2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
The ombudsman also sought to have the general election of 2 February 2014 invalidated following advice from Thammasat University journalism law lecturer Kittipong Kamolthammawong. The ombudsman's authority concerns constitutionality of law, rather than election-related matters. In light of the limitation of his authority, the ombudsman then filed a request on 6 March 2014 for the Constitutional Court to decide if the royal decree, whereby the House of Representatives was dissolved, was unconstitutional.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
On 21 March 2014, the Constitutional Court, by six votes to three, ruled that the royal decree was contrary to the constitution—insofar as it affected the election—when the general election, scheduled for 2 February 2014, could not be completed on that day throughout Thailand. The constitution stipulates that only a royal decree can dissolve the House of Representatives and it must also order a general election to be held on the same day nationwide, within 45 days of the dissolution. According to the court, at the point that the royal decree was deemed unconstitutional, the election also became unconstitutional as a consequence.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
The Constitutional Court decision received heavy criticism from academic sectors and the Pheu Thai Party. Thammasat University public law lecturer Piyabutr Saengkanokkul commented that nothing in the royal decree was contrary to the constitution, as it did not fail to comply with the requirements of the constitution mentioned by the court. Chulalongkorn University constitutional law lecturer Kanin Boonsuwan questioned the logic of the decision, because the activity that the constitution required of the decree could not be completed due to hindrance from the anti-government protesters.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
Chulalongkorn University political science lecturer Pornson Liengboonlertchai added that a law is deemed unconstitutional when its contents are contrary to the constitution, not when it is prevented from being implemented according to the constitution. Legal scholar Verapat Pariyawong noted that the court invalidated the election because it was not completed within one day, but the court refrained from considering why it could not be completed.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
Political analyst Kan Yuenyong said, "independent agencies are being quite obvious that they want to remove her [Yingluck] and her entire cabinet to create a power vacuum, claim that elections can't be held and then nominate a prime minister of their choice". Chiang Mai University law lecturer Somchai Preecha-silapakul said he was grieved by the decision and described it as a "constitutional coup". Former judge and former EC member Sodsri Sattayatham criticised the court for freezing the country and encouraged people to vote in the new election to "bring back democracy".


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
The Pheu Thai Party lamented the decision, stating that the country had lost an opportunity to move on and that the court had established an "infamous standard" by which an entire election can be overturned because of disruptions at some polling stations. Opposition MP Chuwit Kamolvisit issued a similar statement: "[The court has set] a standard that if you want to overturn an election, you just find someones to block a few polling stations....Just do this and you can make the whole election void."


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
On 21 March, a group of students using the slogan "Respect My Future" gathered at the Democracy Monument and covered it with black cloth to mourn for democracy. Another group launched a campaign called "Respect My Vote" in front of Lord Rattanathibet's Mansion, the Constitutional Court's former seat, with a view to demanding the resignation of the Constitutional Court judges on the grounds that they "devalued the people's votes". Ceremonies were held in Benchasiri Park, Bangkok, featuring floating black balloons and black candles, to bid farewell to democracy and deplore the court. Pheu Thai Party members said they would dress in black for six days in mourning for the six judges who resolved to invalidate the election, while medical officers in Chiang Mai Province also donned black clothing.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
The Democrat Party's Ongart Clampaiboon that Pheu Thai should respect the court ruling, and that the next election should not be too early or it might be invalid again. One of the PDRC's co-speakers, Ekkanut, stated immediately after the ruling that PDRC respected the ruling and that Yingluck's government was "stubborn" about finishing the election process while it was not yet ready. He added that this might be a good chance for everyone to co-operate on reform before election. Suthep declined to make any comment on the ruling.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Ombudsman's request for election invalidation
Anti -government protesters applauded the decision and vowed to disrupt new elections until an unelected people's council is achieved.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
Cases of intimidation, violence and criminal activities, committed by PDRC guards and supporters, continued. Police arrested in Surat Thani, Suthep's hometown, a man who confessed to being paid by the PDRC to shoot at pro-government Red Shirt protesters the day before the election at Lak Si, leading to seven people injured and one man paralysed. The "popcorn gunman", who fired a M16 rifle, also admitted that a PDRC guard leader provided him with the weapon.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
Warrants were issued by the court for the arrest of Issara Somchai, a former Democrat MP from Ubon Ratchathani and PDRC leader, and five PDRC security guards. Issara was accused of ordering his guards to detain, beat, and kill a civilian after they found him with Red Shirt supporters cards. The man was allegedly detained for five days, beaten, tied up and thrown into the Bang Pakong River by anti-government protest guards. A PDRC supporter known as "little Saddam", who was photographed trying to strangle a man who had tried to vote, was also sought.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
Pro -government demonstrators from the People's Radio for Democracy Group (PRDG), a faction of the UDD, rallied at the National Anti- Corruption Commission office on 24 March 2014. Four members of the PRDG proceeded to assault a Buddhist monk named Phra Prat, who received minor injuries. According to Phra Prat, he saw protesters assaulting another man, so he complained to the protesters. One of the PRDG attackers claimed that Phra Prat was not a real monk and was going to attack her with his cane. She also blamed the monk for scolding them in the first place.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
On 29 March 2014, a group of anti-government protesters from the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) were led by Suthep on a march around Bangkok streets, from Lumpini Park to the Royal Plaza and parliament. The march eventually returned to Lumpini Park to affirm its stance that reforms must be carried out before a general election is undertaken. While 53 political parties called for a fresh election to be held within 45–60 days, the Democrat Party echoed Suthep's position: the ruling Pheu Thai Party would use the power it won in a fresh election to pass illegitimate laws. The party did not elaborate on its planned involvement in the next election.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
At the PDRC rally at Lumpini Park on 5 April 2014, Suthep outlined his strategies in the campaign to remove Yingluck from her role as caretaker. He called on all PDRC local networks to gather lists of their members throughout Thailand and "wait for the day of battle", further explaining that he would lead "a prolonged fight" that will last "for at least 15 days". The outcome of two events were presented as critical to the course of Suthep's future actions: the NACC's ruling on Yingluck and the verdict by the Constitutional Court on whether Yinluck violated the 2007 Constitution.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
In the event of a guilty finding by the NACC, Suthep asked his supporters to await further instructions. However, if the Constitutional Court ruled against Yinluck, Suthep called for an immediate mass mobilisation so that he could assume the role of "sovereign body" to enact a new charter, akin to the military dictators of the 1960s. Suthep stated as a reassurance: "[I] will be able to order anyone to be executed by firing squad, but I will only freeze assets".


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
If he assumed a ruling position, Suthep stated that he planned to appoint a prime minister and cabinet members at his discretion, followed by a request for approval from Thailand's king, so that he might appoint a National Legislative Assembly and "People's Council"—two unelected legislative bodies—to engage in national "reforms". Suthep expressed a commitment to return power to the Thai people following the implementation of the reforms, but spoke of further street-based protests if his appointed government failed to implement the reforms dictated by the PDRC.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Continued protests and violence
On 25 April 2014 a soldier was removing a barrier placed near the anti-government protest site on Chaeng Watthana when protest guards opened fire at him. The attack ended after the guards viewed his military identification card.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
Over two years prior, on 30 September 2011, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) transferred Thawin Pliansri from the office of Secretary General of the National Security Council (NSC) to the office of Prime Minister Advisor. Police General Wichian Photphosri, then Commissioner General of the Royal Thai Police (RTP), was appointed as the NSC Secretary General instead, and Police General Priewpan Damapong, elder brother of Thaksin's former wife Potjaman Shinawatra, was appointed as the new RTP Commissioner General. Thawin requested an administrative court to revoke the transfer.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
The Supreme Administrative Court delivered a final judgment on 7 March 2014 that the transfer was legal, but was unreasonable because it did not appear that Thawin had carried out his duties ineffectively or failed to abide by the policy of the government. The court ordered the OPM to transfer Thawin back to his former office within 45 days. The OPM announced the transfer on 28 April 2014, retroactive to 30 September 2011.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
Appointed Senator Paiboon Nititawan then requested the Constitutional Court to remove Yingluck from office, citing that the transfer of Thawin was the exercise of power to interfere with governmental affairs in favour of Yingluck's family or the Pheu Thai Party. The constitution prohibits a representative, senator or minister from, for his or her own sake or for the sake of his or her political party, interfering with regular government affairs, including the transfer, appointment, promotion, demotion, or removal of governmental officers.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
On 3 April 2014, the Constitutional Court agreed to address the case and ordered Yingluck to reply within 15 days. Yingluck replied:


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
The final hearing was held on 6 May 2014. The court rendered its decision on 7 May 2014, stating that Yingluck could still be removed from office as her office exists until a new council of ministers is formed. The court decided that the transfer of Thawin involved her personal interest, saying:


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
[ Since] Police General Priewpan is the maternal [great] uncle of the grandchildren of the Respondent, he could be deemed a relative of the Respondent. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the acts of the Respondent were not for the sake of the Nation and its people, but were done with a concealed or hidden intention to favour the Respondent herself or her partisans.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
The court then unanimously removed her from office. It also removed nine other ministers voting in favour of the transfer. These ministers were Anudith Nakornthap (Minister of Information and Communication Technology), Chalerm Yubamrung (Minister of Labour), Kittiratt Na-Ranong (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), Plodprasop Suraswadi (Deputy Prime Minister), Police General Pracha Promnok (Minister of Justice), Santi Prompat (Minister attached to the OPM), Siriwat Kajornprasart (Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives), Surapong Tovichakchaikul (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and General Yuttasak Sasiprapa (Deputy Minister of Defence).


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
The remaining ministers selected Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Commerce) to act as caretaker prime minister in place of Yingluck.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
Tight security was placed around court precincts during the televised pronouncement of the decision and the judges left the court immediately after the pronouncement. The court appeared to overturn its own precedent. On 5 February 2014, it dismissed a similar petition against Abhisit Vejjajiva, citing that he had already vacated office upon dissolution of the House of Representatives. The New York Times also noted that the court reached the decision with "unusual speed" as it was delivered just one day after Yingluck gave evidence to the court, while The Wall Street Journal reported that the grounds for which Yingluck was removed were "relatively obscure".


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Request for removal of Yingluck from office
After hearing the decision, Yingluck held a press conference during which she denied all the accusations. The pro-government Red Shirt faction leaders described the decision as a "judicial coup" and said they will hold a mass rally to protest her removal on 10 May 2014, prompting the Constitutional Court to order its own holiday from 8–13 May 2014.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Post Yingluck's removal
PDRC leader Suthep launched his "final battle" with media intimidation. On 9 May at 09:09, protesters marched to the buildings of Channels 3, 5, 7, 9 and NBT, where they stayed overnight to make sure the stations did not deviate from PDRC-approved coverage. According to Suthep, these media agencies are "mouthpieces" of the government and must be convinced to refrain from broadcasting any more pro-government "propaganda". They must not report the news on behalf of the tyrants any longer, because it distorts the truth, adding that he intended to ask for co-operation from these stations to broadcast his speech once "victory" is achieved.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Post Yingluck's removal
The Thai Journalists Association, the Thai Broadcast Journalists Association, and human rights groups condemned the PDRC move. The intimidation campaign occurred previously during the Bangkok Shutdown campaign.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Post Yingluck's removal
Meanwhile, those led by Luang Phu Buddha Issara went to CMPO headquarters, where violence erupted between protesters and police. Protesters dismantled barricades and demanded that CMPO send out a representative to talk to them within five minutes. When the five minutes had passed, the protesters broke in, causing police to fire tear gas and water cannons at them. The protesters withdrew. The violence resulted in four protesters injured, included the leader himself.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Post Yingluck's removal
The following day, after negotiations with Col Sombat Thanyawan, deputy commander of the Cavalry Centre who supervised security at Government House, Suthep and the PDRC were granted permission to enter the Santi Maitree building. The Santi Maitree is the building at Government House where the cabinet ministers' offices are located. The building was to be used as an office and meeting place for the PDRC.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Post Yingluck's removal
The UDD staged a rally at Aksa Road on 10 May to show support for the recently removed Yingluck and other cabinet members. "I plead with the president of the Supreme Court, which is one of the three pillars of democracy, to reconsider thoroughly the demands by Mr Suthep and the subsequent proposal made by the not-yet-validly nominated Senate speaker to hold a meeting and appoint a new prime minister," said Jatuporn Prompan, leader of the UDD. The Red Shirt leader warned that any attempt by the Supreme Court and the Senate to discuss "unlawful" demands for an interim government could steer Thailand toward a civil war.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Post Yingluck's removal
The PDRC relocated their main rally site from Lumphini Park to Ratchadamnoen Nok Avenue, not far from Government House on 11 May. A clean up operation took place in Lumphini Park two days later.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Coup d'état
On 20 May 2014, the Royal Thai Army intervened by declaring martial law nationwide and establishing a military command to resolve the situation. The caretaker government stated that the army never sought its opinion on the martial law declaration. The army insisted that the move was not a coup d'état and the government remained in office.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Timeline of the events, Coup d'état
On the evening of 22 May 2014, the army formally staged a coup against the caretaker government and formed a junta called National Peace and Order Maintaining Council (NPOMC) to govern the country. On 21 August 2014 army chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha was appointed prime minister by a legislature he had handpicked.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Concurrent to the 2013–2014 political crisis in Thailand, the rice-pledge scheme has been a significant issue for the caretaker government. Following the dissolution of parliament on 9 December 2013, Yingluck and her Cabinet neglected to approve a renewed budget for the rice pledge. As of 31 January 2014, the caretaker government had not only defaulted on the payments that are owed to the nation's rice farmers as part of the scheme, but caretaker Finance Minister Kittiratt Na Ranong does not have access to the Bt130 billion that is required to resolve the situation. In its reduced "caretaker" capacity, the Finance Ministry is constitutionally barred from borrowing money that would create obligations for the next government.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
The sum of Bt130 billion has been owed to the nation's rice farmers since October 2013 and, as of 31 January 2014, more than 200 farmers have sought the help of the Lawyers' Council with representation in a class action against the government. While the rice farmers of Thailand are the lowest class in the Thai social hierarchy, they are also traditionally a key component of the Pheu Thai Party's political base.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
As of 31 January 2014, rice farmers, predominantly from the North and Central regions, have blocked highways to protest against the government and have also stated that they may travel to Bangkok to join the anti-government protest. Many farmers are bankrupt as a result of the outstanding payments and at least three farmers under the scheme have committed suicide.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
The Thai Ministry of Commerce announced on 4 February 2014 that China cancelled a contract to purchase more than a million tonnes of rice due to a continuing investigation of the Anti- Corruption Commission into a rice purchase policy administered by Yingluck. The protesting farmers announced that they would intensify their protest on 6 February 2014 by blocking all of Thailand's major roads, even though many farmers from the north of the country could not afford to participate.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
The protesting rice farmers—1.4 million farmers in total have been affected—are seeking compensation from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC), as they believe that the bank can recoup the payment from the government at a later time; however, the BAAC has stated that it relies upon the government for funds. Additionally, a number of farmers from the Central provinces might travel to Bangkok and demand payment in front of the Commerce Ministry on 6 February.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Suthep announced to supporters in Silom on 6 February that one potential solution to the rice farmers predicament is to sell the government's 8 million-tonne stock of pledged rice; however, PDRC-organized protesters would need to forcibly enter secured warehouses to retrieve the rice. One of the PDRC core leaders stated that Suthep would embark on a public walk on 7 February to collect donations for the rice farmers. According to Rangsan Srivorasart, Permanent Secretary for Finance, on 7 February, a confidential plan involving Thailand's banks will ensure that the rice farmers will be paid through a Bt130 billion loan. Rangsan stated that several options existed to obtain the necessary funds.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
In a statement to the media on 11 February, Yingluck stated that the government possessed the financial means to pay all outstanding debts to the nation's rice farmers and was adamant that the payments will be honoured at the stipulated prices. However, a Bangkok Post report, published on 12 February 2014, states that the National Anti- Corruption Commission (NACC) is expected to bring formal charges against Yingluck following the collation of evidence to substantiate a case regarding the rice scheme. NACC deputy secretary-general Witthaya Akhompitaksaid on 11 February that the NACC expects to press charges against the caretaker Prime Minister.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Witthaya explained that if the NACC panel accumulates enough evidence, Yingluck, who is also chairwoman of the National Rice Policy Committee, would be in violation of Section 157 of the Criminal Code for dereliction of duty and, if charged, will be permitted to present her case to the panel—the panel will then decide if the indictment of Yingluck is justified. The case dates back to mid-January 2014 and, if the case is taken to court, Yingluck would be required to step down from all official roles.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Meanwhile, caretaker Commerce Minister Niwatthamrong Bunsongphaisan stated that a cabinet meeting held on 11 February approved a central budget of Bt712 million to pay a total of 3,921 undocumented farmers under the rice scheme and the budget will be forwarded to the EC for endorsement between 11 and 14 February 2014.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
On the evening of 12 February, Thai Rice Association president Prasit Boonchoey warned that around 50,000 rice farmers to oust the caretaker government due to the outstanding payments. Prasit spoke on one of the PDRC protest stages, confirming that he had spoken with other farmer leaders from the western, lower northern, and upper central regions in regard to escalating the protest action. On the morning of 13 February, another group of farmers were escorted by lawyers from the Lawyers Association of Thailand to file legal charges against the caretaker government for fraudulent conduct. On the evening of 14 February, farmer leader Dhaicharn Mata warned Yingluck that the consequences will be "unpredictable and uncontrollable" if the farmers demands are not met.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Rice farmers used a truck to overcome razor wire barricades at one of Yingluck's temporary offices in the Chaeng Wattana area. The caretaker prime minister refused to meet with the farmers, but government officials identified the dissolution of parliament in December 2013 as the cause of the payment delay. Caretaker Finance Minister Kittiratt Na-Ranong informed the media that Bt2 billion had already been paid and a further Bt3.39 billion is owed to the farmers. He said the government will pay the remainder of the debt through the state-owned agricultural bank: "Considering the (bank's) capacity in handling daily payments, it is expected that all payments will be made within six to eight weeks."


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
On 18 February 2014, Yingluck delivered a speech to respond to the desperation of the rice farmers and detailed how the issue will be resolved. Yingluck also explained that the anti-government protest movement has acted as an obstacle to the successful continuation of the scheme, which she claimed had been functional during its first two years of existence prior to the 2013–2014 political crisis. Yinluck affirmed that, regardless of the obstacles, she would "persist in fighting for the farmers"; however, the caretaker prime minister called upon the co-operation of Thailand's banks, whereby loans would be granted to the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) for the payment of rice farmers:


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
With a solid guarantee under the law, there are no reasons for the banks and their unions to fear that their money would be used in the wrong way. The government is responsible for every baht. Moreover, the country's financial institutions are very strong with high liquidity. They can comfortably provide loans to help farmers without taking too much risk.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Yingluck further stated that the BAAC will extend the debt repayment time by six months due to the hardships endured by the farmers, in addition to increasing the loan limit for the upcoming crop season. The speech was telecast nationwide by the Television Pool of Thailand.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
However, also on 18 February, the National Anti- Corruption Commission released a statement charging Yingluck with improperly handling the government's rice subsidy scheme. The Commission states that the scheme involved the government's purchase of farmers' crops for prices up to 50 per cent higher than global prices over a two-year period. The caretaker prime minister received a summons to face the Commission's charges on 27 February 2014, and her impeachment and removal from official duties is one potential outcome.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
EC member Somchai Srisutthiyakorn announced on 4 March 2014 that the caretaker government received the approval of the EC to pay the rice farmers who joined the rice-pledging scheme with Bt20 billion from the nation's central fund. The money will be dispensed as a loan to the government, which will use the revenue from rice sales to repay the amount by 31 May 2014.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Rice-pledge scheme crisis
Led by monk Phra Buddha Issara, a group of farmers dumped rice at the Government Lottery Office (GLO) on 22 March 2014, leading to the closure of the office for the day. The monk demanded that the GLO use lottery sale funds to purchase 100 tonnes of rice from farmers and stated that the Office needs to pay the farmers at least THB12,000 for each tonne of rice.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
On 23 December 2013, the Thai baht dropped to a three-year low due to the political unrest in the preceding months. According to Bloomberg News, the Thai currency lost 4.6 percent over November and December, while the main stock index also dropped (9.1 percent). A chief Japanese trader on emerging Asian markets told Bloomberg News: "There is no reason to buy the baht or Thai assets while the protests continue."


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
In terms of tourism, Thailand's Association of Domestic Travel reported a decrease of US$125 million worth of tourist revenue around Christmas and New Year compared to the same period in 2012. The Thai-Chinese Tourism Alliance Association has projected that, for Q1 2014, Chinese arrivals are expected to drop 60 per cent from 900,000 compared with the same period in 2013 (in 2013, Chinese nationals were responsible for the highest level of tourism in Thailand). On 6 January, Singapore Airlines stated that it will cancel 19 flights due to the political situation in Bangkok, while travel agencies have experienced a decline in patronage.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
The Bank of Thailand reported on the second day of the anti-government Operation, 14 January 2014, that 135 different bank branches had been affected. It said 36 branches announced full day closure, including three Bangkok Bank branches, 17 Krungthai branches and five Siam Commercial branches, while 99 others closed ahead of regular business hours, including 72 Thai Military branches and 10 CIMB branches.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
According to data compiled by Thailand's Financial Ministry, Bloomberg L.P. and the Stock Exchange of Thailand, foreign investors have withdrawn US$3 billion (nearly THB100 billion) from Thai stocks since protests began on 31 October 2013. Analysts are commenting on the benefits being reaped by Thailand's neighbouring countries and the Thai Stock Exchange has traced approximately THB6.3 billion that has moved to Indonesian shares.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
On 23 January 2014, Tourism and Sports Minister Somsak Phurisisak stated that the total number of visitors to Thailand will drop to one million in January 2014, half of the usual tourist population for the month. A representative from Barclay's, a UK multinational banking and financial services company, reiterated the repetitive history of the protest movement and further explained: "It's not the first time this has happened. What's damaging is perceptions, investment and tourism. It's all reversible at the moment, but as time goes by some of it will become permanent."


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
On 27 January 2014, the Erawan Center, an emergency medical service unit of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), announced that 10 deaths had occurred during the anti-government protests, while 571 injuries had been documented. An increase in tension has been identified in the lead-up to 2 February elections.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
According to a 12 February media report, Bangkok businesses were hopeful for a resolution to the political unrest, as the financial impact had become more problematic. CentralWorld, one of Southeast Asia's largest shopping plazas, reported that customer traffic was down 20 per cent from 2013, Japanese department store operator Isetan's Bangkok location had been closing an hour earlier, the Ratchaprasong district's accommodation venues experienced a 60 per cent decline in patronage, and only 5,000 tourists were frequenting popular foreign backpacker destination Khaosan Road on a daily basis, representing a 50 per cent drop. On the same date, the central Bank of Thailand downgraded its GDP growth projection for 2014 from 4 per cent to 3 per cent.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
An economic data report published on 17 February stated that GDP increased 0.6 per cent in the last three months of 2013, the country's lowest level of growth since the first quarter of 2012. The data also showed that the nation's currency has weakened by 4 per cent since the commencement of the protests. Bank of Thailand spokeswoman Roong Mallikamas stated that the monetary policy as of 17 February is sufficient to accommodate the nation's needs.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
On 13 April 2014, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a Thai academic based at Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Security and International Studies in Bangkok, assessed the 2014 political crisis for the East Asia Forum, a joint initiative of the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) and the South Asian Bureau of Economic Research (SABER). Thitinan writes that "Yingluck’s days are numbered" and foresees two potential outcomes for Thailand: "If it is a government that includes both sides of the divide, Thailand may be able to navigate a way out.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
But if it is a partisan anti-Thaksin interim government, more tumult and turmoil can be expected." The academic expresses his support for a democratic process, as he concludes with the statement, "Thais must realise that the starting point for any democracy is the will of the majority and that autocratic rule in Thailand ultimately cannot last."


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
The private Thai think tank Kasikorn Research Center (KResearch) reported in mid-April 2014 that Thailand was at risk of entering into a recessionary period due to the ongoing political turmoil in the nation. The Center presented data that indicated an absence of growth in Thai exports during the first quarter of 2014, similar to the final quarter of 2013, while a minus growth of 1.8 percent continued beyond this period. The think tank predicted about 1.8 percent growth for Thailand's economy over 2014; however, Bangkok Bank executive vice-president Kobsak Pootrakool estimated an annual growth of around 2 to 3 percent, as well as an expansion of 5 to 7 percent in exports as a result of a recovering global economy.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis
The political crisis initially raised fears of a violent response from supporters of Thaksin, who felt disenfranchised after the governments they had elected in the prior five general elections were removed before completing their terms.


2013–2014 Thai political crisis, Impact of political crisis, Legal sanctions
In 2016, Vivat Yodprasit, better known as the popcorn gunman, was sentenced to 37 years in prison for a murder that was linked to the crisis.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis
A political crisis evolved in Tunisia following the assassination of leftist leader Mohamed Brahmi in late July 2013, during which the country's mainly secular opposition organized several protests against the ruling Troika alliance that was dominated by Rashid al-Ghannushi's Islamist Ennahda Movement. The events came as part of the aftermath of the Tunisian Revolution which ousted the country's longtime president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, followed by a general election which saw Ennahda win a plurality alongside Moncef Marzouki's allied Congress for the Republic (CPR). The crisis gradually subsided when Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh resigned and a new constitution was adopted in January 2014.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis
Many incidents fueled the protests including the assassination of prominent secular leaders Chokri Belaid on 6 February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July. Other factors include the government's failure to deal with the rise of hardline Salafist groups including Ansar al-Sharia which is widely believed to be behind the assassinations, as well as many other attacks on security personnel and state institutions. This prompted the government to list the group as a terrorist organization amid growing pressure by opposition groups.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis
The protests intensified on 23 October 2013, when thousands of demonstrators took to the streets calling for the government to step down hours before talks between the ruling Islamist coalition and opposition leaders that concluded with Ennahda promising to resign in three weeks ending a months-old political deadlock. In exchange for Ennahda's resignation, the opposition agreed to pass a constitution in which freedom of worship will be guaranteed but in the same time gave a greater role to religion in public life than before.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Background, Tunisian revolution of 2011
A period of civil resistance characterized by riots and unrest took place throughout the nation following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2011 and fueled by high unemployment, corruption, political repression and poor living conditions forcing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country ending his 23-year rule over Tunisia. This was followed by the suspension then dissolution of the former ruling RCD party and the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi amid further public pressure.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Background, Constituent Assembly and new government
Following the revolution, an election for a constituent assembly which had 217 seats was held on 23 October 2011 that saw the Ennahda Movement led by Rashid al-Ghannushi win a plurality in the election (41% of the seats) closely followed by the Congress for the Republic (CPR) led by Moncef Marzouki (13.4% of the seats) who was later elected as President of Tunisia by the Constituent Assembly.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Background, Constituent Assembly and new government
The Ennahda Movement had long been banned in the political spectrum by former President Ben Ali, most notably in the 1989 elections where some of its members had to run independently due to government repression. Two years after the elections Ben Ali jailed nearly 25,000 of its activists with Ennahda militants responding by attacking the ruling party's headquarters killing one person and splashing acid on others. Following the revolution, it described itself to be a "moderate Islamist" party by advocating democracy and recognizing political pluralism and dialogue with the West.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Background, Constituent Assembly and new government
Its supporters back then regarded the party as an example of how a balance can be struck between modernity and Islamism while its critics viewed it as a threat to secularism in Tunisia, which was often regarded as the most secular Arab state. In addition, leading Ennahda figures have repeatedly tried to reassure worrying Tunisians that it would protect civil rights and democracy.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Background, Constituent Assembly and new government
However, the movement was accused to have been shaped by Qutbism and is highly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and many of its secular opponents pointing out to acid attacks on female students in the 1980s for dressing "indecently" as a warning sign from Islamist repression. It is also believed that Rashid al-Ghannushi himself, the co-founder of the party had a long history of violent thinking. Following Ben Ali's ouster, the party was legalized and Ghannushi was welcomed by a crowd of 1,000 people upon his return to the country after 22 years of exile in Europe. Ghannushi later formed an alliance called the Troika with two secular political parties which are Moncef Marzouki's CPR and the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations
The protests were fueled by high scale political assassinations, most notably the murder of Democratic Patriots' Movement leader Chokri Belaid on 6 February 2013 and of People's Movement leader and member of parliament Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013 who were both members of the same left-wing coalition. Both murders were blamed on Islamic extremists with Boubacar Hakim, a hardline Salafist who is being sought for under suspicion of smuggling weapons from Libya, as the prime suspect.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Chokri Belaid
On 6 February 2013, Chokri Belaid was leaving his house on his way to the headquarters of the Tunisian General Labour Union for a meeting with its secretary general when he was shot four times by a gunman who later took off on a motorbike driven by a second accomplice. Belaid was quickly rushed to the nearest clinic but the doctors were unable to save him and he was pronounced dead at the clinic.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Chokri Belaid
Current secretary general of Belaid's party and leader of the Popular Front, Ziad Lakhdhar, said in a statement: "Chokri Belaid was killed today by four bullets to the head and chest ... doctors told us that he has died. This is a sad day for Tunisia". It was also reported that Belaid had received several death threats prior to his assassination with many of his supporters blaming Ennahda for failing to protect him following those threats and an incident targeting fellow party members a week earlier.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Chokri Belaid
Belaid had always attacked the "Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution" (LPR), a government-aligned nationwide organization that claims to root out remnants of Ben Ali's regime but are accused of thuggish behaviour towards opposition groups, and he claimed that there are groups inside Ennahda that incite violence and that the LPR's committees are tools used by the government and its allied Islamists to get rid of the party's leftist coalition.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Chokri Belaid
The night before the incident, he appeared in a political talk show on Tunisia's Nessma TV and said; "Rashid Ghannushi considers the leagues to be the conscience of the nation, so the defense of the authors of violence is clear. All those who oppose Ennahda become the targets of violence." Following his assassination, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Interior Ministry building in Tunis carrying Belaid's coffin and shouted "The people demand the fall of the regime". The day turned violent when some of the protesters threw rocks with the police using tear gas to disperse the rallies.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Mohamed Brahmi
On 25 July 2013, Mohamed Brahmi was shot dead in his car in front of his home in Tunis by unknown gunmen on a motorbike in front of his wife Mbarka and his daughter Belkis who were both shocked after the tragedy. The incident occurred on the day Tunisia was set to celebrate Republic Day when the country was celebrating the 56th anniversary of the beginning of Habib Bourguiba's presidency.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Mohamed Brahmi
He was later transported to Charles Nicolle Hospital after being paraded down Avenue Habib Bourguiba by thousands of his supporters including relatives and fellow party members who demonstrated and blamed the incumbent Ennahda Party and their followers for the assassination while shouting "Down with the rule of the Islamists!". They were also joined by his wife and daughter in front of the hospital where he died. Hundreds of supporters also protested in Brahmi's hometown of Sidi Bouzid. During Brahmi's funeral, protesters called for the government to be toppled, while police fired tear gas on them.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Assassination of Mohamed Brahmi
According to a statement made by the Tunisian Prosecutor regarding the autopsy of Brahmi's corpse; "The deceased had been hit with fourteen gunshots: six in his torso and eight in his left leg". Brahmi's killing was condemned by many international leaders including UN Human Rights chief Navi Pillay and President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz who said in a statement; "I am deeply saddened to learn of the despicable murder of our colleague Mohamed Brahmi. I condemn this assassination in the strongest terms."


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Investigations
Investigations had been issued following both assassinations and Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou announced at a news conference that the same 9mm automatic weapon that killed Belaid also killed Brahmi. The Chokri Belaid defense committee spokesman Tayeb Oqaili claimed on 2 October that, according to official documents, Abdulhakim Belhadj of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group was involved in the killings of both Belaid and Brahmi, pointing to links between the LIFG, Ansar al Sharia and the Ennahda Movement.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Political assassinations, Investigations
The left-wing leader maintained that Belhadj apparently intended to carry out terrorist attacks in Tunisia, and trained the Ansar al-Sharia cell that killed the opposition politicians, all under close observation by Ennahda leaders Rashid al-Ghannushi, Hamadi Jebali and Samir Dilou, among others. On 19 September 2013, Tunisia's interior minister told lawmakers the CIA informed authorities Brahmi was a target and said there'd been a "failure" in the security services' response. He announced an investigation had been opened.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Rise of extremism
The post-revolution Tunisia has witnessed an unprecedented rise in extremism through increasing militant activity, weapons smuggling from Libya and involvement in the political scene. They range from self-claimed moderate parties like Ennahda to the more hard-line Ansar al-Sharia and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Most of them denounced violence as a way to reach their goals and have advocated democracy. However, some have been engaged in numerous clashes with security forces mainly in the south and north-west of the country resulting in numerous casualties on both sides in a conflict that is often related to the wider Maghreb insurgency.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Rise of extremism
Several attacks by extremist factions took place in the Mount Chaambi national park on the border with Algeria. On 29 July 2013, a military convoy was ambushed by militants resulting in a number of deaths with many of the victims found beheaded and others mutilated. A week later, the Tunisian Armed Forces responded with an army offensive and air strikes to clear out the mountains of Islamist elements responsible for the assaults.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Rise of extremism
One of the most prominent extremist organizations is Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) that was highly involved in the political scene before being listed by the government as a terrorist group. The group was founded in April 2011 by Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi, who had previously co-founded the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) in Afghanistan with Tarek Maaroufi. Unlike Al-Qaeda and other like-minded groups in the Arab world, the AST claims to be non-violent and engages in charitable activity as a way of gaining support providing food, medicine and clothing while at the same time preaching mainstream Salafist thinking.


2013–2014 Tunisian political crisis, Issues, Rise of extremism
However, they have been involved in numerous violent incidents such as their alleged role in the storming of the US embassy in Tunis and an attack on a television station that showed the animated film Persepolis because it depicted God while repeatedly calling for the Islamization of the Tunisian media. They have also carried out attacks on art exhibits, premises that sell alcohol and ransacked ancient shrines it considered un-Islamic.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania
In October 2013, there was an outbreak of Zika fever in French Polynesia, the first outbreak of several Zika outbreaks across Oceania. With 8,723 cases reported, it was the largest outbreak of Zika fever before the outbreak in the Americas that began in April 2015. An earlier outbreak occurred on Yap Island in the Federated States of Micronesia in 2007, but it is thought that the 2013–2014 outbreak involved an independent introduction of the Zika virus from Southeast Asia. Investigators suggested that the outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases in the Pacific from 2012 to 2014 were "the early stages of a wave that will continue for several years", particularly because of their vulnerability to infectious diseases stemming from isolation and immunologically naive populations.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, French Polynesia
The first Zika outbreak started in French Polynesia in October 2013, with cases reported in the Society, Marquesas and Tuamotu Islands on Tahiti, Mo'orea, Raiatea, Tahaa, Bora Bora, Nuku Hiva and Arutua. The outbreak ran concurrently with an outbreak of dengue fever.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, French Polynesia
In December 2013, an American traveler to Mo'orea was diagnosed with Zika virus infection in New York after an 11-day history of symptoms, becoming the first American tourist to be diagnosed with Zika. A Japanese tourist returning to Japan was also diagnosed with Zika virus infection by the National Institute of Infectious Diseases after visiting Bora Bora, becoming the first imported case of Zika fever in Japan.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, French Polynesia
By February 2014, it was estimated that more than 29,000 people with Zika-like symptoms had sought medical care, roughly 11.5% of the population, with 8,503 suspected cases. Of 746 samples tested at the Institut Louis-Malardé in Tahiti by 7 February, 396 (53.1%) were confirmed as containing the Zika virus by RT-PCR. Two further cases of Zika virus infection were imported into Japan, and on 25 February, the Norwegian Institute of Public Health reported that a traveler returning to Norway from Tahiti was confirmed to have a Zika virus infection.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, French Polynesia
By March 2014, the outbreak was declining in the majority of the islands, and by October the outbreak had abated. A total of 8,723 suspected cases of Zika virus infection were reported, as well as more than 30,000 estimated clinical visits and medical consultations due to concerns about Zika. The true number of Zika cases was estimated at more than 30,000.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, New Caledonia
Zika spread westwards from French Polynesia to New Caledonia, where imported cases from French Polynesia were reported from November 2013 onwards. The first indigenous case was confirmed in January 2014 by the Pasteur Institute. On 10 February, there were 64 reported cases of Zika in the communities of Greater Nouméa, Dumbéa, and Ouvéa, of which 30 were imported from French Polynesia. By 26 February 2014, there were 140 confirmed cases of Zika in New Caledonia, including 32 imported cases. The outbreak peaked in April, and by 17 September, the number of confirmed cases had gone up to 1,400, of which 35 were imported. During the same time period, there were also outbreaks of chikungunya fever and dengue fever.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, Cook Islands
In February 2014, an outbreak of Zika was reported in the Cook Islands, to the southwest of French Polynesia. In March, an Australian woman was diagnosed with a Zika virus infection by Queensland Health following a recent trip to the Cook Islands, becoming the second reported case of Zika diagnosed in Australia. Nearly 40 other cases of Zika virus infection were imported into New Zealand. By 29 May, the outbreak had ended, with 50 confirmed and 932 suspected cases of Zika virus infection.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, Easter Island
By March 2014, there were one confirmed and 40 suspected cases of Zika virus infection on Easter Island. The Zika virus was suspected to have been carried to the island by a tourist from French Polynesia during the annual Tapati festival, held between January and February. Chilean health authorities decided against issuing a health alert, saying that the outbreak had been contained and was under control, and advised travelers to take precautions against mosquito bites. By the end of the year, 173 cases of Zika had been reported, but all of the cases were described as "mild".


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Epidemiology, Easter Island
On 24 September 2014, a Belgian woman flying to Easter Island from Tahiti was diagnosed with Zika virus infection after having previously received ambulatory care in Tahiti, and was taken to Hanga Roa Hospital for evaluation. LAN Airlines undertook operations to ensure other people on the woman's flight were not infected, and local health authorities stated that Zika was not a risk for people on the island.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Transmission
Zika is a mosquito-borne disease. Four aedine species of mosquito are found in the Pacific, including Aedes aegypti, widespread across the South Pacific, and Aedes polynesiensis, found between Fiji and French Polynesia. Aedes aegypti has previous been identified as a wild vector of the Zika virus, and preliminary results from the Institut Louis-Malardé have supported the main role of Aedes aegypti and probable role of Aedes polynesiensis in spreading the Zika virus.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Transmission
People infected with the Zika virus traveling to other Pacific islands could transmit the disease to local mosquitoes that bit them. The infected mosquitoes could then go on to spread Zika among the local mosquito population, and thence cause outbreaks of Zika among local people.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Transmission
A study conducted between November 2013 and February 2014 in French Polynesia found that 2.8% of blood donors tested positive for the Zika virus, of which 3% were asymptomatic at the time of blood donation. 11 of the infected donors studied subsequently reported symptoms of Zika virus infection within 10 days. This indicated a potential risk of transmission of the Zika virus through blood transfusions, but there are no confirmed cases of this occurring. Nucleic acid testing of blood donors was implemented in French Polynesia from 13 January 2014 onwards to prevent unintended transmission of the Zika virus.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Possible links to neurological syndromes, infant microcephaly and other disorders
A concurrent increase in neurological syndromes and autoimmune complications was first reported in early 2014. Of the 8,723 cases of Zika reported in French Polynesia, complications related to neurological signs of infection were noted in 74 people, including Guillain–Barré syndrome (GBS) in 42 people, as well as encephalitis, meningoencephalitis, paraesthesia, facial paralysis or myelitis in 25. However, there was only one laboratory confirmation of Zika virus infection using RT-PCR in patients with GBS. Among the initial 38 cases of GBS found in suspected Zika cases, 73% were male and infected individuals were aged between 27 and 70. This was highly unusual, as prior to the Zika outbreak there had only been 21 cases of GBS in French Polynesia between 2009 and 2012. 18 people newly diagnosed with GBS were admitted to the local rehabilitation centre, putting heavy strain on the limited intensive care resources available.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Possible links to neurological syndromes, infant microcephaly and other disorders
On 24 November 2015, health authorities in French Polynesia reported that there had been an unusual increase in the number of cases of central nervous system malformations in fetuses and infants during 2014–2015, coinciding with the outbreak of Zika on the islands. These malformations included 12 with fetal cerebral malformations or polymalformative syndromes, which includes microcephaly, and another 5 with brainstem dysfunction and absence of swallowing, much greater than the annual average of one case.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Possible links to neurological syndromes, infant microcephaly and other disorders
None of the pregnant women involved had medical signs of Zika virus infection, but four who were tested gave positive results in IgG serology assays for flaviviruses, suggesting an asymptomatic Zika virus infection during pregnancy. French Polynesian health authorities hypothesise that these abnormalities are associated with Zika if pregnant women are infected during the first or second trimester of pregnancy. Dr. Didier Musso, an infectious disease specialist at the Institut Louis-Malardé, said that there was "very high suspicion" of a link between microcephaly and the Zika virus outbreak in French Polynesia, but added that further research was still needed.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Possible links to neurological syndromes, infant microcephaly and other disorders
The two cases of Zika virus infection imported into Japan from French Polynesia in February 2014 showed signs of leukopenia (decreased levels of white blood cells) and moderate thrombocytopenia (decreased levels of platelets).


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Aftermath
Brazilian researchers have suggested that a traveler infected with the Zika virus arrived in Brazil from French Polynesia, leading to the ongoing Zika virus outbreak that began in 2015. This may have occurred during the 2014 FIFA World Cup tournament, or shortly after, based on phylogenetic DNA analysis of the virus. French researchers have speculated that the virus arrived in August 2014, when canoeing teams from French Polynesia, New Caledonia, the Cook Islands and Easter Island attended the Va'a World Sprint Championships in Rio de Janeiro.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Aftermath
Between 1 January and 20 May 2015, a further 82 confirmed cases of Zika were reported in New Caledonia, including ten imported cases.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Aftermath
In early 2015, two cases of Zika virus infection were reported in travelers returning to Italy from French Polynesia.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Aftermath
In February 2015, an outbreak of Zika began in the Solomon Islands. The Ministry of Health and Medical Services reported the first laboratory confirmation of Zika virus infection on 12 March 2015, and by 3 May 302 cases of Zika had been reported, with the number of new cases steadily decreasing.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Aftermath
On 27 April 2015, the Ministry of Health of Vanuatu announced that blood samples collected prior to Cyclone Pam in March were confirmed to contain the Zika virus. The Ministry of Health advised people to consult medical aid if they experienced a high fever with no obvious cause, and recommended communities clean up places where mosquitoes could lay eggs. The introduction of the Zika virus was thought to be linked to frequent travel between New Caledonia and Vanuatu.


2013–2014 Zika virus outbreaks in Oceania, Aftermath
Local transmission of the Zika virus by mosquitoes has been reported in the Polynesian islands of American Samoa, Samoa, and Tonga since November 2015. Cases of Zika virus infection have subsequently been confirmed in American Samoa, Samoa, Tonga, and the Marshall Islands.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak
The 2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak represented the first recorded outbreak of the disease outside of tropical Africa and Asia. In December 2013, the first locally transmitted case of chikungunya in the Americas was detected in Saint Martin. Shortly after the first case the disease began to spread rapidly throughout the Caribbean region. By the end of the year, it had spread to Martinique and Guadeloupe, with suspected cases in Saint Barthélemy. By the end of January 2014, cases had been confirmed in Saint Barthélemy, as well as the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, and French Guiana.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak
On the basis of 4,000 confirmed cases and over 30,000 suspected cases, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) declared a Caribbean-wide epidemic of the virus in early May. By the end of May, four cases of chikungunya had been confirmed in Florida. By July 2014 there were an estimated 355,000 cases in the Caribbean. By August 2014, 25 Caribbean countries had confirmed at least one case. The epidemic was over by 2015.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Background
Chikungunya is an arbovirus common to tropical regions of Africa and Asia. It is spread to humans by Aedes mosquitoes (primarily Aedes aegypti) that breed in stagnant water. The virus was first isolated in 1953, and likely first arose during the 1700s.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Background
Chikungunya is characterized by a sudden high fever and intense joint pain, between four and seven days after infection. It can also cause headaches, muscle pain, fatigue, and rashes. Most infected patients recover within 10 days, and deaths are rare. However, in some cases joint pain can linger for months or years. There is no vaccine or treatment for chikungunya and preventing its spread is difficult. Outbreaks are primarily dealt with through preventive measures, such as wearing long-sleeved clothing, and vector population control.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, First cases
In early December 2013, health officials confirmed two cases of locally transmitted chikungunya on the French half of Saint Martin. It was announced to the public on December 17, by which time 10 cases had been confirmed and many more suspected cases were undergoing lab tests. Vice President Guillaume Arnell declared that his country had an "obligation" to prevent the disease from spreading. "It started here so we have to contain it here", he said. Swift action was taken, and a Pan American Health Organization representative said she was satisfied by the response.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, First cases
Even so, there were 66 confirmed cases by the end of the month, including at least one case on the Dutch half of the island, and more than 180 suspected cases. The virus had also spread to Martinique (3 cases) and Guadeloupe (1 case) by the end of the year. In Saint Barthélemy, there were 21 suspected cases.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, First cases
Previously, chikungunya had not been found in the Americas. Although it had never previously been found, it was considered an emerging threat and preparations for its spread were underway by 2012. In July 2013, a Caribbean-wide virtual meeting was held to educate high-ranking medical personnel on how to detect the virus. It is unclear how the virus first spread to the Americas' mosquito population.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Spread of the chikungunya virus
By January 21, 2014, cases had been St. Barthelemy and the British Virgin Islands. Dominica and French Guiana both had one reported case due to travel in the affected islands. At the start of April, chikungunya was confirmed in the Dominican Republic. On 24 April, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines announced the island had three confirmed cases of chikungunya and an outbreak was officially declared. Two days later, Antigua and Barbuda announced its first confirmed case, on the island of Antigua. Four other cases were suspected.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Spread of the chikungunya virus
At the end of April, there were more than 4,100 probable cases of chikungunya across fourteen different Caribbean countries. In addition to thirteen island nations, the virus had been confirmed in French Guiana. Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Martin had the most reported cases.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Spread of the chikungunya virus
During the week of April 27, 2014, health officials from multiple agencies met in the Dominican Republic to discuss the outbreak. On May 1, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) declared a Caribbean-wide epidemic of the virus. The United States-based Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said it was "working with state health departments to increase awareness about chikungunya and to facilitate diagnostic testing" in preparation for possible introduction into South Florida.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Spread of the chikungunya virus
As of May 19, 2014, the Dominican Republic had over 32,000 reported cases of chikungunya, representing 68% of the total cases registered to date. By the end of May, four cases had been confirmed in Florida. Over 50,000 people were suspected to have contracted the virus in total.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Spread of the chikungunya virus
As of late September 2014, Health Minister Nancy Pérez of Venezuela stated that only 400 Venezuelans were infected with chikungunya while the Central University of Venezuela stated that there could be between 65,000 and 117,000 Venezuelans infected. The Venezuelan government has announced a three-stage plan to counter the outbreak, with Health Minister Pérez stating that the key function is to eliminate areas of mosquito breeding.


2013–2014 chikungunya outbreak, Spread of the chikungunya virus
By November 2014 most of the Caribbean Islands were affected and the Pan-American Health Organization reported about 800,000 suspected cases alone in the Caribbean.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process
The Solution process (Turkish: Çözüm süreci), also known as Peace process (Turkish: Barış süreci; Kurdish: Proseya Aştiyê) or the Kurdish–Turkish peace process, was a peace process that aimed to resolve the Turkey–PKK conflict as part of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present). The conflict has been ongoing since 1984 and resulted in some 40,000–100,000 mortal casualties and great economic losses for Turkey as well as high damage to the general population.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process
Though there was a unilateral cease-fire between 1999 and 2004, the sides failed to gain understanding, and the conflict became increasingly violent. The 2013 truce was working until September 2014, but when the relations became strained due to spillover of the Syrian Civil War, the truce fully collapsed in July 2015, following the Ceylanpınar incidents, which the Turkish government used as a casus belli to renew full-scale warfare in South-Eastern Turkey.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Background
The Turkey-PKK conflict is an armed conflict between the Republic of Turkey and people related to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which have demanded freedom from Turkey to create an independent Kurdistan, or to have autonomy and greater political and cultural rights for Kurds inside the Republic of Turkey. The PKK is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States, the European Union and NATO. Although insurgents have carried out attacks in many regions of Turkey, the insurgency is mainly in southeastern Turkey.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Background
The PKK's military presence in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, which it uses as launchpad for attacks on Turkey, has resulted in the Turkish military carrying out frequent ground incursions and air and artillery strikes in the region, as the Kurdistan Regional Government claimed they do not have sufficient military forces to prevent the PKK from operating. The conflict has particularly affected Turkey's tourism industry and has cost the economy of Turkey an estimated 300 to 450 billion dollars, mainly military expenses.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Background
Since the PKK was founded on November 27, 1978, it has been involved in armed clashes with Turkish security forces. The full-scale insurgency however, did not begin until August 15, 1984 when the PKK announced a Kurdish uprising. The first insurgency lasted until September 1, 1999  when the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire. The armed conflict was later resumed on June 1, 2004, when the PKK declared an end to its cease-fire. Since summer 2011, the conflict has become increasingly violent with resumption of large-scale hostilities.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments
In November 2012 about 10,000 prisoners were in a hunger strike and had the following three demands. They wanted to defend themselves in Kurdish language while being in court, the improvement of the detention conditions of Abdullah Öcalan, and the start of a peace process between Turkey and the PKK. The Academics for Peace actively supported those demands. On the eve of 2012 (28 December), in a television interview upon a question of whether the government had a project to solve the issue, Erdoğan stated that the government was in negotiations with jailed rebel leader Öcalan.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments
The negotiations were initially named the Solution Process (Çözüm Süreci) in public. While negotiations were going on, there were numerous events that were regarded as sabotage to derail the talks: The assassination of the PKK administrators in Paris Sakine Cansız, Fidan Doğan and Leyla Söylemez in Paris, revealing Öcalan's talks with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) publicly via the Milliyet newspaper and finally, the bombings of the Justice Ministry of Turkey and Erdoğan's office at the Justice and Development Party (AKP) headquarters in Ankara.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments
However, both parties vehemently condemned all three events as they occurred and stated that they were determined anyway. Finally on 21 March 2013, after months of negotiations with the Turkish Government, Abdullah Ocalan's message to the people was read both in Turkish and Kurdish during the Nowruz celebrations in Diyarbakır. The letter called a cease-fire that included disarmament and withdrawal from Turkish soil and calling an end to armed struggle. PKK announced that they would obey, stating that the year of 2013 is the year of solution either through war or through peace. Erdoğan welcomed the letter stating that concrete steps will follow PKK's withdrawal.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments
On 25 April 2013, the PKK announced that it withdraws all its forces within Turkey to northern Iraq. According to the government and the Kurds and to most of the press, this move marks the end of a 30-year-old conflict. The second phase which includes constitutional and legal changes towards the recognition of human rights of the Kurds starts simultaneously with withdrawal.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments, Wise people committee
The government announced its long-awaited list of "wise men" on April 4, the members of a seven-region commission tasked with explaining the ongoing settlement process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to the public and promoting the negotiations. Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç announced the list of "wise people", several weeks after the government first announced plans to set up such a commission made up of intellectuals and well-liked public figures.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments, Wise people committee
The list includes celebrities who are intellectuals, writers and academics as well as singers such as Orhan Gencebay. The commission is made up of groups organized on a regional basis, and will be active in seven regions across the country. On Tuesday, while mystery still shrouded the identities of the government's list of wise people, Erdoğan said, "We will listen to the views and suggestions of the people who are part of this delegation, consult with them and they will organize some events in [the country's] regions and get together with our citizens and local public opinion leaders."


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments, Wise people committee
In a speech on March 23, the prime minister defined the role of the commission, saying they will be conducting a "psychological operation," indicating the wise people will act as public relations agents. In a speech he made in Ankara on March 23, Erdoğan stated, "It is important to prepare the public for this and social perceptions should be created by the wise men." He said only public acceptance can fend off nationalistic shows.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Developments, Wise people committee
The Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) were critical of the wise men list, claiming that the people on the list are all supportive of the government. On April 5, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met for the first time with members of the wise men commission. After five weeks of work, the Wise Persons committee gave its first report to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and shared their impressions on the level of support regarding the process. The meeting lasted over four hours.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Public opinion
On March 21, 2013, a public opinion survey carried out by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) suggests that almost 57.7 percent of people support ongoing government-sponsored efforts for the settlement of the conflict with PKK. While 10 percent declined to comment, slightly more than 22 percent said they do not support the process. The results of the survey were discussed in a meeting held at AK Party headquarters. According to the survey, the highest support for the government efforts to end Turkey-PKK conflict comes from the Southeast, with 81 percent.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Public opinion
The Southeast is followed by the East, with 77 percent. However, the support is lower in the other regions. In Marmara and Central Anatolia, roughly 59 percent of participants in the survey said they support the settlement process, while 49 percent of respondents in the Mediterranean said the same. In the Aegean region, 44 percent of respondents expressed support for the peace talks, and 43 percent in the Black Sea region expressed support.


2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, Public opinion
In early May 2013, the number of supporters increased to 70 percent according to a survey carried out by the AK Party, while a survey conducted by the Konda research company showed that the number of supporters increased to 81.3 percent.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt
On December 29, 2013, three journalists working for the Qatari-based international news channel Al Jazeera English, Australian Peter Greste, Canadian Mohamed Fahmy and Egyptian Baher Mohamed were taken into custody by Egyptian security forces at the Marriott Hotel in Cairo following a raid at their room, which was used for the news channel's remote studio. The Egyptian Interior Ministry confirmed the arrest and said the journalists were accused of reporting false news which was "damaging to national security".


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt
On June 23, 2014, after a four-month trial, all three were found guilty and were sentenced to between 7 and 10 years imprisonment, triggering harsh criticism from other governments and human rights organizations. A day later, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declared that he would not interfere with judicial rulings.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt
In February 2015, Greste was released from prison and deported back to Australia via Cyprus, while the other two journalists were released on bail, pending a new trial. After the retrial, the reporters were again found guilty and sentenced between 3 and 3.5 years imprisonment. A month later, they were released from prison following a presidential pardon issued by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2013 arrest
Australian journalist Peter Greste and his colleagues Mohamed Fahmy and Baher Mohamed were arrested on 29 December 2013 at the Cairo Marriott Hotel after the police conducted a raid at their room, which was used as their makeshift news studio. The Egyptian Interior Ministry confirmed the arrest and said the journalists were accused of reporting false news which was "damaging to national security".


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2013 arrest
Following their arrest, Greste and his colleagues were imprisoned in Egypt in solitary confinement for a month before any formal charges were made.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2013 arrest
On 29 January 2014, it emerged that the Egyptian authorities were to charge 20 journalists belonging to Al Jazeera, including Greste, of falsifying news and having a negative impact on overseas perceptions of the country.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2013 arrest
The three men were being held in the same cell in early February 2014. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the authorities in Egypt to "promptly release" the Al Jazeera staff.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
On 21 February 2014, Greste was denied bail and had his court case adjourned until 5 March 2014.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
On 31 March 2014, he and co-defendants Mohammed Fahmy and Baher Mohamed made a request to a judge during a hearing to be released. During the hearing Greste told the judge: "The idea that I could have an association with the Muslim Brotherhood is frankly preposterous."


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
On paper, Fahmy has been described as the "ring-leader" of the "terrorist cell". Hundreds of so-called fabricated videos considered as evidence confiscated from the Al Jazeera English hard-disk were listed against him personally. Most of these allegedly fabricated videos were filmed in the past three years before Fahmy worked for Al Jazeera when he was still reporting for CNN in Cairo. The investigation states that he prepared a "media center" in the hotel where he held meetings with Muslim Brotherhood leaders and recruited students to gather news.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
But Fahmy testified in court that he was personally a liberal who marched as a private citizen in protests to support President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood. Prominent Egyptian figures like Amr Moussa, the former head of the Arab League, and telecommunication mogul and billionaire Naguib Sawiris attested to Fahmy's integrity in court and confirmed he has no affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
Egyptian scientist Farouk El-Baz who worked on the United States space program also supported Fahmy in a letter submitted to the judge. Mr. Sawiris even took his fury further and released a video calling on Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to release Fahmy.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
Mohamed Fahmy's international lawyer Amal Clooney, hired in his own capacity and not through Al Jazeera Media Network, called the judicial process a "show-trial" in her Huffington Post Article "The Anatomy of an Unfair Trial". She released several statements calling on the Egyptians to release her client and urged the Qatari government and Al Jazeera to take positive steps to support his freedom and refrain from actions that hinder his cause.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
On 23 June 2014, all three were found guilty of the charges against them. Greste and Fahmy were sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Mohamed received a sentence of seven years imprisonment plus an additional three years for bullet possession which he picked up during a demonstration. International reaction was swift and negative. US Secretary of State John Kerry was highly critical of the sentences of Greste and his co-workers, terming them "chilling and draconian" and noted he had spoken to Egyptian governmental officials including President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Al-Sisi however was unmoved. A day after the trial, and amidst the widespread international condemnation, the Egyptian president declared that he would not interfere with judicial rulings.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
Greste and his colleagues were seen internationally as political prisoners due to the nature of the trial, the lack of applicable evidence presented and the sentences.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2014 trial and sentencing
Eleven defendants tried in absentia, including three foreign journalists, received 10-year sentences.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing
The trio stood trial on January 1, 2015, before the Cairo Court Of Cassation. The court ordered a retrial for Fahmy and his two colleagues, while keeping them in custody as their request to release on bail was denied.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing
On 29 August 2015 - after a 9-month-long trial, Fahmy was sentenced to three years in prison, Mohamed was sentenced to 3-and-a-half years in prison and fined E£5,000 ($640), and Greste was sentenced in absentia to three years in prison at a sentencing hearing in Cairo. Following the verdict, Judge Hassan Farid said the accused broadcast "false news ... with the aim of harming the country".


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing
From his home country of Australia, Greste said he would be unable to travel to Egypt or any country with an extradition treaty with Egypt if an international arrest warrant for him was issued. Furthermore, Greste said in a tweet that he was "shocked" and "outraged" about the verdict.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing, Release
On February 1, 2015, Greste was deported to Australia via Cyprus. The presidential decree that allows the deportation of foreigners stipulates that they face prison or trial in their home country, but Australia is unlikely to uphold Greste's conviction. Otherwise, no explanation was given for his release. Two days later, Fahmy renounced his Egyptian citizenship so he could be deported to Canada. His request was still pending at the time of the sentencing in August.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing, Release
On February 12, Fahmy and Mohamed were released on bail of E£250,000 ($33,000) with strict conditions. After the judge handed down sentences in August, they were taken back into custody. Fahmy's lawyer, Amal Clooney, said she would meet with Egyptian government officials to ask for her client to be deported to Canada.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing, Release
On September 23, 2015, Fahmy and Mohamed were released from prison after Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi issued a pardon on 100 activists including the Al Jazeera journalists, which was announced on his Facebook page. This marks the occasion of Eid al-Adha and the President's visit to the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly which will take place later this week. The Al Jazeera Media Network has welcomed their release but continues to demand all charges and sentences against its journalists are dropped.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, 2015 re-trial and sentencing, Release
After release Fahmy traveled back to Canada, where he took a role as a journalist in residence at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, Honours
On February 19, 2015, the three detained reporters won a special Royal Television Society award for their sacrifices to journalism. Greste accepted the award in London for the three.


2013–2015 detention of Al Jazeera journalists by Egypt, Lawsuit against Al Jazeera
On May 5, 2015, Mohamed Fahmy filed a lawsuit against Al Jazeera for C$100 million (US$75.3 million) in punitive and remedial damages for alleged negligence and breach of contract. He accused the network of "negligence" by misinforming him about its legal status and their safety in Egypt.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela
The Venezuelan economic crisis is the deterioration that began to be noticed in the main macroeconomic indicators from the year 2012, and whose consequences continue, not only economically but also politically and socially. The April 2019 International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook described Venezuela as being in a "wartime economy". For the fifth consecutive year, Bloomberg rated Venezuela first on its misery index in 2019.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Origins
The origin of this economic collapse, framed in the context of the Great Recession, years after the improvement of the extraction of unconventional hydrocarbons in the U.S., showed a macro-economic phenomenon of great importance for the region. China's slowdown, a steady increase in oil production, and stable demand generated a surplus of crude oil that caused a drop in prices of reference crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), and Brent Crude, falling in 2014 from $100 a barrel to $50 a barrel, and causing unfavourable changes in the economy of Venezuela (see 2010s oil glut).


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Origins
Owing to high oil reserves, lack of policies on private property and low remittances, by 2012, 90% of Venezuela's revenues came from oil and its derivatives. With the fall in oil prices in early 2015 the country faced a drastic fall in revenues of the US currency along with commodities.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Origins
In addition, the government had not made policy changes to adapt to the low petroleum price. In early 2016, The Washington Post reported the official price of state-retailed petrol was below US$.01 per gallon, and the black market valued the dollar at 150 times what the official state currency exchange rate did.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Business and industry
In 2013, Venezuela ranked as the top spot globally with the highest misery index score.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Business and industry
A number of foreign firms have left the nation, often due to quarrels with the socialist government, including Smurfit Kappa, Clorox, Kimberly Clark and General Mills; the departures aggravate unemployment and shortages.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Business and industry
Domestic airlines are having difficulties because of hyperinflation and parts shortages, and many international airlines have left the country. Airlines from many countries that have left Venezuela including AeroMexico, Air Canada, Avianca (Colombia), Delta, and Lufthansa, making travel to the country difficult. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Government of Venezuela has not paid US$3.8 billion to international airlines in a currency issue involving conversion of local currency to U.S. dollars. Airlines have left for other reasons, including crime against flight crews, stolen baggage, and problems with the quality of jet fuel and maintenance of runways. American Airlines, the last U.S. airline serving Venezuela, left on 15 March 2019, after its pilots refused to fly to Venezuela, citing safety issues.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Business and industry
Iranian Mahan Air (blacklisted by the U.S. since 2011) began direct flights to Caracas in April 2019, "signifying a growing relationship between the two nations" according to FOX News.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Gross domestic product
Estimated to drop by 25% in 2019, the IMF said the contraction in Venezuela's GDP—the largest since the Libyan Civil War began in 2014—was affecting all of Latin America. In 2015 the Venezuelan economy contracted 5.7% and in 2016 it contracted 18.6% according to the Venezuelan central bank.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Gross domestic product
Oil generates about 96% of Venezuela's export revenues; oil prices have fallen when the country faces runaway inflation and a severe scarcity of basic products.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Gross domestic product
In reference to the anti-government protests that shook Venezuela earlier this year, smuggling and of hoarding essential products, the central bank said that those "actions against the national order prevented the full distribution of basic goods to the population, as well as the normal development of the production of goods and services. This resulted in an inflationary upturn and a fall in economic activity".


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Inflation
Inflation in Venezuela remained high during Chávez's presidency. By 2010, inflation removed any advancement of wage increases. The inflation rate in 2014 reached 69% and was the highest in the world. It increased to 181% in 2015, 800% in 2016, 4,000% in 2017 and 2,295,981% in February 2019.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Inflation
In November 2016, Venezuela entered a period of hyperinflation. The Venezuelan government "essentially stopped" producing inflation estimates in early 2018.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Inflation
From 2017 to 2019, some people became video game gold farmers and could be seen playing games such as RuneScape to sell in-game currency or characters for real currency; gamers could make more money than salaried workers by earning only a few dollars per day. In the 2017 Christmas season, some shops stopped using price tags since prices would inflate so quickly.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Inflation
In August 2018, Maduro announced a new currency, the sovereign bolívar, to fight hyperinflation. The new currency replaced the existing paper bolivar at a rate of 1/100,000: a 100,000 bolivar note becoming a 1 sovereign bolivar note. The new bills were introduced on 20 August 2018.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Inflation
At the end of 2018, inflation had reached 1.35 million percent.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Inflation
According to Bloomberg, Venezuela's inflation is expected to reach 8 million percent in 2019, making it the world's most miserable economy. The country continues to top Bloomberg's Misery Index for the fifth year straight.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Shortages
Shortages in Venezuela became prevalent after price controls were enacted according to the economic policy of the Hugo Chávez government. Under the economic policy of the Nicolás Maduro government, greater shortages occurred due to the Venezuelan government's policy of withholding United States dollars from importers with price controls.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Shortages
Shortages occur in regulated products, such as milk, meat, chicken, coffee, rice, oil, precooked flour, and butter; and also basic necessities like toilet paper, personal hygiene products and medicine. Some Venezuelans must search for food—occasionally resorting to eating wild fruit or garbage—wait in lines for hours and sometimes settle without having certain products.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Unemployment
Unemployment was forecasted to reach 44% for 2019; the IMF stated that this was the highest unemployment seen in the world since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Unemployment
Venezuelan's unemployment rate hit 17.4% at the end of June 2017, with the jobless total having doubled over 12 months, when two million people lost their jobs. In January 2016 the unemployment rate was 18.1 percent and the economy was the worst in the world according to the misery index. Venezuela has not reported official unemployment figures since April 2016, when the rate was at 7.3 percent.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Unemployment
Due to the inflation and expropriations by the Venezuelan government to private companies, many others left the country, which in turn increased unemployment for those remaining. Likewise, the salary increase at the end of 2016 brought the dismissal of half of the employees of large companies (Corpoelec, Imaseo, etc. ).


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Unemployment
After having completed substantial improvements over the second half of the 1990s and during the 2000s, which put a few regions on the brink of full employment, Venezuela suffered a severe setback in 2015, when it saw its unemployment rate surging to 1994 levels.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Venezuelan debt
In August 2017 President of the United States Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Venezuela which banned transactions involving Venezuela's state debt including debt restructuring. The technical default period ended 13 November 2017 and Venezuela didn't pay coupons on its dollar eurobonds, causing a cross default on other dollar bonds. A committee consisting of the fifteen largest banks admitted default on state debt obligations which in turn entailed payments on CDS on 30 November.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Venezuelan debt
In November 2017, The Economist estimated Venezuela's debt at US$105 billion and its reserves at US$10 billion. In 2018, Venezuela's debt grew to US$156 billion and as of March 2019, its reserves had dropped to US$8 billion.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Venezuelan debt
With the exception of PDVSA's 2020 bonds, as of January 2019, all of Venezuela's bonds are in default, and Venezuela's government and state-owned companies owe nearly US$8 billion in unpaid interest and principal. As of March 2019, the government and state-owned companies have US$150 billion in debt.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Venezuelan debt
The risk premium began to skyrocket at the end of 2014 to a record high of 3,181 basis points. The risk premium set a record in August 2017, recording 5,000 basis points exceeding eight times Greece's risk premium.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Prices
Due to the lack of its own resources, Venezuela has traditionally exported all its oil abroad, so the energy crisis of 2014 produced a strong inflationary trend. In June 2013, accumulated inflation in the last twelve months was 56.2%. The sharp drop between 2014 and 2016 in the price of oil, sparked fears of a risk of hyperinflation. In 2015, Venezuela reached the highest inflation rate in the last 35 years, and in March 2016 there was hyperinflation for the first time in recorded history. In October 2016, the economy continued to contract while inflation increased again. Between 2017 and 2018, prices rose 2616% - this increase combined with austerity measures and high unemployment negatively impacted the living standards of Venezuelans. At the same time the average wages decreased (real) and the purchasing power was significantly reduced.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Ratings
In the beginning of the crisis, Venezuela's credit ratings were downgraded to "junk territory" or below investment grade with negative outlooks according to most rating agencies. In a little more than one year, Standard and Poor's downgraded Venezuela's credit rating three times; from B+ to B in June 2013, B to B- in December 2013 and from B- to CCC+ in September 2014. Fitch Ratings also lowered each of Venezuela's credit ratings in March 2014 from B+ to B and even lower from B to CCC in December 2014. In December 2013, Moody's Investors Service also downgraded both Venezuela's local (B1) and foreign currency (B2) ratings to Caa1. The noted reasons of credit rating changes were the greatly increased likelihood of economic and financial collapse due to the Venezuelan government's policies and an "out of control" inflation rate.


2013–present economic crisis in Venezuela, Ratings
In July 2017, Standard & Poor's lowered both the domestic and foreign credit ratings of Venezuela to CCC- due to the increasing risk of default. Fitch Ratings followed suit in August 2017, lowering local and foreign credit ratings to CC. In November 2017 Standard & Poor's rated Venezuela in technical default and Fitch ratings rated Venezuela's oil company PDVSA in restrictive default - one rank above full default.


2014
2014 (MMXIV) was a common year starting on Wednesday of the Gregorian calendar, the 2014th year of the Common Era (CE) and Anno Domini (AD) designations, the 14th  year of the 3rd millennium, the 14th  year of the 21st century, and the  5th   year of the 2010s decade.


2014 1. deild
The 2014 1. deild was the 71st season of 1. deild.


2014 1. deild
Tvøroyrar Bóltfelag and FC Suðuroy got promoted to the Faroe Islands Premier League, after finishing 1st and 2nd at the end of the season.


2014 1. deild
Havnar Bóltfelag II and EB/Streymur II got relegated to 2. deild, after finishing 9th and 10th at the end of the season.


2014 1. deild, Teams
A total of 10 teams participated in the 2014 edition of 1. deild.


2014 1. deild karla
The 2014 1. deild karla (English: Men's First Division) was the 60th season of second-tier Icelandic football. Twelve teams contested the league; play began on 9 May and was concluded on 20 September. Leiknir R were crowned champions on 20. Sept 2014 for the first time and earned their first ever promotion to Úrvalsdeild.


2014 1. deild karla, Teams
The league will be contested by twelve clubs. Eight remained in the division from the 2013 season, while four new clubs joined the 1. deild karla:


2014 1. deild karla, Results grid
Each team plays every opponent once home and away for a total of 22 matches per club, and 132 matches altogether.