wireless service industry in the processing of requests, or to subject their request to any but the generally applicable time frames for zoning decisions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (emphasis added). Indeed, as one court has noted, “[t]here is nothing to suggest that Congress, by requiring action ‘within a reasonable period of time,’ intended to force local government procedures onto a rigid timetable .” Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F.Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D.Wash.1996); see also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 43 F.Supp.2d 534, 537 (E.D.Pa.1999) (interpreting the Telecommunications Act’s rea-gonable-period-of-time requirement to be congruent with a state statute imposing a 60-day time limit); Flynn v. Burman, 30 F.Supp.2d 68, 74 (D.Mass.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, under the Telecommunications Act, state
holding that a mere showing facilities were permitted in different locations within a district was not unreasonable discrimination under the telecommunications act as a matter of law holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective holding that a local commission had not failed to act on an application within time limit set by state law and consequently had not failed to act within a reasonable time under telecommunications act