For Dorothy and other nurses, Norway has *become* the destination, from a point of departure where it was not actively *chosen* as a destination. From the data we see that elements of safe, well-paid employment, a generous welfare state and a good work–life balance all infuence the decision to remain, at least for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the door to return migration is left open – or at least is not closed.

Learning a foreign language as an adult is a challenge which all our interviewees stressed. Norwegian language skills essentially do not add up to capital which can be easily transferred and used elsewhere in the world. This makes turning Norway into an unplanned destination, different from an English-speaking country. While nursing allows for agency, due to the global need for nurses, simultaneously, the profession requires excellent communication skills, a familiarity with informal language – slang – as well as a good medical vocabulary. Meanwhile, none of our interviewees had learned Norwegian before obtaining their nursing degree, underscoring the disconnect between their present-day nursing careers in Norway and the country as a migration destination for them. Blessica is one of the nurses who no longer wants to learn yet another language as an adult due to the effort it entails:

I'm done with learning languages because it's very hard to have a language barrier. You cannot express yourself, like, when you want to help the patient […]. Norway is the third foreign country I've lived in, with yet another language barrier.  At work, it's like, okay, but sometimes you have no choice but to learn. I did that. I was quite (…). At frst, I had a lot of fear in me and I was so exhausted after every duty I had at work, because I had to translate everything in my mind, think in English, then in Norwegian, Norwegian-English (…).

Emilia, who moved with the whole family from Poland to Belgium and then migrated on to Norway and bought a house there, said that she adjusts to the rest of the family, who are settled in Norway now: 'I am the one who's in the trap', she said, referring to the fact that Norway was not – and is not – her destination of choice. However, for Emilia, primarily due to family considerations, Norway has become the destination for now and for the mid-term perspective, at least.

Echoing Emilia's refections, other nurse migrants also kept the door open to future onward or return migration, seeing Norway as somewhere to stay only until a certain point in time – such as retirement – which is common more generally among many migrants moving to work in Norway. Some also spoke of more openended trajectories, like Paulina, who decided to migrate internally in Norway frst, then maybe go to Canada or another location, with a good dose of adapting to what life brings. In these more open-ended future outlooks, we also found that multi-sited transnationalism mattered, including where migrants' children were living and consideration of their remittance obligations both today and those anticipated for the future.

Thus, a temporal lens aids our analysis by foregrounding how the past, present and future are viewed from the perspective of the present and compared, for example with the perspective prior to migration or to the most recent migration to Norway. We also fnd that life-course stages intersect with changing perspectives on the past, present and future. An obvious point, perhaps, but future outlooks and considerations about Norway as a *de facto* destination of sorts, differ radically between our migrant-nurse interlocutors in their 20s or 30s and those in their 50s and 60s. Interviewing migrants who are at different life phases enables different analytical perspectives on the life-course in the narratives.

Clarissa, whom we introduced earlier, is in her 60s and the time span between her two migration moves – from the Philippines to Sweden then, subsequently, from Sweden to Norway – is wide. She had different plans and prospects for the future when she moved from the Philippines to Sweden. At the time of our interview, she was looking forward to retirement in the Philippines, where she will have a Swedish and a Norwegian old-age pension and where she envisages a degree of circulation. Her future outlook is different now that her reference point is her retirement age and – on the basis of now having a citizenship which offers her mobility resources and a pension enabling fnancial resources – the ability to live transnationally if she so desires in the future. Clarissa's story illustrates a key insight from our analysis – there is not always a clear answer to the question 'What is a destination?'

#### **2.7 Conclusion**

We suggest that the theorisation of migration decision-making may beneft from the analysis of refections from the perspective of those following complex migration trajectories. We argue that the insights gained on the role of destinations in migration decision-making among predominantly female, skilled, regular migrants, moving from places which are still often viewed as the global periphery, are worth further integrating into the body of mainstream migration theory. We offer three conclusions to this end.

First, migration decisions are neither entirely open-ended processes nor are they possible to pin-point and see as entirely individualised. Instead, we fnd much in our study to support analyses of migration decisions which encompass processual dimensions. This is critical in two ways. We fnd that there is much to glean from traditional migration theory, in the sense that economic differences do matter as migration decisions are often built on what is otherwise referred to as wage differentials. However, there is always also the collective dimension at play, often embedded within family networks which may be stretched internally or internationally by migration. The relational dimensions thus need to be taken into account in order to explain migration decisions, especially as these are intertwined rather than existing as two parallel considerations. We also fnd that migration decisions would beneft from being understood as processual, in that, increasingly, migration is found to be stepwise, fractured – perhaps usefully understood as a journey or as liquid. In our analysis we can maybe best see that migration decisions need to be understood more fully by taking on the role of what is unplanned and unforeseen, yet still materialises as part of an individual's migration project, often but not always, in response to migration regulations.

Second, nurse migrants' narratives reveal agency in individuals who are often economically independent, having multiple resources, drawing on multi-sited transnational networks and actively capitalising on the experience of having managed in different national contexts on the global labour market. This empowered image of predominantly female migrant nurses, both white and non-white, whose positionality might be traditionally viewed as a limitation rather than an opportunity to migrate overseas, emerged from our analysis.

Third, we fnd that an active choice of internal onward migration within Norway can have comparable implications as international migration in terms of professional development and economic gains but without the costs that international migration entails. Migrant nurses can therefore show autonomy and agency by actively building on their mobility resources and experience gained in Norway to transfer these to new locations internally within the country.

Finally, we start and fnish this chapter with the paradox that, despite an active non-choice of Norway as 'the destination', the country has become the destination – at present, for the time being and, for some, with a longer-term perspective. We fnd that Norway – as a destination of onward migration – was usually not the result of the fulflment of a plan initially made. However, the view of Norway as the current

destination might also change at some point in the future and over the life-course. While the notion of destinations is pervasive in both migration theories and immigration policies, in fact, the idea of 'the destination' is neither as singular nor as straightforward as it may appear. For nurse migrants, we fnd that destinations may *become.* The becoming of destinations might happen *de facto*, by choice or by resignation, willingly or with resistance; the temporal view might be permanent or open-ended, seen as part of migration projects to be continued and refective of lives that are embedded in transnational social networks across multiple sites.

**Acknowledgments** This research was part of the project *Migration for Welfare: Nurses within Three Regimes of Immigration and Integration into the Norwegian Welfare State* (WELLMIG), funded by the Research Council of Norway. We would like to thank Gee Berry (PRIO) for her help with producing the fgures and the WELLMIG research team, members of PRIO's Migration Centre, the editors of this volume and the designated reviewers, for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Chapter 3 For the Sake of Our Children? A Mixed-Methods Study of the Family Dynamics of Intra-European Mobility Among Somalis**

**Marloes de Hoon and Ilse van Liempt**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

In the literature, the intra-EU mobility of citizens born outside Europe is predominantly understood as a response to the limitations of their lives as economically and culturally marginalised citizens (Van Liempt, 2011a, b; Toma & Castagnone, 2015; Ahrens et al., 2016; Della Puppa, 2018a; Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018; Ramos, 2018; De Hoon et al., 2019; Moret, 2020). While arrival in Europe meant a loss of socio-economic status for many, onward mobility1 provides migrants with opportunities to access better positions (Van Liempt, 2011a; Moret, 2020). Most empirical contributions assume that these mobility practices are part of a family strategy. It is therefore surprising that little attention has been paid to intergenerational dynamics *within* families around onward-mobility projects within Europe (see also Chap. 6 by Mingot, Chap. 9 by Della Puppa and Sredanovic and Chap. 11 by Formenti).

The existing literature (e.g. Djajić, 2008) often highlights the desire of parents to keep the family united when (re-)migrating. This is in keeping with neoclassical migration theory, in which female spouses and their children are seen as 'assets' that simply move together with the male breadwinner. Recent studies, however, paint a more complex picture, in which all members of the family can be proactive

M. de Hoon

Department of Political Science, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

I. van Liempt (\*) Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2023

1 In this chapter, onward mobility is defned as a long-term move (more than 8 months) to a country other than the country of origin or of asylum. Throughout the chapter we refer to this new destination country as the 'third country'.

J. Ahrens, R. King (eds.), *Onward Migration and Multi-Sited Transnationalism*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12503-4\_3

in migration decision-making, with their unique roles, aspirations, needs and opportunities (Kelly, 2013; Toma & Castagnone, 2015; Serra Mingot & Mazzucato, 2017; Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018). Such dynamics may result in temporary family separation and the creation or continued existence of a transnational family.

Even when a more complex picture of migration planning is provided, the position of the children in this process remains underexposed. Studies that *do* highlight the role of children in migration predominantly point to the 'binding effect' of children in the host country, in particular when they are enrolled in school (Dustmann, 2003a; Djajić, 2008; Trevena et al., 2013; Erdal & Ezzati, 2015). Yet, an emerging body of literature argues that children may also form an important reason to migrate again, especially when relocation opens up new educational opportunities that foster intergenerational social mobility (Hagelskamp et al., 2010). Moreover, parents may envision a transnational (or even a 'cosmopolitan') future for their children that is not always catered for in the country of initial settlement (Van Liempt, 2011c; Della Puppa & King, 2018). We seek to contribute to this debate by focusing on the intergenerational dimension within families and presenting a case study that increases our understanding of when, why and with whom Somali children and their family members move onwards.

The onward mobility of Dutch Somali families to the United Kingdom (UK) provides a rich and suitable case, because of the relatively high onward-mobility rates among both single persons and families. Moreover, there is a great variety in family composition and the presence, age and number of children upon arrival in the Netherlands. Although their onward mobility has been extensively documented, both quantitative research designs (e.g. Van den Reek & Hussein, 2003; Lindley & Van Hear, 2007) as well as qualitative contributions (Van Liempt, 2011b) have largely overlooked the intergenerational dimensions of onward-mobility planning. Using a mixed-methods design, we bring together two high-quality bodies of data to explore the drivers of and dynamics within onward-mobility projects in Somali families.

This chapter continues, frstly, with a discussion of the phenomenon of onward mobility in relation to children's education and upbringing. Secondly, we briefy explain the historical and institutional context of Somali migration to the Netherlands and, thirdly, explain the quantitative and qualitative data that we employ in this study. In the penultimate section, analyses of register data and interview data in combination provide empirical insights into the intergenerational dimensions around onward-mobility planning. These fndings are summarised and discussed in the last section.

#### **3.2 Family Onward Mobility**

Various studies examine how migration is informed by gendered obligations and expectations – for example, the idea that men are expected to provide for the family (Van Dalen et al., 2005; Cooke, 2008; Jolivet, 2020). Men's preferences, however, do not always dominate in the migration decision-making, as illustrated by cases in

which women are both the carers for *and* the breadwinners of the transnational family (Baldassar & Merla, 2013; Serra Mingot & Mazzucato, 2017). Women are shown to be active participants in onward migration decision-making, not only because of their employment (potential) (Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018) but also in their voicing of concerns regarding their offspring (Lindley & Van Hear, 2007).

The literature shows a general preference among mothers to remain in the country of settlement and to avoid disruptions in their children's schooling (Lindley & Van Hear, 2007; Trevena et al., 2013). More generally, research suggests that, once family unifcation is established, the presence of children enhances the integration of the family in the country of residence, making the onward mobility of the family or one of its members less likely (Dustmann, 2003a; Erdal & Ezzati, 2015; Sajons, 2016). Mobility is often seen by parents as disruptive and hampering the integration of their children into schooling systems that are confned to national borders (Erdal & Ezzati, 2015; Trevena et al., 2013). Indeed, educational systems are generally not designed to support children who live transnational lives (Van Geel, 2019). This generates the expectation that children who arrived in the host country at a young age will, instead of moving again in the near future, be prone to remain, together with their parents, at least until successful completion of their education (*Hypothesis 1a*).

A key argument in these studies is that subsequent family migration2 is not only driven by the economic perspectives of the parent(s). In addition, concerns about the offspring are included in the equation, with or without their direct involvement in the migration decision (Dustmann, 2003a; Bushin, 2009; Hutchins, 2011). The theoretical mechanism, as developed in economic contributions, implies that parents' migration decisions are informed by the expected future educational and economic career(s) of their child(ren) (Dustmann, 2003a; Djajić, 2008). Dustmann (2003a) fnds that the birth of a child generally reduces the likelihood of parents returning to their country of origin. He also concludes that this effect is stronger for boys than for girls, which is interpreted as evidence that parental concerns about the future of their offspring depend on the sex of the child, with a greater emphasis on the economic performance of male offspring in the host country.3 While these results form an important addition to studies departing from a single (male) breadwinner model, a sole focus on labour-market performance is too narrow to adequately capture the multi-layered family considerations behind migration.

2We use the term 'subsequent migration' in reference to both return and onward migration.

3By relying on the randomness of the gender of a child, Dustmann (2003a) provides an elegant empirical test of the presumed effect of the birth of a child on return migration. In addition to the fnding that this *generally* reduces the likelihood of return (he stresses that a reversed effect – return plans infuencing fertility decisions – cannot be ruled out), the results indicate unequal associations with return plans according to gender. The magnitude of the effect in the case of boys is stronger, which Dustmann interprets as benefcial aspects of possibly advantageous labour-market conditions and earnings prospects in the host country weighing less for female than for male offspring (2003a, 819).

#### *3.2.1 A Family Approach to Onward Mobility*

We intend to build on the general theoretical model put forward by Dustmann (2003b) and Djajić (2008) by assessing some of the critical underlying assumptions. First, emigration from a host country is by no means necessarily directed towards the origin country. Migration to a third country appears to be more common than return among specifc groups of migrants, as found for forced migrants in the Netherlands (De Hoon et al., 2019). Second, the implicit assumption that children always move together with their parents should be put up for scrutiny. Instead of remaining a family unity, one of the parents may relocate after migration, while the spouse and (some of) the children remain in the host country. Moreover, children can migrate independently of their parents. To address these two shortcomings in the literature, we analyse onward mobility in the context of the family, allowing observations of both independent onward mobility as well as onward mobility with one or both parents. In the remainder of this section, we develop refned hypotheses before introducing our empirical case to study intergenerational dynamics in onward mobility.

#### *3.2.2 Timing of Entry and Educational Trajectories*

It is a foregone conclusion that school systems matter for children's educational trajectories (Entorf & Lauk, 2008; Crul, 2013; Van de Werfhorst, 2019). In a tracking tradition such as the Dutch educational context, children are placed, at a fxed age, into a specifc track for all subjects. Track placement is primarily based on a standardised test but is known to also depend on parents' ability and efforts to infuence this outcome (Forster & van de Werfhorst, 2020). Parental resources such as their own educational attainment as well as their knowledge of the educational system all affect their children's initial placement and their likelihood of successfully (upwardly) navigating the system. Consequently, children with a migration background4 are generally placed in lower tracks and more often ones lower than those corresponding to their test scores, compared to their 'native' counterparts (Crul, 2013).

Tracking implies that underperforming children, for example those who did not manage to realise their full potential up until the moment of tracking, are sorted into streams that offer poor opportunities to move upwards and access higher education. For migrants, the timing of arrival therefore largely determines the opportunities available to make up for the learning disabilities that arise from language defcits and interruptions in schooling. Arriving in the host country at a later age,

4The assumed mechanism is that parents who received their education abroad and arrived in the host country at a later age are generally less informed about host-country education and generally less profcient in the new language compared to parents who were born in the host country.

particularly at age 12 or older, can thus be detrimental. Moreover, the 'side-tracking' of migrant children aged between 12 and 18, which is common in European education systems, tends to negatively affect the school attainment of refugee children in particular (Crul et al., 2017; Folke, 2018; Koehler & Schneider, 2019). In the Dutch context, this side-tracking (*Internationale schakelklas, ISK*), which targets 'frstgeneration' migrant children, generally offers a poor prelude to mainstream education, limiting their 'upstreaming' possibilities. Arriving at an older age may thus spur a desire to increase opportunities elsewhere, for example in a more comprehensive educational system.5

There is a more general argument to be made concerning the timing of arrival in the host country and the mobility trajectories of migrant children. The literature reveals a positive association between children's age at arrival and the return intentions (of their parents). The general theoretical reasoning behind this implies that the younger children are at the moment of entry into the new society, the stronger their orientation towards this country and the less likely they are to intend to forsake it (Erdal & Ezzati, 2015). In what follows, an alternative hypothesis concerning age at arrival and onward mobility is put forward.

#### *3.2.3 Timing of Entry and Onward Mobility*

The interplay between migration and the educational trajectories of children alters when considering onward migration, instead of return, as an alternative to remaining in the host country. Where new migration projects are concerned, there are indications that the presence of school-aged children in the household and concerns about their education spur rather than obstruct migration (Lindley & Van Hear, 2007; Ahrens et al., 2016; Della Puppa & King, 2018; Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018). Indeed, educational experiences in the country of origin and opportunities in other locations may form the very reason why parents engage in onward mobility.

Della Puppa and King (2018) illustrate how Italian Bangladeshi families decide to move to the United Kingdom because of their dissatisfaction with the Italian education system and their aspirations to raise and educate their children in an English educational system in anticipation of a global future. We expect such aspirations to be shared, particularly among families in protracted refugee situations, as their near and presumably also long-term futures will unfold in exile, in a 'transnational social feld' (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004). One can argue that migrating once again may be the most fruitful for children when they are young, as they adapt relatively easily to new (educational) environments. This generates the expectation that the younger children are at arrival, the more likely they are to engage in onward mobility (*Hypothesis 1b*).

5A comprehensive school is a state school for elementary- or secondary-age children that does not select its intake on the basis of academic achievement or aptitude.

While family unity may be the preferred option of most families, this condition is neither easily achieved nor automatically maintained. As such we also explore the possibility of children migrating on their own.6 In line with Djajić (2008), we expect such forms of independent migration of children to be the most common in the case of larger families, because of the variation in the timing of migration between the different members of the family (*Hypothesis 2*). These independent migrations are likely to take place at critical moments in the educational trajectory, resulting in twists in migration propensities over time, rather than a linear relationship between the age of the child and migration propensities.

#### **3.3 Case Description: The Onward Mobility of Dutch Somalis**

Migration from Somalia to the Netherlands has a relatively short history, starting from the late 1980s when the Somali civil war forced large numbers of the population to fee to neighbouring or more-distant countries. More people were forced across the borders after military dictator Siad Barre was overthrown by a coup in 1991. Largely motivated by the search for asylum, Somalis went to live in various regions and countries across the globe, from the Middle East to North America, Australia and Europe. The Netherlands was a main destination for Somalis7 within Europe as a result of its asylum policies and procedures8 but in other respects this country was not necessarily the most obvious place to settle (see also Van Liempt, 2011a). Many Somalis speak English and are used to the British (education) system as a result of a shared colonial past. The Somali population in Europe is a young population, due to the arrival of many young asylum-seekers and the high birth rate of the settled community.

Families may travel together to exercise their right to asylum. Often, however, one member travels ahead to lodge an individual asylum claim; upon receiving a positive answer, he or she then applies for family reunifcation. For Somalis – and refugees more generally – the papers necessary to prove their identity are not easily obtained, which may complicate family reunifcation or even completely rule out this possibility. About a quarter of all Somalis who arrived in the period concerned came under a family reunifcation regulation. In contrast to other migrant groups,

6Within this context, it is critical to stress the role that a host country plays in facilitating the mobility of the family or some of its members, because citizenship is not necessarily obtained by all family members at the same time (see Labussière & Vink, 2020).

7The number of Somali asylum applicants amounted to 29,590 persons in the period 1990–1999. The offcial number of Somalis in the Netherlands fuctuated between 17,156 in 1996, 13,691 in 2006 and 24,951 in 2020 (CBS Statline, 2020).

8Most asylum applicants of Somali origin were allocated (temporary) categorical protection from 1993 to 2001, which resulted, in the majority of cases, in a permanent residence permit.

family reunifcation often implied that the husband and one or more children joined the female frst applicant (Van Liempt, 2007). Moreover, the widespread practice of shared parenthood results in children being reared and supported by member(s) of the family network who are not necessarily their biological parents (Orellana et al., 2001). This combination of Somali familyhood and the imposition of the 'nuclear family paradigm' through Western family-reunifcation policies has resulted in the creation and maintenance of transnational families. Research in various contexts indeed indicates that Somali families are characterised by transnationalism, with family members often moving back and forth between different nation states (Al-Sharmani, 2004). We thus assume families to be only partially (and perhaps temporarily) reunited in the new country of residence, which has implications for their onward mobility process.

Being granted a residence permit in the Netherlands marks the end of a period of insecurity and forced passivity and of the educational interruptions experienced by children – caused by both their forced international migration and the multiple involuntary relocations that followed between asylum places across the country. Based on the institutional school arrangements (see Sect. 3.2.2), we mark four critical stages in children's careers: pre-school (up to age 5), obligatory primary schooling (age 5–12), secondary education (from age 12) and, fnally, the transition from education to the labour market (different ages, depending on the type of education). Studies concerning the educational attainment of refugee groups demonstrate that young Somali adults mostly obtain a diploma of the lower levels of vocational education – generally resulting in limited labour-market prospects – and that the share of dropouts is remarkably high in comparison to other pupils with a refugee background (Dourleijn et al., 2011). Whether the educational careers of Somali children are (consequently) re-routed across the national border is empirically explored in the next sections of this chapter.

#### **3.4 Data and Methods**

Population register data and data from ethnographic feldwork are used to gain broad as well as in-depth insights into families' onward mobility decision-making and outcomes. One may at frst question the value of using population register data for studying onward migration, given its inherent national character. In what follows, we explain how we make use of these population registers in dialogue with ethnographic data, to overcome what is often referred to as 'methodological nationalism' (e.g. Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Anderson, 2019).The two data sources are discussed separately in this section, before being brought together in the analysis section.

#### *3.4.1 Quantitative Data*

Our research sample is based on the total population of Somali children who were registered as asylum migrants in the Netherlands in the period 1995–1999, before reaching the age of 16 (N = 2457). These data are available through the System of Social-Statistical Datasets (SSD), a dataset that contains individual-level information on the population residing in the Netherlands (Bakker et al., 2014).

It is noteworthy that almost three in ten children (N = 735) had no parent (whether registered biological parent or legal guardian) residing in the Netherlands throughout the observation period.9 We restrict our quantitative analysis to children who had at least one registered parent or legal guardian. Furthermore, children who had not acquired Dutch citizenship over the observation period (N = 273 or 15.7 per cent) are left out of the analysis for two reasons. First, children without citizenship may have disappeared from the population register because of non-voluntary emigration, events that we do not aim to theoretically and empirically consider. Second, the interviewee sample exclusively consists of Somalis who hold a Dutch passport, hence omitting those without citizenship makes for a more adequate match between our data sources. This leaves a sample of 1467 Dutch Somali children and information on 2182 parents which we incorporate into the analysis. Children and their families are followed over a period of 15 years since their frst registration in a Dutch municipality.

We chose to take children as the 'reference point' in the family because following the parent(s) would obscure the mobility of children who move with only one parent or independently of their parents, which happened in the majority of the cases (see Table 3.2, below). The observation that in only 52.3 per cent of the cases did all siblings (registered in the Netherlands) migrate together further validates an empirical approach that takes into account the differences in outcomes between siblings by following each of them separately.

Population register data provide a unique opportunity to link multiple generations. For the analyses presented in this chapter, children are linked to their parents as well as to siblings – through the parent(s). In so doing, the family as observed in the data excludes members who are not (registered) in the Netherlands. It is important to keep this in mind while interpreting the results, as we agree with other scholars that family relations – and transnational familyhood in particular – often incorporate several households within and across national borders (Borell et al., 2014; Johnsdotter, 2015). The number of family members who are identifed should be regarded as in the lower range of the actual number of nuclear family members.

9 It is possible that a share of the children without registered parents had actually been reunited with a parent who left the country before 31 December of the year of registration. This could apply to 156 children (6.3 per cent of the total sample), who were marked as being part of a household with at least one parent but were never linked to a parent or legal guardian on the population registers. For refugee children from other countries, this amounts to just 3.0 per cent (355 out of 11,764).

#### *3.4.2 A Comparison Group: Protracted Refugees*

To assess whether our fndings are specifc to people of Somali descent or are, more broadly, generalisable, we run separate models for a comparison group of refugees, sharing the transnational or 'scattered' feature of Somalis. The literature suggests that onward mobility is considered a viable alternative for return or long-term settlement in the country of asylum, in particular when migrants have pre-existing links to other destinations. Onward mobility may, in such cases, refect a family (re-) unifcation or the search to join one's own community. We approximate 'scattered families' with a refugee background by means of the UNHCR defnition of *protracted refugees*10 and, as such, marked 14 countries or regions that produce(d) large numbers of refugees living in exile for an extended period of time (see Table A3.1 for countries and frequencies). Although this list in principle concerns forced migrants who applied for asylum in *developing* countries, a substantial share of these origin groups made it to 'the West'. The selected sending countries are indeed also among the main origin countries of asylum migrants in various European countries.

#### *3.4.3 Qualitative Data: Interviews with Somali Parents and Young Adolescents*

In addition to the register data, we draw upon qualitative data, collected in a study on Dutch Somalis' onward mobility to the United Kingdom. At the core of this project was feldwork with Somalis in Leicester and London between 2008 and 2010 (see Table A3.2 for a sample description). London and Leicester were chosen because both cities house a substantial number of Dutch Somalis (Van den Reek & Hussein, 2003). Not only do these qualitative data provide in-depth insights into onward mobility decision-making but they also allow us to unveil factors, practices and outcomes that are situated across borders or are inherently transnational.

The 33 in-depth interviews were conducted with a mix of parents and children (14 female and 19 male Somalis).11 The age at the moment of interviewing ranged from 20 to 62 years, that at migration to the Netherlands from 1 to 39 and at onward mobility from 12 to 48. All interviews were conducted in Dutch or English and subsequently transcribed.

10A crude measure of refugee populations of 25,000 persons or more who were in exile in developing countries for fve or more years up until 2005.

11Access points for the interviews were Somali community organisations in London and Leicester and shops in neighbourhoods with large concentrations of Somalis; Dutch Somalis were also approached at Somali events. The second author was also introduced to Dutch Somalis in London and Leicester through Somalis she had interviewed earlier in the Netherlands in the context of her PhD research (Van Liempt, 2007).

#### **3.5 Adopting a Multi-methods Approach**

The two bodies of longitudinal data and research methods are brought together in a mixed-methods approach (Creswell, 2014; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). The type of questions we address here on the intergenerational dimensions around onward mobility and the role of children guided us in the development of our research design. Within mixed-methods research, this approach – where the type of information is central – is called 'pragmatic relativism' (Tashakkori et al., 1998).

In addition to the patterns which we structurally identify based on the registers, the stories collected through interviewing serve to tease out the motivations behind the family migration decision-making of Somali parents and the role of children within these decisions.

The literature on combining methods indicates that there are different ways in which data sources can be brought together in terms of timing. In our case the qualitative data were already collected before we started analysing the quantitative data. As such, the quantitative data collection was inspired by and analysed in conjunction with insights from the qualitative data. In the analysis we integrated the results from both methods as a form of triangulation, focusing mostly on the complementarity of the data.

#### *3.5.1 Register Data Sample Characteristics*

The statistics in Table 3.1 provide a general overview of the composition of the Somali children in our register sample. Both sexes make up close to half of the population, with a slight over-representation of boys (52.6 per cent). New-borns and one-year-olds are quite low in number, which is a direct result of the restriction of our sample to children who were *born in Somalia*. Both the migration trajectory as well as the path to municipal registration are lengthy processes, which results in children entering the registers at a later age. The great majority of our sample (ages 0–16), eight out of ten children, arrived before reaching secondary-school age.

Somali families in the Netherlands are relatively large, with almost half of the children entering the registers with three or more siblings. Another remarkable feature is the absence of their fathers in the Dutch context. About half (48.1 per cent)12

12Children are only linked with parents who were on the registers on or after 31 December 1995. In a proportion of the cases, the fathers were the frst asylum applicants, followed after approval by their wife and/or children. In situations where the father left before the end of the year (31 December), he was removed from the registers and thus not linked to the children in our data. If this was common, we would expect the share of children registered without their father to be higher among those who arrived early in the year (the earlier, the more time passes before the end of the calendar year in which the father may have 'slipped through' the registers). Such a correlation between month of arrival and parental composition was not found.

**Table 3.1** Register data description, Somali children and comparison group (protracted refugees)

*Source*: Statistics Netherlands, SSB

of the children of Somali origin in our sample had lived separately from their father during their entire period of residence in the Netherlands, while this amounts to 12.3 per cent for other children (protracted refugees) who arrived in the same period. This situation of absent fathers fts the picture of 'scattered families' that was painted in many of the interviews. (Unoffcial) divorces are common and some fathers have second wives but, even if the marriage of the parents is still intact and not shared, fathers are frequently physically (and emotionally) absent for Somali children (see also Haga, 2020; Ismael, 2020).

We follow the research population over an extended period of time, starting at 31 December of the year of entry onto the municipal registers up until the move or over a period of a maximum of 15 years (180 months). A crucial and unique asset of our data is the information concerning emigration. If residents decide to leave the Netherlands for a period of at least 8 months, they are expected to inform the municipality about the destination and migration date. As these records do not capture unreported emigrations, we deduce an additional category of emigration based on removals from the registers – that is, when the authorities have ascertained that a person or family is no longer residing at the recorded address. In our analysis we focus on emigration from the Netherlands, under the assumption that both registered onward migrants and children who have left without deregistering have resettled in a third country over the course of time.13 The fgures in the bottom rows of Table 3.1 indicate not only that onward mobility is highly common among Somali children in an absolute sense (63.5 per cent) but also that, by the end of the observation period, this percentage is more than twice the share of onward migrants for the comparison group (28.7 per cent). Note that both Somali children and children in the comparison group have formally become Dutch citizens over time.

#### *3.5.2 Analyses: Event History Models and Covariates*

We frst present non-parametric event-history models (Kaplan-Meier curves) to provide a general picture of the timing and magnitude of onward mobility among Somali children. These outcomes are complemented with a set of models to predict the probability of a single event, namely the onward mobility of the child versus their continued stay in the Netherlands. Cause-specifc hazard models are performed to estimate the role of covariates in differentiated, *competing* events: migration with one or both parents (A) or independent migration, without parents (B).

By means of Cox proportional hazard models, we estimate how the probability of onward mobility is conditioned by a set of key characteristics. Sex is included as a dummy variable that takes value 1 for females; their male counterparts form the reference category. In line with the educational stages, as discussed in the case

13We compare the results of our models to model specifcations based on a stricter operationalisation of 'onward migration' to test this assumption. The results are in general comparable but are much more pronounced for the gender variable, which is, in all likelihood, partly driven by differences in propensities (or willingness) to *register* (onward) migration, instead of differences in *actual* migration behaviour. We therefore interpret the results from the main models as more conservative than these additional models.

description section, age at arrival is included as a categorical variable with the reference category made up of children who arrived at pre-school age (0–5) – when school is not yet mandatory – and two additional categories of children who arrived at primary-school age (5–12) or aged 12–16 years. The *family/parental situation* in the Netherlands is also measured as a time-independent categorical variable, differentiating between children who had only their mother registered in the Netherlands (reference category), those who had only their father registered and those who had both parents registered in the Netherlands. It should be noted that this variable is fxed, meaning that it does not vary over the observation period.14 In addition, we incorporate a set of control variables to increase the accuracy of the estimation of the main effects.

We include the number of foreign-born siblings in the Netherlands (continuous), a dummy capturing whether the child is the oldest in the family (in the Netherlands), a time-varying dummy for mothers who gave birth to a child (a younger sibling) born on Dutch soil and a time-varying categorical variable measuring the employment situation of the parents. The number of years until Dutch citizenship acquisition (the speed of naturalisation) is also included in the extended models. Lastly, related to the refugee dispersal policy and residential locations in the Netherlands, we control for a set of time-varying residential variables, including the years between municipal registration and allocation to a regular dwelling, internal mobility (inter-municipality mobility up until time *t*) and residency in one out of fve municipalities with the largest Somali community.15

#### **3.6 Findings**

#### *3.6.1 Differentiated Onward Mobility: A Family Approach*

To begin with, the interviews clearly show that onward mobility does not naturally imply a relocation of all (nuclear) family members simultaneously – on the contrary, that appears to be an exception (see Table A3.2, columns 7 and 8). Drawing upon the register data, the wide occurrence of differentiated family migration becomes visible (see Table 3.2). Of all Dutch Somali children who left for a third country during the observation period, about half (51.5 per cent) migrated with only one of their parents – mostly the mother – and more than a quarter (30.8 per cent) left the Netherlands without a parent or legal guardian. Patterns of 'differentiated' mobility are not exclusively found among Somali families. Although children in the comparison group more often than Somalis move with two parents instead of one, migrating without parents is the most common outcome among children in this subpopulation (48.3 per cent).

14Having both parents registered implies that both the mother and the father *at some point in time* were entered onto the municipal registers.

15Rotterdam, Tilburg, The Hague, Amsterdam, Eindhoven.

**Table 3.2** Onward mobility (OM) composition

*Source*: Statistics Netherlands, SSB

*Note*: When restricting the sample to children with two registered parents, the percentage of children migrating with both parents is signifcantly higher and the share of independent migrations lower than for the full sample. However, the pattern of a relatively high percentage of children migrating with one parent – 37.5 among Somali children versus 18.0 for the comparison group – is similar

Our family approach reveals the variation in timing of onward mobility across members of the family. The qualitative data additionally reveal how Somali mothers often stayed behind with the youngest child in order for him or her to fnish elementary school, while older children can travel on their own and/or will be taken care of by (extended) family members in the third country. Ekram (ID#31),16 a young Somali woman, for example, explained how her father had come frst to the UK, while her mother decided to stay behind in the Netherlands with the youngest children: 'My mother decided to stay with us. We were still at a point in our education where transferring could have had a tremendous impact.'

#### *3.6.2 Age at Arrival and Timing of Onward Mobility*

In this section, we discuss the empirical results concerning the role that the age of children at arrival in the frst country of settlement plays in onward-mobility projects. We test the hypothesis (1a) that children who were young (particularly of preschool age: 0–5) when arriving in the Netherlands are the least likely to migrate again, with or without their parents.

Before discussing the results from the multivariate analysis, we present a descriptive picture of the magnitude and timing of the onward mobility of children of Somali origin, by means of Kaplan-Meier cumulative hazard curves (Fig. 3.1). For each point in time, this curve gives the cumulative hazard rate, which is the event rate (onward mobility) at time *t* conditional on surviving (staying in the Netherlands) up to or beyond time *t.* The relatively fat curves in the frst months indicate that onward mobility hardly ever occurs before 3 years after initial registration. After

16We use pseudonyms for all interlocutors. The ID numbers refer to Table A3.2.

**Fig. 3.1** Kaplan Meier curve cumulative onward mobility rate Somali children (N = 1467). (*Source*: Statistics Netherlands, SSB)

about 4.5 years (54 months), the hazard rates clearly increase, with peaks in the period between fve and 7 years after registration, marking the 2 years following citizenship acquisition for most individuals in the sample.

Based on the cumulative onward-mobility rate at the end of the observation period (see Fig. 3.1), we conclude that the youngest children in the sample – aged up to 4 years old at arrival – are more likely to migrate again than those who arrived at mandatory school age (5–12). This gap in cumulative onward-mobility rates starts to manifest itself after 72 months (six years) since registration and remains signifcant over time. The line for the youngest children is steepest in the period of 4.5–6.5 years after registration, indicating that the odds of onward mobility among these children is highest relatively soon after entry in the Netherlands, when they are in primary education. However, more generally we observe that the bulk of children of Somali origin who left for the UK or another country did so after having spent an extended period in the Netherlands of which they became a citizen.

For children in elementary education, it is arguably relatively easy to switch schools and (even) school systems, compared to children who arrived at primaryschool age and are transiting into secondary education in the frst years after arrival. This partly supports our alternative hypothesis (1b). The difference in onwardmobility rates between the youngest group and children of primary-school age at arrival remains signifcant when controlling for a set of other characteristics and appears robust across a number of model specifcations.17 The oldest age group (12–16) shows no signifcant differences to the middle group, which clearly demonstrates the non-linear nature of the relationship between age at arrival and onward mobility.

#### *3.6.3 Motivations for and Timing of Onward Mobility*

We turn to our qualitative data to gain insights into the motivations for the onward mobility of Somali families and the decision-making process. The data clearly demonstrate the dominant role of the parents in decision-making processes that often explicitly concern the educational paths of the child. Much emphasis is placed on foreign educational systems – the British system in particular – which are thought to offer better opportunities for (migrant) children than those in which these latter were raised.

In line with previous studies pertaining not only to Somali (Al-Sharmani, 2010) but also to Iranian (Kelly, 2013) and Moroccan and Bangladeshi (Della Puppa, 2018b) families who migrated to mainland Europe, the parents generally shared the belief that the British education system is more meritocratic and inclusive. They believe that this school system provides more opportunities for the next generation compared to those in other European countries. In addition to the idea that higher education is more accessible, the role of language (English) in education and the broader possibilities for religious education were enticing to parents, which partially stems from a desire to raise their children within their own communities. Related to the language and diasporic motives is the aim to prepare children for a future that is likely to be transnational. This is illustrated by a Somali mother (Fatumo, ID#13), who moved with her four children to Leicester while her husband remained in the Netherlands. When asked what her main reason for moving was, she replied:

Here there are more opportunities. Studying, for the children, is much better; here they can go to university and here you can give your children a religious upbringing. I did not have a clue about opening a shop back then; that came later.

The quote illustrates that mothers often consider the opportunities for their children before exploring their own likelihood of starting a new career elsewhere – like Fatumo, who ran a successful business in Leicester at the time of the interview.

The younger the children are, the more easily they adjust to new (learning) environments. For those who aim to facilitate their children's chance of obtaining a degree in foreign higher education, it is thus advantageous to have them enrolled in

17See Table A3.4 in the appendix. Results from slightly different model specifcations (e.g. in which we added a continuous age at arrival variable) yielded no substantially different effects (insignifcant effect of age continuous). Tables are available upon request.

the system before the transition from secondary to higher education. While, in the case of return migration, parents will often align this event with the completion of their children's (formal) education, the pattern appears different when it comes to onward mobility. This is sensible when return is considered the end of a migration cycle, as opposed to onward mobility – which is merely a continuation of the migratory trajectory. In the presence of a large diaspora network in other countries and the absence of options for safe and sustainable return, families with younger children particularly will try their luck elsewhere. The fact that similar patterns are found for the comparison group (see below) lends further support to this argument.

Based on the extended event-history model coeffcients (Fig. 3.2), we fnd that children who were registered either with both parents or only with their father are *less* likely to migrate again than those who only had their mother residing in the Netherlands (Fig. 3.2, left-hand panel; Table A3.4 Model 1b). This is remarkable, given that such associations are not found among children in the comparison group (Model 1b, right-hand column; Fig. 3.2, right-hand panel). Somali children not only generally travel together with their mother to arrive in the asylum country but are also accompanied by their mothers when engaging in onward mobility (Table 3.2). This fnding resonates with the literature on the rearing practices of Somali parents

**Fig. 3.2** Hazard ratio plots onward mobility, Somali children (left panel, N = 1415) and comparison group (right panel, N = 9794), other control variables included (see Table A3.4, Model 1B)

in various contexts, including the Middle East and the United States, highlighting among other things the high priority given in particular to *female* members of the family. Female offspring are expected to take over the role of providing for the transnational family in the near future (Al-Sharmani, 2004, 2006, 2010). It is, moreover, argued that women, more often than their male counterparts, possess and rely on formal mobility capital (e.g. refugee status or a European passport) for mobility and residential purposes (Al-Sharmani, 2004).

In addition to theoretical expectations concerning the age of children and timing of migration, we hypothesised that those in large families are more prone to onward mobility than children in relatively small families. The hazard ratio (HR) for the number of siblings in the Netherlands is positive but insignifcant. Being the oldest child in the family does increase the onward-mobility odds but only signifcantly for childen in the comparison group (HR 1.25). Children who have a sibling born in the Netherlands are more likely to migrate again than their counterparts whose mother did not give birth to a child on Dutch soil. The positive hazard ratio of this covariate for both groups (HR 1.49 and HR 1.42) suggests that new-borns in the family are positively related to onward mobility, not only for Somalis but for children with a protracted refugee background more generally. This constitutes additional support for our argument that parents will seek to migrate again while their children are still young, even if these latter largely or even exclusively grew up in the country of residence.

Just like family formation and expansion, employment opportunities generally form a core part of family livelihood strategies. Results concerning the socioeconomic position of the parent(s) in the Netherlands indicate that, whereas parental employment reduces the hazard of migration for the comparison group (HR 0.71), the effect is insignifcant for children of Somali descent. In other words, whether Somali parents have formal employment or not does not signifcantly relate to the mobility outcomes of their children. This resonates with the idea that children's onward mobility is not primarily driven by the economic position of their parents but, rather, depends on considerations concerning various family members – not least their own position and perspectives. On the other hand, it should be noted that employment constraints are not fully (or adequately) captured in our models. Rather than whether or not the parent has paid employment, it is the *quality* of the job which may actually be driving onward mobility. Entrepreneurial and employment constraints were indeed widely expressed by the interviewees, regardless of their (formal) economic position. So even if parents had been successful in fnding employment, the quality of the job was often insuffcient, which led them to search for better opportunities elsewhere.

The coeffcients of the control variables in the extended models provide some interesting insights that deserve a mention. Internal mobility is positively associated with international migration. Children who changed their residential location in the Netherlands are more likely to leave the country than those who remained in the municipality of initial settlement. This holds true for both Somali children (HR 1.26) and children in the comparison group (HR 1.18). Internal relocation thus presents itself as part of a wider mobility trajectory for children and families that comprises multiple international moves, rather than an alternative for international border-crossing. The lion's share of the interviewees had, indeed, also relocated internally before moving to the UK, often motivated by employment, educational and housing opportunities and revealing clear similarities to motivations for international relocation. Residing in one of the fve municipalities with the largest Somali community does not signifcantly decrease the onward-mobility propensity.

#### *3.6.4 Mothers as Main Migration Decision-Makers*

Our results highlight the transnational character of many Somali families, where the mother typically lives and moves together with one or more of her children. Most Somali children who obtained asylum in the Netherlands migrated only with their mother in the frst place (see Table 3.1). This is consistent with previous insights into child-rearing and role divisions in Somali families in the West (e.g. Degni et al., 2006; Haga, 2020; Ismael, 2020). The responsibilities that are usually borne by the women – taking care of the household and family – are often further expanded after migration (Borell et al., 2014), resulting in greater informal power. This is refected in the considerations of mothers about their own position and location, as well as the position(s) and perspectives of the children. When Nawal (ID#3) was asked who made the decision to migrate again, she responded:

My mother, she was the main decision-maker, she was the one who said we needed to go, life was getting harder here in the Netherlands and we had lots of relatives in the UK. For my mother it was much easier here, most of our relatives are in the UK, America and Egypt. She was very lonely in the Netherlands. My father came to the Netherlands later – he was in Somalia for a long time – but still most of our relatives were not in the Netherlands.

Interviewer: Did you agree?

My brothers did not know much – they were young – and my mother consulted a lot with me. I am the oldest, I am the only girl. They knew – my mother informed us all – but I don't know if they really understood.

Ibrahim (ID#19) also illustrates how important his mother was in making the fnal decision to move on to the UK.

In 2001, when I started my exams at high school, my brother wanted to continue his study in the US. He had just fnished his higher education (HBO) but in the US they said 'You are from the Netherlands and we also have a university in the UK, maybe that is a better option for you'. Then he went to have a look and did a bit of research on how it all works. My father thought it was a good idea; he had been a student himself so he knew how it all worked. My mother was the one who eventually decided. She said 'If the schools are better – no, not better but quicker – if the time it takes you to get a diploma is shorter, and it is easier to get access, then why should we not take this opportunity?'

In the process of 'rearing devoted and dependable children' (Al-Sharmani, 2006, 62), Somali parents seek to support their children in navigating the educational feld that may transcend international borders, making the mobility of these children essential. One could argue that this applies more generally to those mothers who are part of a large and dispersed diaspora network (see, for example, Jolivet, 2020 for the role of Moroccan mothers). The pattern of children residing and moving with their mothers is, however, not (convincingly) discerned among individuals in the comparison groups, which leads us to provisionally interpret this dynamic as being quite specifc to Somalis.

#### *3.6.5 Children Maturing: 'Independent' Versus Accompanied Mobility*

In this section we delve deeper into the engagement of Somali offspring in onward mobility without their parents, which is observed for three out of ten children (30.8 per cent). The histogram in Fig. 3.3 shows the occurrence of onward migration by composition, for each month of the observation period. Whereas migration with one or both parent(s) peaks in the frst 6 years after arrival, peaks for independent migration are observed after about 7 to 8 years and after a period of 15 years.

**Fig. 3.3** Histogram time of onward mobility by migration composition (Somali children N = 905, comparison group N = 2438)

What catches the eye are the peaks in onward mobility among Somali children and young adults after roughly 6 years of registered residency in the Netherlands. This clearly corresponds to the required (legal) length of stay for naturalisation eligibility. Regardless of the composition, most onward mobility takes places relatively soon after Somalis have become Dutch citizens. For children in the comparison group, the peaks occur later in time and are somewhat fatter. Interestingly, whereas the occurrence of 'independent' onward mobility for Somalis decreases after this frst peak of seven to 8 years, onward mobility among members of the comparison group continues to increase over time.

Concerning the age at migration we fnd, perhaps unsurprisingly, that children who arrive in the frst country of settlement at an older age, have a higher hazard of onward migration without their parents than children who arrived before reaching compulsory school age (Fig. A3.2). In addition, engagement in internal mobility (between municipalities) increases the hazard of independent onward migration in particular.18 Children reaching adolescence move independently of their parents after having changed their residence in the Netherlands. The timing of their migration will depend on their own family formation process, rather than on the family planning of their parents. This is illustrated by Ayaan (ID#22), a young Somali woman who states:

My brother, he left for the UK very quickly. He could not get access to university in the Netherlands so he left, already in 1991 he left for London, on his own, because he wanted to study. We all stayed in the Netherlands. I stayed in the Netherlands another 10 years and then I also went. When my brother left, I had just started high school. After that I continued my higher education in social juridical services and worked for the Refugee Council and the Migrant Rights Centre. My brother wanted to study here and I believe my mother thought that it would then be best to all move together.

Interviewer: And one of your sisters stayed in the Netherlands?

Yes, she wanted to move only after completion of her studies, but she got married, gave birth to a child and now is still there (in the Netherlands).

Our fndings show that (the timing of) migration is the outcome of the careful consideration of the opportunities and attachments of multiple members of the family, where close involvement with the children, for mothers in particular, becomes apparent. Moreover, refugee children arriving at high-school age generally spent more time in the Netherlands, before migrating to a third country independently of their parents. For both generations – parents and their children who landed in the Dutch context for asylum purposes – family formation processes are often intertwined with onward mobility.

18Coeffcients of the extended models are not included in this chapter. Results from these (and more) model specifcations are available upon request.

#### **3.7 Concluding Discussion**

This chapter has presented an examination of intergenerational dynamics within the onward-mobility arrangements of Somali families. Register and interview data are analysed in conjunction, offering unique insights into general patterns of family onward mobility as well as the underlying considerations of various family members. We fnd that, contrary to earlier fndings concerning the role of children in migration planning, Somali children who arrived at a young (pre-school) age are more likely to engage in onward mobility with one or both parents and do so at a somewhat faster pace in comparison to children who arrived at primary-school age. This holds true more generally among protracted refugees who arrived in the Netherlands as minors. The qualitative insights reveal the multifactorial motivations of parent(s) to uproot their children once again. Parents generally feel that their children will be better off in the British education system, with enticing elements such as the accessibility of universities, English as the offcial language and the availability of religious education (see also Chap. 9 by Della Puppa and Sredanovic).

Our results further highlight the key role that mothers play in managing the onward mobility of various members of the family. Children mostly engage in onward mobility together with their mothers, who also 'pioneered' the asylummotivated migration to the Netherlands. This contrasts with previously found patterns of stepwise family onward migration, where mothers and children typically followed the male head of the family (Herrera, 2012; Jolivet, 2020). The 'reversed' gendered patterns for both arrival in the Netherlands and onward mobility appear to be specifc to Somalis (this pattern was not found for the comparison group). This is in line with in-depth qualitative insights into Somali transnational familyhood, revealing the high priority of mobility by female members of the family who are expected to cater for the migration of their offspring while trying to avoid disruptions in the children's education.

Children who arrived aged 11 or older – and thus skipped the transition to secondary education – are the most likely to move independently of their parents. Such manifestations of onward mobility without the parents are common among Somali children who arrived as young adolescents. Among the comparison group, being a girl and being the oldest child in the household also increase the likelihood of this scenario occurring. The timing of independent migration differs from migration involving one or both parents, as it only unfolds after a relatively long period of time (with a peak at 15 years since frst registration in the Netherlands). These fndings merit further empirical investigation into the mobility trajectories of refugee children, the role of their parents and their own family formation and their independent paths towards new destinations.

The interview material provides some indication that the perceived educational perspectives overseas did not always materialise (cf. Patterson, Chap. 10). Anecdotal evidence points to the underperformance and/or drop-out of – mainly – Somali boys, who were consequently 'sent back' to Somalia or to their country of citizenship. The continuation or abandonment of educational trajectories is largely beyond the scope of our empirical contribution and deserves more attention in order to better grasp the open dimension and multi-directedness of the mobility trajectories of young Dutch Somalis and other young (protracted) refugees alike. As clearly demonstrated in this chapter, many refugee children will – rather than settling permanently in the country that granted them asylum – remain on the move, facilitated by the presence of family and community members in different parts of the globe. Future research into the settlement and return of refugees should therefore incorporate this long-neglected option of continued mobility, which may under certain conditions provide a viable approach to sustaining a livelihood.

Whereas this chapter represents a clear innovation in onward-mobility research by adopting a family approach, we do acknowledge its limits in accounting for the ties with other family members such as extended kin or community members and the role of social capital, in driving or facilitating the migration of Somali children, particularly in the case of 'independent' mobility. Multi-sited longitudinal or retrospective survey approaches are needed to further narrow this gap. Lastly, we acknowledge that no clear causal conclusions can be drawn based on our empirical contribution. Both the age at which children arrive in the Netherlands as well as their onward mobility may be associated with unobserved (family) characteristics. The present chapter provides various points of entry through which to further scrutinise refned theoretical expectations concerning family dynamics in onward mobility.

#### **Appendix**

#### *Tables*

**Table A3.1** Frequencies protracted refugees by origin country

*Source*: Statistics Netherlands

a Countries with <50 observations

**Table A3.2** Sample description, qualitative data

(continued)

70

**Table A3.2**

(continued)

*Source*: feldwork with Somalis in Leicester and London between 2008 and 2010

**Table A3.3** Cox PH model onward migration, hazard ratio's Model 1

*Source*: Statistics Netherlands

*Notes*: Stratifed by year of registration; \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

**Table A3.4** Cox PH model onward migration, hazard ratio's Model 1B

*Source*: Statistics Netherlands

*Notes*: Stratifed by years of registration; \*\*\* p < 0.001. \*\* p < 0.01. \* p < 0.05

#### *Figures*

**Fig. A3.1** Kaplan Meier curve cumulative onward mobility rate comparison group (N = 9927). (*Source*: Statistics Netherlands, SSB)

**Fig. A3.2** Hazard ratio plots onward mobility, Somali children (left panel, N = 1415) and comparison group (right panel, N = 9794), other control variables included (Table available upon request)

#### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Chapter 4 Remittance-Sending Behaviour Along Migration Trajectories: The Case of Senegalese, Ghanaian and Congolese Migrants**

**Wendy Flikweert, Özge Bilgili, and Kim Caarls**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

With an increase in global migration (at least until the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic) and with recent technological and communication developments that facilitate migrants' transnational engagement, there is a growing interest in understanding the determinants of economic transnationalism. Monetary remittances are a form of transnational economic activity that is part of the relations which migrants may keep across nation states' geographical, political and cultural boundaries (Al-Ali et al., 2001a; Glick Schiller, 2008; Vertovec, 2009). The amount of transnational monetary transfers has increased rapidly: in 2018, remittances to lower- and middleincome countries were estimated to have reached US\$529 billion (then around €448 billion), an increase of almost 10 per cent compared to the previous year (World Bank, 2019).

Besides their potential adverse effects (e.g. increased inequality) it is, overall, often argued that remittances have great developmental potential (De Haas, 2005). Monetary remittances can contribute to improving the living conditions of households in migrants' origin countries, as they provide a safety-net in poorer areas and go directly to people in need. Moreover, remittances can contribute to the increased economic activity and investment propensity of families abroad, potentially leading

Ö. Bilgili

#### K. Caarls Independent Researcher, The Hague, The Netherlands e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2023 J. Ahrens, R. King (eds.), *Onward Migration and Multi-Sited Transnationalism*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12503-4\_4

W. Flikweert (\*)

Independent Researcher, Amsterdam, The Netherlands e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
to an increase in the general prosperity of migrant-sending regions in the long term (Taylor et al., 1996; De Haas, 2003, 2005).

While there has been great interest in remittances for decades – due, *inter alia*, to their potentially positive impact on the livelihoods of migrants' families (e.g., Taylor et al., 1996; De Haas, 2003) – the research feld remains limited in certain aspects. Particularly, as we argue in this chapter, most studies on economic remittances are dominated by a static view of migration: it assumes that people leave their origin countries behind, settle down in one reception country and then start remitting (Malkki, 1992). This leads to a limited understanding of remittancesending behaviour because it assumes that migrants remit only when they consider themselves to be settled in the destination country. However, many migrants may also remit *during* their journeys. While the vast majority of research focuses on migrants who consider that they have reached their fnal destination, little is known about the economic remittance-sending behaviour of migrants who are on the move.

In fact, the increasing restriction of legal migration and intensifed controls at European borders have led to more complex, fragmented and diverse migration trajectories (Dahinden, 2010; Collyer et al., 2012; Schapendonk & Steel, 2014; Snel et al., 2021). Migrants who spend longer periods of time *en route* may have diverse (and more dangerous) experiences between departure and arrival (Schapendonk, 2009). Thus far, there is little scientifc understanding of how these experiences may affect migrants' transnational engagements such as remittance-sending. If we assume that remittances mostly support families in migrant-sending countries by providing a safety-net or an income enabling them to maintain a basic standard of living, it is relevant to gain more insight into how these situations infuence migrants' remittance-sending behaviour. Our research contributes to flling this gap in the literature by exploring differences in remittance-sending behaviour among migrants in relation to their mobility patterns. More specifcally, we aim to understand how and why migrants' remittance-sending behaviour differs when they consider themselves to be on the move and when they are settled. Using retrospective, longitudinal data from the Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project, we investigate how being on the move relates to the remittance-sending behaviour of Senegalese, Ghanaian and Congolese migrants along their migration trajectories.

#### **4.2 Sub-Saharan Migration Routes to Europe**

As a response to increased border controls or changing situations in transit countries, migration routes, trends and patterns between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe have shifted continuously over time (Lessault & Beauchemin, 2009; Schoumaker et al., 2018). While a large number of sub-Saharan migrants entered Europe by air, a signifcant number reached Europe's territories overland and by sea (Caarls et al., 2021). Among this latter group, a wide variety of modes of transport and routes were used to enter Europe. Around the turn of the twenty-frst century, the main departure points for sub-Saharan migrants were from Northern Morocco for travel to Spain, Melilla or Ceuta, from Libya and Tunisia to Lampedusa, Sicily and Malta

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and from the West African coast for migrants travelling to the Canary Islands (Schoumaker et al., 2018). Senegalese migrants mainly set off either directly to the Canary Islands by boat or overland to Morocco or Mauritania. Ghanaians either headed to Africa's West Coast or crossed the Sahara to Morocco or Libya, while the Congolese commonly migrated to Europe via North Africa.

Additionally, 'traditional' destination countries have changed for sub-Saharan African migrants (Mazzucato et al., 2015). Although increased border controls have made migration to Europe more diffcult, the increasing lack of opportunities in African destination countries and the growing demand for cheap labour in Southern Europe in particular have increased migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and people have emigrated to new destination countries. Whereas around 3 million sub-Saharan African migrants were living in Europe in 2000, this number had increased to 3.9 million by 2011 (Schoumaker et al., 2018). In the 2000s, Senegalese destinations in Europe were mainly Italy and Spain, even though they primarily used to migrate to France. Ghanaians mostly migrated to the UK, the US and new European destination countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Congolese migration itineraries shifted differently. With the abolition of apartheid in South Africa and the ending of the Angolan War in the early 2000s, new economic opportunities were created in the region, which decreased the number of Congolese migrating to Europe.

#### **4.3 Conceptualising Migration Trajectories**

In order to show that migration experiences go beyond initial points of 'departure' and 'arrival', scholars have often used various terms to acknowledge that migration does not usually have a clear end-point but can involve secondary, onward, return or circular migration (Ehrkamp, 2019). In Chap. 2, Erdal et al. suggest the term 'complex migration trajectories'. As such, migration is characterised by multidirectionality and complexity, with deep entanglement between mobility and immobility along migrants' routes (Düvell, 2006; Collyer, 2007; Ehrkamp, 2019). To recognise this (im)mobility – aggravated by strict state immigration regimes (Düvell, 2006) and therefore, at least to a certain extent, involuntary – the term 'transit migration' has commonly been used. This is defned as 'the situation between emigration and settlement that is characterised by an indefnite migrant stay, legal or illegal, and may or may not develop into further migration depending on a series of structural and individual factors' (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008, 4) and is often thought to be anticipated before migrants depart from their origin countries (Castagnone, 2011).

However, as transit migration is often not a choice, nor is it always intended or planned, the 'initial' aim of reaching a specifc country is not always realised and changes along their journeys (Düvell, 2006; Collyer, 2007). Rather, transit stays are characterised by indefniteness that may result in (involuntary) settlement (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). In addition, merely categorising transit migration as a phase between departure and arrival does not refect migrants' changing aims and different experiences along their trajectories, whereby migrants change their plans, adapt to new environments and explore opportunities in countries of stay (Andersson, 2016; Massey et al., 2016; Staring, 2018). A broader interpretation that refects migrants' embodied experiences along their journeys is therefore needed. Hence, we turn to Coutin's (2005) term '*en route*' 1 to explore how transit migration can be experienced as a 'liminal state that positions migrants simultaneously outside (in transition, not yet arrived), yet inside (travelling through), national space' (Coutin, 2005, 196). Along migration journeys, migrants can be physically present in 'precarious transit zones' (Hess, 2012) while being excluded from the rights and protection mechanisms which citizens of that state enjoy.

Being *en route*/on the move is often characterised by particular living conditions that increase migrants' vulnerability and poverty – conditions such as semiprotection, social exclusion, a lack of state protection or outright hostility (Coutin, 2005; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). This precariousness is mainly driven by two mechanisms (Düvell, 2006). First, it is produced by nation states, international regulations or border regimes (e.g., the increased securitisation of the EU's outer borders) as they exclude certain migrants from conventional protection regimes and restrict them from legally reaching their territories, thereby creating challenges for the protection of human rights and access to basic services. Second, this precariousness is driven by social class. Whereas wealthier migrants can afford to pay for a direct fight or provide savings to obtain a visa, poorer migrants are inclined to use less expensive modes of travel, usually overland or by sea (Düvell, 2006).

In this chapter, we explore how Senegalese, Ghanaian and Congolese migrants engage in sending economic remittances to their origin countries while considering themselves to be on the move rather than being settled. We understand being *en route* as a lived experience (Düvell, 2006), meaning that migrants themselves are 'experiencing subjects' (Eastmond, 2007) who have defned, in hindsight, what they experienced as stays to settle or stays with the intention of moving onwards. This overcomes the constraints that previous research raises, arguing that concepts – such as transit migration – should be studied not only as a socio-political condition but also as a way of experiencing the world (Willen, 2007). It allows moving beyond over-generalised notions of transit migration and acknowledges the wide diversity in transit zones and migrants' different realities in transit (Collyer et al., 2012; Hess, 2012).

Against this backdrop, we argue that our regard as researchers should move towards the experiences of migrants *en route* who are also likely to be sending remittances from different places which they do not consider to be their fnal destination. These remittance fows can be both to countries of origin or elsewhere where they have social ties (as also demonstrated in Patterson's Chap. 10 in this book). In fact, previous research has also highlighted the importance of reverse remittances, which support migrants on the road and abroad (Mazzucato, 2011). While we

1We also use 'being on the move' as a translation of this terminology and refer to the two terms interchangeably.

acknowledge that remittances can be sent to and from diverse places, due to data limitations this chapter focuses on the remittance-sending behaviour of migrants only towards their country of origin.

#### **4.4 Remittance-Sending Capacity and Incentives of Migrants** *En Route*

Although being *en route* is initially expected to be a temporary experience without the intention to settle down in the country of stay, it is often unclear how such a stay will develop (Düvell, 2006). Migrants might be hindered in moving onwards and their future decisions might be dependent on the available and affordable choices, a local network or migrant smugglers or brokers (Collyer, 2010). Following the lifecycle theory of consumption (Dustmann, 1997), this insecurity and precariousness could lead migrants in temporary stays to save their money in order to ensure their future consumption. This implies that they are more likely to prioritise money as a means to contribute to reaching their future destinations, instead of investing it in relationships with the origin country. Consequently, money sent through remittances is less likely be prioritised over more direct expenditure on their onward migration, leading migrants *en route* to (temporarily) refrain from sending remittances. Therefore, we expect that *migrants en route are less likely to remit compared to migrants who consider themselves to be settled*.

Several factors could further explain the expected difference between remittancesending behaviour *en route* compared to that when settled. The particular living conditions and opportunities of being *en route* are likely to infuence migrants' remittance-sending behaviour, as engagement in transnational activities (i.e. sending remittances) is closely related to migrants' transnational capabilities to engage in these exchanges (Bilgili, 2014, 2015). These transnational capabilities include two elements. First, migrants need the capacity to engage in transnational activities (Al-Ali et al., 2001b). When it comes to monetary remittances, this depends, for example, on migrants' wages, on alternative forms of income or on their savings. These capacities are infuenced by the local context and the characteristics of the country of origin, as the skills and resources available to migrants to engage in transnational activities are infuenced by their social networks, opportunities and the length of time spent in the country of stay (Carling & Hoelscher, 2013). Second, engagement in sending remittances depends on the migrants' incentives to remit and their willingness to prioritise money spent on these remittances over other expenditure (Bilgili, 2015). These incentives depend on migrants' connections and attachment with both their origin country and their countries of stay. In order to remit, it is a prerequisite that migrants identify with the social, economic and political processes in their origin countries (Al-Ali et al., 2001b).

In this research, we frst investigate whether migrants' employment status in their country of stay, as a transnational capacity, can explain possible differences in remittance-sending behaviour. Previous research has shown that income and employment status are closely related to sending remittances, as migrants

struggling to cover their living expenses in the host country are limited in their possibilities to remit (Hagen-Zanker & Siegel, 2007; Carling & Hoelscher, 2013). Several studies found that those with higher incomes or with permanent contracts were more likely to remit (Carling & Hoelscher, 2013; Bilgili, 2014, 2015). Similarly, *those with more stable economic positions are likely to be in less precarious situations and are, therefore, more likely to remit*.

Migrants who are *en route* rely more on informal labour opportunities and social networks infuencing their strategies and objectives (Hess, 2012). They might be more likely to work in precarious jobs and therefore have more unstable labourmarket positions. Moreover, being in a perceived situation of limbo – neither 'here' nor 'there' – can be paralysing. It might prevent them from actively looking for employment, as the stay is probably expected to only be temporary but could, meanwhile, develop in a longer or even a permanent stay (Al-Ali et al., 2001a). Being in a more precarious situation might make it more diffcult to save money and send remittances (Cox et al., 1998). Therefore, we expect that *migrants who are* en route *are less likely to be employed and are therefore less likely to remit, compared to migrants who are settled.*

Another factor infuencing migrants' capacity to remit is their legal status in the host country (Al-Ali et al., 2001a). Although there is no consensus in the literature, there is a common view that the insecurity of migrants' legal status poses obstacles to their engagement in remittance-sending behaviour (Van Meeteren, 2012). Irregular migrants who are structurally excluded might experience (legal) barriers to formal institutional participation, hampering their ability to engage in cross-border activities (Portes, 2001; Bloch, 2008; Vickstrom & Beauchemin, 2016) and undermining a stable situation compared to regular migrants. Since not having a legal status could also make migrants reluctant to engage in activities that jeopardise them – as not abiding by the law could lead to fnes, imprisonment or deportation (Pinger, 2010; Vickstrom & Beauchemin, 2016) and the insecurity of no legal status also limits the freedom to move around – this situation could also lead to psychological problems, such as apathy and non-commitment (Al-Ali et al., 2001a).

Importantly, being *en route* is not intrinsically related to illegality, as it is a process intersecting various other migration categories. Irregular migrants, asylum applicants, refugees, documented migrants and migrants who have been traffcked may all experience fragmented journeys (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008; Collyer, 2010). However, migrants who are *en route* are more likely to be excluded from conventional protection regimes, challenging the protection of their human rights and access to basic services (Düvell, 2006). These structural barriers might, in turn, hamper their likelihood of obtaining a legal status. Moreover, as being on the move is envisioned to be temporary, migrants might be less inclined to make an effort to obtain a legal status in this host country. Accordingly, we expect that *migrants* en route *are less likely to have a fully regular status and are therefore less likely to remit, compared to migrants who consider themselves to be settled*.

Although migrants' economic position and legal status while being *en route* are expected to hamper their remittance-sending behaviour, these capacities play no role if there is no obligation or incentive to send money to their origin countries (Bilgili, 2014). Previous research has shown that different incentives can determine monetary transfers. First, remittances can be sent out of pure self-interest, whereby migrants invest and accumulate assets in their origin country (Hagen-Zanker & Siegel, 2007; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2009). Feelings of attachment to the origin country might be higher for those who have assets, resulting in a strong motivation to remit. Second, economic remittances can also function as a contractual arrangement between migrants and their families in origin countries, as a strategy to diversify income resources to support the household (see Lucas & Stark, 1985). In this way, both migrants and households can mitigate their risks and are insured against fnancial shocks: the household supports the migrant by contributing to their migration costs and, in turn, receives remittances from the migrant as a form of income. Remittances are then sent to repay the loans which migrants took out to pay the costs of migration. Lastly, migrants could also remit because they want to take care of their families for altruistic reasons, as they feel concerned about their families' well-being (Hagen-Zanker & Siegel, 2007; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2009).

Although previous research found that having both assets and family in origin countries is an important incentive for migrants to send remittances, their effect may be less strong for migrants who are in more precarious situations, such as those who still consider themselves to be on the move. Therefore, we expect that *migrants who own assets and/or have family members in their origin countries are more likely to remit but that this relationship will be weaker when they are* en route*.*

#### **4.5 Methods**

#### *4.5.1 Data and Participants*

This research used data from the Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project. Identical surveys were conducted in six European countries – Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands – and the three sub-Saharan African countries of Ghana, Senegal and the Democratic Republic of Congo or DR Congo (Beauchemin et al., 2014). The countries were part of three distinct migration systems (see Fig. 4.1): Senegalese migration was studied in Senegal, France, Spain and Italy, Congolese migration in DR Congo, Belgium and the UK, and Ghanaian

migration in Ghana, the UK and the Netherlands. This multi-sited approach allowed us to realise the aim of the MAFE project: to recognise that migration is not a linear process (from Africa to Europe) but, rather, a process between Africa and Europe, by also including onward, circular and return migration (Beauchemin, 2012).

This research only used data from respondents who had been, at the time of data collection, staying in one of the six European countries for at least one year. Data collection only took place in the major cities where the majority of migrants stayed. Except for Spain, quota sampling was used to select respondents (Beauchemin et al., 2014). These quotas were set by age and gender. Additionally, in France, socio-occupational status was included as an extra criterion and in Belgium and the UK the place of residence was a criterion. Different recruitment methods were used, including approaching respondents in public spaces and churches, through snowballing or through interviewers' contacts. Only in Spain was a random selection of participants possible through the population register. The data were collected between 2008 and 2010 (Beauchemin et al., 2014). Respondents were eligible if they were between 25 and 75 years old at the time of the survey, were born in one of the three African countries and had – or had had – the nationality of their origin country.

The data comprise individual life histories collected through biographic questionnaires. Respondents were asked to provide retrospective information on their family, economic and residential history. In total, 1450 migrants were interviewed in Europe. After only selecting those who were over 18 years old at the time of emigration from their origin country, our fnal sample consisted of 1439 respondents, of whom 601 were Senegalese, 426 were Congolese and 412 were Ghanaian (see Table 4.1 for further specifcation). On average, respondents were 39 years old when they completed the survey. Moreover, most were generally highly educated: at the time of the survey, 41.7 per cent had completed university, with only 5.6 per cent reporting they did not complete any schooling.

**Table 4.1** Sample size per European country and migrants' countries of origin

#### *4.5.2 Measures*

2First, respondents had defned their short stays (less than a year) as a holiday trip, a business trip, a country where they stopped over before migrating to another country (transit), or a country where they intended to stay and settle down. Secondly, for stays of more than a year, respondents had given the reason for choosing the country of stay rather than another country, to which, among others, they could have responded it was a transit stay. Third, respondents had indicated whether, upon arrival, they considered the country of stay their fnal destination, they did not have a clear idea about the country they wanted to go to, or they had in mind to go elsewhere, it was therefore a transit country.

were re-coded so that a higher number refects an increase in satisfaction. From the total number of observed years, 1 per cent of the responses to this question were missing.

Additionally, educational level was included as a control because a higher educational level can result in a higher income and a more stable job, affecting the propensity to remit (Bilgili, 2014). Respondents reported the number of years of schooling and the last school year they attended. Using this information, a timevariant measure for educational level was constructed. Respondents' educational level was lowered by one point for each year prior to the fnal school year. The educational level stayed the same in periods during which education was interrupted. From this range, education was coded in six categories: no schooling, some schooling (1–6 years), primary school (7–10 years), lower-secondary (11–13 years), upper-secondary (14–15) and university (16–23). There were no missing values for the control variables.

#### *4.5.3 Analytical Strategy*

To account for the longitudinal data structure, a person period fle was created that included yearly information for each respondent. This means that a single respondent could appear in multiple lines of the data fle, refecting several years of their life. This fle refected information valid on the 1st of January of each year (e.g., their employment status, subjective wealth, legal status, etc.). Since we were interested in migrants' remittance-sending behaviour in the years in which they lived abroad, we excluded the years in which respondents stayed in their origin countries. The 5 years with missing values on the independent variable 'being *en route*' were excluded from the analysis. In total, the number of observed years from all respondents together was 20,590.

For the main analyses, we ran the models in Mplus, taking into account the multi-level structure by clustering the data on respondents. Mplus allowed us to integrate the different paths of our model simultaneously using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). Missing values on the dependent variables were handled using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) option in Mplus. FIML ignores missing values on a dependent variable if there are valid cases on other variables in the same person–year.

We decided to use the complex survey method to analyse our data. Compared to a random effect specifcation, the complex method makes fewer assumptions about a person over time and is therefore considered to be more reliable, with less bias but also less power. We used the robust weighted least-squares estimator because the dependent variable is binary. For the standard errors of the direct and indirect effects, bootstrapping with 1000 samples was used. For the categorical mediator permit, we calculated the indirect effects through marginal effects while, for the ordinal mediator subjective wealth, a continuous latent variable with categorical indicators was constructed to calculate the indirect effects.

#### **4.6 Results**

#### *4.6.1 Descriptive Results*

Table 4.2 contains information on both time-variant and time-constant variables. For the time-variant variables, the information presented was an average across the total number of observed years of all respondents. For the time-constant variables, the observations for each respondent did not vary across the years (e.g. sex, country

**Table 4.2** Descriptive results for full sample

of origin) and we therefore only presented these descriptive results per individual and not across the years (1439 respondents).

In almost two-thirds of the total observed years, respondents sent remittances. However, respondents reported being *en route* in only 10 per cent of the total number of observed years. When comparing the number of temporary stays to the total number of migration trips (1651), 18 per cent of the total number of different migration trips were classifed as migrants being *en route*.

Over the years, respondents were often employed (70 per cent) and in over threequarters of the observed years, respondents stated they had quite enough to live on. In the majority of observed years (71.1 per cent), respondents reported having a fully regular status, compared to having no residence permit in only 15.4 per cent of the years. In a quarter of the observed years, respondents reported having family in their origin country and in about a third of the observed years said that they owned one or more assets in their origin country.

#### *4.6.2 Analytical Results*

We estimated three structural models with control variables (Table 4.3). Following our frst hypothesis, we initially estimated the direct relationship between being *en route* and sending remittances in a model without mediators and predictors (Model A). Then we estimated a model which included them (Model B). Third, we estimated our full model (Fig. 4.2) and included the hypothesised interactions between being in transit and owning assets and between being in transit and having family in the origin country (Model C). As we found one of the hypothesised interactions was signifcant and the effect of the other one did not change compared to Model B, we turned to Model C for the analysis of our results regarding the remaining hypotheses.

As in our frst hypothesis, we expected that migrants who were on the move would be less likely to send remittances, compared to migrants who considered themselves to be settled. However, we found that the relationship between being *en route* and remitting was insignifcant (Model A).3

Secondly, we expected migrants' economic positions to partially explain the main relationship. We indeed found that employment status and subjective wealth were both signifcantly and positively related to the probability of sending remittances (resp. *β* = .260, *p* < .001; *β* = .076, *p* = .042). This means that being

3As sub-Saharan African migrants are a heterogeneous group and there is a great variety in migration causes and patterns (Schoumaker et al., 2018), it was of interest to test our model for each migrant group separately. Although some previous fndings became insignifcant in these models, possibly due to lower sample sizes, we generally found comparable results and the relationships pointed in similar directions. Interestingly, in line with our frst hypothesis but contrary to our previous fndings, we did fnd that Senegalese who were *en route* were less likely to remit, compared to when they were not *en route*. For Ghanaian and Congolese migrants we did not fnd a signifcant relationship.

Results of logistic regression analysis on sending remittances (N=20,590, estimated with WLSMV)

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**Fig. 4.2** Conceptual model

employed or being more satisfed with their fnancial situation made them more likely to remit. Moreover, we found that migrants who were on the move were less likely to have a satisfactory subjective wealth (*β* = −.286, *p* = .003) but, on the other hand, were more likely to be employed (*β* = .271, *p* = .003) compared to those who considered themselves to no longer be on the move.

Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that employment status was signifcantly and positively mediating the relationship between being *en route* and sending remittances (total indirect effect: *β* = .071, *p* = .007). This means that migrants who were on the move were more likely to be employed and were, therefore, more likely to remit. We did not fnd that migrants' subjective wealth negatively mediated the relationship between being *en route* and sending remittances.

Moreover, we hypothesised that migrants who were *en route* were less likely to have a fully regular status and would, therefore, be less likely to remit. However, we did not fnd that having a more secure legal status was signifcantly related to sending remittances. We did fnd that those who were *en route* were less likely to have a fully regular status, compared to those who were settled (*β* = −.331, *p* = .002).

According to our fourth hypothesis, we expected that migrants who owned assets or had family in their origin country would be more likely to remit but this relationship would be weaker when they were *en route*. We in fact found that the odds of remitting were 1.3 times as high for those who had assets in their origin country compared to those who did not have assets (*β* = .230, *p =* .001). Contrary to our expectations, we found that being *en route* signifcantly and positively moderated this relationship (*β* = .319, *p =* .046) as the relationship between owning assets in the origin country and sending remittances was stronger for those who were *en route*. However, we did not fnd that having family in the origin country was signifcantly related to sending remittances and we also did not fnd support for the notion that being *en route* signifcantly moderated this relationship.

#### **4.7 Discussion**

This chapter aimed to explain the extent to which and how Senegalese, Ghanaian and Congolese migrants' remittance-sending behaviour is affected by being *en route* (or not) along their migration trajectories. Overall, we hypothesised that migrants *en route* would (temporarily) refrain from sending remittances but we did not fnd evidence of this. Although we did not fnd overall support for the hypothesis that being on the move decreased migrants' probability to remit, our results support the idea that migrants' capacities infuenced their remittance-sending behaviour. Those who were employed and were more satisfed with their fnancial situation were more likely to remit. This is in line with previous research and supports the capabilities approach. In other words, migrants' engagement in transnational activities depends on their transnational capacities (Al-Ali et al., 2001b; Bilgili, 2014, 2015). However, migrants' legal status did not affect their remittance-sending behaviour. This is not uncommon, as there is no consensus in the literature that having a more secure legal status is always positively related to migrants' remittancesending behaviour. Previous research, for example, found that undocumented migrants remitted more compared to documented ones (Sana, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006).

As expected, we found that being on the move was negatively related to having a full and regular status. Migrants in temporary stay situations were more likely to be excluded from conventional protection regimes which, in turn, imposes structural barriers that hamper their chances to obtain a legal status (Düvell, 2006). Moreover, being *en route* was also negatively related to migrants' subjective wealth. This, together with a reduced legal status, is in line with previous research stating that transit zones are characterised by precariousness (Hess, 2012).

Contrary to our predictions, we found that being on the move was positively related to being employed, compared to having reached the fnal destination. This, in turn, also partially explained why migrants would, instead, be more likely to remit while they were *en route*. As transit countries are characterised by greater informality (Hess, 2012), migrants might indeed be more likely to be employed because of a large informal sector, possibly explaining this positive relationship. Additionally, in many economically developed destination countries, there is an educational mismatch for immigrants on the labour market because, for example, of discrimination and the lack of recognition of diplomas or language skills (Piracha & Vadean, 2013). This could increase the likelihood of (initial) unemployment in economically developed destination countries, compared to areas where migrants stay temporarily.

These fndings partly indicate that longer and more complex migration journeys are characterised by increased precariousness, as migrants reported a worse subjective wealth and a more precarious legal status while they were *en route*. However, the higher likelihood of being employed in these periods – which in turn increased their probability of remitting – could have worked as a safety-net in times of uncertainty. In this way, migrants then remitted to their origin countries to strengthen

their connections and 'purchase' insurance at times of personal risk (Lucas & Stark, 1985; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006) instead of (temporarily) refraining from remitting. In other words, in light of the increased likelihood of their having to go back home due to their precarious situation and increased future insecurity, migrants on the move may have chosen to send remittances back to their country of origin (Dustmann, 1997).

Following the capabilities approach, migrants' attachment to their origin country was also an important determinant of sending remittances. As expected, we found that owning assets in origin countries was positively related to sending remittances, compared to not owning assets. This is in line with previous research that found that migrants who are more attached to their origin countries are more willing to prioritise spending money on remittances over other expenditure (Carling & Hoelscher, 2013). However, no such relationship was found between having immediate family in origin countries and sending remittances. Our mere focus on the nuclear family in the origin country could, therefore, possibly explain the absence of a signifcant relationship, as those without immediate family in the origin country might also remit to other relatives.

Additionally, we expected that, for those who were in transit, the positive relationships between attachment to origin countries and remitting would be weaker, since they were in more precarious situations and would, therefore, temporarily refrain from sending remittances. However, we found the relationship between owning assets and remitting was, in fact, stronger for those who were in transit. This could indicate further support for the argument that insecure or precarious transit stays might lead migrants to intensify or strengthen their connections with their origin countries by sending remittances. Future research should study in more depth these dynamics and also consider reverse remittances for migrants who are *en route*. Focusing on bi-directional engagements where migrants on the move also receive transnational social and economic support is central not only for understanding the experiences of migrants whose journeys are longer, fragmented and more complex than ever before but also for shedding light onto the effects of these journeys on the lives of those left behind.

#### **4.8 Data Limitations and Multi-sited Transnationalism Research**

Firstly, MAFE data refect the experiences of migrants who arrived in European countries where they considered themselves to be settled. This means that the experiences of migrants who were in transit countries and were hindered from moving on, were not represented in the data. This implies that we might have underestimated the effect of particular living conditions and opportunities for migrants on the move, as we only had information from those who reached one of the six European countries. As such experiences are partially driven by social class (Düvell, 2006), poorer and more vulnerable migrants might experience greater precariousness, possibly preventing them from moving onwards.

Secondly, the use of retrospective data has several limitations. Retrospective information about transitory periods could refect what respondents believed was happening, instead of what was actually happening (Düvell, 2006). It is, therefore, diffcult to determine whether respondents reported their actual intentions upon arrival in a country or whether subsequent events, such as re-migration or settlement, infuenced the way in which they classifed their host country.

Considering both limitations, using a so-called mobile methods approach could be one way to move away from selecting European destination countries as the starting point for sampling migrants (Amelina & Faist, 2012). Quantitative or qualitative data are then collected by following migrants along their trajectories instead of sampling them in (European) destination countries. By interviewing the same migrants at different moments along their migration trajectories, migration can then be studied longitudinally and capture migration dynamics and changing aspirations (Castagnone, 2011). Such a multi-sited and longitudinal method would move away from 'methodological nationalism' and make steps towards a truly transnational perspective for studying complex migration trajectories and transnational engagements.

In conclusion, our research provides a deeper understanding of how sub-Saharan African migrants' trajectories between Africa and Europe affect their remittancessending behaviour. By moving away from the simplistic view of migration as a one-time act from point of departure to destination, we aimed to better refect the realities of migrants' lives and to bring this approach also to the study of remittances (Collyer & de Haas, 2012; Snel et al., 2021). Although we did not fnd support for the idea that being *en route* is negatively related to the probability of sending remittances, our results demonstrated that migrants' capabilities to remit change along their migration trajectories. We therefore conclude by highlighting the importance of including a(n) (im)mobility perspective in the study of remittances and the need for a fuller understanding of how frictions and experiences along more-complex migration trajectories affect remittance-sending behaviour.

#### **References**

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# **Chapter 5 Ambivalent Entanglements: Syrian Refugees' Network Relations and (Im) mobilities in Protracted Displacement**

**Sarah A. Tobin, Benjamin Etzold, Fawwaz Momani, Tamara Adel Al Yakoub, Rola Fares Saleem AlMassad, and Ahmad Ghanem Shdefat**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

In September 2019 we interviewed Mohammed, a 29-year-old Syrian refugee in the northern Jordanian city of Ramtha. He shared with us his journey into Jordan and the ways in which his family network has been divided by their situation of protracted displacement. His story provides important insights into understanding the impact of family networks on mobility aspirations. He said:

I came to Jordan with my uncle and my cousin. When we arrived, in 2011, it was about seven months after the beginning of the revolution. My uncle introduced me to his maternal uncle, who is Jordanian. My uncle sent me immediately to work in the construction sector with him. I spent two years working in this feld and sending money to my family back home. In 2013, my family joined me here because the situation in Syria was diffcult. When my family arrived, they lived with me at home and settled down here. Later, my father

S. A. Tobin (\*)

Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
B. Etzold

Bonn International Centre for Confict Studies (BICC), Bonn, Germany e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
F. Momani · R. F. S. AlMassad Department of Counseling and Educational Psychology, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS><EMAIL_ADDRESS>
T. Adel Al Yakoub Department of Public Administration, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
A. G. Shdefat Department of Counseling and Educational Psychology, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan

Jadara University, Irbid, Jordan e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
© The Author(s) 2023 J. Ahrens, R. King (eds.), *Onward Migration and Multi-Sited Transnationalism*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12503-4\_5

99

moved to Germany. He has been there for four years now. My mother and my siblings will join him as he applied for a family reunion there. All of them are now doing the interviews for that. Morally and psychologically, I would prefer to move to Britain. My brothers-in-law have told me that life and work in Britain are different and more convenient. Everyone has his own life. I prefer to be independent.

In the 10 years of violent confict in Syria, 5.6 million Syrians – more than a quarter of the country's pre-war population – have fed from the war, from political persecution, conscription in the military or dwindling livelihood security in the war-torn country. Most have fed to the neighbouring countries of Turkey (currently around 3.6 million Syrian refugees), Lebanon (more than 1 million), Jordan (approximately 655,000) and Iraq (more than 246,000) (UNHCR, 2018). As the war in Syria continues and the underlying political conficts remain unsolved, the options and hopes for return are dwindling for many of the displaced. Worse still, most continue to live in exile under highly insecure and precarious conditions – or to put it in the UNHCR's terms, in 'a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo'. In such protracted displacement situations, the lives of refugees 'may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulflled after years in exile' (UNHCR, 2004, 1).

Since the UNCHR established this defnition, the number of people who fall into the category of being in a protracted refugee situation has steadily increased to around 16 million by the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2020). For more and more people, the three normally discussed 'durable solutions' of resettlement, local integration and repatriation are thus out of reach (see Kraler et al., 2020 for a critical discussion of the emergence and the value of the notion of durable solutions). While establishing camps and providing for refugees in countries of reception is an important element of humanitarian relief, maintaining a bureaucracy of aid in and through organised camps over a longer period of time might actually contribute to protracting displacement rather than solving refugees' plight, especially if no adequate space for social inclusion and economic self-suffciency are built up simultaneously (Hyndman & Giles, 2016; Betts et al., 2017). Solutions which are more sustainable would thus have to be embedded in clear political and economic strategies and linked to confict management, peacebuilding and development actions (Loescher & Milner, 2008). Moreover, given the fact that displaced families often lead multilocal lives and rely on mobility and cross-border transfers, transnationalism has now been proposed as a fourth durable solution to forced displacement (Van Hear, 2006; Cohen & Van Hear, 2017). Recent literature on transnational migration has emphasised social actors' ability to be mobile as key in this development (Black & King, 2004; Piper, 2009). This warrants attention not only on return migration but also on other forms of secondary migration, including onward migration outside of the frst country of refuge (Jeffery & Murison, 2011).

It is this latter string of the debate to which we want to add our contribution, which is based on collaborative research within the framework of the project

'Transnational Figurations of Displacement' (TRAFIG).1 In our project we consider displaced persons' mobility and their own network connections as socioeconomic and socio-psychological resources that they draw from and utilise in order to live with and eventually overcome protracted displacement. In order to better understand the multiple mobilities that are part of displaced people's trajectories and to comprehend the central role of family, kin relations and other local, translocal and transnational networks in their everyday lives, we make use of the concept of 'translocal fgurations of displacement', which is inspired by fgurational sociology – a meso-level approach emphasising the processual character of life and which centres around the networks of interdependent human beings – and which we combine with state-of-the-art studies on forced displacement as well as key literature on migrants' transnationalism and translocality (Etzold et al., 2019).

For this chapter we draw on the comprehensive fndings of our TRAFIG team's empirical research in Jordan, where we utilised a mixed methodology to better understand Syrian refugees' trajectories into and out of protracted displacement. Based on these rich empirical insights we show that translocal family relations and kin networks do indeed play a decisive role in displaced people's lives. They shaped Syrians' journeys to and within Jordan until they reached their current location, they open up locally available opportunities to sustain one's life in the short and midterm and for longer-term integration and they structure future (intended or imagined) mobilities, both return movements towards 'home' or onward migration to other third countries. The translocal fgurations within which people are embedded inevitably also have quite ambivalent effects on displaced people's lives. Reuniting with one's family in Jordan or moving on to Western Europe or other 'future elsewheres' is often highly idealised, whereas the presence in the 'everyday here' can be full of frustration, dependencies and conficts. Our contribution discusses these ambivalent entanglements and, in particular, the role that (im)mobilities play in this regard.

A central fnding which we present here is that Syrian refugees relied heavily upon extended family and kin networks for movement into and throughout Jordan. Once in Jordan, Syrians continue to cultivate onward migration aspirations to move, to be or to reunite with extended family and kin networks 'elsewhere'. However, these aspirations are highly ambivalent, entangled in concerns and interests about the role of the families and kin networks, dependencies and perceived requirements, conficts and ruptures. Protracted displaced situations for these Syrians have created

1TRAFIG, Transnational Figurations of Displacement, is an EU-funded Horizon 2020 research and innovation project (Grant No. 822453). From 2019 to 2022, 12 partner organisations investigate long-lasting displacement situations at multiple sites in Asia, Africa and Europe and analyse the options to improve displaced people's lives. The project aims to generate new knowledge to help to develop solutions for protracted displacement that are tailored to the needs and capacities of persons affected by it. TRAFIG looks at how transnational and local networks as well as mobility are used as resources by displaced people to manage their everyday lives. See Etzold et al. (2019) for details on the TRAFIG concept and Tobin et al. (2020) for preliminary fndings in Jordan.

conditions of unrealised and idealised futures, aspirations for something better and imaginations of a family life that is likely to never come to pass.

This chapter investigates Syrian refugees' mobilities and 'onward' orientation as a means to understand their embeddedness in social fgurations in Jordan and beyond. We examine the ways in which translocal and transnational networks shape refugees' experiences and mobility *to* and *within* Jordan and their aspirations *beyond* Jordan. We thus examine not only actual mobilities to and within Jordan but also the desires and intentions of Syrian refugees to 'move on' in their lives. In particular, we provide evidence that – what we call – fgurations of family and kin provide key structures and contours to the mobility experienced by Syrians to and within Jordan and to their aspirations to leave Jordan especially through (1) knowledge-sharing and (2) trust-based interactions.

#### **5.2 Entangled (Im)mobilities: Refugees' Positioning in Translocal Figurations of Displacement**

#### *5.2.1 Social Figurations*

This chapter builds on German sociologist Norbert Elias's (1978) fgurational sociology and stresses the networks and interdependencies of displaced people at and across distinct places and, in particular, the transnational dimensions of social fgurations that stretch across the borders of nation states (see Etzold et al., 2019). The fgurational approach is a meso-level concept that can be used to describe the organisation and contingent emergence of social life and the inherent interdependence of actors and groups. It is also a useful concept with which to overcome the division within sociology between a micro-perspective that focuses on individual actors, their perceptions and actions on the one hand and a macro-perspective that centres on structures and functions.2 According to Elias, fgurations are dynamic social constellations between interdependent individuals that are produced in and through interactions and transactions. Social life thus evolves in and is signifcantly shaped by power relations and multiple, often overlapping, social networks or the differently structured 'chains of interdependence' that bind people to one another (Elias, 1978; Baur & Ernst, 2011).

While the notion of fgurations can be applied at multiple social levels (Etzold et al., 2019), the family is a particularly important social fguration, which is marked by somewhat dense and intimate social relations. Castrén and Ketokivi (2015) apply a fgurational approach to studying family relationships, demonstrating that these are simultaneously personally lived and embedded in wider 'webs of relationships' that are both constraining and enabling. Families and kin networks, in a fgurational reading, thus constitute dense fgurations which are highly dynamic in their

2See Dépelteau and Landini (2013) for a useful and comprehensive introduction to Elias' work.