518 U.S. 322116 S.Ct. 2163135 L.Ed.2d 590
LEWISv.UNITED STATESCertiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
No. 95-6465.
Argued April 23, 1996
Decided June 24, 1996

Syllabus
Petitioner was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, each  charge carrying a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months.  He  requested a jury, but the magistrate judge ordered a bench trial,  explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six  months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial.  The District  Court affirmed.  In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth  Amendment jury-trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment, and that because each offense charged here was petty in  character, the fact that petitioner was facing more than six months'  imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial.  The  court explained in dictum that because the offense's characterization as  petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, not the sentence  faced, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not  deprive  a defendant of that right.
Held:
1.  A defendant who is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple  petty offenses does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial  where the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses exceeds six  months.  The right to a jury trial is reserved for defendants accused of  serious offenses and does not extend to petty offenses.  Duncan v.  Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159.  The most relevant criterion with which  to assess the seriousness of an offense is the legislature's judgment of  the offense's character, primarily as expressed in the maximum authorized prison term.  An offense carrying a maximum term of six months or less is presumed petty, unless the legislature has authorized  additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate that it  considered the offense serious.  E.g., Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489  U. S. 538, 543.  Here, by setting the maximum prison term at six months,  Congress categorized the offense of obstructing the mail as petty.  The  fact that petitioner was charged with two counts of a petty offense, and therefore faced an aggregate potential prison term greater than six  months, does not change Congress' judgment of the particular offense's  gravity, nor does it transform the petty offense into a serious one, to  which the jury-trial right would apply. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418  U. S. 506, 511, and Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488, distinguished. Pp.  3-8.
2.  Because petitioner is not entitled to a jury trial, the Court does  not reach the question whether a judge's self-imposed limitation on  sentencing may affect the jury-trial right.  P. 8. 65 F. 3d 252,  affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.  J., and Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an  opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined.  Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in  the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are  requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the  United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other  formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the  preliminary print goes to press.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
This case presents the question whether a defendant who is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses has a  constitutional right to a jury trial where the aggregate prison term  authorized for the offenses exceeds six months.  We  are also asked to  decide whether a defendant who would otherwise have a constitutional  right to a jury trial may be denied that right because the presiding  judge has made a pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed  will not exceed six months.


2
We conclude that no jury-trial right exists where a defendant is  prosecuted for multiple petty offenses.  The Sixth Amendment's guarantee  of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its  scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate  prison term in excess of six months for petty offenses charged.  Because  we decide that no jury-trial right exists where a defendant is charged  with multiple petty offenses, we do not reach the second question.

I.

3
Petitioner Ray Lewis was a mail handler for the United States Postal Service.  One day, postal inspectors saw him open  several pieces  of mail and pocket the contents.  The next day, the inspectors routed  "test" mail, containing marked currency, through petitioner's station.  After seeing petitioner open the mail and remove the currency, the  inspectors arrested him. Petitioner was charged with two counts of  obstructing the mail, in violation of 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 1701.  Each  count carried a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months.  Petitioner requested a jury, but the magistrate judge granted the Government's motion for a bench trial.  She explained that because she  would not, under any circumstances, sentence petitioner to more than six  months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial.


4
Petitioner sought review of the denial of a jury trial, and the  District Court affirmed.  Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals  for the Second Circuit affirmed.  65 F. 3d 252 (1995). The court noted  that the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right pertains only to serious  offenses, that is, those for which the legislature has authorized a  maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment.  The court then  addressed the question whether a defendant facing more than six months'  imprisonment in the aggregate for multiple petty offenses is  nevertheless entitled to a jury trial.  The Court of Appeals concluded  that,  for determination of the right to a jury trial, the proper focus  is on the legislature's determination regarding the character of  the offense, as indicated by maximum penalty authorized, not on  the length  of the maximum aggregate sentence faced.  Id., at 254-255. Because each  offense charged here was petty in character, the court concluded that  petitioner was not entitled  to a jury trial.


5
The court explained in dictum that because the character of the  offense as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, not  the sentence faced, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on  sentencing could not deprive a defendant of the right to a jury trial.  Id., at 255-256.


6
We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. ___ (1996), to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether a defendant prosecuted in  a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses has a constitutional  right to a jury trial, where the aggregate sentence authorized for the  offenses exceeds six months' imprisonment, and whether such jury-trial  right can be eliminated by a judge's pretrial commitment that the  aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months.  See United  States  v. Coppins, 953 F. 2d 86 (CA4 1991); United States v. Bencheck, 926 F. 2d 1512 (CA10 1991); Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F. 2d 563 (CA9 1987).

II.

7
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public  trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime  shall have been committed . . . ."  It is well-established that the  Sixth Amendment, like the common law, reserves this jury-trial right for  prosecutions of serious offenses, and that "there is a category of petty  crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury  trial provision."  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159 (1968).


8
To determine whether an offense is properly characterized as "petty," courts at one time looked to the nature of the offense and  whether it was triable by a jury at common law.  Such determinations  became difficult, because many statutory offenses lack common-law  antecedents. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U. S. 538, 541, and n. 5   (1989). Therefore, more recently, we have instead sought "objective  indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense."  Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147, 148 (1969); accord, District of  Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 628 (1937).  Now, to determine  whether an offense is petty, we consider the maximum penalty attached to  the offense.  This criterion is considered the most relevant with which  to assess the character of an offense, because it reveals the  legislature's judgment about the offense's severity.  "The judiciary  should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a  legislature, which is far better equipped to perform the task . . . ."  Blanton, 489 U. S., at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In  evaluating the seriousness of the offense, we place primary emphasis on  the maximum prison term authorized.  While penalties such as probation  or a fine may infringe on a defendant's freedom, the deprivation of  liberty imposed by imprisonment makes that penalty the best indicator of whether the legislature considered an offense to be "petty" or "serious."  Id., at 542.  An offense carrying a maximum prison term of  six months or less is presumed petty, unless the legislature has  authorized additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate that  the legislature considered the offense serious.  Id., at 543; Codispoti  v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506, 512 (1974).


9
Here, the maximum authorized penalty for obstruction of mail is  six months' imprisonment-a penalty that presumptively places the offense  in the "petty" category.  We face the question whether petitioner is  nevertheless entitled to a jury trial, because he was tried in a single  proceeding for two counts of the petty offense so that the potential  aggregated penalty is 12 months' imprisonment.


10
Petitioner argues that, where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses in a single prosecution, the Sixth Amendment  requires that the aggregate potential penalty be the basis for  determining whether a jury trial is required.  Although each offense  charged here was petty, petitioner faced a potential penalty of more  than six months' imprisonment; and, of course, if any offense charged  had authorized more than six months' imprisonment, he would have been  entitled to a jury trial.  The Court must look to the aggregate  potential prison term to determine the existence of the jury-trial  right, petitioner contends, not to the "petty" character of the offenses  charged.


11
We disagree.  The Sixth Amendment reserves the jury-trial right  to defendants accused of serious crimes.  As set forth above, we  determine whether an offense is serious by looking to the judgment of  the legislature, primarily as expressed in the maximum authorized term  of imprisonment.  Here, by setting the maximum authorized prison term at  six months, the legislature categorized the offense of obstructing the  mail as petty.  The fact that the petitioner was charged with two counts  of a petty offense does not revise the legislative judgment as to the gravity of that particular offense, nor does it transform the petty  offense into a serious one, to which the jury-trial right would apply.  We note that there is precedent at common law that a jury trial was not  provided to a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses.  See,  e.g., Queen v. Matthews, 10 Mod. 26, 88 Eng. Rep. 609 (Q. B. 1712); King  v. Swallow, 8 T. R. 285, 101 Eng. Rep. 1392 (K. B. 1799).


12
Petitioner nevertheless insists that a defendant is entitled to  a jury trial whenever he faces a deprivation of liberty for a period  exceeding six months, a proposition for which he cites our precedent  establishing the six-months' prison sentence as the presumptive cut-off  for determining whether an offense is "petty" or "serious."  To be sure,  in the cases in which we sought to determine the line between "petty"  and "serious" for Sixth Amendment purposes, we considered the severity  of the authorized deprivation of liberty as an indicator of the legislature's appraisal of the offense.  See Blanton, supra, at 542-543;  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 68-69 (1970) (plurality).  But it is  now settled that a legislature's determination that an offense carries a  maximum prison terms of six months or less indicates its view that an  offense is "petty." Blanton, supra, at 543.  Where we have a judgment  by the legislature that an offense is "petty," we do not look to the poten-tial prison term faced by a particular defendant who is charged  with more than one such petty offense.  The maximum authorized penalty  provides an "objective indicatio[n] of the seriousness with which  society regards the offense," Frank, 395 U. S., at 148, and it is that  indication that is used to determine whether a jury trial is required,  not the particularities of an individual case.  Here, the penalty authorized by Congress manifests its judgment that the offense is petty,  and the term of imprisonment faced by petitioner by virtue of the second  count does not alter that fact.


13
Petitioner directs our attention to Codispoti for support for the assertion that the "aggregation of multiple petty offenses renders a  prosecution serious for jury trial purposes."  Brief for Petitioner 18.  Codispoti is inapposite.  There, defendants were each convicted at a  single, nonjury trial for several charges of criminal contempt.  The  Court was unable to determine the legislature's judgment of the  character of that offense, however, because the legislature had not set  a specific penalty for criminal contempt.  In such a situation, where  the legislature has not specified a maximum penalty, courts use the severity of the penalty actually imposed as the measure of the character  of the particular offense. Codispoti, supra, at 511; Frank, 395 U. S.,  at 149.  Here, in contrast, we need not look to the punishment actually  imposed, because we are able to discern Congress' judgment of the  character of the offense.


14
Furthermore, Codispoti emphasized the special concerns raised by  the criminal contempt context.  Contempt "often strikes at the most  vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's  temperament. Even where the  contempt is not a direct insult to  the court . . . it frequently  represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with  the judicial process . . . ."  Codispoti, supra, at 516 (internal  quotation marks omitted); see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S.  455, 465-466 (1971).  In the face of courtroom disruption, a judge may  have difficulty maintaining the detachment necessary for fair  adjudication; at the same time, it is a judge who "determines which and  how many acts of contempt the citation will cover," "determine[s] guilt  or innocence absent a jury," and "impose[s] the sentence." Codispoti,  418 U. S., at 515.  Therefore, Codispoti concluded that the  concentration of power in the judge in the often heated contempt context  presented the "very likelihood of arbitrary action that the requirement  of jury trial was intended to avoid or alleviate."  Id., at 515.  The  benefit of a jury trial, "`as a protection against the arbitrary  exercise of official power,'" was deemed particularly important in that  context. Id., at 516 (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 202   (1968)).


15
The absence of a legislative judgment about the offense's seriousness, coupled with the unique concerns presented in a criminal  contempt case, persuaded us in Codispoti that, in those circumstances,  the jury-trial right should be determined by the aggregate penalties  actually imposed. Codispoti was held to be entitled to a jury trial,  because the sentence actually imposed on him for criminal contempt  exceeded six months.  By comparison, in Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488   (1974), which similarly involved a defendant convicted of criminal  contempt in a jurisdiction where the legislature had not specified a  penalty, we determined that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial, because the sentence actually imposed for criminal contempt did  not exceed six months. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's argument, see post  at 2-4, 8, Codispoti and Taylor do  not stand for the sweeping  proposition that, outside their narrow context, the jury-trial right is  determined by the aggregate penalties faced by a defendant.


16
Certainly the aggregate potential penalty faced by petitioner is  of serious importance to him.  But to determine whether an offense is  serious for Sixth Amendment purposes, we look to the legislature's  judgment, as evidenced by the maximum  penalty authorized.  Where the  offenses charged are petty, and the deprivation of liberty exceeds six  months only as a result of the aggregation of charges, the jury-trial  right does not apply.  As petitioner acknowledges, even if he were to  prevail,  the Government could properly circumvent the jury-trial right  by charging the counts in separate informations and trying them separately.


17
The Constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial extends only to serious offenses, and petitioner was not charged with a  serious offense.  That he was tried for two counts of a petty offense,  and therefore faced an aggregate potential term of imprisonment of more  than six months, does not change the fact that the legislature deemed  this offense petty.  Petitioner is not entitled to a jury trial.


18
Because petitioner is not entitled to a jury trial, we need not  reach the question whether a judge's self-imposed limitation on  sentencing may affect the jury-trial right.


19
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed.


20

It is so ordered.



21
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring in the judgment.


22
This petitioner had no constitutional right to a jury trial because from the outset it was settled that he could be sentenced to no  more than six months' imprisonment for his combined petty offenses.  The particular outcome, however, should not obscure the greater consequence of today's unfortunate decision.  The Court holds that a criminal  defendant may be convicted of innumerable offenses in one proceeding and  sentenced to any number of years' imprisonment, all without benefit of a  jury trial, so long as no one of the offenses considered alone is  punishable by more than six months in prison.  The holding both in its  doctrinal formulation and in its practical effect is one  of the most serious incursions on the right to jury trial in the Court's history,  and it cannot be squared with our precedents.The Sixth Amendment  guarantees a jury trial to a defendant charged with a serious crime. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391  U. S. 145, 159 (1968). Serious crimes, for  purposes of the Sixth Amendment, are defined to include any offense  which carries a maximum penalty of more than six months in prison; the  right to jury trial attaches to those crimes regardless of the sentence  in fact imposed.  Id., at 159-160.  This doctrine is not questioned  here, but it does not define the outer limits of  the right to trial by  jury.  Our cases establish a further proposition: The right to jury  trial extends as well to a defendant who is sentenced in one proceeding to more than six months' imprisonment. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.  S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974).  To be more  specific, a defendant is entitled to a jury if tried in a single  proceeding for more than one petty offense when the combined sentences  will exceed six months' imprisonment; taken together,  the crimes then  are considered serious for constitutional purposes, even if each is  petty by itself, Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 517.


23
The defendants in Codispoti and Taylor had been convicted of criminal contempt without juries in States where the legislatures had  not set a maximum penalty for the crime.  Taylor was convicted of nine  separate contempts and sentenced to six months in prison.  The Court  held he was not entitled to a jury trial. Since the total sentence was  only six months' imprisonment, the "eight contempts, whether considered  singly or collectively, thus constituted petty offenses, and trial by  jury was not required." Taylor v. Hayes, supra, at 496.  Codispoti, by  contrast, was convicted of seven contempts, and he was sentenced  to six  terms of six months' imprisonment and one term of three months' imprisonment, each to run consecutively-a total of 39 months.  We held  he was entitled to a trial by jury because his  aggregate sentence  exceeded six months.  In Codispoti, Pennsylvania made the same argument  the United States makes today.  It said no jury trial is required if the  maximum punishment for each offense does not exceed six months in  prison.  We rejected the claim, saying:


24
"Here the contempts . . . were tried seriatim in one proceeding,  and the trial judge not only imposed a separate sentence for each  contempt but also determined that the individual sentences were to run  consecutively rather than concurrently, a ruling which necessarily  extended the prison term to be served beyond that allowable for a petty  criminal offense. As a result of this single proceeding, Codispoti was  sentenced to three years and three months for his seven contemptuous  acts. . . . In terms of the sentence imposed, which was obviously  several times more than six months, [Codispoti] was tried for what was equivalent to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury trial.


25
"We find unavailing respondent's contrary argument that [Codispoti's] contempts were separate offenses and that, because no more  than a six months' sentence was imposed for any single offense, each  contempt was necessarily a petty offense triable without a jury.  Notwithstanding respondent's characterization of the proceeding, the  salient fact remains that the contempts arose from a single trial, were  charged by a single judge, and were tried in a single proceeding.  The  individual sentences imposed were then aggregated, one sentence taking  account of the others and not beginning until the immediately preceding  sentence had expired."  Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 516-517.


26
The reasons the Court offers to distinguish these cases are not  convincing.  The Court first suggests Codispoti's holding turned on the  absence of a statutory maximum sentence for criminal contempt.  Ante, at  6.  The absence of a statutory maximum sentence, however, has nothing  whatever to do with whether a court must aggregate the penalties that  are in fact imposed for each crime.  Indeed, we know the open-ended  penalty to which Codispoti was subject was not the reason he was  entitled a jury trial because Taylor, decided the same day, held  that a defendant who was subject to the same kind of open-ended sentencing was  not entitled to trial by jury because the sentence he received did not  in fact exceed six months.  Taken together, Codispoti and Taylor stand  for the proposition the Court now rejects: Sentences for petty offenses  must be aggregated in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a  jury trial.  Cf. State v. McCarroll, 337 So. 2d 475, 480 (La. 1976)  (concluding Codispoti compelled it to overrule Monroe v. Wilhite, 233  So. 2d 535 (La.), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 910 (1970), which had held the Sixth Amendment did not require aggregation of penalties for petty offenses to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial).


27
The Court next suggests Codispoti's holding was based on "the special concerns raised by the criminal contempt context."  Ante, at  6-7.  The Codispoti Court was indeed cognizant of the need "to maintain  order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process," 418 U.  S., at 513, and so approved summary conviction and sentencing for  criminal contempt, "where the necessity of circumstances warrants," id.,  at 514. The Court made clear that under those circumstances, a judge may  sentence  a defendant to more than six months' imprisonment for more than   one contempt without empaneling a jury.  Id., at 514-515.  The Court  went on to hold, however, that when the judge postpones the contempt trial until after the immediate proceedings have concluded, the "ordinary rudiments of due process" apply.  Id.,  at 515.  The "ordinary"  rule required aggregation of penalties,  and because Codispoti's  aggregated penalties exceeded six months' imprisonment, entitled him to  a jury trial.


28
In authorizing retroactive consideration of the punishment a defendant receives, the holdings of Codispoti and Taylor must not be  confused with the line of cases entitling a defendant to a jury trial if  he is charged with a crime punishable by more than six months'  imprisonment, regardless of the sentence he in fact receives.  The two  lines of cases are consistent.  Crimes punishable by sentences of more  than six months are deemed by the community's social and ethical  judgments to be serious.  See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S.  617, 628 (1937). Opprobrium attaches to conviction of those crimes  regardless of the length of the actual sentence imposed, and the stigma  itself is enough to entitle the defendant to a jury.  See J. Proffatt, Trial by Jury 149 (1877) (jury trial cannot be denied to a defendant  subject to "punishment which would render him infamous . . . [or] affix  to him the ignominy of a criminal").  This rationale does not entitle a  defendant to trial by jury if he is charged only with petty offenses;  even if they could result in a long sentence when taken together,  convictions for petty offenses do not carry the same stigma as  convictions for serious crimes.


29
The imposition of stigma, however, is not the only or even the  primary consequence a jury trial serves to constrain.  As Codispoti  recognizes, and as ought to be evident, the Sixth Amendment also serves  the different and more practical purpose of preventing a court from  effecting a most serious deprivation  of liberty-ordering a defendant to  prison for a substantial period of time-without the Government's  persuading a jury he belongs there.  A deprivation of liberty so  significant may be exacted if a defendant faces punishment for a series  of crimes,  each of which can be punished by no more than six months'  imprisonment. The stakes for a defendant may then amount in the  aggregate to many years in prison, in which case he must be entitled to interpose a jury between himself and the Government.  If the trial court  rules at the outset that no more than six months' imprisonment will be  imposed for the combined petty offenses, however, the liberty the jury  serves to protect will not be endangered, and there is no corresponding  right to jury trial.


30
Although Codispoti and Taylor are binding precedents, my conclusion rests also on a more fundamental point, one the Court refuses  to confront: The primary purpose of the jury in our legal system is to  stand between the accused and the powers of the State.  Among the most  ominous of those is the power to imprison. Blackstone expressed this  principle when he described the right to trial by jury as a "strong  . . . barrier . . . between the liberties of the people and the  prerogative of the crown."  4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *349-*350. See  also W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 426 (1852) ("[I]t would be  difficult to conceive a better security than this right affords against  any exercise of arbitrary violence on the part of the crown or a  government acting in the name of the crown.  No matter how ardent may be  its wish to destroy or crush an obnoxious opponent, there can be no real  danger from its menaces or acts so long as the party attacked can take  refuge in a jury  fairly and indifferently chosen").  In more recent  times we have said the right to jury trial "reflect[s] a profound  judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice  administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S., at 155.  Providing a  defendant with the right to be tried by a jury gives "him an inestimable  safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."  Id., at 156.  These considerations all are present when a judge in a single case sends a  defendant to prison for years, whether the sentence is the result of one  serious offense or several petty offenses.


31
On the Court's view of the case, however, there is no limit to  the length of the sentence a judge can impose on a defendant without  entitling him to a jury, so long as the prosecutor carves up the charges  into segments punishable by no more than six months apiece.  Prosecutors  have broad discretion in framing charges, see Ball v. United States, 470  U. S. 856, 859 (1985), for criminal conduct often does not arrange  itself in neat categories.  In many cases, a prosecutor can choose to  charge a defendant with multiple petty offenses rather than a single serious offense, and so prevent him under today's holding from obtaining  a trial by jury while still obtaining the same punishment.  Cf. People  v. Estevez, 163 Misc. 2d 839, 847, 622 N. Y. S. 2d 870, 876 (Crim. Ct.  1995) ("The People cannot have it both ways.  They cannot in good faith  seek consolidation of several B misdemeanors, which have been reduced  from Class A misdemeanors, and then after conviction of more than two  offenses seek consecutive sentences which would expose the defendant to over six months' imprisonment while at the same time deny the defendant  the right to jury trial").


32
The Court does not aid its position when it notes, with seeming  approval, the Government's troubling suggestion that a committed  prosecutor could evade the rule here proposed by bringing a series of  prosecutions in separate proceedings, each for an offense punishable by  no more than six months in prison. Ante, at 8.  Were a prosecutor to  take so serious a view of a defendant's conduct as to justify the burden  of separate prosecutions, I should think the case an urgent example of  when a jury is most needed if the offenses are consolidated.  And if a defendant is subject to repeated bench trials because of a prosecutor's  scheme to confine him in jail for years without benefit of a jury trial,  at least he will be provided certain safeguards as a result.  The  prosecution's witnesses, and its theory of the case, will be tested more  than once; the defendant will have repeated opportunities to convince  the judge, or more than one judge, on the merits; and quite apart from  questions of included offenses, the Government may be barred by  collateral estoppel if a fact is found in favor of the defendant and is dispositive in later trials, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970).  Finally, the prosecutor will have to justify, at least to the voters,  this peculiar exercise of discretion.  In short,  if a prosecutor seeks  to achieve a result forbidden in one trial by the expedient of pursuing  many, the process itself will constrain the prosecutor and protect the  defendant in important ways.  The Court's holding, of course, makes it  easier rather than more difficult for a government to evade the  constraints of the Sixth Amendment when it seeks to lock up a defendant  for a long time.


33
The significance of the Court's decision quite transcends the peculations of Ray Lewis, the petitioner here, who twice filched from  the mails.  The decision affects more than repeat violators of traffic  laws, persons accused of public drunkenness, persons who persist in  breaches of the peace, and the wide range of eccentrics capable of  disturbing the quiet enjoyment of life by others.  Just as alarming is  the threat the Court's holding poses to millions of persons in  agriculture, manufacturing, and trade who must comply with minute  administrative regulations, many of them carrying a jail term of  six  months or less.  Violations of these sorts of rules often involve  repeated, discrete acts which can result in potential liability of years  of imprisonment.  See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. Section(s) 707 (violation of  migratory bird treaties, laws, and  regulations); 29 U. S. C. Section(s)  216 (penalties under Fair Labor Standards Act); 36 CFR Section(s) 1.3 (1995) (violation of National Park Service regulations); id., Section(s)  261.1b (violation of Forest Service prohibitions); id., Section(s)  327.25 (violation of Army Corps of Engineers water resource development  project regulations); 43 CFR Section(s) 8351.1-1(b)  (1995) (violation of  Bureau of Land management regulations under National Trails System Act  of 1968). Still, under the Court's holding it makes no difference  whether a defendant is sentenced  to a year in prison or for that matter  to 20 years: As long as no single violation charged is punishable by more than six months, the defendant has no right to a jury.


34
The petitioner errs in the opposite direction.  He argues a defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the penalties for the  crimes charged combine to exceed six months' imprisonment, even if the  trial judge rules that no more than six months' imprisonment will be  imposed. We rejected this position in Taylor, however, and rightly so.  A defendant charged with multiple petty offenses does not face the  societal disapprobation attaching to conviction of a serious crime, and,   so long as the trial judge rules at the outset that no more than  six  months' imprisonment will be imposed, the defendant does not face a serious deprivation of liberty.  A judge who so rules is  not withdrawing  from a defendant a constitutional right to which he is entitled, as  petitioner claims; the defendant is not entitled to the right to begin  with if there is no potential for more than six months' imprisonment.  The judge's statement has no independent force but only clarifies what  would have been the law in its absence.  Codispoti holds that a judge  cannot impose a sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment for multiple  petty offenses without conducting a jury trial, regardless of whether the judge announces that fact from bench.


35
Amici in support of petitioner say it is inappropriate for judges to make these kinds of sentencing decisions before trial. The  Court approved just this practice, however, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.  S. 367 (1979), holding the Sixth Amendment does not require a judge to  appoint counsel for a criminal defendant in a misdemeanor case if the  judge will not sentence the defendant to any jail time.  So too, Federal  Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(a)(2) authorizes district courts not to  apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in petty offense  prosecutions for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed.  The  rules contemplate the determination being made before trial.  Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 58(a)(3).


36
Petitioner's proposal would impose an enormous burden on an already beleaguered criminal justice system by increasing to a dramatic  extent the number of required jury trials.  There are thousands of  instances where minor offenses are tried before a judge, and we would  err on the other side of sensible interpretation were we to hold that  combining petty offenses in a single proceeding mandates a jury trial  even when all possibility for a sentence longer than six months has been foreclosed.


37
When a defendant's liberty is put at great risk in a trial, he  is entitled to have the trial conducted to a jury. This principle lies  at the heart of the Sixth Amendment.  The Court does grave injury to the  Amendment by allowing a defendant to suffer a prison term of any length  after a single trial before a single judge and without the protection of  a jury.  I join only the Court's judgment.


38
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.


39
The Sixth Amendment provides that the accused is entitled to trial by an impartial jury "in all criminal prosecutions."  As Justice  Kennedy persuasively explains, the "primary purpose of the jury in our  legal system is to stand between the accused and the powers of the  State." Ante, at 6.  The majority, relying exclusively on cases in which  the defendant was tried for a single offense, extends a rule designed  with those cases in mind to the wholly dissimilar circumstance in which  the prosecution concerns multiple offenses.  I agree with Justice  Kennedy to the extent he would hold that a prosecution which exposes the  accused to a sentence of imprisonment longer than six months, whether  for a single offense or for a series of offenses, is sufficiently serious to confer on the defendant the right to demand a jury. See  ante, at 6-8.


40
Unlike Justice Kennedy, however, I believe that the right to a  jury trial attaches when the prosecution begins.  I do not quarrel with  the established view that only defendants whose alleged misconduct is  deemed serious by the legislature are entitled to be judged by a jury.  But in my opinion, the legislature's determination of the severity of  the charges against a defendant is properly measured by the maximum  sentence authorized for the prosecution as a whole.  The text of the  Sixth Amendment supports this interpretation by referring expressly to "criminal prosecutions." Nothing in our prior precedents conflicts with  this view.  True, some of our past cases (the ones on which the majority  relies) have referred to an "offense" rather than a "prosecution."  See,  e.g., Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U. S. 538, 541 (1989); Frank v.  United States, 395 U. S. 147, 148 (1969).  But the words were  effectively interchangeable in those cases because the prosecutions at  issue concerned only one offense.  The contempt  cases, which do involve  multiple offenses, demonstrate that aggregation-that is, deciding  whether the defendant has a right  to a jury trial on the basis of the prosecution rather than the  individual offenses-is appropriate.


41
The majority attempts to distinguish Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,  418 U. S. 506 (1974), by suggesting that the Court's decision in that  case turned on the absence of any statutory measure of severity.  Ante,  at 6. That observation is certainly correct to a point: The contempt  cases are special because the sentence actually imposed provides the  only available yardstick by which to judge compliance with the command  of the Sixth Amendment.  But that unique aspect of the cases does not speak to the aggregation question.  Having determined that the defendants in Codispoti were sentenced to no more than six months for  any individual contempt, it would follow from the rule the Court  announces today that a jury trial was unnecessary.  Yet we reversed and  remanded, holding that "each contemnor was tried for what was equivalent  to a serious offense and was [therefore] entitled to a jury trial."  418  U. S., at 517 (emphasis added).1


42
Justice Kennedy reads a second contempt case, Taylor v. Hayes,  418 U. S. 488 (1974), as standing for the proposition that a judge may  defeat the jury trial right by promising a short sentence.  He is  mistaken.  The dispositive fact in Taylor was not that the prison term  imposed was only six months but rather that the actual sentence, acting  as a proxy for the legislative judgment, demonstrated that "the State  itself has determined that the contempt is not so serious as to warrant  more than a six-month sentence."  418 U. S., at 496.  In this case, by contrast, we have an explicit statutory expression of the legislative  judgment that this prosecution is serious-the two offenses charged are  punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 12 months.


43
All agree that a judge may not strip a defendant of the right to  a jury trial for a serious crime by promising a sentence of six months  or less.  This is so because "[o]pprobrium attaches to conviction of  those crimes regardless  of the length of the actual sentence imposed,"  ante, at 5 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  In my view, the same  rule must apply to prosecutions involving multiple offenses which are  serious by virtue of their aggregate possible sentence.  I see no basis  for assuming that the dishonor associated with multiple convictions for  petty offenses is less than the dishonor associated with conviction of a single serious crime.   Because the right attaches at the moment of  prosecution, a judge may not deprive a defendant of a jury trial by  making a pretrial determination that the crimes charged will not warrant  a sentence exceeding six months.


44
Petitioner is entitled to a jury trial because he was charged with offenses carrying a statutory maximum prison sentence of more than  six months.  I therefore would reverse the judgment of the Court of  Appeals and, for that reason, I respectfully dissent.



1
 The majority's speculation that the Court's holding in Codispoti was limited to criminal contempt cases, ante, at 6-7, is  persuasively answered by Justice Kennedy.  See ante, at 4 (opinion  concurring in judgment).


