518 U.S. 187116 S.Ct. 2092135 L.Ed.2d 486
LANEv.PENA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
No. 95-365.
Argued April 15, 1996
Decided June 20, 1996

Syllabus
Respondents terminated petitioner Lane's enrollment at the United States  Merchant Marine Academy on the ground that his recently diagnosed  diabetes mellitus rendered him ineligible to be commissioned for service  in the Navy/Merchant Marine Reserve Program or as a Naval Reserve  Officer.  Alleging that his separation from the Academy violated  Section(s) 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973-which prohibits,  among other things, discrimination on the basis of disability "under any  program or activity conducted by any Executive agency"-Lane brought this suit seeking reinstatement to the Academy, compensatory damages, and  other remedies.  The District Court ordered him reinstated, but  ultimately ruled that he must be denied compensatory damages because  Congress has not waived the Federal Government's sovereign immunity  against monetary damages awards for Section(s) 504(a) violations.  The  Court of Appeals summarily affirmed.
Held:  Congress has not waived the Government's sovereign immunity  against monetary damages awards for Section(s) 504(a) violations.  Pp.  3-12.
(a) The requisite "unequivocal expression" of congressional intent to  grant such a waiver, see, e.g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,  498 U. S. 89, 95, is lacking in the text of Section(s) 505(a)(2), which  decrees that the remedies available for violations of Title VI of the  Civil Rights Act of 1964-including monetary damages awards, see, e.g.,  Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 70-apply also  to Section(s) 504(a) violations "by any . . . Federal provider of [financial] assistance."  This provision makes no mention whatsoever of  "program[s] or activit[ies] conducted by any Executive agency," the  plainly more far-reaching language Congress employed in Section(s)  504(a) itself.  The lack of the necessary clarity of expression in  Section(s) 505(a)(2) is underscored by the precision with which Congress  has waived the Government's sovereign immunity in Section(s) 501 and  505(a)(1) of the Act and in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  Lane's contention that the larger statutory scheme indicates congressional  intent to "level the playing field" by subjecting the Government to the  same remedies as any and all other Section(s) 504(a) defendants is  rejected.  Franklin, supra, at 69-71, distinguished.  Pp. 3-10.
(b) The "equalization" provision of Section(s) 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986-which, after waiving the States'  Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal-court suit for violations of  Section(s) 504 and other civil rights statutes, specifies that legal and  equitable remedies are available in such a suit "to the same extent as  . . . in the suit against any public or private entity other than a  State"-does not reveal congressional intent to equalize the remedies  available against all defendants for Section(s) 504(a) violations, such  that federal agencies, like private entities, must be subject to monetary damages.  Although Lane's argument to this effect is not without force, it is ultimately defeated by the existence of at least  two other conceivable, if not entirely satisfactory, interpretations of  the equalization provision: (1) that "public . . . entit[ies]" refers to  the nonfederal public entities receiving federal financial assistance  that are covered by each of the referenced federal statutes; and (2)  that "public or private entit[ies]" is meant only to subject the States  to the scope of remedies available against either public or private Section(s) 504 defendants, whatever the lesser (or perhaps the greater)  of those remedies might be.  Pp. 10-12.
Affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.  J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.  Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in  the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are  requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the  United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other  formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the  preliminary print goes to press.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355,  29 U. S. C. Section(s) 791 et seq. (Act), prohibits, among other things,  discrimination on the basis of disability "under any program or activity  conducted by any Executive agency."  29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794(a) (1988  ed., Supp. V).  The question presented in this case is whether Congress  has waived the Federal Government's sovereign immunity against awards of  monetary damages for violations of this provision.

I.

2
The United States Merchant Marine Academy is a federal service  academy that trains students to serve as commercial merchant marine  officers and as commissioned officers in the United States armed forces.  The Academy is administered by the Maritime Administration, an  organization within the Department of Transportation.  Petitioner James  Griffin Lane entered the Academy as a first-year student in July 1991  after meeting the Academy's requirements for appointment, including  passing a physical examination conducted by the Department of Defense. During his first year at the Academy, however, Lane was diagnosed by a  private physician as having diabetes mellitus.  Lane reported the  diagnosis to the Academy's Chief Medical Officer. The Academy's  Physical Examination Review Board conducted a hearing in September 1992  to determine Lane's "medical suitability" to continue at the Academy,  following which the Board reported to the Superintendent of the Academy  that Lane suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes.


3
In December 1992, Lane was separated from the Academy on the ground that his diabetes was a "disqualifying condition," rendering him  ineligible to be commissioned for service in the Navy/Merchant Marine  Reserve Program or as a Naval Reserve Officer.  After unsuccessfully  challenging his separation before the Maritime Administrator, Lane  brought suit in federal district court against the Secretary of the  Department of Transportation and other defendants, alleging that his  separation from the Academy violated Section(s) 504(a) of the  Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794(a).  He sought  reinstatement to the Academy, compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and  costs.


4
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lane, concluding that his separation from the Academy solely on  the basis of  his diabetes violated the Act.  The court ordered Lane reinstated to the  Academy, and the Government did not dispute the propriety of this  injunctive relief.  The Government did, however, dispute the propriety  of a compensatory damages award, claiming that the United States was  protected against a damages suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The District Court disagreed; it ruled that Lane was entitled to a compensatory damages award against the Government for its violation of  Section(s) 504(a), but deferred resolution of the specific amount of  damages due.


5
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in Dorsey v. United States Dept. of  Labor, 41 F. 3d 1551 (1994), that the Act did not waive the Federal  Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages for violations  of Section(s) 504(a). The court denied compensatory damages based on the  absence, in any statutory text, of an "unequivocal expression" of  congressional intent to  waive the Government's immunity as to monetary  damages, and this Court's instruction that waivers of sovereign immunity  may not be implied, see, e.g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,   498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990).


6
In light of Dorsey, the District Court vacated its prior order  to the extent that it awarded damages to Lane and held that Lane was not  entitled to a compensatory damages award against the Federal Government.  Lane appealed.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia  Circuit first rejected Lane's request for initial en banc review to  reconsider Dorsey,  then granted the Government's motion for summary  affirmance.  We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. ___ (1996), to resolve the  disagreement in the Courts of Appeals on the important question whether  Congress has waived the Federal Government's immunity against monetary damages awards for violations of Section(s) 504(a) of the Rehabilitation  Act. Compare, e.g., Dorsey, supra,  at 1554-1555, with J. L. v. Social  Security Admin., 971 F. 2d 260 (CA9 1992), and Doe v. Attorney General,  941 F. 2d 780 (CA9  1991).

II.
Section 504(a) of the Act provides that

7
"[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the      United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his      disability, be  excluded from the participation in, be denied      the benefits of, or be  subjected to discrimination under any      program or activity receiving  Federal financial assistance      or under any program or activity conducted  by any Executive      agency or by the United States Postal      Service."  29 U.  S. C. Section(s) 794(a).


8
Section 505(a)(2) of the Act describes the remedies available for a violation of Section(s) 504(a): "The remedies, procedures, and  rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be  available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any  recipient of Federal assistance or  Federal provider of such assistance  under [Section(s) 504]." Section(s) 794a(a)(2).  Because Title VI  provides for monetary damages awards, see Franklin v. Gwinnett County  Public Schools,  503 U. S. 60, 70 (1992) (noting that "a clear majority"  of the Court confirmed in Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New   York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983), that damages are available under Title VI for intentional violations thereof), Lane reads Section(s) 504(a) and  505(a)(2) together to establish a waiver of the Federal Government's  sovereign immunity against monetary  damages awards for violations of  Section(s) 504(a) committed by executive agencies.


9
While Lane's analysis has superficial appeal, it overlooks one  critical requirement firmly grounded in our precedents: A waiver of the  Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed  in statutory text, see, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503  U. S. 30, 33-34, 37 (1992), and will not be implied, Irwin v. Department  of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990).  Moreover, a waiver of the  Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of  its scope, in favor of the sovereign.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op.,  at 4) (when confronted  with a purported waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity,  the Court will "constru[e] ambiguities in favor of immunity"); Library  of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 318 (1986); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453  U. S. 156, 161 (1981) ("limitations and conditions upon which the  Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions  thereto are not to be implied").  To sustain a claim  that the Government  is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims. Nordic Village, 503 U. S., at 34.  A statute's legislative history cannot  supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text; "the  `unequivocal expression' of elimination of sovereign immunity that we  insist  upon is an expression in statutory text."  Id., at 37.


10
The clarity of expression necessary to establish a waiver of the  Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages for violations  of Section(s) 504 is lacking in the text of the relevant provisions.  The language of Section(s) 505(a)(2), the remedies provision, is  telling.  In that section, Congress decreed that the remedies available  for violations of Title VI would be similarly available for violations  of Section(s) 504(a) "by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal  provider of such assistance."  29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794a(a)(2).  This provision makes no mention whatsoever of "program[s] or activit[ies]  conducted by any Executive agency," the plainly more far-reaching  language Congress employed in Section(s) 504(a) itself. Whatever might  be said about the somewhat curious structure of the liability and remedy  provisions, it cannot be disputed that a reference to "federal  provider[s]" of financial assistance in Section(s) 505(a)(2) does not,  without more, establish that Congress has waived the Federal  Government's immunity against monetary damages awards beyond the narrow category of Section(s) 504(a) violations committed by federal funding  agencies acting as such-that is, by "federal provider[s]." The lack of  clarity in Section(s) 505(a)(2)'s "federal provider" provision is  underscored by the precision with which Congress has waived the Federal  Government's sovereign immunity from compensatory damages claims for  violations of Section(s) 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S.  C.  Section(s) 791, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of  disability in employment decisions by the Federal Government.  In  Section(s) 505(a)(1), Congress expressly waived the Federal Government's sovereign immunity against certain remedies for violations of Section(s)  501:


11
"The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section      717  of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [which allows monetary      damages] . . .  shall be available, with respect to any      complaint under section 501 of  this Act, to any employee or      applicant for employment aggrieved by the  final disposition      of such complaint, or by the failure to take final  action on      such complaint."  29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794a(a)(1).


12
Section 505(a)(1)'s broad language-"any complaint under section  501"-suggests by comparison with Section(s) 505(a)(2) that Congress did  not intend to treat all Section(s) 504(a) defendants alike with regard  to remedies.  Had Congress wished to make Title VI remedies available  broadly for all Section(s) 504(a) violations, it could easily have used  language in Section(s) 505(a)(2) that is as sweeping as the "any  complaint" language contained in Section(s) 505(a)(1).


13
But our analysis need not end there.  In the Civil Rights Act of  1991, Congress made perfectly plain that compensatory damages would be  available for certain violations of Section(s)  501 by the Federal  Government (as well as other Section(s) 501 defendants), subject to  express limitations:


14
"In an action brought by a complaining party under the      powers,  remedies, and procedures set forth in . . . section      794a(a)(1) of title  29 [which applies to violations of      Section(s) 501 by the Federal  Government] . . . against a      respondent who engaged in unlawful  intentional      discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful      because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of title      29 and the  regulations implementing section 791 of title 29,      or who violated the  requirements of section 791 of title 29      or the regulations implementing  section 791 of title 29      concerning the provision of a reasonable  accommodation . . .      the complaining party may recover compensatory and  punitive      damages as allowed in subsection  (b) of this section . . .      from  the respondent." Rev. Stat.  Section(s) 1977A, as      added, 105 Stat. 1072,  42 U. S. C. Section(s) 1981a(a)(2).


15
The Act's attorney's fee provision makes a similar point. Section 505(b) provides that, "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce  or charge a violation of a provision of this title, the court, in its  discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United  States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."  29 U. S. C.  Section(s) 794a(b).  This provision likewise illustrates Congress'  ability to craft a clear waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign  immunity against particular remedies for violations of the Act.  The  clarity of these provisions is in sharp contrast to the waiver Lane  seeks to tease out of Section(s) 504 and 505(a)(2) of the Act.


16
Lane insists nonetheless that Section(s) 505(a)(2) compels a result in his favor, arguing that the Department of Transportation is a  "federal provider" within the meaning of Section(s) 505(a)(2) and thus  is liable for a compensatory damages award regardless of our resolution  of the broader sovereign immunity question.  Reply Brief for Petitioner  8-9.  We disagree.  The Department of Transportation, whatever its other  activities, is not a "federal provider" of financial assistance with respect to the Merchant Marine Academy, which the Department itself administers through the Maritime Administration.  At oral argument,  Lane's counsel effectively conceded as much.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7   (acknowledging that the Department of Transportation is not a federal  provider with  respect to the Academy "because of this Court's decision  in [Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U. S.  597, 612 (1986)], which indicates that funds that are actually provided  to an entity that the Federal Government manages itself, which is what  DOT does here . . . for the Merchant Marine Academy," do not render the  agency a "federal provider").  Lane argues that Section(s) 505(a)(2)'s  reference to "federal providers" is not limited by the text of the  provision itself to the funding activities of those providers, but  instead reaches "any act" of an agency that serves as a "federal provider" in any context.  Reply Brief for Petitioner 9, and n. 11.  In  light of our established practice of construing waivers of sovereign  immunity narrowly in favor of the sovereign, however, we decline Lane's  invitation to read the statutory language so broadly.


17
Lane next encourages us to look not only at the language of the  liability and remedies provisions but at the larger statutory scheme,  from which he would discern congressional intent to "level the playing  field" by subjecting the Federal Government to the same remedies as any  and all other Section(s)  504(a) defendants.  A statutory scheme that  would subject the Federal Government to awards of injunctive relief,  attorney's fees, and monetary damages when it acts as a "federal  provider," but would not subject it to monetary damages awards when, and  only when, a federal executive agency itself commits a violation  of Section(s) 504(a), Lane posits, is so illogical as to foreclose the  conclusion that Congress intended to create such a scheme.


18
The statutory scheme on which Lane hinges his argument is admittedly somewhat bewildering.  But the lack of perfect correlation in  the various provisions does not indicate, as Lane suggests, that the  reading proposed by the Government is entirely irrational.  It is plain  that Congress is free to waive the Federal Government's sovereign  immunity against liability without waiving its immunity from monetary  damages awards.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) illustrates this  nicely. Under the provisions of the APA, "[a] person suffering legal  wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute," is expressly  authorized to bring "[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking  relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an  officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official  capacity  or under color of legal authority."  5 U. S. C. Section(s) 702    (emphasis added).


19
In any event, Lane's "equal treatment" argument largely misses  the crucial point that, when it comes to an award of money damages,  sovereign immunity places the Federal Government  on an entirely  different footing than private parties. Petitioner's reliance on  Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), then,  is misplaced.  In Franklin, we held only that the implied private right  of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 supports a  claim for monetary damages.  "[A]bsent clear direction to the contrary  by Congress," we stated, "the federal courts have the power to award any  appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a  federal statute."  Id., at 70-71.  Franklin, however, involved an action  against non-federal defendants under Title IX.  Although the Government  does not contest the propriety of the injunctive relief Lane obtained,  the Federal Government's sovereign immunity prohibits wholesale   application of Franklin to actions against the Government to enforce  Section(s) 504(a). As the Government puts it, "[w]here  a cause of  action is authorized against the federal government,  the available remedies are not those that are `appropriate,' but only those for which  sovereign immunity has been expressly waived."  Brief for Respondents  28.


20
And Lane's "equal treatment" argument falters as well on a point  previously discussed: Section 505(a)(2) itself indicates congressional  intent to treat federal executive agencies differently from other  Section(s) 504(a) defendants for purposes of remedies.  See supra, at 5.  The existence of the Section(s) 505(a)(2) remedies provision brings  this case outside the "general rule" we discussed in Franklin: This is  not a case in which "a right of action exists to enforce a federal right  and Congress is silent on the question of remedies."  Franklin, 503 U. S., at 69.  Title IX, the statute at issue in Franklin, made  no mention  of available remedies.  Id., at 71.  The Rehabilitation Act, by sharp  contrast, contains a provision labeled "Remedies and attorney fees,"  Section(s) 505.  Congress  has thus spoken to the question of remedies in  Section(s) 505(a)(2), the only "remedies" provision directly addressed  to Section(s) 504 violations, and has done so in a way that suggests  that it did not in fact intend to waive the Federal Government's  sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards for executive  agencies' violations of Section(s) 504(a).  Given the existence of a statutory provision that is directed precisely to the remedies available  for violations of Section(s) 504, it would be a curious application of  our sovereign immunity jurisprudence to conclude, as the dissent appears  to do, see post, at 11, that the lack of clear reference to executive  agencies in any express remedies provision indicates congressional  intent to subject the Federal Government to monetary damages.

III.

21
Even if Section(s) 504(a) and 505(a)(2) together do not establish the requisite unequivocal waiver of immunity, Lane insists,  the "equalization" provision contained in Section(s) 1003 of the  Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U. S. C.  Section(s) 2000d-7, reveals congressional intent to equalize the  remedies available against all defendants for Section(s) 504(a)  violations.  Section 1003 was enacted in response to our decision in  Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985), where we  held that Congress had not unmistakably expressed its intent to abrogate  the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Rehabilitation Act, and  that the States accordingly were not "subject to suit in federal court by litigants seeking retroactive monetary relief under Section(s) 504."  Id., at 235.  By enacting Section(s) 1003, Congress sought to provide  the sort of unequivocal waiver that our precedents demand.  That section  provides:


22
"(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment      . . . from suit in Federal court for a violation  of section      504 of the  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX  of the      Education Amendments of  1972, the Age Discrimination Act of      1975, title VI of the Civil Rights  Act of 1964, or the      provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting      discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.


23
"(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute      referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies      both at law  and in equity) are available for such a      violation to the same extent as  such remedies are available      for such a violation in the suit against any  public or      private entity other than a State."  42 U. S. C. Section(s)      2000d-7(a).


24
The "public entities" to which Section(s) 1003 refers, Lane concludes, must include the federal executive agencies named in Section(s) 504(a), and those agencies must be subject to the same remedies under Section(s) 504(a), including monetary damages, as are  private entities.


25
Although Lane's argument is not without some force, Section(s)  1003 ultimately cannot bear the weight Lane would assign it.  The  equalization provision is susceptible of at least two interpretations  other than the across-the-board levelling of liability and remedies that  Lane proposes.  Under the first such interpretation, as proposed by the  Government, the "public . . . entit[ies]" to which the statute refers  are "the nonfederal public entities receiving federal financial assistance that are covered by" each of the statutes to which Section(s)  1003(a)(1) refers: The Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, Title IX, and the  Age Discrimination Act of 1975.  Brief for Respondents 22.  The  Government's suggestion is a plausible one: that Section(s) 1003(a)(2)  refers to municipal hospitals, local school districts, and the like,  which are unquestionably subject to each of the acts listed in  Section(s) 1003(a)(1).  Section 504 alone among the listed acts,  however, extends its coverage to "program[s] or activit[ies] conducted  by any Executive agency."


26
Section 1003 is also open to a second  interpretation, one similar to the "levelling" interpretation suggested  by petitioner: By reference to "public or private entit[ies]," Congress  meant only to subject the States to the scope of remedies available  against either public or private Section(s) 504 defendants, whatever the  lesser (or perhaps the greater) of those remedies might be.  Lane's  reading of the statute-one that would suggest that all Section(s) 504(a)  defendants, including the States, are subject to precisely the same  remedies for violations of that provision-would effectively read out of  the statute the very language on which he seeks to rely.  That is, if the same remedies are available against all governmental and non-governmental defendants under Section(s) 504(a), the "public or  private" language is entirely superfluous.  Congress could have achieved  the result Lane suggests simply by subjecting States to the same  remedies available against "every other entity," without further  elaboration.  The fact that Section(s) 1003(a)(2) itself separately  mentions public and private entities suggests that there is a  distinction to be made in terms of the remedies available against the  two classes of defendants.


27
Although neither of these conceivable readings of Section(s) 1003(a)(2) is entirely satisfactory, their existence points up a fact  fatal to Lane's argument: Section 1003(a) is not so free from ambiguity  that we can comfortably conclude, based thereon, that Congress intended  to subject the Federal Government to awards of monetary damages for  violations of Section(s) 504(a) of the Act.  Given the care with which  Congress responded to our decision in Atascadero by crafting an  unambiguous waiver of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in  Section(s) 1003, it would be ironic indeed to conclude that that same  provision "unequivocally" establishes a waiver of the Federal  Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards by means  of an admittedly ambiguous reference to "public . . . entit[ies]" in the remedies provision attached to the unambiguous waiver of the States'  sovereign immunity.


28
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for  the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.


29

It is so ordered.



30
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting.


31
The Court relies on an amalgam of judge-made rules to defeat the  clear intent of Congress to authorize an award of damages against a  federal executive agency that violates Section(s) 504 of the  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794. To reach this  unfortunate result, the majority ignores the Act's purpose, text, and  legislative history, relying instead on an interpretation of the  structure of Section(s) 504 and 505 that the Court admits is "curious,"  ante, at 5, and "somewhat bewildering," ante, at 8.


32
The relevant facts are undisputed.  The Department of Transportation violated Section(s) 504 by separating petitioner Lane  from the Merchant Marine Academy because he has diabetes. Lane was  injured by that violation, and he is therefore entitled to maintain an  action against the agency under Section(s) 504. The parties and the  Court agree that damages are an appropriate form of relief for most  violations of Section(s) 504, including wrongful conduct by private  recipients of federal funding, by state actors, and by federal agencies  acting in a funding capacity.  The only issue in the case is whether  Congress carved out a special immunity from damages liability for  federal agencies acting in a non-funding capacity, as the Department of Transportation was acting in this instance.  I think it plain that Congress did not.

I.

33
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to "develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of  equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational  rehabilitation and independent living" for the disabled.  29 U. S. C.  Section(s) 701, as amended by Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, Section(s)  122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2984. As originally enacted in 1973, Section(s) 504  of the Act provided:


34
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United      States . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be      excluded from  the participation in, be denied the benefits      of, or be subjected to  discrimination under any program or      activity receiving Federal financial  assistance."  Pub. L.      93-112, 87 Stat. 394.


35
Although the Court pays scant attention to the principle, we have previously held that congressional intent with respect to a statutory provision must be interpreted in the light of the contemporary  legal context.  Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S.  60, 71 (1992).  A review of the relevant authorities convinces me that  Section(s) 504 created a private cause of action with a damages remedy.


36
The text of Section(s) 504 was modeled on the language of Section(s) 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination by any recipient of federal funds on the basis  of race, color, or national origin.1  Following passage of Title VI,  federal courts unanimously held that Section(s) 601 created a private  cause of action.  See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,  696 (1979).  Although we have never expressly ruled on the question, our  opinion in Cannon implicitly ratified that judgment.  Id., at 703.


37
Our explicit holding in Cannon was that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which was also patterned on Title VI,  created a private cause of action.2  This conclusion stemmed, in  part, from our understanding that Congress meant Title IX to be  interpreted and applied in the same manner as Title VI.  Id., at 696.  We presumed, consistent with well-established principles of statutory  interpretation, that Congress was aware of the relevant legal context  when it passed Title IX.  Id., at 696-697.  We also noted that between  the enactment of Title VI in 1964 and the enactment of Title IX in 1972  we had consistently found implied remedies in less clear statutory text.  Id., at 698.


38
Congress passed Section(s) 504 in 1973, just one year after enacting Title IX. Relying on analysis like that set forth in Cannon,  the courts of appeals have uniformly held that Congress intended  Section(s) 504 to provide a private right of action for victims of  prohibited discrimination.3  In my opinion the circuit courts are  undoubtedly correct.4


39
Our decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503  U. S. 60 (1992), makes it equally clear that all traditional forms of  relief, including damages, are available in a private action to enforce  Section(s) 504. In Franklin we held that a plaintiff could seek monetary  damages against a school system accused of violating her rights under  Title IX.  We canvassed the long history of the principle that "where  legal rights have  been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a  general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any  available remedy to make good the wrong done."  Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946). See Franklin, 503 U. S., at 65-71.  Applying this rule  to the implied cause of action in Title IX, we rejected the government's  contention that "whatever the traditional presumption may have been when  the Court decided Bell v. Hood, it has disappeared in succeeding  decades."  Id., at 68.  From Franklin it follows ineluctably that the  original version of Section(s) 504-enacted, it bears repeating, one year   after Title IX-authorized a damages remedy for persons aggrieved  by violations of the provision's discrimination ban.

II.

40
Against this background, Congress passed legislation in 1978 to  extend Section(s) 504's prohibition against discrimination on the basis  of handicap to cover the actions of federal executive agencies.  The  amendment was part of a lengthy piece of legislation intended to  strengthen the protections embodied in the original Act.  See  Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities  Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (statement of  purpose).  The legislation evidenced Congress' continued commitment to  the broad goals of the earlier Act by, for example, adding provisions  aimed at improving accountability and enforcement, see, e.g., Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, Section(s) 122(a)(10), 106, 109(4), 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 711-715, 751, 761b, expanding federal support for research  programs, see, e.g., Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, Section(s) 109(4),  projects such as job training and the removal of physical barriers in  public places, see, e.g., Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, Section(s) 116(2)  120(a), 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 777 et seq., Section(s) 794b, and  creating local rehabilitation  centers across the nation, see Pub. L.  95-602, Title I, Section(s) 115(a), 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 775.  Together, the amendments represented a substantial financial investment  in the future of the disabled in this country.


41
As part of this general expansion of the original Act, Congress  amended Section(s) 504 to forbid discrimination against the handicapped  "under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or  under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by  the United States Postal Service."5 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794(a).  The question we address here is whether this unambiguous extension of  Section(s) 504 to federal agencies was meant to waive the Government's  sovereign immunity to damages liability.  The answer is surely "yes." Section 504 as originally enacted was understood to create a private  right of action for aggrieved individuals and to authorize a damages  remedy.  Congress, acting in 1978, had no reason to expect the courts to  require a clearer statement respecting the remedies available against a  federal defendant than those available against any other Section(s) 504  defendant. And the text of the amendment-which simply inserted the  phrase extending coverage to federal agencies into the existing sentence prohibiting discrimination by federal grantees-gives no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to create a different remedial scheme  for the agencies.


42
The Court rejects this conclusion, however, because it reads another part of the 1978 amendment, Section(s) 505(a)(2), as a limitation on the remedies available against executive agencies under  Section(s) 504.  In my judgment, the Court errs by misinterpreting the  language and structure of Section(s) 505 and ignoring its legislative  history.


43
Congress' intent to strengthen the Act's protections is clearly  evident in Section(s) 505.  The inclusion of an attorney's fees  provision in Section(s) 505(b) fortified the Act's enforcement  mechanisms.  This assistance to plaintiffs was necessary, according to  the Senate report accompanying the amendments, because "the rights  extended to handicapped individuals under title V . . . are, and will  remain, in need of constant vigilance by handicapped individuals to  assure compliance . . . ."  S. Rep. No. 95-890, p. 19 (1978).6


44
The remedies provision, Section(s) 505(a), was also meant to ensure compliance with the 1973 Act, not to restrict remedies that Congress had made available under Section(s) 504, as the majority would  have it.  The section's legislative history demonstrates Congress'  intent.


45
Between the enactment of Section(s) 504 in 1973 and the passage  of Section(s) 505(a)(2) in 1978,7 the Department of Health,  Education, and Welfare promulgated model regulations for federal  agencies to use in implementing the antidiscrimination principle  announced in Section(s) 504.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978).8  Because  of the common understanding that Section(s) 504 was patterned on  Section(s) 601 of Title VI, 42 U. S. C. Section(s) 2000d, and intended  to be enforced in the same manner,9 the Department simply directed  the agencies to follow  the procedures they used to enforce Title VI.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 2137, Section(s) 85.5 (1978).  This directive resulted  in uniform enforcement mechanisms for allegations of discrimination  by federal grantees on the basis of handicap, race, color, or national  origin.10  Moreover, it avoided needless duplication of effort.  Section 601 is accompanied by additional provisions explaining Congress'  intentions with respect to implementation of the provision's mandate.  See 42 U. S. C. Section(s) 2000d-1 et seq.  As originally enacted,  Section(s) 504 stood alone.  It therefore made sense to allow federal  agencies to take advantage of the details included in Title VI and the  regulations promulgated to enforce Section(s) 601.


46
In enacting Section(s) 505(a)(2), Congress explicitly recognized  and approved the application of Title VI's enforcement procedures to  Section(s) 504.  Thus, despite the Court's narrow focus on the  incorporation of the remedies provided by Title VI, Section(s) 505(a)(2)  provides that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" set forth in Title  VI are available to an individual aggrieved by the conduct of a federal  grant recipient.  29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794a(a)(2) (emphasis added).  As the Senate report explained:


47
"It is the committee's understanding that the regulations      promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and      Welfare with  respect to procedures, remedies, and rights      under section 504 conform  with those promulgated under title      VI.  Thus, this amendment codifies  existing practice  as a      specific statutory requirement."  S. Rep. No.  95-890,  at      19.


48
Viewed in this context, the reference in Section(s) 505(a)(2) to  "Federal providers" that the Court finds so puzzling is easily understood: The compliance mechanisms defined in Title VI include remedies, procedures, and rights applicable  to the providers of federal  financial assistance as well as to the recipients of such assistance.  See 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 2000d-1 et seq.; see, e.g., 34 CFR Section(s)  100.6-100.10 (1995) and Part 101 (Department of Education regulations  implementing Title VI); 45 CFR Section(s) 80.6-80.10 (1995) and Part 81   (same for Department of Health and Human Services); id., Section(s) 611.6-611.10 (same for National Science Foundation).


49
Section 505(a)(1), the analogous provision for violations of Section(s) 501's prohibition on handicap discrimination in federal employment, has a similar history.11  The provision was  intended to  "aid in attaining" the goals of Section(s) 501 "by providing for  individuals aggrieved on the basis of their handicap the same rights,  procedures, and remedies provided [to] individuals aggrieved on the  basis of race, creed, color, or national origin."  S. Rep. No. 95-890,  at 18-19.  Like Section(s) 504, Section(s) 501 is not accompanied by any provisions concerning implementation.  Section 505(a)(1) directs the  executive to look to Title VII for appropriate "remedies, procedures, and rights."  29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794a(a)(1) (emphasis added).


50
Unlike Section(s) 501 and the clause of Section(s) 504 relating  to recipients of federal financial assistance, the prohibition on  handicap discrimination in programs or activities conducted by federal  executive agencies had no simple statutory analogue.  The Court opines  that if "Congress [had] wished to make Title VI remedies available  broadly for all Section(s) 504(a) violations, it could easily have used  language in Section(s) 505(a)(2) that is as sweeping as the `any  complaint' language contained in Section(s) 505(a)(1)." Ante, at 6.  I agree.  Congress did not so intend, however, because, in the words of  the United States, "[i]t would have been odd for Congress to have  provided that Title VI remedies applied in Section 504 cases involving  discrimination by executive agencies because Title VI [unlike Section(s)  504] does not prohibit discrimination in programs or activities  conducted by executive  agencies," Brief for Respondents 16, n. 8.


51
The oddity extends beyond the nomenclature used to describe Section(s) 504 defendants.  There are at least two substantive differences between federal executive agencies and federal grantees as  defendants under the provision.  First, Title VI provides remedies which  are appropriate against recipients of federal financial assistance, such  as the withdrawal of funding for continuing violations, see 42 U. S. C.  Section(s) 2000d-1, but which make no sense if applied against an agency  defendant. Second, some violations which an agency might commit concern discrimination more closely analogous to statutory provisions outside of  Title VI.  Thus, the standard enforcement procedures adopted for alleged  violations of Section(s) 504 involving employment discrimination by  federal agencies require the agency to follow Section(s) 501 enforcement  procedures.  See, e.g., 7 CFR Section(s) 15e.170(b) (1995) (Department  of Agriculture regulations implementing Section(s) 504's mandate to  federal agencies); 15 CFR Section(s) 8c.70 (1995) (same for Department  of Commerce); 45 CFR Section(s) 85.61 (1995) (same for Department of Health and Human Services).


52
Viewed in its historical context, Section(s) 505(a)(2) simply has no application to violations of Section(s) 504 committed by federal  agencies acting in a nonfunding capacity.   Section 505(a)(2) delineates  the remedies, procedures, and rights available to persons aggrieved by  the conduct of federal grantees and federal funding agencies.  It is  silent on the remedies, procedures and rights available for  transgressions of  Section(s) 504 by federal executive agencies acting in  a non-funding capacity.  The relief to which petitioner is entitled is  rooted in Section(s) 504 itself.


53
In my opinion, Section(s) 504 is amply sufficient to meet petitioner's needs. By failing to dictate explicitly the remedies available against federal agencies, Congress left in place the remedies  that accompany Section(s) 504's implied cause of action. As Congress  understood in both 1973 and 1978, these remedies include monetary  damages.12  Thus, as of 1978, the Rehabilitation Act provided the  relief sought by petitioner in this case.


54
Under the Court's current jurisprudence, however, Section(s) 504  apparently must be read in a vacuum.  Since the advent of United States  v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992), the Court not only  requires the traditional clear statement of a waiver of sovereign  immunity but steadfastly refuses to consider the legislative history of  a statute, no matter how opaque the statutory language or crystalline  the history.13  I shall not review my objections to that holding  here. See id., at 39-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Suffice it to say  that Congress had no reason to suspect in 1978 that 14 years later this  Court would adopt (and apply retroactively) a radically new and  unforgiving approach to waivers of sovereign immunity.

III.

55
Not surprisingly, given its lack of fidelity to the statutory text and history, the Court's reasoning leads to two implausible conclusions.  To credit the Court's analysis, one must believe that  Congress intended a damages remedy against a federal executive agency  acting indirectly in the provision of funding to nonfederal entities,  but not against an agency acting directly in the conduct of its own  programs and activities.14  Surely such an unexpected result would  have merited comment in a committee report or on the floor of the House  or Senate. Yet there is not a scintilla of evidence in the purpose or  legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act or its amendments   supporting this interpretation of the statute.


56
In addition, the majority's holding necessarily presumes that Congress intended to impose harsher remedies on the States  (which come  under the Section(s) 504 provision prohibiting handicap discrimination  by federal grantees) than on federal agencies for comparable misconduct.  Given the special respect owed to the States-a respect that provided  the ratio decidendi for our decision in Atascadero State Hospital v.  Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)-this suggestion is wholly  unconvincing.  And once again, the legislative history of the  Rehabilitation Act contains no mention of such an intent and no hint of  a policy justification for this distinction.


57
The Court's strict approach to statutory waivers of sovereign immunity leads it to concentrate so carefully on textual details that it  has lost sight of the primary purpose of judicial construction of Acts  of Congress.  We appropriately rely on canons of construction as  tiebreakers to help us discern Congress' intent when its message is not  entirely clear.  The presumption against waivers of sovereign immunity  serves that neutral purpose in doubtful cases.  A rule that refuses to  honor such a waiver because it could have been expressed with even greater clarity, or a rule that refuses to accept guidance from relevant  and reliable legislative history does not facilitate-indeed, actually  obstructs-the neutral performance of the Court's task of carrying out  the will of Congress.


58
The prompt congressional reaction to our decision in Atascadero  illustrates the lack of wisdom of the Court's rigid approach to waivers  of sovereign immunity.15  It was true in that case, as it is in this,  that Congress could have drafted a clearer statement of its intent.  Our  task, however, is not to educate busy legislators in the niceties and  details of scholarly draftsmanship, but rather to do our best to  determine  what message they intended to convey.  When judge-made rules  require Congress to use its valuable time enacting and reenacting provisions whose original intent was clear to all but the most skeptical  and hostile reader, those rules should be discarded.


59
I respectfully dissent.



1
 The precise language of Section(s) 601 is as follows: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or  national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the  benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or  activity receiving Federal financial assistance."  42 U. S. C.  Section(s) 2000d.


2
 Section 901 of Title IX provides:  "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be  denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any  education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance  . . ."  86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. Section(s) 1681(a).


3
 See, e.g., Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F. 2d 296, 299 (CA2  1977); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F. 2d 1247, 1258-1259 (CA3  1979); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Ed., 13 F. 3d 823, 823 (CA4 1994); Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F. 2d 127, 130-131 (CA5 1980),  vacated on other grounds, 451 U. S. 390 (1981); Jennings v. Alexander,  715 F. 2d 1036, 1040-1041 (CA6 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287 (1985); Lloyd v. Regional Transp.  Auth., 548 F. 2d 1277, 1284-1287 (CA7 1977); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.  2d 969, 973-974 (CA8), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982); Kling v.  County of Los Angeles, 633 F. 2d 876, 878 (CA9 1980), rev'd on other  grounds, 474 U. S. 936 (1985); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo.,  658 F. 2d 1372, 1376-1380 (CA10 1981); Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta  Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F. 2d 1376, 1377, n. 1 (CA11 1982), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1099 (1984).


4
 See Conference Report on the Rehabilitation Act Amendments  of 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-1270, p. 27 (1974) (hereinafter Conference Report on 1974 Amendments) (noting that Section(s) 504 was intended to  "permit a judicial remedy through a private action").


5
 Section 504 was amended: "by striking out the period at the  end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof `or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.  The head of each such agency shall promulgate such  regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this  section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and  Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978.  Copies of any proposed  regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of  the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the  thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted to  such committees.'" 92 Stat. 2982.


6
 Section 505 originated in the Senate.


7
 The full text of Section(s) 505(a)(2) reads as follows:  "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil  Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act  or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal  provider of such assistance under section 504 of this Act."  29 U. S. C.  Section(s) 794a(a)(2).


8
 The Department acted pursuant to a directive from President Ford. See Exec. Order No. 11914, "Nondiscrimination With Respect to the  Handicapped in Federally Assisted Programs," issued on April 28, 1976;  41 Fed. Reg. 17871.  Congress had encouraged the President to take this  step.  See Conference Report on 1974 Amendments, at 28 ("The Secretary  of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, because of that  Department's experience in dealing with handicapped persons and with the  elimination of discrimination in other areas, should assume  responsibility for coordinating the section 504 enforcement effort  . . .  The conferees . . . urge . . . delegation of responsibility to  the Secretary [through an Executive Order]").


9
 See Conference Report on 1974 Amendments, at 27 (the  "language of section 504, in following [Title VI and Title IX], . . . envisions the implementation of a compliance program which is similar to  those Acts").


10
 Congress plainly intended this result.  See ibid. ("This approach to implementation of section 504 . . . would . . . provide for  administrative due process").


11
 Section 505(a)(1) provides: "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.  S. C. Section(s) 2000e-16), including the application of sections 706(f) through 706(k) (42 U. S. C. Section(s) 2000e-5(f) through (k)), shall be  available, with respect to any complaint under section 501 of this Act,  to any employee or applicant for employment aggrieved by the final  disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to take final action on  such complaint.  In fashioning an equitable or affirmative action remedy  under such section, a court may take into account the reasonableness of  the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the availability  of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve  an equitable and appropriate remedy."  29 U. S. C. Section(s)  794a(a)(1).


12
 Aware that procedures were also needed, Congress added language in Section(s) 504 directing federal agencies to promulgate  appropriate procedures. 29 U. S. C. Section(s) 794(a) ("The head of each  such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to  carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation,  Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978").


13
 The Court distinguishes Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), on the ground that Franklin involved a  nonfederal defendant whereas this case concerns a federal defendant.  Ante, at 9.  This argument cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of  our opinion.  Franklin relied on cases in which pecuniary awards against  the United States had been upheld.  See 503 U. S., at 67 (citing Kendall  v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), and Dooley v.  United States, 182 U. S. 222 (1901)).  That being so, there is no basis  for restricting application of the rule to the facts of that case.


14
 Even under the majority's interpretation, "Federal  provider" must refer exclusively to executive agencies.  Otherwise Section(s) 505(a)(2) would create remedies against entities which may  not be held liable under Section(s) 504.


15
 The Court decided Atascadero in 1985.  Congress passed legislation to override the decision in 1986.  See Rehabilitation Act  Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U. S. C. Section(s) 2000d-7; see  also ante, at 10.  In recent years Congress has enacted numerous pieces  of legislation designed to override statutory opinions of this Court.  See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 250-251 (1994)  (listing eight decisions legislatively overruled by the Civil Rights Act  of 1991). Additional examples are cited in Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331, App. I   (1991).


