1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Events leading up to the outbreak of the July 1964 Riots
As a form of retaliation and to further incite the conflict between the Malays and PAP, UMNO called for a meeting that was attended by close to 12,000 people. This meeting was chaired by Secretary-General of UMNO Syed Ja’far Albar who referred to Lee as an "Ikan Sepat" (Three spot gourami), a mud-dwelling fish, and called for collective action against the Chinese community led by the PAP. While this convention was underway, communal violence was sparked in Bukit Mertajam killing two people. This was seen as a prelude to the much bigger riots that followed on 21 July 1964.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Events leading up to the outbreak of the July 1964 Riots
Former Minister for Social Affairs, Othman Wok wrote in his autobiography that he had come to know from one of the reporters from the Utusan Melayu that the latter had known about the potential riots even before their outbreak, which raised official suspicions that UMNO leaders might have orchestrated the riots. Othman also makes references to some key political meetings which took place between the Malay community in Singapore and politicians in Singapore to express their grievances.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Events leading up to the outbreak of the July 1964 Riots
Accounts from the meetings indicate that the Malays in Singapore had no major grievances and that UMNO’s Secretary-General Syed Ja’afar was responsible for instigating them. Some of the matters brought up by the Malay community included infrastructural issues that Malay schools faced and these issues were contrary to what the UMNO and Utusan Melayu had portrayed.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Origins of the riots
The UMNO and the Malaysian Federal government blamed the Indonesian forces for stirring up potential conflict among the Malay Kampong regions. However, this was denied by W.A Luscombe the second secretary of the Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur due to the lack of evidence.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Origins of the riots
From the Malaysian government's point of view, Lee Kuan Yew and PAP were responsible for instigating these series of riots and discontent among the Malay community in Singapore. UMNO and Tun Razak had attributed to the Malay's anger and hostility towards the Chinese and Lee Kuan Yew's former speech made on 30 June 1964 for passing inflammatory remarks of the UMNO's communal politics. However, the American Embassy had refuted these claims by stating that Utusan Melayu could have misquoted Lee's speech.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Origins of the riots
Whereas the PAP and Lee Kuan Yew strongly believed that the 1964 July riot was not a spontaneous one, as UNMO had always tried to stir anti-PAP sentiments and communal politics among the Singapore Malays. Furthermore, they had often used fiery speeches and Utusan Melayu as a tool to propagate pro-Malay sentiments and to sway their support towards UMNO.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
On 21 July 1964 afternoon, about 20,000 Malays representing the different Muslim organisations in Singapore had gathered for the procession to begin to mark the birthday celebrations of Prophet Muhammad. The procession started at Padang and was planned to end at the Jamiyah Headquarters located at Lorong 12, Geylang area. The dominant narration of the July 1964 Racial riot on public forums and history textbooks is simplified and remembered as a riot that involved 20,000 Chinese throwing bottles and rocks at the Malays at the Padang.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
In reality, some scholars argue that the bottles and rocks being overthrown and clash with a Malay policeman who tried to restrain the Malays were not the reasons for the cause of the riots. But rather, part of the reasons could be also attributed to the distribution of leaflets to the Malay community before the start of the procession by a group named Pertobohan Perjuangan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapore.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
The leaflets instigated anti-Chinese and anti-PAP sentiments among the Malays as it called for a greater union of the Malays to oppose and wipe out the Chinese as they were believed to be starting a ploy to kill the Malays. SUMO's (Singapore Malay National Organisation) Secretary-General Syed Esa Almenoar had given a fiery speech on the need for the Malay community to fight for their rights instead of giving a religious and non-political speech. This further heightened the suspicions that the Malays had toward the PAP and the Chinese community.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
The procession was being led by Yang di-Pertuan Negara, Yusof bin Ishak and other PAP political leaders such as Othman Wok. The procession went along Arab Street, Kallang and Geylang areas. The riots occurred around 5 p.m., where a few Malay youths were seen to be hitting a Chinese cyclist along Victoria Street, which was intervened against by a Chinese constable.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
Mr. Othman Wok recounted in his autobiography that while he and his team were along Lorong 14, a group of youths believed to be from UMNO shouted "strike the Chinese" and these youths were seen to be marching in front of Wok's contingent. The riots which occurred around Victoria and Geylang had spread to other parts of Singapore such as Palmer Road and Madras Street. The police force, military and the Gurkha battalion were activated to curb the violence and at 9.30 p.m., a curfew was imposed whereby everyone was ordered to stay at home.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
The riot saw serious damages to the private properties, loss of lives, and injuries sustained by the citizens. According to the reports from the police force, a total of 220 incidents were recorded with 4 being killed and 178 people have sustained some injuries. Furthermore, close to 20 shophouses owned by the Chinese around the Geylang and Jalan Eunos regions were burnt down. The curfew was lifted at 6 a.m. on 22 July 1964. Clashes and tensions between the Malays and Chinese re-arose, so the curfew was re-imposed at 11.30 a.m.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
Political leaders of both Malaysia and Singapore, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew, each led national radio broadcasts and emphasized the need to maintain peace and harmony among the different racial and religious groups. Both appealed to the people to remain indoors and not participate in any unlawful acts.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 21 July 1964, Outbreak of the July 1964 Race Riots
The racial riots subsided by 24 July 1964, as the number of communal clashes reported was reduced to seven cases. On 2 August, the imposition of the curfew since 21 July was completely lifted and the high police and military supervision removed.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 2 September 1964
After the July riots, a period of peace was broken by another riot on 2 September 1964. This riot was triggered by the murder of a Malay trishaw rider along Geylang Serai and this incident sparked attempts of stabbings and heightened violence. 13 people were killed, 106 sustained injuries while 1,439 were arrested.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Riot of 2 September 1964
Indonesia was accused of encouraging communal strife to coincide with the landing of the Indonesian commandos in Johor Bahru. This accusation was found to be highly improbable by the American Ambassador to Singapore, who cited the tense situation following the July riots as the cause of the September riot.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Commission of inquiry
Following the July riots, the Singapore government requested that the Malaysian federal government appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the causes of the riots, but this was declined by the Malaysian government. Following the September riots, the Malaysian government finally agreed to form such a commission, with closed-door hearings beginning in April 1965; however the findings of the report have remained confidential.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Singapore’s separation from Malaysia
According to Lee Kuan Yew, there were irreconcilable differences between the two from the outset, due to the UMNO's communal politics. The racial riots in July 1964, triggered and intensified the political rift between PAP and UMNO. Communal politics was often the central theme of Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's speeches and he often pointed the finger at the PAP leaders and Lee Kuan Yew for interfering in his political party's decisions and for contesting in Malaya's federal elections advocating for a non-communal politics.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Singapore’s separation from Malaysia
Furthermore, Tunku Abdul Rahman's encouragement of racial tension and anti-PAP sentiments among Singaporean Malays made it difficult for the PAP to work with UMNO to forge good relations. Thus, these ideological differences in party politics and the outbreaks of the racial riots in 1964 were some of the important contributing factors which led to the eventual separation of Singapore from Malaysia, paving the way for Singapore's independence in June 1965. Singapore has finally declared an independent and sovereign state on 9 August 1965.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Social Memory of 1964 Race Riots
The narration of the 1964 race riots often includes the political dimension where UMNO and PAP had a political rift. This narration does not examine how the Singaporeans who had lived through this period of time had viewed these Racial Riots. Thus, Cheng (2001) attempted to revive the memories of the people who had lived through the racial riots, and most of them associated the racial riots as more of religious tension as it took place during the Prophet Mohammad's birthday procession.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Social Memory of 1964 Race Riots
Some of the Singaporeans felt that this riot had not much of a significant impact on them since they were living in regions far from Geylang and they did not view this riot as being serious. Contrary to the official discourse which cites Syed Ja'far Albar as the culprit instigating the riots, most of the Malays saw the throwing of a bottle by a Chinese causing the riots while the Chinese saw the Malay's aggressive actions towards their racial group as the main factor for the outbreak of the riot. Most of them did not believe that this riot was due to political incompatibility between PAP and UMNO but rather they viewed this as a mere religious and racial clash.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Principles of Multiculturalism and Multiracialism
The July 1964 racial riots played a significant role in shaping some of Singapore's fundamental principles such as multiculturalism and multiracialism once it had gained independence from Malaysia in 1965. The Singapore Constitution emphasized the need to adopt non-discriminatory policies based on race or religion. Furthermore, the state also guaranteed the grant of minority rights and to ensure that the minorities in Singapore are not mistreated, the Maintenance of the Religious Harmony Act was drafted and implemented in 1990.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Principles of Multiculturalism and Multiracialism
Furthermore, the Presidential Council for the Minority Rights (PCMR) was established in 1970 to ensure that the bills passed by the parliament are not discriminatory against any racial group. The government has used the recollection of the 1964 race riots to frame the national narrative of "rising from the ashes of violence-producing racial and religious acrimony to religious harmony and civil peace". For instance, former Prime Minister Goh had implemented a new curriculum known as National Education to foster social and national cohesiveness among Singaporeans.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Principles of Multiculturalism and Multiracialism
In this national education program, students were taught about the 1964 racial riots to educate the younger generation about the detrimental implications of the racial tension to the cohesiveness of a nation. Furthermore, commemorative days such as racial harmony day was also introduced in 1997 to foster greater cultural appreciation and to enable students to inculcate values such as respect. Every year on 21 July, schools commemorate the racial riots to emphasise the need for tolerance among each other. During this commemoration day, schools recall the racial riots that occurred but however, the emphasis on the events are focused on the tension between the Malays and the Chinese rather than on the political and ideological differences between UMNO and PAP.


1964 race riots in Singapore, Aftermath, Internal Security Act
The Internal Security Act grants the executive powers against actions that may threaten the internal security of Singapore, including those that "promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or other classes of the population likely to cause violence".


1964 split in the Communist Party of India
In 1964 a major split occurred in the Communist Party of India. The split was the culmination of decades of tensions and factional infighting. When India became independent in 1947, differences arose of how to adapt to the new situation. As relations between the Nehru government and the Soviet Union improved, a faction that sought cooperation with the dominant Indian National Congress emerged within CPI. This tendency was led by S.A. Dange, whose role in the party hierarchy became increasingly controversial.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India
When the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1962 Dange's opponents within CPI were jailed, but when they were released they sought to challenge his leadership. In 1964 the party was finally divided into two, with the left faction forming the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The split had a lot of regional variations. It also impacted other organizations, such as trade union and peasant movements. The split has been studied extensively by scholars, who have sought to analyze the various domestic and international factors involved.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
Many scholarly and journalistic works have been dedicated to the split. Scholars that have studied the split include Overstreet and Windmiller, Gelman (Indian Communism in Turmoil, 1963), Wood (Observations on the Indian Communist Party Split, 1965), Devlin (Boring from Within, 1964), Ray (Peking and the Indian CP, 1966), Feuer (Marxisms—How Many?, 1966), Fic (Kerala: Yenan of India, 1969), Ram (Indian Communism: Split Within a Split, 1969), Franda (Radical Politics in West Bengal, 1971), Sen Gupta (Communism in Indian Politics, 1972), Kaviraj Sudipta (1979), Thomas Nossiter (1982; 1988) and Singh (1994).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
There is a commonly held perception that the split in CPI was merely an extension of the Sino-Soviet split. The viewpoint that the split was primarily caused by international factors and the role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been upheld by a sector in CPI after the split. Some scholars have sought to portray the split as directly linked to divisions in the world communist movement, whilst others have emphasized indigenous causes. Rao (1983) argues that the narrative that CPI supported the Soviet Union and CPI(M) supported China is an oversimplification. Per Mitra el at. (2004) the circumstances leading up to the split were complex, with local, national and international factors intertwined.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
Per Nossiter (1982) the Sino-Soviet split had repercussions in CPI, but that the 'fundamental cleavage' in the party predated the rupture between Moscow and Peking. The two key issues debates in CPI in the 1950s, according to him were on one hand the relations with the national bourgeoisie, Nehru and the Indian National Congress and on the other hand the possibilities to work within the limits of the Indian constitution.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
These differences were compounded by close links with Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the shifts in CPSU policies (improved Soviet-Nehru relations and peaceful transition to socialism) Furthermore, Nossiter affirms that the Sino-Indian border issue led to the enmeshment of the preexisting internal divisions in CPI and the Sino-Soviet Split.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
Per Adamson (1966) the split in 1964 represented a mere formalization of profound and longstanding cleavages within the Communist Party of India. Wood (1965) states that the split in CPI was in many ways atypical for the world communist movement, and shouldn't be reduced to just a confrontation between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. Per Wood the splits in most other communist parties originate in the 1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties whilst the history of the CPI split is more profound, running back to the foundation of the party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
Per Gunther (2001) international issues like the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet line of peaceful co-existence with the West, improved Soviet relations with Nehru government and the 1962 Sino-Indian war were factors in the split, the most important factor was the domestic situation, i.e. the stance of CPI towards the Indian National Congress.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
According to Sharma (1978) split took place in backdrop of the Sino-Soviet split, the 1962 war and differences on how to assess the economic and political situation India. As a result of the latter, the party failed to articulate a strategic-tactical line of revolution acceptable for both leftist and rightist factions, in particular on how to relate to the Indian National Congress and the right-wing opposition parties like the Swatantra Party and Jan Sangh. Per Sharma most studies on the split have ascribed the split to a combination of these 3 factors, albeit in varying degrees.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Research on the split
Whilst Sharma agrees that these three factors 'accelerated' the split he seeks to point to other factors often overlooked by commentators, namely the stark regional variations in which CPI operated, leadership rivalry and personality-oriented factionalism. Sharma argues that the role of Dange in the party had been a source of contention even in the 1940s, that tensions grew between his supporters and opponents as he steadily arose in the party hierarchy in the years that followed. In particular in the midst of the April 1964 split ideological and strategic issues were put to the back-burner, and rivalries of personality and power struggles came to the forefront. Mohanty (1977) also indicates that personal and factional rivalries were factors in the lead-up to the split.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Factions and nomenclature
Different commentators use different ways to describe the factions within CPI in the lead-up to the split. Sharma (1978), for example, portrays a division into in two factions before the split, leftists and rightists. Per his account Dange, Z.A. Ahmed, M.N. Govindan Nair, Sharma, Bhupesh Gupta were rightist leaders and E.M.S. Namboodiripad, P. Sundarayya, Jyoti Basu, Harkishan Singh Surjeet were leftist leaders. Sharma notes that Gupta vacillated, not taking a clear stand for neither side. Writers like Crouch (1966) and Mallick (1994) describes three factions; leftists, centrists and rightists. The publication Thought used the labels 'Rucos' ('Russian Communists'), 'Chicos' ('Chinese Communists') and 'Cencos' ('Centrist Communists') to identity the CPI factions.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Factions and nomenclature
Following the April 11, 1964 CPI National Council meeting the centrist trend was divided into a 'left-centrist' trend, led by Namboodiripad and Basu, and a 'right-centrist' trend led by Gupta. The former sided with the leftists in the split, the latter with the rightist. But per the RSP organ The Call there was also a 'centralist centrist' trend in West Bengal, who appealed for party unity and refused to pick a side in the split.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Overview, Factions and nomenclature
After the emergence of two separate parties in 1964, some authors began using the names 'CPI(Right)'/'Right Communist Party' or 'CPI(Left)'/'Left Communist Party'. Both parties insisted that they were the authentic CPI, and simply called themselves 'CPI'. The CPI(Left) approached the Election Commission of India ahead of the March 1965 Kerala Legislative Assembly election, requesting to contest the elections under the name of the Communist Party of India. The ECI refused the petition, as CPI(Left) represented a minority of the parliamentary faction of the undivided CPI. In response the CPI(Left) registered itself as the 'Communist Party of India (Marxist)' with the ECI, and the ECI awarded it the hammer and sickle as its election symbol. The CPI(Left) would henceforth be known as the CPI(M).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, Independence of India
Namboodiripad, himself one of the main protagonists in the split, argued that the split had its roots with the transfer of power in 1947 as different leaders developed different views on the new situation. On the eve of the Independence of India, CPI was led by P.C. Joshi. Under Joshi's tenure as CPI general secretary legal struggles was the main tactical line of the party but the party also led militant mass struggles, most notably the  Telangana movement and the Tebhaga movement.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, Independence of India
And as a result, the party was divided on the issue of how to characterize the new political situation after the transfer of power in 1947. Joshi, the party general secretary, argued that Independence was genuine and represented an achievement of the national bourgeoisie. But the two other members of the CPI politburo - B.T. Ranadive and Gangadhar Adhikari - argued that the transfer of power was a sham measure by orchestrated by British imperialism.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, Second Party Congress and the Zhdanov Doctrine
At the 2nd Party Congress, held in Calcutta in 1948, there was an abrupt change leadership and political line. The moderate Joshi was replaced by Ranadive as the new general secretary of the party and people's democratic revolution through class struggle and mass upsurge became the new party line. The new party line drew inspiration from the Zhdanov Doctrine. However the attempt to organize a mass upsurge failed and the party leaders were either jailed or forced to go underground. Between 1949 and 1951 factional conflict virtually paralyzed the party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, Second Party Congress and the Zhdanov Doctrine
By mid-1949 Andhra communists had begun advocating that a 'Maoist' strategy for revolution was apt for India, based on their experience from the Telangana armed struggle. In 1950 Ranadive was deposed from his role as general secretary, and the Andhra cadres led by C. Rajeshwara Rao took over the leadership of the party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, From armed struggle to parliamentary politics
The following year the political line was reversed once again. The CPSU instructed CPI to cancel the Telangana struggle. Notably the CPSU had begun to see Nehru as increasingly independent from the US. The party gathered for a convention in Calcutta which changed the party line to opt for peaceful methods of struggle, rejecting the legacy of Ranadive (who had sought to imitate the Russian revolution) and Rao (who had sought to imitate the Chinese revolution).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, From armed struggle to parliamentary politics
The convention adopted a new party program, which identified India as 'dependent and semi-colonial country' The 1951 program characterized the Nehru government as a "[g]overnment of landlords and princes and the reactionary big bourgeoisie collaborating with the British imperialists" It outlined that the national bourgeoisie was not part of the governing bloc. The 1951 program temporarily settled the factional conflict inside the party. Subsequently after the 1951 Calcutta convention CPI began preparations for participating in 1952 elections.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, From armed struggle to parliamentary politics
The 1951 convention restructured the Central Committee of the party, reducing its membership from 31 (as elected at the 2nd Party Congress) to 21. A new general secretary was named. Ajoy Ghosh was a compromise candidate who was accepted by all factions in the party. But in the years to come Ghosh would frequently be absent on medical leave, and factional rivalries would re-emerge.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Turbulent years: 1947-1953, From armed struggle to parliamentary politics
CPI was heavily factionalized during the years of 1947-1953. The top leadership housed plenty of internal antagonisms; there differences on ideological, strategic and tactical issues but also personal rivalries. During Joshi's period as general secretary, the group around Ranadive organized opposition towards him. When Ranadive held the general secretaryship, Joshi and C. Rajeshwara Rao undermined Ranadive's leadership. During 1949-1950 rumours were actively circulated in the party, accusing Dange of being a government agent. Rao, in turn, was undermined by the Ranadive faction during 1950-1953.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Third Party Congress: Madurai
The 3rd Party Congress was held in Madurai between December 27, 1953 and Jan 3, 1954. 293 delegates participated. At the Madurai Party Congress CPI resolved to continue the path of legal struggles. However, in theory the party still maintained the notion of armed struggle as an option. And whilst the Madurai Party Congress CPI had officially rejected 'Maoist' strategy for revolution in India, a move directly related to Soviet pressure on the party, parts of the party remained inspired by the line of the Communist Party of China.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Third Party Congress: Madurai
At the Madurai Party Congress the rightist wing of the party raised opposition to the 1951 party program. The right-wing trend wanted to recognize India as an independent country, and disagreed with the usage of terms like 'semi-colonial' and 'dependent'. The CPI right-wing argued that Nehru stood for independent development and an anti-imperialist foreign policy. The CPI rightists proposed simultaneous struggle against government and Indian National Congress whilst  seeking cooperation with progressive sectors inside Congress Party. The CPI leftists on the other hand saw the Nehru government as reactionary, and that its supposedly progressive economic policies were deceptive as the government defended feudal interests. Nevertheless, the CPI leftists could agree to support the Nehru government on foreign policy issues.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Third Party Congress: Madurai
The Madurai Party Congress elected a 39-member Central Committee. G. Adhikari defeated the official candidate Hajra Begum for a seat in the Central Committee.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Just prior to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (held in Moscow in February 1956) relations between the Soviet leadership and the Nehru government had improved significantly. Notably the 20th CPSU congress not only denounced the personality cult around Stalin, furthermore the general declaration of the congress recognized possibility for peaceful transition to socialism. Following the 20th CPSU congress factionalism inside CPI increased. On one side, the endorsement of non-capitalist development and peaceful transition to socialism by the 20th CPSU congress further emboldened the right-wing within CPI.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
On the other side, the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev caused dissent within CPI, which pushed CPI closer to the CPC. In reaction to Khrushchev's statement on Stalin, Ghosh urged CPI members to study the CPC statement On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as a foremost appraisal on Stalin's role.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
After the 20th CPSU congress the New Times magazine carried an authoritative article of CPSU policy, authored by Modeste Rubinstein, titled A Non-Capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries. The article, which was reprinted in the CPI monthly New Age made specific reference to India, whereby Nehru and not CPI was described as leading India on path to non-capitalist development, i e. towards socialism. In India, argued Rubinstein, there was a trend towards expansion of the state and co-operative sectors of the economy, which would have indicated that there was the possibility of moving towards a path of non-capitalist development. The article caused a strong reaction in CPI, and Ghosh publicly protested against it. Following the reaction from CPI the CPSU back-tracked a bit on the topic, but would still pressure the CPI to provide support to Nehru and embrace parliamentary tactics.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fourth Party Congress: Palghat
The 4th CPI Party Congress, held in Palghat in April 1956, was influenced by the 20th CPSU Congress, i.e. the policies of peaceful co-existence between socialist and imperialist camps and start of de-Stalinization. At the congress discussions on themes such as the nature of Indian independence, the class character of Indian government, economic development and planning policies marked divisions between rightist and leftist trends inside the party. At Palghat, Joshi led a faction that called for a united front with the Indian National Congress. Joshi's grouping gathered about a third of the delegates, according to Namboodiripad. Ranadive represented the opposite extreme at the 1956 Party Congress, 'implacably' opposed to any support to the Indian National Congress.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fourth Party Congress: Palghat
Per Mohanty (1977) '[t]he Palghat Congress of the CPI in 1956 put forth the line of peaceful struggle and cooperation with the Nehru government.' The Palghat Party Congress confirmed the legal path of the party, and effectively abandoned the notion of armed struggle The Palghat Party Congress removed the description of India as a 'semi-colonial' country from the party program and instead stated that India had recently won its 'independence and sovereignty'. The CPI now supported the Indian government in its Second Five Year Plan, particularly in regards to development of heavy industries.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fourth Party Congress: Palghat
In regards to the Indian capitalists the party now used a much more conciliatory language, as the 4th CPI Party Congress portrayed the conflict between the forces of imperialism and feudalism on one hand confronting 'the entire Indian people, including the national bourgeoisie' on the other. The new party line called for a national democratic front, including the national capitalists. The language of CPI regarding Indian foreign policy also changed significantly - Nehru was no longer branded as a puppet of US and British imperialism, but on the contrary the non-alignment policies of the Nehru government were lauded.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fourth Party Congress: Palghat
The 4th CPI Party Congress described the non-alignment policy as a 'sentinel for peace' and that '[ n]eutrality expresses the sentiment of the masses for maintenance of their national freedom.' Nevertheless the Palghat line argued that whilst the party should support progressive policies of Nehru government, the party should also struggle against reactionary policies of same government.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fourth Party Congress: Palghat
In the list of the newly elected Central Committee Ghosh, Namboodiripad and Dange occupied the top three slots, followed by Ranadive, Joshi and Rao.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, 1957 elections
CPI won the 1957 Kerala Legislative Assembly election, which was seen as an affirmation of the peaceful transition line set by the 20th CPSU Congress. The CPI electoral victory in Kerala resulted in the first opposition-run state government in independent India. Namboodiripad was sworn in as Chief Minister. And whilst in the 1952 elections CPI had won 106 seats in the Legislative Assemblies around the country, in the 1957 elections the party won 201 seats nation-wide.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, 1957 elections
In addition to winning the state assembly election in Kerala, CPI also emerged as the largest opposition party in the parliamentary (Lok Sabha) election. Dange was elected to the Lok Sabha by wide margin. After the election Dange was elected as the new CPI group leader in the Lok Sabha.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, 1957 elections
The outcome of the 1957 elections would impact the roles of Dange and Namboodiripad within the party hierarchy. During the period of 1953-1956 Namboodiripad was seen as the number two in the party, and he was accepted by all factions as the default acting general secretary during Ghosh's medical leaves. But once he took charge as Chief Minister, he was no longer able to exercise organizational functions at the Delhi party headquarters. Generally Dange had been perceived as the number three in the party hierarchy.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, 1957 elections
But his electoral victory and the role he played as the leader of the largest parliamentary opposition faction significantly increased his political stature. And being present at the parliament in Delhi, in the vicinity of the central party headquarters, enabled Dange to emerge as a potential candidate to act as the replacement for the general secretary during Ghosh's medical absences. Coincidentally, Ghosh had no periods of absence during Namboodiripad's tenure as Chief Minister of Kerala.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, 1957 elections
Furthermore, the Kerala election victory caused party to impose curbs on militant mass movements across the country, leading to resentment in party ranks both in Kerala and other states. At the 1957 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, held in Moscow, the Communist Party of China criticized at the CPI for having formed a ministry in Kerala.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fifth Party Congress: Amritsar
The factional conflicts were temporary solved at the 5th Party Congress, held in Amritsar in 1958. Per Kochanek and Hardgrave (2007) the Amritsar thesis 'set forth the nationalist credentials of the CPI'. The Amritsar Party Congress adopted possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, both in terms of strategy and tactics.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fifth Party Congress: Amritsar
Whilst the 1956 congress had used careful wordings when talking about the potential for peaceful transition to socialism via combined electoral and mass struggles, Amritsar Party Congress used a much more optimistic discourse when talking about a parliamentary path to socialism - by this point the party felt that the 1957 electoral victory in Kerala could be replicated in other Indian states and eventually the same modality would be used to come to power in Delhi.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fifth Party Congress: Amritsar
According to Ram (1977) "Amritsar was the culmination of the long retreat from Telangana and from the 1951 tactical line because in its newfound faith in peaceful change, the CPI was repudiating its tactic of combining peasant partisan warfare with the general strike weapon by the peasant-worker class alliance with the working class as a leader. The 1951 tactical line had at best reiterated a theoretical commitment to this tactic because such a struggle was not part of immediate programme. But Amritsar marked the repudiation of even this theoretical commitment".


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fifth Party Congress: Amritsar
As such, the Party Congress stated that CPI 'strives to achieve full Democracy and Socialism by peaceful means. It considers that by developing a powerful mass movement, by winning a majority in Parliament, and by backing it with mass sanctions, the working class and its allies can overcome the resistance of the forces of reaction and insure that Parliament becomes an instrument of people's will for effecting fundamental changes in the economic, social and State structure."


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fifth Party Congress: Amritsar
Furthermore the Amritsar thesis argued that '[m]any of the declared policies of the [Indian National] Congress and some of [its] measures are, in today's context, progressive. Moreover the Amritsar Party Congress outright stated that the 'Communist Party supports the foreign policy of the Indian government and consistently works for strengthening it'.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Fifth Party Congress: Amritsar
The Amritsar Party Congress changed the central leadership structure; the Central Committee and Politburo were replaced by three-tier system with a Secretariat, a Central Executive Committee (CEC) and a 101-member National Council - scrapping the traditional communist nomenclature for bourgeois terminology. By instituting a numerically large National Council, the rightists could strengthen their position as hard-line elements would be diluted. In the Party Congress documents, Dange was listed as no. 2 in the newly elected party leadership whilst Namboodiripad was listed as no. 15.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Consolidation of the party: 1953-1959, Dismissal of the Kerala Government
Whilst forming the Kerala state government in 1957 had strengthened the argument for parliamentary politics, the 1959 ousting of the Namboodiripad cabinet refueled debates inside the party on tactics and strategy. After the 1960 Kerala Legislative Assembly election, which CPI lost, Namboodiripad affirmed that the party would act as a constructive legislative opposition party but emphasized that the 1959 ousting proved that the Indian National Congress would never allow a peaceful handover of power.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Longju incident
During the 1959 rebellion in Tibet, CPI criticized the Nehru government for being biased in favour of the rebellion. Few months later, in August 1959 Nehru made a statement claiming Chinese troops had entered Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency. Almost immediately as the border conflict emerged, a storm of censure within was directed at CPI as critics sought to portray the party as a fifth column of China. Many local units of CPI sought to downplay the border dispute, arguing in favour of peaceful solution to the border conflict.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Longju incident
Following the Longju incident, the CPI CEC resolution sought to take the middle ground, expressing confidence in non-aggressive character of China whilst committing to India's territorial integrity. According to Nossiter, the resolution dissatisfied both the "internationalist Left" and the "nationalist Right" inside the party. And on September 7, 1959 Zhou Enlai declared that China didn't recognize the McMahon line.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Longju incident
As the central CPI party leadership hadn't confronted the public backlash by issuing a statement unequivocally supporting the Indian government's territorial claims, discontent simmered in the party ranks (in particular among the parliamentary representatives of the party). Initially the dissidents managed to remain within the limits of party discipline, but later their dissent turned into an open rebellion. The parliamentary representatives feared that the advances of the party in the 1957 elections would be reverted if the party appeared as siding with China in the border dispute.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Calcutta resolution
The CPI CEC met in Calcutta in late September 1959. At the Calcutta meeting some parliamentary leaders and regional party leaders from Bombay and Kerala wanted the party to publicly support Nehru's position on the border issue, in particular to reaffirm the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian border. The meeting was heated and lasted for 5 days (it had initially been planned to last for 3 days).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Calcutta resolution
The rightist Dange, who was encouraged by the Soviet statement of neutrality on the Sino-Indian dispute, criticized Chinese actions and requested that the party should declare support for the Nehru government on the Sino-Indian border issue. Dange's demand included recognition of the McMahon line. The leftists in the CEC argued that Dange's position constituted a violation of the principles of proletarian internationalism.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Calcutta resolution
Reportedly Ghosh returned from Moscow in haste to arrive in Calcutta to mediate between the factions. A resolution was adopted which sought to find a balance between the factions in the party, on one hand affirming that CPI would be in the forefront to defend India but also arguing that the crisis was being aggravated by Indian reactionaries. The resolution did not affirm the McMahon line as the border between the two countries. Soon after the Calcutta meeting, a five-member delegation led by Ghosh left for Peking to attend the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, In the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti
On October 7, 1959 the Parliamentary Board of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS, a Maharashtrian regional coalition in which CPI participated) issued a statement calling for a return to the Status Quo of 1954, affirming the McMahon line as the 'natural boundary' between the two countries and accused China of occupying Indian territory. The SMS resolution placed CPI in a dilemma, since the SMS resolution and the CPI September 1959 Calcutta resolution clashed on several key points. The Maharashtrian communists were threatened with expulsion from SMS if they didn't vote in favour of the statement.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, In the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti
The Maharashtrian communists voted in favour of the statement, but were notably worried that the action had violated the CPI party line. Per Varkey (1974) it is probable that Dange, who was the chairman of the SMS Parliamentary Board, felt the need to issue a clarifying statement of his own. Dange's statement affirmed that the SMS resolution supported the McMahon line and identified that border violations had been committed, but that the SMS resolution had not sought to portray China as the sole responsible party of the conflict.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, In the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti
Dange's 'clarification' was immediately rejected by the Praja Socialist Party, another SMS constituent, who called the clarification a 'naive attempt' to reconcile the 'wellknown treachery' of CPI with the position of SMS. On October 14, 1959 the executive of the CPI unit in Maharashtra endorsed the SMS resolution and Dange's clarification, framing the SMS resolution as a compromise between the different parties of the coalition. The October 14, 1959 statement of the CPI Maharashtra executive affirmed that all SMS partners were in favour of peaceful negotiations on the basis of the McMahon line. The explicit acceptance of the McMahon by the Maharashtra CPI unit was an unambiguous deviation of from the central party line.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Kongka Pass incident
As Ghosh returned to Delhi, he affirmed to the Indian press that in conversations with Chinese leaders in Peking the latter had committed to a peaceful resolution of the border issue. But a second border incident occurred at Kongka Pass (Ladakh) October 20–21, 1959 in which 9 Indian soldiers were killed during a confrontation with the Chinese military. The incident further exposed divisions within CPI. Dange made a statement condemning China, and stated unequivocal support to Nehru in "whatever [further] steps he takes to avert such incidents".


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Kongka Pass incident
Dange's statement was echoed by A.K. Gopalan (Deputy Leader of CPI in the Lok Sabha), Hirendranath Mukherjee (Deputy Leader of CPI in the Rajya Sabha) and Jharkhande Rai (Leader of CPI faction in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly) in expressing 'anger and outrage' over Chinese actions. The CPI unit in Poona condemned Chinese actions. On October 23, 1959 Hindustan Times reported discontent among CPI units in Trivandrum, Ahmedabad, Amritsar, Patiala, Delhi and Hardwar over the Chinese actions in the border conflict.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Kongka Pass incident
Khrushchev expressed regret over the Ladakh incident and called for negotiations between India and China. Khruschev's statement emboldened the CPI rightists to call for revising the Calcutta CEC resolution and condemn the Chinese actions.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Kongka Pass incident
The CPI Secretariat and CEC met in late October 1959, and resolved to accept the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian border. Notably Ghosh in had failed to convince the CPC to commit to de-escalating border tensions during his visit to Peking earlier the same month. A CPI Secretariat statement was issued on October 24, 1959. The statement was somewhat milder that the public statement done by Dange, it labelled the Chinese action as 'unjustified' and expressed that CPI shared 'the feelings of deep resentment and indignation of the Indian people' regarding the 'heavy loss of life' in the incident.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Kongka Pass incident
Within the Secretariat there had been two suggestions for amendments to the statement, but both were rejected - Z.A. Ahmed had called expressing stronger disapproval of Chinese action whilst Joshi had proposed highlighting the potential role of provocateurs and imperialist forces in aggravating the crisis. The 'internationalist' trend in the party was dissatisfied with acceptance of McMahon line as party policy.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, National Council meeting: Meerut
In early November 1959 the CPI National Council met in Meerut. The Meerut meeting would last for a week. At the Meerut meeting the group hostile towards China began to gain influence in the party. Dange repeated his demand that CPI should recognize the McMahon Line as the Indian border. The meeting adopted the 'nationalist' position for the McMahon line as basis for negotiations between the two countries became party policy, but the meeting also approved the 'internationalist' position that acceptance of territorial claims shouldn't be a precondition for negotiations. The Meerut meeting also censured Dange and two other CPI leaders in Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, S.S. Mirajkar and S.G. Sardesai, for violation of party discipline.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, National Council meeting: Meerut
The resolution of the Meerut meeting sought to reconcile both sides inside the party. All sectors in the party, except the 'internationalist' hardliners in West Bengal, agreed on the agreed with the 'nationalist' position for McMahon line as basis for negotiations. But the Meerut meeting didn't resolve the dispute in the party, the West Bengal communists maintained their positions whilst the Maharashtra communists refused to endorse the censuring of Dange, Mirajkar and Sardesai.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Three standpoints on the border issue
According to Stern, by this point the party was divided into were three factions on the border dispute;


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Three standpoints on the border issue
Per Stern there was some correlation between the leftist trend in the party and 'internationalist' posture on the border issue and between the rightist trend and 'nationalist' group, but that it wasn't possible to equate the leftists with the 'internationalists' nor the rightists with the 'nationalists'. There were several prominent exceptions to this pattern - for example the leftist Ranadive and rightist Joshi were aligned together in 'internationalist' group. The leftist C. Rajeshwara Rao was in 'nationalist' group, although Dange had helped the centrist Ghosh to oust Rao in 1951. And so forth. Per Stern it appeared that CPI leaders involved in mass fronts tended to lean more towards the 'nationalists', with the exception for peasants front.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Three standpoints on the border issue
Stern's study categorizes the positions on the border issue of 34 prominent CPI politicians based on press citations. In Stern's study Dange (Maharashtra), Sardesai (Maharashtra), C. Rajeshwara Rao (Andhra Pradesh), Bhowani Sen (West Bengal), Gopalan (Kerala), Mirajkar (Maharashtra), Jai Bahadur Singh (Uttar Pradesh), Rai (Uttar Pradesh), Ram Asrey (Uttar Pradesh), Hirendranath Mukherjee (West Bengal), V.D. Chitale (Maharashtra), P.K. Vasudevan Nair (Kerala), Renu Chakravartty (West Bengal), S.S. Yusuf (Uttar Pradesh) and Rustom Satin (Uttar Pradesh) were exclusively designated as 'nationalists' (with a declining order of citations - Dange having 31 citations, Satin 1 citation). CPI leaders exclusively designated as 'internationalists' in Stern's study were P. Sundarayya (Andhra Pradesh), Avtar Singh Malhotra (Punjab), Indrajit Gupta (West Bengal), M. Basavapunniah (Andhra Pradesh), Achintya Bhattacharya (Assam), P. Ramamurthi (Madras), Jolly Mohan Kaul (West Bengal), N. Prasada Rao (Andhra Pradesh) and Ranendranath Sen (West Bengal).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Background, Border tensions: 1959, Three standpoints on the border issue
The remaining 9 CPI leaders covered by Stern's study appear in more than one category on the border issue, conveying the prevailing confusion and fluid nature of the controversy;


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split
According to Singh (1994) the split can be divided into three stages; before the 1962 war, the 1962-1964 split and the consolidation of the two parties 1964-1967.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, An ailing general secretary
The CPI leftists had accepted Dange as the new leader of the Lok Sabha group. But they did not accept Dange as the tentative successor to Ghosh as the party general secretary. As the Kerala government had been dismissed, Namboodiripad was again available to function as the acting general secretary during Ghosh's absences. During the November 1959 CEC and May 1960 National Council meetings, when the issue of Ghosh's medical leaves was discussed, the leftists opposed Dange as being designated as the acting general secretary.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Burcharest and Peking Conferences: 1960
In April 1960 the Chinese publication Red Flag published the article 'Long Live Leninism! ', which sharply attacked CPSU in ideological terms. The tensions between CPC and CPSU further escalated in June 1960, as conferences were held in Peking and Bucharest.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Burcharest and Peking Conferences: 1960
At the Bucharest Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties Khruschev called the Chinese actions in the Sino-Indian border conflict a 'stab in the back' against the communist movement in the 'Afro-Asian world'. CPI was represented at Bucharest by M. Basavapunnaiah and Gupta. The Indian delegation took a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute at the conference. By contrast Dange fully defended the Soviet party at the World Conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions held the same month in Peking.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Burcharest and Peking Conferences: 1960
In September 1960, following Khruschev's statements in Bucharest, the CPI National Council issued a resolution stating that "China has lost the sympathy of millions of Indians in return for a few miles of worthless territory", whilst also including criticisms of Indian government postures. The resolution caused resentment among sections of the party - the West Bengal unit stated that National Council resolution appeased Indian chauvinism and the Punjab unit called for the its withdrawal.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Hanoi Congress
The Workers Party of Vietnam held its third national party congress in Hanoi September 5–12, 1960. The CPI was represented at the Hanoi congress by K. Damodaran and Hare Krishna Konar. Allegedly, Ghosh had instructed the two delegates to stay away from contact with the Chinese delegation at Hanoi. Damodaran refused to meet with Chinese delegation, but Konar met with them and accepted their invitation to visit Peking immediately after the Hanoi congress. In Peking Konar met Mao and other leaders. Upon his return to India he argued for CPC positions on border issue as well as the wider ideological conflict between CPSU and CPC. Per Ray, this was first direct attempt by CPC to gain influence inside the CPI.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Moscow Conference
Ahead of November 1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, CPI had to position itself as tensions grew between CPC and CPSU. CPI issued a statement that criticised CPC for 'basically wrong assessment' on situation in India and for not having consulted with CPI. Ghosh led a 5-member CPI delegation at the Moscow conference. The CPI delegation was received by Mikhail Suslov, who criticized the CPI for its opposition to China on the border issue. At the conference, Ghosh's speech took a conciliatory tone towards both CPSU and CPC, but indicated support for Soviet position in the ideological dispute and criticized the CPC its posture on the Sino-Indian border issue.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, January 1961 National Council meeting
The CPI National Council met in January 1961. At the meeting there was a call to withdraw the Meerut resolution, motivated by Suslov's advice in Moscow to revise the anti-China policies of CPI. Ghosh, supported by the right-wing in the National Council, was able to defeat this demand. Following the meeting Promode Dasgupta, the West Bengal state secretary of the party, circulated a document titled Revisionist Trend in the CPI. Dasgupta's document accused Ghosh of surrender to imperialist and bourgeois interests, and called on CPI to follow the lead of the CPC.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
The Sixth CPI Party Congress was held in Vijayawada in April 1961. In February 1961, ahead of the Vijayawada Party Congress, the CPI National Council endorsed Ghosh's draft political resolution to be presented at the Vijayawada Party Congress, but the National Council also decided to allow a leftist alternative document (authored by Ranadive) and a document written by Namboodiripad (criticizing both the leftist and rightist positions) to be circulated.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
It had been expected that the Vijayawada Party Congress would be site of confrontation between the CPI factions. The two main factions clashed harshly in the debates. The Right's position was that the Indian National Congress had both progressive and reactionary sections, and that CPI should support progressive sector of Indian National Congress within a National Democratic Front led by working class. The Left's position was that the role of the Indian National Congress was not entirely negative, but that it was reactionary and should be opposed.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
The Left argued that CPI should work for People's Democracy, and build unity among democratic forces under working class leadership. Namboodiripad represented a third position, that bourgeoisie was divided between monopoly capital (foreign and domestic) and an anti-imperialist/anti-feudal sections. Per Namboodiripad the CPI should seek to win over the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal sectors of bourgeoisie.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
The question of election of the party leadership involved complexities regarding the party hierarchy. Namboodiripad was again the identified the default acting general secretary but Dange had a strong position as the Lok Sabha leader of the party. And the leftists threatened to withdraw from the Party Congress unless they gained more representation in the central leadership bodies. The leftists also demanded that some rightist be excluded from the new CEC. Neither leftists nor rightist wanted to make any concessions on the question of party leadership.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
For the first time the CPSU was represented by a formal delegation at a CPI Party Congress. The Soviet delegate Suslov personally mediated between the groups. Together with Ghosh they managed to get the factions to agree on a policy of 'unity and struggle' towards the Indian government. With Suslov's backing, Dange's line of national democratic front prevailed albeit with modifications. The political resolution and Ghosh's speech were endorsed unanimously. The two alternate drafts where withdrawn, seemingly in exchange for amendments to the main draft (adding anti-Indian National Congress/anti-Nehru wordings). Upon Namboodiripad’s suggestion, the party postponed the revision of the party program.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
Through Suslov's intervention the party constitution was changed, whereby the number of National Council members increased from 101 to 110 in order to accommodate more leftists. The enlarged National Council included 56 members belonging to the Right, 36 to the Left and 18 aligned with Namboodiripad. It was agreed that the election for a new CEC and Secretariat would be deferred for three months and decided by the National Council. The list of elected leaders had Ghosh's name mentioned first, Dange second and Namboodiripad third.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
However, in the end the Vijayawada Party Congress was inconclusive and didn't resolve the tensions in the party. The rightists had achieved a majority, but it was a very slim one. Once the new Secretariat was constituted, was Namboodiripad excluded from it. The five members of the post-Vijayawada Secretariat were Dange, Z.A. Ahmad, M.N. Govindan Nair, Sharma and Gupta. Around this period there was a move to create a new centre around Gupta, which would prioritize revolutionary struggle but not accepting CPC positions completely.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Sixth Party Congress: Vijayawada
By contrast to the role played by the Soviet delegation, there was no Chinese delegation at Vijayawada. According to Rai (1990), the Sino-Soviet split played no prominent role in the Vijayawada Party Congress, and that no section within CPI looked for political guidance from the CPC.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, November 1961 border tensions
In November 1961 Nehru issued a new statement alleging further Chinese incursions. Ghosh issued a statement, calling on Chinese to stop such acts and take actions to avoid such situations in the future. In response People's Daily carried an editorial attacking Ghosh; stating that he 'trailed behind Nehru' and that he had not bothered to get the facts of the situation before making a public statement. The People's Daily editorial inflamed tensions in CPI. Ghosh reacted by pledging CPI support to Nehru to repel Chinese military actions.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Death of Ghosh
Ghosh died in January 1962, and his death put the question on party leadership to the forefront. Both Dange and Namboodiripad vied for post as general secretary. Effectively campaigning for their respective candidatures, the two leaders made sure to author several articles for the New Age weekly.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Death of Ghosh
In April 1962 the CPI National Council met to decide on how to resolve the general secretary vacancy. There were sharp contradictions at the meeting. The right-wing insisted on Dange as new general secretary, the left-wing refused to accept him. In the end the CPI National Council reached a compromise solution; Namboodiripad was named as the new general secretary whilst Dange was named as party chairman (a new post created as part of the compromise). A new Secretariat was constituted with 3 leftists, 3 rightists and 3 centrists. The inclusion of three additional Secretariat members, P. Sundarayya, Surjeet and Basu, was a concession to the left-wing. Sharma (1978) compared the April 1962 phase in the CPI factional conflict with the May 1922 factional tensions in Soviet Russia, when a collective leadership was formed around Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Before the Sino-Indian War, Death of Ghosh
However this compromise was inherently unsustainable as Namboodiripad and Dange were strongly opposed to each other. The lack of a defined division of labour between the posts of chairman and general secretariat would increase tensions, as both Dange and Namboodiripad tried to position themselves as the foremost leader of the party. And this precarious balance was upset when war broke out with China later the same year.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
On October 20, 1962 there new confrontation at border, marking the beginning of the Sino-Indian War. Again, CPI was placed in difficult position. The party chairman Dange and other rightist leaders quickly denounced Chinese action. However, the official CPI statement was delayed for 11 days due to internal discussions. During these 11 days, there were two significant developments in the international sphere - on October 25, 1962 Pravda reversed its position (reportedly due to the Cuban missile crisis) and voiced support to China against India, calling for repudiation of McMahon Line and urging restraint among Indian progressives.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
But on October 27, 1962 People's Daily responded to the Soviet olive branch by denouncing Nehru as an imperialist agent and insulted Dange by labeling him as a 'self-styled Marxist-Leninist' who followed Nehru's instructions. People's Daily insisted that the Soviet Union must abandon its friendly relations with the Nehru government. Following this brief interlude the Soviet Union would support the Indian side in the war, boosting Dange position in the conflict within the party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
On November 1, 1962, after two days of heated debates, the CPI National Council issued a statement titled Unite to Defend the Motherland against China's Open Aggression, which took an unequivocally 'nationalist' position on the border conflict. The statement branded China as the aggressor, rejected Chinese territorial claims and voiced support for the Nehru government to purchase armaments to confront the Chinese military.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
Almost a third of the National Council members had voted against adopting the statement. Many CPI members, especially in West Bengal, opposed to the position of the National Council on the border conflict. Three Secretariat members resigned in protest against the statement, whilst the remainder of the CPI Secretariat (including Namboodiripad) drafted a letter to the communist parties around the world to explain the CPI position on the border conflict. The letter asked the communist parties around the world to pressure the CPC for restraint in the border conflict. Dange travelled to Moscow and to the capitals of other Eastern European countries, to advocate for the CPI position. Before his departure, he met Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
According to Dutt (1971) it appeared that the CPC had expected on that CPI would support its actions in the border conflict, seeing it as confrontation between a socialist state and a non-socialist state. An editorial in People's Daily recalled how 'Kuomintang reactionaries' had attacked the Soviet Union 1927-1929 and how the Chinese communists had sided with the Soviets against the Chinese reactionaries. Per Dutt, CPI did not appreciate this analogy; neither the comparison between Nehru and the Kuomintang nor in the notion that the Nehru government alone would have been responsible for the border clashes.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
The 1962 war put the opponents of the pro-Indian National Congress line within CPI in a precarious situation, as they were branded as 'Pro -China'. The group sought to maintain that their opposition to the China policy of the Nehru government was in line with their opposition to the Indian National Congress government as it represented interests of class enemies.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
On November 22, 1962 the Indian government arrested some 1,000 leftists under the Defense of India Ordinance. Most of the detained belonged to the CPI left-wing. Many were held in prison until late 1963. In Kerala, the arrested included five former CPI ministers, among them the centrist Namboodiripad (who was released after one week) and the rightist C. Achutha Menon. In West Bengal, cadres of the Socialist Unity Centre of India and the Workers Party of India were also detained.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Sino–Indian War & Internment
The arrests further deepened the split in CPI. CPI leftists alleged that the rightists in the party had supplied Home Ministry with lists of leftists, to facilitate the arrests. Per Judge (1992) names of supposedly 'pro-China' party members were provided to the government by indirect means. The arrests aided Dange to strengthen his control over the party organizationally and ideologically. With the leftist leaders in jail, the rightists seized the opportunity to reorganize the Punjab and West Bengal state units of the party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, February 1963 National Council meeting
The rightists also seized the opportunity of the leftists' absence to push for new resolutions at the February 1963 CPI National Council meeting. At this point out of 108 living National Council members, 48 were in prison or underground. A February 1963 National Council statement again denounced Chinese 'aggression' and stated that CPC had violated the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, Dange presented a resolution on the Sino-Soviet rift and the reorganization of the West Bengal and Punjab units of the party. According to the publication Thought, Dange's resolution was fiercely resisted by Namboodiripad, Gopalan, Dinkar Mehta, Chiman Mehta and Y.D. Sharma. But Gupta, who otherwise had hostile relations with Dange, 'threw in a somersault' and sided with the majority at the meeting.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, February 1963 National Council meeting
Namboodiripad had tabled an alternative resolution at the meeting, titled Revisionism and Dogmatism in the CPI. Namboodiripad's document sought to highlight past and current errors, criticizing the rightist leadership for subservience to the Indian National Congress government and calling on CPI to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Namboodiripad's resolution was rejected by the National Council and Namboodiripad resigned from the post as general secretary of the party, citing his concerns with the 'nationalist' postures of the party. P. Sundarayya, Surjeet and Basu also resigned from the CPI Secretariat and CEC.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, February 1963 National Council meeting
Namboodiripad would later accept to withdraw his resignation, but with P. Sundarayya, Basu and Surjeet out of the picture the rightists had a total control over the Secretariat. Namboodiripad found himself completely isolated in the Secretariat. The rightists used their control over the Secretariat to induct more of their own loyalists at the party headquarters and in state units.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, February 1963 National Council meeting
CPC responded to the CPI National Council resolution by denouncing Dange as a 'Titoist revisionist' and called for support to the left-wing within CPI. Dange replied to the CPC comment some six weeks later, in a 30,000 word editorial in New Age titled Neither Revisionism nor Dogmatism Is Our Guide. In August 1963 Dange visited Moscow as a guest of the CPSU. During his stay Pravda published an article denouncing CPC leadership for "aggressive policy" and for "openly interfering" in CPI internal affairs.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Anticipating the split
During 1963 the CPI left-wing, with Gopalan as one of its key leaders, was building up parallel party structure. And the left-wing was boosted when many of their leaders were released from jail in late 1963. When many of the CPI left-wing leaders were released from jail in 1963, they encountered a situation where the Dange group had excluded them from their leadership functions. The leftists responded by grouping together and continued building their own parallel party structures. Rightists decried these moves as violations of party discipline.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Anticipating the split
In October 1963, a group of 17 CPI National Council members issued a resolution titled The Threatening Disruption and Split of the Party - How to Avert the Disaster. Namboodiripad and Basu worked to promote a compromise solution and party unity before and during the January 1964 CEC meeting.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Cracks appear, Anticipating the split
In January 1964 the leader of CPI in Madras P. Ramamurthi resigned in protest against the decision to support the Indian National Congress in municipal elections. In the same month the Indonesian communist leader D.N. Aidit called on Indian communists to set up a rival organization to the 'Dangeite clique'. The January 1964 CEC meeting (dominated by right-wing) issued a circular to party members to resist attempts by Chinese and Indonesian communist leaders to influence the party. On March 27, 1964 P. Sundarayya and T. Nagi Reddy issued a statement from Hyderabad, accusing the rightists of abusing the arrests to seize control over the party machinery.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Dange Letters: March 1964
After years of tensions inside the party, the last straw were the so-called 'Dange Letters'. The letters were encountered by Dwijen Nandi, a CPI leftist and journalist for Swadhinata, whilst he was researching files at the National Archives of India. In the four letters, allegedly authored by Dange in 1924 whilst he was imprisoned for political reasons and addressed to the Viceroy of India, Dange sought to negotiate terms of his release from jail.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Dange Letters: March 1964
Per Sharma (1978) the letters, if authentic, would have indicated that Dange had "offered to act as an agent of the British government in return for remission of his jail sentence". The anti-communist Bombay weekly The Current published the letters on March 7, 1964. The letters caused an outcry in the party, and the CPI leftists and some centrists called for an inquiry into the authenticity of the documents. S.S. Mirajkar, who had been tried and sentenced in the Meerut Conspiracy Case along with the Dange, claimed he had seen the letters and vouched for their authenticity.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Dange Letters: March 1964
On March 13, 1964 the CPI Secretariat labelled the documents as a 'deliberate forgery' and accused the CPI leftists of having circulated the documents. The Dange group claimed that the forged documents has been planted in the National Archives by a bourgeois agent. And in response to the controversy two of Dange's associates, Renu Chakravarty and 'Ferishta' (possibly referring to Chakravarty's husband, Nikhilnath Chakravarty) argued that the letters were forged, since they carried the spelling 'Shripat' whereas Dange had always written his name as 'Shirpad'.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Dange Letters: March 1964
In the atmosphere of increased tensions, the group around Dange portrayed the anti-Dange tirade as a destructive move, effectively equating criticism of the chairman with criticism of the party. The rightists began organizing disciplinary processes against leftists, the leftists responded by conveying that such measures would split the party into two.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Dange Letters: March 1964
The CPI CEC met on April 9, 1964. The leftists and centrists wanted to move an agenda point on the Dange Letters. The rightists, in contrast, wanted to move an agenda point on disruptive activities of 'anti-party elements' (i.e. the CPI leftists). As the meeting commenced the leftists and centrists demanded that the Dange Letters issue be debated first and that Dange should step down from chairing the meeting whilst issue would be discussed. Dange refused to comply, and 12 out of 27 CEC members left the meeting in protest.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Dange Letters: March 1964
The nine of the CEC members walking out belonged to the leftist trend (Gopalan, Basavapunniah, Konar, Promode Dasgupta, Sundarayya, Ramamurthi, Venkataraman, Surjeet and Jagjit Singh Lyallpuri), whilst three belonged to the centrist trend (Namboodiripad, Basu and Gupta). Per Mallick (1994), Dange pushed the centrists into the leftist fold by refusing to compromise regarding the meeting agenda.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, National Council meeting: April 1964
The CPI National Council met on April 11, 1964. Just as two days earlier, the stage was set for a dispute about the Dange Letters and Dange's role. Dange again refused to vacate his chair during a debate on the letters, and 32 out of the 65 attending National Council members stormed out in protest accusing Dange and his followers of 'anti-unity and anti-Communist policies' .


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, National Council meeting: April 1964
The 32 dissident National Council members that staged the walk-out were P. Sundarayya, M. Basavapunniah, T. Nagi Reddy, M. Hanumantha Rao, D.V. Rao, N. Prasad Rao, G. Bapanaiah, Namboodiripad, Gopalan, A.V. Kunhambu, C.H. Kanaran, E.K. Nayanar, V.S. Achuthanandan, E.K. Imbichi Bava, Promode Dasgupta, Muzaffar Ahmad, Basu, Abdul Halim, Konar, Saroj Mukherjee, P. Ramamurthi, M.R. Venkataraman, N. Sankariah, K. Ramani, Surjeet, Lyallpuri, Dalip Singh Tapiala, Bhag Singh, Shiv Kumar Mishra, R.N. Upadhyaya, Mohan Punamia and R.P. Saraf.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, National Council meeting: April 1964
Of the 32, 7 were from Kerala, 6 from Andhra Pradesh, 6 from West Bengal, 4 from Madras, 4 from Punjab, 2 from Uttar Pradeh, 1 from Rajasthan and 1 from Jammu-Kashmir. Whilst Gupta had earlier resigned from the CPI Secretariat and joined the April 9, 1964 CPI CEC walk-out protest, he stayed with the CPI rightists at this juncture. Furthermore, the publication Thought claimed that at least ten 'leftists' had remained in the National Council meeting to the end, counting among them Dinkar Mehta (Gujarat), Josh (Punjab) and Y.D. Sharma (Delhi).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, National Council meeting: April 1964
After walking out, the 32 gathered at Gopalan's residence at 4, Windsor Place. The 32 issued an appeal on April 14, 1964, condemning the 'reformist political line' and 'factionalism' of the Dange group. On April 15, 1964 the suspended leftists issued a draft for a new party programme. Namboodiripad also issued a separate draft of his own. Subsequently the National Council suspended the 32. Immediately after the suspension of the 32, the National Council dispatched leaders across the country to convince state units to remain loyal. The dissidents were organizing party units across the country, declaring any Dange loyalists expelled from the party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, National Council meeting: April 1964
Among those National Council members that remained in CPI (or the CPI(Right) as it became known) there was animosity between followers of Dange, Joshi and Gupta. Both Joshi and Gupta had previously attacked Dange on many occasions.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Last attempt at unity
In June 1964 the CPI(Right) offered to lift the suspension of the 32 National Council members, if the leftists dissolve their organizational structures. A last-ditch effort to retain the party united was done on July 4, 1964 at the residence of Gupta. C. Rajeshwara Rao, Adhikari and Gupta, all CPI Secretariat members, attended on behalf of the right faction and Basu, Surjeet and Promode Dasgupta on behalf of the left faction. According to Wood (1965), the leftists were ready to accept that Dange as chairman if Namboodiripad was reinstated as general secretary but this offer was rejected by the rightists. Other issues of contention were the rightist demand that the leftists close down their press outlets and the leftist demand that party membership scrutiny be instituted.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Divisions in the national leadership and rank-and-file
In the 1964 split 15 out of 27 CEC members sided with the CPI(Right); Dange, Z.A. Ahmed, Gupta, M.N. Govindan Nair, Joshi, N. Rajasekhara Reddy, Bhowani Sen, K. Damodran, Chandra, Josh, Sardesai, Sharma, Bora, C. Rajeshwara Rao and Ram Krishan Patti. Out of the 12 CEC members that had staged the April 9, 1964 walk-out protest only Gupta stayed with the CPI right. In addition to the other eleven CEC members of the April 9, 1964 walk-out protest, the CPI(Left) also counted the CEC member Ranadive, who in jail as of April 1964, among its adherents. 39 out of 107 members of the National Council of the undivided CPI joined the CPI(Left).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Divisions in the national leadership and rank-and-file
In the Lok Sabha faction its leader Gopalan sided with the CPI(Left) whilst its deputy leader Hirendranath Mukherjee sided with the right CPI. In the Rajya Sabha both the CPI faction leader Gupta and deputy leader M.N Govindan Nair sided with the right CPI. With the 1964 split the CPI(Left) and the CPI(Right) would form separate parliamentary groups. By late 1964 the CPI(Right) group had 18 Lok Sabha deputies, CPI Left 11 deputies and 3 deputies remained undecided.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Divisions in the national leadership and rank-and-file
According to Crouch (1966), out of 205 state assembly legislators of the undivided CPI 112 had sided with CPI(Right), 72 with CPI(Left) and the remainder being undecided. Out of the 72 CPI(Left) assembly legislators, 63 were from 63 from Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. Sharma (1978) argues that there is no evidence that split would have been a clash between the parliamentary or organizational wings of the undivided CPI, as the top leaderships in parliament and legislatures were divided evenly. The CPI(Right) headquarters, however, claimed that out of 170 legislators, only 49 had sided with the CPI(Left). According to The Statesman in October 1964 legislators in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh overwhelmingly sided with the CPI(Right).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Divisions in the national leadership and rank-and-file
Gough and Sharma (1973) argues that "the urban elite, most of the intellectual leaders, and the trade union functionaries" sided with the CPI(Right) while "most grassroots leaders who had live links with the masses" sided with the CPI(Left). At the Calcutta Party Congress, the CPI(Left) claimed that the 422 delegates represented 104,421 party members, i.e. 60% of the total pre-split CPI membership. On the other side, the CPI(Right) claimed to have 107,763 party members arguing that only 30% of the undivided CPI had sided with the CPI(Left). Independent estimates of the size of the memberships of the parties varied widely, with a U.S. State Department source estimating the left CPI membership at around 70,000 and the right CPI membership at around 55,000).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Tenali convention: July 1964
The Namboodiripad and the leftists campaigned in party organizations and within mass organizations across the country, mobilizing for party convention in Tenali in July 1964. 146 delegates, 20 of whom represented Kerala, gathered at the Tenali convention held July 7–11, 1964. The delegates claimed to represent some 100,000 party members. The Tenali convention formalized the constitution of the CPI(Left) as a separate party.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Tenali convention: July 1964
A convention had a three-member presidium - Gopalan, Basu and Shiv Verma. In his speech at the convention, the veteran communist leader Muzaffar Ahmad called on the delegates to swear an oath to forge a 'real communist party'. The CPI(Left) branded CPI(Right) as 'revisionist'. The Tenali convention called for making arrangements for a 7th Party Congress in Calcutta in October 1964. The gathering called on the Government of India to communicate directly with the Chinese leadership in order to break the deadlock in the border dispute. Marking a stark difference from the Dangeite right-wing CPI, the Tenali convention was marked by the display of a large portrait of Mao along with the portraits of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Lenin and Stalin.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Tenali convention: July 1964
At the Tenali convention a Bengal-based pro-CPC group, representing one of the most radical streams of the CPI left-wing, presented a draft program proposal of their own. These radicals, represented by Suniti Kumar Ghosh, criticised the draft program proposal prepared by M. Basavapunniah for undermining class struggle and failing to take a clear pro-Chinese position in the ideological conflict between the CPSU and the CPC.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Tenali convention: July 1964
The Tenali convention elected an organising committee for the Calcutta Party Congress - consisting of the 32 dissident CPI National Council members as well S.S. Srivastava (Bihar), Bhattacharya (Assam), S.Y. Kolhatkar (Maharashtra), Banamali Das (Orissa) and 'a comrade from Karnatak'. After the Tenali convention the left CPI organised party district and state conferences in preparation for the Calcutta Party Congress.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
As the CPI(Left) gathered at its Party Congress in Calcutta October–November 1964 and the right CPI held its Party Congress in Bombay in December 1964 the division into two separate parties was cemented. The CPI(Left) Calcutta Party Congress took place October 31-November 7, 1964, at Tyagraja Hall in southern Calcutta. Several key leaders of the CPI(Left) were arrested by the West Bengal state government a few days before the opening of the Party Congress.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
The Calcutta Party Congress adopted a new political program. P. Sundarayya was elected general secretary of the party. In total 422 delegates took part in the Calcutta Congress. The Calcutta Party Congress declared "that all those who assembled for the convention are the real representatives of the Communist movement. The Dange group does not have any right to call itself the Communist Party of India." The Calcutta Party Congress adopted a class analysis of the character of the Indian state, that claimed the Indian bourgeoisie was increasingly collaborating with imperialism.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
The CPI(Left) claimed that 14 out of 19 state units of CPI had joined the Calcutta Party Congress. No fraternal delegations were present at the Calcutta Party Congress.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
The Calcutta Party Congress elected a Central Committee consisting of;


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
A nine-member Politburo was formed, consisting of P. Sundarayya, Namboodiripad, P. Ramamurthi, Promode Dasgupta, M. Basavapunniah, Gopalan, Surjeet, Basu and Ranadive. A Central Control Commission was elected, consisting of Abdul Halim, Dr. Bhag Singh and C. Venkatraman.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
In junction with the Calcutta Party Congress a mass rally was held at Maidan, presided by Gopalan.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, The split, Two parties, Bombay & Calcutta Congresses
At the Bombay Party Congress of the CPI(Right), the CPSU delegation was led by Boris Ponomarev. The Bombay Party Congress denounced CPC for 'chauvinistic distortion', and argued that CPC had tried to interfere in the internal affairs of CPI. Dange authored the thesis which the Bombay Party Congress adopted. The documents adopted at the Calcutta and Bombay gatherings differed on almost every major issue - the character of the Indian state, the state of revolution in the country, strategy, positions towards the Indian government, alliance building, etc. C. Rajeshwara Rao was elected general secretary of CPI(Right).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Discrepancies in strength
The split in CPI had a lot of regional variations. When split finally occurred in April 1964 CPI had most of its strength concentrated in five states - Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras, Punjab and West Bengal. Per Sharma (1978) the influence of the party in other states ranged between marginal and negligible. The sharp discrepancies in strength of state units fueled the rifts within the party, as differently influential state units tended to prefer different approaches to tactics and alliance-building.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Discrepancies in strength
In Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and West Bengal the two largest parties were the Indian National Congress and CPI. In these three states the influence of CPI was growing on the expense of the Indian National Congress, and an 'anti-Congress' line would appear the most electorally opportune choice for CPI. In Madras and Punjab, the political battle was three-sided - Indian National Congress, CPI and a regional party (Akali Dal in Punjab, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras).


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Discrepancies in strength
CPI units were divided on whether to align with the Indian National Congress against the regional party, or align with the regional party against the Indian National Congress. Donald S. Zagoria argued that CPI (Left) saw the Indian National Congress as its main enemy, since it was their main competitor in state politics.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Discrepancies in strength
But in the rest of the country the role of CPI was markedly different. CPI was not in a position to defeat the Indian National Congress and claim a stake in forming a state-level government. But the political monopoly of the Indian National Congress was eroding, with right-wing parties like Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Swatantra Party or regional right-wing outfits (like Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa or the All Party Hill Leaders Conference in Assam) emerging as the challengers. Per Sharma (1978) this trend was particularly strong in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Discrepancies in strength
For the CPI units in these states, the position to align with the Indian National Congress against the 'extreme-right reaction' resonated well. But the proponents of this line argued that it was applicable across the country, creating tensions with the stronger state units. Per Sharma (1978) the 'anti-Congress' line was identified with the CPI left and the 'pro-Congress/anti-extreme-right reaction' line was identified with the CPI right. But there were followers of both positions in all states, meaning each state unit was affected by the power struggle and debates on tactics.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Agrarian demographics
Furthermore Sharma (1978) argues that the sharp discrepancy in influence of CPI in different states at the time could be explained by a demographic and geographic factors. According to his analysis there appeared to exist a correlation between high population density of agrarian areas (i.e. a low man-land ratio) and significant power of CPI in state politics in states like West Bengal (average land per household 3.86 acres), Kerala (1.91, the lowest in the country) and Madras (3.87). The highest man-land ratio was found in Rajasthan (13.75), Maharashtra (12.22) and Gujarat (11.47), states where CPI was weak. Sharma does however acknowledge that the comparison of man-land ratio doesn't take differences in land distribution into account. But he argues that the failure of CPI to develop a common strategy for the party that would work well in divergent agrarian contexts "gave rise to the worst type of factionalism".


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Agrarian demographics
Sharma found correlation between literacy levels in the different states and strength of CPI, with Kerala having the highest adult literacy levels of the Indian states (38.9%) and Madhya Pradesh the lowest (6.7%). On the other hand Sharma's study found no indication that caste or religious affiliation of leaders would have played any role in the split.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Impact of the split on the national question
During the pre-Independence development of CPI, a time when the party was debating on how to relate to the role of the national bourgeoisie, the struggle against British colonial rule and the Pakistan movement, it sought guidance in Marxist-Leninist canon. In 1942 Adhikari authored a resolution, which became the party line on the national question, which sought to apply Stalin's work Marxism and the National Question to Indian conditions. The 1942 CPI resolution stated that the "free India of tomorrow would be a federation or union of autonomous states of the various nationalities such as Pathans, Hindustanis, Rajasthanis, Gujeratis, Bengalis, Assamese, Beharies, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamils, Karnatiks, Maharashtrians, Meralas, etc."


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Impact of the split on the national question
But with the shifts in general political line, there were also shifts on how to relate to the national questions and language issues. According to Karat (1973) the drift towards parliamentary politics and projects of alliances with the progressive sectors of the national bourgeoisie led to a "de-emphasis on the multi-national character of the Indian State and an increasing tendency to speak of Hindi as the 'national language’, ignoring the equality of Indian languages.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Impact of the split on the national question
The eagerness to pursue the peaceful road to socialism necessitated an alliance with a section of the all-India ruling classes, i.e. a wing of the [Indian National] Congress and this understanding logically resulted in talk of India as a 'nation' and the need for a national democratic front. The concept of “national unity" and the short shrift given to the Marxist stand on nationalities was one of the differences which the Party split in 1964 highlighted."


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Impact of the split on the national question
Karat also notes that since after the 1964 split CPI tended to be stronger than CPI(M) in Hindi-speaking states or pro-Hindi states (he counted Gujarat, Maharashtra and Orissa among these states), whilst CPI(M) tended to be stronger than CPI in states with a legacy of strong anti-Hindi movements (Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu). This dynamic led CPI to be more favourable to the role of Hindi as the national language whilst CPI(M) downplayed its importance. Being more rooted in the Hindi belt in the wake of the split, the right-wing CPI sought to emphasize Hindi language to gain patriotic credentials. The CPI(M) on the other hand, whilst maintaining the notion the multinational character of India, removed support for the right to self-determination when adopting its 1964 party program.


1964 split in the Communist Party of India, Regional variations, Impact of the split on the national question
Thakurta and Raghuraman (2007) argues that the fact that the majority of the CPI leadership in states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar sided with CPI(Right), which would embark on a long period of decline, would lead to the erosion of left-wing influence in these states. Moreover, the CPI(ML) split a few years later disproportionately affected CPI(M) in the Hindi belt, further marginalizing CPI(M) in the Hindi-speaking region.