Not only was the political system of China reset in 1949, but the established gender regime also underwent fundamental changes. These changes were implemented in a top-down manner through the establishment of a communist and hence surpassingly gender egalitarian political system. The establishment of the new gender regime was predominately carried out by communist policy elites and officially sanctioned organizations, such as the ACWF. And especially the ACWF played a decisive role. Due to its heterogeneous organization with branches on all administrative levels, it functioned as a good disseminator and propagator of Maoist gender politics (Kaufman 2012; Hershatter 2004; Chen 2011). As such the ACWF held a central role in the production of the gender regime, because it initially had the power to dominate all inscriptions of womanhood in the official discourse (Barlow 2004).

#### *2.3.1 Historic legacies: the Confucian gender regime*

China was a patrilineal society until the twentieth century. Confucian notions persisted: girls must obey fathers before marriage, their husbands thereafter, and sons in old age (Kaufman 2012: 588; Tang et al. 2002: 976). Until colonialism, gender and gender roles were largely defined by Confucian notions (Barlow 1994, 2004, 1993; Ko et al. 2003b; Ko 1994; Mann 1997). 5 Within Confucian ethics, the family was the basic unit of society and the five cardinal relations within a family, i.e., father and son, husband and wife, man and woman, older brother and younger brother, and patriarch and clan member (Li 1991: 53), were fundamental to all other relationships in a society (Moritz and Lee 1998). 6 Confucianism as a family philosophy was a specialized style of theoretical writing about being a person in the patriline,7 and it was exactly this patriline of all Confucian thoughts that was held to be the literal foundation of the central government (Barlow 2004: 37) .

5 This is a simplification since even in China the Confucian discourse had to compete with other philosophical and ethical systems with equally universalistic claims, often subsumed under the rubrics *Buddhism* and *Daoism* (Ko et al. 2003a: 3). Nonetheless, Confucian ethics had tremendous impact on social and state structures in China (Moritz et al. 1998; Ko et al. 2003a; Ko 1994; Croll 1995; Li 2000). Confucianism in itself consists of many variations. To account for the internal variety and changes over time scholars tend to talk about *Confucian discourses* rather than Confucianism and thereby acknowledge that there is not one but many forms of Confucianism (Ko et al. 2003a: 3; Li 2000: 2). Moreover, there is no exact Chinese counterpart to the English term *Confucianism*. The Chinese term often used in similar contexts is *Rujia* (儒家, the school of the literati). The term *Rujia* has also been used to include later developments of Confucian thought. In this analysis I understand Confucianism as institutional structures that directly impinge on people's lives (Li 2000: 5). For the sake of readability, when I refer to Confucianism, I am in fact speaking about the discourses of Confucianism. Confucianism is an ethics of the family or the clan. It encourages the socialization of practices that stabilize the clan and family (Moritz and Lee 1998: 15). It is also an ethics of the state, since it regulates the state structures and the relation between power and morality (Moritz and Lee 1998: 15; Ko et al. 2003a: 8).

A truly educated woman (*Funü*, 妇女) 8 devoted herself to the service of her husband and his family (Barlow 1994: 256). She could only gain social rank through marriage and, hence, the only available roles for women in Confucian China were as wives and mothers (Croll 1995: 37). 9 Woman's role and appropriate behavior were prescribed by the five cardinal relations outlined above (Barlow 1994: 260) and the *Three Obediences and Four Womanly Virtues* (*Sancong*, *Side*, 三从四德) (Croll 1995: 13). In the Confucian discourse the husband is responsible to secure the (material) survival of the family, while the wife is in charge of all decisions within the family, similar to a managing director of the private sphere (Li op. 1991: 55). This division of rights and duties became the cornerstone of the so-called *nei-wai* binary (*Nan zhuwai*, *Nü zhunei*, 男主外,女主内), one of the fundamental principles of the Confucian gender regime and the moral justification for the exclusion of women from the public and particularly the political sphere (Li 2000: 3; Croll 1995: 13). 10

The "three obediences" prescribe women's subordination to the father and elder brother when young (*Weijia congfu*, 未嫁从父), to the husband when married (*Jijia congfu*, 既嫁从父), and to the husband and son in old age (*Fusi*

8 The discursive sign *Funü* slowly emerged at the end of the twentieth century and indicates women's role outside of the family and hence the beginning of the decoupling of family and women from women's identity (Barlow 2004: 40ff.). Moreover, woman is not a stable category but is divided by social class, age, geography, and time. Confucian discourses envisioned a universal and undifferentiated womanhood, defined as the mutually constitutive other of manhood (Ko et al. 2003a: 2).

9 This is a generalization and simplification, since there are records of elite women in late imperial China who were artists and participated in the public sphere (Ko et al. 2003b; Ko 1994).

10 We have to treat these guidelines for an adequate code of conduct carefully, since they aimed to establish an *ideal type* and are not necessarily found as such in the reality of Chinese history. Ko et al., for instance, reject the image of Confucian women as cloistered beings who had no access to the public sphere, regardless of authoritative texts prescribing such isolation (Ko et al. 2003a: 7). Rather, they list examples of women who, despite this dictate, participated in public life. However, we have to treat this finding with equal caution. Chinese women in the late imperial era by and large were likely to act according to these widely accepted norms of adequate behavior.

*congzi*, 夫死从子).11 Since a wife was not only a wife but also a daughter-inlaw**,** she was expected to be filial and hence obedient to her in-laws (Li 2000: 55ff.). The "four womanly virtues" refer to the morality of women (*Fude*, 妇 德) and advise them to know their place in the universe (their *li*) and to behave in total compliance with the time-honored ethical code (Croll 1995: 13). Secondly, women were supposed to be reticent and to take care not to chatter too much or bore others, in short, there was a proper womanly speech (*Fuyan*, 妇 言). Thirdly, women had to be clean of person and habits and adorn themselves with a view pleasant for the opposite sex, i.e., they had to have a modest appearance that was appealing to the opposite sex (*Furong*, 妇容 ). Finally, Chinese women were supposed to be diligent in their household duties (*Fugong*, 妇功) (Croll 1995: 13).

The Confucian gender regime, although abolished in 1949, had long-lasting effects. Remnants of this regime are still evident today. For instance, the *neiwai* binary still guides the everyday behavior of the Chinese. One reason for this can be traced back to its origin. Early Confucian scholars adapted and condensed established sociopolitical practices in their ethical systems (Woo 1999: 110ff.). Because Confucian notions reflected existing practices, they were readily adopted by Chinese people. Moreover, Confucian precepts were frequently reduced to one-line quotations, proverbs, and folk sayings for oral repetition among the literate and illiterate, such as, "To be a woman means to submit" (Lee Swann 1999; Croll 1995: 14). This mineralization of foundational gendered norms guiding everyday practices supported a strong anchoring of such codes of conduct in the sociopolitical sediment of every Chinese.

#### *2.3.2 The Communist gender regime*

The founding of the PRC drastically changed the existing gender regime. Mao propagated that women should be equal to men and "hold up half the sky" (*Chengqi ban bian tian*, 撑起半边天) (Chen 2011: 42). Thus the equality of

11 These are not literal translations. Literally translated, the three obediences state, "unmarried, obey the father" (*Weijia congfu*), "already married, obey the husband" (*Jijia congfu*), and "after the husband's death, obey the son" (*Fusi congzi*).

men and women (*Nannü pingdeng*, 男女平等) was included in the Constitution of the PRC in 1950 (Chen 1999). The Communist gender regime can be divided into two major phases: before and after the reform and open policies at the end of the 1970s (Spakowski 2014; Hershatter 2004). 12

#### *2.3.3. Maoist gender egalitarianism*

Before the reform and open policies, Mao's gender politics can best be described as *Maoist egalitarianism.* The equality of men and women (*Nannü pingdeng*) was symbolized as the core of the Constitution, and women were supposed to assimilate to male-oriented norms (Spakowski 2014: 23). Women were encouraged to fully participate in the socialist construction (Hershatter 2004: 1036). The resulting "iron girl" was able to do the work of men and could simultaneously carry (alone) the burden of housework, while encouraging her family to give their all for the greater social good (Honig 2000). The Maoist gender politics degenderized society and aimed at the establishment of non-difference of the two main sexes (Chen 2011: 42), which led to the emergence of the socialist androgyne (Hershatter 2004; Spakowski 2014; Chen 2011). The rationale underlying Mao's egalitarianism was the subordination of gender issues to class questions. Gender issues were ruled obsolete, and women's liberation was perceived as an integral part of the communist revolution (Chen 2011; Spakowski 2014; Xu 2009). The main advocate of this gender politics was the ACWF, an institutional vehicle for Mao's gender politics, directed by the CCP (Chen 2011: 42; Howell 1997). The ACWF was set up to organize women from the central government down to the local level, execute all the communist political decisions related to women, and rally support for the incorporated policies (Chen 2011: 42; Kaufman 2012: 589; Hershatter 2004: 1035). Due to these features, the ACWF is often described as a typical transmission-belt organization.

12 Other classifications are possible. For our purpose, the distinction between two major developmental phases seems practicable. However, the time before and after the reform and open polices, as well as the post-socialist era in itself, could be divided into several development phases.

#### *2.3.4. Gender politics after the reform and open policies*

The reform and open policies of the late 1970s had a profound impact on the existing gender order and led to the reemergence of women's issues in public and policy debates (Spakowski 2014: 229). Concerning gender politics, core elements of the socialist order remained while the party-state withdrew the provision of gender-related services (Milwertz and Bu 2009: 228; Chen 1999; Evans and Strauss 2010). Gender equality (*Nannü pingdeng*) remained the core element, and the ACWF was reestablished after its disbandment in the Cultural Revolution as the institutional vehicle of CCP's gender politics (Spakowski 2014: 230; Chen 1999). 13

On the one hand, in the reform era women's rights were formally backed by several laws that aimed to improve women's situation by rectifying specific problems, e.g., the Law for the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funü quanyi baozhangfa*, 中华共和国妇女权 益保障法) was implemented in 1992 and the Marriage Law was amended in 1980. Despite the new opportunities, increased social space, improved economic conditions, and enhanced legislation, women were negatively impacted by the socioeconomic transformation. The downsizing and economic restructuring of state-owned industries pushed women *en masse* out of the labor market (Spakowski 2014; Liu 2007; Kaufman 2012; Wesoky 2002). Women were, and still are, discriminated in higher education (Spakowski 2014), restricted by the well-known one-child policy (Hong 1987), and excluded from high leadership roles within the party and enterprises (Chen 2011; Croll 1995).

Moreover, women's situation is also influenced by informal gender institutions. Gendered expectations and arrangements of family life and marriage persist (Evans and Strauss 2010). And the socially institutionalized discourse of the *nei-wai* binary continues to function as a cognitive framework molding many aspects of gendered behavior and practices (Evans and Strauss 2010; Evans 2010), often discouraging women from participating fully and equally in socioeconomic life (Hong Fincher 2013). A regular survey by the National

13 For a more detailed inquiry into the Cultural Revolution, cf. Fairbank and Goldman (2006) and Gernet (1988); for a more in-depth discussion of women's situation during the Cultural Revolution, cf. Croll (1978).

Bureau of Statistics even warns that the social support for the *nei-wai* binary might be on the rise again (Department of Social, Science and Technology, and Cultural Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics 2012). In 2000 44.4% of the surveyed respondents approved the notion, "A good marriage is better than a good job for women" (Department of Social, Science and Technology, and Cultural Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics 2012: 126). In 2004 53.9% of the male respondents and 50.4% of the female respondents supported the notion, "Men should mainly work outside, women should mainly do housework" (Department of Population, Social Science, and Technology, National Bureau of Statistics 2004: 107), and in 2012 61.6% of the male respondents and 54.8% of the female respondents approved the same notion (Department of Social, Science and Technology, and Cultural Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics 2012: 126), which indicates a slow but steady increase in the approval rates for the *nei-wai* binary, the cornerstone of the traditional Confucian gender regime. These statistics parallel the decline in women's political participation in recent years. The proportion of women in the Party's Central Committee (CCP), after increasing from 5–13% between the 1960s–70s, declined to 7.69% in 2002 (Guo and Zheng 2008) and dropped to a devastating low of 4.9% in the recent party congress (Zheng 2014). Moreover, in the eighteenth Politburo Standing Committee only two out of twenty-five members, Liu Yandong and Sun Chunlan, were women (Yuen 2013). Furthermore, traditional Confucian gender institutions were reemphasized in public debates to address the pending problems related to socioeconomic hardship. For instance, when women were pushed *en masse* out of the labor market in the 1980s, the public discourse "women should return home" (*Funü huijia*, 妇女回家) became dominant (Zhang 2005: 377).

Against this background, the ambivalence of the current Chinese gender regime is striking. It follows the legacy of the traditional Confucian patriarchal gender regime, which is predominately manifested today in the form of informal gender institutions (established cognitive frameworks, Chinese proverbs, stories). Simultaneously, it is formally manifested as a gender egalitarian regime with formal institutions that secure and prescribe gender equality. Gender activism in the Chinese hybrid regime is therefore challenged on two fronts: The authoritarian legacy limits civil rights, including, among others, freedom of press, the right to free assembly, and the right of free speech; in addition, the traditional informal gender institutions of the patriarchal legacy have created a hostile atmosphere for gender activists, who are rejected by society and/or policy elites.

# 3. Beijing anti-domestic violence activism: a form of Chinese gender activism

The relationship between gender equality and DV is complex. Evidence suggests that gender inequalities increase the risk of violence by men against women and inhibit the ability of victims to seek protection (World Health Organization 2009). When gender inequalities prevail, women are often subordinated to men, which results in a lower social status of women and allows men control over them and a greater decision-making power (World Health Organization 2009; Hanser 2007: 208; Berkel and LaVerne 2007: 13; Walker 1999: 22; Hester 2004: 1433; Tang et al. 2002: 975). Such situations make women more vulnerable to physical, psychological, and sexual violence by men and hinder victims from getting help. As such, how a state deals with DV is a good indicator in understanding how well gender equality is supported and implemented by that state.

Gender relations are power relations.14 Unequal gender relations can be manifested in the form of laws and regulations and gender politics and policies, such as the one-child policy, or in informal institutions, such as the aforementioned *nei-wai* binary. As a result, gender-specific formal and informal institutions can express and consolidate unequal gender relations. In this way, the prevalence of DV is largely influenced by the existing gender politics and the resulting gender relations, making Beijing ADV activism a good case to exemplify how Chinese gender activism is wedged between the patriarchal and authoritarian legacy.

14 Power can be understood as a relationship between actors. This relationship is defined through actions that relate to the actions of another actor (cf. Foucault et al. 2005, 252).

# **3.1 From superficial public displays of goodwill to improved legal protection against DV**

DV remains a severe problem in the PRC.15 Depending on the study, between 24.7% and 54.6% females are victims of DV (All-China Women's Federation, Oct. 21, 2011: 4). It is not a new political issue, but resurfaced as a central topic in the mid-1990s. Until then most state measures were superficial public displays of goodwill (Milwertz 2003: 630). The reform and open policies marked a turning point for ADV activism. The reforms led not only to a boom of social organizations but also to an increase in women's organizations (Milwertz 2003; Zhang 2009; Kaufman 2009). This enhanced interest in women's issues was due to the aforementioned emerging negative outcomes of the reforms for women (Spakowski 2014; Xu 2009; Chen and Cheung 2011). Moreover, a growing number of women's organizations began engaging with the DV issue. DV reemerged as an important issue for several reasons. Besides a greater general awareness of women's issues, the PRC signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Human Rights in China [HRIC] 2006). By doing so, they committed themselves internationally to combatting DV and hence increased national support for ADV. Furthermore, Beijing hosted the "Fourth World Conference of Women" in 1995, which was organized and directed by the United Nations. DV was one of the four core issues broadly discussed by international scholars and – for the first time – Chinese practitioners and scholars (interview #2 with a founder and legal expert of a professional organization). In the following years, DV became more and more public. Especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, much has been improved in the legal sphere with regard to DV, for instance, the Marriage Law was revised in 2001 to include DV as an acceptable reason for divorce (Lü 2011), and local rules or policies dealing with DV in 28 out of 34 provinces or equivalent administrative regions were created (Creasey et al. December 2013). Nonetheless, DV remains a severe issue, and the

15 *Domestic violence* refers in the context of the PRC mostly to three sets of actions: physical violence (*Shenti baoli*, 身体暴力), psychic violence (*Jingshen baoli*, 精神暴力), and/or sexual violence (*Xingbali*,性暴力). For an in-depth discussion, cf. Zhang and Liu Meng (2004).

official Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the PRC was only introduced in the spring of 2016 (Li Jianhua 2016; Gao 2016; Gao et al. 2016). 16

#### **3.2 Main actors of Beijing ADV social and gender activism**

Beijing ADV activism is mostly comprised of expert organizations, which are driven by charismatic leaders rather than individual activists (interview #3 with the administrative director of a professional organization). The founders, employees, and volunteers of such organizations are mostly experts in their particular fields; for instance, there are legal scholars in legal aid organizations and social workers in organizations providing educational seminars for cadres. Most experts have been committed to tackling DV for a long time (interviews with a co-founder and legal expert, with a founder and legal expert, with a social work expert, and a managing director and media expert of professional organizations) and have well-established links to the political system, either through their networks or as a result of being embedded in established political and academic institutions (interviews with a cofounder and legal expert and a managing director and media expert of professional organizations). In Beijing, four organizations are crucially important to the ADV professional movement, all of which hold official registrations. To obtain an official registration status, organizations must be associated with state entities (Ma 2009); the state entities are responsible for their activities and thus function as a control mechanism. As a result of being highly networked and supervised, Beijing ADV organizations have a rather corporatist and nonconfrontational tactical orientation. Nonetheless, two of the four organizations lost their registration status in 2010 and had to reapply as independent nonprofit entities (interviews with a cofounder and legal expert and a managing director and media expert of professional organizations). This marks an important caesura in the Beijing ADV

16 For the entire law please check: http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-12/27/c\_128571791. htm. An unofficial translation can be found here: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%E5% 8F%8D%E5%AE%B6%E5%BA%AD%E6%9A%B4%E5%8A%9B%E6%B3%95-2015/? lang=en.

activism. Since all of these social organizations depend on external funding, which for most of them consists of international giving,17 Beijing ADV actors are especially vulnerable to changes in international funding trends.

The networks between all organizations were well institutionalized.18 Employees of all organizations were members of the same formal women's rights networks, which disseminate national and international gender-specific information mostly through internet channels, such as mailing lists and webpages. Moreover they frequently worked together on diverse projects, ranging from gender discrimination lawsuits to conferences and workshops. The offices of two of the four organizations were located in the same building, providing an infrastructure for easy informal exchange. This combination of institutionalized communication and geographic proximity led to strong networks that could be easily maintained and actions that could be easily coordinated.

#### **3.3 Strategic alignment of Beijing ADV actors**

Prior to 1995, psychological and emotional support for DV victims were cornerstones of ADV organizations' efforts. After 1995, this tactical approach changed; they increasingly turned to the legal dimension of DV and to raising awareness about the issue (interview #8 with a managing director and media expert of a professional organization). However, the nonconfrontational tactical approach adopted by ADV actors toward the party-state remained the same pre- and post-1995: they adapted to the prevailing political environment in which the party-state officially remained the dominant policy decisionmaker – one of the two Goliaths, the authoritarian legacy. As such, ADV

17 These organizations are reluctant to provide detailed listings of the funds they receive. They are afraid that public knowledge of their predominant dependence on foreign donors puts them at higher risk for backlashes by party-state actors.

18 The alliance changed profoundly in 2014 with the dissolution of one of the organizations, an umbrella organization which held a central role in the mobilization process of Beijing ADV activism. The organization claimed on their now inactive webpage that the main reason for its dissolution was that the draft for an ADV law was accepted for discussion into the NPC in 2013 and hence their proclaimed superordinate goal was achieved.

organizations provided legal recommendations, seminars, and workshops for policy cadres and other multipliers and conducted pilot projects on DV prevention. Especially awareness raising campaigns were supported by the ACWF.

These mobilization efforts were framed as supportive to the CCP's efforts. As a result, the organizations were able to establish themselves as important advisors for policy cadres regarding legal protection against DV (interview #1 with a co-founder and legal expert of a professional organization). In this sense, professional ADV organizations functioned as service providers and professional advocates simultaneously. Their advocacy was directed to a wide range of recipients from policy elites (such as members of the ACWF and NPC) to lawyers and judges. All of them were key figures in implementing formal and informal institutional change top-down.

On the other hand, the tactical approach of Beijing ADV activism was limited by the second Goliath, the patriarchal legacy. The ADV activists adapted their tactical approach to the narrow space open to gender activities. DV has long been a taboo topic, traditionally confined to the private sphere. This confinement to the private sphere is deeply rooted in the traditional Confucian gender regime in which female obedience to father, husband, son, and, as their representatives, the in-laws, is strongly anchored in considerable parts of society even today. Moreover, the *nei-wai* binary confines woman to the house and makes the family, where she has a subordinate role, her main frame of reference. Instead of disappearing, the *nei-wai* binary is, as discussed previously, advancing once again. Consequently female victims of DV face rather unsurmountable difficulties to defend themselves. If they remain in the rather traditional gender regime, they are expected to be obedient to the male family members and their representatives (the in-laws) and are not supposed to discuss their family matters in public. In fact it is exactly this behavior that is prohibited in the traditional Chinese proverb "Don't wash your dirty linen in public" (*Jia chou bu ke waiyang*, 家丑不可外扬), which effectively contains family quarrels and is often used to circumscribe DV as well.

Beijing ADV activism, for instance, designed their tactical approach to address the increasing sensitivity of the issue, in order to avoid scaring off possible recipients by violating DV taboos during awareness raising campaigns (interview #6 with a founder and legal expert of a professional organization). Most of the Beijing ADV activists followed a scattergun approach directed at policy elites, as they intended to mobilize key figures and gatekeepers who are better able to implement useful measures to fight DV. Moreover, by focusing the activism on policy elites, the activists emphasized the supportive, nonconfrontational nature of their initiatives; they simply framed themselves as *providing expertise to policy elites* and as *raising their awareness of emerging and existing blind spots*. As such, they framed themselves as neither challenging the party-state (authoritarian legacy) nor traditionalists (patriarchal legacy).

And, finally, Beijing ADV activists navigated between formal gender equality institutions and lingering informal Confucian gender institutions condemning DV to the private sphere. They clearly aligned their claims with the established gender equality of the Constitution or the Women's Law, but they designed their activities in a manner that did not vehemently contradict the prevailing condemnation of DV to the private sphere. Their campaigns are predominately designed for policy elites and as such are not public disturbances. If public awareness raising campaigns are held, they are not designed as huge events. Rather, they are planned in collaboration with other social organizations and the local ACWF branch. Since the ACWF is aware of the *local culture,* they can adapt the events to the specific micro-institutional context.

The composition and tactical alignment of Beijing ADV activism only recently underwent fundamental changes. Since 2012, individual volunteers have begun associating themselves with established ADV organizations and they have increasingly made their concerns public through staged public disturbances, thus deviating from the highly sensitive, nonconfrontational approach. This tactical approach was first applied in Beijing ADV activism, but has spread like wildfire to other issues of gender activism.

# **3.4 Recent trends of Beijing ADV activism: We are here, we are visible, and we demand change!**

ADV activism in Beijing has undergone drastic changes in terms of its personnel composition and tactical approaches since 2012. Although the changes were initiated by Beijing ADV activists, the new tactical approach has spread like wildfire, first in the nationwide ADV mobilization and then to other subjects of gender activism, such as the Occupy Men's Bathroom19 and Equal University Access20 campaigns.

This new tactical approach is often labeled "performance art public advocacy," which consists of live performances in public places for public audiences (Guo et al. 2013) and thus differs significantly from traditional advocacy tools such as lobbying (Wang Man 2012) or the compilation of (legal) recommendations for policy elites. It is an inclusive strategy and has the potential to receive broad media coverage due to its public event character; as such, it is an apt tool to raise public awareness and rally support for policy reforms. However, unlike ex-ante expectations, the actual media response is strikingly low, as I argue elsewhere.

The young people have a different way than the old … the previously existing approach based on experience and expert knowledge is completely different … The old approach relied on articles, experts, or the ACWF. But this new approach is a very direct activity; it is the freedom of speech of the public … These activities try to spur the public to discuss such hot topics. (Interview #4 with a resort manager of a professional organization, translation by author)

19 Occupy Men's Bathroom (*Zhanlin Nan Cesuo*, 占领男厕所) was initiated by feminist activists in Guandong in 2012 and was quickly taken up by feminist activists in many major cities in the PRC to tackle the problem of the limited number of public toilets for women. Women occupied men's public bathrooms to call for improved and increased facilities for women and the incorporation of women's needs in day-to-day activities.

20 Equal University Access activism refers to activities in 2012 in which young female activists used performance art public advocacy to demonstrate for the equal treatment of women in the university entry exams.

#### *3.4.1 The Injured Brides* as forerunner of a new tactical approach

In 2012 three women in Western wedding dresses adorned with red "blood" stains paraded down the *Qianmen* pedestrian street with signs drawing attention to the social problem of DV (Chen Di 2012). Their signs stated that love is no excuse for violence (*Ai bushi baoli de jiekou*. 爱不是暴力的借口), proclaimed a violence-free zone since equality is the precondition for harmony (*Baoli wutequ: pingdeng cahexie*. 暴力无特区: 平等才和谐), and questioned why the majority stayed silent despite DV occurring in close proximity to them (*Ni yiran chenmo? Baoli zai shenbian*. 你依然沉默?暴力在身本). *The Injured Brides* event is the first known occurrence of public performance art advocacy used in the Chinese women's movement (interviews with a social work expert and a managing director and media expert of professional organizations).

To stress the symbolism of the event, *The Injured Brides* took place on Valentine's Day 2012. The day is widely perceived as a special date (*Qingrenjie*, 情人节) symbolizing the celebration of harmonious intimate relationships. Within the women's movement, and particularly among ADV activists, Valentine's Day is also significant as the date of the international "V Day" campaign. V Day was initiated by Eve Ensler; inspired by reactions to her play *The Vagina Monologues*, the campaign calls for creative, simultaneous actions worldwide on Valentine's Day to raise awareness of and demand an end to violence against women. During *The Injured Brides* performance, DV was portrayed as symbolizing the dark side of intimate relationships, in sharp contrast to the romantic image of love that is commonly propagated on Valentine's Day. By using a topic relevant to every Chinese – love and marriage – and by contrasting the ideal of harmonious intimacy with DV, the activists hoped to draw attention to and rally support against DV (interview #4 with a resort manager of a professional organization).

The activists chose to parade down the famous *Qianmen* pedestrian street because it is known as one of the last remnants of the business center of old Beijing and is one of the top tourist locations. Given the high pedestrian traffic, the performance had the potential to reach a substantial audience: "Qianmen … is also Beijing's business district and there are quite a lot of people on the streets" (interview #5 with a public performance art activist; translation by author).

Moreover, *The Injured Brides* was repeatedly framed as the activism of independent volunteers, which emphasized the activists' separation from professional ADV organizations (Wang Man 2012; interview #4 with a resort manager of a professional organization). This framing stemmed from fear of reprisals against the ADV organizations involved (interview with a resort manager of a professional organization) if these collective social actors were perceived as initiators of public disturbances:

We always say it is an activity organized by volunteers, because it can bring along threats for the organizations. … The reporters are always very keen to know what organization we are representing, but if we would give them a name, the organization could experience diverse risks. … In Beijing we can discuss, organize, and conduct almost any activity, but if the police find out about it, if too many people know that we work this way, they [the authorities] can easily find a reason to shut us [the organizations] down. (Interview #4 with a resort manager of a professional organization; translation by author*)*

#### *3.4.2 Features of a new tactical turn*

This new tactical approach is innovatively enacting performances in public settings. Such performances are not directed at the attention of policy elites but media representatives (and through the latter, the broader public), who are drawn to the scene by means of the element of public disturbance: "They [the authorities] simply don't want to have any kind of controversy or incident; they simply don't want any kind of controversy or activity out on the street" (interview #4 with a resort manager of a professional organization; translation by author).

Disturbing the social order is part of the Chinese penal code, but due to its broad scope it is hard to define exactly which actions may constitute such a disturbance. It is a widespread practice to round up undesirable social elements, such as dissidents, labor activists, or initiators of other forms of disruption of the social order (Johnson 2005: 294).

This new tactic is in sharp contrast to the tactics of professional ADV organizations in Beijing. Whereas the professional organizations are not interested in challenging the established regime – neither the CCP rule nor possible remnants of the Confucian gender regime – public performance art activism is meant to expose traditional taboos and disturb the social order. These activists therefore run the risk of violating the penal code and disturbing the deep-seated informal institutions. In doing so, they challenge both Goliaths, the authoritarian legacy and the patriarchal legacy. And the risks associated with such social and gender activism are doubled as well.

However, to ease this twofold confrontational tactical approach, the activists keep framing their activity as supportive of the CCP. "Harmonious society" (*Hexie shehui* 和谐社会) is one of the central *social and political leitmotifs* propagated by the CCP to encourage social and political stability. The CCP still spends considerable amounts of financial resources on the establishment of the harmonious society slogan as an important pillar of Chinese society (Holbig and Gilley 2010). Activists conducting performance art advocacy consciously used this leitmotif to legitimize their claims (interview #4 with a resort manager of a professional organization). The signs carried down the *Qianmen* during *The Injured Brides* stated "Violence Free Zone: Equality is the Precondition of Harmony." The message hence emphasized the ongoing gender inequality in the PRC and brought out how a harmonious society could only be achieved after gender equality was established. The activists thus framed their public disturbance activity as supportive of official party-state propaganda, thereby trying to ease the confrontational character of the event.

Nonetheless, because this new tactical approach challenges the authoritarian and patriarchal legacies, activists are put at increased risk. This became most evident in March 2015 when five gender activists, three of whom were directly and indirectly involved in the introduction of this new approach, were detained by the CCP. The Beijing police charged them with "gathering crowds to disturb public order," not only for their conduct at *The Injured Brides* performance but also for the Occupy Men's Bathrooms campaign (Zhao 2015). Even Chinese feminist experts were surprised by the unexpected harsh behavior toward the gender activists (Zhao 2015). Ai Xiaoming, a well-known Chinese feminist scholar, argues that the detained activists became influential advocates and that the Chinese policy elites are most afraid of the entry of citizen expression in the public sphere. Therefore, these activists constituted a sustainable threat to social stability and were seen as uncontrollable because they seemed to have the potential to mobilize huge parts of the Chinese society (Zhao 2015).

# 4. Conclusions: gender activism wedged between authoritarian and patriarchal legacies

If we reflect on the forms of Beijing ADV activism, we find two interlinked tactical approaches. In the first stage of activism, the field was dominated by professional expert organizations, which were tightly embedded into the established control system of (collective) social actors. Their well-established networks with policy elites enabled them to function as advisors and experts and, hence, to some degree, to influence policy decision-making. Moreover, these organizations conducted important groundwork to raise awareness for DV. In the second stage of Beijing ADV activism, provocative, progressive, and rather independent activists appeared whose aims contrasted sharply with those of the professional ADV organizations; they sought a huge media impact, they wanted to shake-up and wake-up society.

The potential impact of gender activism largely depends on the selected tactical approach. Professional gender organizations are able to support (legal) improvements in the gender realm and in state-society relations. However, these changes do not reflect the *huge expectations* of a Western democratic and gender equal society. Professional gender organizations are able to consult with policy elites and participate as experts in decision-making process if they stick to the CCP's rules to operate in a nonconfrontational and incorporated manner. In such cases, they actually become important experts in their field and have an impact on the official policy process. Moreover, they are able to influence CCP gender politics, most notably the enacted legal improvements in the realm of DV. However, gender activism such as FEMEN21 is far-fetched

21 According to the FEMEN website, "FEMEN is an international women's movement of brave topless female activists painted with the slogans and crowned with flowers." For more information please check: https://femen.org/about-us/

because it violates both the established gender institutions and the guidelines of the political regime.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the later tactical approach is built on the earlier one; without the awareness raising campaigns of the professional ADV organizations it seems unlikely that the performance art advocacy activists would have had any positive impact. In that sense the activism of the professional organizations created greater leeway for the subsequent young and provocative activists.

Moreover, gender activism remains wedged between two Goliaths – the authoritarian and patriarchal legacies. While this article indicates that both kinds of activists are able to influence policy elites and impact policy decision-making, it seems activists are more likely to be successful if they incorporate themselves into the control system established by the CCP for social actors and do not confront gender inequalities too loudly or publicly. When using the latter tactics, the activists' risk seems to double, most notably in the current unexpected and hard crackdown on social and gender activists.

# References

Fulda, Andreas/Li, Yanyan/Song, Qinghua (2012): New Strategies of Civil Society in China: a case study of the network governance**Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.** approach. In: Journal of Contemporary China 21, 76, pp. 675–693. DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2012.666837.

Foucault, Michel (et al.) (2005): Analytik der Macht. Frankfurt a.M.:Suhrkamp.

of Chinese tradition. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press (Introduction to Asian civilization), pp. 821–824.

# Appendix

#### **Interviews**

# In the Shadow of Autocracy. Gender Politics in Chile

Patricia Graf *Patricia Graf*

# 1. Introduction

Gender Politics in Chile

Women's movements have become an established area of research in the analysis of democratization processes. A wide range of studies show that women's movements have influenced democratization throughout the world by integrating women's rights into policy making processes (Boris 1998; Jaquette 1994). Women's movements thus play an important role not only in overcoming autocratic regimes but also in shaping democracy. Under this view, women's movements in democratic transitions are acclaimed for their emancipatory potential; however, the fact that authoritarian regimes in transition are also working to consolidate their authoritarian ideals of gender relations often fades into the background. For instance, the study of Woods and Frankenberger (2016) on family policy in authoritarian states showed that "electoral autocracies" – autocracies in which staged elections take place – are able to preserve their traditional gender policies. They allow the opening process while maintaining control over national identities and existing gender relations.

The mechanisms and discourses that might lead to such a consolidation are examined in this chapter in light of the role of women's movements in Chile's democratic transition. The case of Chile was selected, on the one hand, because it exhibits particularly resistant authoritarian institutional enclaves. On the other, Chilean women's movements are often cited as a paragon of women's movements in transitions. In public opinion and scientific literature (Valenzuela 1998; Jaquette 1994; Franceschet and Macdonald 2004), Chilean women's movements are regarded as playing a decisive role in resistance to the dictatorship. Despite the central role of Chilean women's movements as a

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strong civil society force, especially for gender politics, institutions and gender images inherited from the autocratic regime (e.g., conservative divorce and reproductive rights) have remained dominant. I argue that in the time of transition there was a "normalization of hegemonic discourses of the authoritarian" (Graf, Schneider, and Wilde 2017: 79) that stabilized conservative institutions and gender images. In this chapter, I examine the nature of these normalization processes, as well as the role played by civil society in this normalization. The theoretical basis of this chapter is the governmental perspective on gender relations, which assigns an important role to civil society in the stabilization of transitioning regimes; the focus of this chapter is on the predominant discourses in democratic opening and closing processes (Graf, Schneider, and Wilde 2017).

The study of Chilean women's movements is based on a literature review of the role of women's movements in transition politics and on a secondary analysis of speeches and interviews of movement members and members of the transition regime. In the first step, the case study focuses on a concrete legislative process, the Law on Domestic Violence. This policy was chosen because its analysis clearly demonstrates how the conservative family image from the dictatorship was normalized in a democratic context. In a second step, I examine the role of women's movements in democratic transitions. For this purpose, the initial situation of the women's movement at the end of the dictatorship is presented. On this basis, I analyze how the women's movement became more and more divided after the end of the dictatorship and how this was accompanied by a normalization of authoritarian discourse. It will be shown how this normalization has even influenced the gender policies of recent president in office Michelle Bachelet.

# 2. Theoretical background

Gender relations play an important role in securing the stability of authoritarian regimes and in de-democratization. Numerous cases, such as the military dictatorship in Spain or the Peruvian gender policy under Fujimori, highlight the influence of autocratic regimes on gender relations. There are, however, large gaps in research on gender relations in autocracies and transitional regimes. The gender images and roles often found in informal institutions and power relations are neglected due to the common focus on the "deficits" of formal institutions. Studies in comparative analysis have emerged that systematically explore the role of gender relations in autocracies. In recent times, this strand of research has focused on the legitimacy of autocratic regimes (cf. Gerschewski et al. 2013). This approach assumes that autocratic regimes not only accumulate output legitimacy, for example by means of political results and regime performance, but also generate input legitimacy.

Democratic regimes achieve input legitimacy through democratic consent. It has long been assumed that among autocratic regimes only the electoral autocracies could access this source of input legitimacy, because they connect the population by means of pseudo-elections (Buzogány, Frankenberger, and Graf 2016). As Hannah Arendt asserted, authoritarian regimes still have other sources of input legitimacy, with ideologies and identity policies playing central roles. Ideology "promises to explain all historical happenings, the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the future" (Arendt 1951/1966: 470). Recent reflections on the role of legitimacy in autocracies are taking up this perspective once again (for an overview, see Kailitz and Wurster 2017).

As Arendt pointed out in her remarks on totalitarian rule, totalitarian systems seek to destroy social pluralism: "Ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction" (Arendt 1951/1966: 471). In terms of gender relations, this means that pluralist gender subject positions are replaced with uniform images. These images – embedded in ideologies and identity policies – are very influential (Wilde 2012). I argue that this holds true for autocracies, too. Authoritarian regimes can use their gender policies to transport their ideologies and express their visions of family, social security, education, and gender roles (cf. Woods and Frankenberger 2016).

What is the relationship between the gender policies of autocracies and transitional regimes? Gender research so far has mainly analyzed the effects of

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gender on formal and informal institutions (Waylen 2015). The research strand of historical institutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) assumes that both formal and informal institutions are not simply replaced but can be "deposited" in later regimes. During regime transitions, powerful actors negotiate which institutions of the authoritarian system will be "inherited" and the limits of civilian rule (Fuentes 2000: 112). Who are the actors of negotiation? Studies on women's movements in Latin America (Franceschet and Macdonald 2004; Valenzuela 1998), authoritarian Spain (Threlfall 2013), and Eastern Europe (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998) indicate that some of them exerted pressure on authoritarian regimes.

Literature on international norm creation and norm entrepreneurs suggests that organized civil society can contribute to political opening by pressuring the regime to implement international women's rights on a national level (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Rošul-Gajić 2014). These women's movements successfully linked national and international levels, which enabled them to influence and shape discourse about gender. Knowledge of how discourses are negotiated and shaped is helpful when considering gender in autocracy and transition scholarship for two reasons. On the one hand, it shows that discourse is also subject to powerful negotiations in autocracies. On the other, such an understanding offers another perspective in contrast to the monolithic field of populism, which emphasizes the discourse of charismatic leaders who seek to generate input legitimacy by exalting the people and who ascribe traits to the actors of civil society.

Literature on norm creation is helpful for investigating the breakdown of autocratic discourse, as it emphasizes the dynamics of change and the significance of networked actors in an organized civil society. However, literature on international norm entrepreneurs has a strong normative foundation. Organized civil society is automatically perceived as the antithesis to autocrats; it is a "school of democracy" (Graf, Schneider, and Wilde 2017: 73). This normative assumption is also expressed in the standard definitions of civil society: "Civil society is the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (Diamond 1999: 221). But such a normative

assumption obscures the internal power relations of actors of movements or of state institutions.

On the one hand, the "voluntary" aspect of civil society automatically connects its actors to instruments of deliberation; actors are seen as persons who would not resort to coercion or oppression. Yet, there are examples of social movements that are not based on internal democratic processes, such as the Peruvian guerrilla movement Luminous Path. All in all, "social movements cannot simply be equated with democracy" (Roth 1999: 48). On the other hand, definitions of civil society like the one provided by Diamond position social movements outside of the power and hierarchy of the state. To understand the power of civil society in transitions, we must consider its connection to the government apparatus. As Wilde (2014) shows, in accordance with Gramsci, civil society has the function of supporting the transition regime's institutions. It can thus serve to stabilize conservative institutions and gender images. This stabilization is referred to by Graf et al. as a "normalization of antifeminist and conservative gender images" (2017: 82): there is the generation of norms on the one hand, and on the other gender images are being explained as "normal," everyday practices – despite their contestation by parts of civil society. This process of normalization, however, generates input legitimacy for the transition regime because it helps to form a "we-feeling," or a collective identity.

To refer to such conservative institutions and gender images, I use the term "authoritarian gender regime." According to Henninger and Ostendorf, gender regimes focus on "the core political question of politics and power" (2005: 20). The focus is thus not only on how formal and informal institutions shape gender relations, but also on the power and domination relations underlying discursive practices and gender norms (Bothfeld 2008).

How can we define authoritarian gender regimes? Friedrich und Brzezinski define authoritarianism as "any political system in which the rulers are insufficiently, or not at all, subject to antecedent and enforceable rules of law – enforceable, that is, by other authorities who share in the government and who have sufficient power to compel the lawbreaking rulers to submit to the law" (1965: 5). In the absence of pluralism and diversity, autocracies are based on ideologies and mentalities that support the regime and maintain a unified national identity (Buzogány, Frankenberger, and Graf 2016). Authoritarian gen-

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der regimes are thus characterized by the fact that political positions and resources influencing gender relations are beyond the scope of state institutions and practices. Second, the gender norms and discourses of authoritarian gender regimes are based on ideologies and mentalities that do not allow a variety of gender images. Gender norms that could become "dangerous" for the regime are thus precluded. In transitions, authoritarian gender regimes must compete with democratic gender regimes. The authoritarian gender regime can become normalized in this process.

The mechanisms and discourses contributing to this normalization are investigated in the following in the case of Chilean gender policy during the transitional government of Patricio Aylwin (1989–1994). Subsequently, I analyze the aftereffects of gender norms established during the transitional government and how they shaped the scope of reform of gender policy under Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010, 2014–2018).

# 3. Gender policies in Chile

Among Latin American countries, Chile is often presented as a model for the successful transition to democracy. Chile is seen as exemplary in terms of it rule of law and economic performance (Hillebrand 2004). It is categorized as a consolidated democracy and depicted as a successful system transformation (Merkel 2010). When Patricio Aylwin, the first democratically elected president, took over the political leadership in Chile after sixteen years of military rule, he removed the last military dictatorship in the southern part of Latin America. Nevertheless, authoritarian ideologies are still at work in the subjects, mentalities, and institutions and guide the thoughts and actions of the people. Authoritarian enclaves – authoritarian institutional "islands" within a democratic political system – contribute to this effect. These enclaves are still apparent in several policy areas, including the area of gender policy. In the following, I will examine which mechanisms and discourses led to the negotiation and stabilization of these enclaves.

# 4. The establishment of an authoritarian gender regime during military dictatorship

Chilean women's movements played an important part in the transition to democracy. They are considered as one of the few movements capable of acting during the military dictatorship, since civil society organizations operating within the parties and trade unions were violently oppressed (Boris 1998). The motives of the women who organized during the military dictatorship were highly varied. On the one hand, women of different backgrounds organized soup kitchens in poverty-stricken areas (Boris 1998). On the other, women increasingly took over the role of breadwinners due to the "disappearance" of many men during the military dictatorship. Also, the neo-liberal, export-oriented policy created new employment opportunities for women, especially in the agricultural sector. Toward the end of the military dictatorship, these women workers organized themselves in the fight for better labor rights (Tinsman 2000). They also organized to protest human rights violations and to search for those who disappeared.

The military regime was not blind to the formation of the women's movement. In an effort to suppress alternative visions of society, eliminate anti-regime tendencies, and control gender relations, Augusto Pinochet created the National Women's Office (SERNAM). His wife, Lucia Hiriart, served as director and was joined by several officers' wives and upper-class women in the administration (Chuchryk 1994, 2016). SERNAM was intended to generate legitimacy for the military regime and to propagate Pinochet's vision of the "patriarchal family" as the ideal order. In Pinochet's vision, women were to concentrate on family affairs, patriotic childhood upbringing, welfare, and the fight against poverty (Thomas 2016). This traditional division (vision) of gender roles was not unique to Pinochet, as it had already been promoted under the rule of Salvador Allende: the slogan of the leading parties under Allende was "Give land to the man who works it," which institutionalized gender-specific land rights (Tinsman 2000: 158). Fischer describes the Chilean agrarian reform under Allende as representing a "monstrous" masculine, heteronormative ideal (2016: 41). To sum up, during the final period of the military dictator-

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ship there was a broad women's movement which made demands on the military regime. The military regime responded by founding SERNAM as the first Chilean institution for gender policy.

# 5. Normalization of authoritarian gender images during the transition

In 1988 Pinochet lost his own referendum, which would have secured him a "second term." This opened the way for Chile's transition to democracy. However, the conservative gender and family images of the dictatorship survived this referendum and were normalized during the first years of the transition.

The focus of the first democratically elected transitional government under Patricio Aylwin was how to cope with past human rights abuses. Here, too, conservative gender images were passed down. Since Aylwin was severely restricted and under pressure by numerous prerogatives still possessed by the military, he chose the discourse of the *Reconciliación* in order to enforce a human rights policy oriented toward reconciliation and forgiveness. Aylwin applied the strategy of non-cooperation with the military and tried to limit the constitutional power of the military, i.e., the authoritarian enclaves within the democratic constitution. Aylwin's establishing of the Rettig Commission to investigate human rights violations led to the *Dia de Enlace*: In response to the commission's institutionalization, Pinochet ordered unannounced military exercises throughout the country (Fuentes 2000). In terms of human rights policy, Aylwin made concessions.

This influenced Aylwin's understanding of the transition, which he claimed was completed with the first democratic election, as well as his assertion that the view should now be directed toward the future (Forstenzer 2017). Human rights violations should only be pursued "as far as possible" (Hiner and Azocar 2015). Above all, the Catholic Church was able to make use of its proximity to the Christian Democratic Party in order to implement its vision of reconstruction. Actors of the Church and of the conservative parties were key to shaping the discourse of the *Renacimiento*, the rebirth of Chile. For this rebirth, a consensus was necessary. Victims of political or sexualized violence as well as of ill treatment and other criminal acts that did not end with death were excluded from the first report on the crimes of the dictatorship, the so-called Rettig report. Correspondingly, the report produced a picture of a dictatorship that had mainly been violent to men (Hiner and Azócar 2015). The fact that women during the military dictatorship engaged in acts of political resistance and suffered massive human rights violations is usually excluded from the debates accompanying this development (Hiner and Azócar 2015). At the presentation of the report, Aylwin reiterated the formula of reconciliation: "For the good of Chile we must look to the future that unites us more than the past that separates us … Forgiveness requires regret by one party and generosity by the other" (cited in Hiner and Azócar 2015: 57).

The discourse of reconciliation and consensus meant the continuation of the dictatorship's gender policies, namely, they were left untouched or even linked to liberal norms. This is reflected in domestic violence legislation. It was a major concern of feminist organizations in the first years of transition to pass legislation in this arena (Haas 2010). In 1994 the Chilean Government signed the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Elimination of Violence against Women. This increased the pressure of feminist activists on the Chilean Government to become active in this area, which Aylwin seemed open to, as he had already put stopping violence against women on the reform agenda. However, when the Socialist Party introduced a corresponding bill, the Senate called for cooperation with SERNAM (Haas 2010). SERNAM converted the draft into a bill for the prevention and punishment of "family violence" to protect the family (and the woman in it with her "natural" role) (Ríos Tobar and Marcela 2007). Right-wing parties were bothered by the term "family violence," since it questioned the natural order of the institution of marriage (Hiner and Azócar 2015). Aylwin solved the dilemma once again by founding a National Family Commission. As in the case of the Rettig Commission, the aim was to establish a consensus and an expert committee. Aylwin stated that he wanted to avoid "to go to the press, get involved in controversies or produce spectacular effects." He continued, "[I]t is a commission like the Rettig Commission, which accomplished its mission well, that aims to work in

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silence and with due gravitas" (speech by Patricio Aylwin cited in Hiner and Azócar 2015: 62).

When the bill finally entered the conservative Senate in 1993, the debate on family violence was framed in antifeminist terms: "[T]here is no worse family violence than abortion and divorce," noted Senator Eugenio Cantuarias, member of the right-wing party *Unión Demócrata Independiente.* Senator of the ruling Christian Democratic Party Nicolas Díaz expressed his opinion, which still influences the discussion on women's and reproductive rights: "[T]he most brutal violence is that used to assassinate a child in the uterus" (cited in Hiner and Azócar 2015: 62–63). From an initially feminist reform proposal emerged a discussion that granted antifeminist discourse a prominent place.

SERNAM assumed a moderate position in this dispute to avoid damaging its own institution. Controversial issues such as domestic violence and reproductive rights were downplayed and less controversial issues of gender equality were taken up. Differences – deviant gender images or identities (e.g., indigenous groups such as the Mapuche ) – had no room in this conception of gender policy; the intersectionality of discrimination on the basis of race and sex was therefore neglected by SERNAM (Richards 2005). An activist who identifies as Mapuche describes her interaction with SERNAM concerning the acceptance of intersectionality in politics in the following passage:

"It hasn't been talked about [intersectionality], this is only starting recently. But generally before, they talked about the issue of gender, and that doesn't fit, because the relations between men and women in Western culture is one, and within Mapuche culture, it's another. Our way of relating with men is different. So long as they don't recognize us as a people, they are always going to try to assimilate us, so that we will be the same as the Chileans". (Richards 2005: 212)

Considering the broad landscape of feminist organizations and women's movements that contributed decisively to ending the Pinochet dictatorship, how was such a normalization of antifeminist and conservative gender models possible at all? First, it must be noted that social movements generally lost their influence in the transition to democracy, as political participation – similar to the time before the dictatorship – was concentrated strongly on the political parties. If the "public invisibility" (Chuchryk 1994) of women had opened a window of opportunity for political organization during the dictatorship, it now limited their engagement: the candidates of the first elections were mostly male. This is also the fault of the binominal electoral system, which is advantageous for well-known politicians from established families and disadvantageous for less-familiar female candidates.

For this reason, a group of women belonging to the parties of the center-left coalition came together with independent feminists in the *Concertación de Mujeres por la Democracia* (Coalition of Women for Democracy). They formulated a program to be included in the election program *Concertación* (Chuchryk 1994). However, this led to further divisions between the women's movements: The presence of a common enemy, Pinochet, had bonded the extremely heterogeneous women's movements. Many leftist activists had already established close ties with the Left and Center parties during the dictatorship. This close connection to the state provoked protest among many smaller radical organizations and led to the division of the movements. This division was encouraged by the institutionalization of women's policy in expert committees and institutions, such as SERNAM, and the establishment of a state feminism in which, most importantly, the "institutionalists" (Forstenzer 2017: 171) among the activists were included. Their strategy was to adapt feminist demands to the dominant power relations and social narratives. In addition to the institutionalists and radical activists, there was another group of young women who, after the end of the dictatorship, focused their efforts on organizations that reflected traditional gender roles, e.g., parent organizations and religious associations (Marques-Pereira 2005). In general women only rarely became political party members or worked actively in political parties. And Marques-Pereira noted the political disinterest of young Chileans during the transition period, which was evident in their low rates of electoral registration, i.e., a large portion of young Chileans passed up their chance to vote.

To sum up, during the transition to democracy, Chilean gender policies, as well as the treatment of dictatorship violence, focused on generating a politics of consensus in expert committees. As a result, everyday violence and oppression in Chilean society remained in the dark: "After so many years of violent dictatorship, we as a society were inclined to blame the military and thus were unable to recognize the daily violence in our families" (Bacigalupe 2000: 438).

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A hegemonic discourse became in due time the norm. This discourse determined societal relations and the way to deal with the authoritarian past: through the narrative of reconstruction, Chilean society was depicted as a whole. Key to this discourse was the hegemonic unity of the Chilean people, which excluded deviant gender images or identities. This normalization was made possible by a division of civil society in view of its relation to the transition state. The price paid for the institutionalization of gender policies and for allowing female activists to hold political positions was an extreme narrowing of women's and gender policies to the dominant narrative. Thus, parts of the gender regime were democratized, the parts that had access to political power and resources. But in concrete policies – in the underlying mentalities and attitudes of those who took part in shaping these policies – there was also a normalization of aspects of the authoritarian gender regime. How do these gender policies of the transition affect Chile today? In the following, I consider Chilean gender policy under the two presidencies of Michelle Bachelet and show how the narrow discursive window of gender policy has influenced reform efforts.

# 6. Chile under Bachelet

President Michelle Bachelet has faced high expectations regarding reforms in the field of gender policy. Because she represents the Socialist Party, there was great hope that she would tackle social inequality. And because Bachelet herself is a victim of the dictatorship, many expected her to bring new momentum to the debate on the accountability of past crimes. She also represented feminist positions and advocated gender justice (Stevenson 2012).

Nevertheless, Bachelet's own resume is ambivalent. On the one hand, she pushed forward several important changes: SERNAM has been reformed several times and has gained importance. In her first term (2006–2010), Bachelet succeeded in strengthening SERNAM institutionally, and in her second term (2014–2018) SERNAM was institutionalized as a full-fledged ministry. Furthermore, more and more female politicians connected to feminist groups and NGOs and with political experience in the field of women's policy have taken up SERNAM leadership positions (Thomas 2016).

Another milestone is Bachelet's important reforms, such as the introduction of legislation to decriminalize therapeutic abortion, which was adopted in September 2016 by the Senate. That women have been waiting for this law since the beginning of the transition – twenty-seven years – shows how powerful discourses about the "holy family" and the role of woman still are, even today. According to Stevenson (2012), Bachelet had to bring in all her presidential power to get this law passed. The fact that such a bill could pass the Senate in conservative Chile, in the end, testifies to the power and patience of women's movements and feminist activists.

Bachelet also succeeded in increasing women's descriptive representation. Chile has historically been a country with low female representation both in politics and in the economy. In 2014, only 15.8% of all senators were female (Gender Inequality Index). And access to executive positions in the economy has grown only slightly since the transition (UNDP 2010).

As discussed above, low female representation is mainly due to the binominal electoral system. Bachelet took this as her starting point and in her second term finally pushed through a reform of the electoral system that she had been preparing for many years. With the election of the Chamber of Deputies in November 2017, the reformed electoral system enters into force, which includes the introduction of gender quotas: On the party lists, the number of female and male candidates must not exceed 60% of the total candidates. For every female candidate, the party will be "rewarded" by the state. Parties receive \$20,000 (Gamboa and Morales 2016) for each elected female representative or senator. Even more important is Bachelet's reform of the executive branch to include more women's appointments, as the executive has greater power than congress in the centralized political system of Chile (Stevenson 2012). Bachelet pursued this practice at least at the beginning of the first term; after several political crises, two female ministers were replaced by male colleagues.

Despite these milestones, Bachelet faces strong criticism and seems to disappoint many. For example, leading women's and indigenous organizations complain that SERNAM still pursues family rights at the expense of women's

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rights. And the intersectionality of discrimination due to race and gender is completely dismissed in official policies (CEDEM 2012). The criticism of women's organizations is directed at all areas: sexualized violence by policemen; weak legislation on sexual harassment; inadequate protection of gays and lesbians; inadequate protection and social security of indigenous peoples, especially the Mapuche; and the existing gender wage gap, to name only a few.

Another point of criticism is the insufficient reform of the pension system. This has been a problem since Pinochet's pension privatization. To receive the guaranteed minimal pension, a minimal number of monthly payments has to be paid. However, given the little competition among private providers, three large financial groups are able to hold a quasi-monopoly position. A great deal of criticism arose because a large proportion of Chileans could not reach the minimum pension from the second pillar, since at least 240 regular monthly pensions had to be paid. In the year 2000, 56.7% of all Chileans failed to reach this number. Informal workers in the low-wage sector with frequent work interruptions were particularly disadvantaged (Staab 2016).

With the reforms, the third pillar of voluntary amounts was strengthened, and these were now tax deductible. But this only created incentives for those who earned more. In 2008 Bachelet tried to reform the pension system once again. The reform was explicitly connoted as a "gender reform," and Bachelet pointed to gender injustices in the pension system as the main motivation. The most important element of this reform was the consideration of unpaid care work (regardless of the gender of the care worker). However, the pension reform had to pass Congress and Senate, where an alliance of economic interests and right-wing parties was opposed to a gender-independent payment of care work. The compromise was a maternalist policy exclusively for women: women received child "bonuses," or supplements, for their unpaid care work (Staab 2016). Bachelet wanted to involve the interests of many women's organizations. But because the importance of gender equality in care work was not heeded, the traditional image of the caring mother was strengthened (Staab 2017). A former minister commented on the persistence of these gender images in social policy: "I would say that [the social security system] is like a building with a strong conceptual foundation" (cited in Staab 2016: 125). And this building could not be completely remodeled.

# 7. Conclusion

In the transition to democracy, conservative gender images and roles that emerged during the military dictatorship or even earlier were perpetuated. This was possible due to the establishment of a discourse of reconciliation, which conceived of Chileans as a unified whole in an effort to prioritize (economic) progress. Divergent roles, gender images, and conflictive topics had no place in this discourse. Attempts to implement international standards on the national level were unsuccessful, because they were reinterpreted and integrated into conservative notions of gender relations. The politics of reconciliation led to a division of organized civil society, as only parts of society found a place in the "rebirth" of Chile.

The establishment of a hegemonic discourse was possible by establishing a state feminism and integrating the "institutionalists" among the women's movements into SERNAM. This integration divided radical women's movements and institutionalists; it also weakened feminist demands, because in the desire to extend the influence of the SERNAM the institutionalists adapted feminist demands to the dominant power relations and societal narratives. Thus, the authoritarian gender regime was only partially reformed: access to positions of power and resources were changed, but the conservative discourses and gender images of the old military dictatorship were carried over to the new democratic regime. Young Chileans, who could have potentially brought about change, were rather apathetic and stayed away from the ballots and from political organizations.

More than two decades after the end of the dictatorship, these conservative discourses still limit the political frame and possibilities of Bachelet, who explicitly sought gender and social policy reform. In the area of care and pension policy, traditional gender roles are extremely persistent. This is also due to socially divided attitudes toward gender equality and the gendered division of labor. A survey by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shows that while 62% of the population strongly support or at least accept the traditional role distribution (UNDP 2010, 5), 38% of the population, especially young adults and women, at least support the equal distribution of roles or believe that the state should be more committed to gender equality and diversity.

The reform of the electoral system will hopefully lead not only to an increase in descriptive representation but also substantial representation. It might also lead to the integration of feminist demands and issues of gender justice and intersectionality on a broader basis into the political system. It can be stated that the previous electoral system brought about a narrowing of political content, since candidates representing critical issues did not receive a place on the party lists. As Waylen (2006) shows in the example of the constitutionalization process in Iraq, the guarantee of descriptive representation is not enough if in the transition process there are already elements of an authoritarian gender regime in the constitution.

# References

Arendt, Hannah (1951/1966): The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Verlag.

# Authors

Bräuer, Stephanie, M.A., Political Scientist at WWU Münster. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Graf, Patricia, Prof. Dr., Political Scientist at BSP Business School Berlin. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Hinterhuber, Eva Maria, Prof. Dr., Sociologist at Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences.

E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Mushaben, Joyce, Prof. Dr., Political Scientist at University of Missouri, St. Louis. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Obuch, Katharina, Dr., Political Scientist at WWU Münster. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Panreck, Isabelle-Christine, Dr., Political Scientist at WWU Münster. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Sandhaus, Jasmin, M.A., Project Manager at Academy for Research and Teaching of Practical Politics Bonn. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Schneider, Silke, Dr., Political Scientist at University of Hagen. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Wilde, Gabriele, Prof. Dr., Political Scientist at WWU Münster. E-Mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Zimmer, Annette, Prof. Dr., Political Scientist at WWU Münster.


**Author details**

Norm R. Warpinski

Pinnacle—A Halliburton Service, Houston, Texas, USA

#### **References**

[1] Albright, J. N, & Pearson, C. F. Acoustic Emissions as a Tool for Hydraulic Fracture Location: Experience at the Fenton Hill Hot Dry Rock Site. Society of Petroleum Engi‐ neers Journal. (1982). , 22(4), 523-530.

[2] Batchelor, A. S, Baria, R, & Hearn, K. Monitoring the Effects of Hydraulic Stimulation by Microseismic Event Location: A Case Study. SPE 12109 In: SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, October, (1983). San Francisco, California., 5-8.

**5. Summary**

132 Effective and Sustainable Hydraulic Fracturing

might cause damage.

**Acknowledgements**

**Author details**

Norm R. Warpinski

**References**

Microseismic monitoring is a very useful tool for optimizing fracture treatments, evaluating completion schemes, and assessing well layouts and spacing in unconventional reservoirs. The microseismicity is induced by the reservoir changes resulting from the hydraulic fracturing process. The dimensions and orientation of the fracture can usually be deduced from the microseismic distribution, and it is often possible to determine other features of the fracturing

It is important to understand the geomechanical process that occurs during fracturing to best interpret the microseismic distribution and to fully understand the value of any source analyses, such as moment tensor inversion. The perturbations imparted to the reservoir during

Microseismicity monitoring has provided a very large data base from which environmental impacts of fracturing can be assessed. With thousands of fractures monitored, there is clear evidence that fractures do not extend the thousands of feet vertically to the shallow depths of typical aquifers. Fractures are generally much longer than they are tall as a result of the rock

Microseismicity monitoring has also provided evidence that hydraulic fractures are not likely to generate felt earthquakes in anything other than the rarest circumstances. Most of the seismic activity induced by a hydraulic fracture has energy levels that are 1,000 to 1,000,000 times smaller than events that would be felt at the surface, and even much farther below those that

[1] Albright, J. N, & Pearson, C. F. Acoustic Emissions as a Tool for Hydraulic Fracture Location: Experience at the Fenton Hill Hot Dry Rock Site. Society of Petroleum Engi‐

fracturing are usually very large and can result in unexpected behaviour, if ignored.

process, such as complexity, asymmetry, and interaction with geohazards.

mechanic barriers that result from sedimentary structures.

The author thanks Halliburton for permission to publish this paper.

Pinnacle—A Halliburton Service, Houston, Texas, USA

neers Journal. (1982). , 22(4), 523-530.

[12] Fisher, M. K, Wright, C. A, Davidson, B. M, Goodwin, A. K, Fielder, E. O, Buckler, W. S, & Steinsberger, N. P. Integrating Fracture Mapping Technologies to Optimize Stimulations in the Barnett Shale. SPE Production & Facilities. (2005). , 20(2), 85-93.

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Understanding Hydraulic Fracture Growth, Effectiveness, and Safety Through Microseismic Monitoring

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[25] Agarwal, K, Mayerhofer, M. J, & Warpinski, N. R. Impact of Geomechanics on Micro‐ seismicity. SPE152835 In: SPE/EAGE European Unconventional Resources Confer‐

[26] Fisher, M. K, & Warpinski, N. R. Hydraulic Fracture Height Growth: Real Data. SPE

[27] Warpinski, N. R, Du, J, & Zimmer, U. Measurements of Hydraulic-Fracture-Induced Seismicity in Gas Shales. SPE Production & Operations (2012). , 27(3), 240-252.

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[25] Agarwal, K, Mayerhofer, M. J, & Warpinski, N. R. Impact of Geomechanics on Micro‐ seismicity. SPE152835 In: SPE/EAGE European Unconventional Resources Confer‐ ence and Exhibition, March, (2012). Vienna, Austria., 20-22.

[12] Fisher, M. K, Wright, C. A, Davidson, B. M, Goodwin, A. K, Fielder, E. O, Buckler, W. S, & Steinsberger, N. P. Integrating Fracture Mapping Technologies to Optimize Stimulations in the Barnett Shale. SPE Production & Facilities. (2005). , 20(2), 85-93. [13] Maxwell, S. C, Urbancik, T. I, Steinsberger, N. P, & Zinno, R. Microseismic Imaging of Hydraulic Fracture Complexity in the Barnett Shale. SPE77440 In: SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, 29 September-2 October, (2002). San Antonio,

[14] Pearson, C. The Relationship between Microseismicity and High Pore Pressure Dur‐ ing Hydraulic Stimulation Experiments in Low Permeability Granitic Rocks. Journal

[15] Warpinski, N. R, Wolhart, S. L, & Wright, C. A. Analysis and Prediction of Microseis‐

[16] Aki, K, & Richards, P. G. Quantitative Seismology, 2nd Edition. University Science

[17] Warpinski, N. R, & Teufel, L. W. Influence of Geologic Discontinuities on Hydraulic

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[19] Nasseri MHBThompson B., Schubnel A., and Young RP. Acoustic Emission Monitor‐ ing of Mode I Fracture Toughness (CCNBD) Test in Lac du Bonnet Granite. ARMA/ USRMS In: 40th US Symposium on Rock Mechanics. 25-29 June, (2005). Anchorage,

[20] Chitrala, Y, Sondergeld, C. H, & Rai, C. R. Acoustic Emission Studies of Hydraulic Fracture Evolution Using Different Fluid Viscosities. ARMA In: 46th US Rock Me‐ chanics/Geomechanics Symposium., 24-27 June, (2012). Chicago, Illinois., 12-597. [21] Warpinski, N. R, Mayerhofer, M. J, Agarwal, K, & Du, J. Hydraulic Fracture Geome‐ chanics and Microseismic Source Mechanisms. SPE158935 In: SPE Annual Technical

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[23] Nordgren, R. P. Propagation of a Vertical Hydraulic Fracture. Society of Petroleum

[24] Cipolla, C, Warpinski, N. R, Mayerhofer, M. J, Lolon, E. P, & Vincent, M. C. The Rela‐ tionship Between Fracture Complexity, Reservoir Properties, and Fracture Treatment

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134 Effective and Sustainable Hydraulic Fracturing

**Section 2**

**Naturally Fractured Reservoirs 1**

**Naturally Fractured Reservoirs 1**

**Chapter 7**

**Development of Fracture Networks Through Hydraulic**

A 2-D numerical study was carried out, using a fully coupled rock deformation and fluid flow hydraulic fracturing model, on fracture network formation by advancing, widening and interconnecting discrete natural fractures in a low-permeability rock, some of which are small enough to be considered as a flaw that acts as a fracture seed. The model also includes fractures connecting into one another to form a single hydraulic fracture. In contrast to previous fracture network models, fracture extension and fluid flow behavior, frictional slip, and fracture interaction are all explicitly addressed in this model. Incompressible Newtonian fluid is injected at a constant total rate into fractures to study viscous fluid effects on the network formation. The algorithm for flow division and coalescence is validated through some

Numerical results show that the incremental crack propagation that connects isolated natural fracture sets depends on the current stress state and the fracture arrangement. The newly created connecting fracture segments increase local conductivity since they are oriented along a path that is easier to open when pressurized by fluid and provide a new path for fluid flow. However the hydraulic fracture growth process is retarded by some of the resulting geometric changes such as intersections and offsets, and the growth-induced sliding that can impose a barrier to further fracture growth and fluid flow into parts of the network. Such barriers may eventually result in a fracture branch initiating and growing that results in a relatively shorter

We consider a specific fracture arrangement consisting of around 20 conductive pre-existing fractures to study the effective behavior of the hydraulic fracture growth through a natural fracture network. Mechanical responses have been studied for two different fracture and flow scenarios depending on the fluid entry details: one fracture system assumes each of four entry

and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2013 Zhang and Jeffrey; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2013 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,

**Fracture Growth in Naturally Fractured Reservoirs**

Xi Zhang and Rob Jeffrey

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/56405

**Abstract**

examples.

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

and more conductive path through a fracture network zone.


**HODGKIN'S LYMPHOMA**

Edited by **Nima Rezaei**

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/1469 Edited by Nima Rezaei

#### **Contributors**

Daisuke Niino, Koichi Ohshima, Francisco J Hernandez-Ilizaliturri, Mark Fesler, Margarita Sanchez-Beato, Juan F, Garcia, Beatriz Sanchez-Espiridion, Youssef Al-Tonbary, Matthew Matasar, Matthew Alexander Lunning, Alma Sofo-Hafizovic, Diponkar Banerjee, Karen Fernandez, Pedro De Alarcon, Marylène Lejeune, Tomás Álvaro, Luis De La Cruz-Merino, Fayad, Samer Srour

#### **© The Editor(s) and the Author(s) 2012**

The moral rights of the and the author(s) have been asserted.

All rights to the book as a whole are reserved by INTECH. The book as a whole (compilation) cannot be reproduced, distributed or used for commercial or non-commercial purposes without INTECH's written permission. Enquiries concerning the use of the book should be directed to INTECH rights and permissions department (permissions@intechopen.com).

Violations are liable to prosecution under the governing Copyright Law.

Individual chapters of this publication are distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License which permits commercial use, distribution and reproduction of the individual chapters, provided the original author(s) and source publication are appropriately acknowledged. If so indicated, certain images may not be included under the Creative Commons license. In such cases users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. More details and guidelines concerning content reuse and adaptation can be foundat http://www.intechopen.com/copyright-policy.html.

#### **Notice**

Statements and opinions expressed in the chapters are these of the individual contributors and not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the published chapters. The publisher assumes no responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the use of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained in the book.

First published in Croatia, 2012 by INTECH d.o.o. eBook (PDF) Published by IN TECH d.o.o. Place and year of publication of eBook (PDF): Rijeka, 2019. IntechOpen is the global imprint of IN TECH d.o.o. Printed in Croatia

Legal deposit, Croatia: National and University Library in Zagreb

Additional hard and PDF copies can be obtained from<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Hodgkin's Lymphoma Edited by Nima Rezaei p. cm. ISBN 978-953-51-0402-5 eBook (PDF) ISBN 978-953-51-6933-8


**14.1. Extrinsic apoptotic pathway**

*TRAIL*: This member of the TNF family stimulates the extrinsic apoptotic pathway in a wide variety of cancers upon binding to death receptors, while having no effect on normal cells. Therefore, the use of recombinant TRAIL or agonistic TRAIL-receptor antibodies constitutes a novel therapeutic strategy [172]. TRAIL has been found to bind five receptors in human cells: TRAIL-R1, TRAIL-R2, TRAIL-R3 (DcR1), TRAIL-R4 (DcR2) and the soluble receptor osteoprogeterin. However, DcR1 and DcR2 are unable to transduce a death signal and are considered "decoy receptors". Ashkenazi and colleagues have proposed that the specificity of TRAIL for cancer cells is due to the fact that normal cells express more frequently these decoy receptors [173]. Moreover, TRAIL only weakly induces the prosurvival NFkB pathway [78]. Unfortunately, many primary tumour cell lines have shown resistance to TRAIL [174]. It has been shown that in preclinical studies, the combination of recombinant human TRAIL (rhTRAIL, AMG951, Dulanermin) or agonistic antibodies with irradiation, several chemotherapeutic agents, Akt or proteosome inhibitors induced cell death in tumours resistant to TRAIL [175-177]. Therefore, the efficacy of rhTRAIL or anti-TRAIL-R1/2 antibodies is being examined in different phase I and phase II clinical trails alone or in combination with other chemotherapeutic agents [172,178,179].

*Fas activating compounds:* Fas, also called CD95 or APO-1 is a member of the TNF family of death receptors involved in the extrinsic apoptotic pathway. Fas plays an important role in regulation of the immune system. This receptor belongs to a subgroup within the TNFR family which includes TNFR1, DR3, TRAIL-R4 and TRAIL-R5 [180]. Fas has been recently implicated in the activation of RIP1, resulting in necroptosis when caspase-8 is inactive [181,182]. In addition, Tschopp and colleagues have demonstrated that Fas can activate other signalling pathways involved in proliferation or differentiation [109]. Fas agonists, such as highly aggregated FasL or anti-Fas antibodies are not suitable for cancer therapy owing to their profound liver toxicity. However, weaker Fas agonists may be useful. In this respect, APO010 is undergoing clinical trials for solid tumours [109].


**6. Conclusions**

that the hologram image (refractive index grating) formed in the FLC was rewritten with sufficient speed to project a smooth reproduction of the holographic movie. This result shows that a hologram image was formed at the interference area in the FLC material and that

λ

λ

**Figure 29.** Dynamic hologram formation experiment on an FLC sample. A computer-generated animation was dis‐ played on the SLM. The SLM modulated the object beam (488 nm), which was irradiated on the FLC sample and al‐ lowed to interfere with the reference beam. The readout beam (633 nm) was irradiated on the FLC and diffraction was

 -

contributes to the optical image amplification.

148 Ferroelectric Materials – Synthesis and Characterization

λ

λ

observed.

Real-time dynamic amplification of optical image signals was demonstrated in photorefractive FLC blends. The response time was of sub-millisecond order and was dominated by the formation of an internal electric field. The photorefractive effect of FLCs was significantly dominated by the properties of the FLCs. Aside from spontaneous polarization, viscosity, and the phase transition temperature, the homogeneity of the SS-state was found to be a major factor. The gain coefficient and the response time were also significantly dominated by the homogeneity of the SS-state. Therefore, a highly homogeneous SS-state is necessary to create a photorefractive device. A gain coefficient higher than 1200 cm-1 and a response time shorter than 1 ms were obtained with application of only 1.5 V/μm in a photorefractive FLC blend. This response time is sufficiently short for real-time dynamic holograms. FLC mixtures containing photoconductive chiral dopants exhibited high gain coefficients and fast responses, which confirms their usefulness in photorefractive device applications.


**CALIBRATION AND VALIDATION OF ANALYTICAL METHODS - A SAMPLING OF CURRENT APPROACHES**

#### **Calibration and Validation of Analytical Methods - A Sampling of Current Approaches**

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.69918 Edited by Mark T. Stauffer

#### **Contributors**

Marwa S. El-Azazy, Ioan Tomuta, Alina Porfire, Tibor Casian, Alexandru Gavan, David Jenkins, Cherif Diallo, Ed Bethea, Eliangiringa Kaale, Thomas Layloff, Sussan Ghassabian, Seyed Mojtaba Moosavi, Matthew Halquist, Morse Faria, Fengzhong Dong, Hongbo Fu, Junwei Jia, Huadong Wang, Zhibo Ni, Tentu Nageswara Rao, Mark Thomas Stauffer

#### **© The Editor(s) and the Author(s) 2018**

The rights of the editor(s) and the author(s) have been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights to the book as a whole are reserved by INTECHOPEN LIMITED. The book as a whole (compilation) cannot be reproduced, distributed or used for commercial or non-commercial purposes without INTECHOPEN LIMITED's written permission. Enquiries concerning the use of the book should be directed to INTECHOPEN LIMITED rights and permissions department (permissions@intechopen.com). Violations are liable to prosecution under the governing Copyright Law.

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#### **Notice**

Statements and opinions expressed in the chapters are these of the individual contributors and not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the published chapters. The publisher assumes no responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the use of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained in the book.

First published in London, United Kingdom, 2018 by IntechOpen eBook (PDF) Published by IntechOpen, 2019 IntechOpen is the global imprint of INTECHOPEN LIMITED, registered in England and Wales, registration number: 11086078, The Shard, 25th floor, 32 London Bridge Street London, SE19SG – United Kingdom Printed in Croatia

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