the mystery of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about dying than we know about living. If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or prudence, our servant may prove to be our executioner*".

The reason for recalling this admonition is a disturbing new tendency starting around 2013 for some States, especially some of the NWS, to push back on implementing agreed commitments on nuclear disarmament of 1995/2000/2010 while insisting on full implementation of NNWS commitments on safeguards, export controls, nuclear safety and security, among others. They posit that for nuclear disarmament it is important to take into account the international security situation, revived great power competition and regional instabilities, and to focus instead on nuclear risk reduction, motivations to hold nuclear weapons and on international arms control institutions. Furthermore, it is even argued that the NPT review process may no longer be fit for purpose as regards nuclear disarmament unless it takes account of the considerations noted above.

The NPT cannot resolve every problem related to the international security environment and strategic stability—that is not and never has been the purpose or objective of the Treaty or of its review process. The NPT review process included in the Treaty at the insistence of NNWS was and remains to ensure accountability for the implementation of its provisions and obligations. As discussed above, the 1995 NPTREC in deciding on indefinite extension instituted a strengthened review process that was further elaborated in 2000 to ensure "permanence with accountability". The NPT is not the forum to discuss and review international relations or disputes, the appropriate venues for these are the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.

Other negotiations in other forums will be needed to address advanced emerging technologies, cyber and space weapons, and other related political-military and technological developments. The NPT is not the appropriate forum to negotiate on these matters, but it is the forum to negotiate on measures to further strengthen the authority and integrity of the Treaty across its three pillars and to review their implementation along with Treaty provisions.

The NPT is the only multilateral nuclear arms control treaty on the books that commits the NWS to nuclear disarmament and the NNWS to non-proliferation it is the only multilateral forum in which the NWS are prepared to discuss their nuclear weapon policies with the NNWS, albeit within limits. If the foundations of multilateralism are attacked and weakened, the NPT will not escape its effects.

A key element for success at the next review conference will rest on clear acknowledgement of the continuing validity of the relevant elements of 1995/2000/2010 outcomes that along with the Treaty itself can be considered the "triptych" of the *acquis communautaire* of the NPT community. The *Berlin Declaration on The NPT at Fifty* got it right when it stated that: "We underline that past NPT commitments remain valid and form the basis for making further progress in fully implementing the treaty and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons". Characterizing reaffirmation of existing past commitments as "conventional wisdom that is at least a generation out of date" wins no friends, not to mention is disingenuous.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic will have significant impact on how we think about "national security" and should lead to rethinking about the role of nuclear weapons in international security and to resurrecting concepts such as "our common future", "human security", "cooperative security", "common security", "collective security" (not the NATO version) and the like that were advanced in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s during times of perceptions and realities of existential threats to achieve a more secure world.

An international order anchored in legal norms and treaties offers the best hopes for survival. In this regard the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could establish a "right to nuclear peace" and stop nuclear weapons becoming a "perpetual menace". Sometimes the most penetrating wisdom comes out of the "mouths of babes", in this case a child at the United Nations kindergarten in New York who aptly observed: "Why a country that makes atomic bombs would ban fireworks?".

We need to heed the call of Pope Francis when, during his visit to Japan in November 2019, he clearly voiced his demand that world powers renounce their nuclear arsenals. He declared that both the use and possession of atomic bombs an "immoral" crime and a dangerous waste. I end by recalling Pope Francis' lament at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, "*How can we propose peace if we constantly invoke the threat of nuclear war as a legitimate recourse for the resolution of conflicts? May the abyss of pain endured here remind us of boundaries that must never be crossed*!".

# **Notes**

1. Tariq Rauf, is a Director of Atomic Reporters; former member of the Eminent Persons Group for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament established by the Foreign Minister of Japan; former Head of Nuclear Verification and Security Policy at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, former Alternate Head of the IAEA Delegation to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) Review Conferences; Senior Advisor on nuclear disarmament to the Chairs (nuclear disarmament) at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and 2014 NPT PrepCom; long time Expert with Canada's NPT delegation until 2000. *Personal views are expressed here*.

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# **Chapter 5 Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident**

**Tatsujiro Suzuki**

**Abstract** Even after 11 years, the Fukushima accident is not completely over yet. Technological challenges for decommissioning of Fukushima are unprecedented. Economic, social, and humanitarian impacts are huge and will remain for a long time. The Fukushima nuclear accident completely changed the energy picture in Japan. Nuclear energy is no longer most reliable, least expensive, "main" power source in Japan. Japan's long-term energy policy is self-inconsistent, stating "Japan will reduce its dependence on nuclear power as much as possible," but maintains it as an important option for carbon neutral policy. But mainly due to poor economics, role of nuclear power in carbon neutral policy could be limited. Given the Ukrainian crisis, international community must strengthen international law and norms to protect all nuclear facilities, in particular, sensitive facilities, against military attack. Finally, lessons learned from the Fukushima accidents are: (1) Think unthinkable (2) Engineering risk assessment is not enough (3) Need for independent scientific advice/ policy review organization (4) Public trust is essential.

# **5.1 Introduction**

11 years have passed since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011. Still, there is no clear prospect for decommissioning of the crippled Fukushima reactors and other radioactive wastes generated by decontamination of the land. While evacuation zones have been shrinking steadily, still more than 30,000 people are away from home. Impact of nuclear accident on Japan's energy profile has been quite significant, and public trust has not been recovered yet. The Japanese government maintains its self-inconsistent energy policy, i.e. reducing dependence on nuclear energy as much as possible, while keeping nuclear power as an important option for policy of "carbon–neutral by 2050". This paper summarizes the current status of the Fukushima accident (which is not over yet), and draw lessons from the accident.

© The Author(s) 2023

T. Suzuki (B)

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Nagasaki, Japan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
P. Cotta-Ramusino et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War*, Springer Proceedings in Physics 291, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29708-3\_5

# **5.2 Fukushima Update: The Accident Is Not Over**

Many on-site and off-site challenges remain even 11 years after the accident. Here is the short summary of those challenges.

#### (1) On-site challenges

The removal of spent fuel from cooling pools of Unit 1–4 is the first step to reduce potential risks at the site. So far, removal of spent fuel from Unit 3 and 4 was completed in December 2014 and February 2021 respectively. But spent fuel removal from Unit 1 and 2 has not started yet, and it is currently expected that all spent fuel from both units will be removed by 2031.1

The biggest short-term on-site challenge is management and disposal of "contaminated water". Due to continuous cooling of fuel debris at reactors 1–3 and continuous inflow of underground water into the reactor site, contaminated water has been generated and been stored on-site. Through various measures, such as pumping up water by sub-drains, the construction of land-side frozen walls, generation of contaminated water has been gradually decreasing from 350 to 130 m3/day. Still, it means that almost every week a new 1,000 m3 tank is needed.