517 U.S. 559116 S.Ct. 1589134 L.Ed.2d 809
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.v.GORECertiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
No. 94-896.
Supreme Court of the United States

Syllabus*
Argued October 11, 1995
Decided May 20, 1996
After respondent Gore purchased a new BMW automobile from an authorized  Alabama dealer, he discovered that the car had been repainted.  He  brought this suit for compensatory and punitive damages against  petitioner, the American distributor of BMW's, alleging, inter alia,  that the failure to disclose the repainting constituted fraud under  Alabama law.  At trial, BMW acknowledged that it followed a nationwide  policy of not advising its dealers, and hence their customers, of  predelivery damage to new cars when the cost of repair did not exceed 3  percent of the car's suggested retail price.  Gore's vehicle fell into  that category. The jury returned a verdict finding BMW liable for  compensatory damages of $4,000, and assessing $4 million in punitive  damages. The trial judge denied BMW's post-trial motion to set aside  the punitive damages award, holding, among other things, that the award  was not "grossly excessive" and thus did not violate the Due Process  Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v.  Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 454. The Alabama Supreme Court  agreed, but reduced the award to $2 million on the ground that, in  computing the amount, the jury had improperly multiplied Gore's  compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in all States, not  just those in Alabama.
Held:  The $2 million punitive damages award is grossly excessive and  therefore exceeds the constitutional limit.  Pp. 7-26.
(a) Because such an award violates due process only when it can fairly  be categorized as "grossly excessive" in relation to the State's  legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its  repetition, cf. TXO, 509 U. S., at 456, the federal excessiveness  inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the state  interests that such an award is designed to serve.  Principles of state  sovereignty and comity forbid a State to enact policies for the entire  Nation, or to impose its own policy choice on neighboring States.  See  e.g., Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U. S. 324, 335-336.  Accordingly, the  economic penalties that a State inflicts on those who transgress its  laws, whether the penalties are legislatively authorized fines or  judicially imposed punitive damages, must be supported by the State's  interest in protecting its own consumers and economy, rather than those  of other States or the entire Nation.  Gore's award must therefore be  analyzed in the light of conduct that occurred solely within Alabama,  with consideration being given only to the interests of Alabama  consumers.  Pp. 7-13.
(b) Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court's constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice  not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of  the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.  Three guideposts,  each of which indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the  magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose, lead to the  conclusion that the $2 million award is grossly excessive.  Pp. 13-14.
(c) None of the aggravating factors associated with the first (and perhaps most important) indicium of a punitive damages award's  excessiveness-the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,  see e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371-is present here.  The harm  BMW inflicted on Gore was purely economic; the presale repainting had no  effect on the car's performance, safety features, or appearance; and  BMW's conduct evinced no indifference to or reckless disregard for the  health and safety of others.  Gore's contention that BMW's nondisclosure was particularly reprehensible because it formed part of a nationwide  pattern of tortious conduct is rejected, because a corporate executive  could reasonably have interpreted the relevant state statutes as  establishing safe harbors for nondisclosure of presumptively minor  repairs, and because there is no evidence either that BMW acted in bad  faith when it sought to establish the appropriate line between minor  damage and damage requiring disclosure to purchasers, or that it  persisted in its course of conduct after it had been adjudged unlawful.  Finally, there is no evidence that BMW engaged in deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence  of improper motive.  Pp. 14-20.
(d) The second (and perhaps most commonly cited) indicium of excessiveness-the ratio between the plaintiff's compensatory damages and  the amount of the punitive damages, see e.g., TXO, 509 U. S., at  459-also weighs against Gore, because his $2 million award is 500 times  the amount of his actual harm as determined by the jury, and there is no  suggestion that he or any other BMW purchaser was threatened with any  additional potential harm by BMW's nondisclosure policy.  Although it is  not possible to draw a mathematical bright line between the  constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that  would fit every case, see, e.g., id., at 458, the ratio here is clearly outside the acceptable range.  Pp. 20-23.
(e) Gore's punitive damages award is not saved by the third relevant  indicium of excessiveness-the difference between it and the civil or  criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct, see,  e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 23-because $2  million is substantially greater than Alabama's applicable $2,000 fine  and the penalties imposed in other States for similar malfeasance, and  because none of the pertinent statutes or interpretive decisions would  have put an out-of-state distributor on notice that it might be subject to a multimillion dollar sanction.  Moreover, in the absence of a BMW  history of noncompliance with known statutory requirements, there is no  basis for assuming that a more modest sanction would not have been  sufficient.  Pp. 23-25.
(f) Thus, BMW's conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify the  severe punitive sanction imposed against it.  Whether the appropriate  remedy requires a new trial or merely an independent determination by  the Alabama Supreme Court of the award necessary to vindicate Alabama  consumers' economic interests is a matter for that court to address in  the first instance.  Pp. 25-26.
646 So. 2d 619, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor,  Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined.  Breyer, J., filed a  concurring opinion, in which O'Connor and Souter, JJ., joined.  Scalia,  J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.  Ginsburg,  J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a  State from imposing a "`grossly excessive'" punishment on a tortfeasor.  TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 454   (1993) (and cases cited).  The wrongdoing involved in this case was the  decision by a national distributor of automobiles not to advise its  dealers, and hence their customers, of predelivery damage to new cars  when the cost of repair amounted to less than 3 percent of the car's  suggested retail price.  The question presented is whether a $2 million punitive damages award to the purchaser of one of these cars exceeds the  constitutional limit.


2
* In January 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. (respondent), purchased a black BMW sports sedan for $40,750.88 from an authorized BMW dealer in  Birmingham, Alabama.  After driving the car for approximately nine  months, and without noticing any flaws in its appearance, Dr. Gore took  the car to "Slick Finish," an independent detailer, to make it look  "`snazzier than it normally would appear.'"  646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala.  1994).  Mr. Slick, the proprietor, detected evidence that the car had  been repainted.1 Convinced that he had been cheated, Dr. Gore  brought suit against petitioner BMW of North America (BMW), the American  distributor of BMW automobiles.2  Dr. Gore alleged, inter alia, that  the failure to disclose that the car had been repainted constituted suppression of a material fact.3  The complaint prayed for $500,000  in compensatory and punitive damages, and costs.


3
At trial, BMW acknowledged that it had adopted a nationwide policy in 1983 concerning cars that were damaged in the course of manufacture or transportation.  If the cost of repairing the damage  exceeded 3 percent of the car's suggested retail price, the car was  placed in company service for a period of time and then sold as used.  If the repair cost did not exceed 3 percent of the suggested retail  price, however, the car was sold as new without advising the dealer that  any repairs had been made. Because the $601.37 cost of repainting Dr.  Gore's car was only about 1.5 percent of its suggested retail price, BMW  did not disclose the damage or repair to the Birmingham dealer.


4
Dr. Gore asserted that his repainted car was worth less than a  car that had not been refinished.  To prove his actual damages of  $4,000, he relied on the testimony of a former BMW dealer, who estimated  that the value of a repainted BMW was approximately 10 percent less than  the value of a new car that had not been damaged and repaired.4  To  support his claim for punitive damages, Dr. Gore introduced evidence  that since 1983 BMW had sold 983 refinished cars as new, including 14 in  Alabama, without disclosing that the cars had been repainted before sale  at a cost of more than $300 per vehicle.5  Using the actual damage estimate of $4,000 per vehicle, Dr. Gore argued that a punitive award of  $4 million would provide an appropriate penalty for selling  approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were worth.


5
In defense of its disclosure policy, BMW argued that it was under no obligation to disclose repairs of minor damage to new cars and  that Dr. Gore's car was as good as a car with the original factory  finish.  It disputed Dr. Gore's assertion that the value of the car was  impaired by the repainting and argued that this good-faith belief made a  punitive award inappropriate. BMW also maintained that transactions in  jurisdictions other than Alabama had no relevance to Dr. Gore's claim.


6
The jury returned a verdict finding BMW liable for compensatory  damages of $4,000.  In addition, the jury assessed $4 million in  punitive damages, based on a determination that the nondisclosure policy  constituted "gross, oppressive or malicious" fraud.6  See Ala. Code  Section(s) 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (1993).


7
BMW filed a post-trial motion to set aside the punitive damages  award. The company introduced evidence to establish that its  nondisclosure policy was consistent with the laws of roughly 25 States  defining the disclosure obligations of automobile manufacturers,  distributors, and dealers.  The most stringent of these statutes  required disclosure of repairs costing more than 3 percent of the  suggested retail price; none mandated disclosure of less costly  repairs.7  Relying on these statutes, BMW contended that its conduct  was lawful in these States and therefore could not provide the basis for  an award of punitive damages.


8
BMW also drew the court's attention to the fact that its nondisclosure policy had never been adjudged unlawful before this action  was filed. Just months before Dr. Gore's case went to trial, the jury in  a similar lawsuit filed by another Alabama BMW purchaser found that  BMW's failure to disclose paint repair constituted fraud.  Yates v. BMW  of North America, Inc., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993).8  Before the  judgment in this case, BMW changed its policy by taking steps to avoid  the sale of any refinished vehicles in Alabama and two other States.  When the $4 million verdict was returned in this case, BMW promptly instituted a nationwide policy of full disclosure of all repairs, no  matter how minor.


9
In response to BMW's arguments, Dr. Gore asserted that the policy change demonstrated the efficacy of the punitive damages award.  He noted that while no jury had held the policy unlawful, BMW had  received a number of customer complaints relating to undisclosed repairs  and had settled some lawsuits.9  Finally, he maintained that the  disclosure statutes of other States were irrelevant because BMW had  failed to offer any evidence that the disclosure statutes supplanted,  rather than supplemented, existing causes of action for common-law  fraud.


10
The trial judge denied BMW's post-trial motion, holding, inter  alia, that the award was not excessive.  On appeal, the Alabama Supreme  Court also rejected BMW's claim that the award exceeded the  constitutionally permissible amount.  646 So. 2d 619 (1994).  The  court's excessiveness inquiry applied the factors articulated in Green  Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-224 (Ala. 1989), and approved in  Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1991).  646  So. 2d, at 624-625. Based on its analysis, the court concluded that  BMW's conduct was "reprehensible"; the nondisclosure was profitable for  the company; the judgment "would not have a substantial impact upon [BMW's] financial position"; the litigation had been expensive; no criminal sanctions had been imposed on BMW for the same conduct; the  award of no punitive damages in Yates reflected "the inherent uncertainty of the trial process"; and the punitive award bore a "reasonable relationship" to "the harm that was likely to occur from   [BMW's] conduct as well as . . . the harm that actually occurred."  Id.,  at 625-627.


11
The Alabama Supreme Court did, however, rule in BMW's favor on  one critical point: The court found that the jury improperly computed  the amount of punitive damages by multiplying Dr. Gore's compensatory  damages by the number of similar sales in other jurisdictions.  Id., at  627.  Having found the verdict tainted, the court held that "a  constitutionally reasonable punitive damages award in this case is  $2,000,000," id., at 629, and therefore ordered a remittitur in that  amount.10  The court's discussion of the amount of its remitted award  expressly disclaimed any reliance on "acts that occurred in other jurisdictions"; instead, the court explained that it had used a "comparative analysis" that considered Alabama cases, "along with cases  from other jurisdictions, involving the sale of an automobile where the  seller misrepresented the condition of the vehicle and the jury awarded  punitive damages to the purchaser."11 Id., at 628.


12
Because we believed that a review of this case would help to illuminate "the character of the standard that will identify constitutionally excessive awards" of punitive damages, see Honda Motor  Co. v. Oberg, 512 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4), we granted  certiorari, 513 U. S. ___ (1995).

II

13
Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its  repetition.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974);  Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 266-267 (1981); Haslip,  499 U. S., at 22.  In our federal system, States necessarily have  considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages  that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any particular  case.  Most States that authorize exemplary damages afford the jury  similar latitude, requiring only that the damages awarded be reasonably  necessary to vindicate the State's legitimate interests in punishment  and deterrence.  See TXO, 509 U. S., at 456; Haslip, 499 U. S., at 21, 22.  Only when an award can fairly be categorized as "grossly excessive"  in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness  that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cf.  TXO, 509 U. S., at 456.  For that reason, the federal excessiveness  inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the state  interests that a punitive award is designed to serve.  We therefore  focus our attention first on the scope of Alabama's legitimate interests  in punishing BMW and deterring it from future misconduct.


14
No one doubts that a State may protect its citizens by prohibiting deceptive trade practices and by requiring automobile distributors to disclose presale repairs that affect the value of a new  car.  But the States need not, and in fact do not, provide such  protection in a uniform manner.  Some States rely on the judicial  process to formulate and enforce an appropriate disclosure requirement  by applying principles of contract and tort law.12  Other States have  enacted various forms of legislation that define the disclosure  obligations of automobile manufacturers, distributors, and dealers.13  The result is a patch-work of rules representing the diverse policy  judgments of lawmakers in 50 States.


15
That diversity demonstrates that reasonable people may disagree  about the value of a full disclosure requirement.  Some legislatures may  conclude that affirmative disclosure requirements are unnecessary  because the self-interest of those involved in the automobile trade in  developing and maintaining the goodwill of their customers will motivate  them to make voluntary disclosures or to refrain from selling cars that  do not comply with self-imposed standards.  Those legislatures that do adopt affirmative disclosure obligations may take into account the cost  of government regulation, choosing to draw a line exempting minor  repairs from such a requirement.  In formulating a disclosure standard,  States may also consider other goals, such as providing a "safe harbor"  for automobile manufacturers, distributors, and dealers against lawsuits  over minor repairs.14


16
We may assume, arguendo, that it would be wise for every State  to adopt Dr. Gore's preferred rule, requiring full disclosure of every  presale repair to a car, no matter how trivial and regardless of its  actual impact on the value of the car.  But while we do not doubt that  Congress has ample authority to enact such a policy for the entire  Nation,15 it is clear that no single State could do so, or even  impose its own policy choice on neighboring States.  See Bonaparte v.  Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No State can legislate except  with reference to its own jurisdiction. . . .  Each State is independent  of all the others in this particular").16  Similarly, one State's  power to impose burdens on the interstate market for automobiles is not only subordinate to the federal power over interstate commerce, Gibbons  v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-196 (1824), but is also constrained by the  need to respect the interests of other States, see, e.g., Healy v. Beer  Institute, 491 U. S. 324, 335-336 (1989) (the Constitution has a  "special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union  unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with  the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres" (footnote omitted)); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 643 (1982).


17
We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty  and comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators  of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct  in other States.17  Before this Court Dr. Gore argued that the large  punitive damages award was necessary to induce BMW to change the  nationwide policy that it adopted in 1983.18  But by attempting to  alter BMW's nationwide policy, Alabama would be infringing on the policy  choices of other States.  To avoid such encroachment, the economic  penalties that a State such as Alabama inflicts on those who transgress  its laws, whether the penalties take the form of legislatively authorized fines or judicially imposed punitive damages, must be supported by the State's interest in protecting its own consumers and  its own economy.  Alabama may insist that BMW adhere to a particular  disclosure policy in that State.  Alabama does not have the power,  however, to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and  that had no impact on Alabama or its residents.19  Nor may Alabama  impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful in  other jurisdictions.


18
In this case, we accept the Alabama Supreme Court's interpretation of the jury verdict as reflecting a computation of the  amount of punitive damages "based in large part on conduct that happened  in other jurisdictions."  646 So. 2d, at 627.  As the Alabama Supreme  Court noted, neither the jury nor the trial court was presented with  evidence that any of BMW's out-of-state conduct was unlawful.  "The only  testimony touching the issue showed that approximately 60% of the  vehicles that were refinished were sold in states where failure to  disclose the repair was not an unfair trade practice."  Id., at 627, n.  6.20 The Alabama Supreme Court therefore properly eschewed reliance  on BMW's out-of-state conduct, id., at 628, and based its remitted award  solely on conduct that occurred within Alabama.21  The award must be  analyzed in the light of the same conduct, with consideration given only  to the interests of Alabama consumers, rather than those of the entire  Nation. When the scope of the interest in punishment and deterrence that  an Alabama court may appropriately consider is properly limited, it is  apparent-for reasons that we shall now address-that this award is  grossly excessive.

III

19
Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional  jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the  conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of  the penalty that a State may impose.22  Three guideposts, each of  which indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the  magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose for adhering to the nondisclosure policy adopted in 1983, lead us to the conclusion that the  $2 million award against BMW is grossly excessive: the degree of  reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity between the harm or  potential harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive damages award; and  the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or  imposed in comparable cases.  We discuss these considerations in turn.


Degree of Reprehensibility


20
Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a  punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.23  As the Court stated nearly 150 years ago, exemplary damages imposed on a defendant should reflect "the enormity of  his offense."  Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852).  See also St.  Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63, 66-67 (1919)  (punitive award may not be "wholly disproportioned to the offense");  Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.  S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in  part) (reviewing court "should examine the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the harshness of the award of punitive damages").24 This  principle reflects the accepted view that some wrongs are more  blameworthy than others.  Thus, we have said that "nonviolent crimes are  less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence."  Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 292-293 (1983).  Similarly, "trickery and  deceit", TXO, 509 U. S., at 462, are more reprehensible than negligence.  In TXO, both the West Virginia Supreme Court and the Justices of this Court placed special emphasis on the principle that punitive damages may  not be "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense."25 Id., at 453, 462.  Indeed, for Justice Kennedy, the defendant's  intentional malice was the decisive element in a "close and difficult"  case.  Id., at 468.26


21
In this case, none of the aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible conduct is present.  The harm BMW inflicted  on Dr. Gore was purely economic in nature.  The presale refinishing of  the car had no effect on its performance or safety features, or even its  appearance for at least nine months after his purchase.  BMW's conduct  evinced no indifference to or reckless disregard for the health and  safety of others.  To be sure, infliction of economic injury, especially  when done intentionally through affirmative acts of misconduct, id., at 453, or when the target is financially vulnerable, can warrant a substantial penalty.  But this observation does not convert all acts  that cause economic harm into torts that are sufficiently reprehensible  to justify a significant sanction in addition to compensatory damages.


22
Dr. Gore contends that BMW's conduct was particularly reprehensible because nondisclosure of the repairs to his car formed  part of a nationwide pattern of tortious conduct. Certainly, evidence  that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while  knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant  support for an argument that strong medicine is required to cure the  defendant's disrespect for the law.  See id., at 462, n. 28.  Our  holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first  offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than  an individual instance of malfeasance. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 732 (1948).


23
In support of his thesis, Dr. Gore advances two arguments. First, he asserts that the state disclosure statutes supplement, rather  than supplant, existing remedies for breach of contract and common-law  fraud. Thus, according to Dr. Gore, the statutes may not properly be  viewed as immunizing from liability the nondisclosure of repairs costing  less than the applicable statutory threshold.  Brief for Respondent  18-19.  Second, Dr. Gore maintains that BMW should have anticipated that  its failure to disclose similar repair work could expose it to liability  for fraud.  Id., at 4-5.


24
We recognize, of course, that only state courts may authoritatively construe state statutes.  As far as we are aware, at the  time this action was commenced no state court had explicitly addressed  whether its State's disclosure statute provides a safe harbor for  nondisclosure of presumptively minor repairs or should be construed  instead as supplementing common-law duties.27  A review of the text  of the statutes, however, persuades us that in the absence of a  state-court determination to the contrary, a corporate executive could reasonably interpret the disclosure requirements as establishing safe  harbors.  In California, for example, the disclosure statute defines  "material" damage to a motor vehicle as damage requiring repairs costing  in excess of 3 percent of the suggested retail price or $500, whichever  is greater.  Cal. Veh. Code Ann. Section(s) 9990 (West Supp. 1996).  The  Illinois statute states that in cases in which disclosure is not  required, "nondisclosure does not constitute a misrepresentation or  omission of fact." Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 815, Section(s) 710/5   (1994).28  Perhaps the statutes may also be interpreted in another  way.  We simply emphasize that the record contains no evidence that  BMW's decision to follow a disclosure policy that coincided with the  strictest extant state statute was sufficiently reprehensible to justify  a $2 million award of punitive damages.


25
Dr. Gore's second argument for treating BMW as a recidivist is  that the company should have anticipated that its actions would be  considered fraudulent in some, if not all, jurisdictions.  This  contention overlooks the fact that actionable fraud requires a material  misrepresentation or omission.29  This qualifier invites line drawing  of just the sort engaged in by States with disclosure statutes and by  BMW. We do not think it can be disputed that there may exist minor imperfections in the finish of a new car that can be repaired (or indeed, left unrepaired) without materially affecting the car's value.30  There is no evidence that BMW acted in bad faith when it  sought to establish the appropriate line between presumptively minor  damage and damage requiring disclosure to purchasers.  For this purpose,  BMW could reasonably rely on state disclosure statutes for guidance.  In  this regard, it is also significant that there is no evidence that BMW  persisted in a course of conduct after it had been adjudged unlawful on  even one occasion, let alone repeated occasions.31


26
Finally, the record in this case discloses no deliberate false  statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence  of improper motive, such as were present in Haslip and TXO.  Haslip, 499  U. S., at 5, TXO, 509 U. S., at 453.  We accept, of course, the jury's  finding that BMW suppressed a material fact which Alabama law obligated  it to communicate to prospective purchasers of repainted cars in that  State.  But the omission of a material fact may be less reprehensible  than a deliberate false statement, particularly when there is a good-faith basis for believing that no duty to disclose exists.


27
That conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort  liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages, does not  establish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial  punitive damages award.  Because this case exhibits none of the  circumstances ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct,  we are persuaded that BMW's conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible  to warrant imposition of a $2 million exemplary damages award.


Ratio


28
The second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the  actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.  See TXO, 509 U. S., at 459;  Haslip, 499 U. S., at 23.  The principle that exemplary damages must  bear a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages has a long  pedigree.32 Scholars have identified a number of early English  statutes authorizing the award of multiple damages for particular  wrongs.  Some 65 different enactments during the period between 1275 and  1753 provided for double, treble, or quadruple damages.33  Our  decisions in both Haslip and TXO endorsed the proposition that a  comparison between the compensatory award and the punitive award is  significant.


29
In Haslip we concluded that even though a punitive damages award  of "more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages," might be  "close to the line," it did not "cross the line into the area of  constitutional impropriety."  Haslip, 499 U. S., at 23-24.  TXO,  following dicta in Haslip, refined this analysis by confirming that the  proper inquiry is "`whether there is a reasonable relationship between  the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the  defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred.'"   TXO, 509 U. S., at 460 (emphasis in original), quoting Haslip, 499 U.  S., at 21.  Thus, in upholding the $10 million award in TXO, we relied  on the difference between that figure and the harm to the victim that would have ensued if the tortious plan had succeeded.  That difference  suggested that the relevant ratio was not more than 10 to 1.34


30
The $2 million in punitive damages awarded to Dr. Gore by the Alabama Supreme Court is 500 times the amount of his actual harm as  determined by the jury.35  Moreover, there is no suggestion that Dr.  Gore or any other BMW purchaser was threatened with any additional  potential harm by BMW's nondisclosure policy.  The disparity in this  case is thus dramatically greater than those considered in Haslip and  TXO.36


31
Of course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one  that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award.  TXO,  509 U. S., at 458.37  Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may  properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for  example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small  amount of economic damages.  A higher ratio may also be justified in  cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of  noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.  It is  appropriate, therefore, to reiterate our rejection of a categorical  approach. Once again, "we return to what we said . . . in Haslip: `We  need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between  the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable  that would fit every case. We can say, however, that [a] general  concer[n] of reasonableness . . . properly enter[s] into the  constitutional calculus.'"  TXO, 509 U. S., at 458 (quoting Haslip, 499  U. S., at 18).  In most cases, the ratio will be within a  constitutionally acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified  on this basis. When the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the  award must surely "raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."  TXO, 509 U.  S., at 482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct

32
Comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal  penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides a  third indicium of excessiveness.  As Justice O'Connor has correctly  observed, a reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of  punitive damages is excessive should "accord `substantial deference' to  legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct  at issue."  Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,  Inc., 492 U. S., at 301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting  in part).  In Haslip, 499 U. S., at 23, the Court noted that although  the exemplary award was "much in excess of the fine that could be  imposed," imprisonment was also authorized in the criminal context.38  In this case the $2 million economic sanction imposed on BMW is  substantially greater than the statutory fines available in Alabama and  elsewhere for similar malfeasance.


33
The maximum civil penalty authorized by the Alabama Legislature  for a violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is $2,000;39  other States authorize more severe sanctions, with the maxima ranging  from $5,000 to $10,000.40  Significantly, some statutes draw a  distinction between first offenders and recidivists; thus, in New York  the penalty is $50 for a first offense and $250 for subsequent offenses.  None of these statutes would provide an out-of-state distributor with  fair notice that the first violation-or, indeed the first 14  violations-of its provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion  dollar penalty.  Moreover, at the time BMW's policy was first challenged, there does not appear to have been any judicial decision in  Alabama or elsewhere indicating that application of that policy might  give rise to such severe punishment.


34
The sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it was necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies could be expected to achieve  that goal. The fact that a multimillion dollar penalty prompted a change  in policy sheds no light on the question whether a lesser deterrent  would have adequately protected the interests of Alabama consumers.  In  the absence of a history of noncompliance with known statutory  requirements, there is no basis for assuming that a more modest sanction  would not have been sufficient to motivate full compliance with the  disclosure requirement imposed by the Alabama Supreme Court in this  case.

IV

35
We assume, as the juries in this case and in the Yates case found, that the undisclosed damage to the new BMW's affected their actual value. Notwithstanding the evidence adduced by BMW in an effort  to prove that the repainted cars conformed to the same quality standards  as its other cars, we also assume that it knew, or should have known,  that as time passed the repainted cars would lose their attractive  appearance more rapidly than other BMW's.  Moreover, we of course accept  the Alabama courts' view that the state interest in protecting its  citizens from deceptive trade practices justifies a sanction in addition  to the recovery of compensatory damages.  We cannot, however, accept the conclusion of the Alabama Supreme Court that BMW's conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify a punitive sanction that is tantamount  to a severe criminal penalty.


36
The fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement to fair notice  of the demands that the several States impose on the conduct of its  business. Indeed, its status as an active participant in the national  economy implicates the federal interest in preventing individual States  from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce.  While each State  has ample power to protect its own consumers, none may use the punitive  damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory policies on the entire Nation.


37
As in Haslip, we are not prepared to draw a bright line marking  the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages award.  Unlike that case, however, we are fully convinced that the grossly  excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional  limit.41 Whether the appropriate remedy requires a new trial or  merely an independent determination by the Alabama Supreme Court of the  award necessary to vindicate the economic interests of Alabama consumers  is a matter that should be addressed by the state court in the first  instance.


38
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further  proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.


39
It is so ordered.


40
djq  Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter join, concurring.


41
The Alabama state courts have assessed the defendant $2 million  in "punitive damages" for having knowingly failed to tell a BMW  automobile buyer that, at a cost of $600, it had repainted portions of  his new $40,000 car, thereby lowering its potential resale value by  about 10%. The Court's opinion, which I join, explains why we have  concluded that this award, in this case, was "grossly excessive" in  relation to legitimate punitive damages objectives, and hence an  arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property in violation of the  Due Process Clause.  See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources  Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 453, 454 (1993) (A "grossly excessive" punitive  award amounts to an "arbitrary deprivation of property without due  process of law") (plurality opinion).  Members of this Court have  generally thought, however, that if "fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity."  Id., at 457.  See also Pacific Mut. Life Ins.  Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 40-42 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in  judgment).  And the Court also has found that punitive damages  procedures very similar to those followed here were not, by themselves,  fundamentally unfair. Id., at 15-24. Thus, I believe it important to  explain why this presumption of validity is overcome in this instance.


42
The reason flows from the Court's emphasis in Haslip upon the constitutional importance of legal standards that provide "reasonable  constraints" within which "discretion is exercised," that assure  "meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a jury has  fixed the punitive damages," and permit "appellate review [that] makes  certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their amount and  rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to  deter its repetition." Id., at 20-21.  See also id., at 18 ("[U]nlimited  jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's  constitutional sensibilities").


43
This constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna  Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life,  liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal  processes, but of arbitrary coercion. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S.  327, 331 (1986); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123 (1889).  Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice,  does more than simply provide citizens notice of what actions may  subject them to punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform general  treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law  itself. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106,  112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to  require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a  minority must be imposed generally").


44
Legal standards need not be precise in order to satisfy this constitutional concern.  See Haslip, supra, at 20 (comparing punitive  damages standards to such legal standards as "reasonable care," "due  diligence," and "best interests of the child") (internal quotation marks  omitted).  But they must offer some kind of constraint upon a jury or  court's discretion, and thus protection against purely arbitrary  behavior.  The standards the Alabama courts applied here are vague and  open-ended to the point where they risk arbitrary results.  In my view,  although the vagueness of those standards does not, by itself, violate  due process, see Haslip, supra, it does invite the kind of scrutiny the  Court has given the particular verdict before us.  See id., at 18   ("[C]oncerns of . . . adequate guidance from the court when the case is  tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus"); TXO,  supra, at 475 ("[I]t cannot be denied that the lack of clear guidance  heightens the risk that arbitrariness, passion, or bias will replace  dispassionate deliberation as the basis for the jury's verdict")   (O'Connor, J., dissenting).  This is because the standards, as the  Alabama Supreme Court authoritatively interpreted them here, provided no significant constraints or protection against arbitrary results.


45
First, the Alabama statute that permits punitive damages does not itself contain a standard that readily distinguishes between conduct  warranting very small, and conduct warranting very large, punitive  damages awards.  That statute permits punitive damages in cases of  "oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice."  Ala. Code Section(s)  6-11-20(a) (1993).  But the statute goes on to define those terms  broadly, to encompass far more than the egregious conduct that those  terms, at first reading, might seem to imply.  An intentional  misrepresentation, made through a statement or silence, can easily  amount to "fraud" sufficient to warrant punitive damages.  See  Section(s) 6-11-20(b)(1) ("Fraud" includes "intentional . . .  concealment of a material fact the concealing party had a duty to  disclose, which was gross, oppressive, or malicious and committed with  the intention . . . of thereby depriving a person or entity of property") (emphasis added); Section(s) 6-11-20(b)(2)("Malice" includes  any "wrongful act without just cause or excuse . . . [w]ith an intent to  injure the . . . property of another") (emphasis added); Section(s)  6-11-20(b)(5) ("Oppression" includes "[s]ubjecting a person to . . .  unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights").  The  statute thereby authorizes punitive damages for the most serious kinds  of misrepresentations, say, tricking the elderly out of their life savings, for much less serious conduct, such as the failure to disclose  repainting a car, at issue here, and for a vast range of conduct in  between.


46
Second, the Alabama courts, in this case, have applied the "factors" intended to constrain punitive damages awards, in a way that  belies that purpose.  Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala.  1989), sets forth seven factors that appellate courts use to determine  whether or not a jury award was "grossly excessive" and which, in  principle, might make up for the lack of significant constraint in the  statute.  But, as the Alabama courts have authoritatively interpreted  them, and as their application in this case illustrates, they impose  little actual constraint.


47
(a) Green Oil requires that a punitive damages award "bear a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the  defendant's conduct as well as to the harm that actually has occurred."  Id., at 223.  But this standard does little to guide a determination of  what counts as a "reasonable" relationship, as this case illustrates.  The record evidence of past, present, or likely future harm consists of   (a) $4,000 of harm to Dr. Gore's BMW; (b) 13 other similar Alabama  States.  The Alabama Supreme Court, disregarding BMW's failure to make  relevant objection to the out-of-state instances at trial (as was the  court's right), held that the last mentioned, out-of-state instances did  not count as relevant harm.  It went on to find "a reasonable relationship" between the  harm and the $2 million punitive damages  award without "consider[ing] those acts that occurred in other  jurisdictions." 646 So. 2d 619, 628 (1995) (emphasis added).  For  reasons explored by the majority in greater depth, see ante, at 13-25,  the relationship between this award and the underlying conduct seems  well beyond the bounds of the "reasonable."  To find a "reasonable  relationship" between purely economic harm totaling $56,000, without  significant evidence of future repetition, and a punitive award of $2  million is to empty the "reasonable relationship" test of meaningful content.  As thus construed, it does not set forth a legal standard that  could have significantly constrained the discretion of Alabama  factfinders.


48
(b) Green Oil's second factor is the "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct.  Green Oil, supra, at 223.  Like the "reasonable relationship" test, this factor provides little  guidance on how to relate culpability to the size of an award.  The  Alabama court, in considering this factor, found "reprehensible" that  BMW followed a conscious policy of not disclosing repairs to new cars  when the cost of repairs amounted to less than 3% of the car's value.  Of course, any conscious policy of not disclosing a repair-where one  knows the nondisclosure might cost the customer resale value-is "reprehensible" to some degree.  But, for the reasons discussed by the  majority, ante, at 14-20, I do not see how the Alabama courts could find  conduct that (they assumed) caused $56,000 of relevant economic harm  especially or unusually reprehensible enough to warrant $2 million in  punitive damages, or a significant portion of that award.  To find to  the contrary, as the Alabama courts did, is not simply unreasonable; it  is to make "reprehensibility" a concept without constraining force,  i.e., to deprive the concept of its constraining power to protect  against serious and capricious deprivations.


49
(c) Green Oil's third factor requires "punitive damages" to "remove the profit" of the illegal activity and "be in excess of the  profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss."  Green Oil, supra, at  223.  This factor has the ability to limit awards to a fixed, rational  amount.  But as applied, that concept's potential was not realized, for  the court did not limit the award to anywhere near the $56,000 in  profits evidenced in the record. Given the record's description of the  conduct and its prevalence, this factor could not justify much of the $2  million award.


50
(d) Green Oil's fourth factor is the "financial position" of the  defendant.  Ibid.  Since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person  more than a wealthy one, one can understand the relevance of this factor  to the state's interest in retribution (though not necessarily to its  interest in deterrence, given the more distant relation between a  defendant's wealth and its responses to economic incentives).  See TXO,  509 U. S., at 462, and n. 28 (plurality opinion); id., at 469 (Kennedy,  J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Haslip, 499 U. S., at 21-22; Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,  Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 300 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,  dissenting in part).  This factor, however, is not necessarily intended  to act as a significant constraint on punitive awards.  Rather, it  provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards when the defendant is  wealthy, as this case may illustrate.  That does not make its use  unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means that this factor cannot make  up for the failure of other factors, such as "reprehensibility," to constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant's  conduct.


51
(e) Green Oil's fifth factor is the "costs of litigation" and  the State's desire "to encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to  trial." 539 So. 2d, at 223.  This standard provides meaningful  constraint to the extent that the enhancement it authorized is linked to  a fixed, ascertainable amount approximating actual costs, even when  defined generously to reflect the contingent nature of plaintiffs'  victories.  But as this case shows, the factor cannot operate as a  constraint when an award much in excess of costs is approved for other  reasons. An additional aspect of the standard-the need to "encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial"-is a factor that does not constrain, but enhances, discretionary power-especially when unsupported  by evidence of a special need to encourage litigation (which the Alabama  courts here did not mention).


52
(f) Green Oil's sixth factor is whether or not "criminal sanctions have been imposed on the defendant for his conduct." Ibid.  This factor did not apply here.


53
(g) Green Oil's seventh factor requires that "other civil actions" filed "against the same defendant, based on the same conduct"  be considered in mitigation.  Id., at 224.  That factor did not apply  here.


54
Thus, the first, second, and third Green Oil factors, in principle, might sometimes act as constraints on arbitrary behavior.  But as the Alabama courts interpreted those standards in this case, even  taking those three factors together, they could not have significantly  constrained the court system's ability to impose "grossly excessive"  awards.


55
Third, the state courts neither referred to, nor made any effort  to find, nor enunciated any other standard, that either directly, or  indirectly as background, might have supplied the constraining legal  force that the statute and Green Oil standards (as interpreted here)  lack.  Dr. Gore did argue to the jury an economic theory based on the  need to offset the totality of the harm that the defendant's conduct  caused.  Some theory of that general kind might have provided a  significant constraint on arbitrary awards (at least where confined to  the relevant harm-causing conduct, see ante, at 10-13).  Some  economists, for example, have argued for a standard that would deter  illegal activity causing solely economic harm through the use of  punitive damages awards that, as a whole, would take from a wrongdoer  the total cost of the harm caused.  See, e.g., S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 162 (1987) ("If liability equals losses caused  multiplied by . . . the inverse of the probability of suit, injurers  will act optimally under liability rules despite the chance that they  will escape suit"); Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and  How Much, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1143, 1146-1148 (1989).  My understanding of  the intuitive essence of some of those theories, which I put in crude  form (leaving out various qualifications), is that they could permit  juries to calculate punitive damages by making a rough estimate of  global harm, dividing that estimate by a similarly rough estimate of the number of successful lawsuits that would likely be brought, and adding  generous attorneys fees and other costs.  Smaller damages would not  sufficiently discourage firms from engaging in the harmful conduct,  while larger damages would "over-deter" by leading potential defendants  to spend more to prevent the activity that causes the economic harm,  say, through employee training, than the cost of the harm itself.  See  Galligan, Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages,  51 La. L. Rev. 3, 17-20, 28-30 (1990).  Larger damages might also "double count" by including in the punitive damages award some of the  compensatory, or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would also  recover.


56
The record before us, however, contains nothing suggesting that  the Alabama Supreme Court, when determining the allowable award, applied  any "economic" theory that might explain the $2 million recovery.  Cf.  Browning-Ferris, supra, at 300 (noting that the Constitution "does not  incorporate the views of the Law and Economics School," nor does it  "`require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory'")   (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting CTS  Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U. S. 69, 92 (1987)).  And  courts properly tend to judge the rationality of judicial actions in terms of the reasons that were given, and the facts that were before the  court, cf. TXO, 509 U. S., at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and  concurring in judgment), not those that might have been given on the  basis of some conceivable set of facts (unlike the rationality of  economic statutes enacted by legislatures subject to the public's  control through the ballot box, see, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications,  Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 315 (1993)).  Therefore, reference to a  constraining "economic" theory, which might have counseled more  deferential review by this Court, is lacking in this case.


57
Fourth, I cannot find any community understanding or historic practice that this award might exemplify and which, therefore, would  provide background standards constraining arbitrary behavior and  excessive awards.  A punitive damages award of $2 million for  intentional misrepresentation causing $56,000 of harm is extraordinary  by historical standards, and, as far as I am aware, finds no analogue  until relatively recent times.  Amici for Dr. Gore attempt to show that  this is not true, pointing to various historical cases which, according  to their calculations, represented roughly equivalent punitive awards  for similarly culpable conduct.  See Brief for James D. A. Boyle et al.  as Amici Curiae 4-5 (hereinafter Legal Historians' Brief).  Among others, they cite Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C. P. 1763)  ( 1,000 said to be equivalent of $1.5 million, for warrantless search of  papers); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wills. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K. B. 1763)  ( 300, said to be $450,000, for 6-hour false imprisonment); Hewlett v.  Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277, 128 Eng. Rep. 696 (C. P. 1813) ( 2,000, said to  be $680,000, for malicious prosection); Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442,  128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C. P. 1814) ( 500, said to be $165,000, for  poaching).  But amici apparently base their conversions on a  mathematical assumption, namely that inflation has progressed at a  constant 3% rate of inflation.  See Legal Historians' Brief 4.  In fact, consistent, cumulative inflation is a modern phenomenon.  See McCusker,  How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index for Use as a  Deflator of Money Values in the Economy of the United States, 101  Proceedings of American Antiquarian Society 297, 310, 323-332 (1992).  Estimates based on historical rates of valuation, while highly  approximate, suggest that the ancient extraordinary awards are small  compared to the $2 million here at issue, or other modern punitive  damages figures.  See Appendix to this opinion, infra, at 13-14   (suggesting that the modern equivalent of the awards in the above cases  is something like $150,000, $45,000, $100,000, and $25,000  respectively).  And, as the majority opinion makes clear, the record  contains nothing to suggest that the extraordinary size of the award in  this case is explained by the extraordinary wrongfulness of the  defendant's behavior, measured by historical or community standards,  rather than arbitrariness or caprice.


58
Fifth, there are no other legislative enactments here that classify awards and impose quantitative limits that would significantly  cabin the fairly unbounded discretion created by the absence of  constraining legal standards. Cf., e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code  Ann. Section(s) 41.008 (Supp. 1996) (punitive damages generally limited  to greater of double damages, or $200,000, except cap does not apply to  suits arising from certain serious criminal acts enumerated in the  statute); Conn. Gen. Stat. Section(s) 52-240b (1995) (punitive damages  may not exceed double compensatory damages in product liability cases);  Fla. Stat. Section(s) 768.73(1) (Supp. 1993) (punitive damages in certain actions limited to treble compensatory damages); Ga. Code. Ann.  Section(s) 51-12-5.1(g) (Supp. 1995) ($250,000 cap in certain actions).


59
The upshot is that the rules that purport to channel discretion  in this kind of case, here did not do so in fact. That means that the  award in this case was both (a) the product of a system of standards  that did not significantly constrain a court's, and hence a jury's,  discretion in making that award; and (b) was grossly excessive in light  of the State's legitimate punitive damages objectives.


60
The first of these reasons has special importance where courts  review a jury-determined punitive damages award.  That is because one  cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators through the ballot box;  nor can one expect those jurors to interpret law like judges, who work  within a discipline and hierarchical organization that normally promotes  roughly uniform interpretation and application of the law.  Yet here  Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little, like legislators or judges, for it permits them, to a certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that policy, not to compensate a victim, but to  achieve a policy-related objective outside the confines of the particular case.


61
To the extent that neither clear legal principles, nor fairly obvious historical or community-based standards (defining, say, especially egregious behavior) significantly constrain punitive damages  awards, is there not a substantial risk of outcomes so arbitrary that  they become difficult to square with the Constitution's assurance, to  every citizen, of the law's protection?  The standards here, as  authoritatively interpreted, in my view, make this threat real and not  theoretical. And, in these unusual circumstances, where legal standards  offer virtually no constraint, I believe that this lack of constraining standards warrants this Court's detailed examination of the award.


62
The second reason-the severe disproportionality between the award and the legitimate punitive damages objectives-reflects a judgment  about a matter of degree.  I recognize that it is often difficult to  determine just when a punitive award exceeds an amount reasonably  related to a State's legitimate interests, or when that excess is so  great as to amount to a matter of constitutional concern.  Yet whatever  the difficulties of drawing a precise line, once we examine the award in  this case, it is not difficult to say that this award lies on the line's  far side. The severe lack of proportionality between the size of the  award and the underlying punitive damages objectives shows that the award falls into the category of "gross excessiveness" set forth in this  Court's prior cases.


63
These two reasons taken together overcome what would otherwise  amount to a "strong presumption of validity." TXO, 509 U. S., at 457.  And, for those two reasons, I conclude that the award in this unusual  case violates the basic guarantee of nonarbitrary governmental behavior  that the Due Process Clause provides.


64
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.


65
Although I recognize that all estimates of historic rates of inflation are subject to dispute, including, I assume, the sources below, those sources suggest that the value of the eighteenth and nineteenth century judgments cited by amici is much less than the figures amici arrived at under their presumption of a constant 3% rate  of inflation.


66
In 1763,  1 (Eng.) was worth  1.73 Pennsylvania currency. See  U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States:  Colonial Times to 1970, Series Z-585, p. 1198 (Bicentennial ed. 1975).  For the period 1766-1772,  1 (Penn.) was worth $45.99 (U. S. 1991).  See  McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index for  Use as a Deflator of Money Values in the Economy of the United States,  101 American Antiquarian Society 297, 333 (1992).  Thus,  1 (Eng. 1763)  is worth about $79.56 (U. S. 1991).  Accounting for the 12% inflation of  the U. S. dollar between 1991 and 1995 (when amici filed their brief),  see Economic Indicators, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 23 (Feb. 1996),  1   (Eng. 1763) is worth about $89.11 (U. S. 1995).


67
Calculated another way,  1 (Eng. 1763) is worth about  72.84 (Eng. 1991).  See McCusker, supra, at 312, 342, 350.  And  1 (Eng. 1991)  is worth $1.77 (U. S. 1991).  See 78 Fed. Reserve Bulletin A68 (Feb.  1992). Thus,  1 (Eng. 1763) amounts to about $128.93 (U. S. 1991).  Again, accounting for inflation between 1991 and 1995, this amounts to  about $144.40 (U. S. 1995).


68
Thus, the above sources suggest that the  1,000 award in Wilkes  in 1763 roughly amounts to between $89,110 and $144,440 today, not $1.5  million.  And the  300 award in Huckle that same year would seem to be  worth between $26,733 and $43,320 today, not $450,000.


69
For the period of the Hewlett and Merest decisions,  1 (Eng. 1813) is worth about  25.3 (Eng. 1991).  See McCusker, supra, at 344,  350.  Using the 1991 exchange rate,  1 (Eng. 1813) is worth about $44.78   (U. S. 1991).  Accounting for inflation between 1991 and 1995, this  amounts to about $50.16 (U. S. 1995).


70
Thus, the  2,000 and  500 awards in Hewlett and Merest would seem to be closer to $100,320 and $25,080, respectively, than to amici's  estimates of $680,000 and $165,000.


71
djq  Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.


72
Today we see the latest manifestation of this Court's recent and  increasingly insistent "concern about punitive damages that `run wild.'"  Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 18 (1991).  Since the  Constitution does not make that concern any of our business, the Court's  activities in this area are an unjustified incursion into the province  of state governments.


73
In earlier cases that were the prelude to this decision, I set  forth my view that a state trial procedure that commits the decision  whether to impose punitive damages, and the amount, to the discretion of  the jury, subject to some judicial review for "reasonableness,"  furnishes a defendant with all the process that is "due."  See TXO  Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 470 (1993)  (Scalia, J., concurring in  judgment); Haslip, supra, at 25-28 (Scalia,  J., concurring in judgment); cf. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U. S.  ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 1-2) (Scalia, J., concurring).  I do not  regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a secret  repository of substantive guarantees against "unfairness"-neither the unfairness of an excessive civil compensatory award, nor the unfairness  of an "unreasonable" punitive award.  What the Fourteenth Amendment's  procedural guarantee assures is an opportunity to contest the  reasonableness of a damages judgment in state court; but there is no  federal guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable.  See TXO,  supra, at 471 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).


74
This view, which adheres to the text of the Due Process Clause,  has not prevailed in our punitive-damages cases.  See TXO Production  Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S., at 453-462 (plurality  opinion); id., at 478-481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip, supra, at  18.  When, however, a constitutional doctrine adopted by the Court is  not only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled application, I do  not feel bound to give it stare decisis effect-indeed, I do not feel justified in doing so.  See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U. S.  ___, ___ (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Walton v. Arizona,  497 U. S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part  and dissenting in part).  Our punitive-damages jurisprudence compels  such a response.  The Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing  yet another aspect of our Nation's legal culture (no matter how much in  need of correction it may be), and the application of the Court's new  rule of constitutional law is constrained by no principle other than the Justices' subjective assessment of the "reasonableness" of the award in  relation to the conduct for which it was assessed.


75
Because today's judgment represents the first instance of this  Court's invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as simply  unreasonably large, I think it a proper occasion to discuss these points  at some length.


76
* The most significant aspects of today's decision-the identification of a "substantive due process" right against a "grossly  excessive" award, and the concomitant assumption of ultimate authority  to decide anew a matter of "reasonableness" resolved in lower court  proceedings-are of course not new. Haslip and TXO revived the notion,  moribund since its appearance in the first years of this century, that  the measure of civil punishment poses a question of constitutional  dimension to be answered by this Court.  Neither of those cases,  however, nor any of the precedents upon which they relied, actually took  the step of declaring a punitive award unconstitutional simply because  it was "too big."At the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it  was well understood that punitive damages represent the assessment by  the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment  the defendant deserved. See, e.g., Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 565   (1886); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 521 (1885); Day  v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852).  See generally Haslip, supra, at  25-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  Today's decision, though  dressed up as a legal opinion, is really no more than a disagreement  with the community's sense of indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama jury, as reduced by the State Supreme  Court.  It reflects not merely, as the concurrence candidly  acknowledges, "a judgment about a matter of degree," ante, at 12; but a  judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which  is hardly an analytical determination.


77
There is no precedential warrant for giving our judgment priority over the judgment of state courts and juries on this matter.  The only support for the Court's position is to be found in a handful of  errant federal cases, bunched within a few years of one other, which  invented the notion that an unfairly severe civil sanction amounts to a  violation of constitutional liberties.  These were the decisions upon  which the TXO plurality relied in pronouncing that the Due Process  Clause "imposes substantive limits `beyond which penalties may not go,'"  509 U. S., at 454 (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 78 (1907)); see also 509 U. S., at 478-481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip, 499 U. S., at 18.  Although they are our precedents, they are themselves too shallowly rooted to justify the  Court's recent undertaking.  The only case relied upon in which the  Court actually invalidated a civil sanction does not even support  constitutional review for excessiveness, since it really concerned the  validity, as a matter of procedural due process, of state legislation  that imposed a significant penalty on a common carrier which lacked the  means of determining the legality of its actions before the penalty was  imposed.  See Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.  S. 482, 489-491 (1915).  The amount of the penalty was not a subject of  independent scrutiny.  As for the remaining cases, while the opinions do  consider arguments that statutory penalties can, by reason of their  excessiveness, violate due process, not a single one of these judgments  invalidates a damages award.  See Seaboard, supra, at 78-79;  Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U. S. 86, 111-112 (1909);  Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 286, 290 (1912);  St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63, 66-67 (1919).


78
More importantly, this latter group of cases-which again are the  sole precedential foundation put forward for the rule of constitutional  law espoused by today's Court-simply fabricated the "substantive due  process" right at issue.  Seaboard assigned no precedent to its bald  assertion that the Constitution imposes "limits beyond which penalties  may not go," 207 U. S., at 78. Waters-Pierce cited only Coffey v.  County of Harlan, 204 U. S. 659 (1907), a case which inquired into the  constitutionality of state procedure, id., at 662-663.  Standard Oil  simply cited Waters-Pierce, and St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. offered in addition to these cases only Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502 (1915),  which said nothing to support the notion of a "substantive due process"  right against excessive civil penalties, but to the contrary asserted  that the prescribing and imposing of criminal punishment were "functions  peculiarly belonging to the several States," id., at 509-510.  Thus, the only authority for the Court's position is simply not authoritative.  These cases fall far short of what is needed to supplant this country's  longstanding practice regarding exemplary awards, see, e.g., Haslip, 499  U. S., at 15-18; id., at 25-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

II

79
One might understand the Court's eagerness to enter this field,  rather than leave it with the state legislatures, if it had something  useful to say.  In fact, however, its opinion provides virtually no  guidance to legislatures, and to state and federal courts, as to what a  "constitutionally proper" level of punitive damages might be.


80
We are instructed at the outset of Part II of the Court's opinion-the beginning of its substantive analysis-that "the federal  excessiveness inquiry . . . begins with an identification of the state  interests that a punitive award is designed to serve."  Ante, at 7.  On  first reading this, one is faced with the prospect that federal  punitive-damages law (the new field created by today's decision) will be  beset by the sort of "interest analysis" that has laid waste the  formerly comprehensible field of conflict of laws.  The thought that  each assessment of punitive damages, as to each offense, must be examined to determine the precise "state interests" pursued, is most  unsettling.  Moreover, if those "interests" are the most fundamental  determinant of an award, one would think that due process would require  the assessing jury to be instructed about them.


81
It appears, however (and I certainly hope), that all this is a  false alarm.  As Part II of the Court's opinion unfolds, it turns out to  be directed, not to the question "How much punishment is too much?" but  rather to the question "Which acts can be punished?"  "Alabama does not  have the power," the Court says, "to punish BMW for conduct that was  lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its  residents." Ante, at 12.  That may be true, though only in the narrow  sense that a person cannot be held liable to be punished on the basis of  a lawful act.  But if a person has been held subject to punishment  because he committed an unlawful act, the degree of his punishment  assuredly can be increased on the basis of any other conduct of his that  displays his wickedness, unlawful or not.  Criminal sentences can be  computed, we have said, on the basis of "information concerning every  aspect of a defendant's life," Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241,  250-252 (1949).  The Court at one point seems to acknowledge this,  observing that, although a sentencing court "[cannot] properly punish  lawful conduct," it may in assessing the penalty "consider . . . lawful conduct that bears on the defendant's character."  Ante, at 12, n. 19.  That concession is quite incompatible, however, with the later assertion  that, since "neither the jury nor the trial court was presented with  evidence that any of BMW's out-of-state conduct was unlawful," the  Alabama Supreme Court "therefore properly eschewed reliance on BMW's  out-of-state conduct, . . . and based its remitted award solely on  conduct that occurred within Alabama."  Ante, at 13.  Why could the  Supreme Court of Alabama not consider lawful (but disreputable) conduct,  both inside and outside Alabama, for the purpose of assessing just how bad an actor BMW was? The Court follows up its statement that "Alabama  does not have the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful  where it occurred" with the statement: "Nor may Alabama impose sanctions  on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions."  Ante, at 12.  The Court provides us no citation of authority to support  this proposition-other than the barely analogous cases cited earlier in  the opinion, see ante, at 10-11-and I know of none.


82
These significant issues pronounced upon by the Court are not remotely presented for resolution in the present case.  There is no  basis for believing that Alabama has sought to control conduct elsewhere.  The statutes at issue merely permit civil juries to treat  conduct such as petitioner's as fraud, and authorize an award of  appropriate punitive damages in the event the fraud is found to be  "gross, oppressive, or malicious," Ala. Code Section(s) 6-11-20(b)(1)  (1993).  To be sure, respondent did invite the jury to consider  out-of-state conduct in its calculation of damages, but any increase in  the jury's initial award based on that consideration is not a component  of the remitted judgment before us.  As the Court several times recognizes, in computing the amount of the remitted award the Alabama  Supreme Court-whether it was constitutionally required to or  not-"expressly disclaimed any reliance on acts that occurred in other  jurisdictions."  Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also  ante, at 13.42  Thus, the only question presented by this case is  whether that award, limited to petitioner's Alabama conduct and viewed  in light of the factors identified as properly informing the inquiry, is excessive.  The Court's sweeping (and largely unsupported) statements  regarding the relationship of punitive awards to lawful or unlawful  out-of-state conduct are the purest dicta.

III

83
In Part III of its opinion, the Court identifies "[t]hree guideposts" that lead it to the conclusion that the award in this case  is excessive: degree of reprehensibility, ratio between punitive award  and plaintiff's actual harm, and legislative sanctions provided for  comparable misconduct.  Ante, at 14-25. The legal significance of these  "guideposts" is nowhere explored, but their necessary effect is to  establish federal standards governing the hitherto exclusively state law  of damages. Apparently (though it is by no means clear) all three  federal "guideposts" can be overridden if "necessary to deter future misconduct," ante, at 25-a loophole that will encourage state reviewing  courts to uphold awards as necessary for the "adequat[e] protect[ion]"  of state consumers, ibid.  By effectively requiring state reviewing  courts to concoct rationalizations-whether within the "guideposts" or  through the loophole-to justify the intuitive punitive reactions of  state juries, the Court accords neither category of institution the respect it deserves.


84
Of course it will not be easy for the States to comply with this  new federal law of damages, no matter how willing they are to do so.  In  truth, the "guideposts" mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real  guidance at all.  As to "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's  conduct, we learn that "`nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes  marked by violence or the threat of violence,'" ante, at 15 (quoting  Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 292-293 (1983)), and that "`trickery and deceit'" are "more reprehensible than negligence," ante, at 15. As to  the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, we are told that a  "`general concer[n] of reasonableness . . . enter[s] into the  constitutional calculus,'" ante, at 23 (quoting TXO, supra, at  458)-though even "a breathtaking 500 to 1" will not necessarily do  anything more than "`raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow,'" ante, at 23   (quoting TXO, supra, at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), an opinion  which, when confronted with that "breathtaking" ratio, approved it). And  as to legislative sanctions provided for comparable misconduct, they  should be accorded "`substantial deference,'" ibid. (quoting Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.  S. 257, 301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  One expects the Court to conclude: "To thine own self be true." These  criss-crossing platitudes yield no real answers in no real cases.  And  it must be noted that the Court nowhere says that these three  "guideposts" are the only guideposts; indeed, it makes very clear that  they are not-explaining away the earlier opinions that do not really  follow these "guideposts" on the basis of additional factors, thereby  "reiterat[ing] our rejection of a categorical approach."  Ante, at 23.  In other words, even these utter platitudes, if they should ever happen  to produce an answer, may be overridden by other unnamed considerations.  The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower courts-that  does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal  analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular  award of punitive damages was not "fair." The Court distinguishes  today's result from Haslip and TXO partly on the ground that "the record  in this case discloses no deliberate false statements, acts of  affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive,  such as were present in Haslip and TXO."  Ante, at 19.  This seemingly  rejects the findings necessarily made by the jury-that petitioner had committed a fraud that was "gross, oppressive, or malicious," Ala. Code  Section(s) 6-11-20(b)(1) (1996).  Perhaps that rejection is intentional;  the Court does not say.


85
The relationship between judicial application of the new "guideposts" and jury findings poses a real problem for the Court, since  as a matter of logic there is no more justification for ignoring the  jury's determination as to how reprehensible petitioner's conduct was   (i.e., how much it deserves to be punished), than there is for ignoring  its determination that it was reprehensible at all (i.e., that the wrong  was willful and punitive damages are therefore recoverable).  That the  issue has been framed in terms of a constitutional right against unreasonably excessive awards should not obscure the fact that the logical and necessary consequence of the Court's approach is the recognition of a constitutional right against unreasonably imposed awards as well.  The elevation of "fairness" in punishment to a principle of "substantive due process" means that every punitive award  unreasonably imposed is unconstitutional; such an award is by definition  excessive, since it attaches a penalty to conduct undeserving of  punishment.  Indeed, if the Court is correct, it must be that every  claim that a state jury's award of compensatory damages is  "unreasonable" (because not supported by the evidence) amounts to an  assertion of constitutional injury. See TXO, supra, at 471 (Scalia, J.  concurring in judgment).  And the same would be true for determinations  of liability.  By today's logic, every dispute as to evidentiary  sufficiency in a state civil suit poses a question of constitutional  moment, subject to review in this Court. That is a stupefying  proposition.


86
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.


87
djq  Justice Ginsburg, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.


88
The Court, I am convinced, unnecessarily and unwisely ventures  into territory traditionally within the States' domain, and does so in  the face of reform measures recently adopted or currently under  consideration in legislative arenas.  The Alabama Supreme Court, in this  case, endeavored to follow this Court's prior instructions; and, more  recently, Alabama's highest court has installed further controls on  awards of punitive damages (see infra, at 8, n. 6).  I would therefore  leave the state court's judgment undisturbed, and resist unnecessary  intrusion into an area dominantly of state concern.


89
* The respect due the Alabama Supreme Court requires that we strip  from this case a false issue: no impermissible "extraterritoriality"  infects the judgment before us; the excessiveness of the award is the  sole issue genuinely presented. The Court ultimately so recognizes, see  ante, at 12-13, but further clarification is in order.


90
Dr. Gore's experience was not unprecedented among customers who  bought BMW vehicles sold as flawless and brand-new.  In addition to his  own encounter, Gore showed, through paint repair orders introduced at  trial, that on 983 other occasions since 1983, BMW had shipped new  vehicles to dealers without disclosing paint repairs costing at least  $300, Tr. 585-586; at least 14 of the repainted vehicles, the evidence  also showed, were sold as new and undamaged to consumers in Alabama.  646 So. 2d 619, 623 (Ala. 1994).  Sales nationwide, Alabama's Supreme  Court said, were admissible "as to the issue of a `pattern and practice'  of such acts."  Id., at 627.  There was "no error," the court reiterated, "in the admission of the evidence that showed how pervasive  the nondisclosure policy was and the intent behind BMW NA's adoption of  it." Id., at 628.  That determination comports with this Court's  expositions. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509  U. S. 443, 462, and n. 28 (1993) (characterizing as "well-settled" the  admissibility of "evidence of [defendant's] alleged wrongdoing in other  parts of the country" and of defendant's "wealth"); see also Brief for Petitioner 22 (recognizing that similar acts, out-of-state, traditionally have been considered relevant "for the limited purpose of  determining that the conduct before the [c]ourt was reprehensible  because it was part of a pattern rather than an isolated incident").


91
Alabama's highest court next declared that the


92
"jury could not use the number of similar acts that a defendant  has committed in other jurisdictions as a multiplier when determining  the dollar amount of a punitive damages award. Such evidence may not be  considered in setting the size of the civil penalty, because neither the  jury nor the trial court had evidence before it showing in which states  the conduct was wrongful."  646 So. 2d, at 627 (emphasis in original)  (footnote omitted).


93
Because the Alabama Supreme Court provided this clear statement  of the State's law, the multiplier problem encountered in Gore's case is  not likely to occur again.  Now, as a matter of Alabama law, it is  plainly impermissible to assess punitive damages by multiplication based  on out-of-state events not shown to be unlawful.  See, e.g., Independent  Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 658 So. 2d 892, 902-903 (Ala.  1994) (under BMW v. Gore, trial court erred in relying on defendant  insurance company's out-of-state insurance policies in determining harm caused by defendant's unlawful actions).


94
No Alabama authority, it bears emphasisno statute, judicial decision, or trial judge instruction-ever countenanced the jury's multiplication of the $4,000 diminution in value estimated for each  refinished car by the number of such cars (approximately 1,000) shown to  have been sold nationwide.  The sole prompt to the jury to use  nationwide sales as a multiplier came from Gore's lawyer during  summation.  App. 31, Tr. 812-813.  Notably, counsel for BMW failed to  object to Gore's multiplication suggestion, even though BMW's counsel  interrupted to make unrelated objections four other times during Gore's  closing statement.  Tr. 810-811, 854-855, 858, 870-871.  Nor did BMW's  counsel request a charge instructing the jury not to consider  out-of-state sales in calculating the punitive damages award.  See  Record 513-529 (listing all charges requested by counsel).


95
Following the verdict, BMW's counsel challenged the admission of  the paint repair orders, but not, alternately, the jury's apparent use  of the orders in a multiplication exercise. Curiously, during  postverdict argument, BMW's counsel urged that if the repair orders were  indeed admissible, then Gore would have a "full right" to suggest a  multiplier-based disgorgement. Tr. 932.


96
In brief, Gore's case is idiosyncratic.  The jury's improper multiplication, tardily featured by petitioner, is unlikely to recur in  Alabama and does not call for error correction by this Court.


97
Because the jury apparently (and erroneously) had used acts in  other states as a multiplier to arrive at a $4 million sum for punitive  damages, the Alabama Supreme Court itself determined "'the maximum  amount that a properly functioning jury could have awarded.'"  646 So.  2d, at 630 (Houston, J., concurring specially) (quoting Big B, Inc. v.  Cottingham, 634 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. 1993)).  The per curiam opinion  emphasized that in arriving at $2 million as "the amount of punitive  damages to be awarded in this case, [the court did] not consider those  acts that occurred in other jurisdictions." 646 So. 2d, at 628 (emphasis  in original).  As this Court recognizes, the Alabama high court  "properly eschewed reliance on BMW's out-of-state conduct and based its  remitted award solely on conduct that occurred within Alabama."  Ante,  at 13 (citation omitted).  In sum, the Alabama Supreme Court left  standing the jury's decision that the facts warranted an award of  punitive damagesa determination not contested in this Court-and the  state court concluded that, considering only acts in Alabama, $2 million  was "a constitutionally reasonable punitive damages award."  646 So. 2d,  at 629.

II

98
* Alabama's Supreme Court reports that it "thoroughly and painstakingly" reviewed the jury's award, ibid., according to principles  set out in its own pathmarking decisions and in this Court's opinions in  TXO and Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 21 (1991).  646 So. 2d, at 621.  The Alabama court said it gave weight to several  factors, including BMW's deliberate ("reprehensible") presentation of  refinished cars as new and undamaged, without disclosing that the value  of those cars had been reduced by an estimated 10%,43 the financial position of the defendant, and the costs of litigation.  Id., at 625-626.  These standards, we previously held, "impos[e] a sufficiently  definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama  factfinders in awarding punitive damages."  Haslip, 499 U. S., at 22;  see also TXO, 509 U. S., at 462, n. 28.  Alabama's highest court could  have displayed its labor pains more visibly,44 but its judgment is  nonetheless entitled to a presumption of legitimacy.  See Rowan v.  Runnels, 5 How. 134, 139 (1847) ("[T]his court will always feel itself  bound to respect the decisions of the State courts, and from the time  they are made will regard them as conclusive in all cases upon the construction of their own constitution and laws.").


99
We accept, of course, that Alabama's Supreme Court applied the  State's own law correctly.  Under that law, the State's objectives-"punishment and deter-rence"-guide punitive damages awards.  See Birmingham v. Benson, 631 So. 2d 902, 904 (Ala. 1994).  Nor should  we be quick to find a constitutional infirmity when the highest state  court endeavored a corrective for one counsel's slip and the other's  oversight-counsel for plaintiff's excess in summation, unobjected to by  counsel for defendant, see supra, at 3-and when the state court did so  intending to follow the process approved in our Haslip and TXO  decisions.

B

100
The Court finds Alabama's $2 million award not simply excessive,  but grossly so, and therefore unconstitutional.  The decision leads us  further into territory traditionally within the States' domain,45 and  commits the Court, now and again, to correct "misapplication of a  properly stated rule of law."  But cf. S. Ct. Rule 10 ("A petition for a  writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of  erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated  rule of law.").46  The Court is not well equipped for this mission. Tellingly, the Court repeats that it brings to the task no "mathematical  formula," ante, at 22, no "categorical approach," ante, at 23, no  "bright line," ante, at 26.  It has only a vague concept of substantive  due process, a "raised eyebrow" test, see ante, at 23, as its ultimate  guide.47


101
In contrast to habeas corpus review under 28 U. S. C. Section(s)  2254, the Court will work at this business alone.  It will not be aided  by the federal district courts and courts of appeals.  It will be the  only federal court policing the area. The Court's readiness to  superintend state court punitive damages awards is all the more puzzling  in view of the Court's longstanding reluctance to countenance review,  even by courts of appeals, of the size of verdicts returned by juries in  federal district court proceedings.  See generally 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Section(s) 2820 (2d  ed. 1995).  And the reexamination prominent in state courts48 and in  legislative arenas, see Appendix, infra, at 9, serves to underscore why  the Court's enterprise is undue.


102
For the reasons stated, I dissent from this Court's disturbance  of the judgment the Alabama Supreme Court has made.


103
APPENDIX TO DISSENTING OPINION OF GINSBURG, J.


104
State Legislative Activity Regarding Punitive Damages


105
State legislatures have in the hopper or have enacted a variety  of measures to curtail awards of punitive damages.  At least one state  legislature has prohibited punitive damages altogether, unless  explicitly provided by statute.  See N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section(s)  507:16 (1994).  We set out in this appendix some of the several controls  enacted or under consideration in the States.  The measures surveyed  are: (1) caps on awards; (2) provisions for payment of sums to state  agencies rather than to plaintiffs; and (3) mandatory bifurcated trials with separate proceedings for punitive damages determinations.

I. Caps on Punitive Damages Awards

106
* Colorado-Colo. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 13-21-102(1)(a) and (3)  (1987) (as a main rule, caps punitive damages at amount of actual  damages).


107
* Connecticut-Conn. Gen. Stat. Section(s) 52-240b (1995) (caps  punitive damages zat twice compensatory damages in products liability  cases).


108
* Delaware-H. R. 237, 138th Gen. Ass. (introduced May 17, 1995)  (would cap punitive damages at greater of three times compensatory  damages, or $250,000).


109
* Florida-Fla. Stat. Section(s) 768.73(1)(a) and (b) (Supp. 1992) (in general, caps punitive damages at three times compensatory  damages).


110
* Georgia-Ga. Code Ann. Section(s) 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1995) (caps  punitive damages at $250,000 in some tort actions; prohibits multiple  awards stemming from the same predicate conduct in products liability  actions).


111
* Illinois-H. 20, 89th Gen. Ass. 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (enacted  Mar. 9, 1995) (caps punitive damages at three times economic damages).


112
* Indiana-H. 1741, 109th Reg. Sess. (enacted Apr. 26, 1995) (caps punitive damages at greater of three times compensatory damages,  or $50,000).


113
* Kansas-Kan. Stat. Ann. Section(s) 60-3701(e) and (f) (1994) (in general, caps punitive damages at lesser of defendant's annual gross  income, or $5 million).


114
* Maryland-S. 187, 1995 Leg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 27, 1995) (in general, would cap punitive damages at four times compensatory damages).


115
* Minnesota-S. 489, 79th Leg. Sess., 1995 Reg. Sess. (introduced  Feb. 16, 1995) (would require reasonable relationship between  compensatory and punitive damages).


116
* Nevada-Nev. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 42.005(1) (1993) (caps punitive damages at three times compensatory damages if compensatory  damages equal $100,000 or more, and at $300,000 if the compensatory  damages are less than $100,000).


117
* New Jersey-S. 1496, 206th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (1995) (caps punitive damages at greater of five times compensatory damages, or $350,000, in certain tort cases).


118
* North Dakota-N. D. Cent. Code Section(s) 32-03.2-11(4) (Supp.  1995) (caps punitive damages at greater of two times compensatory  damages, or $250,000).


119
* Oklahoma-Okla Stat., Tit. 23, Section(s) 9.1(B)-(D) (Supp. 1996) (caps punitive damages at greater of $100,000, or actual damages,  if jury finds defendant guilty of reckless disregard; and at greatest of  $500,000, twice actualdamages, or the benefit accruing to defendant from  the injury-causing conduct, if jury finds that defendant has acted  intentionally and maliciously).


120
* Texas-S. 25, 74th Reg. Sess. (enacted Apr. 20, 1995) (caps punitive damages at twice economic damages, plus up to $750,000 additional noneconomic damages).


121
* Virginia-Va. Code Ann. Section(s) 8.01-38.1 (1992) (caps punitive damages at $350,000).


122
II. Allocation of Punitive Damages to State Agencies


123
* Arizona-H. R. 2279, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan.  12, 1995) (would allocate punitive damages to a victims' assistance  fund, in specified circumstances).


124
* Florida-Fla. Stat. Section(s) 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1992) (allocates 35% of punitive damages to General Revenue Fund or Public  Medical Assistance Trust Fund); see Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033,  1035-1038 (Fla. App. 1991), aff'd, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (upholding  provision against due process challenge).


125
* Georgia-Ga. Code Ann. Section(s) 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1995)  (allocates 75% of punitive damages, less a proportionate part of  litigation costs, including counsel fees, to state treasury); see Mack  Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 540-543, 436 S. E. 2d 635, 637-639   (Ga. 1993) (upholding provision against constitutional challenge).


126
* Illinois-Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 735, Section(s) 5/2-1207 (1994)  (permits court to apportion punitive damages among plaintiff,  plaintiff's attorney, and Illinois Department of Rehabilitation  Services).


127
* Indiana-H. 1741, 109th Reg. Sess. (enacted Apr. 26, 1995) (subject to statutory exceptions, allocates 75% of punitive damages to a  compensation fund for violent crime victims).


128
* Iowa-Iowa Code Section(s) 668A.1(2)(b) (1987) (in described circumstances, allocates 75% of punitive damages, after payment of costs  and counsel fees, to a civil reparations trust fund); see Shepherd  Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., Inc., 473 N. W. 2d  612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (upholding provision against constitutional  challenge).


129
* Kansas-Kan. Stat. Ann. Section(s) 60-3402(e) (1994) (allocates  50% of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases to state treasury).


130
* Missouri-Mo. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 537.675 (1994) (allocates  50% of punitive damages, after payment of expenses and counsel fees, to  Tort Victims' Compensation Fund).


131
* Montana-H. 71, 54th Leg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 2, 1995) (would allocate 48% of punitive damages to state university system and  12% to school for the deaf and blind).


132
* New Jersey-S. 291, 206th Leg., 1994-1995 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 18, 1994); A. 148, 206th Leg., 1994-1995 1st Reg. Sess.  (introduced Jan. 11, 1994) (would allocate 75% of punitive damages to  New Jersey Health Care Trust Fund).


133
* New Mexico-H. 1017, 42d Leg., 1st Sess. (introduced Feb. 16,  1995) (would allocate punitive damages to Low-Income Attorney Services  Fund).


134
* Oregon-S. 482, 68th Leg. Ass. (enacted July 19, 1995) (amending Ore. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 18.540 and 30.925, and repealing  Ore. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 41.315) (allocates 60% of punitive damages to  Criminal Injuries Compensation Account).


135
* Utah-Utah Code Ann. Section(s) 78-18-1(3) (1992) (allocates 50% of punitive damages in excess of $20,000 to state treasury).


136
III. Mandatory Bifurcation of Liability and Punitive Damages Determinations


137
* California-Cal. Civ. Code Ann. Section(s) 3295(d) (West Supp.  1995) (requires bifurcation, on application of defendant, of liability  and damages phases of trials in which punitive damages are requested).


138
* Delaware-H. R. 237, 138th Gen. Ass. (introduced May 17, 1995)  (would require, at request of any party, a separate proceeding for  determination of punitive damages).


139
* Georgia-Ga. Code Ann. Section(s) 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1995) (in  all cases in which punitive damages are claimed, liability for punitive  damages is tried first, then amount of punitive damages).


140
* Illinois-H. 20, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (enacted Mar. 9, 1995) (mandates, upon defendant's request, separate  proceeding for determination of punitive damages).


141
* Kansas-Kan. Stat. Ann. Section(s) 60-3701(a)-(b) (1994) (trier  of fact determines defendant's liability for punitive damages, then  court determines amount of such damages).


142
* Missouri-Mo. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 510.263(1) and (3) (1994)  (mandates bifurcated proceedings, on request of any party, for jury to  determine first whether defendant is liable for punitive damages, then  amount of punitive damages).


143
* Montana-Mont. Code Ann. Section(s) 27-1-221(7) (1995) (upon finding defendant liable for punitive damages, jury determines the  amount in separate proceeding).


144
* Nevada-Nev. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 42.005(3) (1993) (if jury determines that punitive damages will be awarded, jury then determines  amount in separate proceeding).


145
* New Jersey-N. J. Stat. Ann. Section(s) 2A:58C-5(b) and (d) (West 1987) (mandates separate proceedings for determination of compensatory and punitive damages).


146
* North Dakota-N. D. Cent. Code Section(s) 32.03.2-11(2) (Supp.  1995) (upon request of either party, trier of fact determines whether  compensatory damages will be awarded before determining punitive damages  liability and amount).


147
* Ohio-Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section(s) 2315.21(C)(2) (1995) (if  trier of fact determines that defendant is liable for punitive damages,  court determines the amount of those damages).


148
* Oklahoma-Okla. Stat., Tit. 23, Section(s) 9.1(B)-(D) (Supp. 1995-1996) (requires separate jury proceedings for punitive damages); S.  443, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 31, 1995) (would require  courts to strike requests for punitive damages before trial, unless  plaintiff presents prima facie evidence at least 30 days before trial to  sustain such damages; provide for bifurcated jury trial on request of  defendant; and permit punitive damages only if compensatory damages are awarded).


149
* Virginia-H. 1070, 1994-1995 Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 25, 1994) (would require separate proceedings in which court determines that  punitive damages are appropriate and trier of fact determines amount of  punitive damages).



1
 The top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of Dr. Gore's car were repainted at BMW's vehicle preparation center in Brunswick, Georgia.  The parties presumed that the damage was caused by exposure to  acid rain during transit between the manufacturing plant in Germany and  the preparation center.


2
 Dr. Gore also named the German manufacturer and the  Birmingham dealership as defendants.


3
 Alabama codified its common-law cause of action for fraud  in a 1907 statute that is still in effect.  Hackmeyer v. Hackmeyer, 268 Ala. 329, 333, 106 So. 2d 245, 249 (Ala. 1958).  The statute provides:  "Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation  to communicate constitutes fraud.  The obligation to communicate may  arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the  particular circumstances of the case."  Ala. Code Section(s) 6-5-102   (1993); see Ala. Code Section(s) 4299 (1907).


4
 The dealer who testified to the reduction in value is the former owner of the Birmingham dealership sued in this action.  He sold  the dealership approximately one year before the trial.


5
 Dr. Gore did not explain the significance of the $300  cut-off.


6
 The jury also found the Birmingham dealership liable for  Dr. Gore's compensatory damages and the German manufacturer liable for both the compensatory and punitive damages.  The dealership did not  appeal the judgment against it.  The Alabama Supreme Court held that the  trial court did not have jurisdiction over the German manufacturer and  therefore reversed the judgment against that defendant.


7
 BMW acknowledged that a Georgia statute enacted after Dr.  Gore purchased his car would require disclosure of similar repairs to a car before it was sold in Georgia.  Ga. Code Ann. Section(s) 40-1-5(b)-(e) (1994).


8
 While awarding a comparable amount of compensatory damages, the Yates jury awarded no punitive damages at all.  In Yates, the plaintiff also relied on the 1983 nondisclosure policy, but instead of  offering evidence of 983 repairs costing more than $300 each, he  introduced a bulk exhibit containing 5,856 repair bills to show that  petitioner had sold over 5,800 new BMW vehicles without disclosing that  they had been repaired.


9
 Prior to the lawsuits filed by Dr. Yates and Dr. Gore, BMW  and various BMW dealers had been sued 14 times concerning presale paint  or damage repair.  According to the testimony of BMW's in-house counsel  at the postjudgment hearing on damages, only one of the suits concerned  a car repainted by BMW.


10
 The Alabama Supreme Court did not indicate whether the $2 million figure represented the court's independent assessment of the  appropriate level of punitive damages, or its determination of the  maximum amount that the jury could have awarded consistent with the Due  Process Clause.


11
 Other than Yates v. BMW of North America, Inc., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993), in which no punitive damages were awarded, the Alabama  Supreme Court cited no such cases.  In another portion of its opinion,  646 So. 2d, at 629, the court did cite five Alabama cases, none of which  involved either a dispute arising out of the purchase of an automobile  or an award of punitive damages.  G. M. Mosley Contractors, Inc. v.  Phillips, 487 So. 2d 876, 879 (Ala. 1986); Hollis v. Wyrosdick, 508 So.  2d 704 (Ala. 1987); Campbell v. Burns, 512 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (Ala.  1987); Ashbee v. Brock, 510 So. 2d 214 (Ala. 1987); and Jawad v.  Granade, 497 So. 2d 471 (Ala. 1986).  All of these cases support the  proposition that appellate courts in Alabama presume that jury verdicts  are correct.  In light of the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that (1) the jury had computed its award by multiplying $4,000 by the number  of refinished vehicles sold in the United States and (2) that the award  should have been based on Alabama conduct, respect for the error-free  portion of the jury verdict would seem to produce an award of $56,000   ($4,000 multiplied by 14, the number of repainted vehicles sold in  Alabama).


12
 See, e.g., Rivers v. BMW of North America, Inc., 214 Ga.  App. 880, 449 S. E. 2d 337 (1994) (nondisclosure of presale paint repairs that occurred before state disclosure statute enacted); Wedmore  v. Jordan Motors, Inc., 589 N. E. 2d 1180 (Ind. App. 1992) (same).


13
 Four States require disclosure of vehicle repairs costing more than 3 percent of suggested retail price.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.  Section(s) 28-1304.03 (1989); N. C. Gen. Stat. Section(s) 20-305.1(d)(5a) (1995); S. C. Code Section(s) 56-32-20 (Supp. 1995); Va.  Code Ann. Section(s) 46.2-1571(D) (Supp. 1995).  An additional three  States mandate disclosure when the cost of repairs exceeds 3 percent or  $500, whichever is greater.  Ala. Code Section(s) 8-19-5(22)(c) (1993);  Cal. Veh. Code Ann. Section(s) 9990-9991 (West Supp. 1996); Okla. Stat.,  Tit. 47, Section(s) 1112.1 (1991).  Indiana imposes a 4 percent  disclosure threshold.  Ind. Code Section(s) 9-23-4-4, 9-23-4-5 (1993). Minnesota requires disclosure of repairs costing more than 4 percent of  suggested retail price or $500, whichever is greater. Minn. Stat.  Section(s) 325F.664 (1994).  New York requires disclosure when the cost  of repairs exceeds 5 percent of suggested retail price.  N. Y. Gen. Bus.  Law Section(s) 396-p(5)(a), (d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).  Vermont imposes  a 5 percent disclosure threshold for the first $10,000 in repair costs and 2 percent thereafter.  Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9, Section(s) 4087(d)  (1993).  Eleven States mandate disclosure only of damage costing more  than 6 percent of retail value to repair.  Ark. Code Ann. Section(s)  23-112-705 (1992); Idaho Code Section(s) 49-1624 (1994); Ill. Comp.  Stat., ch. 815, Section(s) 710/5 (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section(s)  190.0491(5) (Baldwin 1988); La. Rev. Stat. Ann Section(s) 32:1260 (Supp.  1995); Miss. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, Regulation No. 1 (1992); N. H. Rev.  Stat. Ann. Section(s) 357-C:5(III)(d) (1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.  Section(s) 4517.61 (1994); R. I. Gen. Laws Section(s) 31-5.1-18(d), (f)  (1995); Wis. Stat. Section(s) 218.01(2d)(a) (1994); Wyo. Stat.  Section(s) 31-16-115 (1994).  Two States require disclosure of repairs costing $3,000 or more.  See Iowa Code Ann. Section(s) 321.69 (Supp.  1996); N. D. Admin. Code Section(s) 37-09-01-01 (1992). Georgia  mandates disclosure of paint damage that costs more than $500 to repair.  Ga. Code Ann. Section(s) 40-1-5(b)-(e) (1994) (enacted after respondent  purchased his car). Florida requires dealers to disclose paint repair  costing more than $100 of which they have actual knowledge.  Fla. Stat.  Section(s) 320.27(9)(n) (1992). Oregon requires manufacturers to  disclose all "post-manufacturing" damage and repairs.  It is unclear  whether this mandate would apply to repairs such as those at issue here. Ore. Rev. Stat. Section(s) 650.155 (1991).
Many, but not all, of the statutes exclude from the computation of repair cost the value of certain components-typically items such as  glass, tires, wheels and bumpers-when they are replaced with identical  manufacturer's original equipment.  E.g., Cal. Veh. Code Ann. Section(s)  9990-9991 (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. Section(s) 40-1-5(b)-(e)  (1994); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 815, Section(s) 710/5 (1994); Ky. Rev.  Stat. Ann. Section(s) 190.0491(5) (Baldwin 1988); Okla. Stat., Tit. 47,  Section(s) 1112.1 (1991); Va. Code Ann. Section(s) 46.2-1571(D) (Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9, Section(s) 4087(d) (1993).


14
 Also, a state legislature might plausibly conclude that  the administrative costs associated with full disclosure would have the  effect of raising car prices to the State's residents.


15
 Federal disclosure requirements are, of course, a familiar part of our law.  See, e.g., the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,  as added by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 104 Stat.  2353, 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 343; the Truth In Lending Act, 82 Stat.  148, as amended, 15 U. S. C. Section(s) 1604; the Securities and  Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 892, 894, as amended, 15 U. S. C.  Section(s) 78l-78m; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 79  Stat. 283, as amended, 15 U. S. C. Section(s) 1333; Alcoholic Beverage  Labeling Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4519, 27 U. S. C. Section(s) 215.


16
 See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 824 (1975)  ("A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its  own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State"); New York  Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be  impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the  jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the  constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within  the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which  the Government under the Constitution depends.  This is so obviously the  necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in question and hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound");  Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 669 (1892) ("Laws have no force of  themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and  can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States").


17
 State power may be exercised as much by a jury's  application of a state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.  See New York Co. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 265 (1964) ("The test  is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the  form, whether such power has in fact been exercised"); San Diego  Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 247 (1959)  ("regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages  as through some form of preventive relief").


18
 Brief for Respondent 11-12, 23, 27-28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 50-54. Dr. Gore's interest in altering the nationwide policy stems from  his concern that BMW would not (or could not) discontinue the policy in  Alabama alone.  Id., at 11.  "If Alabama were limited to imposing  punitive damages based only on BMW's gain from fraudulent sales in  Alabama, the resulting award would have no prospect of protecting  Alabama consumers from fraud, as it would provide no incentive for BMW  to alter the unitary, national policy of nondisclosure which yielded BMW  millions of dollars in profits."  Id., at 23.  The record discloses no  basis for Dr. Gore's contention that BMW could not comply with Alabama's  law without changing its nationwide policy.


19
 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 363 (1978) ("To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to  do is a due process violation of the most basic sort"). Our cases  concerning recidivist statutes are not to the contrary. Habitual  offender statutes permit the sentencing court to enhance a defendant's  punishment for a crime in light of prior convictions, including  convictions in foreign jurisdictions.  See e.g., Ala. Code Section(s)  13A-5-9 (1994); Cal. Penal Code Ann. Section(s) 667.5(f), 668 (West  Supp. 1996); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, Section(s) 5/33B-1 (1994); N. Y.  Penal Law Section(s) 70.04, 70.06, 70.08, 70.10 (McKinney 1987 and Supp.  1996); Tex. Penal Code Ann. Section(s) 12.42 (1994 and Supp. 1995-1996).  A sentencing judge may even consider past criminal behavior which did  not result in a conviction and lawful conduct that bears on the  defendant's character and prospects for rehabilitation. Williams v. New  York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949).  But we have never held that a sentencing  court could properly punish lawful conduct.  This distinction is  precisely the one we draw here. See n. 21, infra.


20
 Given that the verdict was based in part on out-of-state conduct that was lawful where it occurred, we need not consider whether  one State may properly attempt to change a tortfeasors' unlawful conduct  in another State.


21
 Of course, the fact that the Alabama Supreme Court  correctly concluded that it was error for the jury to use the number of sales in other States as a multiplier in computing the amount of its  punitive sanction does not mean that evidence describing out-of-state  transactions is irrelevant in a case of this kind. To the contrary, as  we stated in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S.  443, 462, n. 28 (1993), and discuss more fully infra, at 16-19, such  evidence is relevant to the determination of the degree of  reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.


22
 See Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423 (1987) (Ex Post Facto Clause violated by retroactive imposition of revised sentencing guidelines that provided longer sentence for defendant's crime); Bouie  v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964) (retroactive application of  new construction of statute violated due process); id., at 350-355   (citing cases); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U. S. 110 (1991) (due process  violated because defendant and his counsel did not have adequate notice  that judge might impose death sentence).  The strict constitutional  safeguards afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil  cases, but the basic protection against "judgments without notice"  afforded by the Due Process Clause, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186,  217 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), is implicated by civil  penalties.


23
 "The flagrancy of the misconduct is thought to be the  primary consideration in determining the amount of punitive damages." Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39  Vill. L. Rev. 363, 387 (1994).


24
 The principle that punishment should fit the crime "is  deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence." Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 284 (1983).  See Burkett v. Lanata, 15 La.  Ann. 337, 339 (1860) (punitive damages should be "commensurate to the  nature of the offence"); Blanchard v. Morris, 15 Ill. 35, 36 (1853)  ("[W]e cannot say [the exemplary damages] are excessive under the  circumstances; for the proofs show that threats, violence, and  imprisonment, were accompanied by mental fear, torture, and agony of  mind"); Louisville & Northern R. Co. v. Brown, 127 Ky. 732, 749, 106 S.  W. 795, 799 (1908) ("We are not aware of any case in which the court has sustained a verdict as large as this one unless the injuries were permanent").


25
 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 22 (1991).


26
 The dissenters also recognized that "TXO's conduct was clearly wrongful, calculated, and improper . . . ."  TXO, 509 U. S., at  482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).


27
 In Jeter v. M & M Dodge, Inc., 634 So. 2d 1383 (La. App. 1994), a Louisiana court of appeals suggested that the Louisiana disclosure statute functions as a safe harbor.  Finding that the cost of  repairing presale damage to the plaintiff's car exceeded the statutory  disclosure threshold, the court held that the disclosure statute did not  provide a defense to the action.  Id., at 1384.
During the pendency of this litigation, Alabama enacted a disclosure statute which defines "material" damage to a new car as damage requiring repairs costing in excess of 3 percent of suggested  retail price or $500, whichever is greater.  Ala. Code Section(s)  8-19-5(22) (1993).  After its decision in this case, the Alabama Supreme  Court stated in dicta that the remedies available under this section of  its Deceptive Trade Practices Act did not displace or alter pre-existing  remedies available under either the common law or other statutes.  Hines  v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 655 So. 2d 909, 917, n. 2 (Ala.  1994).  It refused, however, to "recognize, or impose on automobile manufacturers, a general duty to disclose every repair of damage, however slight, incurred during the manufacturing process."  Id., at  921.  Instead, it held that whether a defendant has a duty to disclose  is a question of fact "for the jury to determine."  Id., at 918.  In  reaching that conclusion it overruled two earlier decisions that seemed  to indicate that as a matter of law there was no disclosure obligation  in cases comparable to this one. Id., at 920 (overruling Century  21-Reeves Realty, Inc. v. McConnell Cadillac, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1273   (Ala. 1993), and Cobb v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., 569 So. 2d  395 (Ala. 1990)).


28
 See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section(s) 28-1304.03   (1989) ("[I]f disclosure is not required under this section, a purchaser may not revoke or rescind a sales contract due solely to the fact that  the new motor vehicle was damaged and repaired prior to completion of  the sale"); Ind. Code Section(s) 9-23-4-5 (1993) (providing that  "[r]epaired damage to a customer-ordered new motor vehicle not exceeding  four percent (4%) of the manufacturer's suggested retail price does not  need to be disclosed at the time of sale"); N. C. Gen. Stat. Section(s) 20-305.1(e) (1993) (requiring disclosure of repairs costing more than 5  percent of suggested retail price and prohibiting revocation or  rescission of sales contract on the basis of less costly repairs); Okla.  Stat., Tit. 47, Section(s) 1112.1 (1991) (defining "material" damage to  a car as damage requiring repairs costing in excess of 3 percent of  suggested retail price or $500, whichever is greater).


29
 Restatement (Second) of Torts Section(s) 538 (1977); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of  Torts Section(s) 108 (5th ed. 1984).


30
 The Alabama Supreme Court has held that a car may be considered "new" as a matter of law even if its finish contains minor  cosmetic flaws.  Wilburn v. Larry Savage Chevrolet, Inc., 477 So. 2d 384   (Ala. 1985).  We note also that at trial respondent only introduced  evidence of undisclosed paint damage to new cars repaired at a cost of  $300 or more.  This decision suggests that respondent believed that the  jury might consider some repairs too de minimis to warrant disclosure.


31
 Before the verdict in this case, BMW had changed its  policy with respect to Alabama and two other States.   Five days after the jury award, BMW altered its nationwide policy to one of full disclosure.


32
 See, e.g., Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447, 448 (1852) ("[E]xemplary damages allowed should bear some proportion to the real  damage sustained"); Saunders v. Mullen, 66 Iowa 728, 729, 24 N. W. 529   (1885) ("When the actual damages are so small, the amount allowed as  exemplary damages should not be so large"); Flannery v. Baltimore & Ohio  R. Co., 15 D. C. 111, 125 (1885) (when punitive damages award "is out of  all proportion to the injuries received, we feel it our duty to  interfere"); Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Nichols, 9 Am. & Eng. R.  R. Cas. 361, 365 (Tex. 1882) ("Exemplary damages, when allowed, should  bear proportion to the actual damages sustained"); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90, 91-92 (1875) (punitive damages "enormously in excess of  what may justly be regarded as compensation" for the injury must be set  aside "to prevent injustice").


33
 Owen, supra n. 23, at 368, and n. 23.  One English  statute, for example, provides that officers arresting persons out of their jurisdiction shall pay double damages.  3 Edw., I., ch. 35. Another directs that in an action for forcible entry or detainer, the  plaintiff shall recover treble damages.  8 Hen. VI, ch. 9, Section(s) 6.
Present-day federal law allows or mandates imposition of multiple damages for a wide assortment of offenses, including violations  of the antitrust laws, see Section(s) 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.  731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. Section(s) 15, and the Racketeer Influenced  and Corrupt Organizations Act, see 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 1964, and  certain breaches of the trademark laws, see Section(s) 35 of the  Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 439, as amended, 15 U. S. C. Section(s)  1117, and the patent laws, see 66 Stat. 813, 35 U. S. C. Section(s) 284.


34
 "While petitioner stresses the shocking disparity between  the punitive award and the compensatory award, that shock dissipates when one considers the potential loss to respondents, in terms of reduced or eliminated royalties payments, had petitioner succeeded in  its illicit scheme.  Thus, even if the actual value of the `potential  harm' to respondents is not between $5 million and $8.3 million, but is  closer to $4 million, or $2 million, or even $1 million, the disparity  between the punitive award and the potential harm does not, in our view,  `jar one's constitutional sensibilities.'"  TXO, 509 U. S., at 462,  quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S., at 18.


35
 Even assuming each repainted BMW suffers a diminution in value of approximately $4,000, the award is 35 times greater than the  total damages of all 14 Alabama consumers who purchased repainted BMW's.


36
 The ratio here is also dramatically greater than any award that would be permissible under the statutes and proposed statutes summarized in the appendix to Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion.  Post, at 9-11.


37
 Conceivably the Alabama Supreme Court's selection of a 500  to 1 ratio was an application of Justice Scalia's identification of one  possible reading of the plurality opinion in TXO: any future due process  challenge to a punitive damages award could be disposed of with the  simple observation that "this is no worse than TXO."  509 U. S., at 472   (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  As we explain in the text, this  award is significantly worse than the award in TXO.


38
 Although the Court did not address the size of the  punitive damages award in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 (1984), the dissenters commented on its excessive character, noting that  the "$10 million [punitive damages award] that the jury imposed is 100  times greater than the maximum fine that may be imposed . . . for a  single violation of federal standards" and "more than 10 times greater  than the largest single fine that the Commission has ever imposed."  Id., at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  In New York Times Co. v.  Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), the Court observed that the punitive  award for libel was "one thousand times greater than the maximum fine  provided by the Alabama criminal statute," and concluded that the "fear  of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under  a criminal statute."  Id., at 277.


39
 Ala. Code Section(s) 8-19-11(b) (1993).


40
 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. Section(s) 23-112-309(b) (1992)  (up to $5,000 for violation of state Motor Vehicle Commission Act that would allow suspension of dealer's license; up to $10,000 for violation  of Act that would allow revocation of dealer's license); Fla. Stat.  Section(s) 320.27(12) (1992) (up to $1,000); Ga. Code Ann. Section(s)  40-1-5(g), 10-1-397(a) (1994 and Supp. 1996) (up to $2,000  administratively; up to $5,000 in superior court); Ind. Code Ann.  Section(s) 9-23-6-4 (1993) ($50 to $1,000); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.  Section(s) 357-C:15, 651:2 (1995 and Supp. 1995) (corporate fine of up  to $20,000); N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section(s) 396-p(6) (McKinney Supp.  1995) ($50 for first offense; $250 for subsequent offenses).


41
 Justice Ginsburg expresses concern that we are "the only federal court policing" this limit.  Post, at 7.  The small number of  punitive damages questions that we have reviewed in recent years,  together with the fact that this is the first case in decades in which  we have found that a punitive damages award exceeds the constitutional  limit, indicates that this concern is at best premature.  In any event,  this consideration surely does not justify an abdication of our  responsibility to enforce constitutional protections in an extraordinary  case such as this one.


42
 The Alabama Supreme Court said:
"[W]e must conclude that the award of punitive damages was based in large part on conduct that happened in other jurisdictions. . . .  Although evidence of similar acts in other jurisdictions is admissible  as to the issue of `pattern and practice' of such acts, . . . this jury  could not use the number of similar acts that a defendant has committed  in other jurisdictions as a multiplier when determining the dollar  amount of a punitive damages award.  Such evidence may not be considered  in setting the size of the civil penalty, because neither the jury nor  the trial court had evidence before it showing in which states the conduct was wrongful."  646 So. 2d 619, 627 (1994).


43
 According to trial testimony, in late May 1992, BMW began redirecting refinished cars out of Alabama and two other States. Tr.  964.  The jury returned its verdict in favor of Gore on June 12, 1992.  Five days later, BMW changed its national policy to one of full  disclosure.  Id., at 1026.


44
 See, e.g., Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, et al. as Amici Curiae 6-28 (economic analysis demonstrates that Alabama Supreme  Court's judgment was not unreasonable); W. Landes & R. Posner, Economic  Structure of Tort Law 160-163 (1987) (economic model for assessing  propriety of punitive damages in certain tort cases).


45
 See ante, at 7 ("In our federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any  particular case."); Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco  Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 278 (1989) (In any "lawsuit where state  law provides the basis of decision, the propriety of an award of  punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the jury  may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law.");  Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 255 (1984) ("Punitive  damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law.").


46
 Petitioner invites the Court to address the question of multiple punitive damages awards stemming from the same alleged misconduct.  The Court does not take up the invitation, and rightly so,  in my judgment, for this case does not present the issue.  For three  reasons, the question of multiple awards is hypothetical, not real, in  Gore's case. First, the punitive damages award in favor of Gore is the  only such award yet entered against BMW on account of its nondisclosure policy.
Second, BMW did not raise the issue of multiple punitives below. Indeed, in its reply brief before the Alabama Supreme Court, BMW stated:  "Gore confuses our point about fairness among plaintiffs. He treats  this point as a premature `multiple punitive damages' argument.  But,  contrary to Gore's assertion, we are not asking this Court to hold, as a  matter of law, that a `constitutional violation occurs when a defendant  is subjected to punitive damages in two separate cases.'"  Reply Brief  for Appellant in Nos. 1920324, 1920325 (Ala. Sup. Ct.), p. 48 (internal  citations omitted).
Third, if BMW had already suffered a punitive damages judgment in connection with its nondisclosure policy, Alabama's highest court  presumably would have taken that fact into consideration. In reviewing  punitive damages awards attacked as excessive, the Alabama Supreme Court  considers whether "there have been other civil actions against the same  defendant, based on the same conduct." 646 So. 2d 619, 624 (1994)  (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 224 (Ala. 1989)).  If  so, "this should be taken into account in mitigation of the punitive  damages award."  Ibid.  The Alabama court accordingly observed that Gore's counsel had filed 24 other actions against BMW in Alabama and  Georgia, but that no other punitive damages award had so far resulted.  Id., at 626.


47
 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion offers nothing more solid. Under Haslip, he acknowledges, Alabama's standards for punitive  damages, standing alone, do not violate due process. Ante, at 3.  But  they "invit[e] the kind of scrutiny the Court has given the particular  verdict before us."  Ibid.  Pursuing that invitation, Justice Breyer  concludes that, matching the particular facts of this case to Alabama's  "legitimate punitive damages objectives," ante, at 12, the award was  "grossly excessive."  Ibid.  The exercise is engaging, but ultimately tells us only this: too big will be judged unfair.  What is the Court's  measure of too big?  Not a cap of the kind a legislature could order, or  a mathematical test this Court can divine and impose.  Too big is, in  the end, the amount at which five Members of the Court bridle.


48
 See, e.g., Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox,  232 Neb. 846, 857, 443 N. W. 2d 566, 574 (1989) (per curiam) ("[P]unitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages contravene Neb. Const.  art. VII, Section(s) 5, and thus are not allowed in this jurisdiction."); Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester, 398 Mass.  862, 502 N. E. 2d 132 (1986) (punitive damages are not permitted, unless  expressly authorized by statute); Fisher Properties, Inc. v.  Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 826, 852, 726 P. 2d 8, 23 (1986) (en  banc) (same).
In Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, No. 1940357 (Nov. 17, 1995), the Alabama Supreme Court revised the State's regime for assessments of punitive damages.  Henceforth, trials will be bifurcated.  Initially, juries will be instructed to determine liability and the  amount of compensatory damages, if any; also, the jury is to return a  special verdict on the question whether a punitive damages award is  warranted. If the jury answers yes to the punitive damages question, the  trial will be resumed for the presentation of evidence and instructions  relevant to the amount appropriate to award as punitive damages.After  postverdict trial court review and subsequent appellate review, the  amount of the final punitive damages judgment will be paid into the  trial court.  The trial court will then order payment of litigation  expenses, including the plaintiff's attorney fees, and instruct the  clerk to divide the remainder equally between the plaintiff and the  State General Fund.  The provision for payment to the State General Fund  is applicable to all judgments not yet satisfied, and therefore would  apply to the judgment in Gore's case.


