*Article* **Modernity, Its Impact on Muslim World and General Characteristics of 19–20th-Century Revivalist–Reformists' Re-Reading of the Qur'an**

**Ismail Albayrak**

School of Theology, Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, Australia Catholic University, Melbourne 3002, Australia<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
**Abstract:** The 19th and 20th centuries were times of great change and transformation for the Muslim world. The salvation of the ummah—which is getting politically, militarily, and economically more backward against the West, terms such as revival (*ihya*), renewal (*tajdid*) and reform and reconstruction (*islah*)—have occupied almost all intellectuals and ulama. Many prescriptions have been proposed on this subject, the most vivid examples of which are mainly related to new approaches to the Qur'an and its interpretation. This article deals with the innovations put forward by reformist–revivalist leaders in different Muslim geographies regarding the interpretation of the Qur'an under the influence of modernism. We see that these approaches, which are basically based on the assumption of the inadequacy of classical methods and understandings, open up to questions and discussions for many hermeneutical devices that have become entrenched in the classical period and even argue that they are now unnecessary. Contrary to classical Qur'anic exegesis, reformist *tajdid*-centered suggestions of polyphonic modern Qur'an interpretations, the theological reflections of these suggestions, and most importantly their effect (or ineffectiveness) on Muslim societies are among the main topics of the article. In the beginning, the pressure of modernity, which should not be ignored in the perception and interpretation of the Qur'an, has become an indispensable element in the course of time. This new phenomenon and changing conditions have forced many Muslim intellectuals to compromise on principles that have become norms. The result, instead of a healthy reform, consisted of eclectic innovations and only saved the day and could not find a serious ground for itself in the grassroots.

**Keywords:** the Qur'an; exegesis; *ijtihad*; revival; renewal; modernity

#### **1. Introduction**

One of the most important common features of the contemporary reformist–revival scholars and movements under their influence manifested in different Islamic geographies is the need for a new way of re-reading the Qur'an. Almost all of them have taken the Qur'an as a basis for the *tajdid* (renewal) and improvement to be realized. In this article, firstly the developments that came with the Renaissance and enlightenment in the West and their impact on the Islamic world will be discussed. Then, general discussions about the perception of modernism in the Muslim world will be summarized. Finally, the reflections of the reformist and revivalist perception on the re-reading of the Qur'an, which is the main dynamic in various renewalist and revivalist movements, will be covered. In doing so, besides Qur'an and exegesis, approaches to the other major sources and related disciplines will also be discussed. It should be noted at the outset that we use terms such as reformist, modernist, revivalist or renawalist in a very general sense because of the transitions and intersections between them. It is also important to note that we will not be discussing the revivalist movements in which traditional Qur'an readings are continued. We will not focus on those who show new approaches by dressing classical instruments in modern clothes. The main approaches we will concentrate on are how changing conditions of modern periods have forced many Muslim intellectuals to compromise on principles that

**Citation:** Albayrak, Ismail. 2022. Modernity, Its Impact on Muslim World and General Characteristics of 19–20th-Century Revivalist– Reformists' Re-Reading of the Qur'an. *Religions* 13: 424. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel13050424

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 7 February 2022 Accepted: 4 May 2022 Published: 7 May 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

have become norms. The result was that, instead of a healthy reform, eclectic innovations only saved the day, and could not find serious ground for itself in the grassroots.

#### **2. Modernism in the West**

At the beginning, it should be emphasized that modernism is not a concept which has had its boundaries drawn in a very clearly defined manner. In fact, it is a term which is defined in different ways by different people—both in terms of etymology and as a technical term. It is possible to summarize a special yet comprehensive definition of modernism, which is the development of a new point of view, as opposed to classical, traditional and ancient beliefs, as follows: 'the ideology and way of life brought to light by the mental transformation of the West which came with the Age of Enlightenment' (Demir and Acar 1992, p. 251). According to another description, modernism is both a philosophical and an art movement that refers to a global transformation in Western society and culture that from the early decades of the 19th and 20th centuries sought a new alignment with the experience and values of modern industrial life. It is an anthropocentric world view which is based on the foundations of humanism, secularism, and democracy, which gives supremacy and freedom to humankind, and seeks salvation in science rather than religion (Demir and Acar 1992). This, together with the fact that the comparison of all types of new things with the traditional, old, or ancient evokes modernism, modernity is presented to us as a never-ending process (Soyan 1993). In other words, modernism appears to us as a notion which is permanently constructing itself, in opposition to its old self. For this reason, post-modernism or post-post-modernism and the following processes are inevitable phenomena.

When we go back to the above definition, it does not evade our attention that enlightenment is a notification of modernism. The most radical change in this process is made to the traditional understanding of religion,—in particular, pietism, which views individual morals as the fundamental element of religion, and rationalism, which refutes all forms of orthodoxy have cracked the dogmatic structure of Protestantism (Erkilet 2001) and gives it a more liberal character (Sarıbay 1995). An important result of the emphasis on extreme rationalism, which we can call the corner stone of enlightenment, is its noteworthy variance from the status (authority) of the Bible. First, a limited God acting according to the laws of nature, and then many so called irrational Old and New Testament passages describing the transgression of these limits were tried to be presented in a more reasonable framework. In short, Christianity becomes historical and then history itself is given a more secular structure. According to A. Davuto ˘glu this is a revolution which allows the West to move from mythology to history (Davuto ˘glu 2001). However, it should not be forgotten that it is religion and faith which have been damaged the most from this revolution. That is because at the start of the Age of Enlightenment certain liberal thinkers, such as Baron d'Holbach, proposed that religion should be completely abandoned in order to be able to reach a full accord with nature, and this is extremely important in terms of how it exhibits the approach of the messengers of modernism. Even though they refuse to accept the authenticity of the religions, and despite the existence of certain pragmatists, such as Voltaire (Outram 1997),1 who stated that the existence of religion should not be ignored as it ensures social order, it had almost become fashionable to associate the cause of all types of negative factors with God.2

On the one hand, religion seems to have lost its privilege and old value within the community—or, to put it in more cautious terms, the existence of religion simply became a vehicle—while on the other hand ,the rationalization of society, which is acknowledged as the most important gift of modernism, has especially tested the incidents surrounding modern human, and then presented it in a dominant way. This shows the degression of metaphysics and an uptrend in positivism. Mind shows that knowledge is power. Within this process secularization carries the role of a catalyst in the ever-decreasing religious practice. Meanwhile, the separation of public and private areas by Weber played an important role in religion being seen as something which is personal or to do with one's own conscience, or, at the very least to be considered separate from the state and communal life. Clearly, whatever exists that is not in accord with the rational knowledge standards that come with the Age of Enlightenment, or, indeed, in conflict with them, now belongs in the individual area (Poole 1993). In a mentality where reason (intelligibility) is the sole measure of everything, it should be natural not giving the necessary place to religion. In a world where people possess the self-confidence, and unlimited right to criticize, for these people to exist and act constantly in accordance with their own subjectivity, God needed to die (Soyan 1993).

Further, the contemporary trinity (humanism, secularism, and democracy) upon which modernism is seated continuously evolves and transforms everything and makes it obligatory to move forward. Indeed, the fundamental reason underlying the emergence of many of the sciences in the West during the 19th century, such as historical philosophy, sociology, anthropology, the history of civilization, religious history, etc., is known to be the attempts to verify the correctness of the beliefs of progress, development, and modernization (Bulaç 1996). However, the essentiality of this change should not be limited just to religion. It is possible to observe changes in every area of social life, especially in sciences, politics, technology, architecture, morals, arts, aesthetics, etc. Additionally, the difference between economic (technological) and social (political, cultural, legal, artistic) modernism shows the intellectual transformation of modernism within a more categorical framework. With modernization, which has been shaped by the fundamental propositions of the philosophy of enlightenment, the West has achieved economic welfare on the one hand, through the industrial revolution, and on the other hand the democratic administrative structure which is present in the political arena. Further, being protected from social and political instability, avoiding the tyranny of an all-powerful state, and guaranteeing peace and ensuring the balance of power, which they achieved after the Vienna Congress in 1815 (Altun 2002), which had met for that very purpose, has led Westerners to obtain self-confidence and made them believe that the developments they would achieve in the commercial and industrial arenas via their well-organized states, and the financial development which resulted from this would be irrevocable. Further, both the administrative imperialism and the commercial dominance (colonialism) (O'Leary 1995) the West achieved over the rest of the world meant that they were placed in the very center of history and led them to view history through a one-sided perspective.

The clearest traces of this multi-sided development were felt much more within the social and cultural life. The progressive and evolutionary understanding which continued in a straight line forced some (such as August Comte) to see this process (theological, metaphysical, positive) as something that all communities must experience, and that otherwise they would disappear (Bulaç 1996). Therefore, the West has seen modernism as the peak point which could be achieved by any community. Indeed, some have even evaluated the attempts of other communities to undertake the Western-centered modernization as a national conversion into becoming civilized without hesitation (Davuto ˘glu 2001).

Scientific and technological developments are also important motives which led to a speedier transformation. The father of the atom bomb, Julius Robert Oppenheimer, argued that 'the technical progress made by mankind in the last 40 years is greater than the developments achieved in the 40 centuries' (Izzetbegovic 1989, p. 61); this is an important evaluation in that it shows the extent of the mentioned transformation. As well as creating communities which produce more and consume more, this speedy transformation caused serious damage to traditional views of religion and of the world. Modernism incited the individualistic and egotistical characteristics of humankind and broke their ties with the traditional community. Modernization caused individuals to act as if they were each some sort of small God, and as well as not refraining from devouring and obliterating natural resources in order to meet the economic demands of some societies led to unfair competition and exploitation through the cooperation of centralized state power and bureaucracy (Dallmayr 2001). Many critics of modernism state that it has not met every

need of humankind, and that, indeed, it has led to a more materialistic world, and a world which has become a commodity with human being at its center (ibid.).

Together with this, the problems faced on this matter by the West who experienced modernism considerably earlier than the Islamic world, are somewhat more. The emphasis on extreme positivism, the attempts to find the absolute universal truth based on experimentation and experience, causing the engineering of artificial communities by ignoring the existence of many factors which shape human life, by implementing scientific symptoms similar to those lost in the physical arena to social sciences and humanities, the continuous attempts to evaluate others in line with their own value measurements, and the acceptance of Western based communal, political, cultural and legal developments as the only measure has caused modernization to arrive at various impasses. Furthermore, the two important World Wars (I and II) caused by the West, and the serious economic crisis caused by the free market in America in 1929, together with this scientific and economic development, has led various philosophers to seriously question whether rational Western people possess the qualifications required to oversee science and its data (Davuto ˘glu 2001).

Added to this is the fact that contrary to Newtonian understanding of physics, Einstein's theory of relativity draws attention to the presence of more than one framework of time, etc., and these developments can also be seen as among the important factors disproving the accent on only one truth (Murphy 1995). This new era can be called postmodernism, or it can be referred to as ultra, neo or post-industrial or digital periods, but the fact is that the assumption that a different time is being experienced can be very clearly seen. However, this does not mean the arguments for modernism have disappeared completely. While post-modernism is, in contrast to modernism, carries a more relativistic, pluralistic truth claims, and allows for God in the life of the individual and of the community,3 its many meta-statements, on the other hand have also been able to carry subjectivity and distinctiveness.

#### **3. Muslim Perception of Modernism/Modernity**

It will be beneficial to touch on the Muslim world and its experience of modernism, which is more important in terms of our subject matter discussion. The Muslim geography has spent the last three centuries in a very deep political, ideological, social, and commercial crisis. It cannot be said that they have come out of this crisis, even today. In particular, the intervention of Western powers has caused Muslim states to weaken, and even for much of the established and cultural heritage to be turned upside down. While on the one hand Western nations used their economic supremacy to control local industry in various regions such as the Ottoman lands, Iran, Indian Subcontinent, Egypt, North Africa, Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, etc., on the other hand they have succeeded in entering into local culture through the schools they have established in these regions (Lapidus 1996).

In Subcontinent, the Westerners, who were employed in the political and military arena by the weakening Moghul governments established schools in the region where they ensured that children grew up into intellectuals who could translate their own views. The Muslims, who had been the dominant class in the region, lost this distinction, especially after English became the only language used in state authorities and schools. The truth is that Hindus found more openings for themselves within the new structure of the region, in place of Muslims who lost their importance, both in the financial sense, and in their social status (Ahmed 1990).

The situation is no different in other regions either. Westerners established a school in Lebanon as early as 1728, and this school was followed by Maronite colleges established in 1735 and 1795 (Lapidus 1996). The intellectuals who became a sort of volunteer ambassadors of the new Western values played an important role in the cultivating nationalism and secularism in the lands where they lived. The effects of these individuals are not limited to just modern Western education either. This new elite who ensured that goods from the West were sold in the local markets, also published numerous newspapers and magazines to try to affect the structure of thought of local people in favour of the liberal Western thought. If we look in particular at the media sector in various different Muslim regions, it is seen that the effective activities of the non-Muslim minorities in this sector were not a coincidence (ibid.). An interesting point about the economy is that all Muslim countries became completely dependent on the West in the second half of the 19th century. The Ottomans were in a state where they were unable to pay even the interest of the loans they took from Western countries in 1882. In 1875, Egypt was under the complete control of public debt (ibid.). The situation in Iran and India was no different to that of the Ottomans and Egypt.

The Muslim civilization, which had been continuously dominant against non-Muslim nations in both the East and the West for centuries entered into such a defeated relationship with the dominant West that this has led Muslim intellectuals to try to find ways out of this situation. During this period, when the defeated were forced to imitate the victorious, it was observed that the first reforms were in the field of the defense industry, due to the fact that military insufficiencies were given as the reasons for lost battles. In Ottoman case, Selim III. employed Swedish, French, British and Hungarian engineers and established military and naval schools, and those similar structures were implemented in the Egypt of Mehmet Ali Pasha and in Tunisia where a large number of Italian engineers were employed (Hüseyin 1986). As well as reforms concerning defense, many reforms followed in various fields, in these regions. The reform movements initially carried the idea that they could take the scientific techniques of the West and combine these with Islamic morals, but as the speedy decline of the Muslim world continued and spread even further, it is observed that Western civilization, which was at first seen as an unavoidable evil, became transformed into an indispensable good (Kara 1986). The following comment made by Ö. Çaha, shows the status of the attempts of the Ottoman State, which was in very close contact with the West, to modernize, very clearly: 'The laws enacted during the period between 1840 and the declaration of the 2nd Constitution (1908) were more numerous and more comprehensive than the laws cited during the Republican period' (Çaha 2001, p. 273). These new laws, in some instances a more eclectic and radical reform, rather than a more European or more traditional Islamic understanding of law, were aimed for in different areas (social, political, administrative, family law, penal law, citizenship, etc.).

In the meantime, an important point that needs reminding is that, contrary to the West, modernization and revivalist movements in Muslim countries appeared, and continued as a sort of religious movement (Kara 2001). That is why the role played by the traditional scholars (*ulama*) during this process is extremely important in terms of our subject. While it is not possible to define a single attitude amongst the ulama, in general their relationship with the modernist experience of Muslims presents a tragi-comic structure. It is true that the Ottoman ulama supported the reform movements to a certain extent. However, on the one hand the ulama were accused of being short-sighted when they supported innovation and Western style new laws in the country, and on the other hand, when they did not support it, they were accused of being against the reform. Religious foundations and trustees (*awqaf* lands and properties) are very good illustrations in this regard. Colonial powers could not intervene the *awqaf* because Ottoman lands and very important real estates were in *awqaf* status. The elimination of the ruling in these religious foundations and institutions would mean the removing of a serious obstacle in front of the colonization. While some revivalist scholars were aware of the danger, many liberal and reformists considered this in the context of personal liberties, property ownership, freedom, etc. This situation resulted in the cancellation of this feature of foundation properties and lands. Turkish exegete Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, who worked as a minister of religious foundation during late Ottoman government, described the situation by saying that eastern table (*maide-i ¸sark*) has been made ready to be to be eaten by the colonial powers (Öztürk 1993, p. 196).

It is possible to see a similar attitude in other Muslim regions too. Further, the more active role played by intellectuals, who had been brought up in the West, in the social and political life of the countries. They caused the existing status of the ulama to weaken and a new elite, apart from the traditional ulama, about to be born. While one group aimed to modernize Islam from within by taking fundamental religious principles as their basis in the reform movements, another group was proposing a modernization where secular and nationalist sentiments were at the forefront, at European political and economic forums (Lapidus 1996). Further, while the thoughts of some on change were within the framework of ethical and religious reforms, others were hoping to make the socio-cultural structures of Muslims in the communal area fit in with the requirements of the modern era (Merad n.d.). As a result, the reform and revivalist movements undertaken by the seemingly more conservative attitude and those whose approach was more liberal, in the face of the West, caused semantic changes in many of the key terms of Islam (Bulaç 1996; Kara 1986). For instance, the identifying of Islamic Law with the rules of logic on which Western civil laws are based, or the attachment of Muslims to their religion with that of the attachment Westerners felt for the love of their countries by the Egyptian scholar Rifaa Tahtawi, who lived in Paris between 1826–1836 are good examples of this semantic change (Hüseyin 1986). Additionally, this required the Qur'an being interpreted in a new way, and its meanings being developed using modern approaches.

The return to the Qur'an and attempts to have it stated in a way that can be perceived in the modern century, which was supported by all religious, secular, and even atheist individuals living on Muslim soil, came about in the same way everywhere. We now want to touch on, albeit briefly, the conspicuous differences amongst Muslim intellectuals on Qur'anic readings, in this critical process of modernization. In order for it to be a systematic presentation, it is possible to list the mentioned differences under principal headings, and within the framework of some examples (Merto ˘glu 2001, 2010). However, together with this, the inference must be made that the fundamental characteristics in modern revivalist Qur'anic readings are the shared characteristics of many reform-minded Muslim intellectuals (Merto ˘glu 2001, 2010). That is because, as we will see later, the Muslim intellectuals in the 19th and 20th centuries exhibited a point of view, which, rather than being a single type of approach to interpretation, was at times even contradictory to its own systematic or inconsistent in its commentary. That is why it would be beneficial to perceive the fundamental characteristics of modern Qur'anic readings as the more frequent approaches to interpretation rather than as generally valid or as indispensable. It is possible to summarise these distinctive characteristics and renewal spirit in modernist Qur'anic exegesis as follows.

#### 1. Qur'an centric reading of the Qur'an in modernity

One of the most fundamental characteristics of modern Qur'anic readings is that they are centered on the Qur'an. As an extension of the emphasis on the Qur'an which came with Shah Wali Allah, modern Muslim intellectuals say that because Muslims have been occupied with many Islamic disciplines the turn of the Qur'an did not arrive, and that an important amount of time has been spent on studying in other areas, and that is why not enough accent has been placed on the Qur'an. They further state that the Qur'an is not limited to just being in the monopoly of the ulama, experts and the jurists, but that it is the natural right of everyone (even non-Muslims) to give consideration to its meanings. Therefore, the modern Muslim reformer does not accept an approach such as the obliqueness of the Qur'an. The Qur'an is the clearest text; it can be understood without the need for external sources. Within this context re-reading and interpretations of the Qur'an are valued highly. The reader should be faced directly with the Qur'an, and should deliberate, reflect, discuss, and contemplate on it. Indeed, some intellectuals believe that even the *mutashabihat* (ambiguous or verses with multiple meanings) in the Qur'an possess the characteristic of being easy to understand which exceeds the classical understanding of them (Saeed 2005; Koç 2012; Kayacan 2013; Gökkır 2014). For instance, while Parwiz interprets *muhkam* as reality (*haqiqat*) and *mutashabih* as research (*tahqiqat*), we witness that Ahmad Khan interprets the former as fundamental principles and the latter as symbolic verses. Egyptian scholar Jawhari, however, possesses a more interesting point of view; the former points to existing species, while the latter refers to evolution (Baljon 1961).

A natural conclusion of this method of reading which is centered heavily on the Qur'an is that the sceptic approach among modern thinkers towards hadiths has become more prevalent. Even though the observed effects of the classical orientalist criticisms, such as the delayed codification of the hadiths, the insufficiency of the *isnad* (chain of transmitters) system(!), and sometimes the presence of some reports which are difficult to compile with the content of the Qur'an, cannot be denied, it is also true that modern Muslim revivalists have been giving direction to each other on the matter too. The most interesting attitude on this matter is the use of Qur'anic verses to disregard or ignore the hadiths. Scholars such as Ahmaduddin, Cheragh Ali, Parwiz, Chakralawi, Mashriqi, etc., are the first to display negative views on the prophetic traditions (Birı¸sık 2001). Mashriqi, for instance, associates the interpretation of the Qur'an in the light of the prophetic tradition as a sign of seeing the Qur'an with the insufficient perception (Birı¸sık 2001).

#### 2. Critical evaluations of the traditional schools of thought

They do not accept traditional juristic schools and consensus. Their opposition to innovation and imitation are somewhat dominant in their writings. Additionally, their emphasis on new judicial opinion or reasoning is almost like an indispensable characteristic of all modern intellectuals. The opinions of past scholars are not valid today, because these opinions are historical, and they have been based on the time and situation which existed in the past. Islam, on the other hand, is a religion of logic and has structured itself on top of *ijtihad*. Hence, opinion has been seen as the essential condition of this great religion. However, as stated by many individuals, it should not be the duty of individual religious scholar to form *ijtihads* (new judicial opinion or reasoning), but of committees made up of experts in different fields (Jansen 1993; Siddiqi 1982). The door to *ijtihad* must be reopened. Some argue that this *ijtihad* will be realised through new Islamic legal studies which are centered on the Qur'an, rather than through traditional Islamic schools' methodologies such as the way of *mutakallimun* (theologians) or *fuqaha* (jurists). However, in such a project all Islamic legal sources other than the Qur'an may be ignored. Another point that needs to be reminded here is that contemporary scholars who are attempting to realise a new legal understanding centered on the Qur'an contradict even each other. Two important examples on the matter are Ahmaduddin's statement of the ritual prayer being performed to be three times a day, while Chakralawi says that there is nothing in the Qur'an about the call to prayer and concludes that it is tantamount to blasphemy (Albayrak 2004).

#### 3. Criticism of Qur'anic sciences and sub-disciplines

The insufficiency of the Qur'anic sciences is another of the important subjects paid attention to by modern reformist scholars. According to them, the existing material should be evaluated in a systematic and critical manner, and a new method of interpretation should be developed. The most striking approach on the matter is displayed by Mashriqi and Fazlurrahman, who argue that the traditional Qur'anic sciences are pushing people away from the Qur'an (Rahman 1990; Çoruh 2019).

They do not in general accept the existence of *naskh* within the Qur'an (Rahbar 1956; Çoruh 2019; Sim¸ ¸ sek n.d.). The subject of *naskh* is defined as one of the most difficult areas of exegesis in chapter three of *al-Fawd al-Kabir* of Shah Wali Allah (al-Dihlawi n.d.). Wali Allah argues that because of disagreement about exact scope of the notion of the *naskh*, some people increased the number of abrogated verses up to five hundred. Suyuti, in line with the exegete Abu Bakr b. al-Arabi, reduced this number from five hundred to twenty, and states that he himself has issues with this figure, namely twenty, before proceeding to look into the subject matter verses one by one, and reducing the number of abrogated verses to five (al-Dihlawi n.d.). This approach displayed by Dihlawi has encouraged his successors to evaluate the notion of *naskh* as a matter of *ijtihadi* (based on analogy and rational reasoning) issue, and even some to completely deny its existence within the Qur'an. For these many modern intellectuals and reformers, the Word of God is so great that it cannot be abrogated based on the views of people. Together with this, and there are also many modern Muslim

thinkers who do not deny *naskh*, there are also those whose approach is that it is the abrogation of the books of former religious traditions (Albayrak 2004; Sim¸ ¸ sek n.d.).

Due to the providence concerning the hadiths, the reports of the occasion of revelations cannot be accepted when trying to understand the verses. In general, these modern scholars try to obtain the historical background of the Qur'anic passage from their textual context. Further, by frequently referring to certain issues in daily life, they have attempted to apply the verses to events that occurred during post-revelation period despite the existence of various subjectivity and ungrounded claims. Nevertheless, together in particular with the insistent emphasis of pro-historical hermeneutical readings of the Qur'an, the importance of the reports of the occasion of revelations have begun to re-emerge and increase in recent times (Albayrak 2004).

Another important point in the writings of the reformist scholars in Qur'anic exegesis is the notion of *tanasub/munasabat* (thematic and textual unity). The classical exegetes acknowledge *tanasub* (thematic unity) to be the most honourable of Qur'anic sub-disciplines, but which has not been able to achieve the necessary level of recognition in the commentaries of the Qur'an. Even though it is said that their recent insistence on *tanasub* is due to the fact that they are trying to establish an anti-thesis to the argument of some Western scholars that the Qur'anic verses, passages, and chapters were brought together in a disorganised way, there are other reasons too. The most significant one is that , as opposed to the approach of classical interpreters, who viewed the verses and passages separately and interpreted them part by part, the approach by modern intellectuals, where they looked into the Qur'an as a whole, has resulted in observing a large number of elegant and deep meanings in this unity (Albayrak 2004; Çoruh 2019).

There is a serious reaction against the *isra'iliyyat* reports (Biblical materials) in Qur'anic exegesis. The knowledge among some modern exegetes of the Qur'an of foreign languages or their grasp of the content of the sacred texts in the Hebrew or Syriac languages makes them different from classical counterparts. For example, Charagh Ali and Farahi used to know Hebrew as well as some other Western languages (Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2001). Due to this, they have been able to read the Bible in its original or translated versions. Baljon states that modern Muslim intellectuals concentrated more on the Bible than extra-Biblical materials, such as the Talmud (Baljon 1961), or non-canonical writings of Christians. The most important pillar of the modern period of Muslim enlightenment is the total rejection of these exegetical narrations (Albayrak 2004). Sometimes, while criticizing the narrators who transmitted such reports with a heavy language, they sometimes make diachronic comments: 'this *ummah* cannot compete with or struggle against the state of Israel without fighting the reports of *israiliyyat*.' (˙ Islamo ˘glu 2017a; Metin 2021). Some go further and uses some provacative expression to mix *israiliyyat* reports with modern state of Israel: 'Coca Cola belongs to Israel, to whom do *israiliyyat* reports belong?' or '*israiliyyat* is a state of Israel that fled into the Muslim communities' (˙ Islamo ˘glu 2017b). These tragi-comic comments consider *israiliyyat* reports as an under-cover Mossad agent. This is an interesting anomaly in modern times.

The classical emphasis on the lofty rhetorical nature and literal dispensation of the Qur'an has been ignored in a considerable way in modern times. According to modern reformist, there is no difference between the Arabic spoken by a fluent Arab who lived during that time and the language used by the Qur'an. They openly expressed their dissatisfaction with prioritizing of the Qur'anic Arabic to other languages. As stated by Mashriqi, the rhetoric of the Qur'an is not to be sought in the composition of the text or the literary style, but in the manner in which it is seeking the right path. Importance should not be paid to the linguistic analyses of the Qur'an based on its wording. The message is more important than the literal imitability of the meaning of the words (Baljon 1961; Albayrak 2004). The Qur'an has explained many events by using different words and statements. In relation to this, it is also seen that modern intellectuals either have not made particular use of classical Arabic dictionaries or have frequently stated their inadequacies (Baljon

1961; Çoruh 2019; Albayrak 2004). Similarly, they also disregard various other linguistic apparatus of classical scholarship.

4. Reading the Qur'an in the light of modern sciences

The interpretation of the Qur'an is based on intelligence and the data contained within modern science. The Qur'anic expression *furqân* (the capability of human being to tell right from wrong) in the 4th verse of the chapter Al Imran, the importance of which is stated by Muhammad Abduh, is well-known to be also defined as intelligence (Jansen 1993). Karamat Ali states that the Qur'an contains numerous passages about physics and mathematics, and even that it discusses the old systems of philosophy from all their angles (Ahmed 1990). Interestingly, for him, this is an important piece of evidence as to how much importance has been attached to scientific rhetoric rather than literary rhetoric of the Qur'an. It is argued that reason cannot contradict the revelations, and that therefore many Qur'anic explanations are presented within the framework of intelligent definitions. Should any disaccord between modern science and the verses of the Qur'an be noticed, this must have resulted from a misunderstanding of the scientific data or from scientific opinions which have yet to be completely proven (Siddiqi 1982). As a result of these obsessions with the modern science and radically positivistic attempts to read the Qur'an, it is observed that with many scientific remarks where the text of the Qur'an suffers great difficulties because many new meanings produced from the Qur'an are foreign to the text of the Qur'an itself.

Some of the examples in which the miracles of the Qur'an are rationalized and presented in a scientific context are as follows:, Qur'anic *jinn*s (unseen beings or spirits) being defined as savage or Bedouin groups of people rather than invisible beings, the *Iblis* (Satan) being defined as an internal force within human representing his or her evil side, the parting of the sea at the time of the Prophet Moses' leaving Egypt as the tide, the Prophet Solomon's corpse not rotting after his death due to it being kept in candle wax. Similarly in the chapter Naml (27:18) the statement by one ant to the others 'go to your homes so that Solomon and his armies do not notice you and crush you', as showing ants to be germ bugs which spread bacteria, and the statement in the chapter al-Baqara (2:195) ' ... do not lead yourselves into danger by your own hands.' as related to hygiene or preventative medicine) (Baljon 1961; Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2004). The scientific explanations concerning the theory of evolution and the use of the Qur'anic material do not escape notice either.

At a time when the extremely rationalist point of view developed by the West after the Age of Enlightenment has been replaced by questioning positivistic nature of the science and its absolute truth claim together with that science has not clarified everything, the absolute confidence and reliance shown by Muslim intellectuals on the power of science and intellect forms an interesting irony (Baljon 1961). Further, the famous motto of Ahmad Khan, where 'The Word of God and the Works of God cannot contradict each other' (Rahbar 1956) identifies revelations with events in nature, and as a natural result of this many modernist readers of the Qur'an display a negative attitude towards traditionally accepted miracles. Baljon explains that there are three approaches on the matter: i. the complete refusal of the miracles; ii. showing that the miracles are in accord with the laws of nature by using rational explanations and iii. accepting the miracles but only affording them the minimum of importance (Baljon 1961). For instance, some refute the prophetic traditions on the heavenly journey (*isra* and *mi'raj*) because they find it contrary to the laws of nature, while some have perceived it as a mystical inner experience of the Prophet. As for those who accept the miracles, it is said that they do not afford it the highest significance in terms of proof of the status of the Prophet, because the Qur'an is addressing the intelligence of people, and encouraging them to think in a sensible way (Merto ˘glu 2001). In fact, many modernist thinkers consider the most important miracles to be the Qur'an and the Prophet themselves, and that there is no need to chase after external signs in order to appreciate Islam. For instance, Muhammed Husayin Haykal states that there is no miracle within the Qur'an to prove the status of the Prophet Muhammed, and that the only miracle sent to him was the Qur'an itself (Siddiqi 1982).

Another important feature of modern reformist reading of the Qur'an is to metaphorize and allegorize the meaning of the various verses in connection with the above point. It has been seen that these types of explanations, which are somewhat relative and arbitrary, are attempting to empty some verses about the unseen and hereafter. Parwiz perceives the verses which are to do with heaven and hell as being about the peace and problems on earth, or as stated in the verse 2:36 'However, Satan caused them to slip out of it and removed them from that [condition] in which they had been. Additionally, We said, "Go down, [all of you], as enemies to one another, and you will have upon the earth a place of settlement and provision for a time." Parwiz interprets this *ihbitu* (go down) as the immature (*ghayr mukallaf*) becoming liable (*mukallaf*) is a good illustration of it (Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2004). These are some of the important examples of symbolic readings of some Qur'anic words.

Debates concerning the historical authenticity of the narratives of the Qur'an: The most important representative of this approach is the Egyptian scholar Muhammed Khalaf Allah. He sees the events experienced by the previous Prophets and described in the Qur'an as a series of tales reflected in the heart of the Prophet and says that these parables gave comfort to the Prophet. He also states that these parables are not obliged to be based on the truth (Baljon 1961; Sim¸ ¸ sek n.d.). Although this is a marginal approach for many reformists, it can easily be said that this view is supported by a certain group of Muslim scholars. What kind of contribution this understanding made to contemporary Qur'an readings is another matter of discussion? However, it offers very important clues in order to learn the general perception of the Qur'an by those who adopt such approaches.

#### 5. Trials of new hermeneutic approaches

One of the important approaches is the adoption of the historical hermeneutical interpretation of the Qur'an by some Muslim intellectuals, especially influenced by the works of the Biblical hermeneutical studies. Traces of the debates on historicist readings of the Qur'an, which we see more frequently in recent times, are evident in earlier times as well. The matter which is debated concerns in particular the Muslims' point of view of the nature of Qur'an and its binding status. The Shi'ite author Amir Ali states that 'the assumption that all Qur'anic propositions are forced not to change is an unjust intervention both on history and on the development of human intellect' (Ahmed 1990, p. 109), and, in this way, points to the difference between the unchangeable (fixed) provisions of the Qur'an, and those which are changeable (open to new interpretation). Asaf Ali has a clearer approach and goes into making difference between legal order and moral order (Albayrak 2004). There are also some authors, who, while not displaying a systematic approach, use an atomic approach from time to time in order to imply that some Qur'anic verses are no longer valid in the modern world. Halim Sabit defines the law of natural disposition in creation (*qanun al-fitrah*) as changing judgements in the face of time, place and status' (Merto ˘glu 2001). Bashir Ahmad Dar observes the verse on the people who are warming towards Islam as a provision or those whose hearts have been reconciled (*mu'allafa al-qulub*) which later loses its meaning (Baljon 1961, p. 61). This type of approach is seen too in Parwiz's explanations about the necessity for men and women to receive equal shares of inheritance (Baljon 1961). Further, some modern reformist evaluated the fact that Arab culture at the time of the revelation was included in Qur'anic narratives within the framework of the relationship of the Qur'an with the past events (occasion of revelations). Thus, for them, this indicates not universality but the locality of some Qur'anic commandments.

#### 6. Taking social realities and contemporary situation into account

In contrast to classical interpretation, there is more attention paid to social, political and actual fields. This is one of the most important aspects of the revivalist reading of the Qur'an. The education of Muslims, the status of women within the community (divorce, family planning, polygyny, the right to inheritance, equality, etc.), types of government for Muslims (many debate the advantages of democracy over monarchy or the separation of the affairs of state from religious affairs), the economy, and in particular the matter of interest

have been dealt with very frequently. It is necessary for the ayahs of the Qur'an to be interpreted again in the light of new socio-political context. For instance, verse 42:38 about the administrative responsibilities of public, where the statement: ' ... those who deal with matters among themselves in council ... ' is said to be pointing to the parliamentary system (Jansen 1993). Further, many believe that modern economic life makes financial interest necessary. Redefinition of the meaning of interest inevitable. Of course, this new conceptualisation brings many other anomalies together. For instance, as regards the interest, the basis for its legitimacy is shown in the verse 2:185, where it says, 'God wants to make things easier for you, not harder ... '. This is somewhat interesting (Baljon 1961; Jansen 1993; Albayrak 2004). Moreover, the modern thinkers can comfortably use numerous verses to validate their own opinions. Within this context, one of the important areas of emphasis of modern scholars is their attempt to actively include Muslims within history. The argument that those that are not of the earth or worldly cannot be present in the hereafter either is repeated frequently. The Qur'an does not prescribe just the ritual prayer, fasting or almsgiving, it also prescribes progress. Additionally, progress is only realised when Muslims become wealthier and more advanced. It is possible to sense progressive and revivalist state of mind in the comment by late Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam Musa Kazım that, ' ... money is something that enables life to be lived; it is necessary for salvation, in fact it is life itself (*ma bihi'l-hayattır*);; and it is necessary to be wealthy ... ' (Kazım 1909, p. 52; Merto ˘glu 2001, p. 137; Albayrak 2004).  For the interpretation of the expression *atqakum* (most devoted, God-conscious) as *as'âkum* (the most hard working one and the new meanings gained by the word *kasb* (earning) (Merto ˘glu 2001). The explanations of Parwiz concerning the word *muddathir* (the cloaked one) shed light on the matter too. *Disru'l-mâl* is seen as 'a revenues officer' (Baljon 1961). Thus, Parwiz presents the Prophet not only as the founder of a new religion, but also as the leader of material means, which is the key to worldly prosperity (Baljon 1961, pp. 99–100). He takes out the word in question not only from the textual context, but also from the socio-historical framework and gives it a new meaning. Even if we cannot define this as being totally secularised in the modern sense, these types of approaches are important in a way that they vary from the line taken by very well-established classical scholarship.

The serious criticism of mystic approaches: Especially in classical interpretations, these mystical interpretations are mentioned after the linguistic, historical, and rhetorical interpretation as a richness of the meanings. However, in reformist mind, these comments, as well as the mysticism which they feed off are rejected as causing slackness among Muslims (Albayrak 2004). Disaccord in religion is not a hurdle to equality. There are attempts amongst citizens, and therefore also within the framework of brotherhood to evaluate the subject in some way (Merto ˘glu 2001). In other words, Mystics do not fit the active Muslim perception in the minds of reformer scholars.

The modern revivalist interpretation is very selective. That is the reason they have paid great attention to the verses which discuss the provision of social justice, equality (Merto ˘glu 2001; Albayrak 2004) friendship, brotherhood/sisterhood, unity, etc.

Another area where the effect of modernism is very clearly (and perhaps over abundantly) seen on modern reformists is the more moderate or humanist approach to the interpretations of the concept of *jihad* (struggle and fighting) within the Qur'an, or the verses where the punishment handed out by God to the unbelievers is discussed. *Jihad* is only to be used as a form of defense; God is not a Creator to be frightened of, He is a creator to befriend. His Grace comes before everything, even Justice. These and other similar types of approaches are emphasized very frequently (Baljon 1961; Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2004). As an extension of this the distances between the religions have sometimes been decreased, and that shared values (the universality of fundamental moral principles) have been paid attention to, increasing the explanations that these values are the same in every religion, and separating religion and *shariah*.

It displays approaches which are centered on man, which attach a great deal of importance to the free will of human and evaluates him as an individual who is aware of his responsibilities. It will be beneficial here to remember in particular their active approach to the concepts of fate and destiny.

The wealth of meanings of the text in the Qur'an has been widened with psychological comments as well in many revivalist scholars' writing. Sayid Qutub's exegesis is full of this kind of examples which is alien to its classical counterparts (Düven 2020).

#### **4. Discussion and Conclusions**

So far, we have tried to summarize the process of modernization in the Islamic world and the attempts of Muslims, who live this process in a more passive structure compared to the West, to get rid of the current situation and crises with special references to the Qur'an. Before discussing the general structure of reformist–revivalist Qur'an readings in the light of the articles about the main paradigms of modern Qur'an reading, it is useful to clarify a few issues. First of all, it should be noted that expressions such as reformist–revivalist and renewal(ist) can be deceptive due to the breadth of their content and application areas. When we take into account not only such statements, but also their fellows (modernist, restorationist, renovationist, liberalist, progressive, rationalist, moderate(ist), secularists, reawaken(ist), revitalization(ist), constructivists etc.), we can witness intersections and divergences in many *tajdid* and reform movements (Haddad 1986; Ali and Orofino 2018, p. 27; Ali 2011). While an individual scholar may exhibit a very traditional attitude on one subject, he may adopt a liberal attitude that goes beyond the text of the Qur'an on another subject. On another issue, it is seen that he prefers to be renewed within the tradition. For this reason, as stated at the beginning of the article, we tried to use the aforementioned expressions in a very general sense. The 'revivalist-reformist' in the title of the article also refers to the dichotomy that expresses these intersections.

The article, which summarizes the views put forward about the new Qur'an readings and exegetical methods in the contemporary period, in the context of modernity, draws attention to the differences between the old and new hermeneutical perceptions, and from time to time pointed to the specific scholars who hold certain opinion. However, since the main target is the search for new methods rather than the commentators, the individual views of revivalist–reformist commentators and scholars have not been systematically analyzed with all their features. Because the aim of the article is the critical re-evaluations of the mindset and thought that reduces the experience of modernism and the social, economic and political problems of Muslims to the problem of understanding the Qur'an. However, it is a fact that the individuals in question also affected some of the masses that came after them. Abduh and the modern Salafi approaches or Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh school and many educated Muslim elites are typical examples of this. It should be noted that this interaction was not specifically mentioned in the article. In summary, when we say reformist–renewalist or revivalist, we do not mean groups such as *Tablighi Jamaat* or *Ikhwan Muslimin* that emerged in the contemporary period. As Ali Jan said, the main purpose of these groups is to inculcate Islamic orthodoxy in the masses in the Muslim world as well as in diaspora communities through institutional developments, socio-political activities, missionary preaching, and propagation. Rather, we mean those who seek to get rid of intellectual stagnation, put an end to transmission and narration of the predecessors and develop a new methodology of interpretation of the Qur'an at the hermeneutic level. In other words, we target the group that wants to realize the renewal at the epistemic level first. However, it should not be forgotten that some of the searches for the methods of understanding the Qur'an mentioned in the article are also seen in the conservative or more traditional revivalist movements.

Revivalist–reformist Qur'an readings aim at adapting the verses of the Qur'an to changing conditions and ensuring renewal (*tajdid*). There is no doubt that such Qur'an readings and understanding of exegesis bring a dynamism to Muslims' relationship with the Qur'anic text. However, the most important difference from traditional revivalist approaches is how much autonomy the unchanging Qur'an expressions are applied to changing conditions. As the article draws attention to the approaches of reformist–revivalists with some extreme examples, it is seen that open-ended and uncontrolled interpretations force the imagination of the classical perception (the Qur'an, sunnah, ijma and qiyas are accepted as the criteria and the Qur'an is the eternal word of Allah and it is always contemporary). In other words, a change in *tajdid* (renewals) is normally a gradual, brings a new perspective to the assimilation of the main Islamic sources (Qur'an, hadith) whereas in reformist–revivalist, it can be fast and sometimes top-down and radical. Revivalistreformist thinkers include a wide spectrum and although some of them have traditional revivalist reflexes (only rejecting the taqlid, imitation), mostly with the influence of modernity, their conclusions go beyond the borders of the Qur'anic text. This new approach, in which the mind is prioritized, and the human being is put in the center, contains many different colors and tones.

We have observed that there are endless suggestions and practices in the context of progress, modernization and understanding the Qur'an in accordance with the contemporary modern life, of very important concepts such as *tajdid* (renewal) and *islah* (restitution and reconstruction). It is an indisputable fact that the Islamic civilization, which is a fiqh civilization (Jabiri 1997) 4 in the traditional sense. By the civilization of fiqh, we mean the more practical aspect, and from one's individual life to social and political life, a Muslim responds to everything s/he encounters in his daily life with an Islamic 'judicial mind', that is, a fiqh coding. Everything he encounters is either halal (lawful) or haram (unlawful) (Aktay 2008, p. 46). However, this understanding has gradually moved away from the classical method in the contemporary period. It can be observed in this context that the hierarchy of evidence in the methodology of jurisprudence is overturned. For example, while the basic evidence of the methodology of jurisprudence such as Sunnah, ijma and qiyas are pushed into the background, controversial secondary evidences among the juristic schools such as maslahat, custom, istihsan, etc., has been brought to the fore (Kavak 2011, p. 161). More interestingly, it is the clearest evidence of paradigmatic shift that the main works within the traditional juristic schools, which are accepted by everyone, have been replaced by names such as Ibn Hazm, Shatibi, Tufi, Ibn Qayyim and Shawqani (Kavak 2011). As stated in the article, while the juristic schools and their views were completely evaporated, a new trend of ijtihad centered on the Qur'an but with uncertain methods and open-ended borders began. This new perception of *ijtihad* limited to the Qur'an, on the other hand, is a significant issue in that it shows the profound influence of modernity on the contemporary scholars and reformist–revivalist thoughts. For this perception, which accepts every interpretation of the Qur'an as a contemporary ijtihad, sects lose their meaning. We can easily see in some of the leading scholars of this reformist–revivalist an approach that attributes the bill of backwardness to the wrong religious education and perception of religion and sees it as the main obstacle to progress instead of updating classical methodologies. In the search for alternatives, it was first started as the inadequacy of classical Islamic disciplines and resulted in the making of Qur'anic exegesis, which is a secondary discipline compared to Islamic jurisprudence and theology (*fiqh* and *kalam*) as the primary and only discipline. Paçacı explains it eloquently 'As a result of modernity, the relationship among Islamic disciplines in question has deteriorated, and exegesis (*tafsir*), for example, has gained a prescriptive feature, as opposed to its descriptive character in the classical period, under the influence of Protestant scriptualism and textualism. In addition, theology (*kalam*) and especially jurisprudence (*fiqh*), which were the rule-making binding disciplines of the classical period, have largely lost their functions in the contemporary period' (Paçacı 2003, p. 85). In summary, the last two centuries of Muslim renewal and revivalist thoughts and some movements carried out the alleged reforms through the interpretation of the Qur'an. Of course, there are exceptions, but many reformists from Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan to Abduh (Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism is also included although he did not write a complete commentary) have made exegesis an indispensable part of reform movements. The efforts of these reformist approaches are admirable, as they have been

instrumental in the study of the main source (the Qur'an), which has been neglected for many centuries. In addition, efforts to appropriate the main resource in question should not be overlooked. Perhaps this is the first time in the history of Islam (post-prophetic period) that such a close relationship with the Qur'an is encountered. On the other hand, the fast and cheap spending of 12–13 centuries of Islamic knowledge and intellectual accumulation is an interesting development seen in some of the reform and renewalist movements of the last two centuries.

In this new understanding, where the methodology of the jurisprudence and similar disciplines and their methodologies have almost lost their meaning, the revivalists have mainly concentrated on the Qur'an and exegesis. Representatives of the Qur'an-centered renewal movements reduced all the problems of the Muslim world to the methodology of understanding the Qur'an in particular and Islam in general. It should be also noted that they, as individuals, have high self-confidence on themselves and their new approaches. Some even become obsessed with their methodologies in their re-reading of the Qur'an. Therefore, for a new reform and renewal, the main text, the Qur'an, should be understood with modern methods and new and constant *ijtihad*s that take into account the needs of the contemporary world, independent of traditional knowledge. According to them, it is impossible for a substantial reform or renewal to take place without independent *ijtihad* or more correctly interpretation. However, it is a fact that there are nuances among the modern reformers who embarked on a new *tajdid* and *ijtihad* on the basis of the Qur'an. The tension between the contemporary issues, developments and challenges and classical Muslim intellectual traditions and accumulation, and sometimes the anachcronism observed in classical sources seem to have forced these modernist scholars to gradually change their methods in understanding the main sources of Islam while preserving their Islamic identity. For many cautious and traditionally trained scholars and thinkers, the biggest risk here focuses on the degree to which the fine line between the changeable and unchangeable Islamic principles and Qur'anic rulings will be preserved. While the aforementioned reformist–revivalist leaders sometimes exhibited conservative reflexes, sometimes they undermined almost all the unchangeable normative rules in the Qur'an with very advanced liberal proposals. This, on the other hand, was perceived by conservative circles as the secularization of Islam and its contamination. Maybe they helped people get rid of imitation, but at the same time, they could not bring those people to strong faith and strong understanding (*tahqiq*) with the new way of reading they developed. To put it more clearly, while the traditional disciplines, the hierarchy among them and the classical methods they developed were destroyed, a specific and robust methodology could not be developed to be replaced with them. This has left the contemporary Muslim in a purgatory or limbo where countless views are displayed.

Subjectivities, eclecticism, and individualities have affected the bindingness of the revivalist movements specific to the Qur'an in adapting the unchanging provisions to the changing time and space. Although almost all reformists consider common good of the contemporary Muslim (*maslaha*), it is one of the indisputable facts that many subconsciously believe that classical literature is outdated. For this reason, it is clearly seen in the above-discussed features in all articles that an attempt is made to develop a new theology, jurisprudence, and even a mystical imagination by centering discussion on the Qur'an. In addition, as can be seen in the above items and articles, it has become a common view that every single Muslim will contribute to this vision in contemporary reform movements. In other words, every Muslim with a simple education will be able to contribute to these revival movements specific to the Qur'an. In summary, contrary to the classical perception, in this new understanding, which observes everyone as a potential *mujtahid* (authoritative interpreter of the religious law of Islam), every Muslim has a say on various issues with the exception of the rulings regarding creed and worship. In this new understanding of reading the Qur'an and *tajdid*, people are freed from all kinds of traditional juristic or theological school attachment. Of course, in this perception, the important mission given to the reformist–revivalist modern Muslim in order to read the conditions of the day (since they are the imams of their own madhhab now-juristic schools) does not escape the attention

that the distance between the sacred and profane is gradually narrowing. The notion of sacredness, which was the dominant perception in giving judgments in the classical period, turns into daily intellectual exercises in the modern period. In some of these extreme approaches, we observe the prioritizing of worldliness and heavily human-centered Qur'an readings and exegesis. One of the major side effects of such an approach is to witness the evaporation of unchangeable religious rules in the Qur'an. The best examples in this regard are the legal verses and the notion of miracles in the Qur'an in the reading of Amir Ali and Sir Seyyid Ahmed Khan.

This understanding of reformist–revival, which is to abandon imitation in modern Qur'an readings and build a more dynamic Qur'an perception, includes the danger of ignoring all Islamic discipline and hermeneutical tools created by the classical scholars and live long up until the contemporary period. Thus, the text of the Qur'an, which has become passive with the resetting memory, is transformed into a secondary structure that is forced to keep up with the age rather than giving direction to the age. As it is pointed out from time to time, such an approach undermined the classical notion of consensus (*ijma*) and caused polyphony in the modern period. In our opinion, the modern period shows a dialogue of discord and incoherence (individualistic) in contrast to the classical (even if it contains different sounds) symphony and harmony. In Egypt, the Indian subcontinent, and elsewhere, countless views and approaches with independent and divergent priorities have been put forward in the name of re-reading of the Qur'an in modern context and religious renewal, some negating others, while others almost completely ignoring distinctively Islamic identity. Similarly, they have also imposed their non-Qur'anic proposals and approaches on the Qur'an while ignoring the explicit ruling (*hukm*) of the Qur'an. To do so, they sometimes manipulate Qur'anic evidence.5 This is the main dilemma of the modernist and reformist–revivalist reading of the Qur'anic text. Most interestingly, as with the Christian reformation, the longing for a Muslim version of Martin Luther is one of the prominent phenomena in many *tajdid* movements, *Sola Qur'anicus*.

While the inadequacy of the classical Islamic disciplines that have been created in the contemporary perception of *tajdid* and *ijtihad* has been highly emphasized, the issue of how these authors will carry out the reforms that concern everyone in the modern period has remained rather obscure. In the contemporary period, many classical hermeneutical devices such as abrogation, reports of occasion of revelations, clear and ambiguous verses, *israiliyyat* reports (Biblical materials in the Qur'anic exegesis), the notion of inimitability (*I'jaz alqur'an*), disciplines such as *usul al-fiqh* (methodology of jurisprudence), *hadith* (prophetic traditions), etc., are almost completely ignored. This kind of methodical blindness has caused not only the shallowness of the reforms but also the sterilization of the rich Islamic intellectual tradition. Thus, in modern times, the rich tradition of exegesis has seriously lost blood in terms of content. However, while the reformists' emphasis on modern science and reason brings dynamism to the new approaches to some extent, it is seen that the balance is lost from time to time and the scripture that God sent as a guide has been transformed into a science book or manual for political constitution. While there are those who balance this issue in the reformist–revivalist scholars, there are also those who go to the extreme and draw attention with very absurd comments.

Finally, a more peaceful perception of religion is observed among the reformist thinkers of the Islamic world, which was defeated and withdrawn against the West in the last two centuries. We also witness interesting socio-psychological analyzes in these approaches that are more inclusive, world-peace-centered, environmentally friendly and human-wellbeing-prioritizing. Such Qur'an readings, which we do not see in classical *tafsir* (exegesis), increase gradually in the modern period are important issues in terms of showing that the reformists take the conditions of the day very seriously. In addition, it is worthy of attention that it carries not only exegesis, but also the Islamic belief to daily events in order to raise practical and responsible individuals. As a result, many reformist–revivalists, who sought a way out under the intense pressure of modernity, tried to bring dynamism to the current situation of Muslims by putting the Qur'an in the center. Sometimes, even

with good intentions, they might be destructive, and sometimes they breathe new life into believing people. Especially, the reformist–revivalist scholars of the 20th century to some extent preferred to ignore the rich Islamic disciplines' knowledge rather than revise it.

In the real sense, revival and renewal should be a phenomenon to be built on Muslim intellectual accumulation. Otherwise, it is certain that the renewal to be conducted by demolishing or denying the major devices of the exegetical traditions (such as occasion of revelations, the notion of abrogation, importance of the Qur'anic inimitability, etc.) will come with different problems. We are of the opinion that the reformist–revivalist scholars' renewal to be carried out with interdisciplinary revision of Islamic intellectual tradition rather than only imported phenomena might be more acceptable and longer lasting than mere intellectual exercises. The last two centuries of reforms among Muslims are the best witnesses of this.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes**

#### **References**

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Hüseyin, Muhammed M. 1986. *Modernizmin ˙Islam Dünyasına Giri¸si*. Translated by Sezai Özel. ˙ Istanbul: ˙ Insan Pub.

Jabiri, M. Abid. 1997. *Arap Aklının Olu¸sumu [Formation of Arab Mind]*. Translated by ˙ Ibrahim Akbaba. ˙ Istanbul: ˙ Iz Pub.

Merto ˘glu, Suvat. 2001. Osmanlı'da II. Me¸srutiyet Sonrası Modern Tefsir Anlayı¸sı (Sırat-I Müstakim/Sebilürre¸sâd Dergisi 1908–1914) [Modern Understanding of Interpretation in The Ottoman Era Post the 2nd Constitution (Sırat-ı Mustaqim/Sabil al-Ra¸sad Journal 1908–1914)]. Ph.D. thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey.

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Soyan, Ömer Naci. 1993. *Türkiye'den Felsefe Manzaraları [Philosophical Landscapes from Turkey]*. Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Pub. Sim¸ ¸ sek, Said. n.d. *Günümüz Tefsir Problemleri [Modern Day Exegetical Problems]*. Konya: Kitap Dünyası Pub. Zeka, Necmi. 1994. Yolları Çatallanan Bahçe, Aynalı Gökdelenler, Dil Oyunları ve Robespiere [The Garden With The Forked Road, High Rises With Mirrors, Language Games and Robespiere]. In *Postmodernism*. Edited by Necmi Zeka. ˙

Istanbul: Kıyı Pub.

26

### *Article* **Islamic Revivalism and Muslim Consumer Ethics**

**Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir**

School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798, Singapore<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
**Abstract:** Although scholars have examined the link between religiosity and consumer ethics, the idea of Muslim consumer ethics has not received much traction within academia. The idea of Muslim consumer ethics is a manifestation of religious revivalism. Yet, its discussion must consider the critical roles played by Muslim youth and their consumption of new media because the latter has a profound effect on shaping and directing popular Muslim youth cultures. Muslim consumer ethics encompass the moral and humanistic dimension of living in a globalized world as an extension of an individual's religious practice. This phenomenon of ethical consumption has also been commoditized in a lucrative halal industry that fosters a Muslim identity market.

**Keywords:** Muslim consumer ethics; youth; media; digital age

#### **1. Introduction**

A growing number of Muslims live in urban cities the world over, either as majority or minority populations—the latter owing to intense migrations that are both forced and by choice. This increase in the population densities of Muslims in urban cities, coupled with its rising middle class observed in many parts of the world (Nasr 2009; Jones 2012; Morris 2020), as well as a rather youthful demography who are the most connected generation to date having borne to a digitalized era, has ushered a new phase in Muslim consumption patterns. Within this context, the study of Muslim consumer culture is integral because "consumer culture represents one of the primary arenas in which elements of social change are played out in everyday life" (Miles 2015). For Muslims the world over, and especially for its youth, these changes have been more pronounced since the turn of the millennium. The patterns of Muslim consumption that have emerged have either been met with opposition due to perceptions of threat, or with opportunistic overtures that are eager to capitalize on a youthful, affluent market. However, beyond these polarized responses, how does one systematically make sense of the emerging behaviors in Muslim consumption?

The idea of Muslim consumer ethics needs to be deliberated in scholarly terms. Cesari (2004, p. 47) puts forth the concept of *ethical Islam*, an amalgamation that maximizes "individual autonomy with belief in a higher power" and "an adherence to the moral and humanistic values that underlie religious practice—without, however, adhering to the practice itself". Following Cesari, this paper argues that we should closely examine the intimate relationship between values and practices. Muslim consumer ethics encompass the moral and humanistic dimensions of living in a globalized world as an extension of an individual's religious practice. These refer to a set of considerations that Muslim consumers apply when making their decisions. As Muslims are not a monolithic group, the application of Muslim consumer ethics would necessarily lead to differential outcomes.

The link between piety and consumer ethics (Vitell and Paolillo 2003; Vitell et al. 2005; Vitell 2009) has gained currency in academia of late but the idea of a "Muslim consumer ethics", while having a long tradition in Islamic literature, has not been adequately discussed in Western academia (Hamzah et al. 2018). The practical reason for this lacuna is probably due to the diversity of opinions within the Muslim community, which inevitably prevents any homogenous "Muslim" approach to consumption. In this paper, I outline

**Citation:** Mohamed Nasir, Kamaludeen. 2022. Islamic Revivalism and Muslim Consumer Ethics. *Religions* 13: 747. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel13080747

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 25 May 2022 Accepted: 5 August 2022 Published: 16 August 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

some of the influencing factors and considerations in conceptualizing Muslim consumer ethics. Before going further, however, we would need to look at the relationship between consumption and Islam.

#### **2. Consumption and Islam**

The basis of what is *halal* (permissible) is revealed in the *Qur'an* (the divine book) from God (the Creator) to Muhammad (the Prophet) for all people. In turn, these laws are brought to life through the *Sunnah* (the life, actions and teachings of Muhammad) as recorded in the *Hadith* (the compilation of the traditions of Muhammad). As a rule, everything is sanctioned for the benefit of mankind, and nothing is forbidden save for what is categorically proscribed either by a *Qur'anic* verse or an authentic *Sunnah* of the Prophet. Understood sociologically, Islamic law necessitates social action for a believing and practicing Muslim. After all, religiosity is derived from the term Religare, which refers to the "daily disciplines" (Turner 2008). Hence, to be a Muslim is to navigate one's life in a generally *halal* manner. It is only logical then, when it comes to consumption, that the Muslim is obligated to only engage with *halal* products (Fischer 2016a).

Although the term *halal* has become somewhat synonymous with *halal* cuisines, food is just one of the objects of consumption. Conventional notions of *halal* consumption of food have also evolved. In principle, cuisines and beverages deemed as *halal* must not only be permissible, but they should also be 'pure,' free from any contamination of any *haram* (prohibited) elements. For Muslims living as minorities, ensuring a steady supply of *halal* food sources often becomes a consideration that affects major life decisions such as one's choice of dwelling. Many places have implemented systems of *halal* certification and accreditation to aid Muslim consumption. Although the primary focus has been on food, the Muslim consumer market and "*halal product*" businesses have grown drastically particularly with the extension of the "*halal* requirement" to include products like nonalcoholic toiletries and *halal* cosmetics, for example. Fischer argues that against the backdrop of Islamic revivalism, *halal* markets have thrived on the international scene, with global cities such as Kuala Lumpur and London emerging as key players in the production and trade of *halal* products—even as the notion of what is *halal* is being questioned and shaped. Going further, he contends that events such as the Halal Exhibition, which are now common in both majority and minority Muslim countries, demonstrate "how the proliferation of *halal* sits uneasily between Islamic revivalism, commercialization and secularism as political doctrine and 'the secular' as an epistemic category in everyday life" (Fischer 2016b, p. 143).

Beyond individual products, a *halal* consciousness and assertion for a *shari'ah*-compliant lifestyle have led to the aspiration and evolution of Islamic-based systems. For example, Islamic financial institutions and banking instruments institutionalized theological principles around usury, fair trade and equitable transactions. This paper is not the place to discuss these issues as they warrant highly specialized attention.

The larger issue that I would like to examine is how there have been various attempts to discuss and promulgate a consolidated notion of consumption ethics based on Islamic tenets. For example, Mustafar and Borhan (2013) argue that six variables need to be considered when we broach the issue of ethical consumption in Islam, especially within the context of a developed country. These are the priority of needs, the preservation of the *maqasid al-shari'ah* (objectives of *shari'ah*), abiding by the regulations of *halal* and *haram*, quality consumption, an appreciation of individual and social *maslahah* (interest) and the practice of moderation. The first category of the priority of needs is deconstructed into three categories, *daruriyyat*, *hajiyyat* and *tahsiniyyat,* depending on their relation to the concept of need. *Daruriyyat* refers to the necessities and is critical for survivability. Its deprivation will cause harm to an individual's life. The second order, *hajiyyat*, is not a basic human need but life might be harder without it. The last, *tahsiniyyat*, refers to the luxuries, and complements life on this earth, leading to its so-called perfection.

Islam is often described as an orthopraxy, where the right actions are as important as religious faith. For example, considering social *maslahah* or public interest is a call for social action. It allows for sociological analyses and theorizing as it calls for an inquiry beyond individual concerns of *halal* and *haram*. It is a dynamic concept dependent on factors that are both internal and external to conventional theological debates.

When we turn our gaze upon the young, urban, middle-class Muslims who have overcome the first order of needs and for whom the consumption of *halal* options is readily available, issues of quality consumption and considerations of what might be the social and public interest become increasingly important. As a result, what might begin with the more traditional concern for purity that revolves around the permissibility of ingredients and the manufacturing processes has transcended to a more sophisticated conception of *halal*-ness in contemporary times, which in turn, is intricately woven in the formation of a unique Muslim identity.

Undeniably, the Muslim identity market is a lucrative industry. The State of the Global Islamic Economy Report by Thomson Reuters and DinarStandard projects that the global halal economy will pass USD 3 trillion by 2023. The "*halal* industry" now includes Islamic finance, pitched as a more ethical alternative to mainstream financial institutions (Rudnyckyj 2019), which is estimated at between USD 1 trillion, with a healthy annual growth rate forecast for the next 10 years. Halal food forms the largest market, with consumer spending in the realm of USD 1.3 trillion and comprises a significant portion of the world's food industry. All these have ensured more nuanced debates on what constitutes *halal*-ness, which include discussions on who is funding these products and where the profits are channeled. Part of these conversations has spawned a series of "Islamic" products targeted at influencing the consumerist culture of young Muslims and the new Muslim middle class. The Internet hence becomes the space where the Muslim identity market aimed at the youth is often flouted.

In our attempts to understand the governing principles of consumption of Muslims today, we need to realize that its manifestations cannot be static. Despite being grounded on precepts of 'Islamic' ethics in consumption, Muslim consumer ethics are necessarily evolving. In the following sections, I outline some of the influencing factors and considerations.

#### **3. Islamic Revivalism and Ethical Consumption**

Much scholarly work on Islamic revivalism has focused on the study of social movements. Books have been written on Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Wickham 2013; Mellor 2018), Nadhlatul Ulama (Bush 2009), Muhammadiyah (Nakamura 2012), Gulen (Yavuz 2013; Hendrick 2013; El-Banna 2014), Tablighi Jamaat (Ali 2012; Siddiqi 2018) and so on, charting their impacts on the national, regional and global scene. These social movements are often portrayed as subversive and contrary to the modern and secular way of life by insisting on a re/introduction of Islam into the public sphere. As a corollary to this, and as an offshoot of this emphasis on a social movement perspective, academics have also charted the jostling for power among different schools of thought within and across these social movements.

In depicting Islamic social movements as confrontational to the ruling regime, these works tend to miss portraying the alignment of many of these movements with modern nation-state bureaucracies. Aljunied (2016), in examining the largest Muslim youth movement in Malaysia called the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), demonstrates how members of the Islamic movement have worked within the ambits of the state apparatus to uphold the developmentalist visions of the modern regime. What is even less studied is the link between religious revivalism and a form of Muslim consciousness that cuts across social movements and national boundaries. This paper broaches the topic of Muslim ethical consumption—a form of religious revivalism that influences the collective consciousness of the *ummah* that does not subscribe to rigid social outfits or theological classifications but is more tied to the sensitivities and proclivities of the relatively young, urban middle-class.

#### **4. A Youth-Driven Muslim Identity Market**

An understanding of the consumption practices of Muslims cannot ignore the dispositions of the youth. In studies of religious identities and Islamic revivalism, there is a burgeoning interest to understand "how youth cultures intersect with global processes such as commodification and consumerism, media use, cultural politics, and identity" (Williams and Mohamed Nasir 2017, p. 200). There are several trends from which we can discern and abstract, which impact the demography and influence their practices. Some of these social and global processes are not exclusive to the young Muslim demography while others are more specific to the social group. As Hasan (2016, p. 167) puts it,

Youth are important transmitters of the Islamic revival's ideas, and they creatively translate those messages into lifestyles, fashion, art, music, novels, institutions, and organizations. The messages, in turn, influence multiple social and political fields and encourage a collective identity.

 Media observers have portrayed young people as mere vassals that can be manipulated to fit current trends and shifts in the market. This sentiment is even more prominent in the capitalist industry where the "cult of the youth" is promoted. Backed by a plethora of consumer products, society is taught that the focus is not only on being young but on learning to be one. This narrative, which is backed by the media machinery with its persistent emphasis on acting and looking young, has made youth and youthfulness the order of the day. Globally, companies have tailored their marketing campaigns to explicitly focus on the youth demography and tap into their increasing spending power. However, research has shown that beyond the influences of the mass media, these choices that are made by the youth are often more complex than one might think (Chan 2010; Gbadamosi 2018).

Youth consumption patterns are influenced by several factors such as social class, cultural differences, as well as gender. There have been reports that show that although young people tend to splurge across a whole range of products, they are not just concerned with the consumption of leisure activities. This representation of the carefree youth can be deceiving as young people also strive to augment the family's household income by making steady contributions to their parents, settling personal and familial loans, and saving up for their present and future education (Shanahan et al. 1996). As a case in point, millennials make up almost a quarter of the population in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world. The 2019 Millennial Indonesia report, which surveys young people across twelve of the countries' major cities, found that the top three aspirations of the young are to please their parents, own a house and be good parents.

Trends in youth consumption also often reflect the symbols and predicament of their generation. "Islamic" streetwear fronted by Muslim hip-hop artists, sodas like the *Mecca Cola* and *Zam Zam Cola*, and other "accessories for the fans" enable young people to flaunt their Muslim and western identities simultaneously. Urban middle-class Muslim youth embracing this New Awakening and partaking in this conspicuous consumption and identity politics are not only "good for business". Mushaben (2008) and Mueller (2014) point to the development of *Pop-Islam* over the last few decades, citing as evidence, the growing prominence of charismatic *imams* and the impact of popular culture in creating entertainment celebrities and icons for the Muslim community. As a result, in Europe, a 'young, chic and cool' Islam has emerged among marginalized second-generation Muslim youth who are denied their fundamental rights of citizenship and access to social goods in their countries of birth. Mushaben noted that these trends were exacerbated especially in the aftermath of September 11 although tensions owing to generational gaps within the Muslim community were already evident way before that.

Seen in another way, this capitalistic trend is an example of the commodification of Islam. Skeptics are quick to point out, where is "Islam" in all this consumption? For example, Shirazi (2016) argues in her illuminative book, *Brand Islam: The Marketing and* *Commodification of Piety*, that many of the products marketed as *halal* or Islamic have got nothing to do with religious practice or theology. Instead, it serves as a clever marketing strategy that exploits the overt piety of the middle class and a generation of Muslim minorities that yearns for a sense of belonging to a larger Islamic laity.

#### **5. From Critical Consumers to Active Producers of Media**

There have been many studies that demonstrate the necessary relationship between an ethical consumer and a critical consumer (Schifani and Migliore 2011; Gjerris et al. 2016). Being an ethical consumer compels one to be critical one. McGregor (2008, pp. 273–74), for example, argues that being an ethical or critical consumer is a sign of a good citizenship, for "the true objective of being a citizen is to strive to make decisions that err on the side of moral and ethical consumption as the dominant way of life". One prevalent aspect of contemporary ethical consumption in the digital age, especially in the era of what has been characterized as a post-truth society, has been the desire for content producers, not just individuals and groups on social media but also traditional mainstream media giants, to act ethically.

Muslim consumption patterns must be appreciated against the backdrop of the youth's ability to sustain a heavy dose of apprehension towards the mainstream media. Established literature on youth culture and consumerism often neglects the role of youth as conscientious consumers. Yet, they often form the social group that is generally dissatisfied and critical of mainstream media for its depictions of Islam and Muslims in general, and its portrayals of young Muslims in particular (Richardson 2004; Ahmed 2012; Alizai 2021; Jiwani and Al-Rawi 2021; Weng and Mansouri 2021). Scholars have also captured the pervasive view of Muslims who feel that the mainstream media's caricaturing of their identities is rendering them voiceless, and how the moral panic that is engineered by the mainstream media has sensationalized and demonized the young Muslim subject (Richardson 2004; Kabir 2010, 2013).

This growing discontent heightened in the aftermath of September 11 and the global war on terrorism as the securitization of Muslims was felt across the world. Pejorative depictions of their community and faith in mainstream media drove Muslims to seek alternatives through the Internet. They then appropriated the Internet as a platform to create social networks with other Muslims and express their opinions in online forums and chat groups. Undoubtedly, the Internet offers an important platform to examine identity formation for any social group, but it is even more significant for a generation of Muslims who largely feel misrepresented by mainstream media.

One recurring point of contention is the characterization of a "Muslim crime" in the mainstream media when other acts of criminality are hardly depicted as "Christian" or "Buddhist". This has made many young Muslims feel particularly targeted for their identity (Mohamed Nasir 2016a, p. 171). There are also reports (Bayrakli and Hafez 2021) that link a culture of fear with sustained unfavorable depictions in the public arena. To be sure, these portrayals affect not only how non-Muslims view the Muslim community but also how Muslims view other Muslims as well. The negative portrayal of Muslims in the media has also colored the judgment of Muslims, leading some of them to shun other Muslims.

The pejorative representation of Muslims is also evidenced in movies, advertisements and other forms of popular content. This has been the subject of scholarly discussion for some time now. Jack Shaheen's book, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Shaheen 2001), is perhaps the most celebrated. Of late, Muslim artists have been taking a strong stance against this trend. Beyond rejecting offers to play stereotypical "Muslim roles", such as that of a terrorist, they are taking matters into their own hands by producing content to represent Muslim life on their terms. Hip-hop music is one of the most compelling examples here. Harnessing the potency of the most dominant popular culture of this age, hip-hop presents a powerful platform for Muslims, especially its youth, to offer their interpretation of social reality and engage in a dynamic form of identity formation (Abdul Khabeer 2016; Mohamed Nasir 2020). Furthermore, in Hollywood and especially within the independent productions industry, Muslim artistes have churned out a corpus of work ranging from films to stand-up comedies, depicting a more nuanced view of Muslim life.

The youth's critical consumption of the media is also set against an unprecedented time where social media platforms like Instagram, Twitter and Tik Tok enable them not only to be selective consumers but more significantly, content creators. This is where the younger generation has been most successful in stamping their viewpoints, with scholars of social movements documenting the role of social media in mobilizing social revolutions like the Arab Spring (Howard and Hussain 2013; Bunt 2019). Granted that there is much of what Shirazi will call *Brand Islam* produced in the new media. However, a study of Muslim consumer ethics cannot neglect these attempts by Muslims to speak truth to power.

#### **6. Autonomy versus Authority**

These attempts at critical consumption have been aided by a crisis in institutionalized authority and their conventional platforms for legitimacy building. As ideological battles are increasingly fought on the Internet, the digital world has enfeebled the effectiveness of the state to control the dissemination of information, which it has traditionally enjoyed during the era of television and printed media. This volatility of the Internet, combined with its potentially widespread influence, makes the state vulnerable to challenges to its authority and legitimacy. This has convinced many ruling regimes to attempt at regulating the Internet. Nonetheless, any attempt at curtailing the autonomy of their citizens is even more problematic as the Internet traverse national boundaries.

The discourse of *Islamic radicalization* in the post-September 11 era has caused a struggle for autonomy amongst Muslims—both where they live as minorities and in Muslim majority countries where ruling regimes use the Islamic radicalization narrative as a pretext to entrench their hegemony. For the former, Muslims utilize social media platforms to rally support for issues of concern like the *hijab* and whistle-blow against discriminatory or oppressive practices against Muslims. For the latter, we have seen similar activism against reigning regimes that culminated in the sequence of events we know as the Arab Spring.

The democratization and liberalization of knowledge, which have been a marker of the digital age, have inevitably brought about a crisis of religious authority (Turner 2011). The diversification of Muslim consumption of information and knowledge ultimately poses a challenge to conventional institutions. Multiple sources of authority function and jostle for influence in a competitive environment. As a case in point, in Sydney, the *Australia Federation of Islamic Councils*, *Halal Certification Authority Australia*, *Halal Australia, Australian Halal Food Services* and *Islamic Co-ordinating Council of Australia Inc.* are some of the stakeholders in Australia's huge *halal* market, which also includes exports of its products across the region. Inadvertently, such a rich tapestry of industrial players ensures a more dynamic discourse on what constitutes *halal*.

This critical consumption and Islamic revivalism among young Muslims, is intertwined with the twin phenomena of *online religion* and *religion online*, that I have discussed extensively in my book, *Digital Culture and Religion in Asia* (Han and Mohamed Nasir 2016). The exceptional levels at which young Muslims are seeking religious direction on the Internet are in line with Bunt's observation of the generation of *iMuslims* and the digital *ummah* who gravitate to cyberspace where "Important new issues, with no immediate basis in traditional sources can be discussed. Opinions can be disseminated rapidly, but are not necessarily observed or followed by readers, who may visit another site to solicit an opinion more in line with their personal requirements" (Bunt 2009, p. 136). They are then able to adjust the consumption of religious content according to what Bunt has called "personal requirements", which "include anything from which branch of Islam s/he identifies with, to language, geographic location, level of education, social class, gender, personality, and previous life experiences" (Akou 2010, pp. 336–37). In the same vein, Mahmood's (2004) seminal study of Egyptian society shows that Islamic revivalism has taken a more personalized mode focusing on values of agency and freedom, instead of being centered

on the policies of the state. This very much aligns with Hirschkind (2001) who argues that, although a contingent component, the concerns and practices of Islamic revivalism have peripheralized the nation-state as an integral component determining religious piety.

Beyond seeking personal autonomy, contemporary Muslim consumption choices also transcend a "*halal* consciousness" (Mohamed Nasir et al. 2010) paradigm to include a global geopolitical mapping of events affecting the Muslim *ummah*. The following section on boycotts demonstrates this particularly well. In countries where Muslims live as minorities, this opportunity to connect with a wider Muslim fraternity reflects the global cultural flows that are accentuated in the digital age. The digital revolution also brings fresh ideas or old ideas packaged in new ways to the attention of religious adherents. Muslim consumption trends are equally affected by contemporary causes and global social movements such as environmental awareness, which has in turn spawned off into what has been termed *Green Islam* (Ibrahim 2010; Gade 2019).

The decision to purchase a particular product is very much a rational choice that prompts Muslims to reconcile their piety with popular consumption trends. The factors mentioned above relating to identity, autonomy, authority and a growing aspiration to be producers and not mere consumers that I have outlined above, cannot be more veraciously played out than in the case of Muslim boycotts.

#### **7. Boycotts as Moral Protest**

A powerful example of contemporary Muslim consumer ethics would be to examine the boycott movements over the last few decades. Although these protest movements are essentially global, they manifest themselves differently based on local socio-political conditions (Mohamed Nasir 2016b). Even among soft authoritarian Southeast Asian neighbors like Malaysia and Singapore, endorsements and participation of these movements depend on many variables such as ethnic majority-minority dynamics and state-society relations.

Assertions of Muslim identity have given rise to the practice of boycotts in consumption choices. Many websites were established for this purpose and the lively discourse within the Muslim community about boycotting is a testament to this. The protest culture of a particular locality profoundly affects the dispositions of Muslim resistance. Boycotting and protest culture are not foreign to mainstream Western societies. Groups and events that support "Muslim causes" such as the Palestinian issue and public campaigns against Islamophobia are also well-represented by non-Muslim individuals (Barghouti 2011). Besides boycotting national products, one of the most popular forms of boycotts is those extended to local franchises of global corporations which are perceived to be contributing to the oppression of Muslims overseas.

Consumer boycotts can also display a local element. In some instances, besides making the case for boycotts, Muslims have also promoted buying local products as a substitute and a strategy to aid the local economy. Thus, boycotts afford a chance for second-generation migrants, for example, to flaunt their "national pride" by supporting local produce and initiatives. Back's conceptualization of a "neighborhood nationalism", which simultaneously engages both local and national discourses on race and nation, would be instructive here. This concept of an ethnically inclusive localism or "neighborhood nationalism" in the community is reminiscent of discourses among Muslims who, in their choice to consume indigenous goods, regard the nation as a multicultural space where a sense of belonging is not confined to race or religion, but by a commitment to a particular area (Back 1996, p. 239). To this end, buying local produce can alleviate the moral dilemma in at least a couple of ways. Firstly, Muslims would have fulfilled their obligations to the global *ummah* by partaking in the boycott movements that they feel strongly for. Secondly, they would contribute to the coffers of the local economy and be perceived as patriotic countrymen by buying indigenous products. The act of supporting local products can be seen as a practice of their cultural citizenship.

Muslim boycotts are also sometimes promulgated at national levels and even supported by international Muslim bodies. For example, Muslim countries boycotted Danish

products in 2005 to protest the publication of unflattering cartoons of the Prophet that was released along with an article called *The Face of Muhammed* (Veninga 2014). A particular image of the Prophet with a bomb lodged in his turban proved emblematic of the resistance movement. When the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) convened in Mecca later that year, the representatives roundly condemned what they felt was the "desecration of the Holy Prophet Mohammad in the media of certain countries" calling on "all governments to ensure full respect of all religions and religious symbols" (Tiryakian 2009, p. 240).

My book *Globalized Muslim Youth in the Asia Pacific* (Mohamed Nasir 2016a) discussed how young Muslims in the global cities of Sydney and Singapore are also wary as to whether they are directly or inadvertently contributing to the finances of other religious movements in their country. In this aspect, it can be argued that the plurality of the "religious marketplace" leads to a form of competitiveness among faith communities. The reason for this hesitance comes from their discomfort in making financial contributions to the evangelical efforts of other religious groups. Therefore, economic boycotts are not solely triggered when the makers of the products are seen to be outrightly discriminating against Muslims but also when they are identified as advancing religious causes. Whether living in Muslim majority countries or as minorities in multicultural societies, Muslim communities do not possess any means to exact punitive measures to discipline those who do not conform. Instead, the "punishment" often manifests itself in the form of stigma and social pressure may it be from close-knit groups such as the family and friendship circles, or larger society.

Inescapably, the boycott movement has also influenced popular youth culture. This can be exemplified by a trend that Campbell (2010) calls Islamogaming. For instance, a British software company called *Innovative Minds* campaigns for the boycott of Israel. This initiative is operationalized through the production of multimedia and video games, which the company contends is "the best way to attract the youth to Islam". One of the games, called *The Resistance*, however, has attracted some controversy. Among the features of the game is that a player can take on the role of a farmer in the south of Lebanon who has to protect his family and land from the colonizing Zionist forces (Campbell 2010, p. 65). The series of Islamically themed games on its *Islamic Fun CD* include *Happy Hijab,* where a player helps a Muslim character locate her missing hijab, and *Building Blocks*, where players answer questions to earn blocks for the construction of a mosque.

Be that as it may, there are ongoing ethical debates within the Muslim youth fraternity on the practicality and justification for embracing boycotting as a form of resistance. Even among those who eventually decide not to partake in the boycotting movement, a large proportion of young Muslims have either entertained the idea or debated the concept of boycotting with others or within themselves. A segment of the community believes that the boycotting will end up hurting the smaller businesses more than the actual target, which is the huge multinational corporations. Therefore, in order not to affect "innocent bystanders", some Muslims have refrained from deploying boycotting as a strategy of resistance. Some even go further and dismiss the claims of piety among those who advocate for Muslim boycotts. Among other reasons, they allege that these boycotts can be abused and instead used as a ploy to destabilize business competitors. Compounding these debates on whether one should participate in boycott activities, is the efficacy and sustainability of boycotts as a disciplining tool. Detractors allude to the reactive nature of consumer boycotts and point to how sentiments tend to wane with time as a particular emotive event fade from social memory, leading to similar boycotting efforts being short-lived in the past. Nonetheless, Muslims are cognizant of the past successes of such collective action as a peaceful way of resistance. Among the oft-cited examples were the successes of the boycotting of British goods during the Indian struggle for independence, and the South African struggle against apartheid rule. In 2002, angered by the Israeli military offensive in the West Bank, millions of Arab consumers boycotted US-branded goods causing some companies to suffer up to 50 per cent losses in sales (Suhaimi 2009).

As is evident in this paper, although the Muslim approach to boycotting is not monolithic, the debates persist in the consciousness of Muslim consumers as its cyber presence develops over time. Several significant strands about boycotting can be gleaned from these observations. The first is cultural. Undeniably, contemporary boycotting movements are heavily intertwined with global popular youth culture. The second takes a more economic perspective, recognizing the minority status of Muslims both in numerical terms, and sociologically, in terms of power relationships. Given the small percentage of Muslims in minority countries and the weak economies of Muslim majority ones, some remain skeptical that their efforts would have any significant impact even if each one of them were to participate in the movement. The third argument takes a more social perspective given how boycotting may produce the unintended impact of harming those who are not the subjected targets of the movement. The final strand takes a theological perspective asking the fundamental question of whether boycotting is even permitted in Islam. Of this, some think that the Prophet does not endorse utilizing economic boycotting as a form of resistance.

An investigation of Muslim consumer ethics also must contend with the inherent tension between the concepts of the *ummah* and the state. The tension exists between the particular and the universal. The state is an inherently limiting concept, one that pivots on the concept of sovereignty. It imposes the idea of difference to make itself distinctive from the Other. On the contrary, the *ummah* is a concept that spans national boundaries, binding the Muslims of the world into an unbreakable chain. It is *sui generis*, an external that a Muslim is born into. It is a global fraternity of brotherhood that ignites social action and, occasionally, social change. The *ummah* traverses borders and requires a transcendantelization of the individual consciousness.

#### **8. Conclusions**

Muslim consumer ethics offer the lens through which contemporary pious Muslims navigate moral and humanistic quandaries in a globalized, interconnected world. Factors such as identity, autonomy, authority, as well as a growing aspiration to be producers and not mere consumers, collectively shape the consumption practices of Muslims who are driven not only by theological considerations but by national and global affairs. This paper demonstrates that these concerns might not be mutually exclusive, as Islam also promotes a wider conception of ethical consumption that is governed beyond *halal* concerns. The variegated ways that piety plays out in Muslim consumption patterns are, in large part, driven by the rise of Muslim religious consciousness.

 Just as any study on the subject has necessitated scrutiny of the youth, this paper also highlights the unique practices of young, urban middle-class Muslims who are the main drivers of this resurgence. This revivalism is aided by the information revolution in the digital age that creates networked societies among urban Muslim youth, paving their way to access alternative sources and views, even where religious guidance and knowledge are concerned while providing a space to reconcile their religiosity with their consumption behaviours. As seen in the case of boycotting campaigns, although these movements are characterized by intense mobilization at the communal level, they are also marked by dynamic and complex debates within the Muslim community.

This paper has placed into sharp relief the phenomenon of Muslim consumer ethics through the blending of insights from various scholarly fields, such as Islamic studies, globalization, popular culture and studies on consumer culture. It has resisted looking at Muslims from a sectarian perspective in favor of placing a finger on larger trends that transcend geographies and intra-religious orientations. Such a reflection would hopefully provide a basis for the development of new methodologies and serve as an invitation for future scholars to indulge in the study of Muslim consumer behavior.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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### *Article* **Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism**

**Jan A. Ali**

School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
**Abstract:** Modernity is a global condition of an ongoing socio-cultural, economic, and political transformation of human experience, with tradition or religion having no significant role to play. It is the gradual decline of the role of religion in modernity through the implementation of the principles of secularism which has, according to Islamic revivalists, plunged the world into crisis or *jahiliyya* (unGodliness). Revivalists and sociologists such as Anthony Giddens (1991) call it the "crisis of modernity". In response, many Islamic revivalist movements have emerged to address this condition. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 gave a boost to many existing Islamic revivalist movements and inspired many to appear anew. The phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is a religious transformative response to the crisis of modernity—i.e., the inability of secularism and the process of secularization to fulfill the promise of delivering a model of perfect global order. Contemporary Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity but against secularism and is thus an attempt to steer modernity out of its crisis through a comprehensive and robust process of Islamization—the widespread introduction of Islamic rituals, practices, socio-cultural and economic processes, and institutional developments to the pattern of modern everyday living—and transforming modernity from *dar al-harb* (abode of war) to *dar al-Islam* (abode of peace). The paper argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a complex heterogeneous global phenomenon seeking to steer modernity out of its prevailing crisis through finding in Islam the universal blueprint of life. It further argues that Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity but is a religious based reaction against the negative consequences of modernity, particularly against secularism, and carving out a space for itself in modernity.

**Keywords:** crisis of modernity; Islamic revivalism; Islamization of modernity; modernity; rationality; revivalism; secularism

#### **1. Introduction**

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 was a milestone event in our recent history that inspired a new Islamic activism across the globe as a response to the ongoing socio-religious, economic, and political predicaments in many parts of the Muslim world. Islamic activism or Islamic revivalism is not a new phenomenon and "The past history of Islamic societies contains many examples of reform and revival movements that developed as a response to changing political and economic conditions" (Lapidus 1997, p. 1). The trends of Islamic revivalism can be traced back all the way to one of the greatest Muslim caliphs—Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (680–720)—a "pious and respected caliph who attempted to preserve the integrity of the Muslim Umayyad caliphate (661–750) by emphasizing religion and a return to the original principles of the Islamic faith" (The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 2022). Of course, the Revolution did not solve the problems within the Muslim world, however, it re-energized the prevailing Islamic revivalist movements (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022) and paved the way for many new ones to emerge around the world, producing the phenomenon which came to be known as the contemporary Islamic revivalism (Ali 2012a). It is a religiously motivated transformative response to what is usually called, particularly in sociology, the crisis of modernity (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991; Bauman and Bordoni 2014; Ali and Sahib 2022) or what Lapidus explains as a collection of Islamic revival movements

**Citation:** Ali, Jan A.. 2023. Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism. *Religions* 14: 15. https://doi.org/10.3390/ rel14010015

Academic Editor: Enzo Pace

Received: 4 November 2022 Revised: 12 December 2022 Accepted: 13 December 2022 Published: 22 December 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

who must "be understood as a reaction against modernity" (Lapidus 1997, p. 1) or what Minardi sees as Islamic movements which are "generally dissatisfied with the ongoing conditions . . . [who want] to make radical changes in the system of government and society" (Minardi 2018, p. 250). From the perspective of Islamic revivalists, the crisis of modernity is global but its impact on the Muslim world, particularly since colonialism which dismantled the Muslim world and plunged it into what Haddad (1986) calls the socio-economic and political crisis of the Muslim world, is ongoing. Thus, Islamic revivalism is a response to the decline of the Muslim world as well as the crisis that plagues the world. Drawing largely on Islamic scriptures—Qur'an and *hadith*s (compilation of books of Prophetic Traditions) and the *shari'ah* (Islamic law)—contemporary Islamic revivalism seeks to transform what is seen by Islamic revivalists as the crisis-ridden modernity or a *jahiliyya*saturated modern world (Ali 2012b) through concrete religious actions and religiously informed policies and initiate structural reforms to mitigate and eventually overcome the crisis. Constituted by ideologically and methodologically diverse revivalist movements, contemporary Islamic revivalism is a complex multidimensional and multifaceted reality. Internally diverse with a number of very different streams within itself or, as Arjomand asserts, there is a "variety in Islamic [revivalism]" (Arjomand 2004, p. 11), it pervades the entire globe with varying intensity and extent. Diverse they may be, but what brings them together is their collective grievances about the plight of Muslims in Muslim societies and Islam as their proposed solution for Muslim socio-economic and political malaise. They are united in their collective actions rooted in Islamic symbols and identities seeking to establish an Islamic state through political reform and action, "promoting the ideologies of Sharia law and jurisprudence" (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022, p. 249), and Islamize society by popularizing and institutionalizing Islamic legal principles, Islamic norms and Islamic ethico-moral values (Ismail 2004). Their "goal is to adapt Islamic principles, values, and institutions to the modern world while recognizing the importance of Islam as a cultural frame of reference" (Maghraoui 2006, p. 6) and to "advocate for the interests of Islam and Muslims ... [and] revitalize Islamic teachings and principles not only in the private sphere but also in public (Munabari et al. 2022, p. 5).

Members of Islamic revivalist movements are not anti-modernity; they are generally opposed to Western philosophy, primarily secular nationalism, material capitalism, socialism, communism, and Westernism (Onapajo 2012). In addition, they find secularism to be the most abhorrent feature of modernity (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022) and, therefore strive towards its removal (Ali 2012b). Ali states that:

Islamic revivalism is a defensive reaction to modernity and a response to unfavorable conditions that exists in it. This does not mean Islamic revivalism is against modernization per se, but rather it is anti-Westernization and anti-secularization. (p. 70)

Dessouki (1982) finds contemporary Islamic revivalism to be a defensive reaction to secular modernity, particularly Western secularism and for Aqababaee and Razaghi it is a response to "the New World Order, Western democracy, humanism, secularism, and feminism" (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022, p. 250). These scholars highlight that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a defensive reaction to modernity and is against secularism more specifically.

For Islamic revivalists, secularism, both as an idea and practice, concentrates on "this-worldly" realm in contrast to the sacred and "other-worldly" domain and separates religion from civic affairs and sees the state diminishing the values and roles of religious institutions in the temporal affairs of the nation-state (Asad 2003). They point to some cases in the Muslim world to demonstrate that secular Western hegemony in Egypt, for example, and "colonised, submissive and servile Islam that accepts its confinement to the private sphere" (Soage 2008, p. 27) such as that of Kemalist Turkey has produced a serious decline of "true Islam" (Mulcaire 2016). Contrary to the promises of secular modernity, many Muslim societies experience ongoing widespread socio-cultural, economic, and political discontents (Esposito 1983; Onapajo 2012; Munabari et al. 2022) and there is a