407 U.S. 451
92 S.Ct. 2196
33 L.Ed.2d 51
Pecola Annette WRIGHT et al., Petitioners,v.COUNCIL OF the CITY OF EMPORIA et al.
No. 70—188.
Argued March 1, 1972.
Decided June 22, 1972.
 
      Syllabus
 
      In 1967, Emporia, Virginia, which is located in the center of
 Greensville County, changed from a 'town' to a politically
 independent 'city' authorized by state law to provide its own
 public school system. By a shared-cost agreement with the county,
 Emporia in 1968 continued an arrangement, which antedated its
 change of status, to use the county public school system for
 education of its children. As a consequence of the present
 desegregation lawsuit initiated in 1965, the single school
 division was operating under a 'freedom of choice' plan approved
 by the District Court. Petitioners moved to modify that plan
 following this Court's decision in Green v. County School Board,
 etc., 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716. The District
 Court, after a hearing, on June 25, 1969, ordered petitioners'
 'pairing' plan, to take effect as of the start of the 1969—1970
 school year. Two weeks after entry of the District Court's decree,
 the city announced its plan to operate a separate school system
 and sought termination of the 1968 agreement. On August 1, 1969,
 petitioners filed a supplemental complaint seeking to enjoin the
 city council and school board (named as additional parties
 defendant) from withdrawing Emporia children from the county
 schools. Following hearings, the District Court found that the
 effect of Emporia's withdrawal would be a 'substantial increase in
 the proportion of whites in the schools attended by city
 residents, and a concomitant decrease in the county schools.' In
 addition to the disparity in racial percentages, the court found
 that the proportion of whites in county schools might drop as
 county-school whites shifted to private academies, while some
 whites might return to city schools from the academies they
 previously atended; that two formerly all-white schools (both
 better equipped and better located than the county schools) are in
 Emporia, while all the schools in the surrounding county were
 formerly all-Negro; and that Emporia, which long had the right to
 establish a separate school system, did not decide to do so until
 the court's order prevented the county from continuing its
 long-maintained segregated school system. The court concluded that
 Emporia's withdrawal would frustrate the June 25 decree, and
 enjoined respondents from

1
Page 452
 
 pursuing their plan. Holding that the question whether new school
 district boundaries should be permitted in areas with a history of
 state-enforced racial segregation must be resolved in terms of the
 'dominant purpose of (the) boundary realignment,' the Court of
 Appeals concluded that Emporia's primary purpose was 'benign' and
 not a mere 'cover-up' for racial discrimination, and reversed.
 Held:
 
      1. In determining whether realignment of school districts by
 officials comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth
 Amendment, courts will be guided, not by the motivation of the
 officials, but by the effect of their action. Pp. 461—462.
 
      2. In the totality of the circumstances of this case, the
 District Court was justified in concluding that Emporia's
 establishment of a separate school system would impede the process
 of dismantling the segregated school system. Pp. 463—471.
 
      4 Cir. 442 F.2d 570, reversed.
 
      Samuel W. Tucker, Richmond, Va., for petitioners.
 
      D. Dortch Warriner, Emporia, Va., for respondents.
 
 djQ  Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
 
      We granted certiorari in this case, as in No. 70—130, United
 States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education,1 407 U.S. 484, 92
 S.Ct. 2214, 33 L.Ed.2d 75, to consider the circumstances under


2
Page 453
 
 which a federal court may enjoin state or local officials from
 carving out a new school district from an existing district that
 has not yet completed the process of dismantling a system of
 enforced racial segregation. We did not address ourselves to this
 rather narrow question in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
 Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554, and its
 companion cases decided last Term,2 but the problem has confronted
 other federal courts in one form or another on numerous occasions
 in recent years.3 Here, as in Scotland Neck, the Court of Appeals
 reversed a district court decision enjoining the creation of a new
 school district. 4 Cir., 442 F.2d 570. We conclude that the Court
 of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the legal principles
 applicable in cases such as these, and that the District Court's
 order was proper in the circumstances of this case.
 
                               I
 
      The City of Emporia lies near the center of Greensville
 County, Virginia, a largely rural area located in the North
 Carolina border. Until 1967, Emporia was


3
Page 454
 
 a 'town' under Virginia law, which meant that it was a part of the
 surrounding county for practically all purposes, including the
 purpose of providing public education for children residing in the
 county.
 
      In 1967, Emporia, apparently dissatisfied with the county's
 allocation of revenues from the newly enacted state sales tax,
 successfully sought designation as a 'city of the second class.'4
 As such, it became politically independent from the surrounding
 county, and undertook a separate obligation under state law to
 provide free public schooling to children residing within its
 borders.5 To fulfill this responsibility, Emporia at first sought
 the county's agreement to continue operating the school system on
 virtually the same basis as before, with Emporia sharing in the
 administration as well as the financing of the schools.6 When the
 county officials refused to enter into an arrangement of this
 kind, Emporia agreed to a contract whereby the county would
 continue to educate students residing in the city in exchange for
 Emporia's payment of a specified share of the total cost of the
 system. Under this agreement, signed in April 1968, Emporia had a
 formal voice in the administration of the schools only through its
 par-


4
Page 455
 
 ticipation in the selection of a superintendent. The city and
 county were designated as a single school 'division' by the State
 Board of Education,7 and this arrangement was still in effect at
 the time of the District Court's order challenged in this case.
 
      This lawsuit began in 1965, when a complaint was filed on
 behalf of Negro children seeking an end to state-enforced racial
 segregation in the Greensville County school system. Prior to
 1965, the elementary and high schools located in Emporia served
 all white children in the county, while Negro children throughout
 the county were assigned to a single high school or one of four
 elementary schools, all but one of which were located outside the
 Emporia town boundary. In January 1966, the District Court
 approved a so-called 'freedom of choice' plan that had been
 adopted by the county in April of the previous year. Wright v.
 County School Board of Greensville County, D.C., 252 F.Supp. 378.
 No white students ever attended the Negro schools under this plan,
 and in the 1968—1969 school year only 98 of the county's 2,510
 Negro students attended white schools. The school faculties
 remained completely segregated.
 
      Following our decision in Green v. County School Board, etc.,
 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716, holding that a
 freedom-of-choice plan was an unacceptable method of desegregation
 where it failed. 'to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and
 effective disestablishment of a dual system,' id., at 438, 88
 S.Ct. at 1694, the petitioners filed a motion for further relief.
 The District Court ordered the county to demonstrate its
 compliance with the holding in Green, or to submit a plan designed
 to bring the schools into compliance. After various delays, during
 which the freedom-of-choice sy-


5
Page 456
 
 stem remained in effect, the county submitted two alternative
 plans. The first would have preserved the existing system with
 slight modifications, and the second would have assigned students
 to schools on the basis of curricular choices or standardized test
 scores. The District Court promptly rejected the first of these
 proposals, and took the second under advisement. Meanwhile, the
 petitioners submitted their own proposal, under which all children
 enrolled in a particular grade level would be assigned to the same
 school, thus eliminating any possibility of racial bias in pupil
 assignments. Following an evidentiary hearing on June 23, 1969,
 the District Court rejected the county's alternative plan, finding
 that it would 'substitute . . . one segregated school system for
 another segregated school system.' By an order dated June 25, the
 court ordered the county to implement the plan submitted by the
 petitioners, referred to by the parties as the 'pairing' plan, as
 of the start of the 1969—1970 school year.8
 
      Two weeks after the District Court entered its decree, the
 Emporia City Council sent a letter to the county Board of
 Supervisors announcing the city's intention to operate a separate
 school system beginning in September. The letter stated that an
 'in-depth study and analysis of the directed school arrangement
 reflects a totally unacceptable situation to the Citizens and City
 Council of the City of Emporia.' It asked that the 1968
 city-county agreement be terminated by mutual consent, and that
 title to school property located within Emporia be transferred to
 the city. The letter further


6
Page 457
 
 advised that children residing in the county would be permitted to
 enroll in the city schools on a tuition basis.9 At no time during
 this period did the city officials meet with the county council or
 school board to discuss the implementation of the pairing decree,
 nor did they inform the District Court of their intentions with
 respect to the separate school system.
 
      The county school board refused either to terminate the
 existing agreement or to transfer school buildings to Emporia,
 citing its belief that Emporia's proposed action was 'not in the
 best interest of the children in Greensville County.' The City
 Council and the City School Board nevertheless continued to take
 steps toward implementing the separate system throughout the month
 of July. Notices were circulated inviting parents to register
 their children in the city system, and a request was made to the
 State Board of Education to certify Emporia as a separate school
 division. This request was tabled by the State Board at its August
 meeting, 'in light of matters pending in the federal court.'
 
      According to figures later supplied to the District Court,
 there were 3,759 children enrolled in the unitary system
 contemplated by the desegregation decree, of whom 66% were Negro
 and 34% were white. Had Emporia established a separate school
 system, 1,123 of these students would have attended the city
 schools, of whom 48% were white. It is undisputed that the city
 proposed to operate its own schools on a unitary


7
Page 458
 
 basis, with all children enrolled in any particular grade
 attending the same school.
 
      On August 1, 1969, the petitioners filed a supplemental
 complaint naming the members of the Emporia City Council and the
 City School Board as additional parties defendant,10 and seeking
 to enjoin them from withdrawing Emporia children from the county
 schools. At the conclusion of a hearing on August 8, the District
 Court found that the establishment of a separate school system by
 the city would constitute 'an impermissible interference with and
 frustration of' its order of June 25, and preliminarily enjoined
 the respondents from taking 'any action which would interfere in
 any manner whatsoever with the implementation of the Court's order
 heretofore entered. . . .'
 
      The schools opened in September under the pairing order,
 while Emporia continued to work out detailed plans and budget
 estimates for a separate school system in the hope that the
 District Court would allow its implementation during the following
 school year. At a further hearing in December, the respondents
 presented an expert witness to testify as to the educational
 advantages of the proposed city system, and asked that the
 preliminary injunction be dissolved. On March 2, 1970, the
 District Court entered a memorandum opinion and order denying the
 respondents' motion and making the injunction permanent. Wright v.
 County School Board of Greensville County, 309 F.Supp. 671. The


8
Page 459
 
 Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 442 F.2d 570,
 but stayed its mandate pending action by this Court on a petition
 for certiorari, which we granted. 404 U.S. 820, 92 S.Ct. 56, 30
 L.Ed.2d 48.
 
                              II
 
      Emporia takes the position that since it is a separate
 political jurisdiction entitled under state law to establish a
 school system independent of the county, its action may be
 enjoined only upon a finding either that the state law under which
 it acted is invalid, that the boundaries of the city are drawn so
 as to exclude Negroes, or that the disparity of the racial balance
 of the city and county schools of itself violates the
 Constitution. As we read its opinion, the District Court made no
 such findings; nor do we.
 
      The constitutional violation that formed the predicate for
 the District Court's action was the enforcement until 1969 of
 racial segregation in a public school system of which Emporia had
 always been a part. That finding has not been challenged, nor has
 Emporia questioned the propriety of the 'pairing' order of June
 25, 1969, which was designed to remedy the condition that offended
 the Constitution. Both before and after it became a city, Emporia
 educated its children in the county schools. Only when it became
 clear—15 years after our decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873—that segregation in the
 county system was finally to be abolished, did Emporia attempt to
 take its children out of the county system. Under these
 circumstances, the power of the District Court to enjoin Emporia's
 withdrawal from that system need not rest upon an independent
 constitutional violation. The court's remedial power was invoked
 on the basis of a finding that the dual school system violated the
 Constitution, and since the city and the county constituted


9
Page 460
 
 but one unit for the purpose of student assignments during the
 entire time that the dual system was maintained, they were
 properly treated as a single unit for the purpose of dismantling
 that system.
 
      In Green v. County School Board, etc., 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct.
 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716, the issue was whether the school board's
 adoption of a 'freedom of choice' plan constituted adequate
 compliance with the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, 349
 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (Brown II). We did not hold
 that a freedom-of-choice plan is of itself unconstitutional.
 Rather, we decided that any plan is 'unacceptable' where it 'fails
 to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective
 disestablishment of a dual system. . . .' 391 U.S., at 438, 88
 S.Ct. at 1694. In Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, etc., 391 U.S.
 450, 88 S.Ct. 1700, 20 L.Ed.2d 733, we applied the same principle
 in rejecting a 'free transfer' plan adopted by the school board as
 a method of desegregation:
 
      'We do not hold that 'free transfer' can have no place in a
      desegregation plan. But like 'freedom of choice,' if it
      cannot be shown that such a plan will further rather than
      delay conversion to a unitary, nonracial, nondiscriminatory
      school system, it must be held unacceptable.' Id., at 459, 88
      S.Ct. at 1705.
 
      The effect of Emporia's proposal was to erect new boundary
 lines for the purpose of school attendance in a district where no
 such lines had previously existed, and where a dual school system
 had long flourished. Under the principles of Green and Monroe,
 such a proposal must be judged according to whether it hinders or
 furthers the process of school desegregation. If the proposal
 would impede the dismantling of the dual system, then a district
 court, in the exercise of its remedial discretion, may enjoin it
 from being carried out.
 
      The Court of Appeals apparently did not believe this case to
 be governed by the principles of Green and


10
Page 461
 
 Monroe.11 It held that the question whether new school district
 boundaries should be permitted in areas with a history of
 state-enforced racial segregation is to be resolved in terms of
 the 'dominant purpose of (the) boundary realignment.'
 
      'If the creation of a new school district is designed to
      further the aim of providing quality education and is
      attended secondarily by a modification of the racial balance,
      short of resegregation, the federal courts should not
      interfere. If, however, the primary purpose for creating a
      new school district is to retain as much of separation of the
      races as possible, the state has violated its affirmative
      constitutional duty to end state supported school
      segregation.' 442 F.2d at 572.
 
      Although the District Court had found that 'in a sense, race
 was a factor in the city's decision to secede,' 309 F.Supp., at
 680, the Court of Appeals found that the primary purpose of
 Emporia's action was 'benign,' and was not 'merely a cover-up' for
 racial discrimination. 442 F.2d, at 574.
 
      This 'dominant purpose' test finds no precedent in our
 decisions. It is true that where an action by school authorities
 is motivated by a demonstrated discriminatory purpose, the
 existence of that purpose may add to the discriminatory effect of
 the action by intensifying the stigma of implied racial
 inferiority. And where a school board offers nonracial
 justifications for a plan that is less effective than other
 alternatives for dismantling a dual school system, a demonstrated
 racial purpose may be taken into consideration in determining the
 weight to be given to the proffered justification.


11
Page 462
 
 Cf. Green, supra, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1694. But as we
 said in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225, 91 S.Ct. 1940,
 1945, 29 L.Ed.2d 438, it 'is difficult or impossible for any court
 to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the
 choices of a group of legislators,' and the same may be said of
 the choices of a school board. In addition, an inquiry into the
 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it
 is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools,
 and we have said that '(t)he measure of any desegregation plan is
 its effectiveness.' Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile
 County, 402 U.S. 33, 37, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 1292, 28 L.Ed.2d 577.
 Thus, we have focused upon the effect—not the purpose or
 motivation—of a school board's action in determining whether it is
 a permissible method of dismantling a dual system. The existence
 of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an
 impermissible effect.
 
      The reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case is at odds
 with that of other federal courts that have held that splinter
 school districts may not be created 'where the effect—to say
 nothing of the purpose—of the secession has a substantial adverse
 effect on desegregation of the county school district.' Lee v.
 Macon County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 448 F.2d 746, 752. See
 also Stout v. United States (Jefferson County Board of Education
 v. Board of Education for City of Pleasant Grove), 5 Cir., 448
 F.2d 403, 404; Haney v. County Board of Education, 8 Cir., 410
 F.2d 920, 924; Burleson v. County Board of Election Commissioners,
 D.C., 308 F.Supp. 352, 356, aff'd, 8 Cir., 432 F.2d 1356; Aytch v.
 Mitchell, D.C., 320 F.Supp. 1372, 1377. Though the purpose of the
 new school districts was found to be discriminatory in many of
 these cases, the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or
 purpose, but on the effect of the action upon the dismantling of
 the dual school systems involved. That was the focus of the
 District Court in this case, and we hold that its approach was
 proper.


12
Page 463
 
                              III
 
      The basis for the District Court's ruling was its conclusion
 that if Emporia were allowed to establish an independent system,
 Negroes remaining in the county schools would be deprived of what
 Brown II promised them: a school system in which all vestiges of
 enforced racial segregation have been eliminated. The District
 Court noted that the effect of Emporia's withdrawal would be a
 'substantial increase in the proportion of whites in the schools
 attended by city residents, and a concomitant decrease in the
 county schools.' 309 F.Supp., at 680. In addition, the court found
 that the departure of the city's students, its leadership, and its
 financial support, together with the possible loss of teachers to
 the new system, would diminish the chances that transition to
 unitary schools in the county would prove 'successful.'
 
      Certainly, desegregation is not achieved by splitting a
 single school system operating 'white schools' and 'Negro schools'
 into two new systems, each operating unitary schools within its
 borders, where one of the two new systems is, in fact, 'white' and
 the other is, in fact, 'Negro.' Nor does a court supervising the
 process of desegregation exercise its remedial discretion
 responsibly where it approves a plan that, in the hope of
 providing better 'quality education' to some children, has a
 substantial adverse effect upon the quality of education available
 to others. In some cases, it may be readily perceived that a
 proposed subdivision of a school district will produce one or both
 of these results. In other cases, the likelihood of such results
 may be less apparent. This case is of the latter kind, but an
 examination of the record shows that the District Court's
 conclusions were adequately supported by the evidence.


13
Page 464
 
      Data submitted to the District Court at its December hearing
 showed that the school system in operation under the 'pairing'
 plan, including both Emporia and the county, had a racial
 composition of 34% white and 66% Negro. If Emporia had established
 its own system, and if total enrollment had remained the same, the
 city's schools would have been 48% white and 52% Negro, while the
 county's schools would have been 28% white and 72% Negro.
 
      We need not and do not hold that this disparity in the racial
 composition of the two systems would be a sufficient reason,
 standing alone, to enjoin the creation of the separate school
 district. The fact that a school board's desegregation plan leaves
 some disparity in racial balance among various schools in the
 system does not alone make that plan unacceptable.12 We observed
 in Swann, supra, that '(t)he constitutional command to desegregate
 schools does not mean that every school in every community must
 always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a
 whole.' 402 U.S., at 24, 91 S.Ct. at 1280.
 
      But there is more to this case than the disparity in racial
 percentages reflected by the figures supplied by the school board.
 In the first place, the District Court found that if Emporia were
 allowed to withdraw from the existing system, it 'may be
 anticipated that the proportion of whites in county schools may
 drop as those who can register in private academies,' 309 F.Supp.,
 at 680, while some whites might return to the city schools from
 the private schools in which they had previously enrolled. Thus,
 in the judgment of the District Court, the statistical breakdown
 of the 1969—1970 enrollment figures between city residents and
 county


14
Page 465
 
 residents did not reflect what the situation would have been had
 Emporia established its own school system.
 
      Second, the significance of any racial disparity in this case
 is enhanced by the fact that the two formerly all-white schools
 are located within Emporia, while all the schools located in the
 surrounding county were formerly all-Negro. The record further
 reflects that the school buildings in Emporia are better equipped
 and are located on better sites than are those in the county. We
 noted in Swann that factors such as these may in themselves
 indicate that enforced racial segregation has been perpetuated:
 
      'Independent of student assignment, where it is possible to
      identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by
      reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff,
      the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the
      organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of
      violation of substantive constitutional rights under the
      Equal Protection Clause is shown.' 402 U.S., at 18, 91 S.Ct.,
      at 1277.
 
      Just as racial balance is not required in remedying a dual
 system, neither are racial ratios the sole consideration to be
 taken into account in devising a workable remedy.
 
      The timing of Emporia's action is a third factor that was
 properly taken into account by the District Court in assessing the
 effect of the action upon children remaining in the county
 schools. While Emporia had long had the right under state law to
 establish a separate school system, its decision to do so came
 only upon the basis of—and, as the city officials conceded, in
 reaction to—a court order that prevented the county system from
 maintaining any longer the segregated system that had lingered for
 15 years after Brown I. In the words of Judge Winter, dissenting
 in the Court


15
Page 466
 
 of Appeals, '(i)f the establishment of an Emporia school district
 is not enjoined, the black students in the county will watch as
 nearly one-half the total number of white students in the county
 abandon the county schools for a substantially whiter system.' 442
 F.2d 588, at 590. The message of this action, coming when it did,
 cannot have escaped the Negro children in the county. As we noted
 in Brown I: 'To separate (Negro school children) from others of
 similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
 generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
 community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
 ever to be undone.' 347 U.S., at 494, 74 S.Ct., at 691. We think
 that, under the circumstances, the District Court could rationally
 have concluded that the same adverse psychological effect was
 likely to result from Emporia's withdrawal of its children from
 the Greensville County system.
 
      The weighing of these factors to determine their effect upon
 the process of desegregation is a delicate task that is aided by a
 sensitivity to local conditions, and the judgment is primarily the
 responsibility of the district judge. See Brown II, supra, 349
 U.S. at 299, 75 S.Ct. at 755.13 Given the totality of the
 circumstances, we hold that the District Court was justified in
 its conclusion that Emporia's establishment of a separate system
 would actually impede the process of dismantling the existing dual
 system.


16
Page 467
 
                              IV
 
      Against these considerations, Emporia advances arguments that
 a separate system is necessary to achieve 'quality education' for
 city residents, and that it is unfair in any event to force the
 city to continue to send its children to schools over which the
 city, because of the character of its arrangement with the county,
 has very little control. These arguments are entitled to
 consideration by a court exercising its equitable discretion where
 they are directed to the feasibility or practicality of the
 proposed remedy. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklengurg Board of
 Education, supra, 402 U.S., at 31, 91 S.Ct., at 1283. But, as we
 said in Green v. County School Board, etc., supra, the
 availability of 'more promising courses of action' to dismantle a
 dual system 'at the least . . . places a heavy burden upon the
 board to explain its preference for an apparently less efective
 method.' 391 U.S., at 439, 88 S.Ct., at 1695.
 
      In evaluating Emporia's claims, it must be remembered that
 the city represents the interests of less than one-third of the
 students in the system being desegregated. Only the city officials
 argue that their plan is preferable to the 'pairing' plan
 encompassing the whole of the city-county system. Although the
 county school board took no position in the District Court either
 for or against Emporia's action, it had previously adopted a
 resolution stating its belief that the city's action was not in
 the best interests of the county children. In terms of Green, it
 was only the respondents—not the county school board—who expressed
 a 'preference for an apparently less effective method' of
 desegregation.
 
      At the final hearing in the District Court, the respondents
 presented detailed budgetary proposals and other evidence
 demonstrating that they contemplated a more


17
Page 468
 
 diverse and more expensive educational program than that to which
 the city children had been accustomed in the the Greensville
 County schools. These plans for the city system were developed
 after the preliminary injunction was issued in this case. In
 August 1969, one month before classes were scheduled to open, the
 city officials were intent upon operating a separate system
 despite the fact that the city had no buildings under lease, to
 teachers under contract, and no specific plans for the operation
 of the schools. Thus, the persuasiveness of the 'quality
 education' rationale was open to question. More important,
 however, any increased quality of education provided to city
 students would, under the circumstances found by the District
 Court, have been purchased only at the price of a substantial
 adverse effect upon the viability of the county system. The
 District Court, with its responsibility to provide an effective
 remedy for segregation in the entire city-county system, could not
 properly allow the city to make its part of that system more
 attractive where such a result would be accomplished at the
 expense of the children remaining in the county.
 
      A more weighty consideration put forth by Emporia is its lack
 of formal control over the school system under the terms of its
 contract with the county. This argument is properly addressed to
 the practicality of the District Court's action. As we said in
 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S.,
 at 37, 91 S.Ct., at 1292:
 
      'Having once found a violation, the district judge or school
      authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest
      possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account
      the practicalities of the situation.'
 
      And in Swann, supra, we noted that a desegregation plan
 cannot be regarded as a proper exercise of a dis-


18
Page 469
 
 trict court's discretion where it is not 'reasonable, feasible and
 workable.' 402 U.S., at 31, 91 S.Ct., at 1283.
 
      We do not underestimate the deficiencies, from Emporia's
 standpoint, in the arrangement by which it undertook in 1968 to
 provide for the education of its children. Direct control over
 decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a
 need that is strongly felt in our society, and since 1967 the
 citizens of Emporia have had little of that control. But Emporia
 did find its arrangement with the county both feasible and
 practical up until the time of the desegregation decree issued in
 the summer of 1969. While city officials testified that they were
 dissatisfied with the terms of the contract prior to that time,
 they did not attempt to change it. They argued that the
 arrangement became intolerable when the 'pairing' decree was
 entered, because the county officials who would control the budget
 of the unitary system lacked the desire to make the unitary system
 work. The District Court did not accept the contention that a lack
 of enthusiasm on the part of county leaders would, if Emporia
 children remained in the system, block a successful transition to
 unitary schools. The court felt that the 'desire of the city
 leaders, coupled with their obvious leadership ability,' would
 make itself felt despite the absence of any formal control by the
 city over the system's budget and operation, and that the city's
 leadership would be 'an important facet in the successful
 operation of any court-ordered plan.' 309 F.Supp., at 679. Under
 these circumstances, we cannot say that the enforced continuation
 of the single city-county system was not 'reasonable, feasible and
 workable.'14


19
Page 470
 
      The District Court explicitly noted in its opinion that its
 injunction does not have the effect of locking Emporia into its
 present circumstances for all time. As already noted, our holding
 today does not rest upon a conclusion that the disparity in racial
 balance between the city and county schools resulting from
 separate systems would, absent any other considerations, be
 unacceptable. The city's creation of a separate school system was
 enjoined because of the effect it would have had at the time upon
 the effectiveness of the remedy ordered to dismantle the dual
 system that had long existed in the area. Once the unitary system
 has been established and accepted, it may be that Emporia, if it
 still desires to do so, may establish an independent system
 without such an adverse effect upon the students remaining in the
 county, or it may be able to work out a more satisfactory
 arrangement with the county for joint operation of the existing
 system. We hold only that a new school district may not be created
 where its effect would be to impede the process of dismantling a
 dual system. And in making that essentially factual determination
 in any particular case, 'we must of necessity rely to a large
 extent, as this Court has for more than 16 years, on the informed
 judgment of the district courts in the first instance and on
 courts of appeals.' Swann, supra, 402 U.S., at 28, 91 S.Ct., at
 1282. In this case, we believe that the District Court


20
Page 471
 
 did not abuse its discretion. For these reasons, the judgment of
 the Court of Appeals is reversed.
 
      Reversed.
 
 djQ  Mr. Chief Justice BURGER, with whom Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, Mr.
 Justice POWELL, and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
 
      If it appeared that the city of Emporia's operation of a
 separate school system would either perpetuate racial segregation
 in the schools of the Greensville County area or otherwise
 frustrate the dismantling of the dual system in that area, I would
 unhesitatingly join in reversing the judgment of the Court of
 Appeals and reinstating the judgment of the District Court.
 However, I do not believe the record supports such findings and
 can only conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in
 preventing Emporia from exercising its lawful right to provide for
 the education of its own children.
 
      By accepting the District Court's conclusion that Emporia's
 operation of its own schools would 'impede the dismantling of the
 dual system,' the Court necessarily implies that the result of the
 severance would be something less than unitary schools, and that
 segregated education would persist in some measure in the
 classrooms of the Greensville County area. The Court does not
 articulate the standard by which it reaches this conclusion, and
 its result far exceeds the contemplation of Brown v. Board of
 Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), and
 all succeeding cases, including Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
 Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554
 (1971).
 
      If the severance of the two systems were permitted to
 proceed, the assignment of children to schools would depend solely
 on their residence. County residents would attend county schools,
 and city residents would attend city schools. Assignment to
 schools would in no sense


21
Page 472
 
 depend on race. Such a geographic assignment pattern is prima
 facie consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. See Spencer v.
 Kugler, 326 F.Supp. 1235 (D.C.N.J.1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1027, 92
 S.Ct. 707, 30 L.Ed.2d 723 (1972).
 
      However, where a school system has been operated on a
 segregated basis in the past, and where ostensibly neutral
 attendance zones or district lines are drawn where none have
 existed before, we do not close our eyes to the facts in favor of
 theory. In Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct.
 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), the Court ruled that dual school
 systems must cease to exist in an objective sense as well as under
 the law. It was apparent that under the freedom-of-choice plan
 before the Court in Green, the mere elimination of mandatory
 segregation had privided no meaningful remedy. Green imposed on
 school boards the responsibility to 'fashion steps which promise
 realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'white'
 school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools.' 391 U.S., at 442,
 88 S.Ct., at 1696. That, I believe, is precisely what would result
 if Emporia were permitted to operate its own school system—schools
 neither Negro nor white, 'but just schools.' As separate systems,
 both Emporia and Greensville County would have a majority of Negro
 students, the former slightly more than half, the latter slightly
 more than two-thirds. In the words of the Court of Appeals, '(t)he
 Emporia city unit would not be a white island in an otherwise
 black county.' 442 F.2d, at 573. Moreover, the Negro majority in
 the remaining county system would only slightly exceed that of the
 entire county area including Emporia. It is undisputed that
 education would be conducted on a completely desegregated basis
 within the separate systems. Thus, the situation would in no sense
 be comparable to that where the creation of attendance zones
 within a single formerly segregated school system leaves an
 inordinate number


22
Page 473
 
 of one-race schools, such as were found in Davis v. Board of
 School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 577 (1971).
 Rather than perpetuating a dual system, I believe the proposed
 arrangement would completely eliminate all traces of state imposed
 segregation.
 
      It is quite true that the racial ratios of the two school
 systems would differ, but the elimination of such disparities is
 not the mission of desegregation. We stated in Swann v.
 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S., at 24, 91
 S.Ct., at 1280:
 
      'If we were to read the holding of the District Court to
      require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any
      particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach
      would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse. The
      constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean
      that every school in every community must always reflect the
      racial composition of the school system as a whole.'
 
      It can no more be said that racial balance is the norm to be
 sought, than it can be said that mere racial imbalance was the
 condition requiring a judicial remedy. The pointlessness of such a
 'racial balancing' approach is well illustrated by the facts of
 this case. The District Courtand the petitioners have placed great
 emphasis on the estimated six-percent increase in the proportion
 of Negro students in the county schools that would result from
 Emporia's withdrawal. I do not see how a difference of one or two
 children per class1 would even be noticed, let alone how it would
 render


23
Page 474
 
 a school part of a dual system. We have seen that the normal
 movement of populations could bring about such shifts in a
 relatively short period of time. Obsession with such minor
 statistical differences reflects the gravely mistaken view that a
 plan providing more consistent racial ratios is somehow more
 unitary than one which tolerates a lack of racial balance. Since
 the goal is to dismantle dual school systems rather than to
 reproduce in each classroom a microcosmic reflection of the racial
 proportions of a given geographical area, there is no basis for
 saying that a plan providing a uniform racial balance is more
 effective or constitutionally preferred. School authorities may
 wish to pursue that goal as a matter of policy, but we have made
 it plain that it is not constitutionally mandated. See Swann v.
 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S., at 16, 91
 S.Ct., at 1276.
 
 
 
      The Court disavows a 'racial balancing' approach, and seeks
 to justify the District Court's ruling by relying on several
 additional factors thought to aggravate the effect of the racial
 disparity. The real significance of these additional factors is so
 negligible as to suggest that the racial inbalance itself may be
 what the Court finds most unacceptable.
 
      First, the Court raises the specter of resegregation
 resulting from the operation of separate school systems in the
 county area, but on the record in this case this is, at best,
 highly speculative. The Court suggests two reasons why such an
 additional racial shift could be anticipated with the existence of
 a separate school system for Emporia: white students residing in
 the county might abandon the public schools in favor of private
 academies, and white students residing in the city might leave
 private schools and enroll in the city school.
 
      In assessing these projections it is necessary to compare the
 nature of the proposed separate systems with


24
Page 475
 
 that of the court-ordered 'pairing' system. Thus the first
 possibility, that white students from the county might enter
 private schools, assumes that white families would be more likely
 to withdraw their children from public schools that are 72% Negro
 than from those that are 66% Negro. At most, any such difference
 would be marginal, and in fact it seems highly improbable that
 there would be any difference at all. The second possibility
 postulated by the Court seems equally unlikely; it assumes that
 families from the city who had previously withdrawn their children
 from the public schools due to impending desegregation, would
 return their children to public schools having more Negro than
 white pupils.
 
      The Court does not mention the possibility of some form of
 mass migration of white families into the city from the outlying
 county. Of course, when there are adjoining school districts
 differing in their racial compositions, it is always conceivable
 that the differences will be accentuated by the so-called 'white
 flight' phenomenon. But that danger seems remote in a situation
 such as this where there is a predominantly Negro population
 throughout the entire area of concern.
 
      Second, the Court attaches significance to the fact that the
 school buildings located in the county were formerly used as
 all-Negro schools and intimates that these facilities are of
 generally poorer quality than those in the city. But the District
 Court made no such finding of fact, and the record does not
 support the Court's suggestion on this point. Admittedly some
 dissatisfaction was expressed with the sites of the elementary
 schools in the county, and only the city elementary school has an
 auditorium. However, all three elementary schools located in the
 county are more modern than any school building located in the
 city, and the county and city high school buildings are identical
 in every respect.


25
Page 476
 
 On a fair reading of the entire record, it can only be said that
 any differences between the educational facilities located in the
 city and those in the county are de minimis.
 
      Finally, the Court states that the process of desegregation
 would be impeded by the 'adverse psychological effect' that a
 separate city system would have on Negro students in the county.
 Here, again, the Court seeks to justify the District Court's
 discretionary action by reliance on a factor never considered by
 that court. More important, it surpasses the bounds of reason to
 equate the psychological impact of creating adjoining unitary
 school systems, both having Negro majorities, with the feelings of
 inferiority referred to in Brown I as engendered by a segregated
 school system. In Brown I the Court emphasized that the legal
 policy of separating children in schools solely according to their
 race inevitably generates a sense of inferiority. These
 observations were supported by common human experience and
 reinforced by psychological authority. Here the Court seeks to
 make a similar judgment in a setting where no child is accorded
 differing treatment on the basis of race. This wholly speculative
 observation by the Court is supported neither by common experience
 nor by scientific authority.
 
      Even giving maximum rational weight to all of the factors
 mentioned by the Court, I cannot conclude that separate systems
 for Emporia and Greensville County would be anything less than
 fully unitary and nonracial. The foundation and superstructure of
 the dual system would be dissolved, and the result would not
 factually preserve the separation of races that existed in the
 past. We noted in Swann 'that the existence of some small number
 of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is
 not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices
 segregation by law.' 402


26
Page 477
 
 U.S., at 26, 91 S.Ct., at 1281. This reflects our consistent
 emphasis on the elimination of the discriminatory systems, rather
 than on mere numbers in particular schools. The proposed systems
 here would retain no 'one-race, or virtually one-race schools,'
 but more important, all vestiges of the discriminatory system
 would be removed. That is all the Constitution commands.
 
      It is argued that even if Emporia's operation of its own
 unitary school system would have been constitutionally
 permissible, it was nevertheless within the equitable discretion
 of the District Court to insist on a 'more effective' plan of
 desegregation in the form of a county-wide school system. In Brown
 v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083
 (1955) (Brown II), the Court first conferred on the district
 courts the responsibility to enforce the desegregation of the
 schools, if school authorities failed to do so, according to
 equitable remedial principles. While we have emphasized the
 flexibility of the power of the district courts in this process,
 the invocation of remedial jurisdiction is not equivalent to
 having a school district placed in receivership. It has been
 implicit in all of our decisions from Brown II to Swann, that if
 local authorities devise a plan that will effectively eliminate
 segregation in the schools, a district court must accept such a
 plan unless there are strong reasons why a different plan is to be
 perferred. A local school board plan that will eliminate dual
 schools, stop discrimination, and improve the quality of education
 ought not be cast aside because a judge can evolve some other plan
 that accomplishes the same result, or what he considers a
 preferable result, with a two percent, four percent, or six
 percent difference in racial composition. Such an approach gives
 controlling weight to sociological theories, not constitutional
 doctrine.
 
      This limitation on the discretion of the district courts
 involves more than polite deference to the role of local


27
Page 478
 
 governments. Local control is not only vital to continued public
 support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an
 educational standpoint as well. The success of any school system
 depends on a vast range of factors that lie beyond the competence
 and power of the courts. Curricular decisions, the structuring of
 grade levels, the planning of extracurricular activities, to
 mention a few, are matters lying solely within the province of
 school officials, who maintain a day-to-day supervision that a
 judge cannot. A plan devised by school officials is apt to be
 attuned to these highly relevant educational goals; a plan deemed
 preferable in the abstract by a judge might well overlook and thus
 undermine these primary concerns.
 
      The discretion of a district court is further limited where,
 as here, it deals with totally separate political entities. This
 is a very different case from one where a school board proposes
 attendance zones within a single school district or even one where
 a school district is newly formed within a county unit. Under
 Virginia law, Emporia is as independent from Greensville County as
 one State is from another. See City of Richmond v. Board of
 Supervisors of Henrico County, 199 Va. 679, 684, 101 S.E.2d 641,
 644 (1958); Murray v. City of Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 324, 64 S.E.2d
 804, 807 (1951). This may be an anomaly in municipal
 jurisprudence, but it is Virginia's anomaly; it is of ancient
 origin, and it is not forbidden by the Constitution. To bar the
 city of Emporia from operating its own school system is to strip
 it of its most important governmental responsibility, and thus
 largely to deny its existence as an independent governmental
 entity. It is a serious step and, absent the factors that persuade
 me to the contrary in Scotland Neck,2 decided today, I am
 unwilling to go that far.


28
Page 479
 
      Although the rights and powers of a bona fide political
 entity may not be used as a cloak for evasive action, neither can
 those powers be nullified by judicial intervention to achieve a
 unitary system in a particular way. When a plan devised by local
 authorities crosses the threshold of achieving actual
 desegregation, it is not for the district courts to overstep local
 prerogatives and insist on some other alternative. Judicial power
 ends when a dual school system has ceased to exist.
 
      Since Emporia's operation of a separate school system would
 not compromise the goal of eliminating dual schools, there is no
 basis for requiring Emporia to demonstrate the necessity of its
 decision. The 'heavy burden' test referred to in Green applies
 only where there is serious reason to doubt the efficacy of a
 school board's plan as a means of achieving desegregation, and
 there is no basis for such doubt here. Nonetheless, the Court's
 treatment of Emporia's reasons for establishing a separate system
 merits comment.
 
      The Court makes light of Emporia's desire to create a
 high-quality, unitary school system for the children of its
 citizens. In so doing, the Court disregards the following explicit
 finding of the District Court:
 
      'The city clearly contemplates a superior quality educational
      program. It is anticipated that the cost will be such as to
      require higher tax payments by city residents. A kindergarten
      program, ungraded primary levels, health services, adult
      education, and a low pupil-teacher ratio are included in the
      plan. . . .' 309 F.Supp. at 674.
 
      Furthermore, the Court suggests that if Emporia were in fact
 to provide the top-flight educational program the District Judge
 anticipated, it could only worsen the quality of education in the
 remaining county schools. To be sure, there was cause for concern
 over the relative quality of education offered in the county
 schools;


29
Page 480
 
 as the District Court observed, county officials did 'not embrace
 the court-ordered unitary plan with enthusiasm.' 309 F.Supp., at
 680. The record shows that prior to the 1969—1970 school year,
 per-pupil expenditures in Greensville County lagged behind the
 state median, and that the increase in the county school budget
 for the 1969—1970 school year was insufficient to keep abreast of
 inflation, not to mention increased transportation costs. But the
 city of Emporia was in no position to alleviate this problem for
 the county. The county had previously refused to allow the city to
 participate in joint administration of the schools, and the city
 had absolutely no power to affect the level of funding for the
 county schools. Under the contract, Emporia was the purchaser of
 whatever educational services the county had to offer. Out of
 understandable concern for the quality of these services, it
 sought to alter the contractual arrangement in order to provide
 better unitary schools.
 
      There is no basis on this record for assuming that the
 quality of education in the county schools was likely to suffer
 further due to Emporia's withdrawal. The Court relies on the
 District Court's finding that 'the desire of the city leaders,
 coupled with their obvious leadership ability, is and will be an
 important facet in the successful operation of any court-ordered
 plan.' 309 F.Supp., at 679. The District Court made this finding
 despite the fact that the county had refused to administer the
 schools jointly with the city, and despite uncontradicted evidence
 that there was no line of communications between the city and
 county governments, that the city government had been unable to
 get any cooperation from the county government, and that there was
 an atmosphere of active antagonism between the two governments.
 With all deference to the trier of fact, I cannot accept this
 finding as supported by evidence in the record of this case. It
 appears that the District Court wanted


30
Page 481
 
 that 'obvious leadership ability' of Emporia's citizens to exert
 its influence on the more reluctant leadership in the county. This
 is a laudable goal in the abstract, but the courts must adjust
 their remedies to the facts of each case as they bear on the
 central problem of eliminating a dual system.
 
      Although acknowledging Emporia's need to have some '(d)irect
 control over decisions vitally affecting the education of (its)
 children', the Court states that since Emporia found the
 contractual arrangement tolerable prior to 1969, it should not now
 be heard to complain. However, the city did not enter that
 contract of its own free choice. From the time Emporia became a
 city, consideration was given to the formation of a separate
 school system, and it was at least thought necessary that the city
 participate in administration of the county school system. After
 the county rejected the city's proposal for joint administration,
 the county threatened to terminate educational services for city
 children unless the city entered an agreement by April 30, 1968.
 Only then—under virtual duress—did the city submit to the
 contractal arrangement. It was not until June 1969 that the city
 was advised by its counsel that the agreement might be illegal.
 Steps were then taken to terminate the strained relationship.
 
      Recognizing the tensions inherent in a contractual
 arrangement put together under these conditions, the Court
 indicates that Emporia might be permitted to operate a separate
 school system at some future time. The Court does not explain how
 the passage of time will substantially alter the situation that
 existed at the time the District Court entered its injunction. If,
 as the Court states, desegregation in the county was destined to
 fail if Emporia established its own school system in 1969, it is
 difficult to understand why it would not be an undue risk to allow
 separation in the future.


31
Page 482
 
 The more realistic view is that there was never such a danger, and
 that the District Court had no cause to disregard Emporia's desire
 to free itself from its ties to Greensville County. However, even
 on the Court's terms, I assume that Emporia could go back to the
 District Court tomorrow and renew its request to operate a
 separate system. The county-wide plan has been in effect for the
 past three years, and the city should now be relieved of the
 court-imposed duty to purchase whatever quality of education the
 county sees fit to provide.
 
      Finally, some discussion is warranted of the relevance of
 discriminatory purpose in cases such as these. It is, of course,
 correct that '(t)he measure of any desegregation plan is its
 effectiveness,' Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S., at 37,
 91 S.Ct., at 1292, and that a plan that stops short of dismantling
 a dual school system cannot be redeemed by benevolent motives. But
 it is also true that even where a dual system has in fact been
 dismantled, as it plainly has been in Emporia, we must still be
 alert to make sure that ostensibly nondiscriminatory actions are
 not designed to eclude children from schools because of their
 race. We are well aware that the progress of school desegregation
 since 1954 has been hampered by persistent resistance and evasion
 in many places. Thus, the normal judicial reluctance to probe the
 motives or purposes underlying official acts must yield to the
 realities in this very sensitive area of constitutional
 adjudication. Compare Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
 Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964),
 with Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d
 438 (1971).
 
      There is no basis for concluding, on this record, that
 Emporia's decision to operate a separate school system was the
 manifestation of a discriminatory purpose. The strongest finding
 made by the District Court was that race was 'in a sense' a factor
 in the city's decision; read in context, this ambiguous finding
 does not relate to any


32
Page 483
 
 invidious consideration of race. The District Court relied solely
 on the following testimony of the chairman of the city school
 board:
 
      'Race, of course, affected the operation of the schools by
      the county, and I again say, I do not think, or we felt that
      the county was not capable of putting the monies in and the
      effort and the leadership into a system that would
      effectively make a unitary system work . . ..' 309 F.Supp. at
      680.
 
      I cannot view this kind of consideration of race as
 discriminatory or even objectionable. The same doubts about the
 county's commitment to the operation of a high-quality unitary
 system would have come into play even if the racial composition of
 Emporia were precisely the same as that of the entire county area,
 including Emporia.
 
      Nor is this a case where we can presume a discriminatory
 purpose from an obviously discriminatory effect. Cf. Gomillion v.
 Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). We
 are not confronted with an awkward gerrymander or striking shift
 in racial proportions. The modest difference between the racial
 composition of Emporia's proposed separate school system and that
 of the county as a whole affords no basis for an inference of
 racial motivation. And while it seems that the more cumbersome
 features of the District Court's plan hastened the city's
 inevitable decision to operate a separate unitary school system,
 this was not because of any desire to manipulate the racial
 balance of its schools.
 
      Read as a whole, this record suggests that the District
 Court, acting before our decision in Swann was reaching for some
 hypothetical perfection in racial balance, rather than the
 elimination of a dual school system. To put it in the simplest
 terms the Court, in adopting the District Court's approach, goes
 too far.



1
 Together with No. 70—187, Cotton v. Scotland Neck City
 Board of Education.


2
 The companion cases were Davis v. Board of School
 Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 577;
 McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 91 S.Ct. 1287, 28 L.Ed.2d 582;
 North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 91
 S.Ct. 1284, 28 L.Ed.2d 586; and Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
 Board of Education, 402 U.S. 47, 91 S.Ct. 1292, 28 L.Ed.2d 590.3 On the same day that it reversed the District Court orders
 in this case and in the Scotland Neck cases, the Court of Appeals
 for the Fourth Circuit affirmed an order enjoining the creation of
 a new school district in another county of North Carolina. Turner
 v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School District, 4 Cir., 442 F.2d 584.
 Other cases dealing with attempts to split school districts in the
 process of desegregation are Lee v. Macon County Board of
 Education, 5 Cir., 448 F.2d 746; Stout v. United States (Jefferson
 County Board of Education v. Board of Education for City of
 Pleasant Grove), 5 Cir., 448 F.2d 403; Haney v. County Board of
 Education, 8 Cir., 410 F.2d 920; United States v. Texas, D.C., 321
 F.Supp. 1043, 1052, aff'd, with modifications, 5 Cir., 447 F.2d
 441; Burleson v. County Board of Election Commissioners, D.C., 308
 F.Supp. 352, aff'd, 8 Cir., 432 F.2d 1356; Aytch v. Mitchell,
 D.C., 320 F.Supp. 1372.


4
 Va.Code Ann. § 15.1—982.5 See Va.Code Ann. § 22—93; Colonial Heights v. County of
 Chesterfield, 196 Va. 155, 82 S.E.2d 566 (1954).6 Emporia was entitled under state law to establish an
 independent school system when it became a city in 1967, but it
 chose not to do so because, according to the testimony of the
 chairman of the city school board, a separate system did not seem
 practical at the time. In a letter to the County Board of
 Supervisors in July 1969, the Emporia City Council stated that it
 had authorized a combined system in 1968 because it believed that
 'the educational interest of Emporia citizens, their children and
 those of the citizens and children of Greensville County, could
 best be served by continuing a combined City-County school
 division, thus giving students from both political subdivisions
 full benefits of a larger school system.'


7
 Under Virginia law as it stood in 1969, the school
 'division' was the basic unit for the purpose of school
 administration. See Va.Code Ann. §§ 22—30, 22—34, 22—100.1.


8
 The plan was later modified in certain respects at the
 request of the county school board, and as modified it has been in
 operation since September 1969. Because the four schools located
 outside Emporia's city limits are all in close proximity to the
 city, the 'pairing' plan apparently involved little additional
 transportation of students.


9
 The District Court took special note of this transfer
 arrangement in its memorandum accompanying the preliminary
 injunction issued in August 1969. At the time of the final
 hearing, however, the respondents assured the court that if
 allowed to operate a separate system, they would not permit
 transfers from the county without prior permission of the court.


10
 Because the county school board had ultimate
 responsibility for the administration of the schools under the
 combined system, the members of the Emporia school board were not
 originally parties to the lawsuit. But the District Court's
 desegregation decree bound both county officials 'and their
 successors,' and the District Court treated the Emporia school
 board members, insofar as they intended to replace the county
 board as administrators of part of the system under court order,
 as 'successors' to the members of the county board.


11
 The decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered less
 than a month prior to our decision in Swann v.
 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct.
 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554.


12
 The court order that we approved in Swann, supra, itself
 provided for student bodies ranging from 9% Negro to 38% Negro.


13
 'Full implementation of these constitutional principles
 may require solution of varied local school problems. School
 authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
 assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to
 consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good
 faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.
 Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible
 need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these
 cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.' 349 U.S., at 299,
 75 S.Ct., at 756.


14
 City officials testified that one of the primary
 objections to the court's 'pairing' decree was that it required a
 student to attend six schools in the space of 12 years. Dr.
 Tracey, the expert witness for the respondents, expressed the view
 that this aspect of the decree had undesirable effects from an
 educator's point of view. This argument, however, was never made
 to the District Court either before or at the time it adopted the
 'pairing' plan. Indeed, the city officials never even met with the
 county school board or participated in the hearings that preceded
 the decree. After the June 25 order was entered, the District
 Court modified it at the request of the county board, and at the
 hearing on a preliminary injunction against Emporia's withdrawal
 from the system, the court noted that it would be 'delighted to
 entertain motions for amendment of the (pairing) plan at any
 time.' App. 185a.


1
 The record shows that the pupil-teacher ratio in the
 county schools is less than 25 to 1. Assuming some rough
 correspondence between this ratio and the size of classes, a 6%
 racial shift would represent a change in the racial identity of
 1.5 students per class on the average.


2
 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education and
 Cotton v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 92
 S.Ct. 2214, 33 L.Ed.2d 75.


