2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Battle in Wau town
These began to flee en masse to the nearby UNMISS base and local churches for protection; others escaped to areas held by SPLM-IO-aligned Fertit militias such as the "Fertit Lions". The government forces, however, maintained that the whole battle was the result of tribal fighters invading the town, whereupon "some greedy civilians started immediately on a looting spree". Accordingly, the army had just defended itself and not preyed on civilians, though army spokesman Lul Rurai Koang said that it was possible that individual soldiers might have participated in the looting.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Battle in Wau town
On 28 June, Wau town was once again attacked by a major force of insurgents, reportedly 350–700 fighters. Independent and opposition sources claim that the assailants belonged to a pro-Fertit, SPLM-IO-linked tribal militia, while the government said they were part of the "Islamic Movement for Liberation of Raja". This group, government spokesman Makuei Lueth further claimed, wanted establish an Islamic state in the region, but also included members of the Christian Lord's Resistance Army. He accused Sudan of backing them.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Battle in Wau town
The assault was eventually repelled, and afterwards Dinka gunmen once again began to loot the town and executed anyone opposing them. While the government claimed that the looters were unrelated criminals, locals believed them to be SPLA soldiers as they wore uniforms. UNMISS also said that a total breakdown of law and order had taken place in Wau. A least 30 people were killed while attempting to protect the properties of civilians who fled their homes. After the attackers were driven off, the pro-government mayor of Wau town quickly declared that the town was safe again, but most residents refused to return home. One civilian stated that "Up to now, people are not really secure because some of the soldiers are still moving around."


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Battle in Wau town
Meanwhile, the official SPLM-IO leadership attempted to distance itself from the local uprising. It was estimated that the fighting in the Wau State had resulted in over 400 civilians killed, and up to 120,000 displaced. Of these, 12,000 had sought refuge in the local UNMISS base.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Battle in Wau town
On 2 July, the new Governor of Wau, Andrea Mayan, declared that the situation in the state capital had been stabilized, with people being able to return home. A high level committee had been formed to investigate the clashes, and the curfew was lifted. The Guardian, however, reported that by 5 July, only the Dinka-dominated parts of Wau town "were lively. Pick-up trucks mounted with machine guns and full of soldiers toting AK-47s, mostly Dinka, patrolled the area. In contrast, the southern and western parts of town, home to the Fartit, were deserted after people flocked to churches and the UN base for protection."


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Battle in Wau town
On 7 July, another battle broke out in Wau town, resulting once again in a civilian mass exodus. By then, it was estimated that 150,000 people had fled Wau town, leaving it mostly deserted. Malaria had broken out among the refugees, most of which were forced to live in the bush. Government and rebel forces blamed each other for the renewed fighting; SPLM-IO Maj. Gen. Ashhab Khamis Fahal Ukanda stated that "They [the government] don't think other people have rights in this country. We all worked together to bring independence of the country. But they have turned against the rest of the people. They think they are born to rule. We will not accept that." Three day later, sporadic, small-scale clashes broke out among SPLA units in Wau town.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 12 July, government forces reportedly launched an offensive against SPLM-IO positions in the whole Wau state, most importantly at Angu Angu, Brenji, Faraj Allah, Bazia and Taban. Heavy fighting also took place in the state capital's direct southern vicinity. While both locals as well as local SPLA commanders confirmed the clashes, army spokesman Lul Ruai denied that any military action took place. Whereas the SPLM-IO claimed that they had attempted to evacuate civilians as they had been attacked, the SPLA's 5th Division accused the rebels of attacking Wau town.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
Moreover, the SPLA stated that they had relocated most of their forces from the state capital to defensive positions at Lokoloko and Jebel Rabi. After heavy fighting throughout 12 July, the SPLM-IO was forced to withdraw from Angu Angu, Brenji and Taban, accusing the SPLA to have arrested 25 civilians from these sites and to have taken them to Wau town.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
Governor Mayan announced on 20 July that he planned to initiate a dialogue with the armed opposition groups that still fought against the SPLA in Wau State. Such peace talks, however, would depend on President Kiir's approval. On 23 July, two SPLA soldiers were executed by a firing squad for the murder of a couple in Wau town. The execution was supposed to serve as warning for SPLA soldiers "who used to violet the military regulation, it is also what tell the people of South Sudan that any soldier found committing crime against civilian should be deal with" said a local judge.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 27 July, the SPLM-IO captured the Ngo Baggari County in Wau State from the government after fierce clashes, with the rebels claiming that they had captured the local County Commissioner, Anthony Fada Taban. There were also speculations that Taban might have defected to the SPLM-IO. Governor Mayan admitted that the SPLA had indeed abandoned Ngo Baggari County to the SPLM-IO, but said that the retreat was voluntary and that no clashes had taken place. Furthermore, he denied that the County Commissioner had been captured.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
The SPLM-IO's success in Ngo Baggari was explained by the fact that many locals, who were former soldiers, had been mistreated by the government and subsequently joined the rebels. SPLM-IO commander Ashab Khamis Fahal claimed that 1725 SPLA soldiers had defected to them. Meanwhile, a representative of the UDSF-M party accused SPLA units in Wau State of ignoring the ceasefire and attacking the local opposition groups, thereby causing the insecurity and chaos in the state. He also said that, as the SPLA soldiers received their orders only from the government in Juba, the governor was sidelined and in consequence unable to control the military.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 3 August, commissioner Taban resurfaced, announcing that he had actually defected to the rebels, citing the abuse of civilians by the government as reason. At the same time, the OCHA criticized the government's military for hindering humanitarian relief agencies that attempted to enter Wau town. On 6 August, peace talks between the local opposition and the governor were held, though the situation in the state remained volatile, with civilians being displaced or unlawfully arrested by SPLA soldiers.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
Governor Mayan attempted to ease tensions by negotiating the release of fifty prisoners in October, and including local religious authorities in the peace talks. On the other side, the SPLA prepared a new offensive against the Wau rebels. As of 10 August, the continued fighting had resulted in the Juba-Yambio-Wau road becoming too insecure for the transport of goods, leading to food shortages in Wau town.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 21 August, President Kiir finally approved governor Mayan's peace talks with the rebels of Wau State, while the governor also reached an agreement with the South Sudan Police Service to deploy policemen to Wau town in order to improve the local security. Between 9 and 11 September, clashes once again broke out west of Wau town, as the SPLM-IO claimed that the peace talks had failed, and the government forces had launched a major attack on their positions. The rebels also said that the attack had been repulsed, though this could not be independently confirmed.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 17 September, clashes took place at Bazia and Busseri. Despite the renewed violence, Governor Mayan declared on 19 September that he had formed a committee to hold direct negotiations with the rebels. Just three days later, the SPLA and allied militias launched another attack against SPLM-IO positions, which led to heavy fighting around Wau town, Baggari, Bringi, Busseri, and Bazia that lasted until 25 September. At the same time, President Kiir finally approved the creation of cantonment sites for SPLM-IO forces in the Bahr el Ghazal region after rejecting this move for a long time.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
These cantonment sites, however, were meant only for SPLM-IO fighters loyal to Taban Deng Gai, the new Vice President of South Sudan. Riek Machar's followers, on the other side, were referred to as "warmongers" that would "be dealt with" by the government. On 17 October, the SPLM-IO and local citizens accused the SPLA of robbing and killing nine civilians in Wau. At this point, fighting had mostly abated, as the peace talks progressed.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
By December 2016, however, fighting had restarted, with the rebels having taken control of large areas in the western part of Wau State. Heavy clashes once again broke out in the area around Busseri, forcing many civilians to flee their homes, with the SPLM-IO claiming to have fully captured Busseri. Even though the governor continued to urge the local rebels to join Taban Deng Gai's faction and end their insurgency, his pleas were rejected by the SPLM-IO spokesman for Wau, Nicola Gabriel Adam.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
Gabriel claimed that Taban Deng Gai had become part of the government they were fighting, while accusing the army of being the aggressor in this conflict, saying that the SPLA had just recently attacked SPLM-IO forces near Bringi. The mayor of Wau, meanwhile, denied that clashes were still happening, saying the people still fled to Wau town due to food shortages in their home areas.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
By mid-January 2017, about 28,850 IDPs were sheltered at Wau town, unable to return to their homes due to the ongoing fighting. On 20 January, heavy fighting broke out at Khor Natabu along the Bringi-Wau road, as SPLA-allied Dinka pastoralists from Tonj State attacked local opposition-affiliated Luo farmers. The attack was repulsed, and on 25 January the cattle herders retreated to Tonj. Nevertheless, violence between Luo farmers in Wau State and Dinkas from Tonj continued in the following months, leading to clashes that left dozens dead and displaced many others.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
Also in January 2017, Lt. Col. al-Fadil Meil Issa, a member of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in Wau, was brutally murdered by unknown assailants. Serving as CTSAMM's liaison officer to contact the local rebel factions, Issa had been loyal to Taban Deng Gai's SPLM-IO faction. When the government consequently arrested four suspects, they declared that Issa had been killed by Machar's followers. Clashes took place directly west of Wau town during the night between 30 and 31 January, when a SPLA patrol encountered a group of rebels by chance. Three government soldiers were killed during the following firefight.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 9 March 2017, a leading SPLM-IO commander in Wau State, General Faiz Ismail Fatur, announced that he was defecting to the National Salvation Front (NAS), a newly formed rebel group. Ismail blamed his defection on Machar's neglect of the rebels in Western Bahr el Ghazal, and the problems within the SPLM-IO. According to him, the group lacked both a proper vision as well as capable leadership, and suffered from organizational chaos, saying that "the [rebel] army is curtailed by officers without assignments, shamefully, at places, you find a brigadier leading a squad".


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Fighting in the countryside
On 12 March, rebel forces reportedly launched an attack in Kwarjina County in eastern Wau State, causing the army to deploy more forces to area in order to restore security. Meanwhile, Taban Deng Gai's SPLM-IO faction was granted a minister position in the Wau State government as part of a power-sharing deal. Opposition militants launched a major attack on a government base at Natabu west of Wau town on 24 March 2017. In course of the fighting 12 government soldiers were killed and seven wounded, while the rebels suffered two dead and three wounded.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Government recapture of Baggari and massacre in Wau town
The government began to intensify its counter-insurgency operations in Wau State in early April, moving more troops, tanks and equipment into the region. On 4 April, the strengthened SPLA forces initiated a large-scale offensive against SPLM-IO positions in the areas around Bisellia, Baggari, Bazia, and Kuajiena, resulting in fierce fighting. The SPLM-IO later accused the South Sudanese Air Force of having used chemical weapons to bombard them during these clashes. On 5 April, the rebels launched a counter-attack against Mapel, which resulted in a battle during which either government or opposition fighters gunned down dozens of civilians.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Government recapture of Baggari and massacre in Wau town
Three days later, the government forces retook Baggari, which had been in the hands of the SPLM-IO for nine months, after heavy fighting with rebel defenders. On the following day, however, the rebels ambushed a government convoy as it returned to Wau town, and killed Brig. Gen. Peter Par Jiek, Col. Abraham Bol Chut Dhuol (brother of Matur Chut Dhuol) as well as twelve of their bodyguards. In revenge for the ambush, SPLA soldiers and pro-government Dinka militiamen belonging to Mathiang Anyoor began a rampage in Wau town and surrounding villages, murdering and robbing non-Dinkas.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Government recapture of Baggari and massacre in Wau town
UNMISS stated that at least 16 civilians were killed and 10 wounded, while local sources reported 31 killed and 9 wounded. The SPLM-IO and pro-opposition media claimed that about 50 civilians had been murdered. Locals said that those targeted by the pro-government fighters mostly belonged to the Fertit, Luo, Jur Modo/Jur Beli, Balanda Boor/Balanda Bviri ethnic groups, which were believed by the assailants to support the rebels. Due to the renewed violence, 8,000 more locals were displaced, as 4,000 civilians fled to the UN PoC site at Wau town and 3,800 sought refuge at the Catholic Cathedral. The SPLM government, the SPLM-IO, and the National Democratic Movement (another rebel faction) all condemned the massacre in Wau town, with the government ordering the perpetrators' arrest.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Government recapture of Baggari and massacre in Wau town
It is not a war against rebels, it is a war of looking who is from that tribe and they kill you.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Government recapture of Baggari and massacre in Wau town
On 12 April, the SPLM-IO claimed to have recaptured Baggari and repelled the SPLA attacks against their other strongholds, though this was strongly disputed by the government. As the situation in Wau State and other areas of Western Bahr el Ghazal escalated, SPLA chief of staff Paul Malong Awan was ordered to take command of the operations in the region around 15 April, though Kiir dismissed him in early May. Meanwhile, the number of civilians who had sought refuge at the Catholic Cathedral of Wau town increased to 18.000.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Government recapture of Baggari and massacre in Wau town
In June 2017, Wau State's government organized peace talks between representatives of the Luo tribes of Wau and the Dinka tribes of Tonj with the aim of ending the violence between the two groups. Meanwhile, the citizens of Wau town complained that insecurity still prevailed in the state, with government soldiers regularly stealing from civilians.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
In July and August 2017, Taban Deng Gai's SPLM-IO faction announced that 7,000 rebel fighters in Wau State had defected from Machar's faction to the pro-government forces; this claim could not be independently verified and was denied by the opposition. Only about 150 rebels, led by lieutenant colonels Santino Akot Majok and Salva Ujok Achor, were confirmed to have surrendered. Fighting in the countryside continued, while ethnic conflicts spread to northern Wau State, where tribal fighters from Gogrial State destroyed a village.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
On 3 August, the newly appointed operations commander of the government forces in Wau, Mathok Akec, died of food poisoning, though this was disputed by a local doctor, according to whom sigmoid colon volvulus was the actual cause of death. Due to differing from the military's official account, the doctor in question was subsequently arrested, although the civilian authorities attempted to get him set free.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
Meanwhile, famine spread in Wau State's countryside, leading to starvation and more refugees fleeing to Wau town, whose IDP population had increased to about 52,000 by July. The reasons for the worsening famine in the countryside, especially in Bisselia County, are disputed: Whereas the government maintained that the security situation in Wau State had improved and blamed the lack of humanitarian support, the opposition argued that the famine was part of a deliberate government strategy to starve dissidents in the Baggari, Bisselia, Kpaile, Kawajina, and Udici Counties into submission by disturbing farmers and hindering the work of NGOs.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
According to the pro-government commissioner of Bisselia County, Francis Ibrahim, President Kiir had donated 3,400 sacks of sorghum to the refugees in Wau town, whereas Bisselia's population still had not received any aid by the central authorities by 22 August. The food situation in Bisselia improved in September, as farmers were able to harvest their crops; in other parts of the countryside, however, the famine continued unabated. Around 150 people fled from Bazia to Agok near Wau town due to lack of food in their home areas. Nevertheless, United Nations authorities said that the security had markedly improved in Wau State, citing that around 6,000 IDPs had returned from Wau town to their home areas. Around 32,500 refugees still resided in the PoC camps.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
Meanwhile, the conflict between tribal fighters from northern Wau, southern Gogrial, and western Tonj continued, as several villages were raided and tribal forces clashed with government soldiers. Wau's governor accused "former state officials" of inciting the tribal militias. On 15 September, President Kiir fired Andrea Mayan Achor and some other officials in Wau State without providing a reason, and subsequently appointed Angelo Taban Biajo as new governor of Wau. Achor said that his removal was a "normal government procedure", and asked the citizens of Wau State to support his successor.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
In response to the tribal violence in the northern parts of Wau State, the government started an initiative to collect firearms from the civilian population in August, reportedly collecting over 500 weapons by early December. Despite this, armed cattle raids and tribal clashes continued along the border in 2018, with at least 25 people being killed in February and March of that year in the area of Kwarjiena.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, New tribal conflicts, and famine
In a continued attempt to end the insurgency, SPLA Chief of General Staff James Ajonga Mawut ordered the release of nine POWs who had served as officers for Machar's rebel forces in November 2017, with governor Angelo Taban urging the released officers to encourage active rebel fighters in Wau State to surrender. In December, an important road between Wau and Tumbura could be reopened due to the improving security situation, while the military reportedly prepared a new offensive against rebel forces in Wau State.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
In January 2018, it was discovered that former SPLA Chief of General Staff Paul Malong Awan planned his own rebellion against the government, and had begun to organize an attack of associates on Wau airport. The plot failed, and members of the 5th Division who were suspected of being allied with Malong were arrested, while the rest of the division remained alert in case of further possible incidents. Governor Angelo Taban Biajo subsequently declared that there was no further security risks in Wau.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
Despite initially denying his involvement in any plan to attack Wau, Malong later openly rebelled and started a new insurgent group, the "South Sudan United Front" (SS-UF). In the following months, several officers of the 5th Division joined the insurgency against the government. One of them, Captain Baak Bol Baak, was an alleged Malong follower and escaped with his troops from Wau to join the South Sudan Patriotic Army rebels in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in February 2018. Another, Stephen Buay Rolnyang, was the former chief commander of the 5th Division and rebelled in Mayom in May 2018. Major General Keer Kiir Keer was appointed new head of the SPLA's 5th Division.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
Meanwhile, the security situation in Wau State had improved, so that about 14,000 displaced people returned to their homes between January and June 2018; nevertheless, about 30,000 remained at the refugee camps. Much of western Wau State remained in rebel hands, and the political situation there remained tense; areas like the greater Baggari sub-area were mostly cut off from humanitarian aid and were thus threatened by famine. The Juba-based CTSAMM monitoring group also accused one SPLM-IO group which operated northwest of Wau town of having recruited child soldiers; the SPLM-IO consequently stated that this faction had possibly "gone rogue".


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
In June 2018, fighting reportedly resumed between government and rebel forces, as SPLM-IO rebels claimed that the SPLA had started to attack them at Ngo-Baggari. According to Human Rights Watch, the SPLA's 5th Division under Maj. Gen. Keer Kiir Keer began an assault on rebel-held areas south and southwest of Wau as well as the town of Wad Alel from 12 June, probably to regaining territory before a planned ceasefire agreement could come into effect.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
Wad Alel, a settlement dominated by Luo, was captured and mostly destroyed by the SPLA, although the rebel continued to maintain an underground presence in the town. The military reportedly overran rebel positions at Baggari, Bisellia, and Engo halima on 23 June, though the rebels managed to regain these areas in course of a counter-attack on the following day. On 25 June, the SPLM-IO insurgents claimed that the SPLA and allied JEM militiamen had attempted to capture Omboro from them, though the attack was allegedly repulsed.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
The government denied these accusations, and an army spokesman stated that "there is no fighting because peace talks are ongoing". Although a countrywide ceasefire was supposed to take effect on 30 June, the SPLA reportedly attacked the rebels' base of Mboro in Wau State on that day. The government rejected these accusations, stating that Mboro had been under its control since 2016. A rebel spokesman said about the purported clashes in Wau State that "There is the possibility Salva Kiir is not in control of his forces or he doesn't want peace to come".


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
The SPLA offensive continued unabated in the next months, resulting in clashes at Baggari, Bringi, Basselia, Mboro, Farajalla, Ngisa, Ngo Dakalla, Wad Alel, and along the Jur River. Tens of thousands of civilians were once again displaced, and there were reports widespread abuses at the hands of both sides. Mboro was captured by the SPLA after a battle lasting from 24 to 30 June, whereupon much of the community was destroyed. SPLM-IO rebels retook Wad Alel in July, forcibly recruiting locals and looting the settlement before retreating.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
According to witnesses, security forces arrested local men belonging to ethnic minorities suspected insurgents, during the offensive. The detainees were transported to facilities at Grinti and Jebel Akhdar, and tortured before being released. Both sides hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid by NGOs. The SPLA offensive ended in late August 2018. In September 2018, the South Sudanese government and Riek Machar's SPLM-IO faction signed a peace deal, resulting in the gradual cessation of hostilities between the two sides. Fighting in Wau State initially continued despite the agreement.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Clashes, Paul Malong Awan's rebellion, renewed clashes, and ceasefire deal
Wau State's SPLM-IO rebels agreed to a ceasefire on 31 January 2019, formally ending their insurgency. Both Brigadier General Peter Ngoli, head of SPLA-IO operations in Besselia region, and SPLA commander Joshua Konyi signalled the readiness of their forces to adhere to the peace deal.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Aftermath
Following the end of the clashes, the security situation in Wau State improved, and the relations between soldiers and civilians became better as well. Confidence-building efforts by the NGOs Saferworld and the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) helped to generate new trust, child soldiers were demobilized, and the military encouraged troops to behave properly. At the same time, locals urged to government to pay its soldiers so that they were not forced to steal to feed their families. President Kiir held a speech in Wau on 5 March, asking the people for forgiveness for the mistakes of his government. He urged the locals to refrain from further violence and revenge attacks. He also stated that the government would try to improve the local roads, and ease tensions between farmers and nomads in Wau State. By this point, most refugees in Wau town had returned to their homes.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Aftermath
Per the peace deal the Machar-loyal forces began to relocate to agreed assembly points in Wau State from 22 May 2019, when the first rebel battalion arrived at Busseri.


2016–2019 Wau clashes, Aftermath
By late 2019, a substantial number of SPLA soldiers stationed around Wau belonged to Mathiang Anyoor units. As non-native Dinka, they had few options to defect or desert, and were thus regarded as loyal to the government.


2016–2021 Iranian protests
The Iranian protests are a series of ongoing demonstrations and government crackdowns erupting nationwide in Iran since 2016. The protests with the intention of removing the Iranian government are often fueled by low wages, unemployment, inflation, government corruption, an ongoing water crisis, Persian nationalist fervor and the government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Background
The sequence of protests, which included the 2016 Cyrus the Great Revolt, 2017–2018 Iranian protests, 2018–2019 Iranian general strikes and protests, Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 protests (in January 2020), 2019-2020 Iranian protests, 2020-2021 Iranian protests, met with violent responses by the Iranian authorities, including the killing of 1,500 protesters in November 2019 uprising and the violent crackdown on protests in Mahshahr. Besides toppling the regime, the protest movement is aimed at poverty, issues and corruption in the economy, especially higher wages and pensions.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, January 2020 protests and the beginning of renewed protests and unrest
The January 2020 protests were organised by bus drivers and taxi drivers in Tehran. Anti -regime protests were rising, with this chant, "Death to corrupt officials", heard the most. Seasonal workers in Marivan participated in a strike movement as well, despite attacks by the security forces and intimidation meant to quell public protests that had begun on 24 January triggered by economic grievances. Kangan and Sanandaj experienced protests by oil workers and other sectors, with more that 5 blockades in protest for having not received any wages.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, January 2020 protests and the beginning of renewed protests and unrest
Kaki saw protest rallies over water and fuel shortage crises sparking anger by their citizens for days. Employees in Mahshahr’s petrochemical factory protested non-payment of wages and inadequate responses to their demands. Eslamabad Gharb saw Railway workers protesting against not being paid for five months and the halting of their main construction project by the Security Forces. Hundreds of customers were regularly protesting in regular marches against the stock market and central bank crash in Tehran. Buildings in Isfahan were surrounded by hundreds of farmers, repeatedly rallying over poor conditions.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, January 2020 protests and the beginning of renewed protests and unrest
Recent protests also took place in Khuzestan and Ahvaz and met with violent reactions from security forces. Locals staged rallies in Ahvaz and Gorgan, protesting imprisonments of protesters and demanding the president Hassan Rouhani to step down. In Khuzestan, bus drivers went on strike in protest to their low wages and the high price of spare parts for their buses.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, February 2020
In late-January and February, retirees and workers, employees and farmers, industrial workers and miners participated in protest rallies and marches, strikes, demonstrations, unrest, protest movement and general strike campaigns across Bandar-e-Lengeh in protest against long-delayed wages and insurances. Thousands of dock workers and municipality workers held various protests, protesting for higher salaries and longer insurances. Municipality workers in Alvand, who had not received their salaries for a long time, staged protest gatherings for weeks in January and February.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, February 2020
In Khuzestan, contract workers protested unstable conditions and low salaries, while petrochemical workers of Apadana held gatherings, speeches, meetings and boycotts in companies. Factory workers in Hamedan protested non-implementation of early retirement. Retired workers in Shiraz and service workers rallied in Mashhad in protest against low wages and fake promises. Ahvaz and Golgan saw people gathering on the streets and creating roadblocks with tires, and blockades for weeks, demonstrating against low wages and fake promises.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, March 2020
In March 2020, amid the COVID-19 outbreak, Iran’s prisons became overcrowded and rioting broke out in prisons in Tehran, Khorramshahr and Ahvaz, where 17 were wounded during protests by prisoners in the city against the fears of the spread of COVID-19 in Iranian prisons. Security forces reportedly fired gunshots in Khorramshahr and altogether, 36 were feared dead during the prison riots nationwide.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, April 2020
From 9–22 April, hunger strikes, demonstrations, protest marches, public unrest and protests erupted in Iran’s prisons until July as well, protesting the outbreak of COVID-19 in prison. In response, the government released 85,000 prisoners. The rioting in Fars, Khorramshahr and Ahvaz on 30–31 March was called for the release of prisoners and better conditions in prisons to combat the virus; it was the deadliest prison unrest in years.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
A wave of massive worker protests broke out across Iran when municipal workers and nurses participated in large gatherings against the COVID-19 impact on Iran. For weeks, gatherings, meetings, speeches, strikes and demonstrations occurred nationwide, with at least two cities experiencing major protests. In Khuzestan, medical staff organised large protest rallies in front of their offices, demanding wages and better conditions for hospitality workers. Factory workers, coal miners, machine manufacturers and worker sectors have been among those protesting due to unpaid wages, shortages and poor economy and Protesters have rallied since then.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
Factory and city employees, coal miners, as well as health-care workers are among those who have been protesting in Iran in July. Three weeks of worker protests have broken out across Iran as protests against working conditions, a worsening economy and issues with employment.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
Demonstrations and strikes were calling for payments and complaints of not receiving their wages for months, lack of jobs and employment, unemployment, poor policies and wage increases as well in cities like Tabriz, Dezful, Khoramabad, Khorramshahr (Between 13–26 August, workers staged strikes), Behbahan, Ghazvin, Shiraz (where sugarcane workers launched strikes) and Ahvaz by teachers, workers, miners, nurses and doctors protesting shortages and grappling with the COVID-19 outbreak, municipality workers and jobless workers who had retired. Mashhad, Rasht, Urmia, Ahvaz, Shush, Yazd, and Khomein experienced women’s protests by nurses, teachers, doctors, municipality workers and taxi drivers protesting the conditions and no rights they face.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
Ebrahim Arabzadeh, a contract worker at Mahshahr petrochemical complex, died from heat exhaustion at work on 28 July. This sparked an unprecedented wave of strike action across Iran, with 10,000 workers going on strike, battling the 50-degrees heat in some areas to protest in the oil and gas fields in southern Iran like Abadan and Mahshahr.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
Protesters were builders, electricians, welders, pipefitters and other tradesmen who are leading mass protests and political strike action across the country to protest in their tens of thousands against gang-money robbery in banks and employee conditions in Arak, where hundreds blocked and abandoned their work to join the protests and it even spread to Isfahan, where hundreds called for full-time work and permanent jobs. Workers have been on strike for days in late-July and early August, and unemployment protests have also broken out across industries and factory workers have joined the strike action, ending after a couple of weeks of strikes, with no demands met.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
It is said that 237 protest movements were formed in 85 cities in Iran in July 2020. On 16 July 2020, amid a heavy security presence, protesters took to the streets of Behbehan and chanted "We don't want a clerical regime" and "Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life only for Iran". The security forces fired tear gas to disperse the protesters. A heavy security presence was also reported in various other Iranian cities. The protests come under the slogan "#StopExecutionsInIran" (Persian: اعدام نکنید).


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
On the eve of 16 July 2020, a protest gathering was formed in the city of Behbahan in Khuzestan Province. According to social media account, the execution verdicts for the protesters of 2019–2020 Iranian protests and economical hardships brought by government's lack of proper management were the key points of this protest. According to NetBlocks, Khuzestan's bandwidth was strictly limited in the night of 15 July 2020. According to Deutsche Welle, the unrest also spread to Shiraz, Isfahan, Rasht, Mashhad, Tabriz and Urmia. The protest gatherings, protesters was rallying against hardships for days before the initial uprising, with many injured during rallies as well.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
The Haft Tappeh Sugar Cane Mill Labor Syndicate was the epicentre and scene of protest rallies for 2 months in 2020, from May–July. Workers staged daily street protests for not receiving their wages for consecutive months and the policy of privatisation. Strikers were attacked during the protests in Ahvaz, yet this wave of employee protests was the most peaceful. Thousands participated in clapping strikes, general strikes, walk-outs, chanting and rallying. Strikers was fired in response to the large strikes for months against low wages and no pay-checks.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
Maryam Rajavi supported the protest action, mentioning on Twitter, "The clerical regime has abandoned our people in the clutches of disease, unemployment and poverty. They do not pay workers and nurses’ salaries. The only solution is replacing the mullahs’ oppressive rule in #Iran with people’s sovereignty and the rule of democracy". Thousands of these workers of Haft Tappeh demonstrated in the streets of Shush, calling on their colleagues to show solidarity with their protest march and the slogan "Worker of Haft Tappeh, Unity, Unity." The workers also chanted, "Death to Rouhani, reduce embezzlement, our problem will be solved," and the workers occupied the streets of Shush while shouting and clapping loudly.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, Mid 2020 (May-August)
Protesters rallied in Bandar Abbas, Gilan, Bushehr and other provinces for strike actions for weeks in June–July against low wages and unpaid salaries. Nurses, physicians, medical students, medical staff, doctors and appointees held rallies across Iran, mainly Mashhad and Rasht. Labour protests and union rallies were organised by professionals in Mashhad, protesting risking their lives on the frontlines and not getting their main attention. Protesters were attacked almost daily by Riot police with Batons. Maryam Rajavi commented in support of the demonstrating nurses.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, September 2020
The protest movement first began on 21 September, when rallies was organized by Trade unions against low wages, but the demand became soon into a broader movement, with Teachers, Farmers, Students, Drivers, Mechanics, Shopkeepers, Public sector workers, Workers and more social sectors joining the movement, demanding an end to Corruption, Unemployment, no insurances of workers, licenses being taken away, landlord and worker's bosses taking away money form workers, shops looted and shopkeepers unemployed during the 2019-20 Iranian protests, harsh working and living conditions, blackouts, crackdowns, outages, Poverty, Inflation, closures of Factories, Government's handling of the Coronavirus pandemic, media agencies shutdowns and many more deep issues. Massive labour protests also hit areas nationwide like: Rasht, Zanjan, Yazd, Abadan, Behbahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Isfahan, Ahvaz, Khorramshahr, Kerman, Mashhad, Ardebil and Qom.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, September 2020
Peaceful protests and nonviolent boycotts have also been taking place as well. Workers, teachers and students have also led massive labour protests and general strikes, occupations, wildcat strikes, Rent strikes at shops and closed companies and Sit-ins. On 29 September, police, who had hitherto been passive, moved in to disperse protesters but failed to quell the protests. On 24 January, after three days of protests in Iranshahr, Security forces fired Birdshot and Stun grenades to quell youth protests and insurrectional demonstrations and rebellious protests in the city.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, September 2020
On 21–29 September, workers in sugar factories in Mahabad took to the streets in protest against non-payments, dismissal of several of their colleagues and worker conditions. The protest in Isfahan by locals, protesting heavy machinery in their farms, was quelled. Hundreds of workers in Ahvaz demanded authorities to provide job and livelihood security. In Babol, nurses and medical staff protested against delayed paychecks. In Tehran, retired workers led rallies asking for their wages claims to be addressed. In factories and companies in Yazd, workers gathered in large numbers, protesting the officials’ refusal to pay their overdue wages.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, September 2020
In Savadkuh, industrial workers and miners in factories participated in protests calling for adequate pay based on their job conditions. In Shush, farmers protested a sugar beet contract with Kermanshah, Islamabad companies. In Shiraz, nurses and medical staff protested their delayed paychecks for days. Truck drivers in the city of Fardis protested low fares and high vehicle maintenance costs in a large strike.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
Between 30 September and 7 October, there were protests in Zanjan, Tabriz, Khuzestan and Urmia, demonstrating against the prices of bread and poor conditions. Medical staff went on strike and kindergarten teachers rallied against the government. Teachers and female workers protested in Tehran, Dezful and Hamedan for unconditional employment and better working statuses. Workers rallied in Yazd and Fars protesting the conditions there.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
Workers at natural-gas and petrochemical factories in Hamideh and Mahshahr went on strike for weeks in protest against arrests of workers, employee discrimination and delayed pay checks.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
In October 2020, protesters rallied in support of Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The military crackdown became harsh as protests became larger and violent. Ethnic Azeris constitute a large minority of the Iranian population. The military forces used tear gas and reportedly clashed with protesters in Tabriz, Ardebil, Tehran and Urmia, calling for the closure of the border with Armenia. 38 were detained during demonstrations.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
Worker protests and rallies from 1–21 October were launched after payments were delayed and unpaid wages triggered protests. In Fars, workers protested in large numbers, protesting delayed pay-checks and poor livelihoods. Municipality workers in Hamideh, Ahvaz was arrested after holding gatherings against delayed pay-checks. After Mohammad Reza Shajarian’s death, massive and large anti-regime protests broke out in Tehran, as thousands called for press freedom and the government of Hassan Rouhani to step down. The protest movement led to many arrests and interventions as well. In Bojnurd, municipal workers gathered with their families to protest lack of job security.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
In Ahvaz, fired municipality workers demanded to be returned to work. Arvand Kenar, Ahvaz saw mass protests by municipal workers, private sector workers, miners in Kerman and locals there protested against the drying up of their main wells, pre-school teachers held rallies in Ahvaz demanding a change in their employment status and healthcare workers in protest against delayed wages. In Tabriz, workers rallied in front of their factory, protesting their colleagues dismissals and delayed pay-checks. In Meshginshahr, protesters took to the streets in factories to protest delayed pay-checks.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
Mass protests by 25000 workers and railway workers, miners, infrastructure sectors and teachers occurred all across Iran in October–November, the biggest workers protests since the 1953 strikes. Oil-workers and gas-sector strikes were organised in protest against unpaid wages for months. Railway workers across Iran also went on strike during October, demanding payment of unpaid wages, insurance and equal contracts for contractors. Spontaneous and sporadic protests simultaneously broke out across the country in protest against.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Protest movement, October–November 2020
These contraction workers have organised a campaign of demonstrations and strikes throughout November demanding the renationalisation of the railways and for them to be employed on the basis of permanent contracts. Ongoing strikes occurred by workers in Tabriz, Khorasan, Markazi, Khuzestan and more in protest by workers, municipalities, teachers, railway employees and others.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
A nonviolent three-day strike campaign was launched by toll workers in Ghazvin against employment statuses, meaning high unemployment. Between 19 January and 23 February, nationwide retiree protests erupted in protest against low wages for retirees, demanding justice over the deaths of 1500 during the 2019-2020 Iranian protests and an end to poverty. Iran’s Stock Market Exchange bubble growth finally burst on 24 January. As a result, many people lost the life savings they had invested in the stock market, so there were large protests in Tehran where police fired on protesters. On 7 February, the Iranian media warned of another uprising after major protests in February. Newspaper Jahane-e-Sarat has noted that injustice and inflation had grappled Iranian society, fearing another uprising in our country.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
Between December–January, thousands of stock owners and stock marketers have taken to the streets in protest against the stock crash in Iran. Kohgiluyeh saw protests in January, demonstrating against water crisis and polluted water, calling for the government to take action over the crisis. These deprived workers spread their empty tablecloths on the street. Contract workers in Ilam and Tehran led large rallies over uncertainty of their employment status (around 13,000 went on strike).


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
The employees and retirees taking to the streets in December held rallies over the crisis in the country, mainly in Ahvaz, where major gatherings have been held since November, protesting nonpayments and low wages. Thousands of ranchers, livestock workers and university students held rallies over unequal society, calling for president Hassan Rouhani to listen to their demands. Hundreds of school teachers, nurses and contact health workers held marches in Tehran over unequal job status and employment issues, with demands for authorities to clarify their employment status.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
Drivers of fuel tankers led ten days of labour protests in November–December, to protest low fares and demand higher fares in Arak and Kermanshah. Workers in Ahvaz and restaurant workers and shop owners protested humidity and conditions during work period, inspiring thousands of other worker groups across the country to protest in strike action, starting on 26 November and ending on 1 December. Poultry farmers and municipality workers led protests as well as retired workers in Khuzestan.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
Hundreds of academic staff and faculty members in Mahshahr took to the streets to embrace the same demands of the protesters in other cities. Protests by bus drivers, truckers unions, landowners, sugarcane workers, cargo workers, farmers took to the streets in Shush (over the lack of job security and privatisation of sugarcane worker factories), Isfahan (where farmers protested irrigation water rights), protesting their harsh living conditions and more depriving issues these groups are facing.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
Thousands of retirees staged rallies in multiple cities, including Tehran, Mashhad, Hamadan, Khorramabad, Karaj, Shush, Rasht, Shiraz, Qazvin, and Kermanshah on 10 January to express their frustrating dissatisfaction with low access to their rights and demanding their basic rights.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
The current and recent wave of retiree protests began on 13 December when hundreds of protests and retirees launched nationwide general strikes and countrywide popular demonstrations against inflation and unemployment while economic turmoil and hardships adjusting to pensions also triggered the controversy, ongoing political demonstrations by retirees. Multiple cities saw protests, including Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Rasht, Yazd, Bojnurd, Khorramabad, Ilam, Ahvaz and Arak. The protests on 13 December, 20 December, 27 December and 3 January were peaceful and non-violent.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021
Fars, Kurdistan, Alborz, Qazvin, Razavi Khorasan, East Azerbaijan, Hamadan, Lorestan, Isfahan, Kermanshah, and Khuzestan provinces also saw protests and demonstrations by retirees. They also held protests in Neyshabur, Haft-Tappeh, Qom, Shush Danial and Arak over economic conditions and ruined livelihoods. Pensioners, medical staff, employees, workers, and firefighters held protests for weeks in December and January complaining about overdue wages.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, January 2021
Iranians continued their protests and angry demonstrations on 26 January amid repression from the security forces. The protest movement was launched on 3 January, when hundreds of sectors took to the streets for the biggest second wave of protests since September, the first in 2021. Retirees and pensioners demonstrated on 26 January in protest at inadequate pensions and worsening conditions and demanded officials return their savings and pensions. Cities like Ahvaz, Shush, Karaj, Tabriz expressed their anger, dissatisfaction with unemployment, social problems and inequality among working citizens and in these cities, retirees protested officials’ failure to pay their inherent rights.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, January 2021
In Kermanshah, pensioners protesting low salaries and pensions staged rallies in front of government buildings, the third retiree gathering in the city, while in Ilam, protesters organised their third week of demonstrations and gatherings calling for higher salaries and improvements of poor living conditions.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, January 2021
In Qazvin, Sari, Mashhad, Khorramshahr, Khorramabad, Bojnurd, Shiraz, Rasht and Sanandaj, mass street protests occurred as well, rallying against plundering policies, calling for officials respect their basic rights, officials’ indifference toward their dilemmas and dire living conditions, officials’ failure to pay pensioners’ rights, regime’s indifference, Retirees’ salaries do not fit with their expenditures, government did not balance their salaries and many more depriving issues. The precedented wave of fruitful mass street protests and opposition-led growing popular striking demonstrations occurred in larger numbers this week than the last 4 weeks. This straw of protests has sparked fears among newspapers and controversy among the media, who have warned the explosive and impatient people of Iran might rise up against president Hassan Rouhani.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
On 3 February, retirees and pensioners took to the streets to protest the deteriorating living conditions and the skyrocketing prices in 19 cities for the 6th consecutive week. The protests, the third nationwide protests by retirees in the past month, took place in Tehran, and in many other cities, including Mashhad, Neyshabur, Tabriz, Shiraz, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Arak, Rasht, Yazd, Ahvaz, Sanandaj, Zanjan, Abhar, Ardabil, Khorramabad, Ilam, Karaj, Babol and Shooshtar.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
On 15 February, widespread unrest and severe nonviolent protests and social movement intensified throughout the country as Tehran, Karaj, Nishapur, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Ilam, Khorramabad, Yazd, Isfahan, Arak and other cities nationwide saw popular mass protests and strike actions. While the price of the national currency, the rial, has lost more than 80% of its value in the past few years, pensions have not improved much, and the regime has not adjusted salaries based on the currency and inflation rates. Thus, most pensioners live under the poverty line.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
In Baluchistan, the 2021 Sistan and Baluchestan protests broke out, leaving as many as 10 killed. Rallies, street demonstrations and protest marches has risen since 3 February 2021, when hundreds protested in Isfahan against polluted water. In Shiraz, pensioners rallied for weeks, protesting for larger pensions and calling for new wage increases. The uprising in the Sistan And Baluchistan region has left 50 killed and wounded. Protesters rallied again over the recent days, protesting in Mashhad against retirees conditions and working life for mall employees, and simultaneously, retiree-protesters rallied for their sixth consecutive week in protest against pension law system and social security.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
Rallies were held in Tehran, Izeh and Saveh by unemployed workers, workers, farmers over water conditions, low wages and no payment-received, and more deep issuers. Hundreds have taken to the streets daily in Tehran in front of shopping malls and teachers held strikes and sit-ins publicly in-front of preschools, protesting overdue complaints and not receiving their rights in work. Up to 1,000-5,000 participated in protests since the January protests.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
Protesters took to the streets of Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz, Karaj and Ahvaz to express their anger over economic woes and worsening tensions in the country, in protest against the economy. It is the 4th straight week of pensioner protests against low pensioners wages and calling for higher pensions, while retirees have been protesting social security. Protests called for the government to take action and set higher wages for pensioners and retirees, demonstrating for months.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
The participants of the January–February strike wave was mainly municipality workers, pensioners, retirees, teachers, unemployed or fired workers, railroad workers, petrochemical workers, gas workers, factory workers, miners and manufacturers in Urmia, Mahshahr, Arak, Kerman and more. Teachers, defrauded creditors, other sectors and farmers conducted gatherings in Tehran, Mashhad, Zahedan and Isfahan as well, protesting unpaid wages and demands for their wages grew louder.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
Across Iran, farmers and factory workers have been protesting high prices and unpaid salaries that leave farmers struggling to make money from their businesses and factory workers unable to afford food to put on their table. Nationwide protests by workers, factory employees and farmers against the plan for higher prices ahead of Nowruz and non-payments. The farmers from Hashtbandi in Hormozgan province went on strike as well as Isfahan, Nurabad and other areas across the country to protest the prices of their products and no wage payments.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, February 2021
College students, preschool educators, impoverished citizens, paint workers, bakery workers, and railroad workers of the maintenance sector took to the streets during the string of mass protests, protesting poor conditions and living standards in Iran. Thousands of workers, shopkeepers, steel retirees, drivers, farmers, security staff, residents, water and sewage staff, and bakers rallied in Iran for weeks during the 2-week long strike campaign in February in support of the protesting farmers and calling for president Hassan Rouhani to resign.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
Oil, steel, and seasonal construction workers and independent labor unions along with pensioners and teachers were also present in the gatherings in Tehran on 7 March calling for higher wages. The protesters wanted higher pensions and wages. In Tehran, three protesters were arrested for protesting in the peaceful meetings and nonviolent gatherings, triggering nationwide pensioner protests and widespread demonstrations in Karaj, Arak, Khorramabad, Ahvaz, Isfahan and Shiraz. Since December 2020, pensioners have held several organized nationwide gatherings on a weekly basis. Previous protests were held on 26 January, 10 January, 3 January, 7 February, 21 February, 28 February, March 1 and 14 February.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
On 22 February, retirees staged mass protests across Tehran, Karaj, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz, Ahvaz as part of the weekly retirees strikes and pensioner protests over inflation and economic hardships. Since 3 January, mass protests have rocked nationwide and cities have been gripped with dissent and overflowing demonstrations over inflation and unemployment. Mashhad, Isfahan, Arak, Qazvin, Khorramabad was seen to have experienced protest rallies and street marches in dissatisfaction over adjusting to harsh pensions and poor living conditions for workers.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
Thousands of pensioners peacefully protested again on 28 February to protest inadequate pensions amid high inflation due to ongoing US sanctions and difficult living conditions in Ahvaz, Yazd, Tabriz, Kermanshah, Zanjan, Arak, Ilam, Khorramabad, Karaj, Ardabil, Mashhad, Isfahan, Rasht, Sanandaj, Shiraz, Bojnurd, Qazvin, Neyshabur, Shahroud, Shooshtar, Shush, Kerman, Sari, Dezful and Abadan.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
Between 4–7 March, protests occurred across Iran, with the railway worker strike in Nurabad-Arak in protest for not receiving their wages and benefits, workers in Ahvaz municipality sector protested demanding their rights and delayed wages, Karaj Railway workers went on strike in protest for not receiving their insurance rights for months, workers in a production distribution company in Mahshahr demonstrated demanding their delayed wages and rights and implementing job classification, street peddlers and locals in Tabriz clashed with security forces after protesting in hundreds against prevented from working in front of the Molavi Market, contract employees protested in front of the ministry of oil in Tehran to protest the recognition of discrimination between them and the regime’s official employees, locals of Chaf and Chamkhaleh protested the occupation of their ancestral lands, thousands took to the streets in many cities across nationwide, in cities like Tehran, Yazd, Isfahan, Tabriz, Shushtar, Shush, Haft Tappeh, Khorram Abad, Qazvin, Kermanshah, Ahvaz, Shahrud, Rasht, Mashhad, Sari, Ardebil, Arak, Urmia, Behshahr, Sanandaj, Shiraz, and Karaj, by retirees and pensioners for the 7th consecutive week, protesting for higher pensions and better retiree social security system. Security forces arrested several retirees and pensioners in different cities across the country.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
On 14–17 March, protests by retirees and other sectors across Iran, Urmia and other areas, which was gripped with dissent weekly by pensioners and retirees, was held in protest at rising inflation, demanding their pensions adjusted with the rising inflation rate and the skyrocketing prices. They also protested their long-delayed pensions. Protesters and large crowds gathered nationwide despite police presence calling, chanting and clapping angry slogans calling for the government to adjust their pensions and calling for the government or Hassan Rouhani to resign on the eve of Nowruz. The ongoing protests and anti-establishment demonstrations are worrying for the government ahead of the 2021 Iranian presidential election.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
Retirees held their rallies in dozen Iranian citizens such as Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Rasht, Khorramabad, Arak, Kermanshah, protesting the regime’s institutionalized corruption and wrong policies. The protests were over rising inflation and crisis in society. Workers and pensioners in Mashhad, Ardabil, Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Shooshtar, Ilam, Kerman, Abhar, Bojnurd, Shush County, Iran, Hafttapeh, Abadan, and Dezful staged protests outside the local social security offices in those cities. The protests were against the lack of response to their abysmal living conditions, low wages, and high prices.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
Traditional dairy farmers protested the lack of support on their farming industry from the irrelevant authorities, employees in electricity distribution centres in Tehran demanding their rights, workers in municipalities and buildings in Behbahan staged rallies demanding their wages and protesting poor living conditions, sit-ins by these worker staging rallies was held immediately as well across the country, oil industry retirees in Ahvaz demonstrated calling for better support from the authorities and demanding their worker rights chanting, "We will not relent until we get our rights back. ", the protest marches and popular demonstrations, frequent and fruitful mass rallies by workers in the major Fars metal companies continued for their 5th week over the non-fulfillment of the employer’s obligations.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
In Northeastern Iran, hundreds of protesters clashed with security forces and thousands took part in demonstrations over two days protesting the rape of an 8-year old and 7-year old girl. Protesters broke cars and shouted slogans, at police chasing and fleeing rock throwing protesters in Gonbad Kavuz. On 27 March, workers at Haft Tappeh’ Sugarcane Factory’s pest control unit staged a protest in front of the company’s security office for the second day. They protested the reduction of contract times, not having new contracts, and the dismissal of company workers. On 28 March, workers of Kut Abdollah held protest rallies demanding their delayed wages and bonuses. These workers have not received their salaries for months. In the last week, workers in the Ahvaz Water and Wastewater Department and poultry farmers in Ahvaz protested demanding their delayed wages.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, March 2021
On 29 March, protests erupted across Iran as protesters take to the streets in Many cities like Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, and Gilan to protest a trade cooperation act with China for 25 years. Tehran, Kazeroun, Kermanshah, Karaj has seen daily protest gatherings over a new pact with China, heavy security forces presence was reported. Protesters also held rallies in front of governorships in the Alborz and Isfahan provinces to voice "outrage" over the "controversial" pact.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 4 April, pensioners and retirees held rallies across the country, protesting their poor economic conditions and pension reform to the system, making it harder to adjust to. The protesters held rallies and non-violent marches in Tehran, Arak, Ardabil, Isfahan, Ahvaz, Ilam, Khorramabad, Rasht, Sari, Sanandaj, Shiraz, Karaj, Kerman, Kermanshah, Gorgan, Qazvin, Mashhad, Yazd, Neyshabur, Shush, Shooshtar, and Abhar, demonstrations erupted nationwide after security forces intimidated demonstrators particularly in strikes and marches.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 7 April, retirees and pensioners gathered in Tehran and 24 other cities in  nationwide protest rallies against their dire living conditions, low wages, and high prices. They also held demonstrations in some cities. The retirees expressed their disgust with the entire clerical regime while taking to the streets in Tehran, Sari, Ahvaz, Urmia, Qazvin, Karaj, Rasht, Khorramabad, Kerman, Ardabil, Shush, Andimeshk, Shooshtar, Tabriz, Ilam, Arak, Yazd, Abadan and Khorramshahr, Dezful, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Bojnurd, Shahroud, and Shiraz in front of police stations, government buildings and workplaces.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 5 April-8 April, plundered shareholders of Iran’s Stock Market Exchange in Tehran also reflected their hatred toward the regime and its sham presidential elections. Teachers from various educational institutions in Yazd, Central Iran, rallied in front of the Ministry of Education’s office in the province’s capital to demanding their working privileges. On Tuesday, teachers in Shiraz and Karaj protested the regime’s latest decision to change their pension plan. Thousands of employees in Khorramshahr rallied demanding their delayed pay checks. In Ahvaz, workers from the Ahvaz Water and Wastewater Department walked out, demonstrating the government’s failure to fulfil their demands.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
In Ahvaz, contract workers affiliated with the Agriculture Organization in Ahvaz staged gatherings protesting officials’ failure to allocate an adequate budget to the organisation. In Tehran, workers of the Pars Metal company rallied at factories associated with the company at the Tehran-Karaj road. They protested employers' failure to meet their demands. On 11 April, retirees and pensioners protested against the clerical regime’s oppression, the dire living conditions, low salaries and devastating high prices that have made it impossible for them and their families to survive.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
In Tabriz, retirees put an empty tablecloth on the ground symbolising their empty dinner tables, to protest their deteriorating economic situation. In addition to Tehran, retirees in Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Karaj, Tabriz, Rasht, Kermanshah, Arak, Qazvin, Zanjan, Ardabil, Khorramabad, Kerman, Ilam, Bojnurd, Sanandaj, Urmia, Shahroud, Sari, Neyshabur, Nowshahr, Bushehr, Shush, Shooshtar and Dezful held protest rallies. In Isfahan, retirees closed Abbasabad Street for two hours and resisted SSF’s actions to open the road. In Rasht, too, retirees clashed with the State Security Force, who had detained several protesters.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 14 April, retirees and pensioners held nationwide protests and demonstrations calling for the boycott of the upcoming sham presidential elections over the insufficient pensions they have received. The gatherings took place in Tehran, Karaj, Khorramabad, Arak, Mashhad, Neyshabur, Kerman, Yazd, Qazvin, Kermanshah, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Bojnurd, Rasht, Behshahr, Shush, Shushtar, Boroujerd, Isfahan, Maku, and Shahroud.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 18 April, retirees continued their protests, protesting harsh living conditions, the regime’s inaction to solve their problems, and called for boycotting the upcoming sham presidential elections. Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, Ahvaz, Arak, Kerman, Kermanshah, Qazvin, Bandar Abbas, Mashhad, Rasht, Ardabil, Sari, Behshahr, Borujerd, Dezful, Hafttapeh, and Shush saw protest rallies by retirees.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 21, 22 April and  23, defrauded creditors, whose property and savings had been plundered by the clerical regime’s stock market gambit, protested and marched in Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, and Tabriz, chanting slogans against the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Hassan Rouhani, Judiciary Chief Ebrahim Raisi, calling for the boycott of the sham presidential election.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 19 April, farmers in Ziar city in Isfahan protested and blocked roads, demanding their right to water irrigation, farmers in Vajjareh set vehicles on fire and burnt tires calling for their rights of water irrigation. In Tehran, protesters marched from the Social Security Organization to the Shademan subway, chanting, "We will no longer vote because we have not seen any justice". Protesters in Mashhad took to the streets in opposition to the national elections. Deprived workers and cement factory workers went on strike to protest economic crisis and were demanding their low incomes in Isfahan. Thousands of university graduate teachers held protests in Karaj, near Tehran, demoing equal pay and rights.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 22 April, farmers began protests in Isfahan to protest against how the regime’s destructive water distribution policies affect not only farmers’ lives but also the ecosystem. On 25 April, water system workers launched sit-ins and protests alongside the Zayanderud river, the largest river of the Iranian Plateau, to protest the deaths of thousands of fish every year.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, April 2021
On 29 April, villagers in Aleshtar, Lorestan province clashed with security forces. Conflicts erupted as locals were bloodily cracked down when they were protesting the cutting down of their walnut trees by government forces and the IRGC as part of a plan to seize their lands. Lorestan’s attorney general admitted that several security forces have been wounded during the clashes and added that a dozen people have been arrested.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, May 2021
On 1 May, simultaneously with International Workers’ Day, many workers across Iran held rallies, protesting their harsh living conditions and calling for the regime’s sham presidential elections to be boycotted. Workers rallied in Tehran, Karaj, Arak, Mashhad, Khorramabad, Marivan, Kermanshah, Hafttapeh, Tabriz, Sanandaj, Rasht, Boroujerd, Qazvin, Sari, Ilam, Isfahan, and Ahvaz.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, May 2021
Nurses in Bobal protested for wages as water and wastewater workers rallied demanding their 10-month delayed wages. Workers marched across the street holding placards, demanding their salaries, protesting authorities’ inaction in Susengerd. Teachers held protests for contract signings as people of Maymeh in Isfahan, central Iran, gathered in front of the mayor’s office to protest the transfer of drinking water from this city to the industrial area of Golestan province, while taxi drivers in Naghadeh gathered in front of the governor’s office to seek approval for a fare increase. The decision to increase the fare rate has been pending the approval of the governor for weeks.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, August 2021
There was a 2-day gathering of truck drivers in Ardabil to protest low fares and the high price of spare parts. Strike of transit drivers in protest of non-compliance with their demands at the Mirjavah border. Closing the road from Bandar Abbas to Sirjan by Bandar Abbas truckers in protest of the high price of oil, tires and the lack of cargo, and the condition of the cargo. Doctors staged eight protests in eight cities of eight provinces. These protests were held according to the previous call to protest the ruling medical mafia in the medical community, which was held in the cities of Tehran, Kerman, Shiraz, Mashhad, Hamedan, Yasuj,Khorramabad and Kermanshah.


2016–2021 Iranian protests, Late 2020 and Early 2021, August 2021
Hundreds of welder and assembly workers, Ahvazi citizens, livestock farmers, bakers, and truck drivers took to the streets protesting officials’ failure to keep their promises and resolve their dilemmas.


2016–2021 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly by-elections
During the 2016–2021 timeframe, by-elections were held in Tamil Nadu, India, due to the following events:


2016–2021 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly by-elections, Events leading to By-Election
The 123 AIADMK members include three independents who contested under the AIADMK symbol. They are M.Thamimun Ansari from Nagapattinam (Manithaneya Jananayaga Katchi), U. Thaniyarasu from Kangayam (Tamil Nadu Kongu Ilaingar Peravai) and Karunas from Tiruvadanai (Mukkulathor Pulipadai).


2016–2021 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly by-elections, First By-Election (19 November 2016)
On 26 October 2016, the Election Commission announced that the election for Thiruparankundram, Aravakurichi and Thanjavur constituencies would be held on 19 November 2016. The outcome was:


2016–2021 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly by-elections, Second By-Election (21 December 2017)
On 24 November 2017, the Election Commission announced that the election for Radhakrishnan Nagar constituency would be held on 21 December 2017.


2016–2021 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly by-elections, Third By-Election (18 April 2019 & 19 May 2019)
On 13 March 2019, the Election Commission announced that the election for 18 out of 21 vacant constituencies would be held on 18 April 2019. However bypoll for Tirupparankundram, Aravakurichi and Ottapidaram (SC) assemblies were not announced by Election Commission of India as election petitions were pending in court at that time. On 9 April 2019, Election Commission announced that the by-elections will be held for remaining four vacant assembly constituencies in Sulur, Aravakurichi, Thiruparankundram and Ottapidaram on 19 May 2019 during the last phase of the Lok Sabha elections.


2016–2021 West Bengal Legislative Assembly by-elections
During the timeframe of 2016 and 2021, various by-elections were held for the West Bengal Legislative Assembly.


2016–2021 West Bengal Legislative Assembly by-elections, 2017
By-elections were held for Kanthi Dakshin and Sabang in 2017.


2016–2021 West Bengal Legislative Assembly by-elections, 2019
By-election was held for eight assembly constituencies alongside the 2019 Lok Sabha election. BJP won four out of the eight seats, whereas AITC won three seats and INC won on one seat. Later Kaliaganj, Karimpur and Kharagpur Sadar were won by TMC candidates.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak
An outbreak of cholera began in Yemen in October 2016, and is ongoing as of August 2021. The outbreak peaked in 2017 with over 2000 reported deaths in that year alone. As of August 2021, there have been more than 2.5 million cases reported, and more than 4,000 people have died in the Yemen cholera outbreak, which the United Nations deemed the worst humanitarian crisis in the world at that time. However, the outbreak has substantially decreased by 2021, with a successful vaccination program implemented and only 5,676 suspected cases with two deaths reported between January 1 and March 6 of 2021.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak
Vulnerable to water-borne diseases before the conflict, 16 months went by before a program of oral vaccines was started. The cholera outbreak was worsened as a result of the ongoing civil war and the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen against the Houthi movement that began in March 2015. Airstrikes damaged hospital infrastructure, and water supply and sanitation in Yemen were affected by the ongoing conflict. The government of Yemen stopped funding public health in 2016; sanitation workers were not paid by the government, causing garbage to accumulate, and healthcare workers either fled the country or were not paid.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak
The UNICEF and World Health Organization (WHO) executive directors stated: "This deadly cholera outbreak is the direct consequence of two years of heavy conflict. Collapsing health, water and sanitation systems have cut off 14.5 million people from regular access to clean water and sanitation, increasing the ability of the disease to spread. Rising rates of malnutrition have weakened children's health and made them more vulnerable to disease. An estimated 30,000 dedicated local health workers who play the largest role in ending this outbreak have not been paid their salaries for nearly ten months."


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Background
As of 2017, Yemen had a population of 25 million and was geographically divided into 22 governorates.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Background
The Yemeni Civil War is an ongoing conflict that began in 2015 between two factions: the internationally recognized Yemeni government, led by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and the Houthi armed movement, along with their supporters and allies. Both claim to constitute the official government of Yemen. Houthi forces controlling the capital Sanaʽa, and allied with forces loyal to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, have clashed with forces loyal to the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, based in Aden. A Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen was launched in 2015, with Saudi Arabia leading a coalition of nine countries from the Middle East and Africa, in response to calls from President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi for military support.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Background
Cholera is an infection of the small intestine by strains of the bacterium Vibrio cholerae. It is spread mostly by unsafe water and unsafe food that has been contaminated with human feces containing the bacteria. Symptoms may range from none, to mild, to severe. The classic symptom is large amounts of watery diarrhea lasting a few days. Diarrhea can be so severe that it leads, within hours, to severe dehydration and electrolyte imbalance. The primary treatment is oral rehydration therapy—the replacement of fluids with slightly sweet and salty solutions. In severe cases, intravenous fluids may be required, and antibiotics may be beneficial.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Background
Prevention methods against cholera include improved sanitation and access to clean water. Cholera vaccines that are given by mouth provide reasonable protection for about six months. Two oral killed vaccines are available: Dukoral and Shanchol. Total cost, including delivery costs, of oral cholera vaccination is under US$10 per person.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Outbreak
Following "on the heels of civil conflict between Houthi rebels and the internationally recognized Yemeni regime", the Yemen cholera outbreak began in early October 2016, and by January 2017, the WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (WHO EMRO) considered the outbreak to be unusual in its rapid and wide geographical spread. The serotype of vibrio cholerae O1 involved is Ougawa.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Outbreak
The earliest cases were predominantly in the capital, Sana'a, with some occurring in Aden. By the end of October, cases had been reported in the governorates of Al-Bayda, Aden, Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij and Taiz and, by late November, also in Al-Dhale'a and Amran. By mid-December, 135 districts of 15 governorates had reported suspected cases, but nearly two-thirds were confined to Aden, Al-Bayda, Al-Hudaydah and Taiz. By mid-January 2017, 80% of cases were located in 28 districts of Al-Dhale'a, Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, Lahij and Taiz.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Outbreak
A total of 268 districts from 20 governorates had reported cases by 21 June 2017; over half are from the governorates of Amanat Al Asimah (the capital Sana'a), Al-Hudaydah, Amran and Hajjah, which are all located in the west of the country. In particular, 77.7% of cholera cases (339,061 of 436,625) and 80.7% of deaths from cholera (1,545 of 1,915) occurred in Houthi-controlled governorates, compared to 15.4% of cases and 10.4% of deaths in government-controlled governorates.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Outbreak
Using genomic sequencing, researchers at the Wellcome Sanger Institute and Institut Pasteur concluded the strain of cholera originated in eastern Africa and was carried to Yemen by migrants.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
Yemen authorities announced the cholera outbreak on October 7, 2016. By the end of that year, there were 96 deaths.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
Following the October 2016 outbreak, the rate of spread in most areas declined by the end of February 2017, and by mid-March 2017, the outbreak was in decline after a wave of cold weather. A total of 25,827 suspected cases, including 129 deaths, were reported by 26 April 2017.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
The number of cholera cases resurged in a second wave that began on 27 April 2017. According to Qadri, Islam and Clemens, writing in The New England Journal of Medicine, the dramatic April 2017 resurgence was "coincident with heavy rains that may have contaminated drinking water sources, and was amplified by war-related destruction of municipal water and sewage systems".


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
During May 2017, 74,311 suspected cases, including 605 deaths, were reported. By June, UNICEF and WHO estimated that 5,000 new cases per day were occurring, and that the total number of cases in the country since the outbreak began in October had exceeded 200,000, with 1,300 deaths. The two agencies stated that it was then "the worst cholera outbreak in the world".


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
By 4 July 2017, there were 269,608 cases and the death toll was at 1,614 with a case fatality rate of 0.6%. On 14 August 2017 the WHO updated the number of suspected cholera cases to 500,000. Oxfam said in 2017 the outbreak would become the largest epidemic since record-keeping began, overtaking the 754,373 cases of cholera recorded after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In six months, more people were ill with cholera in Yemen than in seven years after the earthquake in Haiti, and the situation in Yemen was made worse by hunger and malnutrition.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
On 22 December 2017, WHO reported the number of suspected cholera cases in Yemen had surpassed one million.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Morbidity and mortality
By October 2018, there were more than 1.2 million cases reported, and more than 2,500 people—58% children—have died in the Yemen cholera outbreak, which is the worst epidemic in recorded history and was, according to the United Nations (UN), the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Between 1 January 2018 to 31 May 2020, the cumulative total number of suspected cases was 1,371,819 with 1566 associated deaths. The case fatality rate for the outbreak was 0.11% as of 2020, having declined from a high of 1% when the outbreak first began.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges
UNICEF and the WHO attributed the outbreak to malnutrition, collapsing sanitation and clean water systems due to the country's ongoing conflict, and the approximately 30,000 local health care workers who had not been paid for almost a year. These factors resulted in a delayed vaccination program, which was not started until more than one million people were already ill.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Pre-civil war conditions
Even before civil war affected Yemen, it was "beset by circumstances that made it ripe for cholera". A country with high poverty rates, Yemen also suffered frequent droughts and severe water access problems, with only about half of the population having had access to good water and sanitation before the war.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Pre-civil war conditions
Children under five showed a high prevalence of malnutrition, making them further susceptible to disease; Yemen had "one of the highest rates of childhood malnutrition worldwide". The health care system in Yemen before the conflict was weak and lacking infrastructure. For instance, before the war, 70–80% of children were vaccinated against measles, but the vaccination rate had dropped by the end of 2015.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Ongoing conflict
Because of the ongoing conflict in Yemen, and resulting displacement of people who do not have adequate food, waster, housing or sanitation, pre-existing conditions were exacerbated. Shortages have been made worse by naval and air blockades. Bombing has damaged water and sanitation infrastructure. Airstrikes have destroyed facilities in the country for health care; "half of the nation's hospitals have been either destroyed by Saudi airstrikes, occupied by rebel forces, or shut down because there are no medical personnel to staff them".


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Ongoing conflict
Doctors Without Borders reported that a Saudi Arabian coalition airstrike hit a new Médecins Sans Frontières cholera treatment center in Abs, in northwestern Yemen. Doctors Without Borders reported that they had provided GPS coordinates to Saudi Arabia on twelve separate occasions, and had received nine written responses confirming receipt of those coordinates.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Ongoing conflict
Grant Pritchard, Save the Children's interim country director for Yemen, stated in April 2017, "With the right medicines, these [diseases] are all completely treatable – but the Saudi Arabia-led coalition is stopping them from getting in."


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Wastewater and solid waste management systems
Yemen's wastewater and solid waste management systems are the least developed among Middle Eastern countries, which has been a major contributor to the cholera outbreak. With 16 functional sewage treatment plants (STPs) and a growing population, the country's sewage systems are ill-equipped to meet the needs of citizens and serve just 7% of the population. Actual flow rates through the STPs in Yemen exceed the flow rates they were designed to accommodate, which reduces their efficiency.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Wastewater and solid waste management systems
The treatment processes used are also suboptimal, with 68% of STPs using only stabilization ponds - which are generally intended as a primary treatment - to remove pathogens from sewage. This has resulted in high quantities of infectious agents in effluent, which is hazardous to health and can enable the spread of cholera.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Wastewater and solid waste management systems
Moreover, wastewater in Yemen is frequently reused for irrigation purposes by farmers due to a lack of awareness about safety risks. High concentrations of Escherichia coli, Streptococcus faecalis, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Enterobacter aerogenes, Salmonella  typhi, S. typhimurium, and Shigella sonnei - among other harmful fecal coliforms - are present in this wastewater, and transmit to humans when they consume foods irrigated by it.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Wastewater and solid waste management systems
Official dumping sites for solid waste are being created increasingly close to communities, which has increased the risk of infection and general health issues among citizens. This is especially true for the roughly 70% of citizens without access to potable water, who consume water from wells near dumping sites.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, El Niño
The El Niño–Southern Oscillation phenomenon is a major driver of climate variability associated with health outcomes, including influencing cholera dynamics due to changes in rainfall. For example, in East Africa, there was an upsurge in cholera cases in areas with increased rainfall, along with an increase in cases in areas with decreased rainfall. In the 2015-2016 El Niño event, there were an additional 50 000 cases of cholera in East Africa. Based on genomic approaches, there was a linkage found between the epidemic in Yemen starting in 2016 and the earlier outbreaks in East Africa.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, El Niño
This alludes to a possible connection between cholera in East Africa and Yemen. Chironomidae are natural reservoirs and carriers of the Vibrio cholerae bacterium. It has been suggested that adult chironomidae may aerially carry the bacterium between bodies of water, assisting in the transmission of cholera. Based on this evidence, it is hypothesized that the El Nino conditions over the Gulf of Aden may have contributed to the transmission of cholera from the Horn of Africa to Yemen through wind effects on cholera-contaminated flying insects.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Health services and infrastructure collapse
As of 2016, the government ended funding for public health, leaving many employees without salary. The impacts of the outbreak were exacerbated by the collapse of the Yemeni health services, where many health workers remained unpaid for months. A months-long strike of sanitation workers over unpaid wages contributed to the accumulation of garbage that entered the water supply.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Health services and infrastructure collapse
Qadri, Islam and Clemens write that the dramatic April 2017 resurgence coincided with heavy rains, and "was amplified by war-related destruction of municipal water and sewage systems". An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Yemen noted that April's cholera resurgence began ten days after Sana'a's sewer system stopped working.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Health services and infrastructure collapse
A failing sewage system, continued conflict and inadequate health care facilities are only a few of the reasons contributing to this problem. Malnutrition, which is a significant consequence of the Yemen War, has further contributed to this outbreak.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Rainy season
Epidemiological modelling of the outbreak from October 2016 to January 2016 together with satellite image-derived meteorological data showed that the rainfall had a strong impact in increasing the chances of transmission, with the rainy season of April 2017 having coincided with the onset of the second wave of the outbreak topping at more than 50,000 cases per week. The geography of Yemen means that the Western mountainous plateau sees more rainfall, and has therefore an increased risk of high cholera incidence due to water precipitations.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Lack of vaccination
The International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision, which maintains vaccine stockpiles for cholera, announced a plan in June 2017 to send one million doses of oral cholera vaccine (OCV) to Yemen, but this plan stalled. Controversy surrounded whether vaccination was the best strategy, whether it was too late to start a vaccination campaign, whether there was enough stockpiled vaccine to meet worldwide needs, whether all of the reported cases of cholera in Yemen were true cases as opposed to simply cases of diarrhea or other similar symptoms, and the effectiveness of the vaccine. The request for vaccine was retracted.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Lack of vaccination
In May 2018, the first OCV campaign in Yemen was launched. The WHO and UNICEF delivered oral vaccines to 540,000 individuals in August 2018.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, Lack of vaccination
OCVs were not delivered until nearly 3.5 years into this humanitarian emergency, which has most likely been due to ongoing conflict, logistical circumstances, the scale of the epidemic, impairment of the humanitarian response by the parts to the conflict and some degree of negligence from donors, politicians and other decision makers. Whatever the reasons, OCVs were not distributed until nearly 16 months into the cholera outbreak by which time more than a million cases had accumulated. Neither were they in the two years of WaSH infrastructure breakdown that preceded the outbreak. This should serve as a historic example of the failure to control the spread of cholera given the tools that are available. Today, "cholera outbreaks are entirely containable" (The Lancet editorial, 2017).


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Causes and challenges, COVID-19 pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic in Yemen is part of the worldwide pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019. As of 12 November 2020, there were 2,070 confirmed cases and 602 deaths. The COVID-19 pandemic has further burdened the already overwhelmed healthcare system in Yemen fighting a number of diseases including cholera, dengue fever, and malaria. Only half of existing health facilities are fully functioning while more than 17.9 million people of a total population of 30 million need health care services in 2020. In addition, those that remain open lack medical personnel, basic medicine, and essential supplies such as masks and gloves. The lack of flights in and out of Yemen to mitigate the pandemic has also restricted the movement of aid workers responding to the humanitarian crisis.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Humanitarian activity
Through 2018, several humanitarian healthcare organizations had reported activity to contain the cholera outbreak. The International Committee of the Red Cross have supported 17 treatment centers with supplies including IV fluids, oral rehydration therapy supplies, antibiotics, chlorine tablets, in addition to sending engineers to help restore water distribution in Yemen. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) supplied seven hospitals with medicine and supplies, deployed health teams and trained volunteers, delivered health and nutrition services, and facilitated referrals of malnourished children.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Humanitarian activity
The World Health Organization coordinated the Yemen Health Cluster with 40 member organizations, and together with Health and Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) units, explored the use of oral cholera vaccines (OCVs). The WHO reported operating 414 facilities using 406 teams active in 323 districts in Yemen, which included 36 treatment centers for cholera. In the management of cholera, they stated that they trained 900 health workers and ran 139 oral rehydration locations, to treat 700,000 reported cases of the illness. UNICEF reported that they ran awareness campaigns with 20,000 promoters, provided water to more than one million individuals, served as the WaSH lead, and delivered "40 tons of medical equipment including medicine, oral rehydration solution, IV fluids and diarrhea kits".


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Humanitarian activity
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) said it treated at least 103,000 individuals in 37 locations.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, Canada
As of June 2, 2020, Canada has pledged $40 million in humanitarian aid for Yemen to help the politically unstable country cope with cholera, malaria, dengue fever, and diphtheria along with COVID-19. This brings Canada's total contributions to Yemen since 2015 to $220 million, which contributes towards the goal of US$2.4 billion for underfunded humanitarian programs run by UN agencies and humanitarian organizations in Yemen.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has been backing the Yemen government in the fight against the Houthi rebels, and they are also one of the top donors for UN humanitarian aid operations in Yemen. On 23 June 2017, Saudi Arabia's crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, authorized a donation in excess of $66 million for cholera relief in Yemen.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, Saudi Arabia
Mohammed al-Jaber, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, has announced half a billion dollars from Saudi Arabia to support UN programs in 2020.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, United Nations
An aid conference was held in Geneva in April 2017 that raised half of the US$2.1 billion that the United Nations (UN) estimated was needed.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, United Nations
As of July 8, 2019, the UN and partners are running 1200 cholera treatment facilities around the country, however, funding is an issue. The 2019 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan required $4.2 billion to deliver assistance, but they ended up receiving $3.6 billion. For the 2020 plan, the UN has so far received 15% of the necessary $3.5 billion needed.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, United States
On April 3, 2018, the United States (U.S.) announced $87 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help the people of Yemen, bringing the U.S. total assistance since 2017 to more than $854 million. This money will be used for food assistance, safe drinking water, emergency shelter, and medical supplies. The U.S. is also planning to provide $55 million in economic and development assistance, including programs to support livelihoods, rebuild infrastructure, and restore access to education.


2016–2021 Yemen cholera outbreak, Global responses, United States
On March 27, 2020, the Trump administration cut $70 million in assistance destined for northern Yemen, framing the decreased funding as a response to the interference of Houthi rebels. The U.S. officials were concerned that the assistance was directed to fighters instead of civilians. South Yemen, which is less populous, still received aid dollars.