2009–2011 News of the World phone hacking scandal investigations, Hugh Grant
"20 per cent of the Met has taken backhanders from tabloid hacks. So why would they want to open up that can of worms?... And what's wrong with that, anyway? It doesn't hurt anyone particularly."


2009–2011 News of the World phone hacking scandal investigations, Hugh Grant
Grant's article attracted considerable interest, due to both the revelatory content of the taped conversation, and the novelty of Grant himself "turning the tables" on a tabloid journalist.


2009–2011 News of the World phone hacking scandal investigations, Hugh Grant
Whilst the allegations regarding the News of the World continued to receive coverage in the broadsheets and similar media (Grant appeared for example on BBC Radio 4) it was only with the revelation that the voicemail of the then missing and subsequently murdered Millie Dowler had been hacked, and evidence in her murder enquiry had been deleted, that the coverage turned from media interest to widespread public (and eventually political) outrage. Grant became something of a spokesman against Murdoch's News Corporation, culminating in an appearance on the BBC's Question Time in July 2011.


2009–2011 News of the World phone hacking scandal investigations, Further investigations
Further investigations (beyond News of the World and/or beyond phone hacking) developed in 2011. Some of these also revealed further details of the phone hacking and of News International's handling of the phone hacking.


2009–2011 Super League licences
The 2009–11 Super League licences were announced in May 2005 by the Rugby Football League (RFL) as the new determinant of the Super League competition's participants from 2009 in place of promotion and relegation. The licences were awarded after consideration of more factors than just the on-the-field performance of a club in the previous season. After 2007 automatic promotion and relegation was suspended for Super League with new teams admitted on a licence basis with the term of the licence to start in 2009.


2009–2011 Super League licences
The RFL stated that clubs applying to compete in Super League XIV in 2009 would be assessed by criteria in four areas (stadium facilities, finance and business performance, commercial and marketing and playing strength, including junior production and development) with the final evaluations and decisions being taken by the RFL's board of directors. These final deliberations were informed by the findings of a range of experts at the RFL and from external advisors such as KPMG.


2009–2011 Super League licences
Successful applicants would be licensed for three years of Super League competition. Three-yearly reviews of Super League membership will take place to ensure ambitious clubs lower down the leagues can still be successful.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation
The RFL's in-house lawyer, Rod Findlay, explained, "The basis for the licensing process was established in May 2005 when the RFL, in full consultation with member clubs, drew up a strategy document for Super League which basically said 'This is what we want the league to look like and this is what we want the clubs to look like,'". Findlay continued, "The document concluded that the competition should be expanded to 14 clubs and said it was not felt the heartland would be able to sustain that number of Super League clubs. We do not have 14 clubs who satisfy all the Super League strategy aims. The board needs to decide whether those clubs that are not currently satisfying the aims can satisfy them in the future."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation
Commenting on the implementation of three-year licence cycles, the RFL's Chief Executive Nigel Wood stated, "We hope to capture all of the advantages of a closed competition like the NRL without the disadvantages of having perennial under-performers that sometimes you get in a closed competition."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation, Club development
It is thought that the removal of the annual threat of relegation will prompt clubs to invest in developing their infrastructure, such as junior development and facilities, rather than spending on short-term fixes to avoid the drop. "The aim is that clubs direct some of their resources into medium-term development rather than the short-term panic of trying to hire a player, invariably from overseas, who will make the difference against relegation but leave without any long-term legacy," said the RFL's Wood.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation, Club development
The RFL have stated their belief that the benefits of licensing would grow the collective business strength of Super League (Europe) Limited. Alex Byars, senior manager in the Sports Business Group at Deloitte believed that licensing system had the potential to bring more money into the sport: "The greater stability could lead to more investment from outside of the sport as the removal of dramatic revenue changes due to relegation could also increase investor confidence."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation, International competition
Richard Lewis said he expected that "licensing will galvanise the sport, stimulating clubs into addressing the issues of facility improvements, spectator comfort and the production of more players".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation, International competition
The changes brought forth by licensing are intended to strengthen the competition and British rugby league. The strengthened competition, it is hoped, will lead to the development of more players able to compete successfully at international level. "The thinking is that if we have a more intense competition we will produce battle-hardened footballers," said Wood.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation, Expansion to 14 clubs
The RFL have said that there is no upper limit on the number of clubs that may be accepted into the competition if more than fourteen strong applications are received as long as any additional entrants are "not detrimental to the overall quality of the competition and depth of playing talent".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Motivation, Expansion to 14 clubs
In  June 2008, the RFL confirmed that Super League would be expanded from 12 teams to 14 in 2009. Richard Lewis, the RFL's Executive Chairman, said it was "as good a time as any for the sport to go to a 14-team Super League competition" with "television income, sponsorship income and crowd figures - so much going well" and the international game growing. Expansion to 14 teams had been an aim of the RFL and its member clubs since the licensing was agreed upon in a 2005 strategy document.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants
Nineteen applications for Super League licences were received. Each of the 2008 season Super League clubs applied as well as several National League One sides and Toulouse Olympique of the French Elite One Championship.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants
In recent seasons and leading up to the submission deadline, several clubs submitted 'dummy' applications to the RFL - on which they received advice and feedback - in preparation for their official one. This 'dummy' application facility run by the RFL has been praised by clubs including Castleford and its Chief Executive, Richard Wright.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants, Application eligibility
Current Super League clubs were required to submit applications justifying their continued membership of the competition.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants, Application eligibility
Non -Super League clubs based in the United Kingdom had to be participants in The Co-operative National League One during the 2008 season to apply.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants, Application eligibility
Clubs based outside the UK and not competing in either Super League or National League One were able to apply, with applications to be judged by "the independent RFL board under the same process as UK based applications".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants, Application eligibility
The deadline for the completed licence applications of clubs was the end of March 2008.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants, Decision process
The licence application process was designed to have the confidence of clubs being assessed as to the rigour of analysis of the business plans produced. The RFL and the clubs did not want the process to be a "leap of faith".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Applicants, Expulsion from Super League
Clubs that are awarded a Super League Licence are not protected for the three years of the contract from removal from Super League due to the absence of relegation. The RFL Board will have powers enabling them to revoke a club's membership if necessary at any time, with the failed club being replaced by another from outside. The reasons, yet to be finalised and published, are "likely to include insolvency, contractual breach, persistent under performance and possibly persistent rule breaking".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria
Stage two of the licence decision process saw the clubs allocated the points used to decide licence grades according to their strength in several areas.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Facilities
Teams will get one point for having a stadium with a capacity of 12,000 or more. Another point will be awarded if the ground meets the standards of a premier competition in the 21st century.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Attendances
A point will be awarded to clubs with an average attendance of around 10,000 spectators. Another point will be awarded if stadiums are operating at 40 per cent capacity.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Finances
Teams will receive a point if they are solvent. Another point will be awarded if their turnover is more than £4 million.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Player strength
Teams earn one point if they are considered to have made a contribution to the competition - that means averaging a place in the top eight over each of the last three seasons. Another point is available to clubs who make a contribution to home-grown player development. That means at least eight members of a first-team squad of 25 should be discovered, trained and developed in the team's home country (United Kingdom or France).


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Salary cap
One point is on offer to teams who have not committed a major breach of the salary cap in the last three seasons.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Geographical expansion
The final point goes to clubs who do not have another rugby league club within a 20-mile radius.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Total score
The scores attained by each club (out of ten) are translated into a Licence grading.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Licence criteria, Total score
Sky Sports report that it is believed teams who achieve an A or B Licence will be awarded a place in Super League, while those who achieve a C Licence will undergo further scrutiny before the RFL decide who makes the final cut.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Predicted
Sky SportsBoots 'N' All, the magazine programme broadcast on Sky Sports, the primary Super League broadcaster, sent a reporter to each of the nineteen applicants to evaluate them.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Predicted
Code 13Monthly British rugby league magazine Code 13 also evaluated all the licences, apart from Toulouse, in their April 2008 issue.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Outcome
The 19 applicant clubs met with the RFL's board of directors at 0945 BST Tuesday 22 July 2008 to be told the outcome of their bids for licences.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Outcome
The Executive Chairman of the RFL, Richard Lewis publicly announced the 14 clubs to be licensed at 1000 BST. The press conference had been described by some as British rugby league's most significant since the switch to a summer Super League was first mooted in 1995. An announcement of this kind was a first for British sport.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Outcome
The 14 successful clubs included all 12 existing Super League clubs, despite concern that some did not meet the relevant criteria. A day later, on 23 July 2008, the RFL announced the gradings they had given to each of the 14 successful applications.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Outcome
In the lead up to the announcement, Rod Findlay, the RFL's in-house lawyer, stated that he believed the process of preparing the applications would benefit each of the 19 applicants due to the level of scrutiny required for so much of their operation.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Following the announcement of which clubs had successfully obtained a licence to compete in Super League, the RFL released a summary of their assessment of each applicant.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The club's stadium, Odsal, was judged to need improvement, although the RFL noted the Coral Stand development provided Bradford with a good standard hospitality provision and that there were plans for further development in the future known as Odsal Sporting Village. The club financial situation was praised for an ability to operate without shareholder support. Match attendances had fallen in comparison to past seasons but the club was still one of the better supported of the applicants. Bradford had a record of recent success in competition; this was tempered by what was considered a "slight overseas reliance" in the playing department.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The Catalans' home ground, Stade Gilbert Brutus in Perpignan, was considered to be a "sound functional stadium" with further development planned for the year ahead. The RFL found the club's financial forecasts to be of a lower standard than preferred and also that the club had been "reliant on shareholder input". Attendances and merchandising at the club were judged to have improved, as expected, over the three years since the Catalans' entry to Super League, from a low starting point.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
It was noted that the team were achieving positive match results and that more French trained players had been introduced, but that club needed to improve its youth development programme. The RFL felt that the commercial success of the club and an increased player pool proved a vindication of the decision to introduce a French team to the competition.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Castleford's Wheldon Road ground, The Jungle, was deemed to be "limited and old fashioned" though well maintained. The club had noted the standard of the ground and possessed "relatively advanced" plans to build a new stadium. The financial projections submitted by the club were based on a new ground. The RFL believed the club to be financially well managed and for use of external borrowing and shareholder funds to be "limited".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Castleford had produced a "holistic" commercial plan, having a record of achievement in this area, and had enjoyed strong support previously when the club had been relegated from Super League. Relegation, though, had had a detrimental effect on the club's playing staff, despite the club maintaining youth pathways, it had not been able to sign the best of the local rugby league prospects.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The club's Brewery Field home ground was considered to be "limited and old fashioned" though well maintained and there was a commitment to improve the facilities immediately. Celtic Crusaders acknowledged the necessity to develop a new facility in the future. The RFL considered the club's financial projections to be subjective as a consequence of the enterprise being a new venture but noted that the club had shown stability financially since formation.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The RFL noted positive relationships had been developed between the club and commercial partners and that there were opportunities to be exploited through a relationship with Welsh language television channel S4C. The RFL noted that independent market research had found support for Super League in South Wales, but acknowledged that only reality would provide full testing. The club has scholarship and academy team development at an early stage but the RFL noted playing infrastructure was "very good in places".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The Chris Moyles Stadium in Post Office Road was assessed as being well maintained but in need of further investment to meet Super League minimum standards. The club was judged to have good community initiatives and to have generated some positive and creative media coverage in the previous year. The club was proximate to several current Super League clubs and so faced competition. Featherstone's player development pathway was below the standard needed for Super League and would require investment. The club's finances appeared to be stable.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
It was felt that the incomplete state of The Shay stadium "significantly restrained" the club and their application because it made financial and marketing plans quite hypothetical, though the past positive contribution to Super League of the Halifax club was noted. The RFL also noted that Halifax had consistently performed at the higher end of National League 1 in recent campaigns. It was stated that player development investment would need to be increased to reach Super League standard.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Harlequins' home ground, The Stoop, had all-round good facilities and it is hoped stability at this stadium will lead to an increase in attendance as the club attempts to attract the population within their "catchment area" and utilise a "robust" community programme. The club relied on "significant" shareholder support. The club had been "reasonably successful" in Super League and there were local players emerging through player development schemes but the club's junior players are "not regularly attracting national honours".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Huddersfield's home ground was deemed to be "excellent", though not quite state-of-the-art owing to its opening in 1994. Huddersfield were judged to be dependent on the support of its shareholders and to need to meet the aims of its commercial planning to negate this. Attendance at matches has risen, this was attributed to improved on-field performance as well as the recruitment of commercial staff. The club's talent development structures for scholarship and academy players was noted an area that needed close monitoring by the club so that they could meet quotas for club-trained players.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Hull were commended for their "excellent stadium" and attendances. The club were deemed to be well-run and to have good community programmes. Hull showed that they were operating in profit and required little external financial funds. Playing strength was high.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Rovers were said to have strong potential. The club had invested in improving their facilities, with further improvements planned. The club's commercial plans and community work were praised. The assessors considered that further evidence of player performance strategies would have been useful but that this area had improved since the club was promoted to Super League.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Leeds Rhinos' Headingley Stadium was noted to be an older stadium but one that had undergone "significant improvements" with additional ones planned. The Leeds club had historic and projected profits in addition to "strong" net assets. The clubs was praised for good performance commercially, in match attendances, playing record and in producing quality Club Trained players.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Leigh's new stadium at Leigh Sports Village was close to opening and through inspection of the site and a review of plans, the facility was predicted to be "excellent". The assessment team believed the stadium would aid the club in developing its structures and in developing into a strong candidate for Super League. It was judged that Leigh would need to recruit to be able to deliver their "good, reasoned" commercial plan. Leigh was predicted to be reliant on its shareholders. The club had shown evidence of investment in youth production, though this was judged to need improvement to achieve Super League standards.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The club's ground, The Willows, was assessed to be "limited and old fashioned" despite having good corporate and disabled facilities. The assessment noted "relatively advanced" plans for a replacement. Salford had long record of financial stability and their commercial and marketing plans "appear[ed] well developed" with intentions to exploit their planned stadium and access to Salford and Manchester. The club was judged to have been "very diligent in every area" of their player performance strategy although problems with under 16s player development were noted.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The club's Knowsley Road ground was described as "old and tired" and as causing the financial position and commercial activities of the club to be "constrained". It was noted that planning permission had recently been secured for a new stadium. The club's financial plans were based around this new stadium. St Helens had a strong playing infrastructure and were market leaders in junior production.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The acceptance of Toulouse would have meant geographic expansion. The club was considered to have a "commendable commitment" to the production of new players but there was a concern regarding limited numbers of Super League standard talent in the area. Toulouse's financial projections were thought to require hard work to achieve. Toulouse's application included a plan to use two "quality facilities" while redeveloping their own ground.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Wakefield's ground, Belle Vue, was considered to be "limited and old fashioned". The club had plans for a new stadium that they predicted to occupy by 2010. The club was acknowledged to have made an improvement in on-field performance, increased investment in the playing department, made progress with community development, improved attendances and also to have youth development working "reasonably well".


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Warrington play in a "quality new stadium", the Halliwell Jones Stadium, which is "excellent" in all but "one or two aspects". Warrington had plans to improve their ground further. The club's financial projections were considered challenging but it was noted that the club had performed well in that area in the past and had a good commercial plan. Warrington was judged to perform well on the field after investment in its playing infrastructure. It was noted that the next step for Warrington was to begin to contest finals and semi-finals as well as to produce Club Trained international.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
The Vikings' Stobart Stadium Halton ground was considered a good size and well-appointed following investment. The club's application suffered from its recent financial history, insolvency in October 2007, and the new company not being established long despite showing early progress. The National League club had a "reasonable" playing department, though further investment to achieve competitiveness in Super league and to meet Club Trained rules would be needed.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Results, Summary of applications
Wigan's stadium was considered "excellent" with the club attracting good attendances. Strong commercial plans and being a market leader in some areas were positive, though some reliance on the new majority shareholder detracted from this. The club had an excellent playing infrastructure and expressed a commitment to turning more juniors into first team players.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Response to announcement, Wider game and media response
Ray French - Former player, broadcaster - "Widnes, unlike Leigh, reacted with dignity and integrity and a determination to make it in 2011. They were arguably the biggest losers in all this, but the way they reacted was the right thing to do, as was awarding a franchise to the Crusaders. The game can no longer just exist in the north of England, it has to go national and international. It is growing in France and it is also growing in Scotland and Ireland, both places where I wouldn't be surprised to see Super League bids come from next time around."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Response to announcement, Wider game and media response
Brian Moore - Rugby union broadcaster and journalist - "The criteria upon which it is said the awards were made were multifarious, allowing, depending on your point of view, detailed scrutiny of every aspect of each applicant's case; or to allow the Rugby Football League to justify any award it wanted to make."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Response to announcement, Wider game and media response
"The decision to grant a licence to the Celtic Crusaders of Wales in front of Widnes and Halifax has caused justifiable ill-feeling...this was an expansion decision, pure and simple; pretending otherwise is insulting to those who missed out and wasted time and money chasing a franchise they were never going to get."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Monitoring
During the three-year licence period clubs will be monitored by the RFL to ensure that they are "progressing  with plans they put in their original Super League licence applications," said the RFL's director of development, Gary Tasker.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Monitoring
In July 2009, the RFL wrote to five Super League clubs to remind them of the commitments they made regarding improvement of their stadium facilities under the licensing agreement. Castleford, Celtic Crusaders, Wakefield, St Helens and Salford were warned that their continued presence in Super League after the next round of licensing is in jeopardy. An RFL statement said, "[They] have been informed that if plans  to build new stadiums or significantly improve their home venues are not  sufficiently advanced by 2011, they may not satisfy the full criteria for  the next period of licensing". Gary Tasker warned of "the potential implications any failure  to do so may have on their next application. Clubs need to be aware that we  are raising the bar for the next licence period."


2009–2011 Super League licences, Monitoring
In 2009, at an end-of-season briefing given by the RFL's executive chairman, Richard Lewis, expressed his disappointment at the attendance figures for Harlequins home games. Lewis contrasted the increases in rugby league participation in London with the lack of reflection of this in the club's crowds. In 2008, the season leading up to the issuance of licences, Harlequin's highest attendance was 4,378 when Leeds Rhinos played the club as reigning champions, Lewis said "they haven't kicked on like we thought they would". Harlequins achieved an average home attendance of just under 3,500 for 2009.


2009–2011 Super League licences, Monitoring
The club responded to the concern, stating: "Harlequins have been working very hard with the RFL in all of the areas raised at yesterday's briefing. Together with the RFL the club is developing its strategy for fixtures and the community game, amongst other key areas, with the aim of increasing attendances". Paul Blanchard, the Harlequins chief executive, said: "Richard's comments did not come as a surprise to me - in fact I have had this conversation with the RFL before. It makes a good headline for the papers but it is nothing we were not aware of. The comments were actually part of an overview of the season as a whole, and both ourselves and Crusaders were talked about in terms of attendance. We know it is something we have to improve".


2009–2011 Super League licences, The future: 2012–14 licences
Unsuccessful applicant clubs and others will be able to apply for the next set of licences for the three-year period 2012-2014 in 2011. To be eligible they must qualify for the Grand Final of the division below Super League, the Co-operative Championship, in 2009 or 2010 or win the National League Cup.


2009–2011 Super League licences, The future: 2012–14 licences
RFL Chief Executive Nigel Wood sought to allay fears that Super League could become a 'closed shop' in the absence of relegation. Despite the length of the licences being three years, that does not mean that clubs with a licence are assured of remaining in Super League for the full three years of their agreement. "This is not a closed shop", "there must always be a way of getting in and a way of removing under-performing clubs" said Wood.


2009–2011 Super League licences, The future: 2012–14 licences
Mr Wood also said that following the three years, there could be further changes. "The best performing [Championship] club will be guaranteed admission to Super League, either at the expense of the worst performing club or by expanding the competition," he said.


2009–2011 Super League licences, The future: 2012–14 licences
No upper limit on the number of Super League licences awarded has been set by the RFL, the option remains open to expand again in the future. Increasing the number of teams in the competition without changing the competition's format would be at odds with recent RFL and Super League decisions and reports. The RFL's plan for international success, which was the result of an inquiry into England's poor performance at the 2008 World Cup, states an intention to work with clubs to limit the number of games top players can take part in.


2009–2011 Super League licences, The future: 2012–14 licences
The Magic Weekend event has allowed for a reduction in the number of games each club plays to 27, from 28; although a reason for the desire to reduce games in this case was to reduce the number of times Super League sides played each other more than twice in the regular season.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
The 2009–11 Toyota vehicle recalls involved three separate but related recalls of automobiles by Toyota Motor Corporation, which occurred at the end of 2009 and start of 2010. Toyota initiated the recalls, the first two with the assistance of the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), after reports that several vehicles experienced unintended acceleration. The first recall, on November 2, 2009, was to correct a possible incursion of an incorrect or out-of-place front driver's side floor mat into the foot pedal well, which can cause pedal entrapment.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
The second recall, on January 21, 2010, was begun after some crashes were shown not to have been caused by floor mat incursion. This latter defect was identified as a possible mechanical sticking of the accelerator pedal causing unintended acceleration, referred to as Sticking Accelerator Pedal by Toyota. The original action was initiated by Toyota in their Defect Information Report, dated October 5, 2009, amended January 27, 2010. Following the floor mat and accelerator pedal recalls, Toyota also issued a separate recall for hybrid anti-lock brake software in February 2010.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
As of January 28, 2010, Toyota had announced recalls of approximately 5.2 million vehicles for the pedal entrapment/floor mat problem, and an additional 2.3 million vehicles for the accelerator pedal problem. Approximately 1.7 million vehicles are subject to both. Certain related Lexus models and the Pontiac Vibe (the latter being based on the Corolla) were also affected. The next day, Toyota widened the recall to include 1.8 million vehicles in Europe and 75,000 in China. By then, the worldwide total number of cars recalled by Toyota stood at 9 million.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
Sales of multiple recalled models were suspended for several weeks as a result of the accelerator pedal recall, with the vehicles awaiting replacement parts. As of January 2010, 21 deaths were alleged due to the pedal problem since 2000, but following the January 28 recall, additional NHTSA complaints brought the alleged total to 37. The number of alleged victims and reported problems sharply increased following the recall announcements, which were heavily covered by U.S. media, although the causes of individual reports were difficult to verify.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
Government officials, automotive experts, Toyota, and members of the general public contested the scope of the sudden acceleration issue and the veracity of victim and problem reports. Various parties attributed sudden unintended acceleration reports to mechanical, electric, and driver error causes. Some US owners that had their recalled vehicles repaired still reported accelerator pedal issues, leading to investigations and the finding of improper repairs. The recalls further led to additional NHTSA and Toyota investigations, along with multiple lawsuits.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
On February 8, 2011, the NHTSA, in collaboration with NASA, released its findings into the investigation on the Toyota drive-by-wire throttle system. After a 10-month search, NASA and NHTSA scientists found no electronic defect in Toyota vehicles. Driver error or pedal misapplication was found responsible for most of the incidents. The report ended stating, "Our conclusion is Toyota's problems were mechanical, not electrical." This included sticking accelerator pedals, and pedals caught under floor mats.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
However, on October 24, 2013, a jury ruled against Toyota and found that unintended acceleration could have been caused due to deficiencies in the  drive-by-wire throttle system or Electronic Throttle Control System (ETCS). Michael Barr of the Barr Group testified that NASA had not been able to complete its examination of Toyota's ETCS and that Toyota did not follow best practices for real time life critical software, and that a single bit flip which can be caused by cosmic rays could cause unintended acceleration. As well, the run-time stack of the real-time operating system was not large enough and that it was possible for the stack to grow large enough to overwrite data that could cause unintended acceleration. As a result, Toyota has entered into settlement talks with its plaintiffs.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls
In January 2021, engineer Colin O'Flynn was able to induce unintended acceleration with components from a Toyota vehicle using electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) on a test bench. He used an ECU and components from a wrecked 2005 Toyota Corolla. O'Flynn's experiments were conducted without access to the ECU source code, and without access to the confidential report by the Barr Group.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall
On September 26, 2007, Toyota recalled 55,000 sets of heavy-duty rubber floor mats from the Toyota Camry and ES 350 sedans. The recalled mats were of the optional "all-weather" type. NHTSA stated that the recall was due to the risk that unsecured mats could move forward and trap the accelerator pedal.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall
On August 28, 2009, a two-car collision killed four people riding in a Lexus dealer-provided loaner ES 350 in San Diego, California. The NHTSA released a safety investigation report on October 25, finding that the accident vehicle was wrongly fitted with all-weather rubber floor mats meant for the RX 400h SUV, and that these mats were not secured by either of the two retaining clips. The brake hardware also showed signs of heavy braking consistent with a stuck accelerator pedal.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall
The report stated that the accelerator pedal's hinge did not allow relieving obstructions, and the dashboard lacked directions for the three-second emergency press of the push button keyless ignition. NHTSA investigators also recovered the accident vehicle's accelerator pedal, which was still "bonded" to the SUV floor mat. The return spring action of the accelerator pedal was found to be "smooth and unencumbered."


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall
Another investigation conducted by the San Diego County Sheriff's Department found that three days prior to the crash another customer had complained to the dealership about the floor mat trapping the same loaner car's accelerator pedal while driving. The prior driver had switched to neutral and tugged on the floor mat, which released the accelerator.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall
On November 2, 2009, the NHTSA denied a petition to reopen previously closed unintended acceleration investigations of Toyota vehicles, stating they had already been thoroughly investigated making it unlikely for the NHTSA to reach any new conclusions. Later that day Toyota issued a voluntary recall of 3.8 million vehicles, with a letter sent to owners asking them to remove the driver floor mat and not replace it with any other type of mat.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall
In its November 2, 2009 recall announcement, Toyota appeared to claim the floor mats were solely at fault, stating, "The question of unintended acceleration involving Toyota and Lexus vehicles has been repeatedly and thoroughly investigated by NHTSA, without any finding of defect other than the risk from an unsecured or incompatible driver’s floor mat", but the NHTSA issued another statement stating, "This matter is not closed until Toyota has effectively addressed the defect", the letter was “inaccurate and misleading", and that, "removal of the floor mats is simply an interim measure, not a remedy of the underlying defect in the vehicles."


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall, Affected vehicles for floor mat recall
According to Toyota USA, the floor mat recall is confined to the following models:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall, Affected vehicles for floor mat recall
Toyota UK states that the floor mat recall affects US models only.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall, Amended recall to include accelerator pedal
On November 25, 2009, Toyota amended its floor mat recall involving the same 3.8 million vehicles sold in North America. Toyota will reconfigure the accelerator pedal, replace the all-weather floor mats with thinner mats, and install a brake override system to prevent unwanted acceleration. The brake override system, also called "brake to idle" and already a common design in German cars, allows the driver to override the accelerator by hitting the brakes. In a follow-up statement, the NHTSA announced the November 25, 2009 recall details as a "vehicle-based remedy" to address the floor mat pedal issue. According to Toyota, the repair work done under the amended recall for floor mat incursion problems are as follows:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Floor mat recall, Amended recall to include accelerator pedal
In its November 25, 2009 announcement, Toyota stated that dealers would be instructed first on how to reshape the accelerator pedal for the repair. Installation of the brake override began in January 2010 on Toyota Camry and Lexus ES 350 models, the vehicles with the most units included in the recall.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall
On January 21, 2010, Toyota initiated a second recall, this time in response to reports of accelerator pedals sticking in cars without floor mats. The company had received three such complaints in 2009. In its recall announcement, Toyota stated that:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall
The condition is rare and does not occur suddenly. It can occur when the pedal mechanism becomes worn and, in certain conditions, the accelerator pedal may become harder to depress, slower to return or, in the worst case, stuck in a partially depressed position.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall
A concurrent NHTSA press release identified the issue as the "Sticky Pedal Recall" and described the problem and remedy as follows:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall
The January 21 recall announcement for the accelerator pedal problem covered 2.3 million vehicles sold in the U.S.  Toyota then widened the recall to include 1.8 million vehicles in Europe and 75,000 in China. On January 26, Toyota announced that until they had finalized an appropriate remedy to address the potential for sticking accelerator pedals, sales would be suspended for selected vehicles.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall
On January 31, 2010, The Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. regulators cleared Toyota's proposed repair for the pedals and the company would resume production by February 8. On  February 1, 2010 Toyota said that its dealers should get parts to fix the sticky accelerator pedal by the end of the week.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Affected vehicles and vehicle lines
According to the manufacturer, Toyota's accelerator pedal recall and suspension of sales in North America is confined to the following vehicles (vehicles affected are based on certain Vehicle Identification Numbers):


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Affected vehicles and vehicle lines
On January 27, 2010, Toyota USA issued an expanded list of vehicles under recall including:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Affected vehicles and vehicle lines
On January 29, 2010, the Toyota recall was extended to Europe and China. The number of vehicles likely to be affected in Europe was unconfirmed but Toyota said it may reach up to 1.8 million. At the time of recall there had been 30 incidents involving the accelerator pedal problem in Europe.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Affected vehicles and vehicle lines
On January 30, 2010, PSA Peugeot Citroën announced it was recalling cars built in a Czech Republic plant, Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile Czech, a joint venture with Toyota. Although the company did not say when it would begin the recall, nor how many cars were affected, the plant in question, which produces the Peugeot 107, Citroën C1 and the Toyota Aygo, produces 200,000 cars a year.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Affected vehicles and vehicle lines
On February 2, 2010, Toyota announced that the recalls could extend to Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, where Toyota said it had sold a total of 180,000 vehicles, although the company did not specify how many might be affected by a recall. On February 3, 2010, Toyota Australia announced that its accelerator pedals are made by a different supplier and that there is no need for a recall of Australian made vehicles.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
Automobile accelerator pedals have historically been mechanical assemblies which link the pedal to the engine throttle by mechanical linkages or a Bowden cable. With the advent of electronic throttle control, accelerator pedals consist of a spring-loaded pedal arm connected to an electronic transducer. This transducer, typically a potentiometer or Hall effect sensor, converts the position of the pedal arm to an electronic signal which is sent to an electronic control unit (ECU).


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
The older mechanically designed accelerator pedals not only provided a spring return, but the mechanism inherently provided some friction. This friction introduced mechanical hysteresis into the pedal force versus pedal position transfer function. Put more simply, once the pedal was set at a specific position, the friction would help keep the pedal at this setting. This made it easier for the driver to maintain a pedal position. For example, if the driver's foot is slightly jostled by a bump in the road, the accelerator pedal would tend to stay at its setting. While these old purely mechanical designs did have some friction, the return spring force was always designed to overcome this friction with a considerable safety margin. The return spring force ensured that throttle returned to zero if the pedal force applied by the driver was reduced or removed.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
With electronic accelerator pedals, there was little inherent friction because of the simplicity of the mechanical design. The tactile pedal response of only a spring force with no hysteresis can make it more difficult for a driver to maintain an accelerator pedal position. Manufacturers of electronic accelerator pedals designed their pedals with additional parts to recreate the tactile response of the older mechanical accelerator pedals. To quote from CTS Corporation's 2004 US patent application:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
...drivers generally prefer the feel, i.e., the tactile response, of conventional cable-driven throttle systems. Designers have therefore attempted to address this preference with mechanisms for emulating the tactile response of cable-driven accelerator pedals.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
The Toyota electronic accelerator pedals contain a special friction device made of nylon 4/6 or polyphenylene sulfide within the pedal assembly to recreate the tactile response of older pedals. According to the Toyota recall information, it is this device, which in some instances, has been preventing the accelerator pedal from returning to zero. To quote from the Toyota recall FAQ:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
The issue involves a friction device in the pedal designed to provide the proper “feel” by adding resistance and making the pedal steady and stable. This friction device includes a “shoe” that rubs against an adjoining surface during normal pedal operation. Due to the materials used, wear and environmental conditions, these surfaces may, over time, begin to stick and release instead of operating smoothly. In some cases, friction could increase to a point that the pedal is slow to return to the idle position or, in rare cases, the pedal sticks, leaving the throttle partially open.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
According to Toyota, the tactile response friction device in the affected Toyota electronic accelerator pedals sometimes creates too much friction. This excess friction either slows the pedal return or completely stops it. In the worst case, once a pedal is pushed to a specific setting, it stays at the setting even if the driver removes their foot from the pedal. Early reports, in March 2007, involved the Tundra pickup truck, which used nylon 4/6 in the friction lever.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
Some questions and confusion exist if the Toyota explanation fully accounts for all instances of the unintended acceleration involving Toyota vehicles. CTS Corporation, the American manufacturer of the electronic accelerator pedals that Toyota claims are at fault, has announced that:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
The problem of sudden unintended acceleration has been reported to have existed in some Lexus vehicles and Toyota vehicles going back to 1999, when CTS did not even make this product for any customer, CTS believes that the rare slow return pedal phenomenon, which may occur in extreme environmental conditions, should absolutely not be linked with any sudden unintended acceleration incidents. CTS is also not aware of any accidents and injuries caused by the rare slow return pedal condition, to the best of its knowledge. CTS wishes to clarify that it does not, and has never made, any accelerator pedals for Lexus vehicles and that CTS also has no accelerator pedals in Toyota vehicles prior to model year 2005.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, History of accelerator pedal design
In June 2010, Chrysler also recalled 35,000 Dodge and Jeep models for sticky accelerator pedals made by CTS Corporation. Chrysler stated that the CTS pedals have pivot bushings that may dislodge, causing the accelerator to become stuck or slow to return to idle.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Field workaround for sudden unintended acceleration
Different "workarounds", user actions that ameliorate or prevent a negative, previously unforeseen circumstance, have been suggested as temporary fixes:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Field workaround for sudden unintended acceleration
On whether braking alone may fail to stop affected vehicles, a driver account in the Los Angeles Times claimed that the attempt to stop a 2005 Camry was unsuccessful with both the brake and emergency brake. However, tests of the Camry by Car and Driver in 2009, attempting to use the brakes to stop acceleration of a purposely stuck throttle at 70, 100, and 120 mph, found that the test driver was able to reduce speed to 10 mph in all instances, and in the 70 and 100 mph tests, stop the car completely.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Field workaround for sudden unintended acceleration
The Camry's braking distances with a purposely stuck accelerator were also shorter than that of the Ford Taurus' regular stopping distance. Car and Driver concluded that, based on their emergency stopping tests, the Camry's brakes could overcome the accelerator in all cases even without a brake override, and that stopping distances with a wide-open throttle were largely indiscernible from regular braking.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Field workaround for sudden unintended acceleration
In 2010, Edmunds.com also tested the stopping distances of a Toyota Camry SE V6 with a purposely stuck wide-open throttle. Their tests found that the car's brakes could override a stuck accelerator and bring the car to a stop. Although the transmission downshifted and the engine continued to propel the car, stopping distance compared "favorably to a normal panic stop on wet asphalt." Edmunds.com did note that switching to neutral was the best option, given that average drivers may not press the brakes as firmly, and lighter presses will simply wear the brakes down.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Accelerator pedal recall, Field workaround for sudden unintended acceleration
The German Commission on Technical Compliance (TÜV) of Rheinland also tested the stopping distance of Toyota iQ, Aygo, Yaris, Auris, Verso, Avensis, and RAV4 models. With the accelerator purposely jammed to 80% of maximum speed, each vehicle was able to brake safely to a halt. The TÜV findings indicated that each model met the legal requirements for deceleration and stopping distances, and that all Toyota models tested had brakes which could override a stuck accelerator.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Anti-lock brake software recall
On February 3, 2010, the NHTSA announced that it had received reports from 102 drivers of possible problems related to the braking system on the 2010 model year Toyota Prius, while an additional 14 such reports had been received in Japan. Three of these reports claimed that brake problems had led to the car crashing, with one accident in July 2009 occurring when a Prius crashed head on into another car injuring two people. The Prius was not involved in Toyota's second recall, although it had been involved in the first recall involving floor mats.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Anti-lock brake software recall
Toyota said that it was investigating the reports, and that it would be "premature to comment." On February 3, 2010 the Japanese Transport Ministry began conducting an investigation on the redesigned Prius, and Toyota said that it was aware of 77 Prius brake complaints in Japan. On February 4, 2010, the NHTSA announced it had opened an investigation into the issues with the Prius's brakes, which Toyota said was caused by a software glitch. The company said it was looking into the best way to solve the problem. An internal NHTSA memo indicated that the issue was the "short delay" in regenerative braking when hitting a bump, resulting in increased stopping distance.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Anti-lock brake software recall
On February 6, 2010, Toyota said that it had fixed the braking problem on Prius models built since late January 2010 via a software update for the ABS system to improve brake response. On the same day, a Japanese newspaper reported that Toyota had contacted dealers in Japan about their intent to recall all affected vehicles. While it was unclear if the same step would be taken elsewhere, American dealers had been told that Toyota was planning on repairing the vehicles.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Anti-lock brake software recall
On February 8, Toyota announced a voluntary global recall of 2010 model year Prius models produced through late January 2010. The affected vehicles will receive a software update for the brakes and its ABS system. In total, Toyota recalled three hybrid vehicles to reprogram the anti-lock braking (ABS) software. In February 2010, a US federal grand jury in New York began the process of determining if there is probable cause to charge Toyota criminally for the way it has handled the Prius' brake recall, and a civil class action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of 2010 Prius hybrid owners. A total of 133,000 Prius vehicles in the U.S. and 52,000 in Europe are to receive the same software update. Guardian.co.uk reports that this affects the third-generation Prius built before January 27, 2010.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On February 8, 2009, Toyota announced a recall of approximately 7,300 early 2010 model year 4-cylinder Camrys due to the possibility of the power steering hose rubbing into the front brake line which may cause a brake fluid leak.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On February 3, 2010, Toyota recalled approximately 153,000 vehicles from model years 2005 to 2011 for failing to comply with requirements of FMVSS 110, "Tire Selection and Rims", due to missing load carrying capacity labels.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On February 12, 2010, Toyota recalled approximately 8,000 2010 model year 4WD Tacoma trucks for potential front drive shaft issues. The recall involves inspecting a drive shaft component which if cracked will be replaced. The Tacoma pickups were built between mid-December 2009 and early February 2010. Most affected vehicles have not been sold.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
Another recall for frame corrosion recall was confined to the following model(s): MY 2000–2003 Toyota Tundra. According to Toyota USA, frame corrosion could allow spare tires or the fuel tank to fall off the vehicle.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On July 7, 2010, Toyota recalled 270,000 Lexus and Crown vehicles worldwide for improperly manufactured valve springs. According to Toyota, the condition can cause rough idling and potential engine stalling.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On October 21, 2010, Toyota announced a recall of 1.53 million vehicles (740,000 in the U.S., 599,000 in Japan, and 191,000 in Europe and other markets) worldwide; the recall affects MY 2005 and 2006 Avalon, MY 2004 to 2006 Highlander (non-hybrid) and Lexus RX330 and MY 2006 Lexus GS300, IS250 and IS350; the models affected in Japan and elsewhere (except the U.S.) include MY 2002 to 2006 Toyota Crown, Crown Majesta, Harrier, Mark X, Alphard, Kluger, and Lexus GS350, IS250 and IS350. The recall concerns brake fluid leakage from the master cylinder (U.S. market and non U.S. marketed Toyota Crown and Lexus GS350) and an electrical problem with the fuel pump, which would cause engine stalling (all markets except the U.S.).


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On November 9, 2011, Toyota announced a recall of 550,000 vehicles (447,000 in the U.S., 38,000 in Japan, and 25,000 in Australia and New Zealand) worldwide; the recall affects MY 2004-2005 Camry, Highlander, Sienna and Solara, MY 2004 Avalon, MY 2006 Highlander HV, MY 2004-2005 Lexus ES330, and RX330 and MY 2006 RX400h.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
The recall concerns a steering problem caused by the misalignment of the inner and outer rings of the crankshaft pulley, which could cause a noise or the Check Engine light to illuminate; if this problem is not corrected, the power steering belt can fall off the pulley, which can cause a sudden loss of power assist.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On October 10, 2012, Toyota announced a recall of 7.43 million vehicles (2.47 million in the US, 460,000 in Japan, 1.39 million in Europe, 3.11 million in other markets) worldwide. In the US the recall affects MY 2005-2010 Yaris, Corolla, Matrix, Camry, RAV4, Highlander, Tundra and Sequoia as well as Scion xB and xD. In Japan, the recall affects MY 2005-2010 Vitz, Belta, Ractis, Ist, and Corolla Rumion. In Europe, the recall affects MY 2005-2010 Yaris, Corolla, Auris, Camry, and RAV-4. Vehicles in overseas markets are also affected.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
The recall concerns a problem with the driver's side power window switch that "sticks" and could lead it to melt or catch fire. It is "not something that would cause any deadly accidents like the recall of 2009" and repairs include the application of a special fluorine grease to the switch.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On January 30, 2013, Toyota announced a recall of one million vehicles in the US. The recall affects 752,000 MY 2003-2004 Corolla and Corolla Matrix models. The recall concerns the airbag module, which can cause the airbag to inflate improperly. Toyota also announced a recall affecting 270,000 MY 2006-2012 Lexus IS models. This recall concerns loose nuts on the wiper blades, which can cause the wipers to fail, especially if there is a heavy buildup of snow.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other recalls
On March 15, 2013, Toyota announced a recall of 209,000 vehicles in the US. The recall affects MY 2007-2013 FJ Cruiser models. The recall concerns the driver and front passenger seat belt retractors, which can come loose, especially if the rear doors are slammed repeatedly.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations
Numerous investigations have taken place, including those by the U.S. NHTSA and Japanese transport ministry. The difficulty of investigations is compounded by the fact that driver error can be a possibility in certain cases. The Wall Street Journal reported, "Even when dealers and automakers suspect driver error, it is difficult for them to outright blame their customers for fear of alienating them or appearing insensitive", which USA Today also suggested.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations
Questions about why cases are mainly in the U.S. have also been raised by international investigations; German publication Der Spiegel reported that similar accidents have rarely occurred outside North America, and although there have been some reports of stuck Toyota accelerator pedals in Germany, all drivers braked successfully without loss of life.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations
In another U.S. incident, on December 26, 2009, four people died in Southlake, Texas, a suburb of Dallas, when their 2008 Toyota Avalon sped off the road and through a fence, landing upside down in a pond. The car's floor mats were found in the trunk of the car, where owners had been advised to put them as part of the recall. According to the police report, the driver suffered from epilepsy, but investigators could not rule out either a vehicle defect or the possibility that the driver had suffered a seizure.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations
On Feb 17, 2010, US safety regulators launched an investigation into Corolla steering complaints. Following the widespread media publicity of the recalls, several media publications suggested that investigations of subsequent reports would have considered the possibility of "copycat complaints" and hoaxes, with potential complainants seeking to capitalize on possible settlement money, or affected by the psychological bandwagon effect of the mass publicity.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations
On March 14, 2010, the Norwegian government considered whether to ban Prius cars from roads in Norway pending an investigation after a near fatal incident involving a senior citizen. On March 29, after receipt of technical and other information, police indicted the driver involved in the Prius incident for making "a false emergency call to police".


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations
The use of vehicle event data recorders and video surveillance also proved beneficial to investigators, with findings of driver error in a March 9, 2010 Prius alleged sudden acceleration crash, where a 56-year-old housekeeper claimed to have braked but was recorded pressing the wrong pedal, and also in a March 29, 2010 Camry alleged sudden acceleration crash, where a 76-year-old driver claimed to have braked, but was filmed not doing so until after impact.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
NHTSA data shows that there was an annual average of 26 abrupt acceleration reports in 1999–2001 Toyota Camry and Lexus ES models. This number increased by more than 400% to a total of 132 annually in 2002–2004 models, which were designed with new electronic throttles. Toyota responded by stating,


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
Six times in the past six years NHTSA has undertaken an exhaustive review of allegations of unintended acceleration on Toyota and Lexus vehicles and six times the agency closed the investigation without finding any electronic engine control system malfunction to be the cause of unintended acceleration.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
In 2004, the NHTSA launched a probe of throttle control systems on around 1 million Lexus and Toyota sedans. Upon that probe, Toyota urged the NHTSA to define the issues as quick bursts where the engine surged to "something less than a wide-open throttle." The company compared the complaints to previous sudden unintended acceleration cases the NHTSA deemed "driver error." It also said the computer could not open the throttle without the accelerator pedal pressed, and, the brakes would be able to stop the car anyway.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
After several months of investigating, the NHTSA said it found no evidence of a defect and there was no data indicating any bad parts. Christopher Santucci, an employee of Toyota's Washington, D.C.office and an NHTSA employee until he was hired by Toyota in 2003, testified that he was informed by the NHTSA in March 2004 about the pending investigation over unintended acceleration complaints. According to Santucci in his deposition, his former NHTSA colleagues decided not to investigate some incidents involving acceleration lasting longer than 1 second.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
The decision to exclude certain incidents from the investigation apparently reduced the significance of the issue to the NHTSA at least on paper. However, in 2005, 2006 and 2008, Toyota customers again asked the NHTSA to investigate uncontrolled acceleration from electronic throttle controls and power steering issues. Although there were hundreds of complaints, the NHTSA found no evidence of defects; and in every case, Toyota provided data it said showed no such evidence.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
On November 2, 2009, the NHTSA denied a petition to reopen previously closed unintended investigations of Toyota vehicles, stating they were unlikely to reach any new conclusions. In February 2010, however NHTSA was again looking into the electronic throttle control systems on Toyota vehicles. In February 2010, State Farm insurance revealed that it had warned NHTSA in late 2007 on an increased trend of Toyota accidents related to the recalled models; other insurers stated however that they had not seen such a trend.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
On June 1, 2010, the NHTSA opened an investigation into reports that floor mats were jamming accelerators in Ford Fusion and Mercury Milan sedans. On June 30, 2010, NHTSA reported on its latest broad study of unintended acceleration on all car makes, including Toyota, in conjunction with NASA and the National Academy of Sciences. NHTSA stated that it was unable to find electronic throttle defects, but identified floor mat entrapment and pedals that were slow to return to idle as two causes of Toyota complaints.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
NHTSA also stated it could only verify one Toyota unintended acceleration accident caused by a vehicle defect. On July 14, 2010, The Wall Street Journal reported that NHTSA investigations of 75 accidents alleged to sudden acceleration in Toyota vehicles had found driver error as the primary cause in all but one case attributed to floor mats. Black box recorder data found that during these crashes, the throttle was open and brakes not pressed.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
On July 30, The Wall Street Journal quoted the former head of NHTSA's Recall Management Division stating that the investigation "has become very political", with Department of Transportation officials "hoping against hope that they find something that points back to a flaw". Although the NHTSA study finding driver error was reportedly complete, DOT officials had blocked its release.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, NHTSA investigations
On February 8, 2011, NASA and the NHTSA announced the findings of a ten-month study concerning the causes of the Toyota malfunctions of 2009. According to their findings, there were no electronic faults in the cars that could have caused the sudden-acceleration problems. "The jury is back, the verdict is in: There is no electronic-based cause for unintendedhigh-speed acceleration in Toyotas, period," Transportation Department Secretary Ray LaHood declared in the LA Times.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, MLIT investigations
Hiroko Tabuchi writing in The New York Times claims that problematic vehicles may have been accurately reported in Japan due to police correctly blaming driver error, as no verified unintended acceleration case exists. The Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) released its findings of sudden acceleration complaints in February 2010, finding that of the 134 cases logged by the ministry between 2007 and 2009, Toyota accounted for 38 cases (28.3% of all reported). Because Toyota's market share was approximately 27.8% of all passenger cargo vehicles, the MLIT noted that no particularly unusual rate was found among these complaints.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and the  House Energy and Commerce Committee held hearings in February 2010. Retired social worker Rhonda Smith testified before Congress that her car accelerated out of control but the NHTSA investigator determined that a misplaced floor mat had caused the problem; the subsequent owner of the car reported no trouble after driving the car over 27,000 miles.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
In a February 2010 letter to Toyota, US congressional investigators "said a review of consumer complaints produced by Toyota shows that company personnel identified sticking pedals or floor mats as the cause of only 16 percent of the unintended acceleration reports". Several media reports later claimed that Toyota had announced that the recalls will not completely solve the accelerator pedal problems.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
On February 24, 2010, Toyota responded that it "has rigorously tested its solutions" and are "confident" with the recall repairs, but that it would continue to monitor other possible contributing factors for unintended acceleration, including mechanical, electronics, and driver error. Akio Toyoda, the president and CEO of Toyota, issued the following statement in regards to the recalled vehicles:


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
Toyota has, for the past few years, been expanding its business rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick. I would like to point out here that Toyota's priority has traditionally been the following: First; Safety, Second; Quality, and Third; Volume. These priorities became confused, and we were not able to stop, think, and make improvements as much as we were able to before, and our basic stance to listen to customers' voices to make better products has weakened somewhat.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
We pursued growth over the speed at which we were able to develop our people and our organization, and we should sincerely be mindful of that. I regret that this has resulted in the safety issues described in the recalls we face today, and I am deeply sorry for any accidents that Toyota drivers have experienced. Especially, I would like to extend my condolences to the members of the Saylor family, for the accident in San Diego. I would like to send my prayers again, and I will do everything in my power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
In early 2010, the US government began considering requiring all vehicles sold in the US to have accelerator override built into their brake systems.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings
Research groups have questioned whether Toyota would "get off easily" because of its large investment in lobbying in Washington, with close ties to the congressional representatives who will lead inquiries into the company's string of safety problems. Other publications noted that half the Democratic congressional members involved in the hearings had received campaign contributions from the United Auto Workers union, a major stockholder of Toyota's top U.S. rival, General Motors.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Investigations, US congressional hearings, US governors' letter to congressional members
On February 10, 2010, four bipartisan US governors from the states of Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi, and Alabama which Toyota operates plants wrote a letter to Congress commenting about "the federal government's obvious conflict of interest because of its huge financial stake in some of its competitors," referring to Toyota as a "victim" of the media's "aggressive and questionable news coverage". The letter also noted there were "16.4 million recalls in the auto industry for 2009", "many as serious or more serious" than Toyota's recall.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath
Toyota stopped producing vehicles on certain production lines for the week of February 1, 2010, to assess and coordinate activities. The North America vehicle production facilities affected were located in Cambridge and Woodstock, Ontario, Canada (where Corolla, Matrix, and RAV4 models are produced), Princeton, Indiana (Highlander and Sequoia), Georgetown, Kentucky (Avalon and Camry), and San Antonio, Texas (Tundra). In addition to recalling vehicles, Toyota announced that it would install brake override systems on all Lexus, Scion and Toyota vehicles by the end of 2010.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath
On February 3, 2010, United States Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood advised owners of vehicles affected by therecall to "stop driving" their vehicles until they can be fixed by a dealer. LaHood later retracted his statement, stating it was "obviously, a misstatement." Secretary La Hood was criticized for making that statement by some media columnists, who suspected La Hood of having a conflict-of-interest due to the U.S. government's auto bailout partial ownership of Toyota's domestic rivals, General Motors and Chrysler.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Economic impact
The recall came at a difficult time for Toyota, as it was struggling to emerge from the recession and had already suffered from a resultant decrease in sales, and the low exchange rate from yen to US dollars. On the day the recall was announced in the US, it was also announced that 750 jobs would be cut at Toyota's British plant at Burnaston, near Derby.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Economic impact
Also, it was estimated that each Toyota dealership in the US could lose between US$1.75 million to US$2 million a month in revenue, a total loss of US$2,470 million across the country from the entire incident. Additionally, Toyota Motors as a whole announced that it could face losses totaling as much as US$2,000 million from lost output and sales worldwide. Between 25 January and 29 January 2010 Toyota shares fell in value by 15%.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Economic impact
According to analysts, Toyota owners (including owners of cars not recalled) may also be economically affected by the recall, as the damage to Toyota's reputation could negatively affect the resale value of used cars.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Manufacturer changes
In addition to its recall efforts, a new global quality committee to coordinate defect analysis and future recall announcements was announced by Toyota in early 2010, along with a Swift Market Analysis Response Team ("SMART") in the U.S. to conduct on-site vehicle inspections, expanded Event Data Recorder usage and readers, third-party quality consultation, and increased driver safety education initiatives. Industry analysts noted that the recall response was a challenge for The Toyota Way manufacturing philosophy, because the recalled parts were not due to factory errors or quality control problems, but rather to design issues leading to consumer complaints. As a result, better communication of consumer issues with management was needed, and so the global quality committee aimed to be more responsive to consumer concerns.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Competitor reactions
One day after Toyota's announced sales suspension General Motors began offering a US$1,000 cash rebate targeted toward Toyota owners. By February 1, 2010 Ford, Chrysler, and Hyundai were offering similar incentives.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Release of Toyota driver jailed for fatal crash
In February 2010, a motion for retrial was submitted on behalf of a Minnesota man, Koua Fong Lee, who, in 2008, was sentenced to eight years in jail for rear-ending a car, killing three of the five occupants and injuring the other two. This happened in June 2006 when he was driving home from church with his family and exiting the highway. Koua insists that his 1996 Toyota Camry sped up to between 70 and 90 mph despite heavy braking. In May 2010, a vehicle inspector hired by attorneys for the convicted man reported finding problems with the car's accelerator system.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Release of Toyota driver jailed for fatal crash
At least two of the jurors from the 2008 trial questioned the guilty verdict, and one of the injured survivors filed suit against Toyota and the local dealership that sold the car, stating that he believed Lee should be set free. In June 2010, the Ramsey County Attorney and prosecutor Susan Gaertner opposed a new trial, stating that she saw no evidence that Koua's Camry experienced "sudden unintended acceleration", and a US District Court Judge was given until September 2010 to decide whether or not Lee should be re-tried.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Release of Toyota driver jailed for fatal crash
In August 2010, the judge ruled that Lee would be re-tried, but the prosecutor declined to prosecute. Prior to the ruling, Gaertner offered Lee release with the condition that he would still have a felony conviction on his record, barring him from driving privileges for ten years, and that he would be jailed if arrested for anything else. Lee did not agree to such conditions. Later that month, a Minnesota judge freed Lee from prison and Gaertner said she would immediately drop the charges.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Media coverage and criticism
According to news analysis by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, which analyzed weekly output from newspapers (The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, and others) as well as network television (ABC, CBS, NBC, and others), the Toyota recalls were the #5 most reported story on U.S. news for the week of January 25–31, 2010, at 4% of all coverage. The following week of February 1–7, 2010, the story reached #2, at 11% of all news coverage. On February 10, Toyota dealers in the five-state Southeast region pulled all advertising from ABC stations in protest of "excessive" reporting on the Toyota recalls. On March 5, the Associated Press described "relentless media coverage" of the recalls from news outlets.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Media coverage and criticism
During the height of the recall crisis, Toyota came in for extensive editorial criticism, with commentators including CounterPunch suggesting that emphasis on profits had resulted in manufacturing defects. Editorials criticizing alleged disproportionate coverage of the recalls ran in Automotive News, AutoWeek, BusinessWeek, Car and Driver, Motor Trend, Popular Mechanics, and the National Post. Such editorials commonly faulted media outlets for leaving out alternative explanations such as driver inattentiveness, driver skills, DUI, being on the cellphone, erroneous perceptions, reckless driving, or texting as causes of accidents. In one cited example, the Los Angeles Times did not mention that an alleged Toyota runaway driver was indicted for vehicular manslaughter and driving under the influence of marijuana.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Media coverage and criticism
Odds from Car and Driver indicated that the alleged fatality risk was about 1 in 200,000 recalled Toyota vehicles, versus a 1 in 8,000 risk of a fatal car accident in any car in the U.S., while Consumer Reports stated a 1 in 10,000 chance of an unintended acceleration complaint out of 20 million Toyotas on the road.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Media coverage and criticism, James Sikes alleged unintended acceleration case
On March 8, 2010, a 2008 Prius allegedly uncontrollably accelerated to 94 miles per hour on a California Highway (US), and the Prius had to be stopped with the verbal assistance of the California Highway Patrol as news cameras watched. The incident received national news coverage, with initial reporting including inaccurate information about the event, such as the claim that a CHP car was used to physically block Sikes' vehicle. Subsequent investigations uncovered suspicious information about the alleged runaway Prius driver, 61-year-old James Sikes, including being US$19,000 behind in his Prius car payments and with US$700,000 in accumulated debt.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Media coverage and criticism, James Sikes alleged unintended acceleration case
Sikes stated he wanted a new car as compensation for the incident. Analyses by Edmunds.com and Forbes found Sikes' acceleration claims and fears of shifting to neutral implausible, with Edmunds concluding that "in other words, this is BS", and Michael Fumento in Forbes analyzing Sikes's claims related to the mechanics of his Prius and his own contradictions, such as saying he didn't want to take his hands off the steering wheel to shift into neutral even though he held a cell phone in his hand almost the entire time, comparing it to the balloon boy hoax.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Media coverage and criticism, James Sikes alleged unintended acceleration case
Further government investigator tests on Sikes's Prius reportedly showed that the brake wear were consistent with intermittent braking, not constant hard braking as he claimed. Sikes also reportedly had a history of false police reports, suspect insurance claims, theft and fraud allegations, and television aspirations. These findings raised questions about "the credibility of Mr. Sikes' reporting of events" in a Congressional memo.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Aftermath, Public image
According to a Rasmussen poll released on February 8, 2010, Toyota was viewed favorably by 59% and unfavorably by 29%. The poll also found 72% of Americans have followed the recent Toyota news stories "somewhat closely" and 31% "very closely". A second Rasmussen poll released on February 12 found 23% of Americans believe the federal government is criticizing Toyota to aid General Motors of which it is the majority owner, 38% disagreed, and 39% were unsure.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
On November 25, 2009, ABC News quoted Sean Kane, head of the for-profit firm Safety Research & Strategies, stating that he had uncovered hundreds of "non-floor mat sudden acceleration cases" which the floor mat recall did not address. Kane, who works with attorneys suing Toyota, said his firm had discovered over 2,000 Toyota sudden acceleration cases involving 16 deaths and 243 injuries, publishing its most comprehensive report on the issue on Feb 5th, 2010. Kane alleged that the problem was not with the accelerator pedals, but with the electronic throttle control systems (ETC).


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
An electronic throttle control system is a drive-by-wire system, in which the accelerator pedal and the engine are indirectly linked electronically, instead of directly linked mechanically. This means that input from the accelerator pedal is just one input used to decide how wide the throttle is opened. On Feb 13, 2010, The Wall Street Journal reported that Kane's company was "controversial" because its income comes from lawsuits against auto manufacturers, which was not disclosed in media reports; auto journalists noted that the firm had a "vested interest" in blaming manufacturer defects while avoiding operator error.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
The Los Angeles Times reported that since Toyota and Lexus began installing electronic throttle control systems in 2001, complaints of unintended acceleration with vehicles from both those brands rose sharply. Electromagnetic interference with the electronic throttle control system is another possible cause of unintended acceleration. Some speculated that cosmic rays, or radiation from outer space, was a possible source for alleged electronic malfunctions.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
The Wall Street Journal obtained a copy of a preliminary study dated on February 4, 2010 by the California-based engineering research firm Exponent. The initial study commissioned by Toyota beginning in December 2009 concluded "Exponent has so far been unable to induce, through electrical disturbances to the system, either unintended acceleration or behavior that might be a precursor to such an event, despite concerted efforts toward this goal." For the study Exponent purchased six Toyota and Lexus vehicles which were analyzed by "engineers and technicians specializing in mechanical, electrical, and automotive engineering."


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
According to Exponent, Toyota "didn't limit the scope or budget of its investigation" which is being shared with Toyota and lawmakers. The study will continue for several more months. According to the Los Angeles Times, Exponent's research has been criticized as being relied upon by companies in need of public defense, although the firm has defended its impartiality towards clients ranging from firms to the U.S. government. A University of California cardiologist was quoted saying, "I would have picked a firm with more of a reputation of neutrality" citing as an example their determination that secondhand smoke isn't carcinogenic.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
Toyota subsequently asked Stanford University's Center for Automotive Research, a facility partly funded by multiple automakers including Toyota, to also evaluate the electronics claims. The center's J. Christian Gerdes PhD, professor of mechanical engineering, rejected several electronics claims as implausible, and said that his findings were independent and that he received no compensation from Toyota for his evaluation.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system
On Feb. 8, 2010 the NHTSA and NASA concluded the electronics were not to blame after reviewing the electronics and electromagnetic interference. The finding was based on studying over 280,000 lines of software coding on nine vehicles involved in earlier sudden acceleration incidents. And studying the throttle systems at NASA's Langley Research Center and Chrysler's Auburn Hills headquarters.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, ABC News acceleration controversy
On February 22, 2010, ABC News broadcast a report which apparently demonstrated how unintended acceleration could be caused by inducing a short circuit in the throttle control. In the segment, Dr. David W. Gilbert, a  professor of automotive technology at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, was shown in a late-model Avalon with ABC News reporter Brian Ross. By "inducing a short" in an unspecified circuit, Gilbert was able to cause the Avalon to accelerate dramatically. After the car was stopped, a diagnostic tool connected to the car's ECU displayed no fault code.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, ABC News acceleration controversy
According to Dr. Gilbert, proper design of the ETC should not have permitted a short like the one he induced to open the throttle; the ECU should have detected a fault and cut the throttle. Tests on GM vehicles, Gilbert said, did not expose a similar flaw. Autoblog's analysis queried the test's real-world accuracy, noting that the short circuit method was not disclosed outside of wiring normally independent sensors together, the ECU could not be expected to detect unrealistic scenarios, and questioning ABC News' and Brian Ross's objectivity.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, ABC News acceleration controversy
Autoblog also uncovered that Gilbert was being paid by parties in lawsuits against Toyota. Automotive analyst John McElroy on Autoline Detroit pointed to network news' history of "rigged" car demonstrations, including the 60 Minutes acceleration demo and the Dateline NBC exploding truck scandal, and noted that ABC News' report did not include opposing views or disclose interviewee's financial ties. Toyota responded by inviting ABC News to be present at its evaluation of the test.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, ABC News acceleration controversy
On March 8, 2010, Toyota held a live news conference where its engineers demonstrated the same short circuit method on Ford, Chevrolet, Chrysler, and BMW vehicles. In each case, engineers were able to induce the same dramatic acceleration with no ECU fault code. Stanford's Center for Automotive Research stated that ABC News' demo was unrealistic and misleading. A study by Exponent Inc. finding that the short circuit "would be highly unlikely to occur naturally” and could “only be contrived in the laboratory" was also issued.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, ABC News acceleration controversy
Toyota further demonstrated how Gilbert had allegedly shaved away wiring insulation, cut wires in the ETC, re-spliced them in a particular sequence, and added a control switch. Gilbert's financial motive, being paid by Sean Kane, was also questioned. AutoWeek, Edmunds.com, and other automotive sources saw the conference as debunking ABC News' claims. On March 11, 2010, ABC News further admitted to faking part of its report after tachometer screenshots were posted online.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, ABC News acceleration controversy
The freeze-frames showed the parking brake, open-door, and seat belt warning lights on while the car was allegedly "accelerating" to 6,000 RPM, indicating that the car was actually not moving. Media blog Gawker.com posted the photos and stated, "the tachometer footage is faked". ABC News claimed that it was "impossible to get a good picture of the tachometer" during the actual test, and re-edited the footage. Gawker.com responded that the edited video was even more "staged". The Associated Press added that the falsified footage "created ethical questions".


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, Possible cruise control cause
In February 2010, multiple media reports claimed that Apple Inc. co -founder Steve Wozniak had suggested that faulty software may be part of the problem. However, in a subsequent CNN interview, Wozniak stated, "I haven't really said those things. They have put those words in my mouth". Instead, Wozniak said his comments were about a "minor" cruise control issue on one of his several Priuses, and regarding other recalls, "whether it was mats, whether it was a sticky accelerator pedal, whatever – I believe they found the right solution. If Toyota says it's not electrical, then I'm sure they're right."


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, Possible cruise control cause
When asked to describe his cruise control problem, Wozniak said, "It's a little more of a procedure of upping the speed, upping the speed, and then suddenly it just sort of went like it thought you told it to go to infinity." As for alternative explanations, Wozniak said "If you're panicked and your car takes off, you don't think of these things."


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, Possible cruise control cause
He also clarified that his comments were "to a group of teachers for a discovery museum and talking about an issue of customer support, how hard it is sometimes to get to the people that can really deal with your problems". Automotive journalist John Voelcker's analysis of Wozniak's description blamed the issue on user error, and not being familiar with the design differences of the adaptive cruise control system.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Electronic throttle control system, Possible cruise control cause
In the Prius, unlike some other cars, holding down the accelerate button increases speed in 5 mph increments continuously; Voelcker suggested Wozniak was holding down the button for longer than necessary, setting the cruise to a high set speed, and thus resulting in the "smooth" acceleration to high speed he experienced. Some Prius users have also suggested erroneous user input explanations. Others have come forward with their own stories about erratic vehicle behavior while using their cruise control. In March 2010, Ward's Auto reported that user unfamiliarity with the faster response of laser- and radar-based cruise control systems was a likely factor according to AAA, NHTSA, and manufacturer findings.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error
The Wall Street Journal reported on February 25, 2010 that "safety regulators, human-error experts and auto makers say driver error is the primary cause of sudden acceleration." Regarding the 2009-10 Toyota recalls, Ward's Auto noted that NHTSA investigations over past years have found that the majority of sudden unintended acceleration cases are due to driver error. In such cases, accidents are the result of drivers mistakenly stepping on the accelerator pedal instead of the brake.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error
On November 29, 2009, the Los Angeles Times quoted a motor skills consultant stating that the fault in sudden acceleration cases "almost always lies with drivers who step on the wrong pedal." In February 2010, Car and Driver suggested that the alleged accident rate of 1 in 200,000 recalled Toyotas was "highly unlikely" to result from vehicle defects, pointing to an increased danger for drivers who "aren't smart or calm enough to shift to neutral".


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error
The same month, Forbes referred to auto industry experts as "skeptical" of defect explanations, suggesting that "driver error and panic account for many reported problems" with recalled Toyotas. On February 4, Leonard Evans, author of Traffic Safety, claimed that driver behavior was the main factor in Toyota accidents, and that the consensus of 70 years of scientific research is that driver error is the prominent explanation for automotive fatalities.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error
In March 2010, Forbes Michael Fumento, The Atlantic's Megan McArdle and attorney Ted Frank argued that the fact that most of the incidents of sudden acceleration in Toyota occur in elderly drivers strongly suggest that there is not an electronics problem as opposed to one of pedal misapplication. Fumento's article was titled: "Why Do Toyotas Hate the Elderly? ", and McArdle noted that  immigrants were also twice as likely to be involved. However, lawsuits filed regarding sudden unintended acceleration cases, along with related third-party investigation reports, have typically avoided the driver error explanation.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error
In August 2010, The Wall Street Journal reported that experts at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had examined the "black boxes" of 58 vehicles involved in sudden-acceleration reports. The study found that in 35 of the cases, the brakes weren't applied at the time of the crash. In nine other cases in the same study, the brakes were used only at the last moment before impact.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error, Factors leading to pedal misapplication
On March 10, 2010, The New York Times ran an opinion piece by Richard Schmidt, PhD, professor emeritus of psychology at University of California Los Angeles and sudden acceleration researcher, suspecting driver error as the primary cause of unexplained Toyota sudden acceleration reports. Schmidt pointed to several factors that make driver error more likely: elderly driver age, lack of experience with the car, and short stature. In addition, unexplained sudden acceleration events were most frequently reported as occurring from low speed or fully stopped.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error, Factors leading to pedal misapplication
Typically, the driver was intending to press the brake, and did not consciously confuse the pedals; however, because of advanced age and neuromuscular irregularities, short stature and difficulty reaching the pedals, a slight misalignment in seating position, or unfamiliarity with the car model, the driver's foot contacted the accelerator by mistake. The resulting unexpected sudden acceleration would lead to panic, with the driver thinking that the acceleration system had failed. The immediate response would be to brake hard, but not knowing that their foot was on the accelerator, pressing down caused greater acceleration.


2009–2011 Toyota vehicle recalls, Other possible causes of unintended acceleration, Driver error, Factors leading to pedal misapplication
In such panic situations, the driver would think that the brakes were not responding, and continue pressing on the accelerator pedal until they crashed. Switching to neutral or turning off the ignition was typically not contemplated. Incidents occurred exclusively in automatic transmission-equipped cars  with driver complaints involving rental cars being far more frequent. All factors point to reduced driver familiarity and sophistication.