407 U.S. 551
92 S.Ct. 2219
33 L.Ed.2d 131
LLOYD CORPORATION, LTD., Petitioner,v.Donald M. TANNER et al.
No. 71—492.
Argued April 18, 1972.
Decided June 22, 1972.
 
      Syllabus
 
      Respondents sought to distribute handbills in the interior
 mall area of petitioner's large privately owned shopping center.
 Petitioner had a strict no-handbilling rule. Petitioner's security
 guards requested respondents under threat of arrest to stop the
 handbilling, suggesting that they could resume their activities on
 the public streets and sidewalks adjacent to but outside the
 center, which respondents did. Respondents, claiming that
 petitioner's action violated their First Amendment rights,
 thereafter brought this action for injunctive and declaratory
 relief. The District Court, stressing that the center is 'open to
 the general public' and 'the functional equivalent of a public
 business district,' and relying on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265, and Amalgamated Food Employees Union
 Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20
 L.Ed.2d 603, held that petitioner's policy of prohibiting
 handbilling within the mall violated respondents' First Amendment
 rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: There has been no
 dedication of petitioner's privately owned and operated shopping
 center to public use so as to entitle respondents to exercise
 First Amendment rights therein that are unrelated to the center's
 operations; and petitioner's property did not lose its private
 character and its right to protection under the Fourteenth
 Amendment merely because the public is generally invited to use it
 for the purpose of doing business with petitioner's tenants. The
 facts in this case are significantly different from those in
 Marsh, supra, which involved a company town with 'all the
 attributes' of a municipality, and Logan Valley, supra, which
 involved labor picketing designed to convey a message to patrons
 of a particular store, so located in the center of a large private
 enclave as to preclude other reasonable access to store patrons.
 Under the circumstances present in this case, where the
 handbilling was unrelated to any activity within the center and
 where respondents had adequate alternative means of communication,
 the courts below erred in holding those decisions controlling. Pp.
 556—570.
 
      446 F.2d 545, reversed and remanded.

1
Page 552
 
      George Black, Jr., Portland, Or., for petitioner.
 
      Carl R. Neil, Portland, Or., for respondents.
 
 djQ  Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
 
      This case presents the question reserved by the Court in
 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
 Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), as to
 the right of a privately owned shopping center to prohibit the
 distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling is
 unrelated to the shopping center's operations. Relying primarily
 on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265
 (1946), and Logan Valley, the United States District Court for the
 District of Oregon sustained an asserted First Amendment right to
 distribute handbills in petitioner's shopping center, and issued a
 permanent injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with
 such right. 308 F.Supp. 128 (1970). The Court of Appeals for the
 Ninth Circuit affirmed, 446 F.2d 545 (1971). We granted certiorari
 to consider petitioner's contention that the decision below


2
Page 553
 
 violates rights of private property protected by the Fifth and
 Fourteenth Amendments. 404 U.S. 1037, 92 S.Ct. 703, 30 L.Ed.2d 728
 (1972).
 
      Lloyd Corp., Ltd. (Lloyd), owns a large, modern retail
 shopping center in Portland, Oregon. Lloyd Center embraces
 altogether about 50 acres, including some 20 acres of open and
 covered parking facilities which accommodate more than 1,000
 automobiles. It has a perimeter of almost one and one-half miles,
 bounded by four public streets. It is crossed in varying degrees
 by several other public streets, all of which have adjacent public
 sidewalks. Lloyd owns all land and buildings within the Center,
 except these public streets and sidewalks. There are some 60
 commercial tenants, including small shops and several major
 department stores.
 
      The Center embodies a relatively new concept in shopping
 center design. The stores are all located within a single large,
 multi-level building complex sometimes referred to as the 'Mall.'
 Within this complex, in addition to the stores, there are parking
 facilities, malls, private sidewalks, stairways, escalators,
 gardens, an auditorium, and a skating rink. Some of the stores
 open directly on the outside public sidewalks, but most open on
 the interior privately owned malls. Some stores open on both.
 There are no public streets or public sidewalks within the
 building complex, which is enclosed and entirely covered except
 for the landscaped portions of some of the interior malls.
 
      The distribution of the handbills occurred in the malls. They
 are a distinctive feature of the Center, serving both utilitarian
 and esthetic functions. Essentially, they are private, interior
 promenades with 10-foot sidewalks serving the stores, and with a
 center strip 30 feet wide in which flowers and shrubs are planted,
 and statutary, fountains, benches, and other amenities are
 located. There is no vehicular traffic on the malls. An archi-


3
Page 554
 
 tectural expert described the purpose of the malls as follows:
 
      'In order to make shopping easy and pleasant, and to help
      realize the goal of maximum sales (for the Center), the shops
      are grouped about special pedestrian ways or malls. Here the
      shopper is isolated from the noise, fumes, confusion and
      distraction which he normally finds along city streets, and a
      controlled, carefree environment is provided . . ..'1
 
      Although the stores close at customary hours, the malls are
 not physically closed, as pedestrian window shopping is encouraged
 within reasonable hours.2 Lloyd employs 12 security guards, who
 are commissioned as such by the city of Portland. The guards have
 police authority within the Center, wear uniforms similar to those
 worn by city police, and are licensed to carry handguns. They are
 employed by and subject to the control of Lloyd. Their duties are
 the customary ones, including shoplifting surveillance and general
 security.
 
      At a few places within the Center small signs are embedded in
 the sidewalk which state:
 
      'NOTICE—Areas In Lloyd Center Used By The


4
Page 555
 
      Public Are Not Public Ways But Are For The Use Of Lloyd
      Center Tenants And The Public Transacting Business With Them.
      Permission To Use Said Areas May Be Revoked At Any Time.
      Lloyd Corporation, Ltd.'
 
      The Center is open generally to the public, with a
 considerable effort being made to attract shoppers and prospective
 shoppers, and to create 'customer motivation' as well as customer
 goodwill in the community. In this respect the Center pursues
 policies comparable to those of major stores and shopping centers
 across the country, although the Center affords superior
 facilities for these purposes. Groups and organizations are
 permitted, by invitation and advance arrangement, to use the
 auditorium and other facilities. Rent is charged for use of the
 auditorium except with respect to certain civic and charitable
 organizations, such as the Cancer Society and Boy and Girl Scouts.
 The Center also allows limited use of the malls by the American
 Legion to sell poppies for disabled veterans, and by the Salvation
 Army and Volunteers of America to solicit Christmas contributions.
 It has denied similar use to other civic and charitable
 organizations. Political use is also forbidden, except that
 presidential candidates of both parties have been allowed to speak
 in the auditorium.3
 
      The Center had been in operation for some eight years when
 this litigation commenced. Throughout this period it had a policy,
 strictly enforced, against the distribution of handbills within
 the building complex and its malls. No exceptions were made with
 respect to handbilling, which was considered likely to annoy
 customers, to create litter, potentially to create disorders,


5
Page 556
 
 and generally to be incompatible with the purpose of the Center
 and the atmosphere sought to be preserved.
 
      On November 14, 1968, the respondents in this case
 distributed within the Center handbill invitations to a meeting of
 the 'Resistance Community' to protest the draft and the Vietnam
 war. The distribution, made in several different places on the
 mall walkways by five young people, was quiet and orderly, and
 there was no littering. There was a complaint from one customer.
 Security guards informed the respondents that they were
 trespassing and would be arrested unless they stopped distributing
 the handbills within the Center.4 The guards suggested that
 respondents distribute their literature on the public streets and
 sidewalks adjacent to but outside of the Center complex.
 Respondents left the premises as requested 'to avoid arrest' and
 continued the handbilling outside. Subsequently this suit was
 instituted in the District Court seeking declaratory and
 injunctive relief.
 
                               I
 
      The District Court, emphasizing that the Center 'is open to
 the general public,' found that it is 'the functional equivalent
 of a public business district.' 308 F.Supp., at 130. That court
 then held that Lloyd's 'rule prohibiting the distribution of
 handbills within the Mall violates . . . First Amendment rights.'
 308 F.Supp., at 131. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals
 held that it was bound by the 'factual determination' as to the
 character of the Center, and concluded that the decisions of this
 Court in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed.
 265 (1946), and Amalgamated Food


6
Page 557
 
 Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), compelled affirmance.5
 
      Marsh involved Chickasaw, Alabama, a company town wholly
 owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp. The opinion of the Court, by
 Mr. Justice Black, described Chickasaw as follows:
 
      'Except for (ownership by a private corporation) it has all
      the characteristics of any other American town. The property
      consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of
      sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on
      which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile
      County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's
      policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented
      the stores and business places on the business block and the
      United States uses one of the places as a post office from
      which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw
      and the adjacent area. The town and the surrounding
      neighborhood, which can not be distinguished from the Gulf
      property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are
      thickly settled, and according to all indications the
      residents use the business block as their regular shopping
      center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make
      use of a company-owned paved street and sidewalk located
      alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave the
      stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads
      at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane
      public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a
      distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop


7
Page 558
 
      highway traffic from coming onto the business block and upon
      arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities
      available there. In short the town and its shopping district
      are accessible to and freely used by the public in general
      and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town
      and shopping center except the fact that the title to the
      property belongs to a private corporation.' 326 U.S., at 502
      503, 66 S.Ct., at 277.
 
      A Jehovah's Witness undertook to distribute religious
 literature on a sidewalk near the post office and was arrested on
 a trespassing charge. In holding that First and Fourteenth
 Amendment rights were infringed, the Court emphasized that the
 business district was within a company-owned town, an anachronism
 long prevalent in some southern States and now rarely found.6
 
      In Logan Valley the Court extended the rationale of Marsh to
 peaceful picketing of a store located in a large shopping center,
 known as Logan Walley Mall, near Altoona, Pennsylvania. Weis
 Markets, Inc. (Weis), an original tenant, had opened a supermarket
 in one of the larger stores and was employing a wholly nonunion
 staff. Within 10 days after Weis opened, members of Amalgamated
 Food Employees Union Local 590 (Union) began picketing Weis,
 carrying signs stating that it was a nonunion market and that its
 employees were not receiving union wages or other union benefits.
 The picketing, conducted by nonemployees, was carried out


8
Page 559
 
 almost entirely in the parcel pickup area immediately adjacent to
 the store and on portions of the adjoining parking lot. The
 picketing was peaceful, with the number of pickets varying from
 four to 13.
 
      Weis and Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., sought and obtained an
 injunction against this picketing. The injunction required that
 all picketing be confined to public areas outside the shopping
 center. On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
 issuance of the injunction, and this Court granted certiorari. In
 framing the question, this Court stated:
 
      'The case squarely presents . . . the question whether
      Pennsylvania's generally valid rules against trespass to
      private property can be applied in these circumstances to bar
      petitioners from the Weis and Logan premises.' 391 U.S., at
      315, 88 S.Ct., at 1606.
 
      The Court noted that the answer would be clear 'if the
 shopping center premises were not privately owned but instead
 constituted the business area of a municipality.' Id., at 315, 88
 S.Ct., at 1607. In the latter situation, it has often been held
 that publicly owned streets, sidewalks, and parks are so
 historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment
 rights that access to them for purposes of exercising such rights
 cannot be denied absolutely. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58
 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59
 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413,
 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943).
 
      The Court then considered Marsh v. Alabama, supra, and
 concluded that:
 
      'The shopping center here is clearly the functional
      equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw involved in
      Marsh.' 391 U.S., at 318, 88 S.Ct., at 1608.
 
      But the Court was careful not to go further and say that for
 all purposes and uses the privately owned streets,


9
Page 560
 
 sidewalks, and other areas of a shopping center are analogous to
 publicly owned facilities:
 
      'All we decide here is that because the shopping center
      serves as the community business block 'and is freely
      accessible and open to the people in the area and those
      passing through,' Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S., at
      508, 66 S.Ct., at 279, the State may not delegate the power,
      through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those
      members of the public wishing to exercise their First
      Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a
      purpose generally consonant with the use to which the
      property is actually put.' Id., at 319—320, 88 S.Ct., at
      1609.
 
      The Court noted that the scope of its holding was limited,
 and expressly reserved judgment on the type of issue presented in
 this case:
 
      'The picketing carried on by petitioners was directed
      specifically at patrons of the Weis Market located within the
      shopping center and the message sought to be conveyed to the
      public concerned the manner in which that particular market
      was being operated. We are, therefore, not called upon to
      consider whether respondents' property rights could,
      consistently with the First Amendment, justify a bar on
      picketing which was not thus directly related in its purpose
      to the use to which the shopping center property was being
      put.' Id., at 320 n. 9, 88 S.Ct., at 1609.
 
      The Court also took specific note of the facts that the
 Union's picketing was 'directed solely at one establishment within
 the shopping center,' Id., at 321, 88 S.Ct., at 1610, and that the
 public berms and sidewalks were 'from 350 to 500 feet away from
 the Weis store.' Id., at 322, 88 S.Ct., at 1610. This distance
 made it difficult 'to communicate (with) patrons of Weis' and 'to
 limit (the) effect (of


10
Page 561
 
 the picketing) to Weis only.' Id., at 322, 323, 88 S.Ct., at
 1611.7 Logan Valley was decided on the basis of this factual
 situation, and the facts in this case are significantly different.
 
                              II
 
      The courts below considered the critical inquiry to be
 whether Lloyd Center was 'the functional equivalent of a public
 business district.'8 This phrase was first used in Logan Valley,
 but its genesis was in Marsh. It is well to consider what Marsh
 actually decided. As noted above, it involved an economic anomaly
 of the past, 'the company town.' One must have seen such towns to
 understand that 'functionally' they were no different from
 municipalities of comparable size. They developed primarily in the
 Deep South to meet economic conditions, especially those which
 existed following the Civil War. Impoverished States, and
 especially backward areas thereof, needed an influx of industry
 and capital. Corporations attracted to the area by natural
 resources and abundant labor were willing to assume the role of
 local government. Quite literally, towns


11
Page 562
 
 were built and operated by private capital with all of the
 customary services and utilities normally afforded by a municipal
 or state government: there were streets, sidewalks, sewers, public
 lighting, police and fire protection, business and residential
 areas, churches, postal facilities, and sometimes schools. In
 short, as Mr. Justice Black said, Chickasaw, Alabama, had 'all the
 characteristics of any other American town.' 326 U.S., at 502, 66
 S.Ct., at 277. The Court simply held that where private interests
 were substituting for and performing the customary functions of
 government, First Amendment freedoms could not be denied where
 exercised in the customary manner on the town's sidewalks and
 streets. Indeed, as title to the entire town was held privately,
 there were no publicly owned streets, sidewalks, or parks where
 such rights could be exercised.
 
      Logan Valley extended Marsh to a shopping center situation in
 a different context from the company town setting, but it did so
 only in a context where the First Amendment activity was related
 to the shopping center's operations. There is some language in
 Logan Valley, unnecessary to the decision, suggesting that the key
 focus of Marsh was upon the 'business district,' and that whenever
 a privately owned business district serves the public generally
 its sidewalks and streets become the functional equivalents of
 similar public facilities.9 As Mr. Justice Black's dissent in
 Logan Valley emphasized, this would be an incorrect interpretation
 of the Court's decision in Marsh:10
 
      'Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind of situation.
      Marsh dealt with the very special


12
Page 563
 
      situation of a company-owned town, complete with streets,
      alleys, sewers, stores, residences, and everything else that
      goes to make a town. The particular company town involved was
      Chickasaw, Alabama, which, as we stated in the opinion,
      except for the fact that it 'is owned by the Gulf
      Shipbuilding Corporation . . . has all the characteristics of
      any other American town. The property consists of residential
      buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal
      plant and a 'business block' on which business places are
      situated.' 326 U.S., at 502, 66 S.Ct. at 277. Again toward
      the end of the opinion we emphasized that 'the town of
      Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town.'
      326 U.S., at 508, 66 S.Ct. at 279. I think it is fair to say
      that the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was that
      the property involved encompassed an area that for all
      practical purposes had been turned into a town; the area had
      all the attributes of a town and was exactly like any other
      town in Alabama.' 391 U.S., at 330—331, 88 S.Ct., at 1614.
 
      The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the
 suggestion that the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a
 business district or a shopping center are the equivalent, for
 First Amendment purposes, of municipally owned streets and
 sidewalks. No such expansive reading of the opinion of the Court
 is necessary or appropriate. The opinion was carefully phrased to
 limit its holding to the picketing involved, where the picketing
 was 'directly related in its purpose to the use to which the
 shopping center property was being put,' 391 U.S., at 320 n. 9, 88
 S.Ct., at 1609, and where the store was located in the center of a
 large private enclave with the consequence that no other
 reasonable opportunities for the pickets to convey their message
 to their intended audience were available.


13
Page 564
 
      Neither of these elements is present in the case now before
 the Court.
 
                              A.
 
      The handbilling by respondents in the malls of Lloyd Center
 had no relation to any purpose for which the center was built and
 being used.11 It is nevertheless argued by respondents that, since
 the Center is open to the public, the private owner cannot enforce
 a restriction against handbilling on the premises. The thrust of
 this argument is considerably broader than the rationale of Logan
 Valley. It requires on relationship, direct or indirect, between
 the purpose of the expressive activity and the business of the
 shopping center. The message sought to be conveyed by respondents
 was directed to all members of the public, not solely to patrons
 of Lloyd Center or of any of its operations. Respondents could
 have distributed these handbills on any public street, on any
 public sidewalk, in any public park, or in any public building in
 the city of Portland.
 
      Respondents' argument, even if otherwise meritorious,
 misapprehends the scope of the invitation extended to the public.
 The invitation is to come to the Center to do business with the
 tenants. It is true that facilities at the Center are used for
 certain meetings and


14
Page 565
 
 for various promotional activities. The obvious purpose,
 recognized widely as legitimate and responsible business activity,
 is to bring potential shoppers to the Center, to create a
 favorable impression, and to generate goodwill. There is no
 open-ended invitation to the public to use the Center for any and
 all purposes, however incompatible with the interests of both the
 stores and the shoppers whom they serve.
 
      Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting in Logan Valley, noted the
 limited scope of a shopping center's invitation to the public:
 
      'In no sense are any parts of the shopping center dedicated
      to the public for general purposes . . .. The public is
      invited to the premises but only in order to do business with
      those who maintain establishments there. The invitation is to
      shop for the products which are sold. There is no general
      invitation to use the parking lot, the pickup zone, or the
      sidewalk except as an adjunct to shopping. No one is invited
      to use the parking lot as a place to park his car while he
      goes elsewhere to work. The driveways and lanes for auto
      traffic are not offered for use as general thoroughfares
      leading from one public street to another. Those driveways
      and parking spaces are not public streets and thus available
      for parades, public meetings, or other activities for which
      public streets are used.' 391 U.S., at 338, 88 S.Ct. at 1619.
 
      It is noteworthy that respondents' argument based on the
 Center's being 'open to the public' would apply in varying degrees
 to most retail stores and service establishments across the
 country. They are all open to the public in the sense that
 customers and potential customers are invited and encouraged to
 enter. In terms of being open to the public, there are differences
 only


15
Page 566
 
 of degree—not of principle—between a free-standing store and one
 located in a shopping center, between a small store and a large
 one, between a single store with some malls and open areas
 designed to attract customers and Lloyd Center with its elaborate
 malls and interior landscaping.
 
                               B
 
      A further fact, distinguishing the present case from Logan
 Valley, is that the Union pickets in that case would have been
 deprived of all reasonable opportunity to convey their message to
 patrons of the Weis store had they been denied access to the
 shopping center.12 The situation at Lloyd Center was notably
 different. The central building complex was surrounded by public
 sidewalks, totaling 66 linear blocks. All persons who enter or
 leave the private areas within the complex must cross public
 streets and sidewalks, either on foot or in automobiles. When
 moving to and from the privately


16
Page 567
 
 owned parking lots, automobiles are required by law to come to a
 complete stop. Handbills may be distributed conveniently to
 pedestrians, and also to occupants of automobiles, from these
 public sidewalks and streets. Indeed, respondents moved to these
 public areas and continued distribution of their handbills after
 being requested to leave the interior malls. It would be an
 unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to
 yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
 circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication
 exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights
 without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.
 In ordering this accommodation the courts below erred in their
 interpretation of this Court's decisions in Marsh and Logan
 Valley.
 
                              III
 
      The basic issue in this case is whether respondents, in the
 exercise of asserted First Amendment rights, may distribute
 handbills on Lloyd's private property contrary to its wishes and
 contrary to a policy enforced against all handbilling. In
 addressing this issue, it must be remembered that the First and
 Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and
 assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the
 owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private
 purposes only. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
 Amendments are also relevant to this case. They provide that '(n)o
 person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
 without due process of law.' There is the further proscription in
 the Fifth Amendment against the taking of 'private property . . .
 for public use, without just compensation.'
 
      Although accommodations between the values protected by these
 three Amendments are sometimes nec-


17
Page 568
 
 essary, and the courts properly have shown a special solicitude
 for the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court has never
 held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general
 rights of free speech on property privately owned and used
 nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. Even where public
 property is involved, the Court has recognized that it is not
 necessarily available for speaking, picketing, or other
 communicative activities. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
 Court in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17
 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966), said:
 
      'The State, no less than a private owner of property, has
      power to preserve the property under its control for the use
      to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is
      no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a
      constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail
      custodian's objections, because this 'area chosen for the
      peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only 'reasonable'
      but also particularly appropriate . . .' Such an argument has
      as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people
      who want to propagandize protests or views have a
      constitutional right to do so whenever and however and
      wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law was
      vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the cases
      petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana, (379 U.S. 536), at 554
      555, (85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471) and (379 U.S. 559), at
      563—564, (85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487). We reject it again.
      The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to
      control the use of its own property for its own lawful
      nondiscriminatory purpose.' 385 U.S., at 47—48, 87 S.Ct., at
      247.
 
      Respondents contend, however, that the property of a large
 shopping center is 'open to the public,' serves the same purposes
 as a 'business district' of a municipality, and therefore has been
 dedicated to certain types


18
Page 569
 
 of public use. The argument is that such a center has sidewalks,
 streets, and parking areas which are functionally similar to
 facilities customarily provided by municipalities. It is then
 asserted that all members of the public, whether invited as
 customers or not, have the same right of free speech as they would
 have on the similar public facilities in the streets of a city or
 town.
 
      The argument reaches too far. The Constitution by no means
 requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private
 property to public use. The closest decision in theory, Marsh v.
 Alabama, supra, involved the assumption by a private enterprise of
 all of the attributes of a state-created municipality and the
 exercise by that enterprise of semiofficial municipal functions as
 a delegate of the State.13 In effect, the owner of the company
 town was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and
 stood in the shoes of the State. In the instant case where is no
 comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power.
 
      Nor does property lose its private character merely because
 the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.
 Few would argue that a free-standing store, with abutting parking
 space for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely
 because the public is invited to shop there. Nor is size alone the
 controlling factor. The essentially private character of a store
 and its privately owned abutting property does not change by
 virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern
 shopping center. This is not to say that no differences may exist
 with respect to government regula-


19
Page 570
 
 tion or rights of citizens arising by virtue of the size and
 diversity of activities carried on within a privately owned
 facility serving the public. There will be, for example, problems
 with respect to public health and safety which vary in degree and
 in the appropriate government response, depending upon the size
 and character of a shopping center, an office building, a sports
 arena, or other large facility serving the public for commercial
 purposes. We do say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
 of private property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights
 of all citizens, must be respected and protected. The Framers of
 the Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental rights
 of a free society are incompatible with each other. There may be
 situations where accommodations between them, and the drawing of
 lines to assure due protection of both, are not easy. But on the
 facts presented in this case, the answer is clear.
 
      We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's
 privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to
 entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First
 Amendment rights. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand
 the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate the
 injunction.
 
      It is so ordered.
 
      Judgment reversed and case remanded.
 
 djQ  Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr.
 Justice BRENNAN, and Mr. Mustice STEWART join, dissenting.
 
      Donald Tanner, Betsy Wheeler, and Susan Roberts (respondents)
 brought this action for a declaratory judgment that they have the
 right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
 States Constitution to distribute handbills in a shopping center
 owned by petitioner and an injunction to enforce that right.


20
Page 571
 
 Relying primarily on our very recent decision in Amalgamated Food
 Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88
 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), the United States District
 Court for the District of Oregon granted the relief requested. 308
 F.Supp. 128 (1970). The United States Court of Appeals for the
 Ninth Circuit affirmed. 446 F.2d 545 (1971). Today, this Court
 reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and attempts to
 distinguish this case from Logan Valley. In my view, the
 distinction that the Court sees between the cases does not exist.
 As I read the opinion of the Court, it is an attack not only on
 the rationale of Logan Valley, but also on this Court's
 longstanding decision in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct.
 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946). Accordingly, I dissent.
 
                               I
 
      Lloyd Center is a large, modern retail shopping center in
 Portland, Oregon. Sprawling over 50 acres of land, the Center
 offers to shoppers more than 60 commercial businesses and
 professional offices. It also affords more than 850,000 square
 feet of open and covered offstreet parking space—enough to
 accommodate more than 1,000 vehicles. Bounded by four public
 streets, Lloyd Center has a perimeter of almost one and one-half
 miles. Four public streets running east-west and one running
 north-south traverse the Center, and at least six other public
 streets run partly into or around it. All of these streets have
 adjacent sidewalks. These streets and sidewalks are the only parts
 of the Center that are not privately owned.
 
      The principal portion of the Center is occupied by a shopping
 area called the 'Mall.' Covering approximately 25 acres of land
 and having a perimeter of four-fifths of a mile, the Maul, in the
 words of the District Court, 'is a multilevel complex of
 buildings, parking facilities, sub-malls, sidewalks, stairways,
 elevators, es-


21
Page 572
 
 calators, bridges, and gardens, and contains a skating rink,
 statues, murals, benches, directories, information booths, and
 other facilities designed to attract visitors and make them
 comfortable.' 308 F.Supp., at 129. No public streets cross the
 Mall, but some stores face those streets that form the perimeter,
 and it is possible to enter those stores from public sidewalks.
 Other stores are located in the interior of the Mall, and can only
 be reached by using privately owned walkways.
 
      On November 14, 1968, respondents entered the Mall and
 distributed handbills inviting the public to a meeting to protest
 the draft and the Vietnam war. The distribution was peaceful,
 nondisruptive, and litter-free. Security guards employed by the
 Center approached respondents, indicated that the Center did not
 permit handbilling in the Mall, suggested that they distribute
 their materials on the public sidewalks and streets, and informed
 them that they could be arrested if they persisted in handbilling
 within the privately owned portions of the Center. These guards
 wore uniforms that were virtually identical to those worn by
 regular Portland police and they possessed full police authority.
 Believing that they would be arrested if they did not leave the
 Mall, respondents departed and subsequently filed this lawsuit.1
 
      A. The question presented by this case is whether one of the
 incidents of petitioner's private ownership of the Lloyd Center is
 the power to exclude certain


22
Page 573
 
 forms of speech from its property. In other words, we must decide
 whether ownership of the Center gives petitioner unfettered
 discretion to determine whether or not it will be used as a public
 forum.
 
      This Court held in Marsh v. Alabama, supra, that even though
 property is privately owned, under some circumstances it may be
 treated as though it were publicly held, at least for purposes of
 the First Amendment. In Marsh, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses
 religious sect was arrested and convicted of violating Alabama's
 criminal trespass statute when she undertook to distribute
 religious literature in the downtown shopping area of a privately
 owned town without permission of the owner. The Court reasoned
 that '(t)he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
 property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
 become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
 those who use it.' Supra, Id., at 506, 66 S.Ct., at 278. Noting
 that the stifling effect produced by any ban on free expression in
 a community's central business district was the same whether the
 ban was imposed by public or private owners, the Court concluded
 that:
 
      'When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
      property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of
      press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the
      fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. As we have
      stated before, the right to exercise the liberties
      safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of
      free government by free men' and we must in all cases 'weigh
      the circumstances and . . . appraise the . . . reasons . . .
      in support of the regulation . . . of the rights.' . . . In
      our view the circumstance that the property rights to the
      premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved,
      took place, were held by others than the public, is not
      suffi-


23
Page 574
 
      cient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
      govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
      fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint
      by the application of a State statute.' (Footnotes and
      citations omitted.) Id., at 509, 66 S.Ct., at 280.
 
      We relied heavily on Marsh in deciding Logan Valley, supra.
 In Logan Valley, a shopping center in its formative stages
 contained a supermarket and department store. The supermarket
 employed a staff composed of only nonunion employees. Members of
 Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590, began to picket the
 market with signs stating that the market's employees were not
 receiving union wages or union benefits. The picketing was carried
 out almost entirely in the parcel pickup area and that portion of
 the parking lot immediately adjacent thereto. 391 U.S., at 311, 88
 S.Ct., at 1604. The supermarket sought and obtained an injunction
 from a Pennsylvania state court prohibiting the union members from
 trespassing upon the parking areas or in the store, the effect of
 which was to prohibit picketing and handbilling on any part of the
 private property and to relegate the union members to carrying
 signs on the publicly owned earthen berms that surrounded the
 shopping center.2 Finding that the shopping center was the
 functional equivalent of the business district involved in Marsh,
 we could see 'no reason why access to a business district in a
 company town for the purpose of exercising First Amendment rights
 should be constitutionally re-


24
Page 575
 
 quired, while access for the same purpose to property functioning
 as a business district should be limited simply because the
 property surrounding the 'business district' is not under the same
 ownership.' Id., at 319, 88 S.Ct., at 1608. Thus, we held that the
 union activity was constitutionally protected.
 
      B. In the instant case the District Court found that 'the
 Mall is the functional equivalent of a public business district'
 within the meaning of Marsh and Logan Valley. The Court of Appeals
 specifically affirmed this finding, and it is overwhelmingly
 supported by the record.
 
      The Lloyd Center is similar to Logan Valley Plaza in several
 respects: both are bordered by public roads, and the entrances of
 both lead directly into the public roads; both contain large
 parking areas and privately owned walkways leading from store to
 store; and the general public has unrestricted access to both. The
 principal differences between the two centers are that the Lloyd
 Center is larger than Logan Valley, that Lloyd Center contains
 more commercial facilities, that Lloyd Center contains a range of
 professional and nonprofessional services that were not found in
 Logan Valley, and that Lloyd Center is much more intertwined with
 public streets than Logan Valley. Also, as in Marsh, supra,
 Lloyd's private police are given full police power by the city of
 Portland, even though they are hired, fired, controlled, and paid
 by the owners of the Center. This was not true in Logan Valley.
 
      In 1954, when Lloyd's owners first acquired land for the
 Center, the city of Portland vacated about eight acres of public
 streets for their use. The ordinance accomplishing the vacation
 sets forth the city's view of the Center's function:
 
      'WHEREAS the Council finds that the reason for these
      vacations is for general building purposes to


25
Page 576
 
      be used in the development of a general retail business
      district and the development of an adequate parking area to
      support said district; . . . the Council . . . finds that in
      order to develop a large retail unit such as contemplated by
      Lloyd Corporation, Ltd., it is necessary to vacate the
      streets above mentioned . . ..' (Emphasis added.) Ordinance
      No. 101288, Nov. 10, 1954, App. 202.
 
      The 1954 ordinance also indicates that the city of Portland
 was aware that as Lloyd Center developed, it would be necessary
 for the city to build new streets and to take other steps to
 control the traffic flow that the Center would engender. App. 202,
 208—209. In 1958, an emergency ordinance was passed giving the
 Lloyd Center an extension of time to meet various conditions on
 which the 1954 vacations were made. The city council viewed the
 projected Center as offering an 'opportunity for much needed
 employment' and concluded that the emergency ordinance was
 'necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health,
 peace and safety of the city of Portland.' Ordinance No. 107641,
 March 20, 1958, App. 196.
 
      In sum, the Lloyd Center is an integral part of the Portland
 community. From its inception, the city viewed it as a 'business
 district' of the city and depended on it to supply much-needed
 employment opportunities. To insure the success of the Center, the
 city carefully integrated it into the pattern of streets already
 established and planned future development of streets around the
 Center. It is plain, therefore, that Lloyd Center is the
 equivalent of a public 'business district' within the meaning of
 Marsh and Logan Valley. In fact, the Lloyd Center is much more
 analogous to the company town in Marsh than was the Logan Valley
 Plaza.
 
      Petitioner agrees with our decision in Logan Valley that it
 is proper for courts to treat shopping centers


26
Page 577
 
 differently from other privately owned property, like private
 residences. The Brief for Petitioner states at pages 9—10 that
 
      '(a) shopping center, which falls somewhere between the
      extremes of a company town and a private residence, is
      neither absolutely subject to the control of the owner nor is
      it absolutely open to all those wishing to engage in speech
      activities. . . .
 
      'Each case requires an appropriate resolution of the
      conflicting interests of shopping center owners and those
      seeking to engage in speech activities on shopping center
      premises.'
 
      Petitioner contends that our decision in Logan Valley struck
 the appropriate balance between First Amendment and private
 property interests. The argument is made, however, that this case
 should be distinguished from Logan Valley, and this is the
 argument that the Court accepts.
 
                              II
 
      As I have pointed out above, Lloyd Center is even more
 clearly the equivalent of a public business district than was
 Logan Valley Plaza. The First Amendment activity in both Logan
 Valley and the instant case was peaceful and nondisruptive; and
 both cases involve traditionally acceptable modes of speech. Why
 then should there be a different result here? The Court's answer
 is that the speech in this case was directed at topics of general
 interest—the the Vietnam war and the draft—whereas the speech in
 Logan Valley was directed to the activities of a store in the
 shopping center, and that this factual difference is of
 constitutional dimensions. I cannot agree.
 
      A. It is true that in Logan Valley we explicitly left open
 the question whether 'property rights could, con-


27
Page 578
 
 sistently with the First Amendment, justify a bar on picketing (or
 handbilling) which was not . . . directly related in its purpose
 to the use to which the shopping center property was being put.'
 391 U.S., at 320 n. 9, 88 S.Ct., at 1609. But, I believe that the
 Court errs in concluding that this issue must be faced in the
 instant case.
 
      The District Court observed that Lloyd Center invites schools
 to hold football rallies, presidential candidates to give
 speeches, and service organizations to hold Veterans Day
 ceremonies on its premises. The court also observed that the
 Center permits the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of America, and
 the American Legion to solicit funds in the Mall. Thus, the court
 concluded that the Center was already open to First Amendment
 activities, and that respondents could not constitutionally be
 excluded from distributing leaflets solely because Lloyd Center
 was not enamored of the form or substance of their speech. The
 Court of Appeals affirmed, taking the position that it was not
 extending either Logan Valley or Marsh. In other words, the
 District Court found that Lloyd Center had deliberately chosen to
 open its private property to a broad range of expression and that
 having done so it could not constitutionally exclude respondents,
 and the Court of Appeals affirmed this finding.
 
      Petitioner apparently concedes that if the lower courts are
 correct, respondents should prevail. Brief for Petitioner 19. This
 concession is, in fact, mandated by our decision in Logan Valley,
 in which we specifically held that members of the public may
 exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises of a
 shopping center that is the functional equivalent of a business
 district if their activity is 'generally consonant with the use to
 which the property is actually put.' 391 U.S., at 320, 88 S.Ct.,
 at 1609. If the property of Lloyd Center is generally open to
 First Amendment activity, respondents cannot be excluded.


28
Page 579
 
      On Veterans Day, Lloyd Center allows organizations to parade
 through the Center with flags, drummers, and color guard units and
 to have a speaker deliver an address on the meaning of Veterans
 Day and the valor of American solidiers. Presidential candidates
 have been permitted to speak without restriction on the issues of
 the day, which presumably include war and peace. The American
 Legion is annually given permission to sell poppies in the Mall
 because Lloyd Center believes that 'veterans . . . deserves (sic)
 some comfort and support by the people of the United States.'3 In
 light of these facts, I perceive no basis for depriving
 respondents of the opportunity to distribute leaflets inviting
 patrons of the Center to attend a meeting in which different
 points of view would be expressed from those held by the
 organizations and persons privileged to use Lloyd Center as a
 forum for parading their ideas and symbols.
 
      I believe that the lower courts correctly held that
 respondents' activities were directly related in purpose to the
 use to which the shopping center was being put. In my view,
 therefore, this case presents no occasion to consider whether or
 not Logan Valley should be extended. But, the Court takes a
 different view and concludes that Lloyd Center was never open to
 First Amendment activity. Even if I could agree with the Court on
 this point, I would not reach a different result in this case.
 
      B. If respondents had distributed handbills complaining about
 one or more stores in Lloyd Center or about


29
Page 580
 
 the Center itself, petitioner concedes that our decision in Logan
 Valley would insulate that conduct from proscription by the
 Center.4 I cannot see any logical reason to treat differently
 speech that is related to subjects other than the Center and its
 member stores.
 
      We must remember that it is a balance that we are striking—a
 balance between the freedom to speak, a freedom that is given a
 preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and the freedom of a
 private property owner to control his property. When the competing
 interests are fairly weighed, the balance can only be struck in
 favor of speech.
 
      Members of the Portland community are able to see doctors,
 dentists, lawyers, bankers, travel agents, and persons offering
 countless other services in Lloyd Center. They can buy almost
 anything that they want or need there. For many Portland citizens,
 Lloyd Center will so completely satisfy their wants that they will
 have no reason to go elsewhere for goods or services. If speech is
 to reach these people, it must reach them in Lloyd Center. The
 Center itself recognizes this. For example, in 1964 its director
 of public relations offered candidates for President and Vice
 President the use of the center for political speeches, boasting
 'that our convenient location and setting would provide the
 largest audience (the candidates) could attract in Oregon.' App.
 187.
 
      For many persons who do not have easy access to television,
 radio, the major newspapers, and the other forms of mass media,
 the only way they can express themselves to a broad range of
 citizens on issues of general public concern is to picket, or to
 handbill, or to utilize other


30
Page 581
 
 free or relatively inexpensive means of communication. The only
 hope that these people have to be able to communicate effectively
 is to be permitted to speak in those areas in which most of their
 fellow citizens can be found. One such area is the business
 district of a city or town or its functional equivalent.5 And this
 is why respondents have a tremendous need to express themselves
 within Lloyd Center.
 
      Petitioner's interests, on the other hand, pale in
 comparison. For example, petitioner urges that respondents' First
 Amendment activity would disturb the Center's customers. It is
 undisputed that some patrons will be disturbed by any First
 Amendment activity that goes on, regardless of its object. But,
 there is no evidence to


31
Page 582
 
 indicate that speech directed to topics unrelated to the shopping
 center would be more likely to impair the motivation of customers
 to buy than speech directed to the uses to which the Center is
 put, which petitioner concedes is constitutionally protected under
 Logan Valley. On the contrary, common sense would indicate that
 speech that is critical of a shopping center or one or more of its
 stores is more likely to deter consumers from purchasing goods or
 services than speech on any other subject. Moreover, petitioner
 acknowledges that respondents have a constitutional right to
 'leaflet' on any subject on public streets and sidewalks within
 Lloyd Center. It is difficult for me to understand why leafletting
 in the Mall would be so much more disturbing to the Center's
 customers.
 
      I also find patently frivolous petitioner's argument that if
 handbilling in the Mall is permitted, Lloyd Center would face
 inordinate difficulties in removing litter from its premises. The
 District Court found that respondents' activities were
 litter-free. Assuming, arguendo, that if respondents had been
 permitted to continue their activities, litter might have
 resulted, I think that it is immediately apparent that even if
 respondents confined their activities to the public streets and
 sidewalks of the Center as Lloyd's private police suggested,
 litter would have been a problem as the recipients of the
 handbills carried them to the shopping and parking areas.
 Petitioner concedes that it would have had to remove this litter.
 There is no evidence that the amount of litter would have
 substantially increased if respondents distributed the leaflets
 within the Mall. But, even assuming that the litter might have
 increased, that is not a sufficient reason for barring First
 Amendment activity. See, e.g., Schneider v. State of New Jersey,
 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). If petitioner is
 truly concerned about litter, it should accept a previous
 suggestion by this Court and prosecute those


32
Page 583
 
 who throw handbills away, not those who use them for communicative
 purposes.6 Id., at 162, 60 S.Ct., at 151.
 
      In sum, the balance plainly must be struck in favor of
 speech.
 
      C. Petitioner's other grounds for denying respondents access
 to the Mall can be dealt with quickly. The assertion is made that
 petitioner had the right to regulate the manner in which First
 Amendment activity took place on its property, and that because
 the public streets and sidewalks inside the Center offered
 sufficient access to the public, it was permissible to deny
 respondents use of the Mall. The District Court found that certain
 stores in the Center could only be reached by using the private
 walkways of the Mall. Those persons who drove into the Center,
 parked in the privately owned parking lots, and who entered the
 stores accessible only through the Mall could not be safely
 reached from the public streets and sidewalks. Hence, the District
 Court properly found that the Mall was the only place where
 respondents had reasonable access to all of Lloyd Center's
 patrons.7 308 F.Supp., at 131. At one point in this


33
Page 584
 
 litigation, petitioner also attempted to assert that it was
 entitled to bar respondents' distribution of leaflets on the
 ground that the leaflets violated the Selective Service laws. The
 District Court found that this contention was without merit. 308
 F.Supp., at 132—133. It seems that petitioner has abandoned the
 contention in this Court. In any event, it is meritless for the
 reasons given by the District Court.
 
                              III
 
      In his dissenting opinion in Logan Valley, 391 U.S. 308, at
 339, 88 S.Ct. 1601, at 1618, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, Mr. Justice White
 said that the rationale of that case would require affirmance of a
 case like the instant one. Mr. Justice White, at that time, was
 convinced that our decision in Logan Valley, incorrect though he
 thought it to be, required that all peaceful and nondisruptive
 speech be permitted on private property that was the functional
 equivalent of a public business district.
 
      As stated above, I believe that the earlier view of Mr.
 Justice White is the correct one, that there is no legitimate way
 of following Logan Valley and not applying it to this case. But,
 one may suspect from reading the opinion of the Court that it is
 Logan Valley itself that the Court finds bothersome. The vote in
 Logan Valley was 6—3, and that decision is only four years old.
 But, I am aware that the composition of this Court has radically
 changed in four years. The fact remains that Logan Valley is
 binding unless and until it is overruled. There is no valid
 distinction between that case and this one, and, therefore, the
 results in both cases should be the same.


34
Page 585
 
      While the majority is obviously troubled by the rationale of
 Logan Valley, it is interesting that none of the participants in
 this litigation have experienced any similar difficulty. Lloyd
 Corp. urges that Logan Valley was correctly decided, that it
 struck a balance that the First Amendment required us to strike,
 and that it has fully complied with Logan Valley with respect to
 labor activity. The American Retail Federation urges in its Brief
 as amicus curiae that a balance must be struck between the
 property interests of shopping center owners and the First
 Amendment interests of shopping center users. It does not urge
 that Logan Valley was incorrectly decided in any way.
 
      It is true that Lloyd Corp. and the American Retail
 Federation ask the Court to distinguish this case from Logan
 Valley, but what is more important is that they recognize that
 when massive areas of private property are opened to the public,
 the First Amendment may come into play. They would like, of
 course, to limit the impact of speech on their private property,
 but whether or not they can do so consistently with the First
 Amendment is a question that this Court must resolve.
 
      We noted in Logan Valley that the large-scale movement of
 this country's population from the cities to the suburbs has been
 accompanied by the growth of suburban shopping centers. In
 response to this phenomenon, cites like Portland are providing for
 large-scale shopping areas within the city. It is obvious that
 privately owned shopping areas could prove to be greatly
 advantageous to cities. They are totally self-sufficient, needing
 no financial support from local government; and if, as here, they
 truly are the functional equivalent of a public business area, the
 city reaps the advantages of having such an area without paying
 for them. Some of the advantages are an increased tax base, a
 drawing attraction for residents, and a stimulus to further
 growth.


35
Page 586
 
      It would not be surprising in the future to see cities rely
 more and more on private businesses to perform functions once
 performed by governmental agencies. The advantage of reduced
 expenses and an increased tax base cannot be overstated. As
 governments rely on private enterprise, public property decreases
 in favor of privately owned property. It becomes harder and harder
 for citizens to find means to communicate with other citizens.
 Only the wealthy may find effective communication possible unless
 we adhere to Marsh v. Alabama and continue to hold that '(t)he
 more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
 the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
 by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it,'
 326 U.S. 276, at 506, 66 S.Ct. 276, at 278.
 
      When there are no effective means of communication, free
 speech is a mere shibboleth. I believe that the First Amendment
 requires it to be a reality. Accordingly, I would affirm the
 decision of the Court of Appeals.



1
 App. 254.2 The manager of the Center testified:
 
      'Q. Turning now to the general policy in operation of the
 Lloyd Center, it's true that the malls and walkways within the
 center are open 24 hours a day; is that right?
 
      'A. Well, they aren't physically closed such as putting a
 gate across, no. But, they are not—when people are there after
 hours, they are watched. And, if it is too late at night, they are
 told the places are closed and they should leave.
 
      'Q. If I wanted to walk through the center malls of Lloyd
 Center at 3:00 in the morning, would anyone stop me?
 
      'A. Depending on who the officer was on duty as to what he is
 supposed to do. But, they would have made inquiry and followed you
 to see what you are doing.' App. 49.


3
 The manager of the Center, explaining why presidential
 candidates were allowed to speak, said: 'We do that for one reason
 and that is great public interest. It . . . brings a great many
 people to Lloyd Center who may shop before they leave.' App. 51.


4
 The city of Portland has an ordinance which makes it
 unlawful to trespass on private property. Portland, Or., Police
 Code § 16—613.


5
 The Court of Appeals also relied on Wolin v. Port of New
 York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (CA2 1968).


6
 In commenting on the necessity for citizens who reside in
 company towns to have access to information, the Court said: 'Many
 people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These
 people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of
 their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make
 decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act
 as good citizens they must be informed.' 326 U.S., at 508, 66
 S.Ct., at 280.


7
 The Court also commented on the increasing role of
 shopping centers and on the problem which they would present with
 respect to union activities if picketing were totally proscribed
 within shopping center areas: 'Business enterprises located in
 downtown areas (on public streets and sidewalks) would be subject
 to on-the-spot public criticism for their (labor) practices, but
 businesses situated in the suburbs could largely immunize
 themselves from similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire
 of parking lots around their stores.' 391 U.S., at 324—325, 88
 S.Ct., at 1612. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas also
 emphasized the related purpose of the picketing in Logan Valley:
 'Picketing in regard to labor conditions the Weis Supermarket is
 directly related to that shopping center business.' 391 U.S., at
 326, 88 S.Ct., at 1612.8 308 F.Supp. 128, 130, 132 (Or.1970); 446 F.2d 545, 546
 (CA9 1971).


9
 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
 Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 20 L.Ed.2d
 603 (1968).10 As Mr. Justice Black was the author of the Court's
 opinion in Marsh, his analysis of its rationale is especially
 meaningful.


11
 The injunction issued against Lloyd is comprehensive. It
 enjoins Lloyd (and others in active concert or participation with
 it) from 'preventing or interfering with the distribution of
 non-commercial handbills in a peaceful and orderly manner in the
 malls and walkways within Lloyd Center at times when they are open
 to general public access.' There is no limitation as to type of
 literature distributed except that it must be 'non-commercial.'
 Nor, indeed, is there any limitation in this injunction as to the
 number of persons participating in such activities or the
 frequency thereof. Irrespective of how controversial, offensive,
 distracting, or extensive the distributions may be, Lloyd has been
 ordered to allow all non-commercial handbilling which anyone
 desires to undertake within its private premises.


12
 The Court's opinion in Logan Valley described the
 obstacles resulting from the location of the Weis store in the
 shopping center, and its relation to public streets and sidewalks:
 'Petitioners' picketing was directed solely at one establishment
 within the shopping center. The berms surrounding the center are
 from 350 to 500 feet away from the Weis store. All entry onto the
 mall premises by customers of Weis, so far as appears, is by
 vehicle from the roads alongside which the berms run. Thus the
 placards bearing the message which petitioners seek to communicate
 to patrons of Weis must be read by those to whom they are directed
 either at a distance so great as to render them virtually
 indecipherable—where the Weis customers are already within the
 mall—or while the prospective reader is moving by car from the
 roads onto the mall parking areas via the entrance ways cut
 through the berms. In addition, the pickets are placed in some
 danger by being forced to walk along heavily traveled roads along
 which traffic moves constantly at rates of speed varying from
 moderate to high. Likewise, the task of distributing handbills to
 persons in moving automobiles is vastly greater (and more
 hazardous) than it would be were petitioners permitted to pass
 them out within the mall to pedestrians.' 391 U.S., at 321—322, 88
 S.Ct., at 1610.


13
 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Logan Valley, emphasized
 the distinction between a privately owned shopping center and the
 'company town' involved in Marsh, which he said had assumed 'all
 the attributes' of a municipality. 391 U.S., at 332, 88 S.Ct., at
 1615. (Original emphasis.)


1
 There is some conflict in the testimony as to precisely
 what the guards told respondents with respect to the likelihood
 that they would be arrested if they did not leave the Mall. The
 Agreed Facts in the Pretrial Order states that the guards said
 that respondents could be arrested if they refused to leave. The
 District Court found that the guards caused respondents to believe
 that they would be arrested and that this was the reason that they
 left the Mall. The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding and it
 is supported by the record.


2
 Logan Valley involved both picketing and handbilling,
 since the effect of the state court injunction was to ban both
 forms of expression. 391 U.S., at 322—323 and n. 12, 88 S.Ct., at
 1610—1611. We made it clear in Logan Valley that while there were
 obvious differences between picketing and handbilling, both
 involved a modicum of a burden of property. We held that neither
 could be barred from a shopping center that was the functional
 equivalent of a public business district. Id., at 315—316, 88
 S.Ct., at 1606—1607.


3
 App. 62 (testimony of R. Horn, manager of Lloyd Center).
 It is widely known that the American Legion is a Veteran's
 organization. See 1 Encyclopedia of Associations 997 (7th ed.
 1972). It is also common knowledge that the poppy is the symbol
 sold by the Legion to finance various of its activities. At times
 the proceeds from selling poppies were used to finance lobbying
 and other activities directed at increasing the military capacity
 of the United States. R. Jones, A History of the American Legion
 330—332 (1946).


4
 The record indicates that when unions have picketed inside
 the Mall, Lloyd Center has voiced no objections. App. 108
 (testimony of R. Horn, manager of Lloyd Center). It is apparent
 that petitioner has no difficulty in accepting our decision in
 Logan Valley and in complying with it.


5
 It is evident from the Court's opinion that the majority
 fails to grasp the essence of our decision in Logan Valley. The
 Court notes that there is a difference between a free-standing
 store and one located in a shopping center, and between small
 stores and extremely large ones, but suggests that because the
 difference is 'of degree—not of principle' it is unimportant. This
 files directly in the face of Logan Valley, where we said that as
 private property expands to the point where it becomes, in
 reality, the business district of a community, the rights of the
 owners to proscribe speech on the part of those invited to use the
 property diminish. When the Court states that this was broad
 language that was somehow unnecessary to our decision it betrays
 its misunderstanding of the holding.
 
      As Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice White both pointed out
 in dissent in Logan Valley, there was really only one issue before
 the Court—i.e., whether the Logan Valley Plazza was prevented by
 the Fourteenth Amendment from inhibiting speech even though it was
 private property. The critical issue was whether the private
 property had sufficient 'public' qualities to warrant a holding
 that the Fourteenth Amendment reached it. We answered this
 question in the affirmative, and the answer was the pivotal factor
 in our decision. Every member of the Court was acutely aware that
 we were dealing with degrees, not absolutes. But we found that
 degrees of difference can be of constitutional dimension. While
 any differences between the instant case and Logan Valley are
 immaterial in my view, such differences as there are make this a
 clearer case of illegal state action.


6
 Since petitioner's security guards have full police power,
 they can enforce state laws against littering, just as they have
 enforced laws against loitering in the past. App. 45 (testimony of
 R. Horn, manager of Lloyd Center).
 
 ----------7.The Court implies that it is willing to reverse both lower
 courts and hold that their findings that alternative forums for
 leafletting in Lloyd Center were either not as effective as the
 Mall or dangerous are clearly erroneous. I too have read the
 record in this case and I find no warrant for such a holding. The
 record plainly shows that it was impossible to reach many of the
 shoppers in the Center without using the Mall unless respondents
 were willing to approach cars as they were leaving the center. The
 District Court and the Court of Appeals took the view that
 requiring respondents to run from the sidewalk, to knock on car
 windows, to ask that the windows be rolled down so that a handbill
 could be distributed, to offer the handbill, run back to the
 sidewalk, and to repeat this gesture for every automobile leaving
 Lloyd Center involved hazards not only to respondents but also to
 other pedestrians and automobile passengers. Having never seen
 Lloyd Center, except in photographs contained in the record, and
 having absolutely no idea of the amount of traffic entering or
 leaving the Center, the Court cavalierly overturns the careful
 findings of facts below. This, in my opinion, exceeds even the
 most expansive view of the proper appellate function of this
 Court.


