A "Mediterranean model of migration" was suggested, as it combined major aspects of the new developments which were enabling and facilitating migrant labour flows into Southern European countries. This model, introduced and elaborated by Russell King and various co-authors (King et al., 1997b; King, 2000), was further discussed (Ribas-Mateos, 2004; Peixoto et al., 2012) and criticised in terms of its heuristic value (Baldwin-Edwards, 2012). Despite its difficulties explaining the migrant labour flows into Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the model later included Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, and Croatia (King & Thomson, 2008). More recently, the model was reiterated to integrate changes brought about by the economic recession (King & DeBono, 2013).

Attempts to understand and theorise the role of migrant labour in rural areas in Southern Europe were initiated by Hoggart and Mendoza (1999), who utilised Piore's (1979) approach. They argued that the availability of migrant labour was crucial for filling the existing 'holes' in rural labour markets. Such arguments were also relevant to Greek agriculture, where migrants responded to the demand for low-skilled migrant labour (Kasimis et al., 2003; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005). In addition, systematic empirical studies illustrating various aspects of the inclusion of migrant labour in the rural labour market. Due to the demographic, social and economic challenges, migrant labour is considered important not only for assisting small family farms to cope with labour demands, but more importantly for increasing the competitiveness of medium and large family farm businesses. When migrant labour is institutionalised in the agricultural sector, it is possible for migrants to seek opportunities to pursue their social and spatial mobility, either within agriculture or across other economic sectors. Two factors are considered relevant here: (a) permanent / seasonal employment in agriculture offers an axis around which researchers can explore divisions and hierarchies among migrant labourers; and (b) the socio-spatial mobility trajectories of migrants need to be viewed within agriculture, across economic sectors, and across the urban/rural space (Kasimis et al., 2010).

In this context, ethnic migrant labour networks are created and sustained by labour contractors and employees to ensure that agricultural labour market needs are covered. In practice, migrant labourers are recruited by ethnic social networks, so they are 'matched' with specific jobs in the secondary labour market (Parks, 2005). There are two interconnected aspects in the functions of migrant social networks: First, migrant social capital is a resource which is often used both to gather knowledge about living abroad and to facilitate job seeking in the host country. This social capital allows them to be placed in specific job positions in the labour market in the host country (Lusis & Bauder, 2010). Second, migrant social networks are important as recruiting mechanisms which function to the benefit of the agricultural employers, while the latter organize themselves, so they behave in a unitary way towards migrant labour (Krissman, 2005). Labour contractors ensure that migrant labourers are connected to employers, but also the labour arrangements determine what information is given to the prospective labourer and what negotiating space is allowed. Bargaining before and after the harvest determines the labourers' daily earnings, but if these earnings are perceived as being 'too low', unsuitable labourers may respond with sloppy work, absenteeism or other 'everyday forms of resistance'. There is a literature on migrant labour control that highlights the connection between modes of control, contestation, and confrontation with social realities beyond the workplace (Ortiz, 2002).

In fact, migrant practices and strategies are continuously reconstructed based on the available policy measures, which are--directly or indirectly--pivotal in creating regular, semi-regular and irregular tiers within the migrant labour force (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). The capacity of migration policies to allow for regularized migrant labour and/or to cater for various seasonal, temporary or ad hoc requirements, therefore creates a complex canvas for employing migrant labourers (Castles, 2006). Policy schemes allowing for seasonal, flexible, and temporary migrant labour are particularly relevant in the case of Mediterranean agriculture, which requires a sizeable labour force to accomplish its role within an increasingly globalized economy (MediTERRA, 2019).

It is well-documented that migrants' "illegality" and/or irregularity leads to the construction of a cheap labour reserve army that is also flexible, vulnerable, and prone to heavy exploitation (De Genova, 2002). There is a rapidly expanding discussion on the precarious migrant status which includes undocumented and documented 'illegality' as well as other forms of insecurity and irregularity (Goldring et al., 2009). Migrant labourers are increasingly undertaking precarious jobs, meaning that their work is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky (Kalleberg, 2009; Anderson, 2010). Precarious employment refers to engagement in non-standard and contingent work; its main component is the employment insecurity that arises from at least four types of employment: part-time, temporary, own account, and multiple job holding. The increasing casualisation of employment, increasing job insecurity, and the downward pressure on earnings and conditions of work reflect much of what is described by 'precarious employment'. The precariousness of migrant labour becomes a wider trend reflected in the proliferation of precarious migrant statuses and employment (Goldring et al., 2009; Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013).

Intensive agricultural production necessitates labour control, which remains the main instrument for governing migrant labour; life precariousness and labour precarity thus remain key components of labour control (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). Recent research conducted in an intensive agricultural production area in Western Greece depicted a situation where the exploitation of migrant labour has been a central feature of agricultural intensification and specialisation (Kasimis et al., 2015; Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2017); at the same time, there is evidence that apart from subjugating and controlling the work of migrants, migrant labour precarity also triggers the political mobilisation of migrant workers, whose position and functions in the productions system shapes their agency.

In those Mediterranean areas where intensive agricultural production functions in particular export-oriented rural localities, the presence of large numbers of migrant labourers has been instrumental in strengthening the production dynamics by keeping labour costs low and securing an adequate supply of medium- and low-skilled labour (Gertel & Sippel, 2014; Corrado et al., 2017; Rye & O'Reilly, 2020); both are needed, since the agricultural producers seek to be competitive in international markets. This intensive agricultural production regime is supported by formal networks of labour recruitment, but informal brokers who organize and secure the continuation of new migrant flows into those areas also play an important role (De Genova, 2002; Krissman, 2005).

In tandem with the notion of precarity, the notion of 'mobilities' has become central to the structuring and enacting of people's lives. Far from simplifying migration to movement, we argue that the discussion around the dynamics of mobilities is informative for the study of the socio-spatial mobilities of migrant labour. There is frequent reference to the 'mobility turn' in sociology (Urry, 2007) and to the 'new mobilities paradigm' (Sheller & Urry, 2006), which have sparked certain inspiring modes of thinking and looking at social phenomena--and specifically migration--through the lens of movement (Hannam et al., 2006). Mobilities need to be seen as a complex assemblage of movement, social imaginaries and experience (Glick Schiller & Salazar, 2013; Salazar, 2017), while they aim to bring together the purely 'social' concerns of sociology (inequality, power, hierarchies) with the 'spatial' concerns of geography (territories, borders, scale) and the 'cultural' concerns of anthropology (discourses, representations) (Sheller, 2011, 2014).

Overall, the above discussion on migrant labour in Mediterranean agriculture has highlighted two major strands in the relevant literature: The first strand underlines the key role migrant labour plays in intensive agriculture, which in turn prioritises specialised agriculture and export-oriented production and instrumentalises migrant labour to increase its effectiveness through (highly or less) sophisticated control mechanisms that include variable types of precarity, ethnic hierarchies, racialisation, manipulation, and exploitation (Rye & Andrzejewska, 2010; Gertel & Sippel, 2014; Kasimis et al., 2015; Corrado et al., 2017; Kilkey & Urzi, 2017; Papadopoulos et al., 2018; Rye & O'Reilly, 2020; Kalantaryan et al., 2021; King et al., 2021; Fonseca et al., 2021; Pereira et al., 2021; Rogaly, 2021). This strand has been more popular in recent years, due to its visibility and those global features that connect Mediterranean agriculture to the international agri-food markets. The second strand underlines the multifunctionality of migrant labour in Mediterranean rural areas which connects migrants to the socio-spatial and agricultural characteristics of places (Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2009; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2013; McAreavey, 2012; Hedberg & do Carmo, 2012; McAreavey, 2017; Papadopoulos et al., 2021). In this connection, migrant labour is seen from the perspective both of the host places and the migrants' own needs, expectations, and aspirations (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2022). Finally, this strand maintains its focus on the interactions between the receiving rural society and the migrants, the responses of migrants to external conditions, their agency, and the rural well-being of migrants and locals.

#### 22.3 Migrant Labour in Greek Agriculture

Greece has major comparative advantages in the agri-food sector which can be attributed to the Mediterranean climate, the favourable conditions in the natural environment of its plains, the significant variety of agricultural products that grow here, the quality and nutritional value of a relatively wide spectrum of agricultural products (olives, grapes, legumes, citrus fruits, etc.) and the country's internationally recognized food traditions. It is often said that several persistent structural weaknesses need to be addressed vis-à-vis the modernisation of the agri-food sector in the country (IOBE, 2020). The main weaknesses include the small and fragmented farm holdings, low productivity, inefficient organization, the low integration of new technologies and equipment, insufficient vocational training, a low level of R&D, a dependency on subsidies, and a lack of branding. In various ways, agriculture is the country's 'reference point', alternating between being a 'sector of departure'--in times of rapid economic modernization and economic expansion--and occasionally serving as a 'sector of arrival', especially for those seeking a better quality of life and agriculture as a gateway to it, but also in times of economic crisis when agriculture is linked to an alternative development pathway (Papadopoulos et al., 2021).

When reviewing the characteristics and role of agriculture in the Greek economy and Greek society, we see that agricultural employment has declined significantly since the mid-1990s, due to agriculture's low attractiveness for young people and to older generations of farmers retiring. However, the share of wage labour in agriculture has increased, a fact related to the increased contributions of migrant labour in the sector. While agricultural employment accounted for 10.9% of total employment prior to the economic crisis, by 2013, it had risen to 12.3%, but had dropped back to 10.9% by 2019. Currently, the agricultural sector employs around 516,000 people and contributes approximately 4% of the country's GDP. More specifically, salaried employment accounted for between 19.1% and 19.8% of total agricultural

Fig. 22.1 Evolution of primary sector employment, salaried labour, and contribution to GDP, 1995–2021. (Source: ELSTAT, National Accounts, 1995–2021 (authors' own elaboration))

employment in the period 1995–2004, before declining for a few years due to the rise of the construction sector. By 2010, salaried agricultural employment had climbed back to its previous level (20.2%) and has since increased. By 2019, salaried employment accounted for 30.5% of agricultural employment, which is the highest it has ever been (Fig. 22.1).

The size and characteristics of agricultural migrant labour have changed a good deal over the last two decades. Papadopoulos et al. (2021) identify the following factors that contributed to these changes: First, the Greek legalization programmes of 2001 and 2005/2007 allowed a significant proportion of the migrants living and working in Greece to legalize their residence/status; this was followed by an increase in an intra-sectoral (within agriculture) and/or inter-sectoral occupational mobility (moving from agriculture to construction and services). In this way, agriculture served as a source of secondary income for many migrants in low constructionseason periods. Second, by the beginning of 2000, migratory flows towards Greece had become highly differentiated as geographic accessibility steadily replaced geographical proximity to Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania as the key factor in shaping these flows (Papadopoulos, 2012). Albanians remained the predominant nationality, while the numbers of A2 migrants (Bulgarians and Romanians) and Asians increased considerably. Due to their unstable legal status, many of the recentlyarrived migrants found work in agriculture, where they frequently performed the more dangerous, unskilled and low-paying jobs. The continuing abandonment of agricultural employment by young people and women, especially in rural areas where the local economy had begun to offer more employment possibilities beyond agriculture, was paralleled by the entry of migrant workers into the primary sector. In the years following the 'migration/refugee crisis' (2015–2019) which resulted in many asylum seekers and refugees being stranded in Greece, agriculture was offered as an option for those who sought employment opportunities as low-skilled and precarious labour.

Before discussing the empirical findings in detail, it is worthy briefly referencing the three periods in the study of migrant labour in Greek agriculture. In the late 1990s, the theme of migrant labour in rural Greece was introduced and emphasised their role as 'saviours' of Greek agriculture who provided the main source of low-skilled 'hands' in rural areas (Lianos et al., 1996; Vaiou & Hadjimichalis, 1997; Kasimis et al., 2003; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005). In line with a state immigration policy that treated migrants in the light of their purely economic functions for the national economy, irregular migrant labour was seen as a 'labour reserve army' that contributed to low production costs. However, it became evident that migrant labour was not a unified category, but rather an aggregation of different migrant nationalities and/or migrant groups who constructed more elaborate coping strategies within local/rural societies. The first regularization schemes launched in the second half of the 1990s offered an opportunity for migrant labour inclusion, allowing the migrants to gain respect and a more secured position in the host country.

In the 2000s, the study of the dynamics of migrant labour showed that there were increased benefits for migrant labourers who remained in local/rural labour markets long-term, either allowing them to move up the social ladder in rural areas or to move out of the agricultural sector (Papadopoulos, 2009; Labrianidis & Sykas, 2009). The continuation of migrant flows allowed for the-low status tasks to be allocated to the newly arrived and more vulnerable migrants. In this context, ethnic employment networks were pivotal for securing upward social mobility for migrants and consolidating longer-resident migrant labourers as a 'labour aristocracy' (Papadopoulos, 2012; Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2017). For spatially mobile migrant labour, participation in ethnic labour networks enabled them to remain in employment and, in some cases, also implied medium-term gains. By 2008/9, the economic and social gains migrants had made which enabled them to be emplaced in local societies were jeopardised due to the economic crisis, which affected both Greek nationals and migrant labour.

In the 2010s, the economic recession acted as a catalyst for the dynamics of migrant labour in rural Greece (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). The insecurity and precarity of migrant labour increased considerably, surpassing that of Greek nationals, while the size of the informal economy increased due to the country's economic contraction. It became evident to migrants themselves that they needed to come up with effective resilience strategies for their own and/or their families' survival/ wellbeing; they also mobilised to defend their incomes and maintain their dignity in the face of employer pressure to reduce their wages further. At the same time, migrant labour and mobility depended on social and regional inequalities, while the latter increased or diminished migrant flows.

# 22.4 Outlining Mediterranean Migrations in Greek Agriculture

Even though rural areas were an important halt and/or destination for various migrant groups originating from the Mediterranean or crossing the Mediterranean on their way to other European countries, international migration into rural parts of Greece would not become the subject of systematic study until recently. In what follows our analysis draws on two multi-sited studies conducted consecutively in rural Western Greece in 2017–2021: One examines the social and spatial trajectories of migrants over the course of their lives in rural and urban areas, while the other focuses on the relationship between different forms of mobilities and spatial inequalities. In both studies, data collection was mainly qualitative, while statistical data from Eurostat and censuses were used to triangulate information from the interviews. Approximately 60 qualitative interviews, life histories, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with migrants originating from Mediterranean countries (e.g., Albanians), transiting Mediterranean countries towards Western Europe (e.g., Syrians), and/or settled in Greece. Similarly, interviews were conducted with EU migrants, internal migrants, especially from urban centres to rural areas, and locals in rural areas. Ethnographic observations and interviews with stakeholders and key informants such as farmers and local authorities at the national and local level were used to triangulate the information from the interviews.

For more than a decade, the region has been the focus of the authors' studies and analysis of socio-spatial mobilities and rural change. In combination with our longstanding presence in the region, recording migrants' experiences by tracing their trajectories along the Mediterranean has enabled us to closely monitor and critically assess social trends as well as national political and economic developments; we have thus responded to the need of including historical perspective in Mediterranean migration research (Zapata-Barrero, 2020).

Our familiarity with the region, as well as the fact that our research team represented a wide range of personal characteristics in terms of gender, languages spoken, age group and rural/urban background, contributed to a climate of trust and connectedness among research participants. What is more, this type of collaboration is thought to combine the benefits of easy access to 'insiders' with the fresh perspective of 'outsiders', especially when research is conducted in multiple locations and languages (Fitzgerald, 2006; Wong & Poon, 2010).

International migration into the region began in the early 1990s, mainly due to the fall of socialist regimes. Hence, a small number of Albanians, Egyptians and a few Bangladeshis arrived in the area, followed by Romanians and Bulgarians. Albanians currently make up the largest share of migrants, followed by EU migrants and Asians. In 2016, a refugee camp was established in the village of Myrsini, a former tourist resort called "LM Village", after the Syrian refugee/migration crisis in 2015. This small camp now houses 280–300 Syrian refugees. The following two sections shed light on the ways the various mobilities and trajectories intersect in the Mediterranean.

# 22.4.1 Illustrating the Contribution(s) of Migrant Labour to Mediterranean Agriculture

The contribution of migrant workers to Mediterranean agriculture in Greece has provoked heated debate, especially during the years of economic crisis in the country. From the interviews conducted with farmers, key informants, and residents of rural areas, it appears that immigration (i.e., the influx of people into rural areas from both other parts of the country and other countries) is seen by the majority as beneficial to the rural economy. In this context, residents emphasise the impact of the migrants' presence on well-being in rural areas in terms of demographic rejuvenation, especially in more remote places and small villages which the younger generation has abandoned. Furthermore, residents emphasised the migrant's contribution to the local economy in terms of increasing consumption and supporting other seasonal activities (e.g., tourism) during peak periods (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2021). In this respect, some locals look back with nostalgia at the earlier years when the village was "full of life", there were children playing in the playgrounds, and the economy was flourishing. This image is in stark contrast to the picture they paint of the situation in small villages, especially in the winter months when tourism is limited. Aris (73 years old) says emphatically, "[in the late 1970s] it was a different village, there were people moving around ... it was a lively village, it had young people, lots of them ... now it's a graveyard ... you go to the cafeteria, 2 to 3 people, the same people every day. You never meet a new person".

In this discourse, Albanians are usually presented as part of the local community, as 'people like us'. Unlike other migrant groups living in the area, Albanians are married and have their families with them in the village. Their children attend the school, and over their long presence in the area they have learnt the Greek language and established strong ties with locals. Equally, Albanian's strategies for career advancement within agriculture and/or in other economic sectors is recognised as evidence of hard work and commitment.

A more 'utilitarian' approach is taken, however, to migrants who have recently arrived in Greece by crossing the Mediterranean, and who work in intensive agriculture. These migrant groups are mainly represented by single men who -on their way to Western countries- found temporary employment in local agriculture. They have a limited presence in the everyday life of the village. Although their contribution to the local agribusiness is often acknowledged, their presence in everyday life is often overlooked or seen as temporary. Issues relating to the integration of the different migrant groups in the region, and concerns about the migration's future contribution, are evident. Thus, as agriculture is the cornerstone of the local economy, residents emphasise the role of migrants in providing the necessary labour in a sector in which local youth are reluctant to work: "... with migration things have changed, ... the farmer who has the harvest has no problem finding workers. If he waited for the Greeks, everything would have rotted in the fields ... there are no Greeks for that... [task]" (Aris 73 years old).

Farmers, on the other hand, often point to the expansion, intensification, and increased competitiveness of farms, as well as to the crucial issue of labour availability, particularly in harvesting seasons. Issues of migrant labour quality and ethnic hierarchy, segregation, and housing conditions, are equally important. For instance, it was argued that the expansion and competitiveness of intensive agriculture in Western Greece is highly dependent on the availability of cheap and 'just in time' labour. "This is a key to developing the export-oriented market for fruits and vegetables" (Key Informant ID 58, farmer).

During the interviews, farmers often emphasised that migrants working in Mediterranean agriculture are a highly heterogeneous group. A distinction is made between the permanent agricultural workers and temporary/seasonal agricultural workers. Within agriculture, there is also an ethnic and occupational hierarchy: Often the more skilled and specialized tasks are assigned either to a small number of Greeks who returned to agriculture during the years of recession (Papadopoulos et al., 2019), or to migrants with a better knowledge of Greek, who have been living for longer period in the area and are more 'trusted' by the farmer.

Migrant workers in Mediterranean agriculture are praised as 'good workers', but this description carries a different meaning, depending on the migrant group the workers belong to. Thus, 'good worker' can relate to the quality of work and to increased productivity, which is implicitly linked to other features of labour division and social position in the occupational hierarchy within agriculture, such as income, prestige, power, and trust: "A good worker gets a good wage" (Key Informant ID 58, farmer). These workers, mainly of Albanian origin, are long-term employees. They are trusted by the farmers, who have invested time in passing on their knowledge and expertise to them. As time goes by, this permanent personnel climbs the agricultural ladder and starts to supervise the temporary workers on the farm. They thus become important human capital for the farm's operation: "We do not change them over the years ... we work with certain people... because if you change the permanent workforce, you cannot pass on the know-how in farming practices" (Key Informant ID 58, farmer).

However, in other cases, 'good worker' can mean cheap, exploitable, disciplined and 'just in time'. As they are often seen as temporary in the region, the precarious situation of the workers and their uncertain legal status as undocumented immigrants detracts from their position when it comes to their claiming payments and social rights. As we will see in the next section, there are cases where Syrian refugees working in the fields have not been paid by farmers, creating a vicious circle of uncertainty, limbo, and precariousness.

For migrant groups crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe, such as Asian migrants, their housing and living conditions are often poor and their inclusion in the lower strata of the labour market is accompanied by spatial segregation; they live in huts near the greenhouses, away from the daily life of the village.

#### 22.4.2 Narratives of Mediterranean Trajectories

This section focuses at the trajectories of migrants originating from Mediterranean countries, crossing Mediterranean countries towards Western Europe, and/or settled in Greece. Agriculture is perceived differently in the context of their social and spatial journeys: either as a sector of arrival, offering a springboard for their integration into the labour market, or as a sector of departure, serving as a steppingstone for career advancement into other sectors of the economy. To illustrate the characteristics of the trajectories, this section uses emblematic vignettes of Albanian and Syrian migrants that shed light on the complex interplay between mobilities in the Mediterranean.

Nikos was born in 1960 in a town in Northern Albania. After graduating from university, he was placed in Southern Albania to work. Like other Albanian migrants at the time, after the collapse of the socialist regime, he takes the decision to come to Greece in 1994. Through family networks and acquaintances, he finds work in a village in Western Greece. Over the years, Nikos lives and works in Western Greece, but also moves around rural areas in mainland Greece, harvesting cotton, apricots, and vegetables. Along with a group of other Albanians, he follows the crops and moves wherever there is an opportunity for work. After a few years, he legalises his status and brings his wife and children to Greece. Starting from agricultural employment, he gains experience of working in Greece and slowly learns the Greek language; after some years building networks with both Albanians and Greeks, this leads to him finding a job in construction. Fifteen years later, his occupational trajectory takes on a new dynamic: "Then I started working on my own, because I met people in the industry, I also learned the craft of painting houses, and little by little I took on my own projects". Nevertheless, employment in agriculture remains a safety net for Nikos, a secure job and income in times when employment in the construction sector is limited. However, he argues that his employment in agriculture has different characteristics now. By earning a reputation as a hardworking and trustworthy member of the local community, by learning the language and expanding his social network, Nikos returns to agriculture as a foreman, supervising other migrant groups who are 'trying to get ahead' by working in the fields.

Nikos' life story sheds light on the role agriculture plays in integrating migrants into the labour market. While agriculture was initially a sector of arrival, over time it was transformed into a sector of departure, towards other sectors in the economy. However, unlike other migrant groups, Nikos saw his future in rural Greece. By combining agricultural employment with secondary employment in rural areas, Nikos' trajectory illustrates how migrant workers can become a multifunctional labour force for rural Greece (Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005), meeting needs beyond the primary sector.

Unlike the Albanian immigrants in rural Greece, for most Syrian refugees the country was a stopover on their journey in search of safety and a better life in Western Europe. According to our research, for a significant number of the Syrians interviewed, agriculture was either their main occupation in Syria, a casual job they did during their stay in Turkey to raise the necessary financial capital to move to Europe, or a temporary occupation during their stay in Greece pending recognition of their refugee status and resettlement in other countries.

Mohammad was born in 1979 in a village near Latakia. In 2007, he moved to Damascus to work in public relations. "It was a good job... until the war. Then all the companies closed". In 2017, he makes the decision to leave Syria. As it was for many other Syrian refugees, Turkey served as a 'migration hub' where he could gather information about routes to Europe (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2019). After crossing the Aegean, Mohammad reaches Chios and is resettled in the Myrsini camp. Two years passed as he was waiting for his asylum application to be processed. However, he did not attend the Greek classes offered in the camp during this time, preferring English classes, as he considered his stay in Greece to be temporary.

During our conversation, he emphasised that it was difficult for him to find a job due to the economic crisis. He received monthly support from the CASH programme but was looking for alternative employment opportunities to increase his income and finance his migration plans. "There was no way to find work... I just took the 150 euro and waited...".

Eventually, he found a job in local agriculture. However, he felt exploited. His experience sheds light on the precarious and vulnerable situation of Syrian refugees working in agriculture (see also Pelek, 2019). "[I was]... talking to people and trying to find work, but I had no luck. Someone offered me work. Olive trees. We worked for about 20 days, and he did not give any money... [he said] I'll pay tomorrow, I'll pay tomorrow, 20 days and he disappeared. ... We worked for 20 days for nothing. That's what happened. We cannot work on contract".

These life stories illustrate aspects of the ethnic hierarchies that emerge in the Greek agricultural sector. For some migrant groups, employment in agriculture is a strategy that allows them to integrate into the labour market and find new opportunities to survive and improve their social and economic status. For others, it is a temporary solution to support the move on to other migration destinations.

#### 22.5 Conclusion

The Mediterranean region is a prominent field for addressing the contribution of migrant labour to agriculture and rural areas more generally. Given the truism that migrants mostly contribute to economic development in urban settings, it took time for researchers to begin investigating the impact of migrant labour in rural areas.

A review of the relevant literature reveals two major strands of thought in the field: the first underlines the key role migrant labour plays in intensive agriculture, and the way in which farmers instrumentalise migrant labour to increase the effectiveness of specialised agricultural and agri-food systems; the second emphasises the multifunctionality of migrant labour in rural areas and sheds light on the interactions between receiving rural areas and the migrants themselves, while also delving into the migrants' agency and aspirations. Both perspectives are valid and relevant for researching Mediterranean migrations and their effect on agriculture and rural areas, but it is important to differentiate analytically between agriculture and rurality as relatively distinct research domains. Migrants' employment and/or movement (s) within agriculture and/or among different sectors across rural areas or across the urban/rural divide remains important in the Mediterranean context.

Our empirical research indicates the interactions between the socio-spatial and the agricultural aspects which remain as essential components of rurality. Specifically, the functionalist understanding of migrant labour as a key factor for intensive agriculture remains important albeit partial because it offers a fragmented interpretation of migrants' real contribution to the receiving societies. We suggest that the contribution of migrant labour to agriculture should be seen in the light of the interplay between the receiving society and the migrants themselves, and by looking more deeply at how migrants aspire and take actions impacting on their present and future.

In addition, the various waves of migration into the Mediterranean region and receiving rural areas should be seen in tandem with the structural characteristics of the agricultural sector. The desires and aspirations of the migrant groups themselves, for social advancement or movement into other economic sectors and places in Greece and abroad, give rise to the emergence of different ethnic hierarchies. To explore the migrant contribution to Mediterranean agriculture, we therefore need to understand how that contribution is perceived by employers and rural residents. We should pay greater attention to the experiences and trajectories of migrants originating from Mediterranean countries, crossing the Mediterranean and/or settled in Greece.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Book Editors and the reviewer(s) for their valuable comments. The 'Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe IMAJINE' project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 726950. This paper reflects only the author's views. The Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

#### References

(Eds.), The new social division: The making and unmaking of precariousness (pp. 101–119). Palgrave Macmillan.

Apostolos G. Papadopoulos studied Sociology in Greece (Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences) and in the United Kingdom (London School of Economics and Political Science) and holds a DPhil in Geography (University of Sussex). He has worked as a researcher/staff member at the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE), University of Patras, University of Ioannina, and Agricultural University of Athens. He is currently Professor of Rural Sociology and Geography at Harokopio University of Athens and at the same time Director of the Institute of Social Research of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE). He has coordinated as project leader several research projects funded by the European Commission, the Greek State and other organisations, and has also served as a senior researcher. He is editor or co-editor of ten edited volumes (two of which were published by Ashgate Publishers) and co-author of one book. His research has been published in Greek, English, Italian, and Portuguese. As President of the Hellenic Sociological Association (HSS), he has taken on the task of organising one of the largest social science congresses in Greece (13th European Sociology Association Conference, Athens, 2017). He is currently Editor-in-Chief of the international journal Sociologia Ruralis and Associate Editor of NEW MEDIT: Mediterranean Journal of Economics, Agriculture and Environment. His research interests include: social class and social mobility; rural change and social inequalities; rural development and policy; family farming; labour market and economic restructuring; labour migration and integration; migration policy; mobilities and spatial justice; social impact of social research.

Loukia-Maria Fratsea is an experienced researcher at the Department of Geography, Harokopio University in Athens, Greece. She holds an Integrated Master in Agricultural Economics and a M.Sc. in Rural Development, both from the Agricultural University of Athens. She holds a PhD in Social Geography, jointly supervised by Harokopio University (Greece) and the University of Calabria (Italy). She has worked as a researcher and project manager in numerous research projects funded by Greek national authorities, the European Commission and international organisations. She has many years of research experience in the fields of social stratification and international migration, socio-economic development, socio-spatial mobilities and rural/coastal transformations, and migrant integration, and has published in Greek and international journals and edited volumes. In addition to Greek, she is fluent in English, French and Romanian. In 2021, she was elected to the Executive Committee of the European Sociological Association (ESA) for the term 2021–2024. Her research interests include rural transformation, migration and social change and social stratification and mobility.

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# Chapter 23 Transnational Migrant Entrepreneurship Policies in the Maghreb Countries: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Samir Djelti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero

# 23.1 Introduction: Setting the Debate on the Political and Economic Mutual Interface in Shaping Mediterranean Migration New Patterns

The transnational dimension of migrants entrepreneurship, which involves a crossborder business activity relying on resources and opportunities in the countries of origin, is capturing more attention of scholars working on transnationalism and entrepreneurship dimensions within migration studies (Drori et al., 2009; Agunias & Newland, 2012; Zapata-Barrero & Rezaei, 2020). Until now, the focus has been mostly concentrated on analysing patterns and defining hypotheses on the favourable and non-favourable factors promoting these new dynamics, mostly at the micro level (Carmichael et al., 2010).

The abundant economic literature considers Transnational Migrant Entrepreneurs (TME) as an opportunity for migrants' personal social mobility but also for the economic development of the origin countries. However, in the political sciences, there are few researches on how the origin countries are capturing the transnational patterns of migrants. This trend of better linking diaspora to development through different practices than the traditional remittances, which was the nuclear argument of the migration/development debate is present in most of the latest international reports (IOM, 2020; World Bank, 2020; Boubakri et al., 2021; Djelti, 2015) and it is

S. Djelti

Mustapha Stambouli University, Mascara, Algeria

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)

GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), Department of Social and Political Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
included in the agenda of the Global Compact on Migration.1 The shared premises are that migrants have experience and funds, which help them to carry out transnational projects with their country. Currently, many states have turned to this economic target by setting up processes to motivate migrants to build entrepreneurship projects with their origin country.

By coupling the economic literature about migration & development and the political/business studies on TME, the rational of this chapter is to explore how the economic context shapes the TME policies in the Maghreb countries? More precisely, what is the role of economic dependence to migration and business climate when it comes to choosing between national, migrants and/or TME policies building? Contextually, we will concentrate on three Maghreb countries; Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. There are already some works focusing on this subregion, which analyse the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Faghih & Zali, 2018); there are also other studies which have focused on how migrants develop entrepreneurship skills and projects in the host countries (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003). But this transnational dimension of migrant entrepreneurs is still in need of more research.

Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are neighbouring developing countries with similar colonial history and geographical features (Brett, 1976). They are concerned by shared geopolitical challenges towards the European Union and neighbourhood with the Northern Mediterranean countries, with similar socio-economic problems and political challenges migration-related (Boubakri et al., 2021). Even the migration corridors follow likewise patterns, and they are usually categorised by leading reports as a micro-Mediterranean Western region for the migratory of routes and corridors (Mcauliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). They also share a colonial past with Francophonie (France) and political history, as it is the case with Spain (Morgenthaler García, 2016). Such facts make them a micro-region within the whole Mediterranean region (Chambers, 2008).

# 23.2 Migration and Development Nexus, and Its Renewal Through TME's Debate

Migration, development, and entrepreneurship have complex theoretical connections that have evolved during the second half of the twenty-first century. This section overviews the evolution of remittance as a source of the national economy to a skills-based approach within the framework of migration & development nexus and TME. It is worth noting that business climate could encourage or not this evolution.

Traditionally, migration and development studies have been ranked in three schools of thinking, namely: the optimistic, the pessimistic, and the new economics

<sup>1</sup> From the 18th (skills development and recognition) to the 23rd objective (international cooperation) https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration

of labour migration (De Haas, 2010). Such categorization is the result of a scientific debate that reflect two different ideologies. Initially the migration and development nexus represent a continued debate between the pessimistic and the optimistic scholars. The optimistic school of thinking, initiated by Grubel and Scott (1966) have predicted that migration can be beneficial for the origin countries through remittances, return migration, and socio-professional networks. Meanwhile the pessimistic one thought that brain-gain is harmful for the economics of the origin countries. Followed by a community of authors, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) has demonstrated, through microeconomic model, that the brain-drain puts the origin countries in the trap of poverty, rendering their development impossible. They consider the brain-drain as a rude factor that develop the economies of the destination countries by under-developing those of the origin.

Based on the new economics of labor migration (Stark & Bloom, 1985), new studies have reconsidered the optimistic school of thinking during the 90s. Based on the same logic of the pessimistic models, Stark et al. (1997) have demonstrated the potential positive effects of migration on the economics of the origin countries. This new optimism has led to an explosion of literature about migration and development. In this context, migration effects have been connected with trade (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2018), foreign investment (Cuadros et al., 2019), innovation (Bahar & Rapoport, 2018), tourism (Djelti et al., 2021), democracy (Rapoport, 2015), and women empowerment (Sinha et al., 2012).

In this framework, the emergence of TME debate is the result of the evolution of studies on the main channels of migration and development namely; remittances, returns, and networks. Observed in the majority of the world origin countries, return migrants use skills and remittances to establish entrepreneurial projects. Such observation has triggered researchers' thinking to consider migrants' entrepreneurship as a development pillar in the origin countries. Regarding remittances, the New Economic of Labour Migration has included its determinants into the family contract framework. Stark (1991) have distinguished four motivations of remittances: the altruistic,2 the self-interest,3 the loans repayment,4 and the coinsurance motivation.5

Taking stocks of more recent works, Portes et al. (2002), Carling (2004), and Portes and Martinez (2021) have theorized the relationship between migration and development through the entrepreneurship channel. Empirical studies (Todorov

<sup>2</sup> The migrants transfer money to the rest of the family members in the country of origin because they look after the wellbeing of them.

<sup>3</sup> It pushes the migrant to transfer their savings to a safer place and invest them. The remittances and investments are generally administered by one or more members of the family remaining in the origin country.

<sup>4</sup> First, the family invests in the education and the emigration of a member, then the debt repayment starts.

<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, the emigrant must support the family members in the difficult times, on the other, the family represents also an insurance for the migrant. The exchange of services has been developed as a new motivation of remittances to pay brother because of his management of the migrant's goods in the origin country (Hoddinott, 1994; De la Brière et al., 1997).

et al., 2018; Kakhkharov & Rohde, 2020) and practical initiatives are now spreading.6 These approaches share the premises that entrepreneurship is a channel that connect migration to development. In practice, the new optimism reconsiders remittances, return migration, and networks, which represent the pillars of migrants' entrepreneurship. Based on the migrants' entrepreneurship experiences in the origin countries, diaspora policies have been developed. To sum up, the optimism in migration and development will support better diaspora policies such as TME patterns, whereas the pessimism will range towards less developed TME's policies. Then it can be stated that there is a link between these classical approaches towards the Migration & Development nexus and the fact that some countries incorporate more explicit and define better their diaspora policies towards TME.

The first literature examining the policy paradigm changes from a remittancesbased approach to skills-mobilization-based approach shares the diagnosis that after some decades of implementation, this policy has become much more a policy rhetoric than efficient policy (Boukharouaa et al., 2014). There is still a policy gap and governance problem between expectations and outcomes of this new policy focus. There is a need to analyse in depth home government programs, how they include this transnational practice into their diaspora policy agenda? and how they understand transnationalism as an asset and diaspora as a capital? From this home perspective, some avenues of the debate wonder how these diaspora policies are drawn strategically and if they meet the TME needs or not. The literature is also interested in why some TME enter in relation with their countries and other prefer to follow an international entrepreneurship venture (Solano, 2021).

# 23.3 The National Economic Challenges and Policy Priorities Approach

Based on the above theoretical background, the economic context is strongly connected with the political priorities in general and migration policies in particular. Put it another way, the general economic context can influence policy makers views and then their decisions to consider, or not, their own nationals living abroad as a source of development, through entrepreneurship migration policy. Based on this hypothesis, the analysis will be introduced by the economic situation in which remittances and business climate are considered as the important motivational factor for the development of entrepreneurship's national policies. The economic dependence to remittances trigger the development of migrants' entrepreneurship policy and the favourable business climate motivate migrants investment. Then, the priority will be given to the national entrepreneurship as a policy for both nationals and be-nationals.

<sup>6</sup> https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/projects/platform-remittances-investments-andmigrants-entrepreneurship-africa-prime-africa\_en

Finally, the transnational entrepreneurship priority is concretised by the definitive incorporation of TME into their agenda and focus on the cultural, economic, and social capacities. The evolution of migrants' entrepreneurship policy, in the context of migration & development nexus enlarge its objectives.

It is worth noting that the policies that engage migrants in transnational activities are not only those encouraging entrepreneurship. We have been especially sensitive to identify the practices of these policies and the main public/private actors involved in their implementation. In the same vein, we have not distinguished general policies promoting entrepreneurship and those specifically targeting migrants. Migrants are be-nationals, that is why they can take advantages from the national, the international and the migrants entrepreneurship policies. In this work, all the policies that foster migrants' entrepreneurship are considered, including migrants' specific policies, those for nationals, and for Foreign Direct investment.

#### 23.4 Subregional Analysis: Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco

This section is devoted to case studies showing how the economic dependence to migrants and the business climate influences policy makers to consider diaspora in their political agenda.

# 23.4.1 The Tunisian Case: A Step-by-Step Entrepreneurship Migration Policy Building

In 1986, Tunisia has adopted a market economic model and signed a free trade agreement with the European Union in 1995. Its economy is historically based on agriculture, energy, tourism, and industry. According to the Doing Business Report (2020), Tunisia has received 2 billion US Dollars of remittances in 2018, which represents 4.9% of its GDP. The importance of remittances in the Tunisian income shows the relevance of the development of this financial source.

Regarding its national entrepreneurship policy, the Promotion Agency for Industry and Innovation (APII), represents the first network that provides services for the Tunisian industrial enterprises. Created in 1972, APII is a public institution that realises the government policy related to the promotion of industries and innovation by assisting the entrepreneurs. It also offers information, support, assistance, partnership, and studies. Between 2001 and 2005, 12 nurseries of company have been created, and in 2005 the national network of nurseries has borne by generalising these structures in the Tunisian territory in order to boost and accelerate enterprises creation (Ouanes, 2016).

The Promotion of Agricultural Investments Agency APIA was founded in 1983, in order to promote the private investment in agriculture, fisheries, and first transformation activities related to the agricultural sectors. In the same vein, the National Agency for Employment and Independent Labour ANETI, the Centre for the Promotion of Exportation (CEPEX), Technical Centres, Technic-poles, and Business Centres have been created. These structures provide specialised trainings, assistance for the realisation of business model and business planning, personal coaching, technical assistance, facilitation for company creation, networking, and control.

In addition to these public institutions, independent initiatives of the civil society have supported the entrepreneurship process. In the context of new Tunisia, numerous associations have been created, among them 1826 are active in the sustainable development field, with a focus on entrepreneurship. These associations focus on the culture of entrepreneurship, through sharing information, awareness campaigns, reception and orientation of entrepreneurs, trainings for the creation of enterprises, help before creation, assistance for finance, advice and coaching in the beginning, and the monitoring in the post creation (Ouanes, 2016).

Regarding funding, the Tunisian legislation have created structures for entrepreneurs by according rational interest rate credits. Two public banks have been mobilized: First, the Tunisian Bank of Solidarity BTS specialized in funding small and medium projects both, directly or via the Microcredit Associations. It allows credits with a maximum of 150 thousand Tunisian Dinars, with a 5% rate of interest, without a real guarantee and with facilitation in reimbursement. Second, the Bank of Small and Medium Companies BFPME, specialised in funding investment projects with global cost between 150 thousand and five million Tunisian Dinar. This bank requires real and personal guaranties and request other credits confirmed by commercial banks. In addition, the government has reinforced the own funding FONAPRAM & FOPRODI, the microfinance institutions Tayssir, Adavans, Enda, the investment companies IntilaQ, Faster Capital, UGFS NA, Carthage Business Angels, and the enterprises with risky capital SICAR.

In order to deal with the issues related to competences and soft skills, the public institutions have focused on providing trainings since 2013. The National Agency for Employment and Independent Work ANETI has offered trainings for the creation of enterprises and entrepreneurs, the evaluation of enterprises, searching ideas, capacity building, languages, TIC, communication, and vital behaviour. In the same vein, Business Centres, Nursery of Companies, incubators, and civil society have also proposed trainings (Khaddamni tarba7, Build your Business, Mashrou3i. etc.) for the transmission of experience and competences. According to Ouanes (2016) the young were not motivated, funds were insufficient, the programs were not up-to-date, and the implicated actors were not collaborative. In parallel, the training and coaching opportunities are dependent to internet and social networks, which are not available for the whole Tunisian population. Furthermore, the proposed trainings have decreased in 2016, especially with the disappearance of numerous competitions of the best projects selection, which beneficiate of funding.

Regarding the entrepreneurship environment based on the World Bank Doing Business Report (2020), Tunisia is ranked in the 78th place. According to Transparency International (2020), it is ranked 74th, and 87th according to the World Competitively Indicator published by the World Economic Forum (Băhnăreanu, 2019). In terms of innovation, the world organization of intellectual property has ranked Tunisia in the 65th place. Tunisia has a medium entrepreneurship climate that could trigger the motivation of both migrants and international entrepreneurs.

Regarding return migration and entrepreneurship in Tunisia, Cassarino (2015) warns that there are few official statistics for the evaluation and the comparison of the return migrants' reintegration. The author has conducted a survey in 2006 and 2012 in Tunisia that has revealed that 31% of the sample are entrepreneurs and independent workers. More precisely, 16% are working in the informal market without creating employment. In addition, becoming an employer is diminishing for the young generations initially because of the institutional and the structural factors in the Tunisian economic system, the limited access to finance and information resources, the administrative and customs bureaucracy, the fiscal hostility, the political and economic imbrication, and the controlled expansion of the private sector. Such analysis confirms, also, the orientation of return migrants to the selffinance and to the family support.

Apart of some initiatives of facilitating the investment of the Tunisian migrant to invest in agriculture, we have not noticed the existence of a national policy. Whereas, the Tunisian international openness and relations has established mechanisms for the management of temporary migration. Started from about two decades, it is summarised in bilateral agreements with the EU. The aim of such partnership is the assistance of the Tunisian students and workers for the acquisition of the necessary professional and academic skills for the development of economic activities once returned back in Tunisia (Cassarino, 2015).

In March 2019, a recent agreement between IOM Tunisia and the African Business Leaders, have announced the execution of a social incubator for migrants' entrepreneurs KUFANYA. This project is registered in the Regional Program of Development and Protection of North Africa RDPPNA. It is funded by the European Union and realised by IOM. In practice, the project KUFAYNA is incubated in an accelerator of social innovation called Lab'ess. The incubator promotes, facilitates, and assists the migrant's entrepreneurship in EU and Africa. It also helps to create structures of migrants' entrepreneurship assistance in the African countries. In addition, it provides an assistance for the research of finance, structures, and the entrepreneurship project holders. KUFNAYA promotes also entrepreneurship and investment for the young population in some African countries.

Regarding the political institutions, the Office of Tunisians Abroad OTE, founded in 1988 has the general mission of offering services to the living abroad Tunisians. In the office web,7 they promote investment by presenting the same opportunities of the residents. In addition, the Tunisian National Observatory on Migration8 analyses migration, collects information, establishes studies and evaluations, and cooperates with the other institutions. Furthermore, the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Migration,

<sup>7</sup> https://ote.nat.tn/investir-en-tunisie/

<sup>8</sup> http://www.migration.nat.tn/fr/presentation/missions

and Tunisians Abroad9 supports the Tunisian expatriates worldwide and protect their business interests.

To sum up, the overview about entrepreneurship and return migration shows the weakness of entrepreneurship in Tunisia and the governmental struggle with the issues that can develop this pillar of development. Regarding the entrepreneurship of migrants in Tunisia, it remains individual initiatives, without a developed national strategy to take advantage from this source. The government, with bilateral agreements and cooperation with the EU and NGOs, have initiated projects that can represent the first step for migrants' entrepreneurship policy. To sum up, because of the economic contribution of migrants and the medium business climate, Tunisia is experiencing a step-by-step entrepreneurship migration policy building.

# 23.4.2 The Algerian Case: a Two-in-One Entrepreneurship Policy

The Algerian economy is strongly dependent on natural resources. Its economic case has been widely studied in comparison with "the Dutch disease" and under the "curse of natural resources" topics. The Oil and Gas prices are the main factors that determine the health of its economy, that is why the nowadays most important priority is the diversification of its resources. The Doing Business Report (2020), shows that Algeria received 1.9 billion US Dollars in 2018, which represent 1% of the Algerian GDP this year. Moreover, the majority of remittances circulate in the informal channel. According to Djelti (2015), the informal Algerian inflow of remittances is nine times more important than the formal one. The weakness of remittances in the Algerian economy explains the neglected interest given to migration as an economic opportunity in the political agenda.

During the 90s, in the context of the IMF imposed reforms for the orientation to the market economy, the government has adopted different programs for encouraging entrepreneurship. To do so, structures and funds that motivate, orientate, finance, and assist entrepreneurs have been created. The national unemployment insurance fund CNAC was founded in 1994 as a dispositive for supporting the entrepreneurship activity. This structure supports entrepreneurial activities with a maximal amount of 10.000.000 DA of credit without remuneration. Two years later, the National Agency for the Support of Young Employment ANSEJ was created to encourage all activities that revive the young employment sector. It has focused on funding investments that produce goods and services that do not exceed 10.000.000 DA. The credits are zero interest and guaranteed by a national insurance.

In the same vein, the National Agency for the Support of Investment ANDI, was founded in 2001. Its mission is the promotion of investment and the facilitation of the entrepreneurship activity through the decentralisation of its administrative

<sup>9</sup> https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/

services. More recently, in 2004 a new structure was established in order to focus on the micro credit ANGEM. Its main objective is the insertion of the needy people into the socioeconomic life by creating their own entrepreneurial activity. It funds a maximum amount of 1.000.000 DA guaranteed and without remuneration.

The incubators of companies have appeared in Algeria for those who have investment ideas, these structures offer the physical accommodation for the company from its birth until three years after its registration. It provides assistance by advising, funding, and networking the company. The first incubator has been created in 2004 at Sidi Abdellah. It is a public industrial and commercial company. Five years later, the first private incubator « Alinov » has been created. New public incubators have also been founded in order to assist start-up in the frame of E-Algeria (Cyberparc de Sidi Abdellah (2010), the incubator of Ouargla (2012), Technobridge of l'INTTIC Oran (2013), the incubator of the university of Batna (2013), IncubMe, and ACSE). In order to encourage this sector, the government has, recently, created a ministry for boosting entrepreneurship and start-up.

The concept of Nursery of Company has been adopted in Algeria in 2009 with slight difference from incubators, which represent structures of assistance that concern all the existing companies from one to five years. Like the business incubators, companies can have technical, financial, and advice facilities. In addition, the companies' accelerator structure also concerns the existing companies that target strong growth. They propose programmes of training animated by serial entrepreneurs, with a high level of experience in the creation and the development of companies for the technological start-up. Sylabs, Institut Haba, and the Pivot are the most known accelerators.

The Algerian entrepreneurship structures, especially the first one, have contributed to an increase in the number of created companies. In 2016, 108,538 companies were created. The total number of companies has registered a growth rate of 84% between 2010 and 2018. In general, ANSEJ has consumed about 70% of the budget destined to boost entrepreneurship in Algeria. By the first semester of 2019, Algeria counted about 1.171.945 small and medium companies. Among them, 97% are very small companies with less than ten employees. The small companies and the medium ones represent respectively 2.60% and 0.40%.

Regarding migration and entrepreneurship, the MIREM10 survey has concluded that 13.5% of the migrants have realized one investment, 1.5% have realized two, 0.9% have realized three, and 1.2% have realized more than three investments. Djelti (2015) has conducted a survey on 200 Algerian migrants in France, the study has estimated that the main destinations of these remittances are buying real estate, saving, spending holidays in Algeria, investment, family consumption, and family investment.

Actually, Algerian migrants can take advantages of the return facilities and motivations (Certificat de Changement de Residence CCR). In addition, because of their social ties, the Algerian migrants are more appropriate to benefit from the

<sup>10</sup> http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/fr/research-projects/mirem/

wide above-cited entrepreneurial structures advantages and facilities. The informal sector is crucial in Algeria, that is why this topic needs profound studies to determine the efficacity of this double sides policy (for nationals and be-nationals).

The diversification of the Algerian economy strategy enhances the internal entrepreneurship policy. Such policy provides opportunities for both residents and migrants rather than looking for specific policy for migrants' entrepreneurship. In general, for nationals and be-nationals, a two in one entrepreneurship policy is adopted in Algeria.

# 23.4.3 The Moroccan Case: National and Migrants' Entrepreneurship – Two Parallel Policies

The Moroccan economy is characterized by large tertiary sector (trade and tourism), followed by a secondary (industry and construction), and a primary sector (agriculture).11 According to the Doing Business Report (2020), Morocco has received 7.4 billion US Dollars in 2018, which represents 6.2% of its GDP in this year. The importance of remittances in the Moroccan income has pushed the government to, at least, maintain this economic source. This necessity has triggered the development of the government's will to manage and invest in this economic opportunity.

In addition, regarding the entrepreneurship environment, based on the World Bank Doing Business Report (2020), Morocco is ranked 53rd and 80th according to Transparency International (2020). Furthermore, according to the World Competitively Indicator, published by the World Economic Forum (2019), Morocco is in the 75th place. In terms of innovation, the world organization of intellectual property has ranked Morocco in the 75th position. The medium above rankings makes Morocco attracting foreign investments including migrants. Such a favourable climate has helped the development of migrant's entrepreneurship policies.

The fact that OECD released two reports on Moroccan public policies development and skilled migrants in 2016–17 is an indicator of its strong ties. The diaspora adopted policies consisting of an array of measures, including ministerial and consular reforms, and investment policies to manage a specific profile of the "Moroccans Living Abroad" (MLAs). The Moroccan case illustrates the evolution of a diaspora policy implemented since the 1990s, and now seems to have the shape of a "governance of a structure of opportunities", engaging Moroccan authorities, as well as private and public partnerships, programmes, institutions and government departments.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> https://www.finances.gov.ma/Publication/depf/2019/Tableau\_de\_bord\_sectoriel\_janvier%20201 9.pdf

<sup>12</sup> A Mapping of the institutional diaspora governance evolution can be found in Zapata-Barrero and Hellgren (2020, 2033–2036).

The advancement of capacity building policies to govern the diaspora is situated in the broad process of change in Morocco already described by De Haas (2007), which explored the shift from controlling the diaspora to including it given the high contributions of their remittances. In this framework, some years ago, Morocco is gradually entering in a second phase, by a focus on the mobilization of skilled MLAs in general. This policy shifts from a guest-workers policy narrative (remittancesbased approach) to a much more defined transnational policy narrative (skillsmobilization-based approach). Such transformation must be understood as the broad mainstream focus of Moroccan diaspora governance today.

Three basic pillars sustain the Moroccan diaspora engagement policy philosophy (RdM, 2016): (a) Preservation of the identity of the Moroccans of the World; (b) Protection of rights and interests of MLAs; and (c) Contribution of MLAs to the development of the country. This diaspora policy focus seeks to profit from the know-how accumulated by MLAs for the benefits of Morocco. This policy belongs to its most important strategy regarding their diaspora in Horizon 2025 (Belguendouz, 2010: 29).

This mobilization strategy is explicitly a policy of attraction (Marhaba) of highskilled Moroccan migrants that have acquired a social and cultural capital abroad, and that now are "seduced" to contribute to the national economic development.<sup>13</sup> Some recent researches however argue that the Moroccan policy initiatives to attract their skilled nationals reflect a gap between expectations and outcomes (Zapata-Barrero & Hellgren, 2020). Most authors point out that the lack of an integrative view of the different policy initiatives, and the incoherence between different departments and institutions and programmes seeking to create a structure of opportunities for their nationals living abroad, may be some of the main causes (Boukharouaa et al., 2014; OECD, 2017, p. 55). It is considered that the rich and diversified expertise accumulated by Moroccan skills residing abroad can advantageously be involved in the national development process (Belguendouz, 2010).

The Moroccan policy has triggered the development of both a national entrepreneurial policy and a migration policy for the attraction of entrepreneur migrants. Studies have shown that this policy has not achieved its strategic objectives. Like the case of the other Maghreb countries, more studies are needed to evaluate the implemented policies. In the end, a national and migrants' entrepreneurship are two parallel policies sparked by Morocco. The economic importance of migration returns as an economic source has triggered MIP and the medium business climate have been favourable for its development to TMP.

<sup>13</sup> This justify, Operation Marhaba, which is under the effective presidency of HM King Mohammed VI, highlighting the logistical, human, material and technical resources mobilized, in particular by the Mohammed V Foundation for solidarity, in order to ensure the operation. http://www.ccme. org.ma/en/what-s-new/53253

# 23.5 Different MEP Approaches for Different Economic Contexts

The micro-regional approaches for presenting findings are difficult to achieve since we have three countries with different economic contexts that behave towards their own nationals living abroad differently, and have incorporated entrepreneurship into their diaspora agenda following diverse policy sensitivities. In reality, the three countries still struggle with their national economic problems, they are in a continued process of development, implementation, evaluation, and adjustment of their local entrepreneurship policies. Likewise, the national priorities regarding the entrepreneurship strategy represent an important factor of migrant's entrepreneurship policy. In other words, the countries can focus on the development of a strong national and be-national entrepreneurship policy, or opt for the openness and the attraction of the foreign entrepreneurship, in both cases migrants are included.

In Tunisia, because of the economic structure, the relatively more favourable investment climate, the open policy for cooperation with the European countries, and the active civil society, some initiatives have shown the interest for the development of migrants' entrepreneurship policy. Tunisia is strengthening its relations with the diaspora by creating special structures and going step by step to an entrepreneurship migration policy.

The natural resources returns, not only make migrants contribution neglected, but orientate all the policy priorities to the diversification of the economy. Despite the governmental will to develop entrepreneurship migration policies and the experiences of attracting its skilled migration, the authorities are focusing on the national entrepreneurship by providing funding, trainings, finance, and administrative facilitation. A national entrepreneurship policy that offers the same opportunities for nationals and be-nationals is the choice of policymakers in Algeria.

In Morocco, migrants are considered as an important economic asset from the very beginning. Their remittances, skills and entrepreneurship are now in the governmental agenda. In addition, the relatively favourable investment climate and the international cooperation have attracted important foreign investments, thus encouraging Morocco to engage the national and the migration entrepreneurship policy in the same time.

#### 23.6 Conclusion

The most important of these research findings is that we can build some knowledge through exploring three countries with initial similarities and differences. In spite of these contextual affinities, the way these three countries are related to their diaspora and how they incorporate the logic of considering the capacities of their expatriates as a resource for their own economic development into their agenda clearly differs. This knowledge takes the form of a hypothesis: the economic context is connected to the migration entrepreneurship policy approach.

The working argument is that in spite of similarities in the past and the present link with several European countries, the different migrant's entrepreneurship policies are due to the diverse economic systems: their dependence to remittances and the entrepreneurship business climate. These global economic factors could be the main contextual factors for the different entrepreneurship migrant's policies of the Maghreb countries.

Findings have revealed that, based on the different economic contexts, Tunisia has adopted a step-by-step entrepreneurship migration policy building, Algeria is focusing on a two in one entrepreneurship policy for nationals and be-nationals, and Morocco has chosen to trigger two parallel entrepreneurship policies for nationals and Migrants. The discussion of results has concluded that shaping the migrant's entrepreneurship policies in the three Maghreb countries is strongly related to the economic factors; the economic dependance to remittances trigger MEP and the entrepreneurship climate foster its development to TME policy.

#### References

Stark, O. (Ed.). (1991). The migration of labor. Wiley Blackwell.

Samir Djelti is Professor of Economics at Mustapha Stambouli University-Algeria and associate researcher at the Applied Centre of Development in Algiers (CREAD). He is also a member of EuroMedMig steering committee. He has hold a Master degree in Economics of Migration (causes and consequences) and a PhD in Migration and Development in Algeria. He has developed the osmosis theory of human migration. In addition, he has participated in more than forty national and international conferences and published about twenty papers in the field of Migration Studies. He has been a member in five migration research projects (Doctors' migration, migration and tourism, labour migration, and migration and public health). He has also acted as a migration expert for the United Nations University UNU-GCM, the International Organization of Migration IOM-Algiers, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development ICMPD, and Médecins du Monde MdM. His current fields of interest cover migration methodology, the osmosis theory, the colonial migration, migrants' trajectories and settlement, migration and cities, and migration and access to health services.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero Full Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Catalonia, Barcelona). His main lines of research deal with the relationship between democracy, governance, citizenship, and migrations. He conducts theoretical and empirical research in the Mediterranean area. He is the Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), and of the Master's Program in Migration Studies at UPF. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the largest research network on Immigration in Europe IMISCOE and Chair the External Affairs Committee. He coordinates EuroMedMig (Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration).

For more information about publications: https://www.upf.edu/web/ricard-zapata/

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# Chapter 24 Concluding Remarks: Applying Med-Thinking Proviso to Set a Research Agenda on Mediterranean Migrations

Ricard Zapata-Barrero

# 24.1 What Are the Main Research Frameworks that Link the Different Contributions?

Quickly reviewing images on "Mediterranean migrations" in Google Analytics (November 2022) and even going through Google Scholar Analytics, we can infer several premises. First, negative aspects by far dominate the public representation and research narrative over the positive ones, ruled by the same rhetoric most governments have constructed: crisis and instability, Mediterranean "dis-ordered" migration. This may invite us to reflect on the extent to which a research agenda, which is too often conflict-driven, may fuel mainstream policies and hegemonic reactive governance narratives. This concurrency between the political, the media and the social negative agenda is denounced in most contributions (directly in by Ayoub's contribution in the case of French's Euro-Mediterranean policies), and there is a general claim for a more encouraging or at least independent Mediterranean migrations agenda from scholars, highly contaminated by political decisions.

The second premise we can infer from the Google Scholar screen is that current Mediterranean migrations research is still too state-centric, dominated by national concerns on border control, national identities, social sustainability, regional geo-political considerations related to insecurity, and ideological binomial views in pros and cons. The leading argument here highlights that the dangers of a hypercrisis narrative can legitimise rapid, informal, and flexible policy instruments and legislative proposals that are often at odds with democratic principles and fundamental rights. The crisis narrative simply paints a scenario of exceptionalism in border regimes (as Ferrer/Gabrielli show in examining the evolution of Ceuta and

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)

GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), Department of Social and Political Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Melilla), that can justify acting beyond the usual social and political norms. It can also legitimise the lack of regular channels or in practice, for instance, hotspots system (detention centres without regulation), jungle practices and an overall absence of a humanitarian approach. In fact, we learn from the different contributions that migration cannot be the main object of crisis but rather part of broader crises within politics, morality, the project of modernity and the Enlightenment vision of humanity progress. For example, the geographical European deterritorialization of "problems", creating non-European emplacements in Turkey and Maghreb countries, is also a major trend visible in the first webpage of Google image search. This conveys a key message, particularly valuable for researchers: there is a lot to do to reverse this Google trend, with an algorithm dominated by politics and media.

The contributions in this co-edited book provide a range of insights that can help shape this alternative narrative in Google. Ultimately, what this volume shows is that any research on Mediterranean migrations necessarily becomes critical, (quasi) activist, because any researcher is engaged against the dominant narrative wall. As has been noted, there is a need for a "variable focal length" in the study of Mediterranean migrations (Zapata-Barrero & Faustini, 2019). The various contributions in this volume certainly help to take a step forward in framing an independent research agenda. But we should also recognise that these contributions are in part also Google-dependent since they confirm that the link between the Mediterranean and Migration invites us necessarily to address border regimes and the relation between border, human (im)mobility, and society/politics, about asymmetries of power and inequalities between different cardinal points. The Mediterranean as a geographical contact area between Global North, Global East and Global South is the clear scenario that still polarizes us. It is to speak about viewing critically how states are shaping the current history of restrictions and lockdowns of (im)mobility and how this creates a "disquieting account" in Chambers' terms (2008, 3). With new and constructed spaces of legality, the current Mediterranean scenario is more a geopolitical space for a chess game than a human and (inter)cultural area of mutual understanding.

However, even if there is awareness that the Mediterranean is a space of diversities (intentially in plural), there is still no recognition that diversity can be a resource for transforming the current trans-Mediterranean relations. The different contributions of this volume take a critically distant position from this methodological nationalism that can be found on Google and embrace multi-scale thinking. This is an epistemological claim that knowledge production must be detached from the current domination of states and all their alliances. We also need to incorporate into the agenda more perspectives and visions from other scales (territorial and actors involved in migration dynamics and governance, Southern and Eastern visions of the Mediterranean, the view for departure rather than arrivals, etc). In the words of Musette/Maarmar, there are still too many black boxes that deserve to be explored and that call for data production, which is technically possible only in combination with political will. This "multiple voices framework" should address the epistemology of ignorance that shapes the migration agenda and should also demand that any research finding needs to be strongly connected with the history of migrations and the colonial past. Decolonising current migration governance in the Mediterranean may be the most appropriate approach. This means incorporating what Foucault (1991) refers to as a "polyhedron of intelligibility", and we can also add "heterochrony" and "heterotopia", other Foucauldian notions. The first refers to the idea that there is always a variety of rationalities behind an event or a process that is being scrutinised. This involves the need to consider a mixture of causal factors. In Foucault's own words, it is about understanding and considering the wider influences which contribute to what may appear at first glance to be 'normal' (Foucault, 1991; 77). This describes the need to examine the subject of inquiry in a multi-directional manner rather than solely from "one direction" (Khan, 2016; 67). This also invites Mediterranean migrations researchers to combine in an interdependent way the different levels of analysis, such as micro, meso and macro levels.

On the other hand, heterochrony is a way to indicate that an event is the result of evolution and it is part of an accumulation of different historical layers. To frame a Mediterranean migrations agenda, we need to zoom out historically, because the premise is always that there are many historical narratives behind a given reality. Finally, heterotopia is a notion that seeks to find room to break the usual binomial utopia/dystopia and designates the fact there are spaces that are simply different, literally "in other spaces". Taking the Foucauldian power relation focus, this means looking at alternative spaces, separate from the mainstream. It describes certain cultural, institutional and discursive spaces that are somehow 'other': disturbing, intense, incompatible, contradictory or transforming; a world off-center with respect to normal or everyday spaces, one that possesses multiple, fragmented, or even incompatible meanings (Dehaene & De Cauter, 2008).

"Polyhedron of intelligibility", heterochrony, and heterotopy, are then notions that can help us underline two main final arguments that frame the different contributions of this co-edited book. First, any Mediterranean migrationsrelated topic is always multi-faceted and we need to have a holistic view, as the historical dimension and accumulation of historical moments are key for its understanding. In Braudel philosophy of history's terms, what we can learn from the different contributions is the need to place any topic within a longue durée history rather than within a short-term and event-driven (événementiel) understanding that governs most of today's dominant vision. What we always see as a research pattern connecting all the contributions, and probably closely related to the previous dimension, is the importance of multi-scale approaches in conducting Mediterranean migrations research, which includes looking at "other spaces" instead of the mainstream spaces of research. This means that this volume manages to contribute to knowledge production from the local and regional perspective, reflecting South/ North/East and West geographical perspectives, from receiving and departure countries, and even social actors' views, and incorporating new spaces of exploration. Epistemologically speaking, all these different visions and positions produce different types of knowledge, because they contextualise different kinds of information related to the same topic.

This first reading invites us to a second and final argument: to take seriously the "multi-scale approach" in the study of migrations in the Mediterranean. This is the outcome of putting at work reflexivity in conducting research, and being aware that we should receive different answers to seminal questions such as what is happening, what are the current main patterns, how to understand drivers and mechanisms of Mediterranean migrations, how can we place a determinate topic or event within a longer temporal and spatial continuum, how can we draw future scenario of human (im)mobility in the Mediterranean. Given the negative narrative context, these chapters also offer some paths for optimism, for thinking Mediterranean migrations in positive terms. The different conclusions strive to provide some orientations on how processes of changes should be conducted, and strengthen the view that the Mediterranean needs to be considered as a regional area of co-production of knowledge.

These different contributions display then particular epistemological manifestations of Med-thinking (Zapata-Barrero, 2022), which include both taking seriously multiple-perspective and rejecting Euro-centrism, Western-centrism, and decolonising existing prejudgments around migration in the Mediterranean. The different chapters also invite us to frame migration research with a particular methodological regional lens. Applying this Med-thinking lens to guide the conclusions of this collective book involves then putting into practice at least four main pillars that interact: epistemic solipsism, holism, homeostatic and positive thinking on migration.

A good example of solipsism is the credo that "there is no civilization outside of White-Christian European tradition". Epistemic solipsism shows us how knowledge production is related to (national) self-interest and legitimates fixing binary categorisations and monolithic constructs of the Mediterranean, which we need to problematise. Holism pictures an organic system view of the Mediterranean and establishes that we cannot understand the whole by knowing the components in isolation from each other. This involves that the knowledge we may produce also needs to be framed within a given relational space, and that migrations-related topics cannot be analysed out of a contextual reference framework. Taking again Foucault's (2008) reflections on space, holistic thinking considers space as "emplacements" rather than "localizations". Emplacements are sites that can only be thought of if they are in relation to other sites. Emplacements are context-based locations. Applied to Mediterranean migrations concerns, this also involves including as many aspects as we can from the given topic, ethical, political, economic, legal, sociological, psychological, anthropological, etc. Holistic thinking requires both interdisciplinarity and intersectionality and most of the contributions of this co-edited volume meet this Med-Thinking proviso. As a third pillar, the concept of homeostasis is a way to leave aside presentism and event-based concerns and place migration issues within a long durée continuum. There is a widespread tendency in migration studies to focus research on social, political, economic, cultural changes, leaving aside and even disparaging what remains after a process of transformations. This is probably because most background research assumes that migration and the diversity that follows is one of the key drivers of change today. Within this mental framework, most of these contributions enrich what Med-Thinking claims to be a Copernic turn in Mediterranean migrations research (Zapata-Barrero, 2022; 6), inviting the researcher to focus on continuities over changes. In Weberian terms, to have more of a historical than sociological approach in conducting research. Of course, most of these contributions reject the trend of researching Mediterranean migrations in good or bad, in pros and cons terms. The different chapters invite us to carefully avoid falling within a dialectical approach that links directly research with ideologies. The research frameworks in Mediterranean migrations studies are much more complex and related to different forms of articulating the consequences and impact of migrations. It is not the same to assess migration in positive terms from the country of reception than from the vantage point of the departure country; it is not the same to build a research design from the position of the migrant than from a particular state's interests. Finally, most contributions display what we may call "hybrid research", in the sense that they necessarily combine descriptive and explanatory arguments with normative claims, at different grades and intensity. In other words, it is very difficult to disentangle the "is" from the "ought to be" in Mediterranean migrations research.

# 24.2 What Are the Main Lines of Research That Intersect in the Different Contributions?

Adopting a qualitative conceptual strategy allows us to identify the main keywords in this volume that make up the research map of Mediterranean migrations. These chapters also show how concepts shape representations and perspectives, and how we classify them as a tool of analysis into political (power relations), social (inequalities), cultural and ideological strands. Considering the above preliminary frameworks and focusing on the rationale of each chapter, we can deduce at least seven main avenues for future research on migrations in the Mediterranean. These avenues are not ranked and we will start with the most general and then narrow the focus.

1. Need to review traditional theories and explore new ones, according to new trends and practices, considering Med-thinking lens: What becomes clear is that most theories that shed light on Mediterranean migrations patterns have been constructed without Med-Thinking provisos, always from the point of view of countries of reception, in terms of gains/benefits, political solipsism and Eurocentrism. Many chapters address the tension there is between traditional theories and new migration dynamics in Mediterranean migrations that challenge the functioning of traditional theories. For instance, Awad's contribution discusses how the EU and Egypt share a neoclassical conceptual understanding of Egyptian migration, grafted by the network theory, in its criminal shape. Since the 1970s, Egypt sought to promote labour migration so as to release pressures on its labour market and to bring it valued remittances. However, in order to help meet the EU's aim of stopping migration, it has now given up promoting its labour migration to Europe in return for development cooperation. Awad claims that the EU-Egypt agreed conceptual framework and derived policies achieved their objectives, on the surface, but in reality failed to meet the two parties' real concerns. Awad then argues that the EU-Egypt conceptual framework should go beyond the neoclassical theory and the arguments advanced by approaches such as the dual labour market and world systems theories, and devise corresponding policies and actions. Djelti and Zapata-Barrero's contribution explicitly discusses the traditional migration and development debate incorporating new recent discussions coming from business and migration studies connecting migration, transnationalism, and entrepreneurship. They suggest incorporating migrant's capacities and social/cultural capital to the mutual benefits of countries or the development of their countries of origin. This need to review the dominant and traditional migration-development nexus incorporating different angles of exploration is also claimed by Rodriguez-Peña's contribution, stating that its focus is often shortsighted or primarily on developing countries. This is also the main path articulated by Içduygu/Altiok's contribution. In analysing the irregular migration in Eastern Mediterranean, in particular the case of Afghans and Syrians, they argue that linking the concept of weak statehood with the root causes of migration helps us to better understand the dynamics and mechanism of mixed flows, mainly including irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. This may also explain also new questions such as why and how people move through particular routes over time, trying to understand the particular geography of the Eastern Mediterranean. The need to theorize "black box" situations enhancing evidence-based research deficits and avoiding blind-shooting policies is also addressed by Musette/Maamar's exploration of irregular migrations from North Africa to Europe. They even propose a global view (directly related to a holistic view in Med-Thinking terms) considering all the actors and new data methods to measure the process of irregular maritime migration into several steps, from having a global stock of irregular migrants to how to measure statistics of the sea routes from the countries of departure rather than arrival and even to how to have information of missing migrants (disappeared or drowned). Again, from the perspective of the countries of departure and from the point of view of new emigration policy configurations, Bousetta et al. also identify new migratory dynamics that request a revision of diaspora theories informing policies in Morocco.

2. Need to follow a Mediterranean reading of Methodological nationalism's critical approach and adopt a multi-scale approach: Most contributions take a critical path toward states as the only legitimate actors of knowledge production. This epistemological positionalism takes different forms of expression. From the already mentioned Musette/Maamar's claim for exploring different evidences that are missed by states' dominance of data to Aubarell Solduga's contribution overviewing the Local and Regional Networks and their effects in the Euromed cooperation. These current research trends challenge the limits of the multilevel governance and the absence of Southern Mediterranean engagement. Fakhoury/ Aitken's Lebanese case study also addresses these issues wondering how notions of national identity and otherness materialise, interlace, and collide in the Mediterranean. They exemplify Lebanon's political regime as a system that contributes to building the figure of the refugee as a disrupter to Lebanon's national identity. Finally, even if it is not the central focus, Boubakri's contributions deal with the issue of how the fact that Southern countries are becoming countries of migration may affect hierachical political structures and division of competencies, contributing to a much more decentralised political regime such as Tunisia.

Demirbas/Miliou-Theocharaki's case study analysing the EU-Turkey Deal. Their contribution highlights how political solipsism is not only a narrative-building denunciation but have also practical consequences. This is not only a matter of tightening border regimes and new laws of deterrence, but how Eurocentrism perpetuates precarity when it grounds externalisation and selection of migrants. Within this same research avenue, we can place Panebianco/Cannata's contribution on (im)mobility partnerships. The democratic argument here continues to play a vital role but under a different complementary angle. They highlight how European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP), focusing on the case of Mobility Partnerships (MPs) in the Southern neighbourhood, are in fact trade-offs between cooperation with authoritarian governments to ensure stability and democracy promotion. This can be better framed, they argue, under a stability-democracy dilemma, contending that the EU is unable to promote democracy in the Southern neighbourhood via 'more mobility'.

focuses on how this particular profile of migrant constructs their lives incorporating the will to migrate as a socialization process. This migration culture is reproduced by institutional agents in Morocco and then a certain link exists between mobility culture, structural reproduction and youths' agency. Following a similar rationale, Paynter's contribution to gendered asylum in the Black Mediterranean also illustrates the need to work on particular profiles. In this case, intersectionality also plays a relevant role in fixing her focus: sex trafficking is the outcome of border-gendered and racialised policies.

7. The need to re-interpret the Mediterranean in light of migrations: Most contributions invite us to explore new ways of interpreting the Mediterranean as a space of interconnection through human mobilities. Geha, for instance, argues that the diaspora frames the Mediterranean as a symbolic and activist space of relations. This new space of interpretation also frames the contribution of Fakhoury/Aitken, who suggests handling the Mediterranean through alternative spaces of hospitality incorporating the activity of civic and humanitarian actors, refuting the conception of a closed, excluding citizenship and linked to sectarianism. The Mediterranean as a heterotopic space where exclusion and inclusion co-constitute each other is also addressed. This new way of interpreting the Mediterranean space drives also Buhr/Desille/Fonseca's contribution. In this case, the focus points towards trans-Mediterranean digital space of communication, where time and space become unidimensional realities. These contributors state that ICTs have proved crucial for the maintenance of long-distance familial arrangements, for the mobilization of migrants' social networks, and for managing remittances, but also for shaping migration decisions and the choice of destinations. Migrants' digital practices and the ways they portray the places they use - by posting, commenting, sharing, and leaving online reviews – add up to an ICT-supported imaginary of the city fed by residents, migrants, and other visitors alike.

A scientific disclaimer terminates these conclusions. The fragmentation of knowledge, without its accumulation, hinders the construction of theory and the scientific development of any study. In fact, this volume has attempted to take a step forward in the improvement of research on Mediterranean migrations by bringing together in a single book the new trends in the research agenda on Mediterranean migrations. Of course, they are not exhaustive, but merely indicative, and much remains to be done to develop Med-Thinking in migration studies.

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Ricard Zapata-Barrero Full Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Catalonia, Barcelona). His main lines of research deal with the relationship between democracy, governance, citizenship, and migrations. He conducts theoretical and empirical research in the Mediterranean area. He is the Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), and of the Master's Program in Migration Studies at UPF. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the largest research network on Immigration in Europe IMISCOE and Chair the External Affairs Committee. He coordinates EuroMedMig (Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration).

For more information about publications: https://www.upf.edu/web/ricard-zapata/

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