5.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1956 respectively and live in Daugavpils. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  In October 2011 the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs – “the KNAB”) conducted an inquiry into suspected bribery. It obtained information giving rise to a suspicion that the bribery involved the trade of contraband tobacco and alcohol. The goods were stored on the premises of company M., which was owned by V.K. In November 2011 the KNAB transmitted this information to the State Revenue Service (Valsts ieņēmumu dienests – “the VID”). 8.  On 16 November 2011 the VID dispatched officers to company M. in order to verify the information received with an inspection (apskate), under Article 2561 of the Code of Administrative Violations (Administratīvo pārkāpumu kodekss). According to the Government, V.K. was not present at the site himself, but was informed by telephone when the officers arrived. 9.  At 3.40 p.m. they commenced the inspection of the commercial site used by company M. It covered an area of 7,000 square metres, which was surrounded by a concrete fence and consisted of seven large buildings and numerous containers. It was interrupted as the employees present refused to open a suspicious container, acting on orders given by V.K. over the telephone. The officers then obtained a prosecutor’s authorisation and resumed the inspection. 10.  According to the second applicant, who was an accountant at company M., the officers arrived at about 4 p.m. on 16 November 2011. Although she was informed that she was not under arrest, officer J.L. asked her not to leave the site. The second applicant stayed, but subsequently contacted the company’s lawyer, V.G., who advised her that she had a right to leave. She did so at about 7.30 p.m. At about 10 p.m. V.G. telephoned the second applicant, asking her to return to the site to find his power of attorney to act on behalf of company M. She arrived at about 10.30 p.m. 11.  According to the Government, at 1.16 a.m. on 17 November 2011 V.K. telephoned the first applicant, a guard at company M., to find out how the inspection was progressing. V.K. telephoned him again at 2.37 a.m., this time asking him to follow his instructions. The first applicant was to go to the outbuilding of a furnace facility and open and press certain taps, valves, and buttons. The KNAB intercepted this conversation and informed the VID officers. 12.  At 2.50 a.m. an investigator opened criminal proceedings and decided to conduct an inspection (apskate) of the crime scene. By the same decision, the administrative proceedings were discontinued. According to the Government, shortly thereafter officers arrived at the outbuilding, which smelled of spirits and was filled with large plastic tanks. They discovered the first applicant inside operating various taps and valves and asked him to stop what he was doing. As he refused, the officers handcuffed and removed him from the outbuilding. They placed him in the office building and seized his telephone, given his regular telephone contact with V.K. 13.  According to the first applicant, however, at about 2.30 a.m. on 17 November 2011 he went to the outbuilding to switch on the heating. There was no smell of spirits or large plastic tanks. Shortly thereafter he was handcuffed by officers and his mobile telephone was taken off him. From that moment on, he was under the constant watch of the officers and was not permitted to use the telephone. No reasons were given for their actions. 14.  According to the Government, officers found approximately ten tons of illegal alcohol in the furnace facility. They also discovered a secret passage leading to a nearby forest. In order to preserve the crime scene, they asked the employees present, including the first and second applicants, not to leave. As the second applicant had been observing their activities and contacting someone on a mobile telephone, the officers seized it from her. The first applicant was kept handcuffed until the furnace facility was sealed off and the commercial site secured. The first applicant submitted that he had remained handcuffed until about 8 a.m. 15.  According to the second applicant, because it was so late, she was resting at the site. At about 3 a.m. on 17 November 2011 she was approached by an investigator, I.R. From that moment onwards, she was kept under guard by the officers and forbidden from using the telephone. She was prevented from leaving and ordered to participate in the inspection. 16.  At 10 and 11 a.m. the first and second applicants were both questioned as witnesses. 17.  At 12.10 p.m. the second applicant made a written request to I.R., stating that she was not feeling well and wanted permission to rest. At 12.23 p.m. I.R. allowed her to rest in the office premises. 18.  At 7 p.m., according to the Government, the first applicant left the site. He stated that he had been given permission to leave. 19.  According to the Government, at 7.15 p.m. the officers resumed the inspection. As the second applicant was present, the officers invited her to attend it with V.G. She did not refuse this invitation, nor made any remarks or complaints about it in the relevant record. 20.  According to the Government, at 4.30 a.m. on 18 November 2011 the officers completed the second part of the inspection. It was then, according to the second applicant, that she was allowed to leave the site. 21.  Subsequently, on 18 November 2011 the first applicant was arrested at his home and questioned as a suspect. He was released the same day. 22.  By a decision dated 19 November 2011 the first applicant was declared a suspect. He was subsequently charged with failing to report a serious crime and attempting to conceal evidence of a crime. On 16 January 2013 the criminal proceedings against him were terminated for lack of corpus delicti in his actions. He had followed V.K.’s instructions, without being aware of the consequences of his actions. 23.  On 26 July 2013 the VID completed the investigation and transferred the case to the prosecution service. 24.  At the time the parties exchanged their observations, the criminal proceedings were still pending. 25.  On 14 and 29 December 2011 the applicants lodged complaints with the prosecution service regarding the events of 16 to 18 November 2011. They alleged that the officers had breached Article 5 of the Convention and had also restricted their freedom of movement. 26.  The first applicant stated that at about 2.30 a.m. on 17 November 2011 he had gone to the outbuilding to switch on the heating. The officers had entered shortly afterwards. They had handcuffed him and taken his mobile telephone. From that moment on, he had been under their constant watch and had not been permitted to use the telephone. At about 3 a.m. he had been ordered to participate in the inspection. He had remained handcuffed until about 8 a.m. At about 10 a.m. an investigator, V.V., had invited him to one of the offices for questioning. The first applicant had asked whether lawyer, V.G., could be present, to which he had received a negative reply. The first applicant had been allowed to leave the site at about 7 p.m. on 17 November 2011.
As regards his handcuffing, the first applicant submitted that when the officers had handcuffed him a criminal investigation had not yet been opened. Therefore, the VID officers could not have exercised their powers under sections 16(3) and 161 of the Law on the State Revenue Service (likums “Par Valsts ieņēmumu dienestu”). Furthermore, there had been no grounds under section 161(1) of the Law for his handcuffing and at no point had he actually been formally detained. 27.  The second applicant stated that the VID officers had arrived at about 4 p.m. on 16 November 2011. Although she had been informed that she had not been placed under arrest, officer J.L. had asked her not to leave the site. The second applicant had stayed, but about 7.30 p.m. she had contacted V.G., who had advised her that unless she had been detained she had a right to leave. The second applicant had left, despite the officers’ threats. Another employee, T.K., had also left. At about 10 p.m. V.G. telephoned the second applicant, asking her to return to the site to find his power of attorney to act on behalf of company M. She had arrived at about 10.30 p.m. Later, the second applicant had gone to a lounge area to rest. At about 3 a.m. she had been approached by the VID officers, who had told her that V.G. had left and that the first applicant had been handcuffed. I.R. had seized her telephone and had ordered her to participate in the inspection, without informing her that she had a right not to participate. The second applicant had asked I.R. several times to allow her to stay on the office premises as she had been tired. I.R. had refused several times and had eventually told her that if she continued to make such requests I.R. would detain her for forty-eight hours and place her in isolation cell. She had therefore been compelled to participate in the inspection. Furthermore, she had been under the constant watch of the officers. At about 11 a.m. she had been questioned by V.V., who had not given her an opportunity to contact a lawyer. Although the second applicant had not been under arrest, she had not been allowed to leave the site and her brother had been prevented from seeing her. He had meanwhile contacted a lawyer, I.B., who had arrived at the site at about 9.30 p.m. The second applicant had been allowed to leave the site at about 4.30 a.m. the following morning, when the inspection had been completed.
(b)  Decisions 28.  On 30 December 2011 and 9 January 2012 prosecutor O.R. dismissed the applicants’ complaints. 29.  He reasoned that between 2.50 and 9 a.m. on 17 November 2011 a VID investigator, I.R., had conducted an inspection, which had been resumed at 7.15 p.m. and completed at 4.23 a.m. the following morning. According to the inspection record the applicants and V.G., acting as a representative of company M., had all been present. They had signed the record, but none of them had noted in it that they had been compelled to participate or that they had not been informed of their rights. 30.  There was therefore no reason to consider that the applicants’ presence at the inspection had been unlawful. 31.  In so far as the applicants alleged that the VID officers had restricted their rights, their complaints were transmitted to the VID for disciplinary proceedings (see paragraphs 44-48 below).
(c)  Appeals 32.  On 12 and 18 January 2012 the applicants lodged appeals against the aforementioned decisions, arguing that they had not been informed of their right not to participate in the inspection. Furthermore, they had not been assisted by V.G. From about 9.30 p.m. on 17 November 2011 the second applicant had been assisted by I.B. 33.  The fact that the first applicant had not made any remarks in the inspection record did not prove that there had been no violations. The second applicant had noted in the record that she had not known what her role in the inspection had been.
(d)  Decisions on appeals 34.  On 1 and 3 February 2012 prosecutor V.Š. dismissed the applicants’ appeals. 35.  She reasoned that the inspection had been conducted in accordance with section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums). 36.  The applicants had been present at the site at the start of the inspection at 2.50 a.m. on 17 November 2011. I.R. had invited them to participate in it. There was no evidence suggesting that they had refused. As the applicants had not been involved in the criminal proceedings, there had been no obligation to inform them of their rights. 37.  Furthermore, once the inspection had resumed at 7.15 p.m., the second applicant had had an opportunity to invite her lawyer, I.B. Neither I.B. nor the second applicant had noted in the inspection record that she had participated against her will.
(e)  Further appeals 38.  On 14 and 17 February 2012 the applicants appealed against the aforementioned decisions. 39.  They maintained that I.R. had ordered them to participate in the inspection. The fact that they had not made notes in the record was irrelevant. They had had no information about their status in the proceedings until they had been questioned as witnesses. 40.  In addition, the second applicant had had no opportunity to seek legal assistance, as her mobile telephone had been taken off her. Her relatives had invited I.B., who had arrived at about 9.30 p.m. on 17 November 2011, eighteen hours after the start of the inspection, when it had been nearing its end. The second applicant had been unaware that her rights had been violated and had not known what information to provide to I.B.
(f)  Final decision 41.  On 13 and 14 March 2012 chief prosecutor A.S. dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the lower prosecutors’ decisions. 42.  Between 2.50 and 9 a.m. on 17 November 2011 I.R. had conducted an inspection. The first and second applicants and V.G. had attended. The applicants had familiarised themselves with the inspection record and had signed it. While the first and second applicants had made some remarks in the record, they had not noted that they had participated against their will. The second applicant had also attended the second part of the inspection between 7.15 p.m. on 17 November 2011 and 4.23 a.m. on 18 November 2011. From 8.45 p.m. on 17 November 2011 she had been assisted by I.B. Neither I.B. nor she had noted in the inspection record that she had participated against her will or that she had not known her rights in the criminal proceedings. 43.  There was no reason to conclude that the applicants had not known their rights, including the right to be present at the inspection, to familiarise themselves with and write remarks in the inspection record and to make complaints. 44.  On 16 and 17 January 2012 the VID concluded that there were no grounds for opening disciplinary proceedings against its officers. 45.  Between 17 and 18 November 2011 I.R. had conducted an inspection in accordance with sections 139(1), 159, 160 and 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Under section 9(1) of that legislation everyone had a duty to comply with the requests of an official authorised to conduct criminal proceedings and with the procedure provided by law. 46.  During the inspection on 17 November 2011 the first applicant had opened taps so that spirits could start flowing into the pipes. There had been a suspicion that he had tried to conceal evidence of a crime and therefore had attempted to commit a criminal offence. He had been handcuffed to protect the crime scene and to prevent him from committing further criminal acts, namely, to stop him failing to comply with lawful requests. Immediately after completion of the inspection, the applicant’s handcuffs had been removed. Their use had therefore been lawful. 47.  Referring to section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the VID stated that the restrictions on the first and second applicants’ freedom of movement between 17 and 18 November 2011 had been proportionate to the public interest in crime prevention. 48.  Furthermore, during the inspection the first and second applicants had been assisted by two lawyers. None of them had noted down in the relevant record any objections as regards the course of the inspection, thereby confirming its lawfulness. 49.  On 13 March 2013 the Ombudsperson issued conclusions on the first applicant’s complaint. 50.  At 3.40 p.m. on 16 November 2011 VID officers had commenced a “control” (pārbaude) in administrative proceedings. 51.  At quarter past midnight on 17 November 2011 they had commenced an “inspection of an area inaccessible to the public” (publiski nepieejamas teritorijas apskate) under Article 2561 of the Code of Administrative Violations, based on a prosecutor’s authorisation. 52.  At about 2.30 a.m. the first applicant had gone to the furnace facility. The officers had asked him to stop what he was doing and handcuffed him. 53.  At about 2.50 a.m. a decision had been made to open criminal proceedings and conduct an inspection under sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 54.  Between 9.57 and 10.56 a.m. the first applicant had been informed of his rights and questioned as a witness. 55.  At 10.10 a.m. on 18 November 2011 he had been detained and later the same day questioned as a suspect. 56.  There was no dispute that under the Law on the State Revenue Service, officers could use restraint measures in the circumstances provided for by law. In view of the information received from the VID, the first applicant had been handcuffed under section 161(1)3) and 4) of that legislation on the grounds that he had failed to comply with lawful requests made by the VID officers and to protect an object under guard from unlawful threat. 57.  At the same time, there was no information in the case material regarding lawful requests made by the VID officers which the first applicant had failed to fulfil. Similarly, there was no information that the VID officers had guarded the furnace facility. Accordingly, there had been no legal or factual obstacles preventing him from entering it. 58.  Also, there was no objective reason why less restrictive measures could not have been used to prevent obstruction of the criminal investigation. In view of this, the use of handcuffs had not been necessary. 59.  As a result of the handcuffing, the first applicant’s freedom of movement and right to liberty had been restricted. At the same time, during an inspection under section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Law the rights of those present could not be restricted. The procedure for arrest was laid down in the Code of Administrative Violations and the Criminal Procedure Law, which provided that a record of arrest had to be drawn up. The first applicant had not been detained under Article 253 of the Code of Administrative Violations, and in the criminal proceedings he had only been detained at 10.10 a.m. on 18 November 2011. A record of his arrest had not been drawn up with regard to the restriction on his right to liberty during the inspection on 17 November 2011. This had therefore not been in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. There had been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 60.  There was no dispute that VID officers could invite anyone to participate in the inspection. However, in accordance with section 163(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law, such persons were not under an obligation to participate. At the same time, in its judgment of 14 November 2006 (in case no. SKA-454/2006) the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāta Administratīvo lietu departaments) stated that a request made by a police officer in the performance of his or her official duties was regarded as binding on the person concerned. The Ombudsperson was therefore of the view that the person concerned was prevented from refusing to comply with a request made by an investigating authority, unless informed of the right to do so. In the present case, the first applicant had not been informed of the right to refuse to participate in the inspection. This had not been examined by the prosecution service.