531 U.S. 356121 S.Ct.955148 L.Ed.2d 866
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, et al., PETITIONERSv.PATRICIA GARRETT et al.
No. 99-1240.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued October 11, 2000
Decided February 21, 2001

Syllabus
Respondents Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits against petitioners, Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of th[at] disability ... in regard to ... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment," 42 U.S.C.  12112(a). In an opinion disposing of both cases, the District Court granted petitioners summary judgment, agreeing with them that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the ADA validly abrogates such immunity.
Held: Suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Pp. 4-17.
(a) Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73. Only the second of these requirements is in dispute here. While Congress may not base abrogation of state immunity upon its Article I powers, see e.g., id., at 79, it may subject nonconsenting States to federal-court suit when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see e.g., id., at 80. Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in 1 of that Amendment by enacting "appropriate legislation." See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536. Because it is this Court's responsibility, not Congress', to define the substance of constitutional guarantees, id., at 519-524, 5 legislation, to the extent it reaches beyond the precise scope of 1's protections, must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end, id., at 520. Pp. 4-7.
(b) The first step in applying these principles is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires examination of the limitations 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places upon States' treatment of the disabled. To do so, the Court looks to its prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause dealing with this issue. Kimel, supra, at 83. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, the Court held, inter alia, that mental retardation did not qualify as a "quasi-suspect" classification for equal protection purposes, id., at 435, and that, accordingly, a city ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded incurred only the minimum "rational-basis" review applicable to general social and economic legislation, id., at 446. Although "negative attitudes" and "fear" often accompany irrational biases, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational. They could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 7-10.
(c) The requirements for private individuals to recover money damages against the States-that there be state discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the remedy imposed by Congress be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation-are not met here. First, the ADA's legislative record fails to show that Congress identified a history and pattern of irrational employment discrimination by the States against the disabled. See, e.g., Kimel, supra, at 89. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to local governmental units such as cities and counties, see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530, the Court rejects respondents' contention that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend to such units as well as to States. Congress made a general finding in the ADA that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination ... continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C.  12101(a)(2). Although the record includes instances to support such a finding, the great majority of these incidents do not deal with state activities in employment. Even if it were to be determined that the half a dozen relevant examples from the record showed unconstitutional action on the part of States, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which 5 legislation must be based. See, e.g., Kimel, supra, at 89-91. Moreover, statements in House and Senate committee reports indicate that Congresss targeted the ADA at employment discrimination in the private sector. Second, the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne, supra. For example, while it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by disabled individuals, 12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The ADA does except employers from the "reasonable accommodatio[n]" requirement where the employer can demonstrate that accommodation would impose an "undue hardship" upon it, 12112(b)(5)(A), but, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required. The ADA's constitutional shortcomings are apparent when it is compared to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Holding the latter Act to be "appropriate" legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's protection against racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, this Court emphasized that Congress had there documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States, see id., at 312, and had determined that litigation had proved ineffective to remedy the problem, see id., at 313. The contrast between the kind of evidence detailed in Katzenbach, and the evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. To uphold the ADA's application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority. Pp. 10-17. 193 F.3d 1214, reversed.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'Connor, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
We decide here whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 330, 42 U.S.C.  12111-12117.1 We hold that such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.


2
The ADA prohibits certain employers, including the States, from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7). To this end, the Act requires employers to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer's] business." 12112(b)(5)(A).


3
" '[R]easonable accommodation' may include-


4
"(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 12111(9).


5
The Act also prohibits employers from "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration ... that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability." 12112(b)(3)(A).


6
The Act defines "disability" to include "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 12102(2). A disabled individual is otherwise "qualified" if he or she, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 12111(8).


7
Respondent Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, was employed as the Director of Nursing, OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services, for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. See App. 31, 38. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast cancer and subsequently underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy. See id., at 38. Garrett's treatments required her to take substantial leave from work. Upon returning to work in July 1995, Garrett's supervisor informed Garrett that she would have to give up her Director position. See id., at 39. Garrett then applied for and received a transfer to another, lower paying position as a nurse manager. See ibid.


8
Respondent Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services (Department). See id., at 8. Upon commencing this employment, Ash informed the Department that he suffered from chronic asthma and that his doctor recommended he avoid carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke, and Ash requested that the Department modify his duties to minimize his exposure to these substances. See ibid. Ash was later diagnosed with sleep apnea and requested, again pursuant to his doctor's recommendation, that he be reassigned to daytime shifts to accommodate his condition. See id., at 9. Ultimately, the Department granted none of the requested relief. See id., at 8-9. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he noticed that his performance evaluations were lower than those he had received on previous occasions. See id., at 9.


9
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the District Court, both seeking money damages under the ADA.2 Petitioners moved for summary judgment, claiming that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (ND Ala. 1998). In a single opinion disposing of both cases, the District Court agreed with petitioners' position and granted their motions for summary judgment. See id., at 1410, 1412. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals reversed, 193 F.3d 1214 (1999), adhering to its intervening decision in Kimel v. State Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (CA11 1998), cert. granted, 525 U.S. 1121, cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1184 (2000), that the ADA validly abrogates the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.


10
We granted certiorari, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether an individual may sue a State for money damages in federal court under the ADA.


11
* The Eleventh Amendment provides:


12
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669-670 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court. See Kimel, supra, at 73.


13
We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and "act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." 528 U.S., at 73. The first of these requirements is not in dispute here. See 42 U.S.C.  12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter"). The question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages under the ADA.


14
Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I. See Kimel, supra, at 79 ("Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers"); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction"); College Savings Bank, supra, at 672; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-733 (1999). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), however, we held that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 456 (internal citation omitted). As a result, we concluded, Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its 5 power. See ibid. Our cases have adhered to this proposition. See, e.g., Kimel, supra, at 80. Accordingly, the ADA can apply to the States only to the extent that the statute is appropriate 5 legislation.3


15
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in 1 by enacting "appropriate legislation." See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence. "Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." Kimel, supra, at 81; City of Boerne, supra, at 536.


16
City of Boerne also confirmed, however, the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. 521 U.S., at 519-524. Accordingly, 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of 1's actual guarantees must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id., at 520. II


17
The first step in applying these now familiar principles is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires us to examine the limitations 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places upon States' treatment of the disabled.   As we did last Term in Kimel, see 528 U.S., at 83, we look to our prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause dealing with this issue.


18
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), we considered an equal protection challenge to a city ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The specific question before us was whether the Court of Appeals had erred by holding that mental retardation qualified as a "quasi-suspect" classification under our equal protection jurisprudence. Id., at 435. We answered that question in the affirmative, concluding instead that such legislation incurs only the minimum "rational-basis" review applicable to general social and economic legislation.4 Id., at 446. In a statement that today seems quite prescient, we explained that


19
"if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so." Id., at 445-446.


20
Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses "distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement," a State's decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation. Id., at 441. "Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)). Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative " 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.' " Heller, supra, at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).


21
Justice Breyer suggests that Cleburne stands for the broad proposition that state decisionmaking reflecting "negative attitudes" or "fear" necessarily runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. See post, at 5 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S., at 448). Although such biases may often accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make. As we noted in Cleburne: "[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently ... ." Id., at 448 (emphasis added). This language, read in context, simply states the unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence that state action subject to rational-basis scrutiny does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when it "rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam).


22
Thus, the result of Cleburne is that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational. They could quite hard headedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.5

III

23
Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled. Just as 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions committed "under color of state law," Congress' 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S., at 640 ("It is this conduct then-unremedied patent infringement by the States-that must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress sought to redress in the Patent Remedy Act"); Kimel, 528 U.S., at 89 ("Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation"). The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.


24
Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend not only to States themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities and counties. All of these, they say, are "state actors" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Respondents 8. This is quite true, but the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). These entities are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to rely on 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment.


25
Congress made a general finding in the ADA that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C.  12101(a)(2). The record assembled by Congress includes many instances to support such a finding. But the great majority of these incidents do not deal with the activities of States.


26
Respondents in their brief cite half a dozen examples from the record that did involve States. A department head at the University of North Carolina refused to hire an applicant for the position of health administrator because he was blind; similarly, a student at a state university in South Dakota was denied an opportunity to practice teach because the dean at that time was convinced that blind people could not teach in public schools. A microfilmer at the Kansas Department of Transportation was fired because he had epilepsy; deaf workers at the University of Oklahoma were paid a lower salary than those who could hear. The Indiana State Personnel Office informed a woman with a concealed disability that she should not disclose it if she wished to obtain employment.6


27
Several of these incidents undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make the sort of accommodations for the disabled required by the ADA. Whether they were irrational under our decision in Cleburne is more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out of context. But even if it were to be determined that each incident upon fuller examination showed unconstitutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which 5 legislation must be based. See Kimel, 528 U.S., at 89-91; City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 530-531. Congress, in enacting the ADA, found that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities." 42 U.S.C.  12101(a)(1). In 1990, the States alone employed more than 4.5 million people. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 338 (119th ed. 1999) (Table 534). It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the disabled.


28
Justice Breyer maintains that Congress applied Title I of the ADA to the States in response to a host of incidents representing unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against persons with disabilities. A close review of the relevant materials, however, undercuts that conclusion. Justice Breyer's Appendix C consists not of legislative findings, but of unexamined, anecdotal accounts of "adverse, disparate treatment by state officials." Post, at 3. Of course, as we have already explained, "adverse, disparate treatment" often does not amount to a constitutional violation where rational-basis scrutiny applies. These accounts, moreover, were submitted not directly to Congress but to the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, which made no findings on the subject of state discrimination in employment.7 See the Task Force's Report entitled From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990). And, had Congress truly understood this information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act's legislative findings. There is none. See 42 U.S.C.  12101. Although Justice Breyer would infer from Congress' general conclusions regarding societal discrimination against the disabled that the States had likewise participated in such action, post, at 3, the House and Senate committee reports on the ADA flatly contradict this assertion. After describing the evidence presented to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and its subcommittee (including the Task Force Report upon which the dissent relies), the Committee's report reached, among others, the following conclusion: "Discrimination still persists in such critical areas as employment in the private sector, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications." S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 6 (1989) (emphasis added). The House Committee on Education and Labor, addressing the ADA's employment provisions, reached the same conclusion: "[A]fter extensive review and analysis over a number of Congressional sessions, ... there exists a compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private sector, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications." H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 p. 28 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, not only is the inference Justice Breyer draws unwarranted, but there is also strong evidence that Congress' failure to mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination in employment reflects that body's judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented.


29
Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne, supra. For example, whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to "mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.  12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The ADA does except employers from the "reasonable accommodatio[n]" requirement where the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." 12112(b)(5)(A). However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an "undue burden" upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer's duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer's decision. See ibid.


30
The ADA also forbids "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration" that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis. 12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., ibid. ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact").


31
The ADA's constitutional shortcomings are apparent when the Act is compared to Congress' efforts in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to respond to a serious pattern of constitutional violations. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), we considered whether the Voting Rights Act was "appropriate" legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's protection against racial discrimination in voting. Concluding that it was a valid exercise of Congress' enforcement power under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,8 we noted that "[b]efore enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting." Id., at 308.


32
In that Act, Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States. State officials, Congress found, routinely applied voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens from registering to vote. See id., at 312. Congress also determined that litigation had proved ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-point gap in the registration of white and African-American voters in some States. See id., at 313. Congress' response was to promulgate in the Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evidence of States' systematic denial of those rights was identified.


33
The contrast between this kind of evidence, and the evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. Congressional enactment of the ADA represents its judgment that there should be a "comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.  12101(b)(1). Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those requirements are not met here, and to uphold the Act's application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne.9 Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore


34
Reversed.



NOTES:


1
 Respondents' complaints in the United States District Court alleged violations of both Title I and Title II of the ADA, and petitioners' "Question Presented" can be read to apply to both sections. See Brief for Petitioners i; Brief for United States I. Though the briefs of the parties discuss both sections in their constitutional arguments, no party has briefed the question whether Title II of the ADA, dealing with the "services, programs, or activities of a public entity," 42 U.S.C.  12132 is available for claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with that subject. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion") (internal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals are divided on this issue, compare Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (CA9 1999), with Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (CA11 1998). We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the parties have not favored us with briefing on the statutory question. To the extent the Court granted certiorari on the question whether respondents may sue their state employers for damages under Title II of the ADA, see this Court's Rule 24.1(a), that portion of the writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 184 (1959).


2
 Garrett raised other claims, but those are not presently before the Court.


3
 It is clear that Congress intended to invoke 5 as one of its bases for enacting the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.  12101(b)(4).


4
 Applying the basic principles of rationality review, Cleburne struck down the city ordinance in question. 473 U.S., at 447-450. The Court's reasoning was that the city's purported justifications for the ordinance made no sense in light of how the city treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects. Although the group home for the mentally retarded was required to obtain a special use permit, apartment houses, other multiple-family dwellings, retirement homes, nursing homes, sanitariums, hospitals, boarding houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and dormitories were not subject to the ordinance. See ibid.


5
 It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least one Member of Congress remarked that "this is probably one of the few times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, it's not funny." Hearing on Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1987). A number of these provisions, however, did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring accommodation.


6
 The record does show that some States, adopting the tenets of the eugenics movement of the early part of this century, required extreme measures such as sterilization of persons suffering from hereditary mental disease. These laws were upheld against constitutional attack 70 years ago in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). But there is no indication that any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted.


7
  Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in employment. At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations describe conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional violations by the States, and most of them are so general and brief that no firm conclusion can be drawn. The overwhelming majority of these accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA.


8
 Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.


9
 Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. See n. 5, supra.



35
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, concurring.   Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves. Quite apart from any historical documentation, knowledge of our own human instincts teaches that persons who find it difficult to perform routine functions by reason of some mental or physical impairment might at first seem unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better angels of our nature. There can be little doubt, then, that persons with mental or physical impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will.


36
One of the undoubted achievements of statutes designed to assist those with impairments is that citizens have an incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a better understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting persons with impairments or disabilities into the larger society. The law works this way because the law can be a teacher. So I do not doubt that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 will be a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society.


37
It is a question of quite a different order, however, to say that the States in their official capacities, the States as governmental entities, must be held in violation of the Constitution on the assumption that they embody the misconceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens. It is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act or the omission to remedy. States can, and do, stand apart from the citizenry. States act as neutral entities, ready to take instruction and to enact laws when their citizens so demand. The failure of a State to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).


38
For the reasons explained by the Court, an equal protection violation has not been shown with respect to the several States in this case. If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would have expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the courts of the United States extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations. This confirming judicial documentation does not exist. That there is a new awareness, a new consciousness, a new commitment to better treatment of those disadvantaged by mental or physical impairments does not establish that an absence of state statutory correctives was a constitutional violation.


39
It must be noted, moreover, that what is in question is not whether the Congress, acting pursuant to a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to act. What is involved is only the question whether the States can be subjected to liability in suits brought not by the Federal Government (to which the States have consented, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999)), but by private persons seeking to collect moneys from the state treasury without the consent of the State. The predicate for money damages against an unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must be a federal statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of constitutional violations committed by the State in its official capacity. That predicate, for reasons discussed here and in the decision of the Court, has not been established. With these observations, I join the Court's opinion.


40
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.


41
Reviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency record, the Court holds the statutory provision before us, 42 U.S.C.  12202 unconstitutional. The Court concludes that Congress assembled insufficient evidence of unconstitutional discrimination, ante, at 12, that Congress improperly attempted to "re-write" the law we established in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), ante, at 16, and that the law is not sufficiently tailored to address unconstitutional discrimination, ante, at 14-15.


42
Section 5, however, grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 5. As the Court recognizes, state discrimination in employment against persons with disabilities might " 'run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause' " where there is no " 'rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.' " Ante, at 8 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). See also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, at 440 (stating that the Court will sustain a classification if it is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"). In my view, Congress reasonably could have concluded that the remedy before us constitutes an "appropriate" way to enforce this basic equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution requires.


43
* The Court says that its primary problem with this statutory provision is one of legislative evidence. It says that "Congress assembled only ... minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment." Ante, at 12. In fact, Congress compiled a vast legislative record documenting " 'massive, society-wide discrimination' " against persons with disabilities. S. Rep. No. 101-116, pp. 8-9 (1989) (quoting testimony of Justin Dart, chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities). In addition to the information presented at 13 congressional hearings (see Appendix A, infra), and its own prior experience gathered over 40 years during which it contemplated and enacted considerable similar legislation (see Appendix B, infra), Congress created a special task force to assess the need for comprehensive legislation. That task force held hearings in every State, attended by more than 30,000 people, including thousands who had experienced discrimination first hand. See From ADA to Empowerment, Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 16 (Oct. 12, 1990) (hereinafter Task Force Report). The task force hearings, Congress' own hearings, and an analysis of "census data, national polls, and other studies" led Congress to conclude that "people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally." 42 U.S.C.  12101(a)(6). As to employment, Congress found that "[t]wo-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 [were] not working at all," even though a large majority wanted to, and were able to, work productively. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 9. And Congress found that this discrimination flowed in significant part from "stereotypic assumptions" as well as "purposeful unequal treatment." 42 U.S.C.  12101(a)(7).


44
The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment throughout society in general, including discrimination by private persons and local governments, implicates state governments as well, for state agencies form part of that same larger society. There is no particular reason to believe that they are immune from the "stereotypic assumptions" and pattern of "purposeful unequal treatment" that Congress found prevalent. The Court claims that it "make[s] no sense" to take into consideration constitutional violations committed by local governments. Ante, at 71. But the substantive obligation that the Equal Protection Clause creates applies to state and local governmental entities alike. E.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Local governments often work closely with, and under the supervision of, state officials, and in general, state and local government employers are similarly situated. Nor is determining whether an apparently "local" entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as simple as the majority suggests-it often requires a " 'detailed examination of the relevant provisions of [state] law.' " Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430, n. 6 (1997) (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719-721 (1973)).


45
In any event, there is no need to rest solely upon evidence of discrimination by local governments or general societal discrimination. There are roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments themselves in the legislative record. See, e.g., Appendix C, infra. I fail to see how this evidence "fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which 5 legislation must be based." Ante, at 12.


46
The congressionally appointed task force collected numerous specific examples, provided by persons with disabilities themselves, of adverse, disparate treatment by state officials. They reveal, not what the Court describes as "half a dozen" instances of discrimination, ante, at 11, but hundreds of instances of adverse treatment at the hands of state officials-instances in which a person with a disability found it impossible to obtain a state job, to retain state employment, to use the public transportation that was readily available to others in order to get to work, or to obtain a public education, which is often a prerequisite to obtaining employment. State-imposed barriers also frequently made it difficult or impossible for people to vote, to enter a public building, to access important government services, such as calling for emergency assistance, and to find a place to live due to a pattern of irrational zoning decisions similar to the discrimination that we held unconstitutional in Cleburne, 473 U.S., at 448. See Appendix C, infra.


47
As the Court notes, those who presented instances of discrimination rarely provided additional, independent evidence sufficient to prove in court that, in each instance, the discrimination they suffered lacked justification from a judicial standpoint. Ante, at 12 (stating that instances of discrimination are "described out of context"). Perhaps this explains the Court's view that there is "minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination." Ibid. But a legislature is not a court of law. And Congress, unlike courts, must, and does, routinely draw general conclusions-for example, of likely motive or of likely relationship to legitimate need-from anecdotal and opinion-based evidence of this kind, particularly when the evidence lacks strong refutation. See Task Force Report 16, 20 (task force "met many times with significant representatives of groups opposed to [the] ADA," and as to the general public, although the task force received "about 2,000 letters" in support of the ADA, there was only "one letter in opposition"); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 10 (summarizing testimony that many reasonable accommodations cost "less than $50," and the expense of others, such as hiring employees who can interpret for the deaf, is "frequently exaggerated"). In reviewing 5 legislation, we have never required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence that the Court appears to contemplate. Compare ante, at 12-13, with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-656 (1966) (asking whether Congress' likely conclusions were reasonable, not whether there was adequate evidentiary support in the record). Nor has the Court traditionally required Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down the record evidence, category by category. Compare ante, at 13 (noting statements in two congressional Reports that mentioned state discrimination in public services and transportation but not in employment), with Morgan, supra, at 654 (considering what Congress "might" have concluded); 384 U.S., at 652 (holding that likely discrimination against Puerto Ricans in areas other than voting supported statute abolishing literacy test as qualification for voting).


48
Regardless, Congress expressly found substantial unjustified discrimination against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.  12101(9) (finding a pattern of "unnecessary discrimination and prejudice" that "costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity" (emphasis added)). See also 2 Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Leg. Hist.) (Committee Print compiled for the House Committee on Education and Labor), Ser. No. 102-B, p. 1620 (1990) (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson) (describing "unjustifiable and discriminatory loss of job opportunities"); id., at 1623 (citing study showing " 'strong evidence that employers' fears of low performance among disabled workers are unjustified' "). Moreover, it found that such discrimination typically reflects "stereotypic assumptions" or "purposeful unequal treatment." 42 U.S.C.  12101(7). See also 2 Leg. Hist. 1622 (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson) ("Outmoded stereotypes whether manifested in medical or other job 'requirements' that are unrelated to the successful performance of the job, or in decisions based on the generalized perceptions of supervisors and hiring personnel, have excluded many disabled people from jobs for which they are qualified"). In making these findings, Congress followed our decision in Cleburne, which established that not only discrimination against persons with disabilities that rests upon "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," 473 U.S., at 447 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (omission in Cleburne)), violates the Fourteenth Amendment, but also discrimination that rests solely upon "negative attitude[s]," "fea[r]," 473 U.S., at 448, or "irrational prejudice," id., at 450. Adverse treatment that rests upon such motives is unjustified discrimination in Cleburne's terms.


49
The evidence in the legislative record bears out Congress' finding that the adverse treatment of persons with disabilities was often arbitrary or invidious in this sense, and thus unjustified. For example, one study that was before Congress revealed that "most ... governmental agencies in [one State] discriminated in hiring against job applicants for an average period of five years after treatment for cancer," based in part on coworkers' misguided belief that "cancer is contagious." 2 Leg. Hist. 1619-1620 (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson). A school inexplicably refused to exempt a deaf teacher, who taught at a school for the deaf, from a "listening skills" requirement. Government's Lodging 1503. A State refused to hire a blind employee as director of an agency for the blind-even though he was the most qualified applicant. Id., at 974. Certain state agencies apparently had general policies against hiring or promoting persons with disabilities. Id., at 1159, 1577. A zoo turned away children with Downs Syndrome "because [the zookeeper] feared they would upset the chimpanzees." S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 7. There were reports of numerous zoning decisions based upon "negative attitudes" or "fear," Cleburne, supra, at 448, such as a zoning board that denied a permit for an obviously pretextual reason after hearing arguments that a facility would house " 'deviants' " who needed " 'room to roam,' " Government's Lodging 1068. A complete listing of the hundreds of examples of discrimination by state and local governments that were submitted to the task force is set forth in Appendix C, infra. Congress could have reasonably believed that these examples represented signs of a widespread problem of unconstitutional discrimination.

II

50
The Court's failure to find sufficient evidentiary support may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly in respect to lack of justification. Justice Kennedy's empirical conclusion-which rejects that of Congress-rests heavily upon his failure to find "extensive litigation and discussion of constitutional violations," in "the courts of the United States." Ante, at 2 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). And the Court itself points out that, when economic or social legislation is challenged in court as irrational, hence unconstitutional, the "burden is upon the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Ante, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or as Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, put the matter many years ago, " 'if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain' " challenged legislation, then " 'there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing . . . that the action is arbitrary.' " Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) (quoting Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934)). Imposing this special "burden" upon Congress, the Court fails to find in the legislative record sufficient indication that Congress has "negative[d]" the presumption that state action is rationally related to a legitimate objective. Ante, at 9.


51
The problem with the Court's approach is that neither the "burden of proof" that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its 5 power. "Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process ... have no application to Congress." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 248 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rational-basis review-with its presumptions favoring constitutionality-is "a paradigm of judicial restraint." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (emphasis added). And the Congress of the United States is not a lower court.


52
Indeed, the Court in Cleburne drew this very institutional distinction. We emphasized that "courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices." 473 U.S., at 441. Our invocation of judicial deference and respect for Congress was based on the fact that "[]5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment empowers Congress to enforce [the equal protection] mandate." Id., at 439 (emphasis added). Indeed, we made clear that the absence of a contrary congressional finding was critical to our decision to apply mere rational-basis review to disability discrimination claims-a "congressional direction" to apply a more stringent standard would have been "controlling." Ibid. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (refusing to invalidate a law based on the Equal Protection Clause because a disparate impact standard "should await legislative prescription"). Cf. Mitchell, supra, at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon individual records"). In short, the Court's claim that "to uphold the Act's application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne," ante, at 16, is repudiated by Cleburne itself.


53
There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the exercise of its 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a court's institutional limitations. Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy. Cf. Cleburne, supra, at 442-443 (addressing the problems of the "large and diversified group" of persons with disabilities "is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary"). Unlike courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking constitutional justification. Unlike judges, Members of Congress can directly obtain information from constituents who have first-hand experience with discrimination and related issues.


54
Moreover, unlike judges, Members of Congress are elected. When the Court has applied the majority's burden of proof rule, it has explained that we, i.e., the courts, do not " 'sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.' " Heller, 509 U.S., at 319 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)). To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress' legislative power is to stand the underlying principle-a principle of judicial restraint-on its head. But without the use of this burden of proof rule or some other unusually stringent standard of review, it is difficult to see how the Court can find the legislative record here inadequate. Read with a reasonably favorable eye, the record indicates that state governments subjected those with disabilities to seriously adverse, disparate treatment. And Congress could have found, in a significant number of instances, that this treatment violated the substantive principles of justification-shorn of their judicial-restraint-related presumptions-that this Court recognized in Cleburne.

III

55
The Court argues in the alternative that the statute's damage remedy is not "congruent" with and "proportional" to the equal protection problem that Congress found. Ante, at 14 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). The Court suggests that the Act's "reasonable accommodation" requirement, 42 U.S.C.  12112(b)(5)(A), and disparate impact standard, 12112(b)(3)(A), "far excee[d] what is constitutionally required." Ante, at 14. But we have upheld disparate impact standards in contexts where they were not "constitutionally required." Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), with Washington, supra, at 239, and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-173 (1980), with Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion).


56
And what is wrong with a remedy that, in response to unreasonable employer behavior, requires an employer to make accommodations that are reasonable? Of course, what is "reasonable" in the statutory sense and what is "unreasonable" in the constitutional sense might differ. In other words, the requirement may exceed what is necessary to avoid a constitutional violation. But it is just that power-the power to require more than the minimum- that 5 grants to Congress, as this Court has repeatedly confirmed. As long ago as 1880, the Court wrote that 5 "brought within the domain of congressional power" whatever "tends to enforce submission" to its "prohibitions" and "to secure to all persons ... the equal protection of the laws." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880). More recently, the Court added that 5's "draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 18." Morgan, 384 U.S., at 650 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819)).


57
In keeping with these principles, the Court has said that "[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of "the various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services ... , the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected." 384 U.S., at 653. "It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." Ibid. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (interpreting the similarly worded enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment to permit Congress to use "any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition"). Nothing in the words "reasonable accommodation" suggests that the requirement has no "tend[ency] to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause, Ex parte Virginia, supra, at 346, that it is an irrational way to achieve the objective, Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 324, that it would fall outside the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Morgan, supra, at 650, or that it somehow otherwise exceeds the bounds of the "appropriate," U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 5.


58
The Court's more recent cases have professed to follow the longstanding principle of deference to Congress. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("Congress' 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment." Rather, Congress can prohibit a "somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text"); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (" 'Congress must have wide latitude' ") (quoting City of Boerne, supra, at 519-520); City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 528 (reaffirming Morgan); 521 U.S., at 536 (Congress' "conclusions are entitled to much deference"). And even today, the Court purports to apply, not to depart from, these standards. Ante, at 7. But the Court's analysis and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical significance. The Court 'sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hope.'

IV

59
The Court's harsh review of Congress' use of its 5 power is reminiscent of the similar (now-discredited) limitation that it once imposed upon Congress' Commerce Clause power. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (rejecting Carter Coal's rationale). I could understand the legal basis for such review were we judging a statute that discriminated against those of a particular race or gender, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), or a statute that threatened a basic constitutionally protected liberty such as free speech, see Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Post & Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L. J. 441, 477 (2000) (stating that the Court's recent review of 5 legislation appears to approach strict scrutiny); 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 5-16, p. 959 (3d ed. 2000) (same). The legislation before us, however, does not discriminate against anyone, nor does it pose any threat to basic liberty. And it is difficult to understand why the Court, which applies "minimum 'rational-basis' review" to statutes that burden persons with disabilities, ante, at 7-8, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those same individuals.


60
I recognize nonetheless that this statute imposes a burden upon States in that it removes their Eleventh Amendment protection from suit, thereby subjecting them to potential monetary liability. Rules for interpreting 5 that would provide States with special protection, however, run counter to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its terms, that Amendment prohibits States from denying their citizens equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1. Hence "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.' Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty." City of Rome, 446 U.S., at 179. See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Ex parte Virginia, supra, at 345.   And, ironically, the greater the obstacle the Eleventh Amendment poses to the creation by Congress of the kind of remedy at issue here-the decentralized remedy of private damage actions-the more Congress, seeking to cure important national problems, such as the problem of disability discrimination before us, will have to rely on more uniform remedies, such as federal standards and court injunctions, 42 U.S.C.  12188(a)(2), which are sometimes draconian and typically more intrusive. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 704-705 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Cf. ante, at 15, n. 8. For these reasons, I doubt that today's decision serves any constitutionally based federalism interest.


61
The Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress. Morgan, 384 U.S., at 648, n. 7 (The "sponsors and supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress"). Its decision saps 5 of independent force, effectively "confin[ing] the legislative power ... to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch [is] prepared to adjudge unconstitutional." Id., at 648-649. Whether the Commerce Clause does or does not enable Congress to enact this provision, see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100-185 (1996) (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); College Savings Bank, supra, at 699-700 (Breyer, J., dissenting), in my view, 5 gives Congress the necessary authority.


62
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.


63
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.


64
Congressional hearings on the Americans with Disabilities Act Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H. R. 2273 before the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).


65
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on H. R. 2273 and S. 933 before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).


66
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings on H. R. 2273 before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).


67
Americans with Disabilities: Telecommunications Relay Services, Hearing on Title V of H. R. 2273 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H. R. 2273 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).


68
Field Hearing on Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).


69
Hearing on H. R. 2273, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18 & Sept. 13, 1989) (two hearings)


70
Oversight Hearing on H. R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989)


71
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing before the House Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (May 1989 Hearings).


72
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S. 2345 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).


73
APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.


74
Disability discrimination laws enacted by Congress prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act


75
Act of June 10, 1948, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351


76
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.  4151 et seq.


77
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.  701 et seq.


78
Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 175 (reenacted in 1990 as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.  1400 et seq.)


79
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.  6000 et seq.


80
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C.  1973ee et seq.


81
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C.  41705


82
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.  10801


83
Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C.  3604.


84
APPENDIX C TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.


85
Submissions made by individuals to the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. See the Government's Lodging (available in Clerk of Court's case file).

ALABAMA

86
Page No.


87
00002  discrimination against the mentally ill in city zoning process


88
00003  inaccessible exercise equipment at University of Alabama


89
00004  school failed to train teachers how to work with students with learning disabilities


90
00005  courts failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


91
00006  lack of accessible police and court services for deaf people

00007  inaccessible public transportation

92
00008  child denied public education because of cerebral palsy


93
00009  inaccessible public transportation, which prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work


94
00010  inaccessible public buildings and services; inaccessible transportation


95
00011  inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public transportation


96
00013  inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public transportation


97
00014  failure to enforce building codes requiring access for persons with disabilities

00015  inaccessible courthouse

98
00017  lack of instructions for use of voting machine by blind people; inaccessible restrooms in newly renovated State House

00021  inaccessible public transportation
00023  inaccessible public transportation

99
00024  failure to enforce state and local laws protecting persons with disabilities


100
00025  schools failed to provide an adequate education for children with disabilities

00026  inaccessible public transportation

101
00027  man denied vocational rehabilitation services based on his cerebral palsy; inaccessible public transportation


102
00031  vocational rehabilitation agency failed to provide services for schizophrenics; zoning discrimination against group homes


103
00032  school failed to provide an adequate education


104
00033  school failed to provide an adequate education

ALASKA

105
Page No.


106
00038  school placed child with cerebral palsy in special education classes


107
00041  inaccessible restrooms in state legislature information office


108
00042  inaccessible areas at new Alaska Performing Arts Center


109
00044  inaccessible public transportation, which prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work


110
00046  lack of curb cuts in sidewalks near apartment building for persons with disabilities


111
00048  child erroneously placed in special education classes

00049  inaccessible new performing arts center

112
00050  Alaska Psychiatric Institute failed to provide interpretive services for deaf patients


113
00052  state and local agencies disregarded laws requiring accessibility


114
00055  jail failed to provide person with disability medical treatment


115
00056  inaccessible government buildings in Seward

00057  inaccessible public transportation

116
00058  city failed to train employees how to communicate with people with hearing impairments


117
00059  segregated seating and inaccessibility at new performing arts center


118
00061  inaccessibility of State Ferry Columbia and Alaska Railroad; denial of job interview because person was in a wheelchair

00062  inaccessible new performing arts center

119
00063  person using a respirator denied access to Alaska State Division of Medical Assistance

00065  inaccessible city hall

120
00067  school district retaliated against teacher for asking to be assigned to an accessible classroom

00069  inaccessible public transportation

121
00070  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation


122
00071  state agencies failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


123
00072  department of motor vehicles failed to provide interpretive services


124
00073  inaccessibility of Seward City Hall and other state and local buildings


125
00075  state university failed to assist in covering expense of interpretive services for deaf graduate student

00076  inaccessible public buildings
00077  inaccessible public school
ARIZONA

126
Page No.


127
00090  survey showing inaccessibility problems in city of Phoenix's public services

00110  inaccessible public transportation

128
00112  inaccessible restrooms at state recreation areas


129
00116  department of motor vehicles failed to provide visual signs or other assistance for people with hearing impairments


130
00117  person with disability denied police officer job


131
00119  Arizona Department of Economic Security took 31/2 to 4 years to fix unsafe van lift


132
00121  county paratransit refused to provide transportation to college


133
00124  department of motor vehicles placed restrictions on driver's license because of deafness


134
00125  teacher with hearing impairment denied numerous jobs


135
00127  department of motor vehicles failed to assist deaf people


136
00129  inaccessible entrance, restroom, water fountain, and office at building leased by State


137
00130  woman injured trying to use inaccessible restroom at roadside rest stop; lack of curb cuts

00131  inaccessible social service agencies
ARKANSAS

138
Page No.


139
00136  public school failed to enforce accommodations for student


140
00138  public school teacher refused to allow student with disability to use authorized calculator


141
00139  state university failed to inform student with hearing impairment about activities and rules

00140  lack of curb cuts
00141  inaccessible public transportation

142
00143  inaccessible office area at public housing for persons with disabilities

00144  inaccessible public transportation

143
00145  inaccessible state office of human services; state agencies failed to hire persons with disabilities


144
00146  failure to enforce handicapped parking law


145
00147  school erroneously placed child with mobility impairment in special education classes


146
00149  public schools failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people

00150  inaccessible public transportation

147
00153  person with disability forced to resign employment because of architectural barriers


148
00154  public school held meetings and conferences at inaccessible locations


149
00155  physical barriers prevented citizens from voting


150
00156  rehabilitation services failed to assist people with all kinds of disabilities

00159  inaccessible city and county buildings

151
00161  human services office relocated to inaccessible building

00163  lack of curb cuts
CALIFORNIA

152
Page No.

00166  inaccessible public recreation sites

153
00168  California Relay System failed to provide telephone access to other States for deaf people


154
00180  public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf people

00181  inaccessible public transportation

155
00202  California Children's Services refused to help with cost of caring for child with head injury at home

00206  inaccessible county buildings

156
00208  deaf people denied access to state agencies that lacked TDD's


157
00210  deaf people denied access to state agencies that lacked TDD's


158
00211  public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf people


159
00212  public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf people


160
00213  limited out-of-state telephone relay services


161
00214  inaccessible public transportation limited access to community college

00215  inaccessible public transportation

162
00218  deaf people denied access to state agencies that lacked TDD's


163
00219  state mental health services failed to provide access for deaf people


164
00220  government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


165
00221  inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts

00222  inaccessible public transportation

166
00223  inaccessible airport; inaccessible public transportation


167
00224  California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people to make interstate calls


168
00225  California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people to make interstate calls


169
00226  inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible restrooms in public buildings


170
00227  University of California attempted to terminate employees with disabilities for taking medical leave

00231  state agencies failed to provide TDD's

171
00232  person denied opportunity to serve on jury because county failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


172
00236  public school district failed to provide TTD for deaf parents


173
00237  California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people to make interstate calls


174
00240  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation

00241  inaccessible public transportation
00244  inaccessible public transportation

175
00245  California Civil Service Exam held at high school with inaccessible restrooms


176
00246  inaccessible restrooms in county administration building; lack of curb cuts


177
00247  inaccessible public transportation prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work; States failed to enforce laws requiring accessibility

00248  inaccessible public transportation

178
00249  California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people to make interstate calls

00250  inaccessible public transportation
00252  inaccessible public transportation
00253  inaccessible public transportation

179
00254  inaccessible county courthouse; street signals too fast for safe crossing by wheelchair


180
00255  public functions failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


181
00258  deaf people denied access to state agencies that lacked TDD's


182
00261  California Basic Educational Skills Test discriminated against deaf adults who wanted to become teachers of deaf students


183
00262  department of motor vehicles required doctors to report patients with seizure disorders and revoked such patients' licenses, but did not require reporting of other conditions that could cause erratic driving

COLORADO

184
Page No.


185
00266  person in wheelchair passed by five bus drivers, all of whom claimed that lifts were broken


186
00267  lack of curb cuts and ramps; inaccessible public transportation

00268  inaccessible public transportation
00269  inaccessible public transportation

187
00270  persons with disabilities placed in segregated public housing

00271  inaccessible public transportation

188
00272  lack of curb cuts forced person in wheelchair to use street

00273  inaccessible county courthouse
00274  inaccessible public transportation

189
00275  inaccessible public transportation in small cities; public schools failed to assist students with disabilities


190
00276  inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public facilities and recreation sites


191
00277  political parties held caucuses at inaccessible private home


192
00280  children with developmental disabilities required to attend segregated schools


193
00281  public school system refused to transfer student with disabilities from special to regular school until she brought suit


194
00283  vocational rehabilitation agency refused to take referrals from psychiatric halfway house; person denied driver's license in Virginia because of mental illness CONNECTICUT Page No.


195
00285  public school inaccessible to parent with disability


196
00289  state university denied renewal of contract for graduate assistantship because of age and disability

DELAWARE

197
Page No.


198
00301  inaccessible public high school; inaccessible public transportation


199
00302  inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public transportation


200
00303  inaccessible voting machines; inadequate handicapped parking


201
00308  man with physical disability spent 45 minutes crawling into polling place because it was inaccessible to wheelchairs


202
00310  inaccessible public transportation; public ceremony held at inaccessible building


203
00314  failure to enforce laws requiring handicapped parking spaces, which were usually occupied by police cars


204
00315  high percentage of children with disabilities placed in segregated schools


205
00317  restrictive zoning limited reintegration of institutionalized people into community

00319  inaccessible voting system
00323  inaccessible public transportation

206
00325  inaccessible public transportation made person with disability late for work; inaccessible library and other public buildings


207
00329  State refused to fund services for people with mental illness


208
00330  state transit system provided special vouchers for persons with physical disabilities, but not for mentally ill


209
00331  state criminal justice system failed to provide psychiatric treatment


210
00333  State kept child with schizophrenia in Delaware State Hospital because it lacked services for people who could be released


211
00335  state labor department's restrictive policies prevented persons with disabilities from applying for employment


212
00336  failure to enforce laws requiring handicapped parking spaces, which were usually occupied by police cars


213
00337  public transportation refused to transport person carrying oxygen


214
00338  staff and patients at Delaware State Hospital sexually abused women patients

00343  inaccessible public transportation

215
00345  state police interrogated deaf citizens without providing interpretive services


216
00347  vocational high school sought to transfer student back to special segregated school

GEORGIA

217
Page No.


218
00362  public colleges failed to provide assistance for students with learning disabilities


219
00365  University of Georgia students with disabilities faced architectural barriers, inaccessible public transportation, lack of housing, and failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


220
00366  inaccessible classrooms at University of Georgia


221
00367  University of Georgia located its office of handicapped services in inaccessible second floor office


222
00370  University of Georgia charged students with learning disabilities $600 per quarter for services that other students with disabilities received at no cost


223
00371  Learning Disability Adult Clinic at University of Georgia charged unreasonable fees

00372  inaccessible public transportation

224
00374  traffic court failed to provide interpretive services for deaf person

HAWAII

225
Page No.

00444  inaccessible public transportation
00446  inaccessible public transportation

226
00448  state university failed to enforce handicapped parking laws


227
00451  state employee in wheelchair forced to resign job because frequently unable to get to office due to broken elevator in state building; State Commission on the Handicapped refused employee's request for reasonable accommodation


228
00452  state university failed to provide blind student with timely or adequate books on tape for coursework; lack of signs or information for blind people using public transit


229
00455  person with disability denied opportunity to testify because department of labor held hearing in an inaccessible room


230
00456  state employment agency refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people


231
00457  public school put three-year-old deaf child in same class as fourth graders


232
00458  quadriplegic person who had California driver's license denied license by Hawaii


233
00460  state government office refused to interview persons with emotional disorder or history of alcoholism

00461  inaccessible state buildings

234
00462  person with mobility impairment denied serious consideration for state job due to unreliability of accessible public transportation


235
00463  inaccessible public transportation prevented person with disability from getting to work; inaccessible public buildings


236
00464  lack of curb cuts forced person in wheelchair to use street


237
00467  elevators in public buildings not marked for blind people; bus drivers failed to announce stops for blind people


238
00468  inaccessible public transportation; bus drivers harassed mentally retarded passengers

00469  inaccessible public transportation

239
00472  state mental health system had restrictive institutional policies


240
00473  state social service employees placed limits on opportunities for persons with disabilities based on stereotypical assumptions

00474  lack of curb cuts and ramps
00475  inaccessible public transportation
00476  inaccessible public transportation
00477  inaccessible public library

241
00479  denial of certain licenses to persons with mental disabilities


242
00480  inaccessible restroom in state park; lack of curb cuts


243
00484  state and local government meetings failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


244
00485  students with disabilities unable to participate in school interscholastic sports


245
00486  blind people prevented from traveling outside State because quarantine laws permitted no exemption for their guide dogs


246
00487  state mental health services unavailable for deaf people due to failure to train staff


247
00488  inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible city and county buildings


248
00490  handi-van refused service to person paralyzed from waist down

00491  inaccessible public transportation

249
00492  state agencies failed to monitor conditions in community residential facilities for persons with disabilities

00494  inaccessible public transportation
00495  inaccessible public transportation

250
00496  inadequate assistance for deaf person at court appearance

IDAHO

251
Page No.

00502  inaccessible public transportation
00505  inaccessible public transportation

252
00506  adult victims of abuse with developmental disabilities denied equal rights to testify in court


253
00507  inaccessible public recreation activities

00508  inaccessible public transportation
00509  lack of curb cuts
00510  inaccessible public transportation

254
00511  city and county failed to provide assistance for deaf people at public meetings

00514  inaccessible public transportation

255
00515  public school failed to provide adequate assistance for students with disabilities

00516  inaccessible public transportation

256
00517  public defenders' offices and public meetings failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people; police harassed persons with disabilities who appeared to be intoxicated


257
00518  vocational rehabilitation agency lacked TTY service


258
00521  government agencies lacked staff to assist people with head injuries

00522  inaccessible public transportation
00523  inaccessible public transportation

259
00524  inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public buildings


260
00528  limited access at new county courthouse, library, and city hall


261
00531  school district refused to hire licensed teacher because of speech impediment


262
00533  public school failed to provide assistance for deaf student


263
00537  public school failed to provide interpretive services for deaf student


264
00540  Idaho lacked statewide telephone relay service for deaf people


265
00541  department of employment and department of health and welfare lacked telephone access for deaf people


266
00543  inaccessible restrooms at public high school; student in wheelchair denied admission to regular classes

ILLINOIS

267
Page No.


268
00546  state system for providing ballots to people unable to enter polling place and special bus service caused long wait outside in cold weather


269
00548  schools that mainstream deaf children refused to hire deaf teacher


270
00553  government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at public hearing on school budget


271
00554  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation


272
00559  department of rehabilitation limited services to persons with disabilities by threatening placement in nursing home

00569  police stations lacked TTY service

273
00572  deaf people arrested and held in jail overnight without explanation because of failure to provide interpretive services

00573  inaccessible polling place

274
00574  inaccessible public schools prevented attendance at PTA meetings

00575  inaccessible public transportation
00576  inaccessible public transportation

275
00578  lack of curb cuts and ramps for wheelchairs


276
00579  most state housing agencies lacked telecommunications devices or interpretive services for deaf people


277
00581  state and local government agencies lacked telecommunications devices for deaf people


278
00583  emergency medical, police, and fire services lacked TDD's or personnel trained to receive TDD calls


279
00585  inaccessible public pools; inaccessible restrooms in municipal building

00586  inaccessible public transportation
00587  inaccessible polling place
00588  inaccessible polling place
00589  inaccessible public transportation
00590  inaccessible public transportation
00591  inaccessible library
00592  inaccessible voting system
00594  inaccessible polling place
00595  lack of curb cuts
00596  inaccessible public transportation
00597  inaccessible public transportation
00600  inaccessible public transportation
00603  inaccessible public transportation

280
00605  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public buildings; inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible polling place

INDIANA

281
Page No.


282
00608  state vocational rehabilitation agency refused to help person  it classified as severely disabled


283
00609  for five years, state vocational rehabilitation agency failed to provide assistance

00612  inadequate curb cuts
00613  inaccessible public transportation
00616  inaccessible public transportation
00618  inadequate curb cuts

284
00619  inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public facilities

00621  inaccessible public transportation

285
00622  government agencies failed to provide interpretive services and TTY/TDD's for deaf people


286
00629  deaf counselors discouraged from applying for jobs as rehabilitation counselors for deaf people


287
00637  staff at state psychiatric facilities abused and physically dragged patients


288
00644  person with disability dismissed as director of deaf unit at Central State Hospital


289
00651  public meetings held at inaccessible locations

00653  inaccessible polling place

290
00655  state counselors failed to provide rehabilitation assistance to person with head injury

IOWA

291
Page No.


292
00659  person dismissed as city bus operator after seeking treatment for mental illness


293
00664  state commission failed to supply necessary equipment for deaf and blind employee


294
00665  high school limited opportunities for mentally retarded student to be integrated

KANSAS

295
Page No.


296
00670  Kansas Commission of Civil Rights denied legally blind person job as investigator because of limited ability to drive and refused to allow accommodation that would have permitted use of public transportation


297
00673  police failed to provide interpretive services after arresting deaf man


298
00676  Kansas Department of Transportation fired person because she had epilepsy


299
00679  state investigator failed to examine employment discrimination claims

00685  inaccessible public transportation

300
00695  county failed to assist mentally ill with housing and vocational opportunities


301
00696  damaged sidewalks and poor street lighting posed risk to persons with disabilities

00704  inaccessible city-owned arena
KENTUCKY

302
Page No.


303
00706  bus driver bypassed person standing at stop with guide dog

00709  inaccessible public transportation

304
00712  department of employment services failed to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities


305
00717  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation

00720  inaccessible public transportation

306
00723  state employment service refused to place person in wheelchair

00724  inaccessible public buildings

307
00729  public library, police department, and state university library lacked personnel trained to use TTY devices


308
00731  state university failed to provide assistance to parttime teacher with a disability


309
00732  State prevented deaf teachers from teaching deaf students by requiring courses such as music education

00733  inaccessible public transportation
00736  inaccessible public transportation

310
00740  Kentucky School for the Deaf preferred hiring hearing teachers rather than deaf teachers

LOUISIANA

311
Page No.


312
00743  inaccessible housing for graduate students at Louisiana State University

00745  inaccessible public transportation

313
00748  police assumed person with coordination problems was drunk

00751  inaccessible public transportation

314
00752  vocational rehabilitation program failed to provide services for person with head injury


315
00753  inaccessible public transportation prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work

00758  inaccessible voting machine

316
00759  Louisiana Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund denied membership to person with disability


317
00773  inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts


318
00776  inaccessible buildings at Louisiana State University

MAINE

319
Page No.


320
00778  inadequate sidewalk ramps; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


321
00780  failure to enforce state regulations requiring accessibility in public buildings


322
00782  town refused request for interpretive services for deaf people at town meeting

MARYLAND

323
Page No.


324
00785  public transportation unsafe for persons with disabilities


325
00787  public libraries, state prison and other state offices lacked TDD's


326
00788  department of human relations failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people and did not answer TTY calls


327
00789  vocational rehabilitation counselors failed to help deaf people find jobs

00797  inaccessible public transportation

328
00798  state hospital refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people

MASSACHUSETTS

329
Page No.


330
00808  Office for Children refused to license blind person as day care assistant

00812  inaccessible courthouse

331
00813  inaccessible restrooms in state building and state armory


332
00816  state college threatened to terminate employee because of blindness


333
00829  Massachusetts Adoption Exchange refused to let family with mother who had muscular dystrophy adopt child


334
00835  department of vocational rehabilitation hired able-bodied person instead of qualified person in wheelchair

MICHIGAN

335
Page No.


336
00920  person denied admission to University of Michigan Medical School because of speech impediment

00921  inaccessible state university campuses

337
00922  65 percent of voting precincts in Detroit inaccessible


338
00923  buses with lifts often failed to stop for people in wheelchairs or their lifts did not work


339
00924  state employee threatened with discipline for serving on and attending meetings of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission advisory committee


340
00925  state university stadium lacked accessible restrooms, water fountains, and telephones

00926  inaccessible public transportation

341
00928  school system failed to hire teachers who could communicate with deaf students


342
00932  state university denied interpretive services to part-time deaf student


343
00933  public transportation refused to serve persons in wheelchairs; public agency refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people


344
00939  state university had transportation system for students with disabilities but not for faculty and staff


345
00947  state university lacked adequate curb ramps


346
00950  state denied driver's license to person with epilepsy


347
00958  inaccessible public recreation facilities

00960  inaccessible government buildings

348
00961  state university denied sabbatical proposal of faculty member with disability


349
00963  Michigan Rehabilitation Services placed people in inappropriate positions


350
00964  Michigan Rehabilitation Services failed to accommodate mentally ill persons

00968  inaccessible public transportation

351
00969  man with disability forced to use girls' restroom at state job


352
00970  person with disability terminated from county job and banned from future county employment

MINNESOTA

353
Page No.


354
00974  person with disability and score of 100 was finalist for job as director of agency for the blind, but able-bodied person with score of 70 was hired


355
00980  person with cerebral palsy humiliated at interview for job with state department of education

MISSISSIPPI

356
Page No.

00853  inaccessible public transportation
00855  inaccessible beaches, pools, and parks

357
00984  inaccessible classrooms and library at Mississippi School for the Deaf


358
00985  no state agency to provide or coordinate community service programs for deaf adults


359
00986  inaccessible classrooms at Mississippi School for the Deaf


360
00987  public programs failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people; government failed to post caution signs warning drivers of deaf children


361
00988  inaccessible polling places and voting booths

00989  inaccessible public buildings

362
00990  courts refused to pay for qualified interpretive services for deaf people

00992  inaccessible state university building

363
00993  teacher denied position at public elementary school because of need for braces and a cane to walk


364
00994  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public school rooms; inaccessible public transportation


365
00996  inaccessible department of motor vehicles


366
00997  inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public facilities

00998  inaccessible courthouses

367
00999  state university instructor refused to teach blind person

01000  inaccessible public transportation

368
01001  inaccessible polling place; city employee required to go outside to get to restroom

MISSOURI

369
Page No.

01003  lack of curb cuts

370
01004  inaccessible restrooms in public buildings; lack of curb cuts


371
01006  public schools segregated children with disabilities; inaccessible school buildings


372
01009  inaccessible public transportation and public buildings such as post offices, libraries, schools, and polling places


373
01010  state university tried to discourage blind person's chosen field of study

01013  inaccessible public transportation

374
01015  courthouse failed to provide amplified sound system in courtrooms

MONTANA

375
Page No.

01017  inadequate curb cuts
01022  inadequate curb cuts in downtown area

376
01023  state agencies refused to make reasonable accommodations to paraplegics seeking employment

01024  inaccessible polling place

377
01026  person in wheelchair forced to vote in street

01027  inaccessible polling place
NEBRASKA

378
Page No.


379
01029  government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people serving on juries, commissions, and committees


380
01031  local school district failed to provide interpretive services for deaf child


381
01034  inaccessible entrance at office of county assistance

NEVADA

382
Page No.


383
01038  local government failed to provide assistance for people with head injuries


384
01043  inaccessible government buildings and public facilities


385
01044  person with disability denied access to public transportation because it took too long to get on and off bus


386
01046  community college refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people


387
01050  city ordinance prevented mentally ill from living in residential areas


388
01051  inaccessible public transportation; inadequate curb cuts and ramps


389
01053  failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


390
01054  lack of sidewalk and crosswalk accommodations for persons in   wheelchairs

NEW HAMPSHIRE

391
Page No.


392
01057  state agency failed to assist persons with head injuries despite availability of state surplus funds


393
01061  vocational rehabilitation counselor tried to cut off funds and assistance to person with disability

NEW JERSEY

394
Page No.


395
01067  commission for the blind and visually impaired demoted visually impaired person


396
01068  zoning commission denied permission to open home for persons with head injuries


397
01069  architectural barriers on Cumberland County College campus

01072  inadequate curb cuts
NEW MEXICO

398
Page No.


399
01080  state university denied entry into school of social work to blind person but admitted partially sighted person with lower grades


400
01083  New Mexico lacked statewide TDD relay service


401
01091  prisoners with developmental disabilities subjected to longer terms and abused by other prisoners in state correctional system

01092  inaccessible public transportation

402
01095  University of New Mexico failed to provide assistance for blind student


403
01097  city and county government offices lacked TDD's


404
01098  University of New Mexico hospital failed to provide interpretive services for deaf patients


405
01099  University of New Mexico failed to provide interpretive services for deaf students


406
01100  inaccessible buildings on University of New Mexico campus

NEW YORK

407
Page No.


408
01109  state agencies failed to hire persons with disabilities


409
01114  custodian in public high school denied request of person with disability to use locked elevator


410
01119  at state legislature, person in wheelchair had to wait 45 minutes to use freight elevator


411
01129  public village meetings held in second floor meeting room with no elevator; many polling places inaccessible


412
01130  lack of curb cuts; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


413
01134  inaccessible state parks and public beaches

NORTH CAROLINA

414
Page No.


415
01144  public elementary school initially denied admission and then charged extra fee for child with Down's Syndrome to attend afterschool day care program


416
01155  blind people told not to participate in regular public parks and recreation programs


417
01158  state agencies, other than services for the blind and vocational rehabilitation, employed few persons with disabilities


418
01161  police arrested and jailed deaf person without providing interpretive services

NORTH DAKOTA

419
Page No.


420
01170  person with disability denied access to driver's license exam because held in inaccessible room

01172  inaccessible polling places

421
01175  lack of curb cuts; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws; inaccessible polling places; inaccessible city government meetings


422
01178  failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


423
01183  inaccessible polling places; inaccessible state and local government buildings


424
01185  government agencies failed to enforce policies regarding hiring persons with disabilities; inaccessible polling places; inaccessible public buildings


425
01186  state and local government failed to hire persons with disabilities; inaccessible polling places


426
01187  failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


427
01196  person with head-injury disability denied consideration for position of election polls inspector

OHIO

428
Page No.


429
01215  city failed to trim trees regularly, which posed a hazard to blind people


430
01216  inaccessible state, county, and city buildings


431
01218  inaccessible social service agency offices; inaccessible public transportation


432
01221  vocational rehabilitation agency denied assistance to person with disability


433
01224  rehabilitation services agency failed to assist paranoid schizophrenic


434
01229  vocational rehabilitation agency discouraged person with disability from being a nurse


435
01230  persons with disabilities denied jobs because of inaccessible public transportation


436
01231  blind person denied driver's license though legally eligible


437
01234  inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts


438
01235  public paratransit system often left passengers stranded


439
01236  vocational rehabilitation agency steered person with mental disability to menial job, despite his Ph. D. degree


440
01239  police failed to provide interpretive services for deaf person who was arrested


441
01241  Cleveland State University lacked wheelchair ramps

01242  inaccessible public transportation
OKLAHOMA

442
Page No.


443
01251  Tulsa Housing Authority failed to communicate with and provide information to tenants with disabilities


444
01258  state employment office lacked TDD or workers with interpretive skills; state university paid deaf employees less than hearing employees; state agencies made no effort to hire deaf applicants


445
01265  police officer pointed gun at person with disability who could not get out of car quickly

01266  inaccessible public transportation

446
01269  person with speech impediment denied numerous state jobs

01271  inaccessible restrooms at city parks

447
01275  state government held meeting at hotel with inaccessible restrooms


448
01278  person in wheelchair worked at polling place with inaccessible restrooms

01280  inaccessible polling places

449
01286  qualified blind person who offered to provide own driver denied job as state social worker

OREGON

450
Page No.


451
01370  blind people unable to access printed material from state government


452
01375  school system barred child with cerebral palsy from physical education class and gave her cleaning job instead


453
01377  person with two college degrees and extensive professional experience turned down for appro- priate state government jobs and advised to seek entry-level jobs because of his disability


454
01378  commission for the handicapped lacked funds to enforce laws

PENNSYLVANIA

455
Page No.


456
01391  public library had restrictive policy regarding issuance of library cards to residents of group homes


457
01397  government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at school budget hearing

01399  inaccessible public transportation
01407  inaccessible polling places
01408  inaccessible public transportation
01409  inaccessible polling places
01410  inaccessible polling place

458
01413  inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts

01421  inaccessible public library

459
01423  inaccessible automatic ticket dispensers on Pennsylvania Turnpike


460
01425  bus drivers refused to transport person in wheelchair

01427  inaccessible county offices
01429  lack of curb cuts

461
01430  GED programs offered at inaccessible public schools; bus drivers unwilling or unable to use wheelchair lifts


462
01432  child unable to enroll in first grade because of inaccessible classroom


463
01434  lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation

01435  lack of curb cuts in rural areas
01436  inaccessible polling place
01439  unsafe curb cuts

464
01441  inaccessible state office building SOUTH CAROLINA Page No.


465
01454  government failed to provide 911 emergency service for deaf people


466
01457  state and local agencies, library, and police and fire departments lacked TDD's; government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at meetings

SOUTH DAKOTA

467
Page No.


468
01466  school district failed to provide adequate services to child with disability


469
01467  traffic light and fire hydrant placed where they posed obstacle to blind pedestrians and those in wheelchairs who needed to use curb cuts

01469  inaccessible polling places
01470  inaccessible public transportation

470
01472  State failed to hire persons with disabilities without giving a reason


471
01475  criminal court failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people


472
01476  state university denied blind student opportunity to practice teach as required for teaching certificate

TEXAS

473
Page No.


474
01483  poles obstructed sidewalks; lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation


475
01503  state teachers' exam required deaf teachers who wanted to teach deaf children to pass section on speech assessment and listening


476
01514  medical examination required for renewal of driver's license despite unblemished 20-year driving record

01520  inadequate handicapped parking spaces

477
01521  state vocational rehabilitation agency refused to assist college student who chose to major in political science


478
01522  employee of county human services agency denied handicapped parking place


479
01526  failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


480
01527  inaccessible state university transportation system


481
01529  denial of driver's licenses or accommodations to take driver's test


482
01531  inaccessible buildings at state university


483
01536  state hospital sought to discharge mentally ill boy with HIV


484
01540  special transit system refused to transport man with mental retardation though he could not use regular bus


485
01542  deaf man not permitted to take state cosmetology exam with assistance from interpreter


486
01543  blind man not permitted to take state chiropractic exam because he could not read x-rays alone


487
01549  deaf instructors unable to pass state teachers' exam for teachers of deaf students that assessed speech and language skills


488
01551  inadequate handicapped parking and enforcement

UTAH

489
Page No.


490
01554  state rehabilitation service had never hired deaf counselor or administrator


491
01556  child denied admission to public school because first-grade teacher refused to teach him


492
01563  public school failed to implement state review panel findings regarding accommodation for child with disability


493
01576  state office for persons with disabilities failed to hire such persons; inaccessible public transportation


494
01577  state government denied persons with disabilities upper level management jobs


495
01580  rehabilitation services agency discriminated against employee with reading disability


496
01581  qualified blind teacher denied job and told that school needed teacher who could also coach football, but school hired sighted person who was  not a coach

01584  inaccessible public transportation
01586  inaccessible government office

497
01587  public school teacher refused to give child with learning disability his grades and said he did not belong in public school


498
01592  Utah denied mainstream education to child with Down's Syndrome, though child had been mainstreamed in another State


499
01595  person with disability involuntarily hospitalized and abused by state university hospital


500
01613  inaccessible public high school facilities

VERMONT

501
Page No.


502
01634  zoning board denied use permit for community mental health center

VIRGINIA

503
Page No.


504
01642  student with learning disability misclassified as mentally retarded and deemed ineligible to take drama class at public school


505
01646  inaccessible buildings at state school for blind and deaf youth


506
01647  failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


507
01654  inaccessible restrooms in government buildings; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws


508
01656  state programs for persons with disabilities failed to communicate with deaf people


509
01660  lack of state institutional care to rehabilitate people with head injuries

01663  inaccessible traffic court
01664  inaccessible public transportation
01667  lack of curb cuts

510
01668  inaccessible public transportation prevented persons with disabilities from voting


511
01671  state and local government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at meetings


512
01674  lack of curb cuts outside county courthouse


513
01675  deaf people denied access to 911 emergency services

01676  inaccessible courthouse
01677  inaccessible public transportation

514
01678  lack of curb cuts and ramp for access to courthouse

01679  inaccessible county courthouse
01680  inaccessible courthouse and library
01682  inaccessible high school

515
01683  lack of curb cuts at city's main intersection


516
01684  person in wheelchair received ticket for obstructing street traffic even though sidewalks not accessible


517
01686  inaccessible transportation on state university campus

WASHINGTON

518
Page No.


519
01690  deaf people required to pay for interpretive services in court


520
01692  state government's lack of TDD deterred deaf people from applying for employment


521
01694  government office lacked TDD and interpretive services for deaf people


522
01696  state human rights commission lacked staff to pursue case of discrimination against blind person


523
01706  community college failed to provide interpretive services for deaf students or to assist students with disabilities in other ways


524
01716  local sheriff 's department discontinued TDD


525
01717  inaccessible restroom at state ferry terminal

WEST VIRGINIA

526
Page No.

01742  inaccessible public transportation

527
01745  sheriff denied person with disability use of elevator in courthouse


528
01746  law enforcement agencies lacked ability to communicate with deaf people

WISCONSIN

529
Page No.


530
01752  public school recreation program refused to provide interpretive services for deaf child


531
01755  state university hospital and sheriff 's office failed to provide TDD's or trained personnel

01756  inaccessible polling places

532
01767  person with disabilities denied admission to graduate study at state university

01758  inaccessible city hall

533
01759  state offices lacked TDD's and failed to provide material in braille or on tape


534
01760  department of motor vehicles revoked person with diabetes' driver's license despite doctor's report


535
01761  inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts or ramps


536
01766  department of motor vehicles tried to revoke license of person who used hand controls in car

01767  inaccessible polling places

537
01771  blind and deaf people denied equal access to jury service

WYOMING

538
Page No.


539
01773  State lacked telephone relay system for deaf people

01775  inaccessible state buildings

540
01777  department of motor vehicles denied driver's license to person with epilepsy


541
01780  inaccessible buildings at state university


542
01781  zoning board denied permit for group home for persons with disabilities


543
01786  person in wheelchair denied marriage license because courthouse was inaccessible

