pandemic, many governments in Europe opted for this choice. The social science literature has already begun to analyse the attitudes of citizens towards lockdowns (Mariot et al., 2021), the impact of health measures on trust in governments (Glaurdić et al., 2021; Oude Groeniger et al., 2021), the responses of so-called "populist" parties to this restriction of freedom of movements (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2020) and the political aspects of lockdowns that were presented as health measures during the frst wave of COVID-19 (Bristielle, 2021). However, few studies have examined the different realities that were provoked by lockdown measures in different countries and the evolution of these measures over time. For instance, during the frst lockdown, French citizens could not leave their home without a self-signed "derogation to travel" certifcate proving a "compelling reason" to go out, while in Germany, the ban on leaving one's home was strongly recommended but not imposed.

This chapter has a dual objective. On the one hand, it aims to highlight differences in the stringency of lockdowns across countries. On the other hand, it seeks to identify some explanatory factors behind the observed differences. The comparative analysis builds on the EXCEPTIUS database and covers 20 countries in the frst wave, and 15 in the second wave. The study period is from January 2020 to December 2020 and covers the frst wave (January–June 2020) and the second wave (July–December 2020) of COVID-19. First, we distinguish between strict and fexible lockdowns, using an indicator of coerciveness of the lockdown by compiling different variables, such as the order to "stay home", the number of kilometres of travel allowed outside home, or the presence or self-completed forms for leaving home. Secondly, we look at whether the level of coerciveness of lockdown measures taken by governments was linked to the health situation in the country (circulation of the virus, number of deaths), and/or to political and economic criteria (wealth of the country, confdence of citizens in the institutions, party family of the ruling party) and if they had signifcantly impacted on the number of deaths.

#### State of Art and Hypotheses

Previous studies have already shown that several factors come into play when analysing the differences in the measures that governments adopted to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in the frst wave. For example, Engler et al. (2021) show that the quality of democracy in countries had an important impact on the restriction of individual freedom during the health crisis (see also Kuebler in this volume): the more governments protected freedom outside of crisis periods, the less restrictive measures they implemented during the COVID-19 crisis. Bristielle (2021) and Engler et al. (2021) show that, during the frst wave, the measures depended largely on trust in institutions and political actors: the higher was the level of trust in political institutions, the less stringent the measures adopted. These works have highlighted the deeply political aspects of the measures put in place to curb the epidemic. Considering this political dimension, we formulate three hypotheses:

Lesschaeve et al. (2021) examined the economic dimension of the lockdown measures implemented to contain the COVID-19 epidemic. Their study showed that during the frst wave in southern and eastern Europe, people were in favour of implementing these measures despite their "high economic costs". However, in the long run, countries with a low GDP would be less inclined to implement strong restrictive measures that affect the country's economy, which leads us to our fourth hypothesis:

H4: During the second wave, countries with the lowest GDP per capita implemented fewer lockdown measures than others.

Finally, this chapter looks at the effects of political party ideology on the response to the COVID-19 epidemic. Diverse ideologies— for example, liberalism, socialism, conservatism (Mudde, 2004)—can be associated with different positions that advocate both strong restrictions to protect the weakest and hospital care, and more fexible responses in order to guarantee individual freedom and collective rights. Katsambekis and Stavrakakis (2020) have shown that populist parties in Europe responded differently depending on national particularities, and that the right-left axis did not seem to have played a major role to explain their positions. For example, in France, the radical left, represented by La France insoumise (Unbowed France, LFI), and the radical right, represented by the Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN), assessed the situation differently, explaining that the COVID-19 crisis validated their respective ideologies. For LFI, the COVID-19 epidemic was the result of the ecological crisis, while for the RN it was linked to open borders and mass immigration (Chazel, 2020). However, during the frst wave both parties defended the implementation of strong lockdown measures. This brings us to the ffth hypothesis:

H5: During both waves, the political ideology of the ruling party had no impact on the intensity of the lockdown measures.

To initially test these hypotheses, the chapter uses data coded in 20 European countries for the frst wave and 15 countries for the second wave by the EXCEPTIUS project. We compiled an indicator of the stringency of lockdown measures put in place to contain the COVID-19 pandemic during the frst and second waves, based on seven ordinal variables, each graduating from low to high the coercive intensity of single COVID-19 measures.

The aggregation of the indicator is done as follows: for each wave, and for each variable, we consider the most coercive measure taken by a country whether at the national or subnational level, considering that, depending on the state form of the countries, major decisions may have been taken mainly at one of the two levels (see Chap. 6).

We then divide each variable by the number of categories it contains, and then we divide the indicator by the number of variables (7) so that its value lies between zero and one. Thus, 0 corresponds to no coercive measure at all and one corresponds to the maximum possible coercive measures. Each value is the maximum of what a country has implemented during each wave (no matter if this score describes 1 day or 3 months); therefore, the indicator does not aim at capturing in which country the measures have been implemented the longest, but rather at capturing which are the maximum measures (in terms of severity) that have been implemented by the countries over a wave.

The indicator is then used to examine the correlation between the stringency of COVID-19 containment measures and contextual factors regarding health, political and economic conditions. Results provide insights into why such measures have been put in place in certain countries and enable to confront the working hypotheses. Respective variables (see respective distribution in appendixes 1 and 2) include:

2Available online: https://COVIDtracker.fr/COVIDtracker-world/. The COVID Tracker website is based on Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 data (states' declarations of the number of deaths).

3 In most countries, data are available from this date.

#### Analysis and Results

#### *Different Types of Lockdowns*

Three groups of countries can be distinguished according to the intensity of the measures implemented: light lockdown (from 0 to 0.33), medium lockdown (from 0.33 to 0.66) and strict lockdown (from 0.66 to 1).

The data show that two countries (out of 20) had light lockdowns in place in the frst wave (Finland and Sweden), and fve countries (out of 15) in the second wave (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden). The frst group of countries is characterized by the fact that the governments in place relied primarily on the responsibility of citizens rather than on coercion: the injunctions to stay at home were primarily recommendations, and many shops remained open during the period. For example, in Finland, in the frst and second waves (with a respective lockdown score of 0.24 and 0.17), the government recommended that cafés and restaurants be closed, and banned gatherings of more than ten people.

The Swedish case received particular attention. The indicator of coercive lockdown measures shows that there were no measures during the frst wave (0) and a very light closure measure of non-essential shops during the second wave (0.07). The Swedish centre-left government led by Stefan Löfven (*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti* [Swedish Social Democratic Party]) had announced during the frst wave of COVID-19 that the fght against the virus was a "marathon, not a sprint". For instance, the Swedish government encouraged citizens to work from home, when possible, discouraged travel and going out for those who felt ill and for citizens aged 70 or older. During the frst two COVID-19 waves, the Swedish government stood out by the trust it placed in its citizens to limit their contacts. When, in most European countries, masks started to become compulsory after the frst wave (see de Saint Phalle's chapter in this volume), the government stood out again, as wearing masks never became compulsory. All over Europe, the Swedish case was taken as an example by the supporters of the lifting of sanitary restrictions (e.g., showing that another model was then possible), and it was mobilized by other political and scientifc actors as an example not to be followed (e.g., showing the impasse of the search for herd immunity).

Regarding medium lockdowns, 14 countries out of 20 implemented them during the frst wave (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom) and 9 countries (out of 15) did so during the second wave (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom). In most of these countries, governments have also called on citizens to take responsibility. This was the case in the Netherlands, for example, where the government declared relying on the "intelligence" and "self-discipline" of citizens. There was no form to fll in to leave home, no time limit and no space limit.

Finally, 4 countries (out of 20) implemented strict lockdown during the frst wave (Spain, France, Italy, Romania) and only 1 (out of 15) during the second wave (France). During the frst wave, countries such as Spain, Italy and France relied on coercion. In these three countries, citizens were forbidden to leave their homes except for essential reasons such as buying food or walking their pets. Very heavy fnes could be imposed, and prison sentences could be incurred for non-compliance with lockdown (e.g., in France, up to 3750 euros and 6 months in prison). Citizens were required to carry a self-signed sworn statement/travel certifcate every time they left their home to justify a compelling reason. In France, during the frst lockdown, citizens were allowed to go out for 1 h/day, within a maximum radius of 1 km. France is a special case as during the second wave it implemented both strict lockdown measures and a strict curfew, while most other countries chose one or the other.

#### *Initial Explanation of the Stringency of Lockdowns*

When we look at the impact of the circulation of the virus on the lockdown measures, we can observe differences between the two waves (Figs. 12.1 and 12.2). In the frst wave, a positive correlation between the circulation of the virus and the severity of the lockdown measures implemented is observed (*r* = 0.53): the higher the level of virus circulation (proxied by the number of deaths at the beginning of each phase), the stricter the lockdown measures—thus invalidating H1. However, for the second wave, if the correlation remains positive it appears much lighter and not signifcant (*r* = 0.27). As such, the posited relationship between the intensity of circulation of COVID-19 and the coerciveness of lockdown measures decorrelates and decreases over time.

Regarding the impacts of economic and political factors, the analysis of the frst wave data reveals that only the level of institutional trust had a signifcant and negative impact on the types of lockdown measures implemented (Fig. 12.3). The lower the level of institutional trust, the higher

**Fig. 12.1** Indicator of coercive measures and deaths per million habitants, beginning of the frst wave

**Fig. 12.2** Indicator of coercive measures and death per million habitants, beginning of the second wave

**Fig. 12.3** (**a**) First (on the left) and (**b**) second (on the right) waves. Indicator of coercive measures and trust in political institutions

the intensity of coercive measures (*r* = −0.61). Similar results are observed in the second wave. The link between institutional trust and coercive measures is still signifcantly negative with a similar intensity (*r* = −0.59), thereby confrming H3 for the two waves.

Meanwhile, it seems that the GDP level, standing for the capacity of the countries' economy to cope with strong lockdown measures and the economic slowdown it implies is not linked with the coerciveness of implemented lockdowns (*r* = −0.24 with no signifcance for the frst wave and *r* = 0.01 for the second wave). This result invalidates H4. In addition, the type of political party in power does not appear as a signifcant factor either to explain the decision to implement strong or weak lockdowns, neither during the frst wave (*r* = 0.01) or the second wave (−0.16), here confrming H5 (Figs. 12.4 and 12.5).

Finally, regarding the impact of lockdown measures on mortality, during the frst wave and the second wave, only a very low correlation exists with weak signifcance (*r* = 0.19 for the frst wave, *r* = 0.34 for the second wave), partially validating the low impact of lockdown measures on mortality (H2) (Fig. 12.6).

#### Conclusion

This chapter has provided two main explanations for decision-making in times of crisis. On the one hand, while almost all European countries drastically restricted the movement of citizens and urged them to stay at home, there were also large differences between these countries. The lockdowns implemented to contain the circulation of COVID-19 have shown very different realities. On the other hand, only two of the four variables we

**Fig. 12.4** (**a**) First (on the left) and (**b**) second (on the right) waves. Indicator of coercive measures and GDP per capita

**Fig. 12.5** (**a**) First (on the left) and (**b**) second (on the right) waves. Indicator of coercive measures and party in power

selected explain the level of severity of the lockdowns put in place. The circulation of the virus had a signifcant impact (the higher the circulation, the stricter the lockdowns) but only during the frst wave, while the level of trust of citizens in political institutions was a much more robust explanatory factor during both waves (the lower the level of trust, the stricter the measures).

The chapter also showed that neither the level of GDP nor the incumbent political party explained the severity of the lockdown measures during the frst two waves. Regarding the level of GDP, no correlation can be made between the latter and the indicator of coercive measures.

Regarding the ideological position of the governing party, it is interesting to note that the left-right axis does not seem to have had any impact on the position taken by the different political parties on lockdown

**Fig. 12.6** (**a**) First (on the left) and (**b**) second (on the right) waves. Indicator of coercive measures and death per million (30 June/31 December 2020)

measures. For instance, the left was largely divided on the policy responses to the COVID-19 epidemic. In France, the main left-wing party, LFI opposed lockdown measures from the second wave onwards. The party proposed the reopening of essential and non-essential shops and the introduction of a "rolling society" (*société par roulement*). In Spain, Podemos (We Can), the Spanish counterpart of LFI, widely criticized the "laxity" of right-wing parties in some autonomous communities led by the conservative *Partido Popular* (Popular Party, PP), as in the Community of Madrid, and defended lockdown as a measure to protect the most vulnerable citizens.

To go further, it could be interesting to study the impact of complementary context variables such as democratic level of the country, hospital capacity or trust in the police. Furthermore, a double synchronic and diachronic analysis could be performed on the frst and second wave (and also include the third wave) to categorize the countries according to the strictness of the lockdowns for each wave but also in an evolutionary way to perform an average over the study period.

**Acknowledgements** The author acknowledges Chloé Alexandre and Antoine Bristielle for their help and very valuable feedback on the chapter.

#### References

Bristielle, A. (2021). *À Qui Se Fier? De La Crise de Confance Institutionnelle à La Crise Sanitaire*. Monde En Cours. La Tour d'Aigues; Éditions de l'Aube ; Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### Masks and Social Distancing During COVID-19

*Eugénie de Saint-Phalle*

#### Introduction

During the COVID-19 pandemic, mask mandates emerged as key strategies to curb transmission and protect public health with social distancing measures (Chu et al., 2020).

In 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended the use of face masks in specifc settings, particularly where physical distancing could not be maintained or where community transmission was high (WHO, 2020). European countries adopted mask-wearing policies with varying degrees of stringency and enforcement (Howard et al., 2021). While some countries mandated mask-wearing in public spaces early in the pandemic, others introduced them later or revised their guidance as additional evidence on mask effectiveness emerged (Fischer et al., 2021). Existing research on mask mandates has largely focused on assessing the effcacy of face masks in reducing viral transmission (Bundgaard et al.,

E. de Saint-Phalle (\*)

International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2024 221

C. Egger et al. (eds.), *Covid-19 Containment Policies in Europe*, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52096-9\_13

2021; Chu et al., 2020). However, few studies have systematically compared the design, implementation, and impact of mask mandates across European countries (Fischer et al., 2021). Existing studies, such as Oxford COVID-19 response tracker (Hale et al., 2021) provides extensive information, which does not, however, go into the specifcs of the responses (for example, the type of the mask-wearing mandate).

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the mask mandates and social distancing measures implemented in European Union countries, as well as Switzerland and the UK, during the period from 2020 to early 2022.

The goals of this chapter are fourfold: (1) to outline the legal frameworks that allowed for the introduction of mask mandates and social distancing measures in European countries; (2) to map the implementation and retraction timelines of these measures across the region, identifying patterns and variations in policy strictness; (3) to explore the regional differences in implementing mask mandates, with a focus on Eastern, Central, Western, Southern, and Northern European countries; and (4) to analyse the national and regional differences in the implementation of mask mandates within individual countries.

By achieving these goals, we intend to contribute to the existing body of literature on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe, while offering insights into the factors that infuenced the design and implementation of mask mandates and social distancing measures. Some of the existing works have already addressed how governments responded to the pandemic (e.g., Greer et al., 2020). Furthermore, we aim to provide policymakers and public health offcials with valuable information that may inform future decision-making in times of crisis, as well as highlight the limitations and directions for future research in this area.

The Effectiveness and Implications of Mask Mandates

#### *State-of-Art Research*

Previous studies shed light on the role and effectiveness of mask mandates in slowing down the spread of COVID-19. A comprehensive evidence review conducted by Howard et al. (2021) highlighted the importance of mask-wearing in conjunction with other preventive measures in containing the virus' spread. The researchers pointed to various pieces of evidence, including laboratory studies, asymptomatic transmission reports, and super-spreading events, to argue for widespread mask usage given its minimal costs and potential substantial benefts. Lyu and Welby's (2020) research further reinforces the effectiveness of mask mandates. Using a natural experiment design, the authors showed that state-level mask mandates in the United States led to a signifcant slowdown in the daily COVID-19 growth rate, implying that such mandates can considerably curb the community spread of the virus. Based on these fndings, the authors estimated that between 230,000 and 450,000 cases were possibly prevented by May 22, 2020, due to these mandates.

However, the effectiveness of mask mandates cannot be considered in isolation, as they are infuenced by a myriad of factors including public compliance, demographic attributes, socio-economic conditions, and the broader public health environment, including the pandemic's state and other protective measures' implementation. A global study by Islam et al. (2020) underscores this point by demonstrating that physical distancing interventions, presumably inclusive of mask-wearing, were associated with a decrease in COVID-19 incidence. Nevertheless, the correlation's strength varied by country and over time, implying that local factors and adherence to measures can signifcantly affect the success of these interventions.

The fndings of these studies have economic implications as well. Fowler et al. (2021) have shown that the implementation of stay-at-home orders, a visible public health measure similar to mask mandates, had a noticeable effect on COVID-19 cases and fatalities in the United States. This suggests that such measures may play a role in controlling disease, shaping public perceptions, and potentially mitigating the pandemic's economic impacts. In summary, mask mandates appear to be a key tool in controlling COVID-19's spread. Nevertheless, their effectiveness hinges on several factors, such as timely implementation, public compliance, and integration with other public health measures.

#### *Infuence of Rising Cases on the Implementation of Mandates*

Figure 13.1 illustrates the implementation of mask mandates in selected countries, based on the number of weekly cases preceding the decision, and shows the differences among the three waves.

**Fig. 13.1** Distribution of weekly COVID-19 cases by mask mandate category, by wave. Source: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering. Note: The data presented may be non-exhaustive

Based on the graph, we can conclude the following. First, the number of cases it took to implement mask mandates differs among waves: in the frst wave, most mandates were passed when the infection rates were relatively low, with some notable exceptions. The second wave has seen several annulments of masks, and most countries stuck to using masks in either all public or in private spaces.1 By the third wave, the use of masks in public spaces, both closed and open, has become the most popular measure for most countries. However, no annulments were registered in the dataset for this period (January–April 2021). Other measures, such as use of masks in only closed or private spaces, were signifcantly less popular. This also may indicate that by the third wave of the pandemic, most countries have

1 It is important to note that mandates for private spaces do not mean that no masks are used in public spaces. Usage of masks in private spaces (e.g., at home or in cars) often was implemented separately from other mask mandates and depended on how country managed the issue in general.

established similar approaches to mask management, as more information and experience was acquired during 2020.

#### Legal Frameworks for Mask Mandates in European Countries

The introduction of mask mandates and social distancing measures across European countries was facilitated through different legal frameworks, broadly categorized as emergency powers or existing crisis-management legislation.

#### *Emergency Powers Versus Existing Legislation*

Emergency powers refer to the temporary authority granted to governments to address extraordinary situations, such as pandemics or natural disasters (Ferejohn & Pasquino 2004, see also Egger's chapter in this volume). They often involve the suspension or modifcation of ordinary legal processes, allowing for the swift implementation of public health measures. In contrast, existing legislation encompasses the pre-existing laws and regulations that provide a legal basis for introducing public health measures without resorting to emergency powers (Habibi et al., 2020). Sometimes, emergency powers were deemed necessary to respond to the fast-evolving situation, while in others, existing legislation provided suffcient legal authority to implement mask mandates and social distancing measures.

#### *Countries That Used Emergency Powers to Introduce Mandates*

Several European countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, relied on emergency powers to introduce mask mandates and social distancing measures in the early stages of the pandemic. Being hit the frst among European countries, Italy enacted a nationwide state of emergency on January 31, 2020, enabling the government to adopt a series of decrees and ordinances that imposed mask requirements and social distancing rules. Similarly, in France, the government declared a state of health emergency on March 23, 2020, under the Public Health, granting the executive branch extensive powers to impose various containment measures, including mask mandates. In Spain, the government declared a state of alarm on March 14, 2020, under the Organic Law 4/1981, giving the executive branch the authority to impose restrictions on movement and social interactions, including the use of face masks in public spaces.

#### *Countries That Used Existing Legal Frameworks to Introduce Mandates*

Other European countries relied on existing legal frameworks to implement mask mandates and social distancing measures. For instance, Germany used the Infection Protection Act (*Infektionsschutzgesetz*) to grant federal states the authority to introduce mask requirements and social distancing rules. The Netherlands implemented mask mandates through the Temporary Measures COVID-19 Act, which provided a legal basis for restrictions on public gatherings and mask-wearing in designated areas. In Belgium, the government relied on the Law on Civil Security (*Loi relative à la sécurité civile*) to impose mask mandates and social distancing measures (Belgium 2007). Similarly, Switzerland implemented mask requirements and social distancing rules through the Epidemics Act (*Epidemiengesetz*), which grants the Federal Council the authority to take necessary measures to combat communicable diseases.

In summary, European countries adopted a mix of emergency powers and existing legislation to introduce mask mandates and social distancing measures. The choice of legal framework depended on the specifc circumstances in each country and the perceived need for rapid action. The use of emergency powers has been subject to critique by scholars and civil society organizations, who argue that such powers can lead to the centralization of decision-making, lack of transparency, and potential erosion of civil liberties (Ginsburg & Versteeg, 2021; Habibi et al., 2020).

Critics contend governments might exploit emergencies to increase executive authority, bypass legislative oversight, and undermine democratic checks and balances (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004; Gostin et al., 2020). Proponents of emergency powers emphasize the need for swift and decisive action to address public health crises, arguing that the fexibility offered by emergency powers can facilitate more effective responses to rapidly developing situations (Dodds et al., 2020). Thus, the choice of legal framework for implementing mask mandates and social distancing measures in European countries refects not only the specifc conditions of the pandemic but also broader debates surrounding the balance between executive authority, democratic accountability, and public health imperatives during times of crisis.

#### Timeline of the Implementation and Retraction of Mask Mandates and Social Distancing Measures

In this section, we examine three distinct groups of countries based on their approach to mask mandates and social distancing measures: strict, moderate, and lenient. These categories refect the varying degrees of stringency, comprehensiveness, and duration of the public health policies implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

*Strict Countries* Strict countries are those that have implemented comprehensive and stringent mask mandates and social distancing measures, often enforcing these policies with penalties for non-compliance. These countries typically introduced mask mandates early in the pandemic, requiring the use of face coverings in various public settings and maintaining strict social distancing rules. Strict countries have also periodically reinforced these measures as the pandemic evolved, responding to changing transmission rates and emerging evidence. The strict approach is hypothesized to prioritize public health and safety, with the aim of minimizing the spread of the virus and protecting vulnerable populations. In such countries, fnes for not following the rules were generally high and enforced by the police.

*Moderate Countries* Moderate countries are characterized by a more balanced approach to mask mandates and social distancing measures, adopting policies that are less stringent than those in strict countries but still aimed at reducing transmission. These countries may have introduced mask mandates and social distancing rules with more fexibility, allowing for regional variations or exemptions based on local conditions. Governments took into account the trade-offs between public health, economic, and social considerations, seeking a balance between controlling the spread of the virus and mitigating the disruptive effects of these measures on society and the economy.

*Lenient Countries* Lenient countries are those that have implemented relatively relaxed mask mandates and social distancing measures, relying more on voluntary compliance and personal responsibility. These countries may have introduced mask mandates and social distancing rules later in the pandemic or limited their scope to specifc settings or situations. Governments in such countries might have prioritized individual freedoms and economic concerns over strict public health measures, considering the

#### 228 E. DE SAINT-PHALLE

**Fig. 13.2** Type of mask mandates implemented in selected EU countries (including Switzerland and the UK). Source: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

potential negative consequences of prolonged or stringent restrictions on society and the economy.

Figure 13.2 visualizes the types of responses in terms of mask mandates. We observe that while some countries had a varying response, like Italy, which was the frst one to be hit by the pandemic in February 2020. The use of masks appears to be quite strict: not only were the masks required in all public spaces most of the time, but several decrees were passed that required wearing masks in all public and private spaces. On the contrary, countries like Denmark or Finland mostly required the masks only in closed spaces (with Finland simply recommending the use).

#### *Timeline for Strict Countries*

Strict countries in Europe enforced rigorous mask mandates and social distancing measures early in the pandemic, maintaining them for extended durations, with retractions and reintroductions as needed. Italy, for instance, executed a nationwide lockdown on March 9, 2020, and required mask-wearing in public spaces beginning April 26. The Italian government upheld mask mandates and social distancing rules, modifying them based on the epidemiological situation. Some restrictions were eased in the summer of 2020, but were later reintroduced as the pandemic worsened. Greece swiftly imposed a lockdown on March 23, 2020, and introduced mask mandates in public spaces on June 29, 2020. Greece sustained these measures throughout the pandemic, adjusting them according to regional differences and epidemiological trends. Mask mandates were partially lifted during low transmission periods but were reinstated as cases surged. France also pursued a strict approach, initiating a nationwide lockdown on March 17, 2020, followed by mask mandates in public spaces from May 11, 2020. The French government relaxed some restrictions in the summer of 2020, only to reimpose them later in response to subsequent waves of the pandemic.

#### *Timeline for Moderate Countries*

Moderate countries in Europe adopted more gradual approaches to mask mandates and social distancing measures, adjusting their implementation based on the epidemiological situation. Germany, for example, did not impose a nationwide lockdown but instead implemented regional lockdowns and mask mandates depending on the infection rates in each federal state. Mask-wearing became compulsory in public transportation and shops across all federal states by April 27, 2020, with each state setting its own timeline for enforcement and easing (Robert Koch Institute, 2020). Retractions and reintroductions of these measures were subject to regional decisions. In the Czech Republic, the government initially enforced a lockdown on March 16, 2020, and mandated mask-wearing in public spaces on March 18. Although the government eased some restrictions in May 2020, it reintroduced them later as the pandemic continued. Masks were no longer required outdoors from May 25, 2020, but were later reinstated as cases increased.

The Netherlands implemented an "intelligent lockdown" on March 15, 2020, which included social distancing measures but no compulsory mask mandates. However, the government later introduced mask mandates in public transportation on June 1, 2020, and expanded it to indoor public spaces on December 1, 2020. The Netherlands temporarily lifted the indoor mask mandate during low transmission periods, only to reimpose it when cases rose again. Similarly, the United Kingdom adopted a diverse approach to managing the pandemic, with England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland implementing their own measures. Overall, the UK favoured voluntary guidance and targeted restrictions over blanket lockdowns and mask mandates. However, mask-wearing became compulsory in public transport and indoor public spaces in England from July 24, 2020, and was later rescinded on July 19, 2021, as part of the UK's broader reopening strategy.

#### *Timeline for Lenient Countries*

Lenient countries in Europe typically adopted less stringent mask mandates and social distancing measures, often relying on voluntary guidelines and recommendations. They were relatively late into the pandemic (often in the second wave) to introduce masks in public spaces. For instance, Denmark implemented a partial lockdown on March 11, 2020, but did not mandate masks in public spaces until August 22, 2020. The Danish government later lifted the mask mandate on September 10, 2021, following a decline in COVID-19 cases. Finland never introduced an offcial mask mandate, instead issuing only a recommendation. An anecdotic explanation circulated a lot, explaining that two meters of distance is too close for Finns.

Estonia followed a similar approach, enacting social distancing recommendations without imposing a full lockdown or widespread mask mandates. In Estonia, mask-wearing was only required in public transportation and in healthcare facilities. Restrictions were gradually lifted as the pandemic situation improved.

#### *Spillover Effects Between Countries*

As the pandemic unfolded, spillover effects between countries became apparent, with neighbouring nations often infuencing each other's policy decisions. The implementation or relaxation of mask mandates and social distancing measures in one country sometimes prompted similar actions in nearby countries, either due to epidemiological trends or political considerations. For example, when Germany implemented regional lockdowns and mask mandates, several neighbouring countries, such as Austria and Poland, followed suit by adopting similar policies. The success or failure of these measures in one country often informed policy decisions in others.

Moreover, the European Union's coordination efforts, such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) guidelines and recommendations, played a role in harmonizing some public health measures across member states (ECDC, 2020). The exchange of information and best practices facilitated evidence-based policymaking and contributed to a more unifed approach to managing the pandemic. Additionally, spillover effects were evident in the coordination of travel restrictions between countries. As nations implemented or lifted mask mandates and social distancing measures, they often adjusted their travel policies accordingly, allowing or limiting the movement of people based on the epidemiological situation in adjacent countries.

To sum up, the implementation and retraction of mask mandates and social distancing measures across European countries were infuenced not only by their unique policy approaches and epidemiological situations but also by spillover effects resulting from the interconnectedness of the continent and the need for coordinated action to address the pandemic (Fig. 13.3).

**Fig. 13.3** Mapping of mask mandates' strictness

#### Regional Differences in the Implementation of Mask Mandates

The implementation of mask mandates across Europe showcased a mosaic of strategies, refecting the unique social, political, and epidemiological contexts of each region. From Eastern to Northern Europe, countries exhibited diverse approaches to mask mandates, with some enforcing strict nationwide policies, while others favoured regional or voluntary guidelines. This variety indicates that there were no one-size-fts-all solutions in response to the pandemic.

#### *Eastern European Countries*

Eastern European countries exhibited a wide array of strategies when it came to implementing mask mandates. Countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Lithuania, each adopted different policies, refecting their distinct public health priorities and evolving understanding of the virus. For example, Romania instituted mandatory mask-wearing in public spaces on May 15, 2020, and continued to enforce this policy throughout the pandemic, with varying levels of strictness depending on the epidemiological situation. Bulgaria enforced mask-wearing on public transportation and in indoor public spaces starting May 14, 2020. However, during periods of low transmission, the Bulgarian government eased these restrictions, refecting a more fexible approach that balanced public health concerns with social and economic considerations. Lithuania adopted a more targeted approach to mask mandates, introducing requirements for face coverings in public transportation and indoor public spaces on April 10, 2020. Poland implemented a nationwide mask mandate on April 16, 2020, which initially required face coverings in all public spaces, both indoor and outdoor.

#### *Western European Countries*

Western European countries also exhibited a range of responses to mask mandates during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland each adopted distinct strategies that refected their unique political structures, public health systems, and social contexts. Germany employed a regional approach to mask mandates, allowing each of its 16 federal states to determine their own timeline for implementing and lifting mask requirements. This decentralized strategy was consistent with Germany's federal system, which grants signifcant autonomy to individual states in areas such as public health. Austria, in contrast, opted for a more centralized strategy. The Austrian government imposed a nationwide mask mandate on April 6, 2020, requiring masks in public transportation, shops, and indoor public spaces. As the pandemic evolved, Austria adapted its mask policy based on the prevailing epidemiological situation, tightening or easing restrictions in response to fuctuations in case numbers and other relevant indicators.

Switzerland took a somewhat mixed approach to mask mandates. The Swiss government initially recommended, rather than required, the use of masks in public spaces when physical distancing of 2 m could not be maintained. However, as the pandemic progressed and case numbers increased, the Swiss Federal Council implemented a nationwide mask mandate on October 19, 2020, which applied to public transportation, indoor public spaces, and shops. Despite this central decision, cantonal governments were given the authority to impose additional mask requirements or relax them based on local conditions. This approach struck a balance between nationwide consistency and regional adaptability.

#### *Central European Countries*

Slovenian government chose to implement a nationwide mask mandate on March 30, 2020, requiring individuals to wear masks in enclosed public spaces, such as shops, and on public transportation. The decision to apply this mandate uniformly across the country was driven by a desire for consistency in policy and messaging, as well as a recognition of the potential for rapid spread of the virus if left unchecked. Slovakia's approach to mask mandates evolved over time. Initially, the government enforced a nationwide mask mandate on March 25, 2020, requiring the use of masks in public transportation and indoor public spaces. This early action was taken to prevent the healthcare system from becoming overwhelmed by a surge in cases. However, as the pandemic progressed and more data became available, the Slovak government modifed the policy to focus on specifc regions with higher infection rates. This targeted approach allowed for a more effcient allocation of resources and a tailored response to the varying levels of risk across the country.

#### *Southern European Countries*

Approaches in the Southern Europe varied, mostly based on the epidemiological situation and the number of infections. Italy introduced a nationwide mask mandate on April 26, 2020, and sustained this requirement, with modifcations based on the epidemiological context. Portugal mandated mask-wearing in public transportation and enclosed spaces from May 4, 2020, and later expanded the requirement to outdoor public spaces where social distancing was impractical. Conversely, Malta implemented a nationwide mask mandate on October 17, 2020, requiring face coverings in all public spaces, both indoor and outdoor. This approach was infuenced by the island nation's dense population and the need to minimize transmission in close quarters. In Croatia, the government enforced mask-wearing in indoor public spaces and on public transportation starting July 13, 2020. This approach was taken in response to the rising number of cases in the country. Additionally, the Croatian government recommended the use of masks in outdoor public spaces, particularly when physical distancing could not be maintained. This guidance was aimed at reducing transmission of the virus while allowing for greater fexibility in outdoor settings, where the risk of transmission is generally lower.

#### *Northern European Countries*

Northern European countries took varied but generally lenient approaches to mask mandates. As previously mentioned, Denmark did not impose mask-wearing in public spaces until August 22, 2020, and eventually lifted the mandate on September 10, 2021. This relatively late introduction of mask rules and subsequent lifting demonstrated the Danish government's evolving approach based on the changing epidemiological situation. In Finland, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare advised wearing masks in situations where social distancing was unattainable, such as on public transportation, but never mandated masks on a nationwide scale. This guidance-based approach aimed to empower individuals to make informed decisions about mask-wearing, without imposing strict requirements. Norway, similar to Finland, did not impose a nationwide mask mandate. The Norwegian Institute of Public Health recommended the use of masks in situations where maintaining social distancing was diffcult, such as on public transportation or in crowded indoor spaces. The Norwegian government focused on promoting other preventive measures like physical distancing and maintaining good hygiene to limit the spread of the virus.

Sweden, known for its distinct approach to the pandemic, did not implement a nationwide mask mandate. Instead, the Swedish Public Health Agency recommended mask-wearing in specifc situations, such as during peak hours on public transportation, while emphasizing the importance of other preventive measures like social distancing and good hygiene practices. This strategy was consistent with Sweden's overall approach to the pandemic, which relied on voluntary compliance and individual responsibility.

#### National and Regional Differences in the Implementation of Mask Mandates

The implementation of mask mandates also varied in terms of the level at which these measures were enacted. Some countries chose to enforce mask mandates exclusively at the national level, while others opted for a combination of national and regional approaches. Several factors, including political systems, regional autonomy, epidemiological trends, cultural factors, and the need for adaptability infuenced the decision to govern the situation at.

*Political Systems* The political structure of a country plays a signifcant role in determining the level at which mask mandates are implemented. Countries with centralized political systems, such as Denmark and Greece, were more likely to implement national-level mandates, whereas those with more decentralized or federal systems, such as Germany and Spain, opted for a combination of national and regional approaches.

*Regional Autonomy* In countries with strong regional governments, such as the United Kingdom and Spain, regional authorities played a more prominent role in implementing and adjusting mask mandates. This allowed for a greater degree of autonomy in responding to local conditions and needs, while still adhering to overarching national guidelines (see Chap. 5 on territorial powers).

*Epidemiological Trends* The distribution of COVID-19 cases and the severity of outbreaks varied considerably across regions within individual countries. As a result, some governments opted for regional approaches to mask mandates, allowing them to tailor their policies to local infection rates and trends. This fexibility enabled a more targeted response to the pandemic.

*Need for Adaptability* The rapidly evolving nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, with frequent changes in infection rates, transmission patterns, and the emergence of new virus variants, necessitated a high degree of adaptability in public health measures. For some countries, a regional approach to mask mandates provided the fexibility to adjust policies quickly in response to changing circumstances, whereas others preferred a uniform national approach to maintain consistency and avoid confusion among the public (Fig. 13.4).

**Fig. 13.4** Total number of mask mandate-related legislation in European countries. Source: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering. Notes: The list may be non-exhaustive

#### *Countries That Implemented Mandates Only on the National Level*

Most countries across Europe, such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Portugal, Baltic states and others, opted for a purely national-level mandates, mostly due to the specifcs of political systems and the centralized governmental approach to the crisis management. Mask mandates were enforced at the national level, with a uniform approach across all regions. One primary factor is the need for a unifed and consistent approach to public health policy. By implementing mask mandates at the national level, governments can ensure that the entire population adheres to the same set of guidelines, which helps to streamline public health messaging and reduce confusion. This consistent approach is particularly important during a pandemic, as it enables clear communication of expectations and guidelines, fostering public trust and compliance with public health measures.

Additionally, national-level mask mandates can be more effective in controlling the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, as they are not limited by regional boundaries or differences in policy implementation. Viruses do not respect borders, and a patchwork of regional policies can create loopholes that facilitate the spread of the virus. A nationwide mandate allows for a more coordinated and comprehensive response to the pandemic, ensuring that all regions are working together to mitigate transmission and protect public health. Furthermore, national governments typically have greater resources and expertise to monitor and evaluate the impact of mask mandates, enabling them to adapt policies as needed based on the evolving epidemiological situation.

#### *Countries That Implemented Mandates on National and Regional Levels*

Some countries, such as Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, have opted for a mixed approach to mask mandates, implementing them at both national and regional levels. This strategy allowed for more fexibility and adaptability in response to local conditions. Moreover, it refects the recognition that different regions may face varying levels of risk and unique challenges in managing the pandemic. By allowing regional or municipal authorities to tailor mask mandates to local conditions, governments can create more targeted and fexible public health policies that address the specifc needs of each area.

A mixed approach also acknowledges the importance of balancing nationwide consistency with regional autonomy. In countries with federal or decentralized political systems, regional or municipal authorities often have greater knowledge of local conditions and more direct access to relevant data. This familiarity with the local context enables them to make more informed decisions about the appropriate public health measures to implement in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, by involving regional or municipal authorities in the decision-making process, national governments can promote collaboration and encourage the sharing of best practices and lessons learned. This cooperative approach fosters a more effective and adaptive response to the pandemic, ensuring that public health policies remain responsive to the evolving epidemiological situation in each region.

In the United Kingdom, governments of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland each set their own mask-wearing policies, refecting the devolved nature of the UK's political system. While these policies were similar in many respects, they were tailored to the specifc needs and circumstances of each region. Similarly, in Hungary, the national government introduced a nationwide mask mandate on April 27, 2020, requiring masks on public transportation and indoor public spaces. Despite this national level policy, regional governments were permitted to adjust the rules according to the local situation. This allowed for more targeted responses to outbreaks and changing infection rates.

#### *Insights and Conclusions*

Upon examining the various approaches to mask mandates across Europe, several patterns emerge. Firstly, countries that opted for nationwide mandates, such as Austria, France, or Italy, tended to adjust their policies in response to the changing epidemiological situation. This suggests that these countries valued a centralized approach, ensuring consistent application of the mandates while remaining adaptable to the fuctuations in transmission rates. Secondly, countries with more decentralized political systems, like Germany or Spain, preferred to allow regional or local authorities to determine the specifcs of mask mandates. This approach illustrates the importance of regional autonomy and decision-making in tailoring pandemic responses to the unique circumstances of each area. Drawing conclusions from these patterns, it is evident that various factors played a role in shaping a country's approach to mask mandates. In some cases, the preference for nationwide mandates or voluntary guidelines may be indicative of trust in government and public health authorities, as well as societal attitudes towards individual liberties and collective responsibility. Furthermore, the varied approaches to mask mandates underscore the complex interplay between public health objectives and the need to balance economic, social, and psychological considerations during a crisis.

#### Conclusion

This chapter has examined the various legal frameworks, timelines, regional differences, and national and regional implementations of mask mandates in European countries during the period of 2020–early 2022. The analysis revealed that countries utilized a mix of emergency powers and existing legislation to introduce mask mandates and social distancing measures, depending on the specifc circumstances and perceived need for rapid action. The study also identifed three broad categories of countries in terms of strictness, with strict, moderate, and lenient countries displaying different timelines for the implementation and retraction of these measures. Additionally, the investigation uncovered distinct regional patterns in the enforcement of mask mandates, with Eastern, Central, Western, Southern, and Northern European countries exhibiting diverse approaches. Lastly, the research highlighted the differences between countries implementing mandates solely at the national level and those employing a combination of national and regional approaches.

The fndings of this chapter have several implications for future policies related to public health measures. Understanding the legal frameworks and the diverse approaches employed across Europe provides valuable insights for policymakers in the event of future public health crises. By examining the effectiveness of different strategies, authorities can identify best practices and adopt more targeted, context-sensitive policies. Furthermore, the recognition of regional differences and the potential benefts of a combined national-regional approach can contribute to more effcient and adaptable policy responses to evolving epidemiological situations.

This study has some limitations, such as the focus on mask mandates and social distancing measures, which may not encompass the full range of public health policies enacted during the pandemic. Additionally, the analysis is primarily descriptive and does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of these measures in controlling the spread of the virus.

Future research could build upon this study by exploring the effectiveness of mask mandates and social distancing measures in reducing transmission rates and preventing outbreaks. Moreover, researchers could examine the interplay between public health measures, public compliance, and cultural factors, and investigate how these elements infuence the success of different policy approaches.

#### References

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### Education in Times of COVID-19

#### *Olga Litvyak*

#### Introduction

The COVID-19-induced policy responses in the education sector were particularly diverse, often with distinct approaches adopted not only across Europe but even at the regional level within one country, for example, in Spain (Díez-Gutiérrez & Gajardo Espinoza, 2021) or Germany (Freundl et al., 2021). Furthermore, countries introduced a variety of measures depending on the level of education. While universities largely switched to digital or hybrid learning, daycare and primary schools that initially also faced restrictions on face-to-face learning became crucial in providing support to workers in essential professions and, in the later stage of the pandemic, to parents working from home.

School closures during the lockdown periods largely disrupted education, leading to potential long-term consequences (Blaskó et al., 2022), especially for young children (Fuchs-Schündeln et al., 2020), and increasing existing educational inequalities (Dimopoulos et al., 2021; Engzell

O. Litvyak (\*)

Department of Communication, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Department for E-Governance and Administration, University for Continuing Education Krems, Krems an der Donau, Austria e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2024 243

C. Egger et al. (eds.), *Covid-19 Containment Policies in Europe*, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52096-9\_14

et al., 2020). Emerging research on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the education sector has shown that suspension of in-person learning has contributed to learning loss, exacerbating achievement gaps in several European countries (Maldonado & De Witte, 2022), and negatively impacted students' well-being (Grewenig et al., 2021). It also challenged the capacities and abilities of parents, who often had to combine their work responsibilities with home schooling (Hank & Steinbach, 2020; Hipp & Bünning, 2021).

At the same time, the transition to distance and hybrid learning accelerated the digitalisation of education institutions and education systems across Europe, amplifying economic disparities across the countries (Arday, 2022). With digital learning becoming the dominant policy measure, especially in higher education sector, supranational actors, such as the EU and the UN intensifed competition for global education governance, proposing own policy solutions (Symeonidis et al., 2021; Williamson et al., 2020; Wulff, 2021).

This chapter discusses differences and similarities in education policy measures adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic in the countries of the European Economic Area and Switzerland and the role of supranational actors. It addresses the differences between crisis policymaking process in the feld of education, contrasting them with the COVID-19-related developments, such as epidemiological data and the introduction of lockdowns or other restrictions. Thus, it aims at providing an in-depth comparative examination of the emergency policymaking in the feld of education during the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### Diversity of Policy Responses in the Field of Education Across Europe

The COVID-19 pandemic forced millions of people to stay at home, leaving educational institutions closed for months and, as in other spheres of life in pandemic, often moving everyday life and, as an essential part of it, learning and teaching, into the digital realm. High fragmentation of education governance in the European countries and absence of the EU-wide education policies hindered an effective and coordinated response to the challenges emerging during the pandemic (Symeonidis et al., 2021). In the situation of high uncertainty and growing number of cases and COVID-related deaths, initial crisis-management measures led to closure of educational institutions and often immediate switch to online education. As a result, educational professionals had to cope with the changing mode of teaching and adopt to the challenges of new learning environment, often compromising own physical and mental health (Baker et al., 2021; Košir et al., 2022).

Early childhood education and care sector serves as crucial support mechanisms for parents and constitutes the frst stage of a child's educational journey. The Eurostat data (2022a) reveals that on average 92.9% of children from age three in the EU were enrolled into early childhood education in 2020, though enrolment rates vary between 70 and 100%. In Norway, the share of children attending early childcare facilities was about 95%, whereas in Switzerland this fgure drops to 50%. There are also differences between the fnancial support in this sector, as some countries or even regions provide state support for early childhood education, even from the age of one (e.g., in Vienna state in Austria), whereas other countries have no or limited state-funded kindergarten places.

Primary and secondary schools are the cornerstone of education in Europe. According to the Eurostat statistics (2022b), in 2020 there were 23.3 million primary school pupils with on average 87.3% of them attending public schools. Secondary education still largely constitutes compulsory education in the EEA countries, as children are obliged to attend school until the age of 14–16 (Eurostat, 2022c), with only 2–5% of this age group not attending secondary education institutions. As in the case of primary education, the majority of pupils are educated in public schools.

In 2020, there were 18 million students enrolled in tertiary education programmes in the EU (Eurostat, 2022d), corresponding to on average 70% rate, though there are large discrepancies among countries with lower attendance rates (less than 50%) in the CEE countries (World Bank Group, 2022). These data refect the existing inequalities in the access to higher education. Though some countries provide state support for tertiary education, disparities in social and economic opportunities often render higher education inaccessible, unlike compulsory primary and secondary education. Levels of educational inequality vary across regions, with Nordic and Western European countries demonstrating lower levels, while Mediterranean and Eastern European countries report higher inequality levels (Palmisano et al., 2022).

As in the other aspects of life in times of the COVID-19 pandemic, education was also impacted, when most countries introduced measures limiting the transmission consequently bringing social life to a standstill. Italy, Spain, Austria, the UK, and the Netherlands imposed lockdowns of various intensity (see Chazel's contribution to this volume) in March 2020 that with brief phases of reopening lasted until 2022. The Nordic countries, despite similarities in health and welfare systems, adopted various policies: as Finland, Denmark, and Norway enforced lockdowns, Sweden became known for an alternative approach aiming at herd immunity (Pierre, 2020). The Central and Eastern European countries initially followed Western European countries implementing preventive lockdowns early on and limiting the spread of the COVID-19 in the spring of 2020 (Bohle & Eihmanis, 2022). Educational institutions often had to follow suit and either close completely or provide opportunities for hybrid or digital learning.

However, in the later stages of the crisis, most of the CEE countries failed to implement effective vaccination policies and confront increasing mistrust into the governmental decisions. Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia took advantage of the situation, strengthening illiberal democratic practices (Bohle et al., 2022; Popic & Moise, 2022). In the Baltic countries, on the contrary, early restrictive measures and centralised response provided an opportunity to prepare and preserve the health systems (Webb et al., 2022).

An overview of policy responses in the feld of education across countries, provided in Fig. 14.1, refects the results of the EXCEPTIUS project legislative data analysis. The maps demonstrate how often the measures were mentioned in the legal documents and, therefore, the extent of specifc measures in the period between January 2020 and May 2021.

The dataset includes six different types of policy measures: distance learning, hybrid learning, full closure, partial closure, minimal service for essential professions, and fnally reopening. The frst two measures entail the provisions for either distance learning, such as the use of diverse communication tools, existing and specifcally developed online learning platforms or other instruments allowing to provide distance education. Given the extensive range of tools used to ensure distance learning, this chapter does not aim to enumerate the exact tools deployed in each country. Universities had been incorporating online learning platforms into their classroom teaching long before the pandemic; however, other educational sectors often had to implement ad-hoc developed tools (Barberi et al., 2020; Katić et al., 2021; Williamson et al., 2020).

Hybrid learning, a blend of remote and face-to-face instruction, could supplement distance learning or occasionally act as a transitional phase

**Fig. 14.1** Policy responses in the feld of education across countries, January 2020–May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS dataset, own rendering, demonstrating the salience of the measures in legislative documents by country in percent

between in-person education and remote learning, either prior to or following lockdowns. Full and partial closures of educational institutions encompass restrictions on in-person instruction. Yet, even in the times of full closure of education institutions some countries maintained minimal service for essential professions, offering support for people unable to transition to remote work, such as, for example, doctors, nurses, and police. All the measures could complement each other and be implemented simultaneously, for example, closures, minimal service, and distance learning, and therefore may be referenced concurrently in the analysed legal documents.

Finally, provisions for reopening educational institutions, though primarily put forth when restrictions were being eased, could also be debated alongside discussions about closures or hybrid learning. Therefore, the presence of one of the measures within a legal document does not necessarily preclude the presence of the others.

Table 14.1 provides an overview of the number of coded measures for each country and serves as a basis for interpretation of the results demonstrated in Figs. 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7, 14.8, and 14.9 in the following sections. In case no legislative documents in a country mentioned specifc measures, these countries were excluded from the analysis.

Figure 14.1 reveals important patterns in policy measures in the feld of education, elucidating the differences and similarities between the countries. Hybrid and digital learning provisions dominated the policy response and were to some extent introduced in almost all the countries analysed within the project.

However, only a small number of countries implemented full or partial closures of education institutions. Among these countries are Germany, Denmark, the UK, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Finland that opted for strict lockdowns in the early days of the pandemic. These countries are also among those who maintained minimal educational service for essential professions, aiming to support the crucial workforce. The data demonstrates the lack of this policy measure in the CEE countries except for Hungary and the Czech Republic.

As the pandemic evolved, the policy focus shifted towards relaxing measures in education sector. Despite the positive effect of the closures on the infection transmission, increasing number of expert advice highlighted the negative impact of the closures on socio-emotional well-being of children, youth, educational professionals, and parents (Brooks et al., 2020; Viner et al., 2020), the long-term learning losses (Blaskó et al., 2022) and inequalities between the countries and regions (Esteban-Navarro et al., 2020; Mitescu-Manea et al., 2021). Contrary to the restrictions, relaxing measures contributed to positive emotions (Eisele et al., 2021). Therefore, the prevalence of educational reopening provisions across Europe found in the analysed legal documents is not surprising.

**Table 14.1** Overview of the policy measures data by country

*Source*: EXCEPTIUS data

The comparison of the WHO epidemiological data (WHO, n.d.) on the new cases of the COVID-19 and total deaths for all the countries (Figs. 14.2 and 14.3) generally demonstrates the link between the negative health dynamics during the pandemic and the measures restricting in-person education. Given the existence of signifcant outliers, such as days with a high number of newly registered cases, for instance, with a maximum of 57,506 in Italy, Fig. 14.2 amplifes the core fndings of the comparison for up to 5000 new cases per day, disregarding the outliers. As the fgures show, decrease in the number of new cases and fatalities aligns

**Fig. 14.2** Association between the daily number of new COVID-19 cases limited to maximum 5000 and mentions of policy measures, January 2020–May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

**Fig. 14.3** Association between the daily total number of deaths and mentions of policy measures, January 2020–May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS dataset, own rendering

with legislation on reopening measures and the shift towards hybrid education. There is, however, a large range in the daily number of cases when it comes to the introduction of the full closure measures. The boxplots that link distance learning and the provision of minimal service to total deaths in Fig. 14.3 reveal comparable trends.

Table 14.2 provides an overview of the measures within the dataset concerning different educational felds. It reveals that legislative attention to primary, secondary, and tertiary education is relatively equal, while the portion of documents addressing early childhood education constitutes approximately half of that dedicated to each of the other sectors.

**Table 14.2** Policy measures by country and education sector

*Source*: EXCEPTIUS data

Wide range of policy responses adopted by nations within the EEA refects the variety of educational institutions, the distinct characteristics of different educational levels, and their societal roles. The next part of the chapter focuses on the in-depth discussion of the measures introduced within the educational sectors, from early childhood education to primary and secondary schools and, fnally, university sector.

#### Distance and Hybrid Learning Measures

Distance and hybrid learning measures dominated the policy response in the feld of education (see Figs. 14.4 and 14.5). Almost all the countries investigated within the EXCEPTIUS project made legal provisions for either one or both measures. However, the extent of these measures across different levels of education varies.

Compared to all other education felds, both distance and hybrid learning measures prevail in the feld of tertiary education. Due to their age, students at this level typically exhibit greater independence. Coupled with the high level of digital skills they were often considered capable to, often almost immediately, transition to digital learning. Indeed, the Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2020) reveals that in 2019 about 80% of European youth aged between 16 and 24 had basic or above basic digital skills.

**Fig. 14.4** Distance learning measures by country and education feld introduced from January 2020 to May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

**Fig. 14.5** Hybrid learning measures by country and education feld introduced from January 2020 to May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

Analysis of legislative documents revealed that distance learning was the sole policy response for tertiary education in Greece and neighbouring Cyprus. In Spain, Hungary, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Croatia, and Germany, distance learning emerged as the dominant response in the higher education sector, supplemented by hybrid learning. The data shows that, notably, only Austria, Portugal, and Czech Republic did not make any distance learning provisions for higher education in the legislation analysed, with the latter adopting the measure only in the feld of early childhood education and care, that is, daycare and kindergarten. However, both Austria and Portugal largely employed hybrid learning in higher education, resulting in students primarily using online tools for learning and attending exams physically.

On the contrary, distance learning is seldom used in early childhood education and care, a sector pivotal in supporting the workforce by alleviating childcare responsibilities. Considering comparatively high occurrence of the early childhood education mentions in legal documents in Switzerland (see Table 14.2), extensive focus on distance learning in early childhood education is remarkable. In Switzerland, 65% of the documents discussing distance learning provide legal provisions for early childhood education sector. Predictably, most European countries channelled their efforts into creating hybrid possibilities for early childhood education. In case of Croatia, Sweden, and Luxembourg, these were the only identifed measures in the analysis of the legal basis for early childhood education policies in the pandemic. In France, Belgium, Poland, Malta, Italy, Romania, and Spain, hybrid learning was the most crucial policy response in the sector of early childhood education with more than a half of the analysed documents legislating its use.

Given the similarities between primary and secondary education sectors, it is not surprising that emergency decision-making often yielded similar policy responses for both, with comparable prominence in the analysed documents. With a very few exceptions the trends in pandemic response in secondary education remain the same as in the primary education, with hybrid and distance learning predominantly used across the EEA countries. In Germany, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Greece, distance learning was the prevailing measure in secondary education sector, though, as discussed later, the school closures are seldom mentioned in the countries' legislation. Although the data suggests that distance and hybrid learning provisions are important in Romania, Norway, and Sweden, the limited number of documents coded for these countries precludes defnitive interpretations.

#### Closures and Provision of the Minimal Service for Essential Professions

Overall full or partial closures (see Figs. 14.6 and 14.7) were rather rare with fewer than half of all the European countries examined within the EXCEPTIUS project opting for these approaches. Even when these measures were implemented, in Finland, Estonia, Poland, Portugal, and the UK, the overall number of mentions of these measures in the data was fewer than 10, thereby making any resulting conclusions somewhat tentative. The measures often complement each other or are used at different times during the pandemic. However, the exact timing is not the focus of this overview. This section largely addresses the closures in combination with the minimal service for essential professions.

The analysis of closures in education corresponds to the trends revealed in the previous section. A distinguishing factor in higher education was the greater prevalence of full or partial closures complemented by distance or hybrid learning provisions discussed earlier. Consistent with its approach in other education sectors, the Czech Republic outlined measures for

**Fig. 14.6** Full closure measures by country and education feld introduced from January 2020 to May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

**Fig. 14.7** Partial closure measures by country and education feld introduced from January 2020 to May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

comprehensive and partial closures of tertiary institutions. Similar trends were observed in Austria, where universities remained closed for nearly 2 years, relying on regional and institution-specifc distance learning tools. Switzerland notably used full closure measures only for universities, paired with hybrid learning that essentially meant long-term remote learning. The fndings on the prevalence of full and partial closures in Finland, Estonia, Poland, Portugal, and the UK are not particularly meaningful, given the limited instances of these measures within the legislative documents.

Full closure policies were less common in secondary education, with Greece, Germany, and the Czech Republic once again standing out. Further, Austria widely implemented partial closures in secondary education. This strategy complemented full closures in Germany, a variation potentially attributable to the specifcs of educational decision-making in Germany. It is worth noting that legislative power in the educational sector in Germany is often decentralised, residing more often with the German states than the federal government.

The full closure measures for primary education institutions were rare, though Denmark represents a distinct exception with about 97% of the full closure legislation targeting primary schools. Other countries like Greece and Czech Republic implemented this measure to some extent both in primary and secondary education, opting for a unifed approach to these educational felds. Partial closure of secondary educational institutions dominated legislative responses in countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany, Czech Republic, UK, and Finland, aligning with their stringent lockdowns.

The results on the early childhood education demonstrate once again how important the provision of service in this feld was during the pandemic. Only a minority of countries broadly implemented full closure measures in early childhood education, with Poland, and to a large extent Greece and Finland being the prime examples. Few countries largely adopted full closure of the early childhood education. Two countries, however, stand out in this regard: Greece and the Czech Republic. Though the latter had provisions for minimal service for essential professions and some distance learning, the COVID-19 response in the country largely entailed the complete closure of early childhood education. In Greece, the governmental response to the pandemic was even more drastic, as almost all the legislation analysed focused on either the full closure or partial closure of early childhood education institutions.

**Fig. 14.8** Minimal service provision for essential workers by country and education feld introduced from January 2020 to May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

When it comes to the provisions of minimal educational services (Fig. 14.8), most measures target early childhood, primary, and secondary education sectors. Large percentage of the provisions for the university education in France and the Netherlands translates to a small number of instances when viewed in absolute terms. Germany stands out as a country that to some extent preserved minimal service in all the felds of education.

The EXCEPTIUS data demonstrates that countries enforcing strict lockdowns, such as Austria, UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal, and Germany, enacted signifcant legislative measures to preserve early childhood education and care for essential workers. As discussed earlier, this educational sector was also rarely affected by the closures. The overall approaches to early childhood and primary education highlight their importance for society, particularly for working parents. The pandemicinduced closures, as discussed earlier, added pressure on such parents, thus making minimal service maintenance or distance learning provisions crucial for sustaining the economy and health systems.

Though children in secondary school require less caring as children of pre-school and primary school age, secondary education programmes are more challenging for parents that had to adopt to home schooling. Therefore, providing minimal secondary school service for essential professions remained one of the main legislative priorities for the countries with strict lockdowns. This measure held particular signifcance in the UK, Denmark, Spain, and to a lesser extent, in Portugal and the Netherlands. As in the case of primary education, approximately a third of all legislative documents related to secondary education in Austria, Germany, and Portugal incorporated similar provisions for maintaining minimal service.

Overall, the similarities between the early childhood and primary education sectors refect the role the education for young children plays in society, providing important support for working parents. In the time of high uncertainty during the pandemic the closures of these education institutions contributed to overall stress put on parents, some of whom had to juggle home offce with childcare and education (Spinelli et al., 2020). Thus, the maintenance of minimal service or at least some provisions for distance or hybrid learning observed in the most EEA countries were necessary to preserve economic performance of adult population, but also to reduce the strain on the health systems.

#### Reopening Measures

The variety of measures employed by the European countries to navigate the educational implications of the COVID-19 crisis has been substantial, and reopening measures tied directly to the level of restrictions, closures, and limitations on face-to-face instruction. In line with the fndings discussed above, legislating reopening of educational institutions (Fig. 14.9) was crucial for countries that underwent closure or transitioned to distance learning.

Yet, the level of attention towards these measures in many countries (see Table 14.1) should be taken in consideration, when interpreting the results. Cyprus, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, and Switzerland demonstrated the greatest legislative focus, with mentions of reopening exceeding 20 instances in their legal documents.

The results indicate that reopening legislation across countries mostly focused on the primary and secondary school education, followed by the early childhood education and care, and, fnally, to a lesser extent by higher education. The fndings reveal a relatively uniform attention patterns across countries, with only a handful of exceptions prioritising a particular educational sector.

With respect to early childhood education and to a lesser extent primary education, Hungary's prominence in attention to reopening

**Fig. 14.9** Reopening measures by country and education feld introduced from January 2020 to May 2021. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS data, own rendering

measures refects both the pandemic fatigue and scepticism towards the crisis exhibited by the nation's right-wing government. Primary education was dominating legislative documents on reopening in Greece, and to some extent in Czech Republic and Poland. These measures also highlight the exacerbation of existing gender inequalities during the COVID-19 crisis, especially prominent in Central and Eastern European countries.

Considering the critical role secondary education plays in granting access to higher education and improving life prospects (Grewenig et al., 2021; Hammerstein et al., 2021; Maldonado & De Witte, 2022; Reimers, 2022), it is understandable it often receives equal or even greater attention in reopening-related legislation compared to primary education. Cyprus, Finland, Italy, Romania, and Sweden notably prioritised the reopening measures pertaining to secondary education.

Finally, regarding higher education, reopening measures have been less prominent as universities mainly operated in a distance or hybrid learning mode. Belgium stands out with more than 80% of legislation addressing reopening measures focusing on the university sector. Though other countries, such as Estonia or Romania, target about one-third of their reopening policy measures towards higher education, emphasis on this sector is relatively low. Consequently, these results should be interpreted considering the general lower legislative attention towards higher education, when it comes to reopening measures.

### Conclusion: Lessons Learnt from COVID-19 Policymaking in Education Field

Though both salience of education across legal acts related to COVID-19 and policy responses in this feld differ, some patterns emerge across Europe, often conditioned by general country response to the pandemic and the extent of restrictions rather than by geographical or cultural factors.

Overall, the EEA countries largely made use of digital and hybrid learning, especially in the primary, secondary, and higher education felds. The countries that had imposed strict lockdowns and closure of early childhood and primary education institutions often aimed to provide support to the parents working in essential professions, offering minimal service in such cases. To some extent, the same trend pertained to secondary education, whereas in higher education minimal service was rather rare.

The analysis has revealed overall consistency in the pandemic policy response in the felds of primary and secondary education sectors across the EEA countries, as measures in the two sectors often converge. Articulation of reopening provisions was important for the sectors that placed additional strain on parents, such as early childhood and primary education.

A challenge to the education systems around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic became a critical juncture that has led to re-evaluation of existing policies and practices in education. Fostering the digitalisation in higher education, it has highlighted the existing inequalities in the access to education, social and geographical digital divides (e.g., between rural and urban regions, see Esteban-Navarro et al., 2020), as well as generational differences among teaching professionals (Webb et al., 2021). In the aftermath of the pandemic, the educational institutions, especially in the feld of higher education, returned to the new normal with the changes in teacher training (Baker et al., 2021; Díez-Gutiérrez & Gajardo Espinoza, 2021) and increasing use of digital means in education.

Though overall focus of the EU education policies remained on upskilling and sustainable development, the lessons learned during the pandemic contributed to acceleration of digitalisation in education policies (Symeonidis et al., 2021). Focus on digitalisation would allow to make education more resilient to new crises and decrease inequalities in access to education, especially in primary and secondary sector, as the future generations of students and education professionals become more profcient in digital skills.

#### References

*European Educational Research Journal, 20*(4), 479–497. https://doi. org/10.1177/14749041211023331

*The Lancet Child & Adolescent Health, 4*(5), 397–404. https://doi. org/10.1016/S2352-4642(20)30095-X

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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### Compulsory Medical Examinations and "Green Pass"

*Clara Egger and Raul Magni-Berton*

#### Introduction

To manage the COVID-19 pandemic, European governments have combined restrictive measures with a close monitoring of the epidemiological situation. The most stringent measures—such as the imposition of lockdowns, curfews and the closure of national borders—have always been justifed by epidemiological indicators, in particular the evolution of COVID-19 cases and deaths. At the same time, the relaxing of containment measures has often come with the requirement to undergo compulsory medical examinations. In the summer of 2020, bars and restaurants

C. Egger (\*) Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
R. Magni-Berton European School of Political and Social Sciences, ESPOL-LAB Université Catholique de Lille, Lille, France e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
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in Belgium, Italy and Cyprus reopened only to people able to show evidence of a negative COVID-19 test. Later in 2021, as COVID-19 vaccines became available to the public and vaccination the leading strategy to contain the pandemic, COVID-19 passes became widespread across Europe—with the notable exceptions of Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Under various names, such as the Green Pass in Italy, the 2 or 3 G Pass in Germany, the Immunity Pass in Hungary or the Freedom ID in Lithuania, these documents linked the restoration of daily freedoms to a negative COVID-19 test, proof of vaccination or full recovery from the disease. Much has been written about the role of vaccination policy in containing the COVID-19 pandemic (see Charrier et al., 2022 for a review).

Several datasets document the vaccination plans adopted, how different target groups were prioritised for access to vaccination, and whether vaccination policies were compulsory or not (Cameron-Blake et al., 2023; Cheng et al., 2020). However, most of these datasets begin their coverage in 2022 (Cameron-Blake et al., 2023), when controversies about the merits of vaccine mandates became heated in both the academic and public spheres (see, among others, Karaivanov et al., 2022; Kuznetsova et al., 2022). Moreover, we know little about the compulsory medical examinations that took place before then. The tracking of COVID-19 health surveillance measures before 2022 mostly concerns internal and external border restrictions and the availability of testing facilities (Cheng et al., 2020) but does not examine how compulsory medical procedures were used to relax restrictions on mass gatherings, allow access to public and private services, and various socio-cultural activities.

This chapter aims to fll this gap and focuses on two main medical procedures: the mandatory testing policy implemented before the mass rollout of COVID-19 vaccines, and the implementation of COVID-19 passes. Our descriptive analysis is divided into three main sections. First, we map how different European countries relied on mandatory testing and green passes and show that, unlike other non-pharmaceutical policies, the implementation of such policies is quite homogeneous across (see the other chapters gathered in Part III of this volume). Main differences concern the territorial level of implementation of COVID-19 passes and their date of introduction. Second, we focus on the use of COVID-19 passes and examine whether their adoption is associated with a deterioration of the public health situation in a country or with the overall stringency of the crisis response. In other words, we ask whether COVID-19 passes are yet another policy instrument used by restrictive governments, or whether they are part of a different approach to public health monitoring. Finally, we conclude our chapter with some insights into the effectiveness of COVID-19 passes in generating support for vaccination policies.

#### Strengthening Control Measures to Ease Restrictions: Comparing Mandatory Testing and COVID-19 Passes

The EXCEPTIUS data allow to trace how compulsory medical examinations have been used together with other types of restrictive measures. A typical and well-documented example concerns the use of compulsory medical examinations at international and internal borders. In the summer of 2020, all European countries reopened their external borders (and internal borders in the case of federal states) to people who can prove their immunity, either through vaccination, recovery status or negative COVID-19 tests. What is less well documented, however, is how compulsory medical procedures have been used at the domestic level, not to control the free movement of individuals, but to guarantee other types of fundamental or everyday freedoms—such as the freedom of association or the use of public and private facilities. In this section, we focus on two of the most commonly used medical procedures: compulsory testing and the COVID-19 passes.

Prior to the release of COVID-19 vaccines to the public, EXCEPTIUS data show that very few countries relied on compulsory testing to grant access to mass gatherings or closed public and private spaces. Compulsory testing procedures condition access to some spaces and participation to mass events to evidence of a negative COVID-19 test. In most cases, large gatherings were banned, shops and restaurants were closed, or strict social distancing was enforced. Figure 15.1 shows the countries that implemented compulsory testing policies during the three COVID-19 waves covered by EXCEPTIUS data (from January 2020 to April 2021). Note that coverage ends shortly after the start of mass vaccination campaigns in Europe and before the introduction of the EU COVID-19 digital certifcate in July 2021.

Three groups of countries can be distinguished. The frst—consisting of Denmark and the Czech Republic—includes countries that started implementing mandatory testing in the frst wave and continued to do so throughout the three waves. Mandatory testing for access to closed spaces

**Fig. 15.1** Compulsory testing to access mass events and public and private facilities. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS, own rendering

and mass gatherings was introduced in Denmark as early as on 17 March 2023. Czechia followed a month later, on 23 April 2020. Initially, mandatory testing was only required to access closed spaces but was extended to mass gatherings on 17 May 2021. Belgium, Cyprus, Italy and Poland started enforcing mandatory testing in the second wave, but with a very different timing. While Cyprus adopted regulations on 14 July 2020, the other countries did so only in the autumn (30 November for Italy, 30 October for Poland) or winter of 2020 (Christmas Eve for Belgium). In these countries, a negative test was required to access every closed space. Only one country in our dataset, Greece, required a mandatory test to access closed spaces only during wave 3 and implemented as of 10 April 2021.

In contrast, the introduction of a COVID-19 pass concerned a much larger number of countries in Europe. This pass required individuals to show proof of some form of immunity to COVID-19 before entering public or private spaces and attending mass events. Most of the countries in our sample accepted different types of evidence, such as a negative COVID-19 test less than 48 h old, a complete vaccination scheme or a recovery status. In some cases—described below—the COVID-19 pass was restricted to vaccinated persons only. This widespread use can be explained by two factors: the mass availability of vaccines, but also the decision of the European Union to enforce an EU-wide COVID-19 digital certifcate, which facilitated its adoption by many countries. Table 15.1 shows the timing of the introduction of the COVID-19 pass in Europe and does not suggest any specifc patterns of diffusion of the pass, for example, in relation to neighbouring countries. Instead, each country seems to have followed its own strategy, although some explicitly mentioned that the EU digital certifcate provided strong incentives for them to develop their own pass.

As with the compulsory testing policy, Denmark—together with Hungary—pioneered the movement. However, the enforcement of the

**Table 15.1** Month of enforcement of the COVID-19 pass per country

*Source*: EXCEPTIUS, own rendering

COVID-19 pass in Denmark was suspended 6 months after its introduction, in September 2021, while the Hungarian immunity pass was converted to a vaccine-only pass in February 2022. Both countries were closely followed by Austria, Cyprus, Lithuania—called Freedom ID—and the Czech Republic in May 2021. In Cyprus, a recovery status was not suffcient to issue a "safe pass". Austria made the headlines with the adoption of a general COVID-19 vaccination mandate in the country on 5 February 2022. This COVID-19 Mandatory Vaccination Ordinance stipulated that anyone who did not comply with the vaccination mandate after 15 March 2022 could be fned up to 3600 euros, depending on their income level. The fne could be waived if a person was vaccinated within 2 weeks of being reminded, and a person could only be fned four times in a calendar year for non-compliance. Latvia and Italy introduced the pass in June 2021, but in Italy only one dose of vaccine was required. France, Ireland and Estonia followed suit in July and August, immediately introducing the EU COVID-19 digital pass. In Ireland, the pass was only required to access indoor spaces where social distancing could not be maintained.

The other countries in our sample adopted the COVID-19 pass in the autumn, with some national specifcities. In Portugal, high-risk municipalities were offered the possibility to request a COVID-19 pass in July 2021, except on Friday evenings, weekends and national holidays. Its use was extended nationally in November 2021. However, vaccinated persons could only obtain a pass if they could provide evidence of a recent negative COVID-19 test. In Croatia, the use of the pass was restricted to public buildings. Although not shown in Table 15.1, Greece introduced a pass as well, but we were unable to collect data on the date of its introduction.

Other countries were characterised by a more decentralised approach (see Magni-Berton in this volume for a more detailed analysis). In Spain, despite high infection rates, only the tourist regions of Galicia and the Canary Islands adopted it. In Germany, the rules for mandatory testing varied from place to place and state to state. Bade-Württemberg accepted the usual three types of proof (3G for "geimpft, getestete, gennesen"). In Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, 2G rules restricted the issue of the pass to vaccinated or recovered people, while in the latter region a negative test was required on top of either document to access nightclubs and Christmas markets. However, on 7 April 2022, the German Bundestag rejected a national vaccination mandate (Gehrke, 2022). In the UK, only England and Scotland required a pass to attend mass gatherings from September 2021, while enforcement was left to venues in Sweden and cities in Norway.

#### Public Health Concerns Versus Overall Stringency of Crisis Response: What Drives the Adoption of the COVID-19 Pass?

To further explain the rationale behind the different strategies adopted by European governments, this section examines the relationship between the adoption of the COVID-19 pass, the evolution of the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic on the national territory and the overall stringency of the crisis response. Our reasoning is as follows. On the one hand, COVID-19 passes can be seen as a way of preserving some daily freedoms while limiting their impact on public health indicators in a high-risk epidemiological context characterised, for example, by an increase in cases and deaths. The timeline of COVID-19 adoption in Europe—see Table 15.1 provides some evidence to support this interpretation. More than half of the countries in our sample introduced the pass before the winter season when people's promiscuity is high—or at the peak of the tourist season (France, Portugal, Spain). On the other hand, we can expect the introduction of the COVID-19 passes to be associated with the overall stringency of the crisis response in a country. As documented in previous studies (Egger et al., 2021; Engler et al., 2021, Vulcano in this volume), some governments were caught in a vicious circle of distrust when designing their COVID-19 management policies. Public trust is key to ensuring compliance with COVID-19 measures. The higher the level of public trust, the less the need for authorities to rely on very stringent measures to ensure compliance. Conversely, governments facing low levels of public trust are forced to rely on very stringent policies to enforce containment measures. In doing so, however, governments further erode their (limited) trust capital and must always go the extra mile to ensure a minimum level of compliance with sanitary measures. According to this interpretation, we should see that COVID-19 passes are adopted by countries that do not necessarily face higher epidemiological risks but are characterised by very stringent policies. To explore the validity of both explanations, we rely only on descriptive data, due to the limited size of our sample. We used the data of Mathieu et al. (2021) and calculated the monthly evolution (in percentage) of the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths 1 month before the implementation of the COVID-19 laws in each country. We had to rely on monthly indicators because for more than half of the countries in our sample the exact date of enforcement of the COVID-19 pass was not available. Nevertheless, we believe that these indicators provide a frst indication of some of the drivers of such a government decision. The results of this descriptive analysis are presented in Table 15.2.

Four groups of countries can be distinguished. The frst group—in bold-includes countries that adopted the COVID-19 pass in a context of marked deterioration in epidemiological indicators. The second group in bold italics—includes countries that experienced an increase in the number of cases and deaths before adopting the pass, but to a lesser extent. Estonia could be included in the frst group for the increase in the number

**Table 15.2** Evolution of the COVID-19 epidemiological indicators 1 month before the enforcement of the COVID-19 pass

*Source*: EXCEPTIUS data; Mathieu et al. (2021)

of deaths, but not for the number of cases. A third group of countries showed a more mixed pattern. In some cases (e.g. Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and Portugal) the number of cases increased but this was not yet associated with an increase of the lethality of the disease. In this case, the adoption of the COVID-19 pass can be seen as a precautionary measure to anticipate a possible increase in the number of deaths, for example, due to overcrowding in hospitals. In Finland, the pass was introduced when the number of cases was falling sharply, but after an increase in the number of deaths. In Austria, the number of cases and deaths increased, but the increase was close to zero. The last group of three countries (in italics ) is characterised by a reverse and less expected trend. In these countries, the pass was introduced at a time when there was no evidence of a deterioration in public health.

According to the index presented by Chazel in this volume, the last group of countries scores highly in terms of non-pharmaceutical policy stringency. In particular, France, which has implemented the COVID-19 pass in a situation where infections and deaths are decreasing, has been classifed as the most stringent country in Europe. Italy was the second. The case of the Czech Republic is less clear, although it was ranked quite high (seventh) in each wave. Only Austria and Spain are identifed as more stringent than the Czech Republic in the frst two waves. As we have seen, Austria implemented the COVID-19 pass without any risk of infection or death. Unfortunately, no vaccination data are available for Spain.

Globally, therefore, we can conclude that the motivation to introduce the COVID-19 pass was generally due to a deterioration of epidemiological indicators, except in countries where non-pharmaceutical restrictions were already particularly high.

#### Does COVID-19 Pass Boost Vaccination?

A key argument used by policymakers to justify the introduction of the COVID-19 pass is the need to create incentives for people to be vaccinated in a context where mass vaccination was considered as the safest and most effective strategy to contain the pandemic. Although most countries accepted different types of evidence of immunity status, vaccination was the simplest and least demanding way to obtain an indefnite COVID-19 pass. In contrast, relying on COVID-19 testing meant that people had to be tested almost every time they wanted to enter a public or private space, as the validity of the tests often expired after 48 h. A key question is whether the introduction of the COVID-19 pass convinced more people to be vaccinated for the frst time. Previous studies have provided mixed evidence on this question. While COVID-19 mandates have not been shown to be particularly effective in reducing vaccine hesitancy among the adult population in Europe (Kuznetsova et al., 2022) and the USA (Mello et al., 2022), proof of COVID-19 vaccination requirements for access to public places and non-essential businesses contributed to an increase in vaccine uptake in Canada, France, Germany and Italy (Karaivanov et al., 2022). To contribute to such debates, Fig. 15.2 compares the proportion of the population primo-vaccinated one month before and after the introduction of COVID-19 passes, using vaccination data from Mathieu et al. (2021). Note that we do not take into account differences in the type of passes used, as the variation between European countries is rather limited, as explained in section "Strengthening Control Measures to Ease Restrictions: Comparing Mandatory Testing and COVID-19 Passes". Looking at the fgure, two fndings emerge. First, passes do not appear to be particularly effective in countries that are already characterised by a high uptake of COVID-19 vaccines, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and the European record holder, Portugal.

**Fig. 15.2** Vaccination rate before and after the implementation of the COVID-19 pass. *Source*: EXCEPTIUS and Mathieu et al. (2021)

Second, in Austria, Cyprus, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Ireland, Lithuania, Denmark and the Czech Republic, the introduction of COVID-19 passes was followed by a notable increase in vaccination coverage, despite large differences in the proportion of vaccinated persons before the measure was introduced. Third, in Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia and Switzerland, the enforcement of passes did not lead to a massive decrease in vaccine hesitancy in a context of low to moderate vaccine uptake. Taken together, this descriptive evidence suggests that COVID-19 passes alone are not suffcient to increase vaccination coverage. Their impact is more likely to depend on the initial level of vaccination and people's attitudes towards vaccination.

We conclude this chapter by examining these attitudes. Attitudes to the COVID-19 vaccine may vary according to general attitudes to vaccination and the specifc context of the pandemic, which was characterised by emergency and restrictive policies. The Vaccine Confdence Project, funded by the European Commission, provides bi-annual surveys of public attitudes to vaccines across the EU. Their most recent report (de Figueiredo et al., 2022) introduced the question of confdence in the COVID-19 vaccine in almost all EU countries except the Czech Republic.

To capture the specifcity of the COVID-19 vaccine, we compare the level of confdence in it to the confdence in the fu vaccine. Confdence is measured in terms of potential side effects (% of people who think the vaccine is safe). Overall, while the fu vaccine is considered safe by 81.4% of Europeans, the COVID 19 vaccine is considered safe by 73.5% of respondents. In each country, confdence in the COVID-19 vaccine is lower than in the fu vaccine. The difference is particularly small in Denmark and Portugal, where confdence is particularly high. On the contrary, in Eastern countries, where vaccine confdence is generally the lowest, the difference between fu and COVID-19 vaccines is particularly large. This is particularly the case in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In Latvia, the difference is smallest because confdence in fu vaccine is already particularly low. These differences in confdence are not associated with the month in which the COVID-19 passes are administered. However, we fnd an association between the relative lack of confdence and the epidemiological context: the more the latter worsened when the pass was introduced, the lower the confdence, both in absolute terms and relative to the confdence in fu vaccines. This correlation could be interpreted as follows: governments in countries with low confdence in vaccines have to wait for an emergency to implement the pass in a consensual way. This is not the case for governments in countries with high confdence in vaccines. However, there are some exceptions. Governments in Austria, France and Hungary implement passes without facing a particular public health emergency, despite relatively low levels of confdence in vaccines. On the other hand, Cyprus implemented the COVID-19 pass in a worsened epidemiological context, despite a high level of confdence in vaccines.

#### Conclusion

In contrast to the variants of compulsory testing, the COVID-19 pass has been widely implemented in Europe with similar modalities. Our data cover 23 EU countries plus Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Data are not available for Romania, Poland and Slovakia. Only three countries do not use it: Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Some countries have implemented it at sub-national level, including Germany, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. The date of implementation varies from March 2021 (Hungary) to November 2021 (Croatia, the Netherlands and Portugal). The impact on the vaccination rate also varies between countries: in Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Italy, the vaccination rate increased by more than 20% after the introduction of the pass. In Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Portugal, on the other hand, the vaccination rate remained almost the same.

The implementation of COVID-19 passes also varied according to the epidemiological context. In most countries, the pass was introduced after an increase in infections or deaths due to COVID-19. Three countries (Czech Republic, France and Italy) introduced their passes when the number of infections and deaths was falling sharply. In France and Italy, this could be explained by the calendar, just before the tourist season. Another complementary explanation could be the fact that they were among the countries that implemented the most stringent nonpharmaceutical measures. Austria could be included in this group, as it introduced the pass in a stable epidemiological context. This suggests that these governments are following their own preferences rather than adapting their policies. Finally, we also observe that the countries that waited for the epidemiological indicators to deteriorate are usually those where confdence in vaccines is lower. In high-confdence contexts, the introduction of the pass was not clearly associated with such a deterioration. However, in the case of Austria, France, Hungary and possibly the Czech Republic, the pass was introduced in non-emergency situations despite relatively low confdence in vaccines.

In the light of these fndings, we conclude with some suggestions. Vaccination in the context of a pandemic can help to create personal benefts for people who help to reduce the spread of the virus. However, it can also create huge disadvantages for those who refuse to be vaccinated, leading to protests, polarisation or economic stagnation. To avoid these side effects, vaccination should be used in countries with high levels of trust (including trust in vaccines) but low vaccination rates. Denmark is a typical case. Given the moderate impact of the vaccination rate, the opposite case—a country with relatively low confdence in vaccines and the political system and high vaccination rates should fnd alternative ways to encourage people to vaccinate themselves. The Netherlands is a typical case. In the intermediate context, it is debatable and probably right for many countries to introduce a vaccination pass if the spread of the virus is worrying. On the other hand, a vaccination pass should be avoided when the vaccination rate is above 60%.

#### References

tion of COVID-19 policies across European democracies. *West European Politics, 44*(5–6), 1077–1102.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### Lockdowns and Mobility Rate Variation in the COVID-19 Era

*Rossella Vulcano*

#### Introduction

In March 2020, governments were faced with the need to implement restrictive measures to reduce social coming closer and promote public behaviour change in social distance (Pedersen & Favero, 2020). Such non-pharmaceutical interventions included several containment measures whose most typical examples were lockdowns. In this chapter, lockdowns are conceptualised as a cluster of heterogeneous interventions according to the categories used in the EXCEPTIUS dataset (Egger et al., 2022).

As a result of the restrictive measures, European Member States experienced different rates of compliance, conceptualised in this case as the change in the rate of mobility for retail and recreation, which differs across countries.

R. Vulcano (\*)

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Science, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Political Science, SHPT, PACTE, University of Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
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At the onset of the pandemic, academic attention focused on investigating possible triggers for compliance with social distancing measures. However, there is no comprehensive narrative describing the variability of mobility rates due to restrictive measures and providing a comparative description of possible compliance triggers across Europe. Therefore, this chapter aims to contribute to the literature on mobility rate variability in COVID-19 by elucidating the mobility rate variability during the frst strict national lockdown in 15 EU Member States, and to identify possible research clues focused on improving crisis-management strategies for future possible crises and enhancing public safety.

Indeed, although the effectiveness of lockdowns in containing the spread of COVID-19 is still controversial (Dainton & Hay, 2021), this chapter follows the empirical fndings of Mégarbane et al. (2021) and Alfano and Ercolano (2020), which positively correlate restrictive social mobility policies with rule compliance and public safety.

In addition, the importance of contextual factors in shaping citizens' rule compliance (lower mobility rates) is considered, such as the level of stringency of containment measures (Caselli et al., 2022), modalities of public enforcement (Mills et al., 2021), government trust (Bargain & Aminjonov, 2020), risk perception (Xie et al., 2020) and the infuence of time (Six et al., 2021).

#### Mobility Rate and Compliance

The extant literature highlights how societal and institutional macro-level factors, such as the stringency of restrictions, the modalities of public enforcement and government trust, are important triggers of rule compliance towards lockdowns. As lockdowns aim to reduce the mobility rate, authors such as Dainton and Hay (2021) and Caselli et al. (2022) analysed the variation in mobility rate to estimate the level of compliance with COVID-19 containment measures.

Caselli et al. (2022) and Sun et al. (2021) demonstrate how a higher level of lockdown stringency leads to a greater decrease in mobility rate. However, despite the robustness of the authors' results, the former focuses only on three EU Member States while the latter focuses only on the US. Similar to the deterrent logic of higher stringency, another macro element such as rule enforcement has been shown to be infuential in reducing the mobility rate during lockdowns. Indeed, Huntley et al. (2020) and Jennings and Perez (2020) provide empirical evidence on how stronger enforcement, in this case higher fnes and a higher number of police offcers on the street, leads to a greater decrease in the mobility rate. Nevertheless, there is no analysis focusing on the whole European continent that differentiates between the stringency of legislation and the depth of control of enforcement modalities nor is there a comparative analysis of the enforcement rate during the COVID-19 per EU Member State.

In addition, not only macro factors directly related to the regulations implemented, but also public perceptions of government reliability, such as higher public trust, lead people to comply more (Bargain & Aminjonov, 2020; Sarracino et al., 2022). In addition, previous literature on preventive behaviour and COVID-19 has highlighted how higher levels of risk perception leads to higher compliance (Xie et al., 2020).

This chapter aims to contribute to current research on compliance with COVID-19 regulations by providing a descriptive analysis of the above factors. A novelty is the use of risk perception at the macro level. It also aims to identify the most infuential dimension of compliance, be it policy or public opinion.

#### Measuring Compliance and Its Drivers

This chapter uses the Google Mobility Rate dataset (2022) to operationalise the dependent variable (compliance with social distancing measures). The dataset collects aggregated and anonymised data from Google Maps, which reports mobility trends per country and region on a daily basis from February 2020 to October 2022. In addition, these trends are divided into six main categories (1) retail and recreation, (2) food and pharmacy, (3) parks, (4) transit stations, (5) workplaces, (6) and residential. Finally, the variability of mobility rates is calculated based on a baseline, which is the median of a fve-week period between 3 January 2020 and 6 February 2020. Nevertheless, in the current chapter, only the mobility category retail and recreation is considered, as it was the one that was frst targeted by various lockdown policies. Therefore, when using the term 'mobility rate', the current chapter only refers to the mobility rate towards retail and recreational places such as bars and clubs.

Second, this chapter uses EXCEPTIUS data (Egger et al., 2022) as an independent variable of the stringency of social distancing measures adopted by governments. However, the EXCEPTIUS dataset does not include a dedicated category on lockdowns as this terminology was used by most European members only in offcial government press conferences and mass media, and not in the relevant legislative decrees (see Chazel in this volume). Specifcally, the current chapter uses seven measures falling under the lockdowns umbrella as presented by Chazel in this chapter and aggregates them into a single stringency score.

In order to operationalise 'regulatory enforcement', this chapter uses Eurostat's Government Expenditure (2020) dataset. The dataset collects the annual expenditure as a percentage of GDP of each government by function, some of which are health, public services, education, defence, public order and safety from 2012 to 2021 in all European Member States. In this case, the chapter only analyses annual government expenditure on 'public order and safety', which includes expenditure on 'police, fre brigade, courts, prisons, R&D related to public order and safety' as well as expenditure classifed elsewhere (Eurostat, 2021).

Furthermore, in the absence of a longitudinal dataset on risk perception, this chapter draws upon a proxy for risk perception by using the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths per day at the national level. Indeed, a linear statistical correlation has already been observed between a higher rate of recorded COVID-19 cases and an increase in individual risk perception (Vulcano, 2025).

For this purpose, the current chapter uses the "Coronavirus (COVID-19) cases" of Our World in Data (data collected in 2023), which collects the number of COVID-19 deaths, cases, tests, hospitalisations and vaccinations worldwide on a daily basis until today (Edouard et al., 2020).

Finally, to measure public trust in government, this chapter uses the European Parliament COVID-19 Survey—Round 1 (GESIS, 2021). The survey aims to collect data on the general satisfaction of the public with the COVID-19 responses. The survey was carried out in April and May 2020 in 24 EU Member States. The current paper uses the mean of the answers given by people per nation using an ordinal scale (1 = I do not trust the government at all to 4 = I really trust the government).

#### General Analysis of Lockdown and Mobility Rates

In general, across all three waves of COVID-19, the Czech Republic and Austria have implemented the highest number of national lockdowns, followed by Belgium, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Portugal (see Table 16.1). Croatia, Malta and Finland are the countries with the lowest number of implemented lockdowns. France, Germany, Italy and Portugal have implemented the most restrictive measures, followed by Austria, the

**Table 16.1** Comparison between the level of stringency of the frst implemented lockdown and mobility rates

*Source*: EXEPTIUS and Google Mobility Reports. In the second column, the table shows the mean of the 15-day mobility rate before the implementation of the frst lockdown. Since the Google Mobility dataset uses the median of a fve-week period between 3 January 2020 and 6 February 2020 as the baseline for the mobility rate, the numbers are relative. The third column shows the average mobility rate over the 15 days following the lockdown

Czech Republic and Croatia. On the other hand, Estonia, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg have the least restrictive measures. By simply subtracting the mean mobility rate before the ban from the mean mobility rate after the ban, it is possible to grasp the variation of mobility rates before and after the ban. France, Austria, Croatia and Italy are the countries where the mobility rate decreased the most, while Hungary and Malta experienced the smallest decrease in the mobility rate. Finally, Belgium is the only country where the mobility rate increased after the introduction of the lockdown.

#### Analysis of Compliance

The following analysis considers the previously mentioned macro factors: (1) stringency, (2) enforcement (security expenditure), (3) trust in government, (4) risk perception by considering only the frst national lockdown per country and 15 days pre- and post-lockdown. As the dataset includes 15 EU Member States1 with 30 observations each, the total number of observations is 450.2 Finally, as the European Parliament's COVID-19 survey is based on a large sample of individuals per country, the mean of the answers per country is used in this chapter.

The following graphs show the multivariate OLS regression with mobility rate as the dependent variable and security expenditure, government trust, stringency and risk perception as independent variables. These data are collected 15 days before and 15 days after the frst lockdown to observe its impact. Some data, such as stringency or risk perception, are collected every day and do not require special processing. Other measures, such as security expenditure and government trust, are collected annually. Their impact on mobility is, therefore, expected to be conditional on the implementation of the lockdown. This is why a dummy variable (prelockdown implementation = 0 and post-lockdown implementation = 1) was introduced to create an interaction term for the variables that have identical observations.