517 U.S. 706116 S.Ct. 1712135 L.Ed.2d 1
QUACKENBUSH, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, et al.v.ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO.Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
No. 95-244.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 20, 1996
Decided June 3, 1996

Syllabus*
Petitioner California Insurance Commissioner, as trustee over the assets  of the Mission Insurance Company and its affiliates, filed a state court  action against respondent Allstate Insurance Company, seeking, among  other things, contract and tort damages for Allstate's alleged breach of  reinsurance agreements. Allstate removed the action to federal court on  diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the  Federal Arbitration Act.  The Commissioner sought remand to state court, arguing that the District Court should abstain from hearing the case  under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, because its resolution  might interfere with California's regulation of the Mission insolvency.  Specifically, the Commissioner indicated that the issue whether Allstate  could set off its own contract claims against the Commissioner's  recovery was a question of state law currently pending before the state  courts in another Mission insolvency case.  Observing that the State's  overriding interest in the uniform and orderly regulation of insurance  insolvencies and liquidations could be undermined by inconsistent  rulings from the federal and state courts, and determining that the  setoff question should be resolved in state court, the District Court concluded that Burford abstention was appropriate and remanded the case  to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion.  After  determining that appellate review of the District Court's remand order  was not barred by 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1447(d), and that the remand  order was appealable under 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1291 as a final  collateral order, the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision and ordered the  case sent to arbitration. Concluding that Burford abstention is limited  to equitable actions, the court held that abstention was inappropriate  in this damages action.
Held:
1.  An abstention-based remand order is appealable under 28 U. S. C.  Section(s) 1291.  Section 1447(d)-which provides that "[a]n order  remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not  reviewable on appeal or otherwise"-interposes no bar to appellate review  of the order at issue.  Only remands based on grounds specified in  the District Court's order in this case does not fall into either  category of remand order described in Section(s) 1447(c): It is not  based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal  procedure.  The remand order here falls within that narrow class of  collateral orders that are immediately appealable under Section(s) 1291.  It puts the litigants in this case effectively out of court, and its  effect is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,  460 U. S. 1, 11, n. 11.  The order also conclusively determines an issue  that is separate from the merits, namely the question whether the  federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the  interest of comity and federalism; the rights asserted on appeal from  the abstention decision are sufficiently important to warrant an  immediate appeal; and the remand order will not be subsumed in any other  appealable order entered by the District Court.  See Moses H. Cone,  supra.
The decision in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S.  336, 352-353, that "an order remanding a removed action does not  represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal," is disavowed to the  extent it would require this Court to ignore the implications of the  later holding in Moses H. Cone.  Pp. 4-8.
2.  Federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on  abstention principles only where the relief sought is equitable or  otherwise discretionary.  Because this was a damages action, the  District Court's remand order was an unwarranted application of the  Burford doctrine.  Pp. 8-25.
(a) In cases where the relief sought is equitable in nature or otherwise  discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to stay the action  based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate  circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either  dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court.  See, e.g., Great  Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297.  By contrast,  federal courts may stay actions for damages based on abstention principles, but those principles do not support the outright dismissal  or remand of damages actions.  See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.  Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 28.  Pp. 8-16.
(b) Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents  "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of  substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the  case then at bar," or if its adjudication in a federal forum "would be  disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect  to a matter of substantial public concern."  Colorado River Water  Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 814.  This power to  dismiss represents an extraordinary and narrow exception to a district  court's duty to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.  Pp. 16-22.
(c) Applying Burford to this case, the federal interests are pronounced, as Allstate's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration  Act implicates a substantial federal concern for the enforcement of  arbitration agreements.  With regard to the state interests, the case  appears at first blush to present nothing more than a run-of-the-mill  contract dispute: The Commissioner seeks damages for Allstate's failure  to perform its obligations under a reinsurance agreement.  Pp. 22-23.
(d) To the extent the Ninth Circuit held only that a federal court  cannot, under Burford, dismiss or remand an action when the relief  sought is not discretionary, its judgment is consistent with this  Court's abstention cases.  The Commissioner appears to have conceded  that the relief sought is neither equitable nor otherwise committed to  the court's discretion.  However, by limiting Burford abstention to  equitable cases, the court applied a per se rule more rigid than this  Court's precedents require. Since abstention principles are not  completely inapplicable in damages actions, Burford might have supported  an order to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the  state court litigation on the setoff issue.  Only the remand order which  the Ninth Circuit entered is being reviewed, and, thus, it is not necessary to determine whether a more limited abstention-based stay  order would have been warranted on the facts of this case. Pp. 23-24.  47 F. 3d 350, affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scalia, J.,  and Kennedy, J., filed concurring opinions.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
In this case, we consider whether an abstention-based remand order is appealable as a final order under 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1291,  and whether the abstention doctrine first recognized in Burford v. Sun  Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), can be applied in a common-law suit for  damages.

I.

2
Petitioner, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of California, was appointed trustee over the assets of the Mission Insurance Company and its affiliates (Mission companies) in 1987, after  those companies were ordered into liquidation by a California court.  In  an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission companies, the  Commissioner filed the instant action against respondent Allstate  Insurance Company in state court, seeking contract and tort damages for  Allstate's alleged breach of certain reinsurance agreements, as well as  a general declaration of Allstate's obligations under those agreements.


3
Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. Section(s) 1 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V).  The Commissioner sought remand to state court, arguing that the  District Court should abstain from hearing the case under Burford,  supra, because its resolution might interfere with California's  regulation of the Mission insolvency.  Specifically, the Commissioner  indicated that Allstate would be asserting its right to set off its own  contract claims against the Commissioner's recovery under the contract,  that the viability of these setoff claims was a hotly disputed question  of state law, and that this question was currently pending before the  state courts in another case arising out of the Mission insolvency.


4
The District Court observed that "California has an overriding  interest in regulating insurance insolvencies and liquidations in a  uniform and orderly manner," and that in this case "this important state  interest could be undermined by inconsistent rulings from the federal  and state courts."  App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a.  Based on these  observations, and its determination that the setoff question should be  resolved in state court, the District Court concluded this case was an appropriate one for the exercise of Burford abstention.  The District  Court did not stay its hand pending the California courts' resolution of  the setoff issue, but instead remanded the entire case to state court.  The District Court entered this remand order without ruling on  Allstate's motion to compel arbitration.


5
After determining that appellate review of the District Court's  remand order was not barred by 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1447(d), see  Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F. 3d 350, 352 (CA9 1995) (citing  Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976)), and  that the remand order was appealable under 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1291  as a final collateral order, see 47 F. 3d, at 353-354 (citing Moses H.  Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983)),  the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's  decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that federal courts can abstain from hearing a case under  Burford only when the relief being sought is equitable in nature, and  therefore held that abstention was inappropriate in this case because  the Commissioner purported to be seeking only legal relief.  47 F. 3d.,  at 354-356; App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-37a (order denying petition for  rehearing because Commissioner had waived any argument that this case  involved a request for equitable relief).


6
The Ninth Circuit's holding that abstention-based remand orders  are appealable conflicts with the decisions of other courts of appeals,  see Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F. 3d 856, 865 (CA1  1993) (order not appealable); Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co., Ltd., 842  F. 2d 31, 34 (CA2 1988) (same); In re Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., 54 F. 3d  475, 477, n. 7 (CA8 1995) (same); but see Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.  3d 590, 593 (CA2 1994) (order appealable under collateral order doctrine), as does its determination that Burford abstention can only be  exercised in cases in which equitable relief is sought, see Lac  D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F. 2d  1033, 1045 (CA3 1988) (Burford abstention appropriate in case seeking  declaratory relief); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F. 2d 1179, 1192, n. 17   (CA4 1988) (Burford abstention appropriate in action for damages);  Wolfson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 51 F. 3d 141, 147 (CA8 1995)  (same); but see Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F. 2d 878, 882 (CA1 1993) (federal  court can abstain under Burford only if it is "sitting in equity"); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F. 2d 265, 272   (CA3 1991) (same); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmer's Cheese  Cooperative, 583 F. 2d 104, 111 (CA3 1978) (same).  We granted  certiorari to resolve these conflicts, 516 U. S. ___ (1995), and now  affirm on grounds different than those provided by the Ninth Circuit.

II.

7
We first consider whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction  to hear Allstate's appeal under 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1291, which  confers jurisdiction over appeals from "final decisions" of the district  courts, and 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1447(d), which provides that "[a]n  order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is  not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." We agree with the Ninth Circuit  and the parties that Section(s) 1447(d) interposes no bar to appellate  review of the remand order at issue in this case. See 47 F. 3d, at 352;  Brief for Petitioner 29-30; Brief for Respondent 13-14, n. 12.  As we  held in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, supra, at 345-346,  and reiterated this Term in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.  S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op. at 3), "Section(s) 1447(d) must be read in  pari materia with Section(s) 1447(c), so that only remands based on  grounds specified in Section(s) 1447(c) are immune from review under Section(s) 1447(d)."  This gloss renders Section(s) 1447(d) inapplicable  here: The District Court's abstention-based remand order does not fall  into either category of remand order described in Section(s) 1447(c), as  it is not based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in  removal procedure.


8
Finding no affirmative bar to appellate review of the District  Court's remand order, we must determine whether that review may be  obtained by appeal under Section(s) 1291.  The general rule is that "a  party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final  judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at  any stage of the litigation may be ventilated."  Digital Equipment Corp.  v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4)  (citations omitted). Accordingly, we have held that a decision is  ordinarily considered final and appealable under Section(s) 1291 only if  it "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court  to do but execute the judgment."  Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S.  229, 233 (1945); see also Digital, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3)  (quoting this standard).  We have also recognized, however, a narrow  class of collateral orders which do not meet this definition of  finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable under  Section(s) 1291 because they "`conclusively determine [a] disputed  question'" that is "`completely separate from the merits of the  action,'" "`effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,'" Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 431 (1985) (quoting  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)), and "too  important to be denied review," Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan  Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949).


9
The application of these principles to the appealability of the  remand order before us is controlled by our decision in Moses H. Cone  Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983).  The  District Court in that case entered an order under Colorado River Water  Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), staying a  federal diversity suit pending the completion of a declaratory judgment  action that had been filed in state court.  The Court of Appeals held  that this stay order was appealable under Section(s) 1291, and we  affirmed that determination on two independent grounds.


10
We first concluded that the abstention-based stay order was appealable as a "final decision" under Section(s) 1291 because it put  the litigants "`effectively out of court,'" 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11   (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713,  715, n. 2 (1962) (per curiam)), and because its effect was "precisely to  surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court," 460 U. S.,  at 11, n. 11.  These standards do not reflect our oft-repeated  definition of finality, see supra, at 4 (citing Catlin, supra, at 233);  see, e.g., Digital, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3) (citing the Catlin  definition); Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 497 (1989)  (same); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 521-522 (1988) (same),  but in Moses H. Cone we found their application to be compelled by precedent, see 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11 ("Idlewild's reasoning is limited  to cases where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar  doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all or an essential part  of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum").


11
As an alternative to this reliance on Idlewild, we also held that the stay order at issue in Moses H. Cone was appealable under the  collateral order doctrine.  460 U. S., at 11.  We determined that a stay  order based on the Colorado River doctrine "presents an important issue  separate from the merits" because it "amounts to a refusal to  adjudicate" the case in federal court; that such orders could not be  reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the federal action because  the district court would be bound, as a matter of res judicata, to honor  the state court's judgment; and that unlike other stay orders, which  might readily be reconsidered by the district court, abstention-based  stay orders of this ilk are "conclusive" because they are the practical equivalent of an order dismissing the case.  460 U. S., at 12.


12
The District Court's order remanding on grounds of Burford abstention is in all relevant respects indistinguishable from the stay  order we found to be appealable in Moses H. Cone.  No less than an order  staying a federal-court action pending adjudication of the dispute in  state court, it puts the litigants in this case "`effectively out of  court,'" Moses H. Cone, supra, at 11, n. 11 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage  Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, supra, at 715, n. 2), and its effect is  "precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state  court," 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11.  Indeed, the remand order is clearly  more "final" than a stay order in this sense.  When a district court  remands a case to a state court, the district court disassociates itself  from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court's docket.


13
The District Court's order is also indistinguishable from the stay order we considered in Moses H. Cone in that it conclusively determines an issue that is separate from the merits, namely the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism.  See infra, at 9,  20.  In addition, the rights asserted on appeal from the District  Court's abstention decision are, in our view, sufficiently important to  warrant an immediate appeal.  See infra, at 8-9, 17-21 (describing  interests weighed in decision to abstain under Burford); cf. Digital,  supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15) (review under collateral order doctrine  limited to those issues "`too important to be denied review'") (quoting  Cohen, supra, at 546).  And, like the stay order we found appealable in Moses H. Cone, the District Court's remand order in this case will not  be subsumed in any other appealable order entered by the District Court.


14
We have previously stated that "an order remanding a removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal." Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S., at 352-53. Petitioner asks that we adhere to that statement and hold that appellate  review of the District Court's remand order can only be obtained through  a petition for writ of mandamus.  To the extent Thermtron would require  us to ignore the implications of our later holding in Moses H. Cone,  however, we disavow it. Thermtron's determination that remand orders  are not reviewable "final judgments" doubtless was necessary to the  resolution of that case, see 423 U. S., at 352 (posing the question  whether mandamus was the appropriate vehicle), but our principal concern in Thermtron was the interpretation of the bar to appellate review embodied in 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1447(d), see supra, at 4, and our  statement concerning the appropriate procedural vehicle for reviewing a  district court's remand order was peripheral to that concern.  Moreover,  the parties in Thermtron did not brief the question, our opinion does  not refer to Catlin or its definition of "final decisions," and our  opinion nowhere addresses whether any class of remand order might be  appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  Indeed, the only  support Thermtron cites for the proposition that remand orders are reviewable only by mandamus, not by appeal, is Railroad Co. v. Wiswall,  23 Wall. 507 (1875), the superannuated reasoning of which is of little  vitality today, compare id., at 508 (deeming a "writ of error to review  what has been done" an inappropriate vehicle for reviewing a court of  appeals'"refusal to hear and decide") with Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at  10-11, n. 11 (holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts  to a refusal to hear and decide a case).


15
Admittedly, remand orders like the one entered in this case do  not meet the traditional definition of finalitythey do not "en[d] the  litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing more for the court to do  but execute the judgment," Catlin, 324 U. S., at 233.  But because the  District Court's remand order is functionally indistinguishable from the  stay order we found appealable in Moses H. Cone, see supra, at 6-7, we  conclude that it is appealable, and turn to the merits of the Ninth  Circuit's decision respecting Burford abstention.

III.
A.

16
We have often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.  See, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 821 ("[F]ederal  courts have a virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the  jurisdiction given them'"); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical  Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415 (1964) ("`When a federal court is properly  appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its  duty to take such jurisdiction'") (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas  Co., 212 U. S. 19, 40 (1909)); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404   (1821) (federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not"). This  duty is not, however, absolute.  See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.  S., Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 422 (1932) ("[T]he proposition that a court  having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true").   Indeed, we have held that federal courts may decline to exercise their  jurisdiction, in otherwise "`exceptional circumstances,'" where denying  a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing  interest, Colorado River, supra, at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 189 (1959)), for example where abstention is warranted by considerations of "proper constitutional  adjudication," "regard for federal-state relations," or "wise judicial  administration," Colorado River, supra, at 817 (internal quotation marks  omitted).


17
We have thus held that federal courts have the power to refrain  from hearing cases that would interfere with a pending state criminal  proceeding, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), or with certain  types of state civil proceedings, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S.  592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977); cases in which the  resolution of a federal constitutional question might be obviated if the  state courts were given the opportunity to interpret ambiguous state  law, see Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); cases raising issues "intimately involved with [the states'] sovereign  prerogative," the proper adjudication of which might be impaired by  unsettled questions of state law, see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.  Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 28 (1959); id., at 31 (Stewart, J.,  concurring); cases whose resolution by a federal court might  unnecessarily interfere with a state system for the collection of taxes,  see Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943); and  cases which are duplicative of a pending state proceeding, see Colorado  River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935).


18
Our longstanding application of these doctrines reflects "the commonlaw background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction  were enacted," New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of  New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 359 (1989) (NOPSI) (citing Shapiro,  Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 570-577 (1985)).  And, as the Ninth Circuit correctly indicated, 47 F. 3d, at 354, it has  long been established that a federal court has the authority to decline  to exercise its jurisdiction when it "is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity," Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc.  v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).  This  tradition informs our understanding of the jurisdiction Congress has  conferred upon the federal courts, and explains the development of our  abstention doctrines.  In Pullman, for example, we explained the  principle underlying our abstention doctrines as follows:


19
" . . . The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of      regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary      remedy of  the injunction. . . . Few public interests have a      higher claim upon the  discretion of a federal chancellor      than the avoidance of needless  friction with state policies,      whether the policy relates to the      enforcement of the criminal law, or the administration of a      specialized  scheme for liquidating embarrassed business      enterprises, or the final  authority of a state court to      interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the  state.  These      cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our      federal system, whereby the federal courts, `exercising a      wise  discretion,' restrain their authority because of      `scrupulous regard for  the rightful independence of the      state governments' and for the smooth  working of the federal      judiciary.  This use of equitable powers is a  contribution      of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between      state and federal authority without the need of rigorous      congressional  restriction of those powers."  312 U. S., at      500-501 (citations  omitted).


20
Though we have thus located the power to abstain in the historic  discretion exercised by federal courts "sitting in equity," we have not  treated abstention as a "technical rule of equity procedure." Thibodaux,  supra, at 28.  Rather, we have recognized that the authority of a  federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all  cases in which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief. See  NOPSI, supra, at 359 (mandate of federal jurisdiction "does not  eliminate . . . the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to  grant certain types of relief").  Accordingly, we have not limited the application of the abstention doctrines to suits for injunctive relief,  but have also required federal courts to decline to exercise  jurisdiction over certain classes of declaratory judgments, see, e.g.,  Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297 (federal court must abstain from hearing  declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of a state  tax); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971) (extending  Younger abstention to declaratory judgment actions), the granting of  which is generally committed to the courts' discretion, see Wilton v.  Seven Falls Co., 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 5) (federal  courts have "discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise  satisfies subject-matter jurisdictional prerequisites").


21
Nevertheless, we have not previously addressed whether the principles underlying our abstention cases would support the remand or  dismissal of a common-law action for damages.  Cf. Deakins v. Monaghan,  484 U. S. 193, 202, and n. 6 (1988) (reserving the question whether  Younger requires abstention in an action for damages); Ankenbrandt v.  Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992) (discussing, without applying, Burford  abstention in damages action).  To be sure, we held in Fair Assessment  in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, supra, that a federal court should not entertain a Section(s) 1983 suit for damages based on the enforcement of a state tax scheme, see 454 U. S., at 115, but we have  subsequently indicated that Fair Assessment was a case about the scope  of the Section(s) 1983 cause of action, see National Private Truck  Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (1995)  (slip op., at 7-8), not the abstention doctrines.  To the extent Fair  Assessment does apply abstention principles, its holding is very  limited.  The damages action in that case was based on the  unconstitutional application of a state tax law, and the award of  damages turned first on a declaration that the state tax was in fact  unconstitutional.  We therefore drew an analogy to Huffman and other  cases in which we had approved the application of abstention principles  in declaratory judgment actions, and held that the federal court should  decline to hear the action because "[t]he recovery of damages under the  Civil Rights Act first requires a `declaration' or determination of the  unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its  operation."  Fair Assessment, supra, at 115.


22
Otherwise, we have applied abstention principles to actions "at  law" only to permit a federal court to enter a stay order that postpones  adjudication of the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether.  See, e.g., Thibodaux, 360 U. S., at 28-30 (approving stay order);  Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 44 (1970) (per curiam)  (directing district court to "hold its hand until the Puerto Rican  Supreme Court has authoritatively ruled on the local law question in  light of the federal claims" (footnote omitted)) (emphasis added);  United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U. S. 134, 135-136   (1962) (per curiam) ("Wise judicial administration in this case counsels  that decision of the federal question be deferred until the potentially controlling state-law issue is authoritatively put to rest"); Clay v.  Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U. S. 207, 212 (1960) (approving "postponement  of decision" in damages suit).


23
Our decisions in Thibodaux and County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185 (1959) illustrate the distinction we have  drawn between abstention-based remand orders or dismissals and  abstention-based decisions merely to stay adjudication of a federal  suit.  In Thibodaux, a city in Louisiana brought an eminent domain  proceeding in state court, seeking to condemn for public use certain  property owned by a Florida corporation. After the corporation removed  the action to federal court on diversity grounds, the Federal District  Court decided on its own motion to stay the case, pending a state  court's determination whether the city could exercise the power of  eminent domain under state law.  The case did not arise within the  "equity" jurisdiction of the federal courts, 360 U. S., at 28, because  the suit sought compensation for a taking, and the District Court lacked  discretion to deny relief on the corporation's claim. Nonetheless, the  issues in the suit were "intimately involved with [the state's]  sovereign prerogative."  Ibid.  We concluded that "[t]he considerations  that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding the hazards of  serious disruption by federal courts of state government or needless  friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate  in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a  federal court." Ibid.  And based on that conclusion, we affirmed the  district court's order staying the case.


24
County of Allegheny was decided the same day as Thibodaux, and  like Thibodaux it involved review of a District Court order abstaining  from the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over a state law eminent  domain action.  Unlike in Thibodaux, however, the District Court in  County of Allegheny had not merely stayed adjudication of the federal  action pending the resolution of an issue in state court, but rather had  dismissed the federal action altogether.  Based in large measure on this  distinction, we reversed the District Court's order.  See 360 U. S., at  190; Thibodaux, 360 U. S., at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("In Mashuda,  the Court holds that it was error for the District Court to dismiss the  complaint" (emphasis added)).


25
We were careful to note in Thibodaux that the District Court had  only stayed the federal suit pending adjudication of the dispute in  state court.  Unlike the outright dismissal or remand of a federal suit,  we held, an order merely staying the action "does not constitute  abnegation of judicial duty.  On the contrary, it is a wise and  productive discharge of it.  There is only postponement of decision for  its best fruition."  Id., at 29.  We have thus held that in cases where  the relief being sought is equitable in nature or otherwise  discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to stay the action  based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either  dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court.  By contrast, while  we have held that federal courts may stay actions for damages based on  abstention principles, we have not held that those principles support  the outright dismissal or remand of damages actions.


26
One final line of cases bears mentioning.  Though we deal here  with our abstention doctrines, we have recognized that federal courts  have discretion to dismiss damages actions, in certain narrow  circumstances, under the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens.  The seminal case recognizing this authority is Gulf Oil Corp. v.  Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947), in which we considered whether a Federal  District Court sitting in diversity in New York could dismiss a tort  action for damages on the grounds that Virginia provided a more  appropriate locale for adjudicating the dispute.  Id., at 503.  We  conceded that the application of this doctrine should be "rare," id., at  509, but also held that the exercise of forum non conveniens is not limited to actions in equity:


27
"This Court, in recognizing and approving it by name has      never  indicated that it was rejecting application of the      doctrine to law  actions which had been an integral and      necessary part of [the] evolution  of the doctrine.  Wherever      it is applied in courts in other  jurisdictions, its      application does not depend on whether the action is  at law      or in equity."  Id., at 505, n. 4 (citations omitted).


28
The dispute in Gulf Oil was over venue, not jurisdiction, and the expectation was that after dismissal of the suit in New York the  parties would refile in federal court, not the state courts of Virginia.  This transfer of venue function of the forum non conveniens doctrine  has been superseded by statute, see 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 1404(a);  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 253 (1981), and to the  extent we have continued to recognize that federal courts have the power  to dismiss damages actions under the common-law forum non conveniens  doctrine, we have done so only in "cases where the alternative forum is  abroad." American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 449, n. 2 (1994); see, e.g., Piper, 454 U. S., at 265-269 (dismissal of wrongful  death action).


29
The fact that we have applied the forum non conveniens doctrine  in this manner does not change our analysis in this case, where we deal  with the scope of the Burford abstention doctrine.  To be sure, the  abstention doctrines and the doctrine of forum non conveniens proceed  from a similar premise: In rare circumstances, federal courts can  relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.  But our  abstention doctrine is of a distinct historical pedigree, and the  traditional considerations behind dismissal for forum non conveniens  differ markedly from those informing the decision to abstain.  Compare  American Dredging, supra, at 448-449 (describing "multifarious factors," including both public and private interests, which might allow a district court to dismiss a case under doctrine of forum non conveniens)  with Burford, 319 U. S., at 332-333 (describing "federal-state conflict"  that requires a federal court to yield jurisdiction in favor of a state  forum).  Federal courts abstain out of deference to the paramount  interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of  comity and federalism. See, e.g., ibid.; Younger, 401 U. S., at 44-45.  Dismissal for forum non conveniens, by contrast, has historically  reflected a far broader range of considerations, see Piper, 454 U. S.,  at 241, 257-262 (describing the interests which bear on forum non conveniens decision); Gulf Oil, 330 U. S., at 508-509 (same), most notably the convenience to the parties and the practical difficulties  that can attend the adjudication of a dispute in a certain locality, see  Piper, supra, at 257-259 (evidentiary problems, unavailability of  witnesses, difficulty of coordinating multiple suits); Gulf Oil, supra,  at 511 (availability of witnesses, need to interplead Virginia  corporation, location of evidence).

B.

30
With these background principles in mind, we consider the contours of the Burford doctrine.  The principal issue presented in  Burford was the "reasonableness" of an order issued by the Texas  Railroad Commission, which granted "a permit to drill four oil wells on  a small plot of land in the East Texas oil field." 319 U. S., at 317.  Due to the potentially overlapping claims of the many parties who might  have an interest in a common pool of oil and the need for uniform  regulation of the oil industry, Texas endowed the Railroad Commission  with exclusive regulatory authority in the area.  Texas also placed the  authority to review the Commission's orders in a single set of state  courts, "[t]o prevent the confusion of multiple review," id., at 326,  and to permit an experienced cadre of state judges to obtain "specialized knowledge" in the field, id., at 327.  Though Texas had  thus demonstrated its interest in maintaining uniform review of the  Commission's orders, the federal courts had, in the years preceding  Burford, become increasingly involved in reviewing the reasonableness of  the Commission's orders, both under a constitutional standard imposed  under the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v.  Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, 577 (1940), and under state law,  which established a similar standard, see Burford, 319 U. S., at 317,  326.


31
Viewing the case as "a simple proceeding in equity to enjoin the  enforcement of the Commissioner's order," id., at 317, we framed the  question presented in terms of the power of a federal court of equity to  abstain from exercising its jurisdiction:


32
"Although a federal equity court does have jurisdiction of a      particular proceeding, it may, in its sound discretion,      whether its  jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of      diversity of citizenship of  otherwise, `refuse to enforce or      protect legal rights, the exercise of  which may be      prejudicial to the public interest,' for it `is in the      public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise      their  discretionary power with proper regard for the      rightful independence of  state governments in carrying out      their domestic policy.'  While many  other questions are      argued, we find it necessary to decide only one:  Assuming      that the federal district court had jurisdiction, should it,      as  a matter of sound equitable discretion, have declined to      exercise that  jurisdiction here?"  Id., at 317-318 (footnote      omitted) (quoting United  States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern,      289 U. S. 352, 360 (1933) and  Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294      U. S., at 185).


33
Having thus posed the question in terms of the District Court's  discretion, as a court sitting "in equity," to decline jurisdiction, we  approved the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on a number of  grounds that were unique to that case. We noted, for instance, the  difficulty of the regulatory issues presented, stating that the "order  under consideration is part of the general regulatory system devised for  the conservation of oil and gas in Texas, an aspect of `as thorny a  problem as has challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures.'"  319 U. S., at 318 (quoting Rowan, supra, at 579).  We also stressed the demonstrated need for uniform regulation in the area, 319 U. S., at  318-319, citing the unified procedures Texas had established to "prevent  the confusion of multiple review," id., at 325-326, and the important  state interests this uniform system of review was designed to serve,  id., at 319-320.  Most importantly, we also described the detrimental  impact of ongoing federal court review of the Commission's orders, which  review had already led to contradictory adjudications by the state and  federal courts. Id., at 327-328, 331-332.


34
We ultimately concluded in Burford that dismissal was appropriate because the availability of an alternative, federal forum  threatened to frustrate the purpose of the complex administrative system  that Texas had established.  See id., at 332 ("The whole cycle of  federal-state conflict cannot be permitted to begin again").  We have  since provided more generalized descriptions of the Burford doctrine,  see, e.g., County of Allegheny, 360 U. S., at 189 ("abstention on  grounds of comity with the States where the exercise of jurisdiction by  the federal court would disrupt a state administrative process"); Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 814-816 (abstention where "exercise of  federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be  disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect  to a matter of substantial public concern"), but with the exception of  cases that rest only loosely on the Burford rationale, e.g., Louisiana  Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25 (1959), we have revisited  the decision only infrequently in the intervening 50 years.  See NOPSI,  491 U. S. 350 (1989).


35
In NOPSI, our most recent exposition of the Burford doctrine, we  again located the power to dismiss based on abstention principles in the  discretionary power of a federal court sitting in equity, and we again  illustrated the narrow range of circumstances in which Burford can  justify the dismissal of a federal action.  The issue in NOPSI was  preemption.  A New Orleans utility that had been saddled by a decision  of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission with part of the cost of building and operating a nuclear reactor sought approval of a rate increase from the Council of the City of New Orleans.  The Council denied the rate increase on the grounds that "a public hearing was necessary to explore `the legality and prudency' [sic]" of the expenses  allocated to the utility under the FERC decision, 491 U. S., at 355, and  the utility brought suit in federal court, seeking an injunction against  enforcement of the Council's order and a declaration that the utility  was entitled to a rate increase.  The utility claimed that "federal law  required the Council to allow it to recover, through an increase in  retail rates, its FERC-allocated share of the [cost of the reactor]." Ibid.  The federal pre-emption question was the only issue raised in the  case; there were no state law claims.


36
In reversing the District Court's decision to dismiss under Burford, we recognized "the federal courts' discretion in determining  whether to grant certain types of relief," 491 U. S., at 359, and we  indicated, as we had previously in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern  R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 350-351 (1951), that Burford permits "a federal  court sitting in equity," 491 U. S., at 361, to dismiss a case only in  extraordinary circumstances.  We thus indicated that Burford allows a  federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents "`difficult  questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar,'"  or if its adjudication in a federal forum "`would be disruptive of state  efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of  substantial public concern.'"  491 U. S., at 361 (quoting Colorado  River, 424 U. S., at 814).


37
We ultimately held that Burford did not provide proper grounds  for an abstention-based dismissal in NOPSI because the "case [did] not  involve a state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims   [were] `in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be  untangled before the federal case can proceed,'" 491 U. S., at 361   (quoting McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187,  373 U. S. 668, 674 (1963)), and because there was no serious threat of  conflict between the adjudication of the federal claim presented in the  case and the State's interest in ensuring uniformity in ratemaking  decisions:


38
"While Burford is concerned with protecting complex state      administrative processes from undue federal influence, it      does not  require abstention whenever there exists such a      process, or even in all  cases where there is a `potential      for conflict' with state regulatory  law or policy.  Here,      NOPSI's primary claim is that the Council is  prohibited by      federal law from refusing to provide reimbursement for      FERC-allocated wholesale costs.  Unlike a claim that a state      agency has  misapplied its lawful authority or has failed to      take into consideration  or properly weigh relevant state-law      factors, federal adjudication of  this sort of pre-emption      claim would not disrupt the State's attempt to  ensure      uniformity in the treatment of an `essentially local      problem.'"  341 U. S., at 362 (quoting Alabama Pub. Serv.      Comm'n, supra, at 347)  (citations omitted).


39
These cases do not provide a formulaic test for determining when  dismissal under Burford is appropriate, but they do demonstrate that the  power to dismiss under the Burford doctrine, as with other abstention  doctrines, see supra, at 9-16 (describing the traditional application of  the abstention doctrines), derives from the discretion historically  enjoyed by courts of equity.  They further demonstrate that exercise of  this discretion must reflect "principles of federalism and comity." Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 32 (1993).  Ultimately, what is at stake  is a federal court's decision, based on a careful consideration of the  federal interests in retaining jurisdiction over the dispute and the  competing concern for the "independence of state action," Burford, 319  U. S., at 334, that the State's interests are paramount and that a  dispute would best be adjudicated in a state forum.  See NOPSI, 491 U.  S., at 363 (question under Burford is whether adjudication in federal  court would "unduly intrude into the processes of state government or undermine the State's ability to maintain desired uniformity"). This  equitable decision balances the strong federal interest in having  certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights, adjudicated in  federal court, against the State's interests in maintaining "uniformity  in the treatment of an `essentially local problem,'" 491 U. S., at 362   (quoting Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra, at 347), and retaining local control over "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import," Colorado River, supra, at 814.  This balance only rarely favors abstention, and the power to dismiss  recognized in Burford represents an "`extraordinary and narrow exception  to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly  before it.'"  Colorado River, supra, at 813 (quoting County of  Allegheny, 360 U. S., at 188).

C.

40
We turn, finally, to the application of Burford in this case. As in NOPSI, see 491 U. S., at 363, the federal interests in this case  are pronounced, as Allstate's motion to compel arbitration under the  Federal Arbitration Act implicates a substantial federal concern for the  enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.  Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985) (FAA reflects  "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution"); cf.  Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 25-26 (in deciding whether to defer to  state court adjudication under the Colorado River doctrine, "the  presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration  weighing against surrender").  With regard to the state interests, however, the case appears at first blush to present nothing more than a  run-of-the-mill contract dispute.  The Commissioner seeks damages from  Allstate for Allstate's failure to perform its obligations under a  reinsurance agreement.  What differentiates this case from other  diversity actions seeking damages for breach of contract, if anything,  is the impact federal adjudication of the dispute might have on the  ongoing liquidation proceedings in state court: The Commissioner claims  that any recovery by Allstate on its setoff claims would amount to an  illegal "preference" under state law.  This question appears now to have been conclusively answered by the California Supreme Court, see Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 3 Cal.  4th 1118, 842 P. 2d 48 (1992) (permitting reinsurers to assert setoff  claims in suits filed by the Commissioner in the Mission insolvency),  although at the time the District Court ruled this question was still  hotly contested.


41
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the District Court's remand order was inappropriate because "Burford abstention does not apply to  suits seeking solely legal relief."  47 F. 3d, at 354. Addressing our  abstention cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal courts' power  to abstain in certain cases is "locat[ed] . . . in the unique powers of  equitable courts," and that it derives from equity courts'  "`discretionary power to grant or withhold relief.'"  47 F. 3d, at 355   (quoting Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S., at  350-351).  The Ninth Circuit's reversal of the District Court's  abstention-based remand order in this case therefore reflects the  application of a per se rule: "[T]he power of federal courts to abstain  from exercising their jurisdiction, at least in Burford abstention cases, is founded upon a discretion they possess only in equitable cases."  47 F. 3d, at 355-356.


42
To the extent the Ninth Circuit held only that a federal court  cannot, under Burford, dismiss or remand an action when the relief  sought is not discretionary, its judgment is consistent with our  abstention cases.  We have explained the power dismiss or remand a case  under the abstention doctrines in terms of the discretion federal courts  have traditionally exercised in deciding whether to provide equitable or  discretionary relief, see supra, at 9-11, 14, and the Commissioner  appears to have conceded that the relief being sought in this case is  neither equitable nor otherwise committed to the discretion of the  court. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-37a (order denying petition for rehearing).  In those cases in which we have applied traditional abstention principles to damages actions, we have only permitted a federal court to "withhold action until the state proceedings have concluded," Growe, 507 U. S., at 32; that is, we have permitted federal  courts applying abstention principles in damages actions to enter a  stay, but we have not permitted them to dismiss the action altogether,  see supra, at 11-14.


43
The per se rule described by the Ninth Circuit is, however, more  rigid than our precedents require.  We have not strictly limited  abstention to "equitable cases," 47 F. 3d, at 356, but rather have  extended the doctrine to all cases in which a federal court is asked to  provide some form of discretionary relief.  See Huffman, 319 U. S., at  297; Samuels, 401 U. S., at 69-70, 72-73; supra, at 11.  Moreover, as  demonstrated by our decision in Thibodaux, see supra, at 12-14, we have  not held that abstention principles are completely inapplicable in  damages actions. Burford might support a federal court's decision to  postpone adjudication of a damages action pending the resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law.  For example, given  the situation the District Court faced in this case, a stay order might  have been appropriate: The setoff issue was being decided by the state  courts at the time the District Court ruled, see Prudential Reinsurance  Co., supra, and in the interest of avoiding inconsistent adjudications  on that point, the District Court might have been justified in entering  a stay to await the outcome of the state court litigation.


44
Like the Ninth Circuit, we review only the remand order which was entered, and find it unnecessary to determine whether a more limited  abstention-based stay order would have been warranted on the facts of  this case.  We have no occasion to resolve what additional authority to  abstain might be provided under our decision in Fair Assessment, see  supra, at 11-12.  Nor do we find it necessary to inquire fully as to  whether this case presents the sort of "exceptional circumstance" in  which Burford abstention or other grounds for yielding federal  jurisdiction might be appropriate.  Under our precedents, federal courts  have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles  only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise  discretionary.  Because this was a damages action, we conclude that the  District Court's remand order was an unwarranted application of the  Burford doctrine.  The judgment is affirmed.


45
It is so ordered.


46
djq  Justice Scalia, concurring.


47
I join the opinion of the Court.  I write separately only to respond to Justice Kennedy's concurrence.


48
Justice Kennedy, while joining the opinion of the Court, says that he would "not rule out . . . the possibility that a federal court  might dismiss a suit for damages in a case where a serious affront to  the interests of federalism could be averted in no other way," post, at  1-2. I would not have joined today's opinion if I believed it left such  discretionary dismissal available. Such action is foreclosed, I think,  by the Court's holding, clearly summarized in the concluding sentences  of the opinion: "Under our precedents, federal courts have the power to  dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary. Because  this was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court's remand  order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine."  Ante, at  24-25.


49
Justice Kennedy's projected horrible of a "serious affront to the interests of federalism" cannot possibly materialize under the Court's holding.  There is no "serious affront to the interests of federalism" when Congress lawfully decides to pre-empt state action-which is what our cases hold (and today's opinion affirms)  Congress does whenever it instructs federal courts to assert  jurisdiction over matters as to which relief is not discretionary.


50
If the Court today felt empowered to decide for itself when congressionally decreed jurisdiction constitutes a "serious affront" and  when it does not, the opinion would have read much differently.  Most  pertinently, it would not have found it unnecessary "to inquire fully as  to whether this case presents the sort of `exceptional circumstance' in  which Burford abstention or other grounds for yielding federal  jurisdiction might be appropriate."  Ante, at 24.  There were certainly grounds for such an inquiry if we thought it relevant.  The "[then]  unsettled but since resolved question of California law" to which  Justice Kennedy refers, post, at 1, was only part of the basis for the  District Court's decision to remand to state court; the court also  pointed more generally to what it thought was the State's "overriding  interest in regulating insurance insolvencies and liquidations in a  uniform and orderly manner," App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a.  As the Court's  opinion says, it is not necessary to inquire fully into that matter  because this was a damages action.


51
djq  Justice Kennedy, concurring.


52
When this suit first was filed, it raised an unsettled but since  resolved question of California law concerning the ability of companies  in Allstate's position to set off claims held against Mission.  The  principal reason for the District Court's decision to dismiss the case  was the threat posed to the state proceedings by different state and  federal rulings on the question.  The court's concern was reasonable.  States, as a matter of tradition and express federal consent, have an important interest in maintaining precise and detailed regulatory schemes for the insurance industry.  See, e. g., the McCarran-Ferguson  Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. Section(s) 1011 et seq.  The  fact that a state court rather than an agency was chosen to implement  California's scheme provided more reason, not less, for the federal  court to stay its hand.


53
At the same time, however, we have not considered a case in which dismissal of a suit for damages by extension of the doctrine of  Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), was held to be authorized  and necessary.  As the Court explains, no doubt the preferred course in  such circumstances is to resolve any serious potential for federal  intrusion by staying the suit while retaining jurisdiction.  We ought  not rule out, though, the possibility that a federal court might dismiss  a suit for damages in a case where a serious affront to the interests of federalism could be averted in no other way.  We need not reach that  question here.


54
Abstention doctrines are a significant contribution to the theory of federalism and to the preservation of the federal system in  practice. They allow federal courts to give appropriate and necessary  recognition to the role and authority of the States. The duty to take  these considerations into account must inform the exercise of federal  jurisdiction. Principles of equity thus are not the sole foundation for  abstention rules; obligations of comity, and respect for the appropriate  balance between state and federal interests, are an important part of  the justification and authority for abstention as well.  See, e. g.,  id., at 334 ("a sound respect for the independence of state action  requires the federal equity court to stay its hand"); Younger v. Harris,  401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971) (rooting abstention in "a proper respect for state functions" and "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both  State and National Governments"); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976) (abstention doctrines  are based on "considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and  regard for federal-state relations").  See also Shapiro, Jurisdiction  and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 551-552 (1985).  The  traditional role of discretion in the exercise of equity jurisdiction  makes abstention easiest to justify in cases where equitable relief is sought, but abstention, including dismissal, is a possibility that may  yet be addressed in a suit for damages, if fundamental concerns of  federalism require us to face the issue.


55
With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.



*
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience  of the reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321,  337.


