1963 Senegalese general election, Further reading
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1963 Senegalese prime ministerial referendum
A referendum on abolishing the post of Prime Minister was held in Senegal on 3 March 1963. The result was 99.45% of voters in favour of the change, with a 94.3% turnout.


1963 Senior League World Series
The 1963 Senior League World Series took place from August 15–17 in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, United States. Monterrey, Mexico defeated Downey, California in the championship game. This was the only edition held in Bethlehem.


1963 Senior League World Series
This was the first SLWS to feature an international squad.


1963 Seychellois parliamentary election
Parliamentary elections were held in the Seychelles between 12 and 14 August 1963 for the Legislative Council of Seychelles


1963 Seychellois parliamentary election, Campaign
For the first time, the Seychelles Taxpayers and Producers Association was challenged by another party, the Seychelles Islanders United Party.


1963 Sheffield City Council election
The election was held on 9 May 1963, with one third up for vote and two vacancies in Attercliffe and Tinsley. The election, boasting a record field of candidates, seen Labour win back all their 1960 losses as well as gaining Hillsborough. The Ratepayers Association's failure to contest these elections meant their sole representation on the council, as one of the Firth Park councillors, was lost. Overall turnout was unchanged from the previous years, at 31%.


1963 Sheffield City Council election, Election result
The result had the following consequences for the total number of seats on the Council after the elections:


1963 Sicilian regional election
The Sicilian regional election of 1963 took place on 9 June 1963.


1963 Sicilian regional election
Christian Democracy was by far the largest party, largely ahead of the Italian Communist Party. After the election Giuseppe D'Angelo, the incumbent Christian Democratic President, formed a new government that included the Italian Socialist Party, the Italian Liberal Party, the Italian Democratic Socialist Party and the Italian Republican Party. In 1966 the Liberals left the government and Francesco Coniglio replaced D'Angelo as President of the Region.


1963 Singaporean general election
General elections were held in Singapore on 21 September 1963. The elections saw the Malaysian ruling party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), backed with Singapore Alliance Party (SAP) in an attempt to oust the People's Action Party (PAP), after violating previous agreement not to do so and a highlight in the relations between UMNO and the PAP. However, the result was a victory for the PAP, which won 37 of the 51 seats in the Singapore Legislative Assembly. The 1963 election was the only election to date with no boundary changes to any of the 51 existing constituencies.


1963 Singaporean general election
As Singapore gained independence in 1965, this election was the only election that was held as a state of Malaysia. After independence, the elected members of the Legislative Assembly would then become Members of the inaugural Parliament of Singapore.


1963 Singaporean general election, Background
Although the People's Action Party (PAP) had won 43 seats in the 1959 elections, they lost four seats in 1961 (two were from the by-election defeats, and two defected to the new United People's Party (UPP)). A further 13 legislators were expelled from PAP for voting against the government in a no-confidence motion on 20 July 1961; the dissidents subsequently formed a new party, the Barisan Sosialis (BS), alleging PAP as a communist front. The combination of by-election defeats, defections and expulsions reduced the PAP by 17 seats down to 26, leaving PAP with a one-seat majority.


1963 Singaporean general election, Background
On 3 July 1962, while the integration referendum debate was in procession, PAP lost its majority following the resignation of legislator Ho Puay Choo (who later joined BS on 11 August). Five days later, UPP legislator S. V. Lingam returned to PAP fold, giving it back its one-seat majority, but five days later, PAP lost its majority again after health minister Ahmad Ibrahim died from liver cancer. BS initially planned to field its iconic leader, Lim Chin Siong, in the vacated seat, but the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew opted against a by-election, and instead called a fresh election.


1963 Singaporean general election, Background
On 31 August 1963, Singapore was declared independent with PAP declared as trustees until the merger with Malaysia could be complete. On 3 September, Lee dissolved the Legislative Assembly in accordance with procedure, and called for elections to be held on 21 September.


1963 Singaporean general election, Campaign
The elections, held in the midst of Singapore's merger with Malaysia, are remembered as the PAP's most hard-fought election, as the party fielded a full slate and faced intensive challenges from three components that did nearly the same. BS collated with Parti Rakyat, and fielded candidates in all but two seats, while UPP had an unusual large number of candidates. The PAP government launched Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963 and detained several BS leaders, including Lim.


1963 Singaporean general election, Campaign
On the final night of campaigning, PAP officials warned that should BS win the election and defeat PAP, the Malaysia Federal government could send troops into Singapore to invoke emergency powers in place of the incoming government led by the new pro-communist party, leaving no opportunity for BS to respond. This was said to have accounted for the eventual victory of the PAP the following day.


1963 Singaporean general election, Campaign
The sole Workers' Party (WP) legislator David Marshall resigned from the party he founded and became the only independent. Another participant was Singapore Alliance, an extension of the ruling federal Alliance Party in Malaysia, which was a coalition consisting of the Singapore People's Alliance (SPA) along with the local branches of UMNO, the Malayan Chinese Association and Malayan Indian Congress. However, former Chief Minister and leader Lim Yew Hock opted not to run in the elections, citing a defamation campaign by the PAP.


1963 Singaporean general election, Results
The PAP won a landslide victory, securing a two-thirds majority, an outcome that had been in doubt or unexpected in the lead-up to the vote. However, the party's vote share was its lowest-ever at just under 47%. Despite the BS and UPP winning a combined 14 seats, both parties failed to win most of the seats they contested, due to the split of the anti-PAP vote. A total of 92 candidates lost their deposits.


1963 Singaporean general election, Results
The Singapore Alliance lost all seven seats it had held before dissolution, losing even in core support areas such as Malay constituencies Kampong Kembangan, Geylang Serai and Southern Islands.


1963 Singaporean general election, Results
Nine incumbent members lost their re-election on the election, among which the defeats of Kenneth Michael Byrne and Tan Kia Gan (in the seats of Crawford and Paya Lebar, respectively) marked the first time a higher-ranked PAP cabinet minister had been defeated in their constituencies. This would not happen again until the 2011 elections, 48 years and 11 elections later, where cabinet ministers Lim Hwee Hua and George Yeo were defeated in his constituency of Aljunied.


1963 Singaporean general election, Aftermath
Many cited factors that led to the PAP victory include:


1963 Singaporean general election, Aftermath
To discourage future defections, the PAP government passed a constitutional amendment stipulating that legislators who resign or are expelled from the parties they were elected under would lose their seats. As a result, by-elections were subsequently held in Hong Lim in 1965, seven constituencies in 1966 and five constituencies in 1967. Those victories resulted PAP in achieving a parliament monopoly that would last for the next 15 years until the first elected opposition MP in 1981.


1963 Singaporean general election, Aftermath
The distribution of 15 Singapore seats in Malaysia's lower house of Parliament (Dewan Rakyat) was based on the outcome of the election. PAP was allocated 12, which were given to Prime Minister Lee, Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye, ministers Goh Keng Swee, Ong Pang Boon, S. Rajaratnam, Yong Nyuk Lin, Jek Yeun Thong, Lim Kim San, Othman Wok and assembly members Abdul Rahim Ishak, Wee Toon Boon and Ho See Beng. BS was allocated 3: Chia Thye Poh, Lim Huan Boon and Kow Kee Seng.


1963 Six Hour Le Mans
The 1963 Six Hour Le Mans was an endurance race for Sports Cars, Touring Cars & Grand Touring Cars. The race was held at the Caversham Airfield circuit in Western Australia on 3 June 1963. It was the ninth annual Six Hour Le Mans race.


1963 Six Hour Le Mans
The race was won by Jeff Dunkerton driving a Lotus Super 7. The winning car completed 194 laps, a total distance of 427 miles (688 km).


1963 Skopje earthquake
The 1963 Skopje earthquake (Macedonian: Скопски земјотрес од 1963 година, romanized: Skopski zemjotres od 1963 godina) was a 6.1 moment magnitude earthquake which occurred in Skopje, SR Macedonia (present-day North Macedonia), then part of the SFR Yugoslavia, on July 26, 1963, which killed over 1,070 people, injured between 3,000 and 4,000 and left more than 200,000 people homeless. About 80 percent of the city was destroyed.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Facts
The earthquake, which measured 6.1 on the moment magnitude scale, occurred on July 26, 1963, at 04:17 UTC (5:17 am local time) in Skopje, Socialist Republic of Macedonia, then part of SFR Yugoslavia (present-day North Macedonia). The tremor lasted for 20 seconds and was felt mostly along the Vardar River Valley. There were also smaller aftershocks until 5:43.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
Within a few days after the earthquake took place, 35 nations requested that the United Nations General Assembly place relief for Skopje on their list of agendas. Relief, in the form of money, medical, engineering and building teams and supplies was offered from 78 countries throughout the world.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
United States president John F. Kennedy ordered the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development (USAID) to take actions for disaster assistance in Skopje by sending personnel, prefabricated houses, tent cities and other forms of relief. Substantial relief also arrived from the Soviet Union. Its leader, Nikita Khrushchev, visited Skopje personally. As the SFR Yugoslavia was a member of the Non Aligned Movement during the Cold War, the American and Soviet troops stationed in Skopje could freely shake hands for the first time since their encounter on Elbe in 1945.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
The first foreign journalist who arrived in Skopje to report on the earthquake was David Binder of The New York Times. As he watched Skopje from the plane, he commented that the city looked like it was bombed.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
The United Kingdom-based charity War on Want  organised a public appeal and contracted with UK engineer Demetrius Comino to provide Dexion building frame materials and personnel under Barto Stuart to enable the building of 1560 dwellings, enough for two complete villages, one of which was nicknamed Dexiongrad. Dexion belongs to the Skopje's Municipality of Gjorče Petrov. At the same time, the UK Government made a gift of 44 x 24 feet wide Nissen huts which the Yugoslav authorities used as six schools to be used in satellite suburbs until permanent schools could be established.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
The construction of these huts was under the supervision of a small detachment of nine Royal Engineers led by Lt Charles Brodley RE. Later, "War on Want" purchased sufficient huts to provide accommodation for 2,000 workmen engaged in the reconstruction of the city and the Engineer detachment was increased to 49 under the command of Captain SL Rooth RE.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
In 1965, the Japanese architect Kenzo Tange was asked by the United Nations to enter a limited competition for the redevelopment of Skopje, after which Tange won 60% of the prize while the Yugoslav team won the remaining 40%. However, Tange's plan for Skopje (one of his major works) remains partly implemented, specifically concerning the New Skopje Railway Station and the so-called City Wall.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
As the city gradually began to recover, the need for revival of cultural life arose. The artist Pablo Picasso donated his painting Head of a Woman (1963), which was exhibited in the new post-earthquake Contemporary Art Museum of Macedonia. The museum building was a donation from Poland and was designed by several Polish architects. The concert hall "Univerzalna sala" was built with donations from around 35 countries and its prefabricated building was made in neighbouring Bulgaria.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
After the request of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Rab Butler informed the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom on February 19, 1964 that the Government of the United Kingdom has approved new 500,000 GBP loan for reconstruction of Skopje.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
Several streets and objects in Skopje were named in honor of the countries which helped in their construction and/or donated housing. For example, the government of Romania donated the polyclinic medical center, which was named after its capital, Bucharest. In Karposh Municipality, there are soviet-donated apartment buildings called in Macedonian: „руски згради“ (ruski zgradi, meaning "Russian buildings") and Swedish and Finnish prefabs called „шведски / фински бараки“ (švedski / finski baraki).


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
One example is Skopje's Mexico Street (улица Мексичка, ulica Meksička). It was officially named in honor of the country Mexico and a memorial plaque from the Mexican president Adolfo López Mateos was unveiled at the location. In 2012, the street's well-known resident, the rock musician Vlatko Stefanovski and his brother, the playwright Goran Stefanovski protested against the mayor's decision to rename several city streets, including Mexico Street.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
The Stefanovski brothers reminded people that the street they grew up on and where the Macedonian rock group Leb i sol was formed was built with donations from Mexico and argued that this act of solidarity must never be forgotten. The old name Meksička was brought back in February 2021 by the Skopje City Council.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
Being rebuilt from ruins thanks to the relief from all around the world, Skopje is often referred to as "The City of International Solidarity", which is its motto.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Aftermath
One year after the 1963 Skopje earthquake, the first Yugoslavian Code for Construction in Seismic Regions (temporary code 1964), was prepared by a committee consisting of international and national experts.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Quotes
Following the earthquake, Josip Broz Tito, then-president of SFR Yugoslavia, sent a message of condolences to the Socialist Republic of Macedonia before visiting the city personally:


1963 Skopje earthquake, Quotes
Together with all the people of Yugoslavia we will endeavour to mitigate the misfortune that has befallen your republic.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Quotes
Skopje must not remain merely a newspaper report of its first sufferings, but must be the responsibility of all of us, of all men who today or tomorrow, through some similar new catastrophe, may become Skopians.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Quotes
Skopje is not a film, not a thriller where we guess the chief event. It is a concentration of man’s struggle for freedom, with a result which inspires further struggles and no acceptance of defeat.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Popular culture
The Skopje earthquake is referenced in many works of art including literature, music, theatre and films. An example is the Macedonian feature film Memento, directed by Dimitrie Osmanli in 1967. An example from the field of literature is the poem Skoplje 1963 by the Austrian poet Christine Busta.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
Symbol of the earthquake: The Old Railway Station in Skopje. The clock stopped at 5.17 on July 26, 1963. Today the building is used by the Museum of the City of Skopje (Muzej na grad Skopje).


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
Monument dedicated to the victims of the earthquake, near the Old Railway Station


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
New settlements in Skopje donated by: USA, UK, West Germany, Mexico, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, ČSSR, Poland, the World Council of Churches etc.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
Charity concert by Henryk Szeryng for the victims of the Skopje earthquake, Reims, France, November 26, 1963


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
Newspaper clips: Help for the citizens of Skopje from Roosendaal, Netherlands, August 8, 1963


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
The next day after the earthquake, citizens preparing temporary dwellings.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
Yugoslav delegation led by Josip Broz Tito, on "Ivo Lola Ribar" street.


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
Giving first aid to casualties in front of hotel Macedonia


1963 Skopje earthquake, Gallery
A view of the center of Skopje before the earthquake


1963 Sligo Senior Football Championship
This is a round-up of the 1963 Sligo Senior Football Championship. Ballisodare, having linked up with neighbours St. Patrick's, claimed a fourth successive title in 1963, following a replay win over Craobh Rua in the final.


1963 Sligo Senior Football Championship, Sligo Senior Football Championship Final
Team:P. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. ForpadraigP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. FallonP. Fallon


1963 Sligo Senior Football Championship, Sligo Senior Football Championship Final, Sligo Senior Football Championship Final Replay
Team:A. O'BrienB. McGovernB. McDermottJ. MurphyP.J. LenehanT. HaydenJ. LeeK. LambG. HattonF. MurphyG. ChattenJ. BoweA. LangG. BurkeJ. Moss


1963 Society of Film and Television Arts Television Awards
The 1963 Society of Film and Television Arts Television Awards, the United Kingdom's premier television awards ceremony. The awards later became known as the British Academy Television Awards, under which name they are still given.


1963 Solitude Grand Prix
The 13th Solitude Grand Prix was a non-Championship motor race, run to Formula One rules, held on 28 July 1963 at the Solitudering, near Stuttgart. The race was run over 25 laps of the circuit, and was won by Jack Brabham in a Brabham BT3.


1963 South African Grand Prix
The 1963 South African Grand Prix, formally titled the 10th International RAC Grand Prix of South Africa, was a Formula One motor race held at East London on 28 December 1963. It was the tenth and final race in both the 1963 World Championship of Drivers and the 1963 International Cup for Formula One Manufacturers. The 85-lap race was won from pole position by Jim Clark in a works Lotus-Climax, the Scottish driver achieving his seventh win of the 1963 Championship. Dan Gurney finished second in a Brabham-Climax, while Graham Hill was third in a BRM. It would be the last Formula One race in December until the 2019 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix.


1963 South American Basketball Championship
The South American Basketball Championship 1963 was the 19th edition of this regional tournament. It was held from February 14 to March 4 in Lima, Peru. Nine teams competed.


1963 South American Basketball Championship, Results
The final standings were determined by a round robin, where the 9 teams played against each other once.


1963 South American Championship
The 1963 South American Championship was held in Bolivia between 10 and 31 March 1963. It was won by Bolivia with Paraguay second. This is, so far, Bolivia's only Copa America title.


1963 South American Championship, Squads
For a complete list of participating squads see: 1963 South American Championship squads


1963 South American Championship, Final round
Chile was not invited due to the Lauca River conflict with Bolivia.


1963 South American Championship, Final round
Uruguay withdrew due to the designation of La Paz as a tournament site.


1963 South American Championship, Goal scorers
With six goals, Carlos Alberto Raffo of Ecuador is the top scorer in the tournament. In total, 91 goals were scored by 40 different players, with none of them credited as own goal.


1963 South American Championship squads
These are the squads for the countries that played in the 1963 South American Championship. The participating countries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru. Chile and Uruguay withdrew from the tournament. The teams plays in a single round-robin tournament, earning two points for a win, one point for a draw, and zero points for a loss.


1963 South American Championships in Athletics
The 1963 South American Championships in Athletics  were held in Cali, Colombia, between 29 June and 7 July.


1963 South Boston 400 (April)
The 1963 South Boston 400 was a NASCAR Grand National Series event that was held on April 14, 1963, at South Boston Speedway in South Boston, Virginia.


1963 South Boston 400 (April)
The transition to purpose-built racecars began in the early 1960s and occurred gradually over that decade. Changes made to the sport by the late 1960s brought an end to the "strictly stock" vehicles of the 1950s.


1963 South Boston 400 (April), Race report
Ned Jarrett and Richard Petty would be the only lap leaders for this race; with Petty leading the most laps. There were 400 laps in this one-hour-and-fifty-nine-minute race. Last-place finisher Joe Weatherly had to withdraw from the race on lap 48 due to troubles with his vehicle's rear end. Only him, Jimmy Pardue, Neil Castles, Billy Wade and Larry Thomas failed to finish the race out of this grid of 16 American-born drivers.


1963 South Boston 400 (April), Race report
Jim Paschal was defeated by his Petty Enterprises teammate Richard Petty by two laps in front a live audience of five thousand people. Ned Jarrett qualified for the pole position while driving speeds up to 78.72 miles per hour (126.69 km/h). The average speed of the actual racing event was 75.229 miles per hour (121.069 km/h). Most of the drivers on the starting grid used Chevrolet as their manufacturer while Plymouth and Dodge took up a sizeable amount of the grid; model years for the vehicles varied from 1961 to 1963, as allowances were made for older vehicles before NASCAR become modernized.


1963 South Boston 400 (April), Race report
Larry Manning scores his first of two career top five finishes.


1963 South Boston 400 (April), Race report
Winnings for this race varied from $1,500 for the winner ($12,526.63 when considering inflation) and $380 for the last-place driver ($3,173.41 when considering inflation); with the total prize purse consisting of $6,095 ($50,899.87 when considering inflation). Earl Brooks would make first "top five" finish here out of the three that he performed during his professional stock car racing career.


1963 South Boston 400 (April), Race report
Notable crew chiefs for this race include Crawford Clements, Franklin McMillion, Johnny Divers, and Herman Beam.


1963 South Carolina Gamecocks football team
The 1963 South Carolina Gamecocks football team represented the University of South Carolina in the Atlantic Coast Conference in the 1963 NCAA University Division football season. In one of the worst seasons in Gamecock history, the Gamecocks finished the season 1–8–1 overall.


1963 South Dakota Coyotes football team
The 1963 South Dakota Coyotes football team was an American football team that represented the University of South Dakota in the North Central Conference (NCC) during the 1963 NCAA College Division football season. In its first season under head coach Marv Rist, the team compiled a 1–7 record (1–5 against NCC opponents), finished in seventh place out of seven teams in the NCC, and was outscored by a total of 297 to 28. The team played its home games at Inman Field in Vermillion, South Dakota.


1963 South Dakota State Jackrabbits football team
The 1963 South Dakota State Jackrabbits football team was an American football team that represented South Dakota State University in the North Central Conference (NCC) during the 1963 NCAA College Division football season. In its 17th season under head coach Ralph Ginn, the team compiled a 9–1 record, won the NCC championship, and outscored opponents by a total of 278 to 166.


1963 South Dakota State Jackrabbits football team
The team's statistical leaders included Gale Douglas with 621 rushing yards and quarterback Ron Meyer with 1,091 passing yards. Halfback Wayne Rasmussen was selected as the NCC's Most Valuable Players. Other key players included ends Darrel Tramp and Ed Maras, tackle Dave Westbrock, center Jerry Ochs, and halfback Wayne Rasmussen.


1963 South Korean legislative election
Legislative elections were held in South Korea on 26 November 1963. They were the first held after the 1961 coup and subsequent approval of a new constitution the previous December, which inaugurated the Third Republic.


1963 South Korean legislative election
The result was a victory for the Democratic Republican Party of coup leader Park Chung-hee, which won 110 of the 175 seats in the National Assembly. Voter turnout was 72.1%.


1963 South Korean presidential election
Presidential elections were held in South Korea on 15 October 1963. They were the first elections since the 1961 May Coup, and the first during the Third Republic. The result was a narrow victory for the acting incumbent and leader of the governing military Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, Park Chung Hee, who won 46.6% of the vote, securing a transition to civilian rule under his Democratic Republican Party. Voter turnout was 85.0%.


1963 South Korean presidential election, Background
General Park Chung-hee, who had led the military government of South Korea since his coup in 1961, agreed to return the power to civil politicians on 8 April 1963, at the same time as announcing he would run for the presidency of the new civilian government. This was after he announced his plans to extend the military rule for another four years, to which United States reacted by threatening to cease all economic aid.


1963 South Korean presidential election, Nominations, Military
The military formed the Democratic Republican Party in February, and Park Chung-hee, who had officially retired from military service the day before, accepted DRP nomination for president in October.


1963 South Korean presidential election, Nominations, Military
On 3 September, the members of the military that were critical of Park's dictatorial behaviour split and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), nominating former Chief of Staff of the Army and former interim prime minister Song Yo-chan for president. Members of the party were oppressed by the government for doing this. Song later withdrew and endorsed Yun Posun.


1963 South Korean presidential election, Nominations, Civilian
Civilian politicians were deeply divided into multiple parties rather than unifying against Park. On 14 May, Former President Yun Posun and his followers founded the Civil Rule Party (CRP), which nominated Yun as its presidential candidate. Also claiming to represent the civilian politicians was the New Politics Party (NPP), which nominated former Prime Minister Heo Jeong as its candidate.


1963 South Korean presidential election, Nominations, Civilian
When it became clear that Park would win easily if both candidates ran, Yun suggested that the civilians unite under one party, which the NPP agreed to. The People's Party (PP) was officially founded in September, uniting the CRP and NPP, and Democratic Friendship Party of former Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok. However, after failing to reach an agreement on whether to nominate Yun or Heo for president, on 13 September, the Civil Rule Party split from the PP and officially re-nominated Yun for president. The factions of Heo and Lee, which remained in the PP, nominated Heo.


1963 South Korean presidential election, Nominations, Civilian
On 2 October, Heo withdrew his bid for presidency and endorsed Yun, hoping to help defeat Park.


1963 South Pacific Games
The 1963 South Pacific Games, held from 29 August to 9 September 1963 at Suva in Fiji, was the first edition of the South Pacific Games. The multisport games were established to engender bonds of friendship amongst peoples in the Pacific, after an idea originated by Dr A.H. Sahu Khan was adopted by the South Pacific Commission. At a meeting of nine Territories, held in Nouméa during March 1961, Fiji was awarded the honour of hosting the first Games.


1963 South Pacific Games, Participating countries
Thirteen Pacific nations or territories, and 646 competitors, participated in the Games:


1963 South Pacific Games, Sports
Ten sports were contested at the 1963 South Pacific Games:


1963 South Pacific Games, Final medal table
The home nation, Fiji, easily topped the (unofficial) medal tally:


1963 South Pacific Games, Calendar
The following table provides a summary of the competition schedule.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
The Games official report listed the PNG contingent at 86 (78 competitors and 8 officials), although the Canberra Times reported a team of 93 (competitors and officials).


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
The medal table published on the Pacific Games Council webpage (as at May 2015), counts four extra medals (two for Fiji and one each for PNG and American Samoa) that were not actually awarded according to the Official Report and Results published in 1963. The medal columns for these countries have been marked up with a (blue background) in the table above with those counts revised down. The totals on the right and at the bottom of the table are also amended to account for this change.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
The swimming medal totals for Fiji and PNG have been amended to exclude the unofficial 3 × 110 yd medley relay for women for which medals were not awarded, although Fiji and PNG finished first and second respectively.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
The boxing medal totals for American Samoa and Fiji have been amended to exclude two semifinalists who were disqualified in their respective semifinal bouts and, as such, did not receive a bronze medal; S. Tinoe from American Samoa in the featherweight class, and M. Delai from Fiji in the light-heavyweight class.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
Track and field athletics: There were 29 events in total; 19 for men and 10 for women. In the women's 4 x 100 metres relay, only a gold medal was awarded (to Fiji). The remaining teams were disqualified.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
The game of "women's basketball" in the early 1960s often referred to the sport now known as netball. A recap of the 1963 results published in the Pacific Islands Monthly in 1969 does not mention netball but records that Fiji won the women's basketball competition. The official FIBA basketball record indicates that only a men's competition was held in 1963. A summary of the SPG netball competitions as reported by Islands Business in 1990 shows that Fiji won the netball title in 1963.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
Boxing: Although there were ten weight divisions, medals were only awarded in eight of them. Fiji made the only nominations in the flyweight and heavyweight classes and had put two boxers in each division to ensure a contest. J. Roba and M. Mate in the flyweight, and V. Dikidikiliti and P. Kali in the heavyweight, were awarded silver cups in lieu of medals.


1963 South Pacific Games, Notes
Tennis and table tennis were contested as mixed team sports on a knock-out basis, with each sport having only one gold medal awarded.


1963 South Vietnamese coup
In November 1963, President Ngô Đình Diệm and the Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam was deposed by a group of Army of the Republic of Vietnam officers who disagreed with his handling of both the Buddhist crisis and the Viet Cong threat to the regime. In South Vietnam, the coup was referred to as Cách mạng 1-11-63 ("1 November 1963 Revolution").


1963 South Vietnamese coup
The Kennedy administration had been aware of the coup planning, but Cable 243 from the United States Department of State to U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., stated that it was U.S. policy not to try to stop it. Lucien Conein, the Central Intelligence Agency's liaison between the U.S. Embassy and the coup planners, told them that the U.S. would not intervene to stop it. Conein also provided funds to the coup leaders.


1963 South Vietnamese coup
The coup was led by General Dương Văn Minh and started on 1 November. It proceeded smoothly as many loyalist leaders were captured after being caught off-guard and casualties were light. Diệm was captured and executed the next day along with his brother and adviser Ngô Đình Nhu.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
Diệm's road to political power began in July 1954 when he was appointed the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam by former Emperor Bảo Đại, who was Head of State. Bảo Đại disliked Diệm but selected him in the hopes that he would attract United States aid, but the two became embroiled in a power struggle. The issue was brought to a head when Diệm scheduled a referendum for October 1955, which was rigged by his brother Nhu, and proclaimed himself the President of the newly created Republic of Vietnam.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
He proceeded to strengthen his autocratic and nepotistic rule over the country. A constitution was written by a rubber stamp legislature which gave Diệm the power to create laws by decree and arbitrarily give himself emergency powers. Dissidents, both communist and nationalist, were jailed and executed in the thousands, and elections were routinely rigged. Opposition candidates were threatened with being charged for conspiring with the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam, which carried the death penalty, and in many areas, large numbers of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops were sent to stuff ballot boxes.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
Diệm kept the control of the nation firmly within the hands of his family, and promotions in the ARVN were given on the basis of loyalty rather than merit. Two unsuccessful attempts had been made to depose Diệm; in 1960, a paratrooper revolt was quashed after Diệm stalled for negotiations to buy time for loyalists to put down the coup attempt, while a 1962 palace bombing by two Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) pilots failed to kill him.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
South Vietnam's Buddhist majority had long been discontented with Diệm's strong favoritism towards Roman Catholics. Public servants and army officers had long been promoted on the basis of religious preference, and government contracts, US aid, business favors, and tax concessions were preferentially given to Catholics. The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and its holdings were exempt from land reform (i.e., appropriation). In the countryside, Catholics were de facto exempt from performing corvée labor, and in some rural areas, it was claimed that Catholic priests led private armies against Buddhist villages. In 1957, Diệm dedicated the nation to the Virgin Mary.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
Discontent with Diệm and Nhu exploded into mass protest during mid-1963 when nine Buddhists died at the hand of Diệm's army and police on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. In response, the US government was concerned about the possibility "for the Dim/Nhu government to succeed and for us [the United States] to continue to support them." The response by Ambassador Frederick Nolting was, "We should take it slow and easy and see if we can live with the Diem government."


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
As a result of this potential inability to support the Diem/Nhu government, the United States government discussed a proposed coup. In a telegram to the American Embassy in Saigon, Mr. Hilsman expresses that at some point should we need "political liquidation" we should also "urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary."


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
In May 1963, a law against the flying of religious flags was selectively enforced; the Buddhist flag was banned from display on Vesak while the Vatican flag was displayed to celebrate the anniversary of the consecration of Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục, Diệm's brother. Many Buddhists defied the ban and a protest was ended when government forces opened fire. With Diệm remaining intransigent in the face of escalating Buddhist demands for religious equality, sections of society began calling for his removal from power.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Background
The key turning point came shortly after midnight on 21 August, when Nhu's ARVN Special Forces raided and vandalized Buddhist pagodas across the country, arresting thousands of monks and causing a death toll estimated to be in the hundreds. Numerous coup plans had been explored by the army before, but the plotters intensified their activities with increased confidence after the administration of US President John F. Kennedy authorized the US embassy to explore the possibility of a leadership change through Cable 243. They felt Diệm's policies were making their allied regime in Vietnam politically unsustainable.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies
There were many conspiracies against Diệm in 1963, many by different cliques of military officers independent from one another. According to the historian Ellen Hammer, there were "perhaps as many as six and possibly more" different plots, and these spanned the gamut of society to include civilian politicians, union leaders, and university students.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by mid-level officers
In mid-1963, one group was composed of mid-level officers such as colonels, majors, and captains. Colonel Đỗ Mậu director of military security was in this group, which was coordinated by Trần Kim Tuyến, South Vietnam's director of intelligence. Tuyến had been a palace insider, but a rift had developed in recent years, and he began plotting as early as 1962. As South Vietnam was a police state, Tuyến was a powerful figure and had many contacts. Another person in this group was Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, an undetected communist agent who was deliberately fomenting infighting among the officers and mismanaging the Strategic Hamlet Program in order to destabilise the Saigon government.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by mid-level officers
Tuyến's group had many officers who were members of the opposition Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng and Đại Việt Quốc Dân Đảng, who had been discriminated against on issues of promotions, which were preferentially given to members of the regime's secret Cần Lao Party, a secret Catholic organisation responsible for maintaining Diệm's grip on power. These included commanders of airborne, marine and tank units from the 5th Division, mostly at battalion level.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by mid-level officers
When Tuyến's machinations were uncovered, he was exiled by Nhu. Mậu and Thảo took over but their initial coup plans for 15 July were shelved when American CIA officer Lucien Conein instructed Thảo's superior, General Trần Thiện Khiêm, the head of the ARVN, to stop the coup on the grounds that it was premature. Thảo and Mậu's group resumed plotting, intending to move on 24 October and they recruited a total of 3000 men. They augmented their forces with an assortment of officers from auxiliary units such as from the Signal Corps, Transportation Corps and some RVNAF pilots.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by mid-level officers
Mậu enlisted the help of Khiêm following Tuyến's departure into exile. Mậu gained the cooperation of an assortment of military and civilian dissidents known as the Military and Civilian Front for the Revolution in Vietnam (MCFRV). The MCFRV had started to plot independently in August and their leader was a cousin of Mậu.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by mid-level officers
Thảo's 24 October coup was canceled after senior officers decided that their younger colleagues could not succeed without the help of General Tôn Thất Đính, a loyalist who controlled the III Corps. The generals sabotaged the younger officers by ordering one of their key regiments into the countryside to fight the communists. The younger officers' plot was integrated into the generals' larger group, and because Khiêm and Mậu were involved with both groups.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by mid-level officers
After the coup was completed, the media learned that the conspiracy organised by Tuyến and Thảo had been more advanced than that of the generals' before the latter were integrated into the main plot. General Trần Văn Đôn threatened to have the younger officers arrested but Mậu intervened to protect them.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals
Following the Xá Lợi Pagoda raids, the senior generals started their own plot in earnest, having only had vague plans prior to this. General Đôn, nominally a high-ranking general, but in a position without command of troops since the palace distrusted him, was sought out by Mậu, who wanted to collaborate. Mậu later accompanied the ranking general in the plot, Dương Văn Minh, on recruitment campaigns. Despite his high rank, Minh was out of favour and served as the Presidential Military Advisor, a meaningless desk job where he had no subordinates in the field and no access to soldiers.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals
Mậu helped Minh to secure the cooperation of General Nguyễn Khánh, who commanded the II Corps that oversaw the Central Highlands of the country, and Colonel Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, who commanded the 5th Division based just outside the capital in Biên Hòa. According to Thiệu, Mậu and Minh had promised to establish a more strongly anti-communist government and to keep Diệm as a figurehead president.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals, Recruitment of Đính
The generals knew that without the cooperation of General Đính, a coup would be difficult as his III Corps forces oversaw the region surrounding the capital. Regarded by his peers as ambitious, vain and impulsive, Đính was a favorite of the Ngô family, and headed the military wing of the Cần Lao Party. Đính converted to Catholicism as Diệm trusted his co-religionists and promoted officers based on loyalty and not competence. Đính was known mainly for his drunken presence in Saigon's nightclubs, and the CIA labeled him a "basic opportunist".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals, Recruitment of Đính
Đính privately claimed responsibility for the pagoda attacks, stating to a journalist, "I have defeated Henry Cabot Lodge [the US ambassador to South Vietnam]. He came here to stage a coup d'état, but I, Tôn Thất Đính, have conquered him and saved the country." During this period, Đính claimed he was "a great national hero". His ego had been played upon by the Ngô brothers, who reiterated this point and paid him a large cash bonus after the pagoda raids. In the heady times after the attacks, Đính told his American advisors that "he was without doubt the greatest general officer in the ARVN, the saviour of Saigon ... and soon he would be the top military man in the country".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals, Recruitment of Đính
In a press conference soon after, Đính claimed to have saved South Vietnam from "foreign adventurers", a euphemism for the United States. After being questioned sharply, Đính quickly became angry. Ray Herndon of United Press International (UPI) asked him to name the country that he was referring to, but Đính dodged the question. Herndon lampooned him by saying that a national hero should be able to identify the national enemy, and asked him to call Madame Nhu, the country's First Lady known for her anti-American comments, to get help in identifying the hostile country in question. After several reporters derisively laughed at his comments, Đính angrily stormed out of the conference.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals, Recruitment of Đính
Đính returned to the officers' mess at the Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters and his colleagues attempted to play on Đính's ego to convince him to join their plot. In a series of meetings, the other generals assured Đính that he was a national hero worthy of political authority, and claimed that Nhu had not realised how important he was in the future of the country. Đính's colleagues even bribed his soothsayer to predict his elevation to political power.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals, Recruitment of Đính
The other generals told him that the people were dissatisfied with Diệm's cabinet and that Vietnam needed dynamic young officers in politics, and that their presence would reverse the declining morale in the ARVN. They advised Đính to ask Diệm to promote him to Interior Minister, Dương Văn Minh to Defence Minister, and Trần Văn Minh to Education Minister.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Plotting by the generals, Recruitment of Đính
Đính and his fellow generals met Diệm at the palace, where Đính asked the president to promote him to the post of Interior Minister. Diệm bluntly chastised Đính in front of his colleagues, and ordered him out of Saigon to the Central Highlands resort town of Đà Lạt to rest. Đính was humiliated and embarrassed, having promised his colleagues he would be successful. The Ngô brothers had been alarmed by Đính's request, and put him under surveillance. Đính found out, further straining his relationship with the palace. Đính agreed to join the coup, although with his ambitious nature, the other officers were skeptical and planned to have him assassinated if he tried to switch sides. Without Đính's troops, the coup would not have been possible.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
By mid-October, Diệm and Nhu were aware that a group of ARVN generals and colonels were planning a coup, but did not know that Đính was firmly among them, although they grew wary of him after his request for a cabinet post.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Nhu then made a plan to outwit the generals with a counter-plot. The generals heard of this and decided that they had to counteract him. The other generals were still suspicious of Đính and whether he would betray them to the palace. Having found out that Đính would be recruited for Nhu's plan, and not sure which side he was really on, they promised to make him Interior Minister and other rewards if they helped to overthrow the Ngô family. Having gained a reassurance from Đính, the generals placated the younger officers, whose coup had been integrated into their plans.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
As part of the generals' plot, Đính sent Colonel Nguyễn Hữu Có, his deputy corps commander, to Mỹ Tho to talk to the 7th Division commander, Colonel (later Major General) Bùi Đình Đạm, and two regimental commanders, the armoured unit commander, both of the 7th Division, and the Mỹ Tho region provincial chief. Exhorting them to join the coup on the grounds that Diệm's regime was unable to keep the military going forward, he stated that all the generals except Cao were in the plot, while Đính was going to do so. According to one account, Đính intended for loyalists to report Có's activities to Diệm and Nhu so that it would give him an opportunity to orchestrate a stunt to ingratiate himself with the palace.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Nhu's agents heard of the conversation and reported to the palace. When the Ngô brothers confronted Đính with the report of what had happened in Mỹ Tho, Đính feigned astonishment at his deputy's behaviour. He began crying and said


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
This is my fault, because you have suspected me. I have not really gone to work for the last 15 days but have stayed at home because I was sad. But I am not against you. I was sad because I thought I was discredited with you. So Nguyễn Hữu Có profited from my absence to make trouble.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Đính claimed to know nothing of Có's activities, raising his voice, vowing to have his deputy killed. Nhu opposed this and stated that he wanted Có alive to catch the plotters, and tried to use Đính to achieve this. Despite their distrust of Đính, the Ngô brothers told them this was not the case and that they would promote him. Nhu ordered Đính and Tung, both of whom took their orders directly from the palace instead of the ARVN command, to plan a fake coup against the Ngô family. One of Nhu's objectives was to trick dissidents into joining the false uprising so that they could be identified and eliminated. Another objective of the public relations stunt was to give the public a false impression of the strength of the Ngô regime.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Codenamed "Operation Bravo", the first stage of the scheme would involve some of Tung's loyalist soldiers, disguised as insurgents led by apparently renegade junior officers, faking a coup and vandalising the capital. During the orchestrated chaos of the first coup, the disguised loyalists would riot and in the ensuing mayhem, kill the leading coup plotters, such as Generals Dương Văn Minh, Trần Văn Đôn, Lê Văn Kim and junior officers that were helping them.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
The loyalists and some of Nhu's underworld connections were also to kill some figures who were assisting the conspirators, such as the titular but relatively powerless Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, CIA agent Lucien Conein, who was on assignment in South Vietnam as a military adviser, and Lodge. Buddhist and student dissident leaders would also be targeted. These would be blamed on "neutralist and pro-communist elements".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Tung would then announce the formation of a "revolutionary government" consisting of opposition activists who had not consented to being named in the government, while Diệm and Nhu would pretend to be on the run and move to Vũng Tàu. A fake "counter-coup" was to follow, whereby Tung's men, having left Saigon on the pretext of fighting the Viet Cong (VC), as well as Đính's forces, would triumphantly re-enter Saigon to reaffirm the Diệm regime. Nhu would then round up opposition figures.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Đính, now a double agent, was put in charge of the fake coup and was allowed the additional control of the 7th Division, which was previously assigned to Diệm loyalist General Huỳnh Văn Cao, who was in charge of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta. The reassignment of the 7th Division to Đính gave his III Corps complete encirclement of Saigon. The encirclement would prevent Cao from storming the capital to save Diệm as he had done during the 1960 coup attempt. This arrangement was supposed to make Đính's task of serving the regime easier, but it was exploited to bring down the Ngô family.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Nhu and Tung remained unaware of Đính's allegiance to the rebels, and were fooled. Đính told Tung that the fake coup needed to employ an overwhelming amount of force. He said that tanks were required "because armour is dangerous". Đính said that fresh troops were needed in the capital, opining, "If we move reserves into the city, the Americans will be angry. They'll complain that we're not fighting the war. So we must camouflage our plan by sending the special forces out to the country. That will deceive them." Nhu had no idea that Đính's real intention was to engulf Saigon with rebel units and lock Tung's loyalists in the countryside where they could not defend the Ngôs.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Nhu's coup would take place on 1 November, All Saints' Day, when Catholics prepare for All Souls' Day, which follows the next day. This was so that troops could move freely through the streets, which would be carrying less traffic. The generals decided to start their real coup on the same day to try to exploit Đính's liaison with Nhu.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Colonel Đỗ Mậu, one of the conspirators, concocted military intelligence reports with false data that claimed that the VC were massing outside the capital for an offensive. He convinced Diệm and Nhu to send the special forces out of the capital to fight the VC. Tung and Nhu agreed to send all four Saigon-based special forces companies out of Saigon on 29 October.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Another of Diệm's brothers, Ngô Đình Cẩn, began to suspect Mậu and told the palace, which told army chief General Khiêm to have Mậu arrested. However, Khiêm, who was also part of the plot, deliberately procrastinated and Mậu remained free. In the meantime, it was too late for the brothers to bring their loyalists back into the capital.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Conspiracies, Nhu's counter-plot
Not trusting Có, Diệm put Colonel Lâm Văn Phát in command of the 7th Division on 31 October. According to tradition, Phát had to pay the Corps' commander a courtesy visit before assuming control of the division. Đính refused to see Phát and told him to come back on Friday at 14:00, by which time the coup would have been in progress. In the meantime, Đính had Đôn sign a counter-order transferring command of the 7th Division to Có.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Rebel troop movements in and around Saigon
The insurgent plans were based on three main task forces. The first consisted of two battalions of marines and a company of M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs). Two battalions of airborne troops regarded as being pro-Diệm were moved to Bình Dương Province to the north of the capital and replaced with the two marine battalions. The marines and the paratroopers were South Vietnam's strategic reserve and were usually deployed near Saigon for protecting the regime against any coups.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Rebel troop movements in and around Saigon
Another task force consisted of the 6th Airborne Battalion, which was based in Vũng Tàu around 70 km southwest of the capital, and a trainee battalion, supplemented by 12 APCs from the armor school at Long Hải. The final task force consisted of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment of the 5th Division of Colonel Thiệu. The troops involved in the operations in Saigon began preparing to move into the capital on the evening before the coup and in the early morning. The second task force moved in from the southeast and converged with the other two moving in from the north, and some rebel elements from the 7th Division from the southwest.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Rebel troop movements in and around Saigon
By noon, thousands of rebel soldiers had assembled on the city's outskirts, checking equipment and weapons and receiving last-minute orders. Three marine battalions in tanks and armored cars had moved toward the Saigon city center to spearhead the revolt, and some of the 7th Division had arrived from the Mekong Delta to cut the main road from the south into Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base. The enlisted men did not know the truth behind their mission, nor did many lower-ranking officers; the senior officers told them that they were crushing a police revolt. One airborne lieutenant was suspicious, and as they moved into the suburbs, a colonel revealed that their objective was the Cộng Hòa barracks of the Presidential Guard. When the lieutenant asked "Who is the enemy and who our friend? ", the colonel retorted "Anyone who opposes us is the enemy".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Rebel troop movements in and around Saigon
The task forces were used to man various parts of the city, guarding the howitzers to be used in the siege of loyalist installations, and to protect the headquarters of Colonel Thiệu. Đính had 20 tanks brought to his III Corps headquarters at Camp Lê Văn Duyệt. In all, the conspirators had 40 tanks and armoured personnel carriers.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
At 10:00 on 1 November, Lodge, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander General Paul D. Harkins and Admiral Harry D. Felt, the commander of US forces in the Pacific region, were invited to Gia Long Palace by Diệm. Đôn had scheduled the meeting for the visiting Felt at that time to keep Diệm occupied as the troops were moved in and to keep the president in Saigon.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
They were accompanied by Đôn, whose desk job meant that his duties consisted mainly of meeting visiting military dignitaries. Diệm gave one of his chain-smoking monologues and said that he would cooperate with US recommendations. According to Lodge, however, Diệm was more direct and to the point than usual. Diệm recounted to Felt about the Ngô family's achievements, then complained about American aid cuts in response to the pagoda raids. He blamed the generals, claiming they had attacked the Buddhists, not the special forces, and claimed Tung's men were now under ARVN control and not used as a private army, which was false. Diệm also claimed that aid cutbacks had hindered the army and led to food shortages.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
At one stage, Diệm said "I know there is going to be a coup attempt, but I don't know who is going to do it", to which Lodge purportedly replied "I don't think that there is anything to worry about". Diệm then asked Lodge to talk to officials in Washington about Nhu's future; Diệm was still refusing to remove his brother from authority. He said "Please tell President Kennedy I am a good and frank ally, that I would rather be frank and settle questions than talk about them after we have lost everything.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
Tell President Kennedy that I take all his suggestions very seriously and wish to carry them out but it is a question of timing." Lodge did not discuss anything specific with regards to a regime change, but claimed that he was not worried by rumors that Diệm and Nhu had wanted to assassinate him. Lodge expressed his "admiration and personal friendship" and gratitude for Diệm's hospitality.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
As Harkins and Felt prepared to leave, Diệm took Lodge aside for an individual discussion and repeatedly asked what the Americans wanted, repeating his request for 20 minutes. This was a trick on Diem's part, as the fake coup was about to start. In reference to a United Nations inquiry over his repression of the Buddhists, Diệm claimed that Buddhists had been brainwashed by the Americans. Diệm claimed he had closed the pagodas because among the students were communists about to throw grenades and perpetrate bombings during the UN visit.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
The president also claimed that some Americans were planning a coup against him and promised to give Lodge names. The American ambassador replied with a poker face that he was committed to removing any of his countrymen who were involved in plotting, even though he was doing so himself. Lodge was not taken in by Diệm, as Washington had already told Diệm what reforms were necessary, such as the removal of Nhu and the use of the special forces to fight communists rather than dissidents; Diệm had not responded to US advice. Lodge knew that the real coup was in the offing and did not want to stop it, even if Diệm's overtures were genuine.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
Felt was unaware of impending events—as was Harkins—and hurried to Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base for his noon flight. Before leaving, he held a press conference with Harkins and Đôn while the rebels were rolling into the city. Harkins spoke about the military situation with optimism; on the morning of the coup, the front page of the Stars and Stripes, a military newspaper, featured a piece with Harkins' sunny outlook, entitled "Viet Victory Near". While Felt and Harkins were talking, the officers were preparing to launch the coup at a lunchtime meeting at military headquarters next to the airport.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
Thinking of the situation, Đôn kept glancing at his watch while waiting for Felt to fly out. The three men were standing as they talked, and Đôn, overcome by nerves, chewed his gum "like a threshing machine", and could not stand still, frequently changing his footing as he talked. After Felt left, the runway was closed, and Đôn brushed off Harkins and quickly went away to get ready for the coup.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
Up to the last minute, Harkins and Felt remained unaware of the imminent coup, despite Đôn's fidgety behaviour. The pair had paid a visit to Đôn to discuss military issues at 09:15, but instead of the Vietnamese general hosting his American visitors as Joint General Staff headquarters, as was the norm, Đôn went to the MACV office. Although Felt was surprised, the Americans did not realise the reason for the unusual venue and then pointed at a map and wondered why two airborne battalions appeared to be idling.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Lodge, Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm
Đôn replied that they were going into battle, and Harkins nodded, unaware that they were entering Saigon. Harkins had told the generals earlier that he opposed a coup, so Đôn avoided the topic. Felt had been told of the existence of coup plans by Lodge, who falsely informed him that it was not imminent, saying "There isn't a Vietnamese general with hair enough on his chest to make it go." Felt later said that Đôn appeared to be calm and composed.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Distrust
On the morning of the coup, there was still some trepidation among the plotters. Khiêm approached Đính and asked him to keep their conversation confidential. After the III Corps commander agreed, Khiêm claimed that he wanted to cancel the coup, saying "Đính, I think we still have time to talk to the old man. I don't want to hurt him. Have pity on him!" Đính contemplated the situation and said that he would still proceed with the overthrow. Khiêm reported this to Đôn, and claimed that he had placed Chinese medicinal oil into his eyes to irritate and redden them and thus give the appearance he had become remorseful about the coup, in order to test Đính's loyalty to the plot.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Distrust
Both Minh and Đôn were wary of Khiêm and Đính up to the last minute, as the latter were both Catholics who were favourites of the Ngô family, who had been rewarded for their loyalty, rather than competence. Khiêm was Diệm's godson. The other generals remained worried that Đính might switch sides and go through with the second part of Nhu's fake coup. The generals were also concerned that they would not have enough forces to overcome the loyalists.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Premature start
The first victim of the coup was Captain Hồ Tấn Quyền, Diệm's loyalist Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVNN) commander, who was shot dead on his 36th birthday before noon. There are varying accounts of Quyền's death. According to Stanley Karnow, Quyền had noticed abnormal troop movements and drove off to discuss the matter with a colleague. A jeep of rebel marines followed and intercepted him by overtaking him and blocking the road. Quyền abandoned his vehicle and ran across the open field, but stumbled and fell with the marines in hot pursuit.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Premature start
One of them reached him and shot him in the head point blank. According to Ellen Hammer, however, Quyền started his birthday with an early morning tennis match with fellow officers, who invited him to a lunchtime birthday party. Quyền declined in order to look after his children who were at home alone while his wife was studying in Japan. His deputy, who was part of the plot, followed him home and managed to change Quyền's mind. The two men headed for a restaurant on Saigon's outskirts, and the shooting took place along the way.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Premature start
Historian and author Mark Moyar wrote that Quyền noticed suspicious troop movements near the capital in the morning. As Quyền prepared to go to the palace to alert the Ngô brothers, his deputy shot him dead on the Biên Hòa highway. The generals were immediately informed of the killing and forced to bring forward intended troop movements into Saigon ahead of schedule.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Capture of loyalist officers
On 1 November, the plotters summoned many senior officers who were not involved in the plot to the JGS headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt, on the pretext of a routine lunchtime leadership meeting. Mậu and Đôn organised the invitations and set up the trap. At 13:45, Đôn announced that a coup was taking place. Most of the officers rose to applaud, while those who did not and refused to turn against Diệm were arrested. The plotters neutralised many Diệm loyalists in this manner, most notably Colonel Tung, who was taken away by Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung, Minh's bodyguard. As he was led away, Tung angrily denounced the generals, shouting "Remember who gave you your stars!"


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Capture of loyalist officers
During the early stages of the coup, the rebels forced Tung to order his men to surrender by putting a pistol to his head and forcing him to make a phone call to his subordinates. This meant that only the Presidential Guard was left to defend Gia Long Palace. At 16:45, Tung was forced at gunpoint to talk to Diệm on the phone, telling the president that he had told his men to stand down, but Tung failed to convince the president to surrender. Minh then ordered Nhung to execute Tung as he still commanded the loyalty of his men.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Capture of loyalist officers
The other generals had little sympathy for the special forces commander as he had disguised his men in army uniforms and framed the generals for the pagoda raids. The generals were well aware of the threat that Tung posed; they had discussed and agreed on his elimination during their planning, having contemplated waging an offensive against Tung's special forces. At nightfall Tung was taken with Major Lé Quang Trieu, his brother and deputy, hands tied, into a jeep and driven to edge of the air base. Forced to kneel over two freshly dug holes, the brothers were shot into their graves and buried.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Capture of loyalist officers
Another leading officer who stayed loyal to Diệm was Colonel Cao Văn Viên, commander of the airborne brigade. Viên had been unaware of the plot, and the generals had discussed whether to assassinate him during their planning phase because they knew he was a Diệmist. However, Đính, who played mahjong with Viên's wife, convinced Minh to not have Viên liquidated, and promised that Viên would not oppose the coup. Đính's prediction that Viên would acquiesce was incorrect. Viên "broke down completely" and took off his insignia and handed it to Minh in resignation.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Capture of loyalist officers
He was then taken into custody, and sentenced to death. Viên had planned with Diệm to allow the president to take refuge at his home in the event of a coup, but the offer was moot as rebels surrounded Viên's house after taking him into custody. Viên narrowly avoided execution and was released and returned to command after the coup. General Khang, the commander of the marine brigade, was also put under arrest for remaining loyal to Diệm, as was the head of the RVNAF Đỗ Khắc Mai, and the National Police chief.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Final preparations, Capture of loyalist officers
After the loyalists were taken away, Minh read the coup proclamation and his objectives and taped it and asked the other officers to sign the papers. They then spoke into the recorder, identifying themselves as supporters of the coup. Minh told his subordinates to have copies made of the original, and hid the copies in several places so that his accomplices could not claim that they were not involved if the putsch failed. Minh was to play them over the radio later that day.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Seizing control of the 7th Division
With a group of his personal rebel officers, Có flew by helicopter to Mỹ Tho, the division headquarters, to take command on the morning of the coup. Reaching the Mekong Delta town two hours before the scheduled start of the coup, he held a ceremony for the division's incumbent officers—who thought the change of command was a routine matter—in a local hall. When the coup started, Có's men charged through the doors with automatic guns and arrested the officers, before taking command. He said "Please remain seated quietly. Anyone who rises will be instantly shot".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Seizing control of the 7th Division
Có then phoned Cao, further south in the Mekong Delta's largest town Cần Thơ, where the IV Corps was headquartered. The rebel colonel assured Cao that the divisional and corps transfer had taken place smoothly. Có, a central Vietnamese, was afraid that Cao, a Mekong Delta native would recognise his fake southern accent, and realize that he was impersonating Phat, another southerner. However, Cao did not notice.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Seizing control of the 7th Division
When Cao was informed by his subordinates that there was a coup occurring in the capital, he believed it to be part of the false coup, as he had been told beforehand by Nhu; Cao was one of the regime's most loyal and favourites generals and he was going to help stage the second part of Nhu's plan. Cao told one regiments and a few tanks to ready themselves for the second part of the plot. Later, Cao realised it was a genuine coup.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Seizing control of the 7th Division
He sent the 9th Division under Colonel Bùi Dzinh to move north through Mỹ Tho towards Saigon to save Diệm, but Có had already made plans to cut off any attempt by Cao to relieve Saigon. When Cao radioed the 7th Division in Mỹ Tho, Có identified himself and taunted the corps commander, saying "Didn't you recognise my accent?". Có told the general that he had ordered all the ferries to the Saigon side of the Mekong River, and told Cao not to attempt to cross unless he wanted to die. Seeing that Diệm was lost, Cao later expressed solidarity with the coup.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
The rebels encountered little resistance at the start of the attack on Saigon, and this allowed them to generate momentum. This was primarily to Diệm and Nhu's complacency and mistaken assumption that the military action was the start of Operation Bravo. The central police called Diệm, informing him that the marines did not appear to be friendly. It was too late as the rebels captured the police headquarters and shut down the secret police, which were directly controlled by Nhu.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Wearing red scarves for identification, the rebel marines caught the loyalists off guard and took over control of the building of the Interior Ministry and the National Police headquarters. The latter installation was captured by some newly enlisted troops from the Quang Trung Training Camp, led by General Mai Hữu Xuân, who promptly arrested the Diem supporters in the office. The rebels also tried to take control of the Infantry School in Saigon so that they could use the two trainee battalions against Diệm, but the loyalist head of the institution, Colonel Lam Son, foiled their plans.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
One of Diệm's aides called Đính but was told that Đính was not there. Diệm and Nhu remained relaxed, confident that it was the phony coup. When security officials noticed the troop movements, a panicked young officer telephoned Nhu, who serenely said. "It's all right, I know about it." The generals timed the coup to trick Nhu and Diệm, who were always paranoid about threats to their power, into believing that the threat was false.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
The rebels outnumbered the Diệmists and quickly made inroads against the loyalists, who were caught unawares and confused about whether the coup was real. The generals wanted and needed to finish the operation quickly with as little hand-to-hand combat as possible, as they knew that both factions would have to put aside their differences and regroup to fight the communists after the coup, and because a drawn out mini-civil war would only allow the communists to take over the countryside while the ARVN fought in the capital. Minh had decided to keep the loyalists in their rank afterward if they still wanted to fight the VC. Furthermore, a drawn-out conflict would benefit the VC. Most of the anti-Diệm forces also wanted to avoid killing the president in a large-scale battle for the palace.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
The rebels quickly took control of Tân Sơn Nhứt to control air traffic, and set up checkpoints and defense installations on the cities' outskirts to guard against any counterattack that might come from outside the capital. They also blew up government buildings, and took control of the national post office and Radio Saigon. Four RVNAF AD-6 fighter-bombers roared above the city centre, adding to the confusion and threatening loyalist positions.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Lieutenant Colonel Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, the RVNAF deputy commander, sent two T-28 fighter-bombers over Saigon. They strafed the palace, and fired two rockets while avoiding sporadic black and white clouds of antiaircraft fire. Both shots missed their targets, and the second struck an empty US Marine barracks. At the same time, some fighter-bombers made strafing runs at the RVNN headquarters in the capital, where the defenders remained loyal to Diệm. Some anti-aircraft guns on the RVNN vessels patrolling in the Saigon River returned fire. Around 15 minutes after the start of the coup, radio transmissions were taken off the air, severing communication with those outside Saigon.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Early on during the coup, while the special forces were still fighting before the generals forced Tung to order them to capitulate, one of his subordinates was in Gia Long Palace made a proposal to Diệm. According to the diary of one of Diệm's aides, the special forces officer drew up and proposed a surprise counter-attack on the rebel headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt using loyalist infantry and tanks. Tân Sơn Nhứt was located on the northwestern edge of the city, and the officer said that it was only protected by trainee soldiers.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
He told Diệm there was no chance that the new recruits could resist a loyalist attack and therefore the generals would be easily captured and the leadership of the coup would break down. The aide reported that Diệm turned down the proposal, saying "The brigade should conserve its forces to fight the communists and avoid bloodshed. In the meantime, it should protect Gia Long Palace, the post office and the treasury."


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Another aide believed that Diệm did not want to attack the headquarters of the JGS because "it represented the authority of the armed forces" and to avoid "more harm, more death, more suffering for the soldiers". According to this account, Diệm "was confident that his forbearance would make the coup forces realize that he was a president who always stood on the side of the masses of the population".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
To stop the loyalist forces near the palace from escaping, armoured and artillery units commanded by Colonel Thiệu placed their tanks and howitzers shoulder-to-shoulder, in preparation for the shelling of the Cộng Hòa barracks of the Presidential Guard, located near the palace. APCs brought more rebel troops with machine guns to surround the Cộng Hòa Barracks, where the defenders were armed with artillery, mortars and machine guns.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Under the command of Thiệu, the siege of the barracks started, and rebel artillery shells soon reduced the buildings to rubble, but the pro-Diệm loyalists fought on, a scant five blocks from the palace. Presidential Guard tanks returned fire, severely damaging nearby roadways. After an hour, Diệm and Nhu suspected that something was amiss and attempted to call Đính's office for a second time and again were told Đính was not there. Not believing Đính had double-crossed them, the Ngô brothers were heard in the background speculating that Đính had been arrested by the rebels.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
The generals then phoned Gia Long Palace with an ultimatum. If Diệm resigned immediately, he and Nhu would be safely exiled. If he did not, they would launch air strikes and start shelling the palace within the hour. The generals said that there would be no negotiation, only a yes or no would be acceptable. Diệm made no reply.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Shortly after 16:00, Diệm telephoned JGS headquarters. Đôn answered and stated "the time has come when the army must respond to the wishes of the people" because Diệm had failed to reform his leadership. The pair had a robust argument and Diệm asked the commanders to visit him the palace to negotiate and work on a reform plan. The generals, remembering that he bought time for loyalists to come to his aid during the 1960 coup attempt by stalling the coup with talks and a false promise of reform and power-sharing, turned down his suggestion.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
At 16:30, the generals officially announced the coup over national radio, repeating the recorded message at five-minute intervals. Their message called on Diệm and Nhu to give up power, and many officers identified themselves as participants. The recorded pledges made at JGS were also played. Minh said "The day the people have been waiting for has come. For eight years, the people of Vietnam have suffered under the rotten, nepotic Diem regime, but now the armed forces have come to their rescue." It further said "Soldiers in the army, security service, civil defense force, and people's force ...


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
The Ngo Dinh Diem government, abusing power, has thought only of personal ambition and slighted the fatherland's interests ... The army has swung into action. The task of you all is to unite ... The revolution will certainly be successful." The proclamation was endorsed by 14 generals, 7 colonels and a major. It further added that "We have no political ambitions ... We act not for fame or benefit, but to save our beloved fatherland."


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
However a technical malfunction interrupted the broadcasts with twist and cha-cha music; under the Diệm regime Madame Nhu had banned dancing and associated music under a series of "morality laws". In the meantime, RVNAF transport planes dropped rebel leaflets over Saigon, asking the population to rally to the anti-Diệm cause. Concurrent to the generals' radio broadcast, Diệm telephoned Lodge at the US Embassy. Diệm angrily shouted in French, and Lodge had to hold the receiver away from his ear. Diệm's voice was loud enough that Lodge's aides could hear the message from a distance. Lodge reported the following exchange to Washington:


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Diệm: Some units have made a rebellion and I want to know what is the attitude of the US? Lodge: I do not feel well enough informed to be able to tell you. I have heard the shooting, but am not acquainted with all the facts. Also it is 4:30 A.M. in Washington and the US government cannot possibly have a view. D : But you must have some general ideas. After all, I am a chief of state. I have tried to do my duty. I want to do now what duty and good sense require.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
I believe in duty above all. L: You have certainly done your duty. As I told you only this morning, I admire your courage and your great contributions to your country. No one can take away from you the credit for all you have done. Now I am worried about your physical safety. I have a report that those in charge of the current activity offer you and your brother safe conduct out of the country if you resign. Had you heard this? D : No. [ pause] You have my telephone number. L: Yes. If I can do anything for your physical safety, please call me. D : I am trying to reestablish order.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
It later emerged, however, that Lodge had not given a full account of the conversation to his superiors at the State Department. The Australian historian Anne E. Blair said "there can be no doubt that Lodge silenced some of Diệm's rejoinder, supremely confident as he was in his ability to control not only the American press by the official government records as well".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Lodge's aide, Frederick Flott, claimed that in the middle of the conversation Lodge offered to send his staff to Diệm's palace to have the Ngô brothers taken to the airport and safely exiled and exhorted him to leave. Lodge wanted to send Flott to the palace in a taxi marked with American flags, to negotiate his way into the building and take the brothers to the airport, where he would be flown aboard an American aircraft to a military base in the Philippines. Diệm mistakenly presumed that Lodge's offer implied American reinforcements against the coup. One account from a US embassy official added the following passage, omitted by Lodge.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Lodge: Well, you are a chief of state. I cannot give you advice, but personally, and as a friend, and as somebody who is concerned about your health, my suggestion would be you think seriously of getting away. Now, if I can be of any help on that, I'm prepared to send my driver with an officer of mine to escort you to safety. And we can get you on my jet aircraft, and I'm sure I can deliver on that. One of my officers will ride in the front seat of my limousine with the chauffeur.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Diệm: No, I cannot agree to fleeing, because this is all a tempest in a teapot; it's a couple of hothead generals who don't speak for the army, and I know that the real troops are loyal to me and will soon have this all straightened out. L: Well, Mr. President, that is your decision, certainly. I cannot advise you one way or the other. But as I've said, if I can ever be of any assistance in looking after your security, I would certainly do so. D : Well, I want you to tell Washington that this is being done, and that I want them to land the BLTs [battalion landing teams], the two marine BLTs on the aircraft carriers offshore. I want them to land and protect the palace.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Diệm's bodyguard would claim decades later that the president further said:


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Mr. Ambassador, do you realize who you are talking to? I would like you to know that you are talking to the president of an independent and sovereign nation. I will only leave this country if it is the wish of my people. I will never leave according to the request of rebellious generals or of an American ambassador. The US government must take full responsibility before the world for this miserable matter.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Fighting in Saigon
Through the afternoon and into the night, the loudspeakers on the grounds of Gia Long Palace carried Diệm's recorded exhortation to loyalists that "We shall not give in". These were mixed with passages of military music. At the same time, the US military ordered units of the Seventh Fleet to move into the waters near Saigon as a "precautionary measure" in case the fighting endangered Americans lives and to deter an opportunistic communist offensive.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Siege of Gia Long Palace
Gia Long Palace, the presidential mansion, had once served as the home of French governor generals. For security reasons, the surrounding streets were regularly sealed after sunset; the building had several bunkers and an intricate tunnel system, including a half-block long escape route to the basement of the City Hall. On the morning of 1 November, Diệm had reinforced palace security with more soldiers and barbed-wire barricades. The palace was surrounded by walls of around 2.1 m, and defended by 150 troops of the Presidential Guard. The building was protected by machine and antiaircraft guns, ringed with pillboxes, tanks, and 20-mm cannons mounted on armoured vehicles.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Siege of Gia Long Palace
As Diệm refused to surrender, vowing to reassert his control, after sunset, Thiệu led his 7th Division in an assault on Gia Long Palace. They used artillery and flamethrowers and it fell by daybreak after Diệm finally gave the order to the Presidential Guard to surrender. The coup results pleased the anti-Diệmists. The casualties were light: 9 insurgents killed and 46 wounded, 4 dead and 44 injured Presidential Guards. The greatest casualties were from the populace, who suffered 20 deaths and 146 injured.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, I Corps
When I Corps commander General Đỗ Cao Trí was informed that coup was imminent, he left Huế on 29 October for Đà Nẵng so that he would be away from Ngô Đình Cẩn, who ruled central Vietnam from Hue for his family. The coup took place on 1 November, and Trí helped to prevent any loyalist actions by causing diversions. He scheduled a meeting with the province chief and other pro-Diệm officials during the time that the coup was to take place. As a result, Diệm loyalists were stuck in a meeting room and were unable to mobilise the Republican Youth and other Ngô family paramilitary and activist groups.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
In the early morning of 2 November 1963 Diệm agreed to surrender. The ARVN officers had a meeting intended to exile Diệm and Nhu, having promised the Ngô brothers safe passage out of the country into an "honorable retirement". Not all of the senior officers attended the meeting. General Nguyễn Ngọc Lê strongly lobbied for Diệm's execution. There was no formal vote taken at the meeting, and Lê attracted only minority support. Conein reported that the generals had never indicated that assassination was on their minds, since an orderly transition of power was a high priority in achieving their ultimate aim of gaining international recognition.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
Minh and Don asked Conein to secure an American aircraft to take the brothers out of the country. Two days earlier, Lodge had alerted Washington that such a request was likely and recommended Saigon as the departure point. This request put the Kennedy administration in a difficult position, as the provision of an airplane would publicly tie it to the coup. When Conein telephoned the Saigon CIA station, there was a ten-minute wait. The US government would not allow the aircraft to land in any country, unless that state was willing to grant asylum to Diem.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
The United States did not want Diem and Nhu to form a government in exile and Roger Hilsman had written earlier that "Under no circumstances should the Nhus be permitted to remain in Southeast Asia in close proximity to Vietnam because of the plots they will mount to try to regain power. If the generals decide to exile Diem, he should also be sent outside Southeast Asia." He further went on to anticipate what he termed a "Götterdämmerung in the palace".


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
After surrendering, Diệm rang Lodge and spoke to the American envoy for the last time. Lodge did not report the conversation to Washington, so it was widely assumed that the pair last spoke on the previous afternoon when the coup was just starting. However, after Lodge died in 1985, his aide, Colonel Mike Dunn said that Lodge and Diệm spoke for the last at around 07:00 on 2 November, moments after Diệm surrendered. When Diệm called, Lodge "put [him] on hold" and then walked away.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
Upon his return, the ambassador offered Diệm and Nhu asylum, but would not arrange for transportation to the Philippines until the next day. This contradicted his earlier offer of asylum the previous day when he implored Diệm to not resist the coup. Dunn then offered to personally go to the brothers' hideout to escort him so that the generals could not kill him, but Lodge refused, saying "We just can't get that involved". Dunn said "I was really astonished that we didn't do more for them". Having refused to help the Ngô brothers to leave the country safely, Lodge later said after they had been shot: "What would we have done with them if they had lived? Every Colonel Blimp in the world would have made use of them."


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
Dunn claimed Lodge put Diệm on hold to inform Conein where the brothers were—they had sneaked out of the palace so that the generals could capture them. When confronted about Dunn's claim by a historian, Conein denied the account. One of Lodge's staff told Conein that the plane would have to go directly to the faraway asylum-offering country, so that the brothers could not disembark at a nearby stopover country and stay there to foment a counter-coup.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu
Conein was told that the nearest plane that was capable of such a long range flight was in Guam, and it would take 24 hours to make the necessary arrangements. Minh was astounded and told Conein that the generals could not hold Diệm for that long. Conein reportedly did not suspect a deliberate delay by the American embassy. In contrast, a United States Senate investigative commission in the early 1970s raised a provocative conundrum: "One wonders what became of the US military aircraft that had been dispatched to stand by for Lodge's departure, scheduled for the previous day."


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Escape to Cholon
Minh traveled to Gia Long Palace in a sedan with his aide and bodyguard, Captain Nhung to arrest the Ngô brothers. Minh had also dispatched an APC and four jeeps to Gia Long to transport Diệm and Nhu back to JGS headquarters for the ceremonial handover of power during a nationally televised event witnessed by international media. Diệm and Nhu would then "ask" the generals to be granted exile and asylum in a foreign country, which would be granted.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
Minh instead arrived to find that the brothers were missing. In anticipation of a coup, they had ordered the construction of three separate tunnels leading from Gia Long to remote areas outside the palace. Around 20:00 the night before, Diệm and Nhu hurriedly packed American banknotes into a briefcase. They escaped through one of the tunnels with two loyalists: Cao Xuân Vy, head of Nhu's Republican Youth, and RVNAF Lieutenant Đỗ Thơ, Diệm's aide-de-camp, who happened to be a nephew of Đỗ Mậu.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
Diệm and Nhu emerged in a wooded area in a park near the Cercle Sportif (), the city's upper-class sporting club, where they were picked up by a waiting vehicle. Historian Ellen Hammer disputes the tunnel escape, asserting that the Ngô brothers simply walked out of the building, which was not yet under siege. Hammer asserts that they walked past the tennis courts and left the palace grounds through a small gate at Le Thanh Ton Street and entered the car.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
The loyalists traveled through narrow back streets in order to evade rebel checkpoints and changed vehicles to a black Citroën sedan. After leaving the palace, Nhu was reported to have suggested to Diệm that the brothers split up, arguing this would enhance their chances of survival. Nhu proposed that one of them travel to the Mekong Delta to join Cao's IV Corps, while the other would travel to the II Corps of General Khánh in the Central Highlands.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
Nhu felt that the rebel generals would not dare to kill one of them while the other was free, in case the surviving brother was to regain power. According to one account, Diệm reportedly turned down Nhu, reasoning that "You cannot leave alone. They hate you too much; they will kill you. Stay with me and I will protect you." Another story holds that Diệm reportedly said "We have always been together during these last years. How could we separate during these last years? How could we separate in this critical hour?" Nhu agreed to stay together until the end.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
The loyalists reached the home of Ma Tuyen in the Chinese business district of Cholon. Ma Tuyen was a Chinese merchant and friend who was reported to be Nhu's main contact with the Chinese syndicates which controlled the opium trade. The brothers sought asylum from the embassy of the Republic of China, but were turned down and stayed in Ma Tuyen's house as they appealed to ARVN loyalists and attempted to negotiate with the coup leaders.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
Nhu's secret agents had fitted the home with a direct phone line to the palace, so the insurgent generals believed that the brothers were still besieged inside Gia Long. Neither the rebels nor the loyalist Presidential Guard had any idea that at 21:00 they were about to fight for an empty building, leading to futile deaths. Minh was reported to be mortified when he realised that Diệm and Nhu had escaped in the middle of the night.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Diệm's escape
After Minh had ordered the rebels to search the areas known to have been frequented by the Ngô family, Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo was informed by a captured Presidential Guard officer that the brothers had escaped through the tunnels to a refuge in Cholon. Thảo was told by Khiêm to find and prevent Diệm from being killed. When Thảo arrived at Ma Tuyen's house, he phoned his superiors. Diệm and Nhu overheard him and fled to the nearby Catholic Church of St. Francis Xavier (). The Ngô brothers walked through the shady courtyard. It was speculated that they were recognised by an informant while they walked through the yard. A few minutes later, just after 10:00, an APC and two jeeps entered.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Execution
The convoy was led by General Mai Hữu Xuân and consisted of Colonels Quan and Lắm. Quan was Minh's deputy, and Lắm was commander of Diệm's Civil Guard. Lắm had joined the coup once a rebel victory seemed assured. Two further officers made up the convoy: Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa and Captain Nhung, Minh's bodyguard. Nhu expressed disgust that they were to be transported in an APC, asking "You use such a vehicle to drive the president?" Lắm assured them the armor was for their own protection. Xuân told them it was selected to protect them from "extremists". The brothers' hands were tied behind their backs.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Execution
After the arrest, Nhung and Nghĩa sat with the brothers in the APC, and the convoy departed for Tân Sơn Nhứt. Before the convoy departed for the church, Minh reportedly gestured to Nhung with two fingers, which some have claimed was to be taken as an order to kill both brothers. The convoy stopped at a railroad crossing on the return trip, where by all accounts the brothers were killed. An investigation by Đôn later determined that Nghia had shot the brothers at point-blank range with a semi-automatic firearm and that Nhung sprayed them with bullets before repeatedly stabbing the bodies with a knife.


1963 South Vietnamese coup, Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu, Attempted cover-up
When the corpses arrived at JGS headquarters, the generals were shocked. Although they despised and had no sympathy for Nhu, they still respected Diệm, and several lost their composure. Đính later declared "I couldn't sleep that night", while Đôn maintained that the generals were "truly grievous", maintaining that they were sincere in their intentions to give a safe exile. Đôn charged Nhu with convincing Diệm to reject the offer. Lodge later concluded "Once again, brother Nhu proves to be the evil genius in Diệm's life." Đôn ordered another general to tell reporters that the brothers had died in an accident. He went to confront Minh in his office.