All in all, it would be fair to say that while Western colonialism had a profound impact on Sub-Saharan Africa, it is too far-fetched to hold it principally accountable for the region's current state of development. Te colonial period, the post-colonial era and the period of more than half a century since independence should not be bunched together as one. Some might like to think in terms of historical determinism, but the reality is that the colonial legacy is only one of many factors that have had consequences. Exaggeration of the infuence of past history carries with it the danger of vastly underestimating the voluntarism, spontaneity, subjectivity and will of the population. In this regard, 'constructivism' is deemed an instrumental tool to be used alongside conventional method of study.8

Proponents of neo-colonialism argue that Europe's colonization of Africa continues even after independence and, similarly, a group of leftist ideologists and scholars infuenced by Marxian class theory have forwarded such theories as dependency theory and world-systems theory explaining the systematic exploitation and manipulation of the Western powers in Africa and other developing countries through international trade and economic systems.9 But with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and socialist regimes alongside the rise and success of Asian economies, these theories lost their appeal, persuasiveness and relevance. In the post-Cold War era, the topics that draw international attention are globalization, climate change, terrorism, humanitarian crises and so forth, and these pose important challenges to both the developed world and developing countries alike.

Crawford Young sums it up well: 'the explanatory power of colonial legacy, initially compelling, becomes less central as time goes by. Te half century of postcolonial existence now matches the historic duration of efective colonial rule'. In other words, the number of Africans having a personal recollection of 'being colonized' is dwindling.10

### **Ethnicity and Neopatrimonialism**

Much has been made of ethnicity and neo-patrimonialism when it comes to the problem of Africa's development, and they are interesting themes. Generally, the discourse on Africa's ethnicity and neo-patrimonialism tends to treat these negatively, suggesting that they are inimical to Africa's development. 'Colonial legacy' is more or less an 'imagined' factor, but ethnicism and neo-patrimonialism certainly can have more relevance to real life, in that they are social elements. Certainly, ethnicism can play out to undermine social cohesiveness. For its part, neo-patrimonialism, which is generally understood as the practice of leaders and state ofcials parasitically using their state ofces and resources for the furtherance of informal patron–client relationships in which they are engaged, can also be problematic.

It is true that the prominence of ethnicity is markedly high in Sub-Saharan African compared to the rest of the world. For the entire Sub-Saharan African region, the probability that two randomly picked individuals belong to diferent ethnic groups is 66%, compared to 36% for the whole world.11 However, it should be noted that there are wide variations in ethnic heterogeneity among the Sub-Saharan African countries.

Another salient feature that is observable in the region is the tendency to espouse what seem to be incompatible or contradictory aspects of their perception, to the point that it is mystifying. For example, people basically identify themselves primarily in terms of their ethnicity, but they also show in no ambiguous terms a sense of national identity. Experts of Africa's ethnicity point out that subnational citizenship and national citizenship coexist in Africa. It is pointed out that: 'Te simultaneous display of subnational and national identity is one of the most puzzling dimensions of identity politics in Africa.'12

In general, people's attachment to their nation seems to fall short of what we call patriotism; rather, it appears to be more associated with opportunism. Perhaps it can also be understood in terms of 'realism', 'openness', 'fexibility' or 'pragmatism'. In other regions, the term 'sense of nation' may mean being patriotic in terms of sacrifcing oneself and serving one's country. But the situation seems quite diferent in Africa. When I was attending a seminar on history in Kampala, we had a chance to discuss Ugandans' perception of their national identity and sense of nation. A Ugandan participant expressed that 'since we already belong to this country, we might as well get along'. His lukewarm response towards nationhood did not sound out of the ordinary under the circumstances. After more than 50 years since Uganda became independent, I thought that at least the Ugandan intellectuals would have a stronger sense of nation. One panellist, a scholar, even said that life in Uganda was better before independence.

As many have pointed out, the duplicity of people's adherence to different identities is common in Sub-Saharan African nations. Moreover, the characteristic of ethnicity is that it is malleable rather than immutable and exclusionary, as diferent ethnic groups coexist and live peacefully with one another most of the time. A high degree of ethnicity can even have a mitigating efect on the potential division at the national level. Te openness and accommodative attitude of Africans with respect to other ethnic groupings and diferent identities are evident.13 Ethnic clashes mostly surface in relation to issues concerning land rights and government policies or interventions (or the lack thereof). Ethnic tensions or confict are also exacerbated when leaders try to use ethnicity for their own political purposes. In the case of 'kingdoms', the issue can relate to local autonomy and authority vis-à-vis the state.

Te pursuit of self-interest and opportunism seems to be the prevalent motivation for society. One might be perplexed to see many Africans 'display both ethnic polarization and nationalistic fervour'.14 Tim Kellstall points out how the tendency of Africans to have multiple identities has led to a 'fragmentation of the self', and in their quest for survival, people develop links to potential patrons in a bid to garner as many favours as possible: 'Te ways in which people make a living in Africa encourages them into plural identities, which prevents them from organizing collectively over time, thereby foreclosing certain types of social movement and power.'15 It may be even called a 'multiple personality'.

Edmond Keller notes that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 'one's social identity is fuid, intermittent, and experimental' and that two forms of citizenship exist in the minds of people in their daily lives: 'a form of communitarian citizenship and a form based on residence in a national community largely created as a by-product of colonialism'.16 Keller observes that among the most common causes of inter-group confict in Africa today are disputes over identity and citizenship, exacerbated or prompted by bad politics. And they are inherently linked to land rights and immigration issues, as was the case in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Rwanda and Kenya.17 'Ethnic groups are not closed corporate communities, bouncing of each other like billiard balls; rather, they are permeable at the margins and are entangled with 'the other' in numerous ways. Crawford Young observes that ethnic consciousness can vary widely in its intensity, depending on the depth of cultural resources on which it draws and its degree of mobilization'.18

Is Africa's ethnicity the cause or consequence of what is taking place in Africa? Does it negatively impact nation-building or is it like many other factors, being essentially *neutral*, depending on how it is employed? I think what we need to be careful of in this discourse is the possibility of having a 'Eurocentric bias'. From the perspective of Western countries, a sense of national citizenship, civic society, good institutions and governance, and a free-market economy are considered to be factors that are conducive for development. But from the standpoint of developing countries, many feel that these are the features of the end results, not the causes, of development. How can we reconcile such diferences?

Te identity and ethnicism of Africans seem to be a refection of how Africans are adapting to reality. Te ethnic community, considered as an expansion of one's family and relatives, constitutes a basic foundation or system of people's life. But confronted with the reality of deepening 'dualism' in every aspect of life—the economic, social and political gap or discrepancy between rural and urban areas—people have come to realize the limits of what their ethnic communities can provide to them, in contrast to the opportunities and benefts that can be sought from the state or foreign partners. For Sub-Saharan Africans, diferences in terms of religion and political views do not seem to matter and they are rarely made into an issue, except in some isolated cases. For ordinary people, their fundamental concern has been subsistence or survival, while the privileged class has sought the maintenance of the status quo or the protection of their vested interests.

Ethnicism should not be viewed as the primary motivator for people's actions; there are many other elements that account for social dynamism. When problems seemingly taking on an ethnical dimension arise, it is usually the outcome of a combination of various factors at play and is not solely due to ethnicism.

A landmark paper on ethnicity published by the Harvard Institute of Economic Research in 2002 revealed that the Sub-Saharan African nations were the most ethnically diverse in the world.19 Since many Sub-Saharan African countries are seen as fragile, confict-ridden and poor, there may be a natural inclination to presume that ethnic diversity leads to more conficts and hinders economic development and democracy. Tere have also been quite a number of studies purporting to back such a view, but it is also true that there are many diferent ways to conduct research and interpret the data.

On the question of whether there is a correlation between ethnical diversity and development, including stability and governance, the more prudent and objective studies seem to suggest that it is inconclusive or conditional at best. Ethnicity is just one factor among many that have an impact. If we think of ethnicity in terms of the 'fragmentation' of a nation, it is all relative. Ethnicity depends on how we defne it conceptually and technically. Te 'diversity' and 'fragmentation' of a nation is common all over the world. Even if a nation is racially homogeneous, there are sub-regional or socio-cultural divides in most countries. Even in developed countries, cases of regional animosity, stereotyping or even discrimination are not uncommon.

Korea is acknowledged as probably the most homogeneous nation on earth. But ethnical homogeneity does not make democracy or development any easier to come by. Despite being the same homogeneous nation, the two Koreas could not be more diferent from each other in so many aspects. As the example of North Korea shows, political ideology and the type of regime in place can eclipse all other factors.

Tere are many examples all over the world where ethnical homogeneity does not guarantee development. In Africa, Somalia exhibits unusual national homogeneity, with the same languages, religion and race,20 but unfortunately it sufers from extreme internal confict, destabilization and divisions due to clan warfare and rivalry. On the other hand, Uganda, which is considered one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, has enjoyed relatively positive political stability, security, economic growth and business prospects for a Sub-Saharan country. And political and social tensions within homogeneous societies cannot be always less than those of heterogeneous societies.

Rather, I think that conficts and other problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are not caused by ethnic diversity or 'fractionalization' per se, but fundamentally by the 'concentration' of power that inordinately favours one particular group over others. Paul Collier also notes that except for a few specifc cases, ethnic diversity neither increases the likelihood of civil war nor obstructs economic growth: 'multi-ethnic societies can usually be socially and economically fully viable'.21

Surprisingly, many African intellectuals that I have met have stressed that in Africa, ethnicism is not the fundamental cause of troubles; instead, it is being used as a rationalization or means to enhance one's leverage whenever political leaders are faced with problems. Te confict in South Sudan that started in December 2013 is a telling example of this. What started as a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and the former Vice President Riek Machar developed into a broader confict of seemingly 'ethnic' proportions. But as the confict continued, it became increasingly evident that its nature was more of a personal power struggle rather than a civil war between diferent ethical groups.

Along with ethnicism, neo-patrimonialism is another distinctive feature of Sub-Saharan Africa. Neo-patrimonialism is a term that is mostly used to characterize the state of Africa and can be defned as 'a system whereby rulers use state resources for personal beneft and to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population'.22 A more elaborate defnition of this term is given by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle: in a neo-patrimonial state, 'relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system, and ofcials occupy their positions less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status'.23

Tere are scholars of primordialism who believe that ethnicity is a deep-rooted, non-negotiable element defning one's identity in Africa. According to primordialism, Africa's ethnic diversity is seen to be a cause of confict and the reason for the poor functioning of its states.24 Because there is widespread corruption and continual economicbusiness failures and poverty in black Africa, it is easy for Afropessimists to blame the region's 'cronyist-neopatrimonial' tendencies for such problems. As a result, 'stressing the cultural or neopatrimonial dimension of African business (and states) promotes a determinism about African business whereby it is ineluctably corrupt: the very nature of patron-client ties in Sub-Saharan Africa would appear to render the expansion of legitimate commerce extraordinarily difcult, if not impossible'.25

A typical social culture in many countries in the region is that ordinary people do not distinguish their immediate family members from their relatives (even distant relatives) when it comes to referring them as 'brothers', 'sisters', 'mothers' and 'fathers'. Te tradition of 'extended family' persists, and those individuals who have acquired the means or power are expected to help out the other members of the extended family who are in need. Critics would see such cultural elements as making Africa's neo-patrimonial practices even more detrimental to development.

But just like ethnicism, being fxated on neo-patrimonialism without taking into account the wider picture of interacting elements poses the danger of exaggerating or misrepresenting its signifcance. Based on his case studies on Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, and Rwanda, Tim Kelsall argues that neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends, provided that mechanisms can be found to centralize economic rents and manage them in the long term.26 Neo-patrimonialism embodies aspects that breed corruption and are not consistent with the practices of developed nations, but it cannot be singled out as a determinant for underdevelopment. Similar traits existed in Asia, Latin America and even Europe. Botswana is a model country for democracy and governance in Africa, despite its patrimonial politics.27 Rather, it should be viewed more as a sign or outcome of a failure on the part of African countries to meet the challenges and properly adapt to the new environment brought about by their independence.

Teoretically, we can trace the concept of patrimonialism back to Max Weber's famous three types of legitimate authority or rule: traditional, charismatic and rational-legalistic authority. Weber defned patrimonialism as a component of traditional authority, a system in which personal relations dominate in the political and administrative power relations between the ruler and the ruled. Many Africanists observed that traditional patrimonialism has endured into contemporary African regimes in the post-colonial era. Alongside African leaders' essentially patrimonial behaviour coexist formal institutions, laws and bureaucracies, making the task of comprehending Africa ever more complicated. Hence, the notion of neo-patrimonialism was developed to cope with the two dimensions of African states: essentially patrimonial rule coexisting with legal-rational authority.28

Neo-patrimonialism is a testament to the lack of or weakness of an authoritative mechanism for the impersonal and rational allocation of state resources, and hence to the disappointing state of nation-building. Te crux of the matter is that leaders in general have used the modern state apparatus to serve their personal and immediate interests instead of being 'bound' by it to advance the public interest. Hence, the opposite of modernization or nation-building has been taking place: the state institutions have been adapted to the existing socio-cultural practices instead of institutions bringing about changes and progress in society by making the people conform and adapt to them.

Goran Hyden, Julius Court and Kenneth Mease identifed three dimensions of governance from the development context: economic, political and administrative.29 In order for a nation to properly follow the path of development, a clear separation between the public domain and the private domain must be observed. Equally, economic, political and administrative governance should be pursued 'independently', without their boundaries becoming blurred by personal interests and short-term political considerations. Tis would require a strong commitment and moral authority from the top. But what is probably more important is the 'empowerment of people' not only as an efective check against the abuse of power and mismanagement by the authorities and the privileged, but also to *make things work* in terms of the everyday business of the nation.

Tere may be various reasons why neo-patrimonialism is so prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, but I think the big issue here is the absence of a critical turning point or occasion to 'break away' from the past and 'shift' the mindset of the people so that it fts into the developmental mode. Western countries underwent political struggles and upheavals, and many Asian countries experienced national movements or political uprisings, both during and after colonization. Te political consciousness of the people, the sense of socio-political rights expressed in actions, movements and campaigns that constitute the bedrock of nation-building and development were feeble in Sub-Saharan Africa. To this day, African leaders and elites are largely unable (whether willingly or unwillingly) to change the unwholesome syndromes typical of Africa, a subject I will address in more detail later in this book.

### **Institutions, Governance and Democracy**

Debates on Africa's institutional problems can be taxing to both the proponents and critics of Western institutions. It boils down to the question of what makes institutions work and who is responsible for the weakness or failure of Africa's institutions. Tere is no question that democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance are universal values and principles to which virtually every nation would aspire. Te challenge for developing countries is how these goals can be realistically and substantively attained. Tis is a fundamental task that calls for open-mindedness on the part of all stakeholders.

Is adopting Western-style modern state institutions, good governance and democracy the surest way for Africa to realize development? In other words, are weak institutions, bad governance, and undemocratic and authoritarian rule chiefy responsible for Africa's shortcomings? Te mainstream donor community would think that it is a matter of course. However, this seems to be misperception or oversimplifcation of such a premise, which needs to be viewed in a more objective light.

Much has been made about institutions, but 'institution' itself is a vague term. Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as a prototype case of the mismatch between 'having' and 'doing'. Tis mismatch shows no sign of dissipating and the institutional problem is a good example of this reality in the region. Having good institutions is one thing and making them serve their purpose is another. What makes institutions work are the actions of people who uphold them.

In essence, good institutions and governance, the rule of law, freedom of speech, human rights and democracy are essentially ultimate goals or the end state of development rather than the means to achieving development. Tese are the features that emerge from successful development through the process of 'embodiment', which in itself requires arduous endeavours. Tey are not what can be simply 'introduced' and 'adopted' upon wish. Te same applies to economics. Many seem to be unaware or have forgotten that economic growth and income generation cannot come about by transfers of wealth, but by the creation of wealth or the production of goods and services. Teir preoccupation is mostly with the distribution of wealth rather than the creation of wealth.

Another important aspect that may be overlooked is that democracy, the rule of law and good governance are in reality 'modes' rather than 'substance'. In Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy is viewed too much in terms of 'freedom', while the sense of 'responsibility' and citizenship, which is just as important as freedom, is woefully neglected. In a mature democracy, freedom does not mean unfettered liberty that does harm to others, but that is responsible. Freedom of speech and individuals' rights alone cannot guarantee progress, and the obsession to 'duplicate' Western-style institutions and norms only superfcially could hinder Africa's path to genuine democracy.

Developed nations and the established international community regard politics and development premised on the notion of 'rationality'. Because in the West 'rational' thinking prevails in life, Westerners may take it for granted that others will think in the same terms. Tis applies in relation to universal values and norms, business and the market economy, development, science and technology, global challenges, etc. However, as people will soon discover, the reality of Africa seems to be quite removed from such expectations.

Te Sub-Saharan African countries have maintained the state system that is the continuation of the former colonial establishments. Te introduction of the European rational-legal state has led to a Westernization of the political order in Africa and around the world. But Bertrand Badie states that a crucial consequence of this is the failure in terms of 'loss of meaning' in the relationship between rulers and the ruled which 'discourages the individual in his efort to adapt to an institutional life of no concern to him'.30

Not only have Western political institutions and values failed to take frm root in most African countries, but the manner in which they have been pursued or applied is also seen to have inhibited the growth of the very fabric that makes them work. After independence, Sub-Saharan African political leaders 'adapted' to the reality in the way they saw convenient, resulting in the formation of 'hybrid (or mixed) regimes' which are neither true liberal democracies nor the kind of outright dictatorial regimes.31

Basil Davidson suggested that the Western colonization of Africa actually held Africa back from forming nation states in its own way: it is the imposition of the European nation state rather than an intrinsic African characteristic that is at the root of the most of Africa's political problems, and colonialism promoted the rise of alienated African elites largely trained in Europe and oblivious to their historical foundations of political legitimacy.32 According to Davidson, what Africa's leaders inherited was 'a crisis of social disintegration' from which sprang the current problems of Africa: while it was commonly assumed that Africa had no indigenous models for ruling nation states, it was in fact well into the process of evolving its own models for the nation state. Te Asante kingdom of modern-day Ghana, for example, was 'manifestly a national state on its way to becoming a nation-state with every attribute ascribed to a Western European nation-state' and even after Africa's independence, the adherence to African tradition was still derided as 'tribalism' and viewed as an obstacle to development.33

So what we see today in Sub-Saharan Africa is the perennial gap between what is in spirit and what is actually being practised. African countries all have modern executive, legislative and judicial branches modelled after the Western political system and over many decades, their leaders and political elites were orientated in this modern model of statehood. Every nation should follow good governance, the rule of law, accountability and democracy—the standards that are now taken for granted as global norms. But these values or standards have been achieved over centuries of historical progress in the West through many internal and regional conficts and social, political, economic turmoil and evolutions. And it was only in the twentieth century that these Western ideas and norms gained the status of being 'universal values'.

Tere is no denying that Africa's fate and development rests squarely with Africans, not the Western world or the international development community. How deep an impact the colonial legacies have had on Africa is matter of debate, but what is not debated is who are the owners and subjects of development. No matter how convenient and tempting it may be to place the blame on 'outsiders', these 'outsiders' only play a secondary role at best, and the unshakable truth is that the protagonists of Africa's development are none other than Africans themselves. And Africa's development is inexorably tied to nation-building, which is a process that is still very much in the making. But nation-building is not about just 'adopting' or 'adapting'—it should be about carrying out the arduous tasks of making and undergoing change. If African countries have not been able to do this up to this point, after half a century of independence, who should they blame for this other than themselves?

In the meantime, the political dynamics in Africa are seen to follow their own unpredictable course. As stated by Dani Rodrik, according to Freedom House's count, more than 60% of all the countries in the world are electoral democracies, meaning that their regimes have emerged through competitive multi-party elections. But the majority of these 'democracies' are in fact 'illiberal democracies' that brought about the rise of popular autocrats with little regard for the rule of law and civil liberties. Rodrik reminds us that liberal democracy rests on distinct sets of rights—property rights, political rights and civil rights—and that democratic bargaining can work only when the masses are able to organize and mobilize around common interests. And, historically, such mobilizations have been the product of industrialization and urbanization, wars or anti-colonial struggles. But in the developing world, these bargains, by their very nature, produce electoral democracies rather than liberal democracies, so that in practice, the emergence of liberal democracy is rarely seen today.34

Te 'irregularity' of political developments is common in Africa. For example, in Burundi in May 2015, people took to the streets to protest against the removal of term limits for the President, and a military coup was attempted against President Pierre Nkurunziza, who wanted to remain in power. On the other hand, in Rwanda, with two years left before the next elections, people were petitioning Parliament to amend the Constitution, which limits presidents to two terms, in order to allow President Kagame to stand for President again. Even the second-largest political party, the largest opposition party, has backed the removal of term limits for elected political leaders.35

David Booth and Diana Gammack's observation is a telling reminder of the reality in Africa: the reason why the 'development business' most often fails in Africa is because much of the efort of the development community is predicated on false assumptions about how progress takes place in human societies. For the last two decades, development eforts have been based on the thinking that good governance provides a universally valid prescription for economic transformation and social advance, but this 'ahistorical view takes insufcient notice of the fact that Western states did not become economic powerhouses (from the 1750s onwards) … by adopting good governance institutions. Fullblown capitalism creates the social structures and organisational capabilities that lead to democratic governance, not the other way around'.36

Brian Levy also makes a case that over the long term, good governance may indeed be a fnal destination where developing countries can see their governance systems converge. However, he argues that 'the ability to describe the characteristics of efective states does not conjure them into existence out of thin air. Best-practices approaches assume that all policies and institutions are potentially movable and can be aligned to ft some pre-specifed blueprint. But they cannot. Te central question has less to do with the end point than with the journey of getting from here to there'.37

Tose who have lived in Africa long enough will agree that one of the syndromes plaguing Africa today is that people by and large are good at expressing their views, but there is very little corresponding action or responsibility taken to make good on the words spoken. Liberal democracy, the rule of law and good governance will bear fruit when they become the way of life and are embodied in the leaders and the people alike. We should not forget that liberal democracy was not bestowed by the rulers, but was earned by the people who struggled for it. Democracy is something that cannot be 'provided for', but which has to be 'won'. What seems to have been forgotten during the course of liberalization and globalization is that democracy cannot be realized by 'free expressions' alone, but requires concrete deeds and toil.

Te problem in Africa is that the mismatch between 'lofty expectations' and continued 'disingenuousness' on the ground persists in a kind of vicious cycle, only to breed disappointments and ill feeling without actually getting things done. Tis has produced the problem where African elites, whether in government or the private sector, talk the talk but do not walk the walk. Often, their motive is to present a good face to donors and receive aid or benefts, whilst knowing they will fall short in their obligations. Despite the challenging environment, eforts to attain sound institutions and governance should not be stopped. Recent studies have shown that the vast majority of people surveyed in Sub-Saharan African countries thought that democracy was preferable to any other kind of government. Obviously, it would be in the best interests of the African countries if they can espouse and 'internalize' these values as much and as early as possible.

Critics may fnd fault with the way in which the Global North is trying to 'impose' its values, but the Global North will be criticized even more if it was not seen to be steadfastly upholding the universal values. Isn't the European Union referred to as the 'normative power'? But an important thing for Western countries to realize is that it is not enough to only 'assert' these values; equal weight should be given to addressing how to reach the goals, while taking into account the local conditions, indigenous elements and socio-cultural characteristics of African nations.

While most African countries inherited democratic constitutions in the decolonization process, few maintained them. Botswana and Mauritius are just about the only countries that were born democratic and have remained so over the years, although in the case of Botswana, the same political party has been in power since independence. Te vast majority of other African countries followed a path that consisted of a few years of democratic multi-party systems, followed by the progressive establishment of single-party regimes or a military takeover.

But most often in this process, there have been frequent political deadlocks and crisis. By and large, formal democratic institutions proved incompatible at the time with the rise of personal rule and neo-patrimonialism. Formal institutions lost their importance and power became concentrated in a close circle around the personal ruler. Many of these rulers then organized single parties, mass mobilization movements that were then seen as plausible instruments of nation-building. Te rapid failure of democracy in African is a sobering reminder of its inherent drawbacks to democracy, particularly in light of the fact that in the post-Cold War era, donors made extensive eforts to promote democracy in Africa.

What transpired from this for the majority of African states was the rise of authoritarianism and the deterioration of citizens' rights. Many rulers argued that traditional African values such as consensus-seeking and loyalty justifed the adoption of regimes that were seen as dictatorial across the continent. Within a few years of independence, most of the region's democratic aspirations had been stifed. Whatever the merits of the cultural arguments of some African elites to justify their domination, the relative ease with which African dictatorships persisted for decades suggested that many countries shared conditions favouring this type of regime. So what caused this? Tere must have been some commonalities in efect for the countries to produce such similar results across the continent. I believe that the problem is caused not by the failure of institutions themselves, but rather by the inertia and noncommittal attitude when it came to upholding institutions.

Institutions do matter. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson's book *Why Nations Fail* is an inspiring work that tries to explain why some nations become prosperous, but others remain poor. Te authors argue that the answer lies in the diference between inclusive institutions and extractive institutions. Te former 'are those that allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish', while the latter have the opposite properties 'designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to beneft a diferent subset'.38 Tey argue that nations that develop inclusive institutions have far greater potential for growth than those that support extractive institutions that transfer rather than create wealth.

Te authors have also pointed out the stark contrast between South and North Korea. Tey described the former as having inclusive economic institutions, while the latter has extractive economic institutions. Koreans are homogeneous people with a history of many thousands of years of sharing a national identity, language and culture. No doubt, it was the nature of North Korea's institutions—its regime and ideology that turned North Korea into a failed state.

However, despite their appeal, the terminology of 'inclusive' and 'extractive' institutions comes with some question marks. I cannot help thinking that the term sounds tautological, as if to say 'what is good (inclusive) is good (prosperity) and what is bad (extractive) is bad (poor)'. 'Institution' is instead an abstract term that implies many things like ideologies, policies and actions of the state besides formal governing bodies. Te question remains as to why such institutions came about in the frst place and what drives them to continue functioning in this way. And the authors seem to have come up short in proposing specifc mechanisms for encouraging better institutions.39

Institutions, however well thought out and meticulously stipulated into law, are only as good as the intention, persistence and capacity to 'operationalize' them. Te success of institutions depends not on the existence of seemingly good institutions, but rather on the commitment and ability to make those institutions work, including continuous eforts to improve or reform public service mechanisms. Te majority of Sub-Saharan African countries may have the 'right' institutions, but the pace of moving ahead with governance and development is all but gratifying.

Perhaps from a developmental perspective, what should draw our attention the most is the Human Development Index (HDI): out of 188 nations in the world that were surveyed, the bottom ten countries are all Sub-Saharan countries, and among the 'low human development' group of 41 countries having the lowest scores, 36 nations are from Sub-Saharan Africa. Te Fragile State Index (2018) shows the top ten most fragile states and includes seven Sub-Saharan African countries (South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe). In Freedom House's Country Freedom Index (2017), fve Sub-Saharan African countries were included in the top ten least-free countries (Eritrea, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea). Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2016) found that four countries in the region ranked in the top ten most negatively perceived states (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau).

As Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn explain, what is troubling for both the donors and Sub-Saharan African countries alike is that there has been no visible progress in the region's governance during the period from 1985 to 2012 over which the study was conducted, no matter what indicators (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, World Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index or the Political Risk Service) were used.40 Te World Bank's latest Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which measures four areas (clusters) of governance—economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions—illustrates that there was a slight downward trend in the regions' governance over the period from 2008 to 2016.

However, there are countries in the region that usually rank in the top ten in most of the indicators—the usual suspects like Mauritius, Botswana, Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and the new rising star Rwanda—that should also be given due attention. An exception might be Ethiopia, which is the fastest-growing economy in the region, sustaining around 10% growth per annum in recent years.

Lastly, what cannot be stressed enough is the importance of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. From a worldwide perspective, while debates on the correlation between democracy and economic development remain largely contentious and inconclusive in the light of the Asian experience, and notably China, which is a recent example, in Sub-Saharan Africa things seem to be quite diferent. In this region, it is clear that the countries exhibiting a high level of democracy and governance also fare well economically. For example, countries that are categorized as 'free' by Freedom House like Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa are all ranked as 'high-middle income countries', and other countries scoring high in governance like Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Benin are some of the fastest-growing economies in the region.

Te reason for this may be found in the diference in the level of the work ethic: in Asia, a strong work ethic and government's role, and discipline in bureaucracy are seen to ofset the negativities of weak democracy and corruption, but in the case of Africa, which is seen to lag behind in such traits in comparison to Asia, there is an extra burden posed by rampant corruption, ethnicism, nepotism, neopatrimonialism, rent-seeking, etc., and here, as a result, democracy and governance must make up for such drawbacks in order to catch up with other regions. Yes, institutions, governance and democracies should be fervently upheld, but the path to reaching the point where these become efective would require a massive endeavour by society as a whole, entailing enhancement of performance in virtually every segment and sector of the nation (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3).

## **The Role of the State**

According to Irma Adelman: 'No area of economics has experienced as many abrupt changes in the leading paradigm during the post-WWII era as has economic development. Tese changes have had profound implications for the way the role of government has been viewed by development practitioners and their advisors in international organizations' (see Note 40). Te issue of the role of government regarding development is nothing new, but it continues to plague African countries and must be re-examined.

On the face of it, African governments have a high degree of centralization and strong presidential systems. Apparently, out of 49 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, no less than 40 have presidential executives. Te centralization bias is considered both the colonial legacy as well as the refection of reality: the inclination of the colonial administrations was to retain central authority and personal rule prevailed, while African societies were forcefully integrated into the post-colonial mold.41 Another distinct feature of African governments is that they have a rather large number of ministerial posts.

However, despite their large 'horizontal' government structure, African executives do not have big 'vertical' bureaucracies in terms of formally employed civil servants. More importantly, African governments sufer from weak capacity to undertake given tasks in terms of implementing policies, solving problems and providing public services. Te Fragile States Index (formerly called the failed states index), published annually by the Fund for Peace, assesses states' vulnerability to confict and collapse, using a total of 12 indicators that fall into one of the following three groups: social (4), economic (2) and political indicators (6). Among the political indicators are state legitimacy, public services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, etc. Te

**Table 3.1** The Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2016)

*Source* Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 2016 Governance as the provision of the political, social and economic goods that citizens have the right to expect from their state

The IIAG assesses progress under four main conceptual categories: safety & rule of law, participation & human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development

Freedom rating is an average of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL): 1=most free and 7=least free

Above score is aggregate: 0=least free and 100=most free

**Table3.2**Freedom country scores for Sub-Saharan Africa (2017)

**Table 3.3**

Other state performance indicators

Index (2017) Parenthesis: ranking (HDI 188 countries, CPI 176 countries, FSI 178 countries)

2017 Index showed that 32 Sub-Saharan African countries were ranked in the top 50 most fragile.42

A conspicuous feature of Sub-Saharan African countries is the weakness of their governing power and hence their weakness in performing the basic functions to serve the public and realize economic development that is worthy of their potential. Many African governments apparently lack the drive and persistence to achieve short and mid to long-term national goals. And as is often the case, well thoughtout national policies are rendered nominal when confronted by hard realities.

Unfortunately, corruption, bad governance and inefciency have become almost synonymous with African governments, so that donors and the African people may be wary of the notion of governments being 'strengthened'. Yet, for developing countries that are still in the midst of nation-building, discrediting the need for strong government and giving up on the state could be extremely detrimental.

European countries built their nation-state system with centralized government and a highly developed bureaucracy over a long period in their tumultuous history. On the other hand, in comparison, Sub-Saharan African countries lacked a strong social fabric, political norms and systems that form the basis of state. And such elements as tribalism and neo-patrimonialism, while they cannot be branded as defnitive causes of underdevelopment, are still very much prevalent and pertinent. Under the circumstances, if African leaders, elites and people are serious about developing their country, it is imperative that they fnd ways to make their government much more functional, and naturally this will take some time to achieve. But what is more disconcerting is that Africans themselves may not be well aware or concerned about this problem. And development partners do not seem to be particularly interested in helping 'empower' African governments either.

However, the donor community tried various approaches in the early stages of development assistance for poor countries, including eforts to empower the state with optimism. As John Harris notes: 'In the 1950s and 1960s, the centrality of the role of the state and the need for regulation of markets was hardly questioned. It was generally understood that economic development must involve industrialization.'43 In the 1960s, donors indeed espoused such a stance in their aid policy, putting trust in working with African governments so that the latter would follow the course of state-building and economic development, counting on a trickle-down efect for rural development and industrialization. But the approach was short-lived, due to unforeseen disappointing results and also because of the inherent restraints in the political dynamics of the donor community that was impatient with ongoing failures and was under pressure to seek alternative measures.44 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu also notes that: 'In the 1960s, the main focus of aid was on large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects. Tis was the golden age of foreign aid; one which could be justifed as a catalyst of growth and development. Dams, roads, bridges and railways were constructed across the continent. But this phase didn't last long.'45

Te approach that focused on building infrastructures and creating local industries, preferably starting with the agricultural sector, should have been pursued for far longer, instead of quickly shifting to poverty reduction programmes in the 1970s. Te policy choice was right and timely. However, what was lacking was commitment as well as fundamentals like 'internalization' eforts and a sense of ownership on the part of developing nations.

Te golden opportunity for African countries seems to have been missed in this period encompassing the 1960s and 1970s. If they had indeed capitalized on this opportunity and exerted themselves, many success stories would have emerged in the region, as was the case in Asia. While African countries today have registered high economic growth, this masks many worrying features: overdependence on raw materials; continued underdevelopment and low-value addition of the agricultural sector; the 'curse of resources' and the extractive industry; the dominance of foreign companies; a lack of industrialization; overreliance on foreign, multi-national companies and negligible indigenous manufacturing industries; rapid population growth and youth unemployment, etc.46

Turning to the international development architecture, the world has witnessed transitions in mainstream development theories and policy orientations: the structuralist/modernization theory-dominant period (from the end of the Second World War to 1979); the neo-liberalism ascendency period (1979–1996); and the 'revisionist' or 'Post-Washington Consensus' period from 1996 onwards. Te 'revisionist' school advocates a dynamically changing mix of state and market interactions. Te World Bank published a report, 'Te State in a Changing World (1997)', in which it stated that development without an efective state is impossible, stressing the need to fnd a balance between the market and the state, and recognizing that there are market failures as well as state failures.47

Te Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced into African countries in the mid-1980s to reduce the role of the state in the development process and give market forces a greater role in the allocation of resources, but ended in failure and worsened Africa's economy. As a result, an overall policy shift was made, and the New Orthodoxy Era (1996–2010) unfolded for Africa.48 But, apparently, African countries have not yet learned to 'right' the role of the government.

Te global economic and fnancial crisis of 2008–2009 was another turning point in the thinking on economic development. Following the crisis, there appears to have been a convergence of ideas, at least within the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA), on the imperatives of economic development. Te two reports, the 'UNECA/AUC Economic Report on Africa (2011)' and 'Governing Development in Africa: Te Role of the State in Economic Transformation (2011)', suggest that the state has a crucial role to play in meeting the development challenges in Africa. Teir recommendation is that the 'developmental state' approach should be used through disciplined planning, while avoiding the pitfalls of state intervention.49 Te notion is quite sound, but putting this into practice this still remains a big challenge in the absence of concrete actions.

African countries missed the golden opportunity discussed above because successful development through industrialization is becoming increasingly difcult for developing countries to achieve. Dani Rodrick reminds us that historically, rapid growth has always been associated with industrialization. But today, even BRICS countries, including China and India, have not realized the full-scale development (in terms of percentage of employment by economic sectors) of the manufacturing industrial sector that characterizes the growth path of Western economies, but instead have prematurely dipped in the industrial structure, that is, deindustrialization. Rodrik mentions that only South Korea succeeded in achieving sufcient industrialization before, making a transition to an advanced industrial structure that we see in Western economies. He points out that 'less room for industrialisation will almost certainly mean fewer growth miracles in the future' and that 'today's developing countries will possibly have bumpier paths to democracy and good governance'.50

Capitalism's most important components include private property, production factors, capital accumulation and competition.51 Private property rights are a central tenet of capitalism, and the land ownership question can be most problematic but crucial for developing countries. In classical economics, labour, land and capital constitute production factors, but today elements such as technology, entrepreneurship and innovations are considered as crucial means for enhancing production. Tis is all the more so in the increasingly competitive international environment under globalization.

According to Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, the fundamental requirements for successful capitalism are innovation, property rights, and fnancial and capital markets, but none of these is present to any signifcant extent in Africa.52 Tis is a fair assessment, but the interesting thing is that these three fundamental factors—innovation, property rights, and fnancial and capital markets—all invariably demand focused, disciplined and 'intrusive' government intervention. Hence, on the question of whether African countries need strong government, the answer seems to be self-evident. First of all, regarding land reform, only the government can authoritatively certify, allocate and regulate land ownership for the people. Technical innovation requires active, systematic and long-term investment and support of the state. Developing, regulating and reforming fnancial markets, and operating capital resources to assist the private sector are all rudimentary tasks of the government.

Te responsibility for the lacklustre development of African countries rests with Africans themselves, not the donors or the international environment. And 'to imply that entrepreneurs can carry on in environments in which governments are failing in their duty to provide an enabling environment for value-adding business activity is to make a case for failed states dominated by stunted entrepreneurs'.53 But few people in the region seem to take this seriously enough. Te reality is that both market failures and government failures are commonplace. As long as we are talking about the development of 'nation states', mindful that Sub-Saharan African countries are still a long way from completing the task of nation-building, it is imperative that strong, functioning governments must be zealously sought. And the scope of governance that is required is not what the international community can provide on behalf of African states.

Te international community must also be refective and understand that in order for African states to properly tap into and implement policies, and to enhance their output, the latter need to have an efective government. In light of all the problems that African states have experience up to now, it could be argued that it would be better to have as little government as possible. But outsourcing just about everything that the government should be doing while forgoing their task of 'learning by doing', which is the case in most African countries, is tantamount to the state's self-denial of its raison d'être.

Sub-Saharan states are marked by the weak functioning of the government and an inappropriate or 'wrong' policy orientation for economic growth. Many Sub-Saharan African regimes have the facade of authoritarian power, but in reality they lack the focus and determination to get things done and to push the agendas through, as East Asian countries were able to do. Te Asian experience provides fertile ground for sober refections on the part of both African countries and the donor community. In this vein, not enough lessons have been learned, while some experts are dismissive of the East Asian examples, claiming that the 'conditions are diferent' and they are not applicable. We need not simply stick to the examples of the East Asian Tigers, since there are also good case studies in other Southeast Asian countries.

In his book *Asia*-*Africa Development Divergence: A Question of Intent*, David Henley explains why Southeast Asian countries have become much more prosperous over the last half-century compared to African countries, which have stumped without visible signs of a major turnaround. Regarding the scope of divergence, he points out that:

[I]n [the] 1960s, South-East Asians were on the [sic] average much poorer than Africans; by 1980 they caught up, and by 2010 they were two and a half times richer. In South-East Asia the whole of the intervening half-century was a period of almost continuous growth, apart from a brief hiatus at the turn of the century caused by the Asian fnancial crisis. In Africa, per capita income stagnated in the 1970s, declined in the 1980s, grew weakly in the 1990s, and in 2010 was still barely higher than it had been in 1975.54

Henley argues that state-led rural and agricultural development that led to higher incomes for peasant farmers has been central to Southeast Asia's economic success, while its absence in Sub-Saharan Africa was critical for the continent's failure. Te policy prescriptions by the world development agencies like the World Bank and IMF demanding liberalization, deregulation, and privatization and austerity measures in Africa were contradictory to the reality of strategic planning of the national economy that underpinned the success in East Asia. For developing countries, the weaker the government, the more it is likely to be dependent on outside forces, jeopardizing their chances of development.

When coming up with initiatives, especially in multilateral forums, African leaders did show a certain level of energy and enthusiasm. For example, in 1980, African governments adopted their own economic blueprint—the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000 (LPA)—calling for collective self-reliance. But this was scarcely implemented and, moreover, did not sit well with the international development community, as it repudiated the logic of neo-liberal thinking, ending up in failure.55 After the aborted LPA, African leaders launched a second major attempt to reclaim African development agenda and adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in October 2000. But again, African countries failed in this endeavour, drawing considerable criticism because it was never properly implemented.

Te reason why Sub-Saharan African countries continue to struggle with economic transformation and remain poor while being heavily dependent on foreign aid and capital may be attributable to the inability to push for development or a lack of determination and willingness.

## **Natural Conditions**

Te geographical and natural conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by the existence of many landlocked countries and vast inland territories that are very difcult to access due to very poor and sparse roads, the harsh tropical climate and widespread diseases like malaria, are often cited as obstacles to development for the region. Te narrative of the history of colonization of Africa by the Western powers that we are familiar with might have contributed to the stereotypical worldview of the continent.

However, two things must be pointed out: frst, foreign explorers and settlers back then must have faced great hardships, but the geographical condition for development should be judged not from the outsider's point of view but from the locals' position; and, second, objective assessment should be made based not on historical documents, but on the present situation.

In *Te Age of Sustainable Development* (2015), Jefrey Sachs, a pioneer in the research on geographical diferences between places, reiterates that the geography of Africa and adversity of the African climate matter for development. Paul Collier similarly views that being 'land locked with bad neighbours' makes African countries' development harder. In his book *Prisoners of Geography*, Tim Marshall depicts Africa as a historically remote and isolated continent cut of from the centres of trade and disadvantaged in terms of lack of navigable rivers and having too large a land mass to be efectively connected as a single region or even as sub-regions.56

Te efects that geographical and climatic factors can have on the development of countries should not be downplayed and it is a fact that landlocked countries face huge challenges in making their economy competitive in terms of exporting commodities and attracting foreign investment. For the majority of foreigners who have never been to Africa, the mere notion of travelling to this region would entail great adventurism and a psychological challenge.

But this is just one aspect of Sub-Saharan Africa in its natural form, and to a certain degree it is deceptive, masking the overall, accurate picture of Africa. When the Ebola epidemic broke out in West Africa in 2014, it alarmed the international community and travel to and from Africa was greatly curtailed. However, I remember an international health expert telling CNN that people should not be panicking because Africa is not a country but a very big continent.

We must bear in mind that Africa is a huge continent with diverse geographical and climatic features. I know all too well that Africa is not only attractive for foreigners to live in, but undeniably also has a huge potential for growth and development due to its rich natural resources and many other things. Tus, we should be careful not to be simplistic and prejudiced when talking about the 'conditions' of Africa. If there are places where the conditions are adverse, there are also places where the conditions are most favourable. And when one visits Sub-Saharan Africa, it doesn't take long for one to realize that here so many places are far more 'favourable' than other parts of the world.

Te geographical and natural conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa should not be construed as a root cause of its underdevelopment. Instead, it is the human factor, the failure to deal with these conditions that has led to the perpetuation of the problems. Strictly speaking, even endemic and epidemic diseases are largely man-made. But sadly, we tend to attribute the failures of human beings not to humans, but to what we think is convenient. We do not need to mention Arnold Toynbee's famous axiom 'challenge and response', as it is apparent that human endeavour to overcome adversities makes all the diference. Many rich nations had to tame geographical and natural conditions much harsher than those in Africa in order to arrive at where they are now.

Uganda provides a good example at this point. Its nature—the weather, agricultural conditions and natural resources—provides all that one could ask for. It is no wonder that it is called the 'Pearl of Africa'. Other East African countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia and even South Sudan all boast wonderful natural conditions. We need not mention countries in the south like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia. And there are so many countries in western Africa that are richly endowed. I have not heard of instances where great natural calamities such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions and tsunamis have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. Because of global warming and climate change, the whole world is sufering from unexpected or extreme weather conditions. In sum, it is Africa's negative and stereotyped image, along with many other things, rather than the actual workings of the geographical and natural conditions that has far more debilitating efects. Unduly exaggerating the given conditions will only breed despair and dependence.

## **Other Factors (Population, Corruption, Globalization and China)**

We also could conceive of various other factors that may not necessarily be the root cause of Africa's underdevelopment, but can afect the region's development. Corruption readily comes to mind, but there can be other elements like population size and the efects of globalization that also have a bearing.

Regarding population size, conventional wisdom would suggest that it will be easier to foster and run democracy in a smaller nation than a larger one. Direct democracy like the Athenian democracy would only be possible if the size of the community of the people is limited. It could also be argued that the formation of identity and consensus of the people and maintaining of social order will be easier when communities are small. Certainly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least-populous nations, such as the Seychelles, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia, are among the highest scorers in governance and freedom. But countries like Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, which have very small populations, score very low in terms of governance and freedom, so this is not a reliable criterion. Another factor that may need to be considered along with population is the size of the territory or the sparseness of the population.

Te correlation between the size of the population and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa is not easy to gauge either. GDP and per-capita income are generally in a trade-of, hence it is difcult to rank highly in both. GDP represents economic infuence or market size, while per-capita GDP represents the level of wealth enjoyed by the people. For developing economies in particular, both of these matter, and the degree of income or social inequality should also be counted in assessing a nation's overall economic performance. In terms of GDP, the top fve countries are Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia in that order; however, the top fve in per-capita GDP are the Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Gabon and Botswana.

A major issue for Sub-Saharan Africa is the population explosion that has produced an extraordinarily large youth population, which poses huge social economic challenges, given that most of the countries experiencing such phenomenon are the poorest and most fragile countries. It is pointed out that the SSA's population, which is currently over 1.0 billion (that of the entire African continent is over 1.25 billion) may double by 2050.57 Te population of Nigeria, the biggest in the continent, is expected to grow from 191 million in 2017 to 411 million in 2050 to become the world's third-most populous country, behind India and China. However, it would all come down to how the population is managed. Te youth population can turn out to be an asset or a huge liability depending on how the state and society respond to this, which in turn hinges on their ability, commitment and mindset for development.

Compared to the demographic timebomb, corruption is viewed as being outright negative, and many suggest that this is the biggest reason for Africa's problems. But corruption can also be viewed as a refection or outcome of more fundamental problems, in addition to being a reason for underdevelopment. Corruption exists everywhere, in any society and country, but is more conspicuous and widespread in developing countries and is seen as a general attribute of a weak social fabric. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is so rampant that it is relentlessly exposed time after time in the news.

As a continent, Africa continues to top the list in the category of having the most highly corrupt countries, with 12 countries ranking in the top 20 and fve in the top ten, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2016), which surveyed 177 countries worldwide. An African Union study conducted in 2002 estimated that corruption cost the continent roughly \$150 billion a year. Te foreign aid that Sub-Saharan Africa received from developed countries amounted to \$22.5 billion in 2008, according to the OECD.58 According to the East African Bribery Index of 2009, compiled by Transparency International, over half of East Africans polled paid bribes to access public services that should have been provided for free. Corruption in Africa, which ranges from high-level political graft to low-level bribes given to public ofcials, has a hugely corrosive efect on basic institutions and unduly increases the cost of doing business. It is argued that academic research shows that curtailing corruption can drastically enhance the economic productivity of a country, and some economists propose that African governments need to fght corruption instead of relying on foreign aid.59

Tere are several reasons why corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly detrimental to the region's development. Its regularity and rampancy are unmatched. Corruption can be defned simply as 'the abuse of entrusted power for private gain'.60 Hence, discussions on corruption usually centre on 'public sector corruption', but corruptive behaviours or 'irregularities' are not confned to political leaders and public ofcials; they extend far beyond to include the private sector and the public in general.

Except for a very small number of countries, Sub-Saharan African nations experience corruption as the 'norm' rather than the 'exception', with people taking advantage of the 'opportunities' whenever they arise, political graft and systematic extortion by the powerful (leaders and their inner circles) being deeply entrenched and persistent without being challenged, politicians and top ofcials routinely and incessantly engaging in private business, ofcials at various levels in government departments and public ofces frequently being involved in 'organized' irregularities, and police, customs ofcers and other ofcials in public service taking bribes. And this is not the end of the story.

Another form of corruption is 'absenteeism', which is also a very serious problem in the region: government organizational (central and local) ofcials, teachers, doctors, etc. frequently being absent from their ofces to the detriment of the public interest. Corruption in Africa is linked to many other facets and problems inherent in African societies and therefore its scope and impact is as much far-reaching. And the negativity of neo-patrimonialism, ethnicism and other issues related to various syndromes, the mindset and ethics, etc. all contribute to corruption.

While 'corruption' is broadly defned to mean all the 'irregularities' taking place in a society, corruption is also widespread in the private sector as well. It is difcult to distinguish between corruption and theft, and maybe it is meaningless to make the distinction. Especially for foreigners, the difculty in countering corruption in Africa is that one doesn't know who is involved and at what level. Te widespread and common practice of seeking 'commission' is another good example of how corruption can take many forms in the region. Not only are the most fundamental public services that are taken for granted in the developed world not properly provided, even those expensive utility installation services, for instance, that users have to pay high cost to access do not come automatically.

Foreign aid projects can also (and often do) become the targets of corruption. Tey can be subtle in their approach, but it is customary for ofcials who are involved to explicitly or implicitly ask donors to give them some kind of 'commission' for receiving aid. It is true that donors often feel they have to 'pay' for the good deeds they are trying to do, instead of being fully embraced and appreciated.

What makes Africa's corruption more nuanced compared to that in other regions is that it is combined with many other negative factors. Te case in point is that although corruption was widespread in Asian countries, this did not prevent these countries from achieving fast economic growth. Hence, we need to look at the whole picture, taking into account all the relevant factors and the reality on the ground. An interesting observation has been made that 'corruption in African countries tends to be of the decentralised and disorganised type in which paying a bribe to one ofcial does not guarantee that a service will be provided. Tis type of corruption may be more deleterious to growth and development than the centralised and organised type found in Asia. For all these reasons, it is most likely that corruption could have a diferent efect on economic development in African countries than elsewhere'.61

Te state of Africa's corruption is a refection of the African reality. Fundamentally rectifying this problem will by no means be an easy feat and would require all-out and sustained responses. Nonetheless, various supervisory, sanctioning mechanisms to enforce transparency and discipline in the relevant institutions and ofces, along with pressure exerted by the development community, should be stringently applied.

Another subject that deserves our attention, I believe, is the consequences of globalization on Sub-Saharan African countries. While globalization can in general be seen in a positive light in terms of Africa's business and cultural connectivity with the world, its overall impact is anything but simple to assess, and it can entail various risks and sideefects, depending on the capacities of the countries. Tere is no denying that today African countries fnd themselves in a quite diferent international setting compared to when they gained independence. And globalization—inter-dependence and inter-connectivity among economies—may be the most potent force afecting developing and developed countries alike in today's world.

Te impact of globalization is clearly felt in Sub-Saharan Africa, as this was reinforced by the acts of both the international community and the African countries. Perhaps the frst major shockwave of globalization to hit the continent came in the form of policy measures: the neo-liberalist policies prescribed by international fnancial and development institutions during the period of structural adjustment and the Washington Consensus. In order to obtain aid and loans from donors, African countries had to show commitment to market-oriented economic reforms and good governance. And while African countries did not have much choice but to conform to donors' terms, they actually opted for a pro-business liberal economy for a number of reasons.

Te elites of Sub-Saharan African countries are pragmatists, who are keen to obtain wealth by seeking business opportunities with foreign companies and partners. Te limited fnancial resources and capabilities of African states is understandable, but the major problem is really the lack of entrepreneurship, commitment and perseverance to successfully pursue business demonstrated in African business circles, and their inability or hesitation to make the necessary investments for future returns. Tis has left a huge vacuum that foreign investors and partners have had to fll. In many instances, even in remote provinces, landlords and local communities are willing to sell of chunks of land they possess at low prices to foreign investors. Since the locals do not have the means to make use of their land in any case, it would make sense to fnd an option with those who can develop it. For landlocked African countries in particular, the need to remove trade barriers and make their markets more accessible and appealing is deemed to be crucial in order to ofset their disadvantages.

Obviously, there are also downsides to globalization, which are the ultimate price developing countries have to pay for being integrated into the global economy. For example, over the years, East African currencies have undergone a continuously sharp drop in their value against the US dollar, but the East African governments have admitted that there is not much that they can do to counter this phenomenon.

Te deepening of liberalization over recent decades and the way in which African countries have 'adapted' to it have no doubt undermined their economic 'autonomy'. For them, the window of opportunity to approach the ranks of industrialized economies has been narrowing because of the slow pace of structural changes and the absence of strategic thinking and genuine eforts to 'catch up', amid increasing international competition and faster cycles of technological ratcheting-up. Confronted with the economic tasks at hand, African leaders have opted for convenient solutions like inviting foreign capital and expertise to fll their fnancial and capacity gaps, without concurrently taking competitiveness-enhancing measures at their end. Tis is mostly true throughout the region, including South Africa, where there is a juxtaposition of the 'First World' and the 'Tird World', making it an interesting testing ground for 'radical economic transformation'.

For developing countries, continuously relying heavily on foreign frms and capital would not be the best solution in relation to economic development. Te goal should be for African countries to build an industrial economy that is suited to their own specifc situation in which they enjoy ownership, even while they trade freely with the outside. Unfortunately, many Sub-Saharan African countries have opened up and sold of their precious economic rights too soon to foreign companies, without even realizing their long-term value. Te prospect of earning immediate profts, perhaps with 'premiums', can override consideration for the long-term national interests. A good example of this is the telecommunications market. African countries easily gave away their frequency usage rights to foreign companies, unaware that this is tantamount to giving up their strategic leverage and valuable economic sovereignty that could be used for many decades to come.

Lastly, as a feature of globalization, China's increasingly proactive economic engagement with Africa deserves our attention. But the impact that China has on the landscape of Africa's development, the ODA policy of traditional donors and the overall economic dynamism of Africa are uncertain. What is clear is that China's method of economic cooperation is quite diferent from the mainstream donor community, so African countries tend to think of China as an alternative to Western partners.

China's greatest strength lies in its fnancial capability and readiness to do business with Africa. China, employing generous assistance and sumptuous loans as tools, has made tremendous inroads in infrastructure-building and the energy development market in particular, based on their price competitiveness of labour, which is unmatched. For African countries desperate to fnd any fnancial resources for large-scale construction and engineering projects, China's partnership becomes handy. As both China and African countries will point out, these come with 'no strings attached'.

However, while there might not be any strings attached, various socio-economic costs may be incurred. Te impact on the already-fragile governance and business practices in Africa comes to mind. Furthermore, it is no secret that Chinese goods and work that are found in Africa often turn out to be substandard, while Chinese merchants' businesses in retail frequently attract complaints from local competitors.

A latest report by the McKinsey Global Institute shows the profle of China's economic footprint in Africa in comparison to other countries, including the US, Germany, France, the UK and India, in terms of trade, FDI, aid and infrastructure fnancing. We can see that China's lead is absolute in trade and infrastructure fnancing, and while China's FDI is comparatively low, it is registering fast growth; its ODA level is also considerable, on a par with the UK.62

In the past, corruption scandals involving Chinese frms appeared frequently in the African news, and the region's overall perception of China's economic expansion and mode of doing business in Sub-Saharan Africa is mixed, as is captured by surveys. However, we should not be unduly critical. Many Chinese frms enter African markets taking risks in the areas where no one else is likely to venture. Contrary to conventional thinking, aggressive as they may seem, Chinese companies are not necessarily successful in Africa. In fact, they commonly face stif competition even among themselves and many withdraw from African markets after incurring losses. Maybe the biggest downsides to such a 'no-strings-attached' way of doing business with Africa lies in the possibility that it can make African countries more complacent and exacerbate the already-serious dependency syndrome, moral hazard and poor governance. And it is my impression that there is still a considerable misperception amongst African leaders and elites about the situation of their markets and economies, and how companies do business and operate to make proft.63

In this regard, the presence of big multi-national corporations and aggressive Chinese frms may have had an undesirable impact in terms of making people overestimate the capacity of these entities and to have inaccurate views on how business works. For instance, they seem to think that big foreign companies can operate and make a proft for as long as possible and can do anything.

### **Notes**

1. Among many private entities involved in international development, a notable example that I encountered is the Geneva Institute for Leadership & Public Policy based in Switzerland. Te Institute organized, jointly with South Korea's Science & Technology Policy Institute and with its partners Kumi University and the Uganda National Council for Science & Technology, the Conference on National Transformation with special focus on science & technology, business & industry, in Kampala, Uganda, 5–7 October, 2017 (Africana Hotel). Te special guest speaker was David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme.

former. Dependency theory originates with Singer-Prebisch thesis on comparative advantage. Dependency theorists include Latin American Marxists like Celso Furtado, Aníbal Pinto, other Americans like Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Andre Gunder Frank, and many others. Immanuel Wallerstein refned the Marxist aspect of the theory to form the world-systems theory.

**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **4**

## **Uncovering the Main Root Cause: The Mindset Factor**

## **The Forgotten 'Mind Over Matter'?**

As we grapple with the question of what went wrong with Africa's development and what the way forward should be, it is no surprise that so many studies have been done on Africa in wide-ranging felds by various experts and organizations. However, in the eyes of the global community at large, Africa is still very much an unknown, yet-to-bediscovered region and hence much academic, scientifc and fact-fnding research on Africa will follow suit. In business circles, Sub-Saharan Africa is described as 'the last frontier' but the region is already open for the outsiders to take advantage of its potentials.

Africa's development can be an interesting and fascinating subject to ponder on. What makes the feld of development most challenging is that, in sum, it is about carrying out the task of bringing about changes where normally the conditions are the least favourable for doing so. Development bears an aspect of international relations and is an inter-disciplinary feld, but it is unlike any other, especially from the practitioners' perspective. For example, development cooperation has a fundamentally diferent working structure compared to other areas of engagements or dealings, including conventional diplomacy, public diplomacy, trade and investment, security, the environment, etc. In these felds, countries participate as 'equal entities' and each party focuses on advancing its position from its own end. Whether it is about negotiating or carrying out PR activities, the process is simple and predictable. It is not necessary to worry about the situation of one counterpart or its capacity to play its part; the responsibility that one bears is confned to one's own responsibility.

However, in development cooperation, things are very diferent and practitioners cannot go about conducting their own business in a matter-of-fact fashion, paying no attention to the situation of others. It is not enough to have shared goals and reach an agreement, and doing well on your part: one has to involve one's counterpart or partner in doing the difcult and necessary things. Development projects are conducted and assessed over the long haul, and for donors, their assignment is not substantively fulflled until the collaborative work bears fruit in the end. People cannot feel lighthearted when things break down or become white elephants immediately after they have handed over the facilities or programmes to African countries.

Hence, 'rationality' and standard procedures that we are used to following in most felds in international relations do not necessarily apply in development cooperation. If aid projects are to be responsibly carried out in order to produce tangible results, then extra 'human toil' is required, such as a greater level of patience, perseverance and devotion. Frustration and stress levels can become very high when ofcials in charge in the aid recipient country do not properly respond and follow up.

I think development as a specialized feld in its own right has, over time, lost the zeal it needs to have and has settled for the pursuit of human needs and stability. Tis was driven largely by the unmitigated challenges that the development community has faced in its conventional domain, but current events have also played a part. For instance, what could have been a promising second decade for the world in the new millennium began with an uncertain and troubling international landscape: political destabilization, the eruption of new conficts, a new form of international terrorism, and a refugee crisis impacting Europe and having global ramifcations, among others.

We could be overwhelmed by the challenging developments and contingencies around the world, but development initiatives must be focused on the development agenda instead of following the fckle of times. Te more the current situation appears to be entangled, the greater need there is to focus on the fundamentals, root causes and 'ultimate solutions'. Tis is because development is possibly the best answer to most of the ills and problems we face today. As such, it was heartening when, recently, even David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), said that 'humanitarian dollars should be turned into development dollars'.1

We need to have a better misunderstanding of what foreign aid can do. Not all aid is geared towards economic development and, all things considered, the actual portion allotted to economic development is quite small. Tis is because the spectrum of foreign assistance has expanded over decades to include just about everything, as is refected by the adoption of universal Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Te clear phenomenon observable in African development is that the distinction between 'economic development' and 'economic welfare' is increasingly blurred, which I think is a big problem in itself.

To simplify matters, foreign aid can be broken down into four categories: (1) humanitarian assistance; (2) 'social welfare'-type assistance; (3) development assistance; and (4) the promotion of democracy and governance. Humanitarian assistance is for the emergency relief of those sufering as a result of disasters and crises. Social welfare-type programmes target the socially vulnerable or disadvantaged, providing various services to meet their basic needs. While the frst two types of assistance are meant to serve the immediate or basic requirements of the recipients, development assistance is for the mid- to long term sustainable development of the recipient nations. Tese include various types of cooperation like capacity-building, technological cooperation, the construction and handover of facilities and infrastructures, the provision of materials and equipment, the injection of funds, etc. in multiple sectors. Lastly, the promotion of governance, democracy and human rights, and regional security are also important areas in which Western donors provide assistance.

Terefore, foreign aid that directly supports economic development in African countries is not particularly apparent. And this is further 'compromised' by how the recipient countries utilize this aid. Te problem is that various economic projects often turn out to be short-lived programmes that mainly beneft the ofcials of counterpart agencies or a limited number of the people concerned. In sum, even these have turned into 'welfare' programmes instead of acting as sustainable means to assist economic development.

Basically, universal economic activities can be considered as either wealth creation or wealth distribution. Wealth creation is about realizing additional production and value that drives economic growth, leading to overall development. Wealth distribution, in policy terms, is the act of 'correcting' market failures from a socio-political standpoint like addressing income inequality and providing public services. If there is no wealth creation, then there is no wealth to distribute. Tus, for Sub-Saharan African countries, the priority should be 'enlarging the pie' through wealth creation, but their general mindset is fxated on the transfer of wealth. Under such circumstances, various assistance programmes are likely to fail. Te 'welfare mentality' is so widespread in the region that everyone is looking for solutions to come from somewhere else, while readily blaming outsiders and external factors for their own poverty and troubles. More troubling is the failure or unwillingness to take action, and the deep-seated practice of 'non-implementation' poses the biggest mystery, obstacle and threat to development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Te 'mindset' of people should be brought to the forefront of our attention and considered as a key term in the discourse on Africa's development. If people were to ask what the single most important root cause is of underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa, the best answer I can think of is the 'mindset'. Among the myriad of things that can be considered, the ultimate solution to break the impasse lies in a change of mindset. It is one thing to fnd reasons for past failures, which is what everybody has been doing, but quite another to make things right in practice, which seldom takes place in the region.

Te 'mindset change approach' beings with it great benefts, in that it is conducive to the 'internalization' of development, enhancing awareness for ownership, and is action-oriented. It brings home what people have forgotten: the plain and simple truth of *mind over matter*. 'Mindset' can be an elusive term, but it would be useful to confne its meaning to what is relevant to development. Bringing the 'mindset' to the fore in discussion propels search for answers 'from within', which is what development ought to be about in the frst place. Too much energy has been spent on secondary and peripheral issues without addressing the core issue of *mind over matter*.

To make this kind of attitudinal change will not be an easy task, but it is not impossible. It is certainly achievable and there are precedents to prove it. Te most prominent example, I would argue, is South Korea. In Africa, Rwanda is seen as an emerging case, following a similar model. Uganda has already adopted this mindset change programme, although it is still in the initial, exploratory phase of doing so. Sub-Saharan African nations should go beyond acquiring knowledge and capacity to espouse mindset change if they are indeed serious about 'radical transformation', and rightly so.

Te good news is that in some places in Sub-Saharan Africa, people are beginning to at least be aware and are talking about the mindset issue in an open manner. Uganda is one of those where Korea's experience and know-how in this feld has had an infuence. Since 2009, the Canaan Farmers School, an institution in South Korea which specializes in mindset change and agriculture programmes, has worked with Uganda. Born out of the destruction of the Second World War and the subsequent Korean War, the Canaan School is reputed to have played an instrumental role in leadership and agriculture training in the early stages of Korea's economic development. Te objective of this institution was to eradicate poverty and attain sustainable development through changing the mindsets of rural leaders, who, in turn, would spearhead the change of mindsets in their communities. Te School's methodology was adopted later in the model of the New Village Movement (*Saemaeul Undong*) that became a national campaign in South Korea from 1970. Te *Saemaul Undong* became an icon of a successful community-driven, self-help rural development endeavour of Korea that contributed to its overall success in economic development.

## **The 'Mindset Change' Issue in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Few international experts and observers know that South Korea's economic miracle began with the mindset change campaigns conducted at a national level. When you see various books and articles on Korea's rapid economic growth or 'miracle' written by economists, both Korean and foreign, there is hardly any mention of the mindset change campaigns like the *Saemaul Undong*. It is only in recent years that the *Saemaul Undong* was recognized and promoted internationally as a development model, and the *Saemaul Undong* archives were added to UNESCO's Memory of the World Register in 2013.2 In the international development community, UN bodies like the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the pioneers in embracing this approach.3

Tere may be many reasons for this, but two things come to mind. One is the tendency or infuence of mainstream economics and the other is the fundamental 'political' propensity or bias. First, mainstream economists do not deal with 'extraneous' factors like the people's 'mindset'. What approximates 'mindset' according to scholars is the 'hard work' or 'work ethic' of Koreans. Even Alice Amsden's *Asia's Next Giant* (1992) does not mention the *Saemaul Undong* at all. Also, it might be that orthodox economists would have shunned such an 'interventionist' movement.

Another reason why the *Saemaul Undong* has not received universal praise inside Korea is because of the 'political divide' in the nation. No sooner had Korea achieved rapid economic development, the process of its socio-political evolution, democratization began to unfold. Despite the fact that the *Saemaul Undong* had a substantial impact on rural development, because it was initiated by the authoritative government, the progressive-minded population half-heartedly admitted, or were even critical of, its outcomes. Also, as times have changed and people have become wealthier and more self-centred, they tend to be dismissive of things done in the past and do not enough thought to the situation back then, regarding these things as 'outdated' or 'irrelevant'.

Korea and Sub-Saharan African countries share many similar historical experiences. No sooner had Korea been liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 than it became divided. Te subsequent Korean War that started in 1950 devastated the nation. But the great turnaround started with the public programmes to empower the people in the 1950s, and the story of South Korea that unfolded provides valuable lessons for Africa's development.

No one will disagree that without a fundamental change in the mindset of the leaders and the populace, there cannot be real progress. Setting up goals and expressing aspirations is an easy part, but this would be of no avail if they are not followed up with concrete actions. Tere have been serious misperceptions, negligence or intentional 'looking the other way' on the subject. Development is not a 'stock' but a 'fow' concept in economics, and it is all about change and dynamism, not the maintenance of the status quo. But many in the region seem to mistakenly believe that national wealth can be transferred and stocked up like material goods. But even materials and equipment need proper usage and maintenance in order to be useful. Many facilities built to serve the public, like medical clinics, factories, schools and welfare centres, become useless shortly after they are opened and handed over due to a lack of care and ownership, accompanied by corruption.

Although many factors come into play, the real issue is not the lack of resources or means, but the mindset of the people who are involved and responsible for undertaking the work. Evidently, poor work ethics the habit of not thinking ahead and making necessary preparations, not being focused and devoted in relation to one's work, easily quitting one's task, not keeping to deadlines and promise, etc. does so much harm, but this is not mentioned enough. When people imagine poverty in Africa, they tend to think of poverty in terms of lack of means, but one has to think further that poverty can be caused or sustained by the failure to manage oneself, like saving money and having plans for making a living and for spending.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is customary to see people attributing their problem to outside elements. One East African journalist writes:

[W]hat is it that inhibits our ability to produce our own technologies? Note that most sub-Saharan nations possess political institutions and public policies that (we are told) ensure prosperity. Is it, therefore, our education system which is the problem? Is it our social organization? Is it our colonial history that destroyed our self-belief in our ability to produce our own technologies? Is it the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism that keeps us looking outward for the solutions to our problems?4

Tere are diferent ways to deal with these needs and problems. People can be introspective, inclined to seek answers and solutions from within, or can have the opposite tendency and put blame on others or expect others to solve their problems. If we had two distinctly diferent societies, one being 'introspective' and the other having 'disowning' tendencies, which one would fare better? Te answer is obvious.

Te value of being 'introspective' is that over time, individuals are likely to improve and achieve something because of the 'know thyself' kind of efect that it will have. Skills and technologies can be gained when one strives for them. On the other hand, knowledge and institutions are of no consequence when people are idle and irresponsible. Worse, this 'disowning' tendency breeds a 'don't care' mentality. Because people are not the drivers of their own life, they cannot have high expectations of what can be achieved.

It is bafing as to why people should be reluctant to do the things that will only beneft them, particularly in the longer term. Tis is not limited to the economic feld. Institutions, the rule of law, governance and democracy are only worth anything if they are put into practice. We studied at school that the essence of democracy was deeds and practice. It can be a hollow echo of rhetoric which can degenerate into endless political strife if democracy is not properly understood and embodied by the people.

Development is about making difcult changes, and admitting and targeting one's own weakness and problems rather than trying to conceal them, so that they can be overcome. Development is what is earned and not what is bestowed by others, and there is no magical formula for it, except that people and the government all have to work conscientiously with a common purpose. In this regard, much more harm is done by being ambiguous, disingenuous, hypocritical and manneristic than being honest, straightforward and practical. Being politically and diplomatically correct all the time may not be a good thing for the sake of development, and straightforwardness could yield better outcomes.

Fortunately, within Africa, people are showing an increasing awareness that the mindset needs to be changed. Te call for mindset change has been aired in various regional bodies including the African Union (AU), and it is not uncommon to see African leaders and intellectuals speaking out on this.5 Everyone seems to agree that people's mindset should change, but when it comes to how this should be done, people seem to be at a loss and lack clear ideas. Tis is where we need to break out of the box. Rather than give up or try to avoid the matter, it should be tackled head-on. Te ideal scenario would be that the African people themselves take the initiative and make full-fedged eforts in this regard. Development partners can approach this issue with good intentions and without prejudice, being circumspective in relation to the nature of the matter.

Eforts to this end have already been made in Uganda through such projects as the establishment of the National Farmers Leadership Centre (NFLC), which is a training round for mindset change and agricultural development.6 Perhaps the best way to break the yoke of the inaction or powerlessness of the people is to 'provoke' them to change. Tis is because as far as human behaviour is concerned, 'voluntarism' is the surest way forward. Te 'mindset change' of the people, if efected, can have far-reaching and 'explosive' repercussions on their lives and society.

Tere are a number of parallels between Korea's experience and the situation in which Sub-Saharan African countries currently fnd themselves. One of the areas that Korea identifed as crucial for national transformation was the mindset of the people, and the campaign for mindset change was essentially about empowering the people. Te Korean experience will be examined in Part 4 of this book.

With respect to the substance of the problematic mindset in Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe that the following can be identifed as the syndromes or traits that commonly exist in the region: (1) the dependency syndrome; (2) the 'what's-in-it-for-me' syndrome; (3) the 'backtracking syndrome'; (4) expediency or short-sightedness; (5) a lack of action and implementation; (6) a weak sense of responsibility or ownership; (7) a weak sense of nation or patriotism; and (8) a 'commission culture'.7

First, we are all so familiar with the talk of a 'dependency syndrome' in Sub-Saharan Africa that it sounds like a cliché. It is so widespread throughout the region, at all levels in society and the state. For instance, at the provincial level, the general tendency is that the locals wait indefinitely, hoping that the government will come to their aid for the most basic things that they can do for themselves. I had the opportunity to participate in a series of 'community clean-up' exercises in and around Kampala, and on one occasion I was appalled to see frst-hand the scene of total negligence and irresponsibility. Te site was not a slum by any measure, but apparently the residents were waiting for the city authority workers to show up and remove the rubbish. Even on the very day we were conducting clean-up exercise, many locals, particularly young men, were sitting idly and gazing at us, smiling but declining to take part in the exercise. It was an awful state to witness because this had nothing to do with the people lacking knowledge, capacity or fnancial resources (the reasons frequently cited for people failing to act), but was a simple matter of willingness.8

Te 'what's-in-it-for-me?' syndrome is also a widespread phenomenon among the population in the region. Tis is a tendency to consider one's own interests at all times before anything else. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is a well-known fact the poor delivery of public services wrought by civil servants who are devoid of any sense of duty and responsibility is a major hindrance to development. It is a common practice for government ofcials to engage in personal businesses, and even in their ofcial duties their priority is often misplaced, putting their personal interests over the public interest. Tere is a tendency to put the ofcial assignments on the back-burner or neglect them altogether if they fail to see what is in it for them. Such practice not only breeds confict of interests and corruption, but also, more fundamentally, drastically undercuts the government's performance. Economic loss due to disruptions and delays in public service, not to mention outright acts of corruption, is said to be enormous.

Te 'backtracking syndrome' is the tendency to hold back or back pedal instead of moving forward to build on what has already been achieved. I have always thought of this as a great paradox. It is the problem of failing to 'keep pace', stopping short of meeting the target, and not being consistent and living up to expectations. Where dynamic economic growth is enjoyed, people take it for granted that things improve over time. But this is generally not the case in Africa. Tere are actually many things that get worse over time, the most noticeable being the deterioration of physical infrastructure and facilities, but it goes well beyond that.

Te backtracking syndrome is observable on many fronts and it has huge accumulative or multiple efects at the national level. What is so disheartening is that in many cases, local employees, if they are not placed under the 'special attention' of the management, end up causing problems or missing out on the opportunities that will defnitely beneft them (like long-time employment). What we can call the 'self-regulating' or 'self-disciplining' ability of workers is visibly poor. Overall, their will to 'appeal' to their bosses in terms of diligence and performance is short-lived and they do not respond well to the continuing pressures of work. Because Africa's organizations and companies have a weaker management or governance structure compared to foreign entities, their overall organizational output or efciency is also weaker. In contrast, those who do receive greater recognition in foreign organizations enjoy many benefts and opportunities. Tey can even be headhunted by higher-paying government organizations and companies.9

In any organization, local workers can only beneft if they are attuned to maintaining their level of work because normally, over time, they will gain expertise and productivity in relation to their work. Teir pay will increase and it should be a win-win situation for the organization and the employees. But, to our dismay, many show 'regression' instead of steady progress, with the result that they are eventually fred from their job. Te strange phenomenon is that when rewards and incentives are given to employees, one should expect them to perform more positively, but often the opposite occurs—rather than responding in kind, employees become spoilt, complacent and ask for more. Tis results in an ironic situation where the good intentions of one party are met by the negative reaction of the other party, which defes logic and rationality.

Te next trait is expediency or short-sightedness. Tis is quite evident in daily work practices. Cutting corners is a tendency of most technicians and workers in the region, meaning that in order to avoid this as much as possible, customers' intervention in terms of continuous on-site 'supervision' is required. Tis applies to a whole variety of work, ranging from menial chores to construction projects. Sloppy work, the habit of leaving things undone, a failure to keep to deadlines and promises, etc. are the 'norm' rather than the exception.10 Generally, there is a lack of attention to detail and thinking ahead, so that even the most basic things to expect like the standardization and linear, geometric correctness of products are not met most of the time.

Te lack of implementation or action is another distinctive feature of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ian Clarke, an Irish missionary doctor who became the Mayor of Makindye Division in Kampala, gives a vivid account of such a problem:

Uganda was a great country to live in: the weather was lovely, the vegetation beautiful, and the people friendly and outgoing. Some foreigners came to work in Uganda and were at frst enthralled by what they found, particularly by the social life and by how articulate people are, but they often got a rude awakening when it came to the work practices and work ethic. If people could talk their way into making things work, Uganda would have been the best developed country in the world. Donors were impressed with people's grasp of problems and understanding of the steps which should be taken in fnding solutions, but then confused as to why so many basic issues on the ground remained unresolved. Te problem lay in implementation: many public servants were good at analysing and talking about what should be done, as if the very talking was the same as doing it, but then nothing happened. Tis lack of implementation of simple things in the public domain was so common that it was accepted as the norm, and one only remarked when anything actually changed.11

Te disinclination to act is a very serious problem under any circumstances. Everybody seems to agree that there has been too much talking and too little action. Tere is the saying 'easier said than done', but the wise have admonished us against frivolity and talkativeness: 'silence is golden', 'an empty wagon makes more noise', 'action speaks louder than words', 'the superior man acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his action', etc.12

Lack of responsibility and ownership is also a serious obstacle to development. Institutional mechanisms to enforce accountability are important, but what is much more needed is a greater sense of responsibility of the people. Te seriousness of the problem is frequently expressed:

It's very hard to get things done, even at the smallest level. But it is very easy to sit and complain about things. Reading social media, one gets the sense that we have increasingly become a complaining nation, not a doing nation.  But one hardly reads a story of what those complaining are doing to change the situation. Are we waiting for intervention from God?13

What I also see as typical of Sub-Saharan Africa is the practice of ofering amnesty in the name of national reconciliation. Political leaders are quick to call for amnesty, thereby promoting impunity. Betrayal and treachery are also common. When I was in West Africa, I saw internal conficts in many countries where the military as well as political leaders conveniently 'switched sides'. Opportunism prevails, and this leads to a protraction of conficts because there is no clear will for or path towards its closure. In eastern Africa, South Sudan provides the latest worst-case scenario of what personal greed for power and impunity of leaders can do to a nation.

Weakness in the sense of nation and patriotism is another general trait in the region. Te weak sense of nation and patriotism correlates with the weak functioning of states and these two feed of each other. From a national standpoint, the spread of patriotism that transcends tribalism and sectarianism will be an ideal goal to achieve. Many African countries sufering from internal strife and disunity ought to realize the fact that this could easily be exploited, engulfng the whole country and the region into a state of crisis.

So how can a sense of nation, national identity, solidarity or patriotism be fostered? Te greatest responsibility rests with the political leaders and elites, who should be leading their nation forward by example. But this need not be top-down only—it can work both ways, from topdown and bottom-up, in an interactive fashion with people's voluntarism. Sometimes tragic events can serve as a critical turning point for nations. A good example is the case of Rwanda. What the country has been able to achieve in the aftermath of the genocide is remarkable and has set a high bar for other African countries to match. For an African country, Rwanda has tackled seemingly improbable tasks: good governance, the civic-mindedness of the people, social order and discipline, national solidarity, etc. Most surprising is the cleanliness and orderliness of the capital city Kigali to the extent that it makes one wonder if it is indeed a city in Sub-Saharan Africa. What developing countries desperately need is the government setting an example to 'empower' the people rather than simply trying to curry favour with the people, but without enacting essential reforms.

Lastly, there is a widespread practice of people at all levels wanting to be given 'commission' as if they are entitled to it. Foreign investors are the easy targets and can be hassled by various people, including highlevel government ofcials, who are hell-bent on rent-seeking. Te 'commission culture' is one of the many facets of corruption, but because it stands out so prominently in Sub-Saharan Africa, it can be regarded as a syndrome.

## **Notes**

1. David Beasley, speaking at 'Geneva Conference on National Transformation—With Special Focus on Science & Technology, Business & Industry', 7 October, Africana Hotel, Kampala, Uganda. Te conference was jointly organized by the Geneva Institute for Leadership & Public Policy and the Science & Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) of South Korea.

**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part III**

**Africa's Forgotten Mission of Nation-Building: What are Missing**

# **5**

## **Finding the Missing Links**

## **Internalizing Development: The Question of Intent**

One would think that by now, more than 50 years since the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries gained independence, they would have completed the task of nation-building. But the reality is that a big mismatch exists between Africa's legal, political and economic institutions in name and what these actually deliver in practice. Tis appears to be an outcome of a serious lack of ownership and a failure to 'internalize' development. Such a perception is shared by African scholars.1

Before people can 'internalize' development (that is, being oriented towards development as individuals), some kind of visions or schemes for development at the national level to which people can ascribe would be required. Hence, the government's 'moral authority'—which derives from leadership, credibility, performance, etc.—is vital to encouraging people to actively comply with government initiatives. Certainly, the formation of a national consensus and unity will be a huge boost for development. But as many Africans would divulge, their national identity, sense of nation and patriotism are comparatively weak and ambiguous. Tis, together with the weakness of the role of the states, has impeded the ability of African countries to pursue development. As a result, many African nations have spent decades following independence with the facade of development, like electoral democracy and economic liberalization, without substantively making much progress in the essence of nation-building and modernization.

Tere is a popular saying that poverty should not be passed on to the next generation. Te task of development has to be taken seriously by African countries because they are certain to face mounting social, economic and political pressures that can erupt and unleash untenable consequences.

As far as the political system is concerned, the 'hybrid regime' that is typical of Sub-Saharan Africa has proven to be unsuccessful and should also be redressed. Africa's hybrid regimes which combine the formality of liberal-democratic polity with neo-patrimonial authoritarianism are the outcome of the adaptation of the Western political system to 'local needs'. Te problem is that they have the attribute of being neither democratic nor transformative, but in essence are status quo-oriented. Rather than being transitory, this type of polity coupled with problematic electoral democracy appears to be assuming permanence in Africa.

Te downsides of this kind of system are that it seemingly satisfes (even if in a minimalist fashion) popular demand, while protecting the vested interests of the privileged class, so that it is ultimately status quo-promoting. But what may be a comfort zone for political leaders can turn out to be exactly the opposite of what 'national development' requires. David Booth and Dianna Cammack rightly point out the clear gap that exists between formal democratic institutions and the reality in Africa: 'Te trouble with democracy, as a substantive reality and not just a set of formal arrangements, is that its efectiveness depends on social and economic conditions that are not yet enjoyed in most developing countries'.2

African countries should pause and think about how to comprehensively and meaningfully alter their approach of development rather than following the same course that will only yield the same results. Tis is a critical task of 'internalizing' development, and it comes down to the basic question of intent. Tere are so many variables that can have an impact on the livelihood of nations, but African countries should be able to discern between 'external variables' and 'internal variables' and understand their implications.

Te reason why Sub-Saharan Africa's 'development frame' has been inefective in comparison to other regions like East Asia is that Africa got the priorities or sequencing wrong: it treats the external variables as the 'principal' variables while relegating the internal variables to a 'secondary' status. Sub-Saharan African countries have always tended to seek explanations and solutions 'outside' of themselves, and they continue to do so, even though they talk about ownership. Many Asian countries, and particularly South Korea, understood that development is what comes from within, like taking action to catch up with rich countries with a strong sense of responsibility and ownership.

South Koreans could have placed the blame for the country's predicaments on a range of external factors like the colonial legacy, the Korean War, geopolitics, geographical and natural conditions, etc. Tey could have relied on foreign aid without making strenuous eforts for development, leaving the nation's destiny in the hands of outsiders and external dynamics. If this had been the case, Korea would never have even come close to what it achieved.

So the real question lies in the *intent* of Sub-Saharan African nations. How much do African leaders, elites and the general public want to see change? What is the thinking of political leaders and are they really prioritizing national development or are they more interested in amassing wealth for themselves and simply staying in power as long as they can? What is certain is that economic transformation and the overall national development that entails structural changes will not occur as a result of technical prowess and the introduction of systems only.

One of the misguided thoughts that is widely held in the region is that people cannot do things and need assistance from outsiders because they lack the necessary 'capacity'. But capacity is not something that can be injected into someone and then have an immediate efect like vaccination; there is the 'knowledge' part and the 'application' part, and while the former can be gotten from others, the latter is totally up to oneself. In the absence of determination and implementation, knowledge will end up merely as knowledge. When there is a willingness to learn, it will simply be a matter of time before knowledge and skills will be acquired. Nothing can happen all at once and everything is achieved through the 'building-block' approach, as no one has skills and expertise from the beginning.

An overwhelming number of invitation programmes for capacity-building, study tours, conferences, education, cultural exchanges, etc. are ofered to Africans of various backgrounds by donor countries and organizations. Many entry points are provided, but apparently many Africans are not fully taking advantage of these programmes to promote their individual and collective capacity.

Edmund Phelps, the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2006, rightly points out that 'economic growth is dependent on the character of the nation'.3 Mindful of this, it will be worthwhile to fgure out what would be the 'missing links' to development. In my view, they are the following three elements: (1) a sense of nation or national identity; (2) 'development-mindedness'; and (3) a strong role played by the state—coherent industrial policy, prioritization of agriculture-rural development, etc. For African countries, securing these missing links is certainly achievable if there is the intent to do so.

But we also need to take account of the realities such as the 'odd' electoral democracy, the infuence of the internet/social media and globalization, the government's policy of providing handouts, etc. Te development of ICT enabling greater access, sharing of information and inter-connectivity, along with economic globalization, are also afecting the lives of African people. Tese would make people conscious of global trends and raise their expectations of the things to come.

Tis, coupled with the dependency syndrome which seems to have only been exacerbated over time by the government's policy of providing handouts, has fostered a troubling environment where people's demand keeps growing to the extent that meeting these demands becomes unsustainable. Te paradox is that while political leaders and civil servants struggle to respond to people's demands with what available resources they have, the population do not become any more empowered in terms of becoming more responsible and productive. Social pressure mounts when African states continue to fail to deliver public services and mismanage the economy.

African countries and the international community alike should take a long hard look at what takes place underneath the facade of African dynamics. Let us take economic growth, for example. It is true that over the last decade or so, many Sub-Saharan African countries have achieved quite impressive growth and this is to be commended. However, when one looks at the substance, growth was led by extractive industries (and now the downturn because of this), and multi-nationals or foreign companies were the ones that profted the most. Business, investments and economic growth did not translate into meaningful industrial transformation, the creation of a manufacturing sector or the creation of signifcant job opportunities for the masses.

When African economies are assessed in terms of the key parameters of economic development like industrial structure, infrastructure and agriculture, there is hardly any country that would qualify as a success.4 A raw materials or commodity-based industrial structure, absolute shortage and poorly maintained physical infrastructure, a rudimentary and non-competitive agricultural sector, etc. are the causes and at the same time the refections of chronic weaknesses of the Sub-Saharan African economies.

Many countries are belatedly prioritizing the expansion of physical infrastructure and the increase in power-generating capacity. It is surprising to see that the countries are still struggling to achieve the minimum level of the most basic features of infrastructure, like roads, railways and electricity supply. Tis is often attributed to a lack of funding, but human failure, which manifests itself as mismanagement, diversion of funds, lack of will and follow-up actions, is more responsible for such defciencies.

In many cases, the conditions and eforts for 'economic take-of' were not put together from the start. Rural-agricultural development, a backbone for economic transformation, has not been given due attention and pursued energetically because of a lack of understanding of the basics of economics and a reluctance to foresee the problems ahead. When it comes to the formulation and, more importantly, the implementation of national policies, the myopic approach has always incurred heavy costs.

Many things that people are hoping for in developing countries may not easily come about when the leaders' and people's way of life and work patterns are steadfastly maintained. Te situation is that people are unwilling to change their attitudes and yet they want to become better of. But how you change without changing? Tis demands a holistic and long-term view of the problems and solutions, and self-refection.

What African countries can easily do if they have the willingness to do so is to hold national dialogues, leading to action-oriented national campaigns to enhance people's awareness of national tasks and to build a national consensus on the way forward. Nation-building is far from being achieved in the region. Te identifcation and pursuit of societal and national objectives and values are vital for the nation to move forwards, and common goals or interests should be established at the national as well as the community level.

But what will be counterproductive is sectarianism or sectarian interest-seeking at the extreme, especially when the social fabric and social capital are weak, as is the case in Africa. Tere is no shortage of public gatherings or events, and very long hours are spent conducting protocols and listening to what everyone has to say. Tese should become venues for leaders and the people to engage in fruitful discussions and debates on public agendas and how to work together to achieve national goals.

## **A Sense of Nation and National Identity**