2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Emergency meetings and mediation
Joji Kotobalavu, the Chief Executive Officer in the Prime Minister's Department, who chaired an emergency meeting of officials on the 28th, claimed that Vice-President Madraiwiwi had summoned Bainimarama during the afternoon, but Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni denied this. Also present at the meeting were Anare Jale, Solicitor-General Nainendra Nand, and the Acting CEO of Home Affairs, Saverio Baleikanacea. Leweni claimed that in seizing the office of the Home Affairs CEO, Bainimarama was merely appropriating an office that had originally been allocated to the Military, but which had not hitherto been occupied by them. The whole of the second floor of Government Buildings was supposed to be allocated to the Army, Leweni said. The Military was not concerned about the emergency meeting, Leweni said, as it would deal directly with the persons involved.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Emergency meetings and mediation
Vosanibola was quoted on 29 December by the Fiji Times and Fiji Live that there was no cause for alarm, and that everything was under control. He had taken personal charge of the matter, he said. The commissioning of Judge Advocate Leung for the court martial retrial would be processed "soon", he promised. Fiji Live also reported that Vice-President Madraiwiwi would be meeting Commodore Bainimarama in the first week of January 2006 in an effort to defuse the tension.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Emergency meetings and mediation
In a further development, Bainimarama declared on the last day 2005 that he would no longer recognize Josefa Vosanibola as the Minister in charge of the Military Forces. "The Military now is on its own and is not answerable to anyone", the Commander said. In convening the court martial retrial, the Military would now act unilaterally, he said. He repeated his challenge to the government to dismiss him.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Emergency meetings and mediation
The Commander went on to say that much of the Qarase government's legislation was "racist", and that the government was tailoring its legislation to suit only a very few people, not the country as a whole. "I am the one who is standing for democracy and the rule of law because the Government and its officials only want the laws to be made to suit them", he said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Emergency meetings and mediation
Captain Leweni criticized Vosanibola on 3 January 2006 for involving the Office of the President in the dispute. "The RFMF will now ask the minister why they are going back to the very office they have disobeyed by not processing the appointment of the judge advocate made by the President", Leweni said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Emergency meetings and mediation, No more coups
Bainimarama assured his senior officers, however, that he was not contemplating a coup, according to a statement from Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni quoted that day in the Fiji Sun. Rumours of a coup plot had been fabricated by certain government officials overreacting to the Commander's comments, in an attempt to discredit the Commander and the Military, which did not want a coup, Leweni said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Calls for government to resign
In a fresh attack on 3 January 2006, Bainimarama called on the government to resign. The government had no intention, he said, of closing the events of 2000, and was continuing to promote racist legislation. "They have let people out of jail on one excuse or the other. How can they (the Government) sleep at night – do they have a clear conscience?" He went on to call for its resignation. "This government is incompetent," the Fiji Times quoted him as saying. "It's better that they resign so that better people can do the things that is supposed to bring us good."


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Calls for government to resign
Bainimarama's criticism of government decisions was not limited to legal issues. On 6 January, he condemned the earmarking of F$90,000 for the planned visit of American evangelist Benny Hinn, saying the money should have been given to the poor.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
The Fiji Sun reported on 8 January 2006 that the Military was monitoring a shipment of arms sent to the Fiji police force the previous week. Police spokesman Samuela Matakibau, Assistant Commissioner of Police Operation, confirmed the previous evening that a shipment had been received, insisting that the arms were merely replacements for old ones.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni strongly criticized the shipment, and called on the government to reveal its motives for supplying the weapons to the police force. The arms had actually been purchased for Fijian soldiers serving in Iraq, Leweni claimed, before being diverted to the police, and the Military wanted an explanation.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
The concern of the Military was supported by Fiji Labour Party (FLP) parliamentarian Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi, and by Ema Druavesi, General Secretary of the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT). Vayeshnoi called for an investigation into what he said was a misuse of funds, involving the diversion of arms bought for the Military to the police. Druavesi blamed Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola for the diversion of the shipment, and questioned the government's motives in arming the police. "Is the government relying on the police to be used in a confrontational between the two security forces? Blood of Fijians is going to flow if there is a confrontation," she declared. She called on the police to return the weapons to the Military.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
Lieutenant Saula Tuikoro, a former Fiji Intelligence Service agent, told the Fiji Sun on 8 January that the diversion of the shipment was a sinister move on the part of the government to counter the Army. The weapons were more modern and of superior quality to those possessed by the Military, Tuikoro said. He saw this as a threat to national security. "(The) government is now equipping the police to take on the army," he claimed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes defended the shipment on 9 January. The Fiji Village news service reported him as saying that the weapons had been purchased from the police budget and were low-power weapons, unsuitable for military use. They would be used only in life-threatening emergencies by officers from the Police Tactical Response Unit, a new mobile police team based in Nasinu, Hughes said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
The issue flared up again in March. On the 15th, Fiji Live quoted Leweni as accusing the police of purchasing F$1.5 million worth of weapons from South Korea. The shipment allegedly included 123 pistols, 30 submachine guns, and assorted warfare equipment. He also charged Commissioner Hughes with complicity in the deal, which he said had been masterminded by the Australian Defence Review Team as part of a package to reduce the size of the Military and transfer most of its duties to the police. Hughes was deliberately arming Fijians against Fijians, he said. Commodore Bainimarama went further: the shipment had been intended for the Military, he claimed, and had been diverted to the police by the government.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
Hughes expressed surprise at the strong language, and said that the Military was mistaken. The arms had been purchased as per the government's budget allocation to the police, he claimed, for the purpose of countering "armed criminals" such as terrorists. He was also disappointed that the Military had spoken to the media rather than to him directly, he said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Arms shipment to police
Hughes and Bainimarama met on the 16th and agreed afterwards that the disagreement had been due to a misunderstanding. Hughes accepted some responsibility for having failed to explain the details of the shipment and its purpose sooner. This had been unintentional, he insisted.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Threat to remove government
In another apparent escalation of the dispute, the Military released a statement on 9 January 2006, to be published in newspapers the following day, threatening to take control of the country if the government failed to "continue the good fight". It was the military that had entrusted the present government with restoring order and rebuilding the nation in 2000, the statement said, but instead it was continuously promoting "racist" policies and programmes to justify its existence to the indigenous community.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Threat to remove government
The statement came in response to comments made by Acting Foreign Minister Pita Nacuva in a newspaper interview, claiming that the attitude of the Military was merely a sour grapes. "It is obvious from Nacuva's comments that the Government makes light of the sour relationship between the Government and the army in past years. The Government would be very naïve to underestimate the intention of the military in this instance," the statement tersely said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Threat to remove government
Commodore Bainimarama, for his part, declared that if the government's "racist" policies continued, the Military would not hesitate take control of the country. "To the government the military says this is no petty issue. You have the choice to make it right for the nation," the Fiji Live news service quoted him as saying. The death of soldiers in 2000 had yet to be avenged, he said, and the policies of the government prevented the "dark days of 2000" from being erased. He said that political decisions smacked of "a bulling government, lacking in character."


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Threat to remove government
On 11 January, Bainimarama denied a report that he had met secretly with Vice-President Madraiwiwi. He told the Fiji Live news service that the report, published earlier in the Fiji Sun, was not correct, and that he was still waiting for a meeting to be scheduled. On the afternoon of the 12th, however, he told the Fiji Village news service that the meeting had in fact taken place, but said he was not in a position to reveal what had been discussed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Reactions to the crisis
Both before and after the crisis was resolved on 16 January with a truce brokered by Acting President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, the crisis generated a great deal of comment, both locally and internationally.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Reactions to the crisis
The faultline between indigenous and Indo-Fijians, which has defined Fijian politics for the last generation, was much less evident in this event. The main players on both sides were ethnic Fijians. Indo-Fijian-led parties appeared divided in their response, with the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) coming close to endorsing a military coup and its chief rival for the Indo-Fijian vote, the National Federation Party condemning it.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Baledrokadroka incident
Commodore Bainimarama dismissed Lieutenant Colonel Jone Baledrokadroka, the Acting Land Force Commander and effectively the second most senior officer in the Military, on 13 January, alleging insubordination. He subsequently accused Baledrokadroka of plotting a mutiny with "outside" encouragement, implicating the government, and of threatening to shoot him. Baledrokadroka said the allegations were "lies". The confrontation had come about, Baledrokadroka claimed, when Bainimarama had issued him with a "treasonous" order, which he had refused to obey, and accused the Commander of plotting a coup.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Suva calm, but ...
Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes announced that police officers were resuming "normal duties," following a personal assurance from Commodore Bainimarama that there was no threat to national security. The national security alert had been unnecessary and the rumours sweeping the nation had been "media generated," he considered. He also denied rumours that weapons recently purchased by the police were to counter the Military should the need arise. "They are not in any sense part of a program initiated by government by me or by anybody else to equip the police to somehow ... counter any military threat," he insisted. "There is no way the police are gearing up to take on that role."


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Suva calm, but ...
Pending a meeting scheduled for 16 January between the Prime Minister and Military Commander, convened by Vice-President Madraiwiwi, The Sunday Star-Times in New Zealand anonymously quoted what it claimed was a senior indigenous Fijian politician under investigation for coup-related offences, as saying that any effort to dismiss Bainimarama could lead to "a bloodbath". The Sunday Star-Times quoted him as expressing doubts that it would come to that, however, because the Commander knew too much. He did not elaborate.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Suva calm, but ...
The Sunday Star-Times also noted that unlike previous crises, which were, or were widely seen to be, between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, the latter were largely absent from the latest conspiracies.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations
In the aftermath of the crisis, a number of conspiracy theories have been advanced, some of which have sparked investigations and legal proceedings.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
Fiji Labour Party President Jokapeci Koroi issued a statement on 14 January 2006 accusing Lesi Korovavala, the Chief Executive Officer of the Home Affairs Ministry, of having conspired with Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola to arrange a secret meeting between Baledrokadroka and Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, in an attempt to depose Bainimarama. This was Koroi's second controversial statement in less than a week, having said on Fiji Television on the 11th that the FLP would support a military coup.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
Qarase angrily denied the allegations against him and the two public servants on the 15th, challenged Koroi to substantiate them, and said that he had filed charges against her for inciting violence, rebellion, and instability. "This is an outrageous allegation and everything that she is talking about is an absolute lie," the Fiji Sun quoted him as saying of Koroi's allegations. He was not mollified by a later statement by the FLP that her remarks had been taken "out of context." "Television pictures do not lie," Qarase said. He was still indignant on the 18th, condemning FLP leader Mahendra Chaudhry for trying to divert attention from Koroi's statement. Wild allegations were a "hallmark" of the FLP, Qarase claimed. He announced that a complaint had been laid with the police.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
The same day, however, Commodore Bainimarama, however, supported the FLP's claims. At a press conference, he alleged that the Military had tapped a telephone conversation in which Baledrokadroka was asked to elicit support from senior officers for the removal of Bainimarama.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
Powerful people were trying to remove him, he claimed, in order to derail his work to prosecute perpetrators of the 2000 coup.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
Meanwhile, police spokeswoman Sylvia Low had confirmed the day before that a complaint had been received from the Military, calling for an investigation into possible collusion between Baledrokadroka and government officials over an alleged attempt to incite a mutiny.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
On 20 January, Low told the Fiji Times that two complaints had been received concerning Jokapeci Koroi, one from Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola concerning her public endorsement of a potential Military coup, and the other from Lesi Korovavala, Chief Executive Officer of the Home Affairs Ministry, concerning allegations she had made about his alleged role in an alleged army mutiny on 12 January.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Josateki Koroi's allegations
The Fiji Sun quoted Regional Development Minister Ted Young on 21 February as saying that Koroi's endorsement of a possible coup had resulted in a major downturn in the tourism industry.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Conspiracy theories, complaints, and investigations, Poseci Bune's meeting with Bainimarama
It was confirmed by the Military on 17 January that Poseci Bune, the Deputy Leader of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), had met with Bainimarama at Suva the Queen Elizabeth Barracks on the 15th, a day before Bainimarama's crucial meeting with the Prime Minister at Government House. Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni strongly denied claims that Bune's visit had been to influence the Commander to continue with his anti-government campaign. The meeting had been above-board, Leweni said. Bune clarified that his meeting with the Commander had not been as a representative of the FLP.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Bainimarama clarifies
The Fiji Times printed a statement from Commodore Bainimarama on 16 January, the same morning that he was meeting the Prime Minister with Acting President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi as mediator, insisting that there was nothing political about his antigovernment pronouncements. He had never commented except when he believed that government policies were undermining national security, he claimed. "I really don't have any business in the political running of government. My outbursts are not political. It's about national security," he told the Fiji Times. "Security to me and the RFMF means a clean and corrupt-free country," he added.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Bainimarama clarifies
He said that his public attacks on government policies had begun when the government had started interfering with the judicial process. A unilateral government decision in 2003 to commute the sentences of soldiers involved in the Labasa mutiny that took place while the coup was in progress, had been taken without consulting the Military, he claimed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
At a two-hour meeting at Government House, the official residence of the President, that ended around noon on 16 January, Acting President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi succeeded in brokering a truce between the Prime Minister and the Military Commander. The two men arrived separately, Prime Minister Qarase five minutes ahead of schedule and Bainimarama twelve minutes late.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
A statement issued by Madraiwiwi said that following a frank discussion, both men had agreed to put the "national interest" first. Commodore Bainimarama had agreed to consult the Ministry of Home Affairs before making any further statements to the media. Prime Minister Qarase, in turn, had promised not to interfere with police investigations into alleged accomplices of the 2000 coup perpetrators, and had agreed to "address" the Military's concerns over controversial legislation, including the Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill. The Military Commander and the Police Commissioner would both be allowed to attend meetings often National Security Council as Observers.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
"Both recognised the need to put the national interest first. In the light of that consideration, the Prime Minister has agreed that the Commander and the Commissioner of Police be invited to participate in the Security Council as observers," the Acting President said. On 18 January, however, the Prime Minister clarified that the Commander and the Commissioner would attend Security Council meetings only by invitation, and only when deemed necessary.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
In addition, it was agreed that the Prime Minister would from now on deal directly with the two officers, rather than through subordinate ministers or civil servants. He would meet regularly with the Commander to discuss matters of mutual concern, he said. "These meetings will create a new avenue for dialogue between the Government and the military rather than discussions in the media," Prime Minister Qarase told the Fiji Live news service.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
The Prime Minister also revealed on 17 January that he had promised the Commander that the upcoming general election would be conducted independently, without government interference.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
Madraiwiwi called on both parties to be cautious and responsible in their dealings with each other. "It is critical that elements in the Government and the military exercise circumspection and discretion in their dealings with each other at all times," he said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
The meeting had also reestablished normal channels of communication between the government and the Military, Madraiwiwi said. He thanked both men for the way in which the meeting had been conducted.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
On 20 January, Bainimarama attempted to clarify his view of the agreement on Fiji Television. His agreement not to talk to the media was conditional, he said, on being allowed to make representations to the government. If the government failed to address his concerns, he was not precluded from commenting publicly, he considered. He made the remarks with respect to his complaint against Lesi Korovavala, Chief Executive Officer of the Public Service Commission, whom the Military wants removed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, The Government House truce
It was revealed on 26 January that the meeting had been tape recorded at the request of Commodore Bainimarama, with the approval of Acting President Madraiwiwi. The tape is now the property of the Military, according to Fiji Television, and is now being studied by senior Military officers.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath
The aftermath of the crisis had repercussions for both the Military and the government.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, Investigation undertaken
Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni said on 17 January that the Military was undertaking a review to improve its intelligence services. A Board of Inquiry had also been set up to investigate officers accused of having sided with Baledrokadroka in the alleged mutiny, he revealed. Baledrokadroka himself was expected to be called as a witness, he revealed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, Investigation undertaken
The same day, Commodore Bainimarama strongly denied allegations made by Baledrokadroka that he had been planning a coup. According to the Fiji Times, he denied that there was by connection between his own media statements and the expected retirement in March of President Ratu Josefa Iloilo or the absence from the country of parliamentary Speaker, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, himself a former Military commander. Nailatikau's visit to Fijian troops serving as peacekeepers in Iraq was at his own request and had been approved by the Home Affairs Ministry, he said; the Military had nothing to do with it. Likewise, the expected Presidential election was the prerogative of the Great Council of Chiefs, he said; it was nothing to do with the Military.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, Investigation undertaken
Bainimarama also claimed to have been aware of Baledrokadroka's ambition to hold the position of Commander, and to have monitored him for five weeks before dismissing him.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, Investigation undertaken
Leweni announced on 20 January that four senior army officers had been appointed the day before to investigate the alleged mutiny plot. The four officers would not be named until they had completed their work, Leweni said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
The Public Service Commission (PSC) chairman Stuart Huggett revealed to the Fiji Times on 19 January that they had received a formal complaint from Commodore Bainimarama about Lesi Korovavala, the Chief Executive Officer of the Home Affairs Ministry. Bainimarama accused Korovavala of having instigated an alleged threat of mutiny by Lieutenant Colonel Jone Baledrokadroka, the then-Acting Land Force Commander. Earlier, Bainimarama had claimed evidence of a telephone conversation between Baledrokadroka and somebody from outside the camp; the Fiji Times implied this to be Korovavala. The Fiji Village news service, meanwhile, reported that the Military had gathered information that Baledrokadroka had met with Korovavala on a number of occasions.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
Korovavala told Fiji Village that the allegations were false, and had been referred to the police. Huggett also confirmed that the PSC had received a letter from Korovavala denying the allegations.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni said that nothing short of Korovavala's removal would satisfy the Military. This had been a key Military demand before the accord brokered by Vice-President Madraiwiwi on 16 January, and quickly surfaced again. Radio Gold reported on the 17th that Bainimarama had raised the issue at the meeting with Madraiwiwi and Qarase, accusing Korovavala of having caused the friction between the government and the Military. Accordintg to Radio Gold, Bainimarama had told them that he suspected that Korovavala had telephoned Baledrokadroka to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister, and that he had evidence to support his claim.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
Jioji Kotobalavu, the Chief Executive Officer of the Prime Minister's Department, claimed that the Prime Minister was not responsible for the contracts of chief executives and could not interfere.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
Meanwhile, Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola told Fiji Television that he, too, had received a copy of Bainimarama's letter. Korovavala had written to the PSC to deny the charges, he said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
Lawyer Isireli Fa said that Korovavala had asked his firm to study the matter and to protect his interests.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, Aftermath, PSC investigates complaint against Korovavala
Huggett revealed on 20 January that the previous day's meeting of the PSC had decided to appoint an independent team to investigate Bainimarama's complaint against Korovavala. The team would try to deal with the complaints within three months, Huggett told the Fiji Times.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
Strains in the accord began to surface almost immediately. Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes confirmed on 25 January that police were looking into an official complaint from Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola, concerning Commodore Bainimarama's threat on 8 January to depose the government. Police Media Relations Officer Sylvia Low said that police were investigating to determine whether the treat was seditious or treasonous.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
Vosanibola also questioned the integrity of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, asking why it was taking so long to investigate the threatening telephone calls made to several Ministers and senior civil servants in April 2005.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni said that the Military had not been informed of the complaint, and was trying to ascertain its basis.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
Bainimarama reacted angrily to the revelation, accusing the government of breaching the accord brokered by Acting President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi on the 16th. He announced his intention to respond on the 27th, warning that the Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister "had better be ready."


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
The Fiji Times reported that Prime Minister Qarase had refused to answer questions pertaining to the latest disagreement, and had switched off his cellphone when contacted. Later, however, he told the Fiji Village news service that he would personally investigate Vosanibola's actions, to prevent any recurrence of the long-running impasse between the government and Military.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
On 27 January, Vosanibola made any withdrawal of his complaint conditional on an apology from Bainimarama. This provoked an angry response from the Commander on the 29th. He called for Vosanibola, whom he described as "beyond help," to be dismissed and charged. The demand that he apologize for his threats against the government was ridiculous, he said. "Asking me to apologise for making that statement is an insult to the working people of this nation because, simply, it is my job," the Fiji Live news service quoted him as saying.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions
He defined the role of the Military as ensuring security and the well-being of the people of Fiji, which he accused "people like Vosanibola" of failing to do. The Commander's latest statement came notwithstanding the Government House agreement not to speak to the media without consulting the Military. "No one is going to attack the military without any retaliation from the military – not even under any agreement," he defiantly declared.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Commander withdraws from talks
Bainimarama announced on 27 February that on the advice of his senior officers, he had decided to discontinue his fortnightly meetings with the Prime Minister, saying that no progress had been made and that the talks were therefore pointless. From now on, any Cabinet Minister – including the Prime Minister – who wished to see him would have to visit the Queen Elizabeth Barracks headquarters, he told Fiji Village. Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Orisi Rabukawaqa said that the government had failed to grant soldiers' ration allowances or job evaluation exercises, despite the budget allocation, and raising the matter with the Prime Minister had proved futile.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Commander withdraws from talks
Rabukawaqa said that after his weekly meetings with Acting President Madraiwiwi and his fortnightly meetings with Prime Minister Qarase, he would write to both men about issues he wanted addressed. Madraiwiwi replied to the letters, he said; Qarase did not. "We feel that he was just making a fool of us and we have advised the commander not to hold any more meetings with him," Rabukawaqa said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Commander withdraws from talks
Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola responded by saying that Rabukawaqa's comments were not justified, and that concerns that had been raised were being looked into.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Commander withdraws from talks
The Fiji Sun quoted the Prime Minister (6 March) as saying that Bainimarama's decision to withdraw from the talks was "unfortunate." Progress had been made during the course of the discussions, he claimed. What really went wrong was that he expected me and my Government to follow orders. In other words, to do everything he wanted," he later claimed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
Australia's Foreign Minister Alexander Downer reiterated earlier warnings to Bainimarama on 24 February 2006, saying that the passage of legislation was not up to the Military. "People can have whatever opinions they like on the laws but in the end the parliament should make those laws not the military," The Sydney Morning Herald quoted him as saying. Supported by his New Zealand counterpart, Winston Peters, he warned that another coup would be devastating, not only for the Fijian economy but also for its international relationships. The Military responded by asking Downer to stay out of Fijian politics, saying that Australians could not know what it was like to live through a coup.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
Fiji's Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola added that the Military had no authority to interfere with government business. The Commander's stated intention to withdraw from meeting the Prime Minister was disrespectful to the highest office in the land, he told Fiji Live.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
The Fijian Military responded on the 28th, saying that the safety and security of Fiji were the business of the Military. Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Orisi Rabukawaqa was quoted in the Fiji Times as saying that the views expressed by the Australian and New Zealand foreign ministers were disrespectful and irresponsible. He claimed that the security of the nation and its citizens was constitutionally entrusted to the Military, a claim that Vosanibola had disputed.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
Fiji Live reported on 1 March that the Military had called on Prime Minister Qarase to discipline Home Affairs Minister Vosanibola. Military spokesman Captain Neumi Leweni accused Vosanibola of deliberately failing to understand the constitutional prerogatives of the Military. According to Leweni, the 1997 Constitution affirmed the role given to the Military in the 1990 constitution. "If Vosanibola cannot understand simple English than he is not worthy to continue in his cabinet portfolio," he said.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
He accused Vosanibola of committing three serious acts of insubordination since 1983, the most serious, he said, in 2005 when he allegedly tried to thwart President Ratu Josefa Iloilo's decision to appoint Graeme Leung as Judge Advocate of the court martial retrial of former soldiers convicted of their roles in the mutiny that took place at Suva's Queen Elizabeth Barracks on 2 November 2005.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
Commodore Bainimarama concurred with Leweni. He told Fiji Live that Vosanibola was incompetent and unfit to hold office. "This kind of incompetent people should not be voted in," he said. "We should vote for only competent people."


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Renewed warnings from Australia, New Zealand
In an interview with ABC Television reported by Fiji Live on 3 March, Downer reiterated his earlier opposition to Military interference in politics.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Great Council of Chiefs asks President, Vice-President to intervene again
Fiji Live reported on 9 March that the Great Council of Chiefs had expressed concern at the strained relationship between the Prime Minister and the Military Commander, and had criticized the latter for his disregard for the government. They asked both President Ratu Josefa Iloilo and Vice-President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi to mediate.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Truth campaign
On 10 March, Bainimarama announced that the Military was about to embark on a campaign to educate the population about the "lies" being spread by the "opportunists" in the government. "We will go into villages and tell them the real truth of what happened and what is being done ... I will advise the people because they cannot continue to advise a government that continues to make it okay for those that went to jail to get back into society," he told the Fiji Sun. "By not educating the people about doing what is right, it is willfully lying and misleading them."


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Truth campaign
His proposed campaign was endorsed by Poseci Bune, Deputy Leader of the Fiji Labour Party, but condemned by Ropate Sivo, General Secretary of the Conservative Alliance (whose dissolution he is resisting), and by Saula Telawa, President of the New Nationalist Party. The Sun quoted Sivo again on the 12th, calling for Bainimarama's arrest, saying that the Commander himself had a case to answer for his own role in the events of 2000. He accused Bainimarama of fomenting instability and of discouraging foreign investment.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Truth campaign
Home Affairs Minister Josefa Vosanibola said on 12 March that he was losing patience with the failure of the President and Vice-President to discipline the Commander. "I respect Government House but the time has come for them to act," the Fiji Times quoted him as saying. "Why has Government House been sitting on this?"


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Truth campaign
SDL campaign director Jale Baba said that the Military's proposed actions were illegal, and inconsistent with historical reality. He claimed that the policies of the Qarase government were identical to those pursued by the Military when it appointed Qarase as Prime Minister in the first place.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New tensions, Truth campaign
Former Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, despite his support for certain government policies opposed by the Military, endorsed the Military's campaign on 12 March, according to Fiji Village. Rabuka, himself a former Commander of the Army, said that the proposed actions of the Military were constitutional.


2005–2006 Fijian political crisis, New moves
News remained quiet through the middle of 2006 until, in a speech at Ratu Latianara Secondary School, Commodore Bainimarama attacked government policies, which he said were creating a culture of lawlessness in Fiji. In the weeks that followed, he continually threatened to remove the government if it failed to implement his demands. The crisis came to a head when, on 26 November, Bainimarama called up 1,000 reserve troops to the Fijian Army, and reiterated his intention to topple the Fijian Government, during a private trip to New Zealand. This came shortly after police revealed that he would shortly be charged with sedition.


2005–2006 Israeli Final Four
The 2005–2006 Israeli Final Four , the first Israeli Final Four was held at Yad Eliyahu Arena, Tel Aviv, Israel on 6 and 8 June 2006 to determine the winner of the 2005–2006 Israeli League. The contestants were Maccabi Tel Aviv, the 2004–2005 Israeli League champion and the 2005–2006 Israeli State Cup winner, Hapoel Jerusalem, the 2005–2006 Israeli State Cup runner-up, Maccabi Rishon Lezion and Ironi Naharia. Maccabi Tel Aviv won their 46th Israeli League crown, beating Hapoel Jerusalem 96-66 in the final.


2005–2006 Israeli Final Four, Venue
The Yad Eliyahu Arena is an indoor sports arena in Tel Aviv, Israel. Opened in 1963 with its seating capacity varying from 5,000 to 11,700, it had hosted the 1971–1972 FIBA European Champions Cup final, the 1993–1994 FIBA European Championship Final Four and the 2003–2004 Euroleague Final Four.


2005–2006 Massachusetts legislature
The 184th Massachusetts General Court, consisting of the Massachusetts Senate and the Massachusetts House of Representatives, met in 2005 and 2006 during the governorship of Mitt Romney. Robert Travaglini served as president of the Senate and Salvatore DiMasi served as speaker of the House.


2005–2006 Massachusetts legislature, Images
Map of districts of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 2004


2005–2006 Niger food crisis
The 2005–2006 Niger food crisis was a severe but localized food security crisis in the regions of northern Maradi, Tahoua, Tillabéri, and Zinder of Niger from 2005 to 2006. It was caused by an early end to the 2004 rains, desert locust damage to some pasture lands, high food prices, and chronic poverty. In the affected area, 2.4 million of 3.6 million people are considered highly vulnerable to food insecurity. An international assessment stated that, of these, over 800,000 face extreme food insecurity and another 800,000 in moderately insecure food situations are in need of aid.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Background
The crisis had long been predicted after swarms of locusts consumed nearly all crops in parts of Niger during the 2004 agricultural season. In other areas, insufficient rainfall resulted in exceptionally poor harvests and dry pastures affecting both farmers and livestock breeders. An assessment carried out by the government of Niger, the United Nations and international Non Governmental Organizations reached a general consensus that the crisis, while locally severe, had not reached the level of famine according to famine scales.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Background, Demographic causes
The population of Niger increased more than fivefold between 1950 and 2005, from 2.5 million to 13.5 million. The fertility rate in Niger is the highest in the world at 7.6 children per woman, and the population of the country is projected to increase tenfold in the 21st century to more than 200 million people in 2100.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Crisis
The Sahel region as a whole registered a grain surplus of 85,000 tons. However, Niger and Chad suffered grain deficits of around 224,000 and 217,000 tons, respectively. An increase in food prices fuelled the food crisis, especially in Niger, which was the most affected area.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Crisis
Access to food staples became increasingly difficult and severe cases of child malnutrition were reported. The scarcity of water and fodder also adversely affected the health of the cattle, camels, sheep and goats that comprise virtually the only source of food and income for nomadic communities. Competition for limited resources also resulted in some local conflicts.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Crisis
Acute malnutrition rates rose to 13.4 per cent in the southern Niger Maradi and Zinder departments, with 2.5 per cent of this group identified as severely malnourished children under age five, according to UNICEF.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Crisis
The food shortage impacted 3.3 million people —including 800,000 children under age five— in 3,815 villages. Officials estimated cereal deficits at 223,448 tons and livestock feed deficits at 4,642,219 tons.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Response
Although UN's Food and Agriculture Organization already warned of an upcoming crisis in late 2004, donor support came slowly throughout the first half of 2005. In late August 2005, the profile of the crisis was raised after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited President Tandja Mamadou in Zinder. The visit was seen as an attempt to draw attention to the crisis, and also address accusations that the UN had responded slowly. Donors had given less than half of the US$81 million appealed for by the UN.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Response
On January 16, 2006, the UN directed an appeal for US$240 million of food aid for West Africa to feed at least 10 million people affected by the food crisis, with Niger being the worst-affected country.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Media coverage controversy
Several authorities, including the President of Niger at the time, called into the question the veracity of claims made by international media. They argued that, while chronic malnutrition has been issue for populations of Niger, the media erroneously and deliberately portrayed common local dietary habits as signs of widespread famine to appeal to donors' sympathy. On March 3, 2008 TV2 Norway aired the documentary "Sultbløffen" (The Famine Scam) which voiced the view that there was no famine in Niger in 2005-06, but rather chronic malnutrition no different from the previous years.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Media coverage controversy
BBC's Hilary Andersson, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland as well as international media and aid organizations in general were accused of severely overstating and lying about the food situation in the country by misrepresenting the situation. The sources, among them a Norwegian-Swedish foundation of agricultural development and their local assistants, gave a version picturing western media and relief agencies as ignorant towards local agriculture and flora and common dietary habits. They cited so-called "food-racism": the perception that local, traditional food and food plants are useless and poisonous, even though locals have eaten them for millennia.


2005–2006 Niger food crisis, Media coverage controversy
They also denounced the perception that the people of Niger are incapable of living without support from the west, and argued that large food donations overwhelmed the local supply, making it harder for local agriculture to compete. The film was awarded 3rd prize in the Monte Carlo TV festival of 2008, and won Den Store Journalistprisen in Norway in 2009. The BBC claimed to have refuted TV2's allegations unequivocally, and attempted to block the international release of the documentary by withdrawing TV2's license to news footage from the summer of 2005.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute
The 2005–06 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute was between Ukrainian state-controlled oil and gas company Naftogaz Ukrainy and Russian national gas supplier Gazprom. The disagreements concerned natural gas supplies, prices and debts. The conflict started in March 2005, ended in January 2006 and, in addition to the gas companies, involved politicians from both countries.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute
The conflict began when Russia claimed that Ukraine was not paying for gas and was diverting gas bound from Russia to the European Union from pipelines that crossed the country. Ukrainian officials at first denied the last accusation, but later Naftogaz admitted it used some gas intended for other European countries for domestic needs. The dispute peaked on January 1, 2006 when Russia cut off supply. The cutoff affected gas supplies to European countries that depended on Russian natural gas. On January 4, 2006 a preliminary agreement between Ukraine and Russia was achieved, the supply was restored and the situation calmed.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began charging market prices to Ukraine for oil in 1993, but both Ukrainian gas import prices and transit fees for Russian exports to Europe were set in bilateral negotiations, well below European levels.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
In 2004–2005, about 80% of Russian gas exports to the European Union passed through Ukraine. Two-thirds of Gazprom's revenue comes from the sale of gas that crosses Ukraine.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
Ukraine's own gas consumption in 2005 was around 80 billion cubic metres (2.8 trillion cubic feet), of which around 20 billion cubic metres (710 billion cubic feet) were produced domestically, 36 billion cubic metres (1.3 trillion cubic feet) were bought from Turkmenistan, and 17 billion cubic metres (600 billion cubic feet) came from Russia as payment for Russian gas transit. It purchased the remaining 8 billion cubic metres (280 billion cubic feet) from Russia.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
Relatively cheap Russian gas, sold to Ukraine at $50 per cubic meter between 1998 and 2005, supported growth of energy-intensive industries in Ukraine, its status as one of the world's least energy-efficient countries and largest gas importers, expansion of Ukrainian debts. Eventually, Ukraine failed to pay its debts, diverted gas from the transit system; and came under Russian pressure to relinquish infrastructure in return for debt relief.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
Gas trading was conducted under bilateral intergovernmental agreements providing a framework for sales, transit volumes and prices and sometimes other issues such as storage and establishment of joint production ventures. The relevant companies signed contracts in accord with the agreements, supplemented by annual refinements specifying exact prices and volumes for the following year. Gas prices and transit tariffs were set in relationship to each other. Commercial agreements and trade relations have been non-transparent. Trade was conducted by Itera, EuralTransGaz, and since 2004 by RosUkrEnergo, a company with no assets, no track record, and no transparency about its owners. RosUkrEnergo beneficiaries include well-placed officials in Russian and Ukrainian gas industries and governmental structures. RosUkrEnergo is allegedly half-owned by a business ally of Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko. The Ukrainian investigation into RosUkrEnergo, during Yulia Tymoshenko's previous term as Prime Minister, was closed after Yushchenko fired her in September 2005.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
According to the contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz signed on June 21, 2002, payment was in the form of barter—up to 15% of gas pumped through the Ukrainian territory was taken by Ukraine instead of cash. This contract was supposed to be valid until the end of 2013. On August 9, 2004, the two companies signed a contract addendum setting the transit tariff at US$1.09 per 1,000 cubic meters per 100 kilometres (62 mi). This tariff was the basis for computing the amount of gas delivered in lieu of cash.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Historical background
The amendment fixed the gas price at $50 per 1,000 cubic meters (approximately $1.40 per million Btu), independent of European market prices. According to the addendum the price was not subject to change until the end of 2009. In 2005, Gazprom argued that this addendum was only applicable provided that the two countries sign an annual intergovernmental protocol having higher legal status for specifying the terms of gas transit. According to Gazprom, the addendum was void because the annual protocol had not been signed for 2006 under the required terms. Russia claimed that Gazprom's subsidies to the Ukrainian economy amounted to billions of dollars.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
In March, Gazprom informed Ukraine that it was raising prices to market levels, charging $160 per 1,000 cubic meters (approximately $4.40 per million Btu). Ukraine's new government agreed to pay the higher prices in return for increased transit fees. Ukraine took steps to change the payments for the transition of Gazprom's gas to Europe from barter to cash. Yushchenko agreed to pay higher prices only over time, stating that Ukrainian industry would become unprofitable with gas above $90.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
7.8 billion cubic metres (280 billion cubic feet) of natural gas which Gazprom had deposited in Ukrainian storage reservoirs during the previous winter had disappeared. It remained unclear if the gas had leaked away, had been stolen, or if there was another cause. In July by agreement, Gazprom, Naftogaz and RosUkrEnergo reached a preliminary agreement. Naftogaz received 2.55 billion cubic metres (90 billion cubic feet) of natural gas as partial settlement of 2005 transit services and 5.25 billion cubic metres (185 billion cubic feet) was sold by Gazprom to RosUkrEnergo who was to receive it from Naftogaz.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
During the final three months of 2005, negotiations between Gazprom and Naftogaz stalled. Gazprom demanded a 2006 price of $160–230 per 1,000 cubic meters unless a Gazprom/Naftogaz consortium took over transmission. Ukraine agreed presuming it was phased in and that the maximum it was prepared to pay in 2006 was $80 per 1,000 cubic meters.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
In November, Ukraine proposed to pay for gas with weapon supplies as one option. Some Ukrainian officials called for a review of the lease price Russia paid to Ukraine for keeping its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea, while Russia resisted any discussions that might affect the lease.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
On December 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Ukrainian consumers pay less for gas than do Russians. He claimed that Ukraine had enough money to pay market price. Putin also noted that Russia subsidized Ukraine by $1 billion a year from the Russian budget—money that Gazprom would have paid from its revenues. He also noted that 25 million Russians live below the poverty line, further questioning Ukraine's deal.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
On December 13, Gazprom stated that unless an agreement were reached before January 1, 2006, it would cut Ukraine off. Gazprom also stated its readiness to create a joint venture to own and operate Ukraine's gas transit pipelines. After Ukraine rejected this proposal, Gazprom stated that the new price would have to be 220–230 per 1,000 cubic meters (~ $6.35/million Btu), claiming that this was the market price. Ukraine then requested international arbitration.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
On December 15, Ukraine offered a joint-venture for selling gas in the internal Ukrainian market in exchange for gradual price increases up to 2010. Gazprom declined. On December 26, Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov asserted that Ukraine had a contractual right for 15% of the gas transiting to the European Union. This statement came largely in response to the Gazprom threat to resort to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce should Ukraine engage in unlawful withdrawal of Russian transit gas. Earlier, Yekhanurov announced that Ukraine could refer the case to the Institute if the compromise was not reached.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
On December 29, Putin offered Ukraine a $3.6 billion loan to cover the increase in gas prices. Yushchenko rejected the offer. In the last days of 2005, European countries, which had stayed out of the dispute, began advocating for a compromise. On December 31 Putin offered to postpone the price increase until April 2006 if Ukraine immediately agreed to the new prices. Ukraine did not agree.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, 2005 negotiations
Andrei Illarionov, then Putin's economic adviser, resigned rather than explain the price hike and other issues of Russia–Ukraine relations as liberal economic policies.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Cut-off
On January 1, 2006 Gazprom started reducing pressure in the pipeline system ahead of the deadline of the Russian ultimatum set for 10:00 MSK. At the same time Russia accused Ukraine of stealing $25 million worth of gas. Ukraine denied the allegation. On January 24, Naftogaz admitted withholding some Russian gas intended for other European countries, but said it would still meet its contractual obligations. A spokesman for Naftogaz said the gas was needed to cope with especially cold weather.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Cut-off
European gas imports were declining, whether from Ukrainian expropriation or Russian undersupply. Gazprom invited the Switzerland-based goods inspection and testing company SGS to monitor the amount of gas that is entering Ukraine's pipeline network.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Cut-off
The EU's contract with Gazprom requires the supplier to deliver to the former USSR's border, i.e., Ukraine's western border. Therefore, if Ukraine interferes with delivery, the EU can sue Gazprom for contract violations. As soon as the supply began to fall in the EU, Gazprom was forced to return supplies to normal.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Impact on Europe
Many European countries saw a drop in the supply of gas:


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Agreement to end the dispute
On January 4, Russia and Ukraine ended the dispute. A five-year contract was signed, although with prices set for six months only. According to the contract, the gas was sold not directly to Naftogaz, but to RosUkrEnergo, who paid $230 per 1,000 cubic metres. After mixing it with two thirds of cheaper supplies from Central Asia RosUkrEnergo resold it to Ukraine at a price of $95 per 1,000 cubic metres. The parties also agreed to raise the transit tariff from US$1.09 to US$1.60 per 1,000 cubic meters per 100 km. This price also held for transit of Turkmen gas through Russia to Ukraine.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Agreement to end the dispute
The company had to buy 16 billion cubic metres (570 billion cubic feet) from Russia at $230 per 1000 cubic meters, 40 billion cubic metres (1.4 trillion cubic feet) from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan at price of $60–65 per 1000 cubic meters, and then sell it to Ukraine at US$95 per 1000 cubic meters. Besides, RosUkrEnergo had to transport 40 billion cubic metres (1.4 trillion cubic feet) from Turkmenistan to Ukraine at price US$1.60 per 1000 cubic meters per 100 km, or $1,920 million. Total expenses become US$2,500 +US$3,800 + US$1,920 million, or US$8.2 billion. Revenues from selling the gas are just $5.5 billion.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, International reactions
According to the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS, economic ministers of Germany, Italy, Austria and France warned  Ukraine that their nations' relations with Ukraine could be affected if it failed to deliver gas according to the contract schedule. On January 3 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov asked the European Union to influence Ukraine to ensure gas transit from Russia to EU countries.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, International reactions
On January 3 and 4 Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ursula Plassnik supported resumption of gas supplies by Gazprom and emphasized that a lasting solution was preferable to unilateral measures.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, International reactions
According to Pascal Lamy of the World Trade Organization, all Post-Soviet states that buy gas from Gazprom should pay market prices to improve the efficiency of their economies. Illarionov noted there is no such thing as a market price for gas, because Russia offers different terms for analogous countries, e.g. gas price for Ukraine is not calculated in the same way as for Germany.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Alleged political motivation
European and U.S. media cited sources who saw the conflict as punishing the new 'orange' Government of Ukraine, which was considered more pro-NATO and EU than its predecessor, despite the fact that the country paid less than (fellow post-Soviet state) Georgia and other European countries. Russian officials state that the country can no longer subsidize former Soviet republics. However, when the 'orange' Government of Ukraine was ousted later in 2006 and replaced by a new more Moscow-friendly Government led by Viktor Yanukovych, the price for 2007 still grew to $135 per 1,000 cubic meters (from $95 in 2006).


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Alleged political motivation
Earlier in 2005 Gazprom declined Turkmenistan's offer to buy natural gas at $58 per 1,000 cubic meters as too expensive, but in December 2005 it agreed to buy additional 30 billion cubic metres (1.1 trillion cubic feet) of gas at $65. Oil and gas prices doubled during 2005.


2005–2006 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, Public reaction
Political pressure Russia to Ukraine during the gas conflict led to the emergence of a public campaign to boycott Russian goods in Ukraine. In December 2005, unknown activists in Kirovohrad distributed leaflets calling not to buy Russian goods. Then various social and political movements in Ukraine picked up the idea, which got wide publicity and support.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
In 2005 and 2006, a series of events occurred in Thailand as a result of public anger with Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that was supported by Sondhi Limthongkul and his coalitions. It led a military coup that concluded in the overthrow of the Thai Rak Thai government in September 2006, the flight of Thaksin after the court verdict, and the establishment of the junta government led by Surayud Chulanont, a favourite of privy councillor and senior statesman Prem Tinsulanonda.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
The crisis and resulting coup and post-coup military government called into question issues of media freedom, the role of the constitution in breaking a political deadlock, and the existence of political stability in Thailand. It also reflected long-term and significant disparity between urban and rural political orientation and abuses of power and conflict of interest of a democratically elected leader that have long plagued the Thai political landscape. These issues contributed to the crisis and culminated in the coup d'état of September 2006.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
Sondhi Limthongkul, a media mogul who had previously been a staunch supporter of Thaksin, played a major, leading role in the crisis through the establishment of the anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy. The PAD aligned itself with several state-enterprise unions (who were against Thaksin's privatisation plans for state enterprises), human right and civil politics activists who charged Thaksin rule as "undemocratic", monopoly of power, human right abuse, suppressing the freedom of press and extrajudicial killings of drug traffickers, a main concern among several human right groups.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
The crucial anti-Thaksin coalitions were also supporters of the controversial monk Luang Ta Maha Bua (who opposed the Thaksin government's appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharya as acting Supreme Patriarch in place of the critically ill Somdet Phra Yanasangworn), allegedly the political intervention of the monastic affairs.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
Significant supporters of PAD were also prominent socialists, scholars and "royalists" (who claimed that Thaksin frequently insulted King Bhumibol Adulyadej), various factions in the Thai military (who claimed that Thaksin promoted only those who were loyal to him), and various civil groups (who criticised Thaksin for not paying taxes during the sale of Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings, although the capital gains from the transaction were legally exempt from taxation. The movement then was seen highly controversial and complicated.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
In February 2006, Thaksin dissolved Parliament and called a general legislative election for the House of Representatives in April 2006. Most major opposition parties boycotted the election, led by Democrat Party. After the elections, King Bhumibol requested that the courts resolve the crisis. Soon afterwards, the Constitutional Court invalidated the elections based on the positioning of voting booths, and the Criminal Court later jailed members of the Election Commission that did not obey the Court's request to resign. New elections were scheduled for 15 October 2006.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
This time, the opposition announced it was contesting the election, and numerous newly founded parties actively campaigned. The election was cancelled after a military coup on 19 September 2006, while Thaksin was in New York to attend a United Nations summit. Thaksin has since been in exile. The PAD dissolved itself 2 days after the coup after announcing that their goal had been accomplished, but since then (February 2008) has vowed to resume protests should pro-Thaksin practices and policies of the Samak government become evident.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
Apparently, critics on Thaksin Shinawatra took place even before the Sondhi's movement. Severe critics occurred around the Thaksin case of hidden assets, filed to the Constitutional Court. According to the verdict, Thaksin could escape the proof of guilty with 8-7 votes of the judges.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
Human right abuses were also the cause of criticism. Thaksin's war on drugs became controversial when thousands of killings and murder cases explained by the authority as "extrajudicial" and "revenge" on drug traffickers.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis
Besides the removal and a threat on Sondhi's program, freedom of press became the focus. Sutthichai Yoon, another major critic, was filed a case against. In early 2006, the supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, claimed supported by the premier himself and his close figures, blockaded the entry of the Nation Group building, threatening to "burn" the building. Possibly the movement rallied by Sondhi, then became the focus of several anti-Thaksin groups.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, Context
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was embroiled in several controversies after assuming power following the 2001 election. These controversies included alleged conflicts of interest due to his family's holdings in Shin Corporation and a violent crackdown on drug dealers. However, none of these controversies caused significant damage to his popularity, and he became the first elected prime minister to serve a full term, subsequently winning re-election in January 2005.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, Viroj Nualkhair controversy
The origins of the crisis may be traced to the controversy surrounding Viroj Nualkhair, CEO of state-owned Krung Thai Bank (KTB). Viroj faced pressure to leave his position after KTB reported higher than expected levels of non-performing loans in 2004. Viroj was vigorously defended by Sondhi Limthongkul, a media tycoon who had previously been a staunch Thaksin supporter. As KTB CEO, Viroj had forgiven Sondhi's personal debts by 1.6 billion baht and arranged for further rounds of debt forgiveness. When Viroj was forced out of his position, Sondhi's public criticism of Thaksin started to increase.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, The conflict escalates
The Sondhi-Thaksin conflict escalated when Sondhi's Channel 11/1 was temporarily ordered to stop broadcasting due to a contract dispute between cable operator UBC and the government regulator.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, The conflict escalates
In September 2005, Sondhi reportedly made repeated disrespectful on-air references to King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Among these references was a claim that the government's 2004 appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharya as acting Supreme Patriarch in place of the critically ill Somdet Phra Yanasangworn contravened the prerogative of the King. According to Thai ecclesiastic law, the Supreme Patriarch is nominated by the Sangha Supreme Council and formally appointed by the King. Somdet Phra Phuthacharn's appointment was vehemently opposed by Luang Ta Maha Bua, an influential monk with close affiliations to Sondhi (see Luang Ta Maha Bua's opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra). After discussions with King's principal private secretary, Arsa Sarasin, MCOT executive, removed the program.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, The Judiciary under the 1997 Constitution
The Administrative and Constitutional Courts (the first in Thai history) were set up to be based on the French and Italian judicial system, where the judge has direct authority and supervises the investigation into the facts of the case. This is in contrast to the civil and criminal justice systems in Thailand (and most countries) based on the role of a judge as the one who examines the case based solely on the arguments of the prosection and defence attorneys. The administrative court was set up to resolve complaints against the misconduct, neglect or outright abuse by bureaucratic and government agencies. The constitution court was set up to resolve conflicts about unconstitutional legislation.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, The Judiciary under the 1997 Constitution
Apparently the drafters of the 1997 Constitution, one of the most "democratic" constitutions, were quite far sighted by putting in a mechanism to resolve abuses and misconduct by people in authority. But then the Constitutional Court was initially not seen as important, and few anticipated the nature of potential conflicts in legislation could be critical. So the more experienced judges did not see any prestige in taking up position within that judiciary.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Origins of the crisis, The Judiciary under the 1997 Constitution
Their oversight became glaring when Thaksin's 1st Asset Concealment case was brought to the Constitutional Court. His TRT party had just won the popular vote by a historic majority, but he had not completely disclosed his assets as required by the law. A false asset disclosure would normally disqualify someone from taking up any political post for five years. But he pleaded with tears in his eyes that it was just a clerical error. The judges voted narrowly by a 7–8 margin, allowing Thaksin to take up the office of Prime Minister. Thaksin himself claimed that people had overwhelmingly voted for his party and his wealth was distributed in many assets that the clerical error could probably be an "honest mistake".


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
On 27 September 2005, Manager Daily published a sermon by Luang Ta Maha Bua, a popular but controversial monk. The sermon, previously the supporter of Thaksin, became extremely critical of his "former disciple". The issue became further controversial because it came from a monk who is one of Thailand's most revered temple abbots (who are above criticism in Buddhist Thailand) and who has organised several huge donations of solid gold to the Thai Treasury after the previous financial crisis. Especially controversial were the following quotes:


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
"They complained to me about PM Thaksin and Mr. Visanu and two other people that I don’t remember. This is the big ogre [Thai: ตัวยักษ์ใหญ่], big power. Atrocious power will swallow our country, bite liver and lungs and aim for the presidency.... He will put a torch to the country. He will never listen.... This savagery and atrocity appear in every aspect of him.... All he has are things to be used for burning."


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
"He is clearly aiming for the presidency now. The monarch trampled, the religion trampled, the country trampled, by this savage and atrocious power in a few people in the government circle. That is the circle of ogres, of ghosts, of trolls, of demons [Thai:ยักษ์วงผีวงเปรตวงมาร], all in there.... So even Devadatta saw the harm he caused, and he was rewarded for his good deed. He would attain Buddhahood [Thai:พระปัจเจกพุทธเจ้า]. For those who have made mistakes, if we see the harm we cause, we can still get by. But what is it with Thailand? What kind of governance?"


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
"They even dare to accuse Luangta Maha Bua of playing politics. Politics, dog shit [Thai:การบ้านการเมืองขี้หมาอะไร]. There’s only shit all over the country. I brought Buddha’s dharma to cleanse in order for them to repent and recognise good and evil. Because they’re the government. The world flatters them as smart people, but don’t be smart down the toilet [Thai:แต่อย่าฉลาดลงส้วมลงถาน]. Don’t be smart about putting a torch to the head of everyone in the country, from Nation, Religion, and Monarchy on down. These guys will get burned unless they recognise the truth. I’m saddened by all this. How does this come about?"


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
On 11 October 2005, Thaksin sued Manager newspaper for THB 500 million. As monks have traditionally been above criticism, Thaksin did not sue Luang Ta Maha Bua. "This is an exercise of an individual's right to protect his reputation and privacy. The newspaper did not criticise the prime minister fairly as a public official, but rather it took him to task personally, using harsh words, which was damaging to him," Thana Benjathikul, Thaksin's lawyer said.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
Thaksin was immediately attacked by critics and accused of gagging the press. Manager owner Sondhi Limthongkul's lawyer, Suwat Apaipakdi, quoting claimed that "every newspaper reproduced his [Luang Ta Maha Bua] comments. Why did Thaksin not sue him [Luang Ta Maha Bua]? He chose to sue only the Manager Media Group because it's linked to Khun Sondhi". Thaksin's legal team noted that other newspapers only published selected passages of the sermon, and furthermore, that a slanderous headline was used. Respected civil rights lawyer Thongbai Thongpao has noted that Thaksin's lawsuit did have merit. He added that the lawsuits "do not constitute an attack on freedom of the press".


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Luang Ta Maha Bua incident
As recently as 14 March 2006, Luang Ta Maha Bua has asked Thaksin to resign. In a sermon that the monk called "most vehement since the temple was set up," the monk said it was time for Thaksin to abandon the "rotten system he is presiding over". He described the government as "wicked, corrupt, power-hungry and greedy".


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Temple of the Emerald Buddha incident
On 10 April 2005, Thaksin Shinawatra presided over a "secret" and "private" merit-making ceremony at the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, the holiest site in Thai Buddhism.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Temple of the Emerald Buddha incident
Starting October 2005, the website of Phoochatkarn newspaper ran an article alleging that the Prime Minister had usurped the Royal powers of the King by presiding over the ceremony. This blast, referring to a photo printed in The Nation Multimedia newspaper, led Sondhi Limthongkul, the owner of Phoochatkarn, to start using "We Love the King", "We Will Fight for the King", and "Return Power to the King" as his key anti-Thaksin rallying slogans. This allegation has been repeated in Sondhi's "Thailand Weekly" live tapings.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Temple of the Emerald Buddha incident
It also became a staple of the Thailand-insider.com website of Ekkayuth Anchanbutr, a notable critic of Thaksin. A widely circulated spam email showed a picture of Thaksin sitting on a chair normally used by the King and asking "People are familiar with images only of the King and members of the Royal Family, all dressed in royal uniforms and decorated with full regalia, presiding over grand ceremonies in the temple’s main chapel. Yet this picture makes me think: What has happened to our country? ".


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Temple of the Emerald Buddha incident
On 9 November 2005, Cabinet secretary-general Bovornsak Uwanno claimed that King Bhumibol Adulyadej granted permission to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to preside over a grand merit-making ceremony. This was corroborated by Chaktham Thammasak, who was director-general of the Bureau of National Buddhism during the time of the incident. Chaktham claims that the Royal Household Bureau designed every aspect of the ceremony, including the positioning of the chairs.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Temple of the Emerald Buddha incident
On 17 November 2005, the Civil Court issued a gag order on Sondhi to prevent him from making further allegations. This immediately prompted academics and intellectuals to attack Thaksin and accuse him of restricting press freedom. In November 2005, General Kittisak Ratprasert, former chief aide-de-camp to King Bhumibol Adulyadej, filed a complaint at Phra Ratchawang police station alleging that Thaksin and his deputy Visanu Krue-ngarm committed lèse majesté at the Temple.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Temple of the Emerald Buddha incident
These charges have apparently been quietly dropped after King Bhumibol Adulyadej's birthday speech where he claimed he didn't take lèse majesté charges seriously. However, to this day, Sondhi still uses "We Will Fight for the King" and "Return Power to the King" as rallying cries in his anti-Thaksin protests.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Phra Phrom Erawan Shrine incident
In the early hours of 21 March 2006, Thanakorn Pakdeepol, 27, broke into the Phra Phrom Erawan Shrine in central Bangkok and attacked the statue of the god Brahma with a hammer. After destroying the statue, he was attacked and beaten to death by several people in the vicinity. Thanakorn Pakdeepol had a history of mental illness and depression. Thai police are still investigating the case but it became complicated as the wrongdoer was beaten to death.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Phra Phrom Erawan Shrine incident
At an anti-Thaksin rally on 22 March, protest-leader Sondhi Limthongkul claimed that Thaksin Shinawatra masterminded the destruction of the idol to replace Brahma with a "dark force" aligned to Thaksin. Sondhi claimed that Thaksin hired Thanakorn through a Khmer black magic shaman. Sondhi also questioned "why was the man stomped to death after he smashed the statue? I have in-depth information about someone who is deeply obsessed with superstition[referring to Thaksin]. He wants to destroy Thao Maha Phrom so that he can rebuild it by himself and then bury "his stuff" in the statue. This is a way to avert ill omens."


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Phra Phrom Erawan Shrine incident
The vandal's father, Sayant Pakdeepol called Sondhi "the biggest liar I have ever seen". Thaksin called Sondhi's accusations "insane". To date, Sondhi has refused to make public any details about his "in-depth information" regarding his accusations.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Personal attacks
Protesters made many personal attacks against Thaksin Shinawatra. It is debatable whether such attacks had any significant role in his downfall. Among them:


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, $1.88 billion Shin Corporation transaction
On Monday, 23 January 2006, three days after new Thai Telecommunication Act (2006) passed on Friday, 20 January, his family sold all stake in Shin Corporation, a leading communication company in Thailand, to Temasek Holdings with tax liability exemption. The families of Thaksin and his wife netted about 73 billion baht (about US$1.88 billion) tax-free from the buyout, using a regulation that individuals (as opposed to corporations) who sell shares on the stock exchange pay no capital gains tax.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, $1.88 billion Shin Corporation transaction
The Thailand Securities and Exchange Commission investigated the transaction. "The investigation concluded that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter Pinthongta are clear from all wrongdoing," said SEC secretary-general Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala on 23 February 2006. However, the SEC did find that Thaksin's son, Panthongtae, violated rules with regard to information disclosure and public tender offers in transactions between 2000 and 2002. He was fined 6 million THB (about US$150,000). "The case is not severe because Panthongtae did inform the SEC but his report was not totally correct" said the SEC's deputy chief Prasong Vinaiphat.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, $1.88 billion Shin Corporation transaction
Allegations of insider trading by the Shinawatras, executives, and major shareholders were also investigated. No irregularities were found. The military junta later reopened the investigations.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, $1.88 billion Shin Corporation transaction
The transactions have made the Prime Minister the target of accusations that he was selling an asset of national importance to a foreign entity, and hence selling out his nation. The Democrat party spokesman called Thaksin worse than Saddam Hussein for not protecting the Thai economy from foreigners: "Dictator Saddam, though a brutal tyrant, still fought the superpower for the Iraqi motherland". Supporters, however, counter that Thailand's mobile phone industry is highly competitive, and that little criticism was raised when the Norwegian firm Telenor acquired Total Access Communication, the country's second largest operator. Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva had criticised Thaksin earlier for not sufficiently opening up the Thai telecom sector to foreigners.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, $1.88 billion Shin Corporation transaction
Supporters further counter that the complete sale of Shin Corporation by the Shinawatra family has been a long-standing demand of some public groups, as it would allow Thaksin to undertake his duties as Prime Minister without accusation of conflicts of interest.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
The prime minister faced growing pressure to resign following the sale of his family's controlling stake in Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings, the Singapore government's investment agency. Although the SEC's investigation of the transaction cleared Thaksin of all wrongdoing, critics have still accused him of insider trading, use of tax law loopholes, selling out the nation, and other offences.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
Anti - Thaksin protesters are largely composed of urban upper/middle class royalist Bangkokians, dubbed the "Blue Blood Jet Set" by the Bangkok Post. They have been joined by supporters of the controversial Santi Asoke Buddhist sect, followers of the controversial monk Luang Ta Maha Bua, and state enterprises employees who oppose privatisation. Some academics and intellectuals have also joined the protests.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
However, the protests have been divisive. Many urban upper/middle class Bangkokians have expressed frustration at the protesters. Early in 2005, a majority of the employees at state-owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand supported privatisation. The popular but controversial Dharmakaya Buddhist sect has come out in support of Thaksin. Several members of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's Privy Council have asked protesters to seek a peaceful resolution to the situation.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
Supreme Commander General Ruengroj Mahasaranond said "I should like to direct my message at a certain person who resorts to self-promotion by invoking the name of His Majesty...Rivals should not involve the monarch in their quarrels". Many academics have urged the protesters to adhere to the constitution and not pressure the King to appoint a replacement prime minister. Many also note that the majority of Thailand's population, particular the rural poor, are strong supporters of Thaksin.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
On 14 January 2006, hundreds of protestors headed by Sondhi Limthongkul, former senator Pratin Santiprapop, Klanarong Chantik, and Democrat MP Kalaya Sophonpanich stormed into Government House at half past midnight, overwhelming security forces. They occupied the building for twenty minutes before regrouping outside and continuing their protest.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
An anti-Thaksin rally on 4 February 2006 at the Royal Plaza drew a very large crowd. Police and foreign media estimated the turnout to be 40,000 – 50,000. Some local newspapers estimated that up to 100,000 attended. Afterwards, protests waned, with rewer protesters showed up at the Royal Plaza the next weekend. Most Thai newspapers estimated the turnout at 30,000 – 50,000 people. Phoochatkarn Raiwan (owned by Sondhi Limthongkul, the leader of the protest) estimated 100,000 attended. The BBC, Reuters, and AFP estimated 5,000 – 15,000 attended.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Genesis of the demonstrations
The PAD's protests took on an increasingly critical tone in February. In a single protest on 26 February 2006, Buddhist leader Sulak Sivaraksa called Thaksin a pitiful dog and chairman of the northeastern teachers' group Auychai Watha called for Thaksin's children to "become whores infected with venereal disease." The behaviour of the protesters was condemned by the Chairperson of Amnesty International Thailand. Protestors often harassed journalists and newscrews.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Pro-Thaksin demonstrations
On 3 March 2006, a pro-Thaksin rally at Sanam Luang arranged by the TRT party was attended by a massive crowd. Local media reported that up to 200,000 people attended. Some foreign media reported up to 150,000 attended. In this rally, Thaksin promised that "If my party receive less votes than the number of people abstaining combined with votes for smaller parties, I will not accept the premiership...I beg the three opposition parties, Democrat, Chat Thai and Mahachon, to join the contest. If they really insist on a boycott, they can campaign for voters to mark "abstention" to reject me".


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Pro-Thaksin demonstrations
He also promised to amend Article 313 of the Constitution to allow representatives of the people to draft a new charter as occurred in 1974 after the 1973 bloodshed. Some additional laws later would be amended, he said. The whole political reform would take about one year before a referendum to endorse the new charter and another parliament dissolution before a new election. Anti - Thaksin protesters have claimed that most of the attendants were uneducated people who were paid to attend.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
On 5 March 2006, while Thaksin was campaigning for the April 2006 elections in the rural areas, tens of thousands of protesters in Bangkok, shouting "Thaksin Get Out" and "Restore Power to the King", demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister. The anti-Thaksin rally included the burning of an effigy of him in a mock funeral to cries of "Thaksin out! Thaksin out!" It was described as "the biggest anti-government demonstration in Thailand since 1992" in some news reports. The protest also included a satirical Chinese opera and performances of anti-Thaksin Lam tad singing.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
Starting 13 March 2006, anti-Thaksin protests moved to permanent tents and stands outside Government House at the Miskawan Intersection, leading to massive traffic jams in that area. By 5.30 pm, 18 March 2006, approximately 3,000 were protesting at Government House (source: Thai Rath, 19 March 2005).


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
On 18 March 2006, Nuansri Rodkhrut, a representative of the Thai Red Cross, met protest-leader Chamlong Srimuang to inform him that protest tents were in space reserved for the 2006 Red Cross Fair. She was roundly booed by protesters. The Red Cross Fair is held annually at the Royal Plaza, Amphorn Gardens, Sri Ayuthaya Road, and the Miskawan Intersection from the end of March to early April. The fair is hosted by the Thai Red Cross Society and was to be attended by Princess Sirindhorn. Chamlong responded "The protest area does not belong to any individual.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
Our move from Sanam Luang to Government House to kick out PM Thaksin is our job. I have been to the Red Cross Fair since I was a kid, and I don't want to disrupt it. In fact, it is good that the protesters can visit the fair and raise its attendance. Few Fair attendees will visit the area used by the protesters." He suggested to Nuansri that the entrance booth of the Fair be moved 10 meters behind the main stage of the protests. Nuansri responded that she would seek further guidance from her superiors. On the same day, Traffic Police Commander Phanu Kerdlabphon warned that any disruption of Princess Sirindhorn's visit to the Fair would "surely lead to trouble". Chamlong was quoted as saying "If the officers consider it is against the law, then, come and arrest all 100,000 of us here".


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
Starting 15 March 2006, Thaksin supporters have moved en-masse to Bangkok from the North and North-east in a caravan of Ee Taen (slow-moving diesel-engine powered farming vehicles), Thai: อีแต๋น). The "Mob Ee Taen" (so called by the Thai press), as of 18 March 2006, numbered thousands of demonstrators in several hundred Ee Taen and had chosen Chatuchak Park, in the north of Bangkok, as its demonstration site.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
The farmers were joined by 400 motorcycle taxi drivers, who claim that a Thaksin-initiated crackdown has eliminated the need to make payments to corrupt police and underworld elements.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
On 19 March 2006, a group of Thaksin supporters burned a coffin of Apirak Kosayothin, Democrat governor of Bangkok, claiming that the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration was trying to force the protesters out of Chatuchak Park, that the BMA would not provide any water, and provided only two mobile toilet buses. Anti - Thaksin protesters have claimed that the Thaksin supporters are uneducated and had been paid to come support Thaksin. They have also claimed that it is illegal to drive Ee Taen on city streets.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
On the week before the 2006 election, the anti-Thaksin rally moved to Bangkok's shopping districts, with rallies at Bumrungrad International Hospital, The Emporium, and Siam Square. Siam Centre, Siam Discovery, Siam Paragon, and many other businesses and office buildings in the protest area were closed, causing up to 1.2 billion baht in losses. On 29 March, the BTS skytrain had to shut down service at the Siam intersection station, though the service also reported record ridership as a result of the protest rallies. The protests also caused major traffic jams throughout Bangkok, especially Sukhumvit Road and Silom Road, both major Bangkok arteries. The local press estimated 50,000 protesters, although foreign press and independent observers noted only 5,000 – 30,000.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Anti-Thaksin and pro-Thaksin demonstrations, Demonstrations before the April election
The anti-Thaksin protesters were harshly criticised, with 50,000 complaints being made to the FM91 traffic radio station. A poll showed that 71% of Bangkokians disagreed with the protests being moved into the city centre. An opinion poll showed that 26% of Bangkok people supported the resignation of Thaksin, compared to 48% three weeks previously. Protest leader Chamlong Srimuang defended the protesters, saying "Two days of traffic jams is a minor matter, but the nation remaining jammed up was a big problem."


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Planning for the coup
Planning for the coup started in approximately February 2006 and continued in secret during the subsequent crisis. Rumours about unrest in the armed forces and possible coup plots unfurled for months leading to the coup. In May 2006, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin issued assurances that the military would not seize power. On 20 July 2006, around a hundred middle-ranking army officers said to be supporters of Thaksin were reassigned by the army high command, fuelling rumours that the army was divided between supporters and opponents of the prime minister.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Planning for the coup
In July 2006, 3rd Army Area Commander Saprang Kalayanamitr gave an interview where he stated that Thai politics was below standard and that the Kingdom's leadership was weak. He also claimed that Thailand had a false democracy. In August 2006, there were reports of tank movements near Bangkok, but the military attributed these to a scheduled exercise. In early September, Thai police arrested five army officers, all members of Thailand's counter-insurgency command, after intercepting one of the officers with a bomb in a car allegedly targeting the prime minister's residence. Three of the suspects were released after the coup.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Planning for the coup
In December 2006, former National Security Council head Prasong Soonsiri claimed that he and five other senior military figures had been planning a coup as early as July. He claimed that Sonthi was one of those figures, but that Surayud and Prem were not involved at the time.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Impeachment attempts
In February 2006, 28 senators submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court calling for the Prime Minister's impeachment for conflicts of interest and improprieties in the sell-off of Shin Corporation under Articles 96, 216 and 209 of the Thai constitution. The senators said the Prime Minister violated the Constitution and was no longer qualified for office under Article 209. However, the Court rejected the petition on 16 February, with the majority judges saying the petition failed to present sufficient grounds to support the prime minister's alleged misconduct.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, Impeachment attempts
Another impeachment attempt was made by the Thai university students network, led by Thammasat University students. A petition was launched to impeach Thaksin via the Senate. As of 27 February 2006, over 50,000 people signed the petition. This exceeded the minimum number required by the Constitution to launch the bid.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, House dissolution and the April 2006 Legislative Election, House dissolution
Thaksin announced a House dissolution on 24 February 2006, in a bid to defuse the political crisis triggered by his family's sale of Shin Corporation. General elections were scheduled for 2 April. In his weekly radio address following the announcement of his decision, Thaksin promised a series of new populist measures, including pay rises for government workers, an increase in the minimum wage and debt relief for farmers. The opposition Democrat, Chart Thai and Mahachon parties announced a boycott of the election on 27 February.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, House dissolution and the April 2006 Legislative Election, House dissolution
The Nation criticised Thaksin for calling for parliamentary elections. In an editorial, it noted that the election "fails to take into consideration a major fallacy of the concept, particularly in a less-developed democracy like ours, in which the impoverished, poorly informed masses are easily manipulated by people of his ilk. And Thaksin's manipulation has been well documented. It includes an ingenious use of populist policies that pander to the unprincipled wants and needs of the people."


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, House dissolution and the April 2006 Legislative Election, Demand for royal intervention
On 24 March 2006, in front of a rally of 50,000 at Sanam Luang, Democrat party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva demanded that King Bhumibol Adulyadej appoint a new Prime Minister and Cabinet to resolve the political crisis. The People's Alliance for Democracy's (PAD), The Law Society of Thailand, and the Press Council of Thailand also called for royal intervention. Pongsak Payakavichien, of the Press Council, also called on the civil service to detach itself from the government and demand royal intervention.


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, House dissolution and the April 2006 Legislative Election, Demand for royal intervention
However, demands for royal intervention have met with much criticism. The King himself in speeches on 26 April to newly appointed judges dismissed the notion, saying Article 7 of the Constitution invoked by the anti-Thaksin protestors did not give him that power. "Asking for a Royally appointed prime minister is undemocratic. It is, pardon me, a mess. It is irrational." Worachet Pakeerut, a law lecturer at Thammasat University, noted "We're trying to involve the monarch in politics, but it's still not time. If we appeal for a new prime minister, aren't we asking the monarch to take sides?"


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, House dissolution and the April 2006 Legislative Election, Demand for royal intervention
Passakorn Atthasit and 20 relatives of people killed in the October 1973 democracy uprising tied a black cloth around the Democracy Monument and said "We don't care if Mr. Thaksin remains in the post. All we care is that the prime minister is elected. Asking for a royally-bestowed prime minister is akin to ripping the charter apart."


2005–2006 Thai political crisis, House dissolution and the April 2006 Legislative Election, April 2006 House election results
Unofficial results as of 3 April 2006 gave Thaksin's TRT Party victory, with 462 seats in Parliament and 66% of the popular vote. However, 38 TRT candidates, all in the Democrat-dominated south, failed to win up to 20% of votes from eligible voters in their constituency, thus forcing the Election Commission to hold by-elections on 23 April. Election Commission commissioner Prinya Nakchudtree said that election laws would allow new applications in 23 April by-elections, allowing the Democrat Party (which had boycotted 3 April elections) to run in the by-elections. However, the Democrat Party has vowed to boycott the by-elections and has petitioned the Central Administrative Court to cancel the by-elections. Many expect that this will prevent Parliament from reconvening and a Government from forming within the 3 May time-limit set by the Constitution.