Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb

Ganga–Jamuni Tehzeeb (Hindustani for "Ganges–Yamuna Culture"), also spelled as Ganga-Jamni Tehzeeb, is the culture of the central plains of northern India, especially the doab region of Ganges (Ganga) and Yamuna rivers, that is a syncretic fusion of Hindu cultural elements with Muslim religious elements.
K. Warikoo, Professor at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University describes the concept as one exemplifying communal harmony and a shared culture between the Hindus and Muslims of India:
Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb, a poetic Awadhi phrase for a distinctive and syncretic Hindu-Muslim culture, is reflected in the fused spiritual connotations, forms, symbols, aesthetics, crafts and weaves, for example Kashmiri Muslim carpet makers feature Durga in their patterns, Muslim sculptors making idols of Durga, and Hindu craftsmen create the Muharram tazia. This religious syncretism based on the vasudhaiva kutumbakam, unity in diversity and multi-communitarianism is a result of centuries of interfaith exchange and accommodation among Indian religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism) and foreign origin religions (Muslim and Christian) where in India communities preserve own cultural and religious identies while facilitating the shared celebration of festivals, customs and traditions. The shared Indian national identity is separated from the personal religious identity where nation and common social good comes first above the personal religion.
Various iconic people of several religions related to the Bhakti movement, a medieval initiative for the revival and recontextualisation of ancient Vedic traditions, are example of this tehzeeb.
Etymology.
"Ganga-Jamni" Hindi, literally, "mixed," "composite," "alloy," "Tahzeeb", Urdu, via Arabic: تہذيب tahẕīb edification, refinement, polish, culture.
Revolutionary role of bhakti movement.
Surdas, Guru Nanak, Ravidas, Kabir, Bulleh Shah, Tulsidas, Gusainji, Ramananda, Eknath, Tukaram, Mirabai were some of the prominent contributors of bhakti movement. One of the best examples of syncretic faith is captured in one of Kabir's doha (verse), "some chant Allah, some chant Ram, Kabir is a worshiper of true love and hence reveres both."
Regional practices.
Awadh.
Nawabs of Awadh were fore-runners of this culture. The region of Awadh in the state of Uttar Pradesh is usually considered to be the center of this culture. Allahabad, Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad-Ayodhya, and Varanasi (Benares) are a few of the many centers of this culture.
Delhi.
Delhi has also historically been a prime example of the Ganga-Jamuna Tahzeeb; with its iconic Khariboli dialect and being one of the literally centers of the Urdu language, there have been numerous poets such as Amir Khusrow, Mir Taqi Mir, Ghalib, Mohammad Ibrahim Zauq, Daagh Dehlvi, Nida Fazli and many others. Delhi has also contributed to the music of the region, being the birthplace of Qawwali and the Delhi Gharana. Though, there has been conflict between Hindus and Muslims after 2020 Delhi riots.
Hyderabad.
Hyderabad, the capital city of Telangana in south-central part of the India, is also a big example of communal harmony where the local Telugu Hindus and Hyderabadi Muslims live with peace and brotherhood, where Hindu temples serve the dry dates fruits to mosques for Iftar Muslim festival.


National Council of Churches in Bangladesh

The National Council of Churches in Bangladesh is a Christian ecumenical organization founded in Bangladesh in 1949 as the East Pakistan Christian Council. It is a member of the World Council of Churches and the Christian Conference of Asia.


Victor Sylvestrovych Solowij

Victor Sylvestrovych Solowij (29 November 1891 – 31 January 1966), later known as Archbishop Varlaam, was an archbishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church known for his public-political and church activism. He was born in the village of Kiryjivka, in the Sosnycia District of Chernihiv Province, Ukraine.
Early life.
He attended Novhorod-Siversky religious school and the Chernihiv Seminary before obtaining a law degree from Warsaw University in 1914.
From 1914-1915 he worked as a court applicant in Moscow. He was then drafted and served as an artillery officer in the Russian Czarist Army. In 1917 he became the leader-chairman of the Ukrainian Military Community in Moscow and a local court judge in Chernihiv, Ukraine.
In 1918 during the period of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), Solowij was a secretary of the Highest Court of independent Ukraine, later in 1919 in the war of independence he served as captain of an artillery corps of Sichovi Strilci and a commander of an artillery battery of the UHA (Ukrainian Galician Army). In 1920 Solowij was in charge of the legal department in the Headquarters of Ukraine’s Supreme Commander and President, Symon Petliura and became his legal adviser in exile in Poland.
Career.
Ukraine.
During 1923-1939 he was involved in church, community and co-operative activities in Volynia and Polissia in Western Ukraine. He was a member of the Metropolitan Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Poland. In the 1930s he was deported from Ukraine (Polissia) for his pro-Ukrainian activities and worked in the Polish courts, and simultaneously worked as a correspondent of the Ukrainian Learned Institute in Warsaw in the areas of ecclesiastic law and the soviet legislation.
Part of the Second World War the Solowij family lived in the Western Ukrainian regions of Pidlashshia and Kholmshchyna, where Solowij worked in the Polish courts and acted as the legal adviser of Metropolitan Ilarion (Ohijenko) and as a lecturer in the Kholm Religious Seminary (1939-1944).
In 1947-1950 Solowij was the general state secretary of the Ukrainian Government (UPR) in exile and the director of the justice ministry of the Executive Organ of the Ukrainian National Council.
Australia.
After emigrating he involved himself in the organisation of the Ukrainian Community and in church activity. In 1951-1952 he was elected the inaugural chairman of the Ukrainian Association in Australia (now the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations in Australia). He also became a member of the higher church administration of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Australia and New Zealand. In 1953 he was elected as a candidate for a Bishop of the Church and was ordained into the priesthood in 1954. In 1958 he was consecrated in Chicago by Metropolitan Ioan Teodorovych and Archbishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk (later the first Patriarch Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church). With the ecclesiastic name of Varlaam he was appointed as the titular Bishop of Chernihiv and became the governing bishop of the Metropolitan Diocese of the Church in Australia and New Zealand, residing in Melbourne from 1959. In 1965 Bishop Varlaam, elevated to the office of Archbishop, headed a united Church in Australia and New Zealand.
Family.
In 1930 Solowij married Valentyna Tanashevych and they had two sons – Bohdan, born in 1931 and Jaroslaw, born in 1936.
Valentyna, at an age of 37 years, lost her life during the Second World War in Warsaw in 1944 and Solowij never remarried and remained a widower.
Solowij and sons spent 1944 in Germany.
He became terminally ill his last years of life. He resided in the family home of his son Jaroslaw and wife Luba (née Welychko) who looked after him until his death. He died at home on 31 January 1966 and was buried in the Ukrainian Orthodox Section of the Independent Cemetery at Rookwood in Sydney.


Prabartak Sangha

Prabartak Sangha () is a charitable institution known for its social work. It was founded in 1920 by Motilal Roy, a revolutionary, who was inspired and initiated in the spiritual path by Sri Aurobindo. Based in Chandernagore, the Prabartak Sangha in its heyday had branches in the districts of Howrah, undivided 24 Parganas and Chittagong. It has a temple, a monastery, a boys school, a girls school and a destitute home.
Foundation.
In 1915, a Bengali literary magazine named Prabartak was launched under the editorship of Manindra Nath Nayak with the blessings of Motilal Roy and Sri Aurobindo. In 1920, Roy founded the Prabartak Sangha in Chandannagar, then a French possession. In 1925, he assumed the title of Sangha Guru or the chief spiritual leader of the organization. In May 1927, Rabindranath Tagore laid the foundation of the prayer hall of the Prabartak Sangha.
Activities.
The Sangha was founded with the aim of nation building which it sought to achieve through the social and economic upliftment of the masses. It ventured into business, ran educational institutions and established cultural centres to spread the message of its founder. This was also a popular shelter of Indian freedom fighters at that time.
Economy.
The Prabartak Sangha undertook several projects in the economic field, so that the nation can become economically self-sufficient. The Sangha launched a partnership firm Rakshit, Dey and Ghosh Co. that started a carpentry workshop. It later grew into a joint stock company named Prabartak Furnishers Limited with a showroom at Bipin Bihari Ganguly Street in Kolkata. In 1920, the Sangha ventured into agriculture by setting up a farm at Frazerganj in the 24 Parganas. In the same year, it started a textile manufacturing unit named Mrinalini Bastravayana Karyalaya with eight handlooms and paid workers. It use Japanese yarns that could only be replaced by Indian made mill yarns only. By 1925, the Khādī department of the Sangha established branches in Burdwan, Mymensingh, Chittagong and Rangoon. In 1935, it started the Prabartak Jute Mills in Kamarhati, though the production started only in February 1941. It launched the Prabartak Commercial Corporation for the import and export of a wide range of commodities. Apart of these the Sangha had a banking and insurance company named the Prabartak Bank and Insurance Company. It also had a press named the Prabartak Printing and Halftone.
Education.
The Prabartak Sangha established 21 educational institutions in the districts of Hooghly, Howrah, 24 Parganas, Bardhaman, Darjeeling, Chittagong and Faridpur. The profit generated from its businesses were used to run the educational institutes.
Later years.
After the Partition, a branch of the Sangha in Pakistan continued to operate in Chittagong. In India, the activities of the Sangha diminished and were centred on the headquarters in Chandannagar. Motilal Roy died in 1959. In the early 1960s the businesses ran into crisis. In 1963, the Prabartak Bank along with the Bank of Bankura merged with the United Industrial Bank. In 1965, the Prabartak Jute Mills were taken over by Sohanlal Mall and later by the JM Group.


Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Mexico


Francis Trasuns

Francis Trasuns (October 16, 1864 – April 6, 1926) was a Latgalian priest, theologian and politician. He was a member of the State Duma of the Russian Empire (in 1906) and a member of the Latvian parliament (1922–1926). All his life, Trasuns was an active promoter and protector of the Latgalian language and culture.
Early life and education.
Trasuns was a student of the Jelgava Gymnasium, then from 1883 to 1887 he studied in Saint Petersburg's theological seminary, and eventually, in 1887, he joined the Saint Petersburg Roman Catholic Theological Academy and graduated it in 1891. From 1902, Trasuns worked as a professor in the Saint Petersburg's theological seminary. One of his achievements was that some of his lectures were held in the Latgalian language.


Tal-Barrani

Tal-Barrani is a primarily agricultural area in Malta that extends from the town of Żejtun to the villages of Santa Luċija, Ħal Tarxien and Ħal Għaxaq, lying across many south-eastern communities in Malta. The land gives its name to a nearby chapel dedicated to Saint Lucy. In a notarial document dating from the 16th century, the area near this estate was known as "bitalbarrani", that is, the stranger's or outsider's land. This name may indicate that the land under cultivation at Tal-Barrani belonged to some outsider, either someone from outside a village community, or a foreigner. Moreover, the same land contained another area which was called "Tal-Misilmin" (land of the Muslims). At least from the 17th century onwards, Tal-Barrani was a recognised agricultural estate, and was documented in the 1654 property book of the Order of St. John, the "Cabreo Magisteriale".
In the 1960s, a depot for Malta's milk collection system was built at Tal-Barrani. In October 1965, while constructing the depot, a number of archaeological remains were found in the middle of the building site. The site was later demolished, and a private hospital was built, leading to the finding of further tombs in 2008 and 2009. A Late Roman and Byzantine catacomb and a tomb were discovered and excavated in 1993, closer to Żejtun.
Tal-Barrani is an important transportation link in the south-eastern part of the island, with a major road cutting the area in half. The existing road consists of a dual carriageway of two northbound and two southbound lanes separated by a central reserve. A €20 million road project is being proposed to divert traffic between Tal-Barrani Road and Vjal Santa Luċija via tunnels.
Tal-Barrani was the site of political violence on 30 November 1986, when a group of people, some wearing balaclavas, began hurling stones and bottles on an approaching group of political activists. The clashes erupted with the appearance of members of the police’s Special Mobile Unit, who fired teargas canisters and rubber bullets onto the crowd, and mayhem ensued.
Geography and geology.
The promontory of Żejtun is defined to the north by Wied iz-Ziju, which separates Żejtun from Ħal Tarxien and other outlying high ground. This valley includes the area known as Tal-Barrani. The land also gives its name to a type of uniform clay brown soil. In a number of areas in Malta and Gozo, a type of calcareous colluvium lies above a layer of terra fusca. If the colluvium is thin, the mixing of the two layers due to tilling over a long period of time will produce a uniform brown soil, very rich in clay. This type was classified as Tal-Barrani.
Archaeological remains.
Tal-Barrani contains a significant number of archaeological remains. These include an ancient tomb cluster and field systems at the Tal-Ħotba site at Tal-Barrani, and a number of late Roman and Byzantine catacombs. A Christian catacomb and four rock-cut tombs were discovered in 1915, 1963 and 1993, under the present road footprint of Tal-Barrani. At least another seventeen tombs were discovered in 1965, 1966 and 2008 were found in fields in an area known as Tal-Ħotba, very close to Tal-Barrani road. The 1960s discoveries at Tal-Ħotba consisted of three tombs within the footprint of the old milk collection depot.
Ancient cluster of tombs and field systems.
Three ancient Punic rock-cut tombs were uncovered and investigated by the Museums Department in 1965 and 1966 in the Tal-Ħotba area of Tal-Barrani. The tombs were uncovered during the construction of a milk depot on previously undeveloped agricultural land. In 2008, a development permit was issued for the demolition of this industrial building, to be replaced by a new private hospital. Construction works began under archaeological surveillance. By October 2008, rock-cut tombs discoveries were reported. Authorities started an extensive investigation of the land. By early 2009, fourteen rock-cut tombs were found and partially studied. Given the importance of this discovery, the authorities protected these remains, and began procedures for their scheduling. The developer proposed to redesign the development to guarantee the physical conservation of this important cluster of ancient tombs. The proposed hospital building was moved to a new site within the same property. A number of field trenches for agricultural purposes were also uncovered.
Late Roman and Byzantine catacombs.
In May 1993, an important Late Roman to Byzantine burial site was uncovered during trenching works along Tal-Barrani road, on the approach to the higher ground before the 25 November Avenue crossroads leading to Żejtun. Two subterranean burial monuments were discovered within 10.0 metres from each other. These were a multi-chambered burial catacomb, and a Late Roman rock-cut chamber tomb. The catacomb was found on the Żejtun side of the hillock, at a higher point to the chamber tomb, which was found closer towards Ħal Tarxien.
The discovery was important in that it contained the burial strata in their intact state. These survived and were sealed within the catacomb. Additionally, the Tal-Barrani catacomb was the first one to be examined scientifically. The presence of a Christian catacomb so close to a rock-cut chamber tomb is a rare occurrence, which is usually found only in the Rabat area. Tal-Barrani provides evidence of continuity in usage of a much larger communal cemetery; this was initially made up of chamber tombs and a multi-chambered catacomb.
Discoveries in the same location are noted in Temi Żammit's archaeological notebooks, and in the Archaeological Museum's 1963 report. The burial ground was large, and it contained a mixture of tombs and other burial facilities.
One of the skeletons discovered in 1993 showed evidence of an ankylosing spondylitis, and Forestier's disease, which is a chronic form of arthritis involving the spinal area.
The Tal-Barrani road very likely formed part of older road networks, some of which date back to antiquity. The placing of burial tombs and catacombs by the side of main roads was not uncommon in the Maltese islands. The road was widened and realigned in modern times. As a result, some of the Tal-Barrani tombs were discovered, while others remained hidden under the old road surface. This may have preserved the catacomb. The rock-cut chamber tomb was cut into a natural terrace, which was later hidden by the modern Tal-Barrani road. Part of the tomb's shaft was hidden by the rubble wall of the previous and narrower Tal-Barrani road. This rubble wall is still preserved underneath the present central reserve.
When the tomb was discovered, the sealing slab was still lodged securely. The tomb's structure was largely intact, except for the back section which was cut through by the modern trenching works. Apart from debris from the trenching works, the tomb chamber and contents were intact and undisturbed. The chamber contained two main areas, a rectangular burial site with a water trench cutting its middle, and an arcosolium at the back. The front area measured about 2.5 metres in length, slightly longer than the arcosolium which measured 2.1 metres. The water trench in the front provided standing room, and separated the two burial platforms. The water trench was reached by three steps leading down from the entrance, while the arcosolium was a focus point. It betrayed an unusual tomb design, which suggested a Late Roman date for the burials. The burial platform of the arcosolium included two carved head-rests.
Political violence.
Tal-Barrani was the site of political violence on 30 November 1986, after the Nationalist Party decided to organise a political activity in Żejtun, a Labour Party stronghold. The Labour Party viewed this choice as a provocation, and the police withdrew a permit that had already been issued. The government, led by Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, cited public order concerns. The Nationalist Party insisted it had a right to organise political activities anywhere in Malta to exercise its freedom of expression. The Party went to court and in a tense sitting had its claim confirmed. The Constitutional Court authorised the Nationalist Party to hold a meeting in Żejtun on 30 November 1986. The party's general secretary Louis Galea had alerted the police of rumours that the meeting would be obstructed by government supporters. The roads to Żejtun were blocked with stones and rubble during the night of 29 November, and the authorities did not take any action, even when this continued in their presence on 30 November. When the Nationalist Party supporters approached, a small group of men tried to hold them back but eventually retreated behind a truck. The fully equipped Special Mobile Unit police then moved in, followed by over a hundred people, some of them masked and armed. The mounted police brought up the rear, with the police spraying tear gas and firing rubber bullets on the Nationalist Party supporters. Many shots were fired and people were injured, some seriously. The meeting had to be abandoned and the Nationalist Party supporters retreated followed by the "mixed army" of policemen and government supporters. The latter left a lot of damage in their wake, although one could not exclude that some Nationalist Party supporters also caused some damage, particularly to the cars of the police stationed at Tal-Barrani. Sixteen years later, three men were conditionally discharged for their part on the day.
References.


Islam in Turkey

Islam is the most practiced religion in the country. The established presence of Islam in the region that now constitutes modern Turkey dates back to the latter half of the 11th century, when the Seljuks started expanding into eastern Anatolia.
According to the government, 99.8% of the Turkish population is Muslim (although some surveys give a slightly lower estimate of 97%) with the most popular school of thought (madhab) being the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. While there are also a minority of Sufi and non-denominational Muslims.
According to religiosity poll conducted in Turkey in 2019 by OPTİMAR, 89.5% of the population identifies as Muslim, 4.5% believed in God but did not belong to an organized religion, 2.7% were agnostic, 1.7% were atheist, and 1.7% did not answer. Most Muslims in Turkey are Sunnis, forming about 85% of the overall Muslim denominations. The remaining Muslim sects forming about 13% of the overall Muslim population consist of Alevis, Ja'faris (representing 2%) and Alawites (with an estimated population of around 1 million) which is about 1% of the overall Muslim population in Turkey.
Figures on NDM's or Non-denominational Muslims vary with estimates ranging from 2 percent of the population to 19 percent of the population.
History.
Islamic empires.
During the Muslim conquests of the 7th and early 8th centuries, Arab armies established the Islamic Empire. The Islamic Golden Age was soon inaugurated by the middle of the 8th century by the ascension of the Abbasid Caliphate and the transfer of the capital from Damascus to Baghdad.
The later period saw initial expansion and the capture of Crete (840). The Abbasids soon shifted their attention towards the East. During the later fragmentation of the Abbasid rule and the rise of their Shiite rivals the Fatimids and Buyids, a resurgent Byzantium recaptured Crete and Cilicia in 961, Cyprus in 965, and pushed into the Levant by 975. The Byzantines successfully contested with the Fatimids for influence in the region until the arrival of the Seljuk Turks who first allied with the Abbasids and then ruled as the "de facto" rulers.
In 1068 Alp Arslan and allied Turkmen tribes recaptured many Abbasid lands and even invaded Byzantine regions, pushing further into eastern and central Anatolia after a major victory at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. The disintegration of the Seljuk dynasty, the first unified Turkic dynasty, resulted in the rise of subsequent, smaller, rival Turkic kingdoms such as the Danishmends, the Sultanate of Rum, and various Atabegs who contested the control of the region during the Crusades and incrementally expanded across Anatolia until the rise of the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman Caliphate.
Beginning in the twelfth century, new waves of Turkic migrants many of whom belonged to Sufi orders, some of which later incorporated heterodox beliefs. One Sufi order that appealed to Turks on Anatolia after 1300 was the Safaviyya, an order that was originally Sunni and non-political but later became both Shi'a and political based in northwest Iran. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Safavid and similar orders such as the Bektaşi became rivals of the Ottomans—who were orthodox Sunni Muslims—for political control of eastern Anatolia. Although the Bektaşi order became accepted as a sect of orthodox Sunni Muslims, they did not abandon their heterodox beliefs. In contrast, the Safavids eventually conquered Iran, shed their heterodox religious beliefs, and became proponents of orthodox Twelver Shi'a Islam.
The conquest of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople—which the Turks called Istanbul—in 1453 enabled the Ottomans to consolidate their empire in Anatolia and Thrace. The Ottomans later revived the title of caliph during the reign of Sultan Selim. Despite the absence of a formal institutional structure, Sunni religious functionaries played an important political role. Justice was dispensed by religious courts; in theory, the codified system of şeriat regulated all aspects of life, at least for the Muslim subjects of the empire. The head of the judiciary ranked directly below the sultan and was second in power only to the grand vizier. Early in the Ottoman period, the office of grand mufti of Istanbul evolved into that of Şeyhülislam (shaykh, or "leader of Islam"), which had ultimate jurisdiction over all the courts in the empire and consequently exercised authority over the interpretation and application of şeriat. Legal opinions pronounced by the Şeyhülislam were considered definitive interpretations.
Secularization era.
The secularization of Turkey started in the society during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and it was the most prominent and most controversial feature of Atatürk's reforms. Under his leadership, the caliphate—the supreme politico-religious office of Sunni Islam, and symbol of the sultan's claim to world leadership of all Muslims—was abolished. The secular power of the religious authorities and functionaries was reduced and eventually eliminated. The religious foundations were nationalized, and religious education was restricted and for a time prohibited. The influential and popular mystical orders of the dervish brotherhoods (Tariqa) also were suppressed.
Republic period: 1923–present.
The withdrawal of Turkey, heir to the Ottoman Empire, as the presumptive leader of the world Muslim community was symbolic of the change in the government's relationship to Islam. Indeed, secularism "(or laiklik)" became one of the "Kemalist ideology" of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's anti-clerical program for remaking Turkey. Whereas Islam had formed the identity of Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, secularism was seen as molding the new Turkish nation and its citizens.
Atatürk's Reforms.
In 1922 the new nationalist regime abolished the Ottoman sultanate, and in 1924 it abolished the caliphate, the religious office that Ottoman sultans had held for four centuries. Thus, for the first time in Islamic history, no ruler claimed spiritual leadership of Islam.
Atatürk and his associates not only abolished certain religious practices and institutions but also questioned the value of religion, preferring to place their trust in science. They regarded organized religion as an anachronism and contrasted it unfavorably with "civilization", which to them meant a rationalist, secular culture. Establishment of secularism in Turkey was not, as it had been in the West, a gradual process of separation of church and state. In the Ottoman Empire, all spheres of life, at least theoretically, had been subject to traditional religious law, and Sunni religious organizations had been part of the state structure. However, usually state had authority over the clergy and religious law, even at the Ottoman period (e.g.many Sultans are known to change Şeyhülislams, who do not approve state politics). When the reformers of the early 1920s opted for a secular state, they removed religion from the sphere of public policy and restricted it exclusively to that of personal morals, behavior, and faith. Although private observance of religious rituals could continue, religion and religious organization were excluded from public life.
The policies directly affecting religion were numerous and sweeping. In addition to the abolition of the caliphate, new laws mandated abolition of the office of Şeyhülislam; abolition of the religious hierarchy; the closing and confiscation of Sufi lodges, meeting places, and monasteries and the outlawing of their rituals and meetings; establishment of government control over the vakıfs, which had been inalienable under Sharia; replacement of sharia with adapted European legal codes; the closing of religious schools; abandonment of the Islamic calendar in favor of the Gregorian calendar used in the West; restrictions on public attire that had religious associations, with the fez outlawed for men and the veil discouraged for women; and the outlawing of the traditional garb of local religious leaders.
Atatürk and his colleagues also attempted to Turkify Islam through official encouragement of such practices as using Turkish rather than Arabic at devotions, substituting the Turkish word Tanrı for the Arabic word Allah, and introducing Turkish for the daily calls to prayer. These changes in devotional practices deeply disturbed many Muslims and caused widespread resentment, which led in 1950 to a return to the Arabic version of the call to prayer, after the opposition party DP won the elections. Of longer-lasting effect were the regime's measures prohibiting religious education, restricting the building of new mosques, and transferring existing mosques to secular purposes. Most notably, the Hagia Sophia (Justinian's sixth-century Christian basilica, which had been converted into a mosque by Mehmet II) was made a museum in 1935. The effect of these changes was to make religion, or more correctly Islam, subject to the control of the state. Muftis and imams (prayer leaders) were appointed by the government, and religious instruction was taken over by the Ministry of National Education. As a result of these policies, the Turkish Republic was judged negatively by some sections of the Muslim world.
The expectation of the secular ruling elite that the policies of the 1920s and 1930s would diminish the role of religion in public life did not materialize. As early as 1925, religious grievances were one of the principal causes of the Şeyh Sait rebellion, an uprising in southeastern Turkey that may have claimed as many as 30,000 lives before being suppressed.
Although Turkey was secularized at the official level, religion remained a strong force. After 1950 some political leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment to religion by espousing support for programs and policies that appealed to the religiously inclined. Such efforts were opposed by most of the state elite, who believed that secularism was an essential principle of Kemalist Ideology. This disinclination to appreciate religious values and beliefs gradually led to a polarization of society. The polarization became especially evident in the 1980s as a new generation of educated but religiously motivated local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance of the secularized political elite. These new leaders have been assertively proud of Turkey's Islamic heritage and generally have been successful at adapting familiar religious idioms to describe dissatisfaction with various government policies. By their own example of piety, prayer, and political activism, they have helped to spark a revival of Islamic observance in Turkey. By 1994 slogans promising that a return to Islam would cure economic ills and solve the problems of bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to win mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara, the country's two largest cities.
Multiparty Period.
Following the relaxation of authoritarian political controls in 1946, large numbers of people began to call openly for a return to traditional religious practice. During the 1950s, even certain political leaders found it expedient to join religious leaders in advocating more state respect for religion.
A more direct manifestation of the growing reaction against secularism was the revival of the Sufi brotherhoods. Not only did suppressed Sufi orders such as the Kadiri, Mevlevi, Nakşibendi, Khālidiyyā and Al-Ṭarīqah al-Tijāniyyah reemerge, but new movements were formed, including the Nur Cemaati, Gülen movement, Sülaymānīyyā, Community of İskenderpaşa and İsmailağa. The Tijāni became especially militant in confronting the state. For example, Tijāni damaged monuments to Atatürk to symbolize their opposition to his policy of secularization. This was however a very isolated incident and only involved one particular Sheikh of the order. Throughout the 1950s, there were numerous trials of Ticani and other Sufi leaders for antistate activities. Simultaneously, however, some movements, notably the Süleymancı and Nurcular, cooperated with those politicians perceived as supportive of pro-Islamic policies. The Nurcular eventually advocated support for Turkey's multiparty political system, and one of its offshoots, the Gülen movement, had supported the True Path Party while the Işıkçılar and Enver Ören had openly supported the Motherland Party since the mid-1980s.
The demand for restoration of religious education in public schools began in the late 1940s. The government initially responded by authorizing religious instruction in state schools for those students whose parents requested it. Under Democrat Party rule during the 1950s, religious education was made compulsory in secondary schools unless parents made a specific request to have their children excused. Religious education was made compulsory for all primary and secondary school children in 1982.
Inevitably, the reintroduction of religion into the school curriculum raised the question of religious higher education. The secular elites, who tended to distrust traditional religious leaders, believed that Islam could be "reformed" if future leaders were trained in state-controlled seminaries. To further this goal, the government in 1949 established a faculty of divinity at Ankara University to train teachers of Islam and imams. In 1951 the Democrat Party government set up special secondary schools (İmam Hatip schools) for the training of imams and preachers. Initially, the imam hatip schools grew very slowly, but their numbers expanded rapidly to more than 250 during the 1970s, when the pro-Islam National Salvation Party participated in coalition governments. Following the 1980 coup, the military, although secular in orientation, viewed religion as an effective means to counter socialist ideas and thus authorized the construction of ninety more İmam Hatip high schools.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam experienced a kind of political rehabilitation because right-of-center secular leaders perceived religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological struggle with left-of-center secular leaders. A small advocacy group that became extremely influential was the Hearth of Intellectuals ("Aydınlar Ocağı"), an organization that maintains that true Turkish culture is a synthesis of the Turks' pre-Islamic traditions and Islam. According to the Hearth, Islam not only constitutes an essential aspect of Turkish culture but is a force that can be regulated by the state to help socialize the people to be obedient citizens acquiescent to the overall secular order. After the 1980 military coup, many of the Hearth's proposals for restructuring schools, colleges, and state broadcasting were adopted. The result was a purge from these state institutions of more than 2,000 intellectuals perceived as espousing leftist ideas incompatible with the Hearth's vision of Turkey's national culture.
The state's more tolerant attitude toward Islam encouraged the proliferation of private religious activities, including the construction of new mosques and Qur'an schools in the cities, the establishment of Islamic centers for research on and conferences about Islam and its role in Turkey, and the establishment of religiously oriented professional and women's journals. The printing of newspapers, the publication of religious books, and the growth of innumerable religious projects ranging from health centers, child-care facilities, and youth hostels to financial institutions and consumer cooperatives flourished. When the government legalized private broadcasting after 1990, several Islamic radio stations were organized. In the summer of 1994, the first Islamic television station, Kanal 7, began broadcasting, first in Istanbul and subsequently in Ankara.
Although the tarikah (the term can sometimes be used to refer to any 'group or sect' some of whom may not even be Muslim) have played a seminal role in Turkey's religious revival and in the mid-1990s still published several of the country's most widely circulated religious journals and newspapers, a new phenomenon, "İslamcı Aydın" (the Islamist intellectual) unaffiliated with the traditional Sufi orders, emerged during the 1980s. Prolific and popular writers such as Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, and İsmet Özel have drawn upon their knowledge of Western philosophy, Marxist sociology, and radical Islamist political theory to advocate a modern Islamic perspective that does not hesitate to criticize genuine societal ills while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ethical values and spiritual dimensions of religion. Islamist intellectuals are harshly critical of Turkey's secular intellectuals, whom they fault for trying to do in Turkey what Western intellectuals did in Europe: substitute worldly materialism, in its capitalist or socialist version, for religious values.
On 15 July 2016, a coup d'état was attempted in Turkey against state institutions by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces with connections to the Gülen movement, citing an erosion in secularism.
Status of religious freedom.
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on all religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, usually for the stated reason of preserving the secular state, and distance of state to all kinds of beliefs. The Constitution establishes the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the private dissemination of religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. The secularity, bearing a meaning of a protection of believers, plays an important role to protect the state.
While most of the secular countries have religious schools and educational system, one in Turkey can only have religious teachings after a state decided age; which is considered as a necessity given the fact that Turkey is the only considerably secular country in the Muslim world, i.e. it is claimed that conditions to establish secularism on are different than those in Christian world. The establishment of private religious schools and universities (regardless of what religion) is forbidden. Only the state controlled "Imam-Hatip high school" is allowed which benefits only Islamic community in Turkey. This type of high schools teach religious subjects with modern positive science. However, graduates of these schools cannot go to the university to seek higher education in another field of study for example medicine, law, engineering etc.; because graduates of these schools are intended to be clerics, rather than being doctors or lawyers. With the rise of fundamentalism in schools, more than 370 Turkish schools have signed a political declaration by the High School Students Union of Turkey (TLB) in order to protest what they perceive as anti-secularism in schools. Accordingly, there has been a rise in voiced objections to the conversion of schools into an Imam-Hatip, which has affected many Turkish schools since 2012. Many parents have complained about the increasing pressure of schools to become an Imam-Hatip.
The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education through its Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), which reports directly to the Prime Ministry. The Diyanet has responsibility for regulating the operation of the country's 75,000 registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants. Some groups, particularly Alevis, claim that the Diyanet reflects mainstream Islamic beliefs to the exclusion of other beliefs. The government asserts that the Diyanet treats equally all who request services. However, Alevis do not utilize Mosques or the imams for their worship ceremonies. Alevi ceremonies take place in Cem Houses and led by Dedes who do not benefit from the large budget of the Religious Affairs.
Diyanet and secularism.
Reforms going in the direction of secularism have been completed under Atatürk (abolition of the caliphate, etc.).
However, Turkey is not strictly a secular state:
However, each is free of his religious beliefs.
There is an administration called "Presidency of Religious Affairs" or Diyanet manages 77,500 mosques. This state agency, established by Atatürk (1924), finance only Sunni Muslim worship Other religions must ensure a financially self-sustaining running and they face administrative obstacles during operation.
The Diyanet is an official state institution established in 1924 and works to provide Quranic education for children, as well as drafting weekly sermons delivered to approximately 85,000 different mosques. Furthermore, the Diyanet employs all of the imams in Turkey.
When collecting tax, all Turkish citizens are equal. The tax rate is not based on religion. However, through the Diyanet, Turkish citizens are not equal in the use of revenue. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which has a budget over U.S. $2.5 billion in 2012, finance only Sunni Muslim worship.
This situation presents a theological problem, insofar as Islam stipulates, through the notion of haram (Qur'an, Surah 6, verse 152), that we must "give full measure and full weight in all justice”.
Sufi orders like Alevi-Bektashi, Bayrami-Jelveti, Halveti "(Gulshani, Jerrahi, Nasuhi, Rahmani, Sunbuli, Ussaki)," Hurufi-Rüfai, Malamati, Mevlevi, Nakşibendi "(Halidi, Haqqani)," Qadiri-Galibi and Ja'fari Muslims are not officially recognized.
In 2013, with over 4.6 billion TL (Turkish Lira), Diyanet or Ministry of Religious Affairs, occupies the 16th position of central government expenditure.<br>
The budget allocated to Diyanet is:
Diyanet's budget represents:
Headscarf issue.
Although intellectual debates on the role of Islam attracted widespread interest, they did not provoke the kind of controversy that erupted over the issue of appropriate attire for Muslim women. During the early 1980s, female college students who were determined to demonstrate their commitment to Islam began to cover their heads and necks with scarves and wear long, shape-concealing overcoats. The appearance of these women in the citadels of Turkish secularism shocked those men and women who tended to perceive such attire as a symbol of the Islamic traditionalism they rejected. Militant secularists persuaded the Higher Education Council to issue a regulation in 1987 forbidding female university students to cover their heads in class. Protests by thousands of religious students and some university professors forced several universities to waive enforcement of the dress code. The issue continued to be seriously divisive in the mid-1990s. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, highly educated, articulate but religiously pious women have appeared in public dressed in Islamic attire that conceals all but their faces and hands. Other women, especially in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir, have demonstrated against such attire by wearing revealing fashions and Atatürk badges. The issue is discussed and debated in almost every type of forum – artistic, commercial, cultural, economic, political, and religious. For many citizens of Turkey, women's dress has become the issue that defines whether a Muslim is secularist or religious. In 2010, the Turkish Higher Educational council (YÖK) lifted the ban on headscarves at the universities. Since the start of his presidency, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drastically increased the amount of religious high schools across Turkey to support his plan on bringing up a more pious generation. However, this push on piousness in school children seems to have had an adverse effect, for there is anecdotal evidence of a notable amount of Turkish students from religious high schools admitting their loss of faith in Islamic beliefs, which has caused substantial amount of discussion among politicians and religious clerics.
More recently in 2016, Turkey approved hijab as the part of the official police uniform. For the first time, female officers will be able to cover their heads with a headscarf under their police caps. This act was pushed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have been pushing for relaxed restrictions on the hijab.
Denominations.
Sunni Islam.
The vast majority of the present-day Turkish people are Muslim and the most popular school of law is the Hanafite madh'hab of Sunni Islam according to the KONDA Research and Consultancy survey carried out throughout Turkey in 2007. The Hanafi madhhab was the official school of Islamic jurisprudence espoused by the Ottoman Empire and a 2013 survey conducted by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs indicates that 77.5 percent of Turkish Muslims identify themselves as Hanafis. Although the Maturidi and Ash'ari schools of Islamic theology (which apply Ilm al-Kalam or rational thought to understand the Quran and the hadith) have been the dominant creeds in Turkey due to their widespread acceptance and propagation since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, the Athari (literalist) creed of the Salafi movement has seen increasing acceptance.
Compared to the Hanbali school of Islam, the Hanafi school of Islam takes a much more liberal take on the religion, allowing for a more lenient interpretation of religious law.
The Sunni Islamic faith has continuously been a domineering faith since 661. The name Sunni originates from the emphasis of importance on the Sunna, which is related to the establishment of the Shari'a laws.
In Turkey, Muhammad is often called "Hazret-i Muhammed" or "Peygamber Efendimiz" (Our Prophet).
Shia Islam.
Twelver branch of Shia Islam Muslim population of Turkey is composed of Ja'fari aqidah and fiqh, Batiniyya-Sufism aqidah of fiqh of the Alevīs, and Cillī aqidah of Maymūn ibn Abu’l-Qāsim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad ibn at-Tabarānī fiqh of the Alawites, who altogether constitutes nearly one third of the whole population of the country. "(An estimate for the Turkish Alevi population varies between Seven and Eleven Millions. Over 75% of the population, on the other hand, overwhelmingly constitute Maturidi aqidah of the Hanafi fiqh and Ash'ari aqidah of the Shafi'i fiqh of the Sunni followers.)"
Unlike the common usage of the term "Shi'a" in other languages, "Aleviler" instead is being frequently used to represent all the Shi'a Muslim sects in Turkish language. Furthermore, the term Kızılbaş in the history was used pejoratively for all Shi'ites in Anatolia.
Alevis.
There are an estimated 7-9 million Alevi in Turkey which approximately constitutes 10% of the total population.
Ja'faris.
The followers of the Ja'fari jurisprudence constitute the third sizable community with their more than three million members and most of them lives in the eastern provinces neighboring to Azerbaijan, more particularly in the Iğdır Province. They have 70 mosques in Istanbul and some 300 throughout the country and receive no state funding for their mosques and imams as the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is exclusively Sunni.
Alawites.
The majority of the Alawite community in Turkey with an estimated population of around 1,000,000 lives in the Province of Hatay, where they nearly represent half of the total population,
primarily in the districts of Arsuz, Defne and Samandağ, where Alawites constitute the majority and in Iskenderun and Antakya where they constitute a significant minority of the population.
Larger Alawite communities can also be found in the Çukurova region, mostly in and around the cities of Adana, Tarsus and Mersin.
Sufism.
Folk Islam in Turkey has derived many of its popular practices from Sufism which has good presence in Turkey and Egypt. Particular Sufi shaikhs – and occasionally other individuals reputed to be pious – were regarded after death as saints having special powers. Veneration of saints (both male and female) and pilgrimages to their shrines and graves represent an important aspect of popular Islam in the country. Folk Islam has continued to embrace such practices although the veneration of saints officially has been discouraged since the 1930s. Plaques posted in various sanctuaries forbid the lighting of candles, the offering of votive objects, and related devotional activities in these places. Modern day Sufi shaykhs with large adherents in Turkey include Shaykh Mehmet Efendi (residing in Istanbul) and Mawlana Sheikh Nazim Al-Haqqani who resided in Lefka, North Cyprus, until his death in May, 2014.
Quranism.
Those who reject the authority of hadith, known as Quranists, Quraniyoon, or Ahl al-Quran, are also present in Turkey. Notable Turkish Quranists include scholars like Yaşar Nuri Öztürk and Caner Taslaman.
Turkey's role in the Islamic World.
Turkey is a founding member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, formerly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference). The headquarters of some Islamic organizations are located in Turkey:
Further reading.
https://www.dw.com/en/atheism-grows-in-turkey-as-recep-tayyip-erdogan-urges-islam/a-47018029


List of mosques in Tajikistan

This is a list of mosques in Tajikistan.
External links.


Islamophobia in France

Islamophobia in France holds a particularly political significance since France has the largest proportion of Muslims in the Western world, primarily due to the migration from Maghrebi, West African, and Middle Eastern countries. The existence of discrimination against Muslims is reported by the media in the Muslim world. and by the perceived segregation and alienation of Muslims within the French community. This belief that there is an anti-Muslim climate in France is heavily criticised by many members of the French Muslim community who terms it an 'exaggeration'.
The word "Islamophobie" is itself subject of debate in France, since it is not clear whether it designates the fear of Islam or the racism against Muslims, the first being a legal opinion and belief while the second constitutes a crime according to French law. That is the reason why some authors urge to use "racisme anti-musulman", literally "anti-Muslim racism", instead of "Islamophobie", in order to differentiate between the distrust against Islam seen as a corpus of religious beliefs and the systematic hate and discrimination against Muslims. A 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center in Spring 2014 revealed that out of all Europeans, the French view Muslim minorities most favorably with 72% having a favorable opinion.
Some French people hold a belief that Islam is opposed to secularism and modernity. This fear is sometimes considered to originate in the country's experience with terrorism and in the belief that Muslims are unable to integrate with the French culture.
According to an opinion poll, 74% of Muslims in France acknowledge that there is a conflict between living in devotion to one’s religion and living in the western secular society. Muslim individuals’ desire to integrate has been hindered by the reinforcement of cultural differences.
History.
According to researcher Vincent Gassier "‘institutional Islamophobia’ or ‘State Islamophobia’ doesn’t really exist in France". But French society has been infused with Islamophobic attitudes recently. Islam was seen by many as a liberal religion especially during 'les lumieres' (18th) Anti-religious (especially against Christianity) views have developed through France’s historical tradition of segregation between state and church.
For a long time, conservative Muslims have been perceived as outsiders by the general French public, due to Islam’s community structure, a threat to individuality - a strong French value shaped by Laïcité.
Recent times.
The French perceived Muslims as being too attached to their religion, which would ultimately affect their ability to integrate in compliance with the Laïcité value in French society. This resulted in the French government urging the ban of all religious symbols, including Islamic symbols mandating the face coverings.
This experience left deeply embedded perceptions of Islam, driven by negativity, perpetuating the growth of the political right in France and their anti-Islamic views.
Incidence.
Statistics.
The Observatory of Islamophobia confirmed a 34.6% decrease in Islamophobic attacks in France in 2017.
In 2020, according to the French Ministry of Interior incident targeting Muslim increased by 54%, they however were much lower than those targeting other religious and ethnic communities: 154 anti-religious acts targeted Muslims, while those targeting Jews stood at 687 , and those against Christians was 1,052.
Justice system.
Fundamental rights for Muslims in France are the same than any other French citizen, making hard do introduce religious laws for some Muslims. The French adherence to the concept of Laïcité is in contradiction to some radical Muslim behaviors. In turn, forces resisting it are unable to cope with the strength of the growth in this concept. Political leaders emphasis that this is a protection of social cohesion within France, however it affects the inclusion of some Muslims.
Legislation impacting some religious behaviors.
The objective to prevent discrimination between French citizens and to remove religious signs (Christianity, Islam, Judaism) from public space is seen as an injustice by some Muslims.
On the 11th April 2011, French Prime Minister François Fillon banned face veils from being worn in public spaces in France other than Mosques, at home or when travelling as a passenger in a car.
In October 2017, France introduced an Anti-Terrorism Bill which authorised power for officials to search homes, restrict movement and close places of worship. The concept behind this bill has been commended by a United Nations human rights expert who also, on the contrary, highlights the negative influence this may have over religious freedom. Additionally, Fionnuala Ni Aolain has raised concerns regarding the reinforced marginalisation of Muslims in France through the introduction of the bill.
In May 2019, French senate (dominated by legislators of the political right) voted a law to extend civil servant limitations to wear religion signs to helpers attending school trips. This was immediately opposed by the government on the grounds that it would be irresponsible to stigmatise a fraction of the national community..
Anti-discriminatory legislation.
Discriminatory acts against religious groups in France are denounced by legislature which promote equality. Some legislation and political groups which address the issue of discrimination against religious freedom in France include:
In the media.
French media portrayals of Islam often depict mainstream anti-Islamic views."...negative outlook on Islam is covered by the French media — something both logical, and worrying. Logical, because the media have to report on actual incidences, and so they have an incentive to adopt a discourse that echoes what potential readers, TV viewers, and listeners find appealing. Worrying, because this tendency legitimizes negative stereotypes about Islam."
In 2012 the French "Charlie Hebdo" newspaper published satirical cartoons depicting Islamic Prophet Muhammad, following a long tradition of laïcity and blasphemy against all religions. These cartoons received backlash from a part of the Islamic community who claimed that this was a disrespectful portrayal of a religious figure and thus a discriminatory act against Islam.
Following this publications, in 2015, some Islamist terrorist killed 12 peoples and injured 11 in the "Charlie Hebdo" shooting.
In employment.
There have been many reported cases of workplace Islamic discrimination against individuals. French law indicates two main guidelines regarding religion and employment. The “Protection of Individuals” indicates that one’s religious beliefs must not disturb the functioning of the workplace, including views regarding hygiene and safety requirements. The “Proper functioning of the firm” highlights that religion must never interfere with performance or one’s relationship with work. These French policies as seen as conflicting with some integrist views of Islam, claiming that it is dismissing their to practice the religion. For example, prayer breaks are disapproved and a request to not be on project with the opposite sex are denied - two practices followed by Muslims. Furthermore, Muslims can be forced to have a shared workspace with homosexuals and atheists, groups of people that are considered sinful by Islam and affects their ability to integrate in the workplace.
Islamophobic groups and notions.
Great Replacement.
The term "Great Replacement" was created by Renaud Camus in 2011 identifying immigration policies as the main issue affecting the shift in the demographics of France.


Shuichi Thomas Kurai

Shuichi Thomas Kurai (December 14, 1947—June 29, 2018) was a Japanese-born Soto Zen roshi and head abbot of Sozenji Buddhist Temple in Montebello, California. Raised in a Soto temple in Japan, he moved to California with his parents in 1952, where his father (Reverend Shuyu Kurai) served as priest at the Zenshuji Soto Mission in Little Tokyo. In addition to his role as a Zen teacher, Kurai also instructed others in how to play taiko. Kurai was a member of the American Zen Teachers Association.
Kurai died on June 29, 2018 at the age of 70 following a diagnosis of adult T-Cell leukemia.


Somuncu Baba

Sheyh Hamid-i Vali (1331–1412), better known by his sobriquet Somuncu Baba, was an ascetic teacher of Islam in Bursa, Turkey, who exerted extensive influence and is known as a Muslim saint. He was born in Kayseri and died in Darende. He taught at the Ulu Camii (The Great Mosque) where he was installed by Sultan Bayezid I after it was completed. Somuncu Baba's students included Molla Fenari and Hacı Bayram-ı Veli.
Biography.
Somuncu Baba is one of the virtuous men who came to Anadolu for spiritual conquest, he was also a descendant of Islamic prophet Muhammad After receiving an education in cities which are the center of knowledge like Şam, Tabriz, Erdebil, he settled in Bursa for his guidance and duty. He taught at the Bursa Grand Mosque where he was installed by Sultan Bayezid I after it was completed. For hiding his spiritual side, he baked bread and sold them so he was known as Somuncu Baba. He became known after he had translated the sura of Al-Fatiha, in seven different ways during the opening of Bursa Grand Mosque, in Bursa. He avoided becoming famous so he left Bursa and moved Aksaray. He left his son Yusuf Hakiki Baba in Aksaray and he went to Mecca with his son Halil Taybi when they got back to Anadolu they settled in Darende and he died here in 1412. His tomb is still in Darende.
With the help of Es-Seyyid Osman Hulusi Efendi Foundation, it has another mosque,a library, museum and an exhibition hall and it became a complex of building with restoration. With its excursion, it is an attractive center of local and foreign tourists.


Joyce Aryee

Joyce Rosalind Aryee (born 27 March 1947) is a Ghanaian former politician, business executive and minister. Aryee is recognized for having served Ghana for more than 40 years in both the public and private sectors. From 2001 to 2011, she served as the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Chamber of Mines and was the first woman in Africa to have held that role. She has also held political roles in Ghana from the early years of the PNDC government. She is currently the Executive Director of Salt and Light Ministries, a para-church organization. She is an Honorary Council Member of the Ghana Association of Restructuring and Insolvency Advisors.
Early life and education.
Born to a Fante mother and a Ga father, Joyce is the second of four children. During her early years, she lived with her family in North Suntreso, Kumasi where she started her early years of education at Methodist Primary School and Methodist Middle School. She later went to Achimota School and graduated in 1969 from the University of Ghana, Legon with a Bachelor of Arts (BA) Degree in English.
She was formerly married to Dr Charles Wereko-Brobby.
Career.
Early career.
During her study in University of Ghana, she took a job (during holidays) at West Africa Examination Council in the Test Development and Research Office (TDRO). Also, she worked at the Ghana Museums and Monument Board with the administration. From 1976 to 1981, she worked as a Public Relations Officer at the then newly established Environmental Protection Council. Later moved to the Ghana Standards Board (currently Ghana Standards Authority) as Public Relations Officer.
Political career.
From 1982 to 1985 Aryee was appointed by ex-president of Ghana Jerry John Rawlings as the secretary of information for the PNDC. From 1985 to 1987 she was Minister of Education, and in 1987–88 Minister of Local Government. From 1988 to 2001 she was Minister of Democracy in the Office of the Prime Minister, and from 1993 to 2001 a Member of the National Defence Council.
Salt & Light Ministries.
Aryee is the founder and currently executive director of Salt & Light Ministries, a para-church organization. She also runs the Joyce Aryee Consult, which focuses in the areas of Management and Communications. She serves as a board member on several boards such as the Kinross Chirano Gold Mine Ghana board, the Mentoring Women Ghana board, and the Roman Ridge School Academic Board.
Aryee serves as the chair of Harmonious Chorale, a music group in Ghana.She is the founder of the "Salt and Light Ministries", a ministry set to encourage and motivate the Body of Christ. Aryee is also the First Patron Extraordinaire of the Accra Mining Network.
Personal life.
Joyce Aryee has been married twice; first to a medical doctor with whom she lived in Germany and then later to George Yves Wireko Brobbey.
Awards and honors.
Aryee was given the Second Highest State Award, the Companion of the Order of the Volta in 2006 in recognition of her service to the nation. She is also the recipient of the Chartered Institute of Marketing, Ghana (CIMG), Marketing Woman of the Year Award for 2007 and the African Leadership on Centre for Economic Development's African Female Business Leader of the Year Award for 2009.
She was also awarded in 2012 with the Honorary Award of the Year 2012, as well as one of the pioneers and pillars of gospel music, at the Adom FM Ghana Gospel Industry Awards (GGIA) (2nd Edition).
Joyce Aryee was also honored in mining and public service at the maiden edition of the Women in Excellence award in 2011 and was nominated as the “2011 Woman of the Year” by the American Biographical Institute (ABI). She was the first female to receive the Inspirational Woman Award at the Ghana UK Based Achievement (GUBA) Awards 2015 for creating change, which paved the way for women. Again, she won an award as the Public Relations Personality of the Year 2014 by the Institute of Public Relations Ghana and was mentioned in the list of 100 Global Inspiration Women in Mining in the world.
Aryee is an Honorary Fellow of the Ghana Institution of Engineers and received an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Mines and Technology in recognition of her immense contributions to the growth of the mining industry.
Achimota School named their 17th dormitory, 'Rev Joyce R. Aryee House' after her, in honor of her selfless service to the nation and commitment as well as contribution to her alma mater.
Publications.
Aryee has co-authored the book "The Transformed Mind" with Samuel Koranteng-Pipim.


Frederick Streetly

 Frederick James Fairland Streetly, OBE (1879-1957) was an Anglican priest in the mid Twentieth century.
Streetly was educated at Codrington College, Barbados and the University of Durham and ordained in 1916. After a curacy at Scarborough he was Rector of St Agnes, Port of Spain from 1932 to 1940; and then of St Paul, San Fernando until 1947. He was Archdeacon of Trinidad South from 1942 to 1947; and then of Tobago from 1947.
He died in March 1952.


Gustav Baron

Gustav Baron (October 16, 1847 in Kutina – March 18, 1914 in Zagreb) was Croatian theologian, university professor and rector of the University of Zagreb.
He studied theology in Vienna and Zagreb. He was ordained for a priest in 1873. He received his Ph.D in 1876 at the Faculty of Theology of the Royal University of Franz Joseph I. He was professor and chair of the Archiepiscopal Gymnasium in Zagreb. He became a docent at the Faculty of Theology in 1877, and a full professor in 1881. He served as the dean of the faculty in two mandates.
Baron was selected as a rector of the University of Zagreb in the academic year 1885/1886. The topic of his inaugural speech was the Bible. After his rectorship mandate expired, he served as a prorector for a year. In 1887 he was appointed as papal agent. He was the canon and the rector of the Theological Seminary in Zagreb in the period 1897-1907, and a general vicar from 1912 until his death. He was one of the founders of the Croatian Catholic movement and a reviver of church singing tradition.


Jewish Museum of Oporto

The Jewish Museum of Oporto was inaugurated in 2019 by the Jewish Community of Oporto (CIP/CJP) in partnership with B’nai B’rith International. At the inaugural speech, the president of this Jewish organisation, the oldest in the world, said: “This Jewish museum will mark the awakening of Jewish life in Portugal and serve as a beacon of light for the rest of Europe, a land now darkened by resurgent antisemitism”..
The Museum was disigned to help fight antisemitism. The Jewish Community of Oporto presented a video about the Jewish Museum of Oporto providing on film a comprehensive overview of the space.
The Museum is located on Rua de Guerra Junqueiro, opposite the synagogue. Once through the security gates, visitors will not be indifferent: the garden has a stone epigraph in memory of Chief Rabbi Isaac Aboab, the greatest religious authority of the 15th century, who when the Jews were expelled from Spain went to live in Oporto. Here he died and was interred by Abraham Zacuto, mathematician and astronomer. Ahead, a large display case contains a prison-carriage of the Inquisition, used in the film “1618", directed by Luís Ismael for the Community. Finally, at the entrance to the building is a message in Hebrew, which can be translated as follows: “Around the world, where a Jew encounters a Portuguese, he must help him; and where a Portuguese encounters a Jew, he must also help him.”
The first room has many important objects for the Jewish religion – the Torah scrolls, a replica of the Temple of Jerusalem, the volumes of the Talmud, the work "Mishné Torá" by Moisés Maimonides, a shofar and even a gold candelabrum. We are taken on a plurisecular voyage, which starts when Abraham’s forebears obeyed what are known as the Seven Laws of Noah, and continues with the story of his successors, the arrival in Egypt, the saga of the Hebrews arriving on Mount Sinai and the conquest of Canaan, the kingdom of David, the ten lost tribes, the destruction of the first Temple, the destruction of the second and the Jews’ departure into exile, which included the Iberian Peninsula. Here, for centuries the Jews lived side by side with the Romans, Germans, Muslims and Catholics.
Moving on from the first room, the voyage is accompanied by film shots of all ages, showing visitors the environment of the medieval Jewish community, the epigraph of Monchique Synagogue, the Edict of Expulsion decreed by King D. Manuel, the migration waves of the Portuguese Jews to all continents and three centuries of the Inquisition. A new section opens on the 19th century, particularly after the abolition of the Inquisition, when the first Jewish communities found shelter in Portugal – some were Sephardic: in Lisbon, Faro and Azores – others Ashkenazi: in Oporto, made up of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly during the first half of this latter century, the Jewish community of Oporto was mainly Ashkenazi. Between 1927 and 1934, there was a brave attempt by the only Portuguese Jew in the community to attract the Marranos to Judaism. This project was a complete failure and did not produce a single official Jew but it was successful in that the Sephardic diaspora paid for the construction of the huge synagogue that today houses a Jewish community of some five hundred Jews, mainly Sephardim, who for centuries lived in Balkan, Arab or Muslim countries. That part of the museum covering the 21st century shows many religious and cultural activities, and letters received from prominent people such as Pope Francis, Prime Minister António Costa and the Director of the Anti-Defamation League, Jonathan Greenblatt. The last rooms of the Museum offer a splendid view over to the synagogue. One harbours a winery with Port wine, the mark of the city and of the Jewish community. The other displays the many awards won at film festivals for the films which the community produced in a unique project worldwide, with Oporto Diocese, which involves charity actions.
The Jewish Museum of Oporto is included in a strategy of the local Jewish community to fight antisemitism. This strategy includes school visits to Kadoorie Mekor Haim Synagogue, films about the history of the Jews in Portugal; courses for secondary school teachers and others who are interested in themes relating to Judaism and the history of the Jews, and visits to the city’s Holocaust Museum.
The president of the human rights organisation B'nai B'rith International declared that “Jewish and Holocaust museums are essential in a Europe where the Jews, Judaism and Israel are increasingly hated. In 2019, I myself opened the Jewish Museum in Oporto and met in Lisbon with Catarina Vaz Pinto to ensure that this city’s Jewish museum is not forgotten".
The National Director of the Anti-Defamation League underlined the need for the two museums to act in tandem to fight antisemitism: "The Holocaust Museum will convey an important lesson to all: 'Do not be silent in the face of evil!', while the Jewish Museum will tend to reduce conspiracy theories and evil stereotypes concerning the Jews"
In 2021, a protocol of partnership, friendship and cooperation was established between the Historical Society of Independence of Portugal and the Jewish Community of Oporto, with the aim of deepening knowledge of the history of Portugal and of both institutions.
The protocol establishes an annual meeting, rotating between the Jewish Museum of Oporto and the Palace of Independence in Lisbon, to address a topic of public relevance and common interest.


Muslim brotherhoods of Senegal

This is a list of Sufi orders (Tariqas) in Senegal (and also the Gambia). They are active Muslim organizations that can also be found in many other parts of Africa and the Islamic world. Their members are mainly Wolofs, Fulas and Tocouleurs.
List.
The four largest Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal are:


Syro-Lebanese in Egypt

The Syro-Lebanese of Egypt (, transliterated: "Shawam Masr") (), also known as the Levantines of Egypt, are an ethnic minority group in Egypt. They are Egyptians who have ancestry originating from the Levant, mostly what is now Syria and Lebanon. The majority of Egypt's historic Syro-Lebanese community is Christian, mainly Eastern Catholic (Melkite and Maronite) and Eastern Orthodox.
Since antiquity, there has always been a Levantine presence in Egypt, however, they started becoming a distinctive minority in Egypt around the early 18th century. The majority of Syro-Lebanese migrants who arrived in Egypt during this time were French-speaking and highly influenced by the European Culture. By the dawn of the 20th century, the Syro-Lebanese of Egypt were considered a powerful and cosmopolitan community that played an important role in both Egypt's economy and culture.
Due to the rise in nationalism along with the loss of economic freedoms during the 1950s, a part of Egypt's Syro-Lebanese community left the country immigrating to the Americas, Europe, and Australia, as well as many returning to their native Lebanon (especially Beirut) and Syria. Notable descendants of Egypt's Syro-Lebanese community include the world-renowned Egyptian actor Omar Sharif (born Michel Chalhoub) and Egyptian film director Youssef Chahine.
History.
The relations between Egypt and the Levant go back to ancient times. However, the earliest instance of modern Levantine migration to Egypt happened after 1724, when a schism in the Greek Orthodox Church of Antioch resulted in a separate branch of Levantine Christians attached to Rome known as the Melkite Greek Catholics. Once the Syrian and Lebanese Greek Orthodox community was split, a migratory flow resulted in which Melkite Greek Catholics began leaving cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Zahle, and Sidon to move to Egypt. Regarding an early Maronite presence in Egypt dating from the 18th century, it is said that the Holy see of Rome appointed two Maronite priests to serve as advisers to the Franciscans who came from the Custody of the Holy Land to evangelize Egypt because "no one knows the land and mentality of the Coptic Christians like the Maronites".Later during the mid-1800s, due to the political conflict that existed in Lebanon and Syria between the Christian and Druze religious sects, many Syrian and Lebanese Christians, as well as Palestinian and Jordanian Christians to some extent, migrated to Egypt under the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha. These Syro-Lebanese or Levantine Christians, known in Egyptian Arabic as the "Shawam", were either of Greek Orthodox or Catholic (Melkite or Maronite) extraction. The reason immigrants from Lebanon and Syria were considered one ethnic group was because during the mid-1800s, Lebanon was not yet an independent state and was still part of Ottoman Syria, or "Bilad al-Sham" in Arabic, hence their label as "Shawam" or "Shami". Muhammad Ali Pasha endorsed various ethnic and religious groups, including Syro-Lebanese, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Italians, and Maltese to settle in Egypt.
From the building of the Suez Canal to the creation of modern Downtown Cairo, Egypt’s rulers went on a spending spree that attracted migrants from across the world. The Syro-Lebanese, who first migrated were French-speaking and well-educated (largely due to European and American missionaries), had a mindset in the British-run economy of Egypt at the time. As a result, they were able to flourish as an energetic and cosmopolitan community until the Nasser era of the mid-1950s, that adopted an Arabization mind set for the entire region. Most of the Syro-Lebanese were self-employed businessmen or craftsmen and had more of a "Westernized" education than others. Robert Solé, a French author of Levantine-Egyptian descent, describes all of these aspects of the Syro-Lebanese community in Egypt in his book, "Birds of Passage", as well as in his other publications.
The Syro-Lebanese established Melkite Greek-Catholic and Maronite Catholic churches throughout many areas of Egypt such as Cairo, Alexandria, Mansoura, Suez, Port Said, and Tanta. The Greek Orthodox Syro-Lebanese experienced conflict trying to establish their own churches under their native Antiochian denomination, and became under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Church of Alexandria, which was mainly run by an ethnic Greek clergy.
In Egypt, many families of Syro-Lebanese origin became successful in Egypt's business sector along with the established Armenian and Greek communities. Many were involved in Egypt's booming cotton industry. The famous Egyptian newspaper, "Al-Ahram", was created by the Syro-Lebanese Takla family in Egypt.
Syro-Lebanese families dominated the publishing industry, owning major printing houses like Dar al-Hilal (est. 1892), which gave them enormous influence on the country’s cultural life. Even Rose al-Yusuf, the quintessential Egyptian cultural figure from the first half of the twentieth century, was originally Levantine of Turkish descent. The (then) irreverent political and literary magazine she founded and named after herself continues to this day, albeit in state hands like Al-Ahram.
Even the material culture of Cairo has been suffused by Syro-Lebanese influence. The most prolific architect in Central Cairo between the 1930s and 1960s was Antoine Selim Nahas, who is seen as the one of the modernist architects in Egypt. Nahas, who built among other important buildings the Beirut National Museum, established a wildly successful practice in Cairo, where he designed buildings for the rich and famous, often Levantine-Egyptians like himself, such as the actor Farid al-Atrash. Even though the number of Levantine-Egyptians still in Egypt is drastically low today, the Syro-Lebanese community retains its strength in some aspects of the cultural and entertainment industries. Cairo’s most famous restaurant entrepreneur, Nisha Sursock, comes from a prominent Beirut Greek Orthodox family.
The Levantine community in Egypt counted more than 100,000 members at the turn of the 20th century: civil servants, hairdressers, cobblers, drivers, engineers, dentists, doctors, shopkeepers, painters. Their aggregate wealth was reckoned at one and a half billion francs, that is 10% of the Egyptian GDP. Those who had capital invested it in small businesses (oil, soaps, tobacco, patisserie). Others created more important companies trading or producing salt, sodium, textiles, perfume, wood, silk. This economic success led to the foundation of schools, clubs, and charities, generally linked to a place of worship which was most of the time a church. A minority returned to their home village but the majority remained “semi-detached”, settling for several generations in Egypt without for all that involving themselves fully in the host society.
In Mansoura, a city that used to be under huge French and European influence. The Levantines excelled equally as lawyers, cotton trade entrepreneurs, large real-estate owners, medical doctors and pharmacists, department store and restaurant and hotel owners, bankers, and financial agents. They were also renowned for their large estates, like the heirs of Comte Khalil de Saab and the Sussah family, Nagib Sursock, and the 'izba of George Daoud. They owned several international hotels. For instance, Khalil Bahari owned the Semiramis Hotel, which included the best restaurant in Mansoura. Dhaher al-Rayyes was the owner of the largest hotel in Mansoura, the Paris Hotel, while his brother, Bichara, owned the Claridge Hotel, and a third brother owned the Imperial Hotel.
The Shawam of Mansoura occupied key positions as medical doctors, showing why nearly half of the doctors in Mansoura used to be foreigners at that time, mainly Europeans. Levantines also notably became bank managers. Some Shawam earned the titles of Count, like Count Saab and Count Chedid. Others earned the titles of Pasha and Bek, while a few even earned the title of Emir (Prince), like the Lutfallah, and subsequently the Sursock, family.
Identity.
The term "Syro-Lebanese" or "Syrian-Lebanese" is an umbrella term to identify the people of the Levant, especially the generations who lived when most of the region was known as Bilad al-Sham, or Greater Syria. Between the late 18th century and early 20th century, thousands of Levantines left their homeland, mainly due to warfare, and Egypt became the first stop for many who aimed to reach the Western world.
In Egypt, as well as other nations with Syrian and Lebanese diaspora communities, the Levantines mainly identified by religion and city of origin, rather than by ethnicity. For example, one could identify as a "Greek Catholic from Zahle", while another could identify as "Greek Orthodox from Aleppo". For the most part, religious denomination and city of origin were more important to the Levantines than an actual "Levantine" or "Syro-Lebanese" identity. This may explain why it was generally easy for the Syro-Lebanese to assimilate into their newly found homelands and mix with other Christian populations, especially in Egypt. However, the Egyptians, and especially the Coptic Orthodox Christians, could easily point out a Levantine's non-native background due to their foreign Christian background, if not by their overall lighter skin tone.
After generations of living in Egypt, most of this community's descendants, now with Egyptian nationality, tended to identify more as "Egyptian", rather than "Levantine", "Syrian", or "Lebanese", while still maintaining their original Christian sect of identity. However, intermarriage for the Levantines in Egypt eventually became more common after generations, either with native Coptic Christians whom are in millions or with other foreign minority Christians such as Greeks, Armenians, and Maltese. There was much less intermarriage between Levantine Christians and native Muslims, as marriage between Christians and Muslims is still considered taboo in Egypt.
Churches.
Christianity is the dominant religion among Egyptians of Syro-Lebanese descent. The majority follow Greek Orthodox (originally Greek Orthodox Antiochian, but then falling under Greek Orthodox Alexandrian jurisdiction in Egypt), a founder sect of Christianity since the Greco-Roman Egypt, Melkite Greek Catholic Church and the Maronite Church. With Catholic education being popular among Christian families in Egypt, many Levantines also naturally attended Roman Catholic churches regardless of religious background.
• Greek Orthodox & Catholic Churches in Egypt:
Diaspora.
The number of Syro-Lebanese in Egypt has decreased due to the nationalization policies of the Nasser government after the 1952 revolution. As a result, there has been extensive migrations to other countries such as Canada, the United States, France, Australia, Switzerland, and Belgium. The remaining Syro-Lebanese in Egypt began integrating into the rest of Egyptian society, including extensive intermarriage with Coptic Christians and Muslims. Today, most Egyptians of Levantine roots tend to identify more as Egyptian rather than Syrian or Lebanese, even though some traditionally belong to Christian denominations like Greek Orthodox other than Egypt's native Coptic Orthodox, Coptic Catholic, or native Protestant churches.
A large number of Syro-Lebanese families from Egypt now reside in Montreal; The communities of St. George Antiochian Orthodox Church, Saint-Sauveur Melkite Greek-Catholic Cathedral, and St. Maron Church (Maronite Catholic), have many parishioners who are from Egypt or are descendants of Egyptian immigrants. Records from 1987 show that up to 250 families out of the total 1,300 registered families of St. George's Antiochian Orthodox Church of Montreal were originally from Egypt. In that same year, the Melkite Saint Sauveur Cathedral of Montreal reported to have approximately two-thirds of its 3,000 registered families originating from Egypt. Records from the St. Maron Church in Montreal show that out of its total 1,284 registered families in 1987, 600 of them were Maronites from Egypt.
Example of those Greek Catholic Melkite Christians who faced oppression from Nasser regime and was forced to get out residing in Europe, Americas and Australia are; Absi, Ackaoui, Allouche, Anhoury, Arcache, Assouad, Ayrout, Ayoub, Azzam, Barakat, Behna, Bichara, Bittar, Boulad, Bahri, Cassis, Chahine, Chalhoub, Dabbour, Debbané, Doummar, Dahan, Eid, Fakhoury, Gargoura, Gorra, Haddad, Hawawini, Hindeleh, Hobeika, Homsy, Jaouich, Kassab, Kahil, Kahla, Kheir, Kfouri, Klat, Karam, Lahham, Mabardi, Médawar, Michaka, Mirza, Mitri, Naggar, Naoum, Nahas, Nimr, Rabbath, Rathie, Sarkis, Sednaoui, Sabet, Sabbagh, Samman, Sayeh, Sakakini, Sabounghi, Solé, Toutounji,Talka, Tawil, Tagher, Tawa, Yansouni, Zalka, Zayat, Zananiri, Zogheb.
References.


Raja Nahar Khan

Wali-e-Mewat Raja Nahar Khan, Bahadur, f.k.a Raja Sonpar Pal, the ruler of Mewat, was the progenitor of Khanzada Rajput tribe. He converted to Islam during the era of Firuz Shah Tughlaq in 1355.
Background.
He was the son of Yaduvanshi Rajput Raja Lakhan Pal of Kotla Fort and great-grandson of Raja Adhan Pal (who was 4th in descent from Raja Tahan Pal). Tahan Pal, who founded Timangarh, was the eldest son of Maharaja Bijai Pal (founder of Bijai Garh and Maharaja of Karauli), who was 88th in descent from Krishna.
Conversion to Islam.
Kunwar Sonpar Pal (later Raja Nahar Khan) and his brother Kunwar Samar Pal (later Chaju Khan), the sons of Raja Lakhan Pal, were in service of Sultan Firuz Shah Tughlaq of Delhi Sultanate. They were accompanying Sultan in one of his hunting expedition, where the Sultan was attacked by a tiger. Kunwar Sonpar Pal, with his brilliant archery skills, saved the Sultan by killing the tiger. Sultan Firuz then invited the brothers to embrace Islam. After accepting Islam, Sultan Firuz gave them the title of Khan. Kunwar Samar Pal name was changed to "Chahju Khan", while Kunwar Sonpar Pal was given the name of "Naher Khan".
Founder of Khanzada Rajput tribe.
Naher Khan had nine sons, his descendants are known as Khanzada Rajput.
Wali of Mewat.
Raja Nahar Khan of Kotla was a high ranking noble in the royal court of Delhi Sultanate. In 1372, Firuz Shah Tughlaq granted him the Lordship of Mewat. He established a hereditary polity in Mewat and proclaimed the title of Wali-e-Mewat. Later his descendants affirmed their own sovereignty in Mewat. They ruled Mewat till 1527. The last Khanzada Rajput ruler of Mewat was Hasan Khan Mewati, who died in the Battle of Khanwa.
Delhi Power Struggle.
In 1388, Bahadar Nahar Khan aided Abu Bakr Shah , grandson of the late Emperor Firuz Shah Tughlaq, in expelling from Dehli Abubakar's uncle Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud Shah Tughluq and in establishing the former on the throne. In a few months, however, Abu Bkar had to give away before Nasiruddin, and he then fled to Bahadar Nahar's stronghold in Mewat State, where he was pursued by Nasiruddin. After a struggle Abubakar and Bahadar Nahar surrendered, and Abubakar was placed in confinement for life, but Bahadar Nahar received a robe and was allowed to depart.
Timur's Invasion of India.
In 1398 during Timur's Invasion of Delhi, Nahar Khan withdrew to his Kotla Tijara and watched the development of events from there. Mewat State during this time was flooded with fugitives fleeing from Delhi and Khizr Khan, (the future Sultan of Delhi), was one of those who took shelter in Mewat. After defeating Nasiruddin, Timur sent two envoys to Mewat State who invited Wali of Mewat for a meeting with him. Nahar accepted this invitation and both met in 1398. As a gesture of goodwill and symbol of friendship Nahar Khan gifted Timur two white parrots, which Timur praised highly. Timur himself, make prominent mention of the conduct of Nahar Khan during the Invasion of India in AD 1398. Timur states that he sent an embassy to Nahar Khan at Kotila, to which a humble reply was received. Bahadar Nahar sent as a present two white parrots that belonged to the late Emperor. Timur remarks that these parrots were much prized by him.
Death.
In 1402, Nahar Khan was killed in an ambush by his in-laws of Kishangarh Bas. After his death, his son Raja Bahadur Khan succeeded him as Wali-e-Mewat.
Legacy.
He had nine sons namely Wali-e-Mewat Raja Bahadur Khan, Malik Alaudin Khan, Shah Mehmood Khan, Pir Shahab Khan, Malik Haroon Khan, Siraj Khan, Fateh Khan, Noor Khan and Nizam Khan. He was the progenitor of Khanzada Rajput community. Hasan Khan Mewati, Nawab Feroz Khan, Fateh Naseeb Khan, Abdul Kadir Khanzada and Shahzeb Khanzada are his direct descendants.
Haveli Naharwali, in Kucha Sadullah Khan of Chandani Chowk in Old Delhi, is said to be originally owned by him, which later came in the ownership of family of former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, where he was born and his grandfather sold it to Prem Chand Gola after whom this area is now called Gola Market.