Islamic fundamentalism in Iran

The history of Islamic Principlism in Iran covers the history of Islamic revivalism and the rise of political Islam in modern Iran. Today, there are basically three types of Islam in Iran: traditionalism, modernism, and a variety of forms of revivalism usually brought together as fundamentalism. Neo-fundamentalists in Iran are a subgroup of fundamentalists who have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism and Marxism.
The term Principlists, or "Osoulgarayan", is an umbrella term commonly used in Iranian politics to refer to a variety of conservative circles and parties. The term contrasts with reformists or "Eslaah-Talabaan" who seek religious and constitutional reforms in Iran.
Definition.
"Fundamentalism is the belief in absolute religious authority and the demand that this religious authority be legally enforced. Often, fundamentalism involves the willingness to do battle for one's faith. Fundamentalists make up only one part of any religion's followers, who usually fall along a wide spectrum of different interpretations, beliefs and strong values."
There are some major differences between Christian fundamentalism and what is called Islamic fundamentalism. According to Bernard Lewis:
"In western usage these words [Revivalism and Fundamentalism] have a rather specific connotation; they suggest a certain type of religiosity- emotional indeed sentimental; not intellectual, perhaps even anti intellectual; and in general apolitical and even anti-political. Fundamentalists are against liberal theology and biblical criticism and in favor of a return to fundamentals-i.e. to the divine inerrant text of the scriptures. For the so call fundamentalists of Islam these are not and never have been the issues. Liberal theology have not hitherto made much headway in Islam, and the divinity and inerrancy of the Quran are still central dogmas of the faith ... Unlike their Christian namesakes, the Islamic fundamentalists do not set aside but on the contrary embrace much of the post-scriptural scholastic tradition of their faith, in both its theological and its legal aspects."
The Islamist version of political Islam ("neo-fundamentalism" in this article) emerged in response to the perceived shortcomings of fundamentalism. The Islamists, with their cosmopolitan backgrounds, introduced various tools they had borrowed from the West into their organizational arsenal. Ideologically, they drew on antimodernist philosophies that embodied Western dissatisfaction with the consequences of industrialization and positivism.
Iranian fundamentalists and conservatives, commonly describe themselves as "principalist" (also spelled "principlist"); that is, acting politically based on Islamic and revolutionary principles.
Background.
Currently there exists three main types of Islam in Iran: traditionalists (represented by Hossein Nasr, Yousef Sanei), modernists (represented by Abdolkarim Soroush), fundamentalists (represented by Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, and several Grand Ayatollahs the youngest one Mahdi Hadavi). Subsequently, religious fundamentalism in Iran has several aspects that make it different from Islamic fundamentalism in other parts of the world. The terms Iranian "conservatism," "fundamentalism" and "neo-fundamentalism" are all subject to numerous philosophical debates. Javad Tabatabaei and Ronald Dworkin and a few other philosophers of law and politics have criticized the terminology and suggested various other classifications in the context of Iranian political philosophy.
According to Bernard Lewis:
"Even an appropriate vocabulary seemed to be lacking in western languages and writers on the subjects had recourse to such words as "revivalism", "fundamentalism" and "integrism." But most of these words have specifically Christian connotations, and their use to denote Islamic religious phenomena depends at best on a very loose analogy."
Some researchers, categorized Iranian thinkers into five classes:
Traditionists who account for the majority of clerics keep themselves away from modernity and neither accept nor criticize it. Traditionalists believe in eternal wisdom and are critics of humanism and modernity. Traditionalists believe in a sort of religious pluralism which makes them different from Fundamentalists. Fundamentalists are also against modernity. Contrary to traditionists, fundamentalists openly criticize modernity. Moreover, fundamentalists believe that for reviving the religion in the modern era and for opposing modernity, they need to gain social and political power. This makes fundamentalists different from traditionists and traditionalists who are not interested in gaining political power.
As an example of different views on fundamentalism, one can refer to Ruhollah Khomeini who is considered as populist, fundamentalist and reformer by various observers. In July 2007 Iranian reformist president Mohammad Khatami said that Ruhollah Khomeini was the leading "reformist" of our time.
Emergence.
The birth of fundamentalist Islam in Iran is attributed to the early 20th century, almost a century after secular humanism and its associated art and science entered Iran. Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri and Navvab Safavi were among the pioneers of religious fundamentalism in Iran and today serve as the Islamic Republic's foremost heroes and role models.
Iran was the first country in the post-World War II era in which political Islam was the rallying cry for a successful revolution, followed by the new state formally adopting political Islam as its ruling ideology. The grand alliance that led to the 1979 revolution abandoned the traditional clerical quietism, adopting a diverse ideological interpretation of Islam. The first three Islamic discourses were Khomeinism, Ali Shariati's Islamic-left ideology, and Mehdi Bazargan's liberal-democratic Islam. The fourth discourse was the socialist guerrilla groups of Islamic and secular variants, and the fifth was secular constitutionalism in socialist and nationalist forms.
Hassan Rahimpour Azghandi offers the following apologia for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism:
While some researchers refute explanations of "Islamic fundamentalism" as an anti-imperialist political force directed against Western dominance in the Islamic world, others, such as Moaddel, argue that Islam has been politicized only during the second half of the twentieth century as a discourse of opposition, not to Western domination in the state system, but to the ideas, practices, and arbitrary political interventions of a westernizing secularist political elite. This elite has established ideologically
uniform, repressive states which have imposed a Western model and outlook in Muslim societies by coercive means. Islamism thus emerged as a competing narrative contending for state power against a secularist discourse. Its goal was to seize state power through an Islamization of all aspects of life in a Muslim society.
In May 2005, Ali Khamenei defined the "reformist principle-ism" (Osoulgaraiee eslah-talabaaneh) of his Islamic state in opposition to the perceived hostility of the West:
In January 2007, a new parliamentary faction announced its formation. The former "Osulgarayan" ("principalist") faction divided into two due to "lack of consensus" on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's policies. The new faction was named "Faction of creative principalists" which is said to be critical of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's neo-principalist policies and to reject conservatism on such matters related to the government. The main leaders of the faction are Emad Afroogh, Mohammad Khoshchehreh, Saeed Aboutaleb and MP Sobhani.
Viewpoints.
There is a lot that is unique about Iranian fundamentalism but it nonetheless must be seen as one of the Abrahamic revivalisms of the twentieth century. As in the course of the Persian Constitutional Revolution nearly a century earlier, the concept of justice was at the center of the ideological debates among the followers of the three Islamic orientations during and after the revolution. The conservatives (principalists) adhered to the traditional notion of Islamic justice, one which, much like the Aristotelian idea of justice, states that "equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportionately to their relevant differences, and all with impartiality." Neoprincipalists, on the other hand, gave a messianic interpretation to the concept, one that promised equal distribution of societal resources to all—including the "unequals." And finally, those with a liberal orientation to Islam understood the notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary slogan of egalité, i.e., the equality of all before the law.
While the principalists (conservatives) were generally suspicious of modern ideas and resistant to modern lifestyles at the time of the Iranian revolution, the Islamic radicals (neo-principalists) were receptive to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular intellectuals and political activists.
Many of the so-called neo-principalists (neo-fundamentalists), like Christian fundamentalists, pull out a verse from the scriptures and give it a meaning quite contrary to its traditional commentary. Also, even while denouncing modernism as the "Great Satan", many principalists accept its foundations, especially science and technology. For traditionalists, there is beauty in nature which must be preserved and beauty in every aspect of traditional life, from chanting the Qur'an to the artisan's fashioning a bowl or everyday pot. Many principalists even seek a Qur'anic basis for modern man's domination and destruction of nature by referring to the injunction to 'dominate the earth' – misconstruing entirely the basic idea of vicegerency: that man is expected to be the perfect servant of God.
An example of an environmental problem is the overpopulation of the earth. The Neo-fundamentalists's family policy is to increase the population dramatically. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call for increasing Iran's population from 70 to 120 million can be understood in the same line.
In Mehdi Mozaffan's chapter on a comparative study of Islamism in Algeria and Iran, he says,
A major difference between Shia fundamentalism in Iran and mainstream Islamic fundamentalism is that the former has nothing to do with Salafism. According to Gary Legenhausen: "The term "Islamic Fundamentalism" is one that has been invented by Western journalists by analogy with "Christian Fundamentalism". It is not a very apt term, but it has gained currency. In the Sunni world it is used for groups descended from the Salafiyyah movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood." It is worth noting that the concept of "Salaf" (السلف) does not exist in Shia theology in contrast to Sunni Islam as well as Christianity (a similar concept referred to as "original Christianity").
Political Islam consists of a broad array of mass movements in the Muslim world, which share a conviction that political power is an essential instrument for constructing a God-fearing society. They believe that Muslims can fulfill their religious obligations only when public law sanctions and encourages pious behavior. To this end, the majority of these movements work to take control of state power, whether by propaganda, plebiscite, or putsch.
A look through several generations of clerics in seminaries shows significant differences in viewpoints and practical approaches. When young Ruhollah Khomeini urged his mentor Ayatullah Husain Borujerdi, to oppose the Shah more openly. Broujerdi rejected his idea. He believed in the "separation" of religion from politics, even though he was Khomeini's senior in rank. However just before his death Hossein Boroujerdi (d. 1961), expressed his opposition to the Shah's plans for land reform and women's enfranchisement. He also issued a fatwa for killing Ahmad Kasravi. Khomeini remained silent till his seniors Ayatollah Haeri or Ayatolla Boroujerdi's, were alive. Then he was promoted to the status of a Grand marja and started his activism and established his Islamic Republic eventually. Among Khomeini's students, there were notable clerics whose ideas were not compatible with their mentor. As examples of the prototypes of his students one can mention Morteza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti and Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi. Criticizing Mesbah Yazdi and Haghani school Beheshti said: "Controversial and provocative positions that are coupled with violence, in my opinion...will have the reverse effect. Such positions remind many individuals of the wielding of threats of excommunication that you have read about in history concerning the age of the Inquisition, the ideas of the Church, and the Middle Ages". Morteza Motahhari, the most notable student of Khomeini, was widely known as the main theoretician of Iranian revolution (next to Ali Shariati). While Mesbah Yazdi was an advocate of expelling secular University lecturers, Motahhari insisted that the philosophy of marxism or liberalism must be taught by a marxist and liberal respectively. Both Motahhari and Beheshti were assassinated by terrorist groups early after the revolution. Motahhari also introduced the concept of "dynamism of Islam".
After the triumph of the revolution in February 1979, and the subsequent liquidation of the liberal and secular-leftist groups, two principal ideological camps became dominant in Iranian politics, the "conservatives" (fundamentalists) and the "radicals" (neo-fundamentalists). The radicals' following of Khomeini of the revolution rather than his incumbency of the office of the Supreme Jurist (Vali-eFaqih) or his theocratic vision of the "Islamic Government." Today, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi clearly rejects Khomeini's "Islamic Republic" and supports the idea of "Islamic government" where the votes of people has no value.
Contrary to Iranian traditionalists, neo-fundamentalists as well as Iranian liberals have been under the influence of western thinkers. The Islamic neo-fundamentalists have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism without the welfare state.
During the 1990s, Akbar Ganji had discovered crucial links that connected the chain murders of Iran to the reigning neoconservative clergymen (Ali Fallahian, Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi) who had issued the fatwas legitimizing assassinations of secular humanists and religious modernists. In May 1996, Akbar Ganji presented a lecture at Shiraz University entitled "Satan Was the First Fascist." He was charged with defaming the Islamic Republic and tried in a closed court. His defense was later published under the title of "Fascism is one of the Mortal Sins." (Kian, Number 40, February 1997.)
Another important issue is the concept of "insider-outsider" introduced by Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. Accordingly, in his administration outsiders have less rights compared to insiders and cannot have any administrative posts. He stated that "I mean, you [to his followers] must trust an insider as a member of your clique. We must consider as insiders those persons who are sympathetic towards our revolution, our state and Islam. The outsiders are the ones who are opposed to the principle of our state."
In another speech Ali Khamenei compared what he called "American fundamentalism" and "Islamic fundamentalism":
He also made a clear distinction between what he called "extremism" and "fundamentalism": " There may be a handful of extremists here and there, but all the elements serving in various departments of our country are fundamentalists in essence."
Iranian neoconservatives are against democracy, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and disparage the people and their views. In particular Mesbah Yazdi is an aggressive defender of the supreme leader's absolute power, and he has long held that democracy and elections are not compatible with Islam. He once stated that:
In contrast to neo-principalists, principalists accepts the ideas of democracy and UDHR. During his lifetime, Ayatollah Khomeini expressed support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; in "Sahifeh Nour" (Vol.2 Page 242), he states: "We would like to act according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We would like to be free. We would like independence." However, Iran adopted an "alternative" human rights declaration, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in 1990 (one year after Khomeini's death).
There exists various viewpoints on practice of controversial Islamic criminal codes like stoning. Ayatollah Gholamreza Rezvani states that the Quran sanctions stoning unequivocally and since it is the word of God, it must be carried out in real life as if Rezvani is the Prophet on Earth tasked by God to carry forward this message. This is in contrast to principalist point of view. In December 2002, Hashemi Shahroudi, the principalist Head of Judiciary ordered a ban on the practice of stoning.
During Khatami's presidency, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi claimed that an unnamed former CIA chief had visited Iran with a suitcase stuffed with dollars to pay opinion-formers. "What is dangerous is that agents of the enemy, the CIA, have infiltrated the government and the cultural services," he was quoted as saying. On top of its official budget for Iran, the CIA had given "hundreds of millions of dollars to our cultural officials and journalists," he added. "The former head of the CIA recently came here as a tourist with a suitcase full of dollars for our cultural centres and certain newspapers. He made contact with various newspaper chiefs and gave them dollars." Nasser Pourpirar for instance believes that a significant portion of Iranian history are baseless fabrications by Jewish orientalists and Zionists. The whole existence of Pre-Islamic Iran is no more than a Jewish conspiracy and the most important key for analyzing today's world events is the analysis of ancient "Jewish genocide of Purim." Another neoconservative theorist, Mohammad Ali Ramin believes that contemporary western history (e.g. Holocaust) are all fabrications by Jews. He also claimed that Adolf Hitler was a Jew himself. M.A. Ramin, Hassan Abbasi, Abbas Salimi Namin and others have been giving speeches about Jewish conspiracy theory, Iranian and western history intensively all over the country since the establishment of Ahmadinejad government in 2005.
Currently, Abadgaran described itself as a group of Islamic neo-principalist, have the control over current Iranian government. However, it lost the 2006 city council election.
The problem with identity is at the heart of fundamentalism, no matter it is Islamic, Jewish or Christian. If people's religious identity becomes more prominent than the national identity, fundamentalism will rise. In other words, fundamentalism can be seen as "identity-ism." Many of the religious remarks that are made in Iran, especially from official platforms, basically rest on identity-oriented thinking and the inculcation of an identity known as a religious identity.
Under Ahmadinejad, neo-conservative forces are determined to make the Islamic Republic more Islamic than republican. Whether they will succeed is another matter. Power in Iran is a complicated matter, and various factions exist even among conservatives, who run the gamut from hard-liners to pragmatists. Some among Iran's leadership would accept accommodation with the West in exchange for economic and strategic concessions, while others are content to accept isolation from the West. Others favor a "Chinese model," which in Iran would mean opening the economy to international investment while maintaining the clergy's dominance. It is these complex internal forces that will decide the future of Iranian politics.
Circles, schools and organizations.
Fadayan-e Islam.
Fadayan-e Islam was founded in 1946 as an Islamic fundamentalist organization. The founder of the group was Navab Safavi, a neo-fundamentalist cleric. The group's aim was to transform Iran into an "Islamic state." To achieve their objective, the group committed numerous terrorist acts. Notable among these was the 1946 assassination of Ahmad Kasravi, an intellectual who had criticized the Shia Islamic clergy. The group also assassinated two prime ministers (Ali Razmara and Hassan Ali Mansour, 1951 and 1965) and an ex-prime minister (Hazhir, 1949).
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO).
The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the organization was an attempt in bridging Islam and Marxism to offer a revolutionary brand of Islam. It was expelled from Iran after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein starting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-Western attacks prior to the Revolution. Since then, it has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group's own leadership.
During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajai, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980–1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north.
In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. MKO is recognized as a terrorist group by both US and EU.
The MKO maintains fascistic behaviour with all those who do not share its views and positions and routinely attacks Iranian intellectuals and journalists abroad. For instance, MEK agents attacked Iranian journalist Alireza Nourizadeh and injured him seriously.
Haghani school.
Haghani Circle is a neo-fundamentalist school of thought in Iran founded by a group of clerics based in the holy city of Qom and headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, an influential cleric and theologian.
The school trains clerics with both a traditional and modern curriculum, including a secular education in science, medicine, politics, and Western/non-Islamic philosophy (the topics that are not taught in traditional schools). It was founded by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Ayatollah Dr. Beheshti and Ayatollah Sadoughi.
Many famous theologians and influential figures in Iran's politics after the revolution were associated (as teacher or student) with the Haghani Circle or follows its ideology.
Combatant Clergy Association.
The association is composed of right wing conservative elements of Iran's political culture, including the nation's foremost politicized clerics, the Friday prayer leaders in most of Iran's metropolitan areas, the bazaar merchants, and the Supreme Leader. Not surprisingly, members of this faction support a continuation of the status quo, including strict limits on personal freedoms and the continued primacy of the clergy in the nation's day-to-day governance. Important constituents of the Militant Clergy Society include the Islamic Coalition Society and the Coalition of Followers of the Line of the Imam.
The Combatant Clergy Association was the majority party in the 4th and 5th parliaments after the Iranian revolution. It was founded in 1977 by a group of clerics with intentions to use cultural approach to overthrow the Shah. Its founding members were Ali Khamenei, Motahhari, Beheshti, Bahonar, Rafsanjani and Mohammad Mofatteh and its current members include Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmad Jannati, Mahdavi Kani, Reza Akrami and Hassan Rohani.
As the foremost advocates of the Iranian status quo that has left millions disenfranchised, the Militant Clergy Society is exceedingly unpopular among rank-and-file Iranians.
Ansar e Hezbollah.
Ansar-e-Hezbollah is a militant neo-fundamentalist group in Iran. Mojtaba Bigdeli is a spokesman for the Iranian Hezbollah. Human Rights Watch strongly condemned the brutal assault on students at Tehran University halls of residence in the early hours of Friday 9 July 1999 by members of the Ansar-e Hezbollah.
Basij.
Basij is a military fundamentalist network established after the Iranian revolution. In July 1999, "Ezzat Ebrahim-Nejad" was shot dead in Tehran University dormitory by a member of Basij military force. The event initiated a huge demonstration. In 2001, a member of the Basij, Saeed Asgar attempted to assassinate Saeed Hajjarian a leading reformist and political advisor to reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Asagar was arrested and sentenced to spend 15 years in jail, but was released after spending only a short term in prison. Human Rights Watch informs that the Basij belong to the "Parallel institutions" ("nahad-e movazi"), "the quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open in crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at public events." Under the control of the Office of the Supreme Leader these groups set up arbitrary checkpoints around Tehran, uniformed police often refraining from directly confronting these plainclothes agents. "Illegal prisons, which are outside of the oversight of the National Prisons Office, are sites where political prisoners are abused, intimidated, and tortured with impunity." On 8 March 2004 the Basij issued a violent crackdown on the activists celebrating the International Women's Day in Tehran. On 13 November 2006, Tohid Ghaffarzadeh, a student at Islamic Azad University of Sabzevar was murdered by a Basij member at the University. The murderer reportedly said that what he did was according to his religious beliefs. Tohid Ghaffarzadeh was talking to his girlfriend when he was approached and stabbed with a knife by the Basij member.
Theories of state based on divine legitimacy.
Various theories of state based on immediate divine legitimacy have been proposed over the years by Iranian clerics. One can distinguish four types of theocracies. Typology of the types of government adumbrated in Shiite jurisprudential sources can be summarized as follows (in chronological order):
Islamic republic versus Islamic administration.
Since the election of pro-reform president Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there have been two basic approaches, two outlooks, toward the achievement of reform in Iran: "Reformists" within the regime (in-system reformers) essentially believe that the Constitution has the capacity—indeed, the positive potential—to lead the "Revolutionary" government of Iran toward "democracy." By contrast, secularists, who remain outside the regime, basically think that the Constitution contains impediments profound enough to block meaningful reform.
On the other hand, fundamentalists and in-system reformers on one side and neo-fundamentalists on the other side are struggling over "Khomeini’s Islamic Republic" versus "Mesbah’s Islamic administration." Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and Ansar-e-Hezbollah call for a change in the Iranian constitution from a republic to an Islamic administration. They believe the institutions of the Islamic Republic, such as the Majlis (Iran's Parliament), are contradictory to Islamic government which is completely centered around Velayat-e Faqih and total obedience to him.
Ali Khamenei, himself, has remained silent on the issue of whether Iran should have an Islamic Republic or an Islamic Administration. However, he clearly rejected the supervision of Assembly of Experts on the institutions that are governed directly under his responsibility (e.g. Military forces, Judiciary system and IRIB).
Neo-fundamentalists believe that the supreme leader is holy and infallible and the role of people and elections are merely to discover the leader. However, the legitimacy of the leader comes from God and not the people. In January 2007, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who won the 2006 election for Assembly of Experts, clearly rejected this idea and emphasized on the fact that the leader and the cleric members of the Assembly of Experts may make wrong decisions and the legitimacy of the leader comes from the people not the God.
Beyond these theoretical debates, elements of the "Islamic Administration" are (in practice) slowly replacing those of the "Islamic Republic".
Exporting Islamic Revolution and Islamist diplomacy.
Upon establishment of Islamic Republic, the two factions (conservatives and radicals) differed on foreign policy and cultural issues. The radicals (neo-cons) adamantly opposed any rapprochement with the United States and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries, while seeking to expand Iran's relations with the socialist bloc countries. They advocated active support for Islamic and liberation movements, so called "export of the revolution", throughout the world. The conservatives favored a more cautious approach to foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of normalizing Iran's economic relations with the rest of the world, so long as the West's political and cultural influence on the country could be curbed.
According to Iranian scholar Ehsan Naraghi, anti-Western attitude among Iranian Islamists has its root in Marxism and Communism rather than Iranian Islam. Iran and the West had good relations with mutual respect after the Safavid era. However, with the emergence of Communism in Iran, anti-Western attitudes were taken up by some extremists. As Naraqi states, anti-Western attitude in other parts of the Muslim world has a different root than the one in Iran.
After the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, pragmatists (under the leadership of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) sought to normalize Iran's relations with other countries, particularly those in the region, by playing down the once-popular adventurist fantasy of "exporting the Islamic revolution" to other Muslim lands. After the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 elections and the defeat of pragmatists/reformists (under the leadership of Mohammad Khatami), the Neoconservatives who gained full control of both parliament and government for the first time since the Iranian Revolution again recalled the idea of exporting the revolution after years of silence.
Since the Iranian Revolution, the new Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued an Islamic ideological foreign policy that has included creation of Hezbollah, subsidies to Hamas, opposition to Israel and Zionist leaders, and aid to Iraq's Shiite political parties. Hamas leaders verified in 2008 that since Israel pulled out of the Gaza strip in 2005 they have sent their fighters to Iran to train in field tactics and weapons technology. In an interview in 2007, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Kassem told the Iranian Arabic-language TV station al-Qawthar that all military actions in Lebanon must be approved by the authorities in Tehran; in 2008 Iran issued a stamp commemorating a recently killed Hezbollah leader.
Fundamentalism and political realism are diplomatically incompatible. It is believed that the most evident characteristic of diplomacy is flexibility. The reason Iran's diplomacy has encountered many shortcomings and lost numerous opportunities provided by international or regional political developments is the country's focus on fundamental values and neglect of national interests. Fundamentalism is always accompanied with idealism while diplomacy always emphasizes realities. Therefore, the model of realistic fundamentalism will not work in the diplomatic arena.
Muslim thinkers in the world generally believe in a sort of "religious internationalism." Even religious modernists in Iran have still some inclinations towards religious internationalism, and the concept of nation-state is not firmly established in their mind. These kinds of beliefs are mainly rooted in traditional thinking rather than postmodernism. There are however some religious intellectuals like Ahmad Zeidabadi who are against religious internationalism.
Meanwhile, Western countries have adopted various different strategies with respect to fundamentalists. The attitudes of these countries have been mainly driven by geopolitics and the oil market rather than religious extremism itself. According to Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation and a former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at CIA, "United States had no problem with Islam or even Islamic fundamentalism as such. [...] one of the closest American allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, is a fundamentalist state."
Also Maryam Rajavi, the leader of an Islamist-Marxist group, has been invited several times by EU parliament members to address the assembly. In 2004 Alejo Vidal Quadras, European Parliament's first Vice President, met Maryam Rajavi whose group is listed as a terrorist group by EU and USA.
Mehdi Noorbaksh, a professor at the Center for International Studies, University of St. Thomas in Texas, believes that the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism to world peace and security is based on politically and ideologically motivated misinterpretation of the reformist nature of Islamic revival. The portrayal of Iran as a radical Islamic terrorist state by the US has strengthened the extremists and weakened democratic, reformists groups in Iran. According to Professor Noorbaksh, "The spread of democracy and the introduction of socio-political reforms in the Middle East, especially in Iran, will undermine US domination over the region."
Seminary-University conflicts.
One of the main clarion calls raised within the geography of events known as the Cultural Revolution was the call for seminary-university unity. The original idea was a reconciliation between science and religion. In other words, the meaning of seminary-university unity was a resolution of the historical battle between science and religion. Resolving this battle is a scholarly endeavour, not a political and practical one. However, after the revolution, since clerics came to rule over the country, the idea of seminary-university unity, which meant understanding between seminary teachers and academics, gradually turned into submission by academics to clerics and seminary teachers, and it lost its logical and scholarly meaning and took on a political and practical sense. Appointment of Abbasali Amid Zanjani as the only cleric president of University of Tehran on 27 December 2005 can be understood in the same line. Tehran University is the symbol of higher education in Iran. Abbasali Amid Zanjani hold no academic degree and was appointed by Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, the minister of Science, Research, and Technology in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cabinet.
There was a journal in the 1980s, by the name of "University of Revolution" which used to include some material written by neofundamentalists. They wrote many articles to prove that science is not wild and without a homeland, that it is not the case that it recognises no geography, and that it is therefore possible for us to create "Islamic sciences."
In 2007, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a well-known cleric, attacked the University people calling them the most indecent people. In April 2008, four leading clerics namely Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Ebrahim Amini, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and Mohammed Emami-Kashani criticized Iranian Universities, University students and Iranian Higher education system as being secular, non-Islamic, indecent and cheap.
Islamist art and literature.
Both Iranian principle-ism and neo principle-ism are associated with their own art, cinema and literature. In cinema, the first attempts were perhaps made by Masoud Dehnamaki. Dehnamaki, a famous neo-principalist, made his first documentary film "Poverty and Prostitution" in 2002. His next documentary was "Which Blue, Which Red," a film about the rivalry between the Iranian capital's two football teams, Esteqlal and Persepolis, and their fans. He is now making his debut feature-length film "The Outcasts".
Iranian journalist turned documentary filmmaker Masud Dehnamaki was formerly the managing director and chief editor of the weeklies "Shalamcheh" and "Jebheh," which were closed by Tehran's conservative Press Court. These journals were among the main neo-principalist publications. The rightist newsweekly "Shalamcheh" under the editorship of Masoud Dehnamaki, one of the strongest opponents of President Khatami and his
policies, has been closed down by the press supervisory board of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, presumably for insulting or criticizing the late Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, who had called the "velayat-e faqih" position unislamic, prior to his passing away.
Perhaps the most influential neo-conservative newspaper during the 1990s and 2000s was Kayhan daily. Hossein Shariatmadari and Hossein Saffar Harandi (who later became a Minister of Culture) were the main editor and responsible chief of the newspaper. In 2006, the British ambassador to Tehran met Hossein Shariatmadari and acknowledged the role of Kayhan in Iran and the region.
To promote art and literature, "Islamic Development Organization" was founded by Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1991, Ali Khamenei revised the organization's structure and plans. The plan is to promote religious and moral ideas through art and literature. According to the Minister of Culture, Hossein Saffar Harandi, the funds for Qur'anic activities would increase by fourfold in the year 2007. "All of the ninth governments' cultural and artistic activities should conform to the Holy Book," he declared.
While promoting their own art and literature, principalists are against the development of art and literature that has no "valuable content." In 1996, following a fatwa by Ali Khamenei stating that music education corrupts the minds of young children, many music schools were closed and music instruction to children under the age of 16 was banned by public establishments (although private instruction continued). In 2010, Khamenei said that while music is permissible, it is not compatible with the values of the Islamic Republic, and promoted science and sport as alternatives to music.
Khamenei and his followers believe that "Nihilism and Beatle-ism" have ravaged Western youth. According to the renowned novelist and the first president of Iranian Association of Writers after the revolution, Simin Daneshvar, Islamic Republic has been generally hostile toward Iranian writers and intellectuals. This is contrary to the attitude of the Pahlavi regime, Daneshvar added in an interview with Etemaad Daily in 2007.
In 2007, Javad Shamghadri, artistic advisor to president Ahmadinejad, publicly stated that: "Like many other countries in the world, Iran too can get along without a film industry." "Only 20 percent of people go to the cinema, and their needs can be provided through the national radio and television network," he added.
Islamic-neoclassical economy.
In the early times of 1979 revolution Ayatollah Khomeini declared that what mattered was Islam and not the economy. In one of his comments, he dismissed the concerns of his first prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, about the economy by simply noting that "Economics is for donkeys!" However Khomeini in many occasions advised his followers about justice and giving priority to the rights of the deprived and the oppressed members of the community.
"Association of the Lecturers of Qom's Seminaries," or ALQRS (Jame'eh-ye Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyeh-ye Qom), published their authenticated version of Islamic economy in 1984. It was based on traditional interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, which the ALQRS find compatible with the market system and neoclassical economics. They emphasize economic growth against social equity and declare the quest for profit as a legitimate Islamic motive. According to ALQRS, attaining "maximum welfare" in a neoclassical sense is the aim of an Islamic economic system. However, the system must establish the limits of individual rights. In accordance with this ideological-methodological manifesto of the ALQRS, in February 1984, the council for cultural revolution proposed a national curriculum for economics for all Iranian Universities.
The concept of "Islamic economics" appeared as a rainbow on the revolutionary horizon and disappeared soon after the revolutionary heat dissipated (the end of the 1980s and after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini). It disappeared from Iranian political discourse for fifteen years. In the June 2005 presidential elections, neither the populist-fundamentalist
winning candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, nor any of his reformist or conservative opponents said a word about Islamic economy. However, after the establishment of Ahmadinejad's government, his neoconservative team opened the closed file of Islamic economy. For instance, Vice-President Parviz Davoudi said in 2006:
Factional conflict dominated Iranian economic politics under the Ayatollah Khomeini from 1979 to 1989. The two principal factions were a statist-reformist group that favored state control of the economy and a conservative group that favored the private sector. Both factions claimed Khomeini's support, but by 1987, he clearly had sided with the statist-reformists because he believed state capitalism to be the best way of heading off any threat to Islam. Khomeini's death on 3 June 1989 left the factions without their source of legitimation.
Principalists and Women issues.
Principalists, irrespective of their genders, support a very strict life style for women in Iran. The women in the seventh Iranian parliament were against the bill on Iran joining the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which the female reformists in the sixth parliament had fought for vigorously. The women in the seventh parliament have exhibited conservative, right wing tendencies, setting them apart from their counterparts in the preceding parliament. In July 2007, Ali Khamenei criticized Iranian women's rights activists and the "Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women" (CEDAW): "In our country ... some activist women, and some men, have been trying to play with Islamic rules in order to match international conventions related to women," Khamenei said. "This is wrong." However he is positive on reinterpreting Islamic law in a way that it is more favorable for women – but not by following Western conventions. Khamenei made these comments two days after an Iranian women's right activist Delaram Ali was sentenced to 34 months of jail and 10 lashes by Iran's judiciary. Iranian judiciary works under the responsibility of the Supreme Leader and is independent from the government.
Principalist in Iran supported traditional Iranian dress code on Iranian women soon after the revolution of 1979 which was outlawed by Pahlavi regime. Since then Iranian police, governed under the responsibility of the Supreme Leader, have continuously attacked women who do not adhere to the dress code. Fighting such women is considered "fighting morally corrupt people" by principalists. In 2007 a national crackdown was launched by the police in which thousands of women were warned and hundred were arrested. Violators of the dress code can be given lashes, fines and imprisonment. Sae'ed Mortazavi, Tehran's public prosecutor, made this clear when he told the Etemad newspaper: "These women who appear in public like decadent models endanger the security and dignity of young men". Mohammad Taqi Rahbar, a fundamentalist MP, agreed, saying, "Men see models in the streets and ignore their own wives at home. This weakens the pillars of family."
In October 2002, Ali Khamenei asked the Iranian women to avoid feminism and sexism in their campaigns for better female rights. "In the process of raising women's issues and solving their problems, feminist inclinations and sexism should be avoided," he told a group of female parliamentarians.
Like many other Grand Ayatollahs, Ali Khamenei believes that women should be wives and mothers. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has publicly stated: "The real value of a woman is measured by how much she makes the family environment for her husband and children like a paradise." In July 1997 Khamenei said that the idea of women's equal participation in society was "negative, primitive and childish."
Fundamentalist scholars justify the different religious laws for men and women by referring to the biological and sociological differences between men and women. For example, regarding the inheritance law which states that women's share of inheritance is half that of men, Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi quotes the Imam Ali ibn Musa Al-reza who reasons that at the time of marriage man has to pay something to woman and woman receives something, and that men are responsible for both their wives' and their own expenses but women have no responsibility thereof. Women, however, make up 27% of the Iranian labor force, and the percentage of all Iranian women who are economically active has more than doubled from 6.1% in 1986 to 13.7% in 2000.
In terms of health, life expectancy went up by eleven years between 1980 and 2000 for both Iranian men and women. With respect to family planning, "levels of childbearing have declined faster than in any other country," going from 5.6 births per woman in 1985 to 2.0 in 2000, a drop accomplished by a voluntary, but government-sponsored, birth control program. The fact that these changes have occurred within an Islamic legal regime suggests that formal legal status may not be a key factor determining women's well-being.
Women in Iran are only allowed to sing in chorus, and are not allowed to attend sport stadiums. In 2006 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, surprisingly, ordered the vice president to allocate half of the Azadi Soccer Stadium to women. Six Grand Ayatollahs and several MPs protested against Mr. Ahmadinejad's move, and finally the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the president to reconsider his order and follow the clergy.
Tolerance and civil rights.
The issue of tolerance and violence has been subject to intense debates in Iran. A cleric and member of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party, Hojjatoleslam Khorsand was cited by "Etemad daily" as saying that "in cultural issues, a policy of tolerance and laxity is not acceptable." Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, said about Islam's enemies: "They presented principles such as tolerance and compromise as absolute values while violence was introduced as a non-value." Mesbah-Yazdi believes that "the taboo – that every act of violence is bad and every act of tolerance is good – must be broken." Opponents of violence – "even some of the elite" – have been "deceived and entrapped" by "foreign propaganda," he said. Mesbah-Yazdi believes that "The enemies of Islam must also feel the harshness and violence of Islam." He also stated that "The culture of tolerance and indulgence means the disarming of society of its defense mechanism."
Dividing Iranians into Insider and Outsider was first introduced by Ali Khamenei. "Kayhan", which is governed by Ali Khamenei, editorialized on 5 August 1999 that an Insider is "someone whose heart beats for Islam, the revolution and the Imam," while Outsiders are those who have "separated their path from the line of the Imam, the system, and the people who, by relying on "citizens' rights", want to introduce themselves as equal partners."
Irreligious people in Iran have less rights then religious people, for example President of Iran by constitution must be religious. While Jews, Christians and other minorities have the right to take part in University entrance exams and can become members of parliament or city councils, irreligious people are not granted even their basic rights. Most irreligious people, however, hide their beliefs and pretend to be Muslims.
In one occasion, Persian daily "Neshat" published an article which called for abolishing the death penalty, claiming that the capital punishment is no cure for maladies afflicting modern society. In reaction to this article, conservative "Tehran Times Daily" stressed that writers of such articles must remember that the Iranian Muslim nation will not only never tolerate such follies but that the apostates will be given no opportunity to subvert the religion. Neshat's article drew severe criticism from the theologians and clerics, particularly the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who in clear words warned that apostate journalists will be liable to the death penalty, noted the article in the opinion column of the paper adding that the judiciary also promptly warned against any acts or words that undermine the pillars of the Islamic revolution.
In 2002, Ansar e Hezbollah, a hard-line group best known for disrupting reformist gatherings and beating up students, declared a "holy war" to rid Iran of reformers who promote Western democracy and challenge the country's Supreme Leader. Masoud Dehnamaki, an ideologue with the group, also said that Iranians who try to appease Iran's enemies such as the United States "should be stopped."
During Mohammd Khatami's presidency, minister Ataollah Mohajerani launched a tolerance policy ("Tasahol va Tasamoh"). This policy was criticized harshly by conservatives and ended in resignation of the minister.
While some conservatives like Emad Afrough support the idea of Civil society, some like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi are opposed to the idea of civil rights for citizens. Emad Afrough stated: "If we do not actively seek cultural change, our national and ethnic cultures get destroyed. We must consciously choose to answer the questions confronting us. Today's question is civil society ... I believe we can easily reconstruct civil society here (in Iran) based on our own values and cultural characteristics. Civil society is a necessity, and the growing complexity of society requires it. Our historical past also supports it. In reality, in Iran, as in elsewhere in the Middle East, the only obstacle to civil society is the state." Mesbah Yazdi, however, stated: "It doesn’t matter what the people think. The people are ignorant sheep."
In February 2004 Parliament elections, the Council of Guardians, a council of twelve members, half of whom are appointed by Ali Khamenei, disqualified thousands of candidates, including many of the reformist members of the parliament and all the candidates of the Islamic Iran Participation Front party from running. It did not allow 80 members of the 6th Iranian parliament (including the deputy speaker) to run in the election. Apart from Ali Khamenei, many conservative theorists as Emad Afrough supported the decision of Guardian council and accused the reformist parliament members of "being liberal, secular and with no Iranian identity". Referring to 7th parliament members, Ali Meshkini said that the list of candidates had signed by Imam Mahdi: "...I have a special gratitude for Honorable Baqiyatullah (aj), whom when seven months ago during the Night of Power the Divine angels presented him with the list of the names and addresses of the members of the (new) parliament, His Eminency signed all of them...".
In 2007, Ali Khamenei claimed that "Today, homosexuality is a major problem in the western world. They [Western nations] however ignore it. But the reality is that homosexuality has become a serious challenge, pain and unsolvable problem for the intellectuals in the west." Khamenei, however did not mention any names of western intellectuals.
While Iran has been quick to condemn attacks on Shia mosques and Shia holy places all over the world, it has been intolerant toward other religions. For instance in 2006, authorities in the city of Qom arrested more than 1,000 followers of the mystical Sufi tradition of Islam. Iran's hard-line daily "Kayhan" on 14 February 2006 quoted senior clerics in Qom as saying that Sufism should be eradicated in the city, while the Reuters news agency reported that in September one of Iran's hard-line clerics, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Noori Hamedani, called for a clampdown on Sufis in Qom. In 2006, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched a plan to suppress what he called "indecent religious associations that work under the cover of spirituality and Sufism". Morteza Agha-Tehrani, one of the closest disciples of Mesbah-Yazdi and moral advisor to President Ahmadinejad was the leader of a raid on Sufi mosques in Qom.
Criticism of Islamist interpretation of Islam in Iran.
Islamic scholarship in Iran has a long tradition of debate and critique. This tradition has come to pose a challenge to the constitutional order of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a number of seminary-trained scholars have applied their critical methods to basic issues of state legitimacy, in particular the state's right to insist on interpretive closure. For example, Dr. Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, the son of the late Shaykh Abdolkarim Haeri, the founding member of the Qom Theology School, has written a book about criticism of velayat-e faqıh. The regime has responded with force, convening special clergy courts to silence and imprison scholars, in violation of seminary norms of scholarly debate. These conspicuous acts of discipline seem to have backfired, as each escalating punishment has generated new critics within.
In Iran, unlike most countries, epistemological debates have political implications. Because the Islamic Republic stakes its legitimacy on the scholarly authority of its jurist-ruler, the regime takes such debates quite seriously. Through the Special Clergy Court, the regime has tried to clamp down on relativism, calling it self-defeating. The dissident seminarians, too, have
distanced themselves from relativism, calling themselves legitimate religious authorities. It is unclear how the dissidents will reconcile the two seminary norms of open debate and scholarly authority, or what political ramifications might follow from such a reconciliation. It is already clear, though, that the dissidents are creating an unprecedentedly rich documentary record of
Islamic critique of the Islamic state.
Future of fundamentalism in Iran.
Abdolkarim Soroush, advocate of Islamic pluralism, believes that fundamentalism in Iran will self-destruct as it is afflicted with an internal contradiction, which will shatter it from within.
Similar ideas have been put forward by Iranian scholar Saeed Hajjarian. Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saeed Hajjarian and Seyyed Hossein Nasr are among most notable critics of fundamentalism in Iran. Today Iranian neofundamentalists are a very strong minority in Qom seminaries. However, they enjoy support from two Grand Marjas, namely Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Noori Hamedani as well as direct support from supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.
Iran as a victim of Islamic fundamentalism.
There was a handful of Iranian victims among the thousands of innocent dead of 11 September 2001 attacks. Behnaz Mozakka was among the victims of 7 July 2005 London bombings.
In 1943, a Saudi religious judge ordered an Iranian pilgrim beheaded for allegedly defiling the Great Mosque with excrement supposedly carried into the mosque in his pilgrim's garment.
In 1987, Saudi Arabia's fundamentalist regime attacked Iranian pilgrims who were doing a peaceful annual demonstration of Haj and killed some 275 people. 303 people were seriously injured. For years, Iranian pilgrims had tried to stage peaceful political demonstrations in the Muslim holy city of Mecca during the "hajj". Iran sees the 1987 massacre of Iranian pilgrims as the first major attack by Sunni extremists like Osama bin Laden and the emerging Al-Qaeda on Shia Iranians. A few days before the massacre of Iranian pilgrims by Saudi police, USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians.
In March 2004 (Ashura), Al-Qaeda killed 40 Iranian pilgrims at the Shia holy places in Iraq. Many others were injured in the blasts. Ashura commemorates the killing of the revered Imam Hussein at the battle of Karbala in the seventh century AD. It is the event that gave birth to the Shia branch of Islam which predominates in Iran. Ashura is by far the most significant day in the Iranian religious calendar, and it is commemorated as a slaughter of innocents by traitors and tyrants.
Justifying the attack on Iran, Saddam Hussein accused Iranians of "murdering the second (Umar), third (Uthman), and fourth (Ali) Caliphs of Islam". In March 1988, Saddam Hussein killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately using nerve-gas agents. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and China.
Iraq also targeted Iranian civilians with chemical weapons. Many thousands were killed in attacks on populations in villages and towns, as well as front-line hospitals. Many still suffer from the severe effects. In December 2006, Saddam Hussein said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the 1980–1988 war but he took issue with charges that he ordered attacks on Iraqis.
References and further reading.
Written by Principalists:
Written by others:


Port-au-Prince Haiti Temple

The Port-au-Prince Haiti Temple is a temple of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) in the Port-au-Prince suburb of Pétionville, Haiti. It is located adjacent to an existing meetinghouse at the intersection of Route de Frères (Delmas 105) and Impasse Saint-Marc (Frères 23).
History.
The intent to construct the temple was announced by church president Thomas S. Monson on April 5, 2015, during the Sunday morning session of the church's general conference. The Abidjan Ivory Coast and Bangkok Thailand temples were announced at the same time.
At a stake conference in Port-au-Prince on March 12, 2017, apostle Neil L. Andersen announced that a location for the temple had been selected and acquired. On October 28, 2017, a groundbreaking ceremony to signify the beginning of construction took place, with Walter F. González presiding.
In August 2018, the LDS Church announced that Fritzner A. Joseph, a former president of the Haiti Port-au-Prince Mission, would serve as the temple's first president following its dedication.
On November 14, 2018, the LDS Church originally announced that the temple was scheduled for dedication on May 19, 2019. On January 18, 2019, the church provided new dates, announcing the public open house that was held from August 3 through August 17, 2019, excluding Sundays. The temple was dedicated on September 1, 2019 by David A. Bednar.
In 2020, like all the church's other temples, the Port-au-Prince Haiti Temple was closed in response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Temple district.
At the time of its dedication, the temple district includes the five stakes and four districts in Haiti, in which approximately 24,000 members reside.


Edward Morrow

Edward Sydney Morrow (1934–2003) Anglican priest and anti-apartheid activist in Namibia, England, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Biography.
Morrow was born in Brakpan, Transvaal on 30 July 1934, the youngest of seven children. He trained as a quantity surveyor and architectural draughtsman, and worked in Durban for the construction firm Murray & Roberts. He and his wife Laureen were active members of the parish of St Barnabas, on the Bluff in Durban.
In 1970 Bishop Colin Winter, of what was then known as the Diocese of Damaraland, and later the Diocese of Namibia, spoke at a meeting in Durban, and said that people were needed to help the Anglican Church in Namibia. Ed Morrow said he doubted whether he could help, as he was just a builder, but Bishop Winter encouraged him to go anyway. He and his wife Laureen Morrow put some of their furniture into storage, sold some more, and bought a second-hand Volkswagen Kombi with the proceeds, packed the remaining furniture into it, and set off for Windhoek, 1800 kilometres away.
On arrival, they established a building firm. They wanted to call it "Ikon Construction", but the registrar of companies said the name was already taken, so they turned it around and called it "Noki Construction", with a share capital of 200 shares at R1.00 each. The diocese owned 198 shares, Ed owned one, and the diocesan treasurer owned one.
Clergy in Ovamboland were asked to recommend three people from their parishes who wanted to learn the building trade, and three young men joined the firm. They undertook various building projects for the diocese and outside work as well. At his report to the Diocesan Synod in 1971 Ed Morrow noted that they paid three times the going rate for building workers in Windhoek, and were respected in town for quoting fair prices and doing a good job, which showed that it was possible to run a business on Christian lines and still make a profit.
Ed Morrow later went to England to train to be a priest at Queen's College, Edgbaston, Birmingham, and had barely finished his training when he was recalled to Namibia as Vicar General after the deportation of Bishop Richard Wood in June 1975. Three years later he was himself deported from Namibia, and then went to work in the Anglican Diocese of Swaziland at the Usuthu mission. He and his wife Laureen visited Zimbabwe for the independence celebrations in 1980, and were asked to return to help rebuild after the Chimurenga, the war of liberation, and for the next few years he was back in the building trade.
In 1984 Ed Morrow and Laureen moved to Sabie, in the Anglican Diocese of Pretoria, but a couple of years later they were asked by the Namibian churches to set up an ecumenical pastoral care centre for Namibian exiles in Europe, and so moved to Islington, in London. When Namibia became independent he became vicar of St Thomas's, Stamford Hill, in London, and chaplain of Bromley College, a home for retired clergy.
He died on August 13, 2003 of natural causes.


Mary Stockdale

Mary Ridgway Stockdale (1774–1854) was an English writer on the themes of Christian spirituality. She was born on 18 May 1774 in parish of St James, Piccadilly, Westminster, and was the daughter of John Stockdale and sister of John Joseph Stockdale.
Early life.
Mary was a sickly child, educated at the home of her father, a publisher. As she grew older, her health recovered and she pursued her own education, reading widely and enthusiastically. She soon devoted herself to nursing her mother and family and a young maid servant Elizabeth Haws. When Elizabeth died, Mary wrote her first poem, "The Effusions of the Heart" which her father offered to publish. However, Mary modestly refused and only allowed publication when she herself again fell ill and believed herself near to death. In "The Mirror of the Mind", she wrote of "the emptiness of sublunary things" and that she held "the most perfect indifference for everything around me."
Works.
— besides translations from Arnaud Berquin (The Looking-glass for the Mind, Or, Intellectual Mirror: Being an Elegant Collection of the Most Delightful Little Stories and Interesting Tales) and others, and some minor pieces.
She died at the age of 80 and was buried on 16 June 1854 in the parish of Hayes, Middlesex.


Cruz v. Beto

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court upheld a Free Exercise claim on the basis of the allegations that the state of Texas had discriminated against a Buddhist prisoner by "denying him a reasonable opportunity to pursue his Buddhist faith comparable to that offered other prisoners adhering to conventional religious precepts."
Background.
Fred Arispe Cruz, a Mexican-American born in San Antonio, Texas in 1939, was often in trouble with the police in his teenage years, and became addicted to heroin. In 1960, at 21, Cruz was arrested and convicted of “robbery by assault”. He was sentenced to 50 years in a state prison in 1961.
Cruz denied taking part in the robberies. Wanting to appeal his conviction but unable to afford a lawyer, Cruz began to read all of the law books that he could find in the prison library. Despite only having an 8th grade education, Cruz filed his first pro se appeal to the robbery charge in 1962. Fed up with the harsh field labor, brutal corporal punishments and arbitrary disciplinary hearings experienced by prisoners Cruz uses his new-found knowledge to write a lawsuit against the prison system.
Because of his “legal activities” Cruz was classified as an agitator and transferred to the “Ellis Unit” (Also known as the “Alcatraz of Texas”) in 1963. At the Ellis Unit Cruz was pushed to drop his lawsuit by enduring many hours of solitary confinement. In 1967 Cruz wrote to Reverend Hogen Fujimoto, minister in the Shin Buddhist Churches of America (BCA) to request information on Buddhism. Cruz shared the information he received with other inmates which landed him back in solitary, which at the time meant a bread and water diet with a small meal served every third day.
Despite the abusive conditions Cruz succeeded in filing his own lawsuit as well as those of other inmates. One of the suits Cruz assisted with is that of a Muslim at the facility who argued that his civil rights were being violated. Warden McAdams punished two inmates for the incident and kept Muslim prisoners at work in the fields six days a week instead of the five days assigned to other inmates. Within days a riot broke out in the Muslim cell block.
This 1968 riot was the first at Ellis Unit and helped build solidarity among prisoners and gain the attention of outsiders. One of these outsiders was Frances Jalet (later Frances Jalet-Cruz, as Cruz and Jalet were married after his prison release), an attorney whom Cruz had contacted in 1967 after reading about her in a newspaper. Jalet, along with attorney William Bennett Turner, would assist Cruz in his watershed case, "Cruz v. Beto".
Case.
Cruz, a Buddhist, complained that he was not allowed to use the prison chapel, that he was prohibited from writing to his religious advisor, and that he was placed in solitary confinement for sharing his religious material with other prisoners. Cruz filed the lawsuit using his own toilet paper ration. The Federal District Court initially denied relief without a hearing or findings, holding the complaint to be in an area that should be left "to the sound discretion of prison administration."
An amended complaint argued that:
and contrasted that with the fact that the prison:
so:
Outcome.
The court found that:
Concurrence.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result: "I concur in the result reached even though the allegations of the complaint are on the borderline necessary to compel an evidentiary hearing. Some of the claims alleged are frivolous; others do not present justiciable issues. There cannot possibly be any constitutional or legal requirement that the government provide materials for every religion and sect practiced in this diverse country. At most, Buddhist materials cannot be denied to prisoners if someone offers to supply them".
Dissenting Opinion.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist offered dissenting view of the decision. That dissent is summarized below:Unlike the Court, I am not persuaded that petitioner's complaint states a claim under the First Amendment, or that if the opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated the trial court must necessarily conduct a trial upon the complaint.Petitioner alleges that voluntary services are made available at prison facilities so that Protestants, Catholics, and Jews may attend church services of their choice. None of our prior holdings [405 U.S. 319, 324] indicates that such a program on the part of prison officials amounts to the establishment of a religion.Petitioner is a prisoner serving 15 years for robbery in a Texas penitentiary. He is understandably not as free to practice his religion as if he were outside the prison walls. But there is no intimation in his pleadings that he is being punished for his religious views, as was the case in "Cooper v. Pate", 378 U.S. 546 (1964)None of our holdings under the First Amendment requires that, in addition to being allowed freedom of religious belief, prisoners be allowed freely to evangelize their views among other prisoners.Presumably prison officials are not obligated to provide facilities for any particular denominational services within a prison, although once they undertake to provide them for some they must make only such reasonable distinctions as may survive analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. [405 U.S. 319, 325]A long line of decisions by this Court has recognized that the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be applied in a precisely equivalent way in the multitudinous fact situations 405 U.S. 319, 326 that may confront the courts. On the one hand, we have held that racial classifications are "invidious" and "suspect." I think it quite consistent with the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, many of whom would doubtless be surprised to know that convicts came within its ambit, to treat prisoner claims at the other end of the spectrum from claims of racial discrimination. Absent a complaint alleging facts showing that the difference in treatment between petitioner and his fellow Buddhists and practitioners of denominations with more numerous adherents could not reasonably be justified under any rational hypothesis, I would leave the matter in the hands of the prison officials.It has been assumed that the dismissal by the trial court must be treated as proper only if the standard of "Conley v. Gibson", 355 U.S. 41 (1957), would permit the grant of a motion under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b). I would not require the district court to inflexibly apply this general principle to the complaint of every inmate, who is in many respects in a different litigating posture than persons who are unconfined. The inmate stands to [405 U.S. 319, 327] gain something and lose nothing from a complaint stating facts that he is ultimately unable to prove. Though he may be denied legal relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse. To expand the availability of such courtroom appearances by requiring the district court to construe [405 U.S. 319, 328] every inmate's complaint under the liberal rule of "Conley v. Gibson" deprives those courts of the latitude necessary to process this ever-increasing species of complaint.In addition, the trial court had before it the dismissal of another of petitioner's cases filed shortly before the instant action, where the trial judge had been exposed to myriad previous actions, and found them to be "voluminous, repetitious, duplicitous and in many instances deceitful." Whatever might be the posture of this constitutional claim if petitioner had never flooded the courts with repetitive and duplicitous claims, and if it had not recently been adjudicated in an identical proceeding, I believe it could be dismissed as frivolous in the case before us.
A film chronicling the life of Fred Cruz was produced and directed by Susanne Mason. The film, "Writ Writer", was broadcast/presented by PBS TV Broadcast on Independent Lens on Thursday, June 8, 2008.


Religious education in Romania

The Romanian Revolution in 1989, which ended the Communist regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu in December 1989, offered the 15 religious denominations then recognized in Romania the chance to regain the terrain lost after 1945, the year when Dr. Petru Groza of the Ploughmen's Front, a party closely associated with the Communists, became prime minister. From that time, the Romanian Communist Party started a campaign of secularization, seeking to transform the country into an atheist state along Marxist-Leninist lines.
Beginning with the 1989 revolution, the legally recognized churches, especially the Romanian Orthodox Church, the country’s largest religious group, pressured the post-communist authorities to introduce religious education in public schools, offer substantial financial support for theological institutions and allow denominations to resume their social role by posting clergy in hospitals, elderly care homes and prisons. Although education was an area where churches registered success in the early stages of post-communist transition, religious education remains a low priority in Romania.
Religious education under communism.
Shortly after 1945, religious education came under the scrutiny of communist authorities and the Securitate. The Department of Religious Denominations, a governmental body dealing with religious matters since pre-communist times, continued to exist but was transformed into an agency enforcing stricter state control over religious affairs in the country. Recently it was revealed that the Securitate included a special department supervising religious life that tried to solve the so-called "problem of the denominations", especially religious groups and individuals hostile to the new regime.
Post-communist developments.
After decades of officially-backed atheism, one of the first demands churches in that country put forth after December 1989 was the resumption of pre-university religious education in public schools. In January 1990, less than a month after communist leader Ceauşescu was killed by a firing squad and well before post-communist authorities had time to revamp the education system, the new Secretary of State for Religious Denominations, Nicolae Stoicescu, together with the Romanian Orthodox Church’s collective leadership structure, the Holy Synod, pledged their support for the introduction of religious education in public schools at all pre-university levels. An optional religion class, for which students were not to be graded, was to be included in the pre-university curriculum, with students declaring their religious affiliation in consultation with their parents. Students who were atheist or non-religious had the opportunity to opt out of the classes.
The Romanian Senate discussed the bill on 13 June 1995 in the presence of then Minister of Education Liviu Maior (representing the Social Democrats), with much of the discussion centering on Article 9, which recognized religion as a school subject. First, Gheorghe Dumitrescu, who sat on the parliamentary commission on education proposed that Article 9 read: "Mandatory school curricula include religion as a school subject. The study of religion is mandatory in primary school and optional in secondary school, the optional subject being ethics. The study of religion is also optional, depending on the religion and denomination of each student."
One change has been the reorganization of religious education, mainly in primary schools. Romania officially has more than 86% Christian Orthodox believers. Another 6% percent belong to the Catholic Church and 3% are Protestant churches. Muslims and Jews constitute less than 1% and have also started to implement their religious education in schools. In Romanian society, the number of people without any belief (unbaptized and not having been married in a religious setting) is very low, under 0.1%.
Nowadays, national polls show Romanian Orthodox Church to be one of the most trusted institutions in Romania. At this moment there are over 10,000 qualified teachers in public schools and the number is not enough. Their enthusiasm had provided a good assistance to people who were deprived by religious education for decades. Despite a shortage of qualified teachers in religion, many priests and students in theology accomplished in a successful way. The Romanian Orthodox Church has 37 high schools (seminaries) and, in higher education, 12 faculties of theology with over 9,400 undergraduate students specialized in Priesthood, School, Social Services and Sacred Arts.
Under the 1995 and 2011 education laws, students were to attend religious classes by default, and those who wished to opt out of them could only do so through a written request to the school director. The National Council for Combating Discrimination criticized this as an infringement on children's freedom of conscience. On 12 November 2014, the relevant articles of law were ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Romania, effectively abolishing the "de facto" compulsory religious education in Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church protested against the ruling, claiming it is a "humiliation" for religious education, however it has no means to challenge the decision.


Islam in Panama

According to a 2009 Pew Research Center report, there are 24,000 Muslims in Panama who constitute 0.7 percent of the population.
Early history.
The first Muslims in Panama were Mandinka slaves, brought by the Spaniards to work the gold mines in 1552. The Mandinka were mainly animist and Muslims at that time, and their importation was prohibited by Spanish Laws but was violated nonetheless. A group of about 500 that arrived on the Atlantic coast of Panama in 1552, escaped from a sinking ship. They elected a man called Bayano (Vaino) as their leader in the fight against the colonizers. They formed councils, and mosques in the areas now known as Darién Province, Bay of San Miguel, San Blas Islands and the area along the Bayano River, named after Bayano. Bayano gained truces with Panama's colonial governor, but the well known Commander Pedro de Ursúa successfully captured the guerrilla leader, who was sent to Peru and then Spain where he died. After Bayano's death, efforts were made to destroy any trace of Islam during that period in Panama. There is no history as what happened to the Muslims who remained in Panama.
Modern Period.
The second wave of Muslims were single-male immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and Lebanon who arrived from 1904 to 1913 and later married local women. The first mosque was built by the Ahmadiyya Muslim movement, in 1930. In 1929 another group came from Bombay, India who went on to form the Sunni Indo-Pakistani Muslim Society. From 1929-1948 this organization (renamed Panama Muslim Mission) initiated construction on a mosque in Panama City. The location was half completed and was used for Eid prayers and classes for new Muslims, who numbered about twenty-five blacks of West Indian descent. There was also another group practicing Islam in Colón led by a Jamaican named Basil Austkan, who rented a place for salat on 6th Street and Broadway. In 1932 there was a group of Muslim in San Miguel, Calidonia in Panama City who resided in Short Street where they held meetings and prayers. The Muslims in Panama City of Indo-Pakistan origins had no family structure until 1951 when the first families arrived. In 1963, they purchased a plot in the local cemetery called Jardin de Paz; in 1991, property was purchased in an area called Arraijan, which is now used solely as a Muslim cemetery.
Community Development: 1970s to Present.
In the mid-1970s some native Panamanians influenced by the Nation of Islam and led by Abdul Wahab Johnson and Suleyman Johnson, began propagating Islam in Panama City and Colón. After meeting with Dr. Abdulkhabeer Muhammad they began to study orthodox Sunni Islam. In 1977 they received financing from Arab merchants in Colon to rent a place on 7th Street and Central Avenue, Colón. This group, due to lack of knowledge and assistance, eventually disintegrated. The Indo-Pakistani Muslims began teaching their children at home in 1965 until 1973, when a small teaching program began in a room above Bazar Hindustan on Central Avenue, Panama City. In 1978, they began to use a place in the area of Perejil, Panama City, where prayers and meetings took place until the completion of the "El Centro Cultural Islámico de Colón" on January 15, 1982. This masjid was built jointly by the Islamic Call Society (based in Libya) and Salomon Bhikhu a local merchant from India. Since its inauguration, classes have been held in the evenings and Sundays for new Muslims and people interested in Islam, given by Dr. Abdulkhaber Muhammad and in his absence Hamza Beard. In 1991 the Muslim community purchased in Arraiján, which is now used solely as a Muslim cemetery. As of March 1997, there were four mosques Panama.


Parrandas

Parrandas are a traditional carnival-like street parties with origins date back to the 19th century. They take place in northern and central cities of the former Las Villas province (now divided into Villa Clara, Sancti Spíritus and Ciego de Ávila provinces) in Cuba. Most famous parrandas are celebrated in Remedios colonial city where these festivities were originated. Second most popular are celebrated in Camajuaní, followed in popularity by Vueltas, Zulueta, Chambas, Guayos, El Santo, Taguayabón, Buenavista, Calabazar de Sagua, Zaza del Medio, Falcón and many more small town of this central region of Cuba.
Origins and History.
Testimonies place the Parrandas with structure of events similar to what is today as far as 1875. This includes both districts rumba, the plaza works (light and fireworks structures), the firework competition and float display.
By the 19th century the noisy children had developed into people’s rumba with rhythm, music and verses (usually instigating the other district). The first instruments used in the rumba were cencerro, bombo, repique, and one special local drum called "atambora". Later, tumbadoras were added and in the 1930s trumpets made the final addition.
Event activities.
Even when the entire party is celebrated under a competition mood actually is a friendly display of two districts that separate each northern town in Villa Clara province.
First event: Around 10:00 pm the district in charge of the first display of the night announces his first rumba with a "palenque"; palenques are fireworks designed in such a way that once airborne they are almost soundless making them "invisible" among the ambient noise, they explode with a huge bang a few meters over taking by surprise the people gathered in town. Immediately after this the rumba starts with the purpose to "drag" as many dancers from the people while they sign their polka. Once the first district is finished the other one makes its entrance as well. This is repeated several times until the next event.
Second Event: In Remedios city the second event is the lighting of the Plaza works, in the rest of the cities is the Float lighting. Floats are huge architectural structures filled with colors, light bulbs and fantasy décor hauled by a tractor. They have a theme each year and the characters on them have over the top fantasized outfits. In most of the towns these characters should keep still like statues, they are not allowed to move while the float is moving forward and the legend is read to the public, failing to do so will demerit the district. In Taguayabon on the contrary while the legend is read the characters perform as in a theater play. But this behavior is rather new and been consider "un-tasty" and against the tradition in the nearby locations.
Final event: The fireworks. When the float’s legend is finished and the structure has reached the end of its travel, which is no more than 40 meters, the pyrotechnics, which have rapidly placed lines as long as three or four blocks of rockets in the streets, use torches and running by the sides of the racks lit them. Once single run should use near 20 000 rockets. When the regular fireworks are finished the "mortars" are lit as well. Mortars are the antithesis of Palenques since this type of firework makes a loud "canon like" sound that announces the end of its district display.
Parrandas vs. carnivals.
Modern Parrandas also come associated with all sort of vendors and activities on the side. Snacks like candies, pork and ham sandwich, pizza, traditional rice with pork and yucca, handmade toys and craft can be found all over. Occasionally there are some rides like Ferris wheels, carousels and dragon boats.
While every town possesses their own particularities, Parandas in general, follow a very similar structure of events based on their very roots and while they might look similar to Carnivals they actually don’t share much common ground. In the Carnivals there are also floats, but instead of two representing districts there are as many as possible for the hosting city because the mayor even here is the float display and it takes hours and kilometers of city roads for all of them to finish the run. These Floats are also big in size but smaller compared to the ones made in Remedios, Camajuani and Vueltas cities. Characters in the floats perform elaborate dances combining salsa, mambo, cha cha and all sort of tropical rhythms. There are as many rumbas as floats because in Carnivals they become a duo, and the rumba announces the float. Rumba performers don’t expect the people in town to join them since streets are closed in the first place. They also are as over-the-top dressed as the characters in the floats and perform complicated routines. There is a small fireworks display announcing the last float just crossing the finish line, and this leads to the end of the competitive run.
Most famous carnivals in Cuba took place in Santiago de Cuba, Havana and Santa Clara. From these only the last one is still celebrated properly. The other ones have been cancelled or have seen a total restriction of events due to lack of money.
References.
"Martin Farto, Miguel". Las Parrandas de Remedios. Tradicion centenaria.Coleccion Escambray, Publicigraf (c).


Peder Madsen

Peder Madsen (38 August 1843 7 August 1911) was a Danish theologian and Bishop of the Diocese of Zealand from 1909 until his death in 1911. Prior to being ordained as a bishop, he had been a professor and the rector of the University of Copenhagen.
He was appointed a Commander, 1st Class, of the Order of the Dannebrog and was later awarded the Dannebrogordenens Hæderstegn.
Early life and education.
Madsen was born on August 28, 1843 to Mads Jensen and Mette Kirstine Pedersdatter. His father, Mads Jensen, oversaw a farm near Holstebro and worked as a "sognefoged": an appointed aid to the rural chief of police. During his childhood, Madsen was taught by a neighboring priest until attending a secondary school in Viborg from 1858 until 1862. In January of 1868 he received a cand.theol. degree from the University of Copenhagen.
Career.
In 1872 he traveled abroad to Italy, Switzerland, France, and Germany. In particular, he studied theology at the University of Erlangen–Nuremberg, which had a lasting impact on him. He had intended to continue his travels to England, but was called back to the University of Copenhagen to fill the professorial vacancy left by Henrik Nicolai Clausen in 1874. That autumn he began giving lectures on dogmatic theology and the exegesis of the New Testament. In 1875 he was appointed as a fully fledged professor of theology. He later served as the university's rector in 1889–1890 and 1903–1904.
In 1879, Madsen received his doctorate in theology with the completion of his dissertation on Christian spiritual priesthood: "De kristnes aandelige Præstedømme". He went on to publish several other works, including: "Det kirkelige Embede, en dogmatisk Undersøgelse" (1890), "Embedet og Menighedens Samvirken i det kirkelige Arbejde" (1894), "Bornholmerne eller den saakaldte lutherske Missionsforening" (1886), and "Om det foreslaaede Tillæg til vor Gudstjeneste" (1887).
In addition to his work teaching theology, Madsen had an active influence on the work of the church in Denmark. From 1879 to 1881, he was involved in the preparation of a new series of pericopes and later, when the church council was established, his fellow theological faculty elected him as their representative from 1884 until 1886. He served as a member of the committee for the "Danish Lutheran mission in Amerika" in 1880–1894, and was appointed as a member of the board of Indre Mission in 1880.
Madsen was appointed the bishop of Zealand in 1909, a position which he held for only two years before his death in 1911.
Personal life.
On September 16, 1881 he married Charlotte Storck (1842–1917), the daughter of a priest from Lejre Municipality. In 1892, she inherited an estate in Holbæk municipality, Vedbygård. At the time, the estate then became her husband's property, though she regained ownership after his death on August 7, 1911. Madsen is buried at the church cemetery in Ruds Vedby.


Paul Xie Ting-zhe

Paul Xie Ting-zhe (1931 – 14 August 2017) was a Roman Catholic bishop.
Xie Ting-zhe was ordained to the priesthood in 1980. He was ordained a bishop clandestinely in 1991 and served as bishop for the Apostolic Prefecture of Xinjiang, China, until his death.


Shin Jeong-yil

Shin Jeong Yil (Shin Jeongyil, , 1938–1999) was the founder of Hanol-gyo (Korean spiritual foundation), a politician (the founder of Unified Korea party) and an entrepreneur(the founder of Hanon Group).
Hanol-gyo.
Hanol-gyo was established based on Hanol principle which is the teachings on enlightenment and awakening; it pursues self-liberation of consciousness rather than the traditional ways of religious worship.
According to its doctrine of Spiritual Acceptance, Hanol-gyo is open to multi-culture as it allows its participants from various cultures to practice their religion as well. It regards all enlightened beings (Dangun, Buddha, Jesus, Lao-tzu, Confucius, etc.) as teachers of enlightenment and awakening, and various religions as the pursuit of True Spirituality in different ways. Its aim is to overcome all forms of separations (e.g., religion, race, ideology and so on).
The Founder's Doctrine is ""Naol" is "Hanol"", which means “My true spiritual nature is one with the spiritual nature of All.”
Other activities.
As a politician, Shin formed the Unified Korea Political Party and ran for the South Korean presidency twice, in the 13th election in 1987 and 15th election in 1997.
As the founder and chairman of the Hanon Group, Shin acquired the right to develop one of the largest crude oil mines in Iraq. He protested against the war in Iraq and supplied medicine for the children suffering from the war. As recognition of his humanitarian and diplomatic efforts, he was appointed to the Honorary Consul by both the Iraqi and South Korean governments.
Later years.
Shin passed away in 1999. According to the press, "unprecedented number of "sari" (sacred crystals found among the cremated remains of enlightened monks and Buddha) were found and witnessed by many people including clerics and monks of other religions. Hanol-gyo has been exhibiting the "sari" at the Commemoration Ceremonies of the Founder."
Timeline.
Source:


Jean de Bertrand (cardinal)

Jean de Bertrand (1482 – 4 December 1560) was a Roman Catholic cardinal.
Biography.
On 30 Apr 1560, he was consecrated bishop by Filippo Roccabella, Bishop of Recanati.


Petros Efthymiou

Petros Efthymiou (, born 27 March 1950) is a Greek academic and politician of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement. A former minister and MEP, he is currently (since October 2009) the parliamentary spokesman of his party.
Early life.
He was born in Larissa, Thessaly, and graduated from the Philosophical School of the University of Ioannina. In 1974, he was a founding member of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Until 1979, he worked as a teacher of the Greek language in secondary education, as well as a journalist and editor for the party's "Agonistis" youth magazine and the "Sosialistiki Poreia" weekly newspaper.
Career.
In 1980-85 he was editor-in-chief of the political journal "Anti". From 1982 he occupied the post of Special Advisor for Educational Issues at the Ministry of Youth and Sports, before being named Secretary General for Media at the Ministry for the Press and Media for a short term in 1985. From 1986 to 1999, he worked as political editor at the "To Vima" daily, and also as a talk show host for the NET public television network (1994–1999) and as a visiting lecturer at the Panteion University in 1994-95. In 1998, he was awarded the prize for “Excellency in Journalism”, by the President of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Stefanopoulos.
At the 1999 European election he was elected to the European Parliament, serving until 11 April 2000, being a member in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy and the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, Media and Sports. Subsequently, and until PASOK's electoral defeat in March 2004, he occupied the post of Minister of National Education and Religious Affairs. In the same elections, he was for the first time elected as an MP for the Athens B constituency, being subsequently re-elected at the national elections of 16 September 2007 and 4 October 2009.
He served as Press Spokesman and Secretary of the Relations Sector of PASOK in 2006–2007, as well as coordinator of the Economy Sector in the PASOK Parliamentary Committee (2006) and as a member of the Standing Committees on Social Affairs (2007–2008), Financial Affairs, and the Committee for the Constitutional Amendment. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs as well as member of the Standing Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, as well as the spokesman of PASOK's Parliamentary Group since October 2009.
Also he was elected President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O.S.C.E), in Oslo in July 2010.
Personal life.
He is married with the journalist Anastassia Parentzoglou and has two children, named Seline and Paul.


Johannes Rudbeckius

Bishop Johannes Rudbeckius or "Johannes Rudbeck" (April 3, 1581–August 8, 1646), bishop at Västerås, Sweden from 1619 until his death, and personal chaplain to King Gustavus II Adolphus.
Biography.
Johannes Rudbeck was born in Ormesta, Almby parish, outside Örebro, Sweden. He was the son of Johan Pedersson Rudbeck (1550-1603) and Christina Pedersdtr Bose. He was a student at Uppsala University in 1598 and at University of Wittenberg received his Master of Philosophy in 1693. He was a professor of mathematics at Uppsala from 1604, professor of Hebrew from 1609 and professor of theology from 1611.
He was made Bishop in the Diocese of Västerås in 1618.
In his capacity of bishop, he was restlessly active in organising. He founded the Swedish system of parish registers, ordering his parsons to file comments on every person in the parish. In 1623 he founded the first gymnasium, a school of secondary education in Västerås. He also founded the first school for girls in Sweden; Rudbeckii flickskola in 1632. Rudbeckius was considered politically suspect by his superiors but his reforms were gradually introduced in the whole country.
Personal life.
With his second wife Magadalena Malin Carlsdotter (1602–1649) he had a son Olaus Rudbeck (1630–1702), who was a noted scientist of the 17th century. His grandson Olof Rudbeck the Younger (1660–1740) was scientist, botanist and ornithologist. Bishop Rudbeckius' granddaughter, Wendela Rudbeck (1668–1710), married Peter Olai Nobelius (1655–1707) from whom descended Alfred Nobel (1833–1896).


William Manson (theologian)

William Manson (14 April 1882 – 4 April 1958) was a British theologian.
He was educated at the University of Glasgow, where he graduated in 1904. Later he studied at the Oriel College in Oxford, when he graduated in 1908. In the same year he returned to Glasgow and entered United Free Church College for studying Theology and training as a minister of the Free Church of Scotland. In 1911 he was ordained as a minister. From 1911 to 1914 he had a charge at Oban. In 1914 he married Mary D. Ferguson. In the same year he became minister at Pollockshields East in Glasgow.
In 1919 he was appointed to the Chair of New Testament at Knox College in Toronto. In 1925 he became professor of New Testament at the University of Edinburgh. In 1946 he was appointed to the Chair of Biblical Criticism at the University of Edinburgh. In 1952 he retired from teaching. William Manson died in 1958.