2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Round 3 (9 September – present), Final power-sharing deal
The executive power would be shared by the president, the prime minister and the cabinet. Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara have still not decided how to divide the ministries. But Jendayi E. Frazer, the American assistant secretary of state for African affairs, said: “We don’t know what’s on the table, and it’s hard to rally for an agreement when no one knows the details or even the broad outlines”.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Round 3 (9 September – present), Final power-sharing deal
An MDC official said on 13 September that the MDC wanted to control the key ministries of home affairs, finance, and justice; in return, the official said that the MDC was willing to concede the ministries of defence and state security to ZANU-PF.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Round 3 (9 September – present), Final power-sharing deal
On 15 September 2008, SADC leaders witnessed the signing of the power-sharing agreement, brokered by Mbeki. With a symbolic handshake and warm smiles at the Rainbow Towers hotel, in Harare, Mugabe and Tsvangirai signed the deal to end the violent political crisis. Under the terms of the deal, Mugabe will remain President, Tsvangirai will become Prime Minister, the MDC will control the police, ZANU-PF will control the Army, and Mutambara will become Deputy Prime Minister.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition
The parties planned to hold talks regarding the allocation of Cabinet portfolios beginning on 16 September, but these talks were delayed. In The Herald on 17 September, Chinamasa said that the necessary constitutional amendments to provide a legal basis for some aspects of the agreement would be considered by Parliament after it began sitting on 14 October. However, he also said that other aspects of the agreement would not require constitutional amendments.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition
Mugabe, in a speech to the ZANU-PF Central Committee that was broadcast live on 17 September, described the agreement as a "humiliation", but said that the party could have avoided the situation if it had not "blundered" in March, when it failed to win a parliamentary majority. However, he asserted that ZANU-PF was still in "the driving seat" and would "not tolerate any nonsense" from the MDC. The Central Committee approved the agreement, while expressing concern that attacks against ZANU-PF supporters could have a negative effect on relations between the parties. On the same day, Tsvangirai said that he was confident that the deal would hold and that Mugabe was committed to it.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition
The parties held talks regarding the allocation of portfolios on 18 September, but according to Chamisa, the MDC-T spokesman, no agreement was reached and "the matter [was] referred to the negotiators". The negotiators met on 19 September, but according to Chamisa they failed to reach an agreement. Chamisa said that ZANU-PF had a "take, take and take mentality" and wanted to hold all of the most important portfolios, while the MDC favoured a "give and take situation" in which the most important portfolios would be divided fairly. In particular, the MDC wanted to control the finance portfolio, justifying this by pointing to the disastrous state of the economy, but ZANU-PF objected.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Mugabe's trip to New York
With the situation still unresolved, Mugabe embarked on a trip to the United Nations on 19 September; the MDC complained that he did not swear in Tsvangirai before leaving for this trip, which was expected to last at least a week. Vice-President Joseph Msika was responsible for handling Mugabe's duties while he was out of the country. Chamisa said that Mugabe was unwilling to leave the country in Tsvangirai's hands during his absence.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Mugabe's trip to New York
A column in The Herald on 20 September belittled the agreement, saying that Mugabe remained free to appoint a Cabinet of his choosing and was only required to consult with the Prime Minister; it also said that the agreement could "collapse any day". Aside from this, Tsvangirai expressed concern regarding the stark and bitter language in the column (which was generally believed to have been written by Mugabe's spokesman George Charamba, under the pen name Nathaniel Manheru), describing it as hateful.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Mugabe's trip to New York
One passage in the column seemed to suggest violence, saying that an audit of land reform, as provided by the agreement, would "draw blood redder than the setting sun." Although Tsvangirai emphasised that he did not think the column's writer was expressing Mugabe's views, he said that if the column reflected ZANU-PF's attitude, the agreement was already doomed.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Ouster of Mbeki from South African presidency
Only a few days after the agreement was signed, Mbeki was forced to resign as President of South Africa by his party, the African National Congress (ANC). This raised additional concerns about the future of the agreement; it was unclear if Mbeki would continue to act as mediator, and it was unclear if South Africa, under new leadership, would remain so heavily involved in resolving Zimbabwe's political situation.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Ouster of Mbeki from South African presidency
Jakaya Kikwete, the President of Tanzania and Chairman of the African Union, said on 24 September that "the South African government ... will continue to focus on the issue", while SADC spokesman Charles Mubita said that Mbeki would continue to act as mediator. According to Mubita, Mbeki was appointed as mediator "based on his knowledge, understanding and acumen of the situation" and did not necessarily need to be a sitting president to serve in that role.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Ouster of Mbeki from South African presidency
For his part, Mugabe was quoted in The Herald on 25 September as saying that Mbeki's removal as President of South Africa was "devastating" and "very disturbing", while also stating that it was "the action of the South African people" and that as a Zimbabwean he was in no position to judge. Mbeki's successor, Kgalema Motlanthe, said on 2 October that he wanted Mbeki to continue mediating. On 3 October, a spokesman for the South African government announced that Mbeki had agreed to continue in his role as mediator.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Ouster of Mbeki from South African presidency
Mugabe returned to Zimbabwe from the UN on 29 September. He said upon returning that "there is no deadlock" and that only four ministries were left to be decided. According to Mugabe, the Cabinet would be formed later in the same week. On 30 September, Mugabe and Tsvangirai met, but they were unable to reach an agreement on the allocation of Cabinet portfolios and "the matter was referred to the mediator", according to Chamisa.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Ouster of Mbeki from South African presidency
Chamisa argued that if the portfolios were allocated according to ZANU-PF's wishes, then ZANU-PF would control the government and the MDC would be "a mere cosmetic accessory and mere lipstick". He warned that this was "completely unacceptable" and that the MDC was not so "desperate to be in the government" that it would accept a secondary status. ZANU-PF's Chinamasa, however, denied that there was any deadlock in negotiations and said that all parties were committed to reaching an agreement. He said that any disagreement that might exist was insufficient to warrant Mbeki's intervention and expressed confidence that the matter could be resolved without his help.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Further negotiations between party leaders
Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Mutambara met in Harare on 4 October for talks on the distribution of portfolios, but could not reach an agreement; according to Charamba, Mugabe's spokesman, the negotiating teams would meet again to discuss the allocation of the portfolios of finance and home affairs. Spokesmen for the MDC-T and the MDC-M also acknowledged the failure to reach an agreement and said that negotiations would continue. The MDC-T's Chamisa said on 5 October that all of the Cabinet portfolios were in question, not just two of them, as claimed by Charamba.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Further negotiations between party leaders
The negotiators met briefly on 7 October but again failed to reach an agreement. According to Chamisa, the parties were "still in different worlds in a fundamental way". For his part, Biti said that he and fellow MDC negotiator Elton Mangoma left the meeting in outrage after the ZANU-PF negotiators said that they were only present "to justify why they needed the two ministries of home affairs and finance". Biti insisted that the MDC had never agreed to the allocation of any ministries and that it was deceptive for ZANU-PF to claim that there were only two in dispute.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Further negotiations between party leaders
He expressed hope that Mbeki could help resolve the situation, saying that if Mbeki was unsuccessful the only remaining hope was divine intervention. It was reported at this time that the power-sharing agreement was near collapse; reportedly, some members of the ZANU-PF leadership were adamant that the party needed to hold the key portfolios, believing that ZANU-PF would be in grave danger if it did not control those ministries. ANC President Jacob Zuma said on the same day that he hoped the Zimbabwean parties could reach an agreement on their own, but he also said that Mbeki was available to facilitate the negotiations if necessary.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Further negotiations between party leaders
Tsvangirai said on 9 October that the talks were deadlocked and progress was impossible unless Mbeki intervened. Meanwhile, Information Minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu dismissed the claim of a deadlock entirely: "Deadlock is the figment of imagination by our detractors from outside Zimbabwe". According to Ndlovu, it was necessary for ZANU-PF to "teach art of government formation and implementation of policies" to the MDC, as they were "still new". Nevertheless, Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Mutambara met on 10 October and agreed that Mbeki's mediation was needed.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
On 11 October, The Herald published an official list showing the allocation of ministries to the three parties; defence, home affairs, foreign affairs, justice, and local government were among the 14 portfolios allotted to ZANU-PF. The MDC-T's 13 portfolios included constitutional and parliamentary affairs, economic planning and investment promotion, labour and social welfare, sport, arts and culture, and science and technology development, while the MDC-M's three portfolios were listed as education, regional integration and international co-operation, and industry and commerce.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
According to The Herald, only the finance ministry remained in dispute, and it said that Mbeki would travel to Zimbabwe to assist in negotiations on the matter. The allocations published in The Herald were not approved by the MDC-T, which rejected them outright. MDC-T spokesman Chamisa denounced the publication of the list as "unilateral, contemptuous and outrageous", saying that such imbalance in the importance of the portfolios would effectively give ZANU-PF control of the government. He warned that ZANU-PF's "arrogance" would "put the deal into jeopardy". At a rally in Harare on 12 October, Tsvangirai said that the MDC-T would withdraw from the agreement if ZANU-PF did not relent on the allocation of ministries. MDC-M spokesman Edwin Mushoriwa also rejected the list of allocated ministries, saying that it was a "hallucination on the part of ZANU-PF."


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
An official close to the presidency said the dilution of Mugabe's powers promised in the agreement was "illusory", and described the MDC as merely a "junior partner" whose only role would be "to gain legitimacy and international funds". ZANU-PF planned to take the ministries of defence, justice, home affairs, farming, information, and mines. The mining sector is the last occasionally functioning part of the economy given the country's wealth of natural resources and this carries huge opportunities for corruption.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
The MDC would be offered the finance ministry, in an effort to persuade donors that real reform was taking place so that would trigger billions in aid and reconstruction. The presidential official said "It's a tricky situation for the MDC... Nonetheless we now have the opposition in government and they have to fix the economy, just as they told the electorate." A ministerial post involving kick starting foreign aid is seen by some as a poison chalice for the MDC.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
If the party were to succeed it would help shore up support for the ZANU-PF and make it harder to oust in the future, while a failure would cause the MDC to be branded as incompetent and would undermine its own support. MDC officials were said to be aware of the risk of being manipulated and refused to sign up for a ministry that lacks real authority. According to an MDC spokesman, "It would appear that Zanu-PF does not understand power-sharing. We are still poles apart, with them insisting on taking all the key ministries, literally rendering the (opposition) peripheral in government – in fact, a situation where we would be in but out of government."


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
Msika and Joice Mujuru were sworn in as Vice-Presidents by Mugabe on 13 October. Justice Minister Chinamasa said that this represented another step in the process and that it would be followed by the swearing in of the Prime Minister and the new Cabinet, remarking that "the locomotive has been too long at the railway station and it is now warming up its engine towards delivering services to the people".


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Announcement of cabinet
According to Chinamasa, parliamentary approval of the constitutional amendments was not necessary prior to the appointment of the Prime Minister; he said that the amendments would enable Tsvangirai and Mutambara to take up seats in Parliament, and that having seats in Parliament would merely provide them with constitutional legitimacy after they assumed office as ministers. In other comments, Chinamasa blamed the MDC for stalling the situation and complained that it was trying to renew discussion on matters that had been previously settled.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
Later on 13 October, Mbeki arrived in Zimbabwe to facilitate negotiations. Mugabe and Tsvangirai met for over seven hours on 14 October, but no agreement was reached. Talks over the next two days did not produce an agreement, but on 16 October Mugabe expressed optimism about the possibility of an agreement being reached on the next day, stressing the "need for compromise on both sides". Chamisa said that there was "some movement, but not enough". Reportedly control of the home affairs ministry remained a key sticking point; ZANU-PF was said to have offered the finance ministry to the MDC and to have proposed that the parties alternate control of the home affairs ministry, but the MDC reportedly rejected this proposal.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
By 17 October, Tsvangirai announced to the press that the talks had failed due to the conflict over the home affairs ministry, and that both he and Mugabe had agreed to refer a resolution of differences to SADC; Mugabe stated that the talks "went in the wrong direction".


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
On 16 October, SADC had officially acknowledged that it did not recognise Mugabe as the legitimately-elected president in response to a legal application filed against it by the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, but it rejected a request from the Forum for the rejection of Mugabe from SADC meetings due to SADC's belief that Mbeki's role as moderator in the negotiations would facilitate an end to the deadlock and bring the power-sharing deal to fruition. SADC, according to Tsvangirai, would meet on 20 October in Swaziland to discuss further proceedings; in the meantime, neither party would walk away from talks.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
However, on 20 October, the scheduled meeting took place without Tsvangirai in attendance, due to a boycott called by the MDC after Tsvangirai was given a temporary one-way exit document by the Zimbabwean government that was only meant for travel to Swaziland; Swaziland is geographically landlocked by South Africa and Mozambique, and any travel to Swaziland would go through the air or groundspace of either country.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
The MDC took the lack of an official passport, which Tsvangirai had lacked for months prior to the scheduled talks, as a sign of the ZANU-PF's lack of consideration for the MDC or the talks, while the ZANU-PF regarded the matter as a technicality that was due to the government's lack of access to paper.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
The meeting, instead, brought Mugabe to discuss matters with the SADC troika of heads of state from Swaziland, Mozambique and Tanzania, also known as the "Organ on Politics, Defence and Security"; in addition, it was announced that the current South African president, Kgalema Motlanthe, would join the organ. Meanwhile, negotiations between the three parties were suspended for a week.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, Return of Mbeki and failure of negotiations
A new meeting was scheduled to be held in Harare on 27 October. MDC-T spokesman Chamisa said on 24 October that Tsvangirai would attend that meeting. On 25 October, Tsvangirai said that while the MDC respected SADC and the regional leaders, it would not sign an unsuitable deal at their behest. The SADC meeting in Harare was unsuccessful, with control of the home affairs ministry remaining the key sticking point. A communique issued afterwards called for a new SADC summit to be held "as a matter of urgency".


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, SADC ruling, cholera outbreak and Mbeki–Tsvangirai spat
At the subsequent SADC summit in Johannesburg, the SADC leaders proposed the immediate formation of a Cabinet with shared control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Tsvangirai rejected this and criticised SADC for not confronting Mugabe. Returning from the summit on 10 November, Mugabe said that the new Cabinet would be appointed "as quickly as possible" and expressed his hope that the MDC would accept the SADC proposal, while Chinamasa said that the MDC had been invited to submit names for the Cabinet.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, SADC ruling, cholera outbreak and Mbeki–Tsvangirai spat
On 12 November, MDC-T spokesman Chamisa said that his party would not join the Cabinet until "outstanding issues such as the issue of governors, equity and allocation of key ministries" were resolved. Bright Matonga, the Deputy Minister of Information, was quoted by The Herald on the same day as saying that the MDC would "never hold this country to ransom" and that there was no reason why a Cabinet could not be formed without the MDC if necessary.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, SADC ruling, cholera outbreak and Mbeki–Tsvangirai spat
On 24 November, Motlanthe, the President of South Africa, urged the parties to reach an agreement, warning that if they did not, "the situation will get worse and will implode or collapse altogether". Talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC restarted in South Africa on 25 November, again mediated by Mbeki. Mbeki described the negotiations as "the same as ever, forward and backwards, sideways and around ... the usual". Tsvangirai released a statement on 26 November calling on Mbeki to step down.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, SADC ruling, cholera outbreak and Mbeki–Tsvangirai spat
According to Tsvangirai, Mbeki "does not appear to understand how desperate the problem in Zimbabwe is, and the solutions he proposes are too small"; he also accused Mbeki of supporting ZANU-PF and said that the MDC could not "continue negotiating under his facilitation". Two days later, a letter from Mbeki sharply criticising Tsvangirai's position was published. In this letter, Mbeki urged Tsvangirai to "take responsibility for the future of Zimbabwe" instead of devoting himself to "being a militant critic of President Mugabe and ZANU-PF."


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, SADC ruling, cholera outbreak and Mbeki–Tsvangirai spat
In response to Tsvangirai's accusation that the SADC leaders lacked the courage to confront Mugabe, Mbeki said that Tsvangirai had "describe[d] us in a manner that is most offensive in terms of African culture". He also suggested that Tsvangirai perhaps believed "that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, are of greater importance" to Zimbabwe than other countries in the region and Africa as a whole.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, SADC ruling, cholera outbreak and Mbeki–Tsvangirai spat
On 28 November, the details of the bill to change the constitution were agreed, but four other issues remained open. When asked how the talks were going, Chamisa stated that the glass was either half-full or half-empty, depending on the point of view. In the 30 November edition of The Sunday Mail, Chinamasa said that the negotiators had prepared the text for this amendment, but that it still needed to be approved by the leaders on both sides.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
In remarks published in The Herald on 5 December, Mugabe told the ZANU-PF Politburo that "if the arrangement fails to work in the next one-and-a-half to two years", there would be an early election. On 13 December, the draft constitutional amendment was published in the government gazette. According to Motlanthe, the amendment marked a "major step towards the formation of an inclusive government in Zimbabwe", and he expressed his hope that Tsvangirai would be sworn in immediately; it was believed that Mugabe was empowered to swear in Tsvangirai as Prime Minister without waiting for parliamentary approval of the amendment. Chamisa stressed that the outstanding issues of cabinet portfolios and provincial governors still needed to be resolved, while Chinamasa echoed Mugabe's earlier warning that he would call a new election if power-sharing was not successful.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
On 19 December 2008, Mugabe claimed that the US was trying to get Southern African countries to oust him from power, but that his regional neighbours were "not brave enough". On 4 January, Mugabe fired 12 ministers and deputy ministers who had lost their seats in Parliament from the cabinet:


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
On 15 January 2009, Mugabe announced that he would hold talks with Tsvangirai again within a week. On 18 January 2009, Mugabe issued an ultimatum, calling on Tsvangirai to join the unity government or "break from it", refusing to concede on any points of contention.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
After another SADC meeting on 26 January 2009, there were conflicting reports. The SADC and ZANU-PF claimed that it had been agreed that the Constitutional Amendment would be adopted on 5 February 2009 and the new government, including Tsvangirai, sworn in on 11 February 2009, while the MDC stated that there had been no agreement on key issues. However, on 29 January 2009 the MDC confirmed that it would join the inclusive government and that the MDC's national council would vote on the issue on 30 January 2009; it approved the deal. South African President Motlanthe pledged to assist Zimbabwe in the rebuilding process once the unity government was in place.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
The news of the MDC's entry into government was followed by outbreaks of last-minute farm raids by war veterans, who feared that the coalition government would rein in the land reforms as a liberalising measure for the economy. On 5 February, both houses of parliament passed the unity government bill unanimously. Motlanthe expressed optimism on 8 February, saying that Mugabe and Tsvangirai "seem to be getting along fairly well".


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
On 10 February, the law creating a National Security Council, which would include Mugabe and Tsvangirai, was passed by Parliament. Tsvangirai designated the MDC's choices for Cabinet positions on the same day; these included Tendai Biti as Minister of Finance and Giles Mutseyekwa as Co-Minister of Home Affairs. Mugabe's ministerial appointees for ZANU-PF were subsequently announced; this list was dominated by members of the ZANU-PF old guard.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Details of the talks, Negotiations on Cabinet composition, New unilateral threats and MDC capitulation
Tsvangirai and the deputy prime ministers were sworn in on 11 February 2009 as planned. On 13 February 2009, shortly before the planned swearing-in ceremony of the government, the MDC's nominee for deputy agriculture minister, Roy Bennett, was arrested at the Harare airport.


2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations, Aftermath
In August 2013, following Tsvangrai's defeat in the 2013 Zimbabwean general election, Tsavngrai announced that he and his party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would no longer work with Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party, arguing that the elections were rigged and the election results were fraudulent. This would likely mean that Tsvangrai will resign as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, and the breakage of the power sharing deal.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary
The Budapest serial killings were a series of murders perpetrated by four Neo-Nazis (Árpád Zoltán Kiss, István Sándor Kiss, Zsolt István Pető and accomplice István Csaba Csontos) against people of Roma ethnicity, occurring between July 2008 and August 2009. It is regarded as one of the worst crimes in the country's history after the war.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary
The perpetrators had previously obtained firearms and Molotov cocktails after robbing a house in Besenyszög, using them in numerous attacks in 10 locations, killing six people in the process. The subsequent investigation revealed that the gang were skinheads from Debrecen, and their motive was retaliation for crimes committed by gypsies and a desire to incite anti-Roma sentiment among the ethnic Hungarian population.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary
All four were arrested on August 21, 2009 at a nightclub in Debrecen, where two of them worked as bouncers. The criminal proceedings began on March 25, 2011 and lasted until August 6, 2013. Árpád Kiss, István Kiss and Zsolt Pető were sentenced to life imprisonment, while István Csontos was a given a 13-year sentence without a chance of parole, with an expected release date of August 2022.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Pretext
From the very beginning, the four men planned the crimes in advance, selecting several sites which received high media coverage because of past incidents involving the Roma and non-Roma population.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Pretext
The weapons used to carry out the attacks were acquired from a robbery on March 7, 2008. On that day, the Kisses and Pető, who were aided by an unidentified accomplice, broke into the home of a hunter in Besenyszög, who had previously offered to sell them his Franchi M610 VSL. Presenting themselves as police officers, they tied up the occupants with duct tape, threatening them with two objects that resembled real guns.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Pretext
The robbers scavenged the hunter's weapon cabinet, taking the following items: a 7x64mm Mauser rifle with a Swarovski Optik scope, a 12x76mm Fabarm MAX2 Bock sporting rifle, a 12x76mm Franchi M610 VSL semi-automatic shotgun, a FÉG Bock shotgun, an IZS-58 MHE shotgun, a 22mm BRNO M2E hunting rifle, a 16x70mm 158 type rifle and two double-barrel shotguns.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Pretext
After the robbery, the gang began to plan and scout their locations from an apartment on Poroszlay Street in Debrecen. The vehicle used for the attacks was an Opel Astra belonging to Árpád Kiss' wife, which initially had its license plate covered, but later was replaced by fakes manufactured by István Kiss' girlfriend, Edit.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Debrecen
In preparation for the crimes, the gang decided to hold a practise shooting. On June 2, 2008, after midnight, Árpád Kiss fired several shots at the refugee camp in Debrecen with one of the rifles.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Galgagyörk
Galgagyörk was chosen as the first location because there had been previous clashes between the ethnic Hungarian and Roma communities, which were heavily reported in the press. More specifically, the men learned of it from a report on Echo TV about an ethnic Hungarian family being driven out of their homes and the involvement of the Magyar Gárda. While the people who had forced the family to leave were never identified, the gang nevertheless decided to opt for an attack on the local gypsies.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Galgagyörk
On July 21, 2008, the Kisses and Pető opened fire on several residential buildings and breaking several windows. While several people, including minors, were present during the attacks, no injuries were reported. The attack was considered a failure, as the press erroneously considered that this might've been caused by a local feud between residents.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Piricse
Due to the lack of media coverage, the perpetrators considered the Galgagyörk attack to be a failure. This led Árpád and István Kiss to plan another one, and on August 7, 2008, the two of them met with Zsolt Pető to plan their next move, agreeing that they strike in Piricse. The trio got into a car and drove towards their destination, stopping at Encsencs to change the license plate. On the night of August 8, 2008, Molotov cocktails were thrown at two houses on Ady Endre Street and a shotgun shot fired through the window of one building. One of the sleeping occupants, Magdolna Gyetyinás, left the house to check out what was going on, causing István Kiss to shoot her with one of the shotguns, hitting her in the leg and elbow. During their escape, the trio fired several more shots at the houses.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Nyíradony
On the night of September 5, 2008, Árpád Kiss carried out another attack by himself in Nyíradony, using the Mauser rifle to penetrate the window of a house on Jázmin Street in the Tamásipuszta section of the village. Two adults and their four children, in addition to the victim's mother and three minor siblings and brothers, were present in the building, but none were harmed. While they had woken up from the attacks, they decided to wait for the attacker to leave, refraining from switching the lights on as to not draw attention.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tarnabod
During their next meeting on September 27, the main trio planned another attack, this time in Tarnabod, where it was reported that some Roma had murdered an elderly man. In addition to their usual armament and clothing, they also carried with themselves VHF radios to keep in contact.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tarnabod
Two days later, at midnight, Zsolt Pető threw two Molotov cocktails at a house on Tarna Street, one at the wall and the other at a window, before firing at it with his Fabarm. Meanwhile, the Kisses threw their cocktails at another house, before all three fled towards Tarna Creek. Along the way, they shot at another victim who was standing by the window in his home, but failed to hit him. In total, five buildings were shot at or had Molotov cocktails thrown at them, but miraculously none of the residents had been harmed.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tarnabod
Despite the attackers' intentions, they had unknowingly attacked ethnic Hungarian residents living in the village, as that neighborhood was populated mainly by elderly women.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Nagycsécs
On November 3, 2008, the trio attacked two houses on György Dózsa Street in Nagycsécs. One of the buildings was occupied by a married couple and their mentally handicapped, deaf-mute child and the homeowner's physically disabled brother; the other had another couple and their two minor children.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Nagycsécs
Árpád Kiss had stationed himself at a field with his Mauser, covering for István Kiss and Zsolt Pető, who were throwing cocktails at the building. The noise caused the occupants of the buildings to wake up and start extinguishing the flames. The attackers shot and killed József and Tiborné Nagy on the spot, and severely wounded the other man from the adjacent building.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Nagycsécs
A peculiarity noticed by investigators was that, despite István Csontos not being present during this attack, footprints from a fourth person were found at the crime scene, whose identity has not been established to this day.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Alsózsolca
Another attack was carried out on December 15, 2008 on Pista Dankó Street in Alsózsolca, with the targets being an 18-year-old and a 16-year-old chopping firewood near their home. Árpád Kiss shot at the 18-year-old from the other side of the Sajó river with his Mauser, missing him, but instead piercing through his companion's clothing. He fired another shot, hitting the older victim in the hip area and causing him to collapse. Despite his life threatening condition, he was rescued, but was left permanently disabled from his injuries.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tatárszentgyörgy
In 2007, a conflict occurred between ethnic Hungarian and Roma residents in Tatárszentgyörgy, leading to intervention from the Magyar Gárda and members of the National Guard, a right-wing paramilitary organization demanding for the segregation of Romas from ethnic Hungarians. This stunt subsequently led to the organization being outlawed by the government. Because of his incident, the gang chose Tatárszentgyörgy as their next target.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tatárszentgyörgy
On February 23, 2009, the trio arrived in front of a house on Fenyves Street, occupied by 29-year-old Róbert Csorbá, his wife and three children. Árpád Kiss hid himself in the trees while his two cohorts attacked head on, with Zsolt Pető throwing two Molotov cocktails into the attic and walls, causing them to light on fire. When Csorba noticed the fire, he picked up two of his children and ran towards the patio door. He was seen by István Kiss, who fired at the terrace twice with his Franchi, fatally hitting Róbert and his 4-year-old son, Robiká, and seriously injuring the daughter Bianká, who fled back towards the house.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tiszalök
In this incident, the three main perpetrators were joined for the first time by István Csontos, who knew of the previous attacks and wanted to participate due to his anti-gypsy convictions, acting as their getaway driver. Unlike the previous times, Zsolt Pető was not present during the attack in Tiszalök. While Árpád and István Kiss were committing the crime, Csontos waited in nearby Polgár, returning to the crime scene to pick up the brothers and then leave.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tiszalök
Tiszalök was chosen due a 2008 parade organized by the National Guard, and the subsequent counter-protest by the Roma community. The attack took place on April 22, 2009 at 10PM, with Árpád, who was hiding in some nearby grass, opening fire with his shotgun at a house on Nefelejcs Street. This caused the homeowner, Jenö Kóka, to try and flee via the yard, but was seen by the attackers, who shot at him with their rifles, hitting him in the chest and killing him on the spot.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tiszalök
Prior to the murder, police assured the public that they could cordon off the county in a maximum of ten minutes. However, an hour and a half after the murder, one of the Kiss brothers phoned Csontos and told him to pick them up. Csontos was stopped on the way by police officers, but despite having an empty guitar case, military binoculars, maps and a radio in his car, Csontos was let go by the officer and wasn't questioned further.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tiszalök
Ten minutes later, he picked up the brothers from a nearby railway embankment and they all drove away from the area. On the way back, the car got stuck in mud on a dirt road, making Árpád Kiss make a phone call to his partner, Évá N., to help them out (this call would later be used to track down the killers).


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Tiszalök
Évá N. went there in the early hours with her own car, picked up the trio and drove them back to Debrecen, with them returning back the next day with a farmer, whom they had asked to help tow their car away with his tractor. This happened only 40 kilometers away from the crime scene.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Kisléta
The last known attack occurred in Kisléta on August 3, 2009. On that night, the Kiss brothers and Zsolt Pető approached a house on Bocskai Street from the fields, while István Csontos returned to Debrecen with the car until he would be called back to pick his associates.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Kisléta
After approaching the front door, two of them kicked it down and broke inside, where Pető fired at the doorframes with his Fabarm. They then went to the bedroom and opened fire at the two people they found lying in bed. The mother, Mária Balogh, was killed on the spot, while her daughter, Ketrin, who was hiding behind her mother, survived. After the incident, she was left with permanent brain damage.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Kisléta
After the attack in Kisléta, police patrols were increased in the area, so one of the men began carrying around a pistol, in case a shoot-out with police occurred. Disappointed with the resutls, the trio planned to also attack the mayor of the village, who, according to them, was a leftist who always gave the jobs to gypsies. Later on, an allegation by a Magyar Gárda employee claimed that one of the men likely attended Mária Balogh's funeral, as a suspicious man with a tattoo on his right upper arm, most likely Árpád Kiss, was seen there.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Later plans
The perpetrators planned to acquire new weapons before they were captured, so they re-browsed gun advertisements on the internet and also began mapping the sellers' residences. They also considered acquiring high-powered automatic weapons from the military barracks in Hajdúhadház, with Csontos even taking photos of the area, but this idea was later abandoned.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Attacks, Later plans
After Kisléta, the gang planned to attack Ipolytarnóc on August 23, but this was thwarted by their arrest on August 21. This planned attack was confirmed after the seizure of satellite and other recordings, indicating they were going to attack a Roma-populated house in the town. During these seizures, police also uncovered evidence that they had planned to strike in Erdőkertes, Kisvárda and Tura.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, General characteristics of the attacks
The initial attacks were mainly on buildings inhabited by Roma people, with the aim of causing fear and confusion. In comparison, the 2008 Nagycsécs attack marked a turning point in the case when press coverage gave confirmation to the perpetrators. In the subsequent attacks, they typically turned against gypsies with a more ordinary way of life, with the aim of heightening tensions between the Roma and the non-Roma. For this reason, the gang accepted István Csontos as a driver due to increased police presence on the streets.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, General characteristics of the attacks
In total, the gang attacked 10 villages and towns and 55 people, killing six and injuring five.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Investigation
During the investigation, police inspected one and a half million cars and millions of phone calls, as well as reviewing 800 hours worth of surveillance camera footage, lasting roughly a year since the start of the crimes. After the fifth attack in Alsószolca in December 2008, the police concluded that the same perpetrators were responsible for the recent spat of crimes, at which point they started focusing on how and by whom the attacks were committed, as well as who the targets were.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Investigation
Concerning the Tarnabod attack, three young local Roma youths were charged after they had given false testimony and traces of gunpowder was found on them. However, according to their lawyer, the gunpowder actually originated from the arresting officers, and the boys had never owned a firearm. Six months later, the boys were released and later received monetary compensation for their unjustified detention.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Investigation
A large part in stopping the actual killers were the cell phone calls made at the time and place of the crimes, as well as matching DNA samples taken from the suspects. Prior to their arrest, Hungarian police sought assistance from the FBI in profiling the perpetrators.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
The course of the investigation, especially on-site measures after the attack in Tatárszentgyörgy and the inspection of the storage site, was criticized in several aspects. According to several law enforcement agencies, the first-instance proceedings lasted 28 months because deficiencies in the locations had to be clarified during criminal proceedings.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
On May 7, 2009, a forensics team funded by the National and Ethnic Minority Rights Protection Office, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and the European Roma Rights Centre was dispatched to Tatárszentgyörgy to collect data, which they would later published in their report titled The White Booklet. According to the report, after the tragedy, the first people to arrive on the scene were reporters from Dabasi Television, then police and firefighters, with the ambulance coming in last.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
The fire department falsely determined that a short circuit was the cause of the fire, despite a gas can being found on the spot, and police initially ignored testimony about gunshots sounding through the area. It was also documented that one of the detectives had urinated on a footprint possibly belonging to one of the killers, and some authorities claimed the cartridges had been scattered by the victims themselves.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
The Independent Police Complaints Board found that the police had seriously violated the fundamental constitutional rights during the scene: while they had fulfilled their obligation to take action and help prevent an escalation of tensions, they had only partially secured the site. The fire was treated as accidental for more than 10 hours, and after the resignation group and the inspection committee withdrew, no police force remained at the crime scene until a morning inspection began. According to the Board, the reasons for this unprofessional conduct was a lack of ballistic knowledge. During the criminal lawsuit, the judge called the scene "shocking and desperate" because, for example, the ambulance paramedic hadn't noticed that one of the victims had been shot in the head.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
Following the Tatárszentgyörgy tragedy, Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány requested a report from the ministries to supervise the police, fire brigade and the hospitals, which later found an abundance of procedural and professional errors had occurred at the crime scene. The Chief Captain of Pest County initiated disciplinary proceedings against the hot-pressed commander and the head of the on-site inspection.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
According to leaked telegrams published by WikiLeaks in 2011, staff the American embassy in Budapest commented that the view of Hungarian police was that most of the population were indifferent about the case. A few days after the gang members were arrested, in the last days of August 2009, a document referring to intelligence sources appeared on the Internet detailing the omissions made by the intelligence services. The documents revealed that all three main members had been monitored before the attacks, but their supervision had ceased after they had begun.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
Since 2004, István Kiss had not only been under close control by the Hajdú-Bihar police department, but at the beginning of 2008, he was noted for preparing to purchase weapons and large quantities of ammunition. The county branch initiated an extension into its secret data collection program, and even informed then-director general Sándor Laborc about it, but the request was rejected by higher-ups. The National Security Committee of the National Assembly found that there was insufficient communication between units from the Office of Natural Security and that the service was uncaring in its handling of extremists under surveillance.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
In the spring of 2008, despite the request of the Hajdú-Bihar operations officer, the Legal Department never issued a surveillance order on Árpád Kiss or Zsolt Pető, nor did it tighten surveillance on István Kiss, which later on was completely suspended. The committee also established that György Szilvásy and Ádám Ficsor, the successor socialist ministers in charge of the national security services, as well as the former director-general of NBH Sándor Laborc and the acting director-general László Balajti were responsible for this misconduct, with all four resigning from their respective posts.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
The report also indicted Attorney General Tamás Kovács, but no charges were brought against him. Four former NBH officers were charged with forgery of public documents, and even Csontos' detention officer was prosecuted for providing false testimony because he had denied at the hearing that he had anything to do with the detainee, but all defendants were acquitted of their respective charges.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Irregularities in the investigation
In connection with the previous surveillance of the perpetrators by the intelligence agencies, Minister of Defense Csaba Hende initiated an investigation into the activities of the KBH during the murders; the results were originally scheduled to remain encrypted until 2020, but were made public on September 4, 2013.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Arrest
The breakthrough in the case was when the gang's car got stuck in the mud after the attack in Tiszalök, when Árpád Kiss called his girlfriend Évá N. to help take them home. When the phone call was inspected, it was discovered that this same cellular device had been used in proximity to the Galgagyörk and Kisléta crime scenes. A week later, all four suspects were being monitored, and after surveillance determined that the group was planning another attack, it was determined that their arrest couldn't be postponed any longer.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Arrest
The National Bureau of Investigation and the REBISZ arrested two of the men at the dawn of August 21, 2009, at the Pérenyi Club in Debrecen. The arresting force consisted of 85 officers and hundreds of detectives conducting house searches in 13 locations parallel to the arrests, during which they detained the other two suspects. While examining the detainees' homes and dozens of other locations, 1,916 items were seized: map sketches, the getaway vehicle and the winter tires, boots, cameras, and the weapons, which were found hidden in the Pérenyi Club.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Arrest
Police determined that the attacks had been timed, as the perpetrators had wanted to avoid any civilian injuries. In addition, the stolen weaponry from Besenyszög was also found and confiscated from the Kiss brothers' apartment. As the perpetrators lacked any official permit to handle the weaponry, they were also charged with misuse of firearms and ammunition.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Trial
The four men were charged with six murders, five attempted murders, reckless endagerment, maiming, armed robbery, theft and misuse of weaponry and ammunition. In addition, it was specifically mentioned that their actions were committed for racist motives. The first trial began on March 25, 2011 at the Budapest District Court. The final verdict was delivered on August 6, 2013, when all four defendants were found guilty on all counts.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Trial
Árpád Kiss, István Kiss and Zsolt Pető received life terms with 10 years deprivation of civil rights, while István Csontos received a 13-year prison term and 10 years deprivation of civil rights. The four were also required to reimburse the victims' families for 107 million forints. A second trial took hold at the Curia (the forum building for the Supreme Court) in 2016, where the sentences of the convicts were upheld.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Open questions
Although the manner in which the weapons were stolen was clarified to the smallest detail, the origins of the ammunition were not revealed. On the basis of the indictment, it turned out that there were several acquisitions of weapons and ammunition for which there were no intermediaires or contributors. In addition, the did not operate in isolation from other extremist groups and individuals in Debrecen and elsewhere, although Árpád Kiss gradually distanced himself from them and gradually began to use his phone less and less. It is also known that the accomplice in the initial robbery of the weapons has never been identified.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Open questions
During the raid in Perényi Club, in addition to the four later defendants, the police also arrested two other persons, Antal R. and László E., on suspicion of aiding and abetting suspected criminals. They were investigated for possible connection to the gang, but in the end, both were released without any charges. This is despite the fact that one of the men, Antal R., was a self-avowed neo-Nazi and had previously served time in the same jail as István Csontos, with his profile matching that of the suspect accomplice in the robbery.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Open questions
Following the arrests of the accused, an unofficial document leaked which stated that István Kiss had been monitored by the Constitution Protection Office until May 2008. It is unknown how the agency was made aware of the Besenszyög robbery during this period, and as no members of it were questioned during the trial as witnesses nor the indictment mentioned the organization's relationship with the accused, it remains a mystery.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Case overview, Open questions
It is also unclear how the perpetrators acquired the necessary finances for the attacks, or whether they had any supporters, helpers or instigators. According to the investigators, Árpád Kiss and his brother, István, and István Csontos each had an income of around 100-120 thousand forints per month, with only Zsolt Pető earning 200 thousand from his two jobs. Thus, it was rightly concluded that, while they could've had enough for the spent ammunition and raw materials used for the Molotov cocktails, it was considered doubtful it would've covered any other expenses associated with the attacks. The members never used their own phones, always using either disposable phones with SIM cards or walkie-talkies. According to the indictment, the ammo used by Pető alone was enough to dry up their income, and this was excluding travel costs for vignettes and fuel.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Cause of events, Perpetrators' background
At the time of the attacks, Árpád Kiss was 42, his brother István - 33, Zsolt Pető - 34 and István Csontos, who took part solely in the Tiszalök attack, only 27. The latter two were friends of the brothers.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Cause of events, Perpetrators' background
The investigation determined that none of the defendants suffered from mental illness or any personality disorders that necessitated a mitigation of their sentences.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Cause of events, Motives
The main motivations of the perpetrators, who described themselves as neo-Nazis and Hungarianists, was retaliation to crimes committed by Roma offenders who, in their view, terrorized the ethnic Hungarian population but always got away with lenient sentences. The Kiss brothers were particularly affected by an infamous case from 2006, when teacher Lajos Szögi was lynched by the relatives of a girl he had almost run over with his car, but then attempted to help.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Cause of events, Motives
The murder caused outrage in the population, with the brothers joining the National Guard in sympathy, initially believing that the paramilitary organization was suitable for regulating the Roma, taking part in their protest in Pest in 2007. However, they came to the conclusion that the National Guard wasn't strict enough. All three of the main defendants agreed that the state authorities, the judiciaries and the police were doing an improper job in detecting and punishing Roma criminals, and because of this, they had decided to take justice into their own hands.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Commemoration
In November 2009, the National Gypsy Self-Government placed a memorial plaque at the organization's headquarters on Dóhany Street in Budapest, but it was later removed.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Commemoration
On July 19, 2011, a monument designed by Zoltán Nagygyörgy and Ádám Márk Horváth, and funded by Csepel and ARC, was revealed at the Gödör Club in Budapest, to commemorate the victims of the murders and to emphasize the peaceful coexistence of ethnic Hungarians and Roma Hungarians. The monument was exhibited at the Valley of the Arts in Kapolcs, at the Vidor Festival in Nyíregyháza, and at the Sziget Festival and Millenáris Park in Budapest.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Commemoration
The murders inspired the plot of the 2012 film Just the Wind, directed by Benedek Fliegauf. Eszter Hajdú made a documentary about the case entitled Judgment in Hungary; it later won the 2014 jury grand prize at the Open City Docs in London.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Commemoration
After the first fatal attack had occurred, on November 3, 2018, the local Roma government inaugurated a memorial plaque in memory of the Nagy couple in Nagycsécs. On February 23, 2019, a civil commemoration in honor of the victims of the Tatárszentgyörgy attack was held in Budapest. Participants gathered at Pope John Paul II Square and then, after delivering their speeches, marched together toward the Deák Square Lutheran Church, where worship services were held.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Commemoration
On March 28, 2019, Gergely Karácsony, the mayor of Zugló, forwarded a motion to rename Mexikói Street to Robiká Csorba Street. As the family wished to discuss this more widely, he withdrew the motion at their request on April 29.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Commemoration
In a debate held during the second round of the 2019 Budapest municipal elections, candidates Olga Kálmán, Gábor Kerpel-Fronius and Gergely Karácsony all stated that they would support the erection of a memorial to the murder victims in Budapest.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
At the end of 2018, Árpád Kiss asked for a retrial, basing his appeal off the incorrect information provided in the Tiszalök case, which would redefine his guilt from that of a main perpetrator to accomplice, thus reducing his sentence. This was rejected by the Metropolitan Judgement Board on March 28, 2019.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
In the retrial request, Árpád Kiss claimed that he hadn't handled a gun during the murder of Jenö Kóka, but that it was his brother, István, who had pulled the trigger and that his footprint hadn't been recorded by authorities; he also alleged that the shooting of the Debrecen refugee camp wasn't done by him but by Zsolt Petö, and that he had been at his workplace at the time.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
He raised his younger brother's confession as new evidence, however, according to the reasoning of the panel, the new evidence must be capable of establishing a new fact not present in the judgment, which in itself could make the accused likely to get an acquittal or lesser sanction. Since procedural positions cannot be accumulated and charged persons unable to be heard as witnesses, his motion was denied.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
At the beginning of March 2020, the press reported for the first time that the main defendant, Árpád Kiss, wished for a new trial concerning the Roma murders. In his view, the role of the socialist government and the secret services hadn't been properly clarified in previous proceedings.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
Kiss complained that the reasons for the events (social tension between the gypsies and Hungarians, as well as open coverage as crimes committed by gypsies) were all due to activities encouraged by the government at the time, and that the National Guard and the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement had moles who encouraged the acquisition of weapons and the extermination of gypsies, a fact confirmed by the latter organization.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
According to Kiss, the ethnic conflict was blown up by people with a background in the secret services in 2008 in Galgagyörk, as a result of which they had begun to "settle in", espousing slogans reminiscent of one used by the services. He also claimed that the first killing taking place in the same village was no coincidence, alleging that it was all planned in advance by the Constitution Protection Office, who had already admitted that they had monitored István Kiss, but had withheld his files. This general phenomenon, in his view, was caused by the Gyurcsány government's desire to divert people's attention from the country's poor economic situation, anti-government sentiment and impending election defeat for the Hungarian Socialist Party.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
Árpád Kiss also requested an re-examination of István Csontos' role in the murders, as well as people related to him, citing his service in Kosovo and later employment by the Military Security Office and constant contact with his detaining officer, whom he had met in person before the last attack in Kisléta. To date, it hasn't been revealed exactly what the two men had conversed about nor whether Csontos' officer, Ernö Hódos, reported to his supervisor about the meeting. Kiss also requested that the investigators find out why Csontos had been let go from the scene and arrested hours later. István himself later claimed that the police interrogation had been a simple mistake.


2008–2009 neo-Nazi murders of Roma in Hungary, Renewal and reopening of the investigation
In May 2020, the National Bureau of Investigation confirmed that it was conducting a new investigation into the alleged fifth member, and that it was seeking information for any potential instigators, financiers or other accomplices. The reopening of the investigation is presumably related to the new information provided by Árpád Kiss, albeit it remains unclear whether specific people have been eyed as potential suspects.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup First Division
The 2008–10 European Nations Cup First Division was the 7th edition of the championship since it was reformed in 2000. The championship not only determined the champions of the ENC but it also acted as an element of European qualification for the 2011 Rugby World Cup in New Zealand.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup First Division
At present, there is no promotion or relegation between the European Nations Cup and the Six Nations. The current champions are Georgia, who won the 2011 First Division.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup First Division
The top two teams, Georgia and Russia, qualified directly to the 2011 Rugby World Cup, and the third placed team, Romania, entered the European qualification playoffs. These playoffs included the champion of Division 2A and the leaders of the lower ENC divisions (excluding 3D) at the end of the 2008–09 season. Romania emerged as the winner of the playoff series and will go on to play Tunisia, the second place African qualifier, in the semifinals of the Rugby World Cup 2011 20th Place Playoff for the last spot in the 2011 Rugby World Cup finals.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup First Division
This season saw Germany in the First Division for the first time since the divisional system was created, replacing Czech Republic who were relegated to Division 2A.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup First Division
The divisions play on a two-year cycle with the teams playing each other both home and away. From 2009 onward, the title is assigned according to a one-year ranking. So Georgia won the 2009 title  and Romania the title for 2010. The same for the 2011–12 period.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup First Division, Table 2008–10
The cumulated table from both years, 2009–2010, decided which teams qualify directly to 2011 Rugby World Cup, which  team goes through Play-off qualification rounds and which team is relegated to Division 1B for the 2010–12 season.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Second Division
The European Nations Cup Second division 2008–2010 is the second tier of the European Championship for developing Rugby Union nations.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Second Division
It is made up of two divisions with 5 teams in each division. Due to changes in the structure of the European Nations Cup for the 2010–2012 competition, no team will be relegated from Division 2A or 2B. The winner of Division 2A gets promoted to Division One and the winner of Division 2B will get promoted to Division 2A.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Second Division
The leader of Division 2B at the end of the 2008–2009 season, and the champion of Division 2A at the end of the competition, will have the opportunity to participate in qualification for the 2011 Rugby World Cup.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Second Division
The former champions of Division 2A were Germany who have been replaced by the relegated Czech Republic. Poland won Division 2B and were promoted to Division 2A in place of the Netherlands. Sweden was promoted from Division 3A to replace the relegated Andorra.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Second Division, Division 2A
The tournament was won by Ukraine, that obtained the promotion to the highest lever of ENC, and qualification to Rugby World Cup Qualification.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division
The 2008–2010 European Nations Cup (ENC) Third Division (a European rugby union competition for national teams)  will be contested over two years during which all teams meet each other home and away. The Third Division consists of four levels, which effectively constitute the 5th through 8th levels of European international rugby. The winner of each division will be promoted to the next highest division. Due to changes in the competition, the last placed team will not be relegated to the next division lower.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division
The leader of each division (excluding 3D) at the end of the 2008–2009 season will have the opportunity to participate in the qualification for the 2011 Rugby World Cup.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division
The previous champion of Division 3A, Sweden, was promoted to the Second Division and replaced with relegated side Andorra.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division, Table – Division 3A
Serbia were ranked ahead of Andorra based on 39–28 aggregate score in their two matches as the series was tied 1–1.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division, Matches
1 Armenia were unable to show up for the match due to a pilot's strike in Armenia; Lithuania were awarded a 25–0 victory and Armenia received a point for the loss. 2 The match was originally scheduled for 17 April 2010, but was postponed due to the Eyjafjallajökull eruption. 3 Lithuania's win in this match set a new world record in men's International Rugby for the most consecutive wins with 18 wins.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division, Table – Division 3C
Greece were ranked ahead of Bulgaria based on 56–36 aggregate score in two head to head matches as the series was drawn 1–1.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division, Table – Division 3D
On 23 September 2009, Slovakia withdrew from the remainder of the competition, and their record was expunged.


2008–2010 European Nations Cup Third Division, Matches
1 Monaco forfeited the match due to player illness; Azerbaijan received a 6–0 win, and Monaco were given a point for the loss.


2008–2010 Montenegrin municipal elections
Montenegrin municipal elections were held in all 21 municipalities, between April 2004 and October 2006. It resulted in the decisive victory of the ruling Coalition for European Montenegro in 18 out of 21 municipalities, where he has secured a majority, on its own or in a coalition with national minority parties.


2008–2010 Montenegrin municipal elections, Results, Podgorica
The local government was formed after an agreement between ruling Coalition for European Podgorica (composed by Democratic Party of Socialists, the Liberal Party and Bosniak Party), which was a relative winner of the election and Social Democratic Party which ran independently. Current mayor Miomir Mugoša (DPS) has been voted a new four-year mandate.


2008–2010 Montenegrin municipal elections, Results, Herceg Novi
17,039 or 68.4% of eligible voters voted. 16,649 of the votes are valid and 390 invalid.


2008–2010 Montenegrin municipal elections, Results, Tivat
The turnout was 65.2% or 7,062. There were 6,938 valid and 124 invalid votes.


2008–2010 Montenegrin municipal elections, Results, Results in rest of municipalities
In seventeen other municipalities ruling Coalition for European Montenegro (DPS, SDP, LP and BS) stay in power in most municipalities. It held an absolute majority in Bar, Budva, Žabljak, Bijelo Polje, Danilovgrad, Šavnik, Mojkovac, Kolašin, Plav, Rožaje, Nikšić, Cetinje, Andrijevica and Berane. The opposition won only in Plužine, where the local SNP won absolute power, and in Pljevlja where local government was formed by joint opposition list.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
The Icelandic financial crisis was a major economic and political event in Iceland that involved the default of all three of the country's major privately owned commercial banks in late 2008, following their difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt and a run on deposits in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Relative to the size of its economy, Iceland's systemic banking collapse was the largest experienced by any country in economic history. The crisis led to a severe economic slump in 2008–2010 and significant political unrest.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
In the years preceding the crisis, three Icelandic banks, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir, multiplied in size. This expansion was driven by ready access to credit in international financial markets, in particular money markets. As the financial crisis of 2007–2008 unfolded, investors perceived the Icelandic banks to be increasingly risky. Trust in the banks gradually faded, leading to a sharp depreciation of the Icelandic króna in 2008 and increased difficulties for the banks in rolling over their short-term debt.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
At the end of the second quarter of 2008, Iceland's external debt was 9.553 trillion Icelandic krónur (€50 billion), more than 7 times the GDP of Iceland in 2007. The assets of the three banks totaled 14.437 trillion krónur at the end of the second quarter 2008, equal to more than 11 times the national GDP. Due to the huge size of the Icelandic financial system in comparison with the Icelandic economy, the Central Bank of Iceland found itself unable to act as a lender of last resort during the crisis, further aggravating the mistrust in the banking system.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
On 29 September 2008, it was announced that Glitnir would be nationalised. However, subsequent efforts to restore faith in the banking system failed. On 6 October, the Icelandic legislature instituted an emergency law which enabled the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) to take control over financial institutions and made domestic deposits in the banks priority claims. In the following days, new banks were founded to take over the domestic operations of Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir. The old banks were put into receivership and liquidation, resulting in losses for their shareholders and foreign creditors. Outside Iceland, more than half a million depositors lost access to their accounts in foreign branches of Icelandic banks. This led to the 2008–2013 Icesave dispute, that ended with an EFTA Court ruling that Iceland was not obliged to repay Dutch and British depositors minimum deposit guarantees.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
In an effort to stabilize the situation, the Icelandic government stated that all domestic deposits in Icelandic banks would be guaranteed, imposed strict capital controls to stabilize the value of the Icelandic króna, and secured a US$5.1bn sovereign debt package from the IMF and the Nordic countries in order to finance a budget deficit and the restoration of the banking system. The international bailout support programme led by IMF officially ended on 31 August 2011, while the capital controls which were imposed in November 2008 were lifted on 14 March 2017.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
The financial crisis had a serious negative impact on the Icelandic economy. The national currency fell sharply in value, foreign currency transactions were virtually suspended for weeks, and the market capitalisation of the Icelandic stock exchange fell by more than 90%. As a result of the crisis, Iceland underwent a severe economic depression; the country's gross domestic product dropped by 10% in real terms between the third quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2010. A new era with positive GDP growth started in 2011, and has helped foster a gradually declining trend for the unemployment rate. The government budget deficit has declined from 9.7% of GDP in 2009 and 2010 to 0.2% of GDP in 2014; the central government gross debt-to-GDP ratio was expected to decline to less than 60% in 2018 from a maximum of 85% in 2011.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
The Icelandic króna had declined more than 35% against the euro from January to September 2008. Inflation of consumer prices was running at 14%, and Iceland's interest rates had been raised to 15.5% to deal with the high inflation.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
On the night of Wednesday, 8 October 2008, the Central Bank of Iceland abandoned its attempt to peg the Icelandic króna at 131 krónur to the euro after trying to set this peg on 6 October. By 9 October, the Icelandic króna was trading at 340 to the euro when trading in the currency collapsed due to the FME's takeover of the last major Icelandic bank, and thus the loss of all króna trade 'clearing houses'. The next day, the central bank introduced restrictions on the purchase of foreign currency within Iceland. From 9 October to 5 November, the European Central Bank quoted a reference rate of 305 krónur to the euro.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
The Central Bank of Iceland set up a temporary system of daily currency auctions on 15 October to facilitate international trade. The value of the króna is determined by supply and demand in these auctions. The first auction sold €25 million at a rate of 150 krónur to the euro. Commercial króna trading outside Iceland restarted on 28 October, at an exchange rate of 240 krónur to the euro, after Icelandic interest rates had been raised to 18%. The foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of Iceland fell by US$289 million during October 2008.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
During November, the real exchange rate (discounting inflation) of the Icelandic króna, as quoted by the Central Bank of Iceland, was roughly one-third lower than the average rate from 1980 to 2008, and 20% lower than the historical lows during the same period. The external rate as quoted by the European Central Bank was lower still. On the last trading day of the month, 28 November, the Central Bank of Iceland was quoting 182.5 krónur to the euro, while the European Central Bank was quoting 280 krónur to the euro.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
On 28 November, the Central Bank of Iceland and the Minister for Business Affairs agreed on a new set of currency regulations, replacing the central bank's restrictions imposed early on in the crisis. Movements of capital to and from Iceland were banned without a license from central bank. It is estimated that foreign investors hold some €2.9 billion in króna-denominated securities, popularly known as "glacier bonds".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
The foreign exchange rules also oblige Icelandic residents to deposit any new foreign currency they receive with an Icelandic bank. There is anecdotal evidence that some Icelandic exporters had been operating an informal offshore foreign exchange market, trading pounds and euros for krónur outside the control of any regulator and starving the onshore market of foreign currency. Hence the Central Bank had to sell €124 million of currency reserves in November 2008 to make up the difference, compared with an estimated trade surplus of €13.9 million.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
The last currency auction was held on 3 December. The domestic interbank foreign exchange market reopened the following day with three market makers, all of them government-owned. On the first two days of domestic trading, the króna climbed to 153.3 to the euro, up 22% against the last currency auction rate.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Currency
In January 2009, the exchange rate of Icelandic króna against Euro seemed to be more stabilized compared with the situation in October 2008, with the lowest rate at 177.5 krónur per EUR on 1, 3 and 4 January 2009, and the highest at 146.8 on 30 January 2009. In the meantime, however, Iceland's 12-month inflation in January 2009 climbed to a record high of 18.6%.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
In September 2008, internal documents from Kaupthing, the largest bank in Iceland, were leaked to WikiLeaks. On 29 September 2008, a plan was announced for the bank Glitnir to be nationalised by the Icelandic government with the purchase of a 75% stake for €600 million. The government stated that it did not intend to hold ownership of the bank for a long period, and that the bank was expected to carry on operating as normal. According to the government, the bank "would have ceased to exist" within a few weeks if there had not been intervention.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
It later turned out that Glitnir had US$750 million of debt due to mature on 15 October. However, the nationalization of Glitnir never went through, as it was placed in receivership by the FME before the initial plan of the Icelandic government to purchase a 75% stake had been approved by shareholders.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
The announced nationalisation of Glitnir came just as the United Kingdom government was forced to nationalise Bradford & Bingley and to sell its retail operations and branch network to Grupo Santander. Over the weekend of 4–5 October, British newspapers carried many articles detailing the nationalisation of Glitnir and the high leverage of Iceland's other banks.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
Influential BBC business editor Robert Peston published an opinion piece on the banks, stating that debt insurance for Kaupthing required a premium of £625,000 to guarantee the return of £1 million: "the worst case of financial BO I've encountered in some time" was his graphic description. The Guardian said "Iceland is on the brink of collapse. Inflation and interest rates are raging upwards. The krona, Iceland's currency, is in freefall." These articles spooked investors discussing Icesave (the brand name of Landsbanki in the UK and the Netherlands) in online forums and many started moving their savings out of the Internet bank. Problems with access to the site hinted at a run on savings.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On 6 October, a number of private interbank credit facilities to Icelandic banks were shut down. Prime Minister Geir Haarde addressed the nation in a speech that became infamous for its portentous closing words: 'God bless Iceland'. He announced a package of new regulatory measures which were to be put to the Althing, Iceland's parliament, immediately, with the cooperation of the opposition parties. These included the power of the FME to take over the running of Icelandic banks without nationalising them, and preferential treatment for depositors in the event that a bank had to be liquidated. In a separate measure, retail deposits in Icelandic branches of Icelandic banks were guaranteed in full. The emergency measures had been deemed unnecessary by the Icelandic government less than 24 hours earlier.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
That evening, the Guernsey subsidiary of Landsbanki went into voluntary administration with the approval of the Guernsey Financial Services Commission. The administrators would later say that "The main reason for the Bank's difficulties has been the placing of funds with its UK fellow subsidiary, Heritable Bank." Guernsey's Chief Minister stated "the directors of Landsbanki Guernsey took appropriate steps by putting the bank into administration."


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
The FME placed Landsbanki in receivership early on 7 October. A press release from the FME stated that all of Landsbanki's domestic branches, call centres, ATMs and internet operations will be open for business as usual, and that all "domestic deposits" were fully guaranteed. The UK government used the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 first to transfer retail deposits from Heritable Bank to a Treasury holding company, then to sell them to Dutch bank ING Direct for £1 million. The same day, the FME also placed Glitnir into receivership.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
That afternoon, there was a telephone conversation between Icelandic Finance Minister Árni Mathiesen and UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling. That evening, one of the governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, Davíð Oddsson, was interviewed on Icelandic public service broadcaster RÚV and stated that "we [the Icelandic State] do not intend to pay the debts of the banks that have been a little heedless". He compared the government's measures to the U.S. intervention at Washington Mutual, and suggested that foreign creditors would "unfortunately only get 5–10–15% of their claims".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
Darling announced that he was taking steps to freeze the assets of Landsbanki in the UK. The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008 was passed at 10 am on 8 October 2008 and came into force ten minutes later. Under the order the UK Treasury froze the assets of Landsbanki within the UK, and introduced provisions to prevent the sale or movement of Landsbanki assets within the UK, even if held by the Central Bank of Iceland or the Government of Iceland.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
The freezing order took advantage of provisions in sections 4 and 14 and Schedule 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, and was made "because the Treasury believed that action to the detriment of the UK's economy (or part of it) had been or was likely to be taken by certain persons who are the government of or resident of a country or territory outside the UK".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
The UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced that the UK government would launch legal action against Iceland over concerns with compensation for the estimated 300,000 UK savers. Geir Haarde said at a press conference on the following day that the Icelandic government was outraged that the UK government applied provisions of anti-terrorism legislation to it in a move they dubbed an "unfriendly act". The Chancellor of the Exchequer also said that the UK government would foot the entire bill to compensate UK retail depositors, estimated at £4 billion.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
It is reported that more than £4 billion in Icelandic assets in the UK have been frozen by the UK government. The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) also declared Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander, the UK subsidiary of Kaupthing Bank, in default on its obligations, sold Kaupthing Edge, its Internet bank, to ING Direct, and put Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander into administration. Over £2.5 billion of deposits for 160,000 customers were sold to ING Direct. The scale of the run on Kaupthing Edge deposits had been such that many transactions were not completed until 17 October. Although Geir Haarde has described the UK government's actions over Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander as an "abuse of power" and "unprecedented", they were the third such actions taken under the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 in less than ten days, after interventions in Bradford & Bingley and Heritable Bank.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On the same day, the Sveriges Riksbank, Sweden's central bank, made a credit facility of 5 billion Swedish krona (€520 million) available to Kaupthing Bank Sverige AB, the Swedish subsidiary of Kaupthing. The loan was to pay "depositors and other creditors".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On 9 October, Kaupthing was placed into receivership by the FME, following the resignation of the entire board of directors. The bank said that it was in technical default on its loan agreements after its UK subsidiary had been placed into administration. Kaupthing's Luxembourg subsidiary asked for, and obtained, a suspension of payments (similar to chapter 11 protection) in the Luxembourg District Court. Kaupthing's Geneva office, which was a branch of its Luxembourg subsidiary, was prevented from making any payments of more than 5000 Swiss francs by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission. The directors of Kaupthing's subsidiary on the Isle of Man decided to wind up the company after consultation with the Manx authorities. The Finnish Financial Supervision Authority, Rahoitustarkastus, announced having taken control of Kaupthing's Helsinki branch already on 6th, to prevent money from being sent back to Iceland.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On the same day, the UK Treasury issued a licence under the Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008 to allow the London branch of Landsbanki to continue some business. A second licence was issued on 13 October, when the Bank of England provided a £100 million secured loan to Landsbanki "to help maximise the returns to UK creditors".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On 12 October the Norwegian government took control of Kaupthing's Norwegian operations, including "all of the bank's assets and liabilities in Norway".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On 21 October, the Central Bank of Iceland asked the remaining independent financial institutions for new collateral against their loans. This was to replace the shares in Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing which had been pledged as collateral previously and which were now of much lower value, if not worthless. The value of the collateral was estimated at 300 billion krónur (€2 billion).


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
One of the banks, Sparisjóðabanki (SPB, also known as Icebank), stated the next day that it could not provide new collateral for its 68 billion krónur (€451 million) loan, and would have to turn to the government for help. "This problem won't be solved in any other way," said CEO Agnar Hansson.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Banks
On 24 October, it emerged that a Norwegian export credit company (Eksportfinans) had made a complaint to Norwegian police concerning the alleged embezzlement of 415 million Norwegian kroner (€47 million) by Glitnir since 2006. The Icelandic bank had acted as an agent for Eksportfinans, administering loans to several companies: however Eksportfinans alleges that, when the loans were paid off early by borrowers, Glitnir kept the cash and merely continued with the regular payments to Eksportfinans, effectively taking an unauthorized loan itself.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Stock market
Trading in shares of six financial companies on the OMX Nordic Iceland Exchange was suspended on 6 October by order of the FME. On Thursday 9 October, all trading on the exchange was frozen for two days by the government "in an attempt to prevent further panic spreading throughout the country's financial markets". The decision was made to do so due to "unusual market conditions", with share prices having fallen 30% since the start of the month. The closure was extended through Monday 13 October due to continuing "unusual market conditions".


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Stock market
The market reopened on 14 October with the main index, the OMX Iceland 15, at 678.4, which corresponds to a plunge of about 77% compared with 3,004.6 before the closure. This reflects the fact that the value of the three big banks, which form 73.2% of the value of the OMX Iceland 15, had been set to zero. The values of other equities varied from +8% to −15%. Trading in shares of Exista, SPRON and Straumur-Burðarás (13.66% of the OMX Iceland 15) remains suspended. After a week of very thin trading, the OMX Iceland 15 closed on 17 October at 643.1, down 93% in króna terms and 96% in euro terms from its historic high of 9016 (18 July 2007).


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Stock market
Trading in the shares of two financial services companies, Straumur–Burðarás and Exista, resumed on 9 December: together the companies account for 12.04% of the OMX Iceland 15. The values of the shares in both companies dropped sharply, and the index closed at 394.88, down by 40.17% on the day. Trading in shares in SPRON and Kaupthing remains suspended, at prices of 1.90 krónur and 694.00 krónur respectively.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
The four credit rating agencies which monitor Iceland's sovereign debt all lowered their ratings during the crisis, and their outlook for future ratings changes became negative. The Icelandic government had a relatively healthy balance, with sovereign debt of 28% of GDP and a budget surplus of 6% of GDP (2007). More recently, the estimated 2011 debt was 130% of GDP with a budget deficit of 6% of GDP.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
In addition, the value of foreign currency bonds which matured in the remainder of 2008 was only $600 million, and foreign currency debt service in 2009 was only $215 million, well within the government's ability to pay. However the agencies believed that the government would have to issue more foreign currency bonds, both to cover losses as the banks' overseas operations are liquidation and also to stimulate demand in the domestic economy as Iceland goes into recession.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
A team of experts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrived in Iceland at the start of October 2008 for talks with the government. Industry Minister Össur Skarphéðinsson was said to be "favourable" to help from the IMF to stabilise the króna and to allow interest rates to be lowered.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
On 7 October, the central bank of Iceland announced that they had been in talks with the Russian ambassador to Iceland, Victor I. Tatarintsev, over a €4 billion loan from Russia. The loan would be given across three or four years, with an interest rate of 30 to 50 basis points (0.3% to 0.5%) above LIBOR. Central Bank of Iceland governor Davíð Oddsson later clarified that the loan was still being negotiated. According to RÚV, prime minister Geir Haarde had been investigating the possibility of a Russian loan since the mid-summer. When questioned on the matter in a press conference, Geir Haarde said: "We have not received the kind of support that we were requesting from our friends. So in a situation like that one has to look for new friends."


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
A team of Icelandic negotiators arrived in Moscow on 14 October to discuss the possible loan. Russian deputy finance minister Dmitri Pankin said that "The meeting took place in a friendly atmosphere.... We are working thoroughly on the issue to take a final decision". On the same day, the Central Bank of Iceland drew on its swap facilities with the central banks of Denmark and Norway for €200 million each. Iceland has swap facilities with the other Nordic countries for a total of €1.5 billion. Iceland is also seeking assistance from the European Central Bank (ECB): there is some precedent for the move, as the ECB already has currency swap arrangements with Switzerland, another non-member of the European Union.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
On 24 October, the IMF tentatively agreed to lend €1.58 billion. However the loan had still not been approved by the Executive Board of the IMF on 13 November. Due to the delay Iceland found itself caught in a classic catch-22 situation, loans from other countries could not be secured until the IMF program had been approved. The Icelandic government spoke of a $500M (€376M) gap in the funding plans. Dutch finance minister Wouter Bos stated that the Netherlands would oppose the loan unless agreement was reached over deposit insurance for Landsbanki customers in the Netherlands.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Development, Sovereign debt
The IMF-led package of $4.6bn was finally agreed on 19 November, with the IMF loaning $2.1bn and another $2.5bn of loans and currency swaps from Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. In addition, Poland has offered to lend $200M and the Faroe Islands have offered $50M, about 3% of Faroese GDP. The Icelandic government reported that Russia offered to lend $500M, and Poland, $200M. The next day, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom announced a joint loan of $6.3bn (€5bn), related to the deposit insurance dispute.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Causes
In 2001, banks were deregulated in Iceland. This set the stage for banks to upload debts when foreign companies were accumulated. The crisis unfolded when banks became unable to refinance their debts. It is estimated that the three major banks held foreign debt in excess of €50 billion, or about €160,000 per Icelandic resident, compared with Iceland's gross domestic product of €8.5 billion. As early as March 2008, the cost of private deposit insurance for deposits in Landsbanki and Kaupthing was already far higher (6–8½% of the sum deposited) than for other European banks. The króna, which was ranked by The Economist in early 2007 as the most overvalued currency in the world (based on the Big Mac Index), has further suffered from the effects of carry trading.


2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis, Causes
Coming from a small domestic market, Iceland's banks have financed their expansion with loans on the interbank lending market and, more recently, by deposits from outside Iceland (which are also a form of external debt). Households also took on a large amount of debt, equivalent to 213% of disposable income, which led to inflation. This inflation was exacerbated by the practice of the Central Bank of Iceland issuing liquidity loans to banks on the basis of newly issued, uncovered bonds – effectively, printing money on demand.