5.  The applicants are owners of a house at 4, Wagon Street, Rabat, Malta, which they inherited from their late father in 1997. It is a corner house with an area of around 82 square metres. 6.  The applicants alleged that on an unspecified date in 1987 a certain C.C. broke into the house and started to live there, with his family, without legal title. Their allegation was not proved before the domestic courts. 7.  The applicants’ late father had instituted judicial proceedings to have C.C. evicted. According to the applicants, C.C. attempted to validate his position by soliciting the authorities to take action. 8.  A few days before the general elections, on 14 April 1987, the Maltese Government issued a requisition order (no. 1031) under the Housing Act, Chapter 125 of the Laws of Malta, in respect of the property. The authorities assigned the property to C.C. Thus, as from 30 April 1987 C.C. had legal title to the house. 9.  Following various complaints by the former owner, on 2 June 1987 the property was derequisitioned. 10.  The applicants’ late father again instituted judicial proceedings for the eviction of C.C., who no longer had title to the property. 11.  That case was withdrawn due to a clerical mistake in the name of the complainant. Once the mistake had been corrected, the proceedings were recommenced in September 1987. Meanwhile, a request for an injunction (mandat ta’ inibizzjoni) to prohibit C.C. from making structural changes to the property and from entering the property was upheld in part, namely in relation to the works. 12.  On 8 June 1988, pending a judgment by the ordinary court concerning the eviction, the Maltese Government again requisitioned the property, under an order carrying the same reference as the first requisition (no. 1031), and assigned it to C.C. 13.  In consequence, following the State’s action, the Court of Magistrates (in its civil jurisdiction), by means of a judgment of 18 January 1991, dismissed the claim lodged by the applicant’s predecessor. It held that since the property had again been requisitioned and thus was now administered by the Housing Authority which had assigned it to C.C., it could no longer take cognisance of the claims put forward by the complainant. However, it ordered the successful defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. 14.  The rent fixed by the authorities amounted to approximately 35 euros (EUR) annually. Amendments introduced by means of Act X of 2009 increased the rent payable on requisitioned property to a maximum of EUR 185 annually, which may be increased every three years. 15.  The applicants refused to receive such rent or to recognise C.C. as a tenant, in order to avoid prejudicing their case. According to the Government, the tenant deposited the rent in court; however, according to the applicants, from a search of the relevant court registry, no such schedules of deposit had ever been filed. 16.  According to a valuation of January 2011 by the applicants’ ex parte expert, the sale value of the property was EUR 230,000 and given its location it had commercial potential. The estimate was, however, based on the premise that the expert had only seen the property from the outside and had relied on the applicants’ descriptions. A Government expert (who acceded to the property) valued it at a sale price of EUR 153,000. 17.  The impugned restrictions did not apply to leases entered into after 1 June 1995. 18.  On 15 September 2008 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They lodged an action against the Director of Social Housing. The Housing Authority and C.C. were later joined to the proceedings. The applicants complained that the requisition order had breached their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They asked the court to award them adequate compensation reflecting a reasonable rent from 8 June 1988 to the date of judgment and any losses incurred as a result of their inability to develop the property. They further asked the court to order the release of the property free and unencumbered or, if that were not possible, to establish fair conditions in respect of the property and a fair rent for the future. Lastly, they asked the court to give any other orders or directions to ensure that their fundamental rights were respected. 19.  By a judgment of 9 December 2010 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found in favour of the applicants. With reference to the preliminary pleas raised, it considered that it had not been necessary also to notify the Attorney General – such a requirement had been intended to ensure that a representative of a Government department would not fail to appear, a risk eliminated if the Attorney General, who had to provide lawyers for the department’s defence, was notified. In the present case there had been no such risk and therefore the failure to notify him had not brought about the nullity of the claim. The applicants had been suffering a continuing violation from 1988 since they remained dispossessed of their property and therefore had a legal interest in bringing the action. Furthermore, the applicants had no other remedies available to them. Indeed, their action to have C.C. evicted had been dismissed because of their inability to pursue such an action once the property had been requisitioned and no other remedy could have offered the applicants compensation for the breach of their property rights. 20.  On the merits of the case, the Civil Court (First Hall) found a violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as the applicants had been affected by the measure for numerous years during which they had been owed only EUR 35 annually. The court also expressed doubts as to the public interest of the measure. This was in line with the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in similar circumstances, in the cases of Ghigo v. Malta (no. 31122/05, 26 September 2006) and Fleri Soler and Camilleri v. Malta (no. 35349/05, ECHR 2006‑X). It awarded the applicants the sum of EUR 8,000 in compensation based on equity (arbitrio boni viri) and ordered the return of the property free and unencumbered to the applicants within three months. The court considered that it had the power and the duty to take such action under Article 4 (2) of the European Convention Act (see relevant domestic law), in order to bring an end to the consequences of the violation suffered by the applicants. The situation would persist in the absence of legislative intervention. Costs were to be paid by the defendants. 21.  The defendants appealed both in respect of the preliminary pleas and on the merits. The Attorney General also appealed on the same lines, thus joining the proceedings at the appeal stage as a third party on the basis of his interest in the case (appell ta’ terz). The applicants appealed only in respect of the award of compensation, which they considered to be too little given the value of the property at issue. 22.  According to the applicants, before the Constitutional Court they orally invited the President of the Constitutional Court to withdraw from hearing the case (on the basis of Article 734 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure). At the time when the proceedings were instituted, he had been the Attorney General and therefore the senior legal officer responsible for the defence of the two co-defendants in the applicants’ case. He had also been the legal officer advising the Government on the drafting and introduction of Act X of 2009. However, according to the applicants, the President of the Constitutional Court refused to withdraw. The Government noted that this was not mentioned in the court record. 23.  By a judgment of 25 November 2011 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment in relation to the preliminary pleas and merits, but varied the redress awarded. 24.  The Constitutional Court noted, inter alia, that any available ordinary remedies such as judicial review proceedings or proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board were not appropriate in such circumstances. As to the merits, it considered that the measure of control of use had been lawful and pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest, namely social accommodation for C.C. who, as it transpired, had obtained legal title to the property by means of the requisition and, thus, could not be considered a squatter. Despite the lack of a rental valuation of the property, it was clear that even for a small house, a rent of EUR 3 a month (EUR 35 annually until 2010) was extremely low and could not be considered as fair. This situation had lasted for more than twenty-two years. In consequence, the applicants had suffered a disproportionate burden as the proportionality requirement had not been fulfilled. 25.  As to redress, the Constitutional Court increased the compensation to EUR 14,000, but revoked the part of the judgment ordering the release of the property. It considered that since the requisition had been lawful and in the public interest, it was for the court to redress the lack of a fair balance but it was not required to annul the requisition order. Referring to domestic case-law, it held as follows:
 “... while this [constitutional] court has a wide latitude in giving any order it may consider relevant in order for it to safeguard Articles 33 to 45 of the Constitution and human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined in the Convention, such latitude was not unlimited and was circumscribed by the judicial system of the country which did not allow this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] to amend national laws, nor could it make mandatory an action which according to domestic law was discretionary, nor could it order the Housing Authority to pay rent or compensation of a higher value than that provided for by the relevant law. Compensation, if any, which may be paid by this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] is that for the violation found.”
As to the amount of compensation, the Constitutional Court noted that in such cases, given the legitimate aim, it was not required to follow market values. In the present case the court bore in mind the sums usually awarded by the European Court of Human Rights, the low amount of rent due, the relevant period from 1988 to date, the unavailability of an expert valuation of the rental value of the property, the fact that the applicants had brought proceedings in 2008 and that the more favourable order of the first-instance court was being revoked. 26.  Each party was to pay his own share of the costs of the proceedings. 27.  According to the applicants, on an unspecified date, C.C. passed away and his daughter, L.B., took possession of the property and became its occupant. Subsequently, the Department of Social Housing provided L.B. with alternative housing, which she moved into. Despite the vacation of the property, the authorities did not derequisition it. On an unspecified date L.B. returned to the property. 28.  The applicants claimed that the above information had come to their attention in January 2014. Their requests to the authorities (copies submitted to the Court) for official documents explaining in detail the above course of events had remained unanswered. They had therefore filed a judicial protest objecting to the conduct of the authorities and L.B.’s unlawful occupation of their property. 29.  The Government submitted that the above allegations were unsubstantiated.