529 U.S. 244120 S.Ct. 1362146 L.Ed.2d 236
J. WAYNE GARNER, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE  STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES OF  GEORGIA, et al. , PETITIONERSv.ROBERT L. JONES
No. 99-137.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 11, 2000
Decided March 28, 2000

Syllabus
Respondent escaped while serving a life sentence for murder, committed another  murder, and was sentenced to a second life term. Georgia law requires the  State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life  sentences for parole after seven years. At the time respondent committed his  second offense, the Board's Rule 475-3-.05(2) required that reconsiderations for  parole take place every three years. Acting pursuant to statutory authority, the  Board subsequently extended the reconsideration period to at least every eight  years. The Board has the discretion to shorten that interval, but declined to do  so when it applied the amended Rule in respondent's case, citing his multiple  offenses and the circumstances and nature of his second offense. Respondent sued  petitioner Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended  Rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court denied respondent's  motion for discovery and awarded petitioners summary judgment. The Eleventh  Circuit reversed. It found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was  necessarily an ex post facto violation and that the Rule differed in material  respects from the change in California parole law sustained in California Dept.  of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 . It did not consider the Board's  internal policies regarding its implementation of the Rule, finding, among other  things, that such policies were unenforceable and easily changed.
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals' analysis failed to reveal whether retroactive  application of the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2) violated the Ex Post Facto  Clause. The controlling inquiry is whether such application creates a sufficient  risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.  Morales, supra, at 509. Here, the question is whether amended Rule 475-3-.05(2)  creates a significant risk of prolonging respondent's incarceration. That risk  is not inherent in the amended Rule's framework, and it has not otherwise been  demonstrated on the record. While Morales identified several factors convincing  this Court that California's law created an insignificant risk of increased  punishment for covered inmates, the Court was careful not to adopt a single  formula for identifying which parole adjustments would survive an ex post facto  challenge. States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and  addressing problems associated with confinement and release. This case turns on  the amended Rule's operation within the whole context of Georgia's parole  system. Georgia law gives the Board broad discretion in determining whether an  inmate should receive early release. Such discretion does not displace the Ex  Post Facto Clause's protections, but the idea of discretion is that it has the  capacity, and the obligation, to change and adapt based on experience. The  statutory structure, its implementing regulations, and the Board's unrefuted  representations regarding its operations do not support respondent's conclusion  that the Board will not exercise its discretion in the period between parole  reviews. The Georgia law is qualified in two important respects. First, it vests  the Board with discretion as to how often to set an inmate's date for  reconsideration, with an 8-year maximum. Second, the Board's policies permit  expedited reviews in the event of a change in circumstance or new information.  These qualifications permit the Board to set reconsideration dates according to  the likelihood that a review will result in meaningful considerations as to  whether an inmate is suitable for release. The Board's policy of providing  reconsideration every eight years when it does not expect that parole would be  granted during the intervening years enables the Board to ensure that those  prisoners who should receive parole come to its attention. Given respondent's  criminal history, it is difficult to see how the Board increased his risk of  serving a longer time when it set an 8-year, not a 3-year, interval. Yet, even  he may seek earlier review upon showing changed circumstances or new  information. The Eleventh Circuit's supposition that the Rule seems certain to  result in increased incarceration falls short of the rigorous analysis required  by the Morales standard. When the rule does not by its own terms show a  significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the  rule's practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising  discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period of  incarceration than under the earlier rule. On the record in this case, it cannot  be concluded that the change in Georgia law lengthened respondent's actual  imprisonment time. Pp. 5-11.
2. The Eleventh Circuit erred in not considering the Board's internal  policy statement regarding how it intends to enforce its rule. At a minimum,  such statements, along with the Board's actual practices, provide important  instruction as to how the Board interprets its enabling statute and regulations,  and therefore whether the amended Rule created a significant risk of increased  punishment. Absent a demonstration to the contrary, it is presumed that the  Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies. Pp. 11-12.
3. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis failed to reveal whether the amended  Rule, in its operation, created a significant risk of increased punishment for  respondent. He claims that he has not been permitted sufficient discovery to  make this showing. The matter of adequate discovery is one for the Court of  Appeals or, as need be, for the District Court in the first instance. P. 12.  164 F. 3d 589, reversed and remanded.
On writ of certiorari to the united states court of  appeals for the eleventh circuit
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.  J., and O'Connor, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion  concurring in part in the judgment. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in  which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
We granted certiorari to decide whether the retroactive application of a  Georgia law permitting the extension of intervals between parole considerations  violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court of Appeals found that retroactive  application of the change in the law was necessarily an ex post facto violation.  In disagreement with that determination, we reverse its judgment and remand for  further proceedings.


2
* In 1974 respondent Robert L. Jones began serving a life sentence after his  conviction for murder in the State of Georgia. He escaped from prison some five  years later and, after being a fugitive for over two years, committed another  murder. He was apprehended, convicted, and in 1982 sentenced to a second life  term.


3
Under Georgia law, at all times relevant here, the State's Board of Pardons  and Paroles (Board or Parole Board) has been required to consider inmates  serving life sentences for parole after seven years. Ga. Code Ann. 42-9-45(b)  (1982). The issue in this case concerns the interval between proceedings to  reconsider those inmates for parole after its initial denial. At the time  respondent committed his second offense, the Board's Rules required  reconsiderations to take place every three years. Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule  475-3-.05(2) (1979). In 1985, after respondent had begun serving his second life  sentence, the Parole Board, acting under its authority to "set forth ... the  times at which periodic reconsideration [for parole] shall take place," Ga. Code  Ann. 42-9-45(a) (1982), amended its Rules to provide that "[r]econsideration of  those inmates serving life sentences who have been denied parole shall take  place at least every eight years," Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475-3-.05(2) (1985).


4
The Parole Board considered respondent for parole in 1989, seven years  after the 1982 conviction. It denied release and, consistent with the 1985  amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2), reconsideration was set for 1997, eight years  later. In 1991, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh  Circuit held that retroactive application of the amended Rule violated the Ex  Post Facto Clause. Akins v. Snow , 922 F. 2d 1558, cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1260  (1991). In compliance with that decision, in effect reinstating its earlier  3-year Rule, the Parole Board reconsidered respondent's case in 1992 and in  1995. Both times parole was denied, the Board citing for its action respondent's  "multiple offenses" and the "circumstances and nature of" the second offense.  App. 53-54.


5
In 1995 the Parole Board determined that our decision in California Dept.  of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995), had rejected the rationale  underlying the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Akins . The Board resumed  scheduling parole reconsiderations at least every eight years, and so at  respondent's 1995 review it set the next consideration for 2003. Had the Board  wished to do so, it could have shortened the interval, but the 8-year period was  selected based on respondent's "multiple offenses" and the "circumstances and  nature of" his second offense. App. 54. Respondent, acting pro se , brought this  action under 42 U. S. C. 1983, Rev. Stat. 1979, claiming, inter alia , the  amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The suit was  filed against individual members of the Parole Board, petitioners in this Court.  Respondent requested leave to conduct discovery to support his claim, but the  District Court denied the motion and entered summary judgment for petitioners.  The court determined the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2) "change[d] only the  timing between reconsideration hearings" for inmates sentenced to life in  prison, thereby "relieving the Board of the necessity of holding parole hearings  for prisoners who have no reasonable chance of being released." App. to Pet. for  Cert. 27a . Because the Parole Board's policies permit inmates, upon a showing  of "a change in their circumstance or where the Board receives new information,"  App. 56, to receive expedited reconsideration for parole, the court further  concluded the amendment created " `only the most speculative and attenuated  possibility' " of increasing a prisoner's measure of punishment, App. to Pet.  for Cert. 27a (quoting Morales , supra , at 509).


6
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the amended Georgia Rule  distinguishable in material respects from the California law sustained in  Morales . 164 F. 3d 589 (CA11 1999). In finding the Georgia law violative of the  Ex Post Facto Clause, the court posited that the set of inmates affected by the  retroactive change--all prisoners serving life sentences--is "bound to be far  more sizeable than the set ... at issue in Morales "--inmates convicted of more  than one homicide. Id., at 594. The Georgia law sweeps within its coverage, the  court continued, "many inmates who can expect at some point to be paroled,"  ibid. , and thus "seems certain to ensure that some number of inmates will find  the length of their incarceration extended in violation of the Ex Post Facto  Clause of the Constitution," id. , at 595. "Eight years is a long time," the  court emphasized, and "[m]uch can happen in the course of eight years to affect  the determination that an inmate would be suitable for parole." Ibid. The Court  of Appeals recognized that the Parole Board would set a new parole review date  three years or more into the future (up to eight years) only where it concludes  that " `it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted' " sooner.  Ibid. (quoting policy statement of Parole Board). The court thought this policy  insufficient, however, because, unlike the statute in Morales , it does not  require the Board "to make any particularized findings" and is not "carefully  tailored." 164 F. 3d, at 594-595. The court also recognized that the Board's  policy permitted it to reconsider any parole denials upon a showing of a "change  in circumstance[s]" or upon the Board's receipt of "new information." The court  deemed the policy insufficient, however, stating that "[p]olicy statements,  unlike regulations are unenforceable and easily changed, and adherence to them  is a matter of the Board's discretion." Id. , at 595.


7
We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. ___ (1999), and we now reverse.

II

8
The States are prohibited from enacting an ex post facto law. U. S. Const.,  Art. I, 10, cl. 1. One function of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to bar  enactments which, by retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime  after its commission. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 42 (1990) (citing  Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 169-170 (1925)). Retroactive changes in laws  governing parole of prisoners, in some instances, may be violative of this  precept. See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 445-446 (1997) (citing Weaver v.  Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 32 (1981)); Morales, 514 U. S., at 508 -509. Whether  retroactive application of a particular change in parole law respects the  prohibition on ex post facto legislation is often a question of particular  difficulty when the discretion vested in a parole board is taken into account.


9
Our recent decision in Morales is an appropriate beginning point. There a  California statute changed the frequency of reconsideration for parole from  every year to up to every three years for prisoners convicted of more than one  homicide. Morales , 514 U. S., at 503 . We found no ex post facto violation,  emphasizing that not every retroactive procedural change creating a risk of  affecting an inmate's terms or conditions of confinement is prohibited. Id. , at  508-509. The question is "a matter of `degree.' " Id. , at 509 (quoting Beazell  , supra , at 171). The controlling inquiry, we determined, was whether  retroactive application of the change in California law created "a sufficient  risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes."  514 U. S., at 509 .


10
The amended California law did not violate this standard. It did not modify  the statutory punishment imposed for any particular offenses. Nor did the  amendment alter the standards for determining either the initial date for parole  eligibility or an inmate's suitability for parole. Id. , at 507. The amendment  did not change the basic structure of California's parole law. It vested the  California parole board with discretion to decrease the frequency with which it  reconsidered parole for a limited class, consisting of prisoners convicted of  more than one homicide. Id., at 507, 510. If the board determined a low  likelihood of release existed for a member within that class, it could set the  prisoner's next consideration date three years hence. The change in California  law did not, however, prohibit requests for earlier reconsideration based on a  change of circumstances. Id., at 512-513. Historical practices within the  California penal system indicated "about 90% of all prisoners are found  unsuitable for parole at the initial hearing, while 85% are found unsuitable at  the second and subsequent hearings." Id., at 510-511 (citing In re Jackson , 39  Cal. 3d 464, 473, 703 P. 2d 100, 105 (1985)). On these facts we determined the  Ex Post Facto Clause did not prohibit California from conserving and  reallocating the resources that would otherwise be expended to conduct annual  parole hearings for inmates with little chance of release. 514 U. S., at 511  -512. The sum of these factors illustrated that the decrease in the frequency of  parole suitability proceedings "create[d] only the most speculative and  attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the  measure of punishment for covered crimes." Id., at 509.


11
Consistent with the Court of Appeals' analysis, respondent stresses certain  differences between Georgia's amended parole law and the California statute  reviewed in Morales . The amendment to Rule 475-.3-05(2), respondent urges,  permits the extension of parole reconsiderations by five years (not just by two  years); covers all prisoners serving life sentences (not just multiple  murderers); and affords inmates fewer procedural safeguards (in particular, no  formal hearings in which counsel can be present). These differences are not  dispositive. The question is whether the amended Georgia Rule creates a  significant risk of prolonging respondent's incarceration. See id., at 509. The  requisite risk is not inherent in the framework of amended Rule 475-3-.05(2),  and it has not otherwise been demonstrated on the record.


12
Our decision in Morales did not suggest all States must model their  procedures governing consideration for parole after those of California to avoid  offending the Ex Post Facto Clause. The analysis undertaken in Morales did  identify factors which convinced us the amendment to California law created an  insignificant risk of increased punishment for covered inmates. Our opinion was  careful, however, not to adopt a single formula for identifying which  legislative adjustments, in matters bearing on parole, would survive an ex post  facto challenge. Id. , at 509. We also observed that the Ex Post Facto Clause  should not be employed for "the micromanagement of an endless array of  legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures." Id. , at 508.  These remain important concerns. The States must have due flexibility in  formulating parole procedures and addressing problems associated with  confinement and release.


13
The case turns on the operation of the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2)  within the whole context of Georgia's parole system. Georgia law charges the  Parole Board with determining which prisoners "may be released on pardon or  parole and [with] fixing the time and conditions thereof." Ga. Code Ann.  42-9-20 (1997). In making release decisions, the same law, in relevant part,  provides:


14
"Good conduct, achievement of a fifth-grade level or higher on  standardized reading tests, and efficient performance of duties by an inmate  shall be considered by the board in his favor and shall merit consideration of  an application for pardon or parole. No inmate shall be placed on parole until  and unless the board shall find that there is reasonable probability that, if  he is so released, he will live and conduct himself as a respectable and  law-abiding person and that his release will be compatible with his own  welfare and the welfare of society. Furthermore, no person shall be released  on pardon or placed on parole unless and until the board is satisfied that he  will be suitably employed in self-sustaining employment or that he will not  become a public charge." 42-9-42(c).


15
See also 42-9-43 (listing information the Board should consider, including  wardens' reports, results of physical and mental examinations, and reports  regarding prisoners' performance in educational programs). These provisions  illustrate the broad discretion the Parole Board possesses in determining  whether an inmate should receive early release. Accord, Sultenfuss v. Snow , 35  F. 3d 1494, 1501-1502 (CA11 1994) (en banc) (describing the discretion Georgia  law vests with Parole Board). Only upon a showing that the Board engaged in a  "gross abuse of discretion" can a prisoner challenge a parole denial in the  Georgia courts. Lewis v. Griffin , 258 Ga. 887, 888, n. 3, 376 S. E. 2d 364,  366, n. 3 (1989).


16
The presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the Ex Post  Facto Clause, however. Cf. Weaver , 450 U. S., at 30 -31. The danger that  legislatures might disfavor certain persons after the fact is present even in  the parole context, and the Court has stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause  guards against such abuse. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 429 (1987)  (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 389 (1798) (Chase, J.)). On the other hand,  to the extent there inheres in ex post facto doctrine some idea of actual or  constructive notice to the criminal before commission of the offense of the  penalty for the transgression, see Weaver , supra , at 28-29, we can say with  some assurance that where parole is concerned discretion, by its very  definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then  exercised. The idea of discretion is that it has the capacity, and the  obligation, to change and adapt based on experience. New insights into the  accuracy of predictions about the offense and the risk of recidivism consequent  upon the offender's release, along with a complex of other factors, will inform  parole decisions. See, e. g. , Justice v. State Board of Pardons and Paroles ,  234 Ga. 749, 751-752, 218 S. E. 2d 45, 46-47 (1975) (explaining, by illustration to one prisoner's circumstances, that parole  decisions rest upon the Board's consideration of numerous factors specific to an  inmate's offense, rehabilitative efforts, and ability to live a responsible,  productive life). The essence of respondent's case, as we see it, is not that  discretion has been changed in its exercise but that, in the period between  parole reviews, it will not be exercised at all. The statutory structure, its  implementing regulations, and the Parole Board's unrefuted representations  regarding its operations do not lead to this conclusion.


17
The law changing the frequency of parole reviews is qualified in two  important respects. First, the law vests the Parole Board with discretion as to  how often to set an inmate's date for reconsideration, with eight years for the  maximum. See Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475-3-.05(2) (1985) ("Reconsideration ...  shall take place at least every eight years"). Second, the Board's policies  permit "expedited parole reviews in the event of a change in their circumstance  or where the Board receives new information that would warrant a sooner review."  App. 56. These qualifications permit a more careful and accurate exercise of the  discretion the Board has had from the outset. Rather than being required to  review cases pro forma , the Board may set reconsideration dates according to  the likelihood that a review will result in meaningful considerations as to  whether an inmate is suitable for release. The Board's stated policy is to  provide for reconsideration at 8-year intervals "when, in the Board's  determination, it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted  during the intervening years." Ibid. The policy enables the Board to put its  resources to better use, to ensure that those prisoners who should receive  parole come to its attention. By concentrating its efforts on those cases  identified as having a good possibility of early release, the Board's Rules  might result in the release of some prisoners earlier than would have been the  case otherwise.


18
The particular case of the respondent well illustrates that the Board's  Rule changes are designed for the better exercise of the discretion it had from  the outset. Given respondent's criminal history, including his escape from  prison and the commission of a second murder, it is difficult to see how the  Board increased the risk of his serving a longer time when it decided that its  parole review should be exercised after an 8-year, not a 3-year, interval. Yet  if such a risk develops, respondent may, upon a showing of either "a change in  [his] circumstance[s]" or the Board's receipt of "new information," seek an  earlier review before the 8-year interval runs its course.


19
We do not accept the Court of Appeals' supposition that Rule 475-3-.05(2)  "seems certain" to result in some prisoners serving extended periods of  incarceration. 164 F. 3d, at 595. The standard announced in Morales requires a  more rigorous analysis of the level of risk created by the change in law. Cf.  Morales , 514 U. S., at 506 -507, n. 3 ("After Collins , the focus of the ex  post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some  ambiguous sort of `disadvantage' ... but on whether any such change ...  increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable"). When the rule does not  by its own terms show a significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by  evidence drawn from the rule's practical implementation by the agency charged  with exercising discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a  longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule. The litigation in  Morales concerned a statute covering inmates convicted of more than one homicide  and proceeded on the assumption that there were no relevant differences between  inmates for purposes of discerning whether retroactive application of the  amended California law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. In the case before us,  respondent must show that as applied to his own sentence the law created a  significant risk of increasing his punishment. This remains the issue in the  case, though the general operation of the Georgia parole system may produce  relevant evidence and inform further analysis on the point.


20
The record before the Court of Appeals contained little information bearing  on the level of risk created by the change in law. Without knowledge of whether  retroactive application of the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2) increases, to a  significant degree, the likelihood or probability of prolonging respondent's  incarceration, his claim rests upon speculation.


21
On the record in this case, we cannot conclude the change in Georgia law  lengthened respondent's time of actual imprisonment. Georgia law vests broad  discretion with the Board, and our analysis rests upon the premise that the  Board exercises its discretion in accordance with its assessment of each  inmate's likelihood of release between reconsideration dates. If the assessment  later turns out not to hold true for particular inmates, they may invoke the  policy the Parole Board has adopted to permit expedited consideration in the  event of a change in circumstances. App. 56.


22
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Board's internal policy  statement. At a minimum, policy statements, along with the Board's actual  practices, provide important instruction as to how the Board interprets its  enabling statute and regulations, and therefore whether, as a matter of fact,  the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2) created a significant risk of increased  punishment. It is often the case that an agency's policies and practices will  indicate the manner in which it is exercising its discretion. Cf. INS v.  Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U. S. 26, 32 (1996) (observing that the reasonableness of  discretionary agency action can be gauged by reference to the agency's policies  and practices). The Court of Appeals was incorrect to say the Board's policies  were of no relevance in this case. Absent a demonstration to the contrary, we  presume the Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in  fulfilling its obligations. Cf. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugnessy, 347  U. S. 260, 266-268 (1954). In Morales , we relied upon the State's  representation that its parole board had a practice of granting inmates'  requests for early review. See 514 U. S., at 512 -513 (citing Reply Brief for  Petitioner, O. T. 1994, No. 93-1462, p. 3, n. 1.). The policy statement here, by  contrast, is a formal, published statement as to how the Board intends to  enforce its Rule. It follows a fortiori from Morales that the Court of Appeals  should not have disregarded the policy. Absent any demonstration to the contrary  from respondent, we respect the Board's representation that inmates, upon making  a showing of a "change in their circumstance[s]" or upon the Board's receipt of  "new information," may request expedited consideration. App. 56.


23
The Court of Appeals' analysis failed to reveal whether the amendment to  Rule 475-3-.05(2), in its operation, created a significant risk of increased  punishment for respondent. Respondent claims he has not been permitted  sufficient discovery to make this showing. The matter of adequate discovery is  one for the Court of Appeals or, as need be, for the District Court in the first  instance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is  remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.


24
It is so ordered.


25
Justice Scalia , concurring in part in the judgment.


26
I would agree with the Court's opinion if we were faced with an amendment  to the frequency of parole-eligibility determinations prescribed by the Georgia  legislature. Since I do not believe, however, that a change in frequency  prescribed by the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles would violate the   Ex Post Facto Clause even if it did pose a sufficient "risk" of decreasing the  likelihood of parole, I would reverse the decision of the Eleventh Circuit  without the necessity of remand.


27
The Court treats this case as a mere variation on the Morales theme,  whereas in reality it contains a critical difference: In Morales , the frequency  of parole suitability hearings had been fixed by law, and a legislative change  had given California's Board of Prison Terms discretion to decrease the  frequency. See Morales , 514 U. S., at 503 ; ante , at 5. Here, there has been  no such change. Today, as at the time of respondent's offense, the Georgia  statute requires only that the Board provide for automatic "periodic  reconsideration," Ga. Code Ann. 42-9-45. The length of the period, like the  ultimate question of parole, was and is entrusted to the Board's discretion.


28
Any sensible application of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and any application  faithful to its historical meaning, must draw a distinction between the penalty  that a person can anticipate for the commission of a particular crime, and  opportunities for mercy or clemency that may go to the reduction of the penalty.  I know of no precedent for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to the  same degree of mercy or clemency that he could have expected at the time he  committed his offense. Under the traditional system of minimum-maximum sentences  (twenty years to life, for example), it would be absurd to argue that a  defendant would have an e x post facto claim if the compassionate judge who  presided over the district where he committed his crime were replaced, prior to  the defendant's trial, by a so-called "hanging judge." Discretion to be  compassionate or harsh is inherent in the sentencing scheme, and being denied  compassion is one of the risks that the offender knowingly assumes.


29
At the margins, to be sure, it may be difficult to distinguish between  justice and mercy. A statutory parole system that reduces a prisoner's sentence  by fixed amounts of time for good behavior during incarceration can  realistically be viewed as an entitlement--a reduction of the prescribed  penalty--rather than a discretionary grant of leniency. But that is immeasurably  far removed from the present case. In Georgia parole, like pardon (which is  granted or denied by the same Board), is--and was at the time respondent  committed his offense--a matter of grace. It may be denied for any reason  (except, of course, an unlawful one such as race), or for no reason. And where,  as here, the length of the reconsideration period is entrusted to the discretion  of the same body that has discretion over the ultimate parole determination ,  any risk engendered by changes to the length of that period is merely part of  the uncertainty which was inherent in the discretionary parole system, and to  which respondent subjected himself when he committed his crime.


30
It makes no more sense to freeze in time the Board's discretion as to  procedures than it does to freeze in time the Board's discretion as to  substance. Just as the Ex Post Facto Clause gives respondent no cause to  complain that the Board in place at the time of his offense has been replaced by  a new, tough-on-crime Board that is much more parsimonious with parole, it gives  him no cause to complain that it has been replaced by a new, big-on-efficiency  Board that cuts back on reconsiderations without cause. And the change in policy  is irrelevant, in my view, whether or not the pre-existing policy happens to  have been embodied in a policy statement or regulation. To make the  constitutional prohibition turn upon that feature would be to ignore reality and  to discourage measures that promote fairness and consistency. Such a policy  statement or regulation, in the context of a system conferring complete  discretion as to substance and as to the timing of hearings, upon the Parole  Board, simply creates no reasonable expectation of entitlement, except perhaps  among prisoners whose parole hearings are held (or are scheduled to be held)  while the regulation is in effect. This is not an expectation of the sort that  can give rise to ex post facto concerns.


31
In essence, respondent complains that by exercising its discretion (as to  the frequency of review), the Board of Pardons and Paroles has deprived him of  the exercise of its discretion (as to the question of his release). In my view,  these are two sides of the same coin--two aspects of one and the same  discretion--and respondent can have no valid grievance.


32
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join,  dissenting.


33
I think the Court of Appeals made no error here and so respectfully dissent  from the reversal. A change in parole policy violates the Ex Post Facto Clause  if it creates a "sufficient," California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.  S. 499, 509 (1995), or substantial risk that the class affected by the change  will serve longer sentences as a result.1   To determine the likelihood that  the change at issue here will lengthen sentences, we need to look at the terms  of the new rule, and then at the possibility that the terms are mitigated by a  practice of making exceptions.


34
Before the board changed its reconsideration rule, a prisoner would receive  a second consideration for parole by year 10, whereas now the second  consideration must occur only by year 15; those who would receive a third  consideration at year 13 will now have no certain consideration until year 23,  and so on. An example of the effect of the longer intervals between mandatory  review can be seen by considering the average term served under the old rule. In  1992, a member of the Georgia Legislature stated that the average life-sentenced  inmate served 12 years before parole. See Spotts, Sentence and Punishment:  Provide for the Imposition of Life Sentence Without Parole, 10 Ga. St. U. L.  Rev. 183, 183, and n. 4 (1993). Some prisoners must have been paroled before 12  years. But those who would have been paroled when considered a second time at  year 10 or a third time at year 13 will now be delayed to year 15. While the  average helps to show the effects Georgia's new rule is likely to have on some  prisoners who would be released at the early end of the parole spectrum, the  changed rule threatens to increase punishment for all life-sentenced prisoners,  not just those who would have been paroled at or before the average time. If a  prisoner who would have been paroled on his fourth consideration in year 16  under the old rule has to wait until his third consideration in year 23 under  the new rule, his punishment has been increased regardless of the average.


35
Georgia, which controls all of the relevant information, has given us  nothing to suggest the contrary. It has given us no basis to isolate any  subclass of life prisoners subject to the change who were unlikely to be paroled  before some review date at which consideration is guaranteed under the new rule.  On the contrary, the terms of the rule adopted by the State define the affected  class as the entire class of life-sentenced prisoners, and the natural inference  is that the rule affects prisoners throughout the whole class. This is very  different from the situation in Morales, in which it was shown that 85% of the  affected class were found unsuited for parole upon reconsideration. Morales ,  supra , at 511. At some point, common sense can lead to an inference of a  substantial risk of increased punishment, and it does so here.


36
The significance of that conclusion is buttressed by statements by the  board and its chairman, available at the board's official website, indicating  that its policies were intended to increase time served in prison. See Georgia  State Board of Pardons and Paroles, News Releases,  http://www.pap.state.ga.us/NRFrames.htm (Jan. 2, 1998, release, Policy Mandates  90% Prison Time For Certain Offenses) ("Since 1991 the Board has steadily and  consistently amended and refined its guidelines and  policies to provide for lengthier prison service for  violent criminals"); Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Violent-Crime  Lifers Who Died in Prison http://www.pap.state.ga.us/NewRelea.nsf (June 4, 1998)  (quoting Chairman Walter Ray as stating that " `obtaining parole on a  life-sentence is increasingly rare' " and reporting that "[b]ecause of strict  sentencing laws as well as the Board's conservative paroling policy, agency  officials predict successive fiscal years will reflect a rising number of  inmates for whom a life sentence does indeed mean just that").2   If respondent  had ever been allowed to undertake discovery, further statements of punitive  intent may well have been forthcoming. Although we have never decided that a  purpose to increase punishment, absent a punitive effect, itself invalidates a  retroactive policy change, see Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 443 (1997),  evidence of purpose certainly confirms the inference of substantial risk of  longer sentences drawn above. It is, after all, reasonable to expect that  members of a parole board acting with a purpose to get tough succeed in doing  just that.


37
On the other side, there is no indication that the board adopted the new  policy merely to obviate useless hearings or save administrative resources, the  justification the Court accepted in Morales . See 514 U. S., at 511 . Indeed,  since a parole board review in Georgia means that one board member examines an  inmate's file without a hearing and makes a decision, and no specific findings  are required to deny parole, any interpretation of the rule change as a measure  to conserve resources is weak at best, and insufficient to counter the inference  of a substantial risk that the prisoners who will get subsequent manda-  tory parole considerations years after the reviews that the old rule would have  guaranteed will in fact serve longer sentences.3


38
Thus, I believe the Eleventh Circuit properly granted summary judgment for  respondent. Although Georgia argues that the board freely makes exceptions to  the 8-year rule in appropriate cases, the State provided no evidence that the  board's occasional willingness to reexamine cases sufficiently mitigates the  substantial probability of increased punishment. While the majority accepts the  argument that, even without evidence of practice, the board's discretion to  revisit its assignment of a reconsideration date may be sufficient standing  alone to preclude an ex post facto challenge, this is surely wrong. The policy  statement on which the majority is willing to rely, see App. 56, gives a  prisoner no assurance that new information or changed circumstances will matter,  even assuming that prisoners are aware (and able to take advantage) of their  limited ability to ask the board to change its mind. Because in the end the  board's ability to reconsider based on a "change in [a prisoner's] circumstance  or where the Board receives new information," ibid. , is entirely discretionary,  free of all standards, an 8-year period before further consideration of parole  made solely upon review of an inmate's file has to create a real risk of longer  confinement.


39
A further word about the absence of record evidence of practice under the  new rule is in order. One reason that there is none is that Georgia resisted  discovery. In this Court, it sought to compensate for the absence of favorable  evidence by lodging documents recounting parole reconsiderations before the  mandatory reconsideration date. But every instance occurred after the Eleventh  Circuit had ruled against the State.4   These examples of reconsiderations are  the parole equivalent of fixing the broken front steps after the invited guest  has slipped, fallen, and seen a lawyer; they do nothing to show that the board's  own interpretation of its policy mitigated the risk of increased punishment.5


40
I also dissent from the Court's failure to require discovery on remand. At  the very least, the record gives reason to expect that discovery could show that  the affected class has been subjected to the risk of increased sentences.  Morales stressed that the question of what changes will be " `of sufficient  moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition' must be a matter of  `degree,' " 514 U. S., at 509 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Even if  I am wrong and respondent cannot prevail on this record, it is plain that  further discovery is justified to determine the degree to which the change at  issue here altered sentence lengths.



NOTES:


1
 In the first instance, at least, our cases have traditionally evaluated the  effect of the change on the class subject to the new rule, rather than focusing  solely on the individual challenging the change, Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24,  33 (1981). It can be difficult, if not impossible, for one person to prove that  a change in penal policy has increased the quantum of punishment beyond what he  would previously have received, since a sentencing decision is often a mix of  rules and discretion. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (1937). At  the same time, when one looks at the affected class it can be quite clear that  punishment has increased overall. That is proof enough that the new rule applied  retroactively violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and, as an invalid rule, should  not be applied to anyone within the class.


2
 As Georgia's punitiveness increased, the number of persons on parole decreased.  See Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Georgia's Criminal Justice  Population Increased by 9% in 1998;  Only Decrease Was in Persons on Parole http://www.pap.state.ga.us/  NewRelea.nsf, (Feb. 1, 1999).


3
  The majority suggests, ante , at 7, that the Court required no particular  procedural safeguards in California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, even though  the Court mentioned those safeguards as an important factor in its conclusion  that there was no increase in the quantum of punishment in that case, see 514 U.  S., at 511 -512. This is true, but it does not address the problem with  Georgia's virtually unbounded scheme. Once the risk of increased punishment  exists, the Board's nearly nonexistent safeguards provide no way of reducing  that risk.
Georgia insists that its lack of procedural safeguards is irrelevant to this  case, because due process does not require much in the way of procedural  safeguards for parole. But that is beside the point. The challenge here is to  the retroactive increase in the quantum of punishment. Unlike the California  procedure for delaying parole reconsideration in Morales , the Georgia procedure  here includes no actual hearing for the prisoner whose reconsideration is  delayed five extra years, and the Board is not required to explain itself.  Georgia's procedural minimalism increases the likelihood that prisoners will get  rubber-stamp treatment, and decreases the likelihood that the exceptions to the  policy on which the majority relies will actually be applied in a way that  diminishes the significant probability of increased punishment. Cf. Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U. S. 75, 81-82 , n. 4 (1988) (stating that a requirement to give  written reasons provides an inducement to make careful decisions in cases that  might otherwise be summarily ignored); Smith v. Robbins , 528 U. S. __, __  (2000) (slip op., at ___) (S tevens , J., dissenting) (noting that the process  of writing out reasons for decision improves the quality of the decision and can  reveal error). Parole need not operate under rigidly defined procedures, but if  the board decides to make changes retroactive, it must do something to prevent  those changes from increasing punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto  Clause.


4
 Georgia's statistics show only that, in fiscal year 1999, about 20% of inmates  received reconsideration dates of three years or less; about 10% got  reconsideration dates more than three years but less than eight, and 70% got  8-year dates. See App. to Reply Brief for Petitioners 9. Eighty percent were  therefore at least potentially negatively affected by the change from a 3-year  to an 8-year delay in reconsideration. Even on their own terms, then, the  statistics do not show that board policies mitigate the substantial risk of  increased punishment.


5
 Indeed, as the board explains its decisionmaking procedures, "[t]he overriding  factor in determining whether or not to parole a person under life sentence is  the severity of the offense." Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, Parole  Decisions http://www.pap.state.ga.us/  Decisions.htm (visited March 2, 2000). If we accept the Board's statements,  changed circumstances or new information would rarely make a difference.


