528 U.S. 152120 S.Ct. 684145 L.Ed.2d 597
SALVADOR MARTINEZ, PETITIONERv.COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH  APPELLATE DISTRICT
No. 98-7809.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 9, 1999
Decided January 12, 2000

Syllabus
Accused of converting a client's money to his own use while employed as a  paralegal, petitioner Martinez was charged by California with grand theft and  the fraudulent appropriation of another's property. He chose to represent  himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft but convicted him  of embezzlement. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent  himself, and a waiver of counsel. The California Court of Appeal denied his  motion to represent himself based on its prior holding that there is no  constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal under Faretta v.  California, 422 U. S. 806 , in which this Court held that a criminal defendant  has a constitutional right to conduct his own defense at trial when he  voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed without counsel, id., at 807,  836. The state court had explained that the right to counsel on appeal stems  from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,  not from the Sixth Amendment on which Faretta was based, and held that the  denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or  equal protection. The California Supreme Court denied Martinez' application for  a writ of mandate.
Held: Neither Faretta 's holding nor its reasoning requires a State to recognize  a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal  conviction. Although some of Faretta 's reasoning is applicable to appellate  proceedings as well as to trials, there are significant distinctions. First, the  historical evidence Faretta relied on as identifying a right of  self-representation, 422 U. S., at 812 -817, is not useful here because it  pertained to times when lawyers were scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily  available to the average person accused of crime, whereas it has since been  recognized that every indigent defendant in a criminal trial has a  constitutional right to the assistance of appointed counsel, see Gideon v.  Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 . Moreover, unlike the right recognized in Faretta,  the historical evidence does not provide any support for an affirmative  constitutional right to appellate self-representation. Second, Faretta 's  reliance on the Sixth Amendment's structure interpreted in light of its English  and colonial background, 422 U. S., at 818-832, is not relevant here. Because  the Amendment deals strictly with trial rights and does not include any right to  appeal, see Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 656 , it necessarily follows  that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to  appellate self-representation. Faretta' s inquiries into historical English  practices, 422 U. S., at 821 -824, do not provide a basis for extending that  case to the appellate process because there was no appeal from a criminal  conviction in England until 1907. Third, although Faretta 's conclusion that a  knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to trial counsel must be honored out  of respect for individual autonomy, id., at 834, is also applicable in the  appellate context, this Court has recognized that the right is not absolute, see  id., at 835. Given the Court's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not  apply to appellate proceedings, any individual right to self-representation on  appeal based on autonomy principles must be grounded in the Due Process Clause.  Under the practices prevailing in the Nation today, the Court is entirely  unpersuaded that the risk of disloyalty by a court-appointed attorney, or the  suspicion of such disloyalty, that underlies the constitutional right of  self-representation at trial, see id., at 834, is a sufficient concern to  conclude that such a right is a necessary component of a fair appellate  proceeding. The States are clearly within their discretion to conclude that the  government's interests in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the appellate  process outweigh an invasion of the appellant's interest in self-representation,  although the Court's narrow holding does not preclude the States from  recognizing a constitutional right to appellate self-representation under their  own constitutions. Pp. 3-12.  Affirmed.
On writ of certiorari to the supreme court of california
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.  J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.  Kennedy, J., and Breyer, J., filed concurring opinions. Scalia, J., filed an  opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a  person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right  to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by  imprisonment.1    In Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), we decided  that the defendant also "has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel  when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." Id., at 807. Although  that statement arguably embraces the entire judicial proceeding, we also phrased  the question as whether a State may "constitutionally hale a person into its  criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he  wants to conduct his own defense." Ibid. Our conclusion in Faretta extended only  to a defendant's "constitutional right to conduct his own defense." Id., at 836.  Accordingly, our specific holding was confined to the right to defend oneself at  trial. We now address the different question whether the reasoning in support of  that holding also applies when the defendant becomes an appellant and assumes  the burden of persuading a reviewing court that the conviction should be  reversed. We have concluded that it does not.


2
* Martinez describes himself as a self-taught paralegal with 25 years'  experience at 12 different law firms. See App. 13. While employed as an office  assistant at a firm in Santa Ana, California, Martinez was accused of converting  $6,000 of a client's money to his own use. He was charged in a two-count  information with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of  another. He chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, because he  claimed " `there wasn't an attorney on earth who'd believe me once he saw my  past [criminal record].' " Id., at 15. The jury acquitted him on Count 1, grand  theft, but convicted him on Count 2, embezzlement. The jury also found that he  had three prior convictions; accordingly, under California's "three strikes"  law, the court imposed a mandatory sentence of 25-years-to-life in prison. See  Cal. Penal Code 667(d) and (e)(2) (West 1999). Martinez filed a timely notice  of appeal as well as a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel. The  California Court of Appeal denied his motion, and the California Supreme Court  denied his application for a writ of mandate. While the California Supreme Court  did not issue an opinion in this case, the Court of Appeal previously had  explained:


3
"There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal  as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and  equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth  Amendment, which is the foundation on which Faretta is based. The denial of  self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal  protection guarantees." People v. Scott , 64 Cal. App. 4th 550, 554, 75 Cal.  Rptr. 2d 315, 318 (1998).


4
We granted certiorari because Martinez has raised a question on which both  state and federal courts have expressed conflicting views.2   526 U. S. 1064  (1999). We now affirm.

II

5
The Faretta majority based its conclusion on three inter-related arguments.  First, it examined historical evidence identifying a right of  self-representation that had been protected by federal and state law since the  beginning of our Nation, 422 U. S., at 812 -817. Second, it interpreted the  structure of the Sixth Amendment, in the light of its English and colonial  background, id., at 818-832. Third, it concluded that even though it "is  undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend  with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts," a knowing and  intelligent waiver "must be honored out of `that respect for the individual  which is the lifeblood of the law.' Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350-351  [(1970)]." Faretta , 422 U. S., at 834 . Some of the Court's reasoning is  applicable to appellate proceedings as well as to trials. There are, however,  significant distinctions.


6
The historical evidence relied upon by Faretta as identifying a right of  self-representation is not always useful because it pertained to times when  lawyers were scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily available to the average  person accused of crime.3   For one who could not obtain a lawyer,  self-representation was the only feasible alternative to asserting no defense at  all. Thus, a government's recognition of an indigent defendant's right to  represent himself was comparable to bestowing upon the homeless beggar a "right"  to take shelter in the sewers of Paris. Not surprisingly, early precedent  demonstrates that this "right" was not always used to the defendant's advantage  as a shield, but rather was often employed by the prosecution as a sword. The  principal case cited in Faretta is illustrative. In Adams v. United States ex  rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), the Court relied on the existence of the  right of self-representation as the basis for finding that an unrepresented  defendant had waived his right to a trial by jury.4


7
It has since been recognized, however, that an indigent defendant in a  criminal trial has a constitutional right to the assistance of appointed  counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). Thus, an individual's  decision to represent himself is no longer compelled by the necessity of  choosing self-representation over incompetent or nonexistent representation;  rather, it more likely reflects a genuine desire to " `conduct his own cause in  his own words.' " Faretta , 422 U. S., at 823 (footnote omitted). Therefore,  while Faretta is correct in concluding that there is abundant support for the  proposition that a right to self-representation has been recognized for  centuries, the original reasons for protecting that right do not have the same  force when the availability of competent counsel for every indigent defendant  has displaced the need--although not always the desire--for self-representation.


8
The scant historical evidence pertaining to the issue of  self-representation on appeal is even less helpful. The Court in Faretta relied  upon the description of the right in 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat.  92, which states that "the parties may plead and manage their own causes  personally or by the assistance of such counsel ... ." 422 U. S., at 812 . It is  arguable that this language encompasses appeals as well as trials. Assuming it  does apply to appellate proceedings, however, the statutory right is expressly  limited by the phrase "as by the rules of the said courts." 1 Stat. 92.  Appellate courts have maintained the discretion to allow litigants to "manage  their own causes"--and some such litigants have done so effectively.5   That  opportunity, however, has been consistently subject to each court's own rules.


9
We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of  self-representation on appeal. We might, nonetheless, paraphrase Faretta and  assert: No State or Colony ever forced counsel upon a convicted appellant, and  no spokesman ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable or  advisable. 422 U. S., at 832. Such negative historical evidence was meaningful  to the Faretta Court, because the fact that the "[dog] had not barked"6 arguably demonstrated that early lawmakers intended to preserve the  "long-respected right of self-representation" at trial. Ibid. Historical  silence, however, has no probative force in the appellate context because there  simply was no long-respected right of self-representation on appeal. In fact,  the right of appeal itself is of relatively recent origin.


10
Appeals as of right in federal courts were nonexistent for the first  century of our Nation, and appellate review of any sort was "rarely allowed."  Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 656 , n. 3 (1977). The States, also, did  not generally recognize an appeal as of right until Washington became the first  to constitutionalize the right explicitly in 1889.7   There was similarly no  right to appeal in criminal cases at common law, and appellate review of any  sort was "limited" and "rarely used."8   Thus, unlike the inquiry in Faretta ,  the historical evidence does not provide any support for an affirmative  constitutional right to appellate self-representation.


11
The Faretta majority's reliance on the structure of the Sixth Amendment is  also not relevant. The Sixth Amendment identifies the basic rights that the  accused shall enjoy in "all criminal prosecutions." They are presented strictly  as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself.  The Sixth Amendment does not include any right to appeal. As we have recognized,  "[t]he right of appeal, as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a  creature of statute." Abney, 431 U. S., at 656 . It necessarily follows that the  Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to  self-representation on appeal.


12
The Faretta majority's nontextual interpretation of the Sixth Amendment  also included an examination of British criminal jurisprudence and a reference  to the opprobrious trial practices before the Star Chamber. 422 U. S., at 821  -824. These inquiries into historical English practices, however, again do not  provide a basis for extending Faretta to the appellate process, because there  was no appeal from a criminal conviction in England until 1907. See Griffin v.  Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment); 7  Edw. VII, ch. 23 (1907). Indeed, none of our many cases safeguarding the rights  of an indigent appellant has placed any reliance on either the Sixth Amendment  or on Faretta. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 356-358 (1963);  Griffin, 351 U. S., at 12 .


13
Finally, the Faretta majority found that the right to self-representation  at trial was grounded in part in a respect for individual autonomy. See 422 U.  S., at 834 . This consideration is, of course, also applicable to an appellant  seeking to manage his own case. As we explained in Faretta , at the trial level  "[t]o force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law  contrives against him." Ibid. On appellate review, there is surely a similar  risk that the appellant will be skeptical of whether a lawyer, who is employed  by the same government that is prosecuting him, will serve his cause with  undivided loyalty. Equally true on appeal is the related observation that it is  the appellant personally who will bear the consequences of the appeal. See ibid.


14
In light of our conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to  appellate proceedings, any individual right to self-representation on appeal  based on autonomy principles must be grounded in the Due Process Clause. Under  the practices that prevail in the Nation today, however, we are entirely  unpersuaded that the risk of either disloyalty or suspicion of disloyalty is a  sufficient concern to conclude that a constitutional right of  self-representation is a necessary component of a fair appellate proceeding. We  have no doubt that instances of disloyal representation are rare. In both trials  and appeals there are, without question, cases in which counsel's performance is  ineffective. Even in those cases, however, it is reasonable to assume that  counsel's performance is more effective than what the unskilled appellant could  have provided for himself.


15
No one, including Martinez and the Faretta majority, attempts to argue that  as a rule pro se representation is wise, desirable or efficient.9   Although we  found in Faretta that the right to defend oneself at trial is "fundamental" in  nature, 422 U. S., at 817, it is clear that it is representation by counsel that  is the standard, not the exception. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285,  307 (1988) (noting the "strong presumption against" waiver of right to counsel).  Our experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense,  particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal  defense attorney."10


16
As the Faretta opinion recognized, the right to self-representation is not  absolute. The defendant must " `voluntarily and intelligently' " elect to  conduct his own defense, 422 U. S., at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.  458, 464-465 (1938)), and most courts require him to so in a timely manner.11    He must first be "made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of  self-representation." 422 U. S, at 835   . A trial judge may also terminate  self-representation or appoint "standby counsel"--even over the defendant's  objection--if necessary. Id., at 834, n. 46. We have further held that standby  counsel may participate in the trial proceedings, even without the express  consent of the defendant, as long as that participation does not "seriously  undermin[e]" the "appearance before the jury" that the defendant is representing  himself. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 187 (1984). Additionally, the trial  judge is under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or  to perform any legal "chores" for the defendant that counsel would normally  carry out. Id., at 183-184. Even at the trial level, therefore, the government's  interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times  outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.


17
In the appellate context, the balance between the two competing interests  surely tips in favor of the State. The status of the accused defendant, who  retains a presumption of innocence throughout the trial process, changes  dramatically when a jury returns a guilty verdict. We have recognized this  shifting focus and noted:


18
"[T]here are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of  a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage from the State's point  of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to  one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt... .


19
"By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who  initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the  State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge  or a jury below." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 610 (1974).


20
In the words of the Faretta majority, appellate proceedings are simply not a  case of "hal[ing] a person into its criminal courts." 422 U. S., at 807 .


21
The requirement of representation by trained counsel implies no disrespect  for the individual inasmuch as it tends to benefit the appellant as well as the  court. Courts, of course, may still exercise their discretion to allow a lay  person to proceed pro se. We already leave to the appellate courts' discretion,  keeping "the best interests of both the prisoner and the government in mind,"  the decision whether to allow a pro se appellant to participate in, or even to  be present at, oral argument. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 284 (1948).  Considering the change in position from defendant to appellant, the autonomy  interests that survive a felony conviction are less compelling than those  motivating the decision in Faretta . Yet the overriding state interest in the  fair and efficient administration of justice remains as strong as at the trial  level. Thus, the States are clearly within their discretion to conclude that the  government's interests outweigh an invasion of the appellant's interest in  self-representation.

III

22
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the holding nor the  reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to  self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. Our holding is,  of course, narrow. It does not preclude the States from recognizing such a right  under their own constitutions. Its impact on the law will be minimal, because a  lay appellant's rights to participate in appellate proceedings have long been  limited by the well-established conclusions that he has no right to be present  during appellate proceedings, Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442 (1892), or to  present oral argument, Price, 334 U. S., at 285 -286. Meanwhile the rules  governing appeals in California, and presumably those in other States as well,  seem to protect the ability of indigent litigants to make pro se filings. See,  e.g., People v. Wende , 25 Cal. 3d 436, 440, 600 P. 2d 1071, 1074 (1979); see  also Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). In requiring Martinez, under  these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-appointed attorney, the  California courts have not deprived him of a constitutional right. Accordingly,  the judgment of the California Supreme Court is affirmed.


23
It is so ordered.



NOTES:


1
  See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.  458 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin,  407 U. S. 25 (1972).


2
  Compare Myers v. Collins , 8 F. 3d 249, 252 (CA5 1993) (finding right of  self-representation extends to appeals); Campbell v. Blodgett , 940 F. 2d 549,  549 (CA9 1991) (same); Chamberlain v. Ericksen , 744 F. 2d 628, 630 (CA8 1984)  (same); Commonwealth v. Rogers , 537 Pa. 581, 583, 645 A. 2d 223, 224 (1994)  (same); State v. Van Pelt , 305 Ark. 125, 127, 810 S. W. 2d 27, 28 (1991)  (same); Webb v. State , 274 Ind. 540, 542, 412 N. E. 2d 790, 792 (1980) (same);  Webb v. State , 533 S. W. 2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (same), with United  States v. Gillis , 773 F. 2d 549, 560 (CA4 1985) (finding no right of  self-representation on appeal); Lumbert v. Finley , 735 F. 2d 239, 246 (CA7  1984) (same); Hill v. State , 656 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1995) (same); State v.  Gillespie , 898 S. W. 2d 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (same).


3
  "The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues of  self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers. When the Colonies were  first settled, `the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-General  and Solicitors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices of the King's  Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the King's prerogatives,  and twisting the law to secure convictions.' This prejudice gained strength in  the Colonies where `distrust of lawyers became an institution.' Several Colonies  prohibited pleading for hire in the 17th century. The prejudice persisted into  the 18th century as `the lower classes came to identify lawyers with the upper  class.' The years of Revolution and Confederation saw an upsurge of antilawyer  sentiment, a `sudden revival, after the War of the Revolution, of the old  dislike and distrust of lawyers as a class.' " Faretta , 422 U. S., at 826 -827  (footnotes omitted)


4
  Similarly, in the state cases cited by the Court in Faretta , see 422 U. S., at  813 , n. 9, the defendant's right to represent himself was often the predicate  for upholding the waiver of an important right. See, e.g ., Mackreth v. Wilson,  31 Ala. App. 191, 193, 15 So. 2d 112, 113 (1943) (failure of the defendant to  request counsel equaled an "election" to proceed pro se ); Lockard v. State , 92  Idaho 813, 822, 451 P. 2d 1014, 1023 (1969) (court relied on defendant's right  of self-representation to uphold an uncounseled guilty plea, despite claims that  it was coerced); People v. Nelson , 47 Ill. 2d 570, 268 N. E. 2d 2, 3 (1971)  (defendant's pro se status is predicate for upholding waiver of indictment and  jury trial and also to uphold guilty plea); Allen v. Commonwealth , 324 Mass.  558, 562-563, 87 N. E. 2d 192, 195 (1949) (life sentence upheld despite fact  that indigent defendant was unable to procure counsel); Westberry v. State , 254  A. 2d 44, 46 (Me. 1969) (guilty plea upheld because defendant failed to claim  indigency or to request counsel); State v. Hollman , 232 S. C. 489, 499, 102 S.  E. 2d 873, 878 (1958) (right of defendant to represent himself used as basis for  finding he had no right to appointed counsel). But see State v. Thomlinson , 78  S. D 235, 237, 100 N. W. 2d 121, 122 (1960) (vacating conviction based on  court's failure to allow defendant to represent himself); State v. Penderville ,  2 Utah. 2d 281, 287, 272 P. 2d 195, 199 (1954) (same); Cappetta v. State , 204  So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. App. 1967) (same), rev'd, State v. Capetta , 216 So. 2d  749, 750 (Fla. 1968) (finding voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to  proceed pro se ).


5
  See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103 (1978) ( pro se respondent argued,  briefed, and prevailed in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and this  Court).


6
  A. Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 383, 400 (1938).


7
  See Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to An Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable  Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 375, 376 (1985).  Although Washington was the first State to constitutionalize an appeal as of  right, almost all of the States historically had some form of discretionary  appellate review. See, generally, L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America  215-231 (1939).


8
  1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 308-310 (1883).


9
  Some critics argue that the right to proceed pro se at trial in certain cases  is akin to allowing the defendant to waive his right to a fair trial. See, e.g.,  United States v. Farhad , 190 F. 3d 1097, 1106-1107 (CA9 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,  concurring specially), cert. pending, No. 99-7127.


10
  Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment  of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years after Faretta, 6 Seton Hall  Const. L. J. 483, 598 (1996).


11
  See id., at 544-550 (collecting cases).



24
Justice Kennedy , concurring.


25
To resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt upon the rationale of  Faretta v. California , 422 U. S. 806 (1975). Faretta can be accepted as quite  sound, yet it does not follow that a convicted person has a similar right of  self-representation on appeal. Different considerations apply in the appellate  system, and the Court explains why this is so. With these observations, I join  the opinion of the Court.


26
Justice Breyer , concurring.


27
I agree with the Court and join its opinion. Because Justice Scalia writes  separately to underscore the continuing constitutional validity of Faretta v.  California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), I note that judges closer to the firing line  have sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences of that  holding. See e.g ., United States v. Farhad , 190 F. 3d 1097, 1107 (CA9 1999)  (concurring opinion) (right of self-representation "frequently, though not  always, conflicts squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial"). I  have found no empirical research, however, that might help determine whether, in  general, the right to represent oneself furthers, or inhibits, the  Constitution's basic guarantee of fairness. And without some strong factual  basis for believing that Faretta' s holding has proved counterproductive in  practice, we are not in a position to reconsider the constitutional assumptions  that underlie that case.


28
Justice Scalia , concurring in the judgment.


29
I do not share the apparent skepticism of today's opinion concerning the  judgment of the Court (often curiously described as merely the judgment of "the  majority") in Faretta v. California , 422 U. S. 806 (1975). I have no doubt that  the Framers of our Constitution, who were suspicious enough of governmental  power--including judicial power--that they insisted upon a citizen's right to be  judged by an independent jury of private citizens, would not have found  acceptable the compulsory assignment of counsel by the Government to plead a  criminal defendant's case. While I might have rested the decision upon the Due  Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment, I believe it was correct.


30
That asserting the right of self-representation may often, or even usually,  work to the defendant's disadvantage is no more remarkable--and no more a basis  for withdrawing the right--than is the fact that proceeding without counsel in  custodial interrogation, or confessing to the crime, usually works to the  defendant's disadvantage. Our system of laws generally presumes that the  criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and  does not need them dictated by the State. Any other approach is unworthy of a  free people. As Justice Frankfurter eloquently put it for the Court in Adams v.  United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942) , to require the acceptance  of counsel "is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the  Constitution." Id., at 280.


31
In any event, Faretta is relevant to the question before us only to the  limited extent that we must decide whether its holding applies to  self-representation on appeal. It seems to me that question is readily answered  by the fact that there is no constitutional right to appeal. See McKane v.  Durston , 153 U. S. 684, 687-688 (1894). Since a State could, as far as the  federal Constitution is concerned, subject its trial-court determinations to no  review whatever, it could a fortiori subject them to review which consists of a  nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts.  Adversarial review with counsel appointed by the State is even less questionable  than that.


32
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

