517 U.S. 830116 S.Ct. 1813135 L.Ed.2d 113
EXXON CO., U. S. A., et al.v.SOFEC, INC., et al.Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
No. 95-129.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 19, 1996
Decided June 10, 1996

Syllabus
Petitioner Exxon's oil tanker, the Houston, ran aground and was lost  several hours after its "breakout" from a mooring facility owned and  operated, or manufactured, by the various respondents.  Exxon filed a  complaint in admiralty against respondents, alleging, inter alia,  negligence and breach of warranty.  In granting respondents' motion to  bifurcate the trial, the District Court limited the first phase thereof  to the question whether the postbreakout conduct of the Houston's captain, Captain Coyne, was the superseding and sole proximate cause of  the loss of the ship, leaving the issue of causation of the breakout  itself for the second phase.  After a bench trial, the court found that  Captain Coyne's (and by imputation, Exxon's) extraordinary negligence  was indeed the superseding and sole proximate cause of the Houston's  grounding, and entered final judgment against Exxon.  The Ninth Circuit  affirmed.  Among other things, it rejected Exxon's legal argument that  the  doctrines of proximate causation and superseding cause are no longer applicable in admiralty in light of United States v. Reliable Transfer,  421 U. S. 397, in which this Court abandoned  the "divided damages" rule  previously applied in admiralty and adopted the comparative fault  principle for allocating damages among responsible parties; held that  the District Court's causation findings were well supported by the  record and not clearly erroneous; ruled that the lower court did not err  in rendering judgment against Exxon on its breach of warranty claims; and concluded that, under the circumstances, the bifurcation of the  trial was not an abuse of discretion.
Held:  A plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding, and thus the  sole proximate, cause of its own injury cannot recover part of its  damages from tortfeasors or contracting partners whose blameworthy  actions or breaches were causes in fact of the plaintiff's injury. Pp.  5-11.
(a) The Court rejects Exxon's primary argument that the proximate  causation requirement, and the related superseding cause doctrine, are  not or should not be applicable in admiralty. The Court finds  unpersuasive Exxon's assertion that  the lower courts' refusal to  allocate any share of damages to parties whose fault was a cause in fact  of its injury conflicts  with Reliable Transfer.  The proximate causation  requirement was not before the Court in that case, and the Court did not  suggest that it was inapplicable in admiralty.  There is nothing  internally inconsistent in a system that apportions damages based upon comparative fault only among tortfeasors whose actions were proximate  causes of an injury.  Nor is there any repugnancy between the  superseding cause doctrine, which is one facet of the proximate  causation requirement, and a comparative fault method of allocating  damages.  Exxon may be correct that common-law proximate cause concepts  are complex and sometimes confusing, but those concepts are generally  thought to be a necessary limitation on liability.  In ruling upon  whether a defendant's blameworthy act was sufficiently related to the  resulting harm to warrant imposing liability for that harm on the  defendant, admiralty courts may draw guidance from, inter alia, the  extensive body of state law applying proximate causation requirements  and from treatises and other scholarly sources.  Pp. 5-8.
(b) Exxon's argument that the District Court erred in rendering judgment  against it on its breach of warranty claims fares no better. Exxon errs  in relying upon Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon  Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315, which does not purport to deal with the  proximate causation limitation for damages on such claims and is not  relevant here. Where the injured party is the sole proximate cause of  the damage complained of, that party cannot recover in contract from  a party whose breach of warranty is found to be a mere cause in fact of  the damage.  Although the principles of legal causation sometimes  receive labels in contract analysis different from the "proximate  causation" label most frequently employed in tort analysis, these  principles nevertheless also restrict liability in contract.  The  finding that Captain Coyne's extraordinary negligence was the sole  proximate cause of Exxon's injury suffices to cut off respondents'  liability for that injury on a contractual breach of warranty theory as  well.  Pp. 8-9.
(c) Also rejected is Exxon's argument that the lower court's findings that Captain Coyne's extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate  cause of Exxon's injury were in error.  Although Exxon identifies some  tension in the courts' various findings, it has not made the sort of  "obvious and exceptional showing of error," Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.  Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275, that would justify this  Court's reversal of the lower courts' ultimate conclusion.  Pp. 10-11.
(d) Exxon's argument that bifurcation of the trial was error is not  within the questions upon which this Court granted certiorari.  To the  extent that the argument reprises the issue whether the fault of all  parties must be considered together in order that they may be compared  under Reliable Transfer, it is rejected.  To the extent that Exxon  argues that the District Court abused its discretion in dividing the  trial in the particular way that it did, the Court declines to address  the argument.  P. 11.  54 F. 3d 570, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in  the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are  requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the  United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other  formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the  preliminary print goes to press.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397 (1975),  we abandoned the "divided damages" rule previously applied to claims in  admiralty for property damages, and adopted the comparative fault  principle for allocating damages among parties responsible for an  injury.  In this case we affirm that the requirement of legal or  "proximate" causation, and the related "superseding cause" doctrine,  apply in admiralty notwithstanding our adoption of the comparative fault  principle.

I.

2
This case arises from the stranding of a tanker, the Exxon Houston, several hours after it broke away from a Single Point Mooring  System (SPM) owned and operated by the HIRI respondents and manufactured  by respondent Sofec, Inc.1  The Houston was engaged in delivering oil  into HIRI's pipeline through two floating hoses, pursuant to a contract  between Exxon and respondent PRII, when a heavy storm broke the chafe  chain linking the vessel to the SPM.  As the vessel drifted, the oil hoses broke away from the SPM.  The parting of the second hose at approximately 1728 nautical time was designated below as the "breakout."  The hoses were bolted to the ship, and a portion of the second hose  remained attached to the ship.  So long as the hose was attached to and  trailing from the ship, it threatened to foul the ship's propeller, and  consequently the ship's ability to maneuver was restricted.


3
During the 2 hours and 41 minutes following the breakout, the captain of the Houston, Captain Coyne, took the ship through a series of  maneuvers described in some detail in the District Court's findings of  fact.  The District Court found that by 1803, a small assist vessel, the  Nene, was able to get control of the end of the hose so that it was no  longer a threat to the Houston.  See 54 F. 3d 570, 572 (CA9 1995).  Between 1803 and 1830, Captain Coyne maneuvered the Houston out to sea  and away from shallow water.  The District Court, and on appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, found that by 1830, the  Houston had successfully avoided the peril resulting from the breakout.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 65; 54 F. 3d, at 578-579.  The ship had "reached  a safe position," App. to Pet. for Cert. 64, and was "heading out to sea  and in no further danger of stranding," id., at 65; 54 F. 3d, at 578.


4
Many of Captain Coyne's actions after 1830 were negligent, according to the courts below.  Most significant was his failure to have  someone plot the ship's position between 1830 and 2004, a period during  which the crews of the Houston and the Nene were working to disconnect  the hose from the Houston.  Without knowing his position, Captain Coyne  was unable to make effective use of a navigational chart to check for  hazards.  The courts found that this failure to plot fixes of the ship's  position was grossly and extraordinarily negligent.  App. to Pet. for  Cert. 61; 54 F. 3d, at 578.  The District Court found that "Captain  Coyne's decisions were made calmly, deliberately and without the  pressure of an imminent peril."  App. to Pet. for Cert. 60.  His failure  to plot fixes after 1830 "was entirely independent of the fact of breakout; he voluntarily decided not to plot fixes in a situation where  he was able to plot fixes."  Id., at 64.


5
At 1956, Captain Coyne initiated a final turn toward the shore.  Because he had not plotted the ship's position, Captain Coyne was  unaware of its position until he ordered another crew member to plot the  fix at 2004.  Upon seeing the fix on the chart, the captain apparently  realized that the ship was headed for a reef.  Captain Coyne's ensuing  efforts to avoid the reef came too late, and moments later the ship ran  aground, resulting in its constructive total loss.  The District Court  found that Captain Coyne's decision to make this final turn "was not foreseeable."  Id., at 65.


6
Exxon filed a complaint in admiralty against the HIRI respondents and respondent Sofec for, inter alia, the loss of its ship  and cargo.  The complaint contained claims for breach of warranty,  strict products liability, and negligence.  HIRI filed a complaint  against several third-party respondents, who had manufactured and  supplied the chafe chain that held the tanker to the SPM.


7
Before trial, respondents suggested that Captain Coyne's conduct  was the superseding and sole proximate cause of the loss of the ship,  and they moved to bifurcate the trial.  Respondents and the third-party  respondents disputed among themselves the cause of the breakout, and  they apparently sought bifurcation of the trial to avoid lengthy  proceedings to resolve those factual disputes prior to a determination  whether Captain Coyne's conduct was the superseding cause of Exxon's  injury.  The District Court granted the motion, limiting the first phase  of the trial to the issue of proximate causation with respect to actions  taken after the breakout, and leaving the issue of causation of the  breakout itself for the second phase.


8
Following a 3-week bench trial in admiralty, the District Court  found that Captain Coyne's (and by imputation, Exxon's) extraordinary  negligence was the superseding and sole proximate cause of the Houston's  grounding.  Id., at 63.  The court entered final judgment against Exxon  with respect to the loss of the Houston, and Exxon appealed.


9
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court's findings "that  Captain Coyne had ample time, as well as opportunity and available  manpower, to take precautions which would have eliminated the risk of  grounding, and that his failure to do so amounted to extraordinary  negligence, superseding any negligence of the defendants with regard to  the breakout or provision of safe berth after the breakout," were "well  supported by the record," and not clearly erroneous.  54 F. 3d, at 579.  The court rejected Exxon's contention that the captain's actions were foreseeable reactions to the breakout; rather, it noted, Captain Coyne  himself had explained that he did not plot fixes "because he felt it was  unnecessary to do so."  Id., at 578.


10
Relying upon Circuit precedent, the court rejected Exxon's legal  argument that the doctrines of proximate causation and superseding cause  were no longer applicable in admiralty in light of this Court's decision  in Reliable Transfer.  "[A]n intervening force supersedes prior  negligence" and thus breaks the chain of proximate causation required to  impose liability on the original actor, the court held, "where the  subsequent actor's negligence was `extraordinary' (defined as `neither  normal nor reasonably foreseeable')."  Id., at 574.  The court also  rejected Exxon's argument that the District Court erred in  rendering judgment against Exxon on its breach of warranty claims.  "Where, as  here, the district court finds the injured party to be the superseding  or sole proximate cause of the damage complained of, it cannot recover  from a party whose actions or omissions are deemed to be causes in fact,  but not legal causes of the damage." Id., at 576.  Finally, the court  held that under the circumstances of the case, the District Court's  bifurcation of the trial was not an abuse of discretion.  We granted  certiorari. 516 U. S. ___ (1995).

II.

11
Exxon makes four arguments for the reversal of the judgment below: (1) that the superseding cause doctrine does not or should not  apply in admiralty; (2) that respondents' breaches of warranty were  causes in fact of the loss of the Houston and hence respondents should  be liable for that loss; (3) that the lower courts' finding that Captain  Coyne's extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of the  loss of the Houston was in error; and (4) that the District Court abused  its discretion and deprived Exxon of due process in bifurcating the   issue of proximate causation from the other issues.

A.

12
Exxon's primary argument is that the proximate causation requirement, and the related superseding cause doctrine, are not or  should not be applicable in admiralty.  In particular, Exxon asserts  that the lower courts' refusal to allocate any share of damages to  parties whose fault was a cause in fact of Exxon's injury conflicts with  our decision in Reliable Transfer.


13
We disagree.  In Reliable Transfer, we discarded a longstanding  rule that property damages in admiralty cases are to be divided equally  between those liable for injury, "whatever the relative degree of their  fault may have been," 421 U. S., at 397, and adopted the comparative  fault principle in its stead.2  The proximate causation requirement  was not before us in Reliable Transfer, and we did not suggest that the  requirement was inapplicable in admiralty.  (Nor, for that matter, did  we consider whether the injury had been proximately caused by the defendant in that case.)


14
There is nothing internally inconsistent in a system that apportions damages based upon comparative fault only among tortfeasors  whose actions were proximate causes of an injury. Nor is there any  repugnancy between the superseding cause doctrine, which is one facet of  the proximate causation requirement, and a comparative fault method of  allocating damages.  As Professor Schoenbaum has said:


15
"The doctrine of superseding cause is . . . applied where the defendant's negligence in fact substantially contributed to  the plaintiff's injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a later  cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.  It is properly  applied in admiralty cases.  [T]he  superseding cause doctrine can be  reconciled with comparative negligence. Superseding cause operates to  cut off the liability of an admittedly negligent defendant, and there is  properly no apportionment of comparative fault where there is an absence  of proximate causation."  1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law Section(s) 5-3, pp. 165-166 (2d ed. 1994).


16
Indeed, the HIRI respondents assert that of the 46 States that  have adopted a comparative fault system, at least 44 continue to  recognize and apply the superseding cause doctrine. Brief for HIRI  Respondents 28, and n. 31; id., at App. A (listing state court  decisions).  Exxon does not take issue with this assertion and concedes  that it is not aware of any state decision that holds otherwise.  Tr. of  Oral Arg. 10.


17
Exxon also argues that we should in any event eschew in the admiralty context the "confusing maze of common-law proximate cause  concepts"; a system in which damages are allocated based upon the degree  of comparative fault of any party whose act was a cause in fact of  injury is "fairer and simpler," it says. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2.  It is true that commentators have often lamented the degree of  disagreement regarding the principles of proximate causation and  confusion in the doctrine's application, see, e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser  and Keeton on the Law of Torts 263 (5th ed. 1984), but it is also true  that proximate causation principles are generally thought to be a  necessary limitation on liability, see, e.g., id., at 264, 293, 294,  312. Indeed, the system Exxon apparently proposes either would let proximate causation principles, with all of their complexity, creep back  in as one factor in the "comparative fault" analysis itself, see n. 2,  supra, or would produce extreme results.  "In a philosophical sense, the  consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an  event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond."  Keeton, supra,  at 264. Nevertheless,


18
"the careless actor will [not] always be held for all damages for which the forces that he risked were a cause in fact. Somewhere a  point will be reached when courts will agree  that the link has become  too tenuous--that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity.  Thus, if the [negligent] destruction of the Michigan Avenue Bridge had  delayed the arrival of a doctor, with consequent loss of a patient's  life, few judges would impose liability."  Petition of Kinsman Transit  Co., 338 F. 2d 708, 725 (CA2 1964), quoted in 1 Schoenbaum, supra,  Section(s) 5-3, at 164.


19
In ruling upon whether a defendant's blameworthy act was sufficiently related to the resulting harm to warrant imposing liability  for that harm on the defendant, courts sitting in admiralty may draw  guidance from, inter alia, the extensive body of state law applying  proximate causation requirements and from treatises and other scholarly  sources. See Keeton, supra, at 279 ("`The best use that can be made of  the authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations of  situations which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged  to be on one side of the line or the other'") (quoting 1 T. Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 110 (1906)).

B.

20
Exxon's argument that the District Court erred in rendering judgment against Exxon on its breach of warranty claims fares no better.  Exxon implicitly argues that because the respondents breached various  contractual warranties, they were "best situated" to prevent the loss of  the Houston; and Exxon invokes a passage from Italia Societa per Azioni  di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315 (1964).  In  Italia Societa, we held that a stevedore breaches its implied warranty   of workmanlike service to a shipowner when the stevedore nonnegligently  supplies defective equipment that injures one of its employees during  stevedoring operations.  That case does not purport to deal with the  proximate causation limitation for damages on a warranty claim and is  not relevant to the question presented here.


21
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that where the injured party is  the sole proximate cause of the damage complained of, that party cannot  recover in contract from a party whose breach of warranty is found to be  a mere cause in fact of the damage. Although the principles of legal  causation sometimes receive labels in contract analysis different from  the "proximate causation" label most frequently employed in tort  analysis, these principles nevertheless exist to restrict liability in  contract as well.  Indeed, the requirement of foreseeability may  be more stringent in the context of contract liability than it is in the context  of tort liability.  See East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval  Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 874-875 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Contracts  Section(s) 351 and Comment a, pp. 135-136 (1979); 11 W. Jaeger,  Williston on Contracts Section(s) 1344, pp. 227-228 (3d ed. 1968); 5 A.  Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Section(s) 1008, pp. 75-76 (1964); id.,  Section(s) 1019, at 113-116; cf. 3 E. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on  Contracts Section(s) 12.14, pp. 241-243 (1990) (Hadley v. Baxendale, 9  Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), "impose[s] a more severe limitation on the recovery of damages for breach of contract than that applicable  to actions in tort or for breach of warranty, in which substantial or  proximate cause is the test").  The finding that Captain Coyne's  extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of Exxon's injury  suffices to cut off respondents' liability for that injury on a  contractual breach of warranty theory as well.

C.

22
The legal question that we took this case to address is whether  a plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding and thus the sole  proximate cause of its own injury can recover part of its damages from  tortfeasors or contracting partners whose blameworthy actions or  breaches were causes in fact of the plaintiff's injury.  As we have held  above, the answer is that it may not.  Apparently anticipating that this  legal issue would not likely be resolved in its favor, Exxon devotes a  large portion of its briefs to arguing that the findings by the lower   courts that Captain Coyne's extraordinary negligence was the sole  proximate cause of Exxon's injury were in error.  The issues of   proximate causation and superseding cause involve application of  law to fact, which is left to the factfinder, subject to limited review. See,  e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 473-476   (1877); Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, at 320-321; 5 Corbin,  supra, Section(s) 998, at 22-23.  "A court of law, such as this Court  is, rather than a court for correction of errors in fact finding, cannot  undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in  the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error."  Graver  Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275 (1949);  see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 665 (1987);  Reliable Transfer, 421 U. S., at 401, n. 2.  Although Exxon identifies  some tension in the various findings made by the courts below,3 we  nevertheless conclude that Exxon has not  made an "obvious and  exceptional showing of error" that would justify our reversal of the  courts' ultimate conclusion, reached after a 3-week trial and review of  a lengthy and complex record. Without necessarily ratifying the  application of proximate causation principles by the courts below to the  particular facts here, we decline to reconsider their conclusion.

D.

23
Finally, Exxon argues that the District Court erred in bifurcating the trial.  This issue is not within the questions upon  which we granted certiorari.  See Pet. for Cert. i.  To the extent that  Exxon argues that the issue involved here--whether one cause of injury  is a superseding cause--can never be bifurcated from other issues, we  reject that contention.  Again, Exxon relies upon Reliable Transfer in  asserting that the fault of all parties must be considered together in  order that they may be compared.  As explained above, that argument is  wrong: A party whose fault did not proximately cause the injury is not liable at all.  To the extent that Exxon argues that the District Court  abused its discretion in dividing the trial in the particular way that  it did here, we decline to address that argument.


24
The judgment is affirmed.


25

It is so ordered.




1
 The Houston was owned and operated by petitioner Exxon  Shipping Company, whose vessels carried crude oil for petitioner Exxon Company, U. S. A.  We will refer to both of these companies as Exxon.  The HIRI respondents are several affiliated corporations: Pacific  Resources, Inc.; Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc.; PRI Marine, Inc.;  and PRI International, Inc. (PRII).


2
 Some commentators have suggested that there may be a distinction between a system allocating damages on the basis of comparative culpability, and a system allocating damages on the basis of  both comparative culpability and the degree to which fault proximately  or foreseeably contributed to an injury.  W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton  on the Law of Torts 474 (5th ed. 1984); 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and  Maritime Law Section(s) 5-4, p. 167 (2d ed. 1994); Owen & Whitman,  Fifteen Years Under Reliable Transfer: 1975-1990, Developments in  American Maritime Law in Light of the Rule of Comparative Fault, J. Mar.  L. & Com. 445, 476-483 (1991).  We continue to use the term "comparative fault" employed in Reliable Transfer, but we do not mean thereby to take  a position on which of these systems is the appropriate one, assuming  that there is in fact a distinction between them.


3
 Exxon argues that the courts' findings--that by 1803, the  Nene had gained control of the end of the hose so that it was no longer a threat to the Houston, and that by 1830, the Houston had successfully  avoided the peril resulting from alleged breaches of duty on  respondents' part, had "reached a safe position," and was "heading out  to sea and in no further danger of stranding"--are inconsistent with the  apparently uncontested finding that the hose, which was suspended from  the ship's crane during efforts to disconnect the hose from the ship,  caused the crane to topple at 1944, injuring a crewman.  We note in this  regard that the District Court expressly found that the captain's  failure to plot fixes after 1830 "was entirely independent of the fact  of breakout" and that "he voluntarily decided not to plot fixes in a situation where he was able to plot fixes"; the Court of Appeals also  relied upon the fact that Captain Coyne himself had explained that he  did not plot fixes "because he felt it was unnecessary to do so."


