5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Sebedražie. 6.  The present case concerns real property situated in the cadastral area of Sebedražie. Land in this area has been subject to land consolidation proceedings under the Land Consolidation Act (Law no. 330/1991 Coll.). The aim of such proceedings is to reorganise the ownership and use of land in the given area so as to correspond to the requirements of protection of the environment and rational agriculture. 7.  On 29 December 1992 the Prievidza Land Authority issued a decision under section 15(2) of the Act approving accelerated interim arrangements in relation to the land in question, in accordance with a simplified allotment plan, attached to the decision. 8.  Those interim arrangements assigned to the applicant’s father, free of charge, temporary use of land divided by and situated on both sides of a railway line. This land partly neighbours a road and is partly separated from that road by another plot belonging to the applicant. 9.  The title of the applicant’s father to this land was later transferred to the applicant. The Government submitted that that transfer had occurred as a result of the applicant’s purchase of his father’s title; by contrast, the applicant submitted (without offering any details) that his link to the land stemmed directly from his grandfather’s previous ownership. 10.  Under similar terms, other individuals were assigned plots situated further down the railway line that had no or only limited contact with the road in question. 11.  The interim arrangements provided that those concerned were entitled to make use of the existing road network. Such arrangements were to stay in place until the completion of the land consolidation proceedings in the area. The completion of those proceedings was scheduled for 2014. However, no information has been submitted to the Court concerning the current state and outcome of those proceedings, if any. 12.  The bone of contention in the present case is whether or not the existing road network comprised a three-metre-wide makeshift field track (nespevnená poľná cesta), running parallel to the railway, across the land assigned to the applicant’s father, connecting the plots assigned to the other individuals with the road passing around the applicant’s property.
It is the applicant’s contention that in point of fact no such track has ever existed in practice or on paper and that the area is covered by vegetation (in particular, fruit trees).
As would later be established by courts, although the track was not recorded on official maps or other documentation, it existed in practice until the applicant blocked it in 2000 by building a fence and erecting a gate. 13.  On 13 March 2001 a court ordered – by way of an interim measure – the applicant to remove the fence and gate and to enable access to the other plots concerned. 14.  On 20 April 2001 a person to whom land neighbouring the applicant’s had been assigned lodged a civil action against the applicant. The exact formulation of the relief sought evolved in the course of the proceedings; the action ultimately sought to obtain an injunction ordering the applicant to (i) remove the fence, gate, vegetation and anything else obstructing passage over the property in question; (ii) re-establish the original track; and (iii) allow and not hinder the claimants’ passage by that track. 15.  On the merits, the action was examined twice by both the District Court as the first-instance court and the Regional Court as the court of appeal. 16.  The first judgment (of 27 August 2004) granting the action was quashed (on 4 April 2005) following an appeal by the applicant. The second judgment (of 11 February 2009) again granting the action was upheld (on 27 January 2010) following his appeal. 17.  The courts had regard to witness, expert and documentary evidence examined at seven hearings before the first-instance court and to the findings of three in situ examinations conducted by the first-instance judge. 18.  The courts’ reasoning may be summarised as follows. As mentioned above, it was established that the disputed track had never been officially documented, but what was ultimately decisive was that it had existed in point of fact. The latter finding was primarily based on a written representation made by the Land Authority, evidence from three witnesses, and written statements from four other persons. In so far as the applicant had argued to the contrary, relying on his own witnesses, the courts considered to be conclusive photo documentation submitted by the claimant and the in situ findings of the first-instance judge.
The courts observed that the interim arrangements relating to the area concerned, including the disputed track, constituted sui generis restrictions equivalent to easements on the ownership of the land concerned. If the ownership of any plot of land in that area were to be transferred to another person, then any attendant “quasi-easements” would encumber the new owner. The applicant should have known this when he acquired the title to the land from his father.
Accordingly, the applicant was to enable and not to obstruct passage across the land. 19.  No further appeal was available. The matter became resolved by force of a final and binding judgment on 9 March 2010, after the judgment of the court of appeal had been served on the parties. Upon the expiry of the grace period accorded to the applicant for compliance with the judgment on the merits, the respective ruling became enforceable on 10 April 2010. 20.  Together with the above rulings, the applicant was ordered to pay the claimant the amount that the latter had previously paid to the court as an advance on the fees of the court-appointed expert. This ruling became enforceable on 13 March 2010. 21.  On 24 October 2008 the District Court determined the expert’s remuneration. In part, it was to be paid from the advance previously paid by the claimant (some 230 euros (EUR)); the rest (some EUR 480) was paid from the budget of the court. 22.  The applicant appealed, submitting that the expert’s report had been belated and flawed by errors. It should therefore have been disregarded and the expert should be paid either no or reduced remuneration. 23.  On 27 January 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 24 October 2008. 24.  On 4 February 2010 the District Court ordered the applicant to pay some EUR 475 as costs of the in situ inspections and for the remainder of the expert’s fees previously paid by the court. The applicant appealed against this order. 25.  On 16 April 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the contested order. 26.  No further appeal against the ruling of 16 April 2010 was available. After that ruling was served on the parties, the costs order against the applicant became final and binding on 31 May 2010. On the expiry of the grace period accorded for compliance with the costs order, it became enforceable on 4 June 2010. 27.  The decisions of 24 October 2008 and 4 February 2010 were issued with reference to the same file number of the District Court as in the proceedings on the merits. 28.  The enforcement of the above rulings appears to be still pending. In the meantime, the applicant has paid EUR 87.40 in respect of the enforcement officer’s fees. Despite being ordered to remove vegetation from the track in question, he has yet to do so. 29.  On 3 May 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court. The complaint was against the District Court and the Regional Court and challenged specifically their judgments and decisions on the merits of his neighbour’s action (11 February 2009 and 27 January 2010) and on the fees of the expert (24 October 2008 and 27 January 2010).
The applicant alleged, inter alia, a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In that regard, he argued that there had been a restriction of his ownership rights and that that restriction had been neither lawful nor necessary, had not been in the public interest, and had been subject to no compensation.
In addition, the length of the proceedings had been excessive and they had been unfair in that the courts had disregarded his arguments, had accepted expert and other evidence which was not reliable, and had rendered arbitrary decisions. 30.  As can be seen from the Constitutional Court’s decision (see the following paragraph), it had obtained observations in reply to the applicant’s complaint from the Presidents of the District Court and the Regional Court. In the Constitutional Court’s decision, those observations were reflected as follows:
The President of the District Court observed that the claimant and others involved had long been using the disputed track and that the state of affairs had been accepted by the applicant and his father until the applicant had arbitrarily barred the track in 2000, apparently guided by the mistaken belief that his title to the property concerned was absolute. The applicant’s assertions had been properly examined, the court had heard extensive evidence, and the complaint about the length of the proceedings had been belated.
The President of the Regional Court (i) recapitulated the course of the proceedings, (ii) summarised the applicant’s complaint, and (iii) submitted that no position could be taken as regards some of the applicant’s claims relating to the first-instance court, that there had been no undue delays in the proceedings before the court of appeal, and that one of the applicant’s submissions before that court could not have been taken into account because it had been belated. 31.  On 14 April 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible.
It found no unfairness in the proceedings and held, in particular with reference to the reasons for the Regional Court’s decision, that the lower courts’ conclusions had been sufficiently reasoned and not arbitrary. For similar reasons, the Constitutional Court dismissed as being manifestly ill‑founded the complaint about the decision on the expert’s remuneration.
As to the complaint about the length of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court held, referring to its established practice, that it had been lodged belatedly. Specifically, the complaint had been lodged after the ordinary courts’ judgments on the merits had become final.
Lastly, referring to its established practice to that effect, the Constitutional Court held that, in view of the conclusion reached under Article 6 of the Convention, the ordinary courts could not be held liable for any breach of the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 32.  On 16 July 2010 the applicant lodged a fresh constitutional complaint against the District Court and the Regional Court, challenging the costs order against him (4 February and 16 April 2010), and alleging a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on the grounds that the courts had disregarded his arguments and had decided arbitrarily. 33.  On 15 April 2011 the Constitutional Court ruled the complaint inadmissible, having found no appearance of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the contested decisions and the underlying proceedings.