God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate, that he might give him into your hand, as he is this day.'

In this passage, Moses is relating to Israel her recent history. He comments that when the Israelite people requested passage through the land of Heshbon, which belonged to Sihon, the king of that territory, he refused it to them. This refusal seems clearly to have been wicked, because it is described as coming from a hardened spirit and an obstinate heart, and because it justifed what seems to be punitive action from God: the invasion of Sihon's land and the slaughter of its people as related in Deuteronomy 2:32–36. Thus, we derive the following proposition satisfying (P\*):

(3) God chose to bring it about that *Sihon sinfully refused to let the Israelites pass through his land* so that *God might punish him* and give his land to the Israelites.

*Evaluation*: Perhaps an opponent might try to deny that Sihon's refusal was sinful. Perhaps he was merely taking sensible precautions. But the stress on his obstinacy in the passage makes this implausible. Perhaps it might be responded that the invasion of Sihon's land was *not* punitive, and, hence, that we cannot infer that his refusal to let the Israelites pass was sinful. In the context, however, it seems pretty clear that the refusal was sinful, not least because Moses's request was couched in words of peace (Deuteronomy 2:26). And what would happen to the punitive element of the invasion if God did not intend that Sihon sinfully refuse? At this point, the objector might combine the *substratum* strategy with the Kamm-inspired 'because' strategy to suggest that God intentionally permits Sihon to refuse, and foresees that Sihon will sinfully refuse, and does this *because of* the opportunity it provides to punish him. But, once again, it seems implausible to read 'hardened' just in terms of permission, and, once again, it does not seem to ft with the text to insist that God did it simply for the good of a strong will, or for some other reason than the punitive one alluded to in the text.

*Ranking*: Strong.

#### 6.4 Joshua 11:18–20

Joshua made war a long time with all those kings. There was not a city that made peace with the people of Israel except the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon. They took them all in battle. For it was the Lord's doing to harden their hearts that they should come against Israel in battle, in order that they should be devoted to destruction and should receive no mercy but be destroyed, just as the Lord commanded Moses.

Joshua leads the Israelites in the conquest of northern Canaan. The Gibeonites had made peace with Israel through deception (Joshua 9), but the rest of the region is determined not to submit to Israel. Moreover, they are determined in this way because of God's actions. He has decided to harden them to make sure that they come out to make war with Joshua. Again, the text paints this as a wicked action on their part, and, again, God's response is punitive. We therefore derive the following proposition satisfying (P\*):

(4) God chose to bring it about that *the kings of northern Canaan sinfully refused to broker with the Israelites in any fashion* so that *God might punish them* and give their land to the Israelites.

*Evaluation*: This case is structurally parallel to the one from Deuteronomy 2:26–30. Again, because of the satisfaction of (P\*), the *substratum* strategy by itself will be of no avail—the punitive nature of the treatment of the kings seems even clearer than the punitive nature of Sihon's defeat in the previous passage. Suppose that, once more, the objector tries to combine the *substratum* strategy with the Kamm-inspired 'because' line, suggesting that God intentionally permits the kings to refuse to broker with the Israelites, foresees that they will do so sinfully, and acts *because* this will provide him an occasion for punishing them and giving their land to the Israelites. Again, the language of 'hardening' in the text does not seem adequately refected in the suggestion that God permits them to sin, and, again, it seems that it cannot be that his goal is to punish them and give their land to the Israelites if he does not intend *any* means to that end; that would be merely to hope or wish for the end, rather than to intend it. And it does not ring true to the text to suggest that God's ultimate goal was merely to permit the kings to refuse to broker with the Israelites, with everything else's being merely foreseen.

*Ranking*: Strong.

# 6.5 Judges 14:3–4

But [Samson's] father and mother said to him, 'Is there not a woman among the daughters of your relatives, or among all our people, that you must go to take a wife from the uncircumcised Philistines?' But Samson said to his father, 'Get her for me, for she is right in my eyes.' His father and mother did not know that it was from the Lord, for he was seeking an opportunity against the Philistines.

Here Samson has set his eye upon a Philistine woman, and is desirous that a marriage should be arranged between the two of them. His parents resist the idea of his marrying a Philistine, but they aren't aware that Samson's request is 'from the Lord'. We see later in Samson's story that this betrothal leads to conficts between Samson and the Philistines, and culminates in Samson's slaughtering many of them. That sort of punishment is presumably what God was seeking opportunity to bring on the Philistines through Samson's initial marriage. So, we suppose the following proposition satisfying (P) can be derived:

(5) God chose to bring it about that *Samson sinfully request a Philistine bride*, in order that he might give *Samson opportunity to infict suffering on the Philistines*.

*Evaluation*: The *substratum* strategy can be deployed straightforwardly. We can leave Samson's sinfulness out of the picture, and replace (5) with (5′):

(5′) God brought it about that *Samson uttered various sounds and made the correct bodily movements, etc.*, in order to give *Samson opportunity to infict suffering on the Philistines*.

Samson's inner mental life was not necessary to give the Philistines cause for offence; just so long as he said the right things and his body moved in the required ways, this would have been enough for a betrothal to have been arranged and for the Philistines to seek his life, and so on. Samson could have been devoid of any inner consciousness, and yet performed the required part equally well. So, God didn't need to intend the sinfulness for his desired end.

We concede that this is in principle possible, but we also press, as we did in the case of Joseph, the point that the reference of 'it' in v. 4 is surely most naturally taken as referring to Samson's sinful request. But then a natural reading of the text is that this occurrence of sinfulness on Samson's part is also from the Lord.

*Ranking*: Moderate.

#### 6.6 1 Samuel 2:22–25

Now Eli was very old, and he kept hearing all that his sons were doing to all Israel, and how they lay with the women who were serving at the entrance to the tent of meeting. And he said to them, 'Why do you do such things? For I hear of your evil dealings from all the people. […]' But they would not listen to the voice of their father, for it was the will of the Lord to put them to death.

Here, Eli counsels his sons to abandon their wickedness, but the Lord, desiring to put them to death, ensures that they remain unrepentant, and therefore ft for his judgment. We therefore derive the following proposition satisfying (P):

(6) God chose to bring it about that *Eli's sons sinfully refuse to heed their father's warning*, in order that he might *bring about their continued unrepentance*.

*Evaluation*: It is important to note that we reject one reading of this passage on which God brings it about that Eli's sons sinfully refuse their father's counsel so that God can put them to death for precisely that sinful refusal. This circularity would leave unexplained why God wanted them put to death. We think, by contrast, that God antecedently desires to put Eli's sons to death for the sins mentioned in verse 22, and the sinful refusal on the part of the sons is God's means, not to their death, but to their continued unrepentance, which was, in turn, a condition of God's being able justly to put them to death.9 This is why we derive (6).

In this example, the *substratum* strategy could be deployed either, as it was in the case of Samson, that Eli's sons merely perform certain physical actions, such as making the noise (corresponding to the Hebrew equivalent of) 'no' in response to their father's entreaty, or that God didn't intend anything *positive*, merely that they should not heed their father—a

9Or perhaps more than that. Perhaps the text implies that God intended that they should sin more in order that the punishment of death should be even more deserved.

mere *lack* as opposed to a positive *omission*. 10 But we don't think that either of these is true to what is related in the passage. When it says, 'they would not listen to the voice of their father', this means that they heard and understood what Eli said, and made a decision to reject Eli's counsel. For, once they have heard, a decision is forced on them, for even if they decide not to think about it anymore, that constitutes a *de facto* decision to disobey. It might be retorted here that the decision to disobey is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the intended lack of heeding. But the question arises: Why, on this view, does God intend that they not heed their father or, on the frst way of running the response, that they make the noise (corresponding to the Hebrew equivalent of) 'no' in response to their father's entreaty? The only answer available from the text is that God intended that the sons be justly punishable with death, which presupposes that they continue to sin. So, it seems inevitable that God chose to bring it about that they reject their father's counsel in order to bring it about that they continue to sin in order that he might justly put them to death.

*Ranking*: Strong

#### 6.7 2 Samuel 24:9–14

Again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he incited David against them, saying, 'Go, number Israel and Judah'. […] But David's heart struck him after he had numbered the people. And David said to the Lord, 'I have sinned greatly in what I have done. But now, O Lord, please take away the iniquity of your servant, for I have done very foolishly.' And when David arose in the morning, the word of the Lord came to the prophet Gad, David's seer, saying, 'Go and say to David, "Thus says the Lord, Three things I offer you. Choose one of them, that I may do it to you."' So Gad came to David and told him, and said to him, 'Shall three years of famine come to you in your land? Or will you fee three months before your foes while they pursue you? Or shall there be three days' pestilence in your land? Now consider, and decide what answer I shall return to him who sent me.' Then David said to Gad, 'I am in great distress. Let us fall into the hand of the Lord, for his mercy is great; but let me not fall into the hand of man.'11

10The difference between a mere lack and a positive omission can be seen in that we all lack the property of heeding Eli's counsel. Nevertheless, we do not omit to heed it, since an omission occurs only when a duty of some kind is breached, and we have no duty to heed Eli's counsel, since it wasn't addressed to any of us, even indirectly in its inclusion in the Scriptures.

11One should bear in mind how the same event is related in 1 Chronicles 21:1: 'Then Satan stood against Israel and incited David to number Israel.'

Here God desires to punish Israel for their sins, and to provide an occasion for this, he brings about the occurrence of sin from Israel's king, David. David sinfully numbers the people, and he is very soon sorry for what he has done. God offers David the choice of three ways in which the people are to be punished, and David chooses pestilence for a reason that suggests he associates it more closely with God's punishment than the other two ways. About 70,000 of the Israelites die, and God thereby achieves the end he sought. We therefore derive the following proposition, satisfying (P\*):

#### (7) God chooses to bring it about that *David sins by numbering the people* in order that *God has an opportunity to punish Israel*.

*Evaluation*: Part of the puzzle with this passage concerns why it is that God is angry with Israel—no particular sin is specifed on their part. But even if we suppose that they have sinned in some unspecifed way, then there is a further puzzle concerning why it is that God appears to need to get David to sin before he can justly punish Israel. If the people are sinful on their own account, why does God need to get David to sin too? One might, on those grounds, push for the suggestion that God intended only the *substratum* of David's sin, that is, that God intended that David number the people, but merely foresaw, without intending, that in this context numbering the people would constitute a sin. One might assert it not to have been strictly necessary for God's purposes that David sin, for Israel had already sinned on their own account—God just wanted to create *an impression of* a necessary conjunction between Israel's sins and the sins of their king.

Yet several things in the passage make this implausible. (1) In the retelling of the event we fnd in 1 Chronicles 21, it says in verse 7 that 'God was displeased with this thing [David's census], and he struck Israel'. Although it is not explicitly stated that God struck Israel on account of this census, that is surely the natural implication. (2) In 1 Chronicles 21:17 and 2 Samuel 24:17, David declares the people are but innocent sheep in this regard. It would be strange if this were simply untrue. (3) It is surely the thrust of the passage that for David to sin in this regard is a signifcant and necessary step for God to bring upon Israel the punishment he wishes. To deny it is to favour an implausible reading. And if it is not to create an *appearance* of sin that God incites David to number Israel, for what other reason could it be, other than in order that David *actually* sin?

For these reasons, we think that the circumstances and God's reasoning process are best captured by the following: God is (for an undisclosed reason) angry at Israel; but, for God to punish Israel in the way he wishes, it must be the case (again for an unspecifed reason) that David, Israel's king, sins; only then can God vent his anger on Israel in the desired way. But if this is the fairest portrayal of the matter, then it seems that God intends that David sins in order that his end be realised.12

*Ranking*: Strong

## 6.8 1 Kings 22:19–23

Micaiah said, 'Therefore hear the word of the Lord: I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing beside him on his right hand and on his left; and the Lord said, "Who will entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead?" And one said one thing, and another said another. Then a spirit came forward and stood before the Lord, saying, "I will entice him". And the Lord said to him, "By what means?" And he said, "I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets". And he said, "You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so". Now therefore behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets; the Lord has declared disaster for you.'

Here God, as reported by Micaiah the prophet, tells a lying spirit to go and entice Ahab into going up to Ramoth-gilead. The lying prophets say to Ahab, 'Go up to Ramoth-gilead and triumph; the Lord will give it into the hand of the king' (v. 12); their 'prophecy' does indeed turn out to be false (vv. 34–37). Lying is said in the Scriptures to be a sin (Leviticus 19:11), so it looks as though God here intends the occurrence of the sin of lying in order to bring about the goal of Ahab's going up. We thus derive this proposition:

#### (8) God chooses to order that *a lying spirit lie* in order that *Ahab might be enticed to go up to Ramoth-gilead*.

*Evaluation*: Our opponent here could argue that God did not intend that the lying spirit lie, merely that the lying spirit utter the sounds (or the mental equivalent) corresponding to the Hebrew equivalent of 'Go up to Ramoth-gilead and triumph; the Lord will give it into the hand of the

12Arminius also thinks that the *substratum* strategy does not work here: (Arminius 1853: 433).

king'. But, since the lying spirit says itself that it will be 'a lying spirit', and not merely 'an uttering spirit', it seems that the spirit intended to make a false assertion, and that when God says 'go out and do so', he is, therefore, asking the spirit to be a lying spirit, rather than a mere uttering spirit. Nor will it do to say that the Hebrew here translated 'lying spirit' should actually be translated 'false spirit',13 since to assert something that one knows to be false just is to lie.14

Or perhaps our opponent here could say that God intended merely that the lying spirit entice, and didn't have any intentions at all with respect to the means by which the spirit would entice.  Against this, however, it seems implausible that God would use the lying spirit if he did not intend that the spirit lie: Surely God, being omnipotent, could have achieved the desired end of Ahab's going up to Ramothgilead by other means?

Our opponent here could also deny that the lying spirit sins. Our opponent could argue that the Scriptural prohibition translated 'you shall not lie to one another' (Leviticus 19:11) rules out only the asserting of an untruth to someone that has the right to know the truth (Ramsey 1968: 89). Since Ahab, it could be argued, has no right to know the truth here, there is no sin in asserting an untruth to him. This would also explain why God seems to be encouraging or ordering the spirit to lie.

This possibility undermines the usefulness of the text for our purposes.  And the Lord said to Satan, 'Behold, all that he has is in your hand. Only against him do not stretch out your hand'. […] Now […] there came a messenger to Job and said, 'The oxen were ploughing […] and the Sabeans fell upon them and took them and struck down the servants with the edge of the sword […]' […] Then Job arose and […] said, '[…] The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord'. In all this Job did not sin or charge God with wrong.

13 In the parallel passage of 2 Chronicles 18, the ESV has 'deceiving spirit'.

14Cf. (Aquinas 1920: IIaIIae.Q110.a1.*resp*). This defnition of 'lie' is controversial, but there is no space to defend it here.

Here there are two sins mentioned: the sin of Satan in trying to get Job to curse God to his face and the sin of the Sabeans in stealing Job's oxen and killing his servants. The text also mentions two things that are not sins: Job's saying that the Lord had taken away his blessings ('In all this Job did not sin'), and God's so doing ('Job did not […] charge God with wrong'). Not only does Job say that the Lord has taken away, but the book's concluding chapter states that Job's family 'showed him sympathy and comforted him for all the evil that the Lord had brought upon him' (Job 42:11), and God himself says that Job has spoken of him what is right (Job 42:7). So, we seem to have two propositions satisfying schema:

(P) God chooses to bring it about that a [sin] occurs in order that a [state of affairs] should obtain.

In other words:

*Evaluation*: It seems that our opponent could use the *substratum* strategy here, as Arminius notes:

In the affiction of Job, God desired that the patience and constancy of His servant should be tried, and it was tried by the affiction not as a sin but as an act. (Arminius 1853: 433)

Indeed, it would suffce for God to intend the bodily movements of the Sabeans without intending their guilty mind, and it would suffce for God to intend that Satan cause the natural disasters that befall Job, without intending that he do so sinfully.

There is a plausible reply to the *substratum* strategy, however: it seems important that the book records both the occurrence of evils that are obviously sins (the robbery and murder committed by the Sabeans and the Chaldeans) and the occurrence of evils that look like natural disasters (the fre from heaven that consumes his sheep and shepherds, the great wind that takes the lives of his sons and daughters, and the loathsome sores that cover Job's body). If, in fact, God intended the occurrence of the natural evils, but not the occurrence of the moral evils, then that might weaken the force of the book, since the book presents Job as, in some ways, an archetype for *all* human suffering. The book is intended to speak to those feeling the distinctive pain of being sinned against, as well as to those feeling the general pain of hurt (cf. Welty 2018).

*Ranking*: Moderate.

#### 6.10 Psalm 105:25

He turned their hearts to hate his people, to deal craftily with his servants.

This psalm relates Israel's exodus from Egypt, and it says of the Egyptians that God turned their hearts to hate the Israelites, and that this led to the Egyptians' dealing craftily with the Israelites. One therefore might try to derive the following proposition satisfying (Q):

(10) God chose to *turn the hearts of the Egyptians to hate the Israelites* in order that *the Egyptians would deal craftily with the Israelites*.

*Evaluation*: We don't think this verse is of much use for our purposes. The crafty (and therefore presumably wicked) dealing of the Egyptians, and their hatred of the Israelites, can both be read as mere consequences of God's turning the Egyptians' hearts, not as intended effects. Although we think that the more natural reading is that God did intend both effects, we think it is hard to prove that from a short, poetic text.

*Ranking*: Weak.

#### 6.11 Proverbs 16:4

The Lord has made everything for its purpose, even the wicked for the day of trouble.

This verse would appear to provide the opportunity to derive a proposition satisfying (P\*). The verse is ambiguous in what exactly it is communicating. It may be that the wicked are made for a day when their wickedness will be unleashed to cause trouble; or it may be that they are made for the Day of Judgment when God's glory will be displayed in their destruction. But, in either case, it must be that they are wicked for those purposes to be accomplished. God therefore must intend their wicked deeds as the means to either of these described ends. The proposition satisfying (P\*) could, therefore, be:

(11) God chooses to bring it about that *wicked people exist* in order to *punish them for their wickedness on the Day of Judgment/let their wickedness be unleashed in the day of trouble*.

*Evaluation*: Sadly for our purposes, there is another way of reading this verse. The New International Version prefers this other reading, and renders the verse as follows: 'The Lord works out everything to its proper end—even the wicked for a day of disaster.' On this understanding, the verse is only understood to communicate that God is working eventually to punish the evildoer. The NIV reading is a minority reading, and perhaps to be avoided *ceteris paribus* on that ground—most translations accept, broadly, the ESV reading we gave above—yet we concede that the possibility of this other reading implies that the text is not suffciently clear for our purposes.

*Ranking*: Weak.

# 6.12 Isaiah 6:9–10

And God said, 'Go, and say to this people; "Keep on hearing, but do not understand; keep on seeing, but do not perceive." Make the heart of this people dull, and their ears heavy, and blind their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and turn and be healed.'

One might think that the passage licenses the derivation of the following proposition satisfying (Q):

(12) God chooses to bring it about that *Isaiah makes the heart of the people dull* in order that *they should refuse to believe*.

*Evaluation*: Sadly for our purposes, we do not think that the passage demands the truth of (12). The text does not specify *refusal* as God's stated objective, merely an absence of seeing, hearing, and understanding—an absence of belief. Such an absence is not an action, it is a state of affairs not, by its nature, sinful. After all, a rock displays a similar absence of understanding, but that is not sinful, nor even an evil. It is possible that God's intentions as described in Isaiah may therefore be fully captured by the following proposition:

(12′) God chooses to bring it about that *Isaiah makes the heart of the people dull* so that *they do not believe*.

One should also bear in mind certain instances where Jesus cites this verse in the Gospels. In Mark 4:12, Matthew 13:14–15, and Luke 8:10, Jesus cites Isaiah 6:9–10 to explain why he speaks in parables. He does it to ensure that certain people will not believe. Again, however, we think that the same move that is made with respect to the Isaiah passage may be made on those occasions also: it isn't clear that Jesus intends as his end any sinful refusal to believe, merely a defciency in mental or spiritual acuity.

*Ranking*: Moderate to Weak.

#### 6.13 Ezekiel 20:25–26

Moreover, I gave them statutes that were not good and rules by which they could not have life, and I defled them through their very gift in their offering up all their frstborn, that I might devastate them. I did it that they might know that I am the Lord.

In this chapter of Ezekiel, God gives a brief history of Israel, pointing out the continual wickedness of the nation. Towards the end of this history, God, presumably out of his great anger at the repeated moral failure of Israel, decides to give to the nation of Israel statutes that are 'not good'. There is some debate about what these statutes were.15 But, whatever they were, one consequence of them was that the Israelites were defled (whether by their failure to keep them, or because they were wicked statutes that tended to deflement). And God brought about this deflement that he might devastate them. This devastation surely refers to punitive wrath, and, thus, culpable failure on the Israelites' part with regard to their deflement is presupposed. So, we derive the following proposition satisfying (P\*):

(13) God chose to bring it about that *the Israelites be sinfully defled*, in order that *he might devastate them in his wrath*.

*Evaluation*: We cannot think of any plausible way out for an opponent. The objector might try to argue that God intended only to permit the Israelites to defle themselves, and merely foresaw that they would in fact

15 Some commentators think the statutes were pagan strictures that the Israelites sinfully adopted. Early Christians thought that the Mosaic law was being referred to here. There is also the view that the phrase refers to the Deuteronomic code, a code containing elements that weakened Ezekiel's own stricter priestly code: (Hahn and Bergsma 2004).

do so, but the *punitive* nature of the wrath requires the very sinfulness of the sinful offerings the Israelites made, for only thus could they merit punishment. The objector might here once more deploy the combined *substratum-*and-Kamm-inspired strategy, and insist that God permits the Israelites to defle themselves *because of* the fact that they will then merit punishment. But the text holds out only one intention, namely that they might be defled so that they might be devastated.16 We therefore consider this verse strong evidence that God intends that sin occur.

*Ranking*: Strong.

#### References

16Could one say that the 'that' in 'that I might devastate them' in v. 26 is expressive of result, rather than of purpose? Not in the opinion of Daniel Block, who writes that while such ambiguity is present in 'rules by which they could not have life' in v. 25, in v. 26 'Yahweh declares his intentions explicitly: *so that I might devastate them*' (Block 1997: 637).

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CHAPTER 7

# Passages from the New Testament

**Abstract** This chapter analyses in depth a number of passages from the New Testament: Acts 2:23 and Acts 4:27–28, Romans 9:21–24, Romans 11:25–32, Galatians 3:19–22, 2 Thessalonians 2:11–12, 2 Peter 2:12, Revelation 17:16–17, and Revelation 22:10–11. For each passage, the chapter considers the amount of evidence (strong, moderate, or weak) that it provides for the book's thesis, that God intends that sin occur. Also, for each passage the chapter considers alternative interpretations, interpretations on which God does not intend that sin occur. These interpretations are the *substratum* interpretation, the Kammian interpretation, and the combined *substratum*–Kammian interpretation.

**Keywords** New Testament • Biblical exegesis • Predestination • Acts • Romans 9-11 • Reprobation

# 7.1 Acts 2:23 and 4:27–28

[T]his Jesus, delivered up according to the defnite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucifed and killed by the hands of lawless men.

The frst passage here quoted, Acts 2:23, seems to say that God planned it that Jesus should be sinfully delivered up, and the second passage quoted, Acts 4:27–28, seems to say that Herod, Pontius Pilate, and so on were doing what God had predestined when they were sinfully gathering and acting against Jesus. So, we seem to have a proposition satisfying schema (P), that is to say:

(1) God chooses to bring it about that *Jesus should be sinfully delivered up and sinfully put to death* in order that *God's plan of redemption should be fulflled*.

*Evaluation*: Our opponent has a response here. It can be insisted that God intended the physical movements of the handing over of Jesus, and the hammering in of the nails into his hands and feet on the cross, but that he did not intend, and only foresaw, that these movements would be performed sinfully. How plausible is this response? The verse frankly affrms that Jesus's being delivered up was part of God's plan (2:23), and Jesus's being delivered up was a sinful affair. It strikes us as forced to insist that the sinfulness involved in Jesus's betrayal and his being delivered up was not part of God's plan. ('Plan', of course, suggests intention.) It seems to us likewise forced to insist that the sinfulness involved in Jesus's being killed by the hands of lawless people was not part of God's plan. The moral failure involved in the story of Jesus's betrayal and trial is, after all, one of the most striking features of those narratives in the gospels.

We also fnd the 'whatever' in 4:28 to be suggestive. It naturally suggests that, *whatever* Herod, Pilate, and the people ended up doing to Jesus, it was all part of God's predestined plan. But sinful acts were performed on Jesus. Therefore, sins are part of God's predestined plan. Our opponent might, however, insist that the 'whatever' is to be understood as communicating that *whatever God predestined to take place* in this context was done by Herod, Pilate, and so on, not that everything that they did in this context was predestined by God. Thus, on this suggestion, it is not clear that the sinful acts were part of God's predestined plan.

We concede the possibility of this reading, but we fnd the frst understanding of 'whatever' to be more plausible because the latter understanding has the strange consequence that perhaps very little at all of the affair was intended by God, for the second reading makes no comment on how much of the matter was intended by God—it says only that what God *did* intend in this matter came to pass. But surely what is meant here is something more substantive than that: that it *was not possible* for them to do something to Jesus that was outside what God had planned and predestined to occur—whatever they did to Jesus, it was part of God's plan and predestination that it should be so.

*Ranking*: Moderate.

#### 7.2 Romans 9:21–24

Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honourable use and another for dishonourable use? What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory—even us whom he has called, not from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles?

In this chapter of Romans, Paul has asserted that God has the right both to have mercy as he sees ft, and to harden as he sees ft, and the case of Pharaoh is adduced as proof of the existence of the latter right. Paul then anticipates the response of an objector in v. 19, rendering it as follows: 'Then why does God still fnd fault? For who resists his will?'. To this, Paul responds by introducing the metaphor of the potter and the clay—asserting that God has the right to create vessels for destruction as well as to create vessels for mercy—and then follows this with the quoted suggestion above that perhaps the reason why (or, as it seems to us, his intention in so doing) God creates vessels for destruction is so that God can, through a display of righteous wrath on these wicked vessels, make known the riches of his glory, that is, make it plain just what it is from which the vessels of mercy have been spared, and how great that mercy is in consequence. So, we think the following proposition can be derived satisfying (P\*):

(2) God chooses to bring it about that *there exist wicked people* so that he might *make known the riches of his glory through their punishment*.

*Evaluation*: Someone might object that, since Paul prefxes the remarks of vv. 22–23 with a question beginning 'what if', it would not be germane to employ these verses as part of our case. But this would be a mistake. Paul, even though he is not committing himself to the truth of the explanation he gives, is surely offering it as adequate for all the Christian might know. But if we know that God cannot (or even does not) intend that sin occur, then it isn't adequate for all the Christian knows. It might be responded that Paul is giving an *a fortiori* argument, that he is saying, 'even if God had chosen to create you as a wicked person (which he couldn't have done) you still would have had no grounds for complaint'. But v. 21 is not preceded by a 'what if', and that verse, by affrming that the potter, and therefore God, has the right to create vessels for either honourable or dishonourable use, suggests the actual permissibility of God's acting in this way. Secondly, Paul is giving a quick sketch of a theodicy here, explaining why it is that God would harden some into unbelief, or why this would be morally permissible (namely, 'to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy'). But the passage cannot function to present a theodicy if God cannot (or does not) possess the relevant intentions. Thirdly, v. 24 connects the theodicy to concrete fact: the hardening of the Jews so that the Gentiles might be brought in. Thus, God's acting after this manner cannot be considered a pure hypothetical.

For all these reasons, it appears Paul has no qualms about suggesting that God uses (or may permissibly use)—and intends (or may permissibly intend)—that sin occur as a means, and so neither, we contend, should we have any qualms in this regard.

A signifcant point to note is that there is some controversy among commentators about whether to give the 'desiring to show his wrath and power' clause a concessive or a causative reading. The relevant portion might be rendered in one of two ways:

Concessive: '*although* desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power…'

Causative: '*because* desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power…'

An objector might insist on the former reading in an effort to argue that it is not the case that God created these vessels in order to destroy them; rather, God merely restrained himself from destroying them for a great while in order to display his great patience to the vessels of mercy. Against this reading, many things can be said.

Again, a diffculty with the *substratum* strategy is that it is the very sinfulness of the vessels prepared for destruction that God requires, else they could not be legitimate objects of his just wrath and destructive power. Our opponent might try to combine the Kamm-inspired strategy and the *substratum* strategy, holding that God prepares them in foreknowledge of the foreseen but unintended sins that they will commit, and prepares them *because* the opportunity to make known the riches of his glory for vessels

1Piper (1993: 207) remarks that 'Most commentators […] do construe *thelon* as a causal clause, and the most compelling reason is the parallel in thought and language between 9:22 and 9:17'.

of mercy outweighs the evil of the sins. But, once more, God's intention in allowing them to sin, on this view, is not in harmony with the text's phrase 'in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy'.

We conclude that these verses should strongly dispose one to believe that God is capable of intending that sin occur.

*Ranking*: Strong.

# 7.3 Romans 11:25–32

[A] partial hardening has come upon Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles has come in. And in this way all Israel will be saved […] For just as you were at one time disobedient to God but now have received mercy because of their disobedience, so they too have now been disobedient in order that by the mercy shown to you they also may now receive mercy. For God has consigned all to disobedience, that he may have mercy on all.

In this passage, Paul explains that the partial hardening of Israel was brought upon the nation in order that salvation might go out to the Gentiles, and in order that, on account of this mercy shown to the Gentiles, the Jews might also seek after salvation and fnd it. In Romans 11:11, Paul suggests that this will be accomplished through envy: 'through their trespass salvation has come to the Gentiles, so as to make Israel jealous.' But Paul doesn't assert merely that the Jews were made disobedient in order that mercy might be given to the Gentiles, he asserts also that all, both Jewish and Gentile, have been made disobedient in order that God might have mercy on all.

Therefore, from the passage from Romans 11 we derive the following proposition satisfying (P\*):

(3) God chose to bring it about that *the Jews (and indeed everyone) were sinfully disobedient* in order that he might *have mercy on them (and indeed everyone)*.

*Evaluation*: It seems that the *substratum* strategy will not bite, since the mercy that God wants to bestow is forgiveness of sins, and the occurrence of sin is a necessary condition of the occurrence of forgiveness. Again, the objector may combine the *substratum* strategy with the Kamm-inspired triple-effect strategy, and suggest that God intended merely to permit the Jews (and indeed everyone) to be disobedient, and merely foresaw that they actually would be disobedient, but thought his act of permission still worth it because of the foreseen good of the mercy he could then distribute.

As before, we don't think that the language of 'hardening' in verse 25 can be read as merely permitting disobedience, and, as before, the text seems to hold out the having of mercy as God's end. But if God does indeed intend that end, then, in order for it to be a real intention rather than just a hope or a wish, God surely has to intend some means, or part of a means, to his goal—and the hardening mentioned in the text fts the bill perfectly.

*Ranking*: Strong.

#### 7.4 Galatians 3:19–22

Why then the law? It was added because of transgressions, until the offspring should come to whom the promise had been made […]. Is the law then contrary to the promises of God? Certainly not! For if a law had been given that could give life, then righteousness would indeed be by the law. But the Scripture imprisoned everything under sin, so that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe.

In this passage from Galatians, Paul is dealing with the objection that salvation through faith makes the advent of the law mysterious. Paul says that it was added because of, or for the sake of, transgressions. He goes on to say that 'the Scripture imprisoned everything under sin, so that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe'. We believe that both expressions here in the Galatians passage are making the same point: the purpose of the Scripture, or of the law, was to bring about transgressions. Paul noted this function of the law in Romans 7:9: 'I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin came alive and I died.' So, the passage from Galatians shows that God gave the Scriptures, or the law, in order to bring it about that sin occur.

Therefore, from the passage in Galatians we derive the following proposition satisfying (Q):

(4) God chose to *give the law* in order that *people should disobey it*.

*Evaluation*: We acknowledge that there are ways out for objectors here. The expression 'added because of transgressions' from Galatians can be interpreted to mean 'added in order to manage and halt transgressions'. The Message Bible gives that reading: 'The purpose of the law was to keep a sinful people in the way of salvation until Christ (the descendant) came.' The expression has also been interpreted to mean 'to make aware of what counts as transgression'. Hence the Good News Translation: 'What, then, was the purpose of the Law? It was added in order to show what wrongdoing is.' Likewise, the expression 'Scripture imprisoned everything under sin' might be understood merely to mean that the Scriptures made people aware of their sins. So the New Living Translation: 'But the Scriptures declare that we are all prisoners of sin'. We concede that such interpretations are possible, and therefore hold this passage to be of limited use for our purposes.

*Ranking*: Weak.

# 7.5 2 Thessalonians 2:11–12

Therefore God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false, in order that all may be condemned who did not believe in truth but had pleasure in unrighteousness.

In this passage, Paul speaks of the Antichrist and the effects he will have. Verse 11 relates the effects God desires to bring upon 'those who are perishing' (v. 10). One might think a proposition satisfying (P) can be derived:

(5) God chooses to bring it about that certain people believe what is false, in order that they may be condemned.

*Evaluation*: An objector has a couple of plausible responses here, however. For one thing, believing what is false is not a sin. Such a state of affairs can be arrived at in a manner in which no moral responsibility is violated. A *decision* to believe what is false might well be sinful, but it isn't clear that God's intentions here are concerned with *decisions* on the part of 'those who are perishing'. For another thing, it looks as though the 'strong delusion' is responsive to the already sinful status of 'those who are perishing'. So, God doesn't need to bring about a sinful decision on their part to guarantee their condemnability—it looks as though they are guilty already, and God is concerned only to make sure that they stay that way. It can be maintained against us, then, that the strong delusion involves no sinful decision, and is the means God employs to ensure that sinful persons in a certain category *remain* sinful and condemnable.

We could try to respond by arguing that if God wants them to stay in the state of condemnability, then God intends that they should not repent. But it is a sin not to repent. So, we might say that God wants them to commit the sin of *failing* to repent in order that he may be able justly to condemn them. To this, the objector can counter, however, that God intends that they have the mere lack of repentance, a lack common to inanimate objects as well as to some moral agents, and merely foresees that this will amount to a sin in the circumstances. Although this doesn't seem a natural reading of the text to us, we cannot refute it. We do, however, affrm that the text shows the weaker thesis that God intends, if not that sin occur, that there at least be sinful people.

*Ranking*: Weak.

#### 7.6 2 Peter 2:12

But these, like irrational animals, creatures of instinct, born to be caught and destroyed, blaspheming about matters of which they are ignorant, will also be destroyed in their destruction.

In this chapter of 2 Peter, Peter declaims at great length concerning the evil of certain false teachers that have crept into the believers' assemblies. He describes them in this verse as akin to irrational animals 'born to be caught and destroyed'. Such an expression naturally suggests that these false teachers were created and given their wicked lives by God precisely for the sake of being caught and destroyed by God's wrath. We therefore derive the following, satisfying (P\*):

(6) God chose to bring it about that *there were wicked false teachers* in order that *they might be caught and destroyed by God's wrath*.

*Evaluation*: Unfortunately, it isn't quite clear whether the 'born to be caught and destroyed' clause is to be considered as modifying the 'irrational animals'/'creatures of instinct', or, on the other hand, 'these' false teachers. If the former, then there is a quick riposte available for our opponent. It can be suggested that 'born to be caught and destroyed' applies to the irrational animals that the false teachers *resemble*. But it doesn't follow from '*a* is F' and '*b* is like *a*' that '*b* is F'—not every property is carried over. So, we don't have to conclude that the false teachers were born to be caught and destroyed. We concede this point as a matter of logic, though we think that the fact that Peter should bother at all to introduce the property of being born to be caught and destroyed signifes that he wishes the property to be imputed to the false teachers—why should he mention properties that he doesn't want to be considered as carrying across?

A more plausible response for the objector is to say that the expression 'born to be caught and destroyed' just means 'born predestined to be caught and destroyed', the idea being that predestination includes not merely what God intends but also the consequences of God's intentions. Strong's survey of the meaning of '*eis*' would appear to bear out the possibility of the term's being given such a construction (Strong 1890: 'eis', B.II.3.b). Alternatively, 2 Peter 2:12 might merely be expressing a relation of natural 'ftness' for eventual destruction, not divine intention. Against this, however, is the fact that, according to Ephesians 2:3, 'we all once lived in the passions of our fesh […] and were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind', so this would arguably not be in any way a distinguishing characteristic of the false teachers. All in all, we consider this verse to give only weak evidence that God intends that sin occur.

 They will make her desolate and naked, and devour her fesh and burn her up with fre, for God has put it into their hearts to carry out his purpose by being of one mind and handing over their royal power to the beast, until the words of God are fulflled.

Here, John describes the way in which the ten horns (symbolising ten rulers) will hand their power over to the beast and take it away from the whore of Babylon, and the way in which they will destroy her with fre. To hand power over to the beast as opposed to the prostitute is a wicked thing, for Revelation presents the beast as a greater evil than the prostitute, and it indicates how great the descent into wickedness will be in the later times. But God says they fulflled *his purpose* in doing this. God doesn't specify the end that he seeks here, but we nevertheless suggest the following proposition satisfying (P):

(7) God chooses to bring it about that *the ten horns transfer their power to the beast*, in order to achieve *an unspecifed purpose*.

*Evaluation*: Although transferring their power to the beast is sinful, a transference of power by its nature is not sinful. Our opponent might point out, therefore, the possibility that God intended that they transfer their power to the beast, but did not intend (and merely foresaw) that they *sinfully* transfer their power to the beast. The text does, however, mention their 'being of one mind' as part of God's purpose here, which suggests that God's intentions also concerned the mental states involved here. We believe the natural suggestion of the passage is that God intended that they *decide* to transfer their power to the beast. Further, that decision was a sinful decision. But the question concerns whether God intended that sinful element, as opposed to merely foreseeing it.

We acknowledge that there is nothing in the passage compelling one to think that God intends the sinful aspects of the ten horns' behavior. We plead only that introducing such subtleties goes counter to the *prima facie* reading of the text. This is not as forceful a piece of reasoning as we should like, however.

*Ranking*: Weak.

#### 7.8 Revelation 22:10–11

And he said to me, 'Do not seal up the words of the prophecy of this book, for the time is near. Let the evildoer still do evil, and the flthy still be flthy, and the righteous still do right, and the holy still be holy'.

Here, the angel to whom John is talking gives him a curious instruction: to let the evildoer still do evil, and the flthy still be flthy. Whatever the reason for it, the command surely represents God's intentions. One might therefore derive a proposition satisfying (P):

(8) God *gave a command to John to let the evildoer continue to do evil and the morally depraved to continue in their depravity* in order that *the evildoer would continue to do evil and the morally depraved would continue in their depravity*.

*Evaluation*: We think there are too many ways to deal fairly with the passage while avoiding the derivation of (8). One might take God as making that command not in order that the evildoer continue in doing evil, but in order that John might not be unduly burdened about the intractability of the wicked. And even if God did have intentions with regard to the flthy and evildoers, they might be intentions not to bring about wicked decisions or even wicked states, but merely to refrain from preventing such things. Lastly, there is the general point that one does not always give a command with the intention that it be carried out.

For these reasons, we think that little weight can be placed on this passage for our purposes.

*Ranking*: Weak.

#### 7.9 Conclusion

We rank the evidence we have provided to the effect that God intends that sin occur as follows:

Therefore, in the light of several strong proof texts and several moderate proof texts that God intends that sin occur, we affrm that the rational stance for the Christian to take in the face of these Scriptural texts is to affrm that God intends that sin occur.2

#### References

2There are also further texts that we could have marshalled in favour of our case: Exodus 7:3–4, Judges 9:23, 1 Samuel 16:14, 2 Samuel 12:11 & 16:11, 1 Kings 12:15, 2 Chronicles 25:20, Proverbs 21:1, Isaiah 63:17, Ezekiel 23:25, Amos 3:6, Habakkuk 1:12, and 1 Peter 2:8. It would not surprise us if there are many more still.

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CHAPTER 8

# Objections and Concerns

**Abstract** This chapter responds to some objections and concerns. First, it discusses some Scriptural passages that might be adduced against the book's thesis that God intends that sin occur: Habakkuk 1:13, Romans 3:7–8, Matthew 18:4–7; Luke 17:1–2; Mark 9:42, James 1:13–14. Then, it responds to some philosophical objections that have been adduced against the book's thesis. It concludes with a discussion of whether the book's thesis imperils the place occupied by the Doctrine of Double Effect in Christian teaching, concluding that it may still hold good on the human-to-human ethical plane.

**Keywords** Habakkuk 1 • Romans 3:8 • James 1 • Temptation • Leibniz • Double effect

In this fnal section, we discuss some remaining worries and objections. We divide the objections into two types: Scriptural and philosophical. We begin with the Scriptural.

# 8.1 Habakkuk 1:13—God Cannot Look at Wrong

You who are of purer eyes than to see evil and cannot look at wrong, why do you idly look at traitors and remain silent when the wicked swallows up the man more righteous than he?

Habakkuk 1:13 is adduced by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in *Summa Contra Gentiles* (1259–1265) as a proof text for the view that 'God cannot will evil' (Aquinas 1975: I.95). The complaint that Habakkuk makes in the verse is occasioned by God's declaration (vv. 5–11) that he is raising up the Chaldeans as his instrument of judgment—a people described as 'that bitter and hasty nation, who march through the breadth of the earth, to seize dwellings not their own'. Habakkuk appears to have diffculty accepting that God should raise up such a cruel people to do his will, and he expresses his confusion on this point in v. 13.

Aquinas and others seem to think that the verse refutes our thesis as follows.  But our project appears to run counter to the spirit of this verse, for it appears that, far from God's recoiling in horror at sin, our contention is that God decides for his own purposes to bring it about that sin occur.

We make three points in response.

First, it is unwise uncritically to accept as true everything that a prophet utters. Many commentators take issue, for instance, with some of Jeremiah's utterances, holding him to speak impulsively and improperly at points.1 It is possible to read Habakkuk's remark as embodying a similar sort of failure. After all, God made it clear in vv. 5–11 that he was raising up a wicked people to accomplish his ends. It is not diffcult to read Habakkuk's complaint as expressing a refusal to accept and incorporate that revelation. And, indeed, when God replies to Habakkuk in Chap. 2, God doesn't disavow the wicked violence of the Chaldeans. Instead, he promises more violence (2:17), albeit violence that functions as just retribution upon the Chaldeans. We do not rest anything on this point, however.

Secondly and chiefy, it is obvious that we cannot take Habakkuk's expression as literally true. God can indeed see and look at sinfulness. God cannot function as a judge punishing sin unless he knows exactly what sins have taken place. Indeed, Habakkuk's point is that God *does* look at evil people, the traitors he mentions, and their wrong actions, the swallowing up of those more righteous than they. The puzzlement embodied in Habakkuk's question arises from the fact that God seems to be looking at their sins with approbation, since he does not prevent them from

1The *ESV Study Bible*, for instance, remarks regarding Jeremiah 20:7 that 'Jeremiah's complaints are not always pure' (ESV Study Bible 2008: 1410).

occurring. This is puzzling because Habakkuk knows, as he reminds the reader, that God is pure and therefore fnds sin abhorrent. So much so that it is as if he must turn his face away from it, unable to behold it. That is the anthropomorphism we take to be in use here. But that God hates sin is not something we deny; on the contrary, it is something on which we insist. It is quite possible to abhor something, and yet intend that that thing come to be. One might fnd the prospect of amputating one's child's leg abhorrent, but nevertheless decide to do it if one were persuaded that it were the only way of stopping a gangrenous infection from taking the life of one's child. What God's hatred of sin implies is, we think, that God will intend that sin occur only if certain goods can be achieved thereby (his desire for those goods outweighing his horror at the evil). And, in many of the passages we have discussed, God appears to be describing those goods.

This view is not unique to us. Gill (1763) comments on this verse:

The Lord with his eyes of omniscience beholds all things good and evil, and all men good and bad, with all their actions; but then he does not look upon the sins of men with pleasure and approbation.

Thirdly, this passage could be used as an extra proof text for our case. God describes the Chaldeans, in addition to what has already been mentioned, as follows (1:10–11):

They laugh at every fortress, for they pile up earth and take it.

This makes the wickedness of the Chaldeans clear. But, despite that, God has no qualms in affrming that he is raising them up (1:6) and that the ascension of the Chaldeans is his work (1:5).

# 8.2 Romans 3:8—The Ban on Doing Evil that Good May Come

Romans 3:7–8 says this:

But if through my lie God's truth abounds to his glory, why am I still being condemned as a sinner? And why not do evil that good may come?—as some people slanderously charge us with saying. Their condemnation is just. (Rom. 3:7–8, ESV)

Here, Paul deals with a critic that supposes that it is a corollary of Paul's doctrine that one might do evil so that good may come. Paul rejects the thought, and condemns those that impute the suggestion to the early Christian church.

But what could 'doing evil' so that 'good may come' amount to other than *intending that sin* (or a sin) occur for the sake of some good? Thus, an objection to our central contention appears: what Paul condemns here is intending that sin occur for the sake of a good end (and therefore *a fortiori* for a bad end). To do such a thing is wicked, affrms Paul. But such behaviour is precisely what we, the authors, say that God does. But God can perform no wicked act. Therefore, God cannot intend that sin occur.

We give two responses.

First, we don't think that Paul's 'do evil' (*poieso*̄ *men ta kaka* ̄ ) must be rendered as 'intend that sin occur'. It seems reasonable to us to suppose that Paul's meaning can be captured by the following parsing:

(A) And why not *sin* so that good may come?—as some people slanderously charge us with saying. Their condemnation is just.

Thus, Paul can be read not as condemning intending that sin occur for the sake of a good end, but as condemning *performing sinful acts* for the sake of a good end. In that case, the verse makes no comment one way or the other on whether it is always wrong to intend that sin occur. If there are occasions where it is not sinful to intend that sin occur, then such occasions are not covered by the verse. Some might hold, of course, that intending that sin occur is always a sinful act, but that is the very point at issue. Such a person cannot simply appeal to Romans 3:8 to establish that, given the ambiguity we have identifed here. We believe that whether an act of intending that sin occur counts as sinful depends on other considerations—it doesn't follow from the nature of such acts that they are always sinful. We discuss whether or not it is permissible for human beings to intend that sin occur at the end of this chapter.

Secondly, we note that, even if Paul is to be understood as condemning intending that sin occur for the sake of a good end, then it is possible that he has only human-to-human ethics in mind. God has the right to do many things to human beings that we human beings do not have the right to do to each other. God, for instance, has the right to end a human being's life, if he wishes. But we do not have that right. Thus, one might well imagine Paul writing, in a different context where he faced a different sort of slander, 'Should we kill other people so that good may come? As some slanderously report us as saying?'. Were Paul to write such a thing, it would be unreasonable, we suggest, to take Paul as stating killing others always to be sinful, even in the case of God.2 It is simply taken as read that God is often a special case. Thus, even if it is always impermissible for human beings to intend that sin occur, it is consistent with that that it is permissible for God to intend that sin occur. There is, therefore, no clear threat to our central contention here.

# 8.3 Matthew 18:4–7; Luke 17:1–2; Mark 9:42— The Little Ones and the Millstone

This saying occurs in all the synoptic gospels, but the fullest discussion is in Matthew's gospel, where Jesus says the following:

Whoever humbles himself like this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. Whoever receives one such child in my name receives me, but whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world for temptations to sin! For it is necessary that temptations come, but woe to the one by whom the temptation comes! (Matthew 18:4–7)

Jesus speaks here of 'little ones', and it isn't straightforward to determine the class of person Jesus has in mind. Believers? Young believers (either young in physical age or young as believer)? Young children (whether believing or unbelieving)? At any rate, the maximum extension of this expression appears to be the set of everyone that is either a child or a believer. Two things that Jesus says concerning them are pertinent to our case. He condemns those that would 'cause one of those little ones who believe in me to sin' and declares woe upon such people: 'woe to the one by whom the temptation comes!'.

2Compare 1 Corinthians 15: 27, 'For "God has put all things in subjection under his feet." But when it says, "all things are put in subjection," it is plain that he is excepted who put all things in subjection under him'. The Scriptures clearly countenance implicit exceptions, especially relating to God, that are too obvious to mention.

But what does Jesus mean by 'cause … to sin' (*skandalise*)? It is surely ̄ not merely causing a little one to sin that earns Jesus' ire here. After all, one may cause a believer to stumble in sin while being entirely and blamelessly unaware that one is doing so. Doing loud carpentry that causes the Christian in the apartment below to lose his temper, say. Thus, one might argue, it is better to understand Jesus's condemnation as follows: 'Woe to those that act with the intention that a little one should sin, or that bring about a little one's sinning though negligence.'

But if that is a correct understanding, then it is true that

#### (B) It is wrong to intend that a little one sin

And this might cause problems for our project in two ways. First, one might hold that the truth of (B) is best explained by a more general fact:

(C) It is wrong to intend that sin occur.

And if (C) is true, then, so the argument goes, God does not intend that sin occur, because God does nothing wrong.

The second possible problem for our project is as follows. Even if one does not accept the inference from (B) to (C), one might nevertheless complain that the overall implication of our project is that God is frequently involved in planning that various sins occur, and that some of the sins that he intends should occur are the sins of little ones. Thus, (B) by itself is a problem for our project because, again, God does nothing wrong.

In response, we deny that the ground of the wrongness present in (B) is such that it carries over straightforwardly to the divine case. It does not follow from its being wrong for *a human being* to intend that a little one sin, that it is wrong for *God* to intend that a little one sin. We repeat what we said in discussion of Romans 3:8 above, that God is plausibly taken as a special case. We will return later in this chapter to the question what makes our situation relevantly different from God's.

We also note that Jesus seems to have in mind here little ones' being led astray through temptation (v. 7), and one might wonder whether our view implies that God is the one from whom temptation sometimes comes—a problem for our view because surely Jesus would not declare woe against God. But the ESV is misleading here. A more literal rendering of the relevant part of the verse is 'woe to the human (*anthropo*̄ ) by whom the ̄ temptation comes!'. We therefore have explicit indication that Jesus' focus is directed at human beings, with the divine position not in view.

However, the question of how God relates to instances of temptation forms an apt segue into the next text from the Scriptures with which we deal, James on God and temptation, where we offer fuller discussion of this point.

#### 8.4 James 1:13–14—God Does not Tempt

In James's epistle, he writes the following:

Let no one say when he is tempted, 'I am being tempted by God', for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. (James 1:13–14)

This passage's assertion that God tempts no one, in conjunction with an account of what temptation consists in, can be pushed as an objection to the idea that God intends that sin occur. For what is it to tempt someone (to sin) if not to place them in a situation with the intention that they sin in that situation, it may be asked? Thus, from James's insistence that God tempts no one, we can infer that God never places anyone in a situation with the intention that they sin in that situation. But that conclusion is at odds with the central thesis of this book.

This is how Samuel Fancourt (1678–1768) puts the objection:

If the divine being will'd the fall of Adam […] then God's will was the cause of his fall […]. But to necessitate to sin is more than to tempt; and yet we are forbid to say, or think, *When we are TEMPTED, we are tempted of God: For God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man*. (Fancourt 1727: 90–91, punctuation original)

In response, we deny that temptation in the sense that James means can be adequately analysed as placing someone in a situation with the intention that they sin in it. To tempt someone involves, we believe, a *communicative presentation* of a sinful action as being one that the tempted person would be, in some sense, better off for doing. This may involve explicit persuasion, such as when the Devil offered Jesus all the kingdoms of the world if Jesus would but worship him (Matthew 4:8–10); or it might be a purely non-verbal matter, such as decorating the entrance to a brothel with fashy and alluring neon lights. But each example is of a communicative act. Each, in some way, intentionally presents a wicked course of action as desirable, thereby signalling a measure of endorsement of that course of action.

It is this sort of communicative presentation, this endorsement, that we deny that God ever gives to a sinful course of action. God himself may intend on a particular occasion that someone fall when tempted, but he does not personally endorse the temptation. God, we believe, intended that Satan tempt Jesus in the precise way that he did, for example, but Satan's words on that occasion were not God's words. Satan, not God, was the asserter, the communicator there. We therefore hold that God himself offers no communicative encouragement to anyone to sin even though he may bring about the opportunity for them to do so. Indeed, on the contrary, far from offering anyone communicative encouragement to sin, God publicly condemns sin.

In this connection it is worth noting that when God wishes for a human being to be tempted into sin, he is presented in the Scriptures as procuring the services of evil spirits for the task (Judges 9:22–24; 1 Samuel 16:14–23; 1 Kings 22:20–23; 1 Chronicles 21:1). God uses third parties here, we believe, precisely because God's holiness precludes him from offering a communicative presentation of sin as favourable. That would be dishonest communication, and God is not dishonest. But, although God does not lie, the spirits he sends do. At any rate, it is chiefy this idea—the idea that God might be *enjoining* a believer to sin through a particular episode of temptation—that we believe James is concerned to correct in this passage.3

But there is also the affective dimension to be considered. A friend might fall into a sinful practice, and then encourage you to join in on account of the great enjoyment that they fnd in it, thereby tempting you. Your friendship with them thus imperils you. The idea that something like this might happen to God the Father—he is placed under a sore desire to sin, a desire that gets spread out in some way to his followers—is also an idea James appears concerned to repudiate here by his insistence that God 'cannot be tempted with evil'. Of course, if part of what James intends to rule out is that God *likes* sin, then that is no diffculty for our view. We

3Note that James writes of God that 'he himself' (the addition of *autos*) tempts no one. The emphasis there is suggestive: James likely has in mind the episodes in the Old Testament of God's sending lying spirits, and so on, and therefore is careful to direct his focus on the behaviour of God himself, as opposed to the behaviour of the spiritual agents that God sends.

reaffrm our conviction that God hates sin, even though we believe he intends that particular sinful acts occur.

Thus, by affrming both that God fnds sin repulsive and that he offers no communicative encouragement to anyone's sinning, we believe that we have adequately aligned ourselves with James's meaning in this passage. But it is perfectly possible for God to intend that sin occur while hating sin and refusing to offer any communicative encouragement to the effect that people should engage in sin. Thus, there is no problem here for our project.

Finally, should anyone be suspicious about the more restrictive meaning we impose on James—more restrictive, that is, than our objector's we offer two more points.

First, that the Lord's Prayer surely forces us to read James more restrictedly. Jesus himself instructs us to pray to our Father in Heaven, entreating that he 'lead us not into temptation' (Luke 11:4). The fact that such a request needs to be made suggests that God does indeed frequently lead his people into temptation. One might respond that when God leads someone into temptation, he doesn't intend that they succumb to that temptation. We agree that God's intending that they succumb doesn't follow from what is implied by the Lord's Prayer, but the point is that by granting that God sometimes leads people into temptation, one is already forced to restrict the frst-blush reading of James. And if it is agreed that God frequently deliberately leads people into tempting situations, then it no longer seems a stretch to say that God leads people into temptation with the intent that they fall into sin thereby.4

Secondly, if one is to read the passage from James (and the passage from Matthew) as entailing that God does not intend that sin occur, then we point out that that is to place those verses at odds with the force of the many verses we have discussed earlier, and it seems to us that the combined strength of the verses we discussed in earlier chapters outweighs whatever countervailing strength might be had by the verses discussed in this chapter. Thus, submission to the overall force of the testimony of the Christian Scriptures should incline one to our view.

4 Indeed, one might argue, why *would* God lead a believer, say, into temptation, knowing, let us assume, that they would fall to the temptation (or that they had a very good chance of doing so), if not in order that they might fall, and learn some lesson, such as spiritual humility, thereby?

# 8.5 Philosophical Concerns (i): Mooney and White

Certain thinkers have, while securing various other theological desiderata, gone to some pains to avoid the implication that God intends that sin occur. (Mooney 2019), for instance, is concerned that the use of greatergood defences in response to the argument from evil carries the ready implication that God intended that sin and evil occur for the sake of the goods arising therefrom. He therefore introduces a distinction between foreseen and intended means parallel to the distinction between foreseen and intended effects. This is similar to the idea presented in (Kamm 2007), but Mooney appeals to voluntary bodily movements to illustrate his version of the idea. It seems that when one forms an intention to move one's arm, one does not, typically, intend the intermediate physiological causal chain involving one's nervous system (even when one is aware that that is how one's body works). We thus have a case, Mooney avers, of a foreknown but unintended means. We might say something similar, he says, in the case of God:

But if my hand-raising intention is effective by means of an unintended physiological causal chain, then perhaps some of God's volitions are also effective by means of unintended intermediary causes. In particular, perhaps God can cause certain evils which are a necessary means to some good simply by intending that good or a broader, good state of affairs which includes that good, while merely foreseeing and not intending the evils themselves. (Mooney 2019: 219)

White (2016) makes a suggestion in a similar vein. His concern is that theological determinism appears to imply that God intends that sin occur. White prefers to think of God as standing outside time and actualizing the whole of history, the whole space–time block, 'all at once'. White believes that such a picture of the matter permits one to avoid any troublesome implication about God's intending that sin occur. For if God is simply selecting from timeless eternity his preferred possible history to actualize, then the sin in that history is not God's causal means to the actualization of the good in that history, even though it is necessary to it, for God's bringing about of the sin in that history (insofar as he may be said to do that) is not causally prior to his bringing about of the good in that history—he indivisibly causes the whole thing to come to be. White concludes:

Thus it is perfectly possible for the theological determinist to hold that God *intends* the good aspects of the world but merely *foresees* the evil aspects. There is no need to hold that God ever intends evil, although his will determines every detail of creation. (White 2016: 92)

We do not challenge here, as a matter of pure philosophy, Mooney's and White's suggestions.5 We simply note that, since the Scriptures affrm that God has intended that certain sins occur, Mooney's and White's enterprises are unnecessary and misguided.

# 8.6 Philosophical Concerns (ii): A Leibnizian Objection

Someone might be sceptical, however, about our use of the Scriptures. Such a person might put to us the following objection in the spirit of G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716):

Look, all this in the Scriptures about God's intending this or that—it's all just non-literal talk. God is accommodating himself to our lowly conceptual arena. He doesn't really have all these discrete intentions; the only end he really seeks is to create this, the best of all possible worlds, and his whole undivided creative energy is the sole means.

We respond that it would simply be too misleading on God's part for him to present himself as seeking numerous different ends across the Scriptures, and employing a wide variety of means for those different ends, if he didn't, in fact, intend those things individually. The Scriptures tell us, for instance, that God chastens believers *for their good* (Hebrews 12:9–11). If we are to understand that God intended only the great world ensemble,

5However, note the response of Alexander Pruss (1973–) to this idea that by God's actualizing a broader state of affairs that has sin as a part, we can avoid the suggestion that God intends that sin occur: '[It may be responded that] God creates the cosmos in all its spatiotemporal extent as a whole, and hence the means–end analysis is inapplicable. However, the inapplicability of means–end analysis does not follow. For even an agent who produces a sophisticated work as a whole "all at once" would be apt to engage in means–end reasoning such as: "This part of the work (e.g., Eve's sin) is to exist to make ftting that part (e.g., the work of redemption)." The means here may not be causal means, but they are nonetheless intended for the sake of other aspects of the work.' (Pruss 2016: 193).

then this looks untrue.6 There is quite a difference between God's saying, 'I intended this time of trial for your strengthening in righteousness', and his saying, 'The fact that that time of trial strengthened you in righteousness was just a by-product of my seeking the greatest possible world'. The frst is profoundly personal. The second is not. Thus, we take the implications of the Leibnizian objector's scepticism for the accuracy of the Scriptures' talk about God's intentions to be too damaging to accept.

# 8.7 Philosophical Concerns (iii): The Doctrine of Double Effect and Christian Ethics

Finally, one might take issue with our project because it involves, one might think, the denial of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), and because of the broader implications that denial would have for Christian ethics. Drawing from (Cavanaugh 2006) and (Mangan 1949: 43), we can state the DDE as follows. A person may permissibly perform an action that they foresee will produce a good effect and a bad effect provided that four conditions are met:

This doctrine is said by (McIntyre 2019) to have its origin in (Aquinas 1920: II-II.Q64.a7), and has held a venerated position in Roman-Catholic thought, and also, on that account, in the Christian tradition more generally.

Our arguments given in this volume for the claim that God intends that sin occur involve God in a straightforward violation of conditions (ii) and (iii) of the DDE, however: we have affrmed both that God intends that certain evil effects of his actions (namely, certain sins) occur and that the good effects of certain of God's actions are produced by means of certain evil (sinful) effects.

6Alexander Pruss's point mentioned in the previous footnote would work against this but, as we mentioned, it also works against the original suggestion.

But if there is no absolute prohibition on intending that sin occur (for God does it, and it is compatible with his perfect goodness), then, an objector might argue, the foodgates have been opened. How did Christians respond to utilitarian-style reasoning that was happy to employ wickedness as a means to a greater good? They appealed to DDE: 'wicked means cannot be justifed by good ends!'. But if DDE is false, then this response can no longer be straightforwardly made. Moreover, the great tradition of ethical theory that Christian philosophers from Aquinas to Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) have built around the principle of double effect (concerning euthanasia, abortion, just-war theory, and so forth) must now be disregarded.

So runs the objection. We do grant that our position will have various implications for Christian ethics, but we are sympathetic to accounts on which ethics at the intra-human level remains largely unchanged. Consider Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) on the issue:

the […] reason why it would not be lawful for a creature to permit evil to come to pass, and that it would not be wise and good and virtuous in him so to do, is that he has not perfect wisdom or suffciency, so as that it is ft such an affair should be trusted with him—he goes beyond his line, he goes out of his province, he meddles with things too high for him. It is everyone's duty to do things ft for them in their sphere, and commensurate to their power. God never betrusted this providence into the hands of creatures of fnite understandings, nor is it proper that he should. (Edwards 1743)

Edwards's position appears to be that God has not entrusted human beings with the right or privilege of intending that sin occur. God considers them not wise enough to be good stewards in that regard. One might put the following gloss in terms of rights on the matter: it is permissible to intend that sin occur only if one has the relevant sort of rights over the sinner, but only God has such rights; the only way, therefore, for nondivine beings permissibly to intend that sin occur is if God grants them that right, but he has not granted human beings that right.

If such an account is true, then it does indeed look as if much of the Christian ethical tradition can be drawn from without alteration. For, although our contention implies that God-to-human ethics is a rather different matter from what the Christian tradition has typically supposed, it does not follow from that that there needs to be any great shift in how we understand human-to-human ethics.

Nevertheless, although this suggestion from Edwards appears to us to have shown that there *need* be no shift in human-to-human ethics, what reason have we to believe that, as a matter of fact, God has not granted to us the right to intend that sin occur?

We believe that Jesus' warning discussed above in Matthew 18—'whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea'—goes quite a way to establishing this. Jesus' warning here is couched in terms so dreadful that no sensible Christian could consider it a light matter to lead a little one into sin, even a 'small' sin.

#### References

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# Author Index1

#### **A**

*Actus reus*, 33–35 Anscombe, Elizabeth, 28, 105 Aquinas, Thomas, 5, 5n1, 6, 9, 9n3, 16, 23, 34–37, 41, 94, 104, 105 Aristotle, 34 Arminius, Jacobus, 5, 6, 11, 16, 36, 41, 44, 45, 72 Augustine, Aurelius, 5–9, 9n3, 11, 16, 34–35

#### **B**

Barth, Karl, 31, 32 Baxter, Richard, 11, 16 Bayne, Paul, 12 Bellamy, Joseph, 13, 14 Benson, John, 16 Bentham, Jeremy, 3 Block, Daniel, 76n16

## **C**

Calvin, John, 10, 16 Charnock, Stephen, 11, 16, 36, 38 Combined strategy, 53, 59

#### **D**

Davidson, Donald, 4 Duncan, John, 40

#### **E**

Edwards, Jonathan, 12, 13, 16, 105, 106 Emmons, Nathaniel, 14, 15

#### **F**

Fancourt, Samuel, 99

1Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

© The Author(s) 2022 M. J. Hart, D. J. Hill, *Does God Intend that Sin Occur?*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06570-5

#### **H**

Heppe, Heinrich, 39 Hollaz, David, 37 Hopkins, Samuel, 13, 14

#### **K**

Kamm, F. M., 28–32, 51–54, 102

#### **L**

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 23, 24, 39, 40, 103 Lombard, Peter, 9 Luther, Martin, 9–11, 16

#### **M**

Maccovius, Johannes, 12, 16 *Mens rea*, 33–34 Mooney, Justin, 102–103 Muller, Richard, 11 Murphy, Mark, 62n6

#### **P**

Perkins, William, 12, 16 Perspicuity of the Scriptures, 49, 51 Pink, Arthur W., 16 Piper, John, 16, 83, 83n1 Pruss, Alexander, 62n6, 103n5, 104n6

**Q**

Quenstedt, J. A., 10 Quine, W.V., 3

## **S**

Schmid, Heinrich, 10, 37 Scotus, John Duns, 39 *Substratum*, 33–41, 43–46, 48–53, 58–60, 62–67, 69, 70n12, 72, 76, 83, 84

#### **T**

Toplady, Augustus, 11, 35 Triple effect, 27, 46–47, 51–55, 60n2 Tucker, William, 12, 16 Turretin, Francis, 10, 16, 23, 38

#### **V**

Voetius, Gisbertius, 35, 38

#### **W**

Warfeld, Benjamin B, 16 Welty, Greg, 57, 73 White, Heath, 102–103

#### **Z**

Zanchius, Jerome, 11, 35, 36

# Biblical Index1

**G** Genesis 50:19–21, 44

#### **E**

Exodus 4:21, 60–63, 90 9:16, 53, 61, 62

#### **L**

Leviticus 4:2, 2 19:11, 70, 71

#### **D**

Deuteronomy 2:26–30, 63–65, 90 2:32–36, 64

**J** Joshua 9, 65 11:18–20, 65, 90 Judges 9:22–24, 100 14:3-4, 66–67, 90

#### **S**

1 Samuel 2:22–25, 67–68, 90 16:14–23, 100 2 Samuel 24:9–14, 68–70, 90 24:17, 69

#### **K**

1 Kings 22:19–23, 70–71, 90

1Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

© The Author(s) 2022 M. J. Hart, D. J. Hill, *Does God Intend that Sin Occur?*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06570-5

#### **C**

1 Chronicles 21:1, 68n11, 100 21:7, 69 21:17, 69 2 Chronicles 18, 71n13 36:13, 62n4

## **J**

Job 1:9-22, 71–73 42:11, 72 42:7, 72

## **P**

Psalm 105:25, 73, 90 110:1, 48 Proverbs 16:4, 73–74, 90

#### **I**

Isaiah 48:9, 52 6:9-10, 74–75, 90

#### **J**

Jeremiah 20:7, 94n1

#### **E**

Ezekiel 20:25–26, 75–76

#### **D**

Daniel 5:20, 62n4

#### **H**

Habakkuk 1:5–11, 94–95 1:13, 4, 93–95 2:17, 94

#### **M**

Matthew 13:14–15, 75 18:4–7, 97–99 22:31–32, 48 4:1, 22 4:8–10, 99 Mark 4:12, 75 8:17, 62n4 9:42, 97–99

#### **L**

Luke 11:4, 101 17:1–2, 97–99 20:41–44, 48 8:10, 75

## **J**

John 10:34–36, 48 19:11, 2

## **A**

Acts 19:9, 62n4 2:23, 79–81, 90 4:27–28, 16, 79, 80

#### **R**

Romans 11:11, 84 11:25-32, 84–85 3:7–8, 95 7:9, 85 9:18, 62n4 9:21-24, 81–84

# **C**

1 Corinthians 15: 27, 97n2

#### **G**

Galatians 3:19-22, 85–86, 90

**E** Ephesians 2:3, 88

**T** 2 Thessalonians 2:11–12, 86–87, 90

#### **H**

Hebrews 12:9–11, 103 3:13, 62n4

**J**

James 1:13–14, 99–101

#### **P**

2 Peter 2:12, 87–88, 90

#### **R**

Revelation 17:16-17, 88–89 22:10–11, 89–90


3.1.3. Folate (FA) Content

Folate content was found to be 5% of the total weight of the FA-CS-5FU-NPs formulation. Folic acid is commonly engaged as a ligand for targeting cancer cells, as its receptors are over-expressed on the surface of several human cancer cells. Integrating folic acid into chitosan-based drug delivery inventions directs the systems with a well-organized targeting ability [26].

#### *3.2. Characterization of Nanoparticles*

#### 3.2.1. Size, Zeta Potential, and Surface Morphology

The size of the CS-5-FU NPs was found to be 208 ± 14.65 nm, while the FA-CS-5-FU NPs was 235 ± 11.5 nm, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 4A,B. The poly dispersity index (PDI) was found to be 0.2 and 0.19 for of the FA-CS-5-FU NPs and the CS-5-FU NPs. This small size of NPs is important since such NPs in anticancer drugs can easily escape the leaky tumor vasculature and accumulate within the tumor region to exert cytotoxic effects on proliferating cells [27]. The zeta potential of the FA-CS-5-FU NPs was found to be +20 ± 2. The FA-CS-5-FU NPs show an insignificant decrease in zeta potential as compared to the CS-5-FU NPs (Table 1; *p* > 0.05). Other studies have also found a decrease in the value of zeta potential after folate conjugation. [28–30]. The obtained zeta potential value of +26 ± 2 mV in the instance of folic-acid-modified chitosan NPs indicates that folic acid binds to chitosan quite strongly. The free positive NH2 groups of chitosan molecules may account for the positive value. This positive zeta potential is helpful in crossing the negatively charged membrane of cancer cells. The value of the zeta potential (ZP) indicates the repulsive interactions between suspended particles and can therefore be used to forecast the stability of colloidal aqueous dispersions. The prepared nanoparticles were spherical in shape and smooth in surface, as shown in Figure 4B.

**Table 1.** Physicochemical characterization of folic-acid-modified 5-FU-loaded chitosan NPs. Data were presented as triplicate (*n* = 3) and mean ± SD.

**Figure 4.** (**A**) Size distribution of nanoparticles, (**B**) surface morphology of folic-acid-modified 5-FU-loaded chitosan NPs.

#### 3.2.2. Drug Content, Encapsulation Efficiency, and Drug-Loading Efficiency

TPP was used as a cross linker in folate-modified chitosan nanoparticles loaded with 5-FU. The drug content and %EE of the drug were estimated based on the amount of the drug in the supernatant and the sedimented pellets of dispersed nanoparticles after centrifugation. The FA-CS-5-FU NPs demonstrated 5-FU content of 53 ± 0.14% and EE of 59 ± 0.23%. The drug-loading efficiency was 43 ± 3% and 39 ± 2% for CS-5- FU NPs and FA-CS-5-FU NPs, respectively. A decrease in the loading efficiency of NPs with FA conjugation occurred because the folic acid changed a number of amino groups on the chitosan molecules, lowering their positive charges and thereby attracting drug molecules [13]. Consequently, it emerged that the amount of folic acid conjugations in the mixture had a significant effect on the loading efficiency (LE) (Table 1; *p* < 0.05).

#### *3.3. In Vitro Release*

In vitro drug release was evaluated at a pH of 1.2 and 6.5 to measure the 5-FU release from the FA-CS-5FU-NPs and the CS-5FU-NPs using a USP dissolution apparatus 1. Such conditions were set to simulate the acidic gastric and physiological environment of the intestine. The percentage of drug released from the FA-CS-5FU-NPs and the CS-5FU-NPs was in the range of 10.08 ± 0.45% to 96.57 ± 0.09% and 6 ± 0.31% to 91.44 ± 0.21%, respectively. In artificial gastric liquid, 17.02 ± 0.12% and 14.5 ± 0.41% of 5-FU were released from the FA-CS-5FU-NPs and CS-5FU-NPs, respectively, in the first 2 h. The difference in the release pattern of these two formulations was insignificant, as shown in Figure 5 (*p* > 0.05). The initial release of 5-FU at an acidic pH was followed by a sustained release of up to 24 h. The initial release may be due to weakly bound drugs on the surface of nanoparticles [20].

**Figure 5.** In vitro release study of pure 5-FU, CS-5FU-NPs, and FA-CS-5FU-NPs.

Drug release at a pH of 6.5 within the first 2 h from the FA-CS-5FU-NPs and CS-5FU-NPs was 39.37 ± 3% and 36 ± 2.45%, and the accumulative release in 24 h (1440 min) was 96.57 ± 7% and 91.44 ± 7.45%, respectively. These in vitro values indicate that the FA-decorated nanoparticles can be used as a 5-FU delivery vector with a typical controlled release process. The remarkably high release rate of 5-FU from the folic-acid-conjugated nanoparticles, more interestingly at a pH of 6.5, may be due to the increased acidity of the respective release media caused by the presence of folic acid on the targeted nanoparticles. The improved hydrophilicity of the FA–CS nanoparticles due to the addition of folate was linked to the increased release rate [31]. Taken together, the acidic environments of tumor cells are likely to elicit the release of 5-FU from the developed delivery vehicles, and the sustained drug release profile from the vehicles over time can reduce dosing regimens [32].

#### *3.4. Cytotoxicity Studies*

Cytotoxicity studies of free drug and NPs were performed on caco-2 cell lines. The percentage of cell death was determined and shown in Figure 5. The IC50 value of free 5-FU was found to be 4.21 μg/mL. This value was reduced to 3.43 μg/mL (CS-5-FU-NPs) and 2.67 μg/mL (FA-CS-5-FU-NPs) when 5-FU was incorporated into nanoparticles, showing significantly more cytotoxicity than the free drug. Up to 9% of cell death was induced by the free drug (5-FU solution). The percentage of cell death increased when the CS-5- FU-NPs and FA-CS-5-FU-NPs were applied. This increase might be due to the combined effect of drug and hydrophilicity of the FA–CS nanoparticles due to the addition of folate, which began to increase the release rate of 5-FU from NPs. However, a significant effect (*p* < 0.05) on the percentage of cell death was produced when the FA–CS-conjugated NPs were applied (Figure 6). This was the resultant effect of the combination of the drug and folic acid conjugation with chitosan. The FA receptors are more expressed on cancer cells; therefore, the introduction of folic acid on NPs makes them more targeted and cytotoxic in action.

**Figure 6.** Cytotoxicity study shows the % cell death of 5-FU, CS-5-FU-NPs, and FA-CS-5-FU-NPs.

#### **4. Conclusions**

Nanoparticles were successfully prepared using the ionic gelation method. The size and zeta potential and PDI of the CS-5FU-NPs were 208 ± 15, 26 ± 2, −20 ± 2, respectively, and those of the FA-CS-5FU-NPs were 235 ± 12, +20 ± 2 and 0.25, respectively, which are within acceptable ranges. FTIR and 1H-NMR studies confirmed the conjugation of folic acid with the nanoparticles. The drug contents' % yield and the %EE of folate-decorated NPs were 53 ± 1, 80.8 and 59 ± 2%, respectively. The in vitro release of FA-CS-5FU-NPs and CS-5FU-NPs was in the range of 10.08 ± 0.45 to 96.57 ± 0.09% and 6 ± 0.31 to 91.44 ± 0.21, respectively. The percentage of cell death increased in the presence of folic acid, as compared to the free drug and chitosan nanoparticles due to the overexpression of folate receptors on the cancer cells. The results of all these parameters indicate that folatemodified chitosan 5-FU nanoparticles can be used successfully for the delivery of 5-FU with enhanced cytotoxicity and targeted delivery to the tumors.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, A.K.A. and M.M.A.-D.; Data curation, A.K.A. and A.N.; Formal analysis, M.I.; Funding acquisition, A.K.A. and M.M.A.-D.; Investigation, S.U. and M.I.; Methodology, S.U., A.N. and K.U.S.; Validation, A.A.S.; Visualization, A.K.A.; Writing—original draft, S.U.; Writing—review & editing, A.K.A., A.N., K.U.S., M.I., G.M.A., F.A.A.-J., A.A.S. and M.M.A.-D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research was supported by Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University Researchers Supporting Project number (PNURSP2022R30), Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Faculty of Pharmacy, AIMST University, Kedah, Malaysia.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** The animal study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of office of Research, Innovation, and Commercialization (ORIC, 1600/ORIC/2019-ag-394).

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Acknowledgments:** This research was supported by Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University Researchers Supporting Project number (PNURSP2022R30), Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.; and Faculty of Pharmacy, AIMST University, Kedah, Malaysia.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.


3.2.2. Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm

The PSO algorithm is a stochastic technique based on the behavior of bee swarms [42]. This algorithm exhibits great effectiveness in multidimensional optimization problems. This methodology is based on the survival of some living beings (specifically the bees). As well as the genetic algorithm, PSO is initialized with a random initial population. However, in this case, each possible solution, known as a particle, has also been assigned a random velocity [42]. Each particle updates and stores the best position found so far (pbest) and also stores and updates the best position of the rest of the swarm (gbest). To represent the velocity update, the algorithm uses Equation (4), where *vi* is the velocity vector, *xi* is the position vector, α is the weight of the particle that controls the recognition of the place, *c*1 and *c*2 are the acceleration constants of the particles (usually take a value of 2 by default), and *rand* is a random number between 0 and 1.

$$w\_{i}(t+1) = a\upsilon\_{i} + c\_{1} \cdot rand \cdot (pbest(t) - x\_{i}(t)) + c\_{2} \cdot rand \cdot (gbest(t) - x\_{i}(t)) \tag{4}$$

Once the parameters that conform the algorithm are obtained, the swarm is generated by means of the following steps:


*Edited by Roman Hajek*

This book does not provide a comprehensive overview of Multiple Myeloma but a collection of chapters with in-depth information of distinct hot topics in the diagnostic, research and therapeutic fields. The dynamics of testing new drugs for multiple myeloma treatment in clinical trials is breathtaking. Scientific discoveries have uncovered complicated pathogenesis of multiple myeloma; complicated reactions to treatment lead to the creation of super cocktails. Curability of multiple myeloma is a question that is being discussed by the entire professional myeloma world. Improvement of prognosis is a fact which is most important from a patient's perspective. We believe that this book could be of interest to medical professionals specializing in hematooncology, researchers, as well as many others.

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Multiple Myeloma - A Quick Reflection on the Fast Progress

Multiple Myeloma

A Quick Reflection on the Fast Progress