This study is not without limitations. First, due to our use of self-report measures we cannot rule out social desirability bias influencing the findings. Second, the study employed a cross-sectional design, which prevents us from making causal interpretations. Future studies should consider a longitudinal design that would allow for robust causal interpretations, and include measures of social desirability as covariates. Along these lines, while the measure of emotional intelligence used in this study has been identified in the literature as a reliable construct of emotional self-efficacy (Pérez et al., 2005) whose first-order factors are distinct, but correlated dimensions defining the focal construct of emotional intelligence (Walter et al., 2011), future research should also include more objective measures of emotional intelligence to address any concerns related to the use of self-report measures. Third, both health groups exhibited equally poor cancer-screening behaviors, which prevents us from generalizing the findings to these specific disease prevention approaches. On a similar vein, the two groups were highly unlikely to use substances such as nicotine, and alcohol, which is atypical of college students (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2015; Skidmore et al., 2016), and thus may highlight a unique aspect of our sample that limits generalization to other young adult samples. Future studies should cast a wider net to recruit participants by perhaps selecting multiple sampling units. Finally, our study did not include an exhaustive list of health behaviors, thus limiting the findings to the health behaviors gauged herein. Future studies should include additional types of behaviors such as risky sexual behaviors and illicit drug use.

Despite these limitations, our study provides new evidence highlighting the mediating role of health consciousness in the relation between emotional intelligence and health behaviors. Given the predictive role of health behaviors during early adulthood on health outcomes in old age, the results are relevant for educators and policymakers, as they present a mechanism linking young adults' personal characteristics to behaviors that reduce the risk of chronic illness later in life.

### CONCLUSION

This study determined the types of health behaviors that characterize our young adult population as well as the relations between such health behaviors, health consciousness and emotional intelligence. Furthermore, this study tested health consciousness as mediator of the relation between emotional intelligence and health behaviors. The results indicate that health behaviors among young individuals can be viewed as a dichotomy of healthy and unhealthy behaviors. Individuals whose behaviors qualify as healthy tend to have higher levels of emotional intelligence than those whose behaviors are characterized as unhealthy. In our findings, health consciousness exerted an intervening pathway that explained the relation between emotional intelligence and health behaviors. Namely, individuals with low emotional intelligence also had low health consciousness, and thus a higher propensity to engage in unhealthy behaviors relative to individuals with high emotional intelligence. Accordingly, programs seeking to improve health behaviors among young adults should consider the inclusion of emotional intelligence training within the curriculum, as improvements in emotional competencies are likely to influence the development of health consciousness and accordingly improve behaviors that promote health and well-being.

### ETHICS STATEMENT

fpsyg-09-02161 November 8, 2018 Time: 12:29 # 9

This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Institutional Review Board of the City College of New York with written informed consent from all participants. All participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the City College of New York.

### DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The raw and de-identified data supporting the conclusions of the manuscript will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation, to any qualified researcher.

### AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Both authors, AE and SK-M, contributed to the project's design, administration, survey creation, interpretation of findings,

### REFERENCES

writing, and revising of the manuscript. AE contributed to the collection and analysis of data. Both authors approved the final version of this manuscript.

### FUNDING

This research was supported in part by a Professional Staff Congress – City University of New York (PSC-CUNY) Grant Number 68018-00-46, and by fellowship support from the Public Administration program at the City College of New York, both awarded to AE.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the staff of the Spielman Research Lab, as well as volunteers of the ARHAMP Research Lab for their assistance with the collection of data. The authors would also like to thank the students who participated in this study, for without them, this study would not have been possible.

**Conflict of Interest Statement:** The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Copyright © 2018 Espinosa and Kadi´c-Maglajli´c. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

# Emotional Intelligence and Mindfulness: Relation and Enhancement in the Classroom With Adolescents

César Rodríguez-Ledo1 \*, Santos Orejudo2 , Maria Jesús Cardoso2 , Álvaro Balaguer3 and Javier Zarza-Alzugaray4

1 Department of Educational Sciences, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain, 2 Department of Psychology and Sociology, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain, 3 Department of Learning and Curriculum, University of Navarre, Pamplona, Spain, 4 Department of Musical and Body Expression, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain

#### Edited by:

Stella Mavroveli, Imperial College London, United Kingdom

#### Reviewed by:

Mardi A. Crane-Godreau, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, United States Lucia Romo, Université Paris Nanterre, France

> \*Correspondence: César Rodríguez-Ledo<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
#### Specialty section:

This article was submitted to Emotion Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology

Received: 29 May 2018 Accepted: 22 October 2018 Published: 09 November 2018

#### Citation:

Rodríguez-Ledo C, Orejudo S, Cardoso MJ, Balaguer Á and Zarza-Alzugaray J (2018) Emotional Intelligence and Mindfulness: Relation and Enhancement in the Classroom With Adolescents. Front. Psychol. 9:2162. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02162 Emotional intelligence (EI) and mindfulness are two constructs that have been separately studied, and the relation between them still remains unclear. Research in this area has not attempted to go further into how enhancing EI and mindfulness together can achieve better improvements in this ability to attend mindfully. To bridge this knowledge gap, our research goal was to study the relationship between EI and the mindfulness competence in our study sample and to assess the impact of implementing EI and a mindfulness competence developmental program (SEA) about participants' mindfulness competence. The sample consisted of 156 students aged 11–14 years old from a Spanish public high school. One hundred and eight participants were randomly assigned to the experimental condition, and the remaining 48 were to the control condition. The instruments used to evaluate EI were the CDE-SEC, EQi-Youth Version and the General Empathy Scale. Mindfulness on the School Scope Scale was used to assess mindfulness competences. Social adaptation was evaluated by using the social abilities and adjustment questionnaire BAS3. All the instruments where answered by the participants and have been adapted to a sample of youths with such age specifications. The results showed that EI and mindfulness were related to many of the variables measured by the instruments. Showing a good mindfulness competence was particularly related to having a good general level of the EI trait, and to many of the assessed social and emotional variables. The data indicated a significant relation between the mindfulness competence and having better general empathy skills or being better socially adjusted to the school context. The data also indicated a significant effect on participants' interior and kinesthetic mindfulness competence after implementing the SEA Program. These findings corroborate the relationship between EI and mindfulness, and the possibility of enhancing mindfulness by applying a direct intervention program in the classroom.

Keywords: mindfulness, emotional intelligence, program implementation, enhancement, adolescents

## INTRODUCTION

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Interest in how emotional intelligence (EI) can influence academic, professional and social success in a person's development has significantly increased in recent years (Collaborative for Academic Social and Emotional Learning [CASEL], 2015). The social and emotional learning (SEL) concept has been defined as educational innovation that is justified in social needs whose purpose is to develop emotional competences that contribute to better personal and social well-being (Bisquerra, 2003). This interest has led many researchers to study the theoretical basis of the construct and its components. Another focal point for researchers in the field has been to study the best way to enhance EI through training. In this regard, assessing the advantages of enhancing EI components in the classroom has become a mayor study field. Moreover, the relation between EI and other possibly related constructs has been found to be intimately linked to emotional development. One of these constructs is mindfulness, whose relationship with EI has received little attention. As how they are related has not always been clear and so, in this paper, we study the basis of them both and the possible relation between them.

### Emotional Intelligence (EI)

Emotion can be understood as an internal event that energizes human behavior so we can respond to our context by approaching or distancing, depending on whether emotions take a positive or negative hedonic tone (Ekman and Davidson, 1994). Intelligence has been explained as the ability to adapt to this context (Sternberg, 2013). By connecting them both, EI would be defined as people's ability to perceive, understand, regulate and express such emotional events in an adaptive way (Celma-Pastor and Rodríguez-Ledo, 2017). Therefore, EI is a construct that explains how emotions are perceived, regulated and expressed with more or less skill. This understanding improves by the theoretical model proposed by the trait model of Petrides et al. (2007a), which states that EI is based on some personality traits that can consequently be assessed. Such a trait model of EI has been proposed (Petrides et al., 2007a), and it indicates that EI can also be known as an emotional self-efficacy trait, which refers to a constellation of emotionrelated self-perceptions and dispositions located at lower levels of personality hierarchies (Petrides et al., 2007b). Moreover, the possibility of improving EI subcomponents has also been demonstrated when the design and implementation of programs follow appropriate quality measures (Durlak et al., 2011). EI has not always been the only objective to be promoted by SEL Programs as they sometimes aim to improve other related aspects, such as mindfulness, which is addressed specially in this study.

### Mindfulness

The educational psychology field is concerned about, and interested in, studying EI, and research findings support the notion that better motivation and engagement (Saeed and Zyngier, 2012), autonomy (Grolnick and Ryan, 1987) and attention abilities (Kruschke, 2003) enhance student learning. So, educators feel that these three aspects are important and should be promoted in their classrooms (Deci and Ryan, 2008). Consequently, in different countries, many educational models have faithfully reflected this socially desirable norms. They have traditionally rewarded young people who pay attention for long time periods, who are not distracted, and who know how to control their impulses to speak or move (Rodríguez-Ledo and Orejudo-Hernández, 2017). However, this model is changing, largely due to the emergence of more restless and impulsive students, and even to an increase in developmental disorders with a strong attentional component, such as Attention Deficit Disorder and Hyperactivity (ADHD). As indicated by Pagès and Reñé (2008), one of the possible causes could be the high stimulation that today's students receive via many diverse channels, such as regular interaction with screens, especially the Internet. This overstimulation may be the consequence of tablets, computers, video games, especially mobile phone overuse, which are elements that continually require attention. Moreover, several other authors explain that it stems from the culture of immediate reinforcement and intolerance to frustration (García et al., 2011). Apart from looking for causes, it is believed that psychologists and educators should focus on interventions to improve attention and to reduce impulsivity in order to, therefore, revert this tendency. Following this goal, some interventions have attempted to improve such mindfulness competence in youngsters. For instance, Bluth and Eisenlohr-Moul (2017) have found that the implementation of the 8-week MindUp program achieves improvements in perceived stress, resilience, curiosity/exploration and gratitude, and that mindfulness covaries with perceived stress, depressive symptoms and anxiety. Other interventions in the same direction have proven that the implementation of such programs with young adolescent students is related to improvements in areas like: sustained attention (Zeidan et al., 2010), academic performance (León, 2008), reduced anxiety (Sugiura, 2004), reduced aggressiveness (Lantieri, 2009), decreased ADHD symptoms (Lantieri, 2009), lower burnout levels and enhanced motivation to the task or engagement (De La Fuente et al., 2010), and also better levels of emotional well-being (Hamilton et al., 2006). These are some of the most characteristic examples of improvements. An experienced reader can observe that many of the advantages of applying the aforementioned mindfulness techniques are related to improvements in components related to EI and their competences. In fact, other researchers have pointed out the importance of attention for developing the implicit cognitive capacities that make up EI (Mestre et al., 2009).

Following this goal, the best way to enhance attentional mechanisms has been researched in many different ways. Traditionally, the classic definition of attention by James (1890) has been taken as a valid one. He understood attention as the mind clearly and vividly taking several possible objects of thought that simultaneously appear. This attentional mechanism has been considered an essential element in the information management process as it influences the selection of information and establishes priority in processing (Laberge, 1995). In addition,

a consensus exists about the three main functions of attention in human beings (Posner et al., 2007): the alert function, the orientation function and the executive function. The first refers to the state of tonic and phasic preparation to attend to new stimuli. The second refers to the selection of which of these stimuli are salient and is, therefore, adaptive to the process. The third function is related to something more complex: i.e., the supervisory system. This system is in charge of planning the whole process, of maintaining attention during this process, and evaluating performance by correcting it for improvement on future occasions (Chica Martínez and Checa Fernández, 2015). Apart from such functions and to look further at diverse attentional mechanisms and their adaptive sense in real practice, different authors defend dichotomous categories such as (Roselló, 1998): internal versus external, voluntary versus involuntary, open versus covert, divided versus selective, visual versus auditory, etc. Of these categories, a specific type of voluntary attention drew our attention: mindfulness. If voluntary attention is defined as that which can be directed according to our will, and to both the outside (sensations) and the inside (ideas and emotions) (León, 2008), mindfulness is defined as the ability to focus on the present moment in an active and reflective way (Vallejo, 2006).

In order to delimit the concept, several studies have emerged to define it as conscience without judgment, which develops moment after moment by a kind of non-reactive attention that is open and without prejudices in the present time (Kabat-Zinn, 2007), and which allows the awareness of our internal and external experiences without rejecting anything and without clinging to anything (García, 2007). Even more comprehensively, Grossman et al. (2004) define mindfulness as the ability to maintain moment-to-moment attention to emotional and social events, which may be our own or others, and in a non-evaluative fashion (Grossman et al., 2004). Bishop et al. (2004) consider that mindfulness is carved by two components: (1) the self-regulation of attention that is maintained in the immediate experience, which thus allows mental events to be recognized in the present moment; (2) particular orientation toward one's experience in the present moment, characterized by curiosity, openness and acceptance. Therefore, according to Bishop et al. (2004), mindfulness skills are related to three areas of attention: sustained attention, selective attention, and the ability to direct and exchange the focus of attention from one idea to another. Shapiro et al. (2006) attempt to identify the mechanisms of action that are the basis of mindfulness by proposing two research lines: (1) studies that seek to separate and compare the various active ingredients in mindfulness interventions and their relation to other constructs, such as cognitive or emotional capacities; (2) studies that analyze the mindfulness construct itself to determine whether mindfulness development is what really leads to the positive changes that have been observed in many fields. The present study seeks both objectives, while it also attempts to base the relation between basic emotional competences and those of full attention, and to study whether it makes sense working such competences together in the classroom to obtain satisfactory results.

## EI and Mindfulness

When arguing about what EI can be like and, in some way, in relation to this ability to maintain moment-to-moment attention in a non-evaluative manner, Brown and Ryan (2003) indicate that the clarity of perception of own emotional states improves through training in mindfulness techniques. Besides, it is known that a direct relationship exists between training with mindfulness techniques and attention, clarity and emotional repair dimensions (De La Fuente et al., 2010), as well as emotional regulation (Ramos et al., 2009). Along the same lines, Davidson has conducted studies with expert Buddhist monks in mindfulness by demonstrating the primordial importance that mindfulness has when it comes to modifying emotional states voluntarily, and has directly correlated this attentional capacity and emotional regulation (Davidson, 2012). Davidson has also demonstrated how training in mindfulness helps develop more positive and adaptive emotional profiles (Goleman and Davidson, 2017). According to Schoeberlein (2012), the implementation of mindfulness techniques with teachers shows improvements in receptivity to student requirements, promotes emotional balance, contributes to stress management, favors personal relationships, improves the classroom climate and contributes to general well-being. The same author has also found that when students work with mindfulness, it favors their willingness to learn, fosters academic performance, reinforces attention and concentration, reduces anxiety about exams, improves participation in the classroom, promotes impulse control, provides tools to help reduce stress, improves emotional learning, promotes prosocial behavior and supports holistic wellness (Schoeberlein, 2012). Moreover, mixed EI and mindfulness intervention programs, such as that implemented by (Schonert-Reichl et al., 2015), typically find the improvements described in their paper, namely: greater empathy, better emotional control, increased peer acceptance, higher mindfulness competence and even better cognitive and stress control, among others (Schonert-Reichl et al., 2015).

The underlying process that explains how mindfulness achieves such advantages for EI and to enhance some of its components is still being debated. Ramos et al. (2009) explain that training in mindfulness involves exposure to negative emotions that favor habituation to them. Vallejo (2006) indicates that people can change tendencies of automatic response to certain emotional experiences thanks to training in mindfulness, which allows people to respond with other new and more positive behavioral repertoires as a result of quiet reflection. As supported by Holen and Halvor (2007), perhaps the continuous practice of such full consciousness would prepare us against adversity, while reducing tension, fears and worries through the progressive disengagement of thoughts, sensations and emotions. This would thus be a very useful and effective emotional self-regulation mechanism. Shapiro et al. (2006) indicate that mindfulness techniques make users more adaptable, flexible and suitable for the context by developing the re-perceiving mechanism to facilitate reactivity patterns. This is achieved by the fact that the impact allows us to see the current situation as it is at the present

time, which helps us to act accordingly by avoiding the thoughts, emotions and maladaptive behavior that we were used to before developing our full consciousness (Shapiro et al., 2006).

### Enhancing Mindfulness Through the SEA Program

After considering the potential of implementing mindfulness in the classroom, the authors of this study decided to design a program to enhance mindfulness, along with some competences based on participants' EI. The SEA Program to develop emotional and mindfulness competences was designed (Celma-Pastor and Rodríguez-Ledo, 2017) in an attempt to fulfill the best conditions (Durlak et al., 2011) and to promote the development of EI, understood as the capacity to perceive, understand, regulate and express one's own and others' emotional events adaptively (Celma-Pastor and Rodríguez-Ledo, 2017). It also aimed to enhance mindfulness, or the ability to maintain moment-tomoment attention on emotional and social events, either our own or those of others, and in a non-evaluative manner (Grossman et al., 2004). Such a program is meant to be implemented for 1 h/week throughout an academic year (9 months) by following the 18 sessions that compose it. These sessions have been designed to develop such EI and mindfulness by reflecting on participants' current level and by actively working to improve subcomponents according to the described constructs. Mindfulness capacity is specifically developed by following 10 short body scanning and meditation sessions to address external or internal events, as well as other activities, to enhance youngster's awareness or to maintain attention to specific inputs.

According to this twofold objective, which is exploratory before and becomes experimental later, we studied the relation between the relationship between EI and mindfulness in a first phase to discover whether both were related in our sample, and if it made sense to implement them both at the same time. Afterward, the program was implemented in a second phase and any improvement in the mindfulness competence of the participants in the present study was analyzed experimentally by comparing pre/post-test measures. In this way, the first hypothesis that guided our research in the first phase was: mindfulness and EI are closely related constructs. The second hypothesis, which was characteristic of the second phase and related to the improved ability of mindfulness, was proposed: applying the SEA Program for one academic year will improve the mindfulness of the participants in this implementation.

### MATERIALS AND METHODS

### Participants

Our study sample consisted in 156 adolescents aged 11–14 years, distributed into the six class groups of the first grade of Compulsory Secondary Education (ESO in the Spanish education system) at a public high school in a working-class neighborhood in the city of Zaragoza (Spain). Four of these class groups were randomly assigned to the experimental condition (108 participants) and the others to the control (48 students). In gender terms, 86 were male (55.1%) and 70 were female (44.9%). Of the 108 experimental participants, 58 were male (53.7%) and 50 were female (46.3%). Of the 48 control participants, 28 were male (58.3%) and 20 female (41.7%). The gender distribution for the two conditions was statistically and significantly equivalent (X 2 = 0.592 and p > 0.05). From the original number of participants (156), the study lost four of the participants, being 152 the final number of participants in the post-test. The sample's socio-economic and cultural status was medium. The parents, mothers and legal guardians of the participants were informed about the research characteristics in writing and during a meeting. They all received explicit consent to carry out this study. The anonymity of the answers and scores of all the participants were guaranteed and respected.

### Instruments

The instruments used to evaluate the relationship between EI and mindfulness, and the effects of intervention on mindfulness, were chosen from among the many possible options by considering the study sample's age, the model that lies behind such instruments and, of course, the validity of tests. Since our study participants were Spanish youngsters aged 11–14 years old, and according to the model of EI behind the SEA program, the selected instruments were the following:

The emotional development questionnaire for secondary CDE-SEC (Álvarez et al., 2001). This self-report questionnaire consists of 35 items that must be answered according to the degree of agreement or disagreement, 0 meaning completely disagree and 10 completely agree. The EI dimensions assessed by this questionnaire were: (1) Emotional awareness: Ability to become aware of one's own emotions, including the ability to understand the emotional climate of a given context; (2) Emotional regulation: Ability to use emotions appropriately and have good "coping" strategies, ability to self-generate positive emotions; (3) Emotional autonomy: characteristics related to emotional self-management, such as self-esteem, positive attitude in life, responsibility, ability to critically analyze social norms, ability to seek help and resources, and personal self-efficacy; (4) Social competences: ability to maintain good relationships with other people and to master basic social skills, effective communication, respect, pro-social attitudes, assertiveness, etc.; (5) Competences for life and well-being: Ability to adopt appropriate and responsible behavior to solve personal, family, professional and social problems, oriented toward improving the well-being of personal and social life. A total emotional competence score can also be obtained, which results from the average of all the assessed variables. Test reliability varied between α = 0.79 and α = 0.82 for each dimension (Escoda, 2016) and it has been designed and tested for a sample of Spanish youths.

The emotional intelligence questionnaire, youth version EQi-YV (Ferrándiz et al., 2012). The EQi-YV is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure the EI of children and adolescents aged from 7 to 18 years. It is based on the original EQ test (Bar-On, 1997) and has been adapted to Spanish samples. It is a Likert scale whose 60 items give rise to five large EI dimensions that allow subjects' following emotional and social characteristics to be studied: (1) Intrapersonal ability: ability to understand their own emotions and their communication with others; (2)

Interpersonal ability: ability to understand and appreciate others' emotions; (3) Managing emotions: ability to direct and control one's emotions; (4) Adaptability: flexibility and effectiveness to adapt to the social environment and to solve conflicts; (5) General mood: ability to take a positive attitude toward life. It is a wide inventory that provides information about emotional and social competences, and it allows to draw a total social and affective profile known as the total emotional quotient. The validation in the Spanish sample obtains a reliability that oscillates between α = 0.63 (intrapersonal competence) and α = 0.80 (mood) for all five dimensions (Ferrándiz et al., 2012).

The BAS3 socialization battery (Silva and Martorell, 2001). BAS3 consists of 75 items in this self-application version designed for Spanish samples. It evaluates five dimensions that allow us to obtain participants' social behavior profile and their social adjustment, namely: (1) Consideration with others: it detects social sensitivity or preoccupation of others, in particular of those with problems and who are rejected or postponed; (2) Selfcontrol in social relations: it includes a clearly bipolar dimension that represents, on its positive pole, compliance with social rules and norms that facilitates coexistence in mutual respect, and on its negative pole, aggressive and stubborn behavior and indiscipline; (3) Social withdrawal: it detects both passive and active withdrawal from others, until it arrives at a clear isolation (external); (4) Social Anxiety/Shyness: different manifestations of anxiety are detected together with reactions of shyness in social relationships; (5) Leadership: ascendancy, popularity, initiative, self-confidence and service spirit are detected. It is a highly reliable test that presents an average internal consistency of α = 0.75 and a test–retest stability of α = 0.57 measured with Cronbach's alpha (Silva and Martorell, 2001).

The empathy scale for children and adolescents (ESCA) (Bryant, 1982; Mestre et al., 1999). This scale consists of 22 items of yes–no responses that evaluates general cognitive and affective empathy according to participants' agreement or disagreement in 22 situations. It is an adaptation of the infantile and adolescent population (from 11 years of age) of the scale for adults by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) carried out by Bryant (1982). Specifically, it is a scale that provides a general empathy index, whose internal consistency of the original scale is 0.67 (Bryant, 1982). With the Spanish sample, the scale presents a test–retest reliability between α = 0.75 and α = 0.77, depending on the sample used by the Spanish research from which it was obtained (Mestre et al., 1999).

The mindfulness scale for school scope (León, 2008). This selfreport scale is designed especially for young high school students aged 11–15 years. It must be answered in a Likert format with five intervals from 1 to 5, which represent a continuum that goes from "never" to "always" by evaluating three mindfulness dimensions: (a) kinesthetic mindfulness, which refers to the ability to notice movement and motor actions; (b) external mindfulness, which refers to the ability to direct attention to external elements, attention for observation; (c) interior mindfulness, which refers to the ability to direct attention to the intellectual, to the world of ideas, emotions and feelings, which would be attention for introspection. It also offers a total score in the mindfulness product of the sum of the previous three variables. This questionnaire's general internal consistency is α = 0.84. For each component, the author reports a consistency of α = 0.74 for the kinesthetic mindfulness dimension, α = 0.60 for the external mindfulness dimension and α = 0.66 for the interior mindfulness dimension. Test–retest reliability is r = 0.78 at 4 weeks. The exploratory factorial analysis reports that the three factors explain almost 53% of total variance as follows: 35.20% for kinesthetic mindfulness, 9.50% for external mindfulness and 8.10% for internal mindfulness.

### Procedure

First of all, the relationship between EI and mindfulness was studied to look further at how both are related, and to thus determine the suitability of working with them together in implementing the program. In a second phase, a quasiexperimental pre-/post-test design was used with a control group to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention program for participants' mindfulness. Those who applied the program (applicators) in the four class groups that make up the experimental group were the tutors of these class groups, who implemented the program sessions. Sessions were always held at the same time in the morning as part of the tutorial subject (the Spanish education system includes 1 h/week designed to work many different non-academic aspects). The times to apply the experimental groups and controls were balanced so that the application hours were distributed equally during teaching hours. It took 9 months to complete this educational intervention with the participants, during which 55-min sessions were held when the SEA Program was organized. Concretely, the 18 sessions of the SEA program were implemented during October 2014 and June 2015. The diagram of the flow of the study shows in detail dates of the educative intervention accomplished (see **Table 1**).

During 10 of the SEA Program sessions, mindfulness was implemented in the first 10–15 min of the session. The mindfulness techniques, which formed part of the program, were designed to be useful in the participants' real world by seeking their real practical use and attempting to transfer them to their real lives. These mindfulness techniques used meditation techniques to improve internal and external attention. Specific techniques were also used to improve the studied mindfulness subcomponents by seeking improvements in sustained attention through frets and matrices, in the association of students' life spaces to a higher level of attention and a lower level of activation, and by reducing students' activation tone prior to lessons (see Celma-Pastor and Rodríguez-Ledo, 2017). Half of these sessions involved mindfulness meditation. Thus, the ability to maintain attention openly, both inside and outside, according

TABLE 1 | Diagram of the flow of the study.

to what the CD instructions expected, used to guide this activity, was enhanced by anchoring to different aspects: breathing, association of words, body scanner, etc.

Implementing the program's activities was preceded by training given of the tutors who would hold the sessions. This training was carried out by external experts in the area and dealt with the importance of enhancing EI and mindfulness in the classroom, the program's basic theoretical model and the specific application techniques for the different sessions and activities. A weekly follow-up was also carried out during formal and informal meetings, held with experts and applicators to verify if the program was being correctly implemented, to offer help and advice based on specific activities.

The instruments used to collect the data from both phases were administered by the tutors of the class groups under all the experimental conditions. All the instruments were applied twice, one pretest before implementation commenced and a post-test once all the program sessions had finished. Written informed consent to collect data was obtained from the parents/legal guardians of all the participants. The data analyzed herein were those collected by the pretest measurement.

### Data Analysis

Given the normal distribution of errors and the linear relationship of the dependent and independent variables, the reported results about EI and mindfulness competences were examined by a general linear model analysis. To study the relationship between the EI and the mindfulness scores in the first phase, the analysis used bivariate correlations by employing Pearson's r-statistics, where the correlations between 0 and 0.3 were low, those between 0.3 and 0.6 were the medium, and those between 0.6 and 0.9 were high (Field, 2013). In all cases, the pretest measures of the different tests were used so that the implementation effects could be controlled.

In the second phase, the ANCOVA univariate model was applied per measure, where the dependent variable was the posttest measure, the covariate was the pretest measure and the fixed factor was the experimental condition. The statistics used to measure the effect were Pillai's trace (F) and η 2 p , which measure the effect size, where η 2 p < 0.06 was small, η 2 p > from 0.06 to <0.14 was medium and η 2 p > 0.14 was high (Field, 2013).

### RESULTS

In order to verify or refute the research hypotheses, the obtained results were analyzed, first in relation to the link between the EI and mindfulness competences, which were characteristic of the study phase 1, and to then look further at the improvements found after applying the program in phase 2.

### Phase 1: The Relation Between EI and Mindfulness

**Table 2** shows the bivariate correlation scores, measured with Pearson's r, between the EI variables and the mindfulness variables. All the sample participants (both the control and experimental ones) were analyzed, where N = 152.

By analyzing the statistically significant correlations according to the different study dimensions, we noted that for the EI variables, the external mindfulness dimension positively correlated only with the variable competences for life and wellbeing (r152 = 0.189 and p < 0.05).  This correlated with both the total EI score (r152 = 0.278 and p < 0.01) and the total emotional quotient (r152 = 0.198 and p < 0.01). Finally, kinesthetic mindfulness correlated positively with the variables of emotional regulation (r152 = 0.185 and p < 0.05) and general mood (r152 = 0.196 and p < 0.05). This also correlated with both the total emotional competence score (r152 = 0.168 and p < 0.05) and the total emotional quotient (r152 = 0.220 and p < 0.05). We also noted that the total mindfulness score correlated positively with the EI variables competences for life and well-being (r152 = 0.233 and p < 0.01), interpersonal ability (r152 = 0.217 and p < 0.05) and general mood (r152 = 0.208 and p < 0.05). It also correlated with both the total EI scores: total emotional competence (r152 = 0.188 and p < 0.05) and the total emotional quotient (r152 = 0.232 and p < 0.05).

We also observed a positive and statistically significant correlation between the variable empathy and the external (r152 = 0.205 and p < 0.05) and internal (r152 = 0.231 and p < 0.01) mindfulness dimensions, and with the total mindfulness score (r152 = 0.165 and p < 0.05).

Finally, after analyzing the statistically significant correlations for the variables of social abilities and social adjustment, we saw that the external mindfulness dimension correlated positively with the self-control variables in social relations (r152 = 0.224 and p < 0.01) and with social anxiety/shyness (r152 = 0.215 and p < 0.01). The internal mindfulness variable correlated positively with the variable consideration with others (r152 = 0.207 and p < 0.05). The kinesthetic mindfulness dimension correlated positively with the variable self-control in social relations (r152 = 0.202 and p < 0.05), whereas the variable total mindfulness correlated only with the socialization dimension assessed in the variable self-control in social relations (r152 = 0.235 and p < 0.01).

### Phase 2: Effects of the Implementation on Mindfulness

In order to support or refute the second hypothesis, the changes found in the mindfulness competence after implementing the SEA Program were analyzed. **Table 3** shows the descriptive statistics scores of the different factors of the variable mindfulness measured herein with its pretest and post-test measures for each experimental condition.

After presenting the descriptive data, the results obtained after applying the ANCOVA univariate general linear model analysis are shown in **Table 4**. In it, the pre/post-test changes, presumably through educational intervention, introduced into the mindfulness competences of the participants were

#### TABLE 2 | Bivariate correlation scores.

fpsyg-09-02162 November 7, 2018 Time: 16:55 # 7

∗The correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tails). ∗∗The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tails).

observed. They were measured by Pillai's trace (F), and always with 1 degree of freedom, and their effect size (η 2 p ) and their statistical significance (p). Note N = 108 for the participants of the experimental group and N = 48 for the controls.

As noted, the results offered significant differences in two of the three measured mindfulness variables. Specifically, effects were observed in the experimental group on those in the control group for kinesthetic mindfulness (F156 = 4.326, η 2 p = 0.029 and p < 0.05) and internal mindfulness (F156 = 4.979, η 2 p = 0.033 and p < 0.05).

Experimental group N = 108 and control group N = 48.

TABLE 4 | General linear model scores (ANCOVA).

∗The effect is significant with a level of significance of <0.05.

Regarding gender differences, statistical differences were observed between the male and female participants in the pretest of some variables: empathy and social shyness, where the female participants obtained better marks; kinesthetic mindfulness, where the male participants obtained higher scores. However, the data analysis did not find any interaction between gender and the experimental condition. So, we concluded that such gender differences are distributed equally in both the control and experimental conditions. Nor were any statistically significant differences found in improvement between males or females according to the pre/post-tests of their mindfulness capacity as the male and female participants showed similar improvements after the program.

### DISCUSSION

The objective of the present paper was twofold: an exploratory study in a first phase of the relation between the EI construct and the mindfulness construct; in a second phase, to assess the impact

on the participants' mindfulness competences of implementing the Emotional Competency Development SEA Program.

Regarding the first objective, typical of phase 1, we detected that EI and mindfulness are related in many of the variables measured by the instruments. In particular, we suggested that having a good mindfulness competence is related to having a good general EI level and a higher total emotional quotient. This finding is consistent with those studies that have found a relationship between maturing attentional abilities in children and a greater capacity to manage one's emotional states (Mestre et al., 2009; Davidson, 2012; Eisenberg, 2013).

A relation of this type of full attention or mindfulness and EI was found to be more profound according to the results provided herein. According to them, the participants with better capacities to fully pay attention to external events are those with better skills for life and well-being. They are also more empathetic and are better regulated socially, although they may be too shy sometimes. Those participants with better competences to fully pay attention to internal events are more aware of their emotions, are more emotionally autonomous, and are more competent to deal with personal and social problematic situations with better intrapersonal skills and a better overall mood. They are also more empathetic and consider the opinions and wishes of others more, which are important social aspects in any educational environment. In addition, those who better attend to personal and internal events obtain better overall EI scores and can benefit from the traits related to such intelligence.

Finally, and having taken into account the general ability to attend with mindfulness of an external origin, of an internal cognitive origin, or one that is even body-kinesthetic related, a relation with EI was shown. The young participants in our sample who enjoy having more mindfulness competences are people with better skills for life and well-being, and they are more empathetic and better regulated socially, which make them youngsters with better total EI and a higher emotional quotient. This demonstrates a relation between mindfulness and EI, which leads us to wonder whether enhancing both together in the classroom can, in fact, be more positive and effective.

According to this second objective of phase 2 (i.e., implementing the SEA Program with its 18 sessions to enhance some component based on EI and mindfulness), we obtained interesting results. The pre–post evaluation made with the Mindfulness Scale for the School Scope (León, 2008) informed us about the significant effect on the experimental participants compared with the controls for the ability to mindfully attend the interior or the ability to pay attention to the intellectual, to the world of ideas, emotions and feelings. This effect also came over in the capacity of participants' kinesthetic attention or their capacity to make movement and motor actions. Rather than acting as an enhancer, this effect was protective because, according to the obtained data, the ability to fully attend seemed to deteriorate which, in turn, deteriorated this competence. The implemented program was predictably the main aspect to work as a protective factor by absorbing or cushioning this deterioration. The deterioration detected in teenagers' ability to fully attend was consistent with the tendency to worsen, as consistently observed and reported by teachers and educators informally since they started year 1 of secondary education to even higher grades, such as high school year 3 (Greenberg et al., 2003). If aspects such as self-esteem have been found to decrease in adolescence, especially in early stages (Sanchez, 2009), and as EI also seems to do so (Greenberg et al., 2003), attentional aspects may deteriorate, which may be recovered throughout the adolescent stage. This has been confirmed by several studies which have found precisely this attentional worsening in adolescents compared to children and adults (Santos Cela, 2013). If general attention worsens, probably the ability to mindfulness also does, so educational interventions to curb this worsening could act as protective factors from this decline. Thus, the SEA Program proved successful in achieving this in the assessed sample.

The results obtained about the effect of the program support the program itself, as a properly designed one that obtains results which encourage educators to continue implementing it in the classroom so they can continue strengthening attention abilities or can stop typical deterioration in teenager stages. It has also been discovered that a program which works the EI subcomponents together with brief mindfulness techniques can obtain results that improve the latter. Findings by different researchers confirm that by improving mindfulness in the classroom, students' EI (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Ramos et al., 2009; Arias, 2010) and their mindfulness ability (De La Fuente et al., 2010) also improve.

It should be noted that this study contains certain limitations which future researchers are encouraged to overcome. One is related to our sample size and the studied age range. Larger samples may provide more conclusive data. Likewise, we encourage discovering possible improvements in implementing such aspects with other sample types with different ages or idiosyncratic characteristics, such as young people with ADHD. In addition to new and expanded samples, we also encourage researchers to implement the 10 SEA Program sessions that work mindfulness separately by evaluating if the obtained results can be replicated. Although conclusive results were found, it is the students themselves who report their level of competence by using self-report tests. Future researchers are encouraged to use objective measures to evaluate participants' level of mindfulness. As no such objective test was used with the assessed sample, the authors of this study chose the test as it was thought to be best for our sample evaluation, which was that used herein. It is noteworthy that although the found results could appear encouraging considering the brief intervention made, the improvements obtained a small effect size and low correlations, which is something to be considered byfuture applicators. Perhaps longer and more cross-sectional implementations may obtain higher scores.We therefore encourageinterventionsin developing EI-mindfulness during longer interventions that are longitudinal to check whether this protector effect remains over time.

### CONCLUSION

Beyond possible future improvements in research terms, the main objective of all experts in Education and Developmental Psychology is to improve the education system of their respective

countries as it is capital to develop people with a good set of competences for life, including mindfulness. It is known that young people with better competence to mindfully attend will be predictably more attentive, less anxious, will better control their impulses (Sugiura, 2004; Zeidan et al., 2010; Schoeberlein, 2012) and display better academic performance (León, 2008), with lower burnout levels and will feel more motivated by the task (De La Fuente et al., 2010), more prosocial and less aggressive (Lantieri, 2009). They will also have better emotional well-being levels (Hamilton et al., 2006; Schoeberlein, 2012). It has been suggested that such a mindfulness competence can be enhanced by direct intervention in the classroom, which is relatively short and seeks to promote emotional aspects, together with the ability to fully attend time after time. It has been shown how EI correlates with mindfulness and, thus, by working both, we will perhaps further enhance them both. Following Shakir et al. (2017), we also thought about extending training in mindfulness and/or EI techniques to other fields where professionals can easily benefit from it, such as medical professionals and in health care environments. However, we must set a short-term to mid-term goal to continue improving future adults' competences. Therefore, and by considering that if our obligation as psychologists and educators is to train for personal development, the SEA Program can be a successful option to achieve this goal as it becomes an intervention proposal to join many others who seek the long-awaited goal that every educational system yearns for: developing competent people for all the scopes of their lives.

### ETHICS APPROVAL

The authors hereby state that they have not received any payment for this submitted work and have no financial relationship with any organization that could be perceived to influence or give the

### REFERENCES

appearance of potentially influencing what we have written in the submitted work.

The SEA intervention program has been published in TEA Editorial (see Celma-Pastor and Rodríguez-Ledo, 2017) for the interest of possible applicators, but no data have been published in it. Besides this, we have no other relationships or activities that readers could perceive to have influenced or to give the appearance of potentially influencing we have written in the submitted work.

No ethics approval was required for this research since the Spanish public education system and national regulations require no such approval.

### AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct and intellectual contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.

### FUNDING

This research has been carried out with funding from the Department of Education, University, Culture and Sport of the Regional Aragonese Government as part of cooperation projects in the research field of the Department of Psychology at the University of Zaragoza and the Pilar Lorengar High School of Zaragoza, Spain.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank the year-1 Secondary Education students who formed the sample, their teachers–tutors, the high school advisor and all the educational agents involved in this project.

**Conflict of Interest Statement:** The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Copyright © 2018 Rodríguez-Ledo, Orejudo, Cardoso, Balaguer and Zarza-Alzugaray. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

# Putting 'Emotional Intelligences' in Their Place: Introducing the Integrated Model of Affect-Related Individual Differences

David J. Hughes1 \* † and Thomas Rhys Evans2†

1 Alliance Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom, 2 School of Psychological, Social and Behavioural Sciences, Coventry University, Coventry, United Kingdom

#### Edited by:

Juan-Carlos Pérez-González, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Spain

#### Reviewed by:

Jose Miguel Mestre, Universidad de Cádiz, Spain Javier Cejudo, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Spain

\*Correspondence: David J. Hughes<EMAIL_ADDRESS>†Joint first authors

#### Specialty section:

This article was submitted to Emotion Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology

Received: 15 July 2018 Accepted: 19 October 2018 Published: 14 November 2018

#### Citation:

Hughes DJ and Evans TR (2018) Putting 'Emotional Intelligences' in Their Place: Introducing the Integrated Model of Affect-Related Individual Differences. Front. Psychol. 9:2155. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02155 the 'emotional intelligence' (EI) label. This paper discusses one of the most pervasive problems regarding EI-related individual differences, namely, the lack of a meaningful theoretical framework. First, drawing upon existing theoretical frameworks, we argue that EI-related characteristics can be considered constituents of existing models of cognitive ability (ability EI), personality (trait EI), and emotion regulation (EI competencies). Second, having differentiated between these perspectives (ability, personality, and emotion regulation), we draw upon existing theory and research to build the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences (IMAID), which provides an initial mechanistic representation that explains how the different EI-related constructs are likely to interrelate and coalesce to influence affective outcomes. In essence, the IMAID is an integrated mediation model in which emotion regulation mediates the effects of ability EI and affect-related personality traits upon outcomes. Viewing EI-related constructs as interrelated extensions of well-established individual difference frameworks clarifies some pervasive misconceptions regarding EI-related characteristics and provides scholars and practitioners with a clear and useful theoretical framework ripe for exploration. We conclude by using the IMAID to suggest a theoretically driven agenda for future research.

Numerous individual differences, models, and measures have been associated with

Keywords: emotional intelligence, individual differences, emotion, intelligence, personality, emotion regulation

### INTRODUCTION

Emotional intelligence (EI) is a label assigned to a wide array of individual differences that has been widely adopted by scholars and practitioners. Despite this popularity, numerous concerns regarding the theoretical nature of EI-related constructs remain. Taken literally, EI should be a combination of emotion and intelligence. Emotions are considered affective episodes with a perceptual or intellectual component (e.g., perception and appraisal of emotional cues) that hold the property of intentionality (e.g., jealousy toward another or shame toward oneself; Mulligan and Scherer, 2012). Emotions are often triggered and guided by at least one appraisal of a stimulus (e.g., an impending exam) and are associated with physiological and/or cognitive change(s) (e.g., increased heart rate and self-doubting thoughts; Mulligan and Scherer, 2012). Intelligence is

defined as a "mental capability that. . . involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience" (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13). Adopting this emotion plus intelligence (or cognitive ability) perspective, Salovey and Mayer (1990, p. 189) defined EI as the cognitive abilities required to "monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's thinking and actions". Salovey and Mayer's (1990) conceptualization of EI was discussed within academic circles but a more generalized version of EI was rapidly adopted following the publication of Goleman (1995) "Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ". **Figure 1** shows this surge in interest in terms of the prevalence of the term 'EI' within journal articles.

The popularized notion of EI included constructs not captured by Salovey and Mayer's (1990) cognitive ability model, including motivation, empathy, social skills, happiness, and achievement-orientation, amongst others (Goleman, 1995; Bar-On, 1997). In response, EI researchers diversified, developing a myriad of substantively different definitions and measures – all under the EI label (Locke, 2005). The rapid and piecemeal development of EI measures outstripped meaningful theoretical advancements and the commercialization of EI tools exacerbated inconsistencies in terminology, measurement, and empirical findings (Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008).

It is not uncommon for newly proposed constructs to outstrip meaningful theoretical development (Shaffer et al., 2016), partly because producing construct labels, definitions, and measures is easier than developing meaningful theory, and partly because the latter is based upon the former. Thus, the fact that we now have many conceptualizations and operationalizations of EI is not necessarily a problem. Indeed, it is argued that

"when authors begin to map out the conceptual landscape of a topic they should err in favor of including too many factors, recognizing that over time their ideas will be refined" (Whetten, 1989, p. 490). The numerous conceptualizations of EI each have their merits but growing concerns regarding their theoretical status can no longer be left unchecked (Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008). Paramount amongst these concerns are questions regarding what EI actually is, the extent to which the different EI-related constructs are distinct, and which constructs, if any, are redundant manifestations of 'old wine in new bottles' (Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008).

The lack of clarity surrounding EI has led some to dismiss certain elements of the EI literature, and some to dismiss EI completely (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Locke, 2005). We too are skeptical of EI but believe that calls for complete rejection are premature. Before we can confidently reject or retain the various conceptualizations of EI, we need two things: clear and concise definitions that provide clear boundaries for each EI-related construct, and a theoretical framework that describes how they relate to each other and to the broader individual differences arena. Only with such an integrative theoretical framework can we determine whether EI has any scientific value.

Previous papers have provided taxonomies of EI-related constructs aimed to prevent researchers and practitioners from generalizing across the different 'types of EI' (e.g., Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Van Rooy et al., 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008). Typically, these taxonomies have been based upon measurement tools, measurement approaches (e.g., maximal performance vs. self-report), or have focused on differentiating ability EI from other models (e.g., Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2015). Each of these approaches has been useful, but none has yet developed into a meaningful theoretical framework that can be used to rigorously evaluate the full range of EI-related constructs or prevent conceptual confusion. Indeed, some classifications, such as the 'mixed model' grouping, which is atheoretical by definition, is confusing, of little scientific utility and arguably exacerbates rather than reduces conceptual confusion and false claims (e.g., Joseph et al., 2015). In contrast, we aim to proffer a framework that draws not from the inherent quirks of EI measures but from the wider individual differences literature. Specifically, in the first part of the paper we argue that EI-related constructs can be accommodated within well-established theoretical frameworks that describe cognitive ability, personality, and emotion regulation. In doing so, we remove the need for terms such as 'mixed EI,' and provide a simple but powerful framework to classify EI-related constructs. Having introduced this theoretically informed classification, the second contribution of the paper is to present the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences. This model provides an initial mechanistic representation that explains how the different EI-related constructs are likely to interrelate and coalesce to influence affective outcomes. By differentiating and integrating EI-related individual differences, we hope to provide scholars and practitioners with a clear and useful framework that will provide a platform for theoretical refinement, measure development, and future research.

## PERSPECTIVE 1: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS COGNITIVE ABILITIES

fpsyg-09-02155 November 12, 2018 Time: 13:59 # 3

The theoretical backdrop to ability EI research is synonymous to that of general cognitive abilities, essentially, that individuals differ in their cognitive capacity to recognize, comprehend, and manage emotions in much the same way as individuals vary in their capacity for numerical reasoning or spatial awareness (Mayer et al., 2001). However, the existence of ability EI as a form of intelligence has been the subject of contentious debate (Mayer et al., 2001; Locke, 2005). The two major criticisms have been philosophical (e.g., are emotions rational/logical processes?) and measurement-based (e.g., can a question on emotion have an objectively 'correct/incorrect' answer?). These two points of debate have been fiercely argued elsewhere and so we do not revisit them here (c.f. Bowman et al., 2002; Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008; Mestre et al., 2016). Instead, we examine the empirical evidence for considering ability EI as a constituent of broader models of cognitive ability, such as the Cattell–Horn–Carroll model (Schneider and McGrew, 2018).

Ability EI research has drawn predominantly on the Salovey and Mayer (1990) model and operationalized the construct using the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002; formerly the MEIS; Mayer et al., 1999). This model proposes four emotion-related abilities, namely, the perception (accurately perceiving emotions), facilitation (using emotions to aid performance), understanding (comprehending how emotions arise and develop), and management (regulating one's own or others' emotions) of emotions (Mayer and Salovey, 1997).

The MSCEIT has been the most popular measure of ability EI and the measure and construct are often considered synonymous. Researchers have recently acknowledged that additional measures of ability EI are needed, in part because a single measure is unlikely to provide sufficient evidence for the existence of the construct (Mestre et al., 2016) and also because there have been a number of notable critiques regarding the psychometric properties of the MSCEIT (e.g., Matthews et al., 2004; Maul, 2012). For example, the perception factor has demonstrated inconsistent correlations with other measures of emotion recognition (e.g., Matthews et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2006) and the facilitation branch does not hold in factor analyses, with facilitation measures loading on to the perception and management factors (e.g., Roberts et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2010). Indeed, numerous studies now provide support for a hierarchical three-factor model, with emotion perception, understanding, and management correlating highly and loading onto a single higher-order ability EI factor (Fan et al., 2010; MacCann et al., 2014).

Despite the measurement problems, evidence in favor of an affect-related strand of intelligence is mounting. There is clear evidence that individuals consistently differ in their ability to perceive and understand emotions (Mestre et al., 2016). Further, both the general ability EI factor and the three sub-factors are strongly correlated with measures of cognitive ability but remain somewhat distinct (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; MacCann, 2010; MacCann et al., 2014). The most robust investigation of ability EI within the cognitive ability domain comes from MacCann et al. (2014) who tested various factor models examining the structural relations of ability EI tests and tests of general cognitive ability. The best fitting models all situated ability EI-loaded by tests of emotion perception, understanding and management – as a second-stratum factor of general intelligence alongside fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, quantitative reasoning, visual processing, and broad retrieval ability. Across the different factor models, ability EI typically loaded onto g at around 0.80, a similar magnitude to the other broad domains of cognitive ability tested (MacCann et al., 2014: Table 6). MacCann et al. (2014) concluded that ability EI was best considered as a sub-domain of general cognitive ability within a broad Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model of intelligence (Schneider and McGrew, 2018). Further, emerging data suggests that the various EI branches have developmental trajectories similar to closely related cognitive abilities. For example, emotion perception decreases in adulthood as do to other sensory-modality abilities, and emotion understanding/management continues to increase across the lifespan akin to other knowledge-like abilities (Mestre et al., 2016).

Although ability EI can be considered a sub-factor of existing general cognitive ability models, that does not mean it is redundant or lacking in utility. Indeed, evidence suggests that ability EI predicts a number of important outcomes when controlling for general cognitive ability and other individual differences (e.g., Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; Newman et al., 2010), with the incremental prediction most pronounced when the outcomes examined are emotion-laden (e.g., job performance in roles requiring high emotional labor; Joseph and Newman, 2010).

In sum, ability EI, or individual differences in the ability to recognize, understand, and (knowledge of how to) manage emotions appear to exist and fit within a broader cognitive ability framework (MacCann et al., 2014; Mestre et al., 2016). Ability EI shares numerous features with other elements of cognitive ability and provides useful information in explaining emotion-laden outcomes (Mayer et al., 2001; Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; Joseph and Newman, 2010). The evidence summarized here supports a conclusion that ability EI can be considered a sub-factor of general cognitive ability.

### PERSPECTIVE 2: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS PERSONALITY TRAITS

The second perspective on EI was pioneered by Petrides and colleagues and is termed 'trait EI.' The definition of trait EI has evolved over time, from a construct that represents "behavioral dispositions and self-perceived abilities" (Petrides and Furnham, 2001, p. 426), to "emotion-related dispositions" (Petrides et al., 2007b, p. 273), and most recently to the "constellation of emotional self-perceptions located at the

lower levels of personality hierarchies" (Petrides, 2010, p. 137). A large body of evidence demonstrates that trait EI is unrelated to ability EI (correlations are often near-zero; Van Rooy et al., 2005; Petrides et al., 2007a). Thus, we can say that trait EI and ability EI represent two distinct perspectives on EI, with ability EI linked to individual differences in intelligence and trait EI linked to individual differences in personality. However, there remains uncertainty regarding the extent to which trait EI replicates traits within existing personality models or captures a new dimension of personality.

Personality refers to the relatively stable traits that influence a person's typical pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving (Hughes and Batey, 2017). Given this, trait EI should refer exclusively to typical affective tendencies and not self-perceived abilities, which are distinct from personality (Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2004). However, as noted above, trait EI has shifted over time from a mixed construct (dispositions and self-perceived abilities) to a personality construct and it seems that current measures of trait EI still contain questions concerning self-perceived abilities (e.g., I would describe myself as a good negotiator; I believe I am full of personal strengths). This is not surprising given that the trait EI program did not start out to identify the "comprehensive representation of the affective aspects of personality" (Petrides et al., 2016, p. 336) that it now claims to capture. Nevertheless, future research needs to refine trait EI measures so that they focus exclusively on personality.

The most popular measure of trait EI, the TEIQue (Petrides, 2009), has a general factor that can be broken into four-sub-factors and a further 15 facets, two of which are considered auxiliary facets that do not load onto any of the four sub-factors (see **Table 1**). Early exploratory factor analytic evidence showing that some trait EI facets formed a factor separate to the Big Five (Petrides and Furnham, 2001; Petrides et al., 2007b), combined with evidence of modest incremental prediction (beyond short measures of the Big Five; Petrides et al., 2007a), was interpreted as indicating the discovery of a major new personality dimension (Petrides et al., 2007b; Pérez-González and Sanchez-Ruiz, 2014).

However, later research demonstrated substantial overlap between existing personality measures and trait EI measures (e.g., 57% of trait EI variance is accounted for by the Big Five factors), suggesting that trait EI was not that new or that major (Pérez-González and Sanchez-Ruiz, 2014). Indeed, when examining Petrides et al.'s(2007b, Table 4) joint factor analysis of the TEIQue and a measure of the Big Five, there is substantial overlap. Five trait EI facets had no substantial loading on the trait EI factor but did load substantially on other Big Five factors. Six trait EI facets either had their primary loading on a Big Five factor or had substantial loadings on both trait EI and one of the Big Five. Four trait EI facets loaded primarily onto the trait EI factor and had no meaningful cross-loadings. So, of the fifteen TEIQue facets, five are best considered markers of the current Big Five, and a further six can quite easily be incorporated within the Big Five model. What this analysis reveals is that the vast majority of trait EI facets are best considered markers of the Big Five, not as markers of a new trait construct. Indeed, based on a qualitative review of item TABLE 1 | TEIQue facets and similarities to the Big Five.

content, we have illustrated further overlap between trait EI and the Big Five within **Table 1**.

Despite the substantial overlap between trait EI models and the Big Five, Petrides et al.'s (2007b) analyses suggest that four facets (social awareness, emotion management, emotion expression, and trait empathy) are unique from the Big Five. In addition, our qualitative review suggests that some facets do not have direct equivalents in extant models. Thus, it is possible that trait EI research has identified meaningful personality traits that can inform and expand existing personality models. This is especially useful given that current omnibus models of personality (e.g., the Big Five) are not comprehensive in their coverage of the personality sphere (Hughes and Batey, 2017), and this is particularly true for tendencies relating to positive affect (e.g., Pytlik Zillig et al., 2002). Indeed, a number of the 'unique' trait EI facets, representing positive affect or low neuroticism, are not currently captured by the Big Five (e.g., emotion regulation, adaptability, and optimism). This might explain why the factors of well-being and self-control, which subsume these facets, often provide incremental prediction when examined alongside existing personality measures (Andrei et al., 2016).

So, trait EI measures capture a number of affect-related or affect-laden personality traits that span the whole spectrum of personality (i.e., facets from each of the Big Five and seemingly beyond). Having measures that provide a "comprehensive representation of the affective aspects of personality" (Petrides et al., 2016, p. 336) is undoubtedly useful for both research and practice (i.e., identifying which facets to measure during employee selection, Hughes and Batey, 2017). However, whether existing trait EI measures achieve this is debatable. The research that is now needed to achieve comprehensive coverage of

affect-related personality facets involves two major steps. First, research must identify which facets of trait EI models and measures are unique and which are redundant. Second, existing personality measures (i.e., Big Five measures) need to be examined in order to identify other affect-related facets (e.g., anxiety and warmth) that are currently absent from trait EI models.

In sum, whilst trait EI research is not as clear-cut as ability EI research, we can draw several important conclusions, namely that trait EI is distinct from ability EI and that trait EI is, in essence, a collection of affect-related personality traits. In order to make this overlap and theoretical perspective explicit, from this point, we refer to this perspective without using the term 'intelligence.' Instead, we refer to this perspective as 'affect-related personality.' Using a unique label was not a lightly taken decision because whenever novel terminologies are introduced the risk of confusing matters increases. We considered the term 'personality trait EI' or retaining 'trait EI.' However, on reflection, we considered that it would be more confusing to use term 'intelligence' when referring to a collection of personality traits.

### PERSPECTIVE 3: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS EMOTION REGULATION

The third broad grouping of EI-related constructs commonly discussed pertains to Emotional and Social Competencies (e.g., Goleman, 1995; Boyatzis, 2009). EI competencies are "observed when a person demonstrates. . .self-awareness, self-management, social awareness and social skills at appropriate times and ways in sufficient frequency to be effective in the situation" (Boyatzis et al., 2000, p. 344). This definition is so broad that almost any intrapersonal or interpersonal behavior could be classified under this definition, and many have been. Indeed, EI competency models include constructs synonymous with personality (e.g., conscientiousness, optimism; Joseph et al., 2015), constructs concerning the regulation of one's own and others' emotions (e.g., emotional self-control, empathy, and conflict management) and a broad array of performance outcomes (e.g., teamwork, service orientation, innovativeness, social responsibility, leadership; Bar-On, 1997; Boyatzis et al., 2000; Boyatzis, 2009).

The varied nature of these models has led numerous authors to refer to them as 'mixed models' (e.g., Joseph et al., 2015), with mixed models frequently and justifiably criticized for their lack of theoretical clarity (Mayer et al., 2000; Daus and Ashkanasy, 2003; Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008). Indeed, when a construct is so broad that it can reasonably accommodate almost everything it is essentially protean and thus meaningless (Hughes, 2018). 'Valid' constructs have clear definitions, clearly defined content, and clear boundaries (Hughes, 2018). Competency EI models have none of these features (Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008). In addition, competency measures share larger correlations with measures of other constructs than each other (Brackett and Mayer, 2003), have low internal consistency and test–retest reliability (Zeidner et al., 2008), incoherent and inconsistent factor structures (Livingstone and Day, 2005), and when considered alongside personality, intelligence, and selfperceptions, have little predictive value (Joseph et al., 2015). Given the lack of supporting evidence (and quite damning critical evidence), we concur with the previously espoused views that EI competencies represent a proportion of the EI literature that could be abandoned (e.g., Mayer et al., 2000; Brackett and Mayer, 2003; Daus and Ashkanasy, 2003; Zeidner et al., 2004, 2008; Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Locke, 2005). Indeed, the continued use of EI competency models is likely to do "much more harm than good" (Daus and Ashkanasy, 2003, p. 70) when seeking to build coherent theoretical accounts of affective processes and related individual differences.

Although we see no meaningful future for current EI competency models, we do see that the general aim of assessing emotional competence and integrating it within a broad framework of emotion-related individual differences is of value. As noted above, the constructs included within competency models span three domains: personality, broad performance outcomes, and emotion regulation. Within the delineation of emotion-related constructs we present, the personality component is captured under the 'affect-related personality' (e.g., trait EI) banner, so any personality constructs here would represent construct proliferation, and the broad performance outcomes cannot reasonably be considered affectrelated individual differences. However, we would argue that the elements related to emotion regulation do have a place within the broad domain of affect-related individual differences. Thus, we would prefer to see such work move away from EI competencies and focus instead on emotion regulation, which represents 'the use of strategic cognitions or behaviors to improve or worsen [one's] own feelings and those of other people, in the pursuit of hedonic, relational and instrumental goals' (Niven et al., 2011, p. 71). In essence, emotional competence and emotion regulation are aiming to address the same phenomenon, namely, using emotions to facilitate goal attainment. In **Table 2**, we have noted some clear areas of overlap between emotion regulation models and EI competencies.

Given that EI competencies and emotion regulation are both concerned with the same phenomena and the clear overlap in core constructs (see **Table 2**), it makes sense to consolidate the two fields to avoid construct proliferation (i.e., the proposition and marketing of multiple ostensibly unique but actually largely overlapping constructs). This consolidation is likely, in our view, to lead to the abandonment of EI competencies in favor of emotion regulation for three main reasons:

First, emotion regulation has well-developed theories such as the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2015). According to this model, there are five classes of emotion regulation: (i) choosing situations to engage with or avoid (situation selection), (ii) modifying that situation (situation modification), (iii) directing attention within the situation (attentional deployment), (iv) attributing a meaning to the situation (cognitive change), or (v) altering the response to the situation (response modulation). At all five stages, different emotion regulation strategies can be adopted and if implemented successfully can facilitate goal-attainment (Gross, 2015). Some

example strategies are displayed in **Table 2**. The process model of emotion regulation has recently been extended to consider a significant gap noted by the model's author, namely, how individuals come to choose which emotion regulation strategy to adopt. Specifically, Gross proposed three key antecedents to the enacting of emotion regulation, namely, identification, selection, and implementation (Gross, 2015). As we will discuss later, we see a prominent role for ability EI and affect-related personality traits in explaining individual differences in identification (i.e., how capable/prepared people are to pay attention to emotions), selection (i.e., the ability to identify an appropriate emotion regulation class), and implementation (i.e., the specific behavioral nuances with which people enact their regulation).

At this point, it is worth noting how emotion regulation differs from ability EI and in particular the management branch, which is sometimes referred to as the regulation branch (Joseph and Newman, 2010, 2015). Emotion regulation as we have noted above refers to processes and behaviors regarding the up-regulation and down-regulation of emotions. The emotion management branch of ability EI refers to crystallized knowledge regarding these processes and behaviors. In other words, the difference between knowing that consuming alcohol will not improve one's mood, and drinking it regardless. The two are interrelated, but they are not synonymous, one is knowledge and the other is action.

Second, although EI competency models refer to broad outcomes (e.g., optimism or influence), emotion regulation models focus on the specific strategies utilized (see **Table 2**). For example, optimism can be obtained and maintained through positive reappraisal and the use of self-enhancing humor (Scheier and Carver, 1987), whilst influence can be gained in a number of ways, including appropriate displays of anger (e.g., Sy et al., 2005; Côté and Hideg, 2011). This focus on specific strategies provides a greater insight into the processes behind affective phenomena (Mestre et al., 2016) and thus can lead to more specific theories and useful practical guidance (i.e., training programs).

Third, emotion regulation measures are superior to EI competency measures in terms of theoretical coherence and psychometric properties (c.f., Matthews et al., 2003; Bridges et al., 2004). For example, one of the most widely used measures, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003) differentiates between re-appraisal and suppression strategies guided by theoretical models (Gross, 1998; Gross and John, 2003). In addition, the ERQ scales demonstrate adequate reliability, a stable factor structure, and provide prediction of numerous socially important outcomes (e.g., depression, anxiety, stress, interpersonal functioning, well-being, social adjustment, and decision-making; see Spaapen et al., 2014).

In sum, both emotional competence and emotion regulation are attempting to address the same phenomenon: using emotions to facilitate goal attainment. However, only emotion regulation actually achieves this. Compared with EI competency models, emotion regulation models are built on stronger theory, contain more specific construct identification, inspire better measures, and show better predictive properties. Thus, we believe that researchers interested in emotional competence or skill should avoid EI competency/mixed models and instead focus on models of emotion regulation. The integration of EI research with emotion regulation echoes a call from Mestre et al. (2016, p. 327) who recently stated that, 'studying EI through the theoretical framework of emotion regulation may produce greater understanding of the mechanisms by which EI capacities influence valued outcomes.' We agree with Mestre et al. (2016) and see great value in the integration of EI and emotion regulation (see also Hughes and Evans, 2016). In the next section, we expand upon these claims by building an integrative model that combines ability EI, affect-related personality traits, and emotion regulation.

### AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF AFFECT-RELATED INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Using the aforementionedtheoretically informed classification, the second major goal of this paper is to introduce the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences. This model aims to provide an initial mechanistic representation that explains how the different EI-related constructs are likely to interrelate and coalesce to influence affective outcomes. By differentiating and integrating EI-related individual differences, the current paper aims to provide scholars and practitioners with a clear and useful

TABLE 2 | Overlaps between emotion regulation classes, emotion regulation strategies, and outcomes currently considered to be emotional intelligence competencies.

framework that will provide a platform for theoretical refinement, measure development, and future research.

Previous influential models or classifications of EI-related constructs (e.g., trait vs. ability; stream 1, 2, and 3; ability vs. mixed) have typically been based on sub-optimal definitions or measurement tools (e.g., Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2015). For example, Ashkanasy and Daus (2005) influential classification proposed three streams each based on a certain measurement approach, namely, ability EI tests, self- or other-reported ability EI, and EI competency measures. Whilst such groupings have utility in distinguishing among measures, they are, by nature, atheoretical and fail to provide a solid platform for theoretical development. Equally, previous reviews have tended to adopt an ability EI vs. others (mixed models, trait EI, competency) approach and as a result, researchers have tended to treat the different EIrelated constructs as competitors. Indeed, there have been numerous papers pitting the different EI models against each other with a view to identifying which EI is the 'correct' or 'best' EI (e.g., Mayer et al., 2000; Zeidner et al., 2008).

In contrast, we have used the broader individual differences literature as the basis for our classification of EI-related constructs and were not bound by existing measurement tools or deficient definitions (e.g., mixed models). As a result, our classification addresses calls to provide clear boundaries, aligned with traditional individual differences theory, for each of the major EI-related constructs (Zeidner et al., 2004). Importantly, this means that these different EI-related constructs are no longer in direct competition but can instead be viewed as complementary. Rather than conducting predictive validity competitions, pitting different EI measures against each other and other individual differences, we can instead focus on building and testing meaningful theoretical models that explain how individual differences in ability EI, affect-related personality, and emotion regulation interrelate to influence affective behavior (e.g., Seal and Andrews-Brown, 2010; Hughes and Evans, 2016; Mestre et al., 2016). Accordingly, we now propose a model that integrates the three perspectives.

The key principles of the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences are as follows. We propose that ability EI (a sub-factor of cognitive ability) and affect-related personality traits (a collection of affect-related personality traits) drive the identification, selection, and successful implementation of various emotion regulation strategies. In turn, emotion regulation influences important outcomes. A visual representation of the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences is presented in **Figure 2**. In essence, this is an integrated mediation model in which emotion regulation mediates the effects of ability EI and affect-related personality traits upon outcomes (Joseph and Newman, 2010; Côté et al., 2011; Hughes and Evans, 2016; Mestre et al., 2016; Szczygieł and Mikolajczak, 2017). The model is inspired by and builds upon previous integrations of personality, intelligence, and skills that have proven successful in explaining behavior in other domains (e.g., McClelland, 1973; Zeidner, 1995; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2004). Perhaps the key strength of the model is that it provides a testable framework that has the potential to explain how individual differences in ability EI and affect-related personality manifest in diverse behavior and differential outcomes. The model goes beyond simple descriptive correlations and direct effects that have dominated previous research and instead seeks to explain how affective outcomes arise through the dynamic interactions between affect-related individual differences. As a result, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences focuses not simply on what is predicted by EI-related constructs but how these constructs influence outcomes. A greater understanding of how EI-related constructs interact and the nature of the mechanisms by which they influence outcomes stands to inform future theory, measurement, and intervention design.

A few previous papers have proposed and/or partially tested models that integrate some EI-related constructs (e.g., Joseph and Newman, 2010; Seal and Andrews-Brown, 2010; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Mestre et al., 2016). However, none of these models have included all unique elements of the EI literature, all have been bound by existing measurement tools and poorly defined constructs (e.g., mixed models), and most have not considered EI-related constructs within the broader individual differences literature. For example, Seal and Andrews-Brown (2010) posit mediated and moderated relationships between three measures, which they label emotional ability (Salovey and Mayer, 1990), emotional quotient (Bar-On, 1997) and emotional competence (Goleman, 1995). The latter two are considered 'mixed models,' overlap substantially, and as discussed above have been heavily criticized from theoretical and empirical standpoints. This model also fails to provide theoretically meaningful links to the broader literature or draw clear boundaries separating these constructs. As a result, its utility for theory building is limited. In contrast, Mestre et al. (2016) present compelling evidence supporting the positioning of ability EI as a sub-factor of general cognitive ability. They go on to argue that emotion regulation could be the process by which ability EI influences outcomes. This link was supported by a previous meta-analysis demonstrating associations between ability EI scores and emotion regulation (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). The Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences builds upon this paper positing emotion regulation as the mechanism through which EI-related constructs influence outcomes. However, it extends this discussion beyond ability EI to include affect related personality traits. Further, as we discuss in more detail below, the model also posits that individual differences in emotion regulation are most likely driven by both ability EI and affect-related personality traits (Hughes and Evans, 2016).

Overall, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences makes several key contributions to the literature. First, by tying each EI-related construct to existing models of individual differences it provides a clear, theoretically coherent, and parsimonious description of the three key perspectives. Second, the model posits EI-related constructs not as competitors but as complementary constructs that are meaningfully entwined and which coalesce to produce emotion-relevant behavior. Third, through this integration, the model provides a framework that

can explain how individual differences in ability EI and affect related personality traits influence patterns of emotion regulation and subsequently socially important outcomes. In the following sections, we discuss integration further and review extant empirical evidence in support of the key pathways hypothesized. The Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences is inherently causal but most EI research is cross-sectional and correlational in design. Because such designs do not model data in a manner that is appropriate for determining causal relationships (Antonakis et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2018), where available, studies adopting experimental designs, which are better suited to examining causality, are noted (Antonakis et al., 2010).

### PATHWAY 1: G → ABILITY EI

As discussed above, ability EI satisfies a number of important criteria to be considered a cognitive ability (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; MacCann et al., 2014; Mestre et al., 2016). More specifically, current evidence suggests that ability EI is best conceived of as a second-order factor of cognitive ability that is hierarchically structured, consisting of a general factor and three sub-factors, namely, the ability to perceive, understand, and manage emotions (Fan et al., 2010; MacCann et al., 2014). Essentially, ability EI reflects the cognitive capacity to process emotion-laden information (Mayer et al., 2016).

### PATHWAY 2: BIG FIVE → AFFECT-RELATED PERSONALITY TRAITS

Trait EI represents a compound construct containing affectrelated personality traits (Petrides et al., 2007b; Petrides, 2010). Given the pervasiveness of the Big Five and Five Factor Model (FFM) within personality research, and the significant overlap between trait EI and FFM facets (see **Table 1**), it is appropriate to seat the affect-related personality traits perspective within this model (van der Zee and Wabeke, 2004). Historically, most affect-related personality research has focussed on global factors (e.g., total trait EI scores). However, we suggest that this is sub-optimal and potentially misleading, for two main reasons. First, compared to facets, broad factors lead to underestimates and/or distorted estimates of construct relationships (i.e., reduced predictive validity, Hughes and Batey, 2017). This is especially true when facet content is diverse (Hughes and Batey, 2017), like it is with affect-related personality traits, which span all of the Big Five. Second, factors created from a selective subset of traits (e.g., TEIQue) might well be misleading due to data prestructuring. Briefly, factor solutions are only as strong as the variables that are entered for factoring, and factors identified can only be considered to 'exist' or be 'accurate' if they are derived from the entire domain of possible variables (i.e., all affect-related personality facets/items). Given that this was not the case for measures such as the TEIQue (which was developed based on a competency EI model), it is perhaps questionable what the global trait EI and 4 subfactors really represent. Indeed, as we discussed, a number of TEIQue facets do not load on the general factor. Thus, we think that targeted, theory driven, facet-level analyses are the way forward (Hughes and Batey, 2017). That is, researchers should measure the affect-related personality facets that are relevant to their study. Although for slightly different reasons, this recommendation echoes recent calls from the pioneers of the personality based approach to EI (Petrides et al., 2016).

### PATHWAY 3: ABILITY EI → EMOTION REGULATION

Emotion regulation refers to the strategies used to adapt emotions (e.g., suppress or exacerbate) experienced by the self and others in order to facilitate goal-attainment (Niven et al., 2009, 2011; Gross, 2015). If you want to achieve the goal of increasing your positive emotions, you might tell yourself a funny joke. If you want to reduce someone else's anxiety before a test, you might reassure them. Emotion regulation consists of three main decisions (Gross, 2015). First, a person must select if/which emotions need to be regulated in any given situation (identification). Next, the person must choose when regulation strategies (i.e., which of the emotion regulation classes, see **Table 1**), should be utilized (selection). Finally, in the implementation phase, the person must enact the regulation by translating the broad emotion regulation strategy (e.g., cognitive change or situation modification) into specific cognitive or behavioral strategies (e.g., positive reappraisal or conflict resolution). The identification, selection, and implementation stages were recently espoused and understanding them is likely to help explain the existence of consistent individual differences in the frequency and style of emotion regulation (Gross, 2015).

The recency with which the identification, selection, and implementation phases were espoused means that no specific theory, model, or empirical evidence describes relationships between the two. However, there is mounting evidence and increasing theoretical rationale to support a reliable link between ability EI and the use of emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Joseph and Newman, 2010; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Hughes and Evans, 2016; Mestre et al., 2016). For example, a recent meta-analysis found a number of moderate-strong relationships between ability EI and emotion regulation strategies spanning the five major emotion regulation classes (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). As an indication of the degree of the relationship, ability EI reliably predicted the use of nineteen of the 22 emotion regulation strategies investigated (i.e., 95% confidence intervals not crossing 0). Importantly, the strength and direction of the relationships was not uniform, that is, those high in ability EI do not simply regulate more and/or use a greater number of strategies. The pattern of relationships suggests that individuals high in ability EI regulate emotions earlier (which is typically adaptive), adopt more of the strategies typically seen as adaptive (e.g., social support seeking), and fewer of those typically seen as maladaptive (e.g., rumination; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). These theoretical and empirical arguments suggest that ability EI (the cognitive capacity to process emotion-laden information) is likely to be one of the key determinants of the characteristic patterns of emotion regulation displayed by individuals (Mestre et al., 2016).

Experimental research in the field is mostly convergent, with ability EI linked to effective mood maintenance and repair following mood induction via film clips (positive and negative, respectively; Ciarrochi et al., 2000). Similarly, ability EI has been associated with lower worry and avoidant coping during stressful tasks (Matthews et al., 2006). Furthermore, using eye-tracking equipment during an experimental protocol, Davis (2018) found a general orienting preference whereby emotion management was associated with avoidance of negative emotion (anger). However, higher levels of ability EI are not always considered positive, with some relationships with higher cortisol reactivity and thus slower recovery from stress (Bechtoldt and Schneider, 2016).

In sum, whilst experimental studies are rare, those available are broadly consistent with survey studies and support the notion that ability EI is likely to be one antecedent of emotion regulation style. Indeed, it would be surprising if an individual's ability and knowledge pertaining to the perception, understanding, and

management of emotions were unrelated to emotion regulation. Although speculative here, it might be expected that meaningful relationships will emerge between the perception factor of ability EI and the identification stage of emotion regulation, between understanding and selection, and between management and implementation (see **Figure 3**, discussed below).

### PATHWAY 4A AND 4B: AFFECT-RELATED PERSONALITY → EMOTION REGULATION

Whilst ability EI correlates with emotion regulation, it alone does not explain emotion regulation (Mayer et al., 2016). There is a well-documented gap between ability and behavior; individuals with similar levels of ability EI adopt diverse emotion regulation strategies, some of which can be unproductive (e.g., Côté et al., 2011). Both theoretical rationale and empirical evidence suggest that personality also plays a role in guiding individual's emotion regulation (Côté et al., 2011; Davis and Humphrey, 2014; Fiori, 2015; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Hughes and Evans, 2016). Personality traits shape individuals' preferences, attentional focus, and interpersonal behavior, all of which are likely to influence one's choice of emotion regulation strategy (e.g., Côté et al., 2011; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Indeed, meta-analytic estimates suggest that affect-related personality traits are associated with emotion regulation in a similar fashion to ability EI. That is, there is a consistent relationship (i.e., 35 of 37 effect sizes calculated presenting 95% confidence intervals not including 0; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). The nature of these associations suggest that those who scorer higher on measures of trait EI tend to regulate earlier and use regulatory strategies typically considered adaptive more often than strategies typically considered maladaptive. In addition, effect sizes are, on average, larger than those reported for ability EI (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Perhaps this is not hugely surprising, in fact, it would be more surprising if personality did not shape emotion regulation style, for instance, if those high in trait optimism did not frequently use positive reappraisals and those high in trait anxiety did not frequently ruminate.

Experimental results also support a causal relationship between affect-related personality and emotion regulation. For example, trait EI was negatively related to psychological and physiological reactivity when exposed to a stressor (Mikolajczak et al., 2007) and positively related to exhibition of self-efficacy and appraising stressful situations as challenges rather than threats (Mikolajczak and Luminet, 2008). Similarly, affect-related personality traits have been associated with greater susceptibility to mood induction, moderating the effect of experimental stressors on subsequent mood deterioration (Petrides and Furnham, 2003; Mikolajczak et al., 2009).

Above, we hypothesized that there might be meaningful relationships between the three primary EI abilities (perception, understanding, and management) and the identification, selection, and implementation phases of emotion regulation. It is also likely that certain affect-related personality traits will predispose individuals to think and act in specific ways within these phases. For example, certain traits (e.g., emotion perception and empathy) might predispose individuals to invest more effort in monitoring one's own and others' emotions (the identification phase). Other traits (e.g., anxiety or optimism or emotional expression) might predispose individuals to select certain classes of emotion regulation (e.g., situation selection or cognitive change or response modulation) and to implement them using specific strategies (e.g., avoidant coping or positive reappraisal or venting). It is also likely that intrapersonal affect-related personality traits (e.g., stress management) will predict the regulation of one's own emotions, whilst the interpersonal traits (e.g., social awareness) will predict the regulation of others' emotions.

One of the major mechanisms through which affect-related personality traits are likely to influence patterns of emotion regulation, is goals and motives (**Figure 2**, path 4b). Emotion regulation is often, if not always, goal-driven (Gross, 2015) and personality shapes values, goals, and motives (Grant and Mayer, 2009; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015), with affect-related personality traits likely to influence motives and goals within affect-related settings (John and Gross, 2004; Hughes and Evans, 2016). It has been argued that the general goal of emotion-regulation should be to 'feel good' and thus personality is perhaps not that key (e.g., Larsen, 2000; Tice et al., 2004). However, empirical evidence does not support this assertion. Individuals demonstrate considerable variation in how they want to feel and in the direction in which they regulate their emotions (e.g., Gross et al., 2006; Tamir, 2016). For example, Heimpel et al. (2002) found that participants who were low in self-esteem and had recently experienced a failure/loss did not want to feel immediately better. In contrast, those high in self-esteem did seek to make themselves feel better. This multi-study paper showed that the varying regulatory goals were not due to differences in knowledge or expected affect changes but reflected dispositional and stylistic preferences that are almost certainly shaped, to some degree, by personality (e.g., Grant and Mayer, 2009; Augustine et al., 2010; Hughes and Evans, 2016).

We believe that a systematic empirical effort to examine the relationships between affect-related personality and emotion-regulation goals/motives would be hugely useful for theoretical development and explaining consistent individual differences within emotion regulation. A recently published taxonomy (Tamir, 2016), provides a particularly useful framework for guiding examinations between personality, goals, and emotion regulation. The framework consists of two higher-order classes of motives namely, hedonic and instrumental, which subsume six lower-order classes (see Tamir, 2016, **Figure 1**). These lower-order classes lend themselves to a number of hypotheses regarding affect-related personality traits. For example, trait sociability (contained with the TEIQue and most other personality models) is likely to generate goals and motives that are aligned with the social-instrumental class identified by Tamir (2016). Accordingly, one might hypothesize that those high in trait sociability will frequently be motived to regulate emotions in a social-instrumental manner through the use of emotion regulation strategies such as social support seeking and humor use. Similarly, links between trait optimism

and prohedonic motives (i.e., the motive to feel good) or trait achievement striving and performance-instrumental motives could easily be theorized.

In addition, most previous examinations of EI-related constructs and emotion regulation have focussed almost exclusively upon on self-regulation (e.g., Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Mestre et al., 2016; Tamir, 2016). We believe this to be an oversight and expect that affect related personality traits will be of (equal, perhaps even greater) importance to the approaches adopted when attempting to regulate others' emotions (Niven et al., 2011). For example, many affect-related personality traits (e.g., empathy, social awareness) drive an outward focus that is likely to produce motivations aimed at appeasing or pleasing others. Such goals are likely to affect the choices of emotion regulation strategies. For example, although venting (i.e., verbally complaining about a negative event) can be a productive self-regulation strategy, it can be counterproductive for those who receive the venting. It is possible that those high in empathy or social awareness may be more likely to consider the consequences of venting for others and thus suppress their desire to vent in order to regulate the emotions of others (Hughes and Evans, 2016). Currently, however, there is a dearth of research exploring why people engage in other-focused emotion regulation and the different styles with which they do so (Niven, 2016). Another recent taxonomy might be of use in guiding future research is Niven's (2016) work-specific motives framework of interpersonal emotion regulation. The framework identifies eight specific motives which are subsumed under the three major needs proposed in self-determination theory. The framework shares a number of commonalities with that proposed by Tamir (2016). For example, there are different manifestations of motives depending on whether the broad goal is hedonic/pleasure or instrumental/performance focussed, these motives are hierarchically structured, and the lowest-level of abstraction provides a classification system that would lend itself to building logical hypotheses positing personality traits as antecedents of these motives.

### PATHWAY 5: INTERACTION BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND ABILITY → EMOTION REGULATION

In addition to independent effects, it is also possible that ability EI and affect-related personality interact in explaining emotion regulation (Côté et al., 2011; Fiori, 2015; Hughes and Evans, 2016). For example, Côté et al. (2011) found that when individuals were high in both ability EI and moral identity, they were more likely to behave in a prosocial manner, but if they were high in ability EI and Machiavellianism, they were more likely to display interpersonal deviance. Importantly here, higher ability EI was associated with greater performance but the direction of the performance (prosociality or deviance) was explained by personality traits. Similarly, Fiori (2015) found that ability EI interacted with the personality trait of emotionality (similar to neuroticism, marked by fearfulness, anxiety, sentimentality and a dependence on social support) to predict interpersonal effectiveness as assessed through a presentation task. Here, those high in ability EI and low in emotionality (i.e., emotionally stable) were the best performers, whilst those high in ability EI and emotionality were average performers.

The above evidence demonstrates that both ability EI and affect-related personality traits are needed to explain performance. However, all of these studies omit the important mediating mechanism of emotion regulation and thus likely underestimate the effects of EI-related constructs and reduce their ability to explain how the EI-related constructs influenced the outcomes. As noted above, we also expect that ability EI and affect-related personality traits will interact to drive both the selection and implementation of differing emotion regulation strategies. For example, two individuals equally high in ability EI with differing levels of trait optimism (a facet of trait EI; Petrides et al., 2007b) might differ in the speed and frequency with which they engage in positive interpretations (see Hughes and Evans, 2016 for further discussion). Some preliminary evidence for this comes from Davis and Humphrey (2012) who found that ability EI moderated the effects of stressors upon coping strategies and that trait EI moderated the effects of coping strategies upon depression. Although not a direct test of the interactions proposed here, the results suggested that EI-related constructs do interact with some emotion regulation strategies and showed that being high in both ability EI and trait EI facilitated effective coping whereas being high in one or the other was insufficient. Essentially, there are well-established ability and stylistic elements to individuals' patterns of emotion regulation and it is also possible that these two components can be complementary or at odds at any given stage of the emotion regulation process (Izard et al., 2008). If we consider these potential interactions further, what we might expect to see is a pattern whereby ability EI accounts for differences in knowledge/ability related to emotion regulation, personality accounts for differences in style, and the interaction between these two elements provides a meaningful insight into individual differences in emotion regulation. A graphical representation of the main proposed interaction is contained in **Figure 3**.

Thus, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences presented here provides a framework to begin address numerous important questions facing emotion regulation:

"What leads a person to use one rather than another of the various emotion regulation strategies described by the process model? . . . the model is silent as to how these various emotion regulation strategies are actually started or stopped. What initiates emotion regulation? What directs specific emotion regulation strategies? And why do some people regulate emotions successfully while others fail to regulate emotions as they should?" (Gross, 2015, p. 9).

One interesting additional question concerns the extent to which the identification, selection, and implementation of emotion regulation strategies occurs via conscious or implicit (automatic) processes (Fiori, 2009). The Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences provides a framework that could guide initial examinations into the relationships between

different elements of EI and emotion regulation and the nature of the cognitive processes underlying them (Fiori, 2009).

### PATHWAY 6: EMOTION REGULATION → OUTCOMES

Finally, we argue that emotion regulation influences meaningful intrapersonal (i.e., calming oneself before an exam) and interpersonal (i.e., conflict resolution within a team) outcomes. There is a wealth of empirical evidence to support this claim (c.f., Gross, 2015), with emotion regulation playing "a core role in everyday social life" (Niven et al., 2012, p. 247) with utility demonstrated across social, health, educational, and occupational outcomes (Gross, 2002; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Indeed, robust links to outcomes have been established using emotion regulation, EI competency and regulation-competency hybrid scales (e.g., Austin et al., 2010). Thus, this pathway is well supported by previous evidence. The novelty here is that we are arguing that emotion regulation does not simply occur (Gross, 2015), there are drivers of emotion regulation and those drivers are affect-related abilities and personality traits. From this perspective, we can say that emotion regulation represents the principal mediating mechanism through which ability EI and affect-related personality traits influence outcomes (Joseph and Newman, 2010; Hughes and Evans, 2016; Mestre et al., 2016).

### IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The first key contribution of this article was to present a simple theoretical framework that clearly states what each EI-related construct is and is not. Specifically, that ability EI represents an extension to existing cognitive ability models, affect-related personality (e.g., trait EI) represents a collection of affective personality traits, and interest in emotional competence should focus on emotion regulation. To some researching at the cutting-edge of EI, this might seem a relatively modest extension of the extant literature. However, our reading of the EI literature suggests that it is a muchneeded clarification, that explicitly demonstrates that the myriad of EI-related constructs can be accommodated within wellestablished individual difference frameworks, and in doing so, provides a clear theoretical base and boundaries for each. Our framework negates the need for atheoretical terms such as 'mixed EI,' is falsifiable, is more descriptive and explanatory in nature than previously published classifications (e.g., streams 1, 2, and 3), and is less adversarial because it does not set the different perspectives as competitors. The second notable contribution from this paper, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences, comes from adopting these three perspectives and in drawing the different EI-related constructs together in a complementary manner. This model provides an initial mechanistic representation that explains how the different EI-related constructs are likely to interrelate and coalesce to influence important emotionrelevant outcomes through the identification, selection, and implementation of emotion regulation strategies. Accordingly, the model also provides a solid platform for empirical exploration, theoretical refinement, measure development, and possibly practical application.

Despite its promise, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences is clearly exploratory, and needs systematic, rigorous, and detailed empirical scrutiny. For example, some of the pathways proposed (e.g., interaction between ability and personality vs. separate pathways) could be argued to represent competing explanations for the same empirical effect. Hopefully, future research will examine these competing pathways and provide evidence regarding if/when each pathway is most pertinent. Nevertheless, the evidence discussed strongly supports the major premise of the model, namely, that both ability EI and affect-related personality traits influence the selection and implementation of emotion regulation strategies (Côté et al., 2011; Davis and Humphrey, 2014; Fiori, 2015; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Hughes and Evans, 2016). Accordingly, the review presented and the model proposed lead to a number of implications for future research.

First, calls to completely abandon all EI research (e.g., Locke, 2005) seem misguided. However, concerns regarding construct proliferation and redundancy do hold merit. Equally, no aspect of EI is the magical silver bullet often claimed (Goleman, 1995), instead, elements of the EI literature can be seen as extensions of existing ability, personality, and emotion regulation frameworks.

Second, our review of research surrounding the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences suggests that piecemeal assessment of EI related constructs will give misleading findings. Future research interested in explaining emotion regulation or broader outcomes needs to incorporate measures of ability and personality, and consider the interactions between these variables. Equally, studies which estimate direct effects between outcomes and ability EI or affect-related personality traits are likely to underestimate the relations due to the omission of emotion regulation as a mediator.

Third, the research reviewed and the hypotheses made in this paper suggest that focussing upon global ability EI, broad factors containing multiple affect-related personality traits, and/or broad emotion regulation measures is likely to hide important nuanced relationships. Accordingly, we suggest that future researchers adopt a more specific approach measuring theoretically relevant abilities, personality traits (or facets), and regulation strategies. This call echoes similar calls in other applied domains (e.g., individual differences at work, Hughes and Batey, 2017) and calls made from prominent EI and emotion regulation researchers (e.g., Gross, 2015; Mestre et al., 2016; Petrides et al., 2016).

Fourth, although our focus in this paper is not on measurement tools, our review has several implications for the nature of the constructs referred to under the EI banner and how they are operationalized. With regard to ability EI, we noted a number of psychometric misgivings with existing measures (i.e., lack of reliability, inconsistent factor structure, etc.) that need to be addressed through future measure development. We would urge interested readers to see the thoughtful critiques and

guidance offered by Mestre et al. (2016) in their recent review on this subject (see Hughes, 2018; Irwing and Hughes, 2018 for guidance concerning measure development).

Regarding affect-related personality traits, there is an important need for further measure refinements. Our review of item level content combined with a number of empirical studies shows clear overlap between existing personality measures and personality trait EI measures. What we now need is a systematic study from the facet level that can identify which trait EI facets are unique and which are redundant duplications. In addition, it would be of interest to know which affect-related facets, if any, currently included within broad measures of personality (e.g., the NEO-PI-R) have been missed by specific measures (e.g., the TEIQue). These two lines of research would allow for the identification of much more comprehensive list of affect-related personality facets (see also Laborde and Allen, 2016; Petrides et al., 2016), which would be of great use to researchers and practitioners. The concept of EI competencies (e.g., Boyatzis, 2009) is redundant. Models and measures stemming from this perspective capture personality traits already accounted for, self-estimates of ability that are not relevant, and some broad emotion regulation strategies which are better considered within existing emotion regulation frameworks. Thus, we suggest that researchers interested in emotional skill or competence adopt measures of emotion regulation rather than problematic measures of social and emotional competence.

Fifth, the clear delineation of constructs raises the issue of nomenclature. We noted at the outset of this paper that logically speaking any construct labeled EI should consist of both emotion and intelligence. Currently, only the ability EI perspective meets this criterion and thus we would recommend that the label 'EI' is reserved exclusively for this perspective. We are far from the first authors to make such recommendations (e.g., Gignac, 2010),

### REFERENCES

yet, despite previous calls, other EI-related characteristics have been resistant to change. Nevertheless, appropriate nomenclature is crucial for effective scientific communication and for reducing misconceptions. Thus we suggest that from now on, authors refer to ability EI (for affect-related intelligence), affect-related personality traits (for affect-laden personality measures such as those currently referred to as trait EI), and emotion regulation (for measures that concern goal-oriented use of emotions).

### CONCLUSION

In this review, we have outlined three theoretical perspectives on EI and proposed the theoretically driven Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences as a stepping-stone toward building a greater understanding of EI-related individual differences and subsequent affective phenomena. This model posits that despite often being pitted against each other, the different perspectives are actually meaningfully entwined and coalesce to produce emotion-relevant behavior. We hope that our review and model will serve to guide future research and theoretical development. Although we should continue to be skeptical of EI, and actively criticize overblown claims based on atheoretical models and measures, we hope that this review demonstrates that all is not lost with regards to EI-related constructs.

### AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Both authors contributed equally to the work and made a substantial, direct and intellectual contribution to the work. Both authors approved this manuscript for publication.

**Conflict of Interest Statement:** The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Copyright © 2018 Hughes and Evans. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

# The Assertive Resolution of Conflicts in School With a Gamified Emotion Education Program

#### Gemma Filella1 \*, Agnès Ros-Morente1 , Xavier Oriol2 and Jaume March-Llanes1

1 Faculty of Education, Psychology and Social Work, University of Lleida, Lleida, Spain, 2 Facultad de Educación y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Andres Bello, Santiago, Chile

Coexistence in schools inevitably carries a higher risk of conflicts among peers. This fact can be detrimental to the well-being and academic achievement of the students. In many developed countries, about 90% of the pupils in compulsory secondary education report witnessing assaults among peers. In this regard, recognizing, controlling and managing emotions is key to ensure a healthy and effective interaction with others. Negative emotions, such as anger, can trigger conflicts or even episodes of violence if not regulated properly. Interactive tools, such as specialized software's, have shown high rates of efficacy for the training of different kinds of competences like the regulation of emotions. The aim of the present work is to describe the Happy Emotional Education Program and its effects over a sample of secondary school students. This software focuses in the training of emotional competences of the students with the objective of solving conflicts in a more assertive way. The design employed in the present work was a quasiexperimental design with pretest and posttest with a control group. Results show that Happy Emotional Education Program contributes to the management of emotions and the absence of negative affect or anxiety in a significant way. Additionally, the constant use of this interactive tool enhances motivation and the learning process of students. Results also indicate the importance of assessing the effects of the program in the long term. This would enable researchers to further assess the effects of the program over those emotional competences that are more resistant to change given its stable nature.

#### Edited by:

Juan-Carlos Pérez-González, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Spain

#### Reviewed by:

Jose A. Piqueras, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Spain Mingwei Li, Beijing Normal University, China

> \*Correspondence: Gemma Filella<EMAIL_ADDRESS>