2015–2016 Latakia offensive, Strategic Analysis
According to analysis by pro-opposition Al Jazeera, the objective of the Latakia offensive was to consolidate a potential Alawi dominated state (supported by Russia) that would extend from the Coast to Damascus, passing by Hama and Homs. This would entail forcing the population to leave the North of Latakia so that they would be replaced by government supporters. According to the same source, the offensive aims also at embarrassing and pressuring the Turkish government since most of the population in North Latakia are from Turkmen origin. The source attributes the advance by government troops to the powerful missiles used by the Russian airforce and to the lack of support from rebels in Idlib and Hama governorates.


2015–2016 Latakia offensive, Strategic Analysis
On the other hand, the Syrian government claims to be aiming to reconquer the whole of Syria. In this case, after recovering all of Latakia, the next logical step might be to move into neighboring Idlib and recover what was lost to the opposition earlier in the year.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests
2015 Lebanese protests were a series of protests in response to the government's failure to find solutions to a waste crisis caused by the  (south of Beirut) in July 2015. The closure led the region's waste company Sukleen to suspend collection causing piles of rubbish to fill the streets. A series of small but increasing protests, led by grassroots organization "You Stink!," were held throughout the summer, culminating in large protests in August. These attracted thousands of demonstrators but also saw scuffles with police.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests
The protest were categorized by comical slogans and imaginative chants which mostly linked political figures to the crisis. However,  protesters were reported shouting a number of chants made popular during the Arab Spring uprisings across the region, including "Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam" (meaning "The people want to topple the regime").


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, Issues
The ‘National Strategy’ for waste management, drawn up in the years after the Lebanese civil war, saw all the waste from the Beirut, Mount Lebanon region going to a single landfill site. The Naameh facility was opening in 1997 as a temporary, short term site that would take just two million tons of rubbish. 18 years later, the site had taken an estimated 15 million tons of waste.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, Issues
Despite knowing of the closure, the Lebanese government had no plan in place for dealing with the waste. This led waste contractor to suspend collection in July causing waste to pile up around the city. On 27 August, Sukleen restarted collection but with no functioning dump sites, the waste was stored under bridges and on empty lots around the capital.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, Issues
While the protests began over the piles of trash around Beirut and the Mount Lebanon region, they expanded to issues of civil representation, corruption and government inefficiency.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, Issues
Protesters blamed Lebanese leaders, who according to them, did not have a long-term vision to solve the ecological issues affecting Lebanon. See Marine environmental issues in Lebanon.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, Issues
Other issues include daily electricity blackouts, and political bickering that has kept Lebanon without a president since May 2014.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, 23 August 2015 demonstration
Lebanese army units were deployed in central Beirut after the demonstration degenerated in street fighting between protesters and law enforcement. The Lebanese Red Cross said it treated 402 people in Sunday's protest. About 40 people were taken to hospital. Ambulances ferried out casualties after security forces fired tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannon at demonstrators protesting against what they call Lebanon's "political dysfunction". About 200 youths, some wearing scarves or masks to cover their faces, threw stones and bottles filled with sand at police and tried to pull down security barricades. Some demonstrators lit fires. A tree next to a church was set ablaze, road signs were pulled from the ground and shop fronts smashed.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, 23 August 2015 demonstration
The protest, organized by an online group "You Stink!" along with other civil society groups, attracted an estimated 20000 people on the streets of Riad El Solh Square in central Beirut.


2015–2016 Lebanese protests, 23 August 2015 demonstration
By 29 August, more than 100000 Lebanese took to the streets to manifest against the government's corruption. It began as small protest, but it has soon proved to become an uprising, with many protesters calling for a revolution.


2015–2016 Massachusetts legislature
The 189th Massachusetts General Court, consisting of the Massachusetts Senate and the Massachusetts House of Representatives, met in 2015 and 2016 during the governorship of Charlie Baker. Stan Rosenberg served as president of the Senate and Robert DeLeo served as speaker of the House.


2015–2016 Massachusetts legislature, Images
Party composition of the Massachusetts House of Representatives following the 2014 election


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis
A political crisis in Montenegro (Montenegrin: kriza u Crnoj Gori / криза у Црној Гори) was initiated by the opposition parties which staged protests requesting fair elections and transitional government. Opposition coalition Democratic Front organised continuous protests in October 2015 which culminated in a large riot in Podgorica on 24 October. A split in the ruling coalition followed in January 2016, leaving the government functioning as a de facto minority government.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Background, Milo Đukanović's leadership
In 2015, the investigative journalists' network OCCRP named Montenegro's long-time President and Prime Minister Milo Đukanović "Person of the Year in Organized Crime". The extent of Đukanović's corruption led to street demonstrations and calls for his removal.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Anti-government protests
Anti -government protests in Montenegro began in mid-October 2015 and culminated in riots on 24 October 2015 in the capital of Podgorica. The protests were organised by the opposition coalition Democratic Front, which is requesting the formation of a transitional government which would organise next elections.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Anti-government protests
After thousands of people rallied to protest government corruption and demand a transitional government and resignation of Prime Minister Milo Đukanović, who has held prime ministerial or presidential positions for most of the time since 1990, the police intervened tear-gassing the demonstrators on 24 October. Montenegrin police fired tear gas at opposition supporters, while chasing away the demonstrators with armored vehicles. A protest against joining NATO was held in Podgorica on 12 December 2015. A new protest against the government was held on 24 January 2016.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, DPS–SDP split
On January 27, 2016, a parliamentary vote saw the split of the ruling DPS and up until then coalition partner SDP. This followed a failed crisis talk over the organization of the "first free and fair election". The President of the National Assembly Ranko Krivokapić (SDP) strongly criticized Prime Minister Milo Djukanović and the ruling party (DPS). With the split of SDP, Djukanović lost the Assembly majority. Djukanović started an initiative to remove Krivokapić from the seat.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Government confidence voting
On 27 January 2016, despite formerly being an opposition party, Positive Montenegro (PCG) provided the ruling DPS with 3 votes necessary to win the government confidence vote, after the junior partner SDP left the government due to allegations of electoral fraud and political corruption, therefore forming a new ruling majority. Following this vote, national media and other opposition parties accused PCG for deceiving and betraying its voters in order to save Prime Minister Đukanović. In turn, in June 2016 Darko Pajović (PCG) was appointed as the President of the Parliament, position formerly held by Ranko Krivokapić (SDP), and held the position until October 2016.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Provisional Government
A split in the ruling coalition followed in January 2016, leaving the government functioning as a de facto minority government. The provisional government of electoral trust was elected on May 12, 2016, by the parliament of Montenegro. The provisional governing coalition was formed by DPS and several opposition parties.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Provisional Government, Parliament interruption
On 13 May 2016, Prime Minister Milo Đukanović's speech was interrupted by the Democratic Front MPs, who chanted "Milo, you thief" (Montenegrin: Milo, lopove / Мило, лопове), which was followed by a verbal clash between Đukanović and Democratic Front MPs, which was eventually prevented by the other MPs and parliamentary security service.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Alleged coup plot
On 16 October 2016, on the day of the parliamentary election, a group of 20 Serbian and Montenegrin citizens, including the former head of Serbian Gendarmery Bratislav Dikić, were arrested; they, along with other persons, including Russian citizens, were later formally charged by the authorities of Montenegro with an attempted coup d'état. In February 2017, Montenegrin officials accused the Russian state structures of being behind the attempted coup, which envisaged an attack on the country's parliament and assassination of prime minister Milo Đukanović; those accusations were rejected by the Russian government.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Alleged coup plot
According to the prime minister Duško Marković′s statements made in February 2017, the government received definitive information about the coup being prepared on 12 October 2016, when a person involved in the plot gave away the fallback scenario of his Russian minders, who thus aimed to prevent the country from joining NATO; this information was also corroborated by the security services of NATO member countries, who helped the Montenegrin government to investigate the plot.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Alleged coup plot
In early June 2017, the High Court in Montenegro confirmed the indictment of 14 people, including two Russians and two pro-Russia Montenegrin opposition leaders, Andrija Mandic and Milan Knezevic, who had been charged with "preparing a conspiracy against the constitutional order and the security of Montenegro" and an "attempted terrorist act".


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Aftermath, Parliament boycott
Following the events which surrounded the latest parliamentary election, the major opposition parties made a decision to begin a collective boycott of all parliamentary sessions; the boycott continued into 2017, extending to local elections.


2015–2016 Montenegrin crisis, Aftermath, NATO accession
On 28 April 2017, Montenegro's parliament voted 46–0 to join NATO (with 35 MP absentees, out of 81 in Montenegrin parliament), while the opposition parties kept boycotting parliament sessions and protesters burned NATO flags outside. Tensions between Montenegro and Russian Federation continued to escalate thereafter.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums
Two New Zealand flag referendums were held by the New Zealand Government in November/December 2015 and March 2016 and resulted in the retention of the current flag of New Zealand.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums
Shortly after the referendum announcement, party leaders reviewed draft legislation and selected candidates for a Flag Consideration Panel. The purpose of this group was to publicise the process, seek flag submissions and suggestions from the public, and decide on a final shortlist of options. Open consultation and design solicitation garnered 10,292 design suggestions from the public, later reduced to a longlist of 40 designs and then a shortlist of four designs to contend in the first referendum. Following a petition, the shortlist was later expanded to include a fifth design, the Red Peak.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums
The first referendum took place between 20 November and 11 December 2015 and asked, "If the New Zealand flag changes, which flag would you prefer?" Voters were presented with several options selected by the Flag Consideration Panel. The black, white, and blue silver fern flag by Kyle Lockwood advanced to the second referendum.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums
The second referendum took place between 3 and 24 March 2016 and asked voters to choose between the selected alternative (the black, white and blue silver fern flag) and the existing New Zealand flag. The final decision was to keep the current flag.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums
Reception of the process and the official options were highly critical, with no great enthusiasm shown among the public. From an aggregation of analyses, the consensus was that the referendum was "a bewildering process that seems to have satisfied few".


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration
New Zealand has a history of debate about whether the national flag should be changed. For several decades, alternative designs have been proposed, with varying degrees of support. There is no consensus among proponents of changing the flag as to which design should replace the flag.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration
In January 2014, Prime Minister John Key floated the idea of a referendum on a new flag at the 2014 general election. The proposal was met with a mixed response. Then in March, Key announced that New Zealand would hold a referendum within the next three years asking whether to change the flag design, if the National Party be re-elected for a third term. Following National's re-election the details of the referendum were announced.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration, Legal issues
The results of both referendums were binding, meaning the flag with the most votes in the second referendum would become the official flag of New Zealand. In the unlikely event the second referendum vote was tied, an assumption for the status quo would have applied.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration, Legal issues
If a new flag design had been chosen, assuming no intellectual property issues, the Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981 would have been updated to reflect the new design six months to the day after the second referendum results were declared (or earlier by Order in Council). The current flag would have remained the official flag until then; for example, the current flag would have been flown during the 2016 Summer Olympics, four months after the second referendum took place, regardless of the results of the second referendum.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration, Legal issues
This result would not have changed the coat of arms (which includes the current national flag), national Māori flag, nor the flags of Associated States (Cook Islands and Niue), nor the New Zealand Red Ensign (merchant marine), White Ensign (naval), (both incorporating Union Flags) police flag and fire service flag (which are based on the current flag). It would also not change New Zealand's status as a constitutional monarchy in the Commonwealth of Nations.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration, Use of current flag
If the flag had been changed, it would have been legal to have continued to fly the current flag of New Zealand, which would have been "recognised as a flag of historical significance." Old flags would have been replaced once worn out. Official documents depicting the current flag, such as driver licences, would have been phased out as a matter of course – in the case of driver licences, this would have been when licences are renewed and would therefore have taken up to 10 years.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration, Use of current flag
New Zealand Government ships and those non-government ships flying the New Zealand flag (instead of the New Zealand Red Ensign) would have been given an extra six months to change their flag to the new design. Ships flying the New Zealand Red Ensign and ships belonging to the New Zealand Defence Force would not have been affected by any flag changes, nor would any New Zealand-based ships registered to foreign countries.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Background and administration, Cost of transition
The estimated cost of updating government flags and Defence Force uniforms was approximately $2.69 million. Other unknown costs include updating government ships, updating trademarks and logos, publicity of the new flag, excess stock of old flags (including products and souvenirs containing it), and updating all flags, packaging, uniforms and marketing material in the private and sporting sectors. The government would not have provided compensation for the cost of adopting the new flag.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Pre-referendums process, Cross-party group
Shortly after announcing the referendum, party leaders were invited to a cross-party group. The purpose of the cross-party group was to review draft legislation allowing for the referendums to take place, and to nominate candidates for a Flag Consideration Panel by mid February 2015. Members included Bill English (Finance Minister and leader of the group), Jonathan Young (representing National), Trevor Mallard (representing Labour), Kennedy Graham (representing Green), Marama Fox (representing Māori), David Seymour (representing ACT) and Peter Dunne (representing United Future). New Zealand First refused to participate.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Pre-referendums process, Flag Consideration Panel
The Flag Consideration Panel was a separate group of "respected New Zealanders" with representative age, regional, gender and ethnic demographics. Their purpose was to publicise the process, seek flag submissions and suggestions from the public, and decide on a final shortlist of four suitable options for the first referendum. Public consultation took place between May and June 2015. The panel stated that it consulted vexillologists (flag experts) and designers to ensure that the flags chosen were workable and had no impediments. The members of the Flag Consideration Panel were:


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Pre-referendums process, Referendums legislation
The legislation to set up the referendums passed its first Parliament hearing on 12 March 2015 with a vote of 76 to 43. It was then considered by the Justice and Electoral Select Committee. During their public submission intake phase the RSA launched the "Fight for the Flag" campaign, also backed by New Zealand First, to reverse the question order and first ask if New Zealanders want a flag change.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Pre-referendums process, Referendums legislation
Labour MP Trevor Mallard presented a petition signed by 30,000 people to the Committee, asking for a keep/change question to be added to the first referendum, similar to the 2011 voting system referendum. During its second hearing in Parliament, MP Jacinda Ardern proposed an amendment so that the second referendum would only take place if turnout for the first referendum was at least 50%, as a way of ensuring majority rule and reducing costs if the public was apathetic. Ardern's proposal was voted down and the bill was passed as-is on 29 July 2015.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process
As part of the public engagement process, flag designs and symbolism/value suggestions were solicited until 16 July, which resulted in a total of 10,292 design suggestions. All 10,292 submitted design proposals were presented to the public on the New Zealand government website.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process
During the public engagement process, the Flag Consideration Panel travelled around the country for workshops and hui. These in-person consultation events were noted to have markedly low attendance. The consideration panel noted strong online engagement with over 850,000 visits to the website and 1,180,000 engagements on social media.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process
The panel reported that feedback found the themes of freedom, history, equality, respect and family to be the most significant to New Zealanders, however it was later revealed that those themes were dwarfed by the amount of feedback critical of the flag change process. From the submitted designs they found the most common colours were white, blue, red, black, and green. The most common elements incorporated into the flag designs were the Southern Cross, silver fern, kiwi, and koru. The main themes incorporated into the designs were Māori culture, nature and history.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process
The flag of the United Tribes and the Tino Rangatiratanga flag were not considered as eligible options as a result of consultation with Māori groups.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process, Long list
From the 10,292 submitted designs, the Flag Consideration Panel deliberations resulted in their selection of a 'long list' shortlist of 40 designs (announced to the public on 10 August 2015).


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process, Long list
Land Of The Long White Cloud (Ocean Blue) by Mike Archer


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process, Long list
Land Of The Long White Cloud (Traditional Blue) by Mike Archer


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Public engagement process, Long list
Fern (Green, Black & White) by Clay Sinclair and Sandra Ellmers


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Shortlist announcement and adjustment
On 1 September 2015, the Flag Consideration Panel announced the four designs to be included in the first referendum. After public disappointment with the official shortlist, a social media campaign was launched on 2 September for the Red Peak flag. On 23 September, the Green Party MP Gareth Hughes attempted to introduce a bill to parliament to include Red Peak as an option in the first referendum. Prime Minister John Key confirmed that the National Party would pick up the legislation, meaning the Red Peak flag was added as a fifth option in the flag referendum.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Shortlist announcement and adjustment
This proposal won a Wellington newspaper flag competition in July 2004 and appeared on TV3 in 2005 after winning a poll which included the present national flag. It was criticised on aesthetic grounds by Hamish Keith, Paul Henry and John Oliver. New Zealand Herald writer Karl Puschmann called it a design for those "sitting on the fence" who didn't want much change and the National Business Review labelled it "amateur" and "dated". Members of the public compared it unfavourably to Weet-Bix packaging, "Kiwi Party Ware" plastic plate packaging, the National Basketball Association logo, or a merger of the Labour and National party logos.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Shortlist announcement and adjustment
When this design was revealed on the shortlist, the public immediately nicknamed it "Hypnoflag" and "Monkey Butt" via social media.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism
The referendum process and alternative flag designs were highly criticised. Commentators identified many issues and reasons for failure, the most significant of which are listed below.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Politicisation
Prime minister John Key's drive to run the referendums was seen as disproportionate compared to apathy among the public. Members of parliament accused the referendums as Key's "vanity project", populist bread and circuses, a distraction from poverty and housing issues, or a vehicle to establish a personal legacy. In hindsight, the National Business Review suggests that politicisation contributed to the referendum's failure, because the debate and the alternative flag designs were so heavily associated with Key and the National Party rather than the actual flag change itself. Key's campaigning was noted as perplexing and ineffectual.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Politicisation
His statements on the topic of New Zealand's identity and colonial legacy were mixed, which confused the public. Additionally, he relied on his own existing popularity as the face of the referendum to persuade the public, with a change the flag campaign by Change the NZ Flag. Opposition parties had hitherto supported a flag referendum as party policy, but took the opportunity to politicise this referendum.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Politicisation
By focusing on defeating Key himself and criticising the integrity of the process at every stage, the public was split along political party lines and it devolved into a referendum on Key, with many voting for the current flag as a protest vote against him. For example, according to a January 2016 poll by UMR, 16% of those sampled said that they planned to vote to "send a message to John Key". Key's inclusion of the Red Peak design in the shortlist at the request of the Green Party was seen as a belated and futile appeasement, and cross-party support was necessary from the very beginning of the process.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Timing
Members of parliament were also concerned about the timing. Some expressed disgust at the timing of the bill just before the centenary of the Gallipoli landing, some said the process was rushed, and Louisa Wall said that no significant event had occurred to warrant a flag change at this time. Others said it was necessary to constitutionally remove British sovereignty before considering whether to remove a symbol of British sovereignty from the flag. Political commentators also suggested that the timing was futile.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Timing
Matthew Hooton pointed out that there would have been sufficient national momentum in the aftermath of the 2011 Rugby World Cup instead. Morgan Godfery suggested that the public kept the current flag due to insecurity about cultural identity at a time when familiar cultural touchstones like house ownership, the dairy industry and demographics were undergoing upheaval. Audrey Young suggested that the process was too rushed, and a longer one lasting at least two electoral cycles would have allowed more time for opposition party support and the possibility of a Labour prime minister overseeing the final result. Martin Kettle cited status quo bias as a critical influence in referendums and noted that change is typically only possible if there is a previously existing, firm, well-informed movement for change.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Priority
Opposition parties condemned the flag as low priority compared to current issues in the public consciousness such as education, health and housing. Trevor Mallard and Phil Goff cited the results of recent opinion polls that showed public opposition or apathy to a flag change.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Cost
Opposition parties, Royal New Zealand Returned and Services' Association (RSA) president Barry Clark and members of the public criticised the referendum plan for costing $26 million which could be spent on other issues. The $4 million publicity campaign for the national tour was especially criticised as public turnout was markedly apathetic; some admitted that they attended just for free biscuits, and at the Christchurch event only ten people arrived.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Cost
Key defended the cost of the referendum by stating that it was the price to ensure a genuine democratic process and would be a one-off cost for the next "50 to 100 years" regardless of the result. David King pointed out that a stronger brand image for the country could lead to a net financial gain, especially through exports and tourism, with Key pointing out the precedent of Canada changing to its current maple-leaf flag.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Order of questions
During the first Parliamentary hearing, Labour Party, NZ First, Green Party and Māori Party expressed dissatisfaction with the order of the questions and said that the public should first be asked whether they want a change, and continue with a second referendum only if they do, or both questions compacted into one referendum, which could potentially save millions of dollars. David Seymour (ACT's representative in the Cross-Party Group) said that the planned order made sense, as the public would need to see the alternative designs before deciding on a change. Professor John Burrows, chair of the Flag Consideration Panel, agreed that familiarity with proposals was a prerequisite for a properly informed decision about them.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Bias
Various members of parliament accused the process and documents of being biased. Trevor Mallard and Phil Goff claimed that the final list of members of the Flag Consideration Panel was numerically slanted towards those nominated by the National Party, despite the shortlist of candidates being roughly neutral. Denis O'Rourke said that the shortlisting process was undemocratic because the Flag Consideration Panel would select the final flag design options on behalf of New Zealanders. Stuart Nash presented quotes in the Regulatory Impact Statement document admitting that referendum options were restricted by prior decisions by the National Party dominated Cabinet and prime minister, accusing them of pre-determining the process.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Bias
A third-party analysis of submissions to the consideration panel's StandFor.co.nz website revealed that negative submissions were filtered out and disregarded in the panel's report and the associated and widely publicised word cloud. According to this analysis, the largest term in the official word cloud, "equality", appeared in 4.89% of comments, whereas "keeping the current flag" was the most common theme and represented 31.96% of comments. According to opposition MP Trevor Mallard this shows that the flag change process suffered from "total spin" and that the panel pushed to change the flag in breach of its mandate to be neutral.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Bias
Documents revealed that Flag Consideration Panel judge Julie Christie was a board member of the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) body New Zealand Story where she "had formally agreed to support the use of the NZ Way Fern Mark in any flag design". This fern design ended up as one of the shortlist entries. Christie had declared this as a potential conflict of interest but it was dismissed as minor.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Bias
After the Flag Consideration Panel revealed the four shortlisted designs, some noticed that three out of the four designs coincided with prime minister John Key's personal design preferences. Thus, the panel was accused of being sycophantic and undermining their mandate to be neutral and democratic, which restricted the options available to the public and ruined the reputation of the whole process.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
The National Business Review criticised the use of crowdsourcing to solicit flag designs that became publicly viewable on the government's website. Crowdsourcing processes have historically been inundated by unqualified participants submitting large numbers of very low-quality, plagiarised or malicious contributions that ignore standard rules and best practices, with a high administrative burden to identify which ones are legal and serviceable. Crowdsourcing has especially proved unsuitable for tasks that require training or expertise.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
For example, in an expert review of hundreds of photographs submitted to the news site NU.nl, 86% of submissions were deemed unusable and only one photograph was considered professional quality. In the case of the flag referendums, the flag solicitation process was treated as a joke by the public and garnered far too many amateurish and facetious proposals. These were openly viewable on the government's website and became disseminated and mocked on worldwide media, threatening the prestige of the whole process.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
Commentators felt that the Flag Consideration Panel did not have the expertise to make any adequate flag design judgements, since none of its members had any credentials or experience in the fields of graphic design, art or vexillology. A spokesman responded that "it was considered that panel members did not need specialist skills in art, design, legal or intellectual property" and that consultation with experts would be sufficient. The panel stated that it consulted vexillologists and designers to ensure that the flags chosen were workable and had no impediments.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
According to journalist Grant McLachlan, the panel consulted a Nike shoe designer and not any vexillologists. Illustrator Toby Morris condemned the process as "design by committee" and noted that the structural issues were so obvious that he and other designers were able to predict the selections and outcome as soon as the process was announced. Some commentators suggested that the flags should have been evaluated only by professional designers. Nándor Tánczos opined that the Flag Consideration Panel denied the public a chance to choose their favourite designs by deciding on their behalf, since the public had no input or voting on the flag selection.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
Professionals have pointed out that the process ignored established best practices in the fields of market research, design and vexillology. Missing elements included clear research questions, artistic criteria, requirements elicitation, prototyping, monetary reward, direct public consultation on the longlist and shortlist selections, design iteration, deadline extensions and consideration of choice architecture such as randomisation. Those who criticised the use of crowdsourcing sometimes suggested that design professionals should have been given a core role in the creation of the flag designs. For comparison, the North American Vexillological Association's accepted flag design process also involves soliciting public design suggestions, but these submissions are seen only by design experts and vexillologists who then evaluate the entries and make necessary refinements or make new designs based on the suggestions.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
The flag design shortlist was met with negative response from most members of the public, professional designers and the International Federation of Vexillological Associations, with the selection labelled "a national disgrace" by writer Karl Puschmann and "tea towels of Kiwiana" by Gareth Morgan. The selection was lambasted as unappealing, clichéd, dull, superficial and too logo-like. There were complaints that the four initial designs did not offer sufficient variety, as only one did not feature a large silver fern dividing the field, and two were identical except for a colour choice, prompting accusations of groupthink and favouritism amongst the panel.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Flag solicitation and selection
For critics of the referendum process, the problems with the design selection confirmed the ineptitude they had long suspected of the panel. In hindsight, those analysing the reasons for the referendums' failure have posited that the quality of the official selection was so poor that it effectively prevented the possibility of a flag change. Some proposed that the outcome reflected the public's negative reception of the Kyle Lockwood design more than their underlying attitudes about flag change or national identity.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Criticism, Inclusion of Red Peak flag
In September, the initial shortlist of four flags was amended to include the Red Peak flag after an online petition accrued 50,000 signatures. NZ First leader Winston Peters, former National Party official Grant McLachlan and others felt that instead of respectfully incorporating wider public opinion, this inclusion was an arbitrary deference to a trendy but unrepresentative social media campaign at the expense of established procedure and other, larger social media campaigns about the flag. McLachlan demonstrated that online signatures could easily be forged by recording himself signing the petition sixteen times and fraudulently impersonating members of parliament. They accused the campaign of having dubious credibility and chided the government for considering the petition without checking the details sufficiently.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, First referendum
If the New Zealand flag changes, which flag would you prefer?


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, First referendum
The first referendum started on 20 November 2015 with voting closing three weeks later on 11 December 2015. Using the preferential voting system, it asked voters to rank the five shortlisted flag alternatives in order of preference. The most popular design would contend with the current national flag in the second referendum.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, First referendum
Opponents of flag change encouraged members of the public to abstain from voting, render the voting paper invalid or strategically vote for the worst alternative flag as a protest.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, First referendum, Results
Preliminary results were released on the night of 11 December; official results were declared on 15 December. Voters ranked Kyle Lockwood's Silver Fern (Black, White and Blue) design as the most preferred out of the five options.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, First referendum, Results
Non -transferable votes include voting papers that were not able to be transferred, as all of the preferences given had been exhausted. Informal votes include voting papers in which the voter had not clearly indicated their first preference. Invalid votes include voting papers that were unreadable or cancelled.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, First referendum, Results
The added work of calculating results for individual electorates under preferential voting made no vote breakdown by electorate be available.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum
The second referendum started on 3 March 2016 with voting closing three weeks later on 24 March 2016. It asks voters to choose between the existing New Zealand Flag and the preferred alternative design selected in the first referendum.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Results
On 24 March 2016, the preliminary results of the second referendum were announced with the current flag winning 56.7% compared to 43.3% for the new flag.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Results
Informal votes include voting papers where the voter had not clearly indicated their preference (e.g. votes returned blank or voting for both options). Invalid votes include voting papers that were unreadable or cancelled.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Results by electorate
Of New Zealand's 71 electorates, only six had a majority vote in favour of the alternative flag: Bay of Plenty, Clutha-Southland, East Coast Bays, Ilam, Selwyn and Tāmaki.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Results by electorate
The Māori electorates had markedly low turnout and high support for the status quo. This result confused Malcolm Mulholland of the Flag Consideration Panel, who believed they had adequately engaged with Māori during their nationwide tour.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Multiple voting reports
After the first referendum, the Electoral Commission referred seven cases of people apparently voting more than once to police.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Multiple voting reports
On 8 and 9 March, the Electoral Commission referred four more cases of apparent multiple voting to police. This included one case of an Auckland man allegedly voting with 300 ballot papers stolen from other people's mailboxes.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Second referendum, Multiple voting reports
Voting more than once is known as personation and is identified as a corrupt electoral practice under both the Electoral Act 1993 and the Flag Referendums Act. A person convicted of personation is liable to up to two years' imprisonment and a fine up to $40,000, and carries a mandatory disqualification from enrolling or voting for three years.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Aftermath
John Key said that he was disappointed by the result but was still glad that the country had a valuable discussion about what it stood for. The failure of the referendum resulted in a loss of political prestige for Key. Some predicted that this failure would become part of his legacy, though others suggested that this would still be overshadowed by events like the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and privatisation of state assets.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Aftermath
Although the current flag was retained after the referendum, proponents of a flag change were still optimistic. Change the NZ Flag campaign leader Lewis Holden opined that the flag debate "has only just begun". He pointed out that support for the alternative design (43%) was a much closer result than anyone had expected, undermining the stature of the current flag and raising the possibility of a successful flag change in the future. He also noted that factors behind support for a flag change (i.e. cultural diversity, Asia-Pacific links and independent symbols) would only increase in the future.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Aftermath
Change the NZ Flag wound up and its web domain and Facebook page were taken over by New Zealand Republic. Former Green MP Keith Locke also pointed out that the 43% result was a marked increase over previous opinion polls that showed support for change in the 20–30% range. He suggested that a flag process with a better design and less politicisation could feasibly result in a majority vote for change.


2015–2016 New Zealand flag referendums, Aftermath
Politicians were not expected to revisit the flag issue for the next fifteen years or so, though becoming a republic may provide the impetus for another attempt at change. Labour leader Andrew Little agreed that it was appropriate to discuss the flag as part of constitutional debates once the reign of Queen Elizabeth II was over.


2015–2016 Quebec protests
The Quebec protests of 2015–2016 is a protest movement that began on March 21, 2015 in Quebec, in the context of what some student associations, left-wing groups, columnists qualify as social strikes, to denounce the budget restriction measures adopted by the Philippe Couillard government. 130,000 students are on strike during the first national demonstration on April 2, 2015, including 55,000 on general strike. Like the 2012 Quebec student protests, the movement was initiated by students and encompassed various issues, particularly that of public finances.


2015–2016 Quebec protests, Background
Quebec has a long history of Rallies, Revolts, Uprisings and Student protests, most likely due to labour shortages, university fee hikes, tuition fees and payments, Unemployment, Budget measures increases and restrictions and hardships among students. In 1968, hundreds of thousands of students marched state-wide against Budget laws and pension reforms.


2015–2016 Quebec protests, Protests
Protests occurred throughout 2015 by many public and social sectors, mainly leading a second protest movement in September-November 2015 and strikes in 2016. Popular protests first erupted in March 2015, when different trade unions and student opposition groups organised and orchestrated demonstrations and rallies across Quebec and cities in eastern Canada against budget restriction measures adopted by the government. 200,000 participated in strikes in March, April and May, when most of the unrest was taking place. Protesters was demanding justice and tuition freeze, university fee hikes to decrease and more jobs among Students.


2015–2016 Quebec protests, Protests
Tens of thousands of protesters and demonstrators, public and social sectors participated in a national movement and peaceful demonstrations, Rallies and Picketing against harsh working conditions and low wages for workers. Mass protest movements occurred throughout the fall of 2015 and spring of 2016. Mass protests were also held by state-run media, Journalists, Healthcare workers and university students, marching on small lanes and narrow streets in downtown Quebec in September, October, November, December and January.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack
In 2015 and 2016, a series of cyberattacks using the SWIFT banking network were reported, resulting in the successful theft of millions of dollars. The attacks were perpetrated by a hacker group known as APT 38 whose tactics, techniques and procedure overlap with the infamous Lazarus Group who are believed to be behind the Sony attacks. Experts agree that APT 38 was formed following the March 2013 sanctions and the first known operations connected to this group occurred in February 2014. If the attribution to North Korea is accurate, it would be the first known incident of a state actor using cyberattacks to steal funds.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack
The attacks exploited vulnerabilities in the systems of member banks, allowing the attackers to gain control of the banks' legitimate SWIFT credentials. The thieves then used those credentials to send SWIFT funds transfer requests to other banks, which, trusting the messages to be legitimate, then sent the funds to accounts controlled by the attackers.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, First reports
The first public reports of these attacks came from thefts from Bangladesh central bank and a bank in Vietnam.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, First reports
A $101 million theft from the Bangladesh central bank via its account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank was traced to hacker penetration of SWIFT's Alliance Access software, according to a New York Times report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, First reports
Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred on a commercial bank in Vietnam.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, First reports
Both attacks involved malware written to both issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, First reports
Furthermore, news agency Reuters reported on 20 May 2016 that there had already been a similar case in Ecuador in early 2015 when Banco del Austro funds were transferred to bank accounts in Hong Kong. Neither Banco del Austro nor Wells Fargo, who were asked to conduct the transactions, initially reported the movements to SWIFT as suspicious; implications that the actions actually were a theft only emerged during a BDA lawsuit filed against Wells Fargo.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, Expanded scope and suspicions of North Korea
After the initial two reports, two security firms reported that the attacks involved malware similar to that used in the 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment hack and impacted as many at 12 banks in Southeast Asia. Both attacks are attributed to a hacker group nicknamed Lazarus Group by researchers. Symantec has linked the group with North Korea. If North Korea's involvement is true, it would be the first known incident of a state actor using cyberattacks to steal funds.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, Ramifications, International relations
If the attack did originate in North Korea, the thefts would have profound implications for international relations. It would be the first known instance of a state actor using cyber attacks to steal funds.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, Ramifications, International relations
The thefts may also have implications for the regime of international sanctions that aim to isolate North Korea's economy. The theft may represent a significant percentage of North Korea's current GDP.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, Ramifications, SWIFT system
Trust in the SWIFT system has been an important element in international banking for decades. Banks consider SWIFT messages trustworthy, and can thus follow the transmitted instructions immediately. In addition, the thefts themselves can threaten the solvency of the member banks. "This is a big deal, and it gets to the heart of banking," said SWIFT's CEO, Gottfried Leibbrandt, who added, "Banks that are compromised like this can be put out of business."


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, Ramifications, SWIFT system
Following the attacks, SWIFT announced a new regime of mandatory controls required of all banks using the system. SWIFT will inspect member banks for compliance, and inform regulators and other banks of noncompliance.


2015–2016 SWIFT banking hack, Ramifications, SWIFT system
SWIFT officials have made repeated remarks that attacks on the system are expected to continue. In September 2016, SWIFT announced that three additional banks had been attacked. In two of the cases, the hackers succeeded in sending fraudulent SWIFT orders, but the receiving banks found them to be suspicious and discovered the fraud. According to SWIFT officials, in the third case, a patch to the SWIFT software allowed the attacked bank to detect the hackers before messages were sent.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation
Attempts to form a government in Spain followed the inconclusive Spanish general election of 20 December 2015, which failed to deliver an overall majority for any political party. As a result, the previous cabinet headed by Mariano Rajoy was formed to remain in a caretaker capacity until the election of a new government.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation
After a series of inconclusive inter-party negotiations, Pedro Sánchez tried and failed to pass an investiture vote on 2–4 March. Subsequently, a political impasse set in as King Felipe VI could not find a new candidate to nominate with sufficient parliamentary support. As a result, a snap election was held on 26 June. The second election also proved inconclusive, and a failed investiture attempt by Mariano Rajoy on 31 August raised the prospect of a third election.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation
On 1 October, a party rebellion resulted in Pedro Sánchez being ousted as leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the latter voting to allow the formation of a People's Party (PP) minority government. This materialized on 29 October when the PSOE abstained in Rajoy's second investiture bid, thus ending the political deadlock after 313 days without an operational government.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, Legal provisions
The procedure for government formation in Spain was outlined in Article 99 of the 1978 Constitution:


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, Legal provisions
1. After renewal of the Congress of Deputies, and in other cases provided under the Constitution, the King, after consultation with the representatives appointed by the political groups with parliamentary representation, and through the president of the Congress, shall nominate a candidate for prime minister.2. The candidate nominate in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall submit to the Congress of Deputies the political programme of the Government that he intends to form and shall seek the confidence of the Houses.3.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, Legal provisions
If the Congress of Deputies, by vote of the absolute majority of its members, invests said candidate with its confidence, the King shall appoint him President. If an absolute majority is not obtained, the same proposal shall be submitted for a new vote forty-eight hours after the previous vote, and it shall be considered that confidence has been secured if it passes by a simple majority.4. If, after this vote, confidence for the investiture has not been obtained, successive proposals shall be voted upon in the manner provided in the foregoing paragraphs.5. If within two months after the first vote for investiture no candidate has obtained the confidence of Congress, the King shall dissolve Congress and call new elections, following endorsement by the Speaker of Congress.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, Initial positions
As the 2015 Spanish general election produced a very fragmented parliament, a multi-party agreement was expected to be required in order for a stable government to be formed. Caretaker prime minister and People's Party (PP) leader Mariano Rajoy said that he would try to form an administration, whereas opposition and Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) leader Pedro Sánchez advocated for a change in government. Two possible coalitions based on the left–right political spectrum, the right-wing (PP with Citizens (C's))—and the left-wing (PSOE with Podemos), were both short of an overall majority—set at 176 seats—by themselves.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, Initial positions
As a result of the arithmetical infeasibility of an alliance with C's, Mariano Rajoy intended for reaching out to the PSOE to at least secure their abstention in his investiture, even suggesting giving them out some additional posts in the Congress Bureau. This possibility was not contemplated by Pedro Sánchez, but he and his party avoided making any comments on the formation of an alternative left-wing government that included Podemos and its regional alliances. Some within the party—such as president of Castilla–La Mancha Emiliano García-Page—pointed out that, even if the PSOE obtained Podemos's support, it would not muster a majority without that of other parties as well and advocated for the party to remain in opposition.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, Initial positions
Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias laid out stiff terms in order to consider starting negotiations with any party, including the protection of rights within the Constitution, electoral reform, the introduction of recall elections and a new territorial agreement that recognized Spain as a plurinational state and allowed the celebration of a self-determination referendum in Catalonia. The party's policy secretary, Íñigo Errejón, also expressed their initial refusal to support Sánchez as a prospective candidate for prime minister, suggesting instead to look for "an independent candidate, above parties".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, Initial positions
C's leader Albert Rivera had promised during the campaign that he would not be actively supporting either a PP or a PSOE-led government, but that his party could consider an abstention to allow the formation of a minority PP cabinet and that it would oppose any alliance in which Podemos was involved.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
As a consequence of the election, the PSOE was placed in a kingmaker position. Several regional PSOE leaders rallied around Andalusian president Susana Díaz and warned Pedro Sánchez against any agreement with Podemos, seeing the conditions put forward by Pablo Iglesias in the election aftermath as "unaffordable". Some regional premiers from the party—such as García-Page, Valencian president Ximo Puig, Asturias's Javier Fernández or Extremadura's Guillermo Fernández Vara—favoured letting the PP try to form a government on its own.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
After a meeting with Rajoy on 23 December, Sánchez opposed any deals with the PP and voiced his preference to probe alternative alliances instead, while also rejecting a previous proposal from Albert Rivera of a deal between PP, PSOE and C's—explicitly excluding Podemos—that promoted "the regeneration policy reforms that Spain needed".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
Sánchez also faced criticism from within his own party in light of his election result—the worst in the PSOE's recent history up to that point—as his critics aimed for a party congress to be held in February to vote on a new leadership. Díaz—who had become the leading figure of the PSOE's internal opposition to Sánchez—sought to become the new party leader and to eventually lead the PSOE into a new general election, wanting to limit Sánchez's pact policy through the resolutions of the party's federal committee.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
This was accomplished on 28 December, when the party determined that, should Podemos not withdraw its red line condition to hold a referendum in Catalonia, the party would not discuss any pacts with them, requiring Sánchez to avoid becoming prime minister "at any price". Concurrently and in spite of his strong contestation within the party, Sánchez suggested delaying the PSOE leadership election until a new government was formed or a new election was held, with critics claiming that the election should be held "when it is due".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
All three PP, Podemos and C's took advantage of the growing rebellion within the PSOE to force Sánchez into the negotiating table. Pablo Iglesias questioned that people within the PSOE "wouldn't allow Pedro be prime minister", noting that Sánchez "does not control" the party, while warning of the dangers of a hypothetical "three-way grand coalition" between PP, PSOE and C's that Podemos would oppose.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
Rivera pointed out that his party was waiting "for [the PSOE] to solve its internal affairs", whereas the PP reaffirmed its claim to lead the next Spanish government by seeking a multy-party pact with PSOE and C's. PSOE's spokesperson Antonio Hernando confirmed on 5 January that the PSOE would reject the PP's proposal of a grand coalition.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PSOE's stance
On 30 January, amid discussions between the different party factions on the party congress's date—with those supporting Sánchez seeking to delay it until June and his critics wishing to hold it sooner, in April—an agreement was reached for a new leadership to be elected through a party primary election on 8 May, with Pedro Sánchez announcing his will to seek re-election. The party congress to ratify the result of the primaries was scheduled for 20–22 May.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PP scandals
As negotiations for the formation of a new government stagnated, corruption scandals shook Rajoy's party and made it harder for him to secure support for an investiture vote. Two weeks before the election, it was unveiled that PP deputy Pedro Gómez de la Serna had been paid kickbacks worth millions of euros through a business he shared with another PP member, Spain's ambassador to India Gustavo de Arístegui, who resigned shortly thereafter. Gómez de la Serna, who was re-elected as deputy in the 20 December election, refused to vacate his seat, resulting in him being expelled from the PP and forced into the Mixed Group in Congress.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PP scandals
On 22 January 2016, the PP became the first party to ever be judicially charged in a corruption case—a legal figure passed into law by Rajoy's cabinet itself in 2015—after being accused of destroying former treasurer Luis Bárcenas's hard drives in 2013, allegedly containing information related to the party's illegal funding. The same day, a member of deputy prime minister Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría's staff was forced to resign from office after it the unveiling of his involvement in a case of fraudulent awarding of public contracts.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PP scandals
In early February, an illegal financing network was uncovered affecting the Valencian branch of the PP, with dozens of party officials and city councillors either indicted or arrested. Judicial investigation also pointed to former long-time mayor of Valencia and one of the PP's most lauded figures, Rita Barberá, as a participant in the scandal. On 11 February, evidence suggesting that the kickbacks-for-contracts scheme of the Púnica scandal could also involve an illegal financing of the Madrilenian PP led to the resignation of party's regional leader Esperanza Aguirre three days later.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PP scandals
Further scandals affecting the party were unveiled throughout April. The Spanish National Police Corps were sent to register the town hall of Granada—the fourth largest city of Andalusia and nineteenth of Spain—after the city mayor and his government—from the PP—were accused of having been involved in an urban planning corruption scandal. Concurrently, the Spanish Treasury fined former prime minister José María Aznar for evading tax payments through a secret society.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Post-2015 election developments, PP scandals
Finally on 15 April, interim industry minister José Manuel Soria was found to be involved in the Panama Papers scandal, owing to the leaking of information earlier that week revealing that he and his family had maintained several offshore societies on tax havens during the previous decades. Soria initially claimed the falsehood of such claims, but during the ensuing days reports kept leaking that contradicted his initial clarifications. After it was revealed that he had owned one of such societies on Jersey until 2002 during his term as mayor of Las Palmas, he was put in a critical political position over his confusing and changing explanations on the issue, which ultimately led to his renounce.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Rajoy's withdrawal
On 12 January, PSOE and C's reached an agreement to elect former lehendakari Patxi López as new president of the Congress, leading the PP to reluctantly withdraw its candidate over his lack of support and cast blank ballots instead, whereas Podemos proposed Carolina Bescansa for the post with the support of United Left–Popular Unity (IU–UPeC). The next week, King Felipe VI started a round of talks with the different political parties in order to nominate a candidate for prime minister, but privately acknowledged to party representatives that he thought that a Rajoy's investiture was unlikely. Rajoy initially showed his willingness at attempting an investiture run despite not having any support other than that of his own party, whereas Albert Rivera sought to mediate an agreement between PP and PSOE.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Rajoy's withdrawal
As the round of talks drew to a close on 22 January, Pablo Iglesias made a surprise announcement by offering Pedro Sánchez to form a coalition government with himself as his deputy, while also laying out a proposal for the future's cabinet composition. Sánchez welcomed the offer but refused to give a formal answer to it, having insisted earlier that "times should be respected" and that Rajoy "should have the first shot", while noting that "policies should come first, then the government's composition". In response, Mariano Rajoy turned down Felipe VI's nomination as candidate on the grounds that there was now "a verified majority against him" upon knowing of Iglesias's offer to Sánchez, and arguing that he would not be running "just to let the times die out".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Rajoy's withdrawal
After Rajoy's withdrawal, a new round of talks was announced with Sánchez as the most likely nominee. The PSOE—which had intended for Rajoy to go through a failed investiture in Congress—suddenly found itself obliged to either accept or reject Iglesias's offer, which some PSOE high-ranking members regarded as being aimed at "humiliating" and destabilizing them. Pablo Iglesias celebrated that his proposal had caused Rajoy to step back and urged Sánchez to "rise to the challenge" by accepting it. On the other hand, the PSOE attacked Rajoy and dubbed his decision as "irresponsible" while regarding Podemos's offer as "blackmail".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Rajoy's withdrawal
Subsequently, Sánchez also declined to go to an investiture vote until Rajoy made his try or, alternatively, stepped back definitively, though he would later add that he would accept the King's nomination should the PP reject it again. On 2 February, Felipe VI formally tasked him with forming a government, which he accepted.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Rajoy's withdrawal
Sánchez announced that he would try to muster parliamentary support for a successful investiture vote and gave himself a negotiation period of "three weeks to one month". The investiture debate was set to start on 1 March, with the first ballot being scheduled for 2 March, with the date of a hypothetical new election being automatically set for 26 June. Rajoy warned against a possible PSOE–Podemos alliance and expressed his wish for Sánchez to fail in his attempt so that he could explore a three-way "moderate" alliance with PSOE and C's to be led by himself. It was reported that the PP favoured going into an early election as the party confirmed that it would vote against any candidate other than Rajoy.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
After Sánchez's nomination, Podemos and C's expressed their intention to vote against any pact that included each other. Pablo Iglesias asked Sánchez to not seek "impossible pacts" including both of them while insisting on his own offer, whereas Albert Rivera did not rule out the possibility of a PSOE–C's agreement and voiced his wish for the PP to not vote against Sánchez. PSOE started talks with C's, seeking to turn the latter's intended abstention into a "yes" vote, with Rivera not rejecting an eventual incorporation into a PSOE-led government as negotiations progressed. A PSOE–C's pact would have still required further support as it only mustered 130 out of 350 seats, with it being opposed by all three Podemos, Compromís and IU, with whom the PSOE was yet to start talks.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
Talks between the PSOE and several minor parties led to an agreement with Canarian Coalition (CCa) on 19 February, with a decision still pending on whether this would materialize in a support vote or in an abstention. Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and Democracy and Freedom (DiL) announced that they would oppose a PSOE-led government unless it recognized Catalonia's sovereignty by allowing an independence referendum to be held, something the PSOE rejected. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) had already discarded supporting Rajoy and conditioned a support for Sánchez on a new political status being granted for the Basque Country.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
In January, EH Bildu had hinted at being willing to "get involved in the investiture process" if there was "a real offer of change". The PSOE was said to have offered a cabinet post for IU leader Alberto Garzón in a meeting on 8 February; IU was reported as having rejected the offer, being more concerned about programmatic measures and in preventing "a government of the right-wing", as well as in reaching an understanding with other similarly-aligned forces.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
On 15 February—and without any formal talks between the two parties having started yet—Podemos publicly outlined a detailed government programme to the PSOE, which included a proposal for a self-determination referendum to be held in Catalonia. Sánchez criticized Iglesias for not having informed him of such proposal first and for "wanting to negotiate through press briefings", rejecting Podemos's document. Iglesias replied by demanding a meeting with Sánchez to tell him what the PSOE wanted to negotiate, with the latter answering that he would only meet Pablo Iglesias "to sign an agreement".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
Both Iglesias and Mònica Oltra—from Compromís—stated that if PSOE leaders sought to govern alone "they should openly say so", but that "[Sánchez's government] will be a plural one or it won't be". During a European summit on 18 February, Mariano Rajoy was recorded telling British prime minister David Cameron that he expected the government formation process to result in a fresh election, noting that he thought that Sánchez would probably lose the vote on 2–4 March.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
Through Alberto Garzón's mediation, several meetings were finally agreed between PSOE, Podemos, Compromís and IU, starting on 22 February. Concurrently with those talks, PSOE and C's secretly kept their negotiations ongoing, with a final agreement said to be expected within 24–48 hours. The four-way meeting between the left-aligned parties ended with the most troubling matters being postponed for the next day, but all four were reportedly hopeful of an overall agreement being reached. However, while Podemos reluctantly accepted the PSOE keeping its negotiations with C's, it refused to support Sánchez's investiture if he reached a government agreement with this party.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
On the late night of 23 February, PSOE and C's struck a government deal, which was unveiled the next day under the name of "Agreement for a Reformist and Progressive Government" (Spanish: Acuerdo para un Gobierno reformista y de progreso)—and informally dubbed as the "Pact of El Abrazo" or "The Hug Agreement" (Spanish: Pacto del Abrazo), in reference to it being signed in the Constitutional Room of the Congress, presided over by a large picture by Juan Genovés named as "El Abrazo"—and which saw both Sánchez and Rivera inviting all other parties "from the left and the right" to join it.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
It was presented as an "ambitious" programme that comprised constitutional, electoral, social, tax and labour reforms, anti-fraud and anti-corruption measures or a "democratic regeneration" plan—including the enforcement of compulsory party primaries—among others.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
However, the signed document—which did not clarify whether C's would be entering the government if successful—was revealed to include many points that were contrary to Podemos's election manifesto, such as the absence of a specific repealing of the labour reforms of 2010 and 2012, the explicit opposition to any self-determination referendum in Catalonia and the negation of many of the tax hikes proposed by Podemos, little public investment, a lack of prohibition of the so-called "revolving doors", etc.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
As a result, all three Podemos, Compromís and IU broke off negotiations with the PSOE on 24 February, amid accusations to the latter of "dishonesty" and putting all talks on hold until after Sánchez's investiture vote. Concurrently, Rajoy said that the pact between PSOE and C's was "useless", noting the shortage of parliamentary support for the alliance and reiterating that the PP would vote against Sánchez's investiture regardless of his choice of partners. Despite these hostilities, the PSOE was still hoping to lure the PNV into the agreement.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
On 26–27 February, the PSOE submitted its agreement with C's to the vote of its membership, which approved it by a wide margin (79%–21%), albeit on a 51.7% turnout. The vote received wide criticism for the question's wording, as it was regarded as generic and did not explicitly name either C's or the specific document agreed with them. The result was widely interpreted as an effort from party members to avoid disavowing Sánchez just days ahead of his investiture attempt, rather than genuine support for the pact with C's.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
Both signatories soon clashed on the document's interpretation. In an effort to court Podemos, the PSOE claimed that the pact did provide for the repealing of several controversial laws passed during Rajoy's tenure, a claim rejected by C's on the grounds that the written document only mentioned limited modifications on specific issues. Rivera said that he "could not prevent Pedro Sánchez from saying what the accord doesn't state", later adding that his compromise was with the signed document, which initially only provided for C's support to Sánchez's investiture on 2–4 March.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
C's was said as being willing to probe the possibility of an alternative pact with the PP if Sánchez "crashed" in his attempt. On 29 February, hours before the start of Sánchez's investiture debate, the PSOE sent a last-minute offer to Podemos and the other left-wing parties to collect their support, but Podemos leaders rejected it and accused the PSOE of sending a "copy-paste" of the PSOE–C's document with minor modifications and of ignoring almost all of their demands.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Negotiations and PSOE–C's alliance
C's also questioned Sánchez for trying to unilaterally change their alliance's terms in order to desperately obtain the support of other parties, stating that their pledged support was "for the signed deal only" and that "any changes would have to be reviewed so as to see what stance is adopted by the party".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), First investiture attempt
Pedro Sánchez's investiture debate was scheduled to start at 16:30 CET (UTC+1) on 1 March with Sánchez's speech, to be followed by the replies of all other parties and a first round of voting on 2 March, with a second and final balloting on 4 March if required. The PNV decided against supporting Sánchez previous to the debate's start, following mutual disagreements over the previous weekend on an alleged PSOE counter-offer—whose precise content was not disclosed—which PNV spokesman Aitor Esteban said to be "so unacceptable" that his party had chosen to arrange it as if no answer had been received. CCa spokeswoman Ana Oramas also announced that she would be opting to abstain on the basis that "there is no credible or viable majority to govern".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), First investiture attempt
In his speech on 1 March, Sánchez outlined a government programme limited to most of the proposals contained in his accord with C's, asking for Podemos to vote for "a government of change", attacking the PP and thanking Rivera's party for their support. He stated that, even if he did not get enough votes for being elected prime minister, he was "proud to have helped unlock the political situation".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), First investiture attempt
In his rejoinder the next day, in what was reported as one of his "harshest" speeches ever, Mariano Rajoy resorted to sarcasm and aggressive irony and ridiculed the PSOE–C's accord—dubbing it as a "most solemn agreement without the slightest relevance", "a farce", "imposture", "a theatrical representation" or "a vaudeville"—while accusing Sánchez of "trying to stage a personal promotion campaign" ahead of a hypothetical new election and of not having been willing to discuss anything with him, leading to the engagement turning into a mutual exchange of accusations where both Rajoy and Sánchez blamed each other for not allowing the formation of a government.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), First investiture attempt
The debate also showed the PSOE and Podemos delving into their differences, with Pablo Iglesias accusing Sánchez and his party of "betraying the Socialist principles" and of "capitulating" to C's. Albert Rivera defended his alliance with the PSOE "despite their mutual differences", addressing the PP's benches—from where several shouts of "traitor" were uttered—and urging them to "have the courage and bravery" to "set aside" Rajoy's era.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Candidate Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), First investiture attempt
With only 131 voting in favour and 219 opposing in the second round of voting, Pedro Sánchez's investiture became the first one ever to result in a defeat for the nominee, with his candidacy failing to obtain the required majorities in both ballots. The PSOE had hoped to persuade Podemos into either supporting or abstaining in the second ballot, but gave up on their attempt after the harsh debate between Sánchez and Iglesias. The party did try for others to abstain on 4 March vote so as to reduce the large number of "no" votes, but only managed to sway CCa into voting for Sánchez as a political gesture with no practical effects whatsover in the final result.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
After Sánchez's failure, King Felipe VI opted to put any further attempts on hold until a workable government proposal was presented to him. Both PSOE and C's showed their willingness to maintain their alliance ahead of future negotiations, announcing that those would be done with both parties simultaneously on the basis of their agreed document, whereas Podemos and IU rejected resuming talks with the PSOE as long as its deal with C's was maintained. The PSOE increasingly saw any kind of agreement with Podemos as "nigh to impossible"—or even desirable—and began readying itself for the hypothesis of a new election.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
Previously on 5 March, Rajoy had staged what was regarded as his first pre-election rally, asking Sánchez to abstain and let his party govern "as the most-voted one", but acknowledging that the PSOE was unwilling to "come to terms" with him and that he had lost the key support from C's. As a result, political pundits started to point out that the PP was gearing up itself for a new election campaign.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
The PSOE suggested that they could withdraw their support from Podemos-held local councils as a way of pressure, to which Iglesias replied that trying to threaten them was "the wrong way to go" and reminding the Socialists that they were also dependent on Podemos's support in several autonomous communities. Concurrently, Rajoy stated on 7 March that he would be calling Sánchez and Rivera to meet them and re-state his idea of a grand coalition.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
Two days later and pressured by C's, the PSOE agreed to hold a meeting with the PP—a change from their previous approach of refusing to sit down with the PP to negotiate anything—but announced that they would not negotiate the accord's contents and aimed for an unconditional PP's acceptance of them. As a result, the PP rejected the projected meeting over its unwilligness to consent to a PSOE–C's government.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
Between 7 and 9 March, Podemos saw the resignations of several members in its Madrilenian regional branch, amid accusations to the party's national leadership of exerting excessive power. Podemos accused the PSOE of attempting to magnify their crisis to pressure them into supporting Sánchez, but the situation aggravated on 15 March after Iglesias unilaterally dismissed Sergio Pascual—the party's organization secretary and close ally to the party's second-in-command Íñigo Errejón.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
Pascual's dismissal was justified by Iglesias over an alleged "lack of neutrality" in his territorial management, but the move forced Errejón out of public view for two weeks, leading many to speculate about an internal "purge" and a possible power struggle within Podemos between both leaders over the party's stance to Sánchez's investiture, which Errejón was said to favour in order to avoid a new election. After physicist Pablo Echenique was appointed as Pascual's replacement on 2 April, and with Errejón reappearing on 29 March to explain that—despite existing differences—his allegiance to Podemos's project and Iglesias was total, the crisis seemed to alleviate.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Investiture aftermath
The dormant rebellion within the PSOE resumed after Sánchez failed investiture. Some sectors within the party favourable to Sánchez sought to delay the congress that had been scheduled for 8 May as Susana Díaz had allegedly confessed to her close aides that she was determined to dispute the party's leadership. As party members—including Díaz herself—did not see it as desirable to open the issue of succession amid ongoing inter-party negotiations and with a new election looming for 26 June, as decision was taken on 2 April to indefinitely delay the leadership race "until the formation of a new government".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
Podemos sought to avoid being singled out as responsible for the triggering of a new election by adopting a strategy of rapprochement and reconciliation with the PSOE, with a brief meeting with Sánchez on 30 March leading Iglesias to announce that he was willing to give up the post of deputy prime minister in any prospective PSOE–Podemos coalition government as a way to ease relations between the two parties.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
Podemos also accepted three-way talks with C's, although the PSOE and Podemos still differed on their visions of the role that Rivera's party should be playing: Podemos still refused to enter or support any government in which C's was directly involved but accepted that they could work together on specific issues, whereas the PSOE maintained its wish for a "broad spectrum government" with the support of all three parties, although without clarifying what kind of government was being sought or which ones of the parties would be part of it. The three parties agreed to hold a meeting on 7 April to start talks.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
In the run up to the three-way meeting, C's repeatedly warned that it would terminate its alliance with the PSOE if the latter tried to negotiate with Podemos on its own. Further, the former was seen as distancing itself from the PSOE after abstaining during a parliamentary voting on 5 April involving the paralyzation of the enforcement of Rajoy's education law (the LOMCE), a key issue which had been included within the PSOE–C's agreement.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
This had seen Pablo Iglesias highlighting the similarities between his party's programme and that of the PSOE while commenting that the two parties' differences with C's made any prospective three-way alliance very difficult. On the day before the meeting, a harsh confrontation between Iglesias and Rivera during a Congress plenary—in which the former told the latter that "it is difficult to agree a progressive government with intolerant people"—evidenced the tense relationship existing between their two parties. On 5 April, C's demanded being given cabinet posts within a PSOE-led government—the first time it did so—and demanded an unconditional Podemos's support to it, in a move seen as a provokation to the latter so that they rejected any agreement with them.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
Negotiations came to a standstill after the three-way meeting on 7 April, as PSOE and C's unsuccessfully tried to persuade Podemos to subscribe their accord. C's stated that forming a pact with Podemos was "impossible and unworkable", while the PSOE said that they would not be renouncing their alliance with Rivera's party, pointing to the differences between Podemos and C's as the main obstacle for reaching an agreement.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
The next day, Pablo Iglesias revealed that it had been C's the one refusing the concessions that Podemos had made in the meeting and that they had been unwilling to accept any kind of involvement from Podemos in any prospective government, also adding that Sánchez had been effectively "kidnapped" by Rivera's party and was unable to negotiate on his own. As a result, Iglesias announced that the PSOE–C's pact would be put to a vote among Podemos's membership on 14–16 April. Subsequently on 11 April, the PSOE put down any further talks with Podemos on the grounds of a "mistrust" on Iglesias, not seeing any chances for a successful agreement to be reached.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
Commentators noted in the wake of the three-way negotiation failure that a PP–PSOE grand coalition was the only viable—even if highly unlikely—option left. Mariano Rajoy insisted on his proposal of a coalition based on the existing German model to be led by himself while again rejecting the PSOE–C's accord. The PP also commented on C's arithmetic iirelevance, with contacts between both parties having remained cold-tempered following Rivera's alliance with the PSOE and the harsh Rajoy–Rivera debate during Sánchez's failed investiture.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
Sánchez expressed a willingness in entering talks with the PP only for the latter to subscribe his pact with C's, stating that the PSOE would "never" support a PP-led government. Sectors within the PP deflected making any offer until Sánchez's acceptance to enter into formal talks, while hinting at him not being the best PSOE "interlocutor" and preferring another person to negotiate with Rajoy so as to "stop the recreation, theaters and games", though it was said that Rajoy would have been willing to have Sánchez as his deputy in a grand coalition scenario. On 11 April, PSOE's spokesperson Antonio Hernando replied to this that "Mr. Rajoy can save any offer for himself, if he had planned in making one".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, New round of negotiations
C's leaders congratulated themselves for "having thwarted a populist government in Spain"—in reference to Podemos's presence within any prospective cabinet—with Albert Rivera reiterating his idea of "an alliance between the main constitutionalist parties". C's started probing a possible pact with the PP, not discarding the possibility of supporting a candidate other than Rajoy, who—under Rivera's view—"was not able to lead a corruption and blackmail-free cabinet" because of his ties to disgraced PP members such as Luis Bárcenas or Rita Barberá—then under investigation for fraud and money laundering. He also warned that his agreement with the PSOE would be "void" in the event of a new election being triggered.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Final positions
Felipe VI had announced a new and final round of talks for 25–26 April to check whether a candidate would be able to muster enough support to be elected. If no nominee emerged, then he would let the deadline expire on 2 May, dissolve the Cortes Generales and call a fresh election for 26 June. Concurrently, Podemos leaders hoped to use the membership vote on the PSOE—C's pact as a way to pressure the PSOE into coming to terms with them, with the unexpectedly high turnout attracting media attention as it exceeded the one in the PSOE's 27 February vote. The vote saw a rejection of the PSOE–C's accord with an 88–12% result and a support to a PSOE–Podemos–Compromís–IU alliance by 92% to 8%.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Final positions
The landslide result of the vote put down any option for an in extremis agreement, as it showed that neither PSOE nor Podemos were willing to yield to the other's demands. On 21 April, C's leader Albert Rivera called for PP and PSOE leaders to step back and support an independent candidate as prime minister, to which Rajoy replied that Rivera "should do it himself first"—stepping back—while revealing that he would inform the King on his own lack of support because of Sánchez rejection of his grand coalition proposal.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Final positions
On 22 April, economy minister Luis de Guindos was recorded as saying to Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem that a new election was all but certain, with the PP hoping that a similar result to December would see "common sense" prevailing and the PSOE reluctantly agreeing to an alliance with them after the summer. Two days later, Rajoy remarked that his party was "ready" for a new electoral campaign and blamed both PSOE and C's for the election repetition, accusing both of "having made [any agreement] impossible".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Final positions
On 25 April, the King's round of talks turned into a mere formality to certify the failure in negotiations and the triggering of a new election for 26 June. Congress speaker Patxi López had the Cortes's dissolution protocols prepared already from the day the King announced the final round of talks on 12 April, with the dissolution decree having been prepared since at least three days before such round.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Last effort and deadline
On 26 April, Compromís made a last-ditch effort to force left-wing parties into coming to terms, sending PSOE, Podemos and IU a proposal comprising 30-condition agreement "reviewable every six months". The PSOE accepted most of the points but turned down the idea of a coalition, suggesting instead a two-year cabinet headed by Sánchez and including independent members. Compromís leader Mónica Oltra—one of the main promoters of the agreement—replied to the PSOE that their counter-offer was "insulting" because of attempting to buy them into supporting a minority Sánchez cabinet "having just 90 deputies", despite her party having offered "a perfectly-acceptable deal" to "all parties committed to change".


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Last effort and deadline
Pedro Sánchez conceded that he would not be running for investiture under these conditions and acknowledged that Spain was "doomed to a new election", while putting the blame for it on both PP and Podemos. Pablo Iglesias said that he would have accepted Compromís's offer and that his party had made "enough concessions already", blaming Sánchez for his "unwillingness to negotiate". Rajoy argued that it was better to have a new election rather than seeing any of Sánchez's government attempts succeed.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Last effort and deadline
Rivera commented on the proposal that he would not get his party "into last-hour trouble", and that "a three page-long agreement for a four-year government" that was to be formed "by six different parties" was "not even worth looking at". Later that day, Patxi López announced that the King would not be nominating anyone, thus confirming that the Cortes Generales would be dissolved on 2 May.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, First formation round (December 2015 – April 2016), Road to a new election, Last effort and deadline
On 30 April, C's announced that its alliance with the PSOE expired as a result of a new election being called. As a result, some within the PSOE—such as Aragonese president Javier Lambán—urged the party to "abandon" the accord with C's on the eve of the new election once it had proven to be fruitless and counterproductive. The deadline was reached on 2 May, the 11th Legislature of Spain—the shortest in democracy—came to a close and the Cortes Generales were dissolved by the King the following day.


2015–2016 Spanish government formation, Second formation round (June–October 2016), Post-2016 election developments, Election aftermath
The June 2016 election resulted in a People's Party (PP) strengthened at the cost of all other national parties, with both the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and Citizens (C's) losing ground—going down from a combined total of 130 seats to 117—and the newly-formed Unidos Podemos alliance failing to materialize opinion polling's projections of a second-place score ahead of the PSOE, retaining the same 71 seats obtained by both Podemos and United Left (IU) separately in December 2015. Overall, the PP's growth allowed for the PP–C's bloc to climb from 163 to 169 seats, whereas the PSOE–Podemos–IU bloc was reduced from 161 to 156; still both blocs remained short of an absolute majority, with the PSOE retaining the same kingmaker position as before.