517 U.S. 484116 S.Ct. 1495134 L.Ed.2d 711
44 LIQUORMART, INC., et al.v.RHODE ISLAND et al.Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
No. 94-1140.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 1, 1995
Decided May 13, 1996


Syllabus
*

Petitioners, a licensed Rhode Island liquor retailer and a licensed  Massachusetts liquor retailer patronized by Rhode Island residents,  filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Rhode Island laws  banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices except at the place of  sale violate the First Amendment. In concluding that the ban was  unconstitutional because it did not directly advance the State's  asserted interest in the promotion of temperance and was more extensive  than necessary to serve that interest, the District Court reasoned that  the party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries  the burden of justifying it and that the Twenty-first Amendment did not  shift or diminish that burden.  In reversing, the Court of Appeals,  inter alia, found "inherent merit" in the State's submission that  competitive price advertising would ultimately increase sales, and  agreed with it that the Twenty-first Amendment gave its advertising ban  an added presumption of validity.
Held:  The judgment is reversed.  39 F. 3d 5, reversed.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts  I, II, VII, and VIII, concluding:


1
1.  The Twenty-first Amendment cannot save Rhode Island's price  advertising ban because that Amendment does not qualify the First  Amendment's prohibition against laws abridging the freedom of speech.  Although the Twenty-first Amendment-which repealed Prohibition and gave  the States the power to prohibit commerce in, or the use of, alcoholic  beverages-limits the dormant Commerce Clause's effect on a State's  regulatory power over the delivery or use of liquor within its borders,  the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other constitutional provisions.  See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 712.  California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109,  118-119, disavowed.  Because the First Amendment must be included among  those other provisions, the Twenty-first Amendment does not shield the  advertising ban from constitutional scrutiny.  Pp. 28-30.


2
2.  Because Rhode Island has failed to carry its heavy burden of  justifying its complete ban on price advertising, that ban is invalid.  P. 31.


3
Justice Stevens delivered the principal opinion with respect to Parts  III-VI, concluding that Rhode Island's ban on advertisements that  provide the public with accurate information about retail liquor prices  is an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of speech.  Pp. 8-28.


4
(a) Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and  Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part III that although the First  Amendment protects the dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading  commercial messages about lawful products and services in order to  ensure that consumers receive  accurate information, see, e.g., Virginia  Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S.  748, 765, the special nature of commercial speech, including its  "greater objectivity" and "greater hardiness," authorizes the State to  regulate potentially deceptive or overreaching advertising more freely than other forms of protected speech, see, e.g., id., at 771-772, n. 24,  and requires less than strict review of such regulations, Central Hudson  Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566,  n. 9.  However, regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in  order to pursue a policy not related to consumer protection must be  reviewed with "special care," and such blanket bans should not be  approved unless the speech itself was flawed in some way, either because  it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.  See ibid.  Pp. 8-13.


5
(b) Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg,  concluded in Part IV that a review of the case law reveals that  commercial speech regulations are not all subject to a similar form of  constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of  expression.  When a State regulates commercial messages to protect  consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or  requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the  regulation's purpose is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies  less than strict review.  However, where a State entirely prohibits the  dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons  unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far  less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment  generally demands.  The special dangers that attend such complete bans-including, most obviously, the fact that they all but foreclose  alternative channels of communication-present sound reasons that justify  more careful review.  Pp. 14-17.


6
Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part V that because Rhode Island's  advertising ban constitutes a blanket prohibition against truthful,  nonmisleading speech about a lawful product, and serves an end unrelated  to consumer protection, it must be reviewed with "special care" under  Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9.  It cannot survive that review  because it does not satisfy even the less than strict standard that  generally applies in commercial speech cases under Central Hudson, id.,  at 566. First, the advertising ban does not directly advance the  State's substantial interest in promoting temperance.  See ibid. Because a commercial speech regulation may not be sustained if it provides only  ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose, id., at 564,  the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation  will advance its interest, but also that it will do so "to a material  degree," see, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 767.  In this  case, therefore, the State must show that the ban will significantly  reduce alcohol consumption, but has presented no evidence to suggest a  significant reduction. Second, the ban is more extensive than necessary  to serve its stated interest, see 447 U. S., at 566, since alternative  forms of regulation that would not involve any speech restrictions-e.g., the maintenance of higher prices either by direct regulation or by increased taxation, the rationing of per capita purchases, or the use of  educational campaigns focused on drinking problems-would be more likely  to achieve the goal of promoting temperance. Thus, the State has failed  to establish the requisite "reasonable fit" between its regulation and  its goal.  See, e.g., Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492  U. S. 469, 480.  Pp. 17-21.


7
(d) Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and  Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part VI that the State's arguments in  support of its claim that it merely exercised appropriate "legislative  judgment" in determining that a price advertising ban would best promote  temperance-i.e., (1) that because expert opinions as to the  effectiveness of the ban "go both ways," the Court of Appeals correctly  concluded that the ban constituted a "reasonable choice" by the  legislature; (2) that precedent requires that particular deference be  accorded that legislative choice because the State could, if it chose,  ban the sale of alcoholic beverages outright; and (3) that deference is  appropriate because alcoholic beverages are so-called "vice" products--must be rejected.  See Rubin, 514 U. S., at ___, n. 2. United  States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U. S. 418, distinguished; Posadas de  Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328,  distinguished and disavowed in part. Pp. 22-28.


8
Justice Scalia concluded that guidance as to what the First Amendment  forbids, where the core offense of suppressing particular political  ideas is not at issue, must be taken from the long accepted practices of  the American people.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.  S. ___, ___ (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Since, however, the Court has  before it no evidence as to state legislative practices regarding  regulation of commercial speech when the First and Fourteenth Amendments  were adopted, or even as to any national consensus on the subject later developed, he would simply adhere to the Court's existing jurisprudence,  which renders the Rhode Island regulation invalid. Pp. 1-2.


9
Justice Thomas concluded that in cases such as this, in which the  government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or  service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the  marketplace, the Central Hudson balancing test should not be applied.  Rather, such an "interest" is per se illegitimate, cf., e.g., Virginia  Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S.  748, 768-770, and can no more justify regulation of "commercial" speech  than it can justify regulation of "noncommercial" speech.  Pp. 1-12.


10
Justice O'Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Souter, and  Justice Breyer, agreed with the principal opinion that Rhode Island's  prohibition on alcohol-price advertising is invalid and cannot be saved  by the Twenty-first Amendment, but concluded that the First Amendment  question must be resolved more narrowly by applying the test established  in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447  U. S. 557, 566. Assuming that the prohibition satisfies the test's  first three prongs-i.e., that (1) the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, (2) the asserted governmental interest  is substantial, and (3) the regulation directly advances the  governmental interest--Rhode Island's regulation fails the final fourth  prong because its ban is more extensive than necessary to serve its  stated interest.  Rhode Island justifies its ban on price advertising on  the grounds that the ban is intended to keep alcohol prices high as a  way to keep consumption low.  In order for a speech restriction to pass muster under the fourth prong, there must be a reasonable fit between  the legislature's goal and method.  Board of Trustees of State Univ. of  N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480.  The fit here is not reasonable, since  the State has other methods at its disposal--e.g., establishing minimum  prices and/or increasing sales taxes on alcoholic beverages--that would  more directly accomplish its stated goal without intruding on sellers'  ability to provide truthful, nonmisleading information to customers. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S.  328, 341-344, distinguished.  The principal opinion errs in adopting a  new analysis for the evaluation of commercial speech regulation. Pp.  1-7.


11
Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the  opinion of the Court with respects to Parts I, II, and VII, in which  Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, the opinion  of the Court with respect to Part VIII, in which Scalia, Kennedy,  Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts III  and V, in which Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, an opinion  with respect to Part VI, in which Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,  joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.  Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  O'Connor, J., filed  an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and  Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined.


12
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, VII, and  VIII, an opinion with respect to Parts III and V, in which Justice  Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, an opinion with  respect to Part VI, in which Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and  Justice Ginsburg join, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which  Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg join.


13
Last Term we held that a federal law abridging a brewer's right  to provide the public with accurate information about the alcoholic  content of malt beverages is unconstitutional.  Rubin v. Coors Brewing  Co., 514 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 14).  We now hold that  Rhode Island's statutory prohibition against advertisements that provide  the public with accurate information about retail prices of alcoholic  beverages is also invalid.  Our holding rests on the conclusion that  such an advertising ban is an abridgment of speech protected by the  First Amendment and that it is not shielded from constitutional scrutiny by the Twenty-first Amendment.1


14
* In 1956, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted two separate prohibitions against advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages.  The first applies to vendors licensed in Rhode Island as  well as to out-of-state manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers.  It  prohibits them from "advertising in any manner whatsoever" the price of  any alcoholic beverage offered for sale in the State; the only exception  is for price tags or signs displayed with the merchandise within  licensed premises and not visible from the street.2  The second  statute applies to the Rhode Island news media.  It contains a  categorical prohibition against the publication or broadcast of any  advertisements--even those referring to sales in other States--that  "make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages."3


15
In two cases decided in 1985, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of these two statutes.  In S&S Liquor  Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A. 2d 729 (R. I.), a liquor retailer located  in Westerly, Rhode Island, a town that borders the State of Connecticut,  having been advised that his license would be revoked if he advertised  his prices in a Connecticut paper, sought to enjoin enforcement of the  first statute.  Over the dissent of one Justice, the court upheld the  statute. It concluded that the statute served the substantial state  interest in "`the promotion of temperance.'"4 Id., at 737.  Because  the plaintiff failed to prove that the statute did not serve that interest, the court held that he had not carried his burden of establishing a violation of the First Amendment.  In response to the  dissent's argument that the court had placed the burden on the wrong  party, the majority reasoned that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the  statute "`an added presumption [of] validity.'"  S&S Liquor Mart, Inc.  v. Pastore, 497 A. 2d, at 732. Although that presumption had not been  overcome in that case, the State Supreme Court assumed that in a future  case the record might "support the proposition that these advertising restrictions do not further temperance objectives."  Id., at 734.


16
In Rhode Island Liquor Stores Assn. v. Evening Call Pub. Co., 497 A. 2d 331 (R. I. 1985), the plaintiff association5 sought to enjoin the publisher of the local newspaper in Woonsocket, Rhode Island,  from accepting advertisements disclosing the retail price of alcoholic  beverages being sold across the state line in Millville, Massachusetts.  In upholding the injunction, the State Supreme Court adhered to its  reasoning in the Pastore case and rejected the argument that the statute  neither "directly advanced" the state interest in promoting temperance,  nor was "more extensive than necessary to serve that interest" as required by this Court's decision in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.  Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 563 (1980). It assumed the  existence of other, "perhaps more effective means" of achieving the  State's "goal of temperance", but concluded that it was "not  unreasonable for the State of Rhode Island to believe that price  advertising will result in increased sales of alcoholic beverages  generally."  Rhode Island Liquor Stores Assn. v. Evening Call Pub. Co.,  497 A. 2d, at 336.

II

17
Petitioners 44 Liquormart, Inc. (44 Liquormart), and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. (Peoples), are licensed retailers of alcoholic  beverages.  Petitioner 44 Liquormart operates a store in Rhode Island  and petitioner Peoples operates several stores in Massachusetts that are  patronized by Rhode Island residents. Peoples uses alcohol price  advertising extensively in Massachusetts, where such advertising is  permitted, but Rhode Island newspapers and other media outlets have  refused to accept such ads.


18
Complaints from competitors about an advertisement placed by 44  Liquormart in a Rhode Island newspaper in 1991 generated enforcement  proceedings that in turn led to the initiation of this litigation.  The  advertisement did not state the price of any alcoholic beverages.  Indeed, it noted that "State law prohibits advertising liquor prices."  The ad did, however, state the low prices at which peanuts, potato  chips, and Schweppes mixers were being offered, identify various brands  of packaged liquor, and include the word "WOW" in large letters next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles.  Based on the conclusion that the  implied reference to bargain prices for liquor violated the statutory  ban on price advertising, the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator  assessed a $400 fine.


19
After paying the fine, 44 Liquormart, joined by Peoples, filed  this action against the administrator in the Federal District Court  seeking a declaratory judgment that the two statutes and the  administrator's implementing regulations violate the First Amendment and  other provisions of federal law.  The Rhode Island Liquor Stores  Association was allowed to intervene as a defendant and in due course  the State of Rhode Island replaced the administrator as the principal  defendant.  The parties stipulated that the price advertising ban is  vigorously enforced, that Rhode Island permits "all advertising of  alcoholic beverages excepting references to price outside the licensed premises," and that petitioners' proposed ads do not concern an illegal  activity and presumably would not be false or misleading. 44 Liquour  Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (R. I. 1993).  The parties  disagreed, however, about the impact of the ban on the promotion of  temperance in Rhode Island.  On that question the District Court heard  conflicting expert testimony and reviewed a number of studies.


20
In his findings of fact, the District Judge first noted that there was a pronounced lack of unanimity among researchers who have  studied the impact of advertising on the level of consumption of  alcoholic beverages.  He referred to a 1985 Federal Trade Commission  study that found no evidence that alcohol advertising significantly  affects alcohol abuse.  Another study indicated that Rhode Island ranks  in the upper 30% of States in per capita consumption of alcoholic  beverages; alcohol consumption is lower in other States that allow price advertising. After summarizing the testimony of the expert witnesses for  both parties, he found "as a fact that Rhode Island's off-premises  liquor price advertising ban has no significant impact on levels of  alcohol consumption in Rhode Island."  Id., at 549.


21
As a matter of law, he concluded that the price advertising ban  was unconstitutional because it did not "directly advance" the State's  interest in reducing alcohol consumption and was "more extensive than  necessary to serve that interest."  Id., at 555.  He reasoned that the  party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the  burden of justifying it and that the Twenty-first Amendment did not  shift or diminish that burden. Acknowledging that it might have been  reasonable for the state legislature to "assume a correlation between  the price advertising ban and reduced consumption," he held that more  than a rational basis was required to justify the speech restriction, and that the State had failed to demonstrate a reasonable "`fit'" between its policy objectives and its chosen means.  Ibid.


22
The Court of Appeals reversed.  It found "inherent merit" in the  State's submission that competitive price advertising would lower prices  and that lower prices would produce more sales.  39 F. 3d 5, 7 (CA1  1994).  Moreover, it agreed with the reasoning of the Rhode Island  Supreme Court that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the statutes an added  presumption of validity.  Id., at 8. Alternatively, it concluded that  reversal was compelled by this Court's summary action in Queensgate  Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n of Ohio, 459 U. S. 807 (1982).  See 39 F. 3d, at 8. In that case the Court dismissed the appeal from a  decision of the Ohio Supreme Court upholding a prohibition against off-premises advertising of the prices of alcoholic beverages sold by  the drink.  See Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n of  Ohio, 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N. E. 2d 138 (1982).


23
Queensgate has been both followed and distinguished in subsequent cases reviewing the validity of similar advertising bans.6  We are now persuaded that the importance of the First Amendment issue,  as well the suggested relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment, merits  more thorough analysis than it received when we refused to accept  jurisdiction of the Queensgate appeal.  We therefore granted certiorari.  514 U. S. ___ (1995).

III

24
Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in colonial days, the public relied on "commercial speech"  for vital information about the market.  Early newspapers displayed  advertisements for goods and services on their front pages, and town  criers called out prices in public squares.  See J. Wood, The Story of  Advertising 21, 45-69, 85 (1958); J. Smith, Printers and Press Freedom  49 (1988).  Indeed, commercial messages played such a central role in  public life prior to the Founding that Benjamin Franklin authored his  early defense of a free press in support of his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados.  Franklin, An  Apology for Printers, June 10, 1731, reprinted in 2 Writings of Benjamin  Franklin 172 (1907).


25
In accord with the role that commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that advertising provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and  services.  In the early years, the common law, and later, statutes,  served the consumers' interest in the receipt of accurate information in  the commercial market by prohibiting fraudulent and misleading  advertising. It was not until the 1970's, however, that this Court held  that the First Amendment protected the dissemination of truthful and  nonmisleading commercial messages about lawful products and services.  See generally Kozinski & Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 Texas L. Rev. 747 (1993).


26
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), we held that it was error to assume that commercial speech was entitled to no First  Amendment protection or that it was without value in the marketplace of  ideas.  Id., at 825-826.  The following Term in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy  v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we  expanded on our holding in Bigelow and held that the State's blanket ban  on advertising the price of prescription drugs violated the First  Amendment.


27
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. reflected the conclusion that the same interest that supports regulation of potentially misleading advertising,  namely the public's interest in receiving accurate commercial  information, also supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that  provides constitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate and  nonmisleading commercial messages. We explained:


28
"Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may  seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing  and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.  So long  as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation  of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private  economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those  decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.  To this  end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable."  Id., at 765.7


29
The opinion further explained that a State's paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial  information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it:


30
"There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.  That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their  own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the  best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather  than to close them.  If they are truly open, nothing prevents the  `professional' pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior  product, and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume  prescription drug retailer.  But the choice among these alternative  approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's.  It  is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing  information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,  that the First Amendment makes for us."  Id. at 770.


31
On the basis of these principles, our early cases uniformly struck down several broadly based bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech, each of which served ends unrelated to consumer protection.8 Indeed, one of those cases expressly likened the rationale that Virginia Pharmacy Bd. employed to the one that Justice  Brandeis adopted in his concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.  357 (1927).  See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85,  97 (1977).  There, Justice Brandeis wrote, in explaining his objection  to a prohibition of political speech, that "the remedy to be applied is  more speech, not enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify  repression." Whitney, 274 U. S., at 377; see also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 701 (1977) (applying test for suppressing  political speech set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447   (1969)).


32
At the same time, our early cases recognized that the State may  regulate some types of commercial advertising more freely than other  forms of protected speech.  Specifically, we explained that the State  may require commercial messages to "appear in such a form, or include  such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary  to prevent its being deceptive," Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U. S., at  772, n. 24, and that it may restrict some forms of aggressive sales  practices that have the potential to exert "undue influence" over  consumers.  See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 366 (1977).


33
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. attributed the State's authority to impose  these regulations in part to certain "commonsense differences" that  exist between commercial messages and other types of protected  expression. 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24.  Our opinion noted that the  greater "objectivity" of commercial speech justifies affording the State  more freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true  ones, ibid. and that the greater "hardiness" of commercial speech,  inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely diminishes the chilling  effect that may attend its regulation, ibid.


34
Subsequent cases explained that the State's power to regulate commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate  commercial speech that is "linked inextricably" to those transactions.  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 10, n. 9 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State  Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech "occurs in an  area traditionally subject to government regulation . . .").  As one  commentator has explained: "The entire commercial speech doctrine, after  all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear  expression about goods and services and the right of government to  regulate the sales of such goods and services."  L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Section(s) 12-15, p. 903 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, as we explained in Linmark, the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at  "the substance of the information communicated" rather than the  "commercial aspect of [it]-with offerors communicating offers to  offerees."  See Linmark 431 U. S., at 96; Carey v. Population Services  Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 701, n. 28 (1977).


35
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.  Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), we took stock of our developing commercial  speech jurisprudence.  In that case, we considered a regulation  "completely" banning all promotional advertising by electric utilities.  Ibid.  Our decision acknowledged the special features of commercial  speech but identified the serious First Amendment concerns that attend  blanket advertising prohibitions that do not protect consumers from  commercial harms.


36
Five Members of the Court recognized that the state interest in  the conservation of energy was substantial, and that there was "an  immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity."  Id., at 569. Nevertheless, they concluded that the regulation was  invalid because the Commission had failed to make a showing that a more  limited speech regulation would not have adequately served the State's  interest.  Id., at 571.9


37
In reaching its conclusion, the majority explained that although  the special nature of commercial speech may require less than strict  review of its regulation, special concerns arise from "regulations that  entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a  nonspeech-related policy."  Id., at 566, n. 9.  In those circumstances,  "a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying  governmental policy."  Ibid.  As a result, the Court concluded that  "special care" should attend the review of such blanket bans, and it  pointedly remarked that "in recent years this Court has not approved a  blanket ban on commercial speech unless the speech itself was flawed in  some way, either because it was deceptive or related to unlawful  activity." Ibid.10

IV

38
As our review of the case law reveals, Rhode Island errs in concluding that all commercial speech regulations are subject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of expression.  The mere fact that messages propose  commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the  constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.  See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S., at ___-___ (slip op., at  1-3) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).


39
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers  from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires  the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its  regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional  protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict  review.  However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of  truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to  depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally  demands.


40
Sound reasons justify reviewing the latter type of commercial speech regulation more carefully.  Most obviously, complete speech bans,  unlike content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner of  expression, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 89 (1949), are  particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means  of disseminating certain information.


41
Our commercial speech cases have recognized the dangers that attend governmental attempts to single out certain messages for suppression. For example, in Linmark, 431 U. S., at 92-94, we concluded  that a ban on "For Sale" signs was "content based" and failed to leave  open "satisfactory" alternative channels of communication; see also  Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U. S., at 771. Moreover, last Term we upheld  a 30-day prohibition against a certain form of legal solicitation  largely because it left so many channels of communication open to  Florida lawyers. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U. S. ___,  ___-___ (1995) (slip op., at 15-16).11


42
The special dangers that attend complete bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech cannot be explained away by appeals to  the "commonsense distinctions" that exist between commercial and  noncommercial speech.  Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24.  Regulations that suppress the truth are no less troubling because they  target objectively verifiable information, nor are they less effective  because they aim at durable messages.  As a result, neither the "greater  objectivity" nor the "greater hardiness" of truthful, nonmisleading  commercial speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression with  added deference.  Ibid.


43
It is the State's interest in protecting consumers from "commercial harms" that provides "the typical reason why commercial  speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than  noncommercial speech." Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S.  410, 426 (1993).  Yet bans that target truthful, nonmisleading  commercial messages rarely protect consumers from such harms.12   Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an "underlying  governmental policy" that could be implemented without regulating  speech. Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9.  In this way, these  commercial speech bans not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede  debate over central issues of public policy.  See id., at 575 (Blackmun,  J., concurring in judgment).13


44
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception  or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption  that the public will respond "irrationally" to the truth.  Linmark, 431  U. S., at 96.  The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical  of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the  government perceives to be their own good.  That teaching applies  equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of accurate information  about their chosen products:


45
"The commercial market-place, like other spheres of our social  and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information  flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight  worth.  But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not  the government, assess the value of the information presented.  Thus,  even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial  transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.  See  Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, at 762."  Edenfield v. Fane, 507  U. S. 761, 767 (1993).


46
See also Linmark, 431 U. S. at 96 (1977); Rubin v. Coors Brewing  Co., 514 U. S., at ___ (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Tribe,  American Constitutional Law Section(s) 12-2, at 790, and n. 11.

V.

47
In this case, there is no question that Rhode Island's price advertising ban constitutes a blanket prohibition against truthful,  nonmisleading speech about a lawful product.  There is also no question  that the ban serves an end unrelated to consumer protection.  Accordingly, we must review the price advertising ban with "special  care," Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9, mindful that speech  prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review.  Ibid.


48
The State argues that the price advertising prohibition should  nevertheless be upheld because it directly advances the State's  substantial interest in promoting temperance, and because it is no more  extensive than necessary.  Cf. Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566.  Although there is some confusion as to what Rhode Island means by  temperance, we assume that the State asserts an interest in reducing  alcohol consumption.14


49
In evaluating the ban's effectiveness in advancing the State's  interest, we note that a commercial speech regulation "may not be  sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the  government's purpose."  Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 564.  For that  reason, the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its  regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will do so "to a  material degree."  Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 771; see also Rubin v. Coors  Brewing Co., 514 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8-9).  The need for the  State to make such a showing is particularly great given the drastic  nature of its chosen means-the wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information.  Accordingly, we must determine whether the  State has shown that the price advertising ban will significantly reduce  alcohol consumption.


50
We can agree that common sense supports the conclusion that a prohibition against price advertising, like a collusive agreement among  competitors to refrain from such advertising,15 will tend to mitigate  competition and maintain prices at a higher level than would prevail in  a completely free market.  Despite the absence of proof on the point, we  can even agree with the State's contention that it is reasonable to  assume that demand, and hence consumption throughout the market, is  somewhat lower whenever a higher, noncompetitive price level prevails.  However, without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary support  whatsoever, we cannot agree with the assertion that the price  advertising ban will significantly advance the State's interest in  promoting temperance.


51
Although the record suggests that the price advertising ban may  have some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of  modest means, 829 F. Supp., at 546, the State has presented no evidence  to suggest that its speech prohibition will significantly reduce  market-wide consumption.16  Indeed, the District Court's considered  and uncontradicted finding on this point is directly to the contrary.  Id., at 549.17 Moreover, the evidence suggests that the abusive  drinker will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase, and  that the true alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other  necessities.


52
In addition, as the District Court noted, the State has not identified what price level would lead to a significant reduction in  alcohol consumption, nor has it identified the amount that it believes  prices would decrease without the ban.  Ibid.  Thus, the State's own  showing reveals that any connection between the ban and a significant  change in alcohol consumption would be purely fortuitous.


53
As is evident, any conclusion that elimination of the ban would  significantly increase alcohol consumption would require us to engage in  the sort of "speculation or conjecture" that is an unacceptable means of  demonstrating that a restriction on commercial speech directly advances  the State's asserted interest.  Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 770.18  Such  speculation certainly does not suffice when the State takes aim at  accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends.


54
The State also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on speech be no more extensive than necessary.  It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not  involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the  State's goal of promoting temperance.  As the State's own expert  conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or  by increased taxation.  829 F. Supp., at 549.  Per capita purchases  could be limited as is the case with prescription drugs.  Even  educational campaigns focused on the problems of excessive, or even  moderate, drinking might prove to be more effective.


55
As a result, even under the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases, the State has failed to  establish a "reasonable fit" between its abridgment of speech and its  temperance goal.  Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.  S. 469, 480 (1989); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S., at  ___ (slip op., at 15) (explaining that defects in a federal ban on  alcohol advertising are "further highlighted by the availability of  alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's  protections for commercial speech"); Linmark, 431 U. S., at 97   (suggesting that the State use financial incentives or counter-speech,  rather than speech restrictions, to advance its interests).  It  necessarily follows that the price advertising ban cannot survive the  more stringent constitutional review that Central Hudson itself concluded was appropriate for the complete suppression of truthful,  nonmisleading commercial speech.  Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, n.  9.

VI

56
The State responds by arguing that it merely exercised appropriate "legislative judgment" in determining that a price advertising ban would best promote temperance.  Relying on the Central  Hudson analysis set forth in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.  Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328 (1986), and United States v. Edge  Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. ___ (1993), Rhode Island first argues that,  because expert opinions as to the effectiveness of the price advertising  ban "go both ways," the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the  ban constituted a "reasonable choice" by the legislature.  39 F. 3d, at  7.  The State next contends that precedent requires us to give  particular deference to that legislative choice because the State could,  if it chose, ban the sale of alcoholic beverages outright.  See Posadas,  478 U. S., at 345-346. Finally, the State argues that deference is  appropriate because alcoholic beverages are so-called "vice" products.  See Edge, 509 U. S. ___ (slip op., at ___); Posadas, 478 U. S., at  346-347.  We consider each of these contentions in turn.


57
The State's first argument fails to justify the speech prohibition at issue.  Our commercial speech cases recognize some room  for the exercise of legislative judgment.  See Metromedia, Inc. v. San  Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 507-508 (1981).  However, Rhode Island errs in  concluding that Edge and Posadas establish the degree of deference that  its decision to impose a price advertising ban warrants.


58
In Edge, we upheld a federal statute that permitted only those  broadcasters located in States that had legalized lotteries to air  lottery advertising.  The statute was designed to regulate advertising  about an activity that had been deemed illegal in the jurisdiction in  which the broadcaster was located.  509 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at  14-15).  Here, by contrast, the commercial speech ban targets  information about entirely lawful behavior.


59
Posadas is more directly relevant.  There, a five-Member majority held that, under the Central Hudson test, it was "up to the  legislature" to choose to reduce gambling by suppressing in-state casino  advertising rather than engaging in educational speech.  Posadas, 478 U.  S., at 344. Rhode Island argues that this logic demonstrates the  constitutionality of its own decision to ban price advertising in lieu  of raising taxes or employing some other less speech-restrictive means  of promoting temperance.


60
The reasoning in Posadas does support the State's argument, but,  on reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously performed  the First Amendment analysis.  The casino advertising ban was designed  to keep truthful, nonmisleading speech from members of the public for  fear that they would be more likely to gamble if they received it.  As a  result, the advertising ban served to shield the State's antigambling  policy from the public scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech regulation  would draw.  See Posadas, 478 U. S., at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).


61
Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech regulation  of this type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was "up to the  legislature" to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive  policy.  The Posadas majority's conclusion on that point cannot be  reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly  broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading advertising when  nonspeech-related alternatives were available.  See Posadas, 478 U. S.,  at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing cases); Kurland, Posadas de  Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "`Twas Strange, `Twas Passing Strange;  `Twas Pitiful, `Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 12-15.


62
Because the 5-to-4 decision in Posadas marked such a sharp break  from our prior precedent, and because it concerned a constitutional  question about which this Court is the final arbiter, we decline to give  force to its highly deferential approach. Instead, in keeping with our  prior holdings, we conclude that a state legislature does not have the  broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was willing to tolerate.  As we explained in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., "[i]t is precisely  this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and  the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First  Amendment makes for us."  425 U. S., at 770.


63
We also cannot accept the State's second contention, which is premised entirely on the "greater-includes-the-lesser" reasoning endorsed toward the end of the majority's opinion in Posadas. There,  the majority stated that "the greater power to completely ban casino  gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of  casino gambling."  478 U. S., at 345-346.  It went on to state that  "because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of   [casino gambling] it is permissible for the government to take the less  intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through  restrictions on advertising."  Id., at 346.  The majority concluded that  it would "surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would  concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on  behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand."  Ibid.  On  the basis of these statements, the State reasons that its undisputed  authority to ban alcoholic beverages must include the power to restrict  advertisements offering them for sale.


64
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. ___ (1995), the United  States advanced a similar argument as a basis for supporting a statutory  prohibition against revealing the alcoholic content of malt beverages on  product labels.  We rejected the argument, noting that the statement in  the Posadas opinion was made only after the majority had concluded that  the Puerto Rican regulation "survived the Central Hudson test."  514 U.  S., at ___, n. 2 (slip op., at 5, n. 2).  Further consideration  persuades us that the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument should be  rejected for the additional and more important reason that it is  inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine.


65
Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers  include lesser ones, we fail to see how that syllogism requires the  conclusion that the State's power to regulate commercial activity is  "greater" than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial  speech.  Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas, we think it quite  clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than  banning conduct.  As a venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more  injurious to prevent people from teaching others how to fish than to  prevent fish from being sold.19  Similarly, a local ordinance banning  bicycle lessons may curtail freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycle riding within city limits.  In short, we reject the assumption  that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that  logic somehow proves that the power to prohibit an activity is  necessarily "greater" than the power to suppress speech about it.


66
As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, the Posadas syllogism  is even less defensible.  The text of the First Amendment makes clear  that the Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more  dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct.  That presumption accords  with the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a  democratic society.  As a result, the First Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct,  and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another means  that the government may use to achieve its ends.


67
These basic First Amendment principles clearly apply to commercial speech; indeed, the Posadas majority impliedly conceded as  much by applying the Central Hudson test.  Thus, it is no answer that  commercial speech concerns products and services that the government may  freely regulate.  Our decisions from Virginia Pharmacy Bd. on have made  plain that a State's regulation of the sale of goods differs in kind  from a State's regulation of accurate information about those goods.  The distinction that our cases have consistently drawn between these two  types of governmental action is fundamentally incompatible with the absolutist view that the State may ban commercial speech simply because it may constitutionally prohibit the underlying conduct.20


68
That the State has chosen to license its liquor retailers does  not change the analysis.  Even though government is under no obligation  to provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit, it does not  follow that conferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender  of a constitutional right.  See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v.  Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U. S. 583, 594 (1926).  In Perry v.  Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), relying on a host of cases applying  that principle during the preceding quarter-century, the Court explained  that government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially his interest in freedom of speech."  Id., at 597.  That teaching clearly  applies to state attempts to regulate commercial speech, as our cases  striking down bans on truthful, nonmisleading speech by licensed  professionals attest.  See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.  S., at 355; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer  Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976).


69
Thus, just as it is perfectly clear that Rhode Island could not  ban all obscene liquor ads except those that advocated temperance, we  think it equally clear that its power to ban the sale of liquor entirely  does not include a power to censor all advertisements that contain  accurate and nonmisleading information about the price of the product.  As the entire Court apparently now agrees, the statements in the Posadas  opinion on which Rhode Island relies are no longer persuasive.


70
Finally, we find unpersuasive the State's contention that, under  Posadas and Edge, the price advertising ban should be upheld because it  targets commercial speech that pertains to a "vice" activity.  The  appellees premise their request for a so-called "vice" exception to our  commercial speech doctrine on language in Edge which characterized  gambling as a "vice".  Edge, 507 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at ___); see  also Posadas, 478 U. S., at 346-347.  The respondents misread our  precedent.  Our decision last Term striking down an alcohol-related  advertising restriction effectively rejected the very contention  respondents now make.  See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S., at  ___, ___, n. 2.


71
Moreover, the scope of any "vice" exception to the protection afforded by the First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible,  to define. Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or  public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state legislature  as relating to "vice activity".  Such characterization, however, is  anomalous when applied to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery  tickets, or playing cards, that may be lawfully purchased on the open  market.  The recognition of such an exception would also have the  unfortunate consequence of either allowing state legislatures to justify  censorship by the simple expedient of placing the "vice" label on  selected lawful activities, or requiring the federal courts to establish  a federal common law of vice.  See Kurland, 1986 S. Ct. Rev., at 15.  For these reasons, a "vice" label that is unaccompanied by a  corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at issue fails  to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial  speech about that activity.

VII

72
From 1919 until 1933, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution totally prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors" in the United States and its  territories.  Section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed that  prohibition, and Section(s) 2 delegated to the several States the power  to prohibit commerce in, or the use of, alcoholic beverages.21  The  States' regulatory power over this segment of commerce is therefore  largely "unfettered by the Commerce Clause."  Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,  308 U. S. 132, 138 (1939).


73
As is clear, the text of the Twenty-first Amendment supports the  view that, while it grants the States authority over commerce that might  otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no limit  whatsoever on other constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, Rhode  Island argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that in this case the  Twenty-first Amendment tilts the First Amendment analysis in the State's  favor.  See 39 F. 3d, at 7-8.


74
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on our  decision in California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109 (1972).22  In LaRue,  five Members of the Court relied on the Twenty-first Amendment to  buttress the conclusion that the First Amendment did not invalidate  California's prohibition of certain grossly sexual exhibitions in  premises licensed to serve alcoholic beverages. Specifically, the  opinion stated that the Twenty-first Amendment required that the  prohibition be given an added presumption in favor of its validity.  See  id., at 118-119.  We are now persuaded that the Court's analysis in  LaRue would have led to precisely the same result if it had placed no  reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment.


75
Entirely apart from the Twenty-first Amendment, the State has  ample power to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages in inappropriate  locations.  Moreover, in subsequent cases the Court has recognized that  the States' inherent police powers provide ample authority to restrict  the kind of "bacchanalian revelries" described in the LaRue opinion  regardless of whether alcoholic beverages are involved.  Id., at 118;  see, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976);  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991).  As we recently  noted: "LaRue did not involve commercial speech about alcohol, but instead concerned the regulation of nude dancing in places where alcohol  was served."  Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S., at ___, n. 2 (slip  op., at 4, n. 2).


76
Without questioning the holding in LaRue, we now disavow its reasoning insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment.  As we  explained in a case decided more than a decade after LaRue, although the  Twenty-first Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause  on a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating  beverages within its borders, "the Amendment does not license the States  to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution."  Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 712 (1984).  That general conclusion reflects our specific holdings that the Twenty-first  Amendment does not in any way diminish the force of the Supremacy  Clause, id., at 712; California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal  Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 112-114 (1980), the Establishment Clause,  Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982), or the  Equal Protection Clause, Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 209 (1976).  We  see no reason why the First Amendment should not also be included in  that list. Accordingly, we now hold that the Twenty-first Amendment  does not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws abridging  the freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment.  The Twenty-first  Amendment, therefore, cannot save Rhode Island's ban on liquor price  advertising.

VIII

77
Because Rhode Island has failed to carry its heavy burden of justifying its complete ban on price advertising, we conclude that R. I.  Gen. Laws Section(s) 3-8-7 and 3-8-8.1, as well as Regulation 32 of the  Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration, abridge speech in violation  of the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Due  Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The judgment of the Court  of Appeals is therefore reversed.


78
It is so ordered.


79
djq  Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.


80
I share Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition to  support it.  I also share Justice Stevens' aversion towards paternalistic governmental policies that prevent men and women from  hearing facts that might not be good for them.  On the other hand, it  would also be paternalism for us to prevent the people of the States  from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we have good  reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them.  I will  take my guidance as to what the Constitution forbids, with regard to a  text as indeterminate as the First Amendment's preservation of "the  freedom of speech," and where the core offense of suppressing particular  political ideas is not at issue, from the long accepted practices of the American people.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. ___,  ___ (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).


81
The briefs and arguments of the parties in the present case provide no illumination on that point; understandably so, since both  sides accepted Central Hudson.  The amicus brief on behalf of the  American Advertising Federation et al. did examine various expressions  of view at the time the First Amendment was adopted; they are consistent  with First Amendment protection for commercial speech, but certainly not  dispositive.  I consider more relevant the state legislative practices  prevalent at the time the First Amendment was adopted, since almost all  of the States had free-speech constitutional guarantees of their own, whose meaning was not likely to have been different from the federal  constitutional provision derived from them.  Perhaps more relevant still  are the state legislative practices at the time the Fourteenth Amendment  was adopted, since it is most improbable that that adoption was meant to  overturn any existing national consensus regarding free speech.  Indeed,  it is rare that any nationwide practice would develop contrary to a  proper understanding of the First Amendment itself-for which reason I think also relevant any national consensus that had formed regarding  state regulation of advertising after the Fourteenth Amendment, and  before this Court's entry into the field.  The parties and their amici  provide no evidence on these points.


82
Since I do not believe we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong-or at least the wherewithal to say what  ought to replace it-I must resolve this case in accord with our existing  jurisprudence, which all except Justice Thomas agree would prohibit the  challenged regulation.  I am not disposed to develop new law, or  reinforce old, on this issue, and accordingly I merely concur in the  judgment of the Court.  I believe, however, that Justice Stevens'  treatment of the application of the Twenty-First Amendment to this case  is correct, and accordingly join Parts I, II, VII, and VIII of Justice  Stevens' opinion.


83
djq  Justice Thomas, concurring in Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring in the judgment.


84
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in  order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test  adopted in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.  Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), should not be applied, in my view.  Rather,  such an "interest" is per se illegitimate and can no more justify  regulation of "commercial" speech than it can justify regulation of  "noncommercial" speech.


85
* In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer  Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), this Court held that speech  that does "`no more than propose a commercial transaction'" was  protected by the First Amendment, and struck down a ban on price  advertising regarding prescription drugs. The Court asserted that a  "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial  information" may be as keen as, or keener than, his interest in "the  day's most urgent political debate," id., at 763, and that "the proper  allocation of resources" in our free enterprise system requires that  consumer decisions be "intelligent and well informed."  Id., at 765.  The Court also explained that, unless consumers are kept informed about  the operations of the free market system, they cannot form "intelligent  opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered."  Ibid.  See also id., at 765-766, nn. 19-20.23  The Court sharply rebuffed  the State's argument that consumers would make irresponsible choices if  they were able to choose between higher priced but higher quality  pharmaceuticals accompanied by high quality prescription monitoring  services resulting from a "stable pharmacist-customer relationshi[p],"  id., at 768, on the one hand, and cheaper but lower quality  pharmaceuticals unaccompanied by such services, on the other:


86
"[T]he State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance.  The advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way  or the other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed  people will have to the free flow of drug price information.


87
. . . .


88
"There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.  That alternative is to assume that information  is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best  interests, if only they are well enough informed, and that the best  means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than  to close them. . . .  It is precisely this kind of choice, between the  dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it  is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us. . . .  Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition  in other ways.  But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance  of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.  In this sense, the justifications Virginia has offered for suppressing  the flow of prescription drug price information, far from persuading us  that the flow is not protected by the First Amendment, have reinforced  our view that it is."  Id., at 769-770 (citation omitted).


89
The Court opined that false or misleading advertising was not protected, on the grounds that the accuracy of advertising claims may be  more readily verifiable than is the accuracy of political or other  claims, and that "commercial" speech is made more durable by its profit  motive.  Id., at 771, and n. 24.  The Court also made clear that it did  not envision protection for advertising that proposes an illegal  transaction.  Id., at 772-773 (distinguishing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.  Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U. S. 376 (1973)).


90
In case after case following Virginia Pharmacy Bd., the Court,  and individual Members of the Court, have continued to stress the  importance of free dissemination of information about commercial choices  in a market economy; the antipaternalistic premises of the First  Amendment; the impropriety of manipulating consumer choices or public  opinion through the suppression of accurate "commercial" information;  the near impossibility of severing "commercial" speech from speech  necessary to democratic decisionmaking; and the dangers of permitting  the government to do covertly what it might not have been able to muster  the political support to do openly.24


91
In other decisions, however, the Court has appeared to accept the legitimacy of laws that suppress information in order to manipulate  the choices of consumers-so long as the government could show that the  manipulation was in fact successful.  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.  v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), was the first  decision to clearly embrace this position, although the Court applied a  very strict overbreadth analysis to strike down the advertising ban at  issue.25  In two other decisions, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates  v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328 (1986), and United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U. S. 418 (1963), the Court simply presumed that advertising of a product or service leads to increased consumption;  since, as in Central Hudson, the Court saw nothing impermissible in the  government's suppressing information in order to discourage consumption,  it upheld the advertising restrictions in those cases.  Posadas, supra,  at 341- 342; Edge, supra, at 425, 433-434.


92
The Court has at times appeared to assume that "commercial" speech could be censored in a variety of ways for any of a variety of  reasons because, as was said without clear rationale in some post-Virginia Pharmacy Bd. cases, such speech was in a "subordinate  position in the scale of First Amendment values," Ohralik v. Ohio State  Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978); Board of Trustees of State Univ.  of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 478 (1989); Florida Bar v. Went For It,  Inc., 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 4-5), or of "less  constitutional moment," Central Hudson, supra, at 562-563, n. 5.  But  see Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 418-419 (1993) (rejecting this assertion); id., at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (same).  I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting  that "commercial" speech is of "lower value" than "noncommercial"  speech.  Indeed, some historical materials suggest to the contrary.  See, e.g., ante, at 8 (citing Franklin's Apology for Printers); Ex parte  Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878) (dictum that Congress could not,  consistent with freedom of the press, prevent the circulation of lottery  advertising through methods other than the United States mail); see also  In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 134-135 (1892) (continuing to assume that freedom of the press prevents Congress from prohibiting circulation of  newspapers containing lottery advertisements); Lewis Publishing Co. v.  Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 315 (1913) (same); see generally Brief for  American Advertising Federation et al. as Amici Curiae 12-24 (citing  authorities for propositions that commercial activity and advertising  were integral to life in colonial America and that Framers' political  philosophy equated liberty and property and did not distinguish between  commercial and noncommercial messages).  Nor do I believe that the only  explanations that the Court has ever advanced for treating "commercial"  speech differently from other speech can justify restricting  "commercial" speech in order to keep information from legal purchasers  so as to thwart what would otherwise be their choices in the  marketplace.26

II

93
I do not join the principal opinion's application of the Central  Hudson balancing test because I do not believe that such a test should  be applied to a restriction of "commercial" speech, at least when, as  here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved through  keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark.27  Application  of the advancement-of-state-interest prong of Central Hudson makes  little sense to me in such circumstances.  Faulting the State for  failing to show that its price advertising ban decreases alcohol  consumption "significantly," as Justice Stevens does, ante, at 19   (emphasis omitted), seems to imply that if the State had been more successful at keeping consumers ignorant and thereby decreasing their  consumption, then the restriction might have been upheld. This  contradicts Virginia Pharmacy Bd.'s rationale for protecting "commercial" speech in the first instance.


94
Both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor appear to adopt a stricter, more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of Central  Hudson than that suggested in some of our other opinions,28 one that  could, as a practical matter, go a long way toward the position I take.  The State argues that keeping information about lower priced alcohol  from consumers will tend to raise the total price of alcohol to  consumers (defined as money price plus the costs of searching out lower  priced alcohol, see Brief for Respondents 23), thus discouraging alcohol consumption.  In their application of the fourth prong, both Justice  Stevens and Justice O'Connor hold that because the State can ban the  sale of lower priced alcohol altogether by instituting minimum prices or  levying taxes, it cannot ban advertising regarding lower priced liquor.  Although the tenor of Justice O'Connor's opinion (and, to a lesser  extent, that of Justice Stevens's opinion) might suggest that this is  just another routine case-by-case application of Central Hudson's fourth  prong, the Court's holding will in fact be quite sweeping if applied  consistently in future cases.  The opinions would appear to commit the  courts to striking down restrictions on speech whenever a direct  regulation (i.e., a regulation involving no restriction on speech  regarding lawful activity at all) would be an equally effective method  of dampening demand by legal users.  But it would seem that directly  banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or  otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always  be at least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the product would be, and thus virtually all restrictions with such a purpose would fail the fourth  prong of the Central Hudson test.  This would be so even if the direct  regulation is, in one sense, more restrictive of conduct generally.  In  this case, for example, adoption of minimum prices or taxes will mean  that those who, under the current legal system, would have happened  across cheap liquor or would have sought it out, will be forced to pay  more.  Similarly, a State seeking to discourage liquor sales would have  to ban sales by convenience stores rather than banning convenience store liquor advertising; it would have to ban liquor sales after midnight,  rather than banning advertising by late-night liquor sellers; and so on.


95
The upshot of the application of the fourth prong in the opinions of Justice Stevens and of Justice O'Connor seems to be that the  government may not, for the purpose of keeping would-be consumers  ignorant and thus decreasing demand, restrict advertising regarding  commercial transactions-or at least that it may not restrict advertising  regarding commercial transactions except to the extent that it outlaws  or otherwise directly restricts the same transactions within its own  borders.29  I welcome this outcome; but, rather than "applying" the  fourth prong of Central Hudson to reach the inevitable result that all or most such advertising restrictions must be struck down, I would adhere to the doctrine adopted in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. and in Justice  Blackmun's Central Hudson concurrence, that all attempts to dissuade  legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible.

III

96
Although the Court took a sudden turn away from Virginia Pharmacy Bd. in Central Hudson, it has never explained why manipulating  the choices of consumers by keeping them ignorant is more legitimate  when the ignorance is maintained through suppression of "commercial"  speech than when the same ignorance is maintained through suppression of  "noncommercial" speech. The courts, including this Court, have found the  Central Hudson "test" to be, as a general matter, very difficult to  apply with any uniformity.30  This may result in part from the  inherently nondeterminative nature of a case-by-case balancing "test" unaccompanied by any categorical rules, and the consequent likelihood  that individual judicial preferences will govern application of the  test.31  Moreover, the second prong of Central Hudson, as applied to  the facts of that case and to those here, apparently requires judges to  delineate those situations in which citizens cannot be trusted with  information, and invites judges to decide whether they themselves think  that consumption of a product is harmful enough that it should be discouraged.32  In my view, the Central Hudson test asks the courts  to weigh incommensurablesthe value of knowledge versus the value of  ignorance-and to apply contradictory premises-that informed adults are  the best judges of their own interests, and that they are not. Rather  than continuing to apply a test that makes no sense to me when the  asserted state interest is of the type involved here, I would return to  the reasoning and holding of Virginia Pharmacy Bd.  Under that decision,  these restrictions fall.


97
djq  Justice O'Connor, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Souter,  and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.


98
Rhode Island prohibits advertisement of the retail price of alcoholic beverages, except at the place of sale.  The State's only  asserted justification for this ban is that it promotes temperance by  increasing the cost of alcoholic beverages.  Brief for Respondent State  of Rhode Island 22.  I agree with the Court that Rhode Island's  price-advertising ban is invalid.  I would resolve this case more  narrowly, however, by applying our established Central Hudson test to  determine whether this commercial-speech regulation survives First  Amendment scrutiny.


99
Under that test, we first determine whether the speech at issue  concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, and whether the asserted  governmental interest is substantial.  If both these conditions are met,  we must decide whether the regulation "directly advances the  governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive  than is necessary to serve that interest."  Central Hudson Gas & Elec.  Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980).


100
Given the means by which this regulation purportedly serves the  State's interest, our conclusion is plain: Rhode Island's regulation  fails First Amendment scrutiny.


101
Both parties agree that the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test are met.  Even if we assume arguendo that Rhode Island's  regulation also satisfies the requirement that it directly advance the  governmental interest, Rhode Island's regulation fails the final prong;  that is, its ban is more extensive than necessary to serve the State's  interest.


102
As we have explained, in order for a speech restriction to pass  muster under the final prong, there must be a fit between the  legislature's goal and method, "a fit that is not necessarily perfect,  but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best  disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest  served."  Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S.  469, 480 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).  While the State  need not employ the least restrictive means to accomplish its goal, the  fit between means and ends must be "narrowly tailored."  Id., at 480.  The scope of the restriction on speech must be reasonably, though it  need not be perfectly, targeted to address the harm intended to be  regulated. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U. S. ___, ___   (1995) (slip op., at 14-16).  The State's regulation must indicate a "carefu[l] calculat[ion of] the costs and benefits associated with the  burden on speech imposed by its prohibition."  Cincinnati v. Discovery  Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 417 (1993) (internal quotation marks  omitted).  The availability of less burdensome alternatives to reach the  stated goal signals that the fit between the legislature's ends and the  means chosen to accomplish those ends may be too imprecise to withstand  First Amendment scrutiny.  See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S.  ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., 13-15); Cincinnati, supra, at 417, n. 13.  If alternative channels permit communication of the restricted speech, the  regulation is more likely to be considered reasonable.  See Florida Bar,  supra, at ___ - ___ (slip op., at 14-17).


103
Rhode Island offers one, and only one, justification for its ban  on price advertising.  Rhode Island says that the ban is intended to  keep alcohol prices high as a way to keep consumption low.  By  preventing sellers from informing customers of prices, the regulation  prevents competition from driving prices down and requires consumers to  spend more time to find the best price for alcohol.  Brief for  Respondent State of Rhode Island 22.  The higher cost of obtaining  alcohol, Rhode Island argues, will lead to reduced consumption.


104
The fit between Rhode Island's method and this particular goal  is not reasonable.  If the target is simply higher prices generally to  discourage consumption, the regulation imposes too great, and  unnecessary, a prohibition on speech in order to achieve it.  The State  has other methods at its disposal-methods that would more directly  accomplish this stated goal without intruding on sellers' ability to  provide truthful, nonmisleading information to customers.  Indeed, Rhode  Island's own expert conceded that "`the objective of lowering  consumption of alcohol by banning price advertising could be  accomplished by establishing minimum prices and/or by increasing sales  taxes on alcoholic beverages.'"  39 F. 3d 5, 7 (CA1 1994).  A tax, for example, is not normally very difficult to administer and would have a  far more certain and direct effect on prices, without any restriction on  speech. The principal opinion suggests further alternatives, such as  limiting per capita purchases or conducting an educational campaign  about the dangers of alcohol consumption. Ante, at 21.  The ready  availability of such alternatives-at least some of which would far more  effectively achieve Rhode Island's only professed goal, at comparatively  small additional administrative cost-demonstrates that the fit between  ends and means is not narrowly tailored.  Too, this regulation prevents sellers of alcohol from communicating price information anywhere but at  the point of purchase.  No channels exist at all to permit them to  publicize the price of their products.


105
Respondents point for support to Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328 (1986), where, applying the Central Hudson test, we upheld the constitutionality of a  Puerto Rico law that prohibited the advertising of casino gambling aimed  at residents of Puerto Rico, but permitted such advertising aimed at  tourists.


106
The Court there accepted as reasonable the legislature's belief  that the regulation would be effective, and concluded that, because the  restriction affected only advertising of casino gambling aimed at  residents of Puerto Rico, not that aimed at tourists, the restriction  was narrowly tailored to serve Puerto Rico's interest.  478 U. S., at  341-344.  The Court accepted without question Puerto Rico's account of  the effectiveness and reasonableness of its speech restriction.  Respondents ask us to make a similar presumption here to uphold the  validity of Rhode Island's law.


107
It is true that Posadas accepted as reasonable, without further  inquiry, Puerto Rico's assertions that the regulations furthered the  government's interest and were no more extensive than necessary to serve  that interest.  Since Posadas, however, this Court has examined more  searchingly the State's professed goal, and the speech restriction put  into place to further it, before accepting a State's claim that the  speech restriction satisfies First Amendment scrutiny.  See, e.g.,  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U. S. ___; Rubin v. Coors Brewing  Co., 514 U. S. ___ (1995);  Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U. S. ___ (1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761 (1993);  Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410 (1993). In each of these cases we declined  to accept at face value the proffered justification for the State's  regulation, but examined carefully the relationship between the asserted  goal and the speech restriction used to reach that goal.  The closer  look that we have required since Posadas comports better with the  purpose of  the analysis set out in Central Hudson, by requiring the  State to show that the speech restriction directly advances its interest  and is narrowly tailored.  Under such a closer look, Rhode Island's price-advertising ban clearly fails to pass muster.


108
Because Rhode Island's regulation fails even the less stringent  standard set out in Central Hudson, nothing here requires adoption of a  new analysis for the evaluation of commercial speech regulation.  The  principal opinion acknowledges that "even under the less than strict  standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases, the State  has failed to establish a reasonable fit between its abridgement of  speech and its temperance goal."  Ante, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because we need go no further, I would not here undertake the  question whether the test we have employed since Central Hudson should  be displaced.


109
Respondents argue that an additional factor, the Twenty-first Amendment, tips the First Amendment analysis in Rhode Island's favor.


110
The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the prohibition on the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors that had  been established by the 18th Amendment.  Section 2 of the Twenty-first  Amendment created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce  Clause, to permit States to prohibit commerce in, or the use of,  alcoholic beverages.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 206 (1976).


111
In its examination of Rhode Island's statute, the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment provided  an "added presumption in favor of the validity of the state regulation."  39 F. 3d 7-9 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Twenty-first  Amendment cannot save an otherwise invalid restriction on speech.


112
Nothing in the Amendment's text or history justifies its use to  alter the application of the First Amendment.  "[O]ur prior cases have  made clear that the [Twenty-first] Amendment does not license the States  to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution."  Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 712 (1984).  See  also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982)  ("The State may not exercise its power under the Twenty-first Amendment  in a way which impinges upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment");  Craig, supra, at 206 ("Neither the text nor the history of  the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights  protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where the  sale or use of liquor is concerned" (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Twenty-first Amendment does not trump First Amendment rights or add  a presumption of validity to a regulation that cannot otherwise satisfy  First Amendment requirements.


113
The Court of Appeals relied on California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 118-119 (1972), for its determination that the Twenty-first Amendment provided an "added presumption" of the regulation's validity.  There, this Court upheld a State's regulations prohibiting  establishments licensed to sell liquor by the drink from offering  explicitly sexual entertainment.  As we recently explained in Coors,  "LaRue did not involve commercial speech about alcohol, but instead  concerned the regulation of nude dancing in places where alcohol was  served."  514 U. S., at ___, n. 2 (slip op., at 5, n. 2).  The cases  following LaRue similarly involved the regulation of nude or nearly nude  dancing in establishments licensed to serve alcohol.  New York State  Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U. S. 714 (1981) (per curiam); Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U. S. 92 (1986) (per curiam).  Nothing in  LaRue suggested that the Twenty-first Amendment would permit a State to  prohibit the kind of speech at issue here, and as discussed above, the  text and history of the Twenty-first Amendment clearly indicate that the  Amendment was not intended to supplant the general application of  constitutional provisions, except for its limited exception to the  Commerce Clause's normal operation.  Indeed, LaRue notes that prior  decisions "did not go so far as to hold or say that the Twenty-first  Amendment supersedes all other provisions of the United States  Constitution in the area of liquor regulations," 409 U. S., at 115, and  LaRue certainly does not stand for that proposition.  The Court of Appeals' reliance on LaRue was misplaced.


114
Rhode Island's prohibition on alcohol-price advertising, as a means to keep alcohol prices high and consumption low, cannot survive  First Amendment scrutiny.  The Twenty-first Amendment cannot save this  otherwise invalid regulation.  While I agree with the Court's finding  that the regulation is invalid, I would decide that issue on narrower  grounds.  I therefore concur in the judgment.



*
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience  of the reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321,  337.


1
  Although the text of the First Amendment states that  "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," the Amendment applies to the States under the Due Process  Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Board of Ed., Island Trees  Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 855, n. 1 (1982);  Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936); Gitlow v. New  York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).


2
 Rhode Island Gen. Laws Section(s) 3-8-7 (1987) provides:
"Advertising price of malt beverages, cordials, wine or  distilled liquor.-No manufacturer, wholesaler, or shipper from without  this state and no holder of a license issued under the provisions of this title and chapter shall cause or permit the advertising in any  manner whatsoever of the price of any malt beverage, cordials, wine or  distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however, that  the provisions of this section shall not apply to price signs or tags  attached to or placed on merchandise for sale within the licensed  premises in accordance with rules and regulations of the department."
Regulation 32 of the Rules and Regulations of the Liquor Control Administrator provides that no placard or sign that is visible from the  exterior of a package store may make any reference to the price of any  alcoholic beverage.  App. 2 to Brief for Petitioners.


3
 Rhode Island Gen. Laws Section(s) 3-8-8.1 (1987) provides:
"Price advertising by media or advertising companies unlawful.--No newspaper, periodical, radio or television broadcaster or  broadcasting company or any other person, firm or corporation with a  principal place of business in the state of Rhode Island which is  engaged in the business of advertising or selling advertising time or  space shall accept, publish, or broadcast any advertisement in this  state of the price or make reference to the price of any alcoholic  beverages. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this  section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ."  The statute  authorizes the liquor control administrator to exempt trade journals  from its coverage.  Ibid.


4
 "We also have little difficulty in finding that the  asserted governmental interests, herein described as the promotion of temperance and the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages, are substantial.  We note, parenthetically, that the word  `temperance' is oftentimes mistaken as a synonym for `abstinence.'  It  is not. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) defines  `temperance' as `moderation in or abstinence from the use of  intoxicating drink.' The Rhode Island Legislature has the authority,  derived from the state's inherent police power, to enact a variety of  laws designed to suppress intemperance or to minimize the acknowledged  evils of liquor traffic. Thus, there can be no question that these  asserted interests are indeed substantial.  Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp, 699 F. 2d at 500."  S&S Liquor Mart, Inc. v.  Pastore, 497 A. 2d, at 733-734.
In her dissent in Rhode Island Liquor Stores Assn. v. Evening Call Pub. Co., 497 A. 2d 331 (R. I. 1985), Justice Murray suggested that  the advertising ban was motivated, at least in part, by an interest in  protecting small retailers from price competition.  Id., at 342, n. 10.  This suggestion is consistent with the position taken by respondent  Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association in this case.  We, however,  accept the State Supreme Court's identification of the relevant state  interest served by the legislation.


5
 The plaintiff in that case is a respondent in this case and  has filed other actions enforcing the price advertising ban.  See id., at 333.


6
 In Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F. 2d 738 (CA5 1983), the Fifth Circuit distinguished our summary action in Queensgate in considering  the constitutionality of a sweeping state restriction on outdoor liquor  advertising.  The Court explained that Queensgate did not control  because it involved a far narrower alcohol advertising regulation.  Id.,  at 745-746.  By contrast, in Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp, 699 F.  2d 490, 495-497 (CA10 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Capital  Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 697 (1984), the Tenth Circuit relied on Queensgate in considering a prohibition against broadcasting alcohol advertisements.  The Court of Appeals concluded  that Queensgate stood for the proposition that the Twenty-first  Amendment gives the State greater authority to regulate liquor  advertising than the First Amendment would otherwise allow.  699 F. 2d,  at 495-497.
Other than the two Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions  upholding the constitutionality of the statutes at issue in this case,  only one published state court opinion has considered our summary action  in Queensgate in passing on a liquor advertising restriction.  See  Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General, 142 Mich.  App. 294, 370 N. W. 2d 328 (1985). There, the Michigan Court of Appeals  concluded that Queensgate did not control because it involved a far  narrower restriction on liquor advertising than the one that Michigan  had imposed.  142 Mich. App., at 304-305, 370 N. W. 2d, at 333-335.


7
 By contrast, the First Amendment does not protect  commercial speech about unlawful activities.  See Pittsburgh Press Co.  v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376 (1973).


8
 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 355 (1977)  (ban on lawyer advertising); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 700 (1977) (ban on contraceptive advertising); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 92-94 (1977) (ban on `For  Sale' signs); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer  Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976) (ban on prescription drug prices);  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 825 (1975) (ban on abortion  advertising). Although Linmark involved a prohibition against a  particular means of advertising the sale of one's home, we treated the  restriction as if it were a complete ban because it did not leave open  "satisfactory" alternative channels of communication.  431 U. S., at  92-94.


9
 In other words, the regulation failed the fourth step in  the four-part inquiry that the majority announced in its opinion. It wrote: "In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is  protected by the First Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within  that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be  misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is  substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must  determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental  interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is  necessary to serve that interest." Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566.


10
 The Justices concurring in the judgment adopted a somewhat broader view.  They expressed "doubt whether suppression of information  concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is  ever a permissible way for the State to `dampen' the demand for or use  of the product."  Id., at 574. Indeed, Justice Blackmun believed that  even "though `commercial' speech is involved, such a regulation strikes  at the heart of the First Amendment." Ibid.


11
 "Florida permits lawyers to advertise on prime-time  television and radio as well as in newspapers and other media.  They may rent space on billboards.  They may send untargeted letters to the general population, or to discrete segments thereof.  There are, of  course, pages upon pages devoted to lawyers in the Yellow Pages of  Florida telephone directories. These listings are organized  alphabetically and by area of specialty. See generally Rule 4-7.2(a),  Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (`[A] lawyer may advertise services  through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory,  newspaper or other periodical, billboards, and other signs, radio,  television, and recorded messages the public may access by dialing a  telephone number, or through written communication not involving  solicitation as defined in rule 4-7.4'); The Florida Bar: Petition to  Amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So  2d, at 461."  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U. S., at ___ (slip  op., at 15-16).


12
 In Discovery Network, we held that the city's categorical  ban on commercial newsracks attached too much importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.  After concluding that the aesthetic and safety interests served by the newsrack ban bore no relationship whatsoever to the prevention of commercial harms, we rejected the State's attempt to justify its ban on  the sole ground that it targeted commercial speech.  See 507 U. S., at  428.


13
 This case bears out the point.  Rhode Island seeks to  reduce alcohol consumption by increasing alcohol price; yet its means of achieving that goal deprives the public of their chief source of information about the reigning price level of alcohol.  As a result, the  State's price advertising ban keeps the public ignorant of the key  barometer of the ban's effectiveness: The alcohol beverages' prices.


14
 Before the District Court, the State argued that it sought  to reduce consumption among irresponsible drinkers.  App. 67.  In its brief to this Court, it equates its interest in promoting temperance  with an interest in reducing alcohol consumption among all drinkers.  See, e.g., Brief for Respondents 28.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has  characterized the State's interest in "promoting temperance" as both  "the state's interest in reducing the consumption of liquor," S&S  Liquormart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A. 2d 729, 734 (1985), and the State's  interest in discouraging "excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages."  Id. at 735.  A state statute declares the ban's purpose to be "the  promotion of temperance and for the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages."  R. I. Gen. Laws Section(s) 3-1-5 (1987).


15
 See, e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 735 (1988) (considering restriction on price advertising as evidence of Sherman Act violation); United States v.  Sealy, Inc., 388 U. S. 350, 355 (1967) (same); Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53  F. 3d 825, 828 (CA7 1995) (considering restrictions on the location of advertising as evidence of Sherman Act violation).


16
 The appellants' stipulation that they each expect to  realize a $100,000 benefit per year if the ban is lifted is not to the contrary. App. 47.  The stipulation shows only that the appellants believe they will be able to compete more effectively for existing alcohol consumers if there is no ban on price advertising.  It does not  show that they believe either the number of alcohol consumers, or the  number of purchases by those consumers, will increase in the ban's  absence. Indeed, the State's own expert conceded that "plaintiffs'  expectation of realizing additional profits through price advertising  has no necessary relationship to increased overall consumption."  829 F.  Supp., at 549.
Moreover, we attach little significance to the fact that some studies suggest that people budget the amount of money that they will  spend on alcohol.  39 F. 3d 5, 7 (CA1 1994).  These studies show only  that, in a competitive market, people will tend to search for the  cheapest product in order to meet their budgets. The studies do not  suggest that the amount of money budgeted for alcohol consumption will  remain fixed in the face of a market-wide price increase.


17
 Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the  regulation directly advanced the State's interest, it did not dispute  the District Court's conclusion that the evidence suggested that, at most, a price advertising ban would have a marginal impact on overall  alcohol consumption.  Id., at 7-8; cf. Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers  Assn. v. Attorney General, 142 Mich. App., at 311, 370 N. W. 2d, at 336   (explaining that "any additional impact on the level of consumption  attributable to the absence of price advertisements would be  negligible").


18
 Outside the First Amendment context, we have refused to  uphold alcohol advertising bans premised on similarly speculative assertions about their impact on consumption.  See Capital Cities Cable,  Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 715-716 (1984) (holding ban pre-empted by  Federal Communications Commission regulations); California Retail Liquor  Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980) (holding ban  violated the Sherman Act).  It would be anomalous if the First Amendment  were more tolerant of speech bans than federal regulations and statutes.


19
 "Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day.  Teach a  man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime."  The International Thesaurus of Quotations 646 (compiled by R. Tripp 1970).


20
 It is also no answer to say that it would be "strange" if  the First Amendment tolerated a seemingly "greater" regulatory measure while forbidding a "lesser" one.  We recently held that although the  government had the power to proscribe an entire category of speech, such  as obscenity or so-called fighting words, it could not limit the scope  of its ban to obscene or fighting words that expressed a point of view  with which the government disagrees. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S.  377 (1992).  Similarly, in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.  S. 410 (1993), we assumed that States could prevent all newsracks from  being placed on public sidewalks, but nevertheless concluded that they  could not ban only those newsracks that contained certain commercial publications.  Id., at 428.


21
 "Section 2.  The transportation or importation into any  State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is  hereby prohibited."  U. S. Const., Amdt. 21, Section(s) 2.


22
 The State also relies on two per curiam opinions that  followed the 21st Amendment analysis set forth in Larue.  See New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U. S. 714 (1981), and Newport v.  Iacobucci, 479 U. S. 92 (1986).


23
 Accord, Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U. S., at 780, n. 8 (Stewart, J., concurring) (information about price and products conveyed  by advertising may stimulate thought and debate about political  questions).


24
 See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,  431 U. S. 85, 96-97 (1977); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350,  364-365, 368-369, 374-375, 376-377 (1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S.  1, 8-9 (1979); id., at 23-24 (Blackmun, J., for two Justices, concurring  in part and dissenting in part); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.  Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 561-562 (1980); id. at 566,  n. 9; id., at 575 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in  judgment); id., at 581 (Stevens, J., also joined by Brennan, J.,  concurring in judgment); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S.  60, 79 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., for two Justices, concurring in judgment);  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471  U. S. 626, 646 (1985); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.  of P. R., 478 U. S. 328, 350-351, 358 (1986) (Brennan, J., for three  Justices, dissenting); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S.  410, 421-422, n. 17 (1993); id., at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring);  Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 767, 770 (1993); United States v. Edge  Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 437-439, and nn. 1, 3, 4 (1993)  (Stevens, J., for two Justices, dissenting); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of  Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 5-7); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. ___   (1995) (slip op., at 4-5); id., at ___, ___ (Stevens, J., concurring in  judgment) (slip op., at 1-3, 7-8); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515  U. S. ___ (1995) (Kennedy, J., for four Justices, dissenting) (slip op.,  at 5-6, 10-11).


25
 The Court found that although the total effect of the advertising ban would be to decrease consumption, the advertising ban  impermissibly extended to some advertising that itself might not  increase consumption. Central Hudson, supra, at 569-571.


26
 As noted above, the asserted rationales for  differentiating "commercial" speech from other speech are (1) that the  truth of "commercial" speech is supposedly more verifiable, and (2) that "commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest" is supposedly a "hardy breed of expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."  Central Hudson,  supra, at 564, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). The degree to  which these rationales truly justify treating "commercial" speech  differently from other speech (or indeed, whether the requisite  distinction can even be drawn) is open to question, in my view.  See  Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 Va. L. Rev.  627, 634-638 (1990) (questioning basis for drawing distinction); id., at  638-650 (questioning coherence of distinction).  In any event, neither  of these rationales provides any basis for permitting government to keep  citizens ignorant as a means of manipulating their choices in the  commercial or political marketplace.


27
 In other words, I do not believe that a Central  Hudson-type balancing test should apply when the asserted purpose is  like the one put forth by the government in Central Hudson itself.  Whether some type of balancing test is warranted when the asserted state interest is of a different kind is a question that I do not consider  here.


28
 E.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U. S., at 417,  n. 13 (commercial speech restrictions impermissible if alternatives are  "numerous" and obvious).


29
 The two most obvious situations in which no equally  effective direct regulation will be available for discouraging  consumption (and thus, the two situations in which the Court and I might differ on the outcome) are: (1) When a law directly regulating conduct  would violate the Constitution (e.g., because the item is constitutionally protected), or (2) when the sale is to occur outside  the State's borders.
As to the first situation: Although the Court's application of the fourth prong today does not specifically foreclose regulations or  bans of advertising regarding items that cannot constitutionally be  banned, it would seem strange to hold that the government's power to  interfere with transmission of information regarding these items, in  order to dampen demand for them, is more extensive than its power to  restrict, for the same purpose, advertising of items that are not  constitutionally protected.  Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 822   (1975).
As to the second situation: When a State seeks to dampen consumption by its citizens of products or services outside its borders,  it does not have the option of direct regulation.  Here, respondent  correctly points out that alternatives such as taxes will not be  effective in discouraging sales to Rhode Island residents of lower  priced alcohol outside the State, see Brief for Respondent Rhode Island  Liquor Stores Association 27; yet the Court strikes down the ban against  price advertising even as applied to out-of-state liquor sellers such as  petitioner Peoples Super Liquor Stores.  Perhaps Justice Stevens and  Justice O'Connor would distinguish a situation in which a State had actually banned sales of lower priced alcohol within the State and had  then, through a ban of advertising by out-of-state sellers, sought to  keep residents ignorant of the fact that lower priced alcohol was  legally available in other States.  Cf. Edge, supra. See ante, at  22-23.
The outcome in Edge may well be in conflict with the principles espoused in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. and ratified by me today.  See Edge,  509 U. S., at 436-439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  (In Edge, respondent  did not put forth the broader principles adopted in Virginia Pharmacy  Bd., but rather argued that the advertising restriction did not have a  sufficiently close fit under Central Hudson.)  Because the issue of  restrictions on advertising of products or services to be purchased  legally outside a State that has itself banned or regulated the same  purchases within the State is not squarely presented in this case, I  will not address here whether the decision in Edge can be reconciled  with the position I take today.


30
 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, 76 Va. L. Rev., at 630-631 (citing cases); Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 137, 162-166 (1994) (citing cases); Kaskove, New York State Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer: When the Second Circuit Chooses Between Free Speech and Fair  Housing, Who Wins?, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 397, 409-410, and nn. 71, 73,  418 (1995); Note, Dunagin v. City of Oxford: Mississippi's Suppression  of Liquor Advertising, 63 Detroit L. Rev. 175, 184-187 (1985); Faille,  Spinning the Roulette Wheel: Commercial Speech and Philosophical  Cogency, Fed. B. N. & J. (1994), pp. 58, 60-62; Margulies, Connecticut's  Free Speech Clauses: A Framework and an Agenda, 65 Conn. Bar J. 437,  440, n. 20 (1991) (citing cases).


31
 The third prong of Central Hudson is far from a mechanical one.  In Posadas, Edge, and other cases, the Court has presumed that  advertising bans decrease consumption.  Here, by contrast, the principal  opinion demands proof of a "significant" decrease in consumption, and  finds it lacking.  But petitioners' own expert testified at one point  that, taking into account disposable income, price was a "potent"  influence on alcohol consumption, see App. 79; and the American Medical  Association had apparently concluded that advertising of alcohol in  general increased total alcohol consumption sufficiently to make a ban  on advertising worthwhile, see 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 548 (DRI 1993).  A court more inclined to uphold the ban here  could have pointed to these facts in support.
The courts have also had difficulty applying the fourth prong because the outcome has depended upon the level of generality with which  the interest was described.  See Faille, supra, at 58, 60. If today's  strict application of the fourth prong survives, it will clarify the  prong's application in a large number of cases, since, as noted above,  it will simply invalidate most restrictions in which the government  attempts to manipulate consumption through enforced ignorance rather  than through direct regulation.


32
 See ante, at 28 (noting that scope of any "vice" category  of products would be difficult to define).


