534 U.S. 516122 S.Ct. 983152 L.Ed.2d 12
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the  preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify  the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C.  20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections  may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.CORRECTION OFFICER PORTER, et al., PETITIONERSv.RONALD NUSSLE
No. 00-853.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued January 14, 2002Decided February 26, 2002

Syllabus
Without filing a grievance under applicable Connecticut Department of Correction  procedures, plaintiff-respondent Nussle, a state prison inmate, commenced a  federal court action under 42 U.S.C.  1983 charging that corrections officers,  including defendant-petitioner Porter, had subjected him to a sustained pattern  of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in  violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." The  District Court dismissed Nussle's suit, relying on a provision of the Prison  Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.  1997e(a), that directs: "No  action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... ,  or any other Federal law, by a prisoner ... until such administrative remedies as  are available are exhausted." The Second Circuit reversed, holding that  exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind  Nussle asserted. The appeals court concluded that 1997e(a)'s "prison  conditions" phrase covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not  single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners, such as  corrections officers' use of excessive force. In support of its position, the  court cited legislative history suggesting that the PLRA curtails frivolous  suits, not actions seeking relief from corrections officer brutality; the court  also referred to pre-PLRA decisions in which this Court distinguished, for proof  of injury and mens rea purposes, between excessive force claims and conditions  of confinement claims. Held: The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison  life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and  whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Cf. Wilson v. Seiter,  501 U.S. 294, 299, n. 1. Pp. 5-14.
(a) The current exhaustion provision in 1997e(a) differs markedly from its  predecessor. Once within the district court's discretion, exhaustion in  1997e(a) cases is now mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739. And  unlike the previous provision, which encompassed only 1983 suits, exhaustion is  now required for all "action[s] ... brought with respect to prison conditions."  Section 1997e(a), designed to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of  prisoner suits, affords corrections officials an opportunity to address  complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In some  instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate's grievance might  improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need  for litigation. Id., at 737. In other instances, the internal review might  filter out some frivolous claims. Ibid. And for cases ultimately brought to  court, an administrative record clarifying the controversy's contours could  facilitate adjudication. See, e.g., ibid. Pp. 5-7.
(b) Determination of the meaning of 1997e(a)'s "prison conditions" phrase  is guided by the PLRA's text and context, and by this Court's prior decisions  relating to "[s]uits by prisoners," as 1997e is titled. The pathmarking opinion  is McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, in which the Court construed the Federal  Magistrates Act's authorization to district judges to refer "prisoner petitions  challenging conditions of confinement" to magistrate judges. This Court  concluded in McCarthy that, read in its proper context, the phrase "challenging  conditions of confinement" authorizes the nonconsensual reference of all  prisoner petitions to a magistrate, id., at 139. The McCarthy Court emphasized  that Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, had unambiguously placed cases  involving single episodes of unconstitutional conduct within the broad category  of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement, 500 U.S., at 141;  found it telling that Congress, in composing the Magistrates Act, chose language  that so clearly paralleled the Preiser opinion, 500 U.S., at 142; and considered  it significant that the latter Act's purpose-to lighten overworked district  judges' caseload-would be thwarted by allowing satellite litigation over the  precise contours of an exception for single episode cases, id., at 143. The  general presumption that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity  with this Court's precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495, and the  PLRA's dominant concern to promote administrative redress, filter out groundless  claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court, see  Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S., at 737, persuade the Court that 1997e(a)'s key  words "prison conditions" are properly read through the lens of McCarthy and  Preiser. Those decisions tug strongly away from classifying suits about prison  guards' use of excessive force, one or many times, as anything other than  actions "with respect to prison conditions." Nussle misplaces principal reliance  on Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9, and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,  835-836. Although those cases did distinguish excessive force claims from  conditions of confinement claims, they did so in the context of proof  requirements: what injury must a plaintiff allege and show; what mental state  must a plaintiff plead and prove. Proof requirements, once a case is in court,  however, do not touch or concern the threshold inquiry at issue here: whether  resort to a prison grievance process must precede resort to a court. There is no  reason to believe that Congress meant to release the evidentiary distinctions  drawn in Hudson and Farmer from their moorings and extend their application to  1997e(a)'s otherwise invigorated exhaustion requirement. It is at least equally  plausible that Congress inserted "prison conditions" into the exhaustion  provision simply to make it clear that preincarceration claims fall outside  1997e(a), for example, a 1983 claim against the prisoner's arresting officer.  Furthermore, the asserted distinction between excessive force claims and  exhaustion-mandatory "frivolous" claims is untenable, for excessive force claims  can be frivolous, and exhaustion serves purposes beyond weeding out frivolous  allegations. Pp. 7-12.
(c) Other infirmities inhere in the Second Circuit's disposition. See  McCarthy, 500 U.S., at 143. In the prison environment, a specific incident may  be symptomatic of a systemic problem, rather than aberrational. Id., at 143-144.  Nussle urges that his case could be placed in the isolated episode category, but  he might equally urge that his complaint describes a pattern or practice of  harassment climaxing in the alleged beating. It seems unlikely that Congress,  when it included in the PLRA a firm exhaustion requirement, meant to leave the  need to exhaust to the pleader's option. Cf. Preiser, 411 U.S., at 489-490.  Moreover, the appeals court's disposition augurs complexity; bifurcated  proceedings would be normal thereunder when, for example, a prisoner sues both  the corrections officer alleged to have used excessive force and the supervisor  who allegedly failed adequately to monitor those in his charge. Finally, scant  sense supports the single occurrence, prevailing circumstance dichotomy. For  example, prison authorities' interest in receiving prompt notice of, and  opportunity to take action against, guard brutality is no less compelling than  their interest in receiving notice and an opportunity to stop other types of  staff wrongdoing. See id., at 492. Pp. 12-14.
224 F.3d 95, reversed and remanded.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
This case concerns the obligation of prisoners who claim denial of their  federal rights while incarcerated to exhaust prison grievance procedures before  seeking judicial relief. Plaintiff-respondent Ronald Nussle, an inmate in a  Connecticut prison, brought directly to court, without filing an inmate  grievance, a complaint charging that corrections officers singled him out for a  severe beating, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual  punishments." Nussle bypassed the grievance procedure despite a provision of the  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321-73, as amended, 42  U.S.C.  1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V), that directs: "No action shall be brought  with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other  Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional  facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."


2
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 1997e(a) governs only  conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents, such as  corrections officers' use of excessive force, actions that immediately affect  only particular prisoners. Nussle defends the Second Circuit's judgment, but  urges that the relevant distinction is between excessive force claims, which, he  says, need not be pursued administratively, and all other claims, which, he  recognizes, must proceed first through the prison grievance process. We reject  both readings and hold, in line with the text and purpose of the PLRA, our  precedent in point, and the weight of lower court authority, that 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoners seeking redress  for prison circumstances or occurrences.


3
* Respondent Ronald Nussle is an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional  Institution in Connecticut. App. 38. According to his complaint, corrections  officers at the prison subjected him to "a prolonged and sustained pattern of  harassment and intimidation" from the time of his arrival there in May 1996.  Id., at 39. Nussle alleged that he was singled out because he was "perceived" to  be a friend of the Governor of Connecticut, with whom corrections officers were  feuding over labor issues. Ibid.


4
Concerning the episode in suit, Nussle asserted that, on or about June 15,  1996, several officers, including defendant-petitioner Porter, ordered Nussle to  leave his cell, "placed him against a wall and struck him with their hands,  kneed him in the back, [and] pulled his hair." Ibid. Nussle alleged that the  attack was unprovoked and unjustified, and that the officers told him they would  kill him if he reported the beating. Ibid.


5
Then, as now, the Connecticut Department of Correction provided a grievance  system for prisoners. See id., at 5-18. Under that system, grievances must be  filed within 30 days of the "occurrence." Id., at 11. Rules governing the  grievance process include provisions on confidentiality and against reprisals.


6
Id., at 17-18.


7
Without filing a grievance, on June 10, 1999, Nussle commenced an action in  federal district court under 42 U.S.C.  1983; he filed suit days before the  three-year statute of limitations ran out on the 1983 claim.1 Nussle charged, principally, that the corrections officers' assault violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as made  applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 38. The District  Court, relying on 1997e(a), dismissed Nussle's complaint for failure to exhaust  administrative remedies. Nussle v. Willette, 3:99CV1091(AHN) (D Conn., Nov. 22,  1999), App. 43.


8
Construing 1997e(a) narrowly because it is an exception "to the general  rule of non-exhaustion in 1983 cases," the Court of Appeals for the Second  Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment; the appeals court held that  "exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for [prisoner] claims of  assault or excessive force brought under 1983." Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d  95, 106 (2000). Section 1997e(a) requires administrative exhaustion of inmates'  claims "with respect to prison conditions," but contains no definition of the  words "prison conditions." The appeals court found the term "scarcely free of  ambiguity." Id., at 101.2 For purposes of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the court concluded, the term was most appropriately read to mean " 'circumstances affecting everyone in the area,' " rather than " 'single or momentary matter[s],' such as beatings ... directed at particular individuals." Ibid. (quoting Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 300-301 (CA3 2000) (Noonan, J.,  concurring and dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)).


9
The Court of Appeals found support for its position in the PLRA's  legislative history. Floor statements "overwhelmingly suggest[ed]" that Congress  sought to curtail suits qualifying as "frivolous" because of their "subject  matter," e.g., suits over "insufficient storage locker space," "a defective  haircut," or "being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety."  224 F.3d, at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). Actions seeking relief from  corrections officer brutality, the Second Circuit stressed, are not of that  genre. Further, the Court of Appeals referred to pre-PLRA decisions in which  this Court had "disaggregate[d] the broad category of Eighth Amendment claims so  as to distinguish [for proof of injury and mens rea purposes] between 'excessive  force' claims, on the one hand, and 'conditions of confinement' claims, on the  other." Id., at 106 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and Farmer  v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).


10
In conflict with the Second Circuit, other Federal Courts of Appeals have  determined that prisoners alleging assaults by prison guards must meet  1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement before commencing a civil rights action. See  Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446 (CA7 2001); Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259  (CA11 2000); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (CA3 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196  F.3d 641 (CA6 1999). We granted certiorari to resolve the intercircuit conflict,  532 U.S. 1065 (2001), and now reverse the Second Circuit's judgment.

II

11
Ordinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.  1983  need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court. See Patsy  v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Prisoner suits alleging  constitutional deprivations while incarcerated once fell within this general  rule. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam).


12
In 1980, however, Congress introduced an exhaustion prescription for suits  initiated by state prisoners. See Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,  94 Stat. 352, as amended, 42 U.S.C.  1997e (1994 ed.). This measure authorized  district courts to stay a state prisoner's 1983 action "for a period not to  exceed 180 days" while the prisoner exhausted available "plain, speedy, and  effective administrative remedies." 1997e(a)(1). Exhaustion under the 1980  prescription was in large part discretionary; it could be ordered only if the  State's prison grievance system met specified federal standards, and even then,  only if, in the particular case, the court believed the requirement "appropriate  and in the interests of justice." 1997e(a) and (b). We described this  provision as a "limited exhaustion requirement" in McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S.  140, 150-151 (1992), and thought it inapplicable to prisoner suits for damages  when monetary relief was unavailable through the prison grievance system.


13
In 1995, as part of the PLRA, Congress invigorated the exhaustion  prescription. The revised exhaustion provision, titled "Suits by prisoners,"  states: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under  section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in  any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative  remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.  1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp.  V).


14
The current exhaustion provision differs markedly from its predecessor. Once  within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by  1997e(a) is now mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). All  "available" remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal  standards, nor must they be "plain, speedy, and effective." See ibid.; see also  id., at 740, n. 5. Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in  grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to  suit. See id., at 741. And unlike the previous provision, which encompassed only  1983 suits, exhaustion is now required for all "action[s] ... brought with  respect to prison conditions," whether under 1983 or "any other Federal law."  Compare 42 U.S.C.  1997e (1994 ed.) with 42 U.S.C.  1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp.  V). Thus federal prisoners suing under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics  Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), must first exhaust inmate grievance procedures just  as state prisoners must exhaust administrative processes prior to instituting a  1983 suit.


15
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve  the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections  officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing  the initiation of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in  response to an inmate's grievance might improve prison administration and  satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation. Booth, 532 U.S.,  at 737. In other instances, the internal review might "filter out some frivolous  claims." Ibid. And for cases ultimately brought to court, adjudication could be  facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the contours of the  controversy. See ibid.; see also Madigan, 503 U.S., at 146.


16
Congress described the cases covered by 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement  as "action[s] ... brought with respect to prison conditions." Nussle's case  requires us to determine what the 1997e(a) term "prison conditions" means,  given Congress' failure to define the term in the text of the exhaustion  provision.3 We are guided in this endeavor by the PLRA's text and context, and by our prior decisions relating to "[s]uits by prisoners," 1997e.4


17
As to precedent, the pathmarking opinion is McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S.  136 (1991), which construed 28 U.S.C.  636(b)(1)(B) (1988 ed.), a Judicial Code  provision authorizing district judges to refer to magistrate judges, inter alia,  "prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement."5 The petitioning  prisoner in McCarthy argued that 636(b)(1)(B) allowed nonconsensual referrals  "only when a prisoner challenges ongoing prison conditions." 500 U.S., at 138.  The complaint in McCarthy targeted no "ongoing prison conditions"; it homed in  on "an isolated incident" of excessive force. Ibid. For that reason, according  to the McCarthy petitioner, nonconsensual referral of his case was  impermissible. Id., at 138-139.


18
We did not "quarrel with" the prisoner's assertion in McCarthy that "the  most natural reading of the phrase 'challenging conditions of confinement,' when  viewed in isolation, would not include suits seeking relief from isolated  episodes of unconstitutional conduct." Id., at 139. We nonetheless concluded  that the petitioner's argument failed upon reading the phrase "in its proper  context." Ibid. We found no suggestion in 636(b)(1)(B) that Congress meant to  divide prisoner petitions "into subcategories." Ibid. "On the contrary," we  observed, "when the relevant section is read in its entirety, it suggests that  Congress intended to authorize the nonconsensual reference of all prisoner  petitions to a magistrate." Ibid. The Federal Magistrates Act, we noted, covers  actions of two kinds: challenges to "conditions of confinement"; and  "applications for habeas corpus relief." Id., at 140. Congress, we concluded,  "intended to include in their entirety th[ose] two primary categories of suits  brought by prisoners." Ibid.


19
"Just three years before [636(b)(1)(B)] was drafted," we explained in  McCarthy, "our opinion in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), had  described [the] two broad categories of prisoner petitions: (1) those  challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself; and (2) those  challenging the conditions of confinement." Ibid. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.  475 (1973), left no doubt, we further stated in McCarthy, that "the latter  category unambiguously embraced the kind of single episode cases that  petitioner's construction would exclude." 500 U.S., at 141. We found it telling  that Congress, in composing the Magistrates Act, chose language "that so clearly  parallel[ed] our Preiser opinion." Id., at 142. We considered it significant as  well that the purpose of the Magistrates Act-to lighten the caseload of  overworked district judges-would be thwarted by opening the door to satellite  litigation over "the precise contours of [the] suggested exception for single  episode cases." Id., at 143.


20
As in McCarthy, we here read the term "prison conditions" not in isolation,  but "in its proper context." Id., at 139. The PLRA exhaustion provision is  captioned "Suits by prisoners," see 1997e; this unqualified heading scarcely  aids the argument that Congress meant to bisect the universe of prisoner suits. See ibid.; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) ("[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)).


21
This Court generally "presume[s] that Congress expects its statutes to be  read in conformity with th[e] Court's precedents." United States v. Wells, 519  U.S. 482, 495 (1997). That presumption, and the PLRA's dominant concern to  promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and foster better  prepared litigation of claims aired in court, see Booth, 532 U.S., at 737,  persuade us that 1997e(a)'s key words "prison conditions" are properly read  through the lens of McCarthy and Preiser. Those decisions tug strongly away from  classifying suits about prison guards' use of excessive force, one or many  times, as anything other than actions "with respect to prison conditions."


22
Nussle places principal reliance on Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992),  and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-836 (1994), and the Second Circuit  found support for its position in those cases as well, 224 F.3d, at 106. Hudson  held that to sustain a claim of excessive force, a prisoner need not show  significant injury. 503 U.S., at 9. In so ruling, the Court did indeed  distinguish excessive force claims from "conditions of confinement" claims; to  sustain a claim of the latter kind "significant injury" must be shown. Id., at  8-9. Hudson also observed that a "conditions of confinement" claim may succeed  if a prisoner demonstrates that prison officials acted with "deliberate  indifference," id., at 8 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)),  while a prisoner alleging excessive force must demonstrate that the defendant  acted "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 503 U.S., at 7.  Farmer similarly distinguished the mental state that must be shown to prevail on  an excessive force claim, i.e., "purposeful or knowing conduct," from the lesser  mens rea requirement governing "conditions of confinement" claims, i.e.,  "deliberate indifference." 511 U.S., at 835-836. We do not question those  decisions and attendant distinctions in the context in which they were made. But  the question presented here is of a different order.


23
Hudson and Farmer trained solely and precisely on proof requirements: what  injury must a plaintiff allege and show; what mental state must a plaintiff  plead and prove. Proof requirements once a case is in court, however, do not  touch or concern the threshold inquiry before us: whether resort to a prison  grievance process must precede resort to a court. We have no reason to believe  that Congress meant to release the evidentiary distinctions drawn in Hudson and  Farmer from their moorings and extend their application to the otherwise  invigorated exhaustion requirement of 1997e(a). Such an extension would be  highly anomalous given Congress' elimination of judicial discretion to dispense  with exhaustion and its deletion of the former constraint that administrative  remedies must be "plain, speedy, and effective" before exhaustion could be  required. See supra, at 6; Booth, 532 U.S., at 739; cf. id., at 740-741  ("Congress's imposition of an obviously broader exhaustion requirement makes it  highly implausible that it meant to give prisoners a strong inducement to skip  the administrative process simply by limiting prayers for relief to money  damages not offered through administrative grievance mechanisms.").


24
Nussle contends that Congress added the words "prison conditions" to the  text of 1997e(a) specifically to exempt excessive force claims from the now  mandatory exhaustion requirement; he sees that requirement as applicable mainly  to " 'prison conditions' claims that may be frivolous as to subject matter," 224  F.3d, at 106. See Brief for Respondent 2, 26-27. It is at least equally  plausible, however, that Congress inserted "prison conditions" into the  exhaustion provision simply to make it clear that preincarceration claims fall  outside 1997e(a), for example, a Title VII claim against the prisoner's  preincarceration employer, or, for that matter, a 1983 claim against his  arresting officer.


25
Furthermore, the asserted distinction between excessive force claims that  need not be exhausted, on the one hand, and exhaustion-mandatory "frivolous"  claims on the other, see id., at 2, 26-27, is untenable, for "[e]xcessive force  claims can be frivolous," Smith, 255 F.3d, at 452 ("Inmates can allege they were  subject to vicious nudges."), and exhaustion serves purposes beyond weeding out  frivolous allegations, see supra, at 6-7.


26
Other infirmities inhere in the Second Circuit's disposition. See McCarthy,  500 U.S., at 143 ("Petitioner's definition would generate additional work for  the district courts because the distinction between cases challenging ongoing  conditions and those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will often  be difficult to identify."). As McCarthy emphasized, in the prison environment a  specific incident may be symptomatic rather than aberrational. Id., at 143-144.


27
An unwarranted assault by a corrections officer may be reflective of a systemic  problem traceable to poor hiring practices, inadequate training, or insufficient  supervision. See Smith, 255 F.3d, at 449. Nussle himself alleged in this very  case not only the beating he suffered on June 15, 1996; he also alleged,  extending before and after that date, "a prolonged and sustained pattern of  harassment and intimidation by correction officers." App. 39. Nussle urges that  his case could be placed in the isolated episode category, but he might equally  urge that his complaint describes a pattern or practice of harassment climaxing  in the alleged beating. It seems unlikely that Congress, when it included in the  PLRA a firm exhaustion requirement, meant to leave the need to exhaust to the  pleader's option. Cf. Preiser, 411 U.S., at 489-490 ("It would wholly frustrate  explicit congressional intent to hold that [prisoners] could evade this  [exhaustion] requirement by the simple expedient of putting a different label on  their pleadings.").


28
Under Nussle's view and that of the Second Circuit, moreover, bifurcation  would be normal when a prisoner sues both a corrections officer alleged to have  used excessive force and the supervisor who allegedly failed adequately to  monitor those in his charge. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. The officer alone could be  taken directly to court; the charge against the supervisor would proceed first  through the internal grievance process. Similarly split proceedings apparently  would be in order, under the Second Circuit's decision, when the prisoner elects  to pursue against the same officers both discrete instance and ongoing conduct  charges.


29
Finally, we emphasize a concern over and above the complexity augured by the  Second Circuit's disposition: Scant sense supports the single occurrence,  prevailing circumstance dichotomy. Why should a prisoner have immediate access  to court when a guard assaults him on one occasion, but not when beatings are  widespread or routine? See Smith, 255 F.3d, at 450. Nussle's distinction between  excessive force claims and all other prisoner suits, see supra, at 2, presents a  similar anomaly. Do prison authorities have an interest in receiving prompt  notice of, and opportunity to take action against, guard brutality that is  somehow less compelling than their interest in receiving notice and an  opportunity to stop other types of staff wrongdoing? See Preiser, 411 U.S., at  492 ("Since [the] internal problems of state prisons involve issues so  peculiarly within state authority and expertise, the States have an important  interest in not being bypassed in the correction of those problems.").6


30
* * *


31
For the reasons stated, we hold that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement  applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general  circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or  some other wrong. Cf. Wilson, 501 U.S., at 299, n. 1. Accordingly, the judgment  of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further  proceedings consistent with this opinion.


32
It is so ordered.



Notes


1
  The Second Circuit has held that 1983 actions in Connecticut are governed by that State's three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 670 (1977).


2
  Another provision of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C.  3626(g)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V), the court observed, does define "prison conditions." Nussle v. Willette, 224  F.3d 95, 101 (CA2 2000). That provision, which concerns prospective relief,  defines "prison conditions" to mean "the conditions of confinement or the  effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in  prison." The Second Circuit found the 3626(g)(2) definition "no less ambiguous"  than the bare text of 1997e(a). Neither of the alternative 3626(g)(2)  formulations, the court said, would be used in "everyday" speech to describe  "particular instances of assault or excessive force." Id., at 102. But see Booth  v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 294-295 (CA3 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 532 U.S.  731 (2001) (reading 3626(g)(2) to cover all prison conditions and corrections  officer actions that "make [prisoners'] lives worse"). The Second Circuit  ultimately concluded that it would be improper, in any event, automatically to  import 3626(g)(2)'s "definition of 'civil actions brought with respect to  prison conditions' into 42 U.S.C.  1997e(a)" because the two provisions had  "distinct statutory purposes." 224 F.3d, at 105.


3
  The parties dispute the meaning of a simultaneously enacted provision,  3626(g)(2), which concerns prospective relief, and for that purpose, defines  the expression "civil action with respect to prison conditions." See supra, at  3, n. 2 (noting, inter alia, divergent constructions of Second and Third  Circuits). We rest our decision on the meaning of "prison conditions" in the  context of 1997e, and express no definitive opinion on the proper reading of  3626(g)(2).


4
  In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit referred to its "obligation to construe statutory exceptions narrowly, in order to give full effect to the  general rule of non-exhaustion in 1983." 224 F.3d, at 106 (citing City of  Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-732 (1995), and Patsy v. Board  of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 508 (1982)). The Second Circuit did not then  have available to it our subsequently rendered decision in Booth v. Churner, 532  U.S. 731 (2001). Booth held that 1997e(a) mandates initial recourse to the  prison grievance process even when a prisoner seeks only money damages, a remedy  not available in that process. See id., at 741. In so ruling, we observed that  "Congress ... may well have thought we were shortsighted" in failing adequately to  recognize the utility of the administrative process to satisfy, reduce, or  clarify prisoner grievances. Id., at 737. While the canon on which the Second  Circuit relied may be dependable in other contexts, the PLRA establishes a  different regime. For litigation within 1997e(a)'s compass, Congress has  replaced the "general rule of non-exhaustion" with a general rule of exhaustion.


5
  Title 28 U.S.C.  636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part: "(b)(1)  Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary- .   .   .   .   . "a judge  may ... designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary  hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and  recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, ... of applications  for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement."


6
  Other provisions of 1997e that refer to "prison conditions" would have less scope under the Second Circuit's construction of the term. Section 1997e(c)(1) provides for dismissal on the court's own initiative of "any action brought with respect to prison conditions" that is "frivolous [or] malicious." No specific incident complaint would be subject to that prescription under the view that such suits do not implicate "prison conditions." Further, 1997e(f)(1) provides that pretrial proceedings in "any action brought with respect to prison  conditions" may be held at the prison via telephone, video conference, or other  telecommunications technology so that the prisoner need not be physically  transferred to participate. Surely such arrangements would be appropriate in  Nussle's case and others of its genre. But on what authority would these  practical procedures rest if cases like Nussle's do not qualify as actions  regarding "prison conditions"?


