- 73 ܐƌŵƃܐ ܓƢƀ ܐſƢƉــƎ ܕƌܓــƢܐ ܐܘ ܐܘƉــƍܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: Ŵܒܓــ ųــƍƉ Ǝــſܘ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕܗ ̈ــƊܐ ܕܨܒــŴ ƄƏܘܐ ܐƣ̈ 20 ܐܕ ƗܒــŹ ƦــƀƉűƟ ̇ ƚƇ ܘƎƟƦƉ ƎſųƆ܂ ܘƉܐ ܕܐܬܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܒƦܪܗ ܘŵŶܐ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܘƎƃ ܓ ̈ــűܐ ܒƖــŴܗܕųƌ ܘܐŶــű ܘƆܒــƅ ܒƕܕ ܘܢųــƍƉ ƎſųƆ Ū ̇ Ɛƌ Ǝſűſܗ ܉Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܐ Ǝــƀƌܗ űــƃ Ǝــƀƌܕܗ Ǝƀ̈ ̈Ǝŷ ܗƎƀƆ ܒƦƆƦܐ ܙƌ ƎſųƆ ܒܓŴ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ܂ ܘƃƦƤƉ

**2** ŴƆ] + ƈźƉ D **5** ̇ ųƤƀƌ BCDP: ܐƤƀƌ L | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƠܕܒ B in textu, ܬܐŴƌƮƉܐƦƉ B in marg. **6** ŴܒƐƌ BDLP: ŪƐƌ C **7** ܐƦƇƉ BDLP: ܢƦƇƉ C **9** ƈƕܕ [om. L | ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƘŴƏ̈ ŴƇƀƘ P **10** ŴƇƕܐ [+ ܗܘܘ P **11** ܘܢųƇƃܘ [+ ƎƀƇſܐ BCD | ܐƀƉűƟܐ L, Epit.: ܐſܐƉűƟܐ CDP: ܐſܐƀƉűƟܐ B **12** ƎſƢƉܐ Ƣƀܓ [om. BD, D suppl. in marg. **13** ܐܦ [om. L **14** Ʀſܕܐ LP, Epit.: Ʀſܘܐ BCD | ƦƖܒŹܐܬ CDLP: ƦƖܒŹܐܬܬ B **19** ƎſƢƉܐ DLP: ƎſƢƉܕܐ BC **22** ƅܒƆܘ űŶܘܐ LP, Epit.: űŶܘܐ ƅܒƆܘ BCD **23** ƎƀƆܗ LP, Epit.: ƎſųƆ BCD | Ǝƀƌܕܗ BCD, Epit.: ƎſųƆ LP

Consequently, because 'things that are said' are nothing else than words and because it is this division with which he begins, it is evident that he is teaching about simple words."108

71 Now, those who state that the goal of the treatise *Categories* concerns only simple concepts which we acquire about things receive a reason for what they want to say from various arguments109. There is no other way to speak about them than to interrupt our narrative here and to discuss those issues which we have mentioned just above.

#### *[Genera, species, and Platonic forms]110*

72 Philosophers do not agree with each other in their research about genera (γένη) and species (εἴδη), but in their teachings on these issues they have introduced a number of different concepts111. Now, Plato and all those from the Academy hold the following view on genera and species (εἴδη). They state that each thing that exists naturally in the world has a certain form (εἶδος) by itself, but it also possesses a form with its Creator112 which gives subsistence to its essence and according to which it is imprinted and comes into being in the world. Additionally, when someone sees it, then he also receives its form in his memory, and it has subsistence in his mind. Thus, the same form appears in three ways, i.e. with the Creator, in the thing, and in the memory of the person who knows it113.

73 For example, they say that a carpenter or any other kind of craftsman first imprints inside his mind the forms (εἴδη) and shapes (σχήματα) of those things that are produced by him and then carves and furnishes them. And when someone else comes thereafter and sees his works, then he will bring them into his memory and capture and preserve them inside his mind. It will thus

**108** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 9.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat*. 8.29–33.

**109** Cf. the reference to *Cat*. 11b15 by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.8. Sergius discusses this point of view below, in §80.

**110** This excursus by Sergius has a parallel in that section of Ammonius' commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* which refers to *Isag*. 1.9–12. In the latter passage, Porphyry addresses the question of whether genera and species exist in reality or in bare thought. In answering this question, Ammonius turns to the Platonic teaching of Ideas, or Concepts, that are contained in the Intellect of the Demiurge, which Sergius associates with one of the interpretations of the *Categories*, namely the one that states that the scope of this treatise pertains to concepts alone.

**111** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.24–26, who specifies that the disagreement is found between Plato and Aristotle.

**112** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–6: δῆλον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ εἴδη. See also 41.20–21: ὁ γὰρ δημιουργὸς πάντα ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα.

**113** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–13.

 ܐſŵŶ C: ܐſŵŶܕ D **3** ܘܐܦ BCDL: ܐܦ P, Epit. **8** ƎſųƆ] om. C **9** Ŵܒܓ BCDL, Epit.: űƀܒ P **11** ƎſųƀƐ̈ ƍܓ BCDP, cf. ƎſųƐƍܓ Epit.: Ǝſųƀ̈ ƍƐƍܓ L | ܐƀ ̈ ƉűƟ BCDP, Epit.: ܐƀƊſű̈ Ɵ L **15** ܬܐ ̈ ܐƌƮŶܐ .:Epit ,BD ܐſƮŶܐ ܕܨܒŴ ̈ܬܐ ̈ܬܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ :CP ܕܨܒــŴ Ŵܕܨܒــ L **16** ܐƦــƇƉ LP: ܢƦــƇƉ BCD **17** ܐƌŵــƃܕܐ [om. BCDP Ʀſܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ LP: Ʀſܕܐ ܗܘܐƦƌܕ BCD **18** ܘܬܐƢƟ BCDL: ܐܪܘܬܐƟ P **19** ܐƦƊƀŷƣ BDLP: ƦſܐƊƀŷƣ C **23** ܘܬܐƢƠܘܒ BCDL: ܐܪܘܬܐƠܘܒ P

happen that they subsist in three ways, i.e. in the mind of the craftsman, in his works, and in the memory of another person who sees them.

74 In the same way, also the Creator of the universe (first) has essentially thought about the natural constitution of things114. When these thoughts emanated from the essence, they immediately became substances, and with them he imprinted, engraved, and established all things here. It is also through these primary thoughts that he is still constantly forming and constituting everything, applying his craft of creation. And we, humans, who come into being for a particular time, observe natural things, seek the knowledge of them, and retain concepts of them in our memory.

75 Now, they suppose that these thoughts which are considered to be substantially with the Creator are the primary genera and forms (εἴδη) of things. And those imprintings and engravings that are generated from them here in the matter of natures they designate as natural genera and species of things. And further, those concepts of things that are collected in our memory as knowledge of them they call posterior genera and species of things115.

76 In order to further explain this subject matter more clearly, I will immediately provide another example which they introduce. For instance, let there be a ring, they say, with an engraved image (εἰκών) of a particular person. Then someone takes a large amount of ordinary wax (κηρός) and make with that ring multiple imprints on all that wax. After that, also another person who has not seen the ring will come and see the imprints on the wax, put together the images of all of them, and save them in his memory. So, it is obvious that in this case the image will exist in three ways, namely first on the ring, after that on the wax, and then finally in the memory of the person who came and saw the

**114** Thus, the Platonic Forms are associated by Sergius with the Demiurge's thoughts, the notion which apparently belonged to Ammonius, and later on (see §75) he also identifies the thoughts of Demiurge with the primary genera and species, or forms, of the existing things. This identification allows Sergius to further explicate the system of genera and species in the ontological terms, cf. his further excurses in ontology and logic in §§129–133 and 241–242.

**115** Ammonius speaks in his commentary on the *Isagoge* of the forms that are in the Demiurge and that are "prior to the many" (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), forms that are "in the many" (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς), and those which are imprinted in our thought and are "after the many and last-generated" (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ὑστερογενές), see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.6–13 (cf. Elias, *In Isag.*  48.15–30). Philoponus discusses this issue in the context of primary and secondary substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat*. 58.13–21.

 C **9** ƎƍƀƤƍƄƉܘ CDL: ƎƀƤƍ̇ ƄƉܘ P: ƎƀƤƍƃƦƉܘ B **10** ƈƃܕ BCLP: ƈƄܕܒ D | ܐƌŵƃܘܐ BCDL: ܐƍƄſܘܐ P **11** ܘܐܦ BCDP: ܐܦ L **12** Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ̈ųƀܘܢ :L ܐܕ ƣܐܕ P: Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ̈Ǝſųƀ ܘܐܕ ƍƀƃ BCD | ƅſܘܐ [+ ܐƉ P **13** ܐƊƣܕܪܘ BCD: ܐƊƣܪܘ LP | ܐƆܘųܒ BCDL: ܐƌܘųܒ P **15** ܗܘ̣ ̇ ܘ ܕƃــųƆŴܘܢ :BCDP ܐܕƣܐ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ̇ ܘ ܕƘــƢܫ :LP ܕſƢƘــƥ **16** L ܗ ܗ BCD | ܬܗܘܢŴــſűŶ LP: ̈ܕܐ | BCD Ŵſűƀŷſܬܗܘܢ űŶ BCDL: ܕܐ̈ űŶܕ P **18** ƎƀܒƀƐƌܕ BCDP: ƎƀܒƐƌܕ L **21** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P | ŴƠƀźźƙſƮƘ BP: ŴƠƀźŹܐƙſƮƘ CD: ŴƠƀźƙſƮƘ L

wax. While the image on the ring is one both in its form (εἶδος) and in number, what derives from it on the wax are multiple images that differ from each other, not in form but in number. And further, in the mind of the person who finally saw them on the wax it will again be united and become one image that is derived from many116.

77 Thus, also the genera and species (εἴδη) of things exist with the Сreator of beings, like the image on the ring. They are imprinted and established in the natures of things through (his) activity117, like the images on the wax. And then we come to the knowledge of natures and collect inside our intellect genera and species (εἴδη) of each thing among natural beings. Just as the image on the ring is singular, so also all the forms (εἴδη) of things with the Creator are simple. And also, just as the singularity of the image which is on the ring is divided into multiplicity on the wax, so also each one of the simple forms (εἴδη) which are with the Creator is divided in the matter of natures into countless individual items118 which differ from one another not in form — for the form of all of them is one — but in number through which they are divided from one another in their unity. And inside our intellect, from multiple individual beings which are divided from one another only in number the species (εἴδη) of things are again summoned, and they appear as singulars which are acquired from the multitude.

78 So this is how all followers of Plato's ideas teach about these things. But Aristotle and all the Peripatetics, to whom also Alexander of Aphrodisias be-

**116** The same example is used by Ammonius, see *In Isag.* 41.13–20.

**117** Ms. P: "creation". A marginal commentary in mss. BD: "matter".

**118** Syr. *qnome*, "individuals, persons".

̈ƀƉܐ ܕŴƆܬ ƕܒŴܕܐ űƟ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈ƣܐ ܗ ܘܐܦ ܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ ܐƢƘܘܕƀƐſܐ: ܒܐܕ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܒܓŴ ܬܪƦƀƕܢ ŹــŪ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƎſ ܕܒųܘƆܐ ܘܒų ųܒ ܂ƅƏ ƎſܕŴƉ ܐƆ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܓƀــƢ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܗܘܢ ƀƇƕــųܘܢ ܕܗƀƆــƎ ܐſƦſــų ųــƇƃ ܂ƎــſűƀŶܐ ƁܓــƏ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƎſ ܕܒƦܪƦƀƕܢ ܘܒŴƖܗܕƎƌ ųƆ ܐ܂ƀ̈ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܒųܘƆܐ ƍƀƃ ųƆ ƎſųƊƤƉܘ ܬܗܘܢ̈ B76v ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ƈــƀƃܗ ƎــſųƇƄܒ ܘܢ܂ųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ܐſƮŶܘܐ ܐƀƍƀƕܪ̈ ̈ƀܐ ƎƀƙƇƉ: ƈźƉ ̣ܕܗŴƌܢ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ƍƀƃ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈ƣܐ ܗ ̈ƍƀܐ܉ ƈƕ ܐܕ ƃ ƈƕܕ ƈƕ ܘܢųƆ Ǝſűƀܒƕܕ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈Ʀܒܐ ܕƎſ ܗ ̈ܬܐ܂ ܒƄ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƊſŴƟܘ Ǝſųƀ̈ ƍƀƃ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ̈ƣܐ ƎƀƇƖƉ: ܗ ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ̇ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܉ ܓƍ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ųƇƃ ܕƎſųƊƤƉ Ɔــųܘܢ ̈ܪƍƀƕــƀܐ ܘܐŶــſƮܐ: źƉــƈ ܕܗƀƆــƎ ܒܓــŴ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܘܒƦƇƊܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܂ 10

̈ƣܐ ̇ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ܉ ܗƀƆــƎ ܐܕ ųƇƃ ƈƕ ƈƀƃܗ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƊܒ 79 ̈ Ɛƍܐ ܒƖــƁ: ܗƀƆــƎ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــųƊſŴܘܢ ܒܓــŴ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܘܓ C114v ܢŴــƌܕܗ̣ ƈــźƉ :ƎــƀƆܕܗ ܘܢųــƇſܕ Ǝــſܕ ܘܢųƀƍƣܪ̈ŴــƘ ƈƕ ܂ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ܂ ̈Ʀܒܐ ųƇƃܘܢ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܉ ܒƦܪ ƈƀƇƟ ܐƉ Ƅܒ ƎƀܒƐƌƦƉ

80 ܗƣܐ ܕƎſ ƍƙƌܐ ƈƕ ܗ 15 ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƋƀƏ ܗܘܐ ƎƆ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ ƋƀƏ ܗܘܐ ̇ ̈ƀــźܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐƏܒــƢܘ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ Ƥƀƌــų ƤƘ ܐƍƀƕܪ̈ ƈƕ ƎƀƤ̈ ƎƆ ܕƎſ܉ ܐƌ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪſــŴܣ܂ ܗƀƆــƎ ܗƀƃــƈ ܒــƌŵܐ ܗƌܐ ܨ v22P ̇ ܒƀــƎ ܗܘܘ ̈ــƐܐ ̇ ܕܗܕܐ܂ ܐƉــƢܘ ܓƀــƢ ܕܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ƆــƋ ܕƕــƈ ܓƍ ܕŴƊƀƠƌܢ ܬƦſŴŶܗ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕܐܦ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪſــŴܣ ƮƐƕܐ ܕŶܒƎƀƤ ƈƃ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦ ܒƇƖــƊܐ: ܗ Ǝــſܕ ܐƐــ̈ 20 ƍܓ ܐ܂ƌܗ ܒܐƦــƄܒ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ųــƆ ƋــƀƏ :ܘܢųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ܕƐƌƦƉܒƀــƎ ܒܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܕƀƤƍƃƦƉــƎ r7L

̇ ܘ + ;P ܐűƍƐƄƆܪܣ :BCDL ܐƍƐƄƆــűܪܘܣ | P ܐܦ :BCDL ܘܐܦ **1** ܗ L | ܐƀƐſܘܕƢƘܐ L, D in marg.: ܐƀــƐſűƏܘƢƘܐ BCD: ܐƀƐſűƠſܪŴــƘܐ P **3** ̇ ųــƇƃ BDLP: ̇ ųƇƃܘ C **4** ƎſųƊƤƉܘ BCDL: Ǝſܕ ƎſųƊƤƉ P | Ǝſܕ [om. D **5** ܐſƮŶܘܐ BCDP: ܐƌƮŶܘܐ L | ܘܢųƆ] om. B **6** ܐƣ̈ ƈƕ ܐܕ ̈ƀܐ ƍƀƃ ܢŴƌ ̇ ܗ [om. hom. P **8** ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ ̇ ųƇƃ LP: ̇ ųƇƃ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ BCD **9** Ŵܒܓ BCDP: Ŵܕܒܓ L **12** ƎƀƆܗ [om. P | ܐƦƀƕܬܪ Ŵܒܓ ܘܢųƊſŴƟ] om. P **13** ܘܢųƀƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ LP: ܘܢųƍƣܪŴƘ BCD ̇ **16** BCDP ܕܗƣܐ :L ܗƣܐ **15** ųƤƀƌ LP: ܐƤƀƌ BCD **17** ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ [+ ܗܕܐ P | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟܕ BP **18** ̇ BCD ܬŶــƦſŴܐ :LP ܬŶــƦſŴܗ **19** ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B **20** ƎſųƊƤƉ L: ųƊƤƉ BCDP | ƋƀƏ CDLP: ܐƊƀƏ B

longs, do not acknowledge at all those primary forms (εἴδη) which are with the Creator. However, they completely accept those ones which are in matter and in our intellect, and it is about them that their whole teaching is. They name those (forms) which are in matter natural, and those ones which are in our intellect they call noetic and posterior. Thus, in all their writings about natures they teach about natural forms (εἴδη) because they are the nature and the subsistence of things. On the other hand, in those writings which they have composed on the whole craft of logic, they introduce those genera and species (εἴδη) which, as we have said, are called noetic and posterior, because they have subsistence only in intellect and in speech.

79 Therefore, in the teaching on the whole logical craft you ought to investigate those species (εἴδη) and genera whose subsistence is only in intellect, as we have said. These are the subject of all the books on logic, and it is about their divisions that I will speak shortly afterwards.

#### *[The goal of the* Categories*: Conclusion]*

80 But now we shall return to what we began to speak about. We began to say, namely, that some people consider the goal of the treatise *Categories* to pertain only to simple concepts. And when they intend to bring forth a proof for that, they do it in the following way. They state that, if it is the ten genera which comprise everything that exists in the world and which are also called "categories" that (the author) intended to speak about in this treatise, then, since the genera that are considered in the logical craft are those concepts which are ̈źƀƤܐ ̈ܬܐ ܒܓŴ Ŵƕܗܕƌܐ܂ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ƋƆ ܕƈƕ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ Ƙ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƍƉ ̇ ƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܂ ̇ ܕųƇƃ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƤƀƌ

̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܬܪƞſܐƦſ ܐƏܒƢܘ ƈƕ ųƤƀƌ ܕƦƃܒܐ ܗƌܐ: ܕųƍƉܘܢ 81 ܐƆܐ ܗ ̈źƀــƦܐ: ܘƆܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܘܐܦ ƊſܒŴƄƀƇܣ܉ Ɔܐ ƈƕ ܨܒŴ r66D ̈ܬܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƤƘ ̈źƀܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ̈Ʀźƀܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƈƕ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ƤƘ ̈Ƈܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƤƘ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ B77r ܒ ƈƕ ܐƢƉܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƤƀƌ r115C ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƈƕ ųƇƃܘܢ ܐűŷƃ: ܗŴƌ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܒűƀ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ̈ܬܐ ƤƘ ̈ܕƎƕ ܨܒŴ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܕŴƤƉ ƤƘ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ ܕƎſ ƈƕ ܒ ̈Ǝ܂ ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ƠƙƏ ųƤƀƌ ƈƕ ƎƀƆܗ ܐ܂źƀ̈ ƤƘ

**4** ܘܐܦ CDLP: ܐܦ B | ܣŴƄƀƇܒƊſ BCD: ƑƄƀƇܒƊſ LP **6** űŷƃܐ BCDL: ܐűŷƃܐ P **7** Ǝƕܕ̈ ܕŴƤƉ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ̈ ܬܐ ƤƘ Ŵܨܒ [om. hom. P **12** ܐƃܗܪ BCDL: ܐƃܪŴܒ P | ܘܗܐ BCDL: ܐƌܘܗ P **13** ܐƍŹ LP: ܐƀــƖŹ BCD | ܐƘ ̈ ŴــƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܐƙ ̈ ƏŴــƇƀƘܕ LP **15** ƑƀƇŹŴźƏܐܪ L: ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **16** ܐƆܕ BCDL: ܐƆ P | ܐƇ̈ Ɵ] + ƎƀƆܗ BCD **18** ܬܐŴــƍƙƇƊƆ LP: ܬܗŴــƍƙƇƊƆ B, + ܗ sup. lin. in CD **20** ƎــſƢ ̇ Ɵܕ [+ tit. ܐƣ̈ ƈźƉ ܐܕ BCD ܕƦƇƉܐ ܕƊƃܐ ܘܐƎƀƇſ ܐųſƦſܘܢ

collected from things in the memory, it is evident that the goal of the whole treatise concerns simple concepts119.

81 However, those who correctly comprehended the goal of this treatise, among whom was also Iamblichus, stated that it was neither simple things only, nor simple words only, nor simple concepts only that the goal of this treatise concerned, but all of them together, i.e. it concerns simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts120. So much for the goal of this treatise.

82 Now, since the teaching here is about simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts, does this mean that the Philosopher introduced at this point an endless number of words, things, or concepts? For, behold, there is such a number of them as would be impossible to encompass! However, this is not what the knowledge of philosophers aims at, because they always establish general rules (κανόνες) in order to encompass multiple things for the sake of proper understanding of their activities. Therefore, in his teaching on these things Aristotle too fled from the unlimited number of words, and elevated his teaching to their primary genera that he took as general rules by which he would be able to skilfully and intelligently accomplish his teaching121.

83 At this point, we will conclude what just above was intended to explain briefly for the reader what the general content of this book is.

**119** See Philoponus, *In Cat*. 9.4–8: οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων νομίσαντες διαλέγεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, οἷος ἐγένετο ὁ Πορφύριος, φασὶν ὅτι περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος· ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς θεωροῦνται καί εἰσιν ὑστερογενῆ, ἅτινά ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διανοίᾳ· περὶ νοημάτων ἄρα ἐν τούτοις τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὁ λόγος (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.7–11). Here, Philoponus applies the same terms which Ammonius used in his commentary on the *Isagoge* when speaking of the third kind of forms according to the Platonists, see §75.

**120** Sergius' text corresponds nearly verbatim to Philoponus, *In Cat*. 9.12–15: οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.17–18; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 19.35–20.12.

**121** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 12.1–4. Ammonius discusses this subject at length in the *prolegomena* part of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 17.1–20.15.

̇

	- ̇ ܘ ܕƤƉܐܠ ܒűŷܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƆƞƉܐ܉ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܗ ̇ űƠ ܘƆܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƘ 86 Ɔܐ ܓƢƀ ܗ ̇ ƣــƢܪܐ ܐܘ ̇Ɛــơ܉ ܐƆــƞܐ ܕܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕſــƎ ܕƘ ̇ ܕܓــƈ܂ ܗ ܐܘ ƢــſƢƣ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎƉ
	- ܕܓŴƇܬܐ ƌܐƢƉ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƌܐƉــƢ ܕƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ƆųƉــƅ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ܗܝ 15 ƅــƆųƉ ܐƆ űــƃ Ǝــſܕ ܐܢ :ƢــſƢƣ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ ܗܕܐ ƅƆųƉ űƃ ܕܐܢ ܕܓƈ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ܐܢ ƌܐƢƉ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܕƆܐ ƅƆųƉ܉ ܐܢ ƃــű ƆųƉــƅ ܗܕܐ ܗܘ܂̣ ƢſƢƣ ƅƆųƉ ܐƆ űƃ ܘܐܢ ܗܘ܂ ƈܕܓ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ

̇ܒــű ƣــƢܪܐ ܘܕܓƇــŴܬܐ܉ ̣ƉــƎ 87 ̣ܗܘ ܗƀƃــƈ ܗƌܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܕƇƉــƦܐ ܕƕ ̇ ܘ ƀƉűƟܐ: ƎƉ űŶܐ ܕƊƀƏܐ ܐƅſ ̈Ƈܐ ŪƃƢƉ ܪܘƃܒų ܗ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ 20 ܒ Ǝſܬܪܬ

̈ƣܐ **1** ̇ :BDL ܐܕ ųƀƣ̈ ܐܕ P: om. C | ƥƌܕܐ...**2** ƢƉܐƌ CDLP, Epit.: ƢƉܐƌܕ ƥƌܐ B **2** ƎƇƘ BCDP, Epit.: ƎــƇƘܙ L **5** ܙܠ ̇ ̇ ܬܐ .:Epit ,BCDL ܐ ܐ P **6** ơ ̇ ƐƘܕ LP, Epit., corr. in marg. in BD: ܐƟŴƐƘ BCDE | ƅſܐ LP: ƅſܕܐ BCD | ƥƌܕܐ BP, Epit.: ƥƌܐ CDL | ƢƉܐƌ BCLP, Epit.: ƢƉܐƌܕ D ƈــƃܕ2 BCDL, Epit.: ƈــƃ P **8** ƎــƀܒƠƖƉ] + ƈــƀƃܗ L **9** ܐƘ ̈ ŴــƐƇƀƘ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƙ ̈ ƏŴــƇƀƘ P **10** ŴــƠƀźƉƮܓƆ LP: ܐƠــƀźƊƉƮܓƆ B: ܐ̈ ƠــƀźƉܐƢܓƆ C: ܐƠــƀźƉƮܓƆ D **12** ܐƣƢــƘƦƉ L: ܫƢــƘƦƉ P: ܫƢــƙƉ BCD | ܬܐƢــſƢƣ BCDL: ܪܐƢــƣ P | ܬܐŴــƇܘܕܓ LP: ܬܐŴــƇܕܓ ܐܘ BCD ܐƕܕŴƉ BCDL: ܐƕܕŴƤƉ P **13** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ :L ܬܘܒ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ :P ܬܘܒ ųƆ ܗ BCD **15** Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BCD ƅƆųƉ űƃ ܕܐܢ ܗܝ ܐƖſűſ] om. hom. B **16** ܗܕܐ [om. P | ܗܝŴƇƕ] + ܗܕܐ P **17** ܐܢ2 [+ Ǝſܕ P | ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ ܗܕܐ BCDL: ܗܕܐ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ P **20** ŪƃƢƉ LP: ŪƃܪƦƉ BCD

#### *[Kinds of speech]122*

87 Now, this type of speech which expresses truth and falsehood is constructed in its primary composition from two utterances127, namely from the subject

**122** Mss. BCD have the subtitle, "On the kinds of speech, i.e. how many and what they are".

**123** Ammonius writes about "parts of speech" (μέρη τοῦ λόγου) in his commentary on the *Isagoge* right after his account of the Platonic Forms, and this was probably the reason for Sergius to deal with this topic in the same context. Ammonius mentions five "parts" which correspond to the list found by Sergius but adding also the vocative: τοῦ δὲ λόγου πολλά εἰσι μέρη, ἀποφαντικὸν εὐκτικὸν κλητικὸν προστακτικὸν πυσματικόν (*In Isag.* 43.4–5). Ammonius discusses this topic also in the introductory part of his commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* (*In De Int*. 2.9–25), where he calls them, similarly to Sergius, "kinds of speech" (εἴδη τοῦ λόγου) and gives concrete examples of each one of them.

**124** Cf. the examples (deriving mostly from Homer) by Ammonius in *In De Int*. 2.10–20. The last example by Ammonius corresponds to that of Sergius.

**125** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.6–12.

**126** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.12–17.

**127** Syr. *bat qale*, "utterances, words", corresponding to Gr. φωναί.

 ܐƣ̈ ̈ــƐܐ ܘܐܕ ƍܕܓ ܐƣܪŴــƘ ƈźƉ BC: ƈźƉ ̈ƣܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ƍܕܓ ܐƍƣܪŴƘ D

that should be signified and from what signifies it128. What I mean is this. When someone says, "Socrates is walking", he makes a statement which is composed of two utterances, the name "Socrates" and the (phrase) "is walking". While "Socrates" is the subject that is characterized, the words "is walking" are pronounced in order to signify what he is doing. Thus, the utterances which are subjects of these compositions are always signified by something, while other ones which are predicated of them in these compositions signify a particular time and some activity129.

88 In the composition which I am here speaking about, "Socrates is walking", the name "Socrates" signifies a certain person, while the (phrase) "is walking" informs us about his activity, i.e. what he is doing, and also about the time it takes place. For if you say, "Socrates is walking", you signify the present time. But if you say, "Socrates walked", you express the past time. And further, if you say, "Socrates will walk", you point to the future time.

#### *[The ten primary genera]130*

89 We ought to know that in these compositions species (εἴδη) are always subjects that are defined and genera are predicated of them131. What I mean is this. Universal human being, i.e. humanity, and also universal horse, universal dog, and other things like that are species of animal, and animal is their genus. For, as we have said above, we observe each one of them and combine them in our mind into one genus that is imprinted in all of them132.

**128** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.17–20: περιέχει δὲ οὗτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύο τινά, τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἵνα δὲ σαφὴς γένηται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, εἴπωμεν οὕτως· δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι ὑποκείμενον λέγεται περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατηγορούμενον δὲ τὸ περὶ ἐκείνου λεγόμενον. Instead of using a Syriac equivalent for "predicate" (τό κατηγορούμενον), Sergius prefers to speak here of what signifies and what is signified, probably having the Gr. terms τι σημαίνει and τὸ σημαινόμενον in mind. In accord with this, Sergius speaks in §88 of grammatical tenses of the verbs. However, he switches again to the logical terminology in §89.

**129** The same examples appear in Ammonius, *In De Int*. 2.7–11.

**130** Mss. BCD have the subtitle, "On the difference between genera and species". The following section has a parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat*. 13.12–19, where another introductory point is discussed, namely the reason for the title of Aristotle's treatise (cf. further Philoponus, *In Cat*. 12.17–27 and Simplicius, *In Cat*. 15.26–18.6). Sergius' account, however, derives primarily from Ammonius' description of the "ascent to the universal" (ἡ εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομή) and the ten primary genera in *In Isag.* 17.1–20.14. The accounts of both Sergius and Ammonius are based on the so-called "Tree of Porphyry" as described in the *Isagoge* 4.1–8.6. Sergius turns again to this subject matter in §§165–172, speaking of universal and particular.

**131** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 13.12–15: λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πρόκειται αὐτῷ διδάξαι περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ὅτι τὰ μὲν εἴδη τοῖς αὑτῶν γένεσιν ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ γένη κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν ἑαυτῶν.

**132** On the three types of the universals, see §§78 and 80, above. Here Sergius speaks of only the third type, i.e. universals abstracted in human mind "after the many" (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς).

	 D **11** ƥܒŶܕ [lac. in P | ܘܢųƇƄƆ BCD: ܘܢųƇƃ P **16** ܘܗܘ̣ BCP: ܗܘ D **18** ƥƙƌ BCP: ܐܫƙƌ D **20** ƥƙƌ BCP, Epit.: ܐܫƙƌ D **21** ܬܐŴƀŶ1 CP, Epit.: ܬܐŴƀŶܕ BD

90 Further, regarding each one of these species, we observe particulars belonging to certain species and combine them in our memory into their species. What I mean is the following. When we observe this man, and that one, and the rest of them who are numerically distinguished from one another, we combine them in our memory into universal man, which is the nature of humanity, and we establish it as a species of all men. Similarly, also, when we observe all horses, dogs, and bulls, which are numerically distinguished from one another, we in the same way combine them in our intellect into universal horse and universal dog and subsume them under their species. And since such species are numerous and even countless, we further combine them into what someone might call one nature that contains them all, and this is what we call their genus.

91 Thus, animal is the genus for all these species. And this genus is in turn a species of animate body. For there is another genus of plants which comprises many species and which is also a species of animate body. And further, this animate body is a species of substance (οὐσία). For there is inanimate body which is a genus of all bodies that are inanimate and a species of substance.

92 So, substance is a genus which has no other (genus) that is prior to it. Below it, there are other genera, i.e. animate and inanimate body. And also, below the animate one there is a genus of animal. Below animal, then, there are species that are not further divided into genera, but into individual beings which differ from one another only numerically.

	- ̈ܬܐ 96 ƕűſƦƉܐ ܕƎſ ܗܕܐ ƢſƦſܐƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܐƦſ ܨܒŴ ̈ــƎ ̈ Ǝ ܒųܘſܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƠƀƍƏ ƊƀƟƦƌܕ ƎſųƉŴƍƟ Ǝƀƌܗ̣ Ǝſƞ ̈ ܒƊƇƖܐ ܕƆܐ Ɖ :ƎــſųſƦſܐ Ǝــſܕ ƎــƀƆܗ ƅــſܕܐ ܂Ǝſųƍƀƃ Ƌƀ ̇ ƟƦƌ ųܕܒ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܡűƉ ƈƕ

**1** ƦŶƦƆ P, Epit.: ƦŶƦƆܕ BCD **13** ƈƀƃܗ [om. B | ƁƤſܘܪ BCD, Epit.: ƥſܘܪ P **14** ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƊܒ P: ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ CD: ܗܕܐ ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ B **15** Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ CP: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ B ̈ƀــźܐ **16** ƤƘ ܐƍــƀƕܪ̈ űــƀܒ ƎــƀƍƉ ܐƆܕ [om. hom. B **17** ܐƍــƃܗ [+ tit. ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƈــźƉ BCD **18** ܐƊſŴƟ] + ܐƀƇܓ BCD **19** ƎſƢŶܐ BCD, Epit.: ܐƌƢŶܐ P **21** ƎƀƆܗ P: Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCD **22** ƎſųƉŴƍƟ BCP, corr. in marg. D: ƎſųƊſŴƟ D: ƎſųƀƉŴƍƠܒ add. in marg. BD

96 This may be better understood from the contraries: there are things in the world which cannot come into being by themselves but require something else through which their nature would subsist. These are, e.g., whiteness and black-

**133** Lit. "species of species". Sergius thus renders the Gr. εἰδικώτατος.

**134** Lit. "genus of genera", cf. Gr. γενικώτατος.

**135** Cf. Porphyry, *Isag*. 4.14–20.

**136** Syr. *bat qala* "utterance, speech", corresponds to Gr. φωνή.

**137** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.9–10: ὅσα οὖν ἐστιν αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενα καὶ

μὴ δεόμενα πρὸς τὸ ὑποστῆναι ἄλλου τινός, οὐσίαι λέγονται.

 D | ܬܐŴــƊƃܐܘ BCP: ܐƦــƊƊƃܐܘ D **6** ܐƢــƊƖܒ [+ ܪܒܐŴــƖܒ in marg. D ̇ + [ܒűܒƤܐ | D .marg in ܒƀƣŴƄܐ :B ܐܘ ܒƖــŴܪܒܐ ܐܘ ܒƄــƀƣŴܐ + [ܒƤƊــƄܐ ųſƦſܐ BCD ̈Ɗܐ **7** ƄƏܘܐ BDP: ܐƊƀ̈ ƄƏܘܐ C **9** ܕŴŷƇܒ ܘܢųſƦſܐ ܘܘܢųƌ] om.  ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ƈźƉ BCD **19** ƦƆܘܬ P, Epit.: ƦƆܬ ܐܘ BCDE | ܐƮƐƕܕ EP, Epit.: ƎſƢƐƕܕ BCD **20** ƎƀƆųƆ] + ƎſųƇƃ CD: + ܘܢųƇƃ B **21** ƎſųƇƄƆ ƦſܐƌŴܓ BCDE: ƦſܐƌŴܓ ƎſųƇƃ P | ƎſųƇƃ CDEP, Epit.: ܘܢųƇƃ B

ness, sweetness and bitterness, and all other figures (σχήματα), qualities, and colours. They cannot come to be just by themselves, but their subsistence is in something else. For whiteness exists in snow, or in milk, or in white lead, or in anything else like that138. Likewise, also blackness exists in wool or in leather139, sweetness exists in a fig or in honey, and bitterness exists in aloe or in wormwood (ἀψίνθιον). And in the same way, all colours, shapes, and other qualities have subsistence in other things, and their nature cannot subsist only by itself.

97 Thus, such things that have subsistence by themselves and do not require something else through which to subsist — whether they are corporeal or incorporeal — pertain to substance and are called substances. On the other hand, those things that cannot subsist by themselves apart from being in something else, as we have said, differ from substance, and the Philosopher discovered also their genera and species, placed them in the teaching and wrote generally about them too.

98 For he observed and saw that there is something in the world whose subsistence is in substance and which is spoken of by means of measures and numbers. For instance we are accustomed to speak of two cubits or three cubits, and also of one or two palms, of a period of ten months, or ten years, or of any other length. Such words he subsumed under one genus which comprises all of them in common and which he called quantity. For all

**138** Sergius' text is very close to what we find in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.3–9: μάθοιμεν δ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἔστι τινὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃ μὴ δύναται αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἃ καὶ συμβεβηκότα καλεῖται, λευκότης μελανία γλυκύτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ οὐ δύνανται ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἡ λευκότης ἢ ἐν ψιμμυθίῳ ἢ ἐν γάλακτι σώμασιν οὖσιν ὑφέστηκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

**139** Mss. B and D add in the margins: "In a raven or in a Cushite (i.e. an Ethiopian)".

 BCD **8** ܢŴƌܗ [om. B **10** ܘ ̇ ܗ [om. BCD **11** ܣŴŹܐŴƘ] + ܐƌܙ in marg. D | Ǝܒŵܘܒ BCD, Epit.: Ǝܒŵܕܒ P **12** ƎƍŷƄƣܐ BCD: ƎŷƄƣܐ P | ƦſܐƟܙܕ [+ tit. ܡűƉ ܬŴƆܕ ƈźƉ BCD **16** ܘ ̇ ܗ ųܒ ƎƍſųƊƤƉܕ [om. P **17** ܐƙƕܘܐ BCD: ܐƘܐƕܘ P **18** ܐƙƕܐ BCDL: ܐƘܐƕ P **19** ܐƙƕܐ BCDL: ܐƘــܐƕ P **20** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ ܘ ̇ ܗ P **21** ƎſųƐƍܕܓ LP: Ǝſ ̈ ųƀƐƍܕܓ BCD ̇ ܘ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢܐ | BCD Ɖــűܡ :LP Ɖܐ **22** ܗ ܡűƉ ܬŴƆ ƎƉ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƃ] om. hom. P ܬŴƆ CDL: ܬŴƆܕ B

measures, numbers, and calculations of times and years designate a certain quantity140.

99 Thus he discovered two universal genera which encompass multiple things, i.e. substance and quantity. But beyond them, he also saw other words that do not pertain to these two genera. For instance, we have just now spoken about sweetness and bitterness, and about all colours and shapes. They neither pertain to substance nor signify any quantity, because they subsist not by themselves but only in other natures, and they also do not possess any dimension of quantity. All such (words) he (i.e. Aristotle) subsumed under one universal genus141 which he called *pw'ṭws* (ποιότης, "quality")142. As for us, we call it sometimes *ḥayla* ("capacity") and sometimes *muzzaga* ("mixture"), since up to this time we haven't found among Syriac names one which would suit it perfectly143.

100 There are also other words which do not fall under one of those three genera that have been discussed. They have a certain relation to one another144, so that one of them may not be considered without the other. It is in the way of their existence that we call them, e.g. father and son, servant and master, double and half. For neither may a son be considered without a father, nor a servant without a master, nor a half without a double. But also, one may not say that a father, or a master, or a double exists without a son, a servant, or a half. It is all such things that the Philosopher further subsumed under one of the universal genera that he called *prosṭi* (πρός τι) which means "to something"145. Because, as we have said, when any of these things is spoken of, it receives its

**140** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.13–18.

**141** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.18–25. Ammonius speaks here of τὸ ποιόν, "the qualified". Sergius does not seem to make a clear distinction in his commentary between quality and things qualified (see particularly Book VI), although in some passages he speaks rather of the latter than of the former.

**142** Ms. B adds in the margins the Syriac equivalent *zna*, "quality".

**143** Cf. §§354–355 and 365, below. In §355, Sergius writes that he considers the Syriac term *zna* as the most fitting equivalent to the Greek ποιότης, although the two other terms, *ḥayla* and *muzzaga*, also appear in his work (see, e.g., §108), thus corroborating Sergius' statement that all three of them were used synonymously at his time. It is also worthy to note that in ms. E, which contains a selection of passages from Sergius' *Commentary* dating from the 8th century, the term *muzzaga* appears as the only variant in the passage which corresponds to §99.

**144** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29: σχέσις ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον.

**145** Sergius consistently applies the expression *lwat meddem*, "(in relation) to something", which renders the Greek πρός τι. Though it seems possible sometimes (e.g., here) to translate it literally, in what follows, I will use the terms "relation" and "relatives".

̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ ܕƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܒŴƙƀƠƍܬܗ Ɛƌܒܐ ƃــƀƌŴܐ܂ ܘܒƙƀƠƍــŴܬܐ ܕƆــŴܬ ܗ ܗ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƀƌŴƃ܂

	- ܐƤــƊŶ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــƀ̈ ̈Ƈܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƀƆــƦ ܐƌ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ 103 ܬܘܒ ܐŸƄƣ ܒ ̈ܕƎƕ ܙܒــƍܐ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܐſــƅ ܕƍſűƖƉــƎ ƊƆܐƉــƢ܉ ŴــƤƉܕ Ǝــƀ̈ ̈ــƐܐ܉ ܗƌ ܓƍ ̈ــƀܐ ƃــƊܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ̇ ܒــƦܪ ƍƣ ̈ƀܐ ſƮƐƕــƎ: ܐܘ ܐܬƁƇƉ ܘƍƉŴſܐ: ܘűƟܡ ƍƣ ̇ ܘ ̈ƀــƎ ܒŷــű ܓƍــƐܐ ܕܓــŴܐ܉ ܗ ƌܐ ƥܒــŶ ƎــſųƇƃ ƎــƀƆųƆ ܬܘܒ ƎــſųƆܕ ܕųƊƣܗ ܐƦƉܝ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƃــű ܐƌــƥ ƤƌــƦܐܠ ܗƃــƍܐ: Ŷــűܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ 15 ƍƙƉܐ ƦƘܓƊܐ ܐƅſ ܕŸƃƦƤƌ ̣ܗܘ: ܐƦƉܝ ܓƐƍܐ ܕƎſųƇƃ܂
		- ̈ܕƎƕ űƉܡ ܕܐƦſ Ɔܐƥƌ܂ ̈Ƈܐ܉ ܗƎƀƆ ܕŴƤƉ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ 104 ܐƦſ ܕƎſ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܒ ƎــƀƆųƆ ܐ܂ƦƟŵƕ ƋƀƏ ܐܘ :ƎſܐƏ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕƎƍſűƖƉ ƊƆܐƢƉ: ܕƆܒƥƀ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕųſƢƟܝ ܕܐƦſ܂ ̈Ǝƀ ܒűŷ ܓƐƍܐ ܕܓŴܐ܉ ܗ ƌܐ ƥܒŶ ƎſųƇƃ ܬܘܒ

**2** ܘܗܝƦſܐ BCDP: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ L | ųƀƌŴƃ BCDL: ųƍƀƃ P, + B sup. lin., + D in marg.; + tit. ƈźƉ ܐƄſܐ BCD **5** ܘܗܝƦſܐ [+ ܗܘܐ BCD **7** ƎſųƇƃ ƎƀƆܗ LP, Epit.: ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųƇƃ BCD **8** ܐ ̈ Ɛƍܓ LP: Ǝƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ BCD **10** ܐƄſܐ [+ tit. ܝƦƉܐ ƈźƉ BCD **11** ܬܘܒ BCDP: ܘܬܘܒ L **12** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCDL: ƎƀƆܗ P | ܐƍܙܒ [om. B **14** ƎƀƆųƆ] om. P **15** ܐܠƦƤƌ ƥƌܐ CDLP: ƥƌܐ ܐܠƦƤƌ B **16** ƎſųƇƃܕ [+ tit. Ʀſܐ ƈźƉ BCD **19** ܐŴܕܓ [om. BCDEP | Ʀſܕܐ [+ tit. ƋƀƏ ƈźƉ BCD **20** ܐƉ BCDEL: ܡűƉ P**21** ܐܡƟ CDELP: ܐܡƟܕ B | ŪſƦſ BCELP: ܒƦſ D | Ǝƀ̈ ƌܐ [om. P **22** ܐŴܕܓ [om. BCDEP ̇ ܘ ܕųſƢƟܝ ̇ ܘ :BCDL ܗ ųܒ P | ƋƀƏܕ L: ܐƊƀƏܕ P: ƋƀƏ BCD, Epit.; + tit. űܒƕ ƈźƉ BCD

name from its relation to something, which (in turn) has its name146 through its relation to it147.

101 And further, there are other words that are not found under any of these genera, which signify place. For instance, when someone says, "Socrates is in the theatre (θέατρον)", or "Plato is in the market", and everything else like that. He also subsumed them under one universal genus which he called "where", for each one of them appears as an answer to (the question) "where?"148.

102 Now, these are five universal genera that encompass many of those things that exist in the world, i.e. substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, and where.

103 Further, there are other words that do not pertain to the afore-mentioned five genera, which signify certain time. For instance, we are accustomed to say, "yesterday", "today", "ten years ago", or "after so-and-so many years". All of them he also subsumed under one universal genus which he called "when"149. Because if someone is asked this (question), he gives one of the suitable answers which all pertain to the genus of "when".

104 There are other words which signify something that a person possesses. E.g., we are accustomed to say, "he is dressed up", "he has his shoes on", or "he wears a ring". All these too he subsumed under one universal genus which he called "having"150.

105 And further, all other (words) that signify certain position — e.g., when we say, "standing", "sitting", or "lying" — he subsumed under one universal genus which he called "being-in-a-position"151.

**146** In ms. P and in the marginal notes of mss. B and D: "its nature". This variant, however, is most likely a scribal mistake.

**147** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.28–29.

**148** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29–20.2: πάλιν δὲ ἔστι τι τὸ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τόπου σημαντικόν. Ammonius, however, does not mention that the name of this category should be understood as an answer to a question.

**149** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.2–4: πάλιν ἔστι τι χθὲς πέρυσιν αὔριον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποτέ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ χρόνου σημαντικόν. As in the previous case, Ammonius does not mention that Aristotle's title for this category derives from an answer to a certain question. **150** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.6–7. Ammonius interprets this category as "placing of one substance around another" (ἔχειν γάρ ἐστιν οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περίθεσις). Sergius omits this interpretation, just as he does in his account of having in §404.

**151** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.4–6. Ammonius discusses it before having.

	 Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ L **3** ܐŴܕܓ [+ ܘܗܝƦſܐ D | ơƏܐ [+ Ǝƀƌܐ BCD **4** ƅſܐ CDLP: ƅſܕܐ B | ܡűƉܕ BCDL: ܡűƉ P | ƎƀƆܗ [+ tit. ܐܫŶ ƈźƉ BCD **6** ƥƍƃ] + Ǝƀƌܐ BCD **7** ܝųſƢƟܕ BCELP: ܝƢƟܕ D **9** ƎſųƉƦƤƉܕ BCDEP: ƎſųƉƦƤƉܘ L | ƎſųƇƃ BCDEP: ܘܢųƆŴƃ L **11** ܬŴƆܕ LP: ܬŴƆ BCDE **12** Ʀſܕܐ LP: Ʀſܐ BCDE | ƋƀƏܕ LP: ƋƀƏ BCDE | űܒ̇ ƕܕ LP: űܒƕ BCDE | ܐſƢŶܘܐ LP: ƦſƢŶܘܐ BC: ƦſƢŶܘܒܐ D | ܘܢųƇƃܕ LP: ܘܢųƇƃ BCD | ܐܫ ̇ Ŷܕ ELP: ܐܫŶ BCD **13** ƈƃܕ [om. BD | űŶ LP: űŶ űŶ C: űŶ űŶܕ BD **14** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪƆ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P **15** ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ BCDL: ƎƀƐ̈ ƍܓ P | ܐƖŹܬ BCDL: ܐƖŹܬܬ P **16** ܐƢſƦſ CDLP: ƢــſƦſ B | ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑــƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪƆ D **17** ܐűŶ] + ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ BCD **21** ܐƊƃܕ CDL: ܐƊƃ BP | ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ BCDL: Ʀſܕܐ P

**152** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.7–9: πάλιν ἔστι τι τύπτειν θερμαίνειν ψύχειν· τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποιεῖν· ποιεῖν δέ ἐστι τὸ δρᾶν περί τι.

**153** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.9–10.

**154** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.11–12: ἔσχον οὖν δέκα τοιαύτας κοινότητας· οὐσίαν ποσὸν ποιὸν πρός τι ποῦ ποτὲ κεῖσθαι ἔχειν ποιεῖν πάσχειν.

**155** Sergius discusses this question in the context of the genus of relatives, see §§391–393, where his account is based on Aristole's text.

ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ: ܗܐ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƤƉــƦŶŴܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܐſƦſــų r9L ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ ŴƆ ܗƍƃܐ ܙܕܩ ܕƐƌܒƢ܂ ƐƀƟܐ ܓƢƀ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܘܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܕܐſــƅ ̇ ܝ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ƐƀƟܐ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ Ǝſųƍƀƃ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܒų ̇ ܕܬƦƆ܉ ܒųܕܐ ̣ƎƉ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ̈ Ǝƀ ܐܘ Ɖܐ Ǝſܕܬܪܬ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ Ǝſܕ ܝ ̇ B82r ųܒ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ 5

	- ̈ ܐ܉ ̈Ǝ ܬƦƀŶ ܬ̈ܪƎſ ܓƐƍ ̈ܬܐ ܕƠƇƏ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƍƉ ƎſŵŶƦƉ ƎƘܐ ƎſűƉ 112 ܙܕܩ űƊƆܥ ܕŴƆ ܒų ƃــű ܒــų ܒــƌŵܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƊــűܡ ̈ ƀــƎ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ܗܕܐ ƆــŴ ̈ــƎ ܒƦ̈ܪſــƎ ܓƐƍ ŷƃƦƤƉ ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ ܡűƉ ̈ ܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ƦƉܒƀƇźــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ ܬܬƐƌــŪ܉ ܐܦ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܬƣــƖܐ ܓƍــƐ ųƆܘܢ: ܘűŶ ̣ܗܘ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܓƐƍܐ Ƙܐ r29P ̇ ܫ: ܗŴƌ ܕƎſ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ̇ ƍƟــƀܐ ƟــƊſŴܐ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܒųܕܐ ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ: ƈźƉ ̣ܕܗܝ ܒŴŷƇܕųſ ƎƆ ƢƀƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ųܒ ƎƀƃܬƦƌܕ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܡűƉ ƈƕ ơƀƍƏ ܐƆܕ : ̇ ܕųƉŴƍƟ ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉ

**1** ܘܢųſƦſܐ LP: ƎſųſƦſܐ BCD **9** Ǝſܪ̈ŴŶܕ LP: Ǝſܪ̈ŴŶ BCD | ܝ ̇ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐƆܐ ܒų Ǝſܪ̈ŴــŶ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕſــƎ ܕƀƇŶــƎ ܐܘ ̈ Ɗƣܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐƌــŴܢ ܒــų Ŵܕܓــ [om. hom. B **11** ƎــƘܐ CDP: ܐܦ BL ̈ ܐ Ɛƍܓ BPL: ƎƀƐ̈ ƍܓ CD **13** ܡűƉ BCDP: ܡűƊܘܒ L **15** ܫ ̇ ܐƘ BCLP: ƥƘ D **16** ƎƀƆܗ BCDL: ܢŴƌܗ P | ܐƊſŴƟ L: ܐƊƀƟ BCDP **17** ƎƀƃܬƦƌܕ L: Ǝƀƃܕܬܬ BCD: ƎƀƕܬƦƌܕ P **19** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑــƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D **20** ܐ ̈ Ɛــƍܓ ܐƢƐƕ CDLP: ܐƐ̈ ܓƍ ̈ ܐ **21** B ƢƐƕܐ Ɛƍܓ LP: ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ ܐƢƐƕ BCD **23** ܐƉ BCDP: ܐƊƃ L

substance therefore also pertains to substance, this is not how we shall think, for the nature of a piece of wood, or a stone, or anything else like that pertains to substance; because they are wood and stone. That they are of two or three cubit, on the other hand, because of this they pertain to quantity.

111 Also, concerning sweetness or whiteness we may not conclude from the fact that they exist in honey or milk, since honey and milk pertain to substance, that they too pertain to substance. For honey or milk pertain to substance not because they are sweet or white but because they are certain bodies, while because they are sweet or white, they are considered to pertain to quality.

112 Therefore, if some entities appear to be subsumed under two genera, we should know that it is not in one and the same manner that they do this, but, as we have said, they appear in two genera in different ways. For if it were not comprehended like that, then also nine other genera would become idle, and only one genus would remain, namely substance, while all the others would come to be through it, since it alone has subsistence by itself and does not require anything else through what it would be generated, as we have said above.

#### *[Homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, and polynyms]156*

113 Since Aristotle himself before teaching about the ten genera defined 1a1–15 certain terms that appeared to him useful for the knowledge of these genera157, it is also proper for us, if we are eager to follow the order of his teaching, to discuss them according to our capacity, before the division of the genera. Hence here we also begin with it.

**156** The previous paragraph concludes the *prolegomena* part of Sergius' treatise. In what follows, Sergius provides a commentary on Aristotle's text, stating that he is "eager to follow the order of his teaching". Hence the passages from the *Categories* which Sergius apparently comments on are indicated in the outer margins of the text. However, in some cases these references have a conjectural character.

**157** Sergius thus refers to the *antepraedicamenta* section of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 14.4–5: τὰ δὲ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν συμβαλλόμενα ἡμῖν ἔσται εἰς τὴν τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν.

	- ̈ــƎ ƕűſƦƉ ܐźــƀƤ̈ Ƙ ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵــƃ űــƀܒ Ǝܒــŵܒ :ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ ܐܢ ƎــſűƉ 116 ̈ܬܐ: ܘܒŵܒƎ ܒűƀ ƦƇƉܐ ƦƀƍƊŶƦƉܗƎſ܉ ܙܕܩ ƎƆ űƊƆܥ܂ ܕƎſųƍƉ ܨܒŴ ̈ܕܐ: ܘƤſƮƘــƎ ܒƇƊــƦܐ űــŶ Ƌــƕ Ǝ ̈ ܕܨܒــŴ 20 ̈ܬܐ ܒƤــƊܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƤƉــŴܬƘ ̈ܬƎƘ ܘƤſƮƘــƎ ŴــƤƉ ƎــſܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ܐƦــƇƊܒ Ǝܒــŵܘܒ ܂ƎــſܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ̈ ܐ ̈ܬƎƘ: ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ܒƊƤــų ̈ ƀƌܐ܂ ܘܒŵܒــƎ ܬܘܒ ܒƦ̈ܪܬſųſــƎ ƤƉــŴ ܒƄــŴ

**1** ƎſųƇƃ BCDEP: ƈƀƃܗ L | űŶ űƀܒ BCLP: űŶűŷܒ DE **2** ƎſܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ܐƦƇƉ ܗܕܐ ܘܗܝ̣ [ om. hom. P **3** Ǝܒــŵܒ BCELP: Ǝܒŵܘܒ D **5** ƎƍƀƕܕŴƤƉܘ LP: ƎƍƀƕܕŴƤƉܕ BCD **13** ܐƀƌŴƄƆ BLP: ŴƆ ܐƀƌŴƃ C, D in marg.: ܐƍƀƃ ŴƆ D **14** Ǝſųƍƀƃ BCDL: Ǝſųƀƍƀƃ P **15** ƎſųƉŴŶܬ BCLP: ƎſųƀƉŴŶܬ D | ƎſƢ ̇ Ɵ LP: ƎƍſƢ ̇ Ɵ BCD **17** ̇ ܐܘ [+ ƎƉ̣ BCD | ̇ ųƆ] om. B **19** Ǝܒŵܘܒ [+ Ǝ ̇ Ɖ CD | űƀܒ [om. B Ǝ | BCDP ܗܘ + [ܒƤــƊܐ **20** ̈ ƘܬŴــƤƉ BDLP: ƎƘܬ̈ ŴــƉܕ C | ܐƦــƇƊܒ CDLP: ܐƦــƇƉ ƎــƉ̣ B ̈ ƀƌܐ **21** ŴƄܒ ƎƤſƮƘܘ [om. P

114 All things that fall under our knowledge become known sometimes through one simple name and sometimes through a certain account that defines them158. And such a definitory account is sometimes derived from what a thing naturally is and sometimes from what is accidentally concomitant to it. What I mean is this. Naturally man is a certain being which we signify by means of a simple name when we call it "man". But when we compose a statement in order to signify it and call it "rational, mortal animal", we define it by means of a statement which derives from what it naturally is. If, instead, we compose a statement in order to signify it from what is accidentally concomitant to it, e.g. when we say that he is capable of speaking and is skilled in crafts, we determine it from what is accidentally concomitant to it. For we call accidental everything what a man acquires but may exist without it159.

115 So, we say of a simple word which signifies a certain subject matter that it is its name. A statement which signifies a thing and is derived from its nature is called a definition. Also, another kind of statement which is composed from what is accidentally present in things we call a characterization from accidents, or a description160.

116 Thus, since, as we have said, things are comprehended sometimes through simple names and sometimes through a definitory account, we ought to know that some things share with one another only name but differ in their definitory accounts; sometimes they have in common their definitory account but differ in name; and further, sometimes they have in common both, i.e. name

**158** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.4: δηλοῦνται δὲ πάντα καὶ δι' ὀνομάτων καὶ διὰ λόγων (see in general 15.4–16, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.5–6). See also David, *Prolegomena* 11.15–12.18, discussing as one of the introductory questions what a definition (ὁρισμός) is. Like Ammonius, David makes a distinction between a name (ὄνομα) and an account (λόγος) both of which may provide a definition of a subject matter.

**159** Cf. the same example in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.10–16; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.7–8.

**160** Cf. the next main point of David's *Prolegomena* (12.19–13.6) dealing with the distinction between a definition (ὁρισμός), a description (ὑπογραφή), and a descriptive definition (ὑπογραφικὸς ὁρισμός).

܂ƅــƏ ܬܐŴƘܬŴƣ Ǝƀƍ ̇ Ɵ ܐƆ űƃ ܉ƎƤſƮƘ Ǝſųſܪܬ̈Ʀܒ Ǝܒŵܘܒ ܐ܂Ɖ̈ B83r ŴŶƦܘܒ Ɔܐ ܒƊƤܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ܂

̈Ɖܐ **3** ŴŶܘܬ BCDL: ܐƉ̈ ŴŶܘܕܬ P **4** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ [+ ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ BCD **5** ܕܐ̈ űŶ Ƌƕ ܬܐ̈ ̈ܬƎƘ ܨܒŴ ŴƤƉ ̇ ܒƊƤܐ ܘܒƉŴŶƦܐ ܐܘ [om. P | Ƌƕ CDL: ƎƉ B **12** ƦƉܐƃ] + ƈƕ P **14** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD **15** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P | Ƣſܕܨ CDLP: Ƣſƞܕܒ B **16** ܗܘ1 [om. BCD **22** ܗܘ űŶ BDLP: ܗܘ űŶ C **23** Ǝ ̈ ƙƇŷƤƉ BCDL: ƎƀƙƇŷƤƉ P

and definition; and sometimes they differ in both, having in common nothing at all, i.e. neither name nor definition161.

117 One may also express it as follows. Since, as we have said, things have a name and a descriptive definition, what follows from this is that either they share with one another both name and definition; or they differ from one another both in name and in definition; or they have one of them in common but differ in another, while this in turn may happen in two ways, i.e. either they have name in common but differ in definition, or they share definition but differ in name162.

118 Thus, when things have only a name in common but differ in their descriptive definition, they are called "of similar name" (i.e. homonyms)163, for it is only in the name that the similarity between them shows up. For instance, we use the name "dog" to designate dissimilar natures. For there is a water-dog164 and a land-dog, there is a star called like that, the one which ascends after the Orion165, there is also a philosophical writer who is called like that166, and finally a painted or carved image may be called like that too167. So, it is only the name that makes these things similar to one another while the definitions of each one of them are different.

119 When things have definition in common but differ in name, then they are called "of similar kind"168, for they belong to one and the same kind. E.g., we have the custom to call a stone also "rock" and "flint". While the definition of their nature is one, they differ from one another only in names and they are of the same kind.

**161** The taxonomy which Sergius presents here is close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.11–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 22.15–31, who both attribute each case to homonyms, polynyms, synonyms, and heteronyms.

**162** Here, Sergius' account concurs nearly verbatim with what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.16–22: τούτων τοίνυν οὕτως εἰρημένων εἰ λάβοιμεν δύο πράγματα, ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ ἀμφότερα κοινωνοῦσι, λέγω δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἢ κατ' ἄμφω διαφέρουσιν, ἢ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἓν κοινωνοῦσι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον διαφέρουσι· καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέρουσιν.

**163** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.29–16.1: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνοῖεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέροιεν, ὁμώνυμα λέγεται.

**164** Probably, a kind of shark, cf. Chase 2003: 115.

**165** I.e. Sirius, Gr. Σείριος, also called the "dog-star".

**166** I.e. a Cynic philosopher whose name derives from the term κύων, "dog".

**167** Cf. the same example by Simplicius, *In Cat.* 24.9–13.

**168** Greek commentators (including Ammonius and Philoponus) designate these cases as polynyms (πολυώνυμοι). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 16.4–5: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ὀνομάζεται πολυώνυμα. The term suggested by Sergius would correspond to Gr. ὁμοειδής.

	- ̈ ܓƀــܐܬܐ Ɵــűܡ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ Ɛܒ ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ ƚــƇ ̇ 10 Ɖ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ ƈƕ 121 ̈Ʀܐ ƠƀƐƙܒ Ǝſܕ ƎƍŶ ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ܘƢƉܕܐܬܐ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈Ɛܐ: ܗ ܕƈƕ ƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ ̇ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܒƆŴƙܓܐ ܐܘƀƍƉܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƦƣܘܕƎƍſ ųƍƊƏ ̣ƎƉ Ŵƣܪųſ ܕƦƃܒܐ: ̣ܕܗܝ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܕܓܒƢܐ ƌܐƢƉ ܒŴƕŵ̈ܪƦſܐ ܐſــƅ ̇ ƊƆŴƣܐ܂ ܕƎƍſƞƉ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܕƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܬƎƌ ƕܒƎƍſű ųƆ ƋƇƣ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬ̈ܪƎſ܂ 15

**1** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCDP: ƎƀƆܗ L **3** ƅſܐ [+ ܐƌܙ P **7** ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌܕ BCDP: ƢƉܐƌ ƥƌܕܐ L | ƑſܐܪƘ DP: ܐƀƏƢƘ BCL **8** ƎƀƘܬŴƤƉ LP: ƎƘܬ̈ ŴƤƉ BCD **10** ƚƇ ̇ Ɖ] + ƈƇƉ in marg. D | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P | ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ BCDL: ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉ P **13** ܒܐƦƃܕ [+ ܐƌܗ BCD **14** ܐܦ BCDP: ̇ Ŵƣܒŷܐ ܐƍƀƉܐ ܘűƆܘſܐ ܕƢƏܛ + ;L ƋƇƣ :BCDP ƇƣــƋ ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕܬ̈ܪſــƎ **15** L ܘܐܦ ܘųƀƆ ̈ ܐ ܒŴƀܡ ܕƍſܐ ܕƇƀŶܐ ܐƎſ ܘܐƎƀƉ ųźŶܕ ܐƍƠܒŴƣ D

End of Book Two.

**169** Here, Sergius combines two types, heteronyms and synonyms. The first sentence of this paragraph finds a close parallel in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.22–23, where Philoponus explicates the meaning of the term "homonym" that may be applied in multiple ways (ἐν διαφόροις τόποις). **170** I.e. they are heteronyms. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.26: εἰ δὲ κατ' ἄμφω διαφέροιεν, ὀνομά-

ζεται ἑτερώνυμα.

**171** I.e. they are synonyms (thus Sergius seems to believe that both designations refer to the same person). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.22–23: εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἄμφω κοινωνοῦσιν, ὀνομάζεται συνώνυμα. Philoponus, Elias, and Simplicius suggest the same example with the name of Alexander, when speaking of homonyms, which would be more appropriate in this case, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.23–24; Elias, *In Cat.* 139.33; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 31.24–25.

Ǝſܪ̈ܕܬ ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ܓܐƆ̈ P31r ŴƘ ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ ƈƕܕ ܬܐ̈ B84r | C125v ŴƍܒƦƄƉ | D71r ƎſųſƦſܐ ܐƦſ ̈ ƎſųƍƉ űƟܡ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܕƈƕ ܬŴŶ ̈ــƐܐ ̈ƀــźܐ – ƃــƦܒܐ ܕƕــƈ ƐƕــƢܐ ܓƍ ƤƘ ܐƇــ̈ 5 Ɵ ƈƕ ƎſųƍƉ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ ̇ ܘ ܘſųƍƉـــƎ ƕـــƈ ܪܘƃـــܒܐ ƉűƟـــƀܐ ܕܗƀƆـــƎ – ƃـــƦܒܐ ܗ ܕƘܐܪſܐܪŴƀƍƉܣ ̇ ܘ ܘƎſųƍƉ ƈƕ ƢŹŴƟ ƇƇƊƉܐ ܕƍƉــų ܕܪܘƃــܒܐ – ƃــƦܒܐ ܗ ܕܐƠƀŹŴƇƌܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܘܐſƢŶܐ 10 ̈ Ʀſܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܬŶــŴ ̈ ƊƀــƎ – ƃــƦܒܐ ܗ Ə ܐƦſ ̈ ŴــŶܕܬ ƎــſųƀƇƕ ƎــſųƍƉܘ ̇ ܘ ܕƕــƈ ̈ܪſــƤܐ ܕſƢƟƦƉــƎ ܐܬ̈ܪܘܬܐ ܕƟƦƉــƢܐ ܐƘــŴܕƠƀźƠſܐ ܘܗ ŴƠƀƘ ̈ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕŴŹ ̇ ܘ ̇ ƆܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƦƄƉܒƎ – Ʀƃܒܐ ܗ ųƆ Ǝ̈ ŷƤŶܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƈƕ ƎſųƍƉܘ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ ܕƈƕ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܕܪܗƢŹܘܬܐ ܕŴƍƐƄƉܬܐ ܕƘŴƏ 15 ̈źƐܐ ܘܗ C126r | P31v Ǝſܕܬܪ ܓܐƆŴƘ

̈Ǝźƀ ܒƊƇƖܐ ƤƘܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎſųƇƃ ƎſųſƦſܐ Ʀſܐƍƀƃ ŴƆ – ƎſųſƦſܐ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ ̇ ܒ ܐܘ ̇ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ܕŴƤƉܕƎƀƕ – ƍƀƃܐƦſ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐܘ ̈Ʀƀܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ƍƀƃ – Ǝ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕƕűſƦƉ ܐܘ 20 ̇ ܨܒŴ

> ̈Ɔܓܐ **1** ŴƘ C: ܓܐƆŴƘ LP: ܓܐƆ̈ ŴƘ ܬܘܒ D: ųƇſܕ ܓܐƆ ̈ ܕųƇſ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ + [ƀƉűƟܐ **2** B ܬܘܒ ŴƘ D**3** ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉܕ [+ ƎƀƆ ̇ ܗ P **4** ƎſųſƦſܐ [+ ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ P **5** ƎſųƍƉ BCDL: ƎſųƍƉܕ P **6** ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܣŴſƢܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ BC: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D **7** ܒܐƃܪܘ L: ܘܢųܒƃܪܘ BCD: Ǝſųܒƃܪܘ P | ƎƀƆܕܗ [+ ܐƀƉűƟ ܒܐƃܪܘ P **8** ܣŴƀƍƉܐܪſܐܪƘܕ L: ƑƀƍƉƢſƢƘܕ BCD: ƑƀƉܐܪſƢƘܕ P**9** ųƍƉܕ LP: ųƇſܕ BCD **10** ܐƠƀŹŴƇƌܕܐ LP: ܐƠƀź̈ ƠƇƌܕܐ BD: ܐƠƀź̈ ƠƆŴƌܕܐ C **11** ƎƊƀ ̈ Ə] + ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ P | ܐƦſ ̈ ŴŶܕܬ2 CDLP: ܐƉ̈ ܐܬ̈ܪܘܬܐ | P ƌŴſܐƦſ +] ܕƢƟƦƉܐ **12** B ܕܬŴŶ ̈ ܬܐ :CDLP ܐܬܘ B **13** ŴــƠƀƘ ̈ ŴŹܕ L: ܐƠƀƘ ̈ ŴــŹ BCD: ܐƐƘŴــŹ P **14** ƎــƀƇſܐ LP: ƎــƀƆܗ BCD ƎܒƦƄƉ BCDL: ܒܐƦ̈ ƃ Ǝſܪ̈ܬ ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ ƎܒƦ̈ ̇ ܘ **15** P ܕƃ ̇ ܘ :BCDP ܘܗ ܗ L | ܬܘܒ [om. BCD ̈ƀــƍܐ :BCDL ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ **19** ̈ ܬܐ **20** P ܕƃ ̈ ܬܐ :BCDL ܨܒــŴ Ŵܕܨܒ P | Ǝ ̈ ƕűſƦƉܕ CDL: ƎƕܕŴƤƉܕ P: ̈Ʀƀܐ ƍƀƃ B

#### *Divisions of Book Two*

#### *First division*

Writings about the craft of logic:

	- some are about simple words: the treatise *Categories* which is about the ten genera;
	- some are about their first composition: the book *On Interpretation*;
	- and some are about syllogisms which derive from this composition: the book *Prior and Posterior Analytics*;

#### *Second division*

Of what is simple in the world:

**172** Syr. *reše*, corresponding most likely to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, the main points discussed in an argument.

B84v | ܐƦƆܕܬ ܓܐƆŴƘ C126v | D71v ̈ƣܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ r11L| ܐܕ ŴƠƘܕܐ ƍƀƆƞƉܐ ƤƉܐƍƆܐ ƟŴƐƘܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܐܕ 5 ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ƎſƢƟƦƉ ܐƀ ̈ ̈źƀܐ ܘƉűƟ ųƍƉܘܢ ŴƆܬ ܒƢܘſܐ ܐŴƌܢ – ƤƘ ƎſųƉƦƤƉ ܐƀƍƀ̈ ̈ ƀƍƆܐ ܘƃ ܘųƍƉܘܢ ܒųܘƆܐ – ܗܘ ܘųƍƉܘܢ ܒƦܪƦƀƕܢ – ܐſƮŶܐ ܘ̈ܪƀƍƀƕܐ ƎƀƍƃƦƉ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ

ܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƑƍ ܓƍ 10 ̈ƎƀƐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܓƐƍܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܓƐƍܐ ŴƀŶܬܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܓƐƍܐ Ǝƀƣ̈ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܕܫ ܐܕ

**3** ܐƍــƆܐƤƉ BCDP: ܐƌܐƇƤƉ L **6** ܢŴƌܐ LP: ܘܢųſƦſܐ BCD **7** ܘܢųƍƉܘ BCDP: ܘܢųƍƉ L ̈ ƍƆــƀܐ | B ܐſƦſــųܘܢ + [ܒــųܘƆܐ ̈ ƍƆــƀܐ :L ܗܘ ̈ ƀƆܐ :P ܘܗܘ B ܐŴƌܢ + [ܒƦܪƦƀƕܢ **8** BCD ܗܘ [ܕܓŴܐ **14** P ƀƍƤƙƌܐ :BCDL ƍƤƙƌܐ **12** BCD ܓƐƍܐ + [ܐܘƀƏܐ **10** L ܘ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ :BCDP ܘ̈ܪƀƍƀƕܐ om. L

#### *Third division*

There are four kinds of speech:

#### *Fourth division*

Species/forms and genera:

#### *Fifth division*

Substance is a most generic genus.

Body is a species and a genus.

Animate body is a species and a genus.

Animal is a species and a genus.

Universal man is only a species and thus a most specific species.

B85r | C127r ܐƦƣܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ | D72r ܬܐ̈ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƍƉ ̈ ܐ ſƢƟƦƉــƎ – Ƈƃــܒܐ ųــƊƣ ƦــƀƉܕ – Ǝ ̈ ܒƤــƊܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƤƉــŴܬƘ ̈ ƀܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ ܕܓƍܒƢܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܕſܒƤܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ ܕƉ ܘƎſųƍƉ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ – ܕƦƀƉ ܐܕ 5 ̈ƣܐ ƎſųƉƦƤƉ – ƃܐƘܐ ܘƕŴƣܐ ܘƌƢŹܐ ̈ــƦ Ŷــű ܐܕƣܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ– ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܒƤــƊܐ ܘܒŶƦــƉŴܐ – ܒƍ ܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ űƠƉܘƀƌܐ ܘܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ ƘܐܪƑſ Ǝــƀ̈ Ǝ – ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܐƌ ̈ ܘƎſųƍƉ Ɔܐ ܒƊƤܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ ŴƤƉܬƘ ܒƈƄ űƉܡ – ƐƀƟܐ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܘܒƤƌƢܐ 10

̇ ƦƇƉܗ ųƇƃ ̇ ųſƦſܐ ܘܢųƀƇƕܕ ƎƀƆܗ ƑſܪŴܐܓźƟܕ ܐƐ̈ P32r ƍܓ ܐƢƐƕ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ – ܐܘƀƏܐ – ŴƀƊƃܬܐ – ƉــŴܙܓܐ ̇ ܐܫ Ŷ – űܒ̇ – ŴƆܬ űƉܡ – ܐƄſܐ – ܐƦƉܝ – ܐƦſ – ƋƀƏ – ƕ

**3** ƦــƀƉܕ BCDP: ܬŴــƀƉܕ L | ƎــſƢƟƦƉ BCDP: ƎــſųƉƦƤƉ L **4** ܐƤܒــſܕ CDLP: ܐƤܒــƀܕܒ B ܒܐƇƃܘ1 BCDL: ܒܐƇƃ P | ܒܐƇƃܘ2 BCDL: ܒܐƇƃ P | ܒܐƇƃܘ3 BCDL: ܒܐƇƃ P | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P **5** ܕŴŷƇܒ ܐƉŴŶƦܒ CDLP: ܐƉŴŶƦܒ ܕŴŷƇܒ B | ƦƀƉܕ BCDP: ܬŴƀƉܕ L ƎــſųƉƦƤƉ LP: ܢ ̈ ųــƉƦƤƉ BCD **6** ܐƌƢــŹܘ BCDL: ܐƌƢــŹ P **7** ƎــſųƍƉܘ BCLP: ƎــſųƍƉ D ܐƉŴــŶƦܘܒ BCLP: ܐƉŴــŶܘܬ D | ܐƣܐܕ űŶ BCL: ܐƣܐܕ D: ܐƣ̈ :L ܘܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ **8** P ܐܕ ܪܘܣűــƍƐƄƆܐ BCDP | ƑــſܐܪƘ DL: ܐƀــƏƢƘ BCP **9** Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܐ [om. L **11** ܐƐــ̈ ƐƕــƢܐ ܓƍ ̇ ƦƇƉܗ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܗƀƆــƎ ųƇƃ ̇ .om] ܕźƟܐܓŴܪƑſ ܗƎƀƆ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܐųſƦſ BCDL **13** ܬŴƆ BCDL: ܬŴƆܕ P | ܐܫ ̇ Ŷ] + Ǝſܕܬܪ ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƋƇƣ P

#### *Sixth division*

Of things:

\* \* \*

The ten genera of the *Categories* with which Aristotle's entire account is concerned are the following: substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, where, when, having, being-in-a-position, acting, being-affected.

#### C127v | L11v ܐƦƆܕܬ ܐƢƉܐƉ

122 ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܕűƟܡ ܗƌܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܬܪſــƎ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܐܘ ̇ B85v ųــƤƀƌ ƈــƕܕ ܒܐƟŴــƕ ƎــƉ̣ ܐ܉ſܪŴــƣ ܐƦــƇƉ ƦܒƐƌ ܬܐܕܘܪܐ܉ ܢŴŶܐ ̈Ƈܐ ܕܐƮƀƉܢ ųƆ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ ̇ Ǝƀƌ ܒ ̇ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƦƇƀƇƉܐ܂ ܘƦƃƢƣ ŴƆܬ ܗ ܕųƇƃ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ̈Ɖűــƀܐ: ܗ Ɵ ܐƐ̈ 5 ƍܓ ܐƮƐƕ ƈƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ܡűƟ ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ ܕųƊƣܘ ܐŴƌܢ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪŴſܣ܂ ܒƌųܐ ܕƎſ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܬƦƆܐ ƎƃܪƦܕܒ Ǝƀƌ ̇ ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܉ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƣܐ ƈƕ ܗ ̇ ܬܘܒ űƃ ܕųƇſ ܕųƇſ ̈Ɛܐ ܗƀƆــƎ ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ ƦƄƉܒƎ ųƆ ƘŴƐƇƀƙƆܐ ܒų ܒƦƄܒܐ ܗ ܕܓŴܐ܂

	- ̇ ܘ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕƦƉܬƋƀƏ ܪܒƖƀܐƦſ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܗƌܐ 124 ƆŴƘܓܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗ ̇ Ƣ܂ ܕſųƇƃــƎ ƆــƋ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܐƄſــƎ ̣ܕܗܘ܉ ſųƍƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܐƉ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܓــƣűܐ܂ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܬܘܒ ܓــƌŴܐƦſ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ܘƎſųƍƉ űƀŷſܐƦſ܂ ܐƅſ ܕƎƉ ܗܪƃܐ ŴƊƀƟƦƌܢ ƈƀƄƉ Ʀƣܐ ̈ܪܘƃܒƎƀ܂ 20 ̇ ܘ ܕܬƆــƦܐ űŶ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܕܓƣűܐ܉ ܘܐŶــƌƢܐ ܕܓــŴܐ ܘܕſűƀŷſــƦܐ܂ ܘܗ

̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܕźƟܓŴ̈ܪƑſ :LP ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ **1** ܬܘܒ :CD ܬܘܒ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܕųƇſ ̇ **3** P ܕƋƀƏ :BCDL ܕűƟܡ **2** B ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ųƤƀƌ LP: ܐƤƀƌ BCD **4** Ǝƀƌ ̇ ,LP ܗ corr. B: ƎـــƀƆܗ BCD **5** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑـــƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴـــźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪƆ D | ܐƀــƉű̈ Ɵ BCDLP: ܐƀــ ̈ ƊſűƟ corr. BD **6** ܘųــƊƣܕ L: ̇ ųــƊƣܕ BCDP ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: ƑſܪŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D **8** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƙƆ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƙƆ P **12** ƎƀƆܗ CDLP: ܢŴƌܗ B | ܐƀƉ̈ űƟ CDLP: ܐƀ ̈ ƊſűƟ B, corr. D **13** ŭƇƙ ̇ ܘƉ CDLP: ƚƇ ̇ Ɖܘ B | Ǝ̈ ƤܒŶܕ L: ƎƀƤܒŶܕ BCDP **14** ܘܢųſܬƮƐƕ] + ƎƀƆܗ ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ BCD **16** ܐƀƉ̈ űƟ BDLP: ܐƀ ̈ ƊſűƟ C, corr. BD **17** ƦſܐƖƀܪܒ BCDP: ƦſܐƖƀܐܪܒ L **21** ܐƦſűƀŷſܘܕ CLP: Ʀſܐűƀŷſܘܕ D: ܬܐŴſűƀŷſܘܕ B

#### *BOOK THREE*

#### *[The fourfold division]*

122 In the previous book, which was the second one of this treatise, O brother 1a20–1b9 Theodore, the discussion of an inquiry into the goal of the whole logical craft has been set out. At its end, I turned to those terms which Aristotle provided before his teaching on the ten primary genera that are called "categories". In this book, which is the third one of the same treatise, we are about to discuss those things that the Philosopher wrote after that in his treatise on the ten universal genera.

123 Now, those who are eager to chase the true understanding of this man ought to know, O brother, that before the general division of those ten primary categories, this Philosopher established another division of them which is more universal than this one and divided all of them into four parts that encompass the ten. So, ultimately, this fourfold division also includes the other one, for the tenfold one is born out of it, producing a perfect teaching on the nature of each one of the ten primary genera173.

So, this is what he says174 124 about the first division which is set out in a fourfold manner: Of all things that exist in any way some are substances and others accidents, and again, some of them are spoken of universally and some particularly. Thus, six pairings may be generated from this175: the first one is that of substance and accident; another one is that of universal and particular;

**173** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9. Both Ammonius and Philoponus speculate on the value of applying numbers from one to ten in this case. Sergius confines himself here to a short remark about the "perfect teaching", but comes to the issues of numbers based on the Pythagorean teachings later on in a separate section (see §§129–134, below).

**174** Sergius does not quote Aristotle's text here, but rather presents the following teachings as a correct interpretation of chapter 2 of the *Categories*. While Ammonius stresses (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.14–15; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 29.1) that the terms he uses (substance, accident, universal, particular) are not applied by Aristotle, Sergius does not make such a remark, but uses the same terms as if they actually derive from Aristotle.

**175** Sergius' text is very close to the commentary of Ammonius, *In Cat*. 25.5–7: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαίρεσις αὕτη· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι καθόλου τὰ δὲ μερικά, καὶ πάλιν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα· γίνονται τοίνυν συζυγίαι ἕξ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.17–20).

̇ ܘ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܘܕƦſűƀŷſܐ܂ ܘܗŴƃܬ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܕܓŴܐ܂ ܘܗ ̇ ܘ ܐŶــſƢܐ ܕƣــƦܐ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܘܕܓــŴܐ܂ ܘܗ ܘܐܦ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܗ ܐƊــƣܪܘ ƎــƉ̣ ܉ƦــſܐƢſųƌ ƎــƀƆųƆ Ǝſܕ ƎſųƆ Ʀƌܐ ƚƇ̇ B86r ſ ܐ܂Ʀſűƀŷſܘܕ ܕƋƀƏ ƦŶƦƆ܂

̇ ܘ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܕܓــƣűܐ ܘܕܓــŴܐ **1** ̇ ܘ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܘܕƦſűƀŷſܐ ܘܗŴƃܬ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܗ [ܘܗ om. hom. P **2** ܐſƢŶܐ BCDL: ܐƌƢŶܐ P | ܐƦƣܕ BCDP: ܐƦƣܕܐ L **5** ܐƦƣ BCDP: ܐƦƣܐ L **6** ܐŷƄƤƉ LP, D in marg.: ܐſƞƉ BCD **8** ܐƦſűƀŷſܘ LP: ܐƦſűƀŷſܘܕ BCD **9** ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ ܘܘܢųƌ ܒܐƃܪܘ̈ LP: ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ ܘܘܢųƌ ܒܐƃܪܘ̈ BCD **10** ܬܐŴƤƌܐ BCDP: ܬܐŴƤƌ L **11** ܐƌܐƉ űŷܕܒ BDLP: ܬܐŴܨܒ ܐűŷܕܒ C, B in marg.: + ܬܐŴܕܨܒ ܐܘ D in marg. | ܕŴŷƇܒ [om. B **13** ƎƀƆܗ LP: ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ BCD | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ L: ܐƙƏŴƇƇƀƘ P: ܐƌܗ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD **16** ƢſƦſ] om. B | ܐƠƙƏܕ [ ̈ Ƙܐ **18** P ܐƦſܘܗܝ + [ܕųƌܘܐ **17** BCD ܗܝ + ŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏ̈ ŴƇƀƘ P **19** ܬŴƆ BDLP: ܬܗŴƆ C

the third one is that of substance and universal; the fourth one is that of accident and particular; also the fifth one is that of accident and universal; and the last sixth one is that of substance and particular. You learn them clearly from the table below.

125 However, we ought to know that two pairings from these six, namely the first and the second one, may not come to be, for it is impossible both for the same thing to be a substance and an accident, and for the same thing to be in the same way universal and particular. Hence, only four pairings remain as in every way possible in this division, as we said. These are: universal substance, e.g. humanity as a whole; particular accident, e.g. whiteness in only one dress; particular substance, e.g. Socrates alone; and universal accident, e.g. whiteness as a whole176.

126 Of these four pairings the Philosopher put first that of universal substance, for he considered it more honorable in both of its (elements), i.e. both because of substance and universality, than the other three. For substance is much more honorable than accident, because it is sufficient for its own subsistence, while an accident has no way to exist unless there is substance. And universal is honored much more among philosophers than particular, because they always leave particulars behind and seek after universals that provide a profound knowledge of things177.

**176** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.7–12: ὧν αἱ δύο ἀνυπόστατοι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τέσσαρες, φημὶ δὴ τάς τε ὑπαλλήλους καὶ τὰς διαγωνίους, συνεστᾶσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθόλου οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ μερικὰ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου συμβεβηκότα τὰ δὲ μερικαὶ οὐσίαι, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἢ τὶς ἐπιστήμη καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὶς ἄνθρωπος (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.20–23). This passage in Ammonius (and Philoponus) is followed by a diagram, representing the afore-mentioned six combinations, which is nearly identical to the one found in Sergius. In all extant mss. of Sergius' *Commentary*, it appears after §126.

**177** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.16–20: καὶ τούτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι κεχρημένος ἐκτίθεται τὰς τέσσαρας συζυγίας, καὶ πρώτην τὴν καθόλου οὐσίαν, ὡς τιμιωτέραν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἀντικείμενον, λέγω δὴ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός, εἶτα προετίμησε τὸ καθόλου συμβεβηκὸς τῆς μερικῆς οὐσίας, διότι περὶ τῶν καθόλου τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.19–26).

127 ܒــƦܪ ܗƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܪܘƃــܒܐ܉ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ܕƦƌܬƀƏــƋ ܗ r129C ̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ Ʀſűƀŷſܐ: ܐܢ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ƦƀƉܪܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƎƉ ܓƣűܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ̈ــƎ: ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƕűſƦƉ ƎſųƇܒŴــƠƆܕܕ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎƉ ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ ƎſųƇƃܕ ƈźƉ ܒܐƣŴــŶ ųــƆ ــܐܠƕ ܗƦــƖƣƢܒ ܬܐŴــƀƇŶ ̇ L12v ܐܘ ܪܘܬܐŴــŶ ܥűــƌ ƥــƌܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܘܕƢſƢƉܘܬܐ܉ źƉــƈ ܗƌܐ ܒــƦܪ ܪܘƃــܒܐ ܗ ܕܓــŴܐ ƏــƋ ܗ 10 ̇ ܘ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƠƆــŴܒųƇ ܒƦ̈ܪܬſųſــƎ: ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ܓــƣűܐ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܓــŴܐ ƀŷſــſűܐ܂ ܕܓــƣűܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ: ܘܗ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕƦſűƀŷſܐ܉ ƈƕ ܗܕܐ Ɔܐ ơƀƍƏ ܐƌܐ ŴſŴŷƊƆ܂

̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ Ʀſűƀŷſܐ: ̇ ܘ ܕܬƦƆܐ܉ ܗ 128 ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܬܘܒ ƋƏ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̇ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ƈźƉ ܕƠƀƉــƢ ܗܘ ܐܦ ܗƌܐ źƉــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܒــų ܕܐ̈ܪܒـــƖܐ܉ ܕܐſـــƦܘܗܝ ܕܓـــƣűܐ ܘܕܓـــŴܐ܂ ܗƀƆـــƎ ܗƀƃـــƈ ܗƃـــƍܐ 15 ̈ ƀܐܐ܂ ƍƙƌܐ ܓƐƆ Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſ ܐƆ ƎƘܘܐ ܐ܉ƘŴƐƇƀƘ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܐ ƋƏ ƦſܐƐƄźƉ

**1** ܐƀƏܐܘ1 P: Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD | ƎƀƆܗ [om. P **4** ܐƦſ̈ űƀŷſ LP: ܐſ̈ űƀŷſܐ BD: ƎƀƆܗ ̈ſܐ űƀŷſܐ C **5** ƋƀƏܬƦƌܕ BCDP: ƋƀƏƦƌܕ L **6** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ LP: ƎſƢƉܕܐ BCD | ܗܝ̣ [ + ŪŹ BCD **7** ƎſųƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ BCDL: ƎſųƇſܕ P | ƎƀƆܗ BCDP: Ǝƀƌܗ L | ƎſųƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ L: ƎſųƇܒŴƠƆܕ BCD **8** ųƆ] + ųƆ L **10** ƋƏ LP: ܐܡƏ BCD | ܐƣűܓ CDLP: ܐƣűܕܓ B **11** ܐƣűܕܓ CDLP: ܐƣűܓ B | ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ CDLP: ųƇܒŴƠƆܕ B **12** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ [+ ܗܝ̣ BCD | ܐƆ] om. P | ܐƌܐ ơƀƍƏ LP: ܐƠƀƍƏ BCD **13** ƋƏ LP: ܐܡƏ BCD | ܘ ̇ ܗ1 [om. P **14** ƢƠƀƉܕ BCP: ܘƢƠƀƉܕ DL **15** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ܐŴܘܕܓ ܐƣűܕܓ [om. P **16** Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſ BCDL: Ǝƕűſ P | ܐƍƙƌ] + ƎƆ BCD

B86v | D73r

127 After this pairing, it might be appropriate to place that of particular substance, since, as we have said, substance is more honorable than accident. But because every opposite is comprehended from what it is opposed to — for instance, if a man learns about whiteness or sweetness, he immediately gets the idea of blackness and bitterness — because of this, he placed after the pairing of universal substance the one which is opposite to its both (elements), namely particular accident178. That accident is the opposite of substance and also that universal is the opposite of particular, I have no need to demonstrate.

128 Moreover, after that, he placed the third pairing, i.e. that of particular substance, since it is more valuable — because of the substance which is part of it — than another fourth one, which is that of universal and accident. Thus, it is in this orderly way that the Philosopher arranged them, although not many have comprehended this. So, let us turn to the reason of this fourfold division

**178** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.22–24: ἔπειτα δευτέραν τίθησι τὴν ἀντικειμένην ταύτῃ, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τῷ δὲ καθόλου τὸ μερικόν (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.28–31).

129 ƦƀƘܓــŴܪܘܣ ܗƀƃــƈ ܓܒــƢܐ ܕܐƉƦƣــų ܒƖܒ r87B ̈ــűܐ ܘܒܐƕűſــƦܐ ųƇƃܕ :ųƍƙƆŴſ Ɓƍ̈ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܉ ܐƅſ ܕܒƢܐܙܐ űƉܡ ƋƇƤƉ ܗܘܐ Ɔܒ ̈ ܘƎſ ܘܐƎſųſƦſ ܒƊƇƖܐ ųƇƃ܉ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƍƉܐ ̈ܬܐ ܕܗ ƇƀŶܐ ܘƕ 5 ̈ƦƇƇܐ ܕܨܒŴ ̇ ƕűſــƦܗ ܘƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܗ ̣ƉــƎ ̈ܬܐ: ܘƇƃــų ŴܒــƞƆ ƎــſųƆ ƋــƀƠƉܘ ܪܕܐ ̈ ƄــƊܐ ܕƀƊƀƟƦƉــƎ ܒƀƍƊــƍܐ ƀƐƌــܒܐ ܗܘܬ ƣــŴܪſܐ ̈ƍܐ ܘܐƏ ŶــƣŴܒ ̈ƦƇƇܐ܂ ܘƕ

	- ̇ ܘ ܗƈƀƃ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܬܪƍſܐ ܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐܪܙܐ ƀƠƣــƈ ܕܗܘƆܐ ܘܐܕƣܐ܉ 131 ܗ ̇ ــܐܡ Ɔــųܘܢ Ə ƈــƃܕ ܐƦــƀ ̈ ƉűƟ ܐƦــƇƇ̈ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ܕ̈ܪſــƤܐ ܘƕ

**1** Ǝſܕ [om. B | ܐƌܗ ܒܐƃܕܪܘ LP: ܒܐƃܪܘ ܐƌܕܗ BCD **3** ܪܘܣŴܓƦƀƘ L: ܪܘܣŴܓſƦƀƘ BCD: ܘܣƢܬܘܓŴƘ P | ܐű̈ ܒƖܒ BCDL: ܐƮܒƖܒ P **4** ܐܙܐƢܕܒ LP: ܕܒܐܪܙܐ BCD | ųƇƃܕ BCL: ƈƃܕ D: ųƇƃܘ P **5** ܐƦƇƇ̈ ƕܘ LP, add. B in marg.: ܐƦƕűſܘ BCD | ƎſųſƦſܘܐ BCDL: ƎſųſƦſܕܐ Ʀƀƃ P **6** ƎſųƆ BCLP: ܘܢųƆ D **7** ܐƍ ̈ ܒƣŴŶ LP, add. B in marg.: ܐŷƣ ̈ ŴŶ BCD | ܒܐƀƐƌ BCDP: ܒܐƐƌ L ̈ƇƇــƦܐ **8** ƕܘ LP: ܐƦــƇƕܘ BCD **11** ܗܘ [om. BCD **13** ܝ ̇ ܗ [om. D **15** ܐƤــſܪ̈ LP: ܐƣ̈ BCD ܐܕ **16** ܐƌűܒـــƕƦƉ BCDP: ܐƌűܒـــƕܬƦƉ L **17** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴـــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀŹŴƇźƐſܐܪ P **18** ŴƍƟܐܬܬ BCLP: ƎƟܐܬ D **21** ܕܐܪܙܐ BCDL: ܪܐܙܐ P ܐƣܘܐܕ BCDP: ܐƣܘܕܐܕ L, add. D sup. lin.

and discuss why he has established it as first, before the overall division of the ten genera.

#### *[Pythagoras on numbers]179*

129 Now, Pythagoras, who was a man renowned for the practice and knowledge of philosophy, transmitted like a kind of mystery to his disciples that all powers and causes of everything that came to be and exists in the whole world derive from numbers and constitute things, while every knowledge and philosophy about the latter has its origin and reason in calculations and figures (σχήματα) which come forth by means of numbers.

130 So, he stated that the beginning of all numbers is called the one. It is a copy of the Creator who brings order to everything in that, similar to it, he is also single180 and indivisible. And number two, which is born when the primary number doubles itself, serves also as a model (τύπος) for the universal substance of all bodies, which they call matter (ὕλη), and for the nature that is singularly active in bodies, the one which they also call material (ὑλικός) form (εἶδος). These two principles — i.e. form and matter, one of which is efficacious and the other effected, one is active and the other passive — are primary, according to Aristotle, after the Creator of the universe. From them at first the four customary elements (στοιχεῖα) are formed — i.e. the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry — from which in turn the adornment and constitution of the universe takes place.

131 Thus, they say that the second number contains the mystery of matter and form, which, as we have said, Aristotle sets as primary principles and causes of

**179** Cf. §123, above. In the corresponding passage, Ammonius makes a brief note on the application of numbers by Aristotle, without mentioning the name of Pythagoras. The *prolegomena* treatises by David, Elias, and Olympiodorus frequently refer to the Pythagorean arithmology. Cf., e.g., Lectures 16–17 of David's *Introduction to Philosophy* (49.7–54.26), where he describes the following established tradition of Aristotle's commentators: "Since we have earlier on given an arithmetical explanation <...>, the commentators take their starting point from this and proceed to discuss the numbers up to the decad" (Gertz 2018: 133; the Greek text: ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἰρήκαμεν ἀριθμητικὴν αἰτίαν δεικνύουσαν <...> ἐντεῦθεν λαβόντες οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ ἀφορμὴν ἔρχονται καὶ διαλαμβάνουσι περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν ὄντων ἄχρι τῆς δεκάδος).

**180** Syr. *iḥidaya*, here probably corresponding to Gr. μοναχός. Sergius applies the same Syriac term in the meaning "particular, individual", cf., e.g., §168.

̇ ܘ ƀŷſــſűܐ ܘƉűƟــƀܐ: ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ܂ źƉــƈ ܕܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƀƍƉــƍܐ ܗ ܘ ̇ B87v ܗ ܐƍƀƍƊƆ űƆŴƉ ųƤƙƌ ƈƕ ƚƙƕƦƉ űƃ :ܐſܘƢܕܒ ųƊŷƘ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ P34r ܬܐŴƙƀƙƕ ƦƀƤſƢܒ ƎƉ ŪƐƌ̣ űƃ ܐ܉ſܘƢܒ ܗܘ̣ ܘܐܦ ƋƆ ܐƍƃܗ :ܐƍſܬܪ ̈ ſܐ: ܗܘƆܐ ܘܐܕƣܐ ܐƀƟــƋ űƉܡ ̣ƎƉ ŴƣܬŴƘܬܐ ܕܒƢܘŴſܬܗ ܕŴƆܬ ܗܘ ܐ܂ſ ̈ 5 ܕܗܘ ܘܢųƊſŴƟ ųƇƄƆ ƎƀƠƙƏܕ ƦƀƉűƟ

**1** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **3** ܗܘ̣ ܘܐܦ L: ܗܘ̣ ܐܦ BCDP: ܘܗܝƦــſܐ corr. in P **6** Ŵܒــƃܐܬܪ CDL: Ūــƃܐܬܪ BP | ƦــƀƉűƟ] + ƎــƀƆܗ P ̈Ɛܐ **7** ̇ Ŵƌܢ + [ܐƃŴźƏ ܗ BCD | ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD **9** Ƣƀܓ [om. D | ƚƙƕƦƌ LP: ƚƙƕƦƉ BCD | ܐƌܗ [+ Ƣƀܓ D **10** ܕܐܦ ƈźƉ BCDP: ܐܦ L | ܐƌܗ CDLP: ܐƍƀƍƉ B **11** ܘ ̇ ܕܗ [om. B ܐƢƐƕܕ BCDL: ܐƮƐƕ P **12** Ǝſܘ ̇ ܗ BCDL: Ǝſű ̇ ܒƕ P **13** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD | ܐƍƀƍƉ] om. B **14** ƈƄܒ...**176,4** ܐƢƀƊܓ [om. hom. P **18** Ŵſܗܘ CDLP: ܗܘ B **20** ƦſܐƀƇƊƤƉ L: ܐƀƇƊƤƉ BCD ̈ ܘƎſ **21** ܘܗ ųܒ L: Ǝſųſܘųܒ BCD | ܘܡƦƉ BL: ܘܡƦƊƉ CD

everything. For just like the singular and primary number which is similar to the Creator doubled itself and thus gave birth to this second number, in the same way, when the Creator in the beginning181 applied some sort of doubling which derived from the affinity between his creative activity and the creation, he first of all established matter and form that are necessary for the subsistence of all beings.

132 And just as from matter and form, as we said above, the four elements are primarily constituted, which are the secondary principles of beings, so also the number four is born from a doubling of the second number, for when the latter doubles itself it brings forth the subsistence of the former. And since also the number four originates from the primary number and makes the latter fourfold, it is clear that it gives birth to the ten. For one, two, three, and four together make ten.

133 That is why the number ten that is perfect in every respect is also a model (τύπος) for all things and beings of this world, which was made as a whole by the Creator. For just as the fourfold number gives birth to the number ten, which is perfect, as we have said, being the limit of all numbers, because there is no other number higher than it but there are those ones that are infinitely composed from themselves, in the same way from the four elements — i.e. fire, air, earth, and water — also this whole world was composed as an entity, and those things that are delivered into it and come to be remain the same, while not a single thing is ever created in it.

**181** Syr. *b-rišit*. The same word appears in the Syriac translation of Gen. 1:1, i.e. opens the creation story.

134 ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ ܙܒƍܐ ̣ܗܘ ƢŷƊƆ ƢſųƌܐƦſ ܒƦƇƖܗ ܕƆŴƘܓܐ ܗ r88B | r131C ̇ ܘ ̇ ــƢ ܐƌܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕܐƃــƌŵܐ ܪܒƖƀــƀܐ ܕƟــűܡ ܐܬܬƀƏــƋ ƉــƎ ƖƆــƈ܂ ܐƉ ̇ ܘ ܕƐƕــƢܐ: ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̇ ܘ ܪܒƀƖƀܐ ܐܘűƆ ƋƆ ƉــƎ ܪܘƃܒــų ܗ ܕƍƀƍƉܐ ܗ ̈Ɛܐ܉ ܓƢƀƊܐ ܒŷƙــƊܐ ܕܐܬܪƃــŪ ܗƌܐ ƃــƈ ƉــƎ ܐܪܒــƖܐ ܐźƏــƃŴ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ űƟܡ Ŷܒƥ ܐŴƌܢ ƢƐƖƆܐ ܓƍ 5 ̈Ɛܐ ܒƆŴƙܓܐ ܘܢųܓƆŴــƘ ƈــƖƉ ƎƃܪƦܘܒ :ܐƐ̈ ܪܒƀƖƀܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܘƀƉܐ ܕܐƃŴźƏ ̈Ɛܐ ܗƎƀƆ: ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ųƊŷƘ ܕܗƌܐ ̇ ܘ ܐƌƢŶܐ ſƢƀƐƕܐ ܕܓƍ ܗ ƃــƈ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕƀƍƉــƍܐ ܕƐƕــƢܐ ܓƀƊــƢ ܘƀƐƉــƅ ܒــų Ƈƃــųܘܢ ̈ƍƀܐ܉ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ܗƌܐ ƈƃ ܓƢƀƊܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕŶܒƎƀƤƀ ܒų ųƇƃܘܢ ƍƉ ̈Ɛܐ ܕźƟܓŴ̈ܪƑſ܉ ̇ ܕƎſ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܐܦ ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ ųܒ ܐ܂ƍƀ̈ 10 ƃ ̈ܬܐ ܕܒƇƖــƊܐ܂ ܐƄſــƍܐ ܕƆܐ ܐƌــƥ Ŵܨܒــ ƎــſųƇƃ ƥ ̇ ̇ƋƇ ܘŶܒ ܓƢƀƊ ܘƤƉ ܘܢųــƍƉ űــŶ ƦــƀŶܬ ƥــƀܒŶܘ ơــƇ ̇ Ɖــƞܐ ƉــƦܘܡ ܕƄƤƌــŸ Ɖــűܡ ܕƆܐ Ə ̈Ɛܐ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܕܓƍ

135 ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕܐƄſــƍܐ ܕŶƦƉــſŵܐ ƆــƁ ƢſųƌܐſــƦ ܐܬܐƉــƢ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܘܐܦ ƈƕ Ƣƌܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ŴƆܬ ܗƌ v131C ̈Ǝƀ ܕܒƦܪƎƃ: ܕܐƞƆܐ ܒų ŴƍƙƇƉܬܗƎſ܂ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ܗƈƀƃ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ܓــƌŴܐƦſ: ƈــƄƆ ܗܝ ܐƖــſűſ ܗܕܐ ܉Ʀــſܐűƀŷſ ƎſųƊſŴــƟ ܘܗܝƦــſܕܐ Ǝƀ̈ P34v ƌܐ ƎƀƇſܘܐ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܐ̈ܪƄſــƦܐ܂ ŴــŶܬ ƈƕ ̇ ̈ Ɖܐ űƉܡ: ܐܘ ܐƥƌ܂ ܘƆܐ ƠƀƍƏܐ ƈƕ ܬŴŶ ƎſűƉ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܕܓƣűܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܐܪܒƖܐ ̈ܪܘƃــܒܐ ƈــƕܘ :ܪŴــƕŵܒ ܐƆܕ ܒܐ̈ L14r ƟŴƕ ƈƕ ơƀƍƏ :ƈƖƆ ƎƉ ŴƊƀƏܐܬܬ ŴƉűƟܕ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ̈ ƀƌܐ: ܗƌ Ŵــƃ Ǝــſܪ̈ܬ Ƣــƀܓ ƎƀƆܗ ܂ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ƊƀƠƉܕ ܐƦſ ̈ B88v | D74v ŴŶܬ ܘܓــƣűܐ܉ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘ ƣــųƉŴܗܘܢ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƃــƍܐ ܒƀƖــűܐ

> **1** ƈــƀƃܗ [om. B **3** ƋــƆ BCD: ƎــƆ L **5** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **7** ܐƌƢŶܐ BCLP: ܐſƢŶܐ D **8** ܘܢųƇƃ BCLP: ƈƃ D **9** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD **10** ܐƍƀ̈ ƃ CDLP: ܐƍƀ̈ ƍƉ B | Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ L: ƑſܪŴܐܓــźƟܕ P **12** ܘܡƦــƉ BCLP: ܘܡƦــƊƉ D | ƥــƀܒŶܘ CLP: ƥܒ ̇ Ŷܘ BD ̈ Ʀſܐ | B ܕƆܐ :CDLP ܘƆܐ **18** ŴŶܬ ƈƕ ̇ ܐܘ ܡűƉ] om. hom. P **20** ŴƊƀƏܐܬܬ BCDL: ܒܐƃܪܘ̈ ܘƢƉܐܬܐ ŴƉűƟܕ P | ܪŴƕŵܒ BCLP: ܐƦſܪ̈Ŵƕŵܒ D **21** Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BCD | ܐƀƏܐܘ CDLP: B ܕܐܘƀƏܐ

134 So now, after this, it is time to look clearly at the cause for the fourfold division which we earlier presented above182. Thus, I say that just as the fourfold number gives birth from its composition to the number ten which serves as a perfect model for the universe that is composed from the four elements, so too Aristotle first encompassed the ten genera in a fourfold division which resembles the elements and after that introduced another, tenfold, division of these genera which is in itself a model of the universe. For, just as the number ten is complete, comprising all the numbers, so also the universe is complete, containing all the natures. In the same way, also the division of the ten genera of the categories is complete and perfect, encompassing all things that are in the world, for no one is ever able to find anything that would not fall under and be contained in one of these genera.

#### *[Definition of accident]*

135 Since, as it seems to me, these things have been clearly explained, let us further proceed to those ones that are after them, which is in this way also necessary for teaching them. That there are those things that are said universally and those whose subsistence is particular183, is clear to everyone and there is no need for any definitions or long demonstrations. However, a definition of substance or accident themselves from the four pairings which have been previously set out above requires not a few inquiries as well as demonstrations that support it. Because these two terms, i.e. substance and accident, designate something that is unfamiliar to many from ordinary usage, and also what each

**182** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9.

**183** Sergius speaks in one case in terms of predication ("said") and in the other in terms of existence ("subsistence"). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.21–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.9–15.

̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕűſƦƉܥ ƎƉ ƈƃ űŶ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܓــƇܐ ̈ ܓƀܐܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܗ ƐƆ ̈ƌűŶܐ܂ ܘƗſűſ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ܒŴŷƇܕ űŷƆ

̇ ܩ ƖƊƆܒــű܉ ƐƉــƦ ܕƆܐ 136 ƕــƟŴܒܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕƕــƈ ܗƀƆــƎ ܬ̈ܪſــųܘܢ ܙܕ ŸƃƦƤƌ űƉܡ ܕơƀƍƏ ƈƕ ƠƣŴƘܐ ܕƎƉ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܒƦƄƊܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ܂ ̇ ܐƆܐ ƕــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ƕــƟŴܒܐ ܐſــƍܐ ܕƘــܐܐ ƤƆــŴܘܕųƕ 5 ̇ ܘŶƦƆــųƉŴ ̇ ܒƦܪƃــƎ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ܉ ܐſــƄܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܬܪƀƕــƦܗ ܕܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ܕƀƇƕــų ܕܒƦƄܒܐ ܗ r132C ̇ ܘ ܕźƟܓŴ̈ܪƑſ ƎƍƀƊƀƏ ܓƢƀƊܐƦſ܂ ƈƕ ܓƣűܐ ܕƎſ ܗƣܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƏــƋ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ̣ܗܘ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ܂ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܉ űƃ ƎƍſƢƤƉ ƎƉ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܗ ơƀƍƏ ܓƢƀ ƈƕ ܒƍŶŴܐ ܕƆܐ ܒŴƕŵܪ܉ ܐƅſ ܕܐƦſ ƆــƎ ܕŷƌــŴܐ ܒƀƆųــƎ 10 ܂ƎƍƀܒƦƄƉ ƦŶƦƆ ƎƉܕ

	-

̈ــƀܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ Ɖــűܡ ܒƊــűܡ ܒƐƕűŷــƢ ܙƌ 138 ܐƆܐ ܙܕܩ r35P ̇ ƊƆــűܥ܉ ܕܗ ̇ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒܐܬܪܐ܂ ܐܘ ܐܘ ܐ܂ƍܒŵܕܒ ƅſܐ Ǝſܕ Ŵ̇ C132v ƌܗ ܐ܂ƢƉܐƦƉ ܘܢųƇƃ ̈ܬܗ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ƍƉــŴ ̈ܬܐ ܒų ŴƍƉ ƅſܐ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒƊܐƌܐ܂ ܐܘ

̇ | B ܐƌƢŶܐ :CDLP ܐƍſܐ **5** ųƕܘܕŴƤƆ BCDP: ̇ ̈ܕųƕ ܘŴƤƆܘ L **6** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ C: ƑƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܕܐܪ D: ܣŴــƇźźƏܕܐܪ P **7** ܒܐƦƄܕܒ DLP: ܒܐƦƃܕ BC Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ CP: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ D: ܣŴــſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L | ƎــƍƀƊƀƏ] + ƎــƍŶ L **8** ƎƍſƢƤƉ BCLP: ƎƍſܪƢƤƉ D | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **10** ƎƍƀܒƦƄƉ] + tit. ܐƣűܓ ƈźƉ :B ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƆųŹŴ :CL ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ **11** BCD ܕƍƉــŴ ܘܐſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒŶƦــƉŴܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܒűƊܡ ܐƎſƢŶ ܐƦſܘܗܝ | P ܐܪŴƀƇźźƐſܣ :D ܐܪƑƀƆųŹŴźƏ ܗ [om. hom. P **12** ŴƆ LP: ŴƆܘ BCD, Epit. | ܐſƞƉ CDLP: ܐƞƉ B **13** ܘܡƦƉ CDLP: ܡűƉ B **14** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ̈ƀܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ űƉܡ ܒűƊܡ .tit +] ܒų **18** P ƙƏŴƇƀƘܐ ̇ ܝ **19** BCD ܕܒƊƄܐ ܙƌ ܒų +] ܕܗ ̇ ܝ ̇ űƊƆܥ ܕܗ ܓ + [ܕܒܐܬܪܐ | BCD ܒ + [ܕܒŵܒƍܐ | BCD ܐ + [ƦƉܐƢƉܐ **20** P ܐƆܐ ܙܕܩ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒƊܐƌܐ | BCD ̈ ܬܗ | BCD ܕ + [ܕܒƊܐƌܐ **21** P .om] ܐܘ ŴƍƉ] + ܗ BCD

one of them signifies is not apparent and comprehensible save for a few alone184.

136 Therefore, an inquiry should be made into both of them, so that nothing will be missing in the interpretation of other things in this treatise. However, concerning substance we will make a proper inquiry into its meaning and definition later on, where it will completely correspond to Aristotle's account of it in the book *Categories*. Of accident, conversely, we will speak now, starting with a definition which the Philosopher gave for it. Thus, we require no small investigation about those things which we are about to discuss below.

137 Now, Aristotle states that accident is "that which is in something else not as a part of it, it being impossible to exist without that thing which it is in"185. This is a defining account of accident given to us by the Philosopher in the treatise on the ten genera. Thus, an accident is what exists in something else, while it is in it not as its part, and its subsistence is never possible by itself, apart from what it is in.

138 Now, it is necessary to know that there are altogether eleven ways of speaking about being-in-something186. These are: as in a time; or as in a place; or as in a container; or as parts in what they are parts of; or as a whole in its parts; or as

**184** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.29–32: ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθετο ἑαυτοῦ ὁ φιλόσοφος φωναῖς τισι χρησαμένου ἀγνώστοις ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, τῷ τε καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, βούλεται λοιπὸν διδάξαι ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν. Thus, Philoponus refers to the actual expressions used by Aristotle, while Sergius substitutes them with "substance" and "accident".

**185** See *Cat*. 1a24–25: ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν. Aristotle thus defines the expression "in a subject" (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) which is associated by Sergius with the term "accident".

**186** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2 (cf. 29.5–23) and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.7–26. Both lists contain 11 types that are equivalent to Sergius' list, but differ from one another in their sequence. Also Sergius' sequence does not fully correspond to either of them. These lists ultimately go back to *Phys.* 210a14–24, where Aristotle suggests eight ways of being-insomething.

̇ ܐƅſ ̈ƣܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ ̈ܬܗ܂ ܐܘ ŴƍƊܒ ܡűƉ ųƇƃ ƅſܐ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܘܒƢܐ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ̈ƣܐ ܒųܘƆܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ ܓƐƍܐ ܒܐ v14L ̈ ܕƣܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ̇ Ǝ ܕűƉܒƢ ųƆܘܢ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ Ɖ ܕƦƉܕܒƎſƢ ƎƉ ܬƦƀŶ ܐűſܐ ܕܐƥƌ: ܒų ܕܒƀƇƉŴƤܐ܂ ܐܘ r75D ̇ ܐƅſ ܓƣűܐ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕƃܒƢ Ɔܐ ƎƀƖſűſ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܗƎƀƆ ƆܐƎƀƇſ ܕƟ 5 ̇ ƎſƢ܉ ŴƘųƌܟ ܬܘܒ ųƀƇƕܘܢ ܘƌܐƢƉ ܬƦſŴŶܐ ܂ƥƍƇƄƆ Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎƉ̣ ܘܢ܉ųƍƉ űŶ űŶ ƈƃܕ

**1** ųƇƃ] om. P | ܬܗ ̈ ̈ ܕƣܐ | BCD ܘ + [ܒŴƍƊ ̇ ܐƅſ ܓƐƍܐ ܒܐ ̈ƣܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ [ܐܘ ̈ ܕƣܐ **2** BCD ܙ + [ܒܓƐƍܐ | P .om ܒܐ [+ ܚ BCD | ܐƆܘųܒ [+ ܛ BCD **3** ƎƉ] om. B | ܐűſܐ LP, Epit.: ܗűــſܐ BCD | Ǝــ ̇ Ɖ] om. B | ܘܢųƆ] + ܝ BCD **4** ܐƀƇƉŴƤܕܒ [+ ܐſ BCD **7** ܐ [om. P **8** ܢŴƀƇſܕܐ CDLP, Epit.: ܢŴƇſܕܐ B | ƅſܐ [om. L **9** ܐƦƍƤܕܒ LP, Epit.: ܐƦƖƤܕܒ BCD | ƎƇƘܕܙ BLP, Epit.: ƎƇƘܕ C: ƎƇƘ D | ƎƇƘ DLP, Epit.: ƎƇƘܕ C: ƎƇƘܕܙ B **10** ƅſܕܕܐ BCLP, Epit.: ƅſܕܐ D **12** ܒ [om. P | ܘܒܐܬܪܐ CDL, Epit.: ܒܐܬܪܐ BP **13** ܕܐܐܪ BCDLP: ܕܐܬܪܐ Epit. **16** ܓ [om. BCDP | ܡűƉ BLP, Epit.: ܡűƊܒ CD **17** ƅƏ] om. B **20** ܐſƦƘܘ [om. L, + ܓ BCD | ųƆ Ʀſܐ ̈Ɗƀܐ Ɵ LP: ųƆ Ʀſܐ ܐƊƀ̈ Ɵ BCD, Epit.

species in a genus; or as a genus in species (εἴδη); or as forms (εἴδη) in matter; or as the governing of those who are under someone's rule is in the person who governs them; or as in an end; or as an accident in a substance187. However, since these are probably not clearly comprehensible for the readers, let us further turn to them and suggest examples to each one from what is known by everyone.

139 1. So, we say that something is in a time, e.g. when we state about the War of Ilion188 that it occurred in the time of Alexander Paris, or when we say that any other particular thing was in the year of such-and-such (a ruler) or in the day of so-and-so. Everything like this is said to have happened or to be happening in some time.

140 2. Further, we say that something is in a place, just as each one of us is inside the limits of air that surrounds our bodies from outside, or when we say about water or wine that they are inside the inner limits of an earthen vessel or anything else that contains them.

141 3. Also, we say that something is in a container, as water in a pitcher, or as wine in a wineskin, or as any kind of body that is inside another body. This type differs from the previous one in that place has only two dimensions, namely length and breadth, while a container always has three dimensions, namely length, breadth, and depth. Hence, place is such a limit of a body that encloses in its interior part what is placed into it.  The same example appears by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.5–6 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.17–18.

 ܐŵŶƦƉ L | ܐƍƃܗ [om. B **4** ܘ ̇ ܗ [om. BCD | ƎƉ̣ CDLP, Epit.: űƃ B [ܗ **10** B ܐܘ ܐƅſ ܪܓƇܐ :CD ܐܘ ܪܓƇܐ .:Epit ,LP ܘܪܓƇܐ **8** P .om] ܕ **7** BCD ܕųƇſ +] ܓſŴܐ **5** om. P **13** ܘ [om. P **14** ܪŴŷƌܕ [+ ƥƌܐ BCD **15** ܒܐƇƃܘ ܐƀƏŴƏܕ L, Epit.: ܐƀƏŴƏܘ ܒܐƇƃܕ BCDP [ܙ **18** P ܘܐܪܙܐ ܘܙƦſܐ .:Epit ,BCDL ܘܙƦſܐ ܘܐܪܙܐ | BCDP ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ .:Epit ,L ܕܐƎſųſƦſ **16** om. P **19** ܐƀƏŴƏܘܕ BCLP, Epit.: ܐƀƏŴƏܘ D **21** ܒܐƆܘűܘܒ ELP, Epit.: ܒܐƆܘűܒ ܐܘ BCD **22** ܚ [ om. P **23** ܐźƍſܪűƌܕܐ ELP, Epit.: ܐźƍſܕܐܕܪ BCD | ܐƤŷƍܒ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƤƀƍܒ P

body itself which possesses two limits, the interior one which contains what is in it and, as we said, is called its place, and the exterior one which is seen to everyone from outside. Provided this is so, then it is obvious that the way how something is in a place differs from the way of being in a container in that the former is the inner limit of a body, as we said, while the latter is itself a body189.

142 4. But we also say that things are (in something) as parts in what they are parts of, for example a hand, or a leg, or any other member of human body. For these are in a body as its parts.

143 5. Also, it is said that the whole human body is in its parts, i.e. in the head, in the belly, in the hands and legs, and in all other members of it. In this way, as we said, we state that a whole is in its parts.

144 6. Things are said to be in something as species in a genus, when we see that they derive from one and the same genus and say that they are in their common genus. E.g., we say that a horse, a dog, and a bull are in the genus of animal, while a vine, an olive tree, and a cedar are in the genus of plant.

**189** In points 2 and 3, Sergius suggest a different kind of explanation than what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.6–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.18–22.

̇ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ̇ ܐƊƄƏܐ ܕŴƃܪƀƏܐ ܒƐƀƠܐ: ܐܘ ̇ : ܐܘ ܐųſƦſ ܗƍƃܐ܂

	- 148 ܝ ܘܐƅſ ܕܒƀƇƉŴƤܐ ܬܘܒ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܉ ܕܬܨܒƦƀܗ ܕܒƦƀܐ ܒƤــųƊƆŴ ̇ ܂ ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ƎſųƇƃ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ̇ ܕܐƙƆܐ ܒųƀƇƉŴƤ ̣ܗܝ: ܘƦŷƤŶܗ
	- 149 ſܐ ܐƅſ ܓƣűܐ ܕƎſ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܉ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܐƦſ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܒƇŷܒܐ: ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܒƄܐƘܐ: ܘŴƀƇŶܬܐ ܒűܒƤܐ: ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ſųƇƃــƎ ܕܐſــƅ 10 ܗƎƀƆ܂
	- ̈ƀܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ƐƕــƢܐ܉ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ƍƉــƦܐ 151 ܗŴƌܢ ܕƎſ ųƇƃܘܢ ܙƌ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܒų܉ ܘƍƉــųܘܢ ſƞƉــƎ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܕܗ

**1** ܐƊƄƏܐ CDLP, Epit.: ųƊƄƏܐ B | ܐƌƢŶܐ LP, Epit.: ƎſƢŶܐ BCD **3** ܛ [om. P **4** ܐƊƃ CDLP, Epit.: ܐƊƃűܒ B **7** ܝ [om. P | ųƊƆŴƤܒ LP: ųƀƇƉŴƤܒ BCD: ܗܝŴƀƇƉ̈ ŴƤܒ Epit. **8** ƅſܕܐ LP: ƅſܕܕܐ BCD, Epit. **9** ܐſ] om. P | Ǝſܕ [om. C | ܐƀƏܒܐܘ [om. P | Ʀſܕܐ CDLP, Epit.: ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ B **10** ܐƘܐƄܒ CDL, Epit.: ܐƀƣ ̈ ŴƄܒ B: ܪܒܐŴƖܒ P | ƅſܕܐ LP: ƅſܕܕܐ BCD, Epit. **12** ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ BCL: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴــƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P **14** ƅــſܕܐ LP: ƅــſܕܕܐ BCD **16** űƖƇܒ [+ ƎƉ̣ BCD | ųܒ [om. B **19** ܐƆܐ [+ ܐƆ P **21** ܐſƞƉ BCDP: ܐƞƉ L

(σχῆμα) of a chair is in wood, or something else like that190.

150 So, Aristotle writes that accident is "what is in something else not as a part of it" and thus distinguishes accident from all those things that are in something that they are in as parts. He also adds that "it can never have subsistence all by itself without that thing which it is in", in order to distinguish it from all other cases of how a thing is said to be in something. Because all of them, even if they are not said to be in something as a part of it, can however have subsistence without it. An accident, on the contrary, is neither in something as its part, nor can it ever exist without it.

151 As for the other ten types, some of them are said to be in something as part of it, while others can subsist by themselves without it. And since an accident is

**190** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22: ἢ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ, ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδος ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.15–16: ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἢ τὸ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον σχῆμα ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ.

**191** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.13–15: ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι (λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι τόδε τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄρχοντί ἐστιν) (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22–24).

**192** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.16–17 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.24–25.

**193** Ammonius and Philoponus speak in the last case of being "as in a subject", see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.17: ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.25– 26). Since Sergius completely abstains from using the terms applied by Aristotle himself, he modifies this point accordingly.

 LP **6** ƎƘܕܐ BCDP: ƎƘܘܐ L ܘܢųſƦƀƆ LP: ܘܢųſƦſܐ ܐƆ BCD **8** ܘܗܝƦſܘܐ LP: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BC: ܕܐܘܬܘܗܝ D **11** ƎƉ] om. L **12** ƦƇܒŶܐܬ CDLP: ܐƇܒŶƦƉ B | ܘűƃ + ܗܕܐ BCD **13** ܐƉ ̈ ̈ Ɖܐ :CP ܙŹܐ ̈ ƊŹܐ :BD ܙܐŹܐ :L ܙܐ ̈ źܐ ƊƀŹܙ Epit. | ܐƀƆű̈ ƕܘ BCLP: ܐƀƆ̈ űƕ D **15** ܗܕܐ [om. BCD **17** Ƌ ̇ ŷƆ BCLP: ƋƆ D **23** ܘ ̇ :LP 2ܗ ̇ ܝ ܗ BCD **24** ܫƢƘ DLP: ܫƢƘܘ B: ܫƢƘܕ C

in something like the other ten types, the Philosopher added that it is in something not as its part, in order to distinguish it from those things that are (in something) as a part of it. And he further added that it can never have subsistence by itself without that what it is in, in order to distinguish it from all other cases which can exist without that thing which they are in, even if they are not in it as a part194.

152 For example, whiteness is an accident. It has subsistence either in milk, or in white lead, or in any other kind of body. It is in the body that is receptive of it not as its part. Neither can it have subsistence outside the body in which it is, for it will perish at that very moment when it is separated from it.

#### *[Criticism of Aristotle's definition]*

153 Now, it is necessary, as it seems to me, to discuss some enquiries (ζητήματα) and objections which one may hear just after this defining account of accident from those who are judging things without precision. For, since, as we said, any definition of a particular thing ought to suit only this thing which is made known by it, also the defining account of accident must serve for expressing it alone. Thus, there are two ways of making a mistake in a definition: either by enlarging it so that it will comprise not the whole nature of what is defined, or by reducing it and thus including in it other things that are outside of what is defined195. For a balanced and accurate definition of a particular thing is the one which serves for signification of this thing alone, separating and differentiating it from everything else.

**194** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.2–8 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.26–32.

**195** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.6–10: κακίζουσι δέ τινες τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦτον, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείπειν· αὕτη γὰρ κακία ὁρισμοῦ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ ὁριστὸν ἀλλ' ἢ πλείονα περιλαμβάνειν ἢ ἐλάττονα. καὶ οἱ μὲν πλεονάζειν λέγοντές φασι μὴ μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα περιλαμβάνειν τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.9–13. Ammonius characterizes the first kind of criticism (i.e. for being superfluous, cf. ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν by Philoponus) as κατὰ τὸ ὑπεραίρειν καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.

 D **5** ܐƉ̈ ŴŶܕܬ BCDL: ܐƉ̈ ŴŶܘܬ P | Ŵƌܗ BCLP: ܢŴƌܗ D **7** ܐƍƀ̈ Ɩſűſܐ ܗܝ ܕƃ ̈ƍƀܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ Ɩſűſܐ ܗܝ ܕŶܒƥ :BCD ܐƌƮŶܐ Ŷܒƥ ƃ LP **9** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD **11** ܐƢŹܪܗ BDLP: ܐŹܪܗ C **13** ܐƢŹܗƢƆ BDLP: ܐŹܗƢƆ C **15** ܐƦƀƌܕ [om. B **17** ܬܐ ̈ Ŵܨܒ LP, Epit.: ܐܦ BCD ƎƉ̣ ] om. CD **21** űŶ2] om. L **23** ̇ ųƇƀŶ CDLP: ܐƇƀŶ Epit.: ̇ ųƤƀƌ B | Ǝƍŷƌܐ CL: ƎƍŶ BDP, Epit.

154 What I mean is this. A correct definition of man that defines only the human nature and separates it from everything else is "rational mortal animal". So everyone who is a man is a rational mortal animal, and also every rational mortal animal is a man. For a correct interpretation of definitions implies that they are convertible with what they define196. If, however, someone reduces this definition and says only "rational animal", it is obvious that together with the nature of man he will encompass with this expression also other natures, namely angels and demons, for all of them are also rational animals. If, on the contrary, one enlarges this definition and says that man is "rational mortal animal rhetor", then he will reduce the nature that is made known by the definition, because this expression will encompass not the whole nature of men, but only the rhetors.

155 So, these are the two ways of corrupting the teaching of definitions which someone may bring forth as accusations after the defining account of accident. First of all, one might say that it defines and encompasses not only accidents, but also other things that pertain to substance and not to accidents. For, if accident matches the description proposed above, i.e. "what is in something not as a part of it, while it cannot have subsistence without it", since also Socrates and each one of us are in a place, while not being part of the place, and while neither of us, further, is able to exist without place, hence, according to the meaning of that description, we too are accidents. But since it is evident that

**196** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.13–15: οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· τοῦτο ἀντιστρέφει· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος.

 BP **3** ƎƘܐ LP: ƎƘܘܐ BCD **7** ܐƍƀƇƊƤƉ BCD, Epit.: ƁƇƊƤƉ L: ųƍƀƇƊƤƉ P **8** ܐƞƉ LP: ܐſƞƉ BCD, Epit. **9** ƎſųſƦſܐ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųſƦſܐ D **10** ܐܢ [om. P **11** ųƇƃ LP: ųƇƄƆ BCD **12** ܐƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ BCDLP: ܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ corr. BC sup. lin. **13** ܘ ̇ .om] ܐܦ | BCD Ɖܐ + [ܗ P | ܐŷſܪ BCDP: ܐŶܪ L **14** ܕܗܘ̣ [ om. C **17** ܐŷſܪ̈ L: ܐƍŷſܪ̈ BCDP **19** ܗܝ̣ [ om. BD **21** ܗܕܐ ܬŴƆ BCDL: ܕܐųƆ P | ƢƉܐܬܐ LP: ܬƢƉܐܬܐ BCD **23** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCLP: Ʀſܕܐ D | ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ P .hom .om] ܗܘܐ ܒų ܒŵܒƎ ܐƆܐ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܒűƖƇ ܗ

each one of us is also a substance, substance appears to be at the same time substance and accident, which is impossible197.

156 To this we reply, then, that, even if each one of us is in a place while not being a part of the place we are in, it is still possible for our nature to be thought of outside place, because place is not completive of our nature but is attached to us as a concomitant, like a shadow to a body. But what is receptive of an accident is completive of its nature, since (an accident) may never subsist without it, as we have said above. Now, if this is how things stand, it is evident that the definition of accident which is given above does not encompass anything else save it alone198.

157 Further, one might say that the defining account of accident does not encompass its nature on the whole but suits only those accidents which cannot be separated at all from what they are in. For, behold, the fragrance of apples or any kind of spices (ἄρωμα), which is an accident, may nevertheless be separated from what it is in, for even when these things are moved far away their fragrance reaches us. So, if an accident is something that cannot subsist without what it is in, while fragrances which are said to be accidents may be separated from what they are in and reach us, it is evident that the account quoted above does not define all accidents199.

158 What we shall first of all say to this is that it is not stated in this definition that it is completely impossible for an accident to exist for some time apart from what it is in, but that it may not exist at the present moment apart from

**197** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.15–21: φασὶν οὖν οἱ μὲν τὸν ἀποδεδομένον ὁρισμὸν μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἐφαρμόζειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶ παρὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ὢν ἔν τινί ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ (οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου) καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου), ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὁ Σωκράτης συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.10–12).

**198** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.21–30; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.12–20.

**199** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.8–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.10–21.

ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــų ܗƣܐ܂ ̈ܪſــŷܐ ܗƀƃــƈ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܕܗ̈ܪܘƉܐ: ܘܐܦ ܐܢ D77v ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƎــƉ̣ űƖƇܒ ŴƆ ܐƆܐ ܉ƎƟŴƏ ܬŴƆ Ǝſܘܐܬ ܘܢųƍƉ ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ̇ ܐܬſــƎ ƆــŴܬܢ܂ ܐܦ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƀƣƢƘƦƉــƎ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒــų ųƍƉܘܢ ܕܗ̈ܪܘƉܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܗܐ ܒܐܐܪ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ܕܒܓــƊƣŴܐ v137C űƉܡ ƠƉܒųƍƇܘܢ ܘƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕŴƊƀƟƦƌܢ ܒűƖƇ ̣ƎƉ ܗƌܐ܂ v38P

**1** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCL: ܗܘܐ Ʀſܕܐ D | ܐŷſܪ̈ L: ܐƍƀŶܪ̈ BCDP | ƈƀƃܗ CDLP: Ǝſܕ B | ܐܢ ܘܐܦ LP: ƎƘܐ BCD **4** ܐƉܪܘ̈ܕܗ BCLP: ܐƉܪ̈ܕܗ D **6** ܐƍŷſܪ̈ BCDP: ܐƍŶܪ̈ L | ƎƉ̣ ] om. L **8** ƅƤ ̇ Ɖ] + ƥƊƃܘ BCD **9** ܐܦ CDLP: ܐܘ B | ܐƀƏܐܘ [om. L **12** ܐƍŷſܪ̈ BCDP: ܐƍŶܪ̈ L **13** ܕܐܦ BCLP: ƅــſܕܐ D **14** ܐƍــŷſܪ̈ BCDP: ܐƍــŶܪ̈ L **16** ųــƍƀƃ BCDL: ܐƍــƀƃ P **17** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD ܣŴـــſܪŴƘƢƘ BCDL, Epit.: ƑſܪŴـــƘƢƘ P | ܘƢـــŶܕ CDP: ƢـــŶܕ BL **18** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴــƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **19** ܐƍــſƢŶܕ BCDP: ܐƍــſƢŶܕܐ L **20** ƎƀƊŶƦƉܕ BCDP: ƎƀƊŶƦƉ L **21** ƈܒŷƉ BCDL, Epit.: ƈܒƠƉ P | ܘܐܦ BCDL: ܐܦ P, Epit.

what it is in200. So, even if every fragrance of spices can be separated from them and reach our nostrils, it still cannot reach us without another substance which they are in. For even if it is separated from the spices, it is nonetheless in the air as in a certain body which is receptive of it and without which it cannot subsist201.

159 Also, from what follows we shall comprehend that fragrances do not reach our nostrils without certain substance. For, behold, if somebody places an apple in a house for many days it will shrivel and shrink, and from this it is clear that together with its fragrance, a certain substance wastes away and disperses from it. Also, when a man puts some vessel over his nostrils, even if there were spices, he will not sense their fragrance because he will breath clear air. This too makes apparent that when fragrances come into contact with a substance that is much denser than air, they are not perceived any more. So, it has become clear now that fragrances may never exist without some substance which they are in. Consequently, they also fit the above-mentioned account that defines universally the whole nature of accident202.

160 Others, among whom was also Porphyry, since they saw in the definition of accident proposed by Aristotle a certain contradiction with his teaching, sought to formulate it clearly and comprehensibly. Thus, they said that accident is "what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it"203. However, there are quite a few contradictions also in this definition proposed by them. For of accidents some may be separated from what they

**200** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.12–13: πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ᾧ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, "first of all, Aristotle did not say 'in which it was', but 'in which it is'." (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.22–23). Thus, Ammonius stresses the present tense in Aristotle's words.

**201** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.11–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.21–24.

**202** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.16–29.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.24–36.13, Simplicius, *In Cat.* 49.10–14.

**203** Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.24–25: συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς.

ܘƕܐƎƀƆ ܐƌƮŶܐ ųƀƙƇŶܘܢ܉ ܘųƍƉܘܢ Ɔܐ ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ƉــƦܘܡ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ r39P ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓƎƀƣű ųƆ܂

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162 ܘܐܦ ƇŶــƚ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕſــƎ Ɖــſƞܐ ̣ܗܝ ܬܘܒ ƙƊƆــơ ܒــƢܘŶܐ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓƀƣűــƎ ܒــų: ܐſــƅ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕƆܐ ƀƠŶƢƉــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ܕܓــű 15 ̈ƣܐ ܗ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ܕƖƌܒܐ܉ ܘܐƎƘ Ɔܐ ƎƀƠŶƢƉ ܒų ܐܘŴƊƃܬܗ ܕƀƣŴƃܐ ܘܐƅſ ܗ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒــųܘܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƇƊــƦܐ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ܗ ܒƌƢƕŴƐܐ ̣ƎƉ ܓŴ ܐƇܒــŶ ܘܢųــƆ Ǝــſűܒƕ ܐƆ űــƃ ܘܢ܉ųــƍƉ ܢŴــƌܐ ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ܒܐƣŴŷܘܒ űƉܡ܂ ſƞƉܐ ̣ܗܝ ܓƢƀ ܕƦƌܪƌܐ ܘܐܦ ƀƣŴƃܐ ܘƖƌܒܐ ŶــŴ̈ܪܐ܉ ƃــű Ɔܐ ƀƄƌƦƉܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕűŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ܒűƊܡ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ƎƀƆųƆ ŷƆــƊܐ 20 ̇ ܝ ƦƀƍƊŶƦƉܐ ܕܐܬܐƢƉܬ ܐܦ ܗƣܐ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܂ ̣ܗܝ ƦƇƉܐ ܗ

163 ŷƄƤƉܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐܦ ƟŴƆܒƈ ܗ v39P ̇ ܝ ܕܐƢƀƉܐ ܒų ܒƉŴŶƦܐ: ܕƢƘƦƉܫ ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌܕ :ųƆ ƈܒŷ ̇ Ɖ ܐƆ űƃ ųܒ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ܐƉ ܘ ̇ C139r ܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐƣűܓ ƋƆ

̇ | P Ɔܐ ܙŴƕܪ .:Epit ,BCDL ܕƆܐ ܒŴƕŵܪ **4** ųſƦſܕܐ LP, Epit.: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCD **5** ܐƀ ̈ Ɖܕ LP, Epit.: ̈ƍܐ ̈ ƍܐ :CD ܕܒ ܕܙܒ B **8** ƥƌܐ ƈƀƃܗ BCDL: ƈƀƃܗ ƥƌܐ P: ƥƌܐ ƎſűƉ Epit. | ƋƀƏܕܐܬܬ BCLP, D corr. in marg., Epit.: ƋŶܕܐܬܬ D **10** ܗܘܐ̣ [ om. L **11** ܢŴƌ ̇ ųƆ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųƆ D **14** ܬܘܒ [ om. B **16** ܬܗŴƊƃܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܬܘܒ ܬܐŴƊƃܐܘ BCD **17** ƎƉ̣ ] + ܐƣ̈ űܓ BCD **19** ܗܝ̣ [ om. B, Epit. | Ƣƀܓ [om. D **20** ܐܦ LP, Epit.: ܘܐܦ BCD **21** ܗܝ̣ [ om. P, Epit. **22** ܕܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD, Epit. **23** ܐƉ] om. P | ܐƆ…**196,12** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ [om. P

occur in and destroyed by being replaced by another ones, while others may never be separated from what they occur in.

161 For instance, the blackness which occurs in the body of a man who has remained for a long time in the sun and which becomes his accident may be separated and removed from him after he has spent a considerable time washing himself in water and staying in the shade. But the blackness of an Ethiopian204 or a raven which is also their accident may never be separated and removed from the Ethiopian's skin or from raven's feathers. Thus, one may say that the definition formulated by Porphyry — i.e. that accident is "what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it" — does not encompass all the accidents, but only those which may be separated and removed from what they are in, because the other ones, as we have said, are not separable from whose accidents they are205.

162 However, instead of this we shall rather bring forth the following argument. Even if those accidents which may not be removed from what they occur in, such as the blackness of an Ethiopian and also of a raven, are in actuality not separable from those bodies which they occur in, they nevertheless can be separated from them in speech and in thought without causing any destruction of them. For it is possible to imagine both an Ethiopian and a raven as white without bringing any harm to the substance of any of them206. Hence, they are also encompassed by the descriptive account that has been quoted above just now.

163 It is also possible for someone to say against what is stated in this definition — i.e. that accident is "separable from what it is in without destroying

**204** Syr. "the Cushite".

**205** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.7–18.

**206** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.11–15: εἴπομεν δὲ ἤδη ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀπογίνεται, ἀλλ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὁ κόραξ καὶ ὁ Αἰθίοψ λευκός, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον οὐδὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ χωρίσαι δυνατόν· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ νοῆσαι ἄνθρωπον μὴ εἶναι ζῷον φθείρομεν αὐτόν, ἐπινοήσαντες δὲ τὸν κόρακα μὴ εἶναι μέλανα ἢ τὸν Αἰθίοπα οὐ φθείρομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς κόρακος ἢ ἀνθρώπου.

ܬܘܒ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕܐƦƣܐ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܓƣűܐ űƉܡ ܐſƦſــų v93B ̇ : ܘܗܐ ŷƉܒــƇܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܗܘſܐ ܒــų܂ ܘŶƢƟــŴܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܗܘſܐ ܒƖƐــƢܐ: ̣ܗܝ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܗܘſܐ ܒــų܂ ܕܐܦ ſųƀƇƕــƎ ܕܗƀƆــƎ ܬܘܒ ųــƆ ųــƆ ܐƇܒــŷƉܘ ̈ ــƍܐ ŷƄƤƉܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƌܐƢƉ ܐƌــƥ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƉܐ ܕŶƦƉƦƉــƎ Ɖ ̇ ƆܐܪƉــƀƌŴܐ ųــƆ ƎــƇ ̈ ܒƦƀƠܪܐ ܐܘ 5 ̇ ƦƉܪƎƀƘ ƢſƦſ ƉــƎ Ɖܐ ܕܙܕܩ: ŷƉܒ ̈ ƇــƎ܉ ܗƃــƍܐ ܐܦ ܒŷƉ ܪܐƦــƀƠƆ ųــƆ ŴــƆ űƃ Ǝſųܕܒ ܐƦſŴƣ ܐƦƍƀƠƆܘ ܐƣـــƦܐ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ƙƆܓـــƢܐ ŷƉܒـــƇܐ ܐƆܐ ƆܐܪƉـــƀƌŴܐ ƣـــƦſŴܐ ܕŴƉܙܓų܂ űƃ ܕƎſ ŶƦƌܒƈ ̣ܗܘ ܗƌܐ ŴƉܙܓܐ܉ ܐƞƆܐ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ƘܓƢܐ v31L ܡűــƉ ܘ ̇ D78v ųــƆ ܐƣűܓــ ƈܒŷƉ ܐƃܗܪ ܐƆ ܐܦ ƎſűƉ ܂ųƊƕ ųƆ ƈܒŶƦƌ ܕܗ 10 ̇ ܘܐ ܒــų܂ ܘܐܦ ŶƢƟــŴܬܐ ܕſــƎ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ܒƖƐــƢܐ ܕŷƉܒــƇܐ Ɔــų ̇ ܒƦƙƟƢƠܐ ųƍƀƃ ܓƣűܐ܂ ܐƅſ ܕܐܦ ̣ƉــƎ ܗܪƃܐ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒų ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų܂ ܬܘܒ ܬܬŵŶܐ܉ ܕƆܐ ŷƉܒƈ ܓƣűܐ ųƆ

**1** ܐƇܒــŷƉ ܘܗܐ L, Epit., D in marg.: ܐƇܒŷƉܘ BCD | ܐſܕܗܘ ܘ ̇ ŷƉܒƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܗ ̇ ܗܘſܐ + [ܒــų ̇ ܘ **2** .marg in D ܘܗܐ ̣ܗܝ ŷƉܒــƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕܒــų ܗ L, Epit.: ܐƉ BCD ܬܐŴŶƢƟܘ BCL, Epit.: ܬܐŴŷſƢƟܘ D **3** ܬܘܒ [om. L **4** ܗܝ̣ [ +ܬܘܒ L **5** ƎƇ ̈ ܒŷƉ BCD, Epit.: ƈܒــŷƉ L | ܐƀƌŴــƉܐܪƆ BCD, Epit.: ܬܐŴــƍƉܐܘƆ L **6** ܐƦــƍƀƠƆܘ BCL, Epit.: ܪܐƦــƀƠƆܘ D ƎــƇ ̈ ܒŷƉ BCD, Epit.: ƈܒŷƉ L | ܐܦ L, Epit.: ܘܐܦ BCD **10** ܐƢƖƐܒ CDL, Epit.: ܐƢƖƏܕ B **11** ܐƦƙƟƢƠܒ [+ ܘܗܝƦſܐ L **15** ƎƉ̣ ] om. L | ųܒ [om. B | ܐƣ̈ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƦƀƆ űƉܡ ̣ƎƉ ܓű ̇ ܘܐ ܒų ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕܗ ̇ ŷܒƈ ܗ Ɖܕ [om. hom. C **16** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ .:Epit ,LP ܗ ųƆ BD | ųܒ ܘܐ ̇ ܕܗ LP, Epit.: ܘܐųƌܕ BD **19** ƎƘܘܐ LP: ƎƘܐ BCD **21** ܡűƉ] om. B

it" — the following207. Fever is a sort of accident too, but it certainly destroys the body in which it occurs. Also, baldness happens to hair, and it destroys the substrate in which it occurs. Further, one may say about these things the following. Just as the strings of a lyre (κιθάρα), when they are stretched either more tightly or more loosely than is required, destroy the harmony (ἁρμονία) and the coherence of the melody, without however destroying the lyre, so also fever does not destroy the body but the coherent harmony of its constitution. And only when the constitution itself is destroyed, is the body necessarily destroyed with it too. So, even here the accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs. For baldness does not exist in the hair which it destroys but its nature occurs to the skull, so that even from this case it may be seen that an accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs.

164 So, speaking concisely, everything that is in the world most of all desires the subsistence of it essence208 and flees always from its destruction. Thus, if none of the accidents can come to be without the substrate in which it occurs, it is obvious that there are no accidents that would destroy the thing to which they occur unless it would bring itself to destruction. What (has been said) about accident is sufficient for hearers.

#### *[Universals and particulars]209*

165 Since the universal and the particular were also included in the fourfold 1b10–24 division above, we shall also speak briefly about them, although they are evident to everyone. We ought to know that in substance, quantity and other genera we have certain genera that are primary and principal, which are the

**207** The following arguments and examples illustrating them are found in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.18–113.28. Cf. also Elias, *In Isag*. 91.5–93.8.

**208** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 112.12: ἕκαστον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι ἐφίεται.

**209** For the description of the hierarchical structure of genera, species, and particulars known as the "Tree of Porphyry", see Porphyry, *Isag.* 4.1–8.6; Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.5–71.11 and 77.15–79.14; Elias, *In Isag.* 63.6–34. The image of a tree appears in the treatise *On Genus, Species, and Individuality* that is ascribed to Sergius in the only manuscript in which it is preserved and in all likelihood indeed goes back to him. In this treatise, the division of the most generic genera into further genera, species, and particulars is presented in the image of a tree that has large boughs divided into branches and further into twigs and shoots, cf. Furlani 1925.

 B | ܐſƮŶܐ BCDP: ƎƘܐ L **4** űŶ] + űŶ BCD | ܪųƌܕܬܬ LP: ܪųƌܘܕܬܬ BCD **7** ܓܐƇƘƦƉܘ CDLP, Epit.: ܐƣƢƘƦƉܘ B | ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ LP, Epit.: Ǝƀƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ BCD **8** ܐƊƣŴܓــ1 CDL, Epit.: ܡŴــƤܓ B: ܐƊــƀƤܓ P | ܘܗܘ̣ [ om. B **9** ƥــƙƌ LP, Epit.: ܐܫƙƌ BCD **13** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD, Epit. **15** űŷܒ CDLP, Epit.: űŶ ƦŶܬ B **16** ƑſűƀܒƀƠƆܐƆܘ C: ƑſűܒƀƠƆܐƆܘ D: ƑſűƀܒƠƆܐƆܘ BP: ƑſűƀܒƍƠƆܐƆܘ L **17** ܘܢųƇƃܕ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųƇƄܕܒ D | ƎƀƇſܐ BCD: ƎƀƇſܗ L: om. P, Epit. **18** ܐƉűƕ CDLP, Epit.: ܐƉűƕܘ B **20** ̇ ̈Ɖܐ ܐܘ ŴƍƟܕ ܐƍƣܪŴƙܒ [om. hom. P ܐܦ [om. LP

ten categories. There are also other ones that are subordinated to them, and still other ones that are subsumed below the latter ones, and all the way down until the last species and the separate individuals210 that are encompassed by all lower species. In order to explain this to readers, let us take substance and quantity as examples.

166 Now, substance is a certain genus, for there are multiple things that are subsumed beneath it. It is divided primarily into two differentiae, i.e. into body and incorporeal. Body in turn is further divided into other differentiae that are beneath it, namely into animate and inanimate body and into percipient and deprived of perception. In the same way, also animate body is divided into other differentiae, namely into living body and lifeless body and into moving and deprived of motion. Now, living and moving body is further divided into other differentiae which are below it, namely into rational and non-rational and into man and animal. As for man, it is divided only into individuals that are separate and confined by one nature, namely into Plato, Alcibiades, and any other single person211.

167 Now, we ought to know, since each one of those differentiae that are said to be positioned between man below and universal substance above subsumes under itself multiple things that differ from one another either through the division of individuals or through species, that those differentiae that stand higher than others are also called more universal because each one of them

**210** Syr. *qnome*.

**211** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 77.16–78.4: τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέν ἐστι σῶμα τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἔμψυχον τὸ δὲ ἄψυχον, καὶ τοῦ ἐμψύχου τὸ μὲν ζῷον τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δὲ ζωόφυτον <...> πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ μέν ἐστι λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ μὲν θεὸς τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν Σωκράτης τὸ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

 ܬܗŴܒــƀƐƍܒ P **13** ܬܘܗܝŴــŶܬ [+ ܐܦ BC, D in marg. **14** Ǝſܕ [om. L **15** ܐܦ1 LP, Epit.: ܘܐܦ BCD | ܐܦ ܐƊƣŴܓ [om. B | ܐܦ2 LP, Epit.: ܘܐܦ CD **16** ƦŶƦƆܕ [+ ܘܢųƍƉ BCD, Epit. **24** ƈƃ] om. D

contains all those that are lower than it and shares with them both its name and its nature212.

168 What I mean is this. Man is a differentia and a species of living body, as we have said. Thus, this man is called universal, since he encompasses every particular individual from all the human beings. And individuals are called particular213, because there is nothing else that they subsume under themselves and they are not further divided into parts and species. Also, living body is said to be universal, since it encompasses universal man and animal — which differ from one another not only in number but also in species — and shares with them also its name and its nature, for both man and animal are said to be living due to their partaking in its name. Further, also animate body is said to be universal, since it subsumes under itself living being and all its parts, and they partake in its name, for both man and animal are called living. In the same way, body and substance are universals, since they encompass all differentiae below and make them partakers in their name. For body, animate body, animal, and man, as well as other differentiae that are in substance and particular individuals below that are not divided into anything else, are all called substances.

169 To sum this up: All lower differentiae partake in the name of those above them, while the higher ones are not called by the name of the lower ones. So, every man is living, animate, and substance. But not every living being is a man, e.g. animals, neither is every animate being living, e.g. plants. And further, not everything that is substance is animate, e.g. stones and wood, for they are

**212** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 78.5–15.

**213** Syr. *iḥidaya*, "single", here probably reflecting the Gr. ἄτομος (cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 6.13), since Sergius stresses that particulars may not be further divided into parts.

Ɔܐ ƎſƢƟƦƉ܂ ܗŴƃܬ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ƈƃ ܕƁŶ܉ ƢƟƦƉܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܘܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܘƈƃ r41P C141v ƎƉ̣ ܗܘ̣ ܐƀƏܕܐܘ ܐƉ ƈƃ Ǝſܕ ŴƆ ܐ܂ƀƏܐܘ ųƉƦƤƉ ܬܘܒ ܗܘ̣ ƥƙƌܕ ̇ ܒƤƌƢܐ܂ ̇ ŴƀŶܬܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܘ ƈƃ ƢƘܘܣ ܓƊƣŴܐ ̣ܗܘ ܐܘ ̈ــƐܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſƢƉــƎ ܗܘſــƎ ƢſųƌܐſــƦ܉ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ܓƍ ̇ ܗ ųــƆ ƦſŵŶܐܬ ƎſűƉ ܘܢųــƇƄƆ :ܘܢųــƍƀƃ ƎــƉܘ ܗܘܢųƉŴــƣ ƎــƉ Ǝــƀܒųſ ܕܐ̈ 5 űــŶ ƎƉ̣ ƎƀƀƇƕܕ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ̈ſܐ ܕƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƇƘƦƉܓƎƀ܂ ܗ űƀŷſ ܐƉŴ̈ ƍƠƆ ܐƉűƕ ܐſƦ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܬŶ ܐܕ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƖƆــƈ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܒƖƣƢــƦܗ: ܘƆܐ ̈ــſƦܐ Ɔܐ ųƆ ܕƎſ ܬŶ ƎــƉ̣ ܘܡƦــƉ Ǝــƀܒųſ ܘܢ܉ųــƍƉ ƎــƀƠƀŶܘܪ ƢــſƦſ ƎــƀƇƖƉܕ ܬܘܒ ܢŴــƌ ̇ ųƆ ܘܢ܂ųƍƀƃ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ųƉŴƣܗܘܢ ܐܘ

	- **3** ܐƊƣŴܓ [om. B **5** ܗܘܢųƉŴƣ BCDP: ܘܢųſųƉŴƣ L, Epit. | ܘܢųƍƀƃ BCDP, Epit.: ܘܢųƀ̈ ƍƀƃ L**8** Ǝƀܒųſ] + ƎƉ̣ BCD **9** ܗܘܢųƉŴƣ BCDL, Epit.: ܘܢųƉŴƣ P | ƎƉ̣ ̇ ܐܘ LP, Epit.: ƎƉܘ BCD **10** ܬܘܒ [om. B | ܬܐŴƉűܒ [+ Ǝſܕ B **11** Ŵ̇ ƌܗ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ ƎſܪƦƆ ƦƀƉűƟ ܗܘ̣ ܘܐܦ Ƣƀܓ [om. B **13** ơƐƙƉ L: ơƐƘƦƉ BCD: ܫƢƙƉ P | ܐŹܪŴƐƆ BCDP: ܐŹƢƐƆ L **14** ܐſƦƙܘܒ LP: ܐſƦƘܘ BCD **15** ܐƊƀ̈ Ɵ BCDP: ܐƉ̈ ŴƍƟ L **19** ƈƀƃܗ BCDL: ƈƀƄƉ P | ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD | ųܒ [om. P **20** ܐܦ L: ܘܐܦ BCDP | űŶ2] om. B **21** ̇ ܐܘ2 CDLP: ܐܦ B **23** ƎƤſƮƘܕ BL, D add. sup. lin.: ƎƀƤſƢƘܕ C: ƥſƢƘܕ P

substances but they are not called animate. Similarly, every living being is called animate and substance, and everything animate is also designated as substance. But not everything that is substance is necessarily body, or animate, or living, or man. Hence, what was stated has become clear, i.e. that all genera that are higher than others share their name and their nature with the lower species all the way down to particular individuals which are not further divided, while the lower ones never provide with their name or with their nature either those which are immediately above them or those which are further elevated and remote from them.

170 In the same way we also speak about the genus of quantity. For it too is originally divided into two differentiae, i.e. into the one which is continuous and contains no portions and another one which is discrete and divisible. Also, the one which is continuous and has no portions is further divided into line which is comprehended only through length, into surface whose subsistence is through length and breadth, and also into body whose nature exists in three dimensions, i.e. in length, breadth, and depth. As for the other differentia of quantity which is discrete and divisible, it is further divided into number and time. Each one of them is subdivided into other parts contained in it which are called particulars.

171 Now, all the higher differentiae which the genus of quantity has are also said universally, since they encompass each one of those things that are beneath them, i.e. either their parts that are particulars or other differentiae which differ from each other in species. Particulars, then, are all the lower parts of the species which differ from each other only in number.  P **5** ܐƉ BCDL: Ǝ ̇ Ɖ P **7** ܐƖܐܪܒ BDLP: ܐƖܒܐܪܒ C **8** ܙܕܩ [+ ƈƀƃܗ BCD **9** ܐƉ DLP: ܐƊƃ BC **11** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܝ :BCDL ܗ ܗ P | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ P: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴŹܐƟ B; + ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕ L, + ܐƊƄܕܒ ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕ ̈ƀܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƌܙ BCD **13** ƈƃ] om. D | ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ CDLP: ܥűƊƆ B **14** ƑƀƏ̈ ܕܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܕܐܘ BD **16** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ1 BCDP: ƎƀƆܗ L | Ǝƀƌ ̈ + [2ܗ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ ƎƉ̣ ܪܢ̈ƦƀƉܕ B (ditt.) **18** ƈƕܕ BCDL: ƈƕ P | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P **20** ܢƮſűƉܘ LP: ܢƮſűƉܘ ƎſųſƦſܘܐ BCD | ܐƢܒƕ BCDP: ܐűܒƕ L

the other hand, are called all those species and genera which encompass not only particulars that are beneath them, but also other differentiae that encompass the latter.

172 So, what (has been said) thus far should be sufficient for anyone in order to understand what is called universal and what exists particularly214. We ought to know, however, that although four terms have been applied in the table (above) — namely substance, accident, universal, and particular — from which four combinations derive, up to this point we have sufficiently spoken about accident, about universal, and about particular. Thus, from now on let us speak, according to our ability, about substance which is established as the head of the ten genera in the book *Categories*215.

#### *[On substance]216*

173 First of all, we shall investigate in how many ways substance is spoken of, 2a11–34 for the teaching of this book is not about every kind of substance. So, we say that of substances some are simple and others composite. The simple ones are either superior to the composite ones or inferior to them217. The simple substances which are superior to the composite ones are subjects of the whole science that is called theology (θεολογία), which means "on the divine". It is concerning these simple substances that are exalted above the composite ones and, being remote from matter and corruption, abide always in the beatitude which does not pass away that the word is (directed) to everyone who desires to ascend in his knowledge above the visible natures and to be taught what is exalted above many218.

**214** Sergius leaves Chapter 4 of the *Categories* (1b25–2a10) out of his *Commentary*, since he has already suggested an overview of the ten categories in §§95ff. as one of the subject matters among the *prolegomena*.

**215** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–13: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.8–9).

**216** Ms. L has the subtitle "On substance". Mss. BCD: "On substance and in what ways it is said". Ammonius notes (*In Cat*. 66.14–19) that the version of Aristotle's *Categories* which he used contained two subtitles, "On substance" and "On relatives". It is thus possible that Sergius himself included this rubric in the text of his *Commentary*. On the rubrics, see further Philoponus, *In Cat*. 133.21–23 and Simplicius, *In Cat*. 207.27–208.21.

**217** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.18–19: τῆς δὲ οὐσίας ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλῆ ἡ δὲ σύνθετος, καὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἡ μὲν κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ δὲ χείρων (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.23–24).

**218** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.25–29: ἁπλῆ δὲ καὶ κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ἀγγελικὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχικὴ καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται <...> διαλέγεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (οὐ γὰρ πρόκειται αὐτῷ θεολογεῖν).

**1** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCDL: ƎƀƆܗ P **2** ̇ ųſƦſܐ CLP: ƎſųſƦſܐ BD ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ :LP Ɖܐ ܗ BCD **4** ܐƣܘܕܐܕ BCDL: ܐƣܘܐܕ P **5** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDP: ܬܐŴƙƐƇƀƘ L ܐƦــƀƍƀƃ BDLP: ܐƦــƍƀƃ C | ܘܢųــƇƃ BCDP: ܘܢųــƇƃܘ L | ܬŴــƉűܒ BCDL: ܬܐŴــƉűܒ P **6** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ D: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **7** ƈƀƃܗ [om. L ̈ ــƎ **8** ƊƀƟƦƉ LP: ƎــƀƊƀƟƦƉ BCD **9** ܒܐƟ ̈ Ŵــƕܕ LP: ܒܐƟŴــƕܘ BCD **13** ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉܕ BCDL: ̈ ــƎ **14** P ܕܒƇƀƇƊــŴܬܐ ƊƀƏܬƦƉ CDP: ƎــƀƊƀƏܬƦƉ BL **15** ܐ ̈ Ɛــƍܓ BL: Ǝــƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ CDP ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųŹܐƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟܕ P **17** ܐƦźƀƤƘ BCDP: ܐƦźƀƤƘܕ L **18** ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐ ƈƕ CLP: ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐ D: ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐƆ B **21** ܐŴŷƉ BDLP: ܐſŴŷƉ C

175 So, the composite substance, which is, as we have said, between the simple divine one that is superior to it and the simple natural one that is inferior to it, forms the subject of discussion for all those who apply the discipline of logic. And since this is how these things are established in all the writings on the rules (κανόνες) of logic, it was this (substance) that was placed in the teaching as primary among the ten genera of the *Categories*.

176 Thus, O brother, it was not the intention of the Philosopher to speak in this book about the simple substance which is superior to the composite one, for it shall be the concern of someone who teaches about the divine. Neither is he writing here about the other simple (substance) which is inferior and lower then the composite one, for he speaks about it, as we have said, in the treatises on natures. Instead, his goal here is to teach about the composite substance

**219** For ἔνυλον εἶδος, cf. Dexippus, *In Cat*. 40.30.

**220** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.21–22: ἁπλῆ δὲ καὶ χείρων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ὕλη ἡ πρώτη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν συνθέτων ἕνεκα παραλαμβάνονται.

 D in marg. **11** ܐƇܒŶƦƉ BCDL: ܐƇܒŷƉ P **14** Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ BCDL: ƎƀƆܗ P | ƎſųƆ DL, corr. B sup. lin.: ܘܢųƆ BCP, corr. D sup. lin. **15** ܘܢųƀܓƆ ̈ ŴƘ CLP: ܘܢųܓƆŴƘ BD | ƅſܐ BCDL: ƅſܕܐ P | ƢƉܐƌ CLP: ƢƉܐƌܕ BD **18** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ ܐܘƏ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƘŴ ̈ ƐƇƇƀƘ P **19** ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ BC, corr. D sup. lin.: Ǝƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ DLP, +Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ BCD | Ƒــƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BCL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ D: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | ƎſųƀƐ̈ ܘܐܦ :BCDL ܘƆܓƍ ƎſųƀƐ̈ ƍܓƆ P **20** ܐƐƍܓƆܘ [om. B **21** ܘ ̇ ųƆ BCDP: ܝ ̇ ųƆܘ L

which we make use of in the whole discipline of logic, making it comprehensive and clear for those who have recently approached this kind of sciences221.

177 We also ought to investigate why we teach about substance before the other nine genera, i.e. before quantity, quality and others. We shall say that this is because those nine genera require substance in order to subsist, while the latter does not require any of them in order to exist. Thus, the account of substance is esteemed as prior also because, if it were taken away from the nine other genera, they will disappear as well, but if they vanish, then substance will not cease to exist. So, everything is destroyed together with it, but it is not destroyed by anything222.

178 Now, substance is classified in (Aristotle's) teaching (as follows): some of it are primary and others secondary. He called primary substance each one of the particular individuals and parts which have been discussed above and with which the divisions of species end, e.g., when one speaks of Socrates alone, or separately of Plato, or of any other thing, animate or inanimate, which has individual subsistence223. All things like that the Philosopher designates in his treatise on the ten genera as primary substances. What he calls secondary substances, on the other hand, are their species and genera, namely universal man and universal horse, and also the genus of the latter, e.g. when one says, "what is living and animate".

**221** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.27–36.2: διαλέξεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ θεολογίας) οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ χείρονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ φυσιολογίας), ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς συνθέτου καὶ σχετικῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.27–50.1).

**222** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–18: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν· αὕτη γὰρ συνεισφέρεται μὲν ταῖς λοιπαῖς κατηγορίαις, οὐ συνεισφέρει δὲ αὐτάς, καὶ συναιρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ συναιρεῖται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅτι αὕτη αὐθυπόστατός ἐστιν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὔσης οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι κατηγορίας, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐ δυνατὸν τὰς ἄλλας ὑποστῆναι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.5–22).

**223** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.2–4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–3.

	- ̈ƣܐ܉ ܐſــƅ ܕƍſűƖƉــƎ 181 ܗƃــŴܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܓƍــƐܐ ƇƘƦƉــŭ Ɔــܐܕ ŭƇƙƌ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܘƇƆܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ: ܘƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܬܘܒ Ƥƙƌــƍܐ 20 ̈ƣܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܒƢܬ ƇƟܐ ̈ Ʀܐ ܘųƇƄƆܘܢ ܐܕ ܘŴƀŷƆܬܐ ܘƞƍƆܒ ̈ــƎ ̈Ʀܐ ܕƕűſƦƉ ̈ܬܐ ƙƇŷƤƉ ܕƎſ ƦƊƀŷƣܐ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƇƘƦƉܓܐ܉ ƞƆܒŴ

**1** ܐƦƇƉ L: ܐƇƉ BCDP | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ƎƀƆܗ ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P **2** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ ̈ ܢ **3** P ܐܘƏ ųƉƦƤƉ LP, Epit.: ƎſųƉƦƤƉ BCD | Ǝſ ̈ ųƀƣܐܕ BCLP, ̈ ܘܢ .:Epit ̇ ܝ **5** D ܐܕųƀƣ ųƆ BCDP, Epit.: ̇ ųƆ L **6** ƋƀƐƌ BCDL, Epit.:  D

179 So, in a nutshell, primary substances are all particular things which have self-subsistence, while all their species and genera are called secondary substances. Here arises not a small problem of how substance is divided into primary and secondary. But before we proceed with this question properly, we shall first outline all possible ways in which division of any kind becomes possible.

#### *[Types of division]224*

180 Now, everything that is divided is divided either as (a whole) into its parts, or as a genus into species, or as an ambiguous word into different objects (signified by it)225. Also, when something is divided as (a whole) into its parts, sometimes it is divided into parts that are similar to one another, and sometimes into such ones that are dissimilar. What I mean is this. Bone, wood, bronze, and everything else like that are divided into similar parts, since the parts into which each thing of this kind is divided are in every way similar to each other, save for their large or small size only. Everything that is composed of objects that are not similar is divided into dissimilar parts. E.g., man's and animal's body is divided into head, breast, arms, belly, and legs, i.e. into parts that are dissimilar both to the whole and to one another226.

181 Now, a genus is divided into species, as we usually divide substance into body and incorporeal, and further into animate body, living being, plants, and all other species like that. Also, an ambiguous word may be divided into different objects that are signified by it, just as we said above that the name

**224** The same classification appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–82.4; idem, *In Cat.* 38.1–2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.19–22.

**225** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.1–2: τῶν γὰρ διαιρουμένων τὰ μὲν ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη διαιρεῖται, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς φωνὴ ὁμώνυμος εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα. The Syriac adjective *šḥima*, "dusky", is an uncommon rendering for ὁμώνυμος, "ambiguous (or homonymous)", and Sergius probably applies it here in order to explicate the meaning of the Greek term.

**226** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–23: ...ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν, ἢ γὰρ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρεῖται ἢ εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ (καὶ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ μὲν διαιροῦνται φλέβες, ἀρτηρίαι, ὀστᾶ, ταῦτα γὰρ διαιρούμενα ἔχει τὰ μέρη καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ δέ, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ μέν ἐστι κεφαλὴ τὸ δὲ χεὶρ τὸ δὲ πούς)...

̇ ܝ ܕƇƃــܒܐ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܐƢƀƉ ƎƆ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܂ ܕܒــƢܬ ƟــƇܐ ܗ ųƍƉ ̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ ܕܨſــƢ ܬܘܒ ܘƆــų ̈ ــƀܐ: ܘƆــų ̇ ܘ ܕƉ ̇ ܘ ܕſܒــƤܐ ܘƆــų ųƆܘ ܒܐƃŴƃܕ ܘ ̇ C145v ųƆ ̈ܕܐ ƃــű ܒــƢܬ űــŶ ƎــƉ̣ ƎſųƍƀƄܒ Ǝ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕƙƇŷƤƉ ܕܓƚƀƇ܂ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܨܒŴ L35r ܗܝ܂̣ ܐűŶ ƎſܗƦƀƍƕܕŴƤƉ ܐƇƟ

̇űܐ ܕƠƉܒــƇܐ ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܘƆܐ Ɖــſƞܐ **5** B Ƈƃــܒܐ ƃــƃŴܒܐ :CDELP ܕƃــƃŴܒܐ **2** ſܐ Ŵܨܒ ƈƃ ŭƇƘƦƉܕ ܡűƉ ŸƃƦƤƌܕ [om. hom. P | Ŵܨܒ BCDE, Epit.: ܬܐŴܨܒ L **7** ƈƀƄƉ BCDP, Epit.: ƈــƀƃܗ L **10** Ǝــƀƌ ̇ ܗ BCDL: ƎــƀƆܗ P, Epit. **11** ƎــƀƆųƆ LP, Epit.: ƎــſųƆ BCD **12** ܬܗܘܐ [om. B **14** ܐƦƀƉűƠƆ BCDP, Epit.: ܐƦƀƉűƟ ܝ ̇ ųƆ L | ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųſƦſܐ D **15** ܐƄſܐ [ om. P **16** ܘܢųƇƃ CDLP, Epit.: ܘܢųƆ B | ܐƆܕ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƆܘ P **17** ܘųƌܐ̣ CLP, Epit.: ܘųƌܘܐ BD **21** Ǝſųƍƀƃ BCDEL, Epit.: Ǝſųƀƍƀƃ P | ܐƞƉ BCDEL, Epit.: ƎƉ P **22** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BD | ܘܐܦ [+ ܐƆ B **23** Ŵſܗܘ BDLP, Epit.: ܗܘ CE

"dog" is divided into the astral, the terrestrial, and the marine one, and finally into a painted or carved image of it227. These are all things that differ from one another in their nature, while the word signifying them is the same.

182 Thus, since everything that admits of division is divided by means of one of those three types, and it is impossible to find anything divisible that will not fall beneath one of them, it is therefore worth considering which of these types is applied in the division of substance into primary and secondary. Now, I state that (substance) is divided not as (a whole) into parts, neither into those that are similar nor into those that are dissimilar. For otherwise, it would be necessary that there should be another substance that would be divided into them as into its parts, and it would be proper that our teaching about it would be prior to them228.

183 Neither is substance divided here into the primary and secondary one as a genus into species. For among species that derive from the same genus there are no such ones that are prior or posterior, but one may make their division starting from where one wishes, since all species are related (to a certain genus) without any notion of prior and posterior. Therefore, if some substance is primary and another secondary, it is obvious that this division may not be established like that of (a genus into) species229.

184 Neither is it possible to state that the division of substance is like that of an ambiguous word into objects whose natures are not similar to one another. For substances are not only similar to one another in name, but their definition and their nature is also the same in every respect230.

**227** See §118. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.23–82.1: ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, τοῦ κυνὸς ὁ μέν ἐστι χερσαῖος ὁ δὲ θαλάττιος ὁ δὲ ἀστρῷος.

**228** Thus, Sergius states that primary and secondary substance may not be considered as parts of other entity which would equally be called substance and be prior to them. Cf. a rather different argument in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.7–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.9–14.

**229** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.2–7; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.24–54.9. Just as in the previous paragraph, Sergius' argumentation differs considerably from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus.

**230** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.15–22; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.25–31.

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