518 U.S. 267116 S.Ct. 2135135 L.Ed.2d 549
UNITED STATESv.URSERYCertiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
No. 95-345.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 17, 1996
Decided June 24, 1996*

Syllabus
In No. 95-345, the Government instituted civil forfeiture proceedings  under 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7) against respondent Ursery's  house, alleging that it had been used to facilitate illegal drug  transactions. Shortly before Ursery settled that claim, he was indicted,  and was later convicted, of manufacturing marijuana in violation of  Section(s) 841(a)(1). In No. 95-346, the Government filed a civil in rem  complaint against various property seized from, or titled to,  respondents  Arlt and Wren or Arlt's corporation, alleging that each item  was subject to forfeiture under 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A)   because it was involved in money laundering violative of Section(s)  1956, and to forfeiture under 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  881(a)(6) as the proceeds of a felonious drug transaction. Litigation of the forfeiture  action was deferred while Arlt and  Wren were prosecuted on drug and  money-laundering charges under  Section(s) 846 and 18 U. S. C. Section(s)  371 and 1956.  After their convictions, the District Court granted the  Government's motion for summary judgment in the forfeiture proceeding.  The Courts of Appeals reversed Ursery's conviction and the forfeiture  judgment against Arlt and Wren, holding that the Double Jeopardy  Clause prohibits the Government from both punishing a defendant  for a criminal  offense and forfeiting his property for that same offense in a separate  civil proceeding.  The courts reasoned in part that Halper v. United  States, 490 U. S. 435, and Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, meant  that, as a categorical matter, civil forfeitures always constitute  "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.  This Court consolidated the  cases.
Held:  In rem civil forfeitures are neither "punishment" nor criminal  for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Pp. 3-23.
(a) Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel  criminal actions and in rem civil forfeiture proceedings based upon the  same underlying events, see, e.g., The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14-15, and  this Court consistently has concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause  does not apply to such forfeitures because they do not impose  punishment, see, e.g., Various Items of Personal Property v. United  States, 282 U. S. 577, 581; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,  409 U. S. 232, 235-236 (per curiam).  In its most recent case, United  States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, the Court held  that a forfeiture was not barred by a prior criminal proceeding after applying a two-part test asking, first, whether Congress intended the  particular forfeiture to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal  penalty, and, second, whether the forfeiture proceedings are so punitive  in fact as to establish that they may not legitimately be viewed as  civil in nature, despite any congressional intent to establish a civil  remedial mechanism. Pp. 5-9.
(b) Though the 89 Firearms test was more refined, perhaps, than the  Court's Various Items analysis, the conclusion was the same in each  case: in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct  from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and  does not constitute a punishment for double jeopardy purposes.  See Gore  v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 392.  The Courts of Appeals misread  Halper, Austin, and Montana Dept. of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S.  ___, as having abandoned this oft-affirmed rule.  None of those  decisions purported to overrule Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and  89 Firearms or to replace the Court's traditional understanding.  It would have been remarkable for the Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a  long line of precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing  so.  Moreover, the cases in question did not deal with the subject of  this case: in rem civil forfeitures for double jeopardy purposes. Halper  involved in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Kurth Ranch considered a punitive state tax imposed on marijuana under that Clause.  And Austin dealt with civil forfeitures under the Eighth  Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.  Pp. 10-19.
(c) Theforfeitures at issue are civil proceedings under the two-part 89 Firearms test.  First, there is little doubt that Congress intended  proceedings under Section(s) 881 and 981 to be civil, since those  statutes' procedural enforcement mechanisms are themselves distinctly  civil in nature.  See, e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 363.  Second,  there is little evidence, much less the "clearest proof" that the Court  requires, see e.g., id., at 365, suggesting that forfeiture proceedings  under those sections are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary.  These statutes  are, in most significant respects, indistinguishable from those  reviewed, and held not to be punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut  Stones, and 89 Firearms.  That these are civil proceedings is also  supported by other factors that the Court has found persuasive,  including the considerations that (1) in rem civil forfeiture has not  historically been regarded as punishment; (2) there is no requirement in  the statutes at issue that the Government demonstrate scienter in order  to establish that the property is subject to forfeiture; (3) though  both statutes may serve a deterrent purpose, this purpose may serve civil as  well as criminal goals; and (4) the fact that both are tied to criminal  activity is insufficient in itself to  render them punitive.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Ward, 448 U.  S. 242, 247-248, n. 7, 249.  Pp. 19-23.
No. 95-345, 59 F. 3d 568, and No. 95-346, 33 F. 3d 1210 and 56 F. 3d 41,  reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor,  Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.  Kennedy, J., filed  a concurring opinion.  Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the  judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.  Stevens, J., filed an opinion  concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in  the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are  requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the  United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other  formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the  preliminary print goes to press.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.


1
In separate cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Government  from both punishing a defendant for a criminal offense and forfeiting  his property for that same offense in a separate civil proceeding.  We  consolidated those cases for our  review, and now reverse.  These civil  forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally), we hold, do not  constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

I.

2
No. 95-345: Michigan Police found marijuana growing adjacent to  respondent Guy Ursery's house, and discovered marijuana seeds, stems,  stalks, and a growlight within the house.  The United States instituted  civil forfeiture proceedings against the house, alleging that the  property was subject to forfeiture  under 84 Stat. 1276, as amended, 21  U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7) because it had been used for several years  to facilitate the unlawful processing and distribution of a controlled  substance.  Ursery ultimately paid the United States  $13,250 to settle  the forfeiture claim in full.  Shortly before  the settlement was consummated, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana, in violation of Section(s) 841(a)(1).   A jury found him guilty, and he was  sentenced to 63 months in prison.


3
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by a divided vote reversed Ursery's criminal conviction, holding that the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United  States Constitution.  59 F. 3d 568 (1995).  The court based its  conclusion in part upon its belief  that our decisions in United States  v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), and Austin v. United States, 509 U. S.  602 (1993), meant that any civil forfeiture under Section(s) 881(a)(7)  constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Ursery, in the court's view, had therefore been "punished" in the  forfeiture proceeding against his property, and could not be  subsequently criminally tried for violation of 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  841(a)(1).


4
No. 95-346: Following a jury trial, Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren were convicted of: conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture  of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 846;  conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U. S. C.  Section(s) 371; and numerous counts of money laundering, in violation of  Section(s) 1956.  The District Court sentenced Arlt to life in prison  and a 10-year term of supervised release, and imposed a fine of  $250,000.  Wren was sentenced to life imprisonment and a 5-year term of  supervised release.


5
Before the criminal trial had started, the United States had filed a civil in rem complaint against various property seized from, or  titled to, Arlt and Wren, or Payback Mines, a corporation controlled by  Arlt. The complaint alleged that each piece of property was subject to  forfeiture both under 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A), which  provides that "[a]ny property . . . involved in a transaction or  attempted transaction in violation of" Section(s) 1956 (the  money-laundering statute) "is subject to forfeiture to the United  States"; and under 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(6), which provides for  the forfeiture of (i) "[a]ll . . . things of value furnished or intended  to be furnished by any person in exchange for" illegal drugs, (ii) "all proceeds traceable to such an exchange," and (iii) "all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to  facilitate" a federal drug felony.  The parties agreed to defer  litigation of the forfeiture action during the criminal prosecution.  More than a year after the conclusion of the criminal trial, the  District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment in  the civil forfeiture proceeding.


6
Arlt and Wren appealed the decision in the forfeiture action, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that  the forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  33 F. 3d 1210   (1994). The court's decision was based in part upon the same view as  that expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ursery's  case-that our decisions in Halper, supra, and Austin, supra, meant that,  as a categorical matter, forfeitures under Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A) and  Section(s) 881(a)(6) always constitute "punishment." We granted the  Government's petition for certiorari in each of the two cases, and we  now reverse.  516 U. S. ___ (1996).

II.

7
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be  subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or  limb."  U. S. Const., Amdt. 5.  The Clause serves the function of  preventing both "successive punishments and . . . successive  prosecutions."  United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696 (1993),  citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969).  The protection  against multiple punishments prohibits the Government from "`punishing  twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same  offense.'"  Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op.,  at 6) (emphasis omitted), quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938).


8
In the decisions that we review, the Courts of Appeals held that  the civil forfeitures constituted "punishment," making them subject to  the prohibitions of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Government  challenges that characterization of the forfeitures, arguing that the  courts were wrong to conclude that civil forfeitures are punitive for  double jeopardy purposes.1

A.

9
Since the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has authorized  the Government to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and  criminal prosecutions based upon the same underlying events.  See, e.g.,  Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, Section(s) 12, 1 Stat. 39 (goods unloaded  at night or without a permit subject to forfeiture and persons unloading  subject to criminal prosecution); Section(s) 25, id., at 43 (persons convicted of buying or concealing illegally imported goods subject to  both monetary fine and in rem forfeiture of the goods); Section(s) 34,  id., at 46 (imposing criminal penalty and in rem forfeiture where person  convicted of relanding goods entitled to drawback); see also The  Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14-15  (1827) ("Many cases exist, where there is  both a forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty"); cf. Calero-Toledo v.  Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 683 (1974) (discussing  adoption of forfeiture statutes by early Congresses).  And, in a long  line of cases, this Court has considered the application of the Double  Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures, consistently concluding that the Clause does not apply to such actions because they do not impose punishment.


10
One of the first cases to consider the relationship between the  Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture was Various Items of  Personal Property v. United States, 282 U. S. 577 (1931).  In Various  Items, the Waterloo Distilling Corporation had been ordered to forfeit a  distillery, warehouse, and denaturing plant, on the ground that the  corporation had conducted its distilling business in violation of  federal law.   The Government conceded that the corporation had been  convicted  of criminal violations prior to the initiation of the  forfeiture proceeding, and admitted that the criminal conviction had  been based upon "the transactions set forth . . . as a basis for the   forfeiture." Id., at 579.  Considering the corporation's argument that  the forfeiture action violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, this Court unanimously held that the Clause was inapplicable to civil forfeiture  actions:


11
"[This] forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem.  It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction,  held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of  inanimate and insentient.  In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer  in person who is proceeded against, convicted, and punished.  The  forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.  The  provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect of  double jeopardy does not apply."  Id., at 581 (citations omitted;  emphasis added).


12
In reaching its conclusion, the Court drew a sharp distinction  between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil penalties such as  fines: Though the latter could, in some circumstances, be punitive, the  former could not.  Ibid. Referring to a case that was decided the same  day as Various Items, the Court made its point absolutely clear:


13
"In United States v. La Franca, [282 U. S.] 568, we hold      that,  under Section(s) 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act, a civil      action to recover  taxes, which in fact are penalties, is      punitive in character and barred  by a prior conviction of      the defendant for a criminal offense involving  the same      transactions.  This, however, is not that case, but a      proceeding in rem to forfeit property used in committing an      offense."  Id., at 580.


14
Had the Court in Various Items found that a civil forfeiture could constitute a "punishment" under the Fifth Amendment, its holding  would have been quite remarkable.  As that Court recognized, "[a]t  common law, in many cases, the right of forfeiture did not attach until  the offending person had been convicted and the record of conviction  produced."  Ibid.  In other words, at common law, not only was it the  case that a criminal conviction did not bar a civil forfeiture, but, in  fact, the civil forfeiture could not be instituted unless a criminal conviction had already been obtained.  Though this Court had held that  common-law rule inapplicable where the right of forfeiture was "created  by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the exchequer,"  The Palmyra, supra, at 14, it never had suggested that the Constitution  prohibited for statutory civil forfeiture what was required for  common-law civil forfeiture. For the Various Items Court to have held  that the forfeiture was prohibited by the prior criminal proceeding  would have been directly contrary to the common-law rule, and would have  called into question the constitutionality of forfeiture statutes thought constitutional for over a century.   See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 327-328 (1936) (Evidence of  a longstanding legislative practice  "goes a long way in the direction of  proving the presence of unassailable grounds for the constitutionality  of the practice").


15
Following its decision in Various Items, the Court did not consider another double jeopardy case involving a civil forfeiture for  40 years. Then, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.  S. 232 (1972) (per curiam), the Court's brief opinion reaffirmed the  rule of Various Items.  In Emerald Cut Stones, after having been  acquitted of smuggling jewels into the United States, the owner of the  jewels intervened in a proceeding to forfeit them as contraband.  We  rejected the owner's double jeopardy challenge to the forfeiture,  holding that "[i]f for no other reason the forfeiture is not barred by  the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments."  409 U. S.,  at 235. Noting that the forfeiture provisions had been codified  separately from parallel criminal provisions, the Court determined that  the forfeiture clearly was "a civil sanction." Id., at 236.  The  forfeitures were not criminal punishments because they did not impose a  second in personam penalty for the criminal defendant's wrongdoing.


16
In our most recent decision considering whether a civil forfeiture constitutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, we  again affirmed the rule of Various Items.  In United States v. One  Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984), the owner of the  defendant weapons was acquitted of charges of dealing firearms without a  license.  The Government then brought a forfeiture action against the  firearms under 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 924(d), alleging that they were  used or were intended to be used in violation of federal law.


17
In another unanimous decision, we held that the forfeiture was  not barred by the prior criminal proceeding.  We began our analysis by  stating the rule for our decision:


18
"Unless the forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment,      so  that the proceeding is essentially criminal in character,      the Double  Jeopardy Clause is not applicable.  The question,      then, is whether a  Section(s) 924(d) forfeiture proceeding      is intended to be, or by its  nature necessarily is, criminal      and punitive, or civil and remedial."  89 Firearms, supra, at      362 (citations omitted).


19
Our inquiry proceeded in two stages.  In the first stage, we looked to Congress' intent, and concluded that "Congress designed forfeiture under Section(s) 924(d) as a remedial civil sanction." 465  U. S., at 363.  This conclusion was based upon several findings.  First,  noting that the forfeiture proceeding was in rem, we found it  significant that "actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil  proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon the seizure of a physical  object."  89 Firearms, id., at 363, citing, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson  Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S., at 684.  Second, we found that the forfeiture provision, because it reached both weapons used in violation  of federal law and those "intended to be used" in such a manner, reached  a broader range of conduct than its criminal analogue.  Third, we  concluded that the civil forfeiture "further[ed] broad remedial aims,"  including both "discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms," and  "removing from circulation firearms that have been used or intended for  use outside regulated channels of commerce."  89 Firearms, supra, at  364.


20
In the second stage of our analysis, we looked to "`whether the  statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to  negate' Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism,"  465 U. S., at 365, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249   (1980).  Considering several factors that we had used previously in  order to determine whether a civil proceeding was so punitive as to  require application of the full panoply of constitutional protections  required in a criminal trial, see id., at 248, we found only one of  those factors to be present in the Section(s) 924(d) forfeiture.  By  itself, however, the fact that the behavior proscribed by the forfeiture  was already a crime proved insufficient to turn the forfeiture into a punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Hence, we found that  the petitioner had "failed to establish by the `clearest proof' that  Congress has provided a sanction so punitive as to `transfor[m] what was  clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'"  89  Firearms, supra, at 366, quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350  U. S. 148, 154 (1956).  We concluded our decision by restating that  civil forfeiture is "not an additional penalty for the commission of a  criminal act, but rather is a separate civil sanction, remedial in  nature."  89 Firearms, supra, at 366.

B

21
Our cases reviewing civil forfeitures under the Double Jeopardy  Clause adhere to a remarkably consistent theme.  Though the two-part  analytical construct employed in 89 Firearms was more refined, perhaps,  than that we had used over 50 years earlier in Various Items, the  conclusion was the same in each case: in rem civil forfeiture is a  remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam  civil penalties such as fines, and does not constitute a punishment  under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 392 (1958) ("In applying a provision like that of double jeopardy,  which is rooted in history and is not an evolving concept . . . a long  course of adjudication in this Court carries impressive authority").


22
In the case that we currently review, the Court of Appeals for  the Ninth Circuit recognized as much, concluding that after 89 Firearms,  "the law was clear that civil forfeitures did not constitute  `punishment' for double jeopardy purposes."  33 F. 3d, at 1218.  Nevertheless, that court read three of our decisions to have "abandoned"  89 Firearms and the oft-affirmed rule of Various Items.  According to  the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, through our decisions in  United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), Austin v. United States,  509 U. S. 602 (1993), and Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,  511 U. S. ___ (1994), we "changed [our] collective mind," and "adopted a  new test for determining whether a nominally civil sanction constitutes  `punishment' for double jeopardy purposes."  33 F. 3d, at 1218-1219. The  Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit shared the view of the Ninth  Circuit, though it did not  directly rely upon Kurth Ranch.  We turn now  to consider whether Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch accomplished the  radical jurisprudential shift perceived by the Courts of Appeals.


23
In Halper, we considered "whether and under what circumstances a  civil penalty may constitute `punishment' for the purposes of double  jeopardy analysis."  Halper, supra, at 436. Based upon his submission  of 65 inflated Medicare claims,  each of which overcharged the Government  by $9, Halper was criminally convicted of 65 counts of violating the  falseclaims statute, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 287 (1982 ed.), as well as  of 16 counts of mail fraud, and was sentenced to two years in prison and  fined $5,000. Following that criminal conviction, the Government successfully brought a civil action against Halper under 31 U. S. C.  Section(s) 3729 (1982 ed. and Supp. II).  The  District Court hearing the  civil action determined that Halper was liable to the Government for  over $130,000 under Section(s)  3729, which then provided for liability  in the amount of $2,000  per violation, double the Government's actual  damages, and court costs.  The court concluded that imposing the full  civil penalty would constitute a second punishment for Halper's  already-punished criminal offense, however, and therefore reduced  Halper's liability to double the actual damages suffered by the Government and the costs of the civil action.  The Government directly  appealed that decision to this Court.


24
This Court agreed with the District Court's analysis.  We determined that our precedent had established no absolute and irrebuttable rule that a civil fine cannot be "punishment" under the  Double Jeopardy Clause.  Though it was well established that "a civil  remedy does not rise to the level of `punishment' merely because  Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the Government's  actual damages," we found that our case law did "not foreclose the  possibility that in a particular case a civil penalty . . . may be so  extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to  constitute punishment." 490 U. S., at 442.  Emphasizing the  case-specific nature of our inquiry, id., at 448, we compared the size  of the fine imposed on Halper, $130,000, to the damages actually  suffered by the Government as a result of Halper's actions, estimated by  the District Court at $585.  Noting that the fine was more than 220 times greater than the Government's damages, we agreed with the District  Court that "Halper's $130,000 liability is sufficiently disproportionate  that the sanction constitutes a second punishment in violation of double  jeopardy."  Id., at 452.  We remanded to the District Court so that it  could hear evidence regarding the Government's actual damages, and could  then reduce Halper's liability to a nonpunitive level.  Ibid.


25
In Austin, we considered whether a civil forfeiture could violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . . . ."  U. S. Const., Amdt. 8.  Aware that Austin had sold two grams of cocaine the previous day, police  searched his mobile home and body shop. Their search revealed small  amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a handgun, drug paraphernalia, and  almost $5,000 in cash.  Austin was charged with one count of possessing  cocaine with intent to distribute, to which he pleaded guilty.  The  Government then initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding against Austin's  mobile home and auto shop, contending that they had been "used" or were "intended for use" in the commission of a drug offense.  See 21 U. S. C.  Section(s) 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).  Austin contested the forfeiture on the  ground of the Excessive Fines Clause, but the District Court and the  Court of Appeals held the forfeiture constitutional.


26
We limited our review to the question "whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures of property  under 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)." Austin, supra, at  604.  We began our analysis by rejecting the argument that the Excessive  Fines Clause was limited solely to criminal proceedings: The relevant  question was not whether a particular proceeding was criminal or civil,  we determined, but rather was whether forfeiture under Section(s) 881   (a)(4) and (a)(7) constituted "punishment" for the purposes of the  Eighth Amendment. Austin, supra, at 610.  In an effort to answer that question, we briefly reviewed the history of civil forfeiture both in  this country and in England, see id., at 611-618, taking a categorical  approach that contrasted sharply with Halper's case-specific approach to  determining whether a civil penalty constitutes punishment.  Ultimately,  we concluded that "forfeiture under [Section(s) 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)]  constitutes `payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,'  and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."  Id., at 622.


27
In Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. ___   (1994), we considered whether a state tax imposed on marijuana was  invalid under the Double Jeopardy Clause when the taxpayer had already  been criminally convicted of owning the marijuana which was taxed.  We  first established that the fact that Montana had labeled the civil  sanction a "tax" did not end our analysis.  We then turned to consider  whether the tax was so punitive as to constitute a punishment subject to  the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Several differences between the marijuana  tax imposed by Montana and the typical revenue-raising tax were readily  apparent.  The Montana tax was unique in that it was conditioned on the  commission of a crime and was imposed only after the taxpayer had been  arrested: thus, only a person charged with a criminal offense was  subject to the tax.  We also noted that the taxpayer did not own or  possess the taxed marijuana at the time that the tax was imposed.  From  these differences, we determined that the tax was motivated by a "`penal  and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.'" Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16).  Concluding that the Montana tax proceeding "was  the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution," we  affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment barring the tax.  Id., at ___   (slip op., at 17).


28
We think that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the  Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit misread Halper, Austin, and Kurth  Ranch.  None of those decisions purported to overrule the  well-established teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89  Firearms.  Halper involved not a civil forfeiture, but a civil penalty.  That its rule was limited to the latter context is clear from the  decision itself, from the historical distinction that we have drawn  between civil forfeiture and civil penalties, and from the practical  difficulty of applying Halper to a civil forfeiture.


29
In Halper, we emphasized that our decision was limited to the context of civil penalties:


30
"What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case      such  as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision      subjects a  prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction      overwhelmingly  disproportionate to the damages he has      caused.  The rule is one of  reason: Where a defendant      previously has sustained a criminal penalty  and the civil      penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no      rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government      for its  loss, but rather appears to qualify as `punishment'      in the plain meaning  of the word, then the defendant is      entitled to an accounting of the  Government's damages and      costs to determine if the penalty sought in  fact constitutes      a second punishment."  490 U. S., at 449-450 (emphasis      added).


31
The narrow focus of Halper followed from the distinction that we  have drawn historically between civil forfeiture and civil penalties.  Since at least Various Items, we have distinguished civil penalties such  as fines from civil forfeiture proceedings that are in rem.  While a  "civil action to recover . . . penalties, is punitive in character," and  much  like a criminal prosecution in that "it is the wrongdoer in person  who is proceeded against . . . and punished," in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, "it is the property which is proceeded against, and by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned."  Various Items,  282 U. S., at 580-581.  Thus, though for Double Jeopardy purposes we  have never balanced the value of property forfeited in a particular case  against the harm suffered by the Government in that case, we have  balanced the size of a particular civil penalty against the Government's   harm.  See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 154   (1956) (fines not "so unreasonable or excessive" as to transform a civil  remedy into a criminal penalty); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,  317 U. S. 537 (1943) (fine of $315,000 not so disproportionate to Government's harm of $101,500 as to transform the fine into punishment).  Indeed, the rule set forth  in Halper developed from the teaching of Rex  Trailer and Hess.   See Halper, supra, at 445-447.


32
It is difficult to see how the rule of Halper could be applied  to a civil forfeiture.  Civil penalties are designed as a rough form of  "liquidated damages" for the harms suffered by the Government as a  result of a defendant's conduct.  See Rex Trailer, supra, at 153-154.  The civil penalty involved in Halper, for example, provided for a fixed  monetary penalty for each false claim count on which the defendant was  convicted in the criminal proceeding.  Whether a "fixed-penalty  provision" that seeks to compensate the Government for harm it has  suffered is "so extreme" and "so divorced" from the penalty's  nonpunitive purpose of compensating the Government as to be a punishment  may be determined by balancing the Government's harm against the size of  the penalty. Civil forfeitures, in contrast to civil penalties, are  designed to do more than simply compensate the Government.  Forfeitures  serve a variety of purposes, but are designed primarily to confiscate  property used in violation of the law, and to require disgorgement of  the fruits of illegal conduct.  Though it may be possible to quantify  the value of the property forfeited, it is virtually impossible to  quantify, even approximately, the nonpunitive purposes served by a  particular civil forfeiture.  Hence, it is practically difficult to determine whether a particular forfeiture bears no rational relationship  to the nonpunitive purposes of that forfeiture. Quite simply, the  case-by-case balancing test set forth in Halper, in which a court must  compare the harm suffered by the Government against the size of the  penalty imposed, is inapplicable to civil forfeiture.2


33
We recognized as much in Kurth Ranch.  In that case, the Court  expressly disclaimed reliance upon Halper, finding that its casespecific  approach was impossible to apply outside the context of a fixed  civil-penalty provision.  Reviewing the Montana marijuana tax, we held  that because "tax statutes serve  a purpose quite different from civil  penalties, . . . Halper's method of determining whether the exaction was  remedial or punitive simply does not work in the case of a tax statute." Kurth Ranch, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 17) (internal quotation marks  omitted); see also id., at ___ (slip op., at 2-3) (Rehnquist, C. J.,  dissenting) (Halper inapplicable outside of "`fixed-penalty  provision[s]'" that are meant "to recover the costs incurred by the  Government for bringing someone to book for some violation of law").  This is not to say that there is no occasion for analysis of the  Government's harm.  89 Firearms makes clear the relevance of an  evaluation of the harms alleged. The point is simply that Halper's  case-specific approach is inapplicable to civil forfeitures.


34
In the cases that we review, the Courts of Appeals did not find  Halper difficult to apply to civil forfeiture because they concluded  that its case-by-case balancing approach had been supplanted in Austin  by a categorical approach that found a civil sanction to be punitive if  it could not "fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose."  See  Austin, 509 U. S., at  610; see also Halper, supra, at 448.  But Austin,  it must be remembered, did not involve the Double Jeopardy Clause at  all.  Austin was decided solely under the Excessive Fines Clause of the  Eighth Amendment, a constitutional provision which we never have understood as parallel to, or even related to, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The only discussion of  the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in Austin appears in a footnote that acknowledges our decisions holding that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause  has been held not to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings . . . where  the forfeiture could properly be characterized as remedial."  Austin,  supra, at 608, n. 4.  And in Austin we expressly recognized and approved  our decisions in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S.  232 (1972), and United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.  S. 354 (1984).  See Austin, supra, at 608, n. 4.


35
We acknowledged in Austin that our categorical approach under the Excessive Fines Clause was wholly distinct from the case-by-case  approach of Halper, and we explained that the difference in approach was  based in a significant difference between the purposes of our analysis  under each constitutional provision.  See Austin, supra, at 622, n. 14.  It is unnecessary in a case under the Excessive Fines Clause to inquire  at a preliminary stage whether the civil sanction imposed in that particular case is totally inconsistent with any remedial goal. Because  the second stage of inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause asks  whether the particular sanction in question is so large as to be  "excessive," see Austin, 509 U. S., at 622-623 (declining to establish  criteria for excessiveness), a preliminary-stage inquiry that focused on  the disproportionality of a particular sanction would be duplicative of  the excessiveness analysis that would follow.  See id., at 622, n. 14 ("[I]t appears to make little practical difference whether the Excessive  Fines Clause applies to all forfeitures . . . or only to those that  cannot be characterized as purely remedial," because the Excessive Fines  Clause "prohibits only the imposition of `excessive' fines, and a fine  that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered `excessive' in  any event"). Forfeitures effected under 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to review for excessiveness under the  Eighth Amendment after Austin; this does not mean, however, that those forfeitures are so punitive as to constitute punishment for the purposes  of double jeopardy.  The holding of Austin was limited to the Excessive  Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and we decline to import the  analysis of Austin into  our double jeopardy jurisprudence.


36
In sum, nothing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin, purported to  replace our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not  constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel criminal  proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, and this Court  consistently has found civil forfeitures not to constitute punishment  under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  It would have been quite remarkable  for this Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having  even suggested that it was doing so.  Halper dealt with in personam  civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth Ranch with a tax  proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and Austin with civil  forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. None of those cases dealt  with the subject of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of  the Double Jeopardy Clause.

C.

37
We turn now to consider the forfeitures in these cases under the  teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms.  Because  it provides a useful analytical tool, we conduct our inquiry within the  framework of the two-part test used in 89 Firearms.  First, we ask  whether Congress intended proceedings under 21 U. S.  C. Section(s) 881,  and 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 981, to be criminal or civil.  Second, we  turn to consider whether the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to "persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately be  viewed as civil in nature," despite Congress' intent.  89 Firearms, 465  U. S., at 366.


38
There is little doubt that Congress intended these forfeitures  to be civil proceedings.  As was the case in 89 Firearms, "Congress'  intent in this regard is most clearly demonstrated by the procedural  mechanisms it established for enforcing forfeitures under the  statute[s]."  465 U. S., at 363. Both 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881 and 18  U. S. C. Section(s) 981, which is entitled "Civil forfeiture," provide  that the laws "relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture,  and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws . . . shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred" under Section(s) 881  and Section(s) 981.  See 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(d); 18 U. S. C.  Section(s) 981(d).  Because forfeiture proceedings under the customs  laws are in rem, see 19 U. S. C. Section(s) 1602 et seq., it is clear  that Congress intended that a forfeiture under Section(s) 881 or  Section(s) 981, like the forfeiture reviewed in 89 Firearms, would be a  proceeding in rem.  Congress specifically structured these forfeitures  to be impersonal by targeting the property itself.  "In contrast to the  in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in rem have  traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction  dependent upon seizure of a physical object."  89 Firearms, 465 U. S.,  at 363, citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 684.


39
Other procedural mechanisms governing forfeitures under Section(s) 981 and Section(s) 881 also indicate that Congress intended  such proceedings to be civil. Forfeitures under either statute are  governed by 19 U. S. C. Section(s) 1607, which provides that actual  notice of the impending forfeiture is unnecessary when the Government  cannot identify any party with an interest in the seized article, and by  Section(s) 1609, which provides that seized property is subject to  forfeiture through a summary administrative procedure if no party files  a claim to the property.  And 19 U. S. C. Section(s) 1615, which governs  the burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings under Section(s) 881 and Section(s) 981, provides that once the Government has shown probable  cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, then "the burden of  proof shall lie upon [the] claimant."  In sum, "[b]y creating such  distinctly civil procedures for forfeitures under [Section(s) 881 and  Section(s) 981], Congress  has `indicate[d] clearly that it intended a  civil, not a criminal sanction.'" 89 Firearms, supra, at 363, quoting  Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S., at 402.3


40
Moving to the second stage of our analysis, we find that there  is little evidence, much less the "`clearest proof'" that we require,  see 89 Firearms, supra, at 365, quoting Ward, 448 U. S., at 249,  suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  881(a)(6) and (a)(7), and 19 U. S. C. Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A), are so  punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress'  intent to the contrary.  The statutes involved in this case are, in most  significant respects, indistinguishable from those reviewed, and  held  not to be punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89  Firearms.


41
Most significant is that Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A), and Section(s)  881(a)(6) and (a)(7), while perhaps having certain punitive aspects,  serve important nonpunitive goals.  Title 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  881(a)(7), under which Ursery's property was forfeited, provides for the  forfeiture of "all real property . . . which is used or intended to be  used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission  of" a federal drug felony.  Requiring the forfeiture of property used to  commit federal narcotics violations encourages property owners to take care in managing their property and ensures that they will not permit  that property to be used for illegal purposes.  See Bennis v. Michigan,  516 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op., at 10) ("Forfeiture of property  prevents illegal uses . . . by imposing an economic penalty, thereby  rendering illegal behavior unprofitable"); 89 Firearms, supra, at 364   (forfeiture "discourages unregulated commerce in firearms");  Calero-Toledo, supra, at 687-688.  In many circumstances, the forfeiture  may abate a nuisance. See, e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F. 2d 870 (CA2 1990) (forfeiting apartment building used to sell  crack cocaine); see also Bennis, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10)  (affirming application of Michigan statute abating car as a nuisance;  forfeiture "prevent[s] further illicit use of" property); cf. 89  Firearms, supra, at 364 (forfeiture "remov[ed] from circulation firearms  that have been used or intended for use" illegally); Emerald Cut Stones,  409 U. S., at 237 (forfeiture "prevented forbidden merchandise from  circulating in the United States").


42
The forfeiture of the property claimed by Arlt and Wren took place pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A), and 21 U. S. C.  Section(s) 881(a)(6). Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides for the forfeiture  of "any property" involved in illegal money-laundering transactions.  Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ll . . . things of  value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange  for" illegal drugs; "all proceeds traceable to such an exchange"; and  "all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to  be used to facilitate" a federal drug felony.  The same remedial purposes served by Section(s) 881(a)(7) are served by Section(s) 881(a)(6) and Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A).  Only one point merits separate  discussion.  To the extent that Section(s) 881(a)(6) applies to  "proceeds" of illegal drug activity, it serves the additional  nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not profit from their  illegal acts.


43
Other considerations that we have found relevant to the question  whether a proceeding is criminal also tend to support a conclusion that  Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A) and Section(s) 881 (a)(6) and (a)(7) are civil  proceedings.  See Ward, supra, at 247-248, n. 7, 249 (listing relevant  factors and noting that they are neither exhaustive nor dispositive).  First, in light of our decisions in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones,  and 89 Firearms, and the long tradition of federal statutes providing  for a forfeiture proceeding following a criminal prosecution, it  is absolutely clear that in rem civil forfeiture has not historically been  regarded as punishment, as we have understood  that term under the Double  Jeopardy Clause.  Second, there is no requirement in the statutes that  we currently review that the Government demonstrate scienter in order to  establish that the property is subject to forfeiture; indeed, the  property may be subject to forfeiture even if no party files a claim to  it and the Government never shows any connection between the property and a particular person.  See 19 U. S. C. Section(s) 1609.  Though both  Section(s) 881(a) and Section(s) 981(a) contain an "innocent owner"  exception, we do not think that such a provision, without more  indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a  statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Third, though  both statutes may fairly  be said to serve the purpose of deterrence, we  long have held that this purpose may serve civil as well as criminal  goals.  See, e.g., 89 Firearms, supra, at 364; Calero-Toledo, supra, at   677-678.  We recently reaffirmed this conclusion in Bennis v. Michigan,  supra, at ___ (slip. op., at 10), where we held that "forfeiture . . . serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose." Finally, though both statutes are tied to criminal activity, as was the  case in 89 Firearms, this fact is  insufficient to render the statutes  punitive.  See 89 Firearms,  465 U. S., at 365-366. It is well settled  that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in  respect to the same act or omission," Helvering, 303 U. S., at 399.  By  itself, the fact that a forfeiture statute has some connection to a  criminal violation is far from the "clearest proof" necessary to  show  that a proceeding is criminal.


44
We hold that these in rem civil forfeitures are neither "punishment" nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in No.  95-345, and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in No.  95-346, are accordingly reversed.


45

It is so ordered.



46
Justice Kennedy, concurring.


47
I join the Court's opinion and add these further observations.


48
In Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 619-622 (1993), we described the civil in rem forfeiture provision of 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7) at issue here as punitive.  In Libretti  v. United  States, 516 U. S. ___ (1995), we reviewed 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 853,  which in almost identical terms provides for criminal forfeiture of  property involved in or derived from drug crimes.  We held that the  "fundamental nature of criminal forfeiture" is punishment.  516 U. S.,  at ___ (slip op. at 11). Today the Court holds that the civil in rem  forfeitures here are not punishment implicating the protections of the  Double Jeopardy Clause. Ante, at 24-25.  I write to explain why, in my   view, our holding is consistent with both Austin and Libretti.


49
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.  S. Const., Amdt. 5.  We have interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to  "protec[t] against a second prosecution for the same offense after  acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after  conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense."  Justices of  Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294, 306-307   (1984); Jones v. Thomas, 491 U. S. 376, 380-381 (1989).


50
Although there is language in our cases to the contrary, see One  1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 700 (1965); Boyd v.  United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886), civil in rem forfeiture is not  punishment of the wrongdoer for his criminal offense.  We made this  clear in Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U. S.  577 (1931), which the Court is right to deem the seminal case in this  area, ante, at 5.


51
"[This] forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem.  It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction,  held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of  inanimate and insentient.  In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer  in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished.  The  forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.  The  provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect of  double jeopardy does not apply." 282 U. S., at 581 (citations omitted).


52
Embracing the rule of Various Items, that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to in personam punishments of the wrongdoer and not  in rem forfeitures, does not imply that forfeiture inflicts no  punishment. Though I have expressed my doubts about the view expressed  in Austin, 509 U. S., at 611-618, that throughout history forfeitures  have been intended to punish blameworthy owners, id., at 629 (opinion  concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Bennis v. Michigan, 516  U. S.  ___, ___ (1996) (dissenting opinion) (slip op. at 1-2), I did not  there question the punitive nature of Section(s) 881(a)(7), nor do I now.  Under this statute, providing for the forfeiture of real property  used to facilitate a drug offense, only the culpable stand to lose their  property; no interest of any owner  is forfeited if he can show he did  not know of or consent to the crime.  Ibid.


53
The key distinction is that the instrumentality-forfeiture statutes are not directed at those who carry out the crimes, but at  owners who are culpable for the criminal misuse of the property.  See  Austin, supra, at 619 (statutory "exemptions serve to focus the  provisions on the culpability of the owner").  The theory is that the  property, whether or not illegal or dangerous in nature, is hazardous in  the hands of this owner because either he uses it to commit crimes, or  allows others do  so.  The owner can be held accountable for the misuse  of the property.  Cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, supra, at 699 ("There is  nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.  It is only  the alleged use to which this particular automobile was  put that subjects [the owner] to its possible loss.")  The same  rationale is at  work in the statutory provisions enabling forfeiture of currency "used  or intended to be used" to facilitate a criminal offense, Section(s)  881(a)(6).  See also 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A) (property  involved in money-laundering transactions or attempts in violation of 18  U. S. C.  Section(s) 1956).  Since the punishment befalls any  propertyholder who cannot claim statutory innocence, whether or not he  committed any criminal acts, it is not a punishment for a person's  criminal wrongdoing.


54
Forfeiture, then, punishes an owner by taking property involved  in a crime, and it may happen that the owner is also the wrongdoer  charged with a criminal offense.  But the forfeiture is not a second in  personam punishment for the offense, which is all the Double Jeopardy  Clause prohibits.  See ante, at 8 ("The forfeitures were not criminal  punishments because they did not impose a second in personam penalty for  the criminal defendant's wrongdoing."); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.  United States, 409 U. S. 232, 235 (1972) (per curiam) ("the forfeiture  is not barred by the Double Jeop-ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment  because it involves neither two criminal trials  nor two criminalpunishments").


55
Civil in rem forfeiture has long been understood as independent  of criminal punishments.  In The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1 (1827), we  rejected a claim that a libel in rem required a conviction for the  criminal offense charged in the libel. Distinguishing forfeitures of a  felon's goods and chattels, which required proof of a conviction, we  noted that the statutory in rem "offence is attached primarily to the  thing," and that often in rem forfeiture was imposed in the absence of  any in personam penalty.  Id., at 14.  Examining American and English  statutes, we concluded, "the practice has been, and so this Court understand[s] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in  personam."  Id., at 15.


56
Distinguishing between in rem and in personam punishments does  not depend upon, or revive, the fiction alive in Various Items, supra,  at 581, but condemned in Austin, supra, at 615, n. 9, that the property  is punished as if it were a sentient being capable of moral choice.  It  is the owner who feels the pain and receives the stigma of the  forfeiture, not the property.  See United States v. United States Coin &  Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 718 (1971).  The distinction simply recognizes  that Congress, in order to quiet title to forfeitable property in one  proceeding, has structured the forfeiture action as a proceeding against  the property, not against a particular defendant.  Indeed, the Government will often file a forfeiture complaint without any knowledge  of who the owner is.  See ante, at 24.  True, the forfeiture statutes  require proof of a violation of a drug trafficking or other offense, but  the purpose of this predicate showing is just to establish that the  property was used in a crime.  In contrast to criminal forfeiture, see  21 U. S. C. Section(s) 853(a), civil in rem forfeiture actions do not  require a showing that the owner who stands to lose his property  interest has committed a criminal offense.  See 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(6) ("any violation of this subchapter"); Section(s) 881(a)(7) ("a  violation of this subchapter"); 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 981(a)(1)(A) ("a  transaction or attempted transaction in violation of" 18 U. S. C.  Section(s) 1956).  The  offenses committed by Ursery, Arlt, and Wren were  proffered as evidence that the property was used in a crime, but this  does not make forfeiture a punishment for those offenses.  See United  States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 366 (1984)  (civil forfeiture is "not an additional penalty for the commission of a criminal act").


57
For this reason, Justice Stevens' attempt, post, at 22-23, to rely on the same-elements test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.  S. 299, 304 (1932), is unavailing.  Blockburger is a misfit in this  context; it compares the elements of two offenses charged against a  defendant.  The forfeiture cause of action is not charging a second  offense of the person; it is a proceeding against the property in which  proof of a criminal violation by any person will suffice, provided that  some knowledge of or consent to the crime on the part of the property  owner is also established.


58
In Part II-C of its opinion, the Court conducts the two-part inquiry established in 89 Firearms, supra, at 362-366, as to whether,  first, Congress intended the proceedings to be civil, and, second, the  forfeitures are so punitive as to be criminal in nature and therefore  subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ante, at 20.  The test was  imported by the 89 Firearms Court from cases involving civil in personam  penalties.  See 465 U. S., at 362 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.  S. 391, 398-399 (1938), and United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248   (1980)). In the context of this case and the precedents bearing upon  it, I am not sure the test adds much to the clear rule of Various Items  that civil in rem forfeiture of property involved in a crime is not  punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. As to the first prong  of the test, any in rem proceeding is civil.  As to the second prong, so  long as forfeiture hinges on the property's use in a crime, there will  always be the remedial purpose the Court identifies of preventing  property owners from allowing their goods to be used for illegal  purposes, ante, at 22.  I acknowledge 89 Firearms to be precedent,  however, and, because the Court's application of the test is consistent  with Various Items, I join its opinion in full.


59
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.


60
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishment.  See Department of Revenue of  Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 1-4, 8)  (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Civil forfeiture proceedings of the sort at  issue here are not criminal prosecutions, even under the standard of  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 164 (1963), and United  States v. Ward,  448 U. S. 242, 248-251 (1980).


61
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.


62
The question the Court poses is whether civil forfeitures constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Because the numerous federal statutes authorizing forfeitures cover such  a wide variety of situations, it is quite wrong to assume that there is  only one answer to that question. For purposes of analysis it is useful  to identify three different categories of property that are subject to  seizure: proceeds, contraband, and property that has played a part in  the commission of a crime.  The facts of these two cases illustrate the  point.


63
In No. 95-346 the Government has forfeited $405,089.23 in currency. Those funds are the proceeds of unlawful activity.  They are  not property that respondents have any right to retain.  The forfeiture  of such proceeds, like the confiscation of money stolen from a bank,  does not punish respondents because it exacts no price in liberty or  lawfully derived property from them.  I agree that the forfeiture of  such proceeds is not punitive and therefore I concur in the Court's  disposition of No. 95-346.


64
None of the property seized in No. 95-345 constituted proceeds  of illegal activity.  Indeed, the facts of that case reveal a  dramatically different situation.  Respondent Ursery cultivated  marijuana in a heavily wooded area not far from his home in Shiawassee  County, Michigan.  The illegal substance was consumed by members of his  family, but there is no evidence, and no contention by the Government,  that he sold any of it to third parties.  Acting on the basis of the  incorrect assumption that the marijuana plants were on respondent's  property, Michigan police officers executed a warrant to search the  premises.  In his house they found marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a growlight.  I presume those items were seized, and I have no difficulty  concluding that such a seizure does not constitute punishment because  respondent had no right to possess contraband. Accordingly, I agree  with the Court's opinion insofar as it explains why the forfeiture of  contraband does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes.


65
The critical question presented in No. 95-345 arose, not out of  the seizure of contraband by the Michigan police, but rather out of the  decision by the United States Attorney to take respondent's home.  There  is no evidence that the house had been purchased with the proceeds of  unlawful activity and the house itself was surely not contraband.  Nonetheless, 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7) authorized the Government  to seek forfeiture of respondent's residence because it had been used to  facilitate the manufacture and distribution of marijuana.4 Respondent  was then himself prosecuted for and convicted of manufacturing marijuana.  In my opinion none of the reasons supporting the forfeiture  of proceeds or contraband provides a sufficient basis for concluding  that the confiscation of respondent's home was not punitive.


66
The Government has advanced four arguments in support of its position that the forfeiture of respondent's home under Section(s) 881(a)(7) followed by his prosecution under Section(s) 841(a)(1) did not  violate the Double Jeopardy Clause: (1) the forfeiture was not punitive;  (2) even if punitive, it was not a "jeopardy"; (3) even if both the  forfeiture and the prosecution were jeopardies, they were not based on  the same offense under the rule of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.  S. 299 (1932); and (4) in all events, the two cases should be deemed to  constitute a single proceeding for double jeopardy purposes.  Because  the Court addresses only the first of these arguments, I shall begin by  explaining why both reason and precedent support the conclusion that the  taking of respondent's home was unmistakably punitive in character.  I  shall then comment on the other three arguments.

I.

67
In recent years, both Congress and the state legislatures have  armed their law enforcement authorities with new powers to forfeit  property that vastly exceed their traditional tools.5 In response,  this Court has reaf-firmed the fundamental proposition that all  forfeitures must be accomplished within the constraints set by the  Constitution.  See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993);  United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43 (1993).  This Term the Court has begun dismantling the protections it so recently  erected.  In Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. ___ (1996), the Court  held  that officials may confiscate an innocent person's automobile.  And  today, for the first time it upholds the forfeiture of a person's home.  On the way to its surprising conclusion that the owner is not punished  by the loss of his residence, the Court repeatedly professes its  adherence to tradition and time-honored practice. As I discuss below,  however, the decision shows a stunning disregard not only for modern  precedents but for our older ones as well.


68
In the Court's view, the seminal case is Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U. S. 577 (1931), which approved  the forfeiture of an illegal distillery by resort to the "legal fiction"  that the distillery rather than its owner was being punished "as though  it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient."  Id., at 581.  Starting from that fanciful premise, the Court was able to conclude that  confiscating the property after the owner was prosecuted for the  underlying violations of the revenue laws did not offend the Double  Jeopardy Clause.


69
According to the Court, Various Items established a categorical  rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause was "inapplicable to civil  forfeiture actions."  Ante, at 6.  The Court asserts that this rule has  received "remarkably consistent" application and was "reaffirmed" by a  pair of cases  in 1972 and 1984.  Ante, at 10, 7.  In reality, however,  shortly after its announcement, Various Items simply disappeared from  our jurisprudence.  We cited that case in only two decisions over the next seven years, and never again in nearly six decades.  Neither of the  two cases that supposedly "affirmed" Various Items-One Lot Emerald Cut  Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232 (1972) (per curiam), and United  States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984)-even  mentioned it.


70
More important, neither of those cases endorsed the asserted categorical rule that civil forfeitures never give rise to double jeopardy rights.  Instead, each carefully considered the nature of the  particular forfeiture at issue, classifying it as either "punitive" or  "remedial," before deciding whether it implicated double jeopardy.  Emerald Cut Stones concerned a customs statute that authorized  confiscation of certain merchandise, in that case jewelry, that had been  smuggled into the United States.  The Court explained that the purpose  of the statute was to remove such items from circulation, and that the  penalty amounted to a reasonable liquidated damages award to reimburse  the Government for the costs of enforcement and investigation.  In those respects, therefore, it constituted a "remedial rather  than punitive  sanctio[n]."  409 U. S., at 237.  In 89 Firearms,  the Court explored in  even greater detail the character of a federal statute that forfeited  unregistered firearms.  It reasoned that the sanction "further[ed] broad  remedial aims" in  preventing commerce in such weapons, and also covered  a broader  range of conduct than simply criminal behavior.  465 U. S., at  364.  For those reasons, it was not properly characterized as a punitive sanction.


71
The majority, surprisingly, claims that Austin v. United States,  509 U. S. 602 (1993), "expressly recognized and approved" those  decisions. Ante, at 18.  But the Court creates the appearance that we  endorsed its interpretation of 89 Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones by  quoting selectively from Austin.  We actually stated the following:


72
"The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held not to apply in civil  forfeiture proceedings, but only in cases where the forfeiture could  properly be characterized as remedial.  See United States v. One  Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 364 (1984); One Lot Emerald  Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232, 237 (1972); see generally  United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 446-449 (1989) (Double Jeopardy  Clause prohibits second sanction that may not be fairly characterized as  remedial)."  509 U. S., at 608, n. 4 (emphasis added).


73
In reality, both cases rejected the monolithic view that all in  rem civil forfeitures should be treated the same, and recognized the  possibility that other types of forfeitures that could not "properly be  characterized as remedial" might constitute "an additional penalty for  the commission of a criminal act."  465 U. S., at 366.


74
That possibility was not merely speculative.  The Court had already decided that other constitutional protections applied to forfeitures that had a punitive element.  In Boyd v. United States, 116  U. S. 616 (1886), the Court held that compulsory production of an  individual's private papers for use in a proceeding to forfeit his  property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws violated both the  Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause.  As the Court stated, "proceedings instituted for the purpose of  declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences  committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal" and thus give rise to these constitutional safeguards. Id.,  at 634.


75
We reaffirmed Boyd twice during the span of time between our decisions in Various Items and 89 Firearms.  In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan  v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693 (1965), the Court unanimously repeated  Boyd's conclusion that "a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in  character" and "[i]ts object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize  for the commission of an offense against the law."  The Court therefore  held that the Fourth Amendment applied to a proceeding to forfeit an  automobile used to transport illegally manufactured liquor.  Id., at  700.


76
Even more significant is United States v. United States Coin &  Currency, 401 U. S. 715 (1971), in which the Court again held that the  Fifth Amendment applied to forfeiture proceedings.  Coin & Currency  involved the confiscation of gambling money under a statute, quite  similar to 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881, providing that "[i]t shall be  unlawful to have or possess any property intended for use in violating  the provisions of the internal revenue laws . . . and no property right  shall exist in any such property."  Id., at 716 (citing 26 U. S. C.  Section(s)  7302). The Court held that the Fifth Amendment barred the  Government's attempt to introduce evidence of the defendant's failure to  file required tax forms against him in the forfeiture proceeding. Following Boyd, the Court explained that the form of the proceeding as  civil or criminal could not have any bearing on the rights that attached  when the sanction was a penalty.  "From the relevant constitutional  standpoint, there is no difference between a man who `forfeits' $8,674  because he has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man  who pays a `criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of  conduct." 401 U. S., at 718.  In each case, the Court reasoned, the  liability derives from the same offense of the owner; hence, "the Fifth  Amendment applies with equal force."  Ibid.


77
Emerald Cut Stones expressly recognized the continuing validity  of Coin & Currency and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan.  It distinguished the  customs statute in that case because the forfeiture did not depend on  the fact of a criminal offense or conviction.  See 409 U. S., at 236, n.  6.  See also United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 254 (1980)  (discussing Boyd).  That recognition is critical.  For whatever its  connection to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the  Double Jeopardy Clause is part of the same Amendment as the Self-Incrimination Clause, and ought to be interpreted in pari materia.6 By confining its holding to civil forfeitures fairly characterized as remedial, and by distinguishing cases that had applied  the Fifth Amendment to other types of forfeitures, Emerald Cut Stones  and 89 Firearms recognized the possibility that the Double Jeopardy  Clause might apply to certain punitive civil forfeiture proceedings.  One of the mysteries of the Court's opinion is that although it claims  that civil in rem forfeiture cannot be understood as punishment, it  devotes Part II-C to examining the actual purposes of the forfeiture in  this  case and "proving" that they are not punitive.  If the Court truly  adhered to the logic of its position, that entire section  would be unnecessary.


78
Read properly, therefore, 89 Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones are  not inconsistent with, but set the stage for the modern understanding of  how the Double Jeopardy Clause applies in nominally civil proceedings.  That understanding has been developed in a trio of recent decisions:  United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), Austin v. United States,  509 U. S. 602 (1993), and Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,  511 U. S. ___ (1994).  The court of appeals found that the combined effect of two of those decisions-Halper and Austin-established the proposition that forfeitures under 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7)  implicated double jeopardy.  This Court rejects that conclusion,  asserting that none of these cases changed the "oft-affirmed rule" of  Various Items.  Ante, at 10.


79
It is the majority, however, that has "misread" Halper, Austin,  and Kurth Ranch by artificially cabining each to a separate sphere, see  ante, at 20, and treating the three as if they concerned unrelated  subjects.  In fact, all three were devoted to the common enterprise of  giving meaning to the idea of "punishment," a concept that plays a  central role in the jurisprudence of both the Excessive Fines Clause and  the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Halper laid down a general rule for  applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil proceedings:


80
"[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a  remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving  either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come  to understand the term. . . .  We therefore hold that under the Double  Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal  prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the  extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as  remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."  490 U. S., at  448-449.


81
In the past seven years, we have applied that same rule to three  types of sanctions: civil penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes.


82
The first was the subject of Halper itself.  The defendant had  been convicted for submitting 65 false claims for reimbursement (seeking  $12 for each, when the actual services rendered entitled him to only $3)  to a Medicare provider, and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and a  $5,000 fine.  The Government then brought a civil action against him for  the same offenses.  The penalty for violating the civil false-claims statute consisted of double the Government's damages plus court costs  and a fixed fine of $2,000 per false claim.  See id., at 438.  Accordingly, the Government sought a penalty of $130,000, although the  defendant's fraud had caused an actual loss of only $585.  Applying the  definition of "punishment" given above, the Court first held that the  fixed $2,000 fine served a remedial purpose because it was designed to  compensate the Government "roughly" for the costs of law enforcement and  investigation. Id., at 445.  Despite finding that the fine was not by  nature punitive, the Court went on to consider whether the sanction "as applied in the individual case," id., at 448, amounted to punishment. It  answered that question in the affirmative, for the applied sanction  created a "tremendous disparity" with the amount of harm the defendant  actually caused.  Id., at 452.  The Court explained that, as a rule, a  fixed penalty that would otherwise serve remedial ends could still  punish the defendant if the imposed amount was out of all proportion to  the damage done.7


83
The second category of sanctions-civil forfeitures-was the subject of Austin.  In that case, the Government sought to forfeit the  petitioner's mobile home and auto body shop as instrumentalities of the  drug trade under 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) because he  had sold cocaine there. Applying Halper's definition of punishment, see  509 U. S., at 610, 621, we held that Section(s) 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)  must be considered to qualify as such, partly because forfeitures have historically been understood as punishment and more importantly because  no remedial purpose underlay the sanction the statute created.  Merely  compensating the Government for its costs, as in Halper, could not  justify the forfeiture scheme because "[t]he value of the conveyances  and real property forfeitable under Section(s) 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)  . . . can vary so dramatically that any relationship between the  Government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is merely  coincidental."  509 U. S., at 622, n. 14.  Accordingly, we held that any  forfeiture was subject to the constraints of the Excessive Fines Clause  of the Eighth Amendment.


84
The Court expends a great deal of effort attempting to distinguish Austin away as purely an excessive fines case.  The Court  states, for example, that it is "difficult to see" how one would apply  the "rule of Halper" to a civil forfeiture such as was present in  Austin.  Ante, at 15.  But the Court conflates the two different rules  that Halper announced.  As discussed above, Austin expressly quoted  Halper and followed its general rule that a sanction should be  characterized as "punishment" if  it serves any punitive end.  See 509 U.  S., at 610, 621. It relegated to a footnote Halper's narrower rule-the  one for the "rare case," which requires an accounting of the  Government's damages and costs-because it had already decided that the  statute was of a punitive character.  509 U. S., at 622, n. 14.   That approach was perfectly appropriate.  There is no need to determine whether a statute that is punitive by design has a punitive effect when  applied in the individual case.  Halper is  entirely consistent with  Austin, because it determined first that the sanction there generally  did not have a punitive character before it considered whether some  applications might be punitive nonetheless.8


85
The majority implies that Austin's "categorical approach" is somehow suspect as an application of double jeopardy jurisprudence,  ante, at 18, but Kurth Ranch definitively refutes that suggestion.  The  sanction there was a tax imposed on marijuana and applied to a taxpayer  who had already been prosecuted for ownership of the drugs sought to be  taxed. Again applying Halper's definition of punishment, see 511 U. S.,  at ___ (slip op., at 9-10), we considered the nature of the tax, focusing on several unusual features that distinguished it from ordinary  revenue-raising provisions, and concluded that it was motivated by a  "penal and prohibitory intent."  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).9  On  that basis, we held that imposition of the tax after criminal  prosecution of the taxpayer violated double jeopardy.  The approach  taken was thus identical to that followed in Austin.  By considering and  rejecting each of the asserted "remedial" interests served by the  sanction, we reasoned that the tax had an "unmistakable punitive  character" that rendered it punishment in all of its applications.  511  U.  S., at ___ (slip op., at 16).


86
The claim that Halper's "case-by-case" method is "impossible to  apply" to forfeitures or taxes, ante, at 17, thus misses the point.  It  is true that since fixed penalties can serve only one remedial end   (compensation), it is easy to determine whether a particular fine is  punitive in application.  Forfeitures and taxes, generally speaking, may  have a number of remedial rationales.  But to decide if a sanction is  punitive, one need only examine each claimed remedial interest and  determine whether the sanction actually promotes it.  Many of our cases  have followed just such an approach, regardless of whether any nonpunitive purpose can be "quantif[ied]," ante, at 16.  See, e.g.,  Austin; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan.  The majority itself embarks on such an  inquiry in Part II-C of its opinion. Furthermore, even in the context  of forfeitures and taxes, nothing prevents a court from deciding that  although a sanction is designed to be remedial, its application in a  particular case is so extreme as to constitute punishment.  Austin, 509  U. S., at 608, n. 4.10


87
In reaching the conclusion that the civil forfeiture at issue yielded punishment, the Austin Court surveyed the history  of civil  forfeitures at some length.  That history is replete with expressions of  the idea that forfeitures constitute punishment.11 But it was not  necessary in Austin, strictly speaking, to decide that all in rem  forfeitures are punitive.  As Justice Scalia emphasized in his separate  opinion, it was only necessary to characterize the specific "in rem  forfeiture in this case." 509 U. S., at 626 (concurring in part and  concurring in judgment).  The punitive nature of Section(s) 881(a)(4)  and (a)(7) was accepted by every Member of the Austin  Court.  The majority offered several reasons for its holding.  The applicable provisions expressly provided an "innocent owner" defense, indicating  that culpability was a requirement for forfeiture. Further, the  provisions tied forfeiture directly to the commission of narcotics  offenses.  Id., at 620.  Finally, the legislative history indicated that  the provisions were necessary because traditional criminal sanctions  were "`inadequate to deter or punish.'" Ibid. (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 191 (1983)).  In sum, it was unanimously agreed that "[s]tatutory forfeitures under Section(s) 881(a) are certainly payment   (in kind), to a sovereign as punishment for an offense." 509 U. S., at  626-627 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)  (emphasis in original).12


88
Remarkably, the Court today stands Austin on its head-a decision  rendered only three years ago, with unanimity on the pertinent  points-and concludes that Section(s) 881(a)(7) is remedial rather than  punitive in character.  Every reason Austin gave for treating Section(s)  881(a)(7) as punitive-the Court rejects or ignores.  Every reason the  Court provides for treating Section(s) 881(a)(7) as remedial-Austin  rebuffed.  The  Court claims that its conclusion is consistent with  decisions reviewing statutes "indistinguishable" "in most significant  respects" from Section(s) 881(a)(7), ante, at 20, but ignores the fact  that Austin reached the opposite conclusion as to the identical statute  under review here.


89
First, the Court supposes that forfeiture of respondent's house  is remedial in nature because it was an instrumentality of a drug crime.  It is perfectly conceivable that certain kinds of instruments used in  the commission of crimes could be forfeited for remedial purposes. Items  whose principal use is illegal-for example, the distillery in Various  Items-might be thus forfeitable.  But it is difficult to understand how  a house in which marijuana was found helped to substantially  "facilitate" a narcotics offense, or how forfeiture of that house will meaningfully thwart the drug trade.  In Austin, we rejected the argument  that a mobile home and body shop were "instruments" of drug trafficking  simply because marijuana was sold out of them. I see no basis for a  distinction here.13


90
Second, the Court claims that the statute serves the purpose of  deterrence, which helps to show that it is remedial rather than punitive  in character.  Ante, at 24.  That statement cannot be squared with our  precedents.  Halper expressly held, and Austin and Kurth Ranch  reaffirmed, that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to  serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also  serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment" for  purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  490 U. S., at 448.  "`Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental  objectives.'"  Ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.  S. 520, 539, n. 20 (1979)).  To say otherwise is to renounce Halper's  central holding.  If deterrence is a legitimate remedial rationale "distinct from" any punitive purpose, ante, at 23, then the $130,000  fine in Halper could not be condemned as excessive because it plainly  served a powerful deterrent function.  It was a premise of the Court's  analysis in that case that deterrence could not justify a penal  sanction.  As in Bennis v. Michigan, where the Court first announced  this new view of deterrence, it simply ignores Halper without  explanation or comment.  See 516 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).


91
For good measure, the Court also rejects two considerations that  persuaded the majority in Austin to find 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  881(a)(7) a punitive statute.  The Court first asserts that the statute  contains no scienter requirement and property may be forfeited summarily  if no one files claim to it.  Ante, at 24 (citing 19 U. S. C. Section(s)  1609).  Property that is not claimed, however, is considered abandoned;  it proves nothing that the Government is able to forfeit property that  no  one owns. Any time the Government seeks to forfeit claimed property,  it must prove that the claimant is culpable, for the statute contains an  express "innocent owner" exception.  Today the Court finds the structure  of the statute irrelevant, but Austin said that the exemption for  innocent owners "makes [the statute] look more like punishment."  509 U.  S., at 619.  In United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.  S. 715 (1971), the Court found a forfeiture statute punitive on the  basis of discretionary authority granted to the Secretary of the  Treasury to remit property to innocent owners that was provided by a  different statute.


92
Finally, the Court announces that the fact that the statute is  "tied to criminal activity" is insufficient to render it punitive.  Ante, at 24.  Austin expressly relied on Congress' decision to "tie  forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offenses" as evidence that  it was intended to be punitive.  509 U. S., at 620.14


93
The recurrent theme of the Court's opinion is that there is some  mystical difference between in rem and in personam proceedings, such  that only the latter can give rise to double jeopardy concerns.  The  Court claims that "[s]ince at least Various Items," we have drawn this  distinction for purposes of applying relevant constitutional provisions.  Ante, at 14-15. That statement, however, is incorrect.  We have  repeatedly rejected the idea that the nature of the court's jurisdiction  has any bearing on the constitutional protections that apply at a proceeding before it.  "From the relevant constitutional standpoint,  there is no difference between a man who `forfeits' $8,674 because he  has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a  `criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct."  Coin & Currency, 401 U. S., at 718.  See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,  380 U. S., at 701, n. 11; Boyd, 116 U. S., at 638.15  Most recently,  in our application of Halper's definition of punishment, we stated that "[w]e do not understand the Government to rely separately on the technical distinction between proceedings in rem and proceedings in  personam, but we note that any such reliance would be misplaced."  Austin, 509 U. S., at 615, n. 9.16


94
The notion that the label attached to the proceeding is dispositive runs contrary to the trend of our recent cases.  In Halper  we stated that "the labels `criminal' and `civil' are not of paramount  importance" in determining whether a proceeding punishes an individual.  490 U. S., at 447.  In Kurth Ranch we held that the Double Jeopardy  Clause applies to punitive proceedings even if they are labeled a tax.  Indeed, in reaching that conclusion, we followed a 1931 decision that  noted that a tax statute might be considered punitive for double  jeopardy purposes.17  It is thus far too late in the day to contend  that the label placed on a punitive proceeding determines whether it is covered by the Double Jeopardy Clause.


95
The pedantic distinction between in rem and in personam actions  is ultimately only a cover for the real basis for the Court's decision:  the idea that the property, not the owner, is being "punished" for  offenses of which it is "guilty."  Although the Court prefers not to  rely on this notorious fiction too blatantly, its repeated citations to  Various Items make clear that the Court believes respondent's home was  "guilty" of the drug offenses with which he was charged.  See ante, at  15.  On that rationale, of course, the case is easy.  The owner of the property is not being punished when the Government confiscates it, just  the property.  The same sleight-of-hand would have worked in Austin,  too: The owner of the property is not being excessively fined, just the  property itself.  Despite the Government's heavy reliance on that  fiction in Austin, we did not allow it to stand in the way of our  holding that the seizure of property may punish the owner.18


96
Even if the point had not been settled by prior decisions, common sense would dictate the result in this case.  There is simply no  rational basis for characterizing the seizure of this respondent's home  as anything other than punishment for his crime.  The house was neither  proceeds nor contraband and its value had no relation to the  Government's authority to seize it. Under the controlling statute an  essential predicate for the forfeiture was proof that respondent had  used the property in connection with the commission of a crime.  The  forfeiture of this property was unquestionably "a penalty that had  absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the  cost of enforcing the law."  United States v. Ward, 448 U. S., at 254. As we unanimously recognized in Halper, formalistic distinctions that  obscure the obvious practical consequences of  governmental action  disserve the "`humane interests'" protected  by the Double Jeopardy  Clause.  490 U. S., at 447, quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v.  Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 554 (1943)  (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Fidelity  to both reason and precedent dictates the conclusion that this  forfeiture was "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy  Clause.19

II.

97
The Government also argues that the word "jeopardy" refers only  to a criminal proceeding, and that our cases precluding two punishments  for the same offense apply only to situations in which the first  punishment was imposed after conviction of a crime.  In this case the  civil forfeiture proceeding antedated the filing of the criminal charge.  Since the civil case was not a "jeopardy," the argument runs, the  criminal case was the first, rather than the second, jeopardy.  This  argument is foreclosed by our decisions in Halper and Kurth Ranch.


98
Although the point was not expressly mentioned in either case,  both holdings necessarily rested on the assumption that the civil  proceeding in which the second punishment was imposed  was a "jeopardy"  within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Otherwise there would have  been no basis for concluding that the defendants had been "twice put in  jeopardy" as the text of the Clause forbids.  The prohibition against  two such proceedings cannot depend on the order in which they are filed.  Cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("if there is a constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments, the order of punishment cannot possibly make any difference").

III.

99
The Government's third argument is that the civil forfeiture and  the criminal proceeding did not involve the same offense. The  Government relies principally on Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S.  299 (1932), in which we held that for double jeopardy purposes two  statutes define different offenses if "each provision requires proof of  a fact which the other does not."  Id., at 304.  The application of that  test would avoid any double jeopardy objection to a forfeiture followed  by a prosecution-or a prosecution followed by a forfeiture-whenever the seizure could be supported without proof that the defendant committed a  crime and the conviction did not require proof that the forfeited  property had been used illegally.


100
Thus, if instead of forfeiting Ursery's home the Government had  decided to forfeit his neighbor's property where the marijuana was  grown, the Blockburger rule would avoid any double jeopardy objection to  either the forfeiture or respondent's prosecution.  In that scenario,  the forfeiture could be supported without proof that Ursery violated the  law and Ursery  could be convicted without proof that he harvested the  marijuana on property owned by someone else.


101
The rule does, however, bar this conviction because the elements  that the Government was required to allege and prove to sustain the  forfeiture of Ursery's home under Section(s) 881(a)(7) included each of  the elements of the offense for which he was later convicted.  As in  Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U. S. 410 (1980), and Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.  S. 682 (1977) (per curiam), the fact that the "greater" offense (here,  the forfeiture) could have been proved by means of a different "lesser"  offense does not negate the fact that in this instance it was proved by  resort to the same elements as the criminal offense.  This conclusion  also accords with our oft-repeated understanding of the relationship  between a civil forfeiture and the underlying offense.  See, e.g., One  1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U. S., at 701 ("the forfeiture is clearly a  penalty for the criminal offense"); Boyd, 116 U. S., at 634 (describing  sanction as "proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences committed by him").  Accordingly, under the analysis we unanimously applied most recently in  Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S. ___ (1996), the criminal charge was  a lesser-included offense of the forfeiture and therefore constituted a  second jeopardy.


102
Justice Kennedy joins the Court's opinion and therefore ought to  agree with the majority that civil forfeitures do not constitute  punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In fact,  however, he recognizes that "[f]orfeiture . .  . punishes an owner by  taking property involved in a crime."  Ante, at 3.  His real objection  is that a forfeiture does not punish for the same offense as the  underlying criminal conviction.


103
Justice Kennedy theorizes that civil forfeiture punishes for the  misuse of property.  Ibid.  It might be true that some forfeiture  statutes are best described as creating a sanction for misuse, as  opposed to (but perhaps in addition to) a sanction for the substantive  criminal offense. But, again, this  statute is not structured that way.  Section 881(a)(7) incorporates the criminal offense itself as the  predicate for the forfeiture.  See 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7)  (subjecting to forfeiture "[a]ll real property . . . which is used . . .  to commit . . . a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than  one year's imprisonment"). Furthermore,  the innocent owner exemption in  the same subsection provides that "no property shall be forfeited under  this paragraph . . .  by reason of any act or omission established by  that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or  consent  of that owner." Ibid. (emphasis added).  In Austin, we held that  the exemption revealed a "congressional intent to punish only those  involved in drug trafficking" because "`the traditional criminal  sanctions . . . are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously  profitable trade in dangerous drugs.' "  509 U. S., at 619, 620 (quoting  S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 191 (1983)). See also 509 U. S., at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (suggesting that  proportionality of a forfeiture be measured by the relationship of the  property to the underlying offense).  Again, these statements accord  with common sense: forfeiting respondent's house punished him for the  same narcotics violations as his criminal conviction.

IV.

104
The final argument advanced by the Government is that the forfeiture and the criminal conviction should be treated as having occurred in the same proceeding because both were commenced before a  final judgment was entered in either.  Emphasizing the fact that the  Double Jeopardy Clause, and particularly the prohibition against  multiple punishments for the same offense, protects the defendant's  legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence, the  Government maintains that such an expectation could not arise until  after one proceeding was completed. Moreover, it argues, the civil and  criminal sanctions "cannot be (and never have been) joined together in a  single trial under our system of justice."  Brief  for United States 55.


105
This argument is unpersuasive because it is simply inaccurate to  describe two separate proceedings as one.20  I also cannot agree with  the Government's view that there is any procedural obstacle to including  a punitive forfeiture in the final judgment entered in a criminal case.  The sentencing proceeding does not commence until after the defendant  has been found guilty, and I do not see why that proceeding should not encompass all of the punitive sanctions that are warranted by the conviction.  Indeed, a draft of a proposed amendment to the Federal  Rules of Criminal Procedure envisions precisely that procedure.  See  Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(d)(2) (eff. Dec. 1, 1996).21  If, as we have  already determined, the "civil" forfeitures pursuant to Section(s)  881(a)(7) are in fact punitive, a single judgment encompassing the  entire punishment for the defendant's offense is precisely what the  Double Jeopardy Clause requires.  Congress' decision to create novel and additional penalties should not be permitted to eviscerate the protection against governmental overreaching embodied in the Double  Jeopardy Clause.  That protection has far deeper roots than the  relatively recent enactments that have so dramatically expanded the  sovereign's power to forfeit private property.


106
One final example may illustrate the depth of my concern that the Court's treatment of our cases has cut deeply into a guarantee deemed fundamental by the Founders.  The Court relies  heavily on a few  early decisions that involved the forfeiture of vessels whose entire  mission was unlawful and on the Prohibition-era precedent sustaining the  forfeiture of a distillery-a property that served no purpose other than  the manufacture of illegal spirits.  Notably none of those early cases  involved the forfeiture of a home as a form of punishment  for misconduct  that occurred therein.  Consider how drastic the  remedy would have been  if Congress in 1931 had authorized the forfeiture of every home in which  alcoholic beverages were consumed.  Under the Court's reasoning, I fear  that the label "civil," or perhaps "in rem," would have been sufficient  to avoid characterizing such forfeitures as "punitive" for purposes  of  the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Our recent decisions in Halper, Austin, and  Kurth Ranch, dictate a far different conclusion.  I  remain persuaded  that those cases were correctly decided and should be followed today.


107
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the judgment in No. 95-345.



*
 Together with No. 95-346, United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency et al., on certiorari to the United States Court  of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.


1
 The Government raises three other challenges to the decisions that we review.  First, focusing on the decision of the Court  of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in No. 95-345, the Government contends  that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to prohibit a punishment  imposed following a "jeopardy," and that a civil forfeiture, regardless  whether it is a "punishment," is not a "jeopardy."  Thus, because Ursery  had not been placed in "jeopardy" in the civil forfeiture proceeding against his house, the Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable to his  criminal prosecution.  Second, the Government argues that the civil  forfeiture of property is not the same offense as a criminal  prosecution, and therefore that the double jeopardy protection against  multiple punishments for the same offense is not at issue here.  Finally, the Government argues that a civil forfeiture action that is  parallel and contemporaneous with a criminal prosecution should be  deemed to constitute a single proceeding within the meaning of the  Double Jeopardy Clause.
Because we conclude that the civil forfeitures involved in these  cases do not constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see  infra, at __, we do not address those three arguments in this decision.


2
 Justice Stevens' dissent is grounded in the different interpretation that he gives Halper.  He finds that Halper announced  "two different rules": a general rule, applicable to all civil  sanctions, useful for determining whether a sanction is "of a punitive  character"; and a "narrower rule," similar to our understanding of the  case, that requires "an accounting of the Government's damages and  costs."  Post at 12.  Justice Stevens faults us in this case for failing  to apply the "general rule" of Halper.
The problem with Justice Stevens' interpretation of Halper, of course, and therefore with his entire argument, is that Halper did not  announce two rules.  Nowhere in Halper does the Court set forth two  distinct rules or purport to apply a two-step analysis. Justice Stevens  finds his "general rule" in a dictum from Halper: "`[a] civil sanction  that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but  rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or  deterrent purposes, is punishment.'"  Post, at 10, quoting United States  v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989).  But the discussion immediately  following that dictum makes clear that it states not a new and separate test for whether a sanction is a punishment, but rather only a rephrasing of Justice Stevens'"narrower" rule, i.e., the rule requiring  an "accounting of the Government's damages and costs." Id., at 449.
"We  therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who  already has been punished . . . may not be subjected to an additional  civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be  characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
"We acknowledge that this inquiry will not be an exact pursuit. In our decided cases we have noted that the precise amount of the Government's damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.  . . .  [I]t would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a court to determine the precise dollar  figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose  of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on  the quality of punishment."  Id., at 448-449 (emphasis added); see also  id., at 449-451.
The "general rule" discovered by Justice Stevens in Halper would supplant, not mimic, see post at 14, the rule of 89 Firearms, and Emerald Cut Stones.  Whether a particular sanction "cannot fairly be  said solely to serve a remedial purpose" is an inquiry radically  different from that we have traditionally employed in order to determine  whether, as a categorical matter, a civil sanction is subject to the  Double Jeopardy Clause.  Yet nowhere in Halper does the Court purport to  make such a sweeping change in the law, instead emphasizing repeatedly  the narrow scope of its decision.  Halper, supra, at 449 (announcing  rule for "the rare case").  If the "general rule" of Justice Stevens were applied literally, then virtually every sanction would be declared  to be a punishment: it is hard to imagine a sanction that has no  punitive aspect whatsoever.  Justice Stevens' interpretation of Halper  is both contrary to the decision itself and would create an unworkable  rule inconsistent with well-established precedent.


3
  Justice Stevens mischaracterizes our holding.  We do not  hold that in rem civil forfeiture is per se exempt from the scope of the  Double Jeopardy Clause.  See post at 5-9.  Similarly, we do not rest our  conclusion in this case upon the long-recognized fiction that a  forfeiture in rem punishes only malfeasant property rather than a  particular person.  See post, at 18-21. That a forfeiture is designated  as civil by Congress and proceeds in rem establishes a presumption that  it is not subject to double jeopardy.  See, e.g., United States v. One  Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 363 (1984).  Nevertheless,  where the "clearest proof" indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is  "so punitive either in purpose or effect" as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding, that forfeiture may be subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id., at 365.


4
 The contraband found on the premises was evidence that the building had been used to facilitate the commission of a violation of  Title 21 punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.  To justify  that forfeiture, the Government assumed the burden of proving (a) that  respondent had committed such an offense, and (b) that the property had  played some part in it.  The statute provides as follows:
"Section(s) 881.  Forfeitures
"(a) Subject property
"The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
. . . .
"(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest   (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of  land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended  to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the  commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than  one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited  under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by  reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been  committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." Section(s) 881(a)(7).


5
 Justice Thomas has expressed his concern about both the  unusual scope and the novelty of the very statute used to carry out the forfeiture in this case:
"I am disturbed by the breadth of new civil forfeiture      statutes  such as 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7), which      subjects to forfeiture  all real property that is used, or      intended to be used, in the  commission, or even the      facilitation, of a federal drug offense.  As  Justice      O'Connor points out . . . since the Civil War we have upheld      statutes allowing for the civil forfeiture of real property.      A strong  argument can be      made, however, that Section(s) 881(a)(7) is so broad  that it      differs not only in degree, but in kind, from its historical      antecedents. . . .  Indeed, it is unclear whether the central      theory  behind in rem forfeiture, the fiction `that the thing      is primarily  considered the offender,' J. W. Goldsmith,      Jr.-Grant Co. v. United  States, 254 U. S. 505, 511 (1921),      can fully justify the immense scope  of Section(s) 881(a)(7).      Under this provision, `large tracts of land   [and any      improvements thereon] which have no connection with crime      other  than being the location where a drug transaction      occurred,' Brief for  Respondents 20, are subject to      forfeiture.  It is difficult to see how  such real property      is necessarily in any sense `guilty' of an offense,  as could      reasonably be argued of, for example, the distillery in      Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395 (1878),      or the  pirate vessel in Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210      (1844).  Given  that current practice under Section(s)      881(a)(7) appears to be far  removed from the legal fiction      upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine  is based, it may be      necessary-in an appropriate case-to reevaluate our  generally      deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area of      civil forfeiture."  United States v. James Daniel Good Real      Property,  510 U. S. 43, 81-82 (1993) (opinion concurring in      part and dissenting in  part) (footnotes omitted).


6
 If anything, the Double Jeopardy Clause ought to apply to a broader set of proceedings than the Self-Incrimination Clause. While  the latter applies only in a "criminal case," the former concerns any  type of "jeopardy," presumably a larger class of situations.  See U. S.  Const., Amdt. 5.


7
 The Court stated the full rule as follows: "Where a  defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil  penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation  to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as `punishment' in the plain meaning of the word,  then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's  damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes  a second punishment."  United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 449-450   (1989).


8
 Even if Austin had not followed Halper's rule for defining punishment, it would make little sense to say that forfeiture might be  punishment "for the purposes of" the Excessive Fines Clause but not the  Double Jeopardy Clause.  It is difficult to imagine why the Framers of  the two amendments would have required a particular sanction not to be  excessive, but would have allowed it to be imposed multiple times for  the same offense.


9
 Specifically, the tax was conditioned on the commission of  a crime, 511 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13), and it was levied on goods  that the taxpayer did not own or possess at the time of imposition, id.,  at ___ (slip op., at 15-16).


10
 It is true, as the Court asserts, that a fine will only be considered "excessive" if it is disproportionate to any remedial goal.  But Austin established that a forfeiture can also be excessive, although  it could serve multiple remedial goals. Hence, I do not understand why  the Court maintains that Austin did not prove that forfeitures are  punitive. In order to count as a "fine" in the first place, a forfeiture  must be capable of being punitive.  A penalty that is not a "fine"  cannot violate the Excessive Fines Clause, no matter how "excessive."  See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492  U. S. 257 (1989).


11
 See, e.g., Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 364 (1808)  (Marshall, C. J.) ("[T]he act punishes the owner with a forfeiture of  the goods"); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S.  505, 510-511 (1921) (the owner of an automobile confiscated for its use  in transporting liquor during Prohibition is "`properly punished by such  forfeiture'") (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *301).


12
 Just this Term, we have reiterated this conclusion.  See Libretti v. United States, 516 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 9-10)  ("[T]he in rem civil forfeiture authorized by 21 U. S. C. Section(s)  881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is punitive in nature").


13
 The Court also speculates that nuisance abatement may  provide a remedial interest.  Ante, at 23.  The abatement theory was questionable enough in Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. ___ (1996), where  under the State's theory the same acts might or might not turn an  ordinary automobile into a nuisance, depending on the neighborhood in  which the car happened to be parked.  See id., at ___, n. 9 (slip op.,  at 7, n. 9) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Here, there is no argument that  Ursery's home constituted some kind of a nuisance.


14
 Apparently recognizing the difficulty of reconciling its analysis of Section(s) 881(a)(7) with Austin's, the Court admits that  the statute "perhaps ha[s] certain punitive aspects," but finds them  outweighed by its "important nonpunitive goals." Ante, at 22.  Again,  that approach simply repudiates Halper, which defined as punishment for  purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause any sanction that "cannot fairly  be said solely to serve a remedial purpose."  490 U. S., at 448   (emphasis added).


15
 "[A]lthough the owner of goods, sought to be forfeited by  a proceeding in rem, is not the nominal party, he is, nevertheless, the  substantial party to the suit; he certainly is so, after making claim  and defence; and, in a case like the present, he is entitled to all the  privileges which appertain to a person who is prosecuted for a  forfeiture of his property by reason of committing a criminal offence."  Boyd, 116 U. S., at 638.


16
 The Court suggests that the decision in Emerald Cut Stones rested on the fact that the second penalty was "in personam," ante, at  8, but the opinion of the Court did not even mention that term.  In 89  Firearms, the Court discussed the fact that the forfeiture was in rem,  but only for the rather obvious point that Congress intended the  proceeding to be "civil."


17
 "That case, United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568   (1931), observed that the words `tax' and `penalty' `are not interchangeable, one for the other' and that `if an exaction be clearly  a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of  calling it such.'  Id., at 572.  See also Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S.  557, 561 (1922) (`The mere use of the word "tax" in an act primarily  designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that within  the true intendment of the term a tax was laid')."  Department of  Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. ___,  ___, n. 15 (slip op.,  at ___, n. 15) (1994).


18
 Long ago the Court cast doubt on this fiction:
"But where the owner of the property has been admitted as a      claimant, we cannot see the force of this distinction; nor      can we assent  to the proposition that the proceeding is not,      in effect, a proceeding  against the owner of the property,      as well as against the goods; for it  is his      breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the      forfeiture, and it is his property which is sought to be      forfeited  . . .  In the words of a great judge, `Goods, as      goods, cannot offend,  forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the      like, but men whose goods they  are.'* "*Vaughan, C. J., in      Sheppard v. Gosnold, Vaugh. 159, 172,  approved by Ch. Baron      Parker in Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker, 227,  236."      Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 637, and n. (1886).


19
 As I have emphasized, the determination that 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 881(a)(7) is a punitive statute is perfectly consistent with  a conclusion that other types of sanctions are remedial. For example, I  would expect that many types of administrative licensing sanctions are  remedial in the relevant sense of our cases.  See Comment,  Administrative Driver's License Suspension: A Remedial Tool That is Not  in Jeopardy, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 1151 (1996) (arguing that suspension of a  driver's license after conviction for drunk driving is a remedial  sanction under the logic of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch).


20
 In Kurth Ranch we explicitly noted that the tax assessment  and the prosecution were "separate legal proceedings."  511 U. S., at ___, (slip op., at 4).


21
 According to the Rule, once there is a finding that  property is subject to a criminal forfeiture, the court may enter a preliminary forfeiture order.  The order also authorizes the Attorney  General to seize the property, conduct any necessary discovery, and  begin proceedings to protect the rights of third parties.  The order of  forfeiture becomes a part of the sentence and is included in the  judgment.


