**5. Discussion: Relations between the Different Dimensions of Power in GISCO**

After describing the respective forms of power at different levels, this subsection focuses on the interdependent relationships between these levels. At the network level, as described by Glückler and Bathelt, Mossig, as well as Bathelt and Taylor, formal and informal institutions are the basis of cooperation [28,29,31,37] (p. 93). These are mutually recognized and reproduced by the members. Relevant in terms of power are the voting relationships that emerge from the bylaws. Thereby, all four stakeholder groups A to D in GISCO have veto rights. Institutionally, this ensures that no group can outvote the others. In other words, a balance has been created and individual stakeholders' power over others has been ruled out. Also formally established is the (so far unused) possibility of excluding members, which, however, as a last resort does not guarantee stable cooperation. The actors' manners of dealing with each other have established themselves as an informal institution in the course of cooperation. Other informal institutions in GISCO include solving conflicts through personal discussions and moderation, as well as the actors' mutual expectations of professional and fair dealings with each other inside and outside GISCO. The order of the process steps in which content is negotiated has also become such an institution in the network that is recognized by all participants without being written into the bylaws. Those values and norms have a disciplining effect on the individual actors and thus reduce uncertainties [29] (p. 93). Figure 3 shows the schematic process in GISCO already known from Figure 2, but supplemented by the dominant levels of power on each step. *Sustainability* **2022**, *14*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 17 actors' mutual expectations of professional and fair dealings with each other inside and outside GISCO. The order of the process steps in which content is negotiated has also become such an institution in the network that is recognized by all participants without being written into the bylaws. Those values and norms have a disciplining effect on the individual actors and thus reduce uncertainties [29] (p. 93). Figure 3 shows the schematic process in GISCO already known from Figure 2, but supplemented by the dominant levels of power on each step.

As shown in Figure 3, processes in GISCO usually start in the executive board. The members of the executive board decide whether a topic should be discussed further. If so, it is delegated to one of the workings groups (WGs) for more in-depth discussion. Within WG 1: Communication, WG 2: PRO-PLANTEURS and WG 3: Sustainability, the influ-

sonality, perceived expertise and persistence in GISCO can influence the debate, using corresponding strategies of influence. This behavior is consistent with Saffer et al.'s conceptualization of power, in which power in MSIs is associated with influence over communication [27]. This, in turn, is consistent with the "power to" approach of influence through relationships and one's own persuasiveness described in prior theoretical work [29] (pp. 92–93). However, the person-based power decreases in favor of the

In the next step of the processes in GISCO, the four stakeholder groups A to D discuss the decision papers negotiated before in the thematic working groups. Contrary to what might be expected from theory, organization-based power is primarily relevant within these stakeholder groups. In the executive board, the groups act (more or less) cohesively as interest groups. This can be seen, first, in the fact that the interbranch organizations of industry (stakeholder group B) and retail (C) exercise a coordinating function within their stakeholder groups and speak for their groups at the network level. Secondly, it is clear from the fact that stakeholder groups sometimes reject compromises reached in the WGs. Third, in the further steps of the process, negotiation loops take place between the stakeholder groups whose representatives on the executive board conduct negotiations. Consequently, in the context of MSIs we should speak of organization-based power *within* the stakeholder groups and group-based organizational power *between* them, which becomes more relevant than person-based power in the further steps of the negotiation processes. Accordingly, membership of a stakeholder group is important for the assertion of common interests. Although the division of the 75 member organizations (as of 2019) into four stakeholder groups—(A) Federal Govern-

**Figure 3.** Processes and power relations in GISCO. **Figure 3.** Processes and power relations in GISCO.

stakeholder groups with each step of the process.

As shown in Figure 3, processes in GISCO usually start in the executive board. The members of the executive board decide whether a topic should be discussed further. If so, it is delegated to one of the workings groups (WGs) for more in-depth discussion. Within WG 1: Communication, WG 2: PRO-PLANTEURS and WG 3: Sustainability, the influence of individuals is high. The interviews show that individuals with appropriate personality, perceived expertise and persistence in GISCO can influence the debate, using corresponding strategies of influence. This behavior is consistent with Saffer et al.'s conceptualization of power, in which power in MSIs is associated with influence over communication [27]. This, in turn, is consistent with the "power to" approach of influence through relationships and one's own persuasiveness described in prior theoretical work [29] (pp. 92–93). However, the person-based power decreases in favor of the stakeholder groups with each step of the process.

In the next step of the processes in GISCO, the four stakeholder groups A to D discuss the decision papers negotiated before in the thematic working groups. Contrary to what might be expected from theory, organization-based power is primarily relevant within these stakeholder groups. In the executive board, the groups act (more or less) cohesively as interest groups. This can be seen, first, in the fact that the interbranch organizations of industry (stakeholder group B) and retail (C) exercise a coordinating function within their stakeholder groups and speak for their groups at the network level. Secondly, it is clear from the fact that stakeholder groups sometimes reject compromises reached in the WGs. Third, in the further steps of the process, negotiation loops take place between the stakeholder groups whose representatives on the executive board conduct negotiations. Consequently, in the context of MSIs we should speak of organization-based power *within* the stakeholder groups and group-based organizational power *between* them, which becomes more relevant than person-based power in the further steps of the negotiation processes. Accordingly, membership of a stakeholder group is important for the assertion of common interests. Although the division of the 75 member organizations (as of 2019) into four stakeholder groups—(A) Federal Government, (B) Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Industry, (C) Retail Grocery Trade and (D) Civil Society—structurally reduces the heterogeneity in GISCO to a certain extent, the groups' common interests must first be negotiated.

As shown in the results, all stakeholder groups have specific forms of power, which come to play in the executive board. Empirical evidence shows that, due to the structure of GISCO with its four stakeholder groups, these specific forms of power are less likely to be used by individual organizations at the level of the overall network, but rather are first negotiated by the respective stakeholder groups themselves. Industrial and retail companies use group-based organizational power in a form described in the literature on GPNs as corporate power [20,22]. In GISCO, this is reflected in the perception of corporate representatives that it is their responsibility to intensively scrutinize proposals from other groups in terms of their feasibility. Another way of exerting influence is that no measures can be implemented without their ideational and financial support. Therefore, a materially conditional form of influence, coupled with the use of the veto, is characteristic for companies. This effect can be assigned to the "power over" approach, while the explanation of internal processes and practical experiences to other stakeholder groups corresponds to the argumentative "power to" approach. Civil Society has a specific groupbased organizational power that corresponds to collective power [20,22]. It is virtually the "counterpole" (B6 2020: para. 107) of the industrial group. The Civil Society group is described as active and demanding and appears comparatively cohesive, despite its diverse composition. The interviews show that the opportunities for civil societies to exert influence lie primarily in their power of persuasion, their arguments and demands, and the mobilization of others' resources for their concerns. This effect is in line with the "power to" approach. Nevertheless, this stakeholder group also has (immaterial) resources in the sense of "power over": a threatened withdrawal from GISCO would deprive the initiative of legitimacy to a large extent, and some NGOs use their legitimacy as a resource in public campaigns to exert pressure on companies. Furthermore, policymakers have

their own group-based organizational power, equivalent to institutional power [20,22]. The ministries not only assume a kind of patronage for GISCO, but also work on the content of the initiative. Financial support for policy corresponds to the effect of a resource-based "power over" approach to influence. This includes the possibility of opting out of GISCO or becoming legislatively active if necessary. One of the ministries is monitoring the possibility for a legislative regulation. At the time of the interviews, it appears that the ministries want to encourage companies to become more involved without a regulation, which again is in line with the "power to" approach.

Table 3 summarizes the effects of the empirically observed forms of group-based organizational power in GISCO. Here, the representatives are understood as representing their respective organizations, transferring the power of their organizations in global economic contexts in the form of actions in the context of an MSI [34,35].

**Table 3.** Empirically observable effects of group-based organizational power in GISCO.

The diversity of the effects of group-based organizational power in GISCO means that no stakeholder groups are clearly more powerful in relation to others. With reference to Bathelt and Taylor, it can be seen that the power symmetry between the four stakeholder groups does not lead to quick and efficient decisions [31]. This often results in stalemate situations. The following quotation from B5 (2020: para. 35) illustrates a typical agreement process: "Of course, there is a lot of discussion about such small formulations, which sometimes makes it a bit fuzzy. But that's because, based on the positions that the members have, there can't be as much room for maneuver as one might give the other person in normal life". The lack of necessity and willingness to leave the respective positions leads to situations in which compromises are only reached on a voluntary basis. The quotation from interviewee G2 in Figure 3 shows the tough struggle for compromises: "And we often find consensual solutions, and those are always a compromise. It is very rarely the case that a proposal is made, and all parties agree to it" (G2 2020: para. 87).

It can be concluded that the diversity of power forms leads to a dysfunctional power constellation in GISCO in relation to its goals. Moreover, the group-based organizational power of corporations is institutionally advantaged through their veto power. In comparison, the demanding role of civil societies has been elaborated, which are presumably less dependent on veto power than corporations to achieve their goals. This disparity is not overcome in the negotiation processes. The interviews suggest that within the stakeholder groups, precisely because of the use of organization-based power by individual organizations, it is possible, in most cases, to work out a common position. Negotiations at the network level between the stakeholder groups, on the other hand, are often more difficult because there is no clear power hierarchy between the actors. By their very nature, consensus reached between stakeholder groups in this way is often the lowest common denominator. With regard to the MSI's goals regarding the sustainability of the cocoa sector, it should be noted that these have (so far) not been achieved. One interviewee exemplifies: "[ . . . ] the problems in the cocoa sector have been known for over ten years and the problems haven't really changed that much or even improved. So I think the results are still not that earth-shattering" (B2 2020: para. 117). From the interviews it emerges that the opportunities of GISCO lie rather in generating attention, bringing diverse stakeholders into contact with each other and enabling them to learn with and from each other. Improvements regarding the socio-economic living and working conditions of farmers are achieved by GISCO less directly, but much more indirectly or on a smaller scale through the project "PRO-PLANTEURS". In terms of the global cocoa and chocolate sector, interviewees emphasize the steadily increasing amount of certified cocoa processed in Germany by GISCO members. However, many interviewees state that certification as an instrument alone is not sufficient to solve the "wicked problems" [1] in the food supply chain of cocoa in a sufficient way.


**1. Introduction**

Neurodegenerative diseases (ND) cause progressive loss of brain functions and overlapping clinical syndromes. Among the many risk factors associated with neurodegeneration, the aging process itself has by far the most impact. However, other environmental and genetic aspects are associated with the risk of suffering these diseases. Indeed, the NDs are the result of a combination of different environmental risk factors, such as vascular risk, tobacco consumption, alcohol and aging, together with different genes involved in the development of these central nervous system (CNS) disorders. For example, in Alzheimer's disease (AD), APOE4 (apolipoprotein E) is the major genetic risk factor. Moreover, mutations in APP, (amyloid precursor protein) PSEN1 (presenilin proteins) and PSEN2 probably accelerate the toxic accumulation of proteins that leads to the undergoing neurodegenerative process present in AD. Another example is mutation in GBA (glucocerebrosidase), which encodes β-glucocerebrosidase. Alterations in this gene lead to lysosomal enzyme deficiency and an increase in the prevalence of Parkinson diseases (PD). Other mutations in genes, such as LRRK2 (leucine-rich repeat kinase 2), parkin and SNCA, (alpha synuclein) which encodes the protein α-synuclein, are the most common causes of dominantly and recessively inherited PD. These NDs are age-dependent disorders that are becoming increasingly prevalent as life expectancy rises worldwide. This prevalence will increase, becoming a serious economic burden and public health problem. Despite AD and PD being the most common NDs, Huntington's disease (HD), amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), frontotemporal dementia and the spinocerebellar ataxias are also examples of NDs, with aging as the main risk factor for all of them [1–3]. Although they have different clinical manifestations and symptoms, they share common features and mechanisms of neurodegeneration, highlighting protein deposits, mitochondrial homeostasis, stress granules and synaptic toxicity, together with a maladaptive innate immune response that converges in the form of chronic inflammation characterized by reactive gliosis and an increase in proinflammatory cytokines [4,5].

Despite the significant public health issues NDs have, to date, the treatments for these diseases remain symptomatic without halting the progression of the disease. Moreover, the lack of an overall positive effect on the clinical manifestation of the disease, together with the presence of systemic side effects, has prompted the patients to abandon their therapies [6,7]. Due to the lack of an effective treatment for NDs, in the last few years, promising new molecules, such as neurotrophic factors (NTFs), antioxidant molecules and polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFAs), have been raised as a feasible therapeutic options to target the undergoing oxidative stress and inflammatory status or to enhance neurogenesis [8–10].

Nevertheless, no matter the treatment, one of the most challenging obstacles for an effective therapy for NDs is the low penetration efficiency of drugs to the CNS due to the presence of the blood brain barrier (BBB). In the last few years, different strategies have been developed in order to achieve brain targeting. These strategies include direct and indirect methods. The direct or invasive techniques include surgical methods to administer drugs directly into the brain and the disruption of the BBB to open it. Meanwhile, the indirect or noninvasive techniques include nonaggressive approaches to access the brain without affecting this barrier integrity [11,12]. These noninvasive techniques include alternative systemic administration routes like intranasal administration [13,14]. Gartziandia et al. conducted a study that successfully showed the brain delivery of therapeutics after intranasal administration with lipid nanoparticles coated with chitosan (CS) [15]. Moreover, the combination of the formulation with cell-penetrating peptides (CPP) has been disclosed as a useful strategy to enter the brain [16,17]. Anyway, one of the most studied approaches to attain this goal are nanotechnology-based drug delivery systems [18,19]. Among them, nanoparticles (NPs) have been widely used as a promising approach for ND treatment. NPs are highly stable 3D encapsulation systems that can be loaded with drugs and functionalized with targeting ligands or antibodies, and they can be used as nanocarriers to deliver drugs to the CNS [20]. Among other materials, natural or synthetic polymers and lipids have been employed in NP development [11].

Indeed, numerous research papers have combined NPs with well-known treatments or therapeutic approaches that have recently appeared, such as growth factors (GFs), antioxidant molecules and PUFAs entrapped in the nanoformulation [21–24]. All these research papers support the use of nanoparticles, offering many advantages over traditional formulations, such as protecting the molecule from degradation, increasing the half-life of the therapeutic molecules and, therefore, limiting multiple dosing and decreasing side effects. Among others, the nanostructured lipid carriers (NLCs) are an unstructured solid lipid matrix made of a mixture of blended solid and liquid lipids and an aqueous phase with a mixture of surfactants [25]. In addition, they have gained the attention of researchers since they exhibit a lack of toxicity, high drug loading capacity of both hydrophobic and hydrophilic compounds and a natural tendency to pass across the BBB [26]. Moreover, the NLCs can be functionalized with different substances to increase their tendency to pass through the BBB [27]. Examples of these molecules are chitosan (CS) and the cationic cell-penetrating peptide TAT; both molecules have increased brain targeting of therapeutic molecules for NDs treatment, as we pointed out in previous publications [15,24].

Up to today, most of the lipids used for NLC formulation are inert excipients, without any active role in preventing or treating diseases [28]. Indeed, only a few research groups have described the use of functional lipids that could play a therapeutic role in forming the lipid matrix, i.e., Ω-9 oleic acid incorporated into a NLC formulation for dermal applications [29]. Other kinds of functional lipids are PUFAs, Ω-3 and Ω-6 polyunsaturated fatty acids. As previously pointed out, PUFAs have been raised as a promising new approach to target neurodegenerative diseases. Although the biochemical mechanism undergoing the beneficial effect in NDs is not clear at all, they have exhibited the positive effect of decreasing the neuroinflammation process undergoing NDs, improving memory in animal models of AD, sensory motor tests in PD animal models and inhibiting amyloid-β fibrils both in vitro and in vivo [30–32]. Such functional lipids, which are also called nutraceutical, have proved to be a useful tool to manage NDs [33]; although they cannot totally restore brain functions, they may be beneficial to manage some symptoms of the disease or just as a coadjutant treatment. Actually, in the last few years, numerous observational studies showed an association between a diet rich in PUFAs and a lower risk of PD. Moreover, dietary treatments with PUFAs have shown to decrease the inflammatory status of these NDs and decrease depressive symptoms, among others [34–36].

Therefore, taking into account the promising results obtained with PUFAs in ND treatment, along with the beneficial effects of NLCs modified with CS and TAT for brain targeting, the objective of this research article is to combine both strategies for ND treatment. More concretely, the goal of the present work is to develop NLC with a functional lipid, such as DHA (docohexaenoic acid) and its hydroxylated derivate (DHAH), so the nanoparticles themselves could exhibit neuroprotective and antiinflammatory effects. In summary, we aim to demonstrate the beneficial effect of PUFAs incorporated to the NLC matrix, generating a new functional nanocarrier for entrapping different therapeutic molecules in the future and acting as a synergetic therapy.