that may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In none of the cases before us does evidence
holding that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests was admissible as evidence of intoxication holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense holding such intoxication to be voluntary holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense recognizing that the holding of people v whitfield was superseded by a 1995 statutory amendment that provided that evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer admissible on the issue of implied malice aforethought