Islamophobia in the United Kingdom

Islamophobia in the United Kingdom refers to a set of discourses, behaviours and structures which express feelings of anxiety, fear, hostility and rejection towards Islam or Muslims in the United Kingdom. Islamophobia can manifest itself through discrimination in the workforce, negative coverage in the media, and violence against Muslims.
As of 2017, arson attacks against mosques and vehicle ramming have statistically risen against Muslims, predominantly in England and Scotland.
In employment.
Many studies and surveys have concluded that Muslims face discrimination in the work force. Research in 2014 by Dr Nabil Khattab and Professor Ron Johnston using data from the Office for National Statistics' Labour Force Survey found that "Muslim men were up to 76% less likely to have a job of any kind compared to white, male British Christians of the same age and with the same qualifications." An April 2016 report by Nabil Khattab and Shereen Hussein found that first-generation Muslim women from Bangladesh were over six times more likely to be unemployed than White non-Muslim women when adjusting for factors such as "level of education, family situation and age." First generation Muslim Pakistani and Muslim Black women faced less discrimination but were still four times more likely to be unemployed than White non-Muslim women when adjusting for those same factors.
A September 2017 Social Mobility Commission report concluded that Muslims were being held back in the workplace by widespread Islamophobia, racism and discrimination. Despite outperforming their non-Muslim counterparts in education, Muslims were roughly half as likely to hold higher managerial, administrative, and professional occupations. Almost 50% of Muslim households are considered to be in poverty, compared with less than 20% in the overall population. The report listed barriers to success including negative stereotypes about Muslims, a lack of Muslim staff or role models in the classroom, bullying, and harassment. The report revealed that women wearing hijab face particular discrimination once entering the workplace. Professor Jacqueline Stevenson of Sheffield Hallam University which led the research, stated that "Muslims are being excluded, discriminated against or failed at all stages of their transition from education to employment."
In education.
Islamophobia in schools is a growing concern for the United Kingdom, since projections show there may be an estimated 300,000 Muslim teenagers in the education system by 2021. Various incidents have occurred where students were attacked while near school or on campus. Studies show such actions are increasingly common after trigger incidences such as the Manchester bombing. Women and girls who wear hijab are especially targeted. Made prevalent by the Tell Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) organization, it has been reported that around 6% or 53 accounts of reported incidents of Islamophobia have occurred in British educational institutions in 2017. Many of the incidents are associated with bullying and verbal abuse such as calling a fellow peer a "terrorist" or taunting religious garments like that of a hijab. The Muslim Student Survey was sent out from the National Union of Students in 2017 to try to gather data on the subject of Islamophobia in educational environments. In this survey, nearly 33% of Muslim students reported either abuse or crime in their place of study. Most of these reports are believed to be directly related to Islamophobia. It also shows a disconnect when relating to such students since only about four in ten reported Muslim students feel their student governments understand their needs. Even in Wales, teachers in 16 of the 22 local authorities have reached out to an Anti-Racism charity, Show Racism the Red-Card, in response to incidents of racism in their schools.
In airports.
In August 2016, Muslim mental health worker who helps to prevent radicalisation Faizah Shaheen, was detained at Doncaster Sheffield Airport under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for reading "" on a Thomson Airways plane. Shaheen claimed she was targeted and singled out because she was Muslim. Green Party leader Natalie Bennett, director of English PEN Jo Glanville, and co-editor of "Syria Speaks" Zaher Omareen expressed outrage at the incident. In July 2017, Shaheen sued Thomson Airways asking for an apology. The company said that their crew were trained to report "any concerns they may have as a precaution."
In September 2017, Muhammad Rabbani, the international director of CAGE, was arrested and convicted under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for failing to hand over passwords for an iPhone and a laptop, which he said contained sensitive information from a torture victim. He was stopped by police after flying into Heathrow Airport in November 2016 from Qatar, where he was investigating a torture case allegedly linked to the U.S. Rabbani and his lawyers argued that he should not have to hand over the password because it would expose sensitive information given to him by a third party. His arrest and conviction sparked outrage and protests outside the court building in central London where his case was heard by people who believed the case represented a government overreach with regards to counterterrorism stop-and-search powers and profiling of Muslims. Rabbani released a statement on 26 September saying he would file for an appeal.
In politics.
Some raised concerns over the comments made about then candidate for mayor, Sadiq Khan during the 2016 London mayoral election which attempted to link Khan to Islamist extremists. Public opinion polling at the time showed that 31% of Londoners were "uncomfortable" with the prospect of a Muslim mayor. The Vote Leave campaign during leading up to the Brexit vote was also criticized as frequently portraying Muslim immigrants as a threat to future of the country. The government issued "Casey Review into Integration and Opportunity" which aimed to examine the conditions for immigrants to the United Kingdom was criticized for its over focus of the Muslim community, as well as deeper methodical failings. In 2014, over a third of Muslims in the UK said politicians often make bigoted comments towards Muslims. In addition, current British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has also had a history intertwined with islamophobia writing in his 2007 "The Dream of Rome" that there must be something about Islam that has caused them to be "literally centuries behind." Furthermore, in 2018 Johnson compared Muslim women wearing veils to "letter boxes" and "bank robbers" leading to a strongpush back by the British media.
In October 2017, Conservative MP Bob Blackman was criticised for hosting a parliamentary event attended by far-right Hindu nationalist Tapan Ghosh. The conference was also attended by Home Secretary Amber Rudd and First Secretary of State Damian Green, who distanced themselves from Ghosh's views a week afterwards. Prior to the event, Ghosh had praised the persecution of Muslims in Myanmar, said Muslims were "all jihadis," and that Muslims should be forced to leave their religion if they come to a western country. Blackman responded to criticism saying did not regret sharing a platform with Ghosh and that Ghosh was not Islamophobic. The Muslim Council of Britain condemned parliament for welcoming "a man who trades in propagating hatred against Muslims in India." On 26 October, Labour MP Naz Shah wrote to Home Secretary Amber Rudd asking why Ghosh was granted a UK visa.
In 2018, The Muslim Council of Britain wrote to the Conservative Party calling for an urgent inquiry following a number of allegations of Islamophobia. A Conservative councillor Stephen Ardley had been suspended after he allegedly posted Islamophobic comments about the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan. Ardley had said it was "unbelievable" that a Muslim had been elected and went on to describe those who voted for him as "blind". The need for a formal inquiry into Islamophobia in the Conservative Party was described by former Tory cabinet minister Sayeeda Warsi as being "long overdue". In fact, in recent polling, date shows that 60 percent of the party believes that Islam is a general threat to the well-being of Western civilization.
In the media.
The British media began adopting the term 'Islamophobia' in the late 1980s in order to describe the rise in negative feelings towards the Muslim community. A report from the Runnymede Trust later served to more dramatically move the issue into the public light in 1997.
The media, particularly the "Daily Mail" and the "Daily Express", have been criticised for inappropriate comments on migrants, immigration and Muslims. A December 2015 survey by City University, London of journalists found an underrepresentation of Muslims in the field. Only 0.4% of British journalists identified as Muslim or Hindu, 31.6% were Christian, and 61.1% had "no religion." Cited in a report covering the ethics of the British Press, Lord Justice Leveson wrote that "the evidence demonstrates that sections of the press betray a tendency, which is far from being universal or even preponderant, to portray Muslims in a negative light."
An academic paper by Katy Sian published in the journal "South Asian Popular Culture" in 2011 explored the question of how "forced conversion narratives" arose around the Sikh diaspora in the United Kingdom. Sian, who reports that claims of conversion through courtship on campuses are widespread in the UK, says that rather than relying on actual evidence they primarily rest on the word of "a friend of a friend" or on personal anecdote. According to Sian, the narrative is similar to accusations of "white slavery" lodged against the Jewish community and foreigners to the UK and the US, with the former having ties to anti-semitism that mirror the Islamophobia betrayed by the modern narrative. Sian expanded on these views in 2013's "Mistaken Identities, Forced Conversions, and Postcolonial Formations".
On 16 June 2017, BBC Radio 4 acknowledged a complaint that it failed to properly introduce or challenge Frank Gaffney's "conspiracy theories about Muslims and Islam" when he appeared as a guest on "Today".
In an article for "The Independent", writer Sufyan Ismail was critical of the media coverage of the 2017 Beckton acid attack, stating that most mainstream media failed to cover the incident or "at best relegated it to a minor story". Ismail suggested that had the roles of the victims and perpetrator been reversed the case would have been headline news. He compared the acid attack to violent hate-murders of Muslims that had received little coverage in contrast with the murder of Jo Cox or the murder of Lee Rigby.
In August 2017, "The Sun" published a column by Trevor Kavanagh which questioned what actions British society should take to deal with "The Muslim Problem". Kavanagh cited an opinion piece by Labour Shadow Secretary of State for Women and Equalities Sarah Champion MP several days previously as a reason that it was "now acceptable" to describe Muslims as a "specific rather than cultural problem". Sean O'Grady of "The Independent" said that the column used language reminiscent of Nazi propaganda and Nazi phrases. A joint complaint was made to IPSO by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Tell MAMA and Faith Matters. A statement by the groups said: "The printing of the phrase 'The Muslim Problem' – particularly with the capitalisation and italics for emphasis – in a national newspaper sets a dangerous precedent, and harks back to the use of the phrase 'The Jewish Problem' in the last century." A cross-party group of over 100 MPs from the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens subsequently signed a letter to the editor of "The Sun" demanding action over the column. The letter stated the MPs "were truly outraged by the hate and bigotry" in Kavanagh's column.
In the justice system.
A ruling in March 2016 by the European Court of Human Rights effectively cleared of criminal responsibility security officials responsible for the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005. De Menezes was trailed and then shot dead at London's Stockwell tube station by jumpy security officers who mistook him for a suicide bomber a fortnight after multiple bombings on the capital's transport network in 2005. Critics of the ruling claimed that it upheld the right of the authorities to kill potentially innocent people on the basis of mere supposition and racial/religious prejudice.
In September 2017, police officers warned a Muslim doctor, Naila Imran, against pressing charges following anti-Muslim harassment as a counter claim could lead to her "being arrested."
A 2017 Runnymede Trust and University of Greenwich study found that being black or Muslim doubles a prisoner's chances (40%) of having worse prison experiences, which includes having restraints used against them and being put into segregation in past six months, compared with white or non-Muslim prisoners (21%). They were also more likely to be on the lowest rung of the prison rewards and punishment scheme, more likely to be put into segregation and more likely to have restraint used against them. Almost a third of Muslim prisoners (29%) did not have prison jobs or attend education courses, compared with 17% of Christian prisoners. Runnymede stated that the discrepancy in treatment particularly affects rehabilitation.
Defining Islamophobia in the United Kingdom.
Resulting from a lack of widespread acceptance and consensus, in May 2019 the British Government failed to adopt a concrete definition for islamophobia. In an interview with the All Party Parliamentary Group on Muslims, Professor Peter Hopkins of the Centre for Hate Studies at Leicester University stated that by not adopting a concrete definition for islamophobia it may "encourage some people to continue to deny that Islamophobia is an issue in society."
Stereotypes.
In June 2004, prior to the 7/7 attacks on the London Underground, the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, warned that increased attacks against individuals and mosques, was resulting in bitterness that created violent "time-bombs".
Hate crimes.
Some Muslims have been victims of violence because of their religion. In 2005, "The Guardian" commissioned an ICM poll which indicated an increase in anti-Muslim incidents, particularly after the London bombings in July 2005. Another survey of Muslims, this by the Open Society Institute, found that of those polled 32% believed they had suffered religious discrimination at airports, and 80% said they had experienced Islamophobia.
In January 2010, a report by the University of Exeter's European Muslim research centre noted that the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes has increased, ranging from "death threats and murder to persistent low-level assaults, such as spitting and name-calling," for which the media and politicians have been blamed with fueling anti-Muslim hatred. The Islamophobic incidents it described include: "Neil Lewington, a violent extremist nationalist convicted in July 2009 of a bomb plot; Terence Gavan, a violent extremist nationalist convicted in January 2010 of manufacturing nail bombs and other explosives, firearms and weapons; a gang attack in November 2009 on Muslim students at City University; the murder in September 2009 of Muslim pensioner, Ikram Syed ul-Haq; a serious assault in August 2007 on the Imam at London Central Mosque; and an arson attack in June 2009 on Greenwich Islamic Centre." Other Islamophobic incidents mentioned in the report include "Yasir, a young Moroccan," being "nearly killed while waiting to take a bus from Willesden to Regent's Park in London" and "left in a coma for three months"; "Mohammed Kohelee," a "caretaker who suffered burns to his body while trying to prevent an arson attack against Greenwich Mosque"; "the murder" of "Tooting pensioner Ekram Haque" who "was brutally beaten to death in front of his three year old granddaughter" by a "race-hate" gang; and "police officers" being injured "during an English Defence League (EDL) march in Stoke."
On 26 August 2007, fans of the English football club Newcastle United directed anti-Muslim chants at Egyptian Middlesbrough F.C. striker Mido. An FA investigation was launched He revealed his anger at The FA's investigation, believing that they would make no difference to any future abuse. Two men were eventually arrested over the chanting and were due to appear at Teesside Magistrates Court.
A 2013 report by Professor Nigel Copsey of Teesside University, concluded that between 40% and 60% of mosques and other Islamic centers in the UK had suffered vandalism or arson.
In the week following the London Bridge attack in June 2017, anti-Muslim hate crimes increased fivefold. It was the largest increase in hate crimes against Muslims in the country since the similar backlash following the 2013 Murder of Lee Rigby. Acid attacks against Muslims such as the 2017 Beckton acid attack have also risen. Days after the London Bridge attack, a man named Darren Osborne intentionally rammed a van into Muslims coming out of a mosque in London, killing one and leaving 10 people injured.
In August 2017, West Yorkshire Police launched a hate crime investigation after letters threatening acid attacks on Muslims were posted in Bradford. The police said the threats were "extremely seriously" increased patrols in Hanover Square, a mainly Muslim inner-city area where at least two residents received the letters last week. The literature shows an image of a sword and the Saint George's Flag with the words: "Kill scum Muslims."
An October 2017 Press Association investigation found that hate crimes targeting mosques and other Muslim places of worship across the UK more than doubled between 2016 and 2017. The same month, during Hate Crime Awareness Week, Associate Professor of Criminology at Birmingham City University Imran Awan and Lecturer in Criminology at Nottingham Trent University Irene Zempi presented research at the House of Commons showing that some non-Muslim men suffered verbal, physical and emotional abuse because they looked Muslim.
In April 2018, letters were sent to people in East London calling for a "Punish a Muslim Day", with a points system to award people for acts of hatred toward Muslims. Police said there was no credible evidence of a planned attack, and in June of the same year a man from Lincoln was arrested and charged with fourteen criminal offences in connection with the hate mail campaign. At his trial at the Old Bailey in October 2018 he pleaded guilty to fifteen charges relating to the "Punish a Muslim Day" letters and other correspondences sent to individuals, public figures and organisations.
Organisations.
English Defence League.
The emergence of the English Defence League has resulted in demonstrations in English cities with large Muslim populations. The EDL is a far-right, anti-Islam street protest movement which opposes what it considers to be a spread of Islamism, Sharia law and Islamic extremism in the United Kingdom. The EDL has been described as Islamophobic. It has had confrontations with various groups, including supporters of Unite Against Fascism (UAF) and Anonymous.
Co-founder and political activist Tommy Robinson left the group after four years to take on a more peaceful and political approach, and worried about the dangers of right-wing extremism.
Of the online islamophic attacks reports received in 2012 by the Tell Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) organization, 69% had a connection to the far right including the English Defense League.
Scottish Defence League.
The SDL are similar to their counterpart and are very closely associated with the EDL. They are seen as Scotland's main anti-Islamic group. The SDL hold regular demonstrations in Scottish cities. The group is mainly active in Edinburgh, Fife and Glasgow.
Two-time murderer Ronnie Coulter was seen in attendance at a July 2016 SDL demonstration in Edinburgh.
Thomas Conington who petrol bombed the Edinburgh Central Mosque and received 4 years in prison in June 2017, is alleged to be associated with SDL members.
In July 2017, an SDL supporter was found guilty of kicking on the body and punching on the head of an anti-fascist protester who was handing out anti-racism leaflets in Edinburgh. It was alleged that he called the other fellow protesters, in particular a black South African woman, a monkey. He received 12 months community service. Also in 2017, former Scottish Labour Party Deputy Leader Anas Sarwar alleged that he faced death threats from the SDL.
British National Party.
In October 2017, the British National Party launched a campaign against supposed plans for a mosque that local authorities said did not exist.
Opposition.
Several organisations exist in the United Kingdom to combat Islamophobia. Tell MAMA is an organisation that monitors and records hate crimes against Muslims.
Following the passage of Executive Order 13769 by U.S. President Donald Trump, protests took place all across the country by non-Muslim Britons in solidarity with British Muslims and Muslim refugees.
Following a protest by the EDL in April 2017, the Birmingham Central Mosque held a tea party with the goal of countering those demonstrations and promoting interfaith dialogue. The tea party ended up receiving more participants than the original EDL march.
J-Voice, a socialist and progressive Jewish community project, has condemned what it refers to as a "a rise in hatred towards Muslims" and called for Muslims and Jews in the UK to remain united against the "far-right." Following a meeting between Manchester's Jewish community and Tommy Robinson, the Board of Deputies of British Jews stated that "Robinson’s record of anti-Muslim provocation means that he could never be a partner of a respectable or mainstream Jewish organisation."
Based out of London, the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) is a UK human rights organization that works to campaign for justice for the British Muslim community. Along with working closely with the United Nations, IHRC has produced and submitted numerous articles, reports, and general research on islamophobia to governments and international organizations to offer
History.
Robert Lambert and Graham Edward Geddes have compared Islamophobia and anti-Muslim street violence to that of Paki-bashing, a form of racist violence that was perpetrated against South Asians since the 1960s. Lambert notes that a key difference is that, whereas the National Front and BNP targeted all South Asians (including Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs), the EDL specifically target British Muslims. Lambert also compares the media's role in fueling "Paki-bashing" in the late 20th century to its role in fueling anti-Muslim sentiment in the early 21st century. Geddes notes that variations of the "Paki" racial slur are occasionally used by members of the EDL.
British Asians (both Muslim and non-Muslim) faced increased discrimination following Enoch Powell's Rivers of Blood speech and the establishment of the National Front in the late 1960s. This included overt racism in the form of Paki bashing, predominantly from white power skinheads, the National Front, and the British National Party, throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing inspiration from the civil rights movement, the black power movement, and the anti-apartheid movement, young British Pakistani and British Bangladeshi activists began a number of anti-racist Asian youth movements in the 1970s and 1980s, including the Bradford Youth Movement in 1977, the Bangladeshi Youth Movement following the murder of Altab Ali in 1978, and the Newham Youth Movement following the murder of Akhtar Ali Baig in 1980.


Late Call (TV programme)

Late Call was Scottish Television's version of "The Epilogue", presenting five minutes of religious thought late at night.
It was parodied by Rikki Fulton in the comedy show "Scotch and Wry" where it was named "Last Call". His character, "Reverend I.M. Jolly", was an exaggerated version of the clerical and lay representatives from all the mainstream Churches in Scotland who often featured in "Late Call".
The programme was by no means the only production from the Religious Department of Scottish Television, but arguably the best known. Producers were Rev. Dr Nelson Gray, a Congregational Minister, and Rev. Eric Hudson, a Minister of the Church of Scotland.


Sanusi Mahmood

Haji Mohamed Sanusi bin Mahmood (27 September 1909 – 8 October 1995) was the first Mufti of Singapore.
Life.
Sanusi was one of the few ulama who had a good command of Malay, Arabic and English during his time. From 1922 to 1931, he attended Victoria Bridge School and then Raffles Institution. In 1929, due to his excellent results in the Senior Cambridge examination, he managed to skip two grades. Sanusi went on to study Islam and Arabic from his grandfather, the Mufti of Indera Giri, at Safat, Sumatra, Indonesia from 1931 to 1932.
He was the first Singaporean to obtain the prestigious Al-'Alamiyah from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt.
In 1968, Sanusi was appointed as Singapore's first Mufti as well as the President of Syariah Court, holding both posts concurrently. In 1972, he stepped down as the Mufti.
He wrote many books, such as "Kamus Istilah Islamiah Sanusi", "Taman Mu'minin" and "Mengenal Islam dan Hubungannya Dengan Sains & Teknologi".
Death.
He died peacefully on Sunday, 8 October 1995 at the age of 86, leaving behind six sons and two daughters.


Ernest Tatham

Charles Ernest Tatham (13 February 1905 – 14 September 1997) was a Canadian theologian, missionary, and author of books.
Early life.
Tatham was born in Wellington, Ontario in 1905. He was the son of Charles Goodeve Tatham (1854-1918). He earned a B.A. degree in Theology from Toronto Bible College.
Career.
Tatham is best remembered as a co-founder of Emmaus Bible College in Dubuque, Iowa, in 1941, along with R.E. Harlow and John Smart. Some of the correspondence courses he wrote remain part of the curriculum to this very day.
In 1959, Tatham also founded Kingsway Academy, a Christian school in Nassau, Bahamas. In 1970, he was a founding board member of another Christian school; The King's Academy in West Palm Beach, Florida.
He planted nine Open Brethren churches throughout Canada and the United States.
Literary career.
Tatham was a prolific author over a period spanning nearly sixty years. In addition to course materials for Emmaus Bible College, he wrote a number of books for the wider public. Among these were "Daniel Speaks Today," "Forever Secure: Now and Hereafter," "Waiting for the Sunrise", "Food for New Believers", and "Let the Tide Come In!"
The Charismatic Movement.
For most of his life, Tatham was a strict cessationist. Like most of his fellow-Brethren, he believed that the so-called sign gifts (miracles, divine healing, and speaking in tongues) were given only to the early church, for the purpose of authenticating the apostles, and "ceased" with the apostles' deaths. He argued for this view in the Emmaus course on the Holy Spirit, which he authored in 1942. He revised his views in the 1970s, however, and in his 1976 book "Let the Tide Come In!", he embraced continualism (the view that all spiritual gifts are operating today) and said that his earlier support for cessationism had been mistaken. He never endorsed the organized Pentecostal and Charismatic movements, however. He continued to oppose the doctrine of subsequence; he came to believe in the validity of speaking in tongues, but never endorsed the Pentecostal doctrine that it marks a post-conversion Baptism in the Holy Spirit. Indeed, he addressed his book "to all who want God's gifts, but are unable to accept mainstream Charismatic theology." Although the Third Wave movement as such did not exist at the time, the views he expressed were later adopted by large sections of it.
Personal life.
Tatham was the father of Bible teacher Grace Kemp and of Dave Tatham, Paul Tatham, and Ruth Nottage, all of whom assisted in the running of The Kingsway Academy in Nassau. Tatham had four grandchildren through Grace, all born in Nassau.


Islamic banking in Malaysia

Islamic banking in Malaysia began in September 1963 when Perbadanan Wang Simpanan Bakal-Bakal Haji (PWSBH) was established. PWSBH was set up as an institution for Muslims to save for their Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) expenses. In 1969, PWSBH merged with Pejabat Urusan Haji to form Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (now known as Lembaga Tabung Haji).
The first Islamic bank in Malaysia was established in 1983. In 1993, commercial banks, merchant banks and finance companies were allowed to offer Islamic banking products and services under the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS). These institutions however, are required to separate the funds and activities of Islamic banking transactions from that of the conventional banking business to ensure that there would not be any co-mingling of funds.
The list of banks in Malaysia offering Islamic products (updated in 2015) have grown to 16 banks. Apart from banks, other non-banks intermediaries offering syariah based products are Malaysia Building Society Berhad (MBSB) and cooperatives registered under the Cooperative Commission of Malaysia (SKM).
In Malaysia, the National Shariah Advisory Council additionally set up at Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) advises BNM on the Shariah aspects of the operations of these institutions, as well as on their products and services. In 2006, Bank Negara Malaysia setup International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) a dedicated University to provide skilled and certified personnel for Islamic Finance in Malaysia. The university was established as part of the Malaysian Government's initiative to further strengthen the country’s position as an international Islamic finance centre. It is the only university in the world that is wholly dedicated to postgraduate study in Islamic Finance.
In June 2005, Dow Jones and Company of New York City and RHB Securities of Kuala Lumpur, teamed up to launch a new "Islamic Malaysia Index" — a collection of 45 stocks representing Malaysian companies that comply with a variety of Sharia-based criteria. Three variables (the total debt of an indexed company, its total cash plus interest-bearing securities and its accounts receivables) must each be less than 33% of the trailing 12-month average capitalization, for example.


Crimean Tatars in Bulgaria

After 1241, the year of the earliest recorded Tatar invasion of Bulgaria, the Second Bulgarian Empire maintained constant political contact with the Tatars. In this early period (13th and 14th century), "Tatar" was not an ethnonym but a general term for the armies of Genghis Khan’s successors. The First Tatar settlements in Bulgaria may be dated to the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century when military units persecuted in the wake of dynastic feuds in the Golden Horde defected to Bulgarian rulers (Pavlov, 1997).
From the late 14th to the late 15th century, several groups of Tatars settled in the Bulgarian territory (then under the Ottoman rule) for various reasons. The settlers, probably nomads, eventually adopted a sedentary way of life and, in some areas, survived as compact communities for more than two centuries. The records show that the Tatars were inclined to raid villages and resist authority, and were therefore resettled among the local, just as restive, populations in Thrace. The Tatars were assigned special messenger and military missions and were incorporated into the Ottoman military administration. This fact, along with their small number, the closeness between the "Tatar" and local Ottoman Turkish language, and the common religion, led to the eventual loss of group Tatar identity.
Unlike the situation in Thrace, the ethnic composition of Dobruja attests to the existence of a large Tatar community from the 15th to the 20th century. The Ottoman conquest of Bessarabia created conditions for the constant migration of Tatars from the Northern Black Sea region to Dobruja in the 1530s and 1540s.
The 18th century saw the beginning of a radical change in the ethnic composition of the northern Black Sea region as a result of Russian invasions. Between 1783, when the Crimean Khanate was annexed to Russia, and 1874, there were several waves of emigration from the Crimea and Kuban, and a considerable number of Crimean Tatars settled in the Bulgarian lands. The Tatars who live in Bulgaria today are descended precisely from those immigrants, who kept their identity.
The largest wave of emigration was during and after the Crimean War (1853–1856). Of the approximately 230,000 Tatars who emigrated from 1854 to 1862, about 60,000 settled on Bulgarian territory (Romanski, 1917, p. 266). The majority dispersed in Northern Bulgaria, especially in Dobruja, on the plains near the Danube River and in the area of
Vidin.
The mass settlement of Tatars in the Bulgarian lands led to the establishment of traditional relations between Bulgarians and Tatars. Contrary to the Circassian immigration, Bulgarian National Revival society did not disapprove of the settlement of Tatars.
The Tatars themselves were in a state of ethnopsychological shock but, in all likelihood, thanks to their nomadic past, succeeded in adapting to "the alien world". This first period in the modern history of the Tatar group in Bulgaria (1862–1878) was characterized by economic and environmental adjustment to the new realities and the consolidation of all Kipchak-speaking refugees.
The development of the Tatar group and its identity after Bulgaria’s 1878 Liberation was determined by political factors. On the one hand, the host country changed. Having settled in the Ottoman Empire, the Tatars, who had not changed their ethnic and ecological environment, suddenly found themselves in another political organism - Bulgaria, a state that differed greatly from its predecessor. This came as another ethnopsychological shock to the Tatars and prompted a new wave of emigration. Even those who remained in Bulgaria - about 18,000 people, most of them in the areas with Turkish populations in northeastern Bulgaria found it hard to achieve a balance, and many of them eventually emigrated to Turkey.
The second factor of ethnic changes was the nascent Crimean Tatar national "renaissance" and differentiation in the late 19th and early 20th century. Notably, the national idea of the Tatars developed at a time when the majority of them were beyond the boundaries of their historical homeland. Since the national idea was immature among the Crimean Tatars, they were susceptible to assimilation, which, in the Bulgarian conditions, was effected not by the nation-state but by another ethnic group - Bulgarian Turks.
Other factors also accounted for the specificity of each period in the history of the Tatars in Bulgaria. In the post-Liberation period (1878-1912/1918), there were generally no major changes in the Tatar group - there was no large-scale emigration, and the process of ethnic consolidation continued.
The period from the Treaty of Neuilly to the Treaty of Craiova (1919–1940) saw a number of radical changes. Southern Dobruja, home to two-thirds of Bulgaria’s Tatar population, was annexed to Romania. The Tatars found themselves in a state with large Tatar populations around Medgidia, Mangalia, and Köstence (Constanţa). On the other hand, the start of this period coincided with a short-lived Tatar nation-state in Crimea and the constitution of the Turkish secular state. Modern Tatar nationalism embraced Pan-Turkism arid turned to Ankara for support as a result of Kemalist propaganda. This period saw large-scale Tatar emigration to Turkey and the establishment of a circle around the magazine "Emel" (1929-1930 in Dobrich), which used Pan-Turkic slogans as a cover for the promulgation of Turkish policies. Arguably, this was the beginning of the political Turkification of Tatars (Antonov, 1995).
The general tendencies remained the same in the next period (1940 to the early 1950s), except that Bulgaria recovered Southern Dobruja, whose Tatar population had decreased by half.
In the communist period, collectivization and industrialization destroyed the traditional lifestyle of the Tatars too. The natural but slow assimilation into the Turkish community endogamy was no longer possible considering the small number of the Tatar population - was intensified by modernization. There was also a socioeconomic factor, the desire to take advantage of the privileges which the communist authorities granted to the Turkish community.
The communist regime pursued inconsistent policies towards the Tatars. It originally adopted Moscow’s attitude to the Crimean Tatars, officially ignoring their presence in Bulgaria (they were last mentioned in the 1956 census, before reappearing as late as 1992).
In 1962, the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee proposed taking action against the Turkification of Gypsies, Tatars, and Bulgarian Muslims. The measures included a study of the ethnic origins of Bulgaria’s Tatars. This attested to a new policy: accentuating the community's ethnocultural specificity in an effort to highlight and restore the distinction (blurred as a result of Turkification) between Tatars and Turks.
The reforms in the 1990s have led to a restoration of Islamic Turkic names and the creation of conditions for normal contacts with relatives in Turkey, as well as for independent cultural and educational activities. There have been signs of a rebirth of Tatar identity.
Ethnonym.
In the last census (December 1992), 4,515 people (2,045 urban and 2,470 rural residents (4)) identified as Tatars. The ethnonym plays the main role in Tatar self-identification
We are called Tatar, but we don’t know when we came [to those lands] (5).
The Crimean Tatars (Qirim Tatarlari, Tatarlar), against the background of the impressive popularity of the term as an ethnicon in Eurasia, were the first to adopt it as an ethnonym after Genghis Khan wiped out the original Tatars.
Due to the specificity of the Crimean Tatar ethnic genesis, other ethnonyms arc also in use; they have now lost their concrete ethnic content and are, rather, a memory, perception, pejorative name, a supplementary term, and very rarely, a group indicator: Nogay, Tat, Kazan, Kipchak, Laz, Kazakh. They are used as a modifier of the general ethnonym, for instance, Nogay Tarari. Informants have the clearest perception of the Nogay as a separate group of a distinct type of people (prominent cheekbones and inure Mongolian), dialect ("truer Tatar"), livelihood (horse-breeding), and even character. In fact, the most differentiated group are the Tats, the informants know who they are, and they themselves identify as such. Their distinction is based on their dialect. Informants claim that there are Kazan Tatars in Bulgaria; they are "fatter". They have only heard about Kipchaks. Laz Tatars reportedly speak a language similar to Turkish. The Kazakhs are perceived as a "tribe" related to the "Don Kazakhs" (Cossacks), which, however, is Muslim. The more prosaic version is that "Kazakh" is a "nickname": "We call a "Kazakh" someone who is headstrong, stubborn".
Apart from the ethnic terms, Tatars are also divided into subgroups distinguished by territorial origin: Kerisler (from Kerch), Shongarlar (from Chongar),
Orlular (from Or; Russian Perekop) There is also a subdivision of Tatars identified by a personal name - "Sora Tatari", from the name of the tribal chief and Tatar epic hero Chora Batyr (Tasheva. 1975. pp. 2–73).
The pejorative term Tatar Sengenesi ("Tatar Gypsy") refers to a particular group of Tatars in Bulgaria (for example, a family from the village of Golyamo Vranovo, Rousse district), which probably came from Karachai.
As regards the ethnonym as a marker of ethnicity, there are traces of internal ethnic differentiation among the Tatars as part of - and, at the same time, in opposition to their collective identity.
The Turks and the Bulgarians have come to use the popular term "Tatar" as a stereotype (6) rather than an ethnonym. The influence of folklore and, later, of historical texts, is indicative in this respect. In Bulgarian folklore, "the Tatars" are a symbol of the strange and the unknown, and have pejorative connotations (Antonov.1995). Unlike those who do not know any Tatars in real life, those who do have a positive attitude to them. The negative attitude is associated with the ethnonym of the Tatars, and not with the other markers of their group identity.
Origins.
The Crimean Tatar ethnos originated on the territory of the Crimean peninsula and inland steppes in the 14th and 15th centuries. The main ethnic components that were successively incorporated into the new ethnos were the ancient indigenous populations (for example -Bat-Bayan's protobulgarians), the Kumans, and finally, the Kipchakized Mongol clans. Due to the slave trade and the military campaigns for the capture of slaves, economic mainstays of the Crimean khanate - other ethnoses also contributed to the Tatar genotype.
The Tatars in Bulgaria were formed as a group with a common identity as a result of the ethnic consolidation of the immigrants: Crimean Tatars proper, Nogay. Karachai and the distinct group of the Tats. Their consolidation was based on the close languages, common destiny, and political idea of belonging to the former Crimean khanate and respective ethno-social formations.
The Tatars associate their common descent with the idea of a homeland: "we are all from the Crimea", "the Crimea is the homeland of our ancestors" - as well as with their knowledge about its history and the destiny of their own people.
The Tatars stress their specific anthropological type. They regard it as the main marker of Tatar identity, second only to the language. For example, Tatars from Golyamo Vranovo say that those from Vetovo are "truer Tatars" not only because their language is "purer", but also because they have "larger heads and slit eyes. The Tatars also differ from the others in that most of them are "dark-eyed", with a "broad, flat face". Their neighbors likewise regard the specific appearance as a main distinctive feature of the Tatars. They talk of a "Tatar face".
Language.
Crimean Tatar is a Kipchak language from the Western Turkic language group, which, however, has been strongly influenced by Oguz through Ottoman Turkish. The Tatars in Bulgaria speak various local dialects developed in a foreign linguistic environment. This process is very complicated and has continued to the present day. On the one hand, the idiolects of speakers of the main dialects are modifying and tending to become standardized, with a particular dialect prevailing in a particular population center but strongly influenced by other dialects (Boev, 1971, p. 81).
Along with the standardization of the Kipchak dialects of refugees, there was a process of Oghuzation too. This process can be traced back to the pre-emigration Oghuz tradition in the literary Crimean Tatar language (Boev, 1971, p. 94). After the Tatars settled in the Bulgarian lands, the influence of Ottoman Turkish on the vernacular intensified. The Tatar language was at a disadvantage; the official language was Ottoman Turkish and did not develop a literary variant (Boev, 1964, pp. 81–2).
After the Liberation, the process intensified to the point of linguistic assimilation, mainly because Tatars and Turks communicated in Turkish and, later, because most children were sent to Turkish rather than Tatar schools (Boev, 1964, p. 2 Boev, 1971, p. 109). In 1910, 546 Tatars from Southern Dobruja cited Turkish as their native language.
The choice of Turkish in the past few years has also been largely determined by the fact that the Tatars do not have access to Crimean Tatar literature and read the available Turkish books. The boom of Turkish satellite television has also affected the Tatar language. For a considerable section of the Tatar community. Tatar remains a means of communication among elderly people only. Children understand but do not speak the language.
The Tatars started learning Bulgarian even before the Liberation (Kanitz, 1932. p. 141). When Southern Dobruja was under Romanian rule, the Tatars went to Romanian schools and, according to Bulgarian sources, learnt Romanian very quickly. Bulgarian was spoken by the males in their social contacts and at work. Today, even the most elderly Tatar women understand Bulgarian. The Tatars in contemporary Bulgaria are trilingual, but there is a strong tendency towards the replacement of Tatar by Turkish.
The Tatars regard the Tatar language as a distinctive feature of their collective identity and ethnic differentiation from the others: "We don’t speak either pure Turkish or [pure] Bulgarian - we are Tatars". The main marker of Tatarlik " Tatar ethnicity " is the Tatar language. This is also illustrated by a Tatar proverb.
A Tatar who does not speak Tatar with Tatars is not worthy of his mother’s milk (7).
The Tatars qualify the loss of the Tatar language as a loss of ethnicity: "Where the Tatars were a minority, they have been assimilated. The Young no longer speak Tatar, yet in the past, some Turkish women who married Tatars would eventually forget Turkish"; "The Tatars have now mixed […] The language is also mixed"; "We have mixed. We speak almost Turkish [only]. Few Tatars have remained".
Informants say that intermarriage leads to ethnic assimilation because that is the easiest way to lose the Tatar language. Still, there are people of Tatar origins who neither speak nor understand Tatar, yet have the self-awareness of "true Tatars" - probably in combination with a prioritized Turkish self-awareness. There is an interesting form of maintaining the lexical stock of Tatar dialects and of demonstrating Tatar ethnicity: when they meet, Tatars from different population centers will "test" each other on typical Tatar words. Bulgarians or Turks who speak Tatar also test the Tatars and declare themselves truer Tatars if the latter fail to give the right answer. This indicates that non-Tatars also regard language as an important ethnic marker of the Tatar community.
Religion.
The Tatars are Sunni Muslims. For them, religion is an important but not a main ethnic marker because it is identical to that of the Turks. Islam is seen as a basis of the community of all Muslims. Informants from the Tatar, as well as from other groups, tend to regard religion in general as a consolidating factor: "Tatars, Turks, Bulgarians - all are children of God".
The Tatars consider themselves good Muslims. The better educated and younger Tatars regard the Turks as fanatics and themselves as moderates - which they believe is an advantage. Respondents distinguish the two communities by the Islam-based segregation of women in the case of the Turks and the absence of such discrimination among the Tatars, as well as by the attitude to the Christians and the Alevites. The Tatars are tolerant towards the Alevites (Shias) while the Turks (who are Sunni) are not.
The other communities do not consider religion as a main distinctive feature of Tatar identity either, but rather as something that associates the Tatars with the Turks: "(they are) Muslims like the Turks". The Tatar Muslim community (where it is large enough) has its own institutional and ritual practices independent of the Turks. The Tatars celebrate religious holidays in their own esoteric circle and worship God in their own mosques. The Tatars built mosques of their own even right after they settled on Bulgarian territory, and this institution has survived in the population centers with larger Tatar communities. The "Tatar mosque" (for instance, in Vetovo) is a natural centre not only of religious, but also of socio-political life, a place for social contacts and internal demonstration of ethnicity. A map of the Crimea, the Tatar national flag arid photos of prominent Tatars usually hang on the walls; there are books too.
Livelihood.
The special status of the first Tatar settlers in the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of a professional community designated as "Tatars" messengers and guides of strangers - which was eventually dissociated from the Tatar ethnicity. This is a classical case of the adoption of an ethnonym as a name of a profession.
Contemporary Tatars do not distinguish themselves from the other communities on the basis of occupation, but memories of the traditional livelihood have survived in their self-perception: "The Tatars used to be horse-breeders, they produced riders"; "They loved horses, they used to decorate them - with tassels".
In the late 19th and early 20th century, the traditional occupation of Tatars in the countryside was agriculture and in the towns, small-scale trade and various crafts: cartage, candle-making, furriery, butchery, coffee-making, bow production, barbering.
According to Bulgarian sources, Tatar carters were famous for their skills. Some Turkish carters would even claim that they were Tatars. This stereotyping from the recent past has undoubtedly influenced contemporary attitudes to the Tatars.
Symbols.
Informants say that "the old flag of the Tatars was a horsetail’’. The modern one is the golden mark of the Ghirais on a blue-green background. It can occasionally be seen on badges and streamers. Tatar leaders have a tape of the "national anthem," too.
The now "traditional" Tatar festivals have come to play the role of symbols. From 1990 to 1996, such festivals were held in Onogur (Dobrič district), Čerkovna (Silistra district) Vetovo (Ruse district). Kăpinovo, Jovkovo and Topola (Dobrič district). There were three ours of the folk ensembles from Northern Dobruja, which were identified as "Tatar", but most of their performances were in Turkish. The festivals are seen as a distinct demonstration and symbol of Tatar identity. The poem 'I am Tatar', which every younger Tatar knows by heart, is often recited.
Traditional Culture.
The original Tatar cultural tradition was lost in the course of modernization, but elements of the Islamic tradition have survived. The Tatars know and remember, but do not practice their traditional culture. Informants remember typical Tatar elements in the design of houses and costumes (Tatar women did not wear veils), which, however, were abandoned in the process of modernization.
Today Tatars cite traditional food as a marker of their identity: "The Turks adopted Tatar food too, but they can’t prepare it and don’t like it"; or the proverb "The right of the Tatar is meat and rakia". Tatar legends also associate ethnicity with food. Here is how a story explains the death of entire Tatar villages after the settlement: "they fell sick because they weren’t used to the food. They were used to meat, but the Turks ate tarhana [dried ground dough] only - Tatars can’t do without meat". There are special customs for preparing certain dishes, which are therefore seen as traditional Tatar fare.
Most informants believe that the Tatar holidays and customs are original. A smaller part do not think that they are very different from the Turkish, since both are Muslim. The process of extinction of traditional culture has intensified: "We came here long ago, nor are we pure Tatar families only - so that’s how Tatar customs have become of secondary importance and are thus eventually forgotten.
Informants cite the following unique Tatar holidays: Nawrez, the Tatar first day of spring and, in the past, New Year; Tepres, the Tatar St. Sophia’s Day and, in some villages, St. George’s Day; and Qidirlez, the Tatar St George’s Day. They always cite Tatar elements in other rituals - noting, for instance, that "the Turks don’t have that".
History.
Contemporary Tatars know little about their history in terms of events, dates, and specific figures and phenomena. They have not had any particular historical education. The Tatar community does not have its own educational institutions. The earliest signs of a Tatar presence in history are believed to be the uprising of Ivailo and the figure of Chaka: "There was a Bulgarian tsar who was a Tatar - Chaka; that’s what I’ve been telling them, but they won’t believe me". The name of this "Bulgarian tsar" is also cited as Chakatai and Isai.
This example illustrates the Tatar awareness of the historical contribution of their ethnic. One informant elevates this to Tatar universalism: "There are Tatars everywhere. The Turks are Tatars too. There are [Tatars] in China too [...] Do you know who invented the trousers? The Tatars". Such cases are rare. For most Tatars, the milestone event in their history is the emigration from Crimea. They recount the reasons for the emigration (wars, dynastic feuds), the quest for suitable places for settlement (they had to be fertile, to be like the Crimea), the problems of adjustment (other hostile people, strange trees, other seasons). The memories of emigration to Turkey and the performance of Tatar folk ensembles also play an important role in preserving the Tatar ethnicity.
That is how the main points of reference in Tatar ethnic history have been formed. Knowledge of history is an element of the general attainments of the Tatar intellectual elite, whereas ordinary people have only a vague idea of their past.
Value System.
This marker is directly associated with the notion of ethnic character or mentality. The Tatars have a clear concept of character traits which they believe arc typical of their identity: "There is a difference between Turks and Tatars. A big difference. Our folks - men, women - will get together, sit down, but here the men will sit apart from the women [...] And our Tatars are very hospitable, you know. It’s in them. If you are stranded in a village, you’ll never have to spend the night in the Street [...] We don’t care if somebody’s Bulgarian or Turkish - no we don't. We’re a democracy, I tell you". "The Tatars will always help each other. For example, relatives, friends, neighbors will pool efforts [...] Everybody helps in the building of a house - both men and women. The women-folk of Turks don’t go out at all". "The Tatar is cunning and clever, he won’t give in to blackmail and manipulation. He builds networks [...] When two Tatars meet, they become sort of family". "The Tatars will soon make up after a quarrel. When Turks quarrel, they won’t speak to each other for years".
Those statements of informants convey the general idea of a "Tatar character". The main character traits are associated with tolerance in relations among individuals, the genders and ethnic communities, cleverness, hospitality, mutual help. The following positive traits are also believed to be typically Tatar: quick adoption of new developments; diligence; moderateness; persistence; friendliness; patience; courage.
The community’s value system is based not only on the accentuation of the positive but also on the admission of negative character traits. The Tatars sometimes say they are fickle. Tatars will not keep their word, and they are easily carried away and make big promises which they don’t keep: "I’ve broken my word". In addition, the Tatar is "maybas" - literally, "greasy head", i.e. headstrong. Menmenlik is another bad quality" - demonstrative individualism which takes the form of self-congratulation. The more critical also say that Tatars tend to be vindictive, malicious, and miserly.
The quoted statements show that the Tatars are capable of self-observation and self-analysis as an ethnic group. Their self-perception is stereotyped but not lop-sided. The group’s self-portrait specifies the distinction from the others, the own value system, and the individual’s emotional bond with the community.
The specificity or the Bulgarian attitude to the Tatar identity is nest manifested in comparisons with the Turks. The Tatars are always said to be superior: they are better educated, cleverer, more accomplished and hospitable, and work harder. By contrast, the Turks tend to see the Tatars as bad and aggressive. In general, Bulgarian society hardly knows anything about the Tatars. Yet those who do, appreciate the Tatar specificity and identity for what they are worth. The main reason why the general public is not familiar with the Tatars is that the latter has for years deliberately and naturally gravitated towards the Turkish community. Having no high culture and institutions maintaining the Tatar identity, the Tatar ethnic community has been reproducing in a traditional environment.
A cultural-educational association of Tatars in Bulgaria, Asabay (Kinship), based In Silistra and chaired by Ziya Ismail, was set up in 1993. In 1996, Ismail was replaced by Alkin Hassan, and the headquarters moved to Dobrich. The association has not undertaken any considerable projects to date and remains but a symbol of the Tatar presence in Bulgarian public life.
The Tatars are perceived as part of Bulgarian society. They regard Crimea as their "ancestral homeland", but Bulgaria as their own native country.
Despite the demographic crisis and very real threat of gradual and natural extinction of the Tatar community, the past six or seven years have seen a sort of renaissance of Tatar identity. This renaissance might contribute to the survival of the Tatar ethnic group in Bulgaria.


Muslim groups in China

The vast majority of China's Muslims are Sunni Muslims, although some Salafi groups are also present.
Mosques.
The style of architecture of Hui Mosques varies according to their sect. The traditionalist Gedimu Hanafi Sunnis, influenced by Chinese culture, build Mosques which look like Chinese temples. The reformist modernist (but originally Wahhabi inspired) Yihewani build their Mosques to look like Middle Eastern Arab style Mosques.
A
Hanafi Sunni Gedimu.
Gedimu or Qadim is the earliest school of Islam in China. It is a Hanafi non-Sufi school of the Sunni tradition. Its supporters are centered on local mosques, which function as relatively independent units. It is numerically the largest Islamic school of thought in China and most common school of Islam among the Hui. Since the introduction of Islam, first during the Tang Dynasty in China, it continued to the Ming Dynasty with no splits. At the end of the Ming and early Qing Dynasty Sufism was introduced to China.
Its members were sometimes extremely hostile to Sufis, Ikhwanis, and Wahhabis, like the Sufi Jahriyya and Yihewani. They engaged in fights and brawls against Sufis and Wahhabis.
Shafi'i Sunnis.
Early European explorers speculated that T'ung-kan (Dungans, i.e. Hui, called "Chinese Mohammedan") in Xinjiang originated from Khorezmians who were transported to China by the Mongols, and that they were descended from a mixture of Chinese, Iranians, and Turkic peoples. They also reported that the T'ung-kan were Shafi'ites, which the Khorezmians were also.
Sufi Groups.
Islamic scholar Ma Tong recorded that the 6,781,500 Hui in China were predominantly members of Sufi groups. According to Tong, 58.2% were Gedimu, 21% Yihewani, 10.9% Jahriyya, 7.2% Khuffiya, 1.4% Qadariyya (قادرية), and 0.7% Kubrawiyya (کبرویة).
Sufi Kubrawiyya.
Kubrawiyya (in Chinese Kuburenye/Kubulinye) was a Sufi sect which is claimed to
have arrived in China during the Ming dynasty, evidence shows that they existed since the reign of the Kangxi Emperor in the Qing dynasty. A descended of Muhammad, Muhuyindeni went to China, reaching the Dawantou village in Dongxiang around Linxia. The village was entirely composed of Han Chinese surnamed Zhang, all of the same clan. He converted several Zhangs in Yinwa to Islam, to his Sufi menhuan in Dawantou, while in Yangwa the Zhang family people did not convert, and continued to practice Chinese Religion. All the Han Zhangs and the Hui Zhangs, being of the same family, celebrated New Year together up to 1949.
Sufi Khafiya.
Ma Laichi established the Hua Si school ("menhuan") - the core of the Khufiyya (خفيه) 虎夫耶 movement in Chinese Islam. The name of the movement - a Chinese form of the Arabic "Khafiyya", i.e. "the silent ones" - refers to its adherents' emphasis on silent dhikr (invocation of God's name). The Khufiyya teachings were characterized by stronger participation in the society, as well as veneration of saints and seeking inspiration at their tombs.
Ma Laichi spent 32 years spreading his teaching among the Muslim Hui and Salar people in Gansu and Qinghai.
The Khuffiya is a Naqshabandi Sufi order.
Khuffiya Sufis were sometimes hostile to the Ikhwan and other Sufis like the Jahriyya and the Xidaotang, engaging in deadly brawls and fights against them. Its members also called the Xidaotang founder, Ma Qixi, an infidel.
Sufi Jahriyya.
Jahriyya (جهرية) (哲赫林耶) is a menhuan (Sufi order) in China. Founded in the 1760s by Ma Mingxin, it has been active in the late 18th and 19th centuries in the then Gansu Province (also including today's Qinghai and Ningxia), when its followers participated in a number of conflicts with other Muslim groups and in several rebellions against the China's ruling Qing Dynasty. Its members later cooled down, and many of them like Ma Shaowu became loyal to the Chinese government, crushing other Muslim rebels like the Uyghurs.
The Jahriyya order was founded by the Gansu Chinese-speaking Muslim scholar Ma Mingxin soon after his return to China in 1761, after 16 years of studying in Mecca and Yemen.
Jahriyya is a Naqshbandi (نقشبندية) 納克什班迪 Sufi order.
Its adherents were hostile to the other Sufi order, the Khafiya, engaging in fights. The rivalry was so intense that some members took it personally, Ma Shaowu, a Jahriyya had a rivalry against Ma Fuxing, a Khafiyya, even though they both worked for the Chinese government.
Sufi Qadiriyya.
Celibacy, poverty, meditation, and mysticism within an ascetic context along with worship centered on Saint's tombs were promoted by the Qadiri Sufi order among Hui Muslims in China. In China, unlike other Muslim sects, the leaders (Shaikhs) of the Qadiriyya Sufi order are celibate. Unlike other Sufi orders in China, the leadership within the order is not a hereditary position, rather, one of the disciples of the celibate Shaikh is chosen by the Shaikh to succeed him. The 92-year-old celibate Shaikh Yang Shijun was the leader of the Qadiriya order in China as of 1998.
Xidaotang.
Xidaotang is a Chinese-Islamic school of thought. It was founded by Ma Qixi (1857–1914), a Chinese Muslim from Lintan in Gansu, at the beginning of the 20th century. Their teaching of Islamic faith is relatively strongly fused with traditional culture.
It is mainly distributed in Lintan and Hezheng County in northwest China's Gansu Province, and also has followers in the province of Qinghai, the Autonomous Region Xinjiang and the province of Sichuan. It is a Hanafi school of the Sunni tradition similar to Qadim (Gedimu) has included Jahriyya elements.
Its founder, Ma Qixi, was heavily influenced by Chinese culture and religion like Confucianism, and Daoism, taking heavily from the Han Kitab, and he even took cues from Laozi, founder of Daoism.
Khafiya Sufi leaders called the Xidaotang adherents infidels.
Yihewani.
Yihewani 伊赫瓦尼 (Ikhwan) 'Ixwān (إخوان) is a Hanafi (حنفي), non-Sufi school of the Sunni tradition. It is also referred to as "new sect" or "latest sect". It is mainly in Qinghai, Ningxia and Gansu (there in Linxia) and distributed in Beijing, Shanghai, Henan, Shandong and Hebei. It was the end of the 19th century when the Dongxiang Imam Ma Wanfu (1849–1934) from the village of Guoyuan in Hezhou (now the Dongxiang Autonomous County was founded in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province) - who had studied in Mecca and was influenced by the Wahabi movement. After his return to Gansu and he founded the movement with the so-called ten major Ahong. The school rejected Sufism. It claimed that the rites and ceremonies do not stand in line with the Quran and the Hadith and should be abolished. It is against grave and Murshid (leader/teacher) worship, and advocates against preaching (Da'wah) being done in Chinese. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (محمد بن عبد الوهاب), Muhammad Amin al Birkawi (محمد أمين البركوي), and Ibn Tamiyya (ابن تيمية) and their Wahhabi (وهابي) Hanbali madhhab (المذهب الحنبلي) influenced the Yihewani in its foundation during the 19th century despite identifying itself as Hanafi.
The Khafiya Sufi Qing dynasty General Ma Anliang persecuted and executed Yihewani members, because they were considered part of the outlawed "New Teaching", in contrast to the Sufi Khafiya and Gedimu Sunni "Old Teaching".
Hu Songshan, a former Sufi who converted to the Yihewani sect, reformed the Yihewani, making it less hostile to Chinese culture, and integrated modern teaching, and Chinese nationalism into Yihewani teachings.
Wahhabi/Salafi.
Wahabbism is intensely opposed by rival Hui sects in China, by the Hanafi Sunni Gedimu and Sufi Khafiya and Jahriyya. The opposition is so much so that even the Yihewani Chinese sect, which is fundamentalist and was founded by Ma Wanfu who was originally inspired by the Wahhabis, reacted with hostility to Ma Debao and Ma Zhengqing, who attempted to introduce Wahhabism/Salafism as the main form of Islam. They were branded as traitors and weirdos, and Wahhabi teachings were deemed as heresy by the Yihewani leaders. Ma Debao established a Salafi/Wahhabi order, called the Sailaifengye 赛莱菲耶 (Salafi) (سلفية) menhuan in Lanzhou and Linxia, a completely separate sect. None of the four Sunni Madhhab (مذاهب) are followed by the Salafis.
Salafis have a reputation for radicalism among the Hanafi Sunni Gedimu and Yihewani. Sunni Hui avoid Salafis, even if they are family members, and they constantly fight.
Among Hui Salafis and Uyghur Salafis, there is little coordination or cooperation and the two take totally different political agendas, with the Hui Salafists content to carry out their own teachings and remain politically neutral.
Shias in China.
Some Persian and Arab legends record that Zaidis fled to China from the Umayyads during the 8th century CE. At present, the Nizari Isma'ili branch is predominant among the Pamiri Tajiks There is also a community of foreign (largely Iranian) Shia in Guangzhou and a community of Hui converts on Hainan Island.
Infighting between sects.
There have been many occurrences of violent sectarian fighting between different Hui sects. Sectarian fighting between Sufi Hui sects led to the Jahriyya rebellion in the 1780s and the 1895 revolt.
It is claimed by some scholars that the intrusion of Sufism into China caused massive tensions in the Hui community which led to the Dungan revolt. Sufi groups engaged in violent disputes with each other, and with the "old teaching" (lao jiao), non Sufi Gedimu Sunni Muslims who had been in China for centuries.
Violence was brought on by the introduction of the Jahriya by Ma Mingxin in 1761.
Both Hui Muslims and the Qing felt antagonized by the Jahriyya Hui order. Most revolts were due to the Naqshbandiyya. Heterodox status was attributed to the Jahriyya.
In the Jahriyya revolt sectarian violence between two suborders of the Naqshbandi Sufis, the Jahriyya Sufi Muslims and their rivals, the Khafiyya Sufi Muslims, led to a Jahriyya Sufi Muslim rebellion which the Qing dynasty in China crushed with the help of the Khafiyya Sufi Muslims. Due to street fighting and lawsuits between the Jahriyya and Khufiyya Sufi orders, Ma Mingxin was arrested to stop the sectarian violence between the Sufis. The Jahriyya then tried to violently jailbreak Ma Mingxin which lead to his execution and the crushing of the Jahriyya rebels. The Khufiyya Sufis and Gedimu joined together against the Jahriyya Sufis whom they fiercely opposed and differed from in practices. Salar Jahriyyas were among those deported to Xinjiang. Some Han Chinese joined and fought alongside the Jahriyya Salar Muslim rebels in their revolt.
Yaqub Beg's Uyghur forces declared a Jihad against Hui under T'o Ming during the Dungan revolt. The Uyghurs mistakenly thought that the Hui Muslims were Shafi`i, and since the Uyghurs were Hanafi that they should wage war against them. Yaqub Beg enlisted non-Muslim Han Chinese militia under Hsu Hsuehkung in order to fight against the Hui. T'o Ming's forces were defeated by Yaqub, who planned to conquer Dzungharia. Yaqub intended to seize all Dungan territory.
As mentioned in the above sections on each sect, fighting between them is common. It was Muslim Sufi inter-sect fighting that led to the Dungan revolt of 1862–1877, the Dungan revolt of 1895, and other rebellions.
The Qing authorities decreed that the Muslim rebels who were violently attacking were merely heretics, not representative of the entire Muslim population, like the heretical White Lotus did not represent all Buddhists. The Qing authorities decreed that there were two different Muslim sects, the "old" religion and "new" religion, and that the new were heretics and deviated like White Lotus deviated from Buddhism and Daoism, and stated its intention to inform the Muslim community that it was aware that the original Islamic religion was one united sect, before the new "heretics", saying they would separate Muslim rebels by which sect they belonged to.
Different sects used the Chinese legal system to try to sue each other out of existence. The first of these lawsuits came around 1748 by a Gedimu Imam against the Khuffiya Sufis. His lawsuit was dismissed and he left the province. The Dungan revolt (1895–1896) started with a lawsuit when rival Sufi Naqshbandi orders fought against each other. They accused each other of various misdeeds, and filed a lawsuit against each other through the office of the Xining prefect. The Judge decided not to issue a ruling on which group was superior to the other in matters of all Islamic affairs, and urged them to behave. This led to an increase in violent tension which led to the revolt.
The Chinese government was automatically apprehensive and distrustful of the Sufi orders, since heterodox Buddhists and Daoists, which were also banned, looked similar to the Sufi orders with their extensive organized structures and chanting rituals all night. Muslims who were not Sufi filed lawsuits against the Sufis, which stated that they were breaking the law by being heterodox and planning conspiracy. These factors help keep Sufi orders away from Lanzhou.
The Dungan Revolt (1895–96) broke out in the same place as the Jahriyya revolt of 1781 for the same reasons, sectarian violence between two Naqshbandi Sufi orders. After rival Sufi Naqshbandi spiritual orders had fought and accused each other of various misdeeds, instead of continuing the violence they decided to use the Qing legal system to solve the dispute. They filed opposing lawsuits through the office of the Xining Prefect and the judge in the case decided not to issue a ruling on which group was superior to the other in matters of all Islamic affairs, and urged them to behave. As a result, both groups resorted to violence. A "daotai" was sent by the Qing to crush the perpetrators of the violence, which ended in several deaths. This led the involved parties in the dispute to rebel against the Qing.
Other Muslim sects used the legal system to try to crush Ma Qixi's Xidaotang sect. The defendants in the court case, Ma Qixi and others received floggings before a second investigation was held and the case was dismissed.
Ma Lin (warlord) assisted the Xidaotang in filing a lawsuit against Ma Anliang after his death in 1919, to gain recognition for them as a legitimate Muslim sect.
The Khafiya Sufi General Ma Anliang, especially hated the Yihewani leader Ma Wanfu, so much that when the Han general Yang Zengxin captured Ma Wanfu, Ma Anliang arranged to have him shipped to Gansu so he could execute him. As Qing authority broke down in China, the Gedimu Sunnis and Khafiya Sufis went on a vicious campaign to murder Ma Wanfu and stamp out his Wahhabi inspired teachings. The leaders of menhuans attacked Ma Wanfu, and the Gedimu requested that the Qing governor in Lanzhou inflict punishment upon Ma Wanfu.
The Kuomintang general Ma Bufang, a Sufi Hui who backed the Yihewani (Ikhwan) Muslims, persecuted the Salafi/Wahhabis. The Yihewani forced the Salafis into hiding. They were not allowed to move or worship openly. The Yihewani had become secular and Chinese nationalist, and they considered the Salafiyya to be "heterodox" ("xie jiao") and followers of foreigners' teachings ("waidao"). Only after the Communists took over were the Salafis allowed to come out and worship openly. Ma Bufang also repressed his fellow Sufis, including the menhuan he himself belonged to. The Communist regime carries on his policy of favoring the Ikhwan and repressing Sufis to this day. General Ma effectively repressed all non Yihewani groups, including the traditional Sunni Gedimu, the oldest sect of Islam in China, doing things like enforcing Yihewani Imams on them. However, when the Communist party took over, the Gedimu used the Communist party's rules on freedom of religion to ward of the Yihewani practices and Imams.
The Gedimu forbade Yihewani (sunnaiti) from worshipping at their mosques, using knives to threaten them. They accused the other of being non Muslims, and reportedly perceived each other as enemies. Intermarriage between the two were forbidden and family members belonging to either of the two split apart.
The Gedimu and Yihewani (Sunnaiti) accused the Salafis (santai) of being extremist (guoji), opposing their reform.
Jingtang Jiaoyu is a form of Islamic education, heavily influenced by Chinese culture, which the Gedimu Muslims pride themselves in learning. Jingtang Jiaoyu has been severely criticized for pronouncing Arabic incorrectly. Due to the limitations of Chinese characters, it propagates wrong pronunciation in Arabic. Many Hui who used it said Salaam Aleikun instead of Salaam Alaikum.
The Hanafi Sunni Gedimu cling fiercely to Chinese customs and the Jingtang Jiaoyu method of education, refusing to pronounce Arabic correctly even when learning of the correct pronunciation. Hanafi Sunni Sunnaiti's (Yihewani adherents) criticize the Gedimu for practicing Islamic customs influenced by Chinese culture, including Jingtang Jiaoyu, Sunnaiti's pride themselves on speaking correct Arabic, accusing the Gedimu Muslims of practicing Han and Buddhist customs and "Chinese Arabic". One Sunnaiti Imam said of the Gedimu, "blindly followed the traditions of their ancestors".
The Yihewani Imam Hu Songshan's son was Akhund Hu Xueliang (1918 – 1960), who was involved in a famous incident where a Muslim woman wanted a divorce in order to remarry since she waited for a decade when her husband vanished, while divorce is allowed after 4 years in the Maliki madhhab, divorce is only allowed after 90 years in the Hanafi Madhhab, which is the dominant Madhhab practiced in China, and a large number of Chinese Muslims adhere strictly to the Hanafi Madhhab and view all other Madhhab as illegitimate so when Hu Xueliang decided to consult Maliki Madhhab rules and allow the woman to divorce, a violent disturbance broke out against Hu Xueliang so Hu had to be guarded from attacks from other Muslims by the Chinese army.
Inter-sectarian violence between Muslims within the Old Sect broke out in 1992 and resulted in 49 deaths, a court in Ningxia convicted 20 of starting the sectarian riots in February 1994.
After a hiatus after the People's Republic of China came to power, sectarian in fighting resumed in the 1990s in Ningxia between different sects. Several sects refuse to intermarry with each other. Šarḥ Sayf ad-Dīn (شرح سيف الدين), an anti-Wahhabi pamphlet and silsila (سلسلة) was circulated by the Sufi sect Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya (نقشبندية مجددية صوفية).


Committee for Charity and Support for the Palestinians

Committee for Charity and Support for the Palestinians (CBSP) or "Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP)" is a French-based registered charitable organization that was founded in 1990 to provide aid to vulnerable Palestinians. Its current president is Mahmood Zuheir.
The CBSP's states its humanitarian mission is to provide emergency assistance and develop sustainable economic and social programs in partnership with local organizations so as to assist the most needy segments of the Palestinian population in Gaza, the West Bank, and Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon.
In 2010 the organization had around 30 employees and 350 volunteers and received donations from 70,000 donors.
Field of work and other activities.
CBSP's states its work programme is made up of four focus areas:
Seven members of the group participated in the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in 2010.
Accusations of terrorism financing.
In August 2003, the CBSP was listed by the United States Treasury as a terrorist funding organization, also under the allegation that the organization fundraised for Hamas. In November 2003, Australia announced it had frozen the assets of six leaders of Hamas, along with those of a number of charitable institutions - one of which was the CBSP. Spokesperson Youcef Benderbal of the CBSP denied the allegations, stating that "Everyone, especially the French authorities, knows that our efforts and donations are solely directed to charities with a defined aim of supporting the orphans and establishing development projects to benefit them."
Legal proceedings.
CBSP has been involved in legal proceedings against groups accusing them of financing terrorism. In 2006, CBSPs bank Crédit Lyonnais were sued by a group of Americans who claimed that the bank knowingly allowed money to be funneled to Hamas via its accounts. In 2007, the Israel-friendly Simon Wiesenthal Center accused CBSP of funding families of suicide bombers and the CBSP countered with a defamation suit. In 2010, CBSP was again accused of financing terrorism by the French Jewish umbrella organization CRIF and the group again countered with a defamation suit.
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais.
In 2006, thirteen Americans led by Moses Strauss who had sustained injuries from terrorist attacks in Israel, filed a lawsuit in a District Court in Brooklyn against the French-based bank Crédit Lyonnais under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992.
They claimed that the bank knowingly allowed funds to be funnelled to Hamas by failing to quickly close bank accounts for the CBSP. Crédit Lyonnais claimed to have closed the accounts in September 2003, three years after it first noticed "unusual activity" in the account in question.
The suit alleges that "the financial services that the defendant knowingly provided to Hamas by collecting and transmitting funds on behalf of Hamas (with the knowledge that CBSP raises funds for Hamas) assists Hamas in its recruiting, rewarding, and providing incentives to suicide bombers and other terrorists."
The case has not yet been settled and is currently being processed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Wiesenthal case.
The head of international relations for the Simon Wiesenthal Center, Stanley Trevor (Shimon) Samuels, also accused the CBSP of funding families of suicide bombers. In response, the CBSP filed a defamation suit in a Paris court, calling the accusations "ridiculous", and stating that its charitable work consisted of providing aid to some 3,000 Palestinian orphans.
On March 8, 2007, the court ruled that documents produced by the Wiesenthal Center established no "direct or indirect participation in financing terrorism" on the part of the CBSP, characterizing the allegations as "seriously defamatory." Samuel was handed a suspended fine of 1,000 euros (1,300 dollars) and ordered to pay one euro in symbolic damages to the Palestinian support group
The Center appealed the court ruling, and won its case on appeal before the Paris Court of Appeal in October 2008. The court ruled that there was nothing defamatory in the Centre's allegations against the CBSP.
CRIF case.
In 2010 Marc Knobel, a researcher of the Jewish-French umbrella organization Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France (CRIF) published an article on the organization's web site claiming that the CBSP was raising money for Hamas. CBSP responded by suing Knobel for defamation. In 2012, a lower court whose ruling was appealed fined Knobel and CRIF's webmaster $2,070 each for defaming CBSP. In 2014 an appeals court reaffirmed the ruling by the lower court.
The courts ruled that Knobel's article was defamatory because CRIF had failed to present evidence supporting its allegation that CBSP funded Hamas.


Canadian Friends Service Committee

The Canadian Friends Service Committee (CFSC) is a charity that acts on the peace and social justice concerns of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Canada.
Quaker service work is rooted in the daily practice of pacifism, integrity, truthfulness, equality, community, simplicity and, above all, love both in the objectives of its work and in the discernment with which it plans and delivers its work.
History.
Canadian Friends Service Committee (CFSC) was founded in 1931 when members of the Religious Society of Friends or "Quakers" wanted a vehicle to act upon their peace and social justice concerns. That year, Fred Haslam "was instrumental in the organization of the CFSC, and, as its executive secretary for the next twenty-five years, he was personally responsible for the day-to-day direction of its activities, especially those concerning world peace and the abolition of capital punishment".
Since its founding, CFSC has worked on many projects related to peace and justice.
In 1947, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) received the Nobel Peace Prize for its service work during World War II. All of the Service Committees work is honoured by the Prize and the ethics that garnered it continue to inform CFSC's work today.
Between 1959 and 1963, during the Vietnam War, CFSC sent medical aid to Vietnam to be used by victims on all sides of the conflict in accordance with Quaker's tradition of relief work that cuts across the boundaries of war and conflict. Many American Quaker's knowingly contravened U.S. law by contributing to this work through CFSC.
In 1976, CFSC and Canadian Quaker's worked with partners to secure the abolition of the death penalty.
Since 2003, CFSC has been helping American soldiers and their families who refused to participate in the Iraq War and came to Canada seeking refuge.
In 2014, CFSC was one of two non-Indigenous organizations asked to intervene in the Supreme Court in the Tsilhqot'in Nation land rights case, it encouraged the Court to adopt an approach to Indigenous land rights that would be consistent with international human rights standards, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Court later unanimously recognized the Tsilhqot'in peoples right to control their traditional territory.
Program Committees.
Friends have traditionally had a concern for the rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 1974 individual Quakers (Friends) were led to go to Kenora in Northern Ontario to attempt reconciliation in a confrontation over mercury contamination of the waterways. Friends with skills in pathology and medicine assisted the Indigenous community, whose people were suffering from mercury poisoning, by helping to document the problem and to provide medical treatment. The Quaker Committee on Native Concerns (now Quaker Indigenous Rights Committee) was born out of this work and other concerns, especially amongst Friends in western Canada. Since then the Committee has supported Indigenous community building initiatives, and urged governments to live up to their legal commitments to Indigenous peoples including Esgenoopetitj (Burnt Church) in New Brunswick, Pimicikamak Cree Nation in northern Manitoba and the Lubicon in northern Alberta. Since the mid-1990s, QIRC has worked with others at the United Nations towards the development and recognition of an international instrument specifically addressing the rights of Indigenous Rights through the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. CFSC is one of the founding members of the Coalition for the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This group of Indigenous and Non-Indigenous partners work together to inform and educate Canadian people and politicians on work related to "the UN Declaration".
In 1972, CFSC established the Quaker Committee on Jails and Justice (now called Quakers Fostering Justice, QFJ) which has worked to encourage prison visiting, sought alternatives to prisons, and fostered awareness of the roots of crime and violence in society. QFJ promotes restorative justice and has supported the Alternatives to Violence Project. In 1981, Canadian Yearly Meeting (Canadian Quakers) minuted: "Prison abolition is both a process and a long-term goal. In the interim there is a great need for Friends to reach out and to support all those affected: guards, prisoners, victims, and families. We recognize a need for restraint of those few who are exhibiting dangerous behaviour. The kind of restraint used and the help offered during that time must reflect our concern for that of God in every person."
Quaker Peace Committee (QPC), formerly Quaker Peace and Sustainable Communities Committee (QPASCC), exists to put into practice the Quaker Testimonies through projects, education, and public witness designed to alleviate suffering and poverty, promote justice, sustainable livelihoods and peace. The work of QPC is guided by the Quaker Testimonies of Peace, Simplicity, Community, Equality and Integrity. QPC works in partnership with communities, both domestically and internationally.
QPAC's work is rooted in mutual learning, which is the traditional Quaker practice of encouraging exchange, cooperation, education, and relationship amongst partners and participants in projects, overseas or in Canada. Lessons learned through our grassroots experience inform policy and education work in Canada. Generally speaking, projects are designed to have long-term results and develop self-reliance, as well as to respond to practical needs.
Using Quaker practice and in worshipful discernment, QPC provides concrete assistance and engages in policy dialogue towards peaceful, sustainable communities worldwide. QPC's work and experience is shared with Quakers and other people through education and partnership-building. In this way, QPC hopes to contribute to the social transformation necessary to achieve their goal that one day all people might be free from suffering, persecution and repression, and instead enjoy their rights to dignity, sustainable livelihoods, social inclusion and expression.


Islam in Lebanon

Islam in Lebanon () is followed by nearly 61.1% , excluding the Druze, of the country's total population: Sunnis make up also 30.6%, with the Hanafi and Shafiʽi madhhab being the predominant Sunni groups. Shias make up 30.5%, with Twelvers being the predominant Shia group, followed by Alawites and Ismailis. Several large Sufi orders are active in the country, including the Naqshbandi and Qadiriyya tariqas.
Although not traditionally considered as Muslims, the Druze make up 5.2% of the total population, which under the Lebanese political division (Parliament of Lebanon Seat Allocation) the Druze community is designated as one of the five Lebanese Muslim communities (Sunni, Shia, Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili).
Demographics.
The number of Muslims in Lebanon has been disputed for many years. There has been no official census in Lebanon since 1932. According to the CIA World Factbook, the Muslim population is estimated at around 59.5% within the Lebanese territory and of the 8.6–14 million Lebanese diaspora is believed by some to be about 20% of the total population.
The last census in Lebanon in 1932 put the numbers of Muslims (Shia 19%, Sunni 22%, Druze 7%) at 48% of the population (388,400 of 791,700). A study done by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1985 put the numbers of Muslims (Shia 41%, Sunni 27%, Druze 7%) at 75% of the population (1,667,000 of 2,228,000).
Current political and religious issues.
Under the terms of an agreement known as the National Pact between the various political and religious leaders of Lebanon, the president of the country must be a Maronite, the Prime Minister must be a Sunnite, and the Speaker of Parliament must be a Shiite.
Although Lebanon is a secular country, family matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance are still handled by the religious authorities representing a person's faith. Calls for civil marriage are unanimously rejected by the religious authorities but civil marriages conducted in another country are recognized by Lebanese civil authorities.
Non-religion is not recognized by the state, the Minister of the Interior Ziad Baroud made it possible in 2009 to have the religious sect removed from the Lebanese identity card. This does not, however, deny the religious authorities complete control over civil family issues inside the country.
Branches.
Lebanese Muslims are divided into many branches like Shiites, Sunnites, Druze, Alawites, and Ismailis.
Shia Islam.
The Lebanese Shia Muslims are around 27%–29% of the total population. Twelvers are the predominant Shia group, followed by Alawites and Ismailis. The Speaker of Parliament is always a Shi'a Muslim, as it is the only high post that Shi'as are eligible for. The Shiites are largely concentrated in northern and central Beqaa, Southern Lebanon, in south Beirut (southern parts of Greater Beirut).
Sunni Islam.
The Lebanese Sunni Muslims constitute also about 27%–29% of the total population. Sunni notables traditionally held power in the Lebanese state together, and they are still the only ones eligible for the post of Prime Minister Sunnis form the majority in west Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Central and Western Beqaa and hasbaya, ikleem al kharroub, Miniyeh and Danniyeh districts, and Akkar in the north.
Druze.
The Lebanese Druze constitute 5% of the population and can be found primarily in Mount Lebanon and the Shouf District. which under the Lebanese political division (Parliament of Lebanon Seat Allocation) the Druze community is designated as one of the five Lebanese Muslim communities (Sunni, Shia, Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili), even though most Druze do not identify as Muslims, and they do not accept the five pillars of Islam.


Jean du Feynier

Jean du Feynier (died 1538) was the Master of the Order of Preachers from 1532 to 1538.
Biography.
Feynier was a French native of Bern. The Dominican chapter held at Rome in 1532 elected him Master of the Order of Preachers. As master, he visited Spain and the Kingdom of Portugal and then moved on to the Kingdom of France. In France, he was imprisoned because: (1) he was a friend of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, and (2) he refused to allow Francis I of France to impose Jeanne d'Amboise as prioress of the Dominican convent at Prouille. He was released in 1538 and died a short time later.


Nicolas Ladvocat-Billiard

Nicolas Ladvocat-Billiard (died 12 April 1681, Boulogne-Sur-Mer) was a French cleric and doctor of theology. He became grand vicar and canon of Paris before being made bishop of Boulogne in 1677, in succession to François Perrochel. He died in office and was succeeded by Claude Le Tonnelier de Breteuil.


Youngsan University of Son Studies

Youngsan University of Seonstudies is a private religious university located in Yeonggwang County, South Jeolla province, South Korea. It offers graduate and undergraduate training in Won Buddhism and related matters.
History.
The predecessor of the university was founded on April 1, 1927, as Youngsan Hagwon (영산학원/靈山學院), a private academy for training Won Buddhist clergy. It closed down for three years at the end of World War II, from 1944 to 1947, and again during the Korean War from 1950 to 1952. It closed down once again in 1957, to be reopened as a religious school recognized by the government in 1964. 1964 is thus recognized by some as the date of the school's actual founding. The school became a college in 1986, and a university in 1997.


Pir (Alevism)

In Alevism, a Pir meaning Elder is one of the 12 ranks of Imam in Alevism. The rank of Dede or Ana are selected from among the Pirs.


Dorinbo

Dorinbo (c. late 16th century) was a Japanese priest and the uncle of the famous swordsman Miyamoto Musashi during the 17th century in Edo period Japan. He raised Musashi as a youth, and taught him basic knowledge of painting and religion.


Christianity in the Gambia

Christians in the Gambia constitute approximately 3 percent (~136,400) of the country's population (1,705,000 - 2009 est.)
The government did not establish a state religion, but the predominant religion is Islam, practised by approximately 90% of the country's population. Article 25 of the Constitution protects the rights of citizens to practise any religion that they choose.
The Christian community, situated mostly in the west and south of the country, is predominantly Roman Catholic; there are also several Protestant groups including Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and various small evangelical denominations. In 1963 the Gambia Christian Council was formed as an ecumenical association of Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist churches.
Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians is common. In some areas, Islam and Christianity are syncretized with animism.
Roman Catholicism.
In 1931 from the Apostolic Vicariate of Senegambia was established Mission “sui iuris” of Gambia. In 1951 Mission was promoted as the Apostolic Prefecture of Bathurst, in 1957 promoted as Diocese of Bathurst in Gambia (renamed in 1974 as Diocese of Banjul).
Now there are about 42,400 (~2.4%) Catholics in the Gambia. The Diocese of Banjul is divided into 56 parishes.
Bishop James Allen Yaw Odico is the present Catholic Bishop of the diocese of Banjul.
Anglicanism.
The Anglican Diocese of Gambia and the Rio Pongas was founded in 1935. John Daly was the first bishop of the new diocese. In 1951 five West African Anglican dioceses, including the Diocese of Gambia, were formed into the Church of the Province of West Africa. In 1985 from the Diocese of Gambia was separated the Diocese of Guinea and now the jurisdiction of Anglican Diocese of Gambia comprises the Republics of the Gambia, Senegal, and Cape Verde.
In 2000 the Church of the Province of West Africa adopted legislation permitting women priests, but only Liberia and the Gambia have passed enabling legislation and ordained women clergy.
Solomon Tilewa Johnson, who died in 2014, was the first Gambian national to hold the post of Anglican Bishop of Gambia.


Baba Faja Martaneshi

Baba Faja Martaneshi (1910 - 18 March 1947) was an Albanian Bektashi "baba" (Sufi) and a resistance leader during the National Liberation War of the Albanian People.
Biography.
Baba Faja was born Mustafa Xhani in Luz i Madh, Kavajë and pursued religious studies to become a "baba" at the "tekke" of Martanesh, where he acquired the religious name he would become popularly known by. Following the Italian invasion of Albania he led one of the earliest guerrilla bands against the occupiers, denouncing Fascist Italy as anti-Islamic and establishing contacts with the Albanian communist movement, becoming one of the most wanted men in the country in the process. In his memoirs Enver Hoxha wrote that during the war the Baba was "one of those clergy men who wore the cap and the cloak of a dervish, but who had Albania in his heart and in his hand the rifle for its liberation. . . . [he] did not discard his clerical cap and robe, and he was quite right, because in this way he rendered even greater service to the line of the Party and the National Liberation Front for uniting everybody in the war without distinction as to region, or political and religious beliefs." David Smiley described Baba Faja as a likable "scoundrel," who "delighted in singing partisan songs in his deep bass voice, especially after consuming large quantities of raki."
He became a founding member of the National Liberation Front upon its establishment in September 1942, serving on its General Council alongside Enver Hoxha, Myslym Peza and other resistance fighters, and in July 1943 he became a member of the General Staff of the Albanian National Liberation Army. In May 1944 he was elected a Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council. After the war he served as a representative from Elbasan in the Constituent Assembly, subsequently becoming Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly.
During the war he asked Hoxha to admit him as a member of the Communist Party; Hoxha supported this move and added "I am sure that you do not believe in religion but believe only in the Party." To this Baba Faja said, "For the Party I shall discard my clerical robes," to which Hoxha replied, "No, you should stick to the robes you wear. This is not a matter of deceiving people, but you wore the religious robes as a priest before the war and before the formation of the Party. Therefore, go on wearing them, because we have to respect the sentiments of believers and utilize the sympathy which the people have for you and the "tekke" of Martanesh. So, since you are resolutely for the war and love the Party, respect and apply its line, we will admit you as member of the Party." He was subsequently made a member.
In May 1945 he presided over the Fourth Congress of the Bektashi Community, which formally severed relations between the sect and the rest of the Islamic world. As the most prominent Bektashi figure to work with the Communists he led reformers within the sect who advocated allowing the clergy to marry, allowing them to shave their beards and to limit the wearing of religious clothing to ceremonies. On March 18, 1947 the conservative head of the sect, Abas Hilmi, was confronted by Baba Faja and Baba Fejzo Dervishi (a like-minded reformer) who demanded he accept these policies or else face reprisals from the government. Hilmi then proceeded to shoot both men and commit suicide.