2019–2021 locust infestation, Effects
Around 2.25m ha land has already been affected as of April 2020. About 70,000 hectares (172,973 acres) of land in Kenya alone are already infested. 20.2 million people facing severe acute food insecurity in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. If left unchecked, the number of locusts could grow by 500 times by June 2020, when drier weather will help bring the outbreak under control. 1 million ha of land has been targeted for rapid locust surveillance and control in the eight East African countries. 110 000 households have been targeted for rapid livelihoods protection in seven of the eight countries“Effective control is estimated to be around $60m (£47m) but, if an upsurge occurs, the cost will soar to $500m.”


2019–2021 locust infestation, Effects
WFP estimates that long-term response and recovery costs could top US$1billion if swarm growth is not controlled. The World Bank estimates that in Africa alone, more than 90 million hectares of cropland and pasture are at risk and damages and losses could amount to as much as US$9 billion in coming years.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
FAO said containing the plague will cost at least $138 million. So far, donors have pledged $52 million as of April 2020, $10m of which has come from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Failure means more hunger in a region already battered by conflict and climate shocks. Aerial and ground spraying combined with constant tracking of the swarms are viewed as the most effective strategies. But the travel restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic have hindered the preventive measures.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
In the winter breeding areas, control operations started in December 2018 in Eritrea and, to a lesser extent, in Sudan. They extended to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in January where they continued for several months before a further extension to spring breeding areas in Saudi Arabia (February–June), Iran (February–July) and Pakistan (March–July). Control operations were then undertaken in the summer breeding areas along both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border (May–February), Ethiopia (August onwards) and Yemen (July onwards). During the winter of 2019/2020, control was carried out along both sides of the Red Sea (November–March), the Horn of Africa (December–present) and southern Iran (November onwards). About 2.25 Mha had been treated by February 2020.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
As of April 2020 Ethiopia was using five planes and Kenya six planes for spraying and four planes for surveying. But the Kenyan government says it needs 20 planes for spraying - and a continuous supply of the pesticide Fenitrothion. Kenya has trained more than 240 personnel from affected counties in monitoring of locust swarms. To help prevent and control outbreaks, authorities analyze satellite images, stockpile pesticides and conduct aerial spraying. The U.N. has allocated $10 million for aerial spraying.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
At the Intergovernmental Authority on Development climate prediction and applications centre, based in Nairobi, researchers have been running a supercomputer model to predict breeding areas that may have been missed by ground monitoring. These areas could become sources of new swarms if not sprayed and create an upsurge. So if hoppers are stopped from adults this wouldn't lead to another cycle of infestation.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
The supercomputer, funded by £35m of UK aid as part of its Weather and Climate Information Services for Africa programme, has successfully forecast the movement of locusts using data such as wind speed and direction, temperature, and humidity. The model has achieved 90% accuracy in forecasting the future locations of the swarms.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
Researchers are now inputting data on soil moisture and vegetation cover to help predict where eggs have been laid and are likely to hatch and thrive. This will then provide data on where African governments can direct their spraying efforts, helping to control the hoppers before they swarm. The Kenyan government is on high alert and effective control measures have been put in place.


2019–2021 locust infestation, Preventive measures
The Chinese government announced in February it was sending a team of experts to neighbouring Pakistan to develop "targeted programmes" against the locusts and deploy 100,000 ducks.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines
The 2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines was an epidemic. For the past 19 years, the Philippines was free of any polio-related diseases. It was until September 14, 2019, when the disease began to resurface through a positive test result done to a 3-year-old girl from Mindanao. After the confirmation of a second case from tests done on a 5-year-old boy, the government of the Philippines publicly declared a polio outbreak on September 19, 2019. On June 11, 2021, the WHO announced that the outbreak has ended.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the Philippines eradicated polio in 2000.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Epidemiology
On September 19, 2019, a polio outbreak was reported in the Philippines. After two polio cases were reported, the authorities inspected several places including Metro Manila and Davao City. Samples taken from several places across Manila were confirmed to contain "vaccine-derived polio virus" type 2 (VDPV2), similar to the pathogen found on the first two confirmed cases. The government decided to vaccinate all the children regardless of whether they have been affected by polio or not. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) have worked with the government of the Philippines in a massive polio vaccination campaign; other NGOs like the Red Cross are also collaborating in the campaign as well.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Epidemiology
Four cases have been confirmed as of November 5, 2019: the first was a three-year-old girl in Lanao del Sur with the other cases reported in Laguna, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat. It is believed that the public's distrust in the country's poor healthcare system is a cause of the polio outbreak.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Epidemiology
This is not the first disease outbreak in the Philippines in 2019. In February 2019, a measles outbreak occurred as a result of public distrust in the Philippines' poor healthcare system. As of January 2019, the Philippines has been combating a dengue outbreak, the worst dengue outbreak that the Philippines has experienced since 2012. Like the measles outbreak, the dengue outbreak was also caused by public distrust of the dengue vaccination campaign in 2012.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Epidemiology
The World Health Organization and UNICEF Philippines, declared the official end of the polio outbreak on June 11, 2021, after the virus has not been detected in the past 16 months.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Response, Domestic
During this epidemic, WHO, UNICEF and other private medical communities are working hand in hand to help the Philippines Department of Health in conducting enormous vaccination runs throughout Metro Manila, Davao City, Marawi, and other major cities in the country. The campaign sought to end the rise of the deadly virus. According to the Philippine Red Cross, the duration of the mass vaccination run happened between October 14 and 27, 2019; the number of children they aimed to have vaccinated is 65,000 children.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Response, Domestic
As of October 2, 2019, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has pledged US$336,700 from it relief funds in efforts to eradicate polio from the Philippines.


2019–2021 polio outbreak in the Philippines, Response, International
Not only is the outbreak proving a risk to citizens of the Philippines, but other neighboring countries are keeping watch on the spread of the disease as well. An advisory was released by the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia to the Philippines, in aiming to prevent the spread of polio.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League
The 2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League is the inaugural edition of the ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League and a cricket tournament which forms part of the 2023 Cricket World Cup Qualification process. The Challenge League replaced the World Cricket League (WCL) which was previously used as the pathway to the Cricket World Cup. The first fixtures took place in September 2019, with all matches having List A status.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League
The league features the twelve teams ranked from 21st to 32nd place in the WCL following the conclusion of the 2019 ICC World Cricket League Division Two tournament in Namibia. The twelve teams are split into two groups, with each group playing a six-team tournament three times on an annual basis.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League
The top team in each group will advance to the Qualifier Play-off, taking place in 2022, which feeds into the 2022 Cricket World Cup Qualifier tournament. The remaining ten teams cannot qualify for the 2023 World Cup.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League
In addition, either of the top teams could be promoted to the next Cricket World Cup League 2. Of the two top teams from this Challenge League and the bottom two teams in the 2019–22 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2, whichever two of these four teams are ranked higher in the Qualifier Play-off will play in the next League 2 while the two teams ranked lower will play in the next Challenge League. The bottom two teams from each group will play in the relegation play-off tournament in an attempt to remain in the Challenge League for the next edition.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League, Participants
The following teams were ranked from 21st to 32nd in the World Cricket League following the conclusion of the 2019 ICC World Cricket League Division Two tournament, and were allocated to Groups A and B.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League, Fixtures
Each group was scheduled to play three times in a single round-robin tournament format, once each year from 2019 to 2022. This amounts to 15 matches per team and a grand total of 90 matches. In July 2019, the International Cricket Council (ICC) announced that the Malaysian Cricket Association and Cricket Hong Kong would host the 2019 rounds of the tournament. However, citing the instability in Hong Kong, the 2019 matches in League B were moved to Oman. In October 2019, the ICC confirmed that Malaysia would again be the host for the 2020 round of matches in League A, with the Uganda Cricket Association hosting the League B matches.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League, Fixtures
The 2020 League A tournament in Malaysia was originally scheduled to take place in March 2020. However, in March 2020, the tournament was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and rescheduled for 30 September to 10 October 2020. On 10 June 2020, the 2020 League B tournament in Uganda was also postponed due to the pandemic. On 25 August 2020, the rescheduled 2020 League A tournament was postponed again. In December 2020, the ICC announced a revised schedule following the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.


2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge League, Fixtures
In April 2021, the League A tournament in Canada was postponed by one year, with the League A tournament in Malaysia brought forward to the end of 2021. In July 2021, the League B tournament scheduled to take place in Jersey in September 2021, was rescheduled to take place in Hong Kong in December 2021.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2
The 2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2 is the first edition of the ICC Cricket World Cup League 2, a cricket tournament which forms part of the 2023 Cricket World Cup Qualification process. It is currently running from August 2019 to February 2023, with all matches played as One Day Internationals (ODIs). Each set of fixtures will take part as a tri-series.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2
Scotland, Nepal and the United Arab Emirates were joined by the top four teams from the 2019 ICC World Cricket League Division Two tournament. The first round of fixtures were played in Aberdeen, Scotland in August 2019.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2
The top three teams will advance to the 2023 Cricket World Cup Qualifier tournament, with the bottom four teams advancing to the 2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Qualifier Play-off.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2
In addition, the top ranked team in this CWC League 2 could be promoted to the next CWC Super League. Of the top ranked team in this League 2 and the 13th ranked team in 2020–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup Super League, whichever of these two teams is ranked higher in the 2023 Cricket World Cup Qualifier will take the 13th spot in the next Super League while the team ranked lower will play in the next League 2.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2
Either of the bottom two teams in this competition could be relegated to the next Cricket World Cup Challenge League. Of the bottom two teams, and the two champions of the 2019–2022 ICC Cricket World Cup Challenge Leagues A and B, whichever two of these four teams are ranked higher in the Qualifier Play-off, will play in the next League 2, while the two teams ranked lower will play in the next Challenge League.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2, Teams
The top three teams in the ICC Cricket World Cup League 2 will qualify for the World Cup Qualifier while the bottom four go to the Qualifier Play-off.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2, Fixtures
The International Cricket Council (ICC) confirmed the following schedule of fixtures. In December 2020, the ICC announced a revised schedule following the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2, Fixtures
On 13 March 2020, the sixth round of matches, scheduled to take place in Lauderhill, Florida in April 2020, were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and travel restrictions to the United States. On 24 March 2020, the ICC also confirmed that rounds seven and eight, scheduled to take place in Namibia and Papua New Guinea respectively, had also been postponed. The ninth round of fixtures, scheduled to take place in Scotland in July 2020, were postponed on 10 June 2020. The round 10 tournament, scheduled to take place in Namibia in September 2020, was postponed on 23 July 2020.


2019–2023 ICC Cricket World Cup League 2, Fixtures
In February 2021, the ICC confirmed that rounds six, seven and eight of their updated schedule had also been postponed. Round six was scheduled to take place in Oman, with rounds seven and eight scheduled to be played in Papua New Guinea.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England
Structural changes to local government in England have taken place between 2019 and 2021, and will potentially continue in 2023. Ceremonial counties will not see any changes to their external boundaries, but in some cases their subdivisions will be altered.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England
Some of these changes continue the trend of new unitary authorities being created from other types of local government districts. This has been a policy of Communities Secretary Robert Jenrick since 2019.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019
In all new authorities created in 2019, new councils were elected on 2 May 2019, along with local elections in other parts of the country. See 2019 United Kingdom local elections for details.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019, Dorset
On 1 April 2019, the ceremonial county of Dorset was changed from consisting of a non-metropolitan county (itself divided into six non-metropolitan districts) and two unitary authorities, into consisting of two unitary authorities. The new unitary authorities in Dorset are:


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019, Dorset
Charter trustees were established for Bournemouth and for Poole as a consequence. For details of the inaugural elections to the new councils, see 2019 Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council election and 2019 Dorset Council election.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019, Somerset
On 1 April 2019, the number of districts in the non-metropolitan county of Somerset was reduced from five to four, when Taunton Deane and West Somerset were merged as Somerset West and Taunton. This new district is not a unitary authority, and the two-tier structure of county and district councils remains in place.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019, Somerset
Charter trustees were established for Taunton as a consequence. The inaugural election took place in 2019.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019, Suffolk
On 1 April 2019, the number of districts in Suffolk was reduced from seven to five. West Suffolk was created by merging Forest Heath and St Edmundsbury. East Suffolk was created by merging Suffolk Coastal and Waveney. These new districts are not unitary authorities, and the two-tier structure of county and district councils remains in place.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2019, Suffolk
For details of the inaugural elections to the new councils, see 2019 East Suffolk District Council election and 2019 West Suffolk District Council election.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2020
In all new authorities created in 2020, new councils were scheduled to be elected on 7 May 2020, along with local elections in other parts of the country. However, all local elections in the United Kingdom were postponed a year due to the coronavirus pandemic, so elections scheduled for 2020 were instead held on 6 May 2021. See 2021 United Kingdom local elections for details.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2020, Buckinghamshire
The existing Buckinghamshire County Council and the non-metropolitan districts of Aylesbury Vale, Chiltern, South Bucks, and Wycombe in Buckinghamshire was replaced by a single unitary authority known as Buckinghamshire Council on 1 April 2020. This plan was proposed by Martin Tett, leader of the county council, and backed by then-Communities Secretary James Brokenshire. It received approval from Parliament in May 2019. The existing unitary authority of Milton Keynes was not affected; since 1 April 2020, the ceremonial county of Buckinghamshire has therefore been composed of two unitary authorities.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2020, Buckinghamshire
Before this was approved by Parliament, the district councils had proposed a different plan in which Aylesbury Vale would become a unitary authority and the three southern districts would become another unitary authority. The district councils opposed the single unitary Buckinghamshire plan, and considered legal action against it.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2020, Buckinghamshire
For details of the inaugural elections to the new council, see 2021 Buckinghamshire Council election.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2021
In all new authorities created in 2021, new councils were elected on 6 May 2021, along with local elections in other parts of the country. See 2021 United Kingdom local elections for details.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2021, Northamptonshire
On 1 April 2021, the non-metropolitan county of Northamptonshire and its seven districts were abolished, and two new unitary authorities were created:


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2021, Northamptonshire
The Conservative national government proposed the changes in Northamptonshire as a cost saving measure, as the Conservative-led county council had been experiencing financial difficulty. The joint committee for West Northamptonshire claimed that the changes would save 85 million pounds per year. The Northamptonshire (Structural Change) Order 2019 (SCO) was brought before Parliament in October 2019, but due to the dissolution of Parliament on 6 November leading up to the general election on 12 December 2019, the changes were not then given final approval. Parliament went on Christmas break after the election, and the Order was eventually made on 14 February 2020.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Changes in 2021, Northamptonshire
For details of the inaugural elections to the new councils, see 2021 North Northamptonshire Council election and 2021 West Northamptonshire Council election.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022
In July 2021, local government minister Robert Jenrick approved plans for new unitary councils in Cumbria (two authorities), North Yorkshire and Somerset. Parliamentary approval will be sought around the end of 2021, with the intention of holding elections for the new councils in May 2022.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, Cumbria and Lancashire
In October 2020, the UK government invited proposals for reform of arrangements in Cumbria by 2023. Currently, the area is served by the Cumbria County Council, as well as six non-metropolitan district councils.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, Cumbria and Lancashire
Barrow Borough Council and South Lakeland District Council (in Cumbria) and Lancaster City Council (in Lancashire) proposed in 2020 to merge themselves into a Morecambe Bay unitary authority.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, Cumbria and Lancashire
The idea of a Morecambe Bay authority has been proposed several times previously. If the Redcliffe-Maud Report had been implemented, Furness & North Lancashire would have been one of the unitary authorities within the North West Province. Before the unsuccessful 2004 North East England devolution referendum, when similar referendums were also planned in North West England and Yorkshire and the Humber, one proposed structure below the region level in North West England would have created a Morecambe Bay unitary authority, with the rest of Cumbria and Lancashire being divided into more unitary authorities.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, North Yorkshire
In October 2020, the UK government invited proposals for reform of arrangements in North Yorkshire by 2023. Later that year, North Yorkshire County Council proposed a unitary authority to replace existing non-metropolitan districts (but not the City of York, which is already a separate unitary authority).


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, North Yorkshire
Around the same time, the districts of Craven, Harrogate, Richmondshire, Ryedale, Scarborough and Selby submitted a proposal for an "East & West model" of two unitary councils in North Yorkshire. The two new councils for North Yorkshire and York would cover Ryedale, Scarborough, Selby and York in the east, and Craven, Hambleton, Harrogate and Richmondshire in the west.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, Somerset
Changes in Somerset have been under consideration since at least 2018. The existing unitary authorities of Bath and North East Somerset and North Somerset are not affected by any of these proposals. In October 2020, the UK government invited proposals for reform of arrangements in Somerset by 2023. There were two rival proposals: a single unitary council, or two unitary councils (east and west).


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, Somerset
In 2020, Somerset County Council submitted a proposal known as "One Somerset" to the Government. Under this plan, the county council and the four non-metropolitan districts of Mendip, Sedgemoor, Somerset West and Taunton and South Somerset would be replaced by a single unitary authority. This proposal was approved by the Secretary of State in July 2021.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Proposed changes in 2022, Background, Somerset
The four district councils had created a rival proposal, known as "Stronger Somerset", where the county and district councils would be replaced by two unitary authorities. Mendip and South Somerset would be merged to create Eastern Somerset, while Sedgemoor and Somerset West and Taunton would be merged to create Western Somerset. The district councils argued that a single authority would be too far removed from the citizens, and said that forming two instead of one would help save £204 million. District councillors agreed to this plan in August 2020, and a poll organised by the district councils in May 2021 found 65% support for the Stronger Somerset proposal.


2019–2023 structural changes to local government in England, Other proposals, Kent
In Kent in 2017, Dover, Thanet, Shepway, and Canterbury councils proposed a four-way merger in 2020.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy
The 2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy is an ongoing democratic transition in Sudan that began in July 2019.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy
Omar al-Bashir overthrew the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1989 and was himself overthrown in the April 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, in which he was replaced by the Transitional Military Council (TMC) after several months of sustained street protests. Following further protests and the 3 June Khartoum massacre, the TMC and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance agreed on 5 July 2019 to a 39-month transition process to return to democracy, including the creation of executive, legislative and judicial institutions and procedures.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy
On 17 July, the TMC and FFC signed a written form of the agreement. The Darfur Displaced General Coordination opposed the 5 July verbal deal and the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the National Consensus Forces and the Sudanese Journalists Network opposed the 17 July written deal.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy
On 4 August 2019, the Draft Constitutional Declaration was initially signed by Ahmed Rabee for the FFC and by the deputy head of the TMC, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemetti"), in the presence of Ethiopian and African Union mediators, and it was signed more formally by Rabee and Hemetti on 17 August in the presence of international heads of state and government.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Background, Previous democratic experiences
Sudan's 1948 election took place while Sudan was still under Anglo–Egyptian rule, with the question of union or separation from Egypt being a major electoral issue. After independence in 1956, the following half century included a mix of national elections, constitutions, coalition governments, coups d'état, involvement in the Chadian Civil War (2005–2010), islamisation under the influence of Hassan al-Turabi (1989–1999) and the secession of South Sudan (2011).


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Background, Al-Bashir rule
Omar al-Bashir's rule started with the 1989 Sudanese coup d'état and ended with the April 2019 Sudanese coup d'état during the Sudanese Revolution (December 2018 – September 2019).


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, 5 July verbal deal
On 5 July, with the help of African Union mediator Mohamed El Hacen Lebatt and Ethiopian mediator Mahmoud Drir, a verbal deal was reached by the TMC and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance, including Siddig Yousif and Ibrahim al-Amin, on the formation of governmental institutions, under which the presidency of the transitional government would rotate between the military and civilians.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, 5 July verbal deal
The initial verbal deal agreed to by the TMC and the civilian negotiators included the creation of a "sovereignty council", a 39-month transition period leading to elections, a cabinet of ministers, a legislative council, and an investigation into the Khartoum massacre.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, 5 July verbal deal
Tahani Abbas, a cofounder of No to Women's Oppression, stated her worry that women might be excluded from the transition institutions, arguing that women "[bear] the brunt of the violence, [face] sexual harassment and rape" and were active in organising the protests. The Minnawi and al-Nur factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, a Darfur armed rebel group, both stated on 5 July that they rejected the deal, arguing that the deal would not achieve an "equal citizenship state". The Rapid Support Forces attacked people celebrating the deal in Abu Jubaiyah by beating them, firing tear gas, and shooting live bullets into the air. One person was hospitalised for serious wounds.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, 17 July written Political Agreement
Following the 5 July verbal agreement, drafting of a written agreement by a committee of lawyers, including African Union lawyers, was promised to take place "within 48 hours". On 9 July, the 4-person drafting committee, including Yahia al-Hussein, stated that the text had not yet been finished. The new time schedule was for the agreement to be signed "within ten days" in a ceremony including regional leaders.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, 17 July written Political Agreement
On 13 July, three sticking points delaying the signing of the agreement included the FFC requiring the human rights investigation committee to exclude people suspected of responsibility or implementation of the 3 June Khartoum massacre; the FFC requiring a limit on the time frame for appointing the legislative council; and disagreement between the FFC and the TMC regarding TMC "endorse[ment] or [approval] of the nominees". A written form of the deal as a "political agreement", with a constitutional declaration to follow later, was signed by the TMC and FFC on 17 July.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, Objections to the 5 and 17 July 2019 agreements
The Darfur Displaced General Coordination, representing people from Darfur displaced in relation to the Darfur genocide, objected to the 5 July verbal agreement, describing it as "flawed in form and content" and "a desperate attempt to sustain the rule of the National Congress Party", the dominant political party of Omar al-Bashir's 30-year rule of Sudan.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, Objections to the 5 and 17 July 2019 agreements
In the days following the 17 July written deal, rebel groups represented by the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a coalition of political parties that opposed al-Bashir's National Congress, and the Sudanese Journalists Network objected to the signed written agreement. The NCF and the SRF said that the FFC had signed the deal in Khartoum without waiting for the NCF and other opposition forces, who had still been discussing the proposed deal in Addis Ababa.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, July 2019 agreements, Objections to the 5 and 17 July 2019 agreements
The NCF stated that the deal "goes towards granting of power to the military junta", and that the deal does not provide for an international investigation into "crimes committed throughout" al-Bashir's rule. The Sudanese Journalists Network said that the written deal "strengthens the power of the junta, ... and tries to usurp power by stealing the efforts, sweat and blood of the revolution." The NCF called for the draft constitutional declaration to be circulated for comment prior to signing so that it take into account NCF's concerns.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, 4 August/17 August Draft Constitutional Declaration
On 4 August 2019, the Draft Constitutional Declaration (or Draft Constitutional Charter) was signed by Ahmed Rabee for the FFC and by the deputy head of the TMC, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemetti"),  in the presence of Ethiopian and African Union mediators. The document contains 70 legal articles, divided into 16 chapters, defining transitional state bodies and procedures. Rabee and Hemetti signed the document more formally on behalf of the FFC and the TMC on 17 August 2019, in the presence of Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, and other heads of state and government.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, 4 August/17 August Draft Constitutional Declaration, Objections to the 4 August 2019 Draft Constitutional Declaration
The Darfur Displaced General Coordination objected to the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration, arguing that peace requires the disarming of militias; provision of all five suspects wanted in the International Criminal Court investigation in Darfur and the expulsion of new settlers from traditionally owned land in Darfur.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, 4 August/17 August Draft Constitutional Declaration, Objections to the 4 August 2019 Draft Constitutional Declaration
Minni Minawi stated that the SRF objected to the Draft Constitutional Declaration on the grounds that an agreement made among component groups of the FFC in Addis Ababa concerning mechanisms for a nationwide peace process in Sudan was excluded from the declaration and that the declaration constituted a power-sharing agreement between the FFC and the TMC.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform
The legal reform was initiated by the Political Agreement of 17 July 2019, Article 20 of which mandated 'a legal reform program and rebuilding and developing the justice and rights' system and ensure the independence of judiciary and the rule of law.' Many of the reforms affect the Sudanese Criminal Code of 1991 (also known as the Criminal Act or Penal Code).


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform
Some attempts had been made under al-Bashir's rule to reform legislation on issues such as extramarital rape victim blaming via 'adultery', and impunity for marital rape, by amending the definition of rape in Article 149.1 of the Criminal Code in February 2015. However, several commentators such as the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies argued that this amendment had a number of flaws. Even though the amendment made it possible to prosecute marital rape by removing the reference to adultery, there is still no specific prohibition of marital rape, and oral rape is not criminalised.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform
Moreover, Article 149.2 still defined adultery and sodomy as forms of 'rape', so complainants still risked being prosecuted for adultery or sodomy if they failed to prove they were subjected to sexual acts without their consent. Finally, the importance of consent was diminished in favour of coercion, going against the trend in international law to define sexual violence by lack of consent.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Constitutional principles of legal reform (August 2019)
The Draft Constitutional Charter (also known as the Draft Constitutional Declaration) that was agreed in August 2019 further detailed how this reform was to take place during a 39-month transitional period, and in which areas of law these were to be focused. Article 2 of the Charter specifies that 'The Transitional Constitution of Sudan of 2005 and the constitutions of provinces is [sic] repealed, while the laws issued thereunder remain in force, unless they are repealed or amended. The decrees issued from 11 April 2019 until the date of signature of this Constitutional Charter remain in force, unless they are repealed or amended by the Transitional Military Council. If they contradict any provisions of this Constitutional Charter, the provisions of the present Declaration prevail.'


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Constitutional principles of legal reform (August 2019)
Articles 3 and 5 outline what kind of state and society Sudan is, or should become: a parliamentary democracy with equal citizenship for all, that is 'founded on justice, equality, and diversity and guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms,' where the rule of law prevails and 'violations of human rights and international and humanitarian law' and other transgressions are punished, including those committed by the 1989-2019 regime (a point reiterated in Article 7.3). Article 4 establishes the principle of popular sovereignty, and that provisions of existing laws 'that contradict the provisions of this Constitutional Charter shall be repealed or amended to the extent necessary to remove the contradiction'.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Constitutional principles of legal reform (August 2019)
Articles 6 and 7 outline the transitional process by which Sudan will be transformed into what kind of society it should become. Article 7.5 is an almost exact copy of Article 20 of the Political Agreement, thus reiterating the general commitment to legal reform. Further specifications are mentioned:


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Constitutional principles of legal reform (August 2019)
Articles 41 to 66 provide a set of fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms that all Sudanese citizens are entitled to. Notably, Article 50 prohibited 'torture or harsh, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, or debasement of human dignity.' Furthermore, Article 53 envisioned restriction of the death penalty to cases of 'retribution (qasas), a hudud punishment, or as a penalty for crimes of extreme gravity, in accordance with the law', exempting people younger than 18 or older than 70 years from execution, and postponing execution for pregnant and breastfeeding women.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Repeal of the public order law (November 2019)
On 29 November 2019, Article 152 of the Criminal Code (commonly referred to as the Public Order Law or the Public Order Act) was repealed. It was controversial for various reasons, for example, because it was used to punish women who wore trousers in public by lashing them 40 times. Other restrictions targeting women that were repealed included the lack of freedom of dress (by the mandatory hijab and other measures), movement, association, work and study.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Repeal of the public order law (November 2019)
Alleged violations (many of whom were considered 'arbitrary' by activists) were punished with arrest, beatings and deprivation of civil rights such as freedom of association and expression. According to Ihsan Fagiri, leader of the No to Oppression Against Women Initiative, around 45,000 women were prosecuted under the Public Order Act in 2016 alone. It was seen as an important first step towards gradual legal reform to improve the status of women's rights in the country as envisioned by the Charter.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Repeal of the public order law (November 2019)
On the same day, the Dismantling of the Salvation Regime Act was adopted, which disbanded the former ruling National Congress Party of Omar al-Bashir, set up a committee to confiscate the vast assets of the party (many of which were allegedly illegitimately obtained from the population through 'looting', 'stealing' and corruption), and banned 'the symbols of the regime or party' from  'engaging in any political activity for a period of 10 years'.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Miscellaneous Amendments Act (April–July 2020)
On 22 April 2020, the Transitional Legislative Council passed a series of bills that would amend other parts of the Criminal Code of 1991. Amongst other things, female genital mutilation (FGM) was criminalised and made punishable by a fine and 3 years imprisonment. The resulting legal changes were bundled as the 'Miscellaneous Amendments Act' (also called 'Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Act' by some media) and sent to the Sovereignty Council for approval, which took several months to review them.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Miscellaneous Amendments Act (April–July 2020)
According to Justice Minister Nasreldin Abdelbari, some details were added to the Act by the Ministry of Justice following comments made by the Sovereignty Council 'in a manner that does not undermine the law'. The Miscellaneous Amendments Act was finally signed by Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and published in the Official Gazette on 9 July 2020 and thus became law.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Miscellaneous Amendments Act (April–July 2020)
The Miscellaneous Amendments Act (or 'Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Act') had various consequences, including the following:


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Miscellaneous Amendments Act (April–July 2020)
Moreover, a bill reforming the legal and justice system and the Anti- Cyber Crime Act were signed into law on the same day as well.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Religion/state separation and recognition of diversity (September 2020)
As part of the ongoing peace process between the transitional government and various rebel groups, an agreement was reached on 3 September 2020 in Addis Ababa to separate religion and state and not discriminate against anyone's ethnicity in order to secure the equal treatment of all citizens of Sudan. The declaration of principles stated that 'Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed. (...) The state shall not establish an official religion. No citizen shall be discriminated against based on their religion.'


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Religion/state separation and recognition of diversity (September 2020)
Secularism had long been a demand of the SPLM-North al-Hilu rebel faction, with a spokesperson saying: 'The problem is (...) to address why people became rebels? Because there are no equal citizenship rights, there is no distribution of wealth, there is no equal development in the country, there is no equality between black and Arab and Muslim and Christian.'


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
Women's rights activists such as 500 Words magazine editor Ola Diab and Redress legal advisor Charlie Loudon hailed the abolition of repressive measures and restrictions on women as 'great first steps'. They emphasised that the new laws needed to be enforced and the repealed laws also abandoned in practice, which would require revision of the internal policies of government agencies such as the police, the military and intelligence services.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
Several other laws that activists demanded to be removed included the prosecution of rape victims for 'adultery' (Article 149.2), and of women in mixed-sex settings for 'prostitution' (Article 154), other articles dictating women's dress code, and the disbandment of the public order police and dedicated courts that were part of the 'public order regime'. Justice Minister Abdelbari stated in July 2020 that he was also considering to abolish the Personal Status Law to protect women's rights.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) Regional Director Hala al-Karib praised the Act "as a good step in the right direction", but urged the transitional government to press on with more reforms, pointing out that the guardianship system was still enforced through other legislation such as 'passports, immigration and the issuance of official documents and even the record of deaths and births'.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
Al-Karib also called upon the government to sign, ratify and abide by the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol). Other activists claimed there were still other forms of 'legal discrimination' that made women vulnerable to violence such as 'marital rape, and [being] prevented from leaving the home, working, choosing where to live, and [being] treated less equally by other family members.'


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
Sudanese LGBT+ activists hailed the abolition of the death penalty and flogging for anal sex as a 'great first step', but said it was not enough yet, and the end goal should be the decriminalisation of gay sexual activity altogether.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
Human Rights Watch (HRW) praised the transitional government on various steps it had taken for legal reform, including the repealing of the public order law and the apostasy law, the criminalisation of FGM, and the approval of draft laws establishing commissions to work on human rights and transitional justice reforms, but urged it to accelerate its pace of legal and institutional reform and to better consult with civil society groups on new laws before passing them.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Legal reform, Reactions and demands from activists
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), having earlier scrapped Sudan from the list of 'countries of particular concern' (where it had been in 2000–2019) due to its initial reforms, applauded in particular the new reforms relating to women's rights and the apostasy law on 15 July 2020. However, it urged Sudanese lawmakers to repeal the blasphemy law (Article 125 of the Sudanese Penal Code) as well, and to ensure 'that laws regulating hate speech comply with international human rights standards and do not impede freedom of religion or belief'.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Foreign relations
The Trump administration sought to move the transitional government to normalise Israel–Sudan relations by concluding a formal peace deal. It also offered to remove Sudan from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism in return for 335 million US dollars in compensation to families of victims of the 1998 United States embassy bombings by al-Qaida, which the US government alleged the previous Sudanese regime played a role in.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, History, Foreign relations
For the Sudanese transitional government, it was important to receive financial aid and open up trade opportunities in the midst of several ongoing crises, including decades of economic mismanagement under Bashir's regime, an unfinished internal peace process, recent political upheaval and the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving millions of Sudanese in hardship as food and fuel prices had soared. Therefore, in mid-October 2020, it agreed to pay the compensation and distanced itself from the pro-terrorist activities of the Bashir regime in order to lift the anti-terrorist sanctions imposed in 1993 and obtain access to foreign loans and recover the economy. Separately, Sudan had already been conducting negotiations for peace with Israel, and by mid-October had agreed to allow flights to Israel to overfly its territory.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration
The TMC and FFC signed the written form of the Political Agreement on 17 July 2019 in front of witnesses representing the African Union, Ethiopia, and other international bodies.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration
Democratic elections to determine leadership following the 39-month transition period were mentioned in the initial verbal agreement and briefly referred to in the written agreement. Article 19 of the Draft Constitutional Declaration forbids "the chairman and members of the Sovereignty Council and ministers, governors of provinces, or heads of regions" from "[running] in the public elections" that follow the 39-month transition period. Article 38. (c)(iv) of the declaration states that the chair and members of the Elections Commission are to be appointed by the Sovereignty Council in consultation with the Cabinet.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Draft Constitutional Declaration
The 17 July written deal stated, as did the initial verbal deal, that a constitutional agreement for the transition period was planned, and that preparations for a creating a new permanent constitution would be made during the transitional period. Sudan's previous constitution was the 2005 Interim National Constitution.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Draft Constitutional Declaration
On 25 July, Mohamed El Hafiz of the FFC legal committee stated the FFC's requested changes to a draft of the constitutional declaration. The FFC removed a draft article of the declaration that would have giving immunity from prosecution to TMC and Sovereign Council leaders.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Draft Constitutional Declaration
The FFC required that reform of the security forces be carried out by a civilian, not military authority; that the Sovereign Council should only have ceremonial powers; that the Sovereign Council and Cabinet should together prepare laws pending creation of a Legislative Council; and that the Legislative Council should have full legislative powers, including the creation of land, law and election reform commissions. The FFC's comments on the draft covered "85 articles and items".


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Draft Constitutional Declaration
The Constitutional Declaration was signed by Ahmed Rabee for the FFC and deputy head of the TMC, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, on 4 August 2019, in the presence of Ethiopian and African Union mediators. Full ratification was planned for 17 August 2019.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Sovereignty Council
The 11-member Sovereignty Council is defined by Article 9. (a) of the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration as the head of state of Sudan. Planned membership of the Sovereignty Council includes military members Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemetti"),  Lieutenant-General Yasser al-Atta, and two other military members chosen by the TMC; five civilians chosen by the FFC: Aisha Musa el-Said, Siddig Tower, Mohamed Elfaki Suleiman, Hassan Sheikh Idris and Mohammed Hassan al-Ta'ishi; and a civilian, Raja Nicola, chosen by mutual agreement. The Sovereignty Council is mostly male, with only two women members: Aisha Musa and Raja Nicola.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Council of Ministers
The Political Agreement gave the FFC the choice of the ministers of the transitional government, with the sovereignty council holding the right to veto nominations, apart from the defence and interior ministers, who are to be "selected" by military members of the Sovereignty Council and "appointed" by the prime minister. The prime minister can "exceptionally nominate two party qualified members to fulfill ministerial positions."


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Council of Ministers
Chapter 5 (Article 14) of the Draft Constitutional Declaration defines the Transitional Cabinet in similar terms, but gives the Prime Minister the right to choose the other members of the cabinet from a list provided to him or her by the FFC. The cabinet members are "confirmed by the Sovereignty Council".


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Council of Ministers
Article 16. (a) of the Draft Constitutional Declaration requires the Prime Minister and members of Cabinet to be "Sudanese by birth", at least 25 years old, a clean police record for "crimes of honour". Article 16. (b) excludes dual nationals from being a Minister of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs or Justice unless an exemption is agreed by the Sovereignty Council and the FFC for the position of Prime Minister, or by the Sovereignty Council and the Prime Minister for ministerial positions.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Council of Ministers
Abdalla Hamdok, a Sudanese public administrator who served in numerous international administrative positions during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, was nominated by the FFC as Prime Minister, with a formal appointment scheduled for 20 August 2019.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Transitional Legislative Council
Chapter 7 of the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration defines plans for the Transitional Legislative Council.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Transitional Legislative Council
The transition deal (23. (4) of the Draft Constitutional Declaration) sets the transitional Legislative Council to be formed three months after the transitional period starts, after the sovereignty council and cabinet are determined.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Transitional Legislative Council
In the 17 July deal, the FFC and TMC agreed to disagree on the proportions of membership of the Legislative Council. The FFC "confirm[ed] its adherence" to selecting two thirds of the council's members and the TMC "confirm[ed] its position on reviewing the legislative council membership percentages." The FFC and TMC agreed that their respective members of the Sovereignty Council would continue "discussion" on the issue. In 23. (3) of the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration, 67% of the members are to be selected by the FFC and 33% by "other forces" who didn't sign the FFC declaration of January 2019.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Transitional Legislative Council
Article 23. (3) of the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration sets a minimum 40% quota for women membership of the Transitional Legislative Council. Article 23. (1) sets the maximum membership to 300 and excludes membership by members of the National Congress that dominated under al-Bashir and of political forces that participated in the al-Bashir government. Membership is open, under Article 25, to Sudanese nationals at least 21 years old, who "[possess] integrity and competence", have not been criminally convicted for "honour, trustworthiness, or financial responsibility", and can read and write.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Judicial bodies
Chapter 8 of the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration replaces previous existing judicial bodies by a new Supreme Judicial Council and a Constitutional Court. It declares in Article 29. (2) that the "judicial authority" is independent from the Sovereignty Council, the Transitional Legislative Council and "the executive branch", with sufficient financial and administrative resources to be independent. In Article 30. (1) it defines the Constitutional Court to be independent and separate from the judicial authority.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Judicial bodies
It was initially suggested by Khartoum Star and Sudan Daily that Nemat Abdullah Khair was to be sworn in as Chief Justice on 20 August or 21 August 2019. On 10 October 2019, her nomination was confirmed by decree. Article 29. (3) states that the head of the judiciary is also the president of the Supreme Court and is "responsible for administering the judicial authority before the Supreme Judicial Council."


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Human rights
In the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration, Chapter 14 defines "Rights and freedoms". Article 41. (2) states that all international human rights agreements, pacts, and charters ratified by the Republic of Sudan are considered to be "an integral part" of the Draft Constitutional Declaration.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Investigation
The deal was described on 5 July as including the creation of a "transparent and independent investigation" into the events that followed the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, including the Khartoum massacre. On 8 July, Associated Press described the investigation as "Sudanese". The 17 July written political agreement stated that the investigation committee "may seek any African support if needed."


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Investigation
The 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration refers to the investigation in Article 7. (16) as an element of the "Mandate of the Transitional Period", defining the scope as "violations committed on 3 June 2019, and events and incidents where violations of the rights and dignity of civilian and military citizens were committed." The investigation committee is to be created within a month of the Prime Minister's nomination, under an "order" that "guarantees that it will be independent and possess full powers to investigate and determine the timeframe for its activities".


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Investigation
According to an anonymous military official present at pre-5 July negotiations and quoted by The Christian Science Monitor, US negotiators led by Donald E. Booth proposed that TMC members be guaranteed immunity from prosecution in the investigation. The military official stated, "The Americans demanded a deal as soon as possible. Their message was clear: power-sharing in return for guarantees that nobody from the council will be tried." On 13 July, the FFC opposed 3 June Khartoum massacre suspects being members of the investigating committee.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Investigation
The 17 July written deal does not refer to immunity for TMC members. On 25 July, Mohamed El Hafiz of the FFC legal committee stated its requests for changes to a draft of the constitutional declaration. This included the removal of a draft article that would have given immunity from prosecution to TMC and Sovereign Council leaders. El Hafiz said that neither absolute nor procedural immunity would be accepted for any leader. On 31 July, TMC leader al-Burhan "confirmed that the members of the [junta] do not desire immunity". On 1 August, the FFC accepted that Sovereign Council members could have "procedural immunity", defined to mean that Sovereign Council members would have immunity that could be lifted by a two-thirds supermajority vote of the legislative council.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Investigation
In the 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration, Article 21 gives procedural immunity to members of the Sovereignty Council, the Cabinet, the Transitional Legislative Council, governors of provinces and heads of regions, with 21. (2) giving the Transitional Legislative Council the right to lift that immunity by a simple majority.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Investigation
The Khartoum massacre investigation commission, headed by human rights lawyer Nabil Adib, was nominated on 20 October 2019 by Prime Minister Hamdok.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Comprehensive peace
The 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration lists "achieving a just and comprehensive peace, ending the war by addressing the roots of the Sudanese problem" as Article 7. (1), the first listed item in its "Mandate of the Transitional Period", and gives details in Chapter 15, Articles 67 and 58 of the document. Article 67. (b) says that a peace agreement should be completed within six months of the signing of the Draft Constitutional Declaration. Article 67.


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Comprehensive peace
(c) requires women to participate in all levels of the peace procedure and for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 to be applied, and legal establishment of women's rights is covered in Article 67.(d). Other mechanisms for implementing the comprehensive peace process are listed in Articles 67. (e) (stopping hostilities, opening humanitarian assistance corridors, prisoner releases and exchanges), 67. (f) (amnesties for political leaders and members of armed opposition movements), and 67. (g) (accountability for crimes against humanity and war crimes and trials in national and international courts). Article 68 lists 13 "essential issues for peace negotiations".


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, TMC–FFC Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, Comprehensive peace
On 31 August 2020, a peace agreement was signed in Juba, South Sudan, between Sudanese authorities and rebel factions to end armed hostilities. Under the terms of the agreement, the factions that signed will be entitled to five ministers in the transitional cabinet and a quarter of seats in the transitional legislature. At a regional level, signatories will be entitled to 40% of the seats on transitional legislatures of their home states. A final agreement was reached in early September. This agreement stated that 'Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed. (...) The state shall not establish an official religion. No citizen shall be discriminated against based on their religion.'


2019–2024 Sudanese transition to democracy, Transition period protests
Protests continued during the creation of the transitionary period institutions, on issues that included the nomination of a new Chief Justice of Sudan and Attorney-General, killings of civilians by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the toxic effects of cyanide and mercury from gold mining in Northern state and South Kordofan, protests against a state governor in el-Gadarif and against show trials of Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) coordinators, and for officials of the previous government to be dismissed in Red Sea and White Nile.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D
The 2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D was the 21st edition of Coppa Italia Serie D. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy, on 20 May 2020, Lega Nazionale Dilettanti decided not to complete the competition.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Format
All rounds of the event, with the exception of the semi-finals, are a single-match direct elimination. For these matches, in the event of a draw at the end of the 90 minute regulation time, penalty shootout is used to determine the winning team (no extra time is played). The home factor is determined by drawing lots in the preliminary round, in the first round and in round 64. In the round of 32, in the round of 16 and in the quarter-finals, however, the team that played away in the previous round plays at home.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Format
The other way around, proceeding with the draw only in the case of a match between two teams that have both played at home, or both away, in the previous round, the final is instead played at a neutral ground. The semi-finals are organized in home and away matches, with a draw to determine the order of the fields and with the application of the away goal rule. In the return matches there are no extra times but direct penalties in the event of a score that determines a draw in both overall goals and away goals. The match schedule is guided by criteria of geographical proximity.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Calendar
The calendar of the competition was announced on 6 August 2019.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Preliminary Round
Ties were played between 18 August 2019 and 11 September 2019


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, First Round
Ties were played between 24 August 2019 and 2 October 2019


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Round of 64
Ties were played between 18 September 2019 and 9 October 2019.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Round of 32
Ties were played between 9 October 2019 and 30 October 2019.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Round of 16
Ties were played between 13 November 2019 and 20 November 2019.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Quarter-finals
Ties were played between 4 December 2019 and 11 December 2019.


2019−20 Coppa Italia Serie D, Semi-finals
Ties of first legs were played on 29 January 2020. Second leg tie of Folgore Caratese vs.Sanremese was not played due to Sanremese fielding an ineligible player in the first leg.


2019−20 FK Zvijezda 09 season
The 2019–20 season was Zvijezda 09's 11th in existence and their 2nd season in the Premier League BH. Besides competing in the Premier League, the team also competed in the National Cup.


2019−20 FK Zvijezda 09 season
In that season, the league ended abruptly on 1 June 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by default Zvijezda 09 finished in 12th place, getting relegated back to the First League of RS.


2019−20 FK Zvijezda 09 season, Current squad
Note: Flags indicate national team as defined under FIFA eligibility rules. Players may hold more than one non-FIFA nationality.


201st (2/1st Middlesex) Brigade
The 2nd Middlesex Brigade was a 2nd Line Territorial Force Brigade of the British Army in World War I. The brigade was formed as a duplicate of the Middlesex Brigade in October 1914 as part of the 2nd Home Counties Division. As the name suggests, the brigade recruited in Middlesex. In August 1915, in common with all Territorial Force brigades, it was numbered as 201st (2/1st Middlesex) Brigade. Between September 1917 and the end of the year, the brigade was extensively reorganized and lost its territorial identity; henceforth it was known as 201st Brigade.


201st (2/1st Middlesex) Brigade, History
In accordance with the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907 (7 Edw.7, c.9) which brought the Territorial Force into being, the TF was intended to be a home defence force for service during wartime and members could not be compelled to serve outside the country. However, on the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914, many members volunteered for Imperial Service. Therefore, TF units were split into 1st Line (liable for overseas service) and 2nd Line (home service for those unable or unwilling to serve overseas) units. 2nd Line units performed the home defence role, although in fact most of these were also posted abroad in due course.


201st (2/1st Middlesex) Brigade, History
The Brigade served on home defence duties throughout the war, whilst recruiting, training and supplying drafts to overseas units and formations. It was twice warned to prepare to be transferred to Ireland, and in April 1917 for service on the Western Front, but in the event never left England. It was eventually disbanded in March 1919.


201st Airlift Squadron
The 201st Airlift Squadron flies Boeing C-40 Clipper. It is a unit of the District of Columbia Air National Guard. Its parent unit is the 113th Wing.


201st Airlift Squadron, Mission
The 201st Airlift Squadron provides short notice worldwide transportation for the Executive Branch, Congressional Members, Department of Defense officials and high-ranking U.S. and foreign dignitaries using the C-40C aircraft.


201st Airlift Squadron, History
The history of the 201st Airlift Squadron began in 1946 with the activation of "H" Flight, HQ, District of Columbia Air National Guard. Operating out of Hangar 15 on the East side of Andrews Air Force Base, "H" Flight's assortment of B-26, C-47, C-53 and F-51 aircraft provided passenger airlift capabilities to the Air National Guard.


201st Airlift Squadron, History
In 1954 "H" Flight was re-designated as Detachment 1, HQ, District of Columbia Air National Guard. Over the next 38 years Detachment 1 employed more than 20 different types of aircraft to provide worldwide airlift support for both military and civilian passengers. Detachment 1 provided airlift support for large military teams as well as small command groups. The detachment also provided transportation for distinguished passengers such as the vice president, congressional and cabinet members, service secretaries and local civic leaders. In 1984, Detachment 1 relocated to its current location on the West side of Andrews Air Force Base.


201st Airlift Squadron, History
On 20 June 1992, Detachment 1 was re-designated as the 201st Airlift Squadron, District of Columbia Air National Guard. Today the 201st Airlift Squadron continues to carry on the work that was started with "H" Flight in 1946. The continuing efforts to upgrade and expand the squadron's worldwide capabilities led to the acquisition of C-38As in 1998 and C-40Cs (Boeing 737) in 2002. The 201st retired their C-38A fleet in 2015, handing the aircraft off to the United States Navy.


201st Airlift Squadron, History
The events of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in the history of the squadron. The Global War on Terrorism brought a new emphasis on worldwide VIP travel. Since that date, the 201st Airlift Squadron's operational tempo has increased dramatically, with the majority of missions overseas. With its current complement of C-40Cs, the squadron provides worldwide air transportation for the executive branch, congressional members, Department of Defense and high-ranking U.S. and foreign dignitaries.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
The 201st (Toronto Light Infantry) Battalion, CEF was a unit in the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the First World War. Based in Toronto, Ontario, the unit began recruiting during the winter of 1915/16 in that city. The battalion was disbanded while still in Canada, and its men were transferred to the 170th (Mississauga Horse) Battalion, CEF and 198th (Canadian Buffs) Battalion, CEF in September 1916. The 201st (Toronto Light Infantry) Battalion, CEF had one Officer Commanding: Lieut-Col. E. W. Hagarty.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
From The T.L.I. Gazette, the memorial publication of the 201st Battalion CEF (date of publication unknown):


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
"The 201st Battalion was almost 550 strong at the time of its dismemberment and it is calculated that about 500 went overseas. Most of these reached France and the firing line, and about the first to have the experience of front line work were a draft of 48 who went to the 75th Bn. in December 1916, and a similar draft who went to the 58th Bn. about the same date. Altogether there were nine infantry units that received members of the old battalion.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
These were the 3rd, 19th, 20th, 58th, 72nd, 75th, 102nd and 116th Battalions, and the 2nd C.M.R. Others served with Artillery, heavy and field and when the Machine Gun battalions were formed in the spring of '18, some of the boys found their way into them. Others managed to "wangle" the much coveted transfer into the Royal Flying Corps. Two attained captaincies in the R.F.C., Tracey, our former bandmaster, and W.A. Leslie, Annis, H.T. Leslie, J.H. White, Jones, Heakes, Crawford, Leary, Pinnock, Curtis, Henderson, Ferguson, and Harvey were all Flight-Lieutenants and Miles and J.G. Johnston were cadets. Lieuts. Annis, Curtis and Pinnock were killed.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
Of the infantry units the 72nd proved the most unlucky for our boys; only three went to it and of these, A.J. McFarquhar is the sole survivor, the other two, H. Bain and H. Davey being killed. And the 2nd C.M.R. bunch were the most fortunate, all of them returning safe if not sound. Altogether the battalion suffered a loss of 74 killed in action or died of wounds or sickness, and to commemorate these lads who thus gave their lives for their country is the main purpose of this publication."


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
There follows a list of the fallen (notes on how they died, where known, are excerpted from the publication):


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
W.F. Annis, went to the 58th battalion in October 1916 and after being wounded was sent to Canada to join the Royal Flying Corps and was killed there in practice.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
D. Abbot, joined the 75th December 1916 and was killed at Vimy.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
D.C. Bates, was in the 58th and was killed at the Mericourt front


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
N.J. Brown, "Jack" was killed in a raid just before Vimy. He was in the 58th.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
W.E.A. Brown, "Alway" joined the 75th in February 1918; he was wounded July 20, 1918 and killed in action near Arras September 4 of the same year.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
R.J.D. Conklin, "Bob" went to the 19th battalion with a draft from the 198th when the Fifth Division was broken up, and was wounded at Arras August 16, 1918, dying of his wounds in No. 1 CCS three days after.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
W. Craig, went to the 75th in December 1916 and was killed September 2nd, 1918.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
A. Dyson, also was with the 75th and was killed March 1917.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
E.A. Fryers, went on to the 20th battalion in April 1917, was wounded in July, but rejoined his unit in November, and was killed in action January 26th, 1918


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
C. Hewson, was killed at Vimy and is buried at Vimy Ridge


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
A.E. Hogarth,  was killed with the 75th, 1 March 1917


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
R. Kerr, was killed with the 75th 1 March 1917


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
J.H. Laurence, was killed on the Mericourt front 17 September 1917


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
F. Ledrew, who went to the 198th was rejected as physically unfit when his unit went overseas. He signed up, however, with the Army Service Corps and finally got to France with the 8th Canadian Railway Troops in October, 1917. He was killed March 5th 1918 and is buried at Bailleul, France.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
B. Lillew, who was a bugler with the 201st got to France in early 1917 with the 116th battalion. He was a Company Runner until August 8, 1918, when he was killed in the Amiens battle. He is buried in the village of Domart on the Amiens-Roye road.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
R.F. Lowrie, was only 16 when he joined the 201st battalion. He was a company runner when he was killed on the 12th May, 1918 and is buried at Bellacourt.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
H. Mitchell, "Hal" went to the 58th and was killed summer of 1917.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
J.P. Mitcheson, was killed with the 75th on that fatal day, the 1st March 1917.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
G.B. Morgan, was killed with the 75th on the 1st March 1917.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
L.B. Ramsay, (75th) was wounded on the 1st March 1917 when Col. Beckett and so many of the 75th were killed, but recovered and returned to duty after some months in England. He was killed in the Amiens sector, Aug. 22nd, 1918.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
W.J. Searle, was killed with the 58th in the spring of 1917 at Mt. St. Eloi, and is buried there.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
F.G. Stockil, 75th, was wounded in the knee Aug 4th, 1917, but rejoined and was killed on the Lens front Aug 15th of the same year.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
S. Smith, "Stanley" also was with the 19th battalion. He was wounded May 12, 1918 and died the same day at No. 29., CCS. He is buried in Bayneux Imperial cemetery, Doullens.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
G.C. Taylor, went to the 19th battalion. He was wounded near Arras on Aug. 16th, 1918 and died on Aug. 21st.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
G.A. Tucker, W.G. Tyrrell, J.W. Ward, R.S. Waldron, - Walker, F.E. Warner, G. Wesley, A.D. White, J. Woodgate,


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
H. Worthington went to the Divisional Signaller when the 201st was broken up and went overseas in November 1916. He went to France in April 1917 and was a lineman with the 1st Artillery Brigade HQ when he was killed at Hill 70, July 31, 1917.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
"But our narrative concerns particularly those who went to the "Horses" (170th Mississauga Horse Battalion) ...


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
Proceeding overseas in October 1916, two drafts went to France reinforcing the 75th and 58th battalions. The remainder of the 170th was drafted into the 169th battalion and, after a short stay in that unit, the majority transferred to the 116th Battalion. Crossing the Channel with that unit, they landed in Boulogne, France on February 11, 1917.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
The battalion proceeded immediately up the line and taking the place of the 60th battalion in the third division 9th Brigade, fought through all the engagements in which that division took part in 1917 and 1918. Prominent among these shows were Vimy, Avion, Lens, Passchendaele, Amiens, Arras and Cambrai. The 201st fellows, some forty-one in number, played an important part in their unit, many winning promotions and six being awarded decorations for bravery on the field.


201st Battalion (Toronto Light Infantry), CEF
But we would pay tribute to those who made the supreme sacrifice, who died gallantly in action, happy in the thought that they had done what they could and that they were giving their lives for others."


201st Coastal Division (Italy)
The 201 Coastal Division was an Infantry Division of the Italian Army during World War II. The division was based in the south of France and then pulled back into Italy and based in Genova as part of the Italian XV Corps until the Italian surrender to the Allies in September 1943. The division was formed initially as a militia division in 1939, and was reorganised as a coastal division in December 1941. Commanders of the division included Enrico Gazale and Constantino Salvi. During the occupation of France it was part of the Italian fourth army, with its HQ in Sospel.


201st Coastal Division (Italy)
Coastal divisions, were second line divisions, usually formed from men in their forties and fifties intended to perform labour and second line duties. Recruited locally they were often commanded by officers called out of retirement. Their equipment was also second rate, Mussolini had hoped to obtain large quantities of arms and equipment from the disbanded Vichy French army, but this had often been sabotaged or arrived with no ammunition.


201st Combat Communications Group
The United States Air Force's 201st Combat Communications Group (201 CCG) was a combat communications unit located at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, USA. The 201 CCG was composed of a group headquarters and five assigned units located on the Hawaiian islands of Oahu, Maui, Hawaii and Kauai.


201st Combat Communications Group, Mission
The 201st CCG's mission was to provide tactical communications and air traffic services in the defense and service of the United States of America and its allies. It also supports emergency United States Air Force requirements for air traffic control and communications facilities, as well as to provide tactical communications for the State of Hawaii, Department of Defense, in response to emergencies originating from either human or natural causes.


201st Combat Communications Group, History, Emblem
Azure, a lightning bolt bendwise or garnished gules between a pattern of six mullets of five points ofvarying sizes argent and in dexter base a silhouetted Hawaiian warrior brown fimbriated of the second,all within a diminished bordure of the like.


201st Corps (Afghanistan)
The 201st 'Selab' (Flood) Corps of the Afghan National Army was a corps-sized formation of the Afghan National Army. The establishment of the corps started when the first commander and some of his staff were appointed on 1 September 2004. The corps was responsible for the east of the country (Kabul, Logar, Kapisa, Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman provinces). The last corps commander was Major General Mohammad Zaman Waziri.


201st Corps (Afghanistan)
The corps' 1st Brigade was at the Presidential Palace. 3rd Brigade, at Pol-e-Charkhi, was a mechanised formation including M113s and Soviet-built main battle tanks. In mid-2003, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment sent a training team to the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, of the Central Corps to assist the creation of a battalion equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s and BMP-2s to help provide security during the Loya Jirga of 2003 and the 2004 Afghan presidential elections.


201st Corps (Afghanistan)
Later information from LongWarJournal.com placed most of the 3rd Brigade at Jalalabad, 2nd Brigade at Pol-e-Charkhi, and only a single battalion of 1st Brigade at the Presidential Palace. Its area of responsibility included Kabul as well as vital routes running north and south, and valleys leading from the Pakistani border into Afghanistan. As of 2009, the 3rd Brigade of the 201st Corps was the only unit that had control of an area of responsibility in Afghanistan without the aid or assistance of U.S. or coalition forces. August 6–7, 2009 in the Shpee Valley, Kapisa , during a joint Afghan-Franco-American Operation (Brest Thunder), Afghan soldiers from 3rd Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps saved the life of Forward Observer Christopher Mercer Lowe (US Army) after he took a snipers bullet to his right thigh.


201st Corps (Afghanistan)
A new fourth brigade of the corps was planned to be established in the province of Nuristan. By 2013, the 4th Brigade, 201st Corps, had its headquarters near Jalalabad.


201st Corps (Afghanistan)
In February 2008, Marine Colonel Jeffrey Haynes and Embedded Training Team (ETT) 3–5, a part of the Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central (RCAC-C), arrived with a mission to "mentor the 201st Corps.. by providing military advice and training guidance" to its officers and staff noncommissioned officers. "The 201st Corps is very good," Colonel Haynes said. "When the Taliban attacked the prison in Kandahar last summer, they spearheaded the ANA effort into Anghardab and recaptured that strategic valley. The ANA handled their own logistics and their own intelligence." In the recent Marine-ANA-French (Groupement tactique interarmes de Kapisa) Operation Nan-e-Shab Berun, coalition and ANA forces cleared the Alah Say Valley of insurgents; casualties included one French and four ANA soldiers killed, with 37 opponents killed in action.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
Previous Afghan formations in the Kabul area included the Central Army Corps, from at least 1978 through the 1990s, and possibly earlier. The Central Army Corps was a very influential formation.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
In 1953, Lieutenant General Mohammed Daoud Khan, first cousin of the King who had previously served as Minister of Defence, was transferred from command of the Central Corps in Kabul to become Prime Minister of Afghanistan. His command has also been referred to as the Central Command and Central Forces. The Central Corps was headquartered at Amanullah's Darulaman Palace. On the opening day of Parliament in October 1965, a violent student demonstration among which Babrak Karmal was at the forefront forced Zahir Shah's new prime minister Yousef to resign. Two students were killed when the new corps commander, General Abdul Wali, sent in troops to restore order.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
In 1978 the corps consisted of the 7th and 8th Divisions, the Republican Guard Brigade, two commando regiments, the 4th and 15th Armoured Brigades, and several support units. The 4th Armoured Brigade played a key role in spearheading the Saur Revolution of April 1978. An accessible Kabul Times article of the period describes what it claims as the 15th Armoured Division's celebrations of the Saur Revolution, and gives the division commander's name as Major Mohammed Amin.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
The Corps began to be worn away by desertions, with one of the first, involving a brigade of the 7th Division, occurring in mid-May 1979 on the road from Gardez to Khost. The whole brigade, maybe 2000 strong, reportedly joined the mujahadeen. Reportedly they surrendered on the condition that they be allowed to keep their uniforms and weapons and join the anti-government struggle.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
"As late as September 1982," the commander of the Central Corps, a General variously reported as Wodud (Joes) or Abdul Wadood (Yousaf and Adkin), was shot in his office. The 8th Division is extensively referenced in Ali A. Jalali and Lester Grau's Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters, c. 2001.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
In response to a Taliban attack towards Herat from the south in March–April 1995, the Kabul government airlifted a reported 2,000 troops from the Central Corps to Herat. This was the first airlift of its kind since 1992. BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts for 1999 reports a radio transcript from Kabul noting that the former commander of the Central Corps, Mola Abdurraof Akhond, was appointed a commander elsewhere.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
The Central Corps appears to have been reactivated in August 2003. The creation of the corps was planned to place army brigades under a central command structure for the first time, and create a command and control headquarters. Maj Gen Mohammed Moiun Faqir, an ethnic Pashtun, was appointed as corps commander. It was one of the first recipients of new Afghan National Army battalions trained by the United States, with its strength in July including five to six of the new battalions within two brigades. Soon afterwards, a training team from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin was sent to Kabul to assist the leadership of the newly forming 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, of the Central Corps form an effective tank unit, using T-62s.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
In March 2004, fighting between two local militias took place in Herat. It was reported that Mirwais Sadiq (son of warlord Ismail Khan) was assassinated in unclear circumstances. Thereafter a bigger conflict began that resulted in the death of up to 100 people. The battle was between troops of Ismail Khan and Abdul Zahir Nayebzada, a senior local military commander blamed for the death of Sadiq. Nayebzada commanded the 17th Herat Division of the Defence Ministry's 4th Corps. In response to the fighting, about 1,500 newly trained Central Corps soldiers were sent to Herat in order to bring the situation under control.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
The 8th Division was still active in July 2004, when defence minister Mohammed Fahim was considering pushing back against Karzai's removal of him from the position of Karzai's running mate for first vice-president. Fahim and his faction Shura-e Nazar commanded the loyalty of the formation, which was described as having ''..an estimated 5,000 loyal troops stationed in the Shomali Plain—the fertile land just north of Kabul—and in the capital itself.''


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
Following the crash of Kam Air Flight 904 in 2005, ISAF made numerous unsuccessful helicopter rescue operation attempts. ANA soldiers also searched for the plane. The Ministry of Defense ordered the ANA's Central Corps to assemble a team to attempt a rescue of victims presumed to be alive. The crash site was at an altitude of 11,000 feet (3,400 m) on the peak of the Chaperi Mountain, 20 miles (32 km) east of Kabul.


201st Corps (Afghanistan), Previous Afghan Army Forces in the Kabul Area
The 201st Corps and 111th Capital Division were the last government forces operational in Afghanistan remaining before the 2021 Taliban offensive reached Kabul.


201st Division (Imperial Japanese Army)
The 201st Division (第201師団, Dai-nihyakuichi Shidan) was an infantry division of the Imperial Japanese Army. Its call sign was the Musashi Division (武蔵兵団, Musashi Heidan). It was formed 2 April 1945 in Tokyo as a triangular division. It was one of the batch of eight divisions comprising 201st, 202nd, 205th, 206th, 209th, 212th, 214th and 216th divisions created as part of the Japanese reaction on the Battle of Okinawa.


201st Division (Imperial Japanese Army), Action
The 201st division was assigned to the second line of defenses of Kantō region deeper inland. The 501st infantry regiment was garrisoning Zama, 502nd and 503rd infantry regiments - Musashimurayama. Other sub-units were deployed at Gotemba. The 201st division did not see any combat.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
The 210th Division (Chinese: 第210师) was created in April 1949 from security regiments in eastern Hebei area.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
The division was composed of 628th, 629th, and 630th Regiments.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In August 1949, the division attached to 67th Corps and redesignated as the 201st Division (Chinese: 第201师). All its regiments were redesignated:


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In June 1951, Artillery Regiment, 201st Division was activated, which was later renamed as 581st Artillery Regiment in 1953.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In June 1951, 201st Division moved into Korean Peninsula along with the Corps HQ. It was engaged in defensive operations against UN Forces in summer-fall 1951, during which it suffered heavy casualties.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In September 1954 the division pulled out from North Korea.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In April 1960 the division was renamed as 201st Army Division(Chinese: 陆军第201师). By then the division was composed of:


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In December 1968, the division was transferred under 68th Army Corps ' control.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In August 1969, 581st Artillery Regiment was renamed as Artillery Regiment, 201st Army Division.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In April 1970, the division returned to 67th Army Corps' control.


201st Division (People's Republic of China)
In September 1985 the division was disbanded. 602nd Infantry Regiment was transferred to the 200th Infantry Division.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade
The 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade is located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. The 201st was originally named the 201st Military Intelligence Brigade and on 3 July 2008 it became the Army's third active duty battlefield surveillance brigade and was renamed the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB). The US Army decided to get rid of its BfSBs and the 201st was realigned into a new expeditionary military intelligence brigade.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade
The 201st MI currently consists of two Expeditionary Military Intelligence Battalions (E-MI BNs), and a (Headquarters and Headquarters Company) (HHC).


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, Mission
The 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade provides deployable all-source intelligence analysis, human intelligence (humint), electronic warfare intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, target acquisition, battle damage assessment, command and control warfare, and broad bandwidth communications support to I Corps.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, Heritage
The 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade was created from the merger of two separate units; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 503rd Army Security Agency Group, and the 201st Counter Intelligence Detachment.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, 503rd Army Security Group
The HHC, 503rd Army Security Group was constituted as the 323rd Signal Company, on 23 July 1942 and activated in Miami, Florida on 1 September 1942. While stationed on the Marshall Island during World War II, the company supported Army Air Corps units in the Pacific Theater. The company was inactivated on 17 October 1946 at Andrews Field, Camp Springs, Maryland.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, 503rd Army Security Group
After being brought back to service again, the company was redesignated 6 September 1950 as the 323d Signal Radio Intelligence Company, and allotted to the Organized Reserve Corps until the company was again activated 2 October 1950 at Fort Myer, Virginia. On 3 January 1951, the company was converted and redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 601st Communications Reconnaissance Group. On 5 February 1951 the company was redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 503rd Communications Group. The 503rd was again activated on 1 May of the same year.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, 201st Counter Intelligence Detachment
The 201st Military Intelligence Detachment was constituted on 12 July 1944 as the 201st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. The detachment was activated on 20 August 1944 in New Guinea, and while in the Southwest Pacific area, attached to I Corps and supported the Corps through campaigns in New Guinea, and the Philippines. The detachment was inactivated on 25 February 1946 in Japan.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, 201st Counter Intelligence Detachment
On 6 October 1950, the detachment was activated in Korea and assigned to the United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth US Army participating in operations throughout Korea during the Korean War. The detachment was inactivated on 21 February 1955 in Korea. Allotted 20 March 1956 to the Regular Army, the unit activated 12 June of that year in Korea. After again being reorganized and redesignated 15 May 1959 becoming the 201st Military Intelligence Detachment, only to be inactivated the following month on 27 June 1959 in Washington, D.C.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, Merger
The lineage of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 503rd Army Security Agency Group, and 201st Military Intelligence Detachment merged on 1 September 1987. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 503rd Army Security Agency Group was withdrawn from the Army Reserve and allotted to the Regular Army. The company was consolidated with the 201st Military Intelligence Brigade. The new unit was activated on the same day at Fort Lewis, Washington and consisted of the following units:


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, BfSB Transformation
On 3 July 2008, the 201st Military Intelligence Brigade transformed into the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade on Watkins Parade Field at Fort Lewis. The 201st BfSB was the third active-duty surveillance brigade in the Army today, following the 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, which was stood up a year prior at Fort Hood, Texas.


201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade, History, BfSB Transformation
The former MI brigade, which included reservists, and National Guardsmen, as well as active-duty soldiers, transformed into the 201st BfSB within a year. Broadening its reconnaissance mission to include surveillance and target acquisition with the addition of a long-range surveillance company – C Troop, 38th Cavalry, the 63rd Network Support Company, and the 602nd Forward Support Company. This however, was no easy task. The brigade stand-up required an almost total overhaul, complete with equipment, vehicles, amended missions and hundreds of new active-duty soldiers. Three hundred forty-five "whirlwind days" of preparation ended 23 Sep when the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, with its subordinate battalions, cased their colors for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom.