Social media platforms and the interactive web have had a significant impact on political socialisation, creating new pathways of communitybuilding that shifted the focus from real-life, localised networks (such as unions or neighbourhood associations) to vast, diffuse and globalised communities (Finin et al. 2008, Rainie and Wellman 2012, Olson 2014, Miller 2017). Celebrities or influencers are often focal nodes for the spread of information and opinions across these new types of networks in the digital space (Hutchin and Tindall 2021). Unfortunately, this means that celebrities' endorsement of extremist narratives can potently drive the dissemination and normalisation of hate ideologies. Not only do celebrity influencers benefit from an outsized personal media salience (Bantimaroudis 2021), which gives them an agenda-setting power; they can also leverage an affective capital from their fan communities (Mansor et al. 2020, Dong 2022). Therefore, influencers can act as "ambassadors of ideology" (Rothut et al. 2023) who bypass the gatekeeping filters of mainstream media and significantly impact the public's consumption of political information (Newman et al. 2021). However, we identify a gap in existing scientific literature concerning the role of parasocial opinion leaders in the spread of hate ideologies, with most studies focusing on the 'supply' side of the issue (Gaden and Dumitrica 2014, Stehr et al. 2015, Winter et al. 2020, Rothut et al. 2023). We aim to address this by shifting the emphasis from the vertical (top-down) agenda-setting power of celebrities to the communication strategies used by their audience across a range of social media networks (*Facebook*, *Twitter* (now *X*), *YouTube*) in reaction to exclusionary and discriminatory influencer communication.

This paper sets out to analyse the reaction of French social media audiences to antisemitism controversies involving pop culture celebrities. I focus on two such episodes, one with a 'national' celebrity at its centre and the other a 'global' celebrity: the social media ban of the French-Cameroonian comedian Dieudonné M'bala M'bala in June and July 2020 and the controversy following American rapper Kanye West's spate of antisemitic statements in October and November 2022. The focus on user-generated discourse and on comment sections as crucial loci of linguistic struggle (see Loke 2012, Toepfl and Piwoni 2015, Calabrese 2019, Lee et al. 2020) sheds light on the role of audience agency in the performance of 'anti-system' conspiracist and antisemitic narratives. I highlight in particular the linguistic strategies of minimisation, justification and legitimation through which social media users publicly negotiate support for pop culture figures accused of antisemitism. At the juncture of traditional Jew-hatred and pop culture, 'pop' antisemitism emerges as a novel configuration―one co-constructed top down by influencers as well as bottom up by web users from their communities, and as a major driver of hate ideology in society.

#### 2. Methodological approach

My contribution largely builds on the methodology and the data used within the research project Decoding Antisemitism*;* however, given the smaller and more focused corpus, I rely for the analysis phrase on qualitative tools such as Critical Discourse Analysis and the Discourse Historical Approach. The empirical corpus comprises over 4,000 user comments on the *Facebook*, *YouTube* and *Twitter* accounts of leading French news outlets (see Table 3.1) reporting critically on Dieudonné and West's statements. My methodological approach is two-pronged. I first conduct a preliminary thematic mapping of the text through qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2015) enriched with categories from antisemitism studies, using a complex codebook developed within the Decoding Antisemitism project and comprising over 80 items derived from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)'s definition of antisemitism (IHRA 2023, Becker et al. 2024). The codebook takes into account multiple levels of analysis, such as the conceptual level (antisemitic concepts comprising stereotypes, analogies and self-references), the linguistic level (figures of speech, argumentation, etc.) and the semiotic level (punctuation, icons, emoticons, text-image relations, etc.). The qualitative content-analysis stage is followed by a more granular qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis which examines linguistic strategies and discursive constructions employed by social media users to legitimise antisemitic worldviews. Within the field of critical discourse studies, Ruth Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) offers some of the most efficient analytical tools to systematically deconstruct such utterances (Wodak/Reisigl 2009). Building on the DHA, I have designed a framework that takes into account multiple heuristic levels of analysis, synthesised in Figure 3.1:

Table 3.1. Analysed media outlets

Figure 3.1. Levels of discourse analysis

In order to understand how online support for controversial influencers can map onto and reinforce patterns of anti-Jewish prejudice, the following research questions are asked: Is there a correlation between support for Kanye West and Dieudonné and expressions of antisemitic prejudice? Which antisemitic stereotypes or concepts are used to legitimise West's and Dieudonné's positions? How explicit is antisemitic rhetoric in this context and what are the functions of coded language in the discursive construction of the 'us/them' dichotomy?

#### 2.1 Antisemitism and (online) virality: The role of influencers

Virality is defined as the probability of an entity―such as a message―being passed along (Hansen et al. 2011). While virality is an anthropological fixture in human society, only recently, with the advent of the interactive web, has it became a major research focus in social sciences (Arjona-Martín et al. 2020). A growing body of literature has highlighted the perverse effects of viralisation mechanisms, which allow extremism, disinformation and hate speech to leverage some of the inbuilt features of the internet's mass-sharing infrastructures: the lack of gatekeeping, the algorithmic amplification of highly engaging content regardless of its quality, the creation of echo chambers, etc. (Cooper 2012, Mathew et al. 2019, Paris and Donovan 2019, Ananthakrishnan and Tucker 2021, Finkelstein 2022). Antisemitism offers a good vantage point to observe such phenomena: polymorphic, adaptable and syncretic in nature, it is perfectly suited for an age of mass flow of information.

Since the late twentieth century, the internet has become the lifeblood of antisemitic propaganda distribution (Weitzman 2022). Farright networks in anglophone countries were the first to organise online, using this channel to bypass institutional gatekeeping in mainstream media. At their heart, these online ecosystems were interactive, decentralised portals, such as the forums *Stormfront* and *The Right Stuff*, or Wikipedia-like archives such as *Jew Watch*. In this respect, the farright anticipated the 'participatory turn' in digital communication. Since the 2000s, a 'revolution within the revolution' has taken place in communication, with Web 2.0 (or the interactive web) marking a transition from linear mass media (such as newspapers and the radio, or even the first websites) to user-driven creation and dissemination of content.  A central feature of content-sharing platforms such as *Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram* or *TikTok* is the use of automated sets of rules, called algorithms, that make decisions about what users see on the platform. Algorithms promote high-engagement content and, in doing so, risk amplifying outrageous content, including Holocaust-denial or conspiracy theories, because it generates reactions (likes, dislikes, comments and shares). These dynamics also fuel what Ebner (2020) dubs "radicalisation machines": algorithms tend to recommend content based on users' past viewing behaviour, thus creating 'echo chambers' and radicalisation pipelines, often without (or with minimal) external human involvement. This is why self-radicalisation is now a significant focal point of counterextremism studies (see Archetti 2013, Bradbury et al. 2017). Machinedriven virality proves to be much harder to control and track than the human-driven virality of the past.

 However, algorithms do not negate the fundamental verticality embedded into media discourse spaces. Wu et al. (2011) note that, while members of the general public now share the same access to social media that a celebrity does, information flows have not become egalitarian by any means. Personal salience (Bantimaroudis 2023) is still a key―and very unequally distributed―commodity in the attention economy (Marshall 2021, Hendricks and Mehlsen 2022). Although it is far from new or unique to social media, the figure of the *influencer*  occupies a prominent position within information ecosystems and is a powerful driver of virality. Influencers―whether they are digitally native celebrities or have amassed their symbolic capital as artists, entertainers or journalists―act as "superspreaders" in networks who can set and proliferate socio-political agendas (Hendricks/Mehlsen 2022). The Covid pandemic foregrounded the agency of influencers in the spread of disinformation, conspiracy theories and hate speech (Baker 2022).

The interest of studying the role of online influencers in the spread of antisemitism is twofold. First and foremost, influencers act as bridges between digital networks and the broader social conversation. They are relevant as "ideological entrepreneurs" (Hyzen and Van den Bulck 2021) of hate speech, who produce and circulate the stereotypes, analogies and discursive strategies that structure contemporary antisemitic discourse. Secondly, they possess resources of "affective capital" (Dong 2022), which can be channelled into building communities of supporters or fandoms (Stevenson 2018). The emotional and affective dimension that can be embedded into parasocial relations by charismatic celebrities is an interesting blind spot in the study of antisemitic discourse.

#### 2.2 Between the 'old' and the 'new': Dieudonné and French antisemitism

The first such influencer we will be focusing upon is the French comedian and actor Dieudonné M'Bala M'Bala, who became famous for his comedy routines in the 1990s and early 2000s. Dieudonné was born in a Parisian suburb to a mixed-race middle-class family. He achieved a breakthrough in the world of entertainment with his long-time friend, the comedian Élie Semoun (who has Jewish origins), by performing anti-racist, left-leaning comedy routines. However, in the early 2000s, in a context marked by the post-9/11 rhetoric of the 'clash of civilisations' and an uptick in violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he split with Semoun and started promoting a form of 'Black consciousness' tinged with antisemitism and third-worldism (Jobard 2017). Despite being marginalised in the mainstream entertainment industry, Dieudonné managed to structure around him a dense network of alternative media. He re-established himself on his flagship website *Dieudosphère* (with on-demand video service and an e-shop), the streaming and news website *Quenel+*, as well as through his *Twitter* (150,000 followers), *Facebook* (1.3 million followers) and *YouTube* (400,000 followers) accounts. In 2020, *YouTube, Facebook* and *Instagram* decided in quick succession to ban his accounts, further cutting him off from the mainstream (Le Monde 2020). Today, he remains an active figure in far-right circles, trying to capitalise on various anti-establishment movements, such as the yellow vests and anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine protests.

Dieudonné is highly representative of the new ideological synthesis described as 'new antisemitism' (Taguieff 2004, Peace 2009, Bruneteau 2015, Weitzmann 2019). His appeal rests on a trinity of classical antisemitic tropes (such as greed, conspiracy or power), radical anti-Zionism and a more diffuse anti-globalism that aligns with a rejection of the 'cosmopolitan elites' and Western liberal modernity. Dieudonné's core antisemitic views cluster around a few basic key themes:

#### *The rejection of Israel*

Anti-Zionism serves as the gateway towards a more radical form of antisemitism. Dieudonné engages in a demonisation of Israel, notably through the use of the nazi analogy (expressed through puns such as 'Israheil') or colonialism analogies. His anti-Israeli discourse is not rooted in geopolitics or human rights but in what Taguieff (2004) dubs "fantasy-world Zionism": a belief that Israel and Zionists are plotting against the world; that they are omnipotent and demonic; that they are controlling and manipulating the global (and particularly Western) political, financial and media establishment.

#### *The topos of jewish power*

See Becker et al. 2024 on the topos of jewish power. Dieudonné's anti-Zionism maps onto the canonical narrative of a Jewish plot to take over the world. Dieudonné builds on the notion―developed by his long-time political ally Alain Soral―of the 'Empire', an alleged global oligarchic regime secretly run by the Jewish elite (Collectif des 4 2018). A French counterpart of the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG) conspiracy theory, this narrative is often hinted at by Dieudonné in his shows. For example, he uses his one liner "Au dessus c'est l'soleil" ["Above there's only the sun"], accompanied by a finger pointing upward, alongside references to Jews. This builds on conspiracy narratives and tropes of alleged jewish power, suggesting that Jews sit at the very top of power hierarchies and receive orders from no one, unlike politicians or governments, which project an appearance of power but lack true agency. A corollary of this topos is

#### *The topos of the taboo of criticism*

This posits that Jews will supposedly use their networks of influence to silence any critical opinion about them or the State of Israel. Dieudonné, using his legal troubles and his exclusion from the mainstream entertainment industry, *performs* on stage his alleged victimisation and silencing at the hands of the Jews and their accomplices. He jokes that he cannot make jokes about Jews, designating them instead through allusions and detour communication (Proust et al. 2020). Dieudonné frames other comedians―especially if they are also from minority backgrounds―who decide to remain 'politically correct' as traitors, cowards and sell-outs: public figures who choose material comfort over truth.

#### *Jews as ontological oppressors of non-White minorities*

Borrowing from the discourse of the antisemitic *Nation of Islam* in the United States (with which the French comedian has strong links), he relentlessly describes Jews as slavers. This pattern of oppression is today perpetuated, according to him, in the Israeli treatment of Palestinians. This brings a distinct radicality to his anti-Zionist stances: if Palestinian suffering is not a result of an unfortunate geopolitical context but supposedly a natural consequence of Jewish nature, any peaceful cohabitation between the two peoples is impossible.

#### *Denial and/or instrumentalisation of the Holocaust*

See Becker et al. 2024 on this trope. Dieudonné's position on the Holocaust is a clear example of the ways contemporary Holocaust denial is formulated in contemporary discourse through the use of detour communication. Although he gives a platform in his shows to Holocaust deniers such as Robert Faurisson, Dieudonné has never explicitly denied the genocide of the Jewish people. Rather, he frequently adopts a pseudo-intellectual posture of radical scepticism; Dieudonné's 'doubt' aligns with a specific kind of Holocaust denial based on a hypertrophic form of rationality―one which claims to prolong the French tradition of Cartesianism (Jobard 2017). However, Dieudonné is more open in articulating the concept of the instrumentalisation of the holocaust by the Jews. He calls Holocaust commemoration "memorial pornography" and alleges that it has been weaponised by Jews to achieve their (Zionist) agenda. Classical antisemitic stereotypes like greed and avarice are hybridised with themes specific to secondary antisemitism in sketches such as when he portrays the Jewish philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy trying to haggle with a greengrocer for a bag of potatoes: "With six million dead, you can at least give me a good price". He also mocks the Holocaust through puns and wordplay, such as with the song "Hot Pineapple" ("Chaud Ananas" in French, which is phonetically close to the word Shoah, a Hebrew word referring to the Holocaust).

Dieudonné's syncretic antisemitism merges anti-imperialism, anticapitalism, support of Palestinian movements, holocaust denial and systematic suspicion of historical accounts. With millions of followers on social media, Dieudonné is the jutting prow and the public face of contemporary anti-Jewish prejudice in the French-speaking world.

#### 2.3 The "Paranoid Style" of Kanye West: The Ambiguities of American Antisemitism

Unlike European nations, the United States has no significant history of institutionalised federal antisemitism. Under the 1790 Nationality Act, Jews were considered "free white persons" eligible for citizenship (Library of Congress n.d.). Nevertheless, anti-Jewish prejudice developed in the folds of racial science, social Darwinism (popular in the Anglo-Saxon world in the late nineteenth century) and/or Christian fundamentalism. In the interwar period, American populism borrowed heavily from fascism and national socialism: Reverend Charles Coughlin blamed Jews for the spread of communism, while at the same time railing against the 'international bankers' and 'money changers' of the world. He also asserted that Nazism was a "national mechanism of self-defence against Communism" (Dinnerstein 1995). Through its extensive use of modern mass media, notably radio broadcasts, Coughlin represents a sort of 'proto-influencer' who used technology and showmanship to amplify his message, building a parasocial bond with his audience. In post-war America, antisemitism was politically weak, but it could still be an effective force within broader anti-establishment coalitions. Latent anti-Jewish narratives were a structural element of what historian Richard Hofstadter (1967) called the "paranoid style" in American politics: a form of siege mentality and a fantasy of victimisation and moral decay that animates populist and radical ideologies. Later, McCarthyism was infused with antisemitic innuendo, and this anti-communist crusade helped to revive the anti-Jewish sentiment of former Coughlinites. Antisemitism is also a subtext for Christian fundamentalism, despite followers' articulated support for Israel. The Cultural Marxism conspiracy theory, prevalent in most hardline conservative circles, retains elements of structural antisemitism in its allegation that the predominantly Jewish thinkers of the Frankfurt School have been systematically enacting a subversion of traditional American values and morality (Braune 2019).

But one of the most debated aspects of post-war antisemitism has been the rise of anti-Jewish prejudice in some Black communities. Dinnerstein (1995) suggests, quite pertinently, that the cultural legacy of evangelical Christianity had already created a predisposition towards antisemitism in Black communities in the deeply religious American South. However, the emergence of a coherent 'Black antisemitism' is rooted in disillusionment following the Civil Rights Movement, which led some activists to become radicalised. A 'martyrological competition' was established between slavery and the Holocaust, driven by belief that Jewish suffering is acknowledged while Black suffering is marginalised (Sundquist 2009). This resentment hardened into an even stronger allegation: that Jews are fundamentally oppressors that bear a major responsibility for the transatlantic trade. *Nation of Islam* leader Louis Farrakhan alleged that Jews have an "undeniable record" of "anti-Black behavior starting with the horror of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, plantation slavery, Jim Crow, sharecropping, the labour movement of the North and South, the unions and the misuse of our people that continues to this very moment" (Farrakhan 2010). The Black Power movement embraced Islam, third-worldism and, with these, anti-Zionist attitudes. Black antisemitism in America has been just as syncretic as the 'new antisemitism' in France, rehashing old tropes such as the supposed global Jewish plot, greed or usury. It also produced original outputs, such as the bizarre Black Hebrew Israelites myth, according to which Black people are the rightful descendants of Biblical Hebrews, and contemporary Jews have usurped this genealogy (Southern Poverty Law Center n.d.).

Kanye West's political trajectory is, contrary to Dieudonné's, far from linear and coherent. One of the most recognizable faces in the global entertainment and music industry, the Chicago-born rapper, singer, songwriter, record producer and fashion designer started off as a quintessential Black icon. Since then, his political stances radicalised and increasingly attracted controversy. His embrace of religion and of social conservatism (on themes such as abortion) was mirrored by a more sinister promotion of far-right ideology, whether through selling Confederate flags on tour, donning a "White Lives Matter" T-shirt or issuing a spate of antisemitic comments on social media (ADL 2022). While still inchoate, West's antisemitism matters. First and foremost, as an international celebrity spanning multiple industries, West potentially reaches an unprecedented global audience. Secondly, like Dieudonné, his specific strand of 'intersectional' antisemitism sits at the juncture of multiple ideological traditions. West has cultivated strong links to the *Nation of Islam* and Farrakhan, who he called "sensei" (ADL 2022). More recently, West has also been active in right-wing networks: he has been a guest on the conservative *Fox News* talk show "Tucker Carlson Tonight", dined with white supremacist Nick Fuentes and former *Breitbart* editor Milo Yiannopoulos at Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago residence and appeared on conspiracy theorist Alex Jones's *InfoWars* show (ADL 2022). West's antisemitic statements cluster around a few prominent themes:

#### *Tropes about Jewish power and control—particularly in the entertainment and media industry—as well as tropes about Jewish greed and exploitation*

West has espoused conspiracy narratives such as the '300 families'1 or ZOG, which claim that a (Jewish) oligarchy controls the economic system, the world's governments and media corporations: "The Zionist control―the 300 in control of the media and in control of the governments―they don't want us to connect to each other…" ("The Alex Jones Show" on *InfoWars*, 1 December 2022); "[...] the Jewish people have their hand on every single business that controls the world" ("Drink Champs", 16 October 2022). Such statements map onto the notion of a Jewish takeover of Hollywood and the entertainment

<sup>1</sup> The '300 families' is a conspiracy theory that claims a powerful group of interconnected oligarchs, often presented as Jewish, are controlling politics, finance, banking and the military.

industry, which has been embedded into American antisemitism since the 1920s―a time when Jews, amongst others, were accused of using film to weaken the moral fibre of the country with increasing violent and sexual content (Carr 2001). The Cultural Marxism narrative, as well as more recent QAnon phenomenon2 , sees Hollywood and the creative industries as focal points for the dissolution of the American traditional order. Kanye's allegations articulate two distinct narratives from different sides of the political spectrum: that parasitic Jewish elites have captured the heart of the country and that they use their cultural capital to exploit marginalised groups (Black artists) for profit. He has said, "Jewish people have owned the Black voice… The Jewish community, especially in the music industry, in the entertainment [industry], they'll take one of us, the brightest of us [...] and milk us till we die". ("Drink Champs", 16 October 2022). Re-activating the language of 'ownership' of Black people by Jews also connects back to the narrative, popular within certain Black Power milieus, of Jews supposedly organising the transatlantic slave trade.

#### *Questioning Jewish identity through the Black Hebrew Israelite ideology*

The Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) narrative, which West has espoused alongside another high-profile celebrity, basketball star Kyrie Irving, not only erases Jewish identity but also maps onto the stereotype of Jewish deceitfulness and even greed, as it alleges Jews are unfairly benefitting from a usurped status. It can also serve, in West's rhetoric, as a line of defence against antisemitic allegations: "We are Semite, we Jew, so I can't be antisemite" ("Drink Champs", 16 October 2022).

#### *Holocaust denial and affirmation of Hitler and Nazism*

West has stated that "The Holocaust is not what happened. Let's look at the facts of that. And Hitler has a lot of redeeming qualities". ("The Alex Jones Show" on *InfoWars*, 1 December 2022). He also suggests that the negative portrayal of Nazis is a result of the purported Jewish monopoly on media: "The Jewish media has made us feel like the Nazis and Hitler

<sup>2</sup> The QAnon conspiracy theory posits that the world is controlled by a cabal of Satan-worshipping paedophiles.

have never offered anything of value to the world". ("The Alex Jones Show" on *InfoWars*, 1 December 2022).

#### *The topos of the taboo of criticism*

West has asserted: "I crossed the antisemite line. I crossed the gun line. I stood in front of the tank in Tiananmen Square". ("Drink Champs", 16 October 2022). He also often makes a parallel between the social opprobrium over antisemitic beliefs and the genocide of the Jewish people, thus engaging in a trivialisation of the Holocaust: "There's Jewish people that are basically hiding me under their floorboards right now―under the wooden floors. It's like a reverse version of the Holocaust" ("The Alex Jones Show" on *InfoWars*, 1 December 2022).

# 3. Empirical analysis: Comparative case study of web user reactions in French media

In the first stage of the empirical analysis, we attempt to gauge the level of support for Dieudonné and Kanye West expressed in the comment sections. I am operating with three broad categories: antisemitic speech, non-antisemitic speech and counter speech. Non-antisemitic speech includes any comment which does not contain an antisemitic concept, while counter speech is defined more specifically as communicative action that seeks to actively problematise and refute antisemitic tropes, or, more generally, Dieudonné's and Kanye West's behaviour.

In the Dieudonné subcorpus of 1,464 user comments, 58% (n=850) has been labelled non-antisemitic or unclear; 19% (n=284) has been labelled as counter speech. The remaining 23% (n=331) were labelled as antisemitic following the IHRA definition. Only a minority (13%, or 45) of those 331 antisemitic comments were explicit. The vast majority (86%, or 286) relied on implication, detour communication or prior cultural knowledge for the decoding of the antisemitic meaning. In the Kanye West subcorpus, composed of 1,953 comments, 82% (n=1,607) were classified as non-antisemitic or unclear, only 4% (n=69) were deemed to constitute counter speech and 14% (n=276) were of an antisemitic nature. Once again, most of the comments in this final subset (79%, or

220) make use of contextual forms of antisemitic speech, with only 56 comments being explicit.

Of the 3,417 comments analysed in total, therefore, 607, or 17% were antisemitic. These are split unevenly across the two subcorpora (23% and 14% respectively). I hypothesise that the disparity in the percentage of antisemitic comments between the two subcorpora can be explained by the fact that Dieudonné has a highly politicised nucleus of supporters, who fully engage not only with his comedic content but also with his ideological worldview. Meanwhile, West's supporters are often depoliticised and express admiration for the rapper's artistic achievement while distancing themselves from his controversial political stances. A common distancing strategy is the separation of the art from the artist or questioning his mental capacity. Following the codebook developed in the project Decoding Antisemitism, praise for Dieudonné or West's artistic achievements, without reference to their political stances, was classified as non-antisemitic.

A similar dynamic might be an important factor for the dramatic disparity in counter speech observed (19% in the Dieudonné subcorpus to slightly under 4% in the West subcorpus). The polarising and highly politicised nature of Dieudonné means that most of the backlash in the comment sections explicitly targets and problematises his antisemitism. Web users often address and contest allegations of censorship, highlighting for example the private nature of Big Tech companies (which have their own standards outlined in the terms of use) or the illegal nature, under French law, of antisemitic speech. This is not the case in the West subcorpus, where most of the criticism levelled against the rapper is vaguer and encompasses, beyond his political opinions, other aspects of his eccentric persona.

Despite these differences, the most prominent antisemitic topoï were strikingly similar. Unsurprisingly, the concepts and strategies articulated by web users mirror Dieudonné's and West's own discourse against Jews. On the most basic conceptual level, comments convey antisemitism by expressing support for the two influencers and reinforcing their social and political worldview. Support is articulated through conventional phrases such as "Full support to Kanye "3 (LCI.F-FB[20221026]),

<sup>3 &</sup>quot;Soutien à Kanye  ".

"Sending support and strength, Dieudo"4 (LEFIG-FB[20200630]), "GO DIEUDO" (LEFIG-FB[20200630]) and also through iconographic elements, such as hearts, clapping hands or flexed-arm emojis. The choice of attributes―"brave", "courageous", "free-thinking"―has an embedded political dimension, reinforcing the narrative that Dieudonné and West are dissenters or martyrs persecuted by society for their beliefs: "They [Dieudonné and his ally Alain Soral] are the two most courageous men in France"5 (MARIA-FB[20200806]); "YE's bluntness and free spirit is bothering the conspirators"6 (BFMTV-FB[20221027]). Sexual metaphors such as "bending over", implying submission and servility, are also used in predication strategies, distinguishing them from 'sellout' mainstream entertainers who do not question the system: "At least Kanye kept his pants on unlike those wet rags"7 (BFMTV-FB[20221027]).

Support for these influencers is also articulated in implicit ways, through allusions and detour communication. The slogan "Je suis Kanye" or "Je suis Dieudonné" ["I am Kanye" or "I am Dieudonné"] has, in this context, a threefold function: first, to express solidarity with the allegedly silenced celebrity; second, to politicise this support by portraying them as victims of a brutal censorship attempt, which is compared to terrorism; third, it levels an accusation of double standards and hypocrisy against liberal democracies, which are accused of promoting the values of free speech yet cracking down on anti-Jewish offensive speech. One example is, "Je suis Charlie, that does not work for these people as they pick on the poor Jews… what a double standard… disgusting"8 (LEPAR-FB[20200707]).

This maps onto another highly salient topos: the topos of the taboo of criticism. In synergy with the topos of jewish power, it enacts an effective argumentation macro-strategy, because it appeals to the consensual liberal ethos of freedom of expression and conscience: "The best comedian in France is persecuted for daring to make jokes about a group that shall not be named. Freedom of speech is just hypocrisy

<sup>4 &</sup>quot;Soutien et courage Dieudo".

<sup>5 &</sup>quot;C'est les 2 hommes les plus courageux de France.''

<sup>6 &</sup>quot;Cette liberté d'expression et d'esprit de YE dérange la théorie du complot".

<sup>7 &</sup>quot;Au moins Kanye a su garder son pantalon contrairement à tt ces serpillières".

<sup>8 &</sup>quot;Je suis Charlie , ca ne marche pas pour ces gens car ici sa rabaisse les pvres juifs ....deux poids deux mesurs ...deguelasse Tout sa".

and double standards"9 (LEFIG-FB[20200709]). The Jewish out-group is rarely mentioned directly but is regularly alluded to through phrases such as the "chosen people", "the untouchables" or "the community that shall not be named". Intensification strategies and hyperboles are also used, through claims that "there are first-class citizens, and those who are not permitted to look at them or talk about them"10 (LEFIG-FB[20221025]). Feeding into broader anti-elitist and populist frames, this comment manufactures a dichotomy between an alleged corrupt (Jewish) elite and the pure people, kept by the taboo of criticism into a state of submission. Other comments use literary allusions to George Orwell's novel *1984* to create, based on an alleged suppression of free speech, a metaphorical parallel between Orwell's brutal dystopia and Western societies: "The Ministry of Truth strikes again. They are not even hiding it anymore"11 (LEFIG-FB[20200709]). The taboo of criticism triggers what Ruth Wodak (2015) dubbed an ideological "*perpetuum mobile"*, a rhetorical strategy which involves legitimising a controversial statement by means of shifting the optics and reframing the debate. In this case, the antisemitic nature of Dieudonné's and West's stances are being obfuscated by a debate about civil freedoms. Another such argumentation strategy built on re-framing attempts to shift the attention towards the treatment of other discriminated minorities alleges that there is a pervasive societal double standard which shields Jews from any criticism while tolerating attacks on other ethnic and religious groups. While not systematically antisemitic, these remarks frequently intersect other antisemitic stereotypes, such as Jewish power and privilege or accusations of instrumentalising the Holocaust.

The most prominent concepts found in the corpus analysed are listed in Table 3.2 below:

<sup>9 &</sup>quot;Le meilleur humoriste de France qui est persécuté parce qu'il a osé faire des sketchs sur une communauté qu'on a pas le droit de citer. Comme quoi la liberté d'expression c'est de l'hypocrisie de deux poids deux mesures"

<sup>10 &</sup>quot;Il y a les citoyens de première zone et ceux qui ne peuvent les regarder ou parler d'eux".

<sup>11 &</sup>quot;Le Ministere de la vérité a frappé. Ils ne se cachent même plus".

<sup>12 &</sup>quot;Bizarrement il n'y a que ceux qui critiquent les j\*\*\*\* qui finissent au placard, présenté comme des assassins pire que les vrais violeurs de gosses !!!"

<sup>13 &</sup>quot;Pour savoir qui vous gouverne, regardez qui vous ne pouvez pas critiquer"

<sup>14 &</sup>quot;Dieudonné est censuré, ce qui est une honte dans un pays qui se revendique être celui de la liberté!"

<sup>15 &</sup>quot;Le mec a parlé contre l'ordre mondial, il se fait abattre par les dirigeants des dirigeants".

<sup>16 &</sup>quot;Et après on nous dit que ce n'est pas vrai, ((( ils ))) ne contrôlent pas tout".

<sup>17 &</sup>quot;Ça vient d'en haut de très haut, du côté de Tel-Aviv"

<sup>18 &</sup>quot;Il est dans le viseur de la communauté qui représente 500.000 personnes en France qui contrôlent les médias françaises".

Table 3.2: The most prominent concepts found in the corpus

# 4. Detour communication, pop culture and community-building

Another crucial insight of the empirical study concerns the more subtle encoding mechanisms that occur within comment sections. Following Stuart Hall's (2010) influential model of communication, we conceptualise discourse as fundamentally dialogical and interactive: the intersubjectivity of the encoding/decoding process means that communication establishes a recognitive relationship between the sender and the receiver of a message. This dynamic applies also to hate speech and, particularly, to antisemitism. Various authors (Bergmann and Erb 1984, Milbradt 2013, Schwarz-Friesel 2019, Richards et al. 2023) highlight that antisemitic speech increasingly relies on "detour communication" and dog whistles to circumvent the social taboo associated with crude anti-Jewish prejudice. Dog whistles, which can be defined as coded or suggestive language understood by the in-group but hard to decode for the out-group (Richards et al. 2023), are a

<sup>19 &</sup>quot;C est comsa ,ils sont ,si tu n est pas les leurs il sont pres a t ecrasé comme un caffart".

<sup>20 &</sup>quot;Il a été CRIFicié (permettez-moi le néologisme)". CRIF is the acronym of the *Conseil Représentatativ des Institutions Juives de France*, one of the main bodies representing the Jewish minority in France.

particularly interesting form of implicit communication. All implicit communication requires contextual or cultural knowledge to some extent. For example, the allegation in one comment that the order to terminate Dieudonné's social media accounts came from "very very high up, from Tel-Aviv" (LEFIG-FB[20200630]) demands cultural information about the Jewish state and its most populous city, but this information is superficial and very easily accessible. A dog whistle mobilises deeper strata of subcultural knowledge, the meaning of which is opaque to the uninitiated. For example, the triple parentheses (seen in a comment in Table 3.2) or references to "celestial dragons" (see below) will not make sense to someone who is not familiar with the vernacular of online antisemitism. Dog whistles are in a constant state of fluctuation, as new meanings emerge and replace the old.

The corpus exhibits, amongst antisemitic comments, a high level of reliance of coded languages and dog whistles. Some of them, like the echoes (triple parentheses), are well-established in the international language of antisemitism. The echoes, believed to originate from the neo-Nazi American blog *The Right Stuff*, are used to encase a name, institution or category—for instance (((Soros))) or (((bankers)))—to identify it as Jewish; originally, it was a visual pun signifying that Jewish names and actions "echo throughout History" (Smith and Fleishman 2016). They appear a few times in our corpus, often in the context of accusations of an alleged Jewish conspiracy: "And then they tell us that (((they))) don't control everything" (BFMTV-FB[20221027]). While the echoes represent a form of the globalisation of antisemitic vernacular, other dog whistles are specific to the French context and suggest that processes of encoding and decoding are still mainly taking place within each language community, even if there is, naturally, an increased level of cross-pollination between them.

Dieudonné's success in antisemitic milieux was due to his ability to create viral slogans, puns and catchphrases that are perfectly suited to the internet ecosystem. Unsurprisingly, web users repeat these slogans in their comments as a way of covertly conveying approval of Dieudonné's worldview or to manufacture new communication patterns. The oneliner "Above there's only the sun" (see section 2.2), often accompanied or visually represented by the sun emoji, enacts a metaphor for Jewish power: "Then they tell you they are not above the sun. So unfair. They do as they please in this country21" (LEFIG-FB[20200630]); "When you touch the sun ☀ you get burnt"22 (BFMTV-FB[20221208]). The fact such comments show up consistently in our West subcorpus demonstrate they go beyond in-jokes within Dieudonné's fandom and belong to the vernacular of antisemitism in France. Other elements borrowed from Dieudonné's shows include the pineapple symbol―from the "Hot Pineapple" ["Chaud ananas"] jingle―or the phrase "How much does it cost?". The former does not have a fixed meaning, but it is often used to mock accusations of antisemitism or Jewish identity in general, therefore functioning as a knowing wink to other web users familiar with this symbolism. The latter has more conceptual depth, as it maps onto traditional tropes of Jewish greed but also recent accusations of instrumentalising antisemitism: in Dieudonné's sketches, public figures seeking forgiveness for having offended the Jewish community enquire about the amount of financial compensation they need to offer to be 're-admitted' into public life. Commenters now allude that it is Dieudonné and West who will need to pay up to ensure they will be allowed back in the entertainment industry. The meaning is sometimes reinforced by other allusions. For example, one commenter states that Dieudonné will have to pay his compensation in shekels, Israel's currency, thus implying the beneficiaries of this alleged financial "extorsion" scheme (VALEU-FB[20200701]).

Dog whistles are in constant flux, and new meanings and codes emerge as old ones fade out of relevancy. In the French space, the West subcorpus reveals a new pattern. Drawing on anime culture, Jews are often referred to as "celestial dragons" ["dragons célestes"]. In the manga *One Piece* by Eiichiro Oda, "celestial dragons" refer to the greedy, arrogant and cruel aristocracy in that fictional universe. Embedding antisemitic stereotypes into pop-culture vernacular ensures that old antisemitic repertoires (such as concepts of greed, evil or global power) are more easily transferred to contemporary times, able to find new audiences, especially amongst young people who are not otherwise familiar with the ideological tenets of antisemitism. It can also increase

<sup>21 &</sup>quot;Après on nous dira qu'ils sont pas au-dessus du soleil. Belle injustice, ils font ce qu'ils veulent dans ce pays".

<sup>22 &</sup>quot;Quand tu touches le soleil ☀ tu te brules".

the virality of the message, by reducing complex concepts to shareable hashtags and by circumventing moderation filters.

But coded antisemitism is not only a strategic move to evade content moderation efforts. It cuts to the core of the in-group/out-group dynamic upon which antisemitism (amongst other hate ideologies) is premised. Coded language functions as a tool for community-building, creating what psychoanalytical theorist Jacques Lacan (1966: 80 ff) dubbed a social process of "reciprocal recognition" between the actors in the communication act. Being able to understand and decode the inside jokes (and, more broadly, the crypted references) reinforces the sense of belonging. In the case of antisemitism, the social opprobrium adds a new dimension to such processes of community-building. The pleasure of taking part in transgressive "prohibitions" is a strong component that fuels identification with the in-group, while increasing the (moral) gap with the out-group (Proust et al. 2020). As both Dieudonné and West have created a public persona around their alleged victimisation at the hands of the Jewish out-group, expressions of support for the two influencers draw on the same repertoire of performative transgression. Due to their high level of media salience and their extensive sympathy capital, the two influencers have become focal points for the creation of such deviant online communities, however diffuse they may be.

#### 5. Conclusions

This paper sets out to understand the way web users try, in mainstream discourse spaces, to negotiate support for highly controversial public figures accused of antisemitism. Despite the strong moral stigma attached to antisemitism in Western societies, we found both Dieudonné and Kanye West received strong support from, respectively, 23% and 17% of web users in comment sections of major French media outlets. A qualitative empirical analysis of these comments showcases a clear ideological parallel between the antisemitic repertoire of the two influencers and the one mobilised by their supporters. This fact highlights the centrality of influencer speech on the spread of antisemitic tropes. Both Dieudonné and West are products of their social, political and ideological context, and, as such, they are recipients of entrenched traditions of antisemitic thinking in France and the United States. But they also possess a considerable agency: they are not merely 'amplifiers' of antisemitism but also 'ideological entrepreneurs' who actively create and refine new concepts, putting them into circulation in the ideological marketplace. These concepts, fuelled and boosted by the influencer's own personal media salience, achieve viral status before 'trickling down' and entering everyday discourse.

Another key of the success of such 'pop' antisemitism is its heavy use of coded language. Harbouring yet hiding antisemitic meaning, this coded language serves as a medium for passing elements of antisemitic ideology under conditions of social opprobrium. But it can also enhance a sense of belonging and of community within the in-group, by adding a ludic dimension to social and discursive transgression. This raises a set of questions―notably on the dynamics of virality of such antisemitic content on social media and the role of influencers or other 'nodes' in its spread―that would need to be addressed in further empirically grounded research on antisemitism, hate speech and digital culture.

### References

*Howard Journal of Communications,* 23 (3), 235–252, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10646175.2012.695643

Dog Whistle", https://gnet-research.org/2023/06/09/ how-gnome-hunting-became-tiktoks-latest-antisemitic-dog-whistle/

Research Trends in Internet Activism, Radicalization, and Counter-Strategies". In: *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV),* 14 (2), 1–20, https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-3809

#### Sources

Kanye West ?", https://www.facebook.com/LCI/posts/ pfbid0tL1iFLvzDchxRts2re5RnNimFfe6t5ub8ia5N8FoJYfYiKgEU MW253iEDk9N84MFl

# 4. "More Like Genocide"

The Use of the Concept of Genocide in UK Online Debates About Israel

### *Matthew Bolton*

Accusations that Israel has committed, or is in the process of committing, genocide against the Palestinian population of the Middle East are a familiar presence within anti-Israel and anti-Zionist discourse. In the wake of the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent Israeli military invasion of Gaza, claims of an Israeli genocide reached new heights, culminating in Israel being accused of genocide by South Africa at the International Court of Justice. Such claims can be made directly or indirectly, via attempts to draw an equivalence between Auschwitz or the Warsaw Ghetto and the current situation in the Palestinian territories. This chapter examines the use of the concept of genocide in social media discussions responding to UK news reports about Israel in the years prior to the 2023 Israel-Hamas war, thereby setting out the pre-existing conditions for its rise to prominence in the response to that war. It provides a historical account of the development of the concept of genocide, showing its interrelation with antisemitism, the Holocaust and the State of Israel. It then shows how accusations of genocide started being made against Israel in the decades following the Holocaust, and argues that such use is often accompanied by analogies between Israel and Nazi Germany and forms of Holocaust distortion. The chapter then qualitatively analyses comments referencing a supposed Israeli genocide posted on the *Facebook* pages of major British newspapers regarding three Israel-related stories: the May 2021 escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the July 2021 announcement that the US ice cream company Ben & Jerry's would be boycotting Jewish settlements in the West Bank; and the rapid roll-out of the Covid-19 vaccine in Israel from December 2020 to January 2021.

#### 1. Introduction1

In December 2023, South Africa formally issued proceedings against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This court was set up following World War II as one of the principal organs of the new United Nations, as a means of settling legal disputes between member states. South Africa claimed that Israel was committing, and intended to commit, genocide against the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip, as part of the Israeli military's response to the Hamas attacks in southern Israel on 7 October 2023. It called for the court to enforce a series of "provisional measures" against Israel, principally the cessation of military activity in Gaza. In January 2024, the ICJ made an initial ruling, which did not adjudicate on the question of whether Israel had committed, or was committing, genocide. Rather, it recognised—as Joan Donoghue, President of the ICJ for the hearing, later explained—that "the Palestinians had a plausible right to be protected from genocide, and that South Africa had the right to present that claim in the court" (BBC Hardtalk, 2024). The court did order that Israel should apply some "provisional measures" to prevent the possibility of genocide, primarily securing access to aid and basic services, and preventing statements from Israeli politicians and public figures which could be viewed as incitement to genocide (International Court of Justice 2024). However, the court did not rule that Israel should cease its military activity in Gaza, a "provisional measure" that would presumably be of the utmost urgency if Israel was indeed viewed as being in the process of committing genocide.

<sup>1</sup> The chapter was conceived before Hamas attacks on 7 October and subsequent Israeli military actions in Gaza, but has been significantly revised since.

The ICJ's initial ruling did not, then, back up the claim of Israeli genocide in Gaza. While the final ruling is not expected for a number of years, the absence thus far of any legally certified allegations of genocide did not prevent the idea of an Israeli "genocide" becoming a widespread, if not dominant, way of depicting the war by pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel supporters, particularly online.2 This chapter seeks to show that the choice of the concept of "genocide" to describe Israel's response to the 7 October attacks was not based on a disinterested appraisal of the actual situation on the ground in Gaza, nor a universally applied concern with genocide. As the Holocaust historian Tal Bruttmann notes, there has been a clear disparity in the use of "genocide" in relation to the 2023–24 Israel-Hamas conflict. While Israel's critics wasted no time in "jump[ing] over the "war crime" and then "crime against humanity" boxes to label Israel's actions as "genocide", Hamas's indiscriminate violence against any Jew or Israeli they could find on 7 October—precisely the marker of genocidal intent—remains for such observers only at the level of "war crime" (Bruttman and Bou 2024). Moreover, one need only note that on 4 January 2024, the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa warmly welcomed Sudanese militia leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) for a "courtesy" visit to the country. In 2023, Hemedti was accused of leading a genocidal attack on the Masalit group in Western Darfur, in which at least 15,000 died. He has also been implicated in genocidal acts in the early 2000s (Copelyn 2024). Similarly, in 2015, South Africa refused to arrest the then-president of Sudan Omar al-Bashir when he visited the country for an African Union summit—despite his being subject to an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur (International Criminal Court 2017). These incidents seem to call into question South Africa's universal concern with preventing and/or punishing genocide.

This disparity in the use of the concept of genocide in discussions of the recent war, driven by what might appear as a singular, *a priori* desire to associate Israel with genocidal actions, can be better understood once the history of the concept of genocide and its relation to Israel is placed in historical context. The charge of genocide has been made of Israel for

<sup>2</sup> See for example, UK political commentator Owen Jones' claim that Israel was in the grip of a "genocidal mania" made a week after the initial ICJ judgement (Jones, 2024).

decades, and in response to all manner of Israeli actions, long before the 2023 war. The concept was, as it were, already lying "at hand" for use in debates about the Israeli response to the Hamas atrocities, having been in preparation for years. As this article shows, hanging over the history of accusations of Israeli genocide is the spectre of the Holocaust—and the opportunity to accuse Jews of committing the very crime to which they were subjected by the Nazi regime.

This chapter will explore the uses of the concept of "genocide" in online discussions in the UK regarding the State of Israel in the two years preceding the 7 October attacks. In retrospect, these discussions can be seen as laying the discursive groundwork for the concept's ubiquity in 2023 and 2024. The premise of the chapter is that framing the Arab-Israeli conflict through the concept of genocide radically distorts that conflict's origins, historical development and current state. Despite its broader, universal applicability, the concept of genocide is inextricably entwined with antisemitism, the Holocaust and the State of Israel. As such, no use of the concept is free of these historical resonances. This means that charging Israel with committing, or seeking to commit, genocide against the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza is one of the most inflammatory and provocative claims that can be made against Israel as a Jewish state. Moreover, such claims are often accompanied—as frequently seen in online debates about the current conflict—by attempts to equate the Holocaust with the events of the 1947–49 Arab-Jewish/Israeli war, or Auschwitz and the Warsaw Ghetto with contemporary Gaza. The chapter suggests that such comparisons amount to a form of Holocaust distortion, erasing its exterminatory antisemitic character and reducing it to a generic form of state violence.

The chapter begins by summarising the meaning and historical development of the concept of genocide throughout the 1930s, until its adoption by the United Nations in 1948. It then shows why the charge of genocide against Israel is factually unsound, and briefly outlines the political factors which have led to its frequency today, exploring how its adoption by some political leaders and influential academics lends authority to its use by social media commenters in online discussions of Israel. The latter half of the chapter explores the use of the concept online, through qualitative analysis of online responses to three separate UK news stories involving Israel: the escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict in May 2021, the July 2021 announcement that the US ice cream company Ben & Jerry's would no longer permit their products to be sold in Israeli settlements on the West Bank, and the roll-out of the Covid-19 vaccine in Israel in December 2020 and January 2021. The analysis shows how the concept of genocide (Bolton 2024a) is used as a means to delegitimise Israel's existence, and often articulated in combination with other antisemitic concepts—such as making analogies between Israel and Nazi Germany (Becker 2024c), the idea of Jewish or Israeli evil (Bolton 2024b), and calls for violence (Ascone 2024) or death wishes against Israelis and/or Jews (Placzynta 2024a).

### 2. The concept of genocide, the Holocaust and the State of Israel

The concept of genocide was gradually constructed over the 1930s and 40s by the Polish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin. As the Nazi persecution of German Jews ramped up to become the attempted extermination of Jews across Europe, including 49 members of his own family, Lemkin drew parallels with previous incidents of state-led murder of national and ethnic groups, such as the Ottoman Empire's attempt to wipe out the Armenians and the slaughter of Christian Assyrians in Iraq. Arguing that such mass murder based on group identity was a distinct crime from the mass murder of individuals, Lemkin contended that existing legal and political concepts were unable to grasp the specificities of the Nazi persecution and extermination of European Jewry (Lemkin 2012). He struggled for over a decade to convince international legal bodies to make the "destruction of national, religious and racial groups" a crime in international law. In 1942 he coined the neologism "genocide" to describe what had hitherto been a "crime without a name"—"geno-" derived from the Greek *genos*, meaning tribe, and -*cide* from the Latin *caedere*, "to kill". In 1948, the UN adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, outlawing "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such".

The experience of the Holocaust clearly hung over both the forging and juridical adoption of the concept of genocide, while the State of Israel was established the same year as the Genocide Convention was adopted. Although Israel's founding was neither a direct consequence

nor cause of the legal recognition of genocide, the experience of the Holocaust had given a new moral urgency to the Zionist project for a Jewish nation-state. The failure of other states to allow Jews to escape their fate via immigration, and the need to provide a home for thousands of Jewish displaced persons, seemingly made the case for a Jewish state in Mandatory Palestine inarguable.

The concept of genocide thus carries the history of Jewish persecution and attempted extermination within it as a "sedimented layer" (Koselleck 2018), such that it is not possible to use the concept without evoking, in some sense, that history. In the same way, the existence of the State of Israel and the Jewish experience of genocidal violence are, in historical terms, inextricably entwined. Nevertheless, that concept was not a mirror image of the Holocaust: from the outset, Lemkin sought a broader concept that was able to contain a multiplicity of historical experiences, with each able to shed light on the others. There were downsides to this abstraction: something of the historically unprecedented nature of the Holocaust is lost when it is reduced to the concept of genocide. But there are upsides too. By seeking to make visible a mode of state violence against groups that had previously been hidden, Lemkin's concept acts as what Walter Benjamin described as kind of temporal "shock" (1999: 262). It explodes the ceaseless forward march of "homogenous, empty time" (262) and opens up a new vantage point upon experiences and memories of suffering previously lost in the depths of a forgotten or repressed past. This potential to "arrest […] the flow of thought" (262) and bring the past to the present remains potent. Today, an accusation of genocide against a state continues to be one of the most powerful and morally charged that can be made, bringing all of that retrieved history to bear. Despite recent critiques of its prominence (Moses 2021), genocide is still widely regarded as the "crime of crimes" and claims of genocide continue to carry a grave weight.

Given this history, and the interrelation of the concept with the Holocaust and the State of Israel, the claim that Israel has committed, is committing, or intends to commit genocide upon the Palestinian population across the Middle East—that Israel seeks to "wipe the Palestinians from the face of the earth"—is one of the most incendiary charges that can be made of the Jewish state. It is true that claims of genocide are, to an extent, a routine presence within passionate online political debate in the UK—witness the claims that Boris Johnson's Conservative government was seeking to commit genocide by delaying the introduction of Covid-19 lockdowns (Shaw 2020). But when aimed at Israel—so that the victims of the most extreme genocide in history become the perpetrators—it represents an aggravating factor which goes beyond the frenzied hyperbole that characterises much political discourse online. The accusation of Israeli genocide is often combined with disapproval of Jews' supposed moral failure to "learn the lessons" of their past (Placzynta 2024b).

Claims that Israel has perpetrated or is perpetrating a genocide upon the Palestinians can be debunked on a purely empirical basis. As Philip Spencer notes, they are "without foundation in relation to what the Genocide Convention specifies; there is no evidence of an intent on the part of the Israeli state to annihilate the Palestinians as a group" (Spencer 2010: 146). The Palestinian population has not shrunk or disappeared over the course of Israel's existence—quite the opposite. According to the World Bank, in 1990 the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza was around two million. By 2019, it stood at around 4.9 million more than a 100% rise over a period which included the Second Intifada and numerous violent conflicts between Israel and Palestine (World Bank 2019). No political party in Israel advocates for the extermination of the Palestinian people—there are extreme factions which argue for the transfer of the Palestinian population, but this has never been a serious policy, nor has it gained any serious support amongst either Israeli politicians or public. There is no programme for the removal of Palestinian children from their parents to Israeli families, as was the case in colonial genocides such as that of Aboriginal Australians. There is no systematic destruction of Palestinian, Arab or Islamic cultural or religious artefacts, as would be needed to substantiate the weaker claim of "cultural genocide".

A description of the 2023–24 Israeli military actions in Gaza as "genocidal"—that is, a military campaign with the express intent to destroy the Palestinian population as such—relies on a similar distortion of the historical record. In the first place, it means downplaying or ignoring what could rationally be depicted as the genocidal nature of Hamas's 7 October attacks themselves, in which the clear purpose was to kill as many people as possible—regardless of civilian or military status, age or sex—in the time available (van Aaken et al. 2023). If Hamas's actions are, on the contrary, understood as being motivated by genocidal intent, then Israel would fall foul of the Genocide Convention by *not* taking action against the group (Mor 2024). Second, it means redescribing what is a war between the Israeli army and Hamas military units as a one-sided bombardment of civilians by Israel. It further entails ignoring Israeli attempts to warn civilians prior to attacks and to encourage them to move out of targeted areas, and failing to examine whether Hamas is preventing them from doing so. Third, it means dismissing without consideration the Israeli claim that the ratio of civilians to combatants killed by Israel in Gaza is much lower than other equivalent conflicts, and a long way from the total destruction implied by the concept of genocide—while accepting at face value the death figures provided by Hamas-run health agencies (Aizenberg 2023). Fourth, it means ignoring any role Hamas has played in commandeering food and aid meant to be distributed to civilians. Finally, it means removing any responsibility for the continuation of the war from the leaders of Hamas, who could immediately end the fighting by releasing the remaining Israeli hostages and handing themselves in to the International Criminal Court. Thus, as with the more general accusation of Israeli genocide, the specific accusation in the case of 2023–24 war can only be made through a long series of historical and conceptual distortions—although the final ICJ decision may, of course, impact this analysis.

Understanding the origins and spread of the idea of a supposedly genocidal Israeli state therefore entails leaving the world of empirical fact behind and entering the realm of political and symbolic orders. The concept of Israeli genocide sits within a constellation of related antisemitic stereotypes and analogies, particularly those which seek to posit an equivalence or identity between Israel or Zionism and Nazi Germany (Becker 2021). One strain of origin lies in the reception of the Holocaust within the Arab world in the post-war period, as tensions between the Jewish and Arab populations of Mandatory Palestine rose with the prospect of partition and a Jewish state on the horizon, eventually spilling over into war. As Esther Webman and Meir Litvak (2012) have argued, across the post-war period Arab politicians, intellectuals and publics generally regarded the Holocaust as solely a European affair, for which Arabs have paid the ultimate price through the establishment of Israel. Some went a step further and suggested that Jews had exaggerated or fabricated the Holocaust in order to justify a Jewish state (Becker 2024a). This latter position was often combined with comparisons or analogies between Israel and the Nazis, underpinning narratives in which "the Palestinians are […] represented as the Holocaust's true victims" (Webman and Litvak 2012: 2). The building blocks were thus set in place for "the transformation" of Jews "from victims" of genocide "to culprits" (2).

The shifts in narratives around the Nakba, or "the catastrophe"—the expulsion and flight of Arabs from what would become Israel during the Jewish-Arab war of 1947–48—were marked by the impact of these ideas. While the "catastrophe" in the immediate post-war period was understood in terms of the failure of the collected Arab armies to defeat the Israeli military forces (Mor 2023), over time "the Nakba" become the foundation upon which was built a "politics of memory" clearly "modelled […] after Israeli Shoah commemorations" (Bartov 2014: 19). By seeking to make a direct equivalence between the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the State of Israel and the Holocaust, a path is opened not just to the delegitimisation of Israel but to holocaust distortion and even denial (Troschke 2024). The Holocaust here is reduced to an abstract universal (Fine and Spencer 2018), drained of its specific content so that it can be conflated with any number of other forms of political and state violence, thereby making claims of a "Palestinian Holocaust" possible.

The same tendency to equate Israel with the Nazis in order to demonise the former reappears in the narratives of the political left across Europe and the US, particularly in periods of intensified conflict in the Middle East. As Izabella Tabarovsky has shown, much of the conceptual architecture used by the Western left today to demonise Israel—from claims of apartheid to genocide and analogies between Israel and Nazi Germany—originated in the antisemitic anti-Zionist campaigns instigated by the Soviet Union from the 1950s onwards, the terms of which were taken over wholesale by European Communist parties and their "fellow travellers" in the 1970s and 80s (Tabarovsky 2022). By the time of the Second Intifada, claims that Gaza represented a continuation or return of Auschwitz, or was akin to the Warsaw Ghetto, were a frequent presence in Palestinian solidarity movements and marches—again, radically distorting the historical reality of the gas chambers and of the Ghetto (Bob from Brockley 2014). Accusations of Israeli genocide continue to be made in response to Israeli military attacks within the West Bank and Gaza, while the international isolation of Hamas, after their takeover of Gaza following Israeli withdrawal in 2005, is often framed as a step on the road to genocide. This is despite that isolation being a result of Hamas's refusal to agree to the conditions for recognition (most notably full acknowledgement of Israel's right to exist) set out by the Middle East Quartet, as well as Hamas's continued indiscriminate rocket fire at Israeli towns and cities (Reuters 2007).

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, left-led campaigns in the UK sought to abolish Holocaust Memorial Day, or rename it "Genocide Memorial Day", winning support from leading politicians including Jeremy Corbyn, the now former leader of the British Labour Party. The campaigns' ostensible argument was that by focusing on the Holocaust alone, the history and experiences of other genocides were being blotted out. This argument is on shaky ground given that Holocaust Memorial Day events and literature do not solely focus on the Holocaust, but rather commemorate and provide educational information on the history of genocidal violence from the Armenians and the Sinti to atrocities in Cambodia, Srebrenica, Rwanda and Darfur. Indeed, to a great extent the only time when these events gain any public traction in Britain is through Holocaust Memorial Day publicity. Rather, the underlying motive for the campaigns against the name "Holocaust Memorial Day" was the desire to make an equivalence between the Holocaust and the Israeli treatment of Palestinians, a desire in clear evidence when Corbyn hosted an event entitled "Never Again for Anyone: Auschwitz to Gaza" in Parliament on Holocaust Memorial Day in 2010 (Zeffman 2018).

These narratives have been lent legitimacy by the academic discipline of Genocide Studies itself. In order to condemn Israel in the language of the "crime of crimes", some scholars have sought to extend the concept of genocide so that it now includes the Allied bombing of Dresden during World War II, the forced transfer of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the German defeat, and multiple partition and population transfer polices of the post-colonial era, including, crucially, those of the wars that led to the establishment of the State of Israel (Shaw 2010). In so doing, the concept of genocide is deprived of its specific meaning and, as Omer Bartov notes, it becomes impossible to distinguish between different modes of violence "in a manner that would help us understand similarity and difference" (2010: 252). Much as with the use of the apartheid and colonial analogies to describe contemporary Israel by leading NGOs (see Bolton et al. 2023) then, by providing spurious claims of Israeli genocide with the imprimatur of scholarly authority, such works bolster the confidence of those who wish to wield the concept of genocide as a weapon in online debates about Israel. It is likely that the ICJ case on the 2023–24 Israel-Hamas war, and the way its initial judgement has been (mis)interpreted by anti-Israel activists and web users, will only intensify this process of authorisation. Given the proximity of the genocide concept to that of the Nazi analogy, it is at least possible that the latter will be the next concept to be granted scholarly and institutional authority in this way.

#### 3. Qualitative analysis

To explore in more depth the way that the concept of genocide is used in online debates around Israel, and to see how the conceptual history laid out above impacts upon the contemporary use of the concept, the rest of this chapter will focus on the online reactions to three Israel-related new stories over the course of 2020 and 2021. Given that these stories and reactions took place prior to the 2023–24 war, analysing this discourse provides an opportunity to trace the pre-conditions for the concept of genocide's rise to prominence following the war.

To this end, three separate corpora were built of comments posted on the *Facebook* pages of major British newspapers in response to reports of:

<sup>3</sup> https://www.benjerry.com/about-us/media-center/opt-statement.

These stories were chosen because they cover a range of angles on Israel: one directly related to the conflict with the Palestinians; another focused on political campaigns against Israel; and the last a story that was not directly conflict-related, and which drew significant positive coverage of Israel.

Each corpus consisted of 10–15 *Facebook* threads. These threads were analysed qualitatively using the MAXQDA content analysis programme with the antisemitic stereotypes, analogies and linguistic structures used by commenters classified according to the guidelines set out in the Decoding Antisemitism project's "guidebook" (Becker et al. 2024). All comments coded with the "genocide" code where then analysed. In the following, I will set out details of the data set and results of the analysis for each of the three discourse-triggering events in a separate section.

#### 3.1 The May 2021 escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict4

In May 2021, a long-standing legal case regarding the ownership and tenancy of properties in Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah district descended into violence. After protestors at the Al-Aqsa Mosque clashed with Israel police, Hamas militants in Gaza sought to capitalise on the unrest by firing hundreds of rockets at Israeli towns and cities. Israeli forces retaliated through airstrikes on targets in Gaza, leading to many civilian casualties. Intercommunal violence spread within Israel itself, while large anti-Israel demonstrations took place across Europe and the US. These were followed by multiple incidents of physical and verbal attacks on Jewish people, Jewish-owned businesses and synagogues. The escalation phase received substantial coverage in the UK media, and a large number of web-user comments posted in response. As an event directly concerned with the conflict, emotional and at times extreme language and argumentative strategies are to be expected (Becker, Ascone and Troschke 2021).

The corpus for this event consisted of 10 threads taken from the *Facebook* pages of a range of British newspapers across the political spectrum, from *The Times*, *Telegraph* and *Daily Mail* to the *Guardian* and *Independent*. In total, 1,504 comments were analysed. Of these, 422 were

<sup>4</sup> For a more general analysis of online reactions to this event, see Becker et al. 2021.

classed as antisemitic, either directly or in the context of the thread—28% of the total comments. Within the antisemitic comments, 26 expressed or activated the accusation of an Israeli genocide, equalling 6% of the antisemitic comments.

The relatively small number of comments invoking genocide might be explained by the nature of the "discourse trigger"—very few observers, even those most ideologically committed to the Palestinian cause and/or highly distorted images of Israel, could fail to notice that Israeli attacks on Gaza were responding to a barrage of rockets aimed at Israeli cities from Gaza. In the popular interpretation of the concept of genocide, the notion that a group is undergoing genocide sits uneasily with that group's political and military wing engaging in military activity that poses a serious threat to the supposed perpetrators of that genocide. Thus, to use the concept of genocide in such a context entails downplaying the success or effectiveness of the "resistance", something which it appears many pro-Hamas commentators are loath to do.

(1) "Totally deserved and appropriate!!!Israel deserves MUCH more than this. Fascist, Genocidal state!!!!" (IND-FB[20210511])

(1) was posted in response to a report of more than 80 rockets being fired at Tel Aviv from Gaza by Hamas militants. Such rocket attacks are indiscriminate and are directly targeted at civilian populations. The web user not only praises such attacks on civilians as being "deserved" but calls for further and more effective attacks, using a capitalised "MUCH" to emphasise the extent of the destruction and death that Israelis supposedly deserve to suffer and for which they hope. The justification for this death wish appears in the final line of the comment, where Israel as a state is described in essentialised terms as both "Fascist" and "Genocidal".5 Exclamation marks reaffirm the strength of the web user's destructive feelings towards Israel.

<sup>5 &#</sup>x27;Essentialised' here means presenting an ascribed characteristic as inherent, without any specification or limitation. Thus, a comment describing a particular Israeli politician as 'fascist' would not automatically be classed as antisemitic. Describing the state of Israel as 'fascist' in its totality makes fascism an innate (and therefore not temporally limited) characteristic of Israel as such, and this is regarded as an antisemitic ascription.

(2) "Not sure you can call it 'full scale war' when only one side is properly armed? More like genocide". (MIR-FB[20210511])

Here the web user disputes another commenter's description of the escalation phase as tipping into "full scale war", arguing that because only "one side"—i.e. Israel—is "properly armed", the conflict is in fact no such thing, but rather "genocide". Denying that the Palestinians have access to arms—often by portraying Iran-supplied weapons as almost child-like "homemade rockets"—is a common means of attributing sole guilt for the conflict (Vincent and Bolton 2024) to Israel. Similarly, denying that there is a conflict between Israel and Palestine at all, or rejecting the idea that there are "two sides", and instead using one-sided terminology such as "oppression", and, at its extreme, "genocide", to describe the situation in the Middle East is an increasingly popular framing device within social media discussions. This logic is precisely that which has been at play in discussions of the 2023–24 Israel-Hamas war, in which, as notes above, the nature and significance of the 7 October attacks is downplayed or ignored, and use of the term "war" which signifies two combatants—is replaced by "genocide", which, in popular usage, implies a binary aggressor-victim relation.

(3) "Sick telling only one side of the story, and it is the story of the oppressor, genocidal occupier. The Independent deserves being gagged. Sick". (IND-FB[20210511])

(3) aims its ire at the media reporting of the escalation—in this case, reports of rocket fire from Gaza. The web user describes reporting of the experience of Israelis under rocket fire as "sick", and the—presumably distorted, if not fictional—"story of the oppressor, genocidal occupier". The comment implies that the news outlet is deliberately suppressing the Palestinian "story" and as such should be "gagged", i.e. censored. While such comments can often come close to attributions of jewish power and influence (Becker 2024b) over the media, here the implication is rather that the media are, through their own political choice, servile to Israeli interests.

(4) "you do realise Palestine was there before Israel. Is real was created after ww2. So the people persecuted in ww2 have gone on to persecute others the same way. You really need to educate yourself. Actually do some history you plank" (TEL-FB[20210511])

(5) "The fact remains that they are commuting genocide on Palestine what in turn has caused the conflict. Israel wasn't there before ww2" (TEL-FB[20210511])

Both of these comments were posted in quick succession by the same web user in response to reports of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza. The first (4) implies that the creation of Israel following World War II marks the point at which "the people persecuted in ww2" have begun "persecute[ing] others the same way". This not only implies an accusation of genocide and creates an analogy between Israel and the Nazis, but through the use of "the same way" amounts to a form of holocaust distortion or relativisation. The second comment, (5), makes explicit what was implicit in the first, by directly accusing Israel of "commuting [sic] genocide on Palestine". The entire conflict is explained by the supposed "genocide" and the fact that Israel did not exist as a state prior to World War II, thus attributing all guilt for the conflict onto the Israeli side.

(6) "So if some one come and take ur home and ask u to leave .will u . Just leave ? . Or fight back ? . And I already know your answer isn't how white America built with taking ppl home and killing 80 million america native . So I'm not surprised you back isreal crimes ". (TEL-FB[20210511])

(6) begins with a rhetorical question aimed at a previous commenter, asking how they would respond to "some one…tak[ing] ur home", and suggesting that "fight[ing] back" is an appropriate response. The idea of "fighting back" here is broad, with no distinction being drawn between, for example, non-violent civil disobedience and suicide bombings targeting civilians. The comment then makes the genocide accusation implicitly, through an analogy with the destruction of the Native American population during the European colonisation of North America. The deaths of "80 million america native" are cited as an equivalent to Israeli "crimes", effectively accusing Israel of a genocide that in numerical terms surpasses the Holocaust.

#### 3.2 Ben & Jerry's boycott of Israeli settlements on the West Bank

On 19 July 2021, the American ice cream producer Ben & Jerry's announced through its website that it would no longer sell its ice cream in Israeli settlements on the West Bank, saying that it was inconsistent with its values. Priding itself on its politically radical image, the company's decision had been influenced by criticism of its continued operation in the region from "fans and trusted partners". The move was met with a positive reception from sections of Israel civil society and pro-Palestinian groups, but also fierce criticism, including from Israel's foreign minister Yair Lapid, who called it "capitulation to anti-Semitism, to BDS, to all that is evil in the anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish discourse".

The claim that the Ben & Jerry's boycott was antisemitic seems to elide the difference between the State of Israel (as such) and the settlements—an elision that in other contexts could itself be categorised as antisemitic. Indeed, Ben & Jerry's openly declared that they were not boycotting Israel as a state, nor did they support the BDS movement, but rather distinguished between the State of Israel and settlements in the West Bank.6 As such, in contrast to comments like Lapid's, within this analysis the event itself was not considered to be an act of antisemitism. This had an effect on the classification of comments responding to reports of the boycott—comments which merely stated support for the boycott were not classed as antisemitic.7

This corpus consisted of 12 threads taken from the *Facebook* pages of *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *Telegraph*, *Financial Times*, *The Independent* and *The Spectator*. A total of 794 comments were analysed, with 176 (or 22%) categorised as directly or contextually antisemitic. Of the antisemitic comments, 12—or, as with the May escalation corpus, just

<sup>6</sup> Ben & Jerry's decision led to a prolonged conflict with its parent company, *Unilever*, over whether the Israeli licence could be separated from the rest of the business. The dispute was reported as being "settled" in December 2022, although the details remain opaque (https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/ dec/15/unilever-ben-and-jerrys-ice-cream-israel-west-bank, last accessed on 11 July 2023).

<sup>7</sup> By contrast, a comment affirming the author Sally Rooney's boycott of Israeli publishers and translators – which she explicitly linked to BDS and the state of Israel as a whole, rather than just the settlements, would be classed as antisemitic. See Karolina Placzynta's chapter in this volume, and Becker et al. 2021b.

over 6%—expressed claims of, or references to, Israeli genocide. The majority of these references appeared in *Facebook* threads responding to articles in *The Guardian*. The relatively low level of references to genocide in this corpus might be explained by the innocuous or even faintly comical image of an ice cream company seeking to intervene in a complex conflict. Nevertheless, the above average level of antisemitic comments overall—the average proportion of antisemitic comments in UK comment threads examined across the course of the Decoding Antisemitism project is around 10–12%—clearly shows that substantial numbers of web users looked to capitalise on the story in order to make antisemitic statements, with the concept of genocide part of the topoi utilised to that end.

(7) "'Settlers'? I think you mean perpetrators of genocide" (GUARD-FB[20210723])

Responding to a report on the reactions of residents on an Israeli settlement on the West Bank to the boycott, (6) reframes their identity from "settlers" to "perpetrators of genocide", in a question-and-answer format laden with irony. The ostensible world-weary calmness of the comment is emphasised by the use of an eye-rolling emoji, yet disguises an attribution that creates a monstrous, murderous image of the "settlers" which moves far beyond legitimate critique of the practice of settlement.

(8) "The genocideof Palestinian will never be forgotten and when time change israiel will pay for every brutality it's committed and committing against poor Palestinians… and Anti Israiel is not anti semitism the whole world know they can't hide any more behind this ". (GUARD-FB[20210723])

In (7), the Israeli "genocide" of the Palestinians is presupposed, such that the comment's focus is on the future consequences Israel will suffer in response. The web user predicts that Israel will "pay for every brutality" when "times change"—an indirect threat, with an undertone of approval for violent reprisals. This message is combined with an attempt to pre-empt the accusations of antisemitism the web user seems to expect, writing that "anti Israiel is not anti semitism"—but they go further, implicitly making an accusation that Israel instrumentalises antisemitism (Becker 2024a) by making false claims to deflect legitimate criticism of their actions. As with the supposed genocidal actions, the web user suggests that this strategy no longer works as it presumably once did, as "the whole world know they can't hide any more behind" such claims.

(9) "Hamas is just an excuse for the genocide of Palestinians women children's and men's.  Israiel illegally grabbed Palestinians lands houses and farms and made many Palestinians homeless. And after all that terrorist israiel supporters blaming Palestinians. Only humans can understand this". (GUARD-FB[20210723])

Here, the web user argues against other commenters who sought to highlight Israeli security concerns in the face of the fundamentalist, authoritarian and indiscriminate violence of Hamas. (8) contends that references to the nature of Hamas are merely "an excuse" for the Israeli "genocide" of Palestinian society—women, children and men. Gaza is presented as a "live human jail" created by "terrorist" Israel, thereby again removing any political or moral responsibility for the current state of the region from Hamas, the rulers of Gaza. The comment ends by declaring that "only humans can understand this", implicitly attributing a form of immorality and/or evil to Israel and its supporters, depicting them as inhuman and thus morally deficient.

(10) "I think we're well past the point of solely defending human rights there. The very existence of an entire people is at stake so every little bit helps" (GUARD-FB[20210720])

This comment expresses urgency in the face of the imminent destruction of "the very existence of an entire people"—the comment itself is based on an allusion which in the context, is a clear reference to the Palestinian population, and thus an implicit reference to Israeli genocide. Actions and campaigns to defend human rights in the West Bank and Gaza are declared insufficient, implicitly suggesting support for violent resistance. Given that "every little bit helps", there is no distinction made here between boycotts by an ice cream company, violent resistance against the Israeli military, and the targeting of Israeli civilians. This offhand comment therefore implies support for any form of "resistance" against Israel, however indiscriminately violent—a reaction that was, indeed, commonplace in the wake of the 7 October attacks (Becker et al. 2023).

#### 3.3 The roll-out of the Covid-19 vaccine in Israel8

In December 2020, Israel launched its Covid-19 vaccination programme, the first state in the world to do so. The speed of Israel's roll-out of the vaccination programme across its population drew plaudits and positive media coverage, with other countries looking to see what could be learnt from the Israeli experience. But this generally favourable coverage was swiftly followed by media stories focusing on the question of Israel's supposed responsibility for distribution of the vaccine to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. For some, Israel as an occupying power in the West Bank was obliged to distribute the vaccine to Palestinians in the area over which they hold control. Israeli ministers argued that the Oslo Accords gave responsibility for healthcare to the Palestinian Authority, and that it was legitimate for Israel—as for any other nation-state—to prioritise its own citizens (including Israeli Arabs) before donating vaccines elsewhere (Trew 2021). In the event, Israel did donate 5,000 vaccine doses to Palestinian healthcare workers in January 2021, and further donations and swap deals followed later in the year (BBC 2021).

The corpus consisted of 15 threads of comments taken from the *Facebook* pages of all major British national newspapers, with a total of 1,522 comments analysed. Of these, 259 (or 17%) were classified as antisemitic. Out of the antisemitic comments, 32 (or 12%) articulated claims of genocide against Israel.

These results therefore stand out from those of the previous two corpora. Reports on the speed and success of the vaccine roll-out were, unlike the other two discourse events, not directly connected to either the Israel-Palestine conflict or political campaigns against Israel, and this may explain why the overall level of antisemitic comments was significantly lower, dropping by around 5–10%. Yet despite the lower overall level, the percentage of the comments referencing Israeli genocide within those classed as antisemitic was almost double that within the escalation phase and Ben & Jerry's threads.

Reasons for this surprising result—which would need to be explored in further research—might include a general increase in references to genocide and/or deliberate state killing during the most intense and

<sup>8</sup> For further analysis of the reactions to this event, including those from France and Germany, see Becker et al 2021.

fear-ridden periods of the Covid-19 era, or that positive, non-conflictrelated stories about Israel motivated some web users to draw on more extreme concepts to express their antipathy to Israel. On the other hand, stories specifically focusing on the question of Israel's responsibility for Palestinian healthcare did open up a potential pathway to speculation about Israel's motives for not immediately supplying Palestinians with the vaccine. It is possible that the medieval antisemitic depiction of Jews as "well-poisoners", while a rarity in contemporary antisemitic discourse, may have played a more-or-less unconscious role here. For those already motivated by anti-Israel or anti-Jewish animus, it thus only took a small step to begin accusing Israel of deliberately withholding the vaccine for political ends—including, at its most extreme, the end of genocide.

(11) "How is the world silent about this continued genocide. Its insanely inhumane!" (IND-FB[20210108])

This comment presupposes Israeli genocide, and as such portrays the absence of an immediate vaccine distribution programme to the Palestinians as a mere "continuation" of an ongoing extermination policy. Via the use of a rhetorical question, the web user evokes ideas of Jewish privilege or a "free pass" by bemoaning "the world['s]" silence about this supposedly self-evident genocide. The comment concludes with an indeterminate claim that either the genocide itself, or the silence about it, is "insanely inhumane"—implicitly presenting Israel as standing opposed to humanity as such.

Each of these comments present the decision of the Israeli government to vaccinate its own population before distributing vaccines elsewhere as a deliberate, "intentional" attempt to kill (if not entirely wipe out) the Palestinian population. Example (12) begins with the identification of "yet another Israeli crime", accompanied by an ellipsis which indicates graphically the never-ending series of supposed crimes. The self-evidence of the supposed "intended genocide" represented by the dispute over vaccine distribution is then indicated by the web user through the claim that if it is not "genocide" then nothing can be classed as genocide. Comment (13) makes a similar argument in more direct fashion, positing that Israel (or Israelis) "just want[s] the Palestinian people dead and gone". Comment (14) approaches the issue from an act/omission angle, suggesting that "Zionist" inaction in this case stands in contrast to a presupposed over-intervention that characterises Israel's normal position vis-à-vis the Palestinian territories. The only explanation, according to this web user, is that through this omission, "Zionists" hope for the genocide of the "native" population here perhaps alluding to the colonial genocides that accompanied the founding of the US and Australia.

	- B: "they probably where" (DM-FB[20201230])

In the first comment of this interchange, a web user justifies Israel's decision to not immediately distribute Covid vaccines to the Palestinians by suggesting that doing so would only lead to a conspiracy theory that Israel was trying to "poison" the population of the West Bank and Gaza—in effect, that even distributing vaccines would lead to accusations of Israeli genocide. In response, B replies by confirming the proposed conspiracy theory (which carries echoes of the aforementioned "wellpoisoner" calumny), writing that "they"—the Israelis—"probably where [*sic*]". In so doing, they express the genocide concept indirectly through affirmation of a conceptual frame initially presented as a form of critique.

Both of these comments respond to two news stories that are not directly related to the conflict or to the question of Palestinian vaccine distribution—the first responds to a report of Israeli plans to close their borders to foreign travel; the second to an opinion piece asking what other countries could learn from the Israeli roll-out of the vaccine. Despite the benign nature of both stories, these web users nevertheless use them as a vehicle to accuse Israel of genocide. In (16) the comment suggests that there is an ulterior motive to the border closures, namely that Israel will be able to "commit more mass genocide" safe from the prying eyes of foreign observers. (17) combines the concepts of Israel as an innately "racist state" and the apartheid analogy with the claim of genocide, adding to this depictions of Israeli evil ("war crimes" and "human rights abuses"). The final sentence of the comment suggests that the same phenomena are characteristic of the British government, demonstrating how concepts such as genocide, war crimes and abuse of human rights are routinely deprived of concrete meaning through frequent use as generic intensifiers in everyday online communication.

Both (18) and (19) use news stories about the success of the vaccine roll-out to draw a direct equivalence between Israel's treatment of Palestinians and the Holocaust. Example (18) accuses a previous pro-Israeli commenter of "clearly support[ing]" genocide and "holocaust of Palestinians". And, (19) uses language normally associated with the identification of holocaust denial to suggest that denying that Israel's relations with the Palestinians are comparable to the Holocaust is akin to Holocaust denial. In so doing, both comments indirectly distort the Holocaust themselves. By using the terminology of the Holocaust as a linguistic weapon against Israel—or rather against those, potentially Jewish, web users who support or do not automatically condemn Israel—such comments amount to an aggravated form of antisemitic harassment.

(20) "Genocide started after the birth of Israel and this is the Jewish peoples thanks to all those people who sacrificed their lives to liberate them in the second world war". (DM-FB[20201230])

This comment again evokes the image of the Nazi genocide to demonise Israel as genocidal—but adds to this a further attack on "the Jewish people" more broadly. The web user suggests that by supposedly committing genocide—and thereby replicating the Nazi crimes against the Jews—"the Jewish people" have displayed an immoral ingratitude to "all those people who sacrificed their lives to liberate them" in World War II.

 Pure demonic evil" (TEL-FB[20210112])

Responding to an opinion piece on what the British National Health Service could learn from the Israeli experience, comment (21) describes Israel as committing a "slow genocide", and uses dehumanising language—"you make [my skin] crawl" to demonise those who refute such a depiction of Israel. This ascription is intensified by a final clause in which either the posited "slow genocide" itself, or those who support such actions—or both—represent "pure demonic evil". In so doing, the comment activates classical Christian antisemitic stereotypes which associate Jews with the devil and the presence of evil.

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the uses of the concept of genocide in online discourse about Israel in the UK. It traces the concept's history, showing how it has been deeply connected with antisemitism, the Holocaust and the State of Israel from the outset. As such, it represents one of the most incendiary concepts that can be used in disputes about Israel. The chapter sets out why the concept of genocide in relation to Israel is factually inaccurate and distorts the historical reality of the conflict. Moreover, it is often a gateway to forms of holocaust distortion if not outright denial. Qualitatively analysing comments posted online in response to three separate events involving Israel across 2020 and 2021, it has found that references to a supposed Israeli genocide are a continual, if relatively minor, presence within antisemitic comments.

In both the May 2021 escalation phase and the Ben & Jerry's boycott corpora, comments referring to Israeli genocide made up just over 6% of the antisemitic comments. In the Covid-19 vaccine roll-out corpus, 12% of antisemitic comments referenced genocide.

While the data set analysed here—comprising a total of 3,820 comments—is not large enough to draw concrete conclusions, it is nevertheless striking that, rather than a story directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was the one unambiguously positive news story—the speedy roll-out of the Israeli vaccine—that contained the highest percentage of usage of the genocide concept, more than double the level of the other two corpora. This may be due to the heightened emotional atmosphere during the most intense periods of the Covid-19 era, but it may also be that the generally positive nature of the coverage of this event meant web users were forced to reach for more extreme concepts to express their antipathy towards Israel. Further research comparing the uses of the concept in response to different non-conflictrelated stories about Israel would be needed to test this hypothesis. Other potential research questions raised by this analysis include testing how levels of holocaust distortion in online discussions relate to the frequency of attributions of Israeli genocide.

### References

Reuters. 2007. "Quartet deeply concerned by Palestinian violence". *Reuters* (9 August), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN02225618/

### Sources

# 5. Countering Antisemitism Online

A Discursive Analysis of *Facebook* and *Twitter*/*X* Comments

### *Laura Ascone*

Since their emergence on the web, social networks have elicited diverging reactions and opinions. If they are appreciated for helping create new forms of social relations, they are also criticised for facilitating both the emergence and circulation of hate speech. On a macro-level, different European countries have been taking a step forward to counter hate speech, but on a micro-level online comment sections show that some users try to counter it as well, namely by taking part in a discussion and/or reporting hate content. This chapter investigates the way users of French media counter antisemitic discourse in both *Facebook* and *Twitter* (now *X*) comment sections.

The analysis was conducted on 4,230 comments posted on the official *Facebook* and *Twitter* pages of French mainstream media such as *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. The comments were divided in three sub-corpora according to the event they refer to. This way, it was possible to examine the specificities of the comments countering antisemitism in these three different contexts. The annotation and the analyses performed with the software MAXQDA shed light on the connections between the comments conveying antisemitism and those countering them, as well as on how counter speech can sometimes fuel antisemitism and other forms of hate speech.

### 1. Introduction

The number of laws that have recently been enacted across Europe (among others, the *NetzDG* in Germany or the *Loi Avia* in France) are evidence of the European countries' willingness to both limit and counter hate speech. If, on a macro-level, different European countries have been taking a step forward, on a micro-level, online comment sections show that some users try to counter hate speech as well, namely by taking part in a discussion and/or reporting hate content.

This chapter investigates the way users of French media counter antisemitic comments in both *Facebook* and *Twitter* (now *X*) comment sections. This study aims to determine to what extent counter speech is content-dependent, as well as to identify the specificities of the comments countering antisemitism online. The analysis will focus on the argumentative strategies (Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1988) that are adopted by users in order to both deconstruct the different concepts mobilised in antisemitic comments (Becker 2021) and make their point of view incontestable by creating an authoritative ethos (Amossy 2010).

The first part of this chapter will present the theoretical background, the corpus and the methods used. The second part will deal with the comments countering antisemitism in *Facebook* and *Twitter* comment sections. To conclude, attention will be paid to the argumentative strategies adopted by users to counter antisemitic comments.

# 2. Towards a linguistic analysis of antisemitic discourse and counter speech

#### 2.1 Delimiting hate speech and counter speech

The wide range of hateful expressions makes it difficult to establish a universally accepted definition of hate speech. Even though academic and institutional definitions share the core elements of hate speech, none of them seems to encompass all its facets. For this study the following definition was adopted:

> Hate speech is defined as bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person or a group of people because of some of their actual or perceived innate characteristics.  Hate speech is intended to injure, dehumanize, harass, intimidate, debase, degrade, and victimize the targeted groups, and to foment insensitivity and brutality against them (Cohen-Almagor 2011: 1–2).1

Othering plays a crucial role in hate speech. The notion of otherness was defined by Staszak (2008: 2) as "the result of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group ("Us", the Self) constructs one or many […] out-groups ("Them", Other) by stigmatizing a difference―real or imagined―presented as a negation of identity and thus a motive for potential discrimination". By creating an antonymic *Other*, hate speech has a double function: it creates or reinforces the bonds within the in-group (Bernard-Barbeau 2012) while establishing a conflictual link with the out-group.

This link can be reinforced by the phenomenon of "group polarisation" that is facilitated by the internet (Madden 2008): people tend to interact with users sharing the same interests and point of view. This may lead users to perceive their point of view as widely accepted even in cases of hate and extremist ideologies. Likewise, this phenomenon may intensify a sense of identity built in opposition to the out-group.

In this study, I analyse representations of Jews and Israelis as the outgroup and consider verbal antisemitism to be "all linguistic elements by means of which Jews are debased, stigmatised, discriminated against and defamed as Jews, i.e. with which anti-Jewish stereotypes are coded and resentments are conveyed" (Schwarz-Friesel/Reinharz 2017: 48). Among the most common stereotypes seen are characterisations of Jews as a community striving for wealth (greed) and having the power to

<sup>1</sup> Contrary to Cohen-Almagor's definition, the one adopted in the Decoding Antisemitism project comprises unintentional devaluation and/or exclusion as well.

influence the media, politicians and economy. These are long-standing representations of Jews, but new antisemitic concepts have emerged in the last decades. For instance, the nazi analogy―used to target Israel by comparing it to Nazi Germany―has become one of the most prevalent allegations (Becker 2021).

Counter speech is understood here as a discourse countering, in an explicitly antagonistic way, what has been stated elsewhere (Mouffe 2010). In this study, I considered only the comments explicitly countering antisemitic discourse to form a counter speech. We will see, in this context, if counter speech constitutes a "peripheral discourse" within the discursive system (that is, a discourse putting forward a radical break with the dominant ideas and values (Angenot 1989: 22)), or if this understanding of counter speech is problematic since the ideas and values that are dominant in our society are actually advanced and defended by the comments countering antisemitism. Likewise, this chapter investigates the rhetorical (Reboul 1991) and argumentative strategies (Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1988) adopted by users to verbalise and legitimise this break with the dominant discourse.

#### 2.2 The corpus

The analysis was conducted on 4,230 comments posted in the *Facebook* and *Twitter* pages of French mainstream media: *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, *Libération*, *Le Parisien*, *L'Express*, *Le Point*, *France Info*, *Marianne*, *France Bleu*, *Valeurs Actuelles* and *20 Minutes*. The rationale for focusing on mainstream media is twofold: on the one hand, "[the media] are a powerful site for the production and circulation of social meanings, i.e. to a great extent the media decide the significance of things that happen in the world for any given culture, society or social group" (Thornborrow 2004: 56). On the other hand, mainstream media represents an ideological apparatus that frames the society's way of thinking and acting. It is for this reason that the spread of antisemitic content in this milieu―in opposition to extremist contexts―can lead to the normalisation of antisemitism and other hate ideologies. Furthermore, the free-to-access *Facebook* and *Twitter* comment sections allowed examination of the media outlets that require a subscription to read and/or comment on articles on their websites, and that post the same articles on their social networks pages.

The comments were divided into three sub-corpora according to the event dealt with by the articles. The first sub-corpus, which consists of 1,500 comments, is about an escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in May 2021. In response to the publication of these articles, web users criticised and sometimes demonised Israel.

The second sub-corpus comprises 1,000 comments related to the Pegasus case in July 2021. The spyware Pegasus, developed by the Israeli enterprise NSO Group, allows its users to target smartphones. When it was discovered that certain countries used the software to spy on other governments, some web users questioned the innocence of Israel. French mainstream media paid particular attention to the fact that President Emmanuel Macron was targeted by Morocco through the use of this spyware.

The third sub-corpus includes 1,700 comments posted in response to reports of the antisemitic placard shown by right-wing activist Cassandre Fristot in a demonstration against the Covid-19 health pass implementation in August 2021. It bore the slogan "BUT WHO?" ["MAIS QUI?"] surrounded by names of several Jewish personalities and their alleged supporters. Because the rhetorical question refers to the conspiracy theory that holds Jews responsible for the pandemic, the placard was considered antisemitic.

The specificity of this corpus allowed an examination of the way web users of French media counter antisemitism in three different contexts: one involving Israel, one concerning a French news item, and one dealing with an international event that, at first glance, concerns neither Israel nor France.

#### 2.3. The research design

The comments were collected with a custom-designed data-crawling tool and analysed with the MAXQDA software. Detailed coding guidelines were predetermined in order to categorise both the conceptual content of a comment (e.g., the different antisemitic concepts) and the linguistic structures used to convey the antisemitic content (e.g., puns, allusions, threats, etc.). Given the shapeshifting nature of antisemitism, the research team has regularly updated the categories in order to capture

the nuances of antisemitic expressions specific to a certain discourse event.

Adopting a qualitative approach made it possible to conduct more in-depth analyses, which focused on the argumentative strategies employed in the comments countering antisemitic content. Particular attention was paid to the way authors of these comments refer to the antisemitic stereotypes they are trying to deconstruct as well as to the arguments they advanced to legitimise their discourse. Moreover, this qualitative approach enabled examination of the reactions triggered by the counter speech comments, allowing us to see whether this form of spontaneous counter speech―that is, counter speech produced by random users rather than by moderators―can be considered effective.

This ability to investigate the connections between the comments conveying antisemitism and those countering them proved crucial in this study. Furthermore, the combination of corpus linguistics and discourse analysis shed light on the characteristics of *Facebook* and *Twitter* comments countering antisemitism in relation to three different contexts.

#### 3. Counter speech as context-related discourse

#### 3.1 The link between antisemitic and counter speech comments

Before examining the link between the comments conveying antisemitism and those countering them, it is necessary to have a general overview of the proportions of both antisemitic and counter speech comments in the three sub-corpora.

The comments relating to Cassandre Fristot, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Pegasus spyware were found to be antisemitic in 14%, 13% and 4% of cases, respectively. The low amount of antisemitic comments in the Pegasus corpus might be due to the fact that French mainstream media primarily focused on President Emmanuel Macron being spied on by Morocco; only a few articles noted that the spyware was developed by an Israeli enterprise.

This analysis found that the comments countering antisemitism are not as frequent as those spreading antisemitic ideas. In both the Fristot and the Arab-Israeli sub-corpora, 7% of comments are categorised as counter speech. As to the Pegasus sub-corpus, only 1% of comments sought to counter antisemitic content. This suggests that users with antisemitic positions post more freely on the web than those trying to counter these antisemitic ideas. Whether in reaction to the Arab-Israeli conflict, to Fristot's placard or to the Pegasus scandal, antisemitic comments are made twice as frequently as those countering them.

In order to have a better understanding of the way counter speech emerges in *Facebook* and *Twitter* comments, I examined the sequence of comments in the threads under investigation. By looking at the position of counter speech comments in relation to comments marked antisemitic or non-antisemitic, the goal was to test the hypothesis that counter speech would tend to be elicited by antisemitic comments rather than by the news item or the general context.

The Fristot sub-corpus confirmed this hypothesis. Of the 121 comments countering antisemitism, 66 (54%) were posted in reaction to comments expressing antisemitic ideas (see example 1 below); in 32 comments (26%), users reacted to neutral statements, whereas 24 comments (20%) were not posted in reaction to any other comment.

	- B: "Quoting some Jews to take them responsible for what others have messed up during the corona, yes that's antisemitism" (LEFIG-FB[20211020])2

In this exchange, user A denies that the placard implicitly accuses a group of Jewish individuals of being responsible for the current situation. Therefore, this comment constitutes an indirect form of denial of antisemitism (Scheiber 2024). User B then reacts by explaining the message implied by Fristot and why it is considered antisemitic. With this comment, user B counters the idea of an alleged jewish power (Becker 2024).

A different tendency emerged in the other two datasets. In the Pegasus sub-corpus, most of the comments countering antisemitic stereotypes

<sup>2</sup> A: « et alors ? C›est être antisémite ? »

B: « citer des juifs pour leur mettre à dos tout ce que d'autres ont foiré en periode de corona oui c'est de l'antisémitisme »

were posted in reaction to the article rather than in response to other users' comments. In the Arab-Israeli conflict sub-corpus, almost half of the counter speech comments (42 out of 100) were posted in reaction to non-antisemitic statements that nevertheless presented a critique of Israel (see example 2).

	- B: "Hamas couldn't stand idly by? Explain to me on what issue? Hamas, which comes from the Muslim Brotherhood, have been attacking Israel for 70 years. Hamas's only wish is to destroy and annihilate the State of Israel, and do you believe that the State of Israel would stand idly by waiting to be annihilated by Hamas?" (LIBER-FB[20210512])3

Since user A explicitly refers to the escalation phase only, this comment cannot be understood to present Israel as the cause and the only guilty actor in the conflict. Therefore, this comment was considered within the definition of this study to be a legitimate critique of Israel's actions and not an antisemitic statement. However, user B seems to perceive it as the latter.

#### 3.2 The link between antisemitic concepts and counter speech comments

In order to examine the link between the concepts expressed in the antisemitic comments and those countered in the counter speech, attention was paid to the comments directly countering antisemitic statements. The Pegasus sub-corpus presents only two comments reacting to antisemitic statements, that is, 15% of the counter speech comments which, as already mentioned, represent 1% of the whole

<sup>3</sup> A: « Le Hamas ne pouvait pas continuer a rester les bras croises devant un situation qui montait depuis 1 semaine 10 jours, et laisser l'iniative de la contestation a des ONG ! » B: « Le Hamas ne pouvait pas rester les bras croisés ? à quel sujet expliquez moi ? Ça fait 70 ans que le Hamas Qui est une émanation des Frères musulmans ne

l'oubliez pas agresse l'État d'Israël. la seule volonté du Hamas est de détruire l'état Israël de l'anéantir et croyez vous que l'État d'Israël allait rester les bras croisés à attendre Que le Hamas l'anéantisse ? »

sub-corpus. This is in sharp contrast to the Fristot corpus, wherein 54% of the counter speech comments were posted in reaction to comments expressing antisemitic ideas. The analysis conducted on the Fristot dataset showed that all of them countered the concept expressed in the respective antisemitic comment such as the denial of antisemitism (see example 3) and the taboo of criticism (Chapelan 2024).

	- B: "Please show us the role of Soros and Rotschild in the health crisis. Let's see" (MONDE-TW[20210810])4

In this comment, user A questions the accusation of antisemitism for having listed the actors in the health crisis context because only some of them are Jewish. Furthermore, by stipulating that "the FN-style5 ladies aren't [their] cup of tea", the user seems to argue that the denial of antisemitism evident in their comment is not influenced by their political ideas. User B then reacts by addressing user A directly. By asking user A to explain the role of Soros and Rothschild [two names that appear on the placard] in the health crisis, user B indirectly debunks user A's argument that Fristot listed these names without consideration of their [Jewish] identity.

As far as the Arab-Israeli sub-corpus is concerned, only 34% of the counter speech comments were posted in reaction to antisemitic statements (see example 4).

(4) A: "The problem in your story is that the aggressor and the occupying power is Israel"

<sup>4</sup> A: « Donc indiquer une liste d›acteurs de la crise sanitaire dont on désapprouve l›action ou les positions est punissable car certains d›entre eux (7/12 je crois) sont juifs ? Les nénettes style FN c'est pas ma tasse hein mais il n'y aurait pas un soucis là ? »

B: « Indiquez nous le rôle de Soros et de Rotschild dans la crise sanitaire s'il vous plait. Pour voir. »

<sup>5</sup> The speaker refers to the fact that Cassandre Fristot is a right-wing activist having voted Front National, Marine Le Pen's party.

B: "The problem in your story is that Israel is a sovereign and legitimate nation, over the whole Jerusalem and, in the long run, from the sea to the Jordan" (MONDE-FB[20210512])6

User A reacts to a comment where Israel was described as the victim by questioning the other user's point of view ("The problem in your story") and presenting Israel as an evil (Bolton 2024) entity that is acting against the Palestinian population, which implicitly refers to israel's sole guilt in the conflict (Vincent 2024). However, instead of countering this stereotype, user B counters the denial of israel's right to exist (Vincent 2024), namely by describing Israel as "a sovereign and legitimate nation". Even though the evil and the denial of israel's right to exist are two distinct concepts, user B might have understood "occupying power" as a more indirect way to say that Israel is illegally occupying territories outside the Israeli borders. Furthermore, to turn the argument around, user B repeats user A's opening expression.

In eight further counter speech comments from the Arab-Israeli subcorpus, the users countered only one of the several concepts evoked in the antisemitic comments. One example:

	- B: "The terrorism is the use of terror for ideological, political or religious reasons. That's the definition of Hamas, of the Muslim Brotherhood etc, not of Israel, which is just defending itself". (LEPOI-FB[20210512])7

7 A: « Gaza est une prison à ciel ouvert […] mais en même temps en matière de terrorisme d'état de la part d'israel, je sais qu'ils sont les vice champion du monde, ils ont dépassé régime ségrégationniste d'Afrique du sud, bah la prochaine étape c'est de dépasser le détenteur du titre à savoir le régime nazis » B: « Le terrorisme est l'emploi de la terreur à des fins idéologiques, politiques ou religieuses. C est la définition du hamas, des frères musulmans etc, pas d Israël,

qui ne fait que se défendre »

<sup>6</sup> A: « Le problème dans ton histoire c›est que l›agresseur et la puissance occupante est Israël » B: « Le problème dans ton histoire est qu'Israel est une nation souveraine et légitime, sur la totalité de Jérusalem, et à terme, de la mer au Jourdain »

In (5), three antisemitic concepts are expressed by user A. Having presented Israel as a terrorist state, the user cynically compares it to both the South African apartheid system (apartheid analogy) and the Nazi regime (nazi analogy). However, user B counters only the first antisemitic concept: by explaining the definition of terrorism, the user says that Israel does not resort to "the use of terror for ideological, political or religious reasons". Rather, Israel "is just defending itself".

This example suggests that when the antisemitic comments present more than one antisemitic concept, the counter speech comments seem to focus on the first concept only. Yet, the evil stereotype is the only one to be countered even when it appears at the end of a comment.

#### 3.3 The link between the discourse event and counter speech comments

In both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Fristot sub-corpora, the counter speech comments reacting to the articles constitute only a small portion (24% and 20%, respectively), whereas, in the Pegasus corpus, they reach 61%.

(6) "That's obvious that for someone who's close, very close, to Islam Israel can only be guilty all that's bad… Besides it's hot here at the moment, I think Israel has something to do with that, just like with the floods… " (VALEU-FB[20210721])8

In this comment, taken from the Pegasus sub-corpus, the user reacts to the article itself and, in particular, to the French politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon's accusations against Israel mentioned in it. The user disparages Mélenchon by stating that the politician's anti-Israeli stance is affected by his interest in Islam and not by a justifiable reason. Furthermore, with the statement "Besides it's hot here at the moment, I think Israel has something to do with that, just like with the floods", the user derides Mélenchon and all those who blame Israel for any negative event in the world. Using irony in this way, the user implicitly counters the idea that Israel is an evil entity responsible for any calamity.

<sup>8 «</sup> Evidemment que pour ce proche , très proche , de l'islam Israël ne peut qu'être coupable de tous les maux ... D'ailleurs chez nous en ce moment il fait chaud, je pense qu'Israël y est pour quelque chose de même que pour les innondations.... »

In the following example, extracted from the Arab-Israeli sub-corpus, the commenter makes an explicit reference to the news article and even the outlet:

(7) "But hahahaha we talk about deadly attacks on Gaza!????? Do we talk of 300 rockets launched on Israel tonight???? No no… we talk only of 2/3 rockets launched on Gaza in reaction…Thanks Le Figaro for this publication inciting to hatred against Israel ✌" (LEFIG-FB[20210510])9

This user explicitly reacts to the article by accusing *Le Figaro* of "inciting to hatred against Israel". According to the user, the claim is justified by the fact that the article discusses Israel's "deadly attacks on gaza" without mentioning the "300 rockets launched on Israel tonight". In other words, the user counters the idea that Israel is solely responsible for this conflict (israel's guilt).

### 4. The impact of counter speech comments

#### 4.1 The argumentative strategies adopted in counter speech comments

In order to counter antisemitic statements, web users often formulate their counter speech comments in a convincing and persuasive way. They need to create an authoritative *ethos* (Amossy 2010) that allows them to present both themselves and their comments as legitimate and, therefore, incontestable. To achieve this, users resort to different argumentative strategies. Here, I will examine the main strategies identified in the three sub-corpora. The counter speech comments posted in reaction to the Pegasus affair include statements presented as incontrovertible facts rather than opinions, as the following example shows:

(8) "NSO is a private company, but like with any defence material they have to obtain their government's approval to sell, That's where

<sup>9 «</sup> Mais mmmmddddr on parle de frappes meurtrière sur gaza !????? On parle de 300roquettes tires cette nuit sur Israël ???? Nan nan... on parle juste de 2/3 roquettes tirés sur gaza en riposte ...Merci Le Figaro pour cette publication incitant à la haine contre Israël ✌ »

the responsibilities of NSO and the Israeli government end, only the software's users are responsible. Nobody would condemn the USA and Microsoft if one Windows user made illegal use of it. What do you think? This intrigue is to exonerate Morocco from its responsibilities and like LFI and accuse the bad Israelis" (VALEU-FB[20211123])10

The user implicitly rejects the accusations against Israel and NSO11, the Israeli company who developed Pegasus, by asserting that the process followed in the case of this spyware is the same as that adopted in the approval and selling of "any defence material". In order to give weight to their argument, the user poses the hypothetical example of the USA and Microsoft, claiming that nobody would condemn them if Windows was used illegally by one user. The parallel emphasises that Israel is often judged in a more severe way than other nations, drawing attention to and countering the double standard (Vincent 2024) applied to Israel.

One argumentative strategy that was identified in all three subcorpora is the appeal to authority (Ducrot 1984). Users refer to legitimate and authoritative sources in order to make themselves appear to be a reliable source, too:

(9) "Hamas launches hundreds of rockets against civilians in Israel, then Hamas puts children near the rocket launchers because they know that the Israeli army will destroy these launchers. […]: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=Vl4VaMq3tWc" (LIBER-FB[20210512])12

In redirecting readers to a video, this user strives to show that their statement is not simply an opinion or an assumption. Rather, the strategy allows the user to present their comment as based on evidence. Even though the author of the video is not an authoritative source such

<sup>10 «</sup> La société NSO est une société de droit privé, mais comme tout matériel de défense, il doit obtenir l'aval de son gouvernement pour la vente, là s'arrête les responsabilités de la société NSO du gouvernement israélien, seuls sont responsables les utilisateurs de ce logiciel. Il ne viendrait à l'idée de personne de condamner les USA et Microsoft si un utilisateur de Windows en faisait un usage illicite. Qu'en pensez vous? Tout ce micmac pour exonérer le Maroc de ses responsabilités à l'instar de LFI et accuser les méchants israéliens »

<sup>11</sup> NSO stands for Niv, Shalev and Omri, the names of the company's founders.

<sup>12 «</sup> Le hamas tire des centaines de roquettes contre des civils en Israël puis le hamas met des enfants près des lanceurs de roquettes car ils savent que l'armée Israëlienne va détruire ces lanceurs. […] : https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Vl4VaMq3tWc »