1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, United Fruit Company lobbying
By 1950, the United Fruit Company's annual profits were 65 million U.S. dollars, twice as large as the revenue of the government of Guatemala. The company was the largest landowner in Guatemala, and virtually owned Puerto Barrios, Guatemala's only port to the Atlantic Ocean, allowing it to make profits from the flow of goods through the port. Because of its long association with Ubico's government, Guatemalan revolutionaries saw the UFC as an impediment to progress after 1944. This image was reinforced by the company's discriminatory policies against the native population.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, United Fruit Company lobbying
Owing to its size, the reforms of Arévalo's government affected the UFC more than other companies. Among other things, the new labor code allowed UFC workers to strike when their demands for higher wages and job security were not met. The company saw itself as being specifically targeted by the reforms, and refused to negotiate with the numerous sets of strikers, despite frequently being in violation of the new laws. The company's troubles were compounded with the passage of Decree 900 in 1952. Of the 550,000 acres (220,000 ha) that the company owned, only 15 percent was being cultivated; the rest was idle, and thus came under the scope of the agrarian reform law.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, United Fruit Company lobbying
The UFC responded by intensively lobbying the U.S. government; several Congressmen criticized the Guatemalan government for not protecting the interests of the company. The Guatemalan government replied that the company was the main obstacle to progress in the country. American historians observed that "[to] the Guatemalans it appeared that their country was being mercilessly exploited by foreign interests which took huge profits without making any contributions to the nation's welfare".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, United Fruit Company lobbying
In 1953, 200,000 acres (81,000 ha) of uncultivated land was expropriated by the government, which offered the company compensation at the rate of 2.99 U.S. dollars to the acre (7.39 U.S. dollars per hectare), twice what the company had paid when it bought the property. More expropriation occurred soon after, bringing the total to over 400,000 acres (160,000 ha); the government offered compensation to the company at the rate at which the UFC had valued its own property for tax purposes. Since this was a major undervaluation, the company was unhappy with its compensation, resulting in further lobbying in Washington, particularly through U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had close ties to the company.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, United Fruit Company lobbying
The UFC also began a public relations campaign to discredit the Guatemalan government; it hired Edward Bernays, who mounted a concerted misinformation campaign for several years which portrayed the company as the victim of a communist Guatemalan government. The company stepped up its efforts after Dwight Eisenhower was elected U.S. president in 1952. These included commissioning a research study from a firm known to be hostile to social reform, which produced a 235-page report that was highly critical of the Guatemalan government.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, United Fruit Company lobbying
Historians have stated that the report was full of "exaggerations, scurrilous descriptions and bizarre historical theories" but it nonetheless had a significant impact on the members of Congress who read it. Overall, the company spent over half a million dollars to convince lawmakers and the American public that the Guatemalan government needed to be overthrown.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Operation PBFortune
As the Cold War developed and the Guatemalan government clashed with U.S. corporations on an increasing number of issues, the U.S. government grew increasingly suspicious of the Guatemalan Revolution. In addition, the Cold War predisposed the Truman administration to see the Guatemalan government as communist. Arévalo's support for the Caribbean Legion also worried the Truman administration, which saw it as a vehicle for communism, rather than as the anti-dictatorial force it was conceived as. Until the end of its term, the Truman administration had relied on purely diplomatic and economic means to try to reduce the perceived communist influence. The U.S. had refused to sell arms to the Guatemalan government after 1944; in 1951 it began to block all weapons purchases by Guatemala.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Operation PBFortune
The U.S.'s worries over communist influence increased after the election of Árbenz in 1951 and his enactment of Decree 900 in 1952. In April 1952 Anastasio Somoza García, the dictator of Nicaragua, made his first state visit to the U.S. He made several public speeches praising the U.S., and was awarded a medal by the New York City government. During a meeting with Truman and his senior staff, Somoza said that if the U.S. gave him the arms, he would "clean up Guatemala".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Operation PBFortune
The proposal did not receive much immediate support, but Truman instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to follow up on it. The CIA contacted Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan army officer who had been exiled from the country in 1949 following a failed coup attempt against President Arévalo. Believing that Castillo Armas would lead a coup with or without their assistance, the CIA decided to supply him with weapons and 225,000 U.S. dollars. The CIA considered Castillo Armas sufficiently corrupt and authoritarian to be well suited to lead the coup.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Operation PBFortune
The coup was planned in detail over the next few weeks by the CIA, the UFC, and Somoza. The CIA also contacted Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic; the two U.S.-backed dictators were supportive of the plan, and agreed to contribute some funding. Although PBFortune was officially approved on 9 September 1952, various planning steps had been taken earlier in the year.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Operation PBFortune
In January 1952, officers in the CIA's Directorate of Plans compiled a list of "top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in the event of a successful anti-Communist coup". The CIA plan called for the assassination of over 58 Guatemalans, as well as the arrest of many others.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Operation PBFortune
The CIA put the plan into motion in late 1952. A freighter that had been borrowed from the UFC was specially refitted in New Orleans and loaded with weapons under the guise of agricultural machinery, and set sail for Nicaragua. However, the plan was terminated soon after: accounts of its termination vary. Some sources state that the State Department discovered the plan when a senior official was asked to sign a certain document, while others suggest that Somoza was indiscreet. The eventual outcome was that Secretary of State Dean Acheson called off the operation. The CIA continued to support Castillo Armas; it paid him a monthly retainer of 3000 U.S. dollars, and gave him the resources to maintain his rebel force.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Eisenhower administration
During his successful campaign for the U.S. presidency, Dwight Eisenhower pledged to pursue a more proactive anti-communist policy, promising to roll back communism, rather than contain it. Working in an atmosphere of increasing McCarthyism in government circles, Eisenhower was more willing than Truman to use the CIA to depose governments the U.S. disliked. Although PBFortune had been quickly aborted, tension between the U.S. and Guatemala continued to rise, especially with the legalization of the communist PGT, and its inclusion in the government coalition for the elections of January 1953. Articles published in the U.S. press often reflected this predisposition to see communist influence; for example, a New York Times article about the visit to Guatemala by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda highlighted his communist beliefs, but neglected to mention his reputation as the greatest living poet in Latin America.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Eisenhower administration
Several figures in Eisenhower's administration, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother CIA Director Allen Dulles, had close ties to the United Fruit Company. The Dulles brothers had worked for the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, and in that capacity had arranged several deals for the UFC. Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith would later become a director of the company, while Eisenhower's personal assistant Ann C. Whitman was the wife of UFC public relations director Edward Whitman.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Eisenhower administration
These personal connections meant that the Eisenhower administration tended to conflate the interests of the UFC with that of U.S. national security interests, and made it more willing to overthrow the Guatemalan government. The success of the 1953 CIA operation to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran also strengthened Eisenhower's belief in using the agency to effect political change overseas.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Eisenhower administration
Historians and authors writing about the 1954 coup have debated the relative importance of the role of the United Fruit Company and the worries about communist influence (whether or not these were grounded in reality) in the U.S.'s decision to instigate the coup in 1954. Several historians have maintained that the lobbying of the UFC, and the expropriation of its lands, were the chief motivation for the U.S., strengthened by the financial ties of individuals within the Eisenhower administration to the UFC.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Genesis and prelude, Eisenhower administration
Others have argued that the overthrow was motivated primarily by U.S. strategic interest; the knowledge of the presence of a small number of communists close to Árbenz led the U.S. to reach incorrect conclusions about the extent of communist influence. Yet others have argued that the overthrow was part of a larger tendency within the U.S. to oppose nationalist movements in the Third World. Both the role of the UFC and that of the perception of communist influence continue to be cited as motivations for the U.S.'s actions today.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
The CIA operation to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz, code-named Operation PBSuccess, was authorized by Eisenhower in August 1953. The operation was granted a budget of 2.7 million U.S. dollars for "psychological warfare and political action". The total budget has been estimated at between 5 and 7 million dollars, and the planning employed over 100 CIA agents. In addition, the operation recruited scores of individuals from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of the surrounding countries. The plans included drawing up lists of people within Árbenz's government to be assassinated if the coup were to be carried out. Manuals of assassination techniques were compiled, and lists were also made of people whom the junta would dispose of. These were the CIA's first known assassination manuals, and were reused in subsequent CIA actions.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
The State Department created a team of diplomats who would support PBSuccess. It was led by John Peurifoy, who took over as Ambassador to Guatemala in October 1953. Another member of the team was William D. Pawley, a wealthy businessman and diplomat with extensive knowledge of the aviation industry. Peurifoy was a militant anti-communist, and had proven his willingness to work with the CIA during his time as United States Ambassador to Greece. Under Peurifoy's tenure, relations with the Guatemalan government soured further, although those with the Guatemalan military improved.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
In a report to John Dulles, Peurifoy stated that he was "definitely convinced that if [Árbenz] is not a communist, then he will certainly do until one comes along". Within the CIA, the operation was headed by Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner. The field commander selected by Wisner was former U.S. Army Colonel Albert Haney, then chief of the CIA station in South Korea. Haney reported directly to Wisner, thereby separating PBSuccess from the CIA's Latin American division, a decision which created some tension within the agency. Haney decided to establish headquarters in a concealed office complex in Opa-locka, Florida. Codenamed "Lincoln", it became the nerve center of operation PBSuccess.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
The CIA operation was complicated by a premature coup on 29 March 1953, with a futile raid against the army garrison at Salamá, in the central Guatemalan department of Baja Verapaz. The rebellion was swiftly crushed, and a number of participants were arrested. Several CIA agents and allies were imprisoned, weakening the coup effort. Thus the CIA came to rely more heavily on the Guatemalan exile groups and their anti-democratic allies in Guatemala. The CIA considered several candidates to lead the coup.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, the conservative candidate who had lost the 1950 election to Árbenz, held favor with the Guatemalan opposition but was rejected for his role in the Ubico regime, as well as his European appearance, which was unlikely to appeal to the majority mixed-race mestizo population. Another popular candidate was the coffee planter Juan Córdova Cerna, who had briefly served in Arévalo's cabinet before becoming the legal adviser to the UFC.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
The death of his son in an anti-government uprising in 1950 turned him against the government, and he had planned the unsuccessful Salamá coup in 1953 before fleeing to join Castillo Armas in exile. Although his status as a civilian gave him an advantage over Castillo Armas, he was diagnosed with throat cancer in 1954, taking him out of the reckoning. Thus it was Castillo Armas, in exile since the failed 1949 coup and on the CIA's payroll since the aborted PBFortune in 1951, who was to lead the coming coup.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
Castillo Armas was given enough money to recruit a small force of mercenaries from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of nearby countries. This band was called the Army of Liberation. The CIA established training camps in Nicaragua and Honduras and supplied them with weapons as well as several bombers. The U.S. signed military agreements with both those countries prior to the invasion of Guatemala, allowing it to move heavier arms freely. The CIA trained at least 1,725 foreign guerillas plus thousands of additional militants as reserves.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Planning
These preparations were only superficially covert: the CIA intended Árbenz to find out about them, as a part of its plan to convince the Guatemalan people that the overthrow of Árbenz was a fait accompli. Additionally, the CIA made covert contact with a number of church leaders throughout the Guatemalan countryside, and persuaded them to incorporate anti-government messages into their sermons.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
While preparations for Operation PBSuccess were underway, Washington issued a series of statements denouncing the Guatemalan government, alleging that it had been infiltrated by communists. The State Department also asked the Organization of American States to modify the agenda of the Inter-American Conference, which was scheduled to be held in Caracas in March 1954, requesting the addition of an item titled "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics", which was widely seen as a move targeting Guatemala.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
On 29 and 30 January 1954, the Guatemalan government published documents containing information leaked to it by a member of Castillo Armas' team who had turned against him. Lacking in original documents, the government had engaged in poor forgery to enhance the information it possessed, undermining the credibility of its charges. A spate of arrests followed of allies of Castillo Armas within Guatemala, and the government issued statements implicating a "Government of the North" in a plot to overthrow Árbenz.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
Washington denied these allegations, and the U.S. media uniformly took the side of their government; even publications which had until then provided relatively balanced coverage of Guatemala, such as The Christian Science Monitor, suggested that Árbenz had succumbed to communist propaganda. Several Congressmen also pointed to the allegations from the Guatemalan government as proof that it had become communist.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
At the conference in Caracas, the various Latin American governments sought economic aid from the U.S., as well as its continuing non-intervention in their internal affairs. The U.S. government's aim was to pass a resolution condemning the supposed spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. The Guatemalan foreign minister Guillermo Toriello argued strongly against the resolution, stating that it represented the "internationalization of McCarthyism".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
Despite support among the delegates for Toriello's views, the anti-communist resolution passed with only Guatemala voting against, because of the votes of dictatorships dependent on the U.S. and the threat of economic pressure applied by John Dulles. Although support among the delegates for Dulles' strident anti-communism was less strong than he and Eisenhower had hoped for, the conference marked a victory for the U.S., which was able to make concrete Latin American views on communism.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
The U.S. had stopped selling arms to Guatemala in 1951 while signing bilateral defense agreements and increasing arms shipments to neighboring Honduras and Nicaragua. The U.S. promised the Guatemalan military that it too could obtain arms—if Árbenz were deposed. In 1953, the State Department aggravated the U.S. arms embargo by thwarting the Árbenz government's arms purchases from Canada, Germany, and Rhodesia.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
By 1954 Árbenz had become desperate for weapons, and decided to acquire them secretly from Czechoslovakia, which would have been the first time that a Soviet bloc country shipped weapons to the Americas, an action seen as establishing a communist beachhead in the Americas. The weapons were delivered to Guatemala at the Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios by the Swedish freight ship MS Alfhem, which sailed from Szczecin in Poland. The U.S. failed to intercept the shipment despite imposing an illegal naval quarantine on Guatemala.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
However "Guatemalan army officers" quoted in The New York Times said that "some of the arms ... were duds, worn out, or entirely wrong for use there". The CIA portrayed the shipment of these weapons as Soviet interference in the United States' backyard; it was the final spur for the CIA to launch its coup.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Caracas conference and U.S. propaganda
U.S. rhetoric abroad also had an effect on the Guatemalan military. The military had always been anti-communist, and Ambassador Peurifoy had applied pressure on senior officers since his arrival in Guatemala in October 1953. Árbenz had intended the secret shipment of weapons from the Alfhem to be used to bolster peasant militias, in the event of army disloyalty, but the U.S. informed army chiefs of the shipment, forcing Árbenz to hand them over to the military, and deepening the rift between him and his top generals.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Psychological warfare
Castillo Armas' army of 480 men was not large enough to defeat the Guatemalan military, even with U.S.-supplied aircraft. Therefore, the plans for Operation PBSuccess called for a campaign of psychological warfare, which would present Castillo Armas' victory as a fait accompli to the Guatemalan people, and would force Árbenz to resign. The propaganda campaign had begun well before the invasion, with the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) writing hundreds of articles on Guatemala based on CIA reports, and distributing tens of thousands of leaflets throughout Latin America.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Psychological warfare
The CIA persuaded friendly governments to screen video footage of Guatemala that supported the U.S. version of events. As part of the psychological warfare, the U.S. Psychological Strategy Board authorized a "Nerve War Against Individuals" to instill fear and paranoia in potential loyalists and other potential opponents of the coup. This campaign included death threats against political leaders deemed loyal or deemed to be communist, and the sending of small wooden coffins, non-functioning bombs, and hangman's nooses to such people.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Psychological warfare
Alfhem's success in evading the quarantine led to Washington escalating its intimidation of Guatemala through its navy. On 24 May, the U.S. launched Operation Hardrock Baker, a naval blockade of Guatemala. Ships and submarines patrolled the Guatemalan coasts, and all approaching ships were stopped and searched; these included ships from Britain and France, violating international law. However Britain and France did not protest very strongly, hoping that in return the U.S. would not interfere with their efforts to subdue rebellious colonies in the Middle East. The intimidation was not solely naval; on 26 May one of Castillo Armas' planes flew over the capital, dropping leaflets that exhorted people to struggle against communism and support Castillo Armas.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Psychological warfare
The most wide-reaching psychological weapon was the radio station Voice of Liberation. It began broadcasting on 1 May 1954, carrying anti-communist propaganda, telling its listeners to resist the Árbenz government and support the liberating forces of Castillo Armas. The station claimed to be broadcasting from deep within the jungles of the Guatemalan hinterland, a message which many listeners believed. In actuality, the broadcasts were concocted in Miami by Guatemalan exiles, flown to Central America, and broadcast through a mobile transmitter.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Psychological warfare
The Voice of Liberation made an initial broadcast that was repeated four times, after which it took to transmitting two-hour bulletins twice a day. The transmissions were initially only heard intermittently in Guatemala City; a week later, the CIA significantly increased their transmitting power, allowing clear reception in the Guatemalan capital. The radio broadcasts have been given a lot of credit by historians for the success of the coup, owing to the unrest they created throughout the country.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Psychological warfare
They were unexpectedly assisted by the outage of the government-run radio station, which stopped transmitting for three weeks while a new antenna was being fitted. These transmissions continued throughout the conflict, broadcasting exaggerated news of rebel troops converging on the capital, and contributing to massive demoralization among both the army and the civilian population.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Castillo Armas' invasion
Castillo Armas' force of 480 men had been split into four teams, ranging in size from 60 to 198. On 15 June 1954 these four forces left their bases in Honduras and El Salvador, and assembled in various towns just outside the Guatemalan border. The largest force was supposed to attack the Atlantic harbor town of Puerto Barrios, while the others attacked the smaller towns of Esquipulas, Jutiapa, and Zacapa, the Guatemalan army's largest frontier post. The invasion plan quickly faced difficulties; the 60-man force was intercepted and jailed by Salvadoran policemen before it got to the border.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Castillo Armas' invasion
At 8:20 am on 18 June 1954, Castillo Armas led his invading troops over the border. Ten trained saboteurs preceded the invasion, with the aim of blowing up railways and cutting telegraph lines. At about the same time, Castillo Armas' planes flew over a pro-government rally in the capital. The U.S. Psychological Strategy Board ordered the bombing of the Matamoros Fortress in downtown Guatemala City, and a U.S. F-47 warplane flown by a mercenary pilot bombed the city of Chiquimula. Castillo Armas demanded Árbenz's immediate surrender. The invasion provoked a brief panic in the capital, which quickly decreased as the rebels failed to make any striking moves. Bogged down by supplies and a lack of transportation, Castillo Armas' forces took several days to reach their targets, although their planes blew up a bridge on 19 June.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Castillo Armas' invasion
When the rebels did reach their targets, they met with further setbacks. The force of 122 men targeting Zacapa were intercepted and decisively beaten by a garrison of 30 Guatemalan soldiers, with only 30 men escaping death or capture. The force that attacked Puerto Barrios was dispatched by policemen and armed dockworkers, with many of the rebels fleeing back to Honduras. In an effort to regain momentum, the rebel planes tried air attacks on the capital.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Castillo Armas' invasion
These attacks caused little material damage, but they had a significant psychological impact, leading many citizens to believe that the invasion force was more powerful than it actually was. The rebel bombers needed to fly out of the Nicaraguan capital of Managua; as a result, they had a limited payload. A large number of them substituted dynamite or Molotov cocktails for bombs, in an effort to create loud bangs with a lower payload. The planes targeted ammunition depots, parade grounds, and other visible targets.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Castillo Armas' invasion
Early in the morning on 27 June 1954, a CIA Lockheed P-38M Lightning attacked Puerto San José and dropped napalm bombs on the British cargo ship, SS Springfjord, which was on charter to the U.S. company W.R. Grace and Company Line, and was being loaded with Guatemalan cotton and coffee. This incident cost the CIA one million U.S. dollars in compensation. On 22 June, another plane bombed the Honduran town of San Pedro de Copán; John Dulles claimed the attack had been conducted by the Guatemalan air force, thus avoiding diplomatic consequences.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Castillo Armas' invasion
The handful of bombers that the rebel forces had begun with were shot down by the Guatemalan army within a few days, causing Castillo Armas to demand more from the CIA. Eisenhower quickly agreed to provide these additional planes, bolstering the rebel force. William Pawley had a crucial role to play in the delivery of these aircraft.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
The Árbenz government originally meant to repel the invasion by arming the military-age populace, workers' militias, and the Guatemalan Army. Resistance from the armed forces, as well as public knowledge of the secret arms purchase, compelled the President to supply arms only to the Army. From the beginning of the invasion, Árbenz was confident that Castillo Armas could be defeated militarily and expressed this confidence in public. But he was worried that a defeat for Castillo Armas would provoke a direct invasion by the U.S. military.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
This also contributed to his decision not to arm civilians initially; lacking a military reason to do so, this could have cost him the support of the army. Carlos Enrique Díaz, the chief of the Guatemalan armed forces, told Árbenz that arming civilians would be unpopular with his soldiers, and that "the army [would] do its duty".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
Árbenz instead told Díaz to select officers to lead a counter-attack. Díaz chose a corps of officers who were all regarded to be men of personal integrity, and who were loyal to Árbenz. On the night of 19 June, most of the Guatemalan troops in the capital region left for Zacapa, joined by smaller detachments from other garrisons. Árbenz stated that "the invasion was a farce", but worried that if it was defeated on the Honduran border, Honduras would use it as an excuse to declare war on Guatemala, which would lead to a U.S. invasion.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
Because of the rumours spread by the Voice of Liberation, there were worries throughout the countryside that a fifth column attack was imminent; large numbers of peasants went to the government and asked for weapons to defend their country. They were repeatedly told that the army was "successfully defending our country". Nonetheless, peasant volunteers assisted the government war effort, manning roadblocks and donating supplies to the army. Weapons shipments dropped by rebel planes were intercepted and turned over to the government.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
The Árbenz government also pursued diplomatic means to try to end the invasion. It sought support from El Salvador and Mexico; Mexico declined to get involved, and the Salvadoran government merely reported the Guatemalan effort to Peurifoy. Árbenz's largest diplomatic initiative was in taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council. On 18 June the Guatemalan foreign minister petitioned the council to "take measures necessary ... to put a stop to the aggression", which he said Nicaragua and Honduras were responsible for, along with "certain foreign monopolies which have been affected by the progressive policy of my government".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
The Security Council looked at Guatemala's complaint at an emergency session on 20 June. The debate was lengthy and heated, with Nicaragua and Honduras denying any wrongdoing, and the U.S. stating that Eisenhower's role as a general in World War II demonstrated that he was against imperialism. The Soviet Union was the only country to support Guatemala. When the U.S. and its allies proposed referring the matter to the Organization of American States, the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Guatemalan response
Guatemala continued to press for a Security Council investigation; the proposal received the support of Britain and France, but on 24 June it was vetoed by the U.S., the first time it did so against its allies. The U.S. accompanied this with threats to the foreign offices of both countries that the U.S. would stop supporting their other initiatives. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld called the U.S. position "the most serious blow so far aimed at the [United Nations]". A fact-finding mission was set up by the Inter-American Peace Committee; Washington used its influence to delay the entry of the committee until the coup was complete and a military dictatorship installed.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
Árbenz was initially confident that his army would quickly dispatch the rebel force. The victory of a small garrison of 30 soldiers over the 180 strong rebel force outside Zacapa strengthened his belief. By 21 June, Guatemalan soldiers had gathered at Zacapa under the command of Colonel Víctor M. León, who was believed to be loyal to Árbenz. León told Árbenz that the counter-attack would be delayed for logistical reasons, but assured him not to worry, as Castillo Armas would be defeated very soon. Other members of the government were not so certain.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
Army Chief of Staff Parinello inspected the troops at Zacapa on 23 June, and returned to the capital believing that the army would not fight. Afraid of a U.S. intervention in Castillo Armas' favor, he did not tell Árbenz of his suspicions. PGT leaders also began to have their suspicions; acting secretary general Alvarado Monzón sent a member of the central committee to Zacapa to investigate. He returned on 25 June, reporting that the army was highly demoralized, and would not fight. Monzón reported this to Árbenz, who quickly sent another investigator.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
He too returned the same report, carrying an additional message for Árbenz from the officers at Zacapa—asking the President to resign. The officers believed that given U.S. support for the rebels, defeat was inevitable, and Árbenz was to blame for it. He stated that if Árbenz did not resign, the army was likely to strike a deal with Castillo Armas, and march on the capital with him.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
During this period, Castillo Armas had begun to intensify his aerial attacks, with the extra planes that Eisenhower had approved. They had limited material success; many of their bombs were surplus material from World War II, and failed to explode. Nonetheless, they had a significant psychological impact. On 25 June, the same day that he received the army's ultimatum, Árbenz learned that Castillo Armas had scored what later proved to be his only military victory, defeating the Guatemalan garrison at Chiquimula.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
Historian Piero Gleijeses has stated that if it were not for U.S. support for the rebellion, the officer corps of the Guatemalan army would have remained loyal to Árbenz because, although they were not uniformly his supporters, they were more wary of Castillo Armas, and also had strong nationalist views. As it was, they believed that the U.S. would intervene militarily, leading to a battle they could not win.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
On the night of 25 June, Árbenz called a meeting of the senior leaders of the government, the political parties, and the labor unions. Colonel Díaz was also present. The President told them that the army at Zacapa had abandoned the government, and that the civilian population needed to be armed in order to defend the country. Díaz raised no objections, and the unions pledged several thousand troops between them. When the troops were mustered the next day, only a few hundred showed up.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
The civilian population of the capital had fought alongside the Guatemalan Revolution twice before—during the popular uprising of 1944, and again during the attempted coup of 1949—but on this occasion the army, intimidated by the United States, refused to fight. The union members were reluctant to fight both the invasion and their own military. Seeing this, Díaz reneged on his support of the President, and began plotting to overthrow Árbenz with the assistance of other senior army officers. They informed Peurifoy of this plan, asking him to stop the hostilities in return for Árbenz's resignation.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
Peurifoy promised to arrange a truce, and the plotters went to Árbenz and informed him of their decision. Árbenz, utterly exhausted and seeking to preserve at least a measure of the democratic reforms that he had brought, agreed without demur. After informing his cabinet of his decision, he left the presidential palace at 8 pm on 27 June 1954, having taped a resignation speech that was broadcast an hour later.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
In it, he stated that he was resigning in order to eliminate the "pretext for the invasion", and that he wished to preserve the gains of the October Revolution of 1944. He walked to the nearby Mexican Embassy, seeking political asylum. Two months later he was granted safe passage out of the country, and flew to exile in Mexico.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
Some 120 Árbenz loyalists or communists were also allowed to leave, and the CIA stated that none of the assassination plans contemplated by the CIA were actually implemented. On June 30, 1954 the CIA began a comprehensive destruction process of documents related to Operation PBSuccess. When an oversight committee of the United States Senate in 1975 investigated the history of the CIA's assassinations program and requested information about the CIA's assassination program as part of Operation PBSuccess, the CIA stated it had lost all such records.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Árbenz's resignation
Journalist Annie Jacobsen states that the CIA claim of no assassinations having taken place is doubtful. In May 1997, the CIA stated it had rediscovered some of its documents that it had said were lost. The names of assassination targets had all been redacted, which made it impossible to verify whether any of the people on the CIA assassination list were actually killed as part of the operation.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
Immediately after the President announced his resignation, Díaz announced on the radio that he was taking over the presidency, and that the army would continue to fight against the invasion of Castillo Armas. He headed a military junta which also consisted of Colonels Elfego Hernán Monzón Aguirre and Jose Angel Sánchez. Two days later Ambassador Peurifoy told Díaz that he had to resign because, in the words of a CIA officer who spoke to Díaz, he was "not convenient for American foreign policy".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
Peurifoy castigated Díaz for allowing Árbenz to criticize the United States in his resignation speech; meanwhile, a U.S.-trained pilot dropped a bomb on the army's main powder magazine, in order to intimidate the colonel. Soon after, Díaz was overthrown by a rapid bloodless coup led by Colonel Monzón, who was more pliable to U.S. interests. Díaz later stated that Peurifoy had presented him with a list of names of communists, and demanded that all of them be shot by the next day; Díaz had refused, turning Peurifoy further against him.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
On 17 June, the army leaders at Zacapa had begun to negotiate with Castillo Armas. They signed a pact, the Pacto de Las Tunas, three days later, which placed the army at Zacapa under Castillo Armas, in return for a general amnesty. The army returned to its barracks a few days later, "despondent, with a terrible sense of defeat".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
Although Monzón was staunchly anti-communist and repeatedly spoke of his loyalty to the U.S., he was unwilling to hand over power to Castillo Armas. The fall of Díaz had led Peurifoy to believe that the CIA should make way and let the State Department play the lead role in negotiating with the new government of Guatemala. The State Department asked Óscar Osorio, the dictator of El Salvador, to invite all players for talks in San Salvador. Osorio agreed, and Monzón and Castillo Armas arrived in the Salvadoran capital on 30 June.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
Peurifoy initially remained in Guatemala City, to avoid the appearance of a heavy U.S. role, but he was forced to travel to San Salvador when the negotiations came close to breaking down on the first day. In the words of John Dulles, Peurifoy's role was to "crack some heads together". Neither Monzón nor Castillo Armas could have remained in power without U.S. support, and thus Peurifoy was able to force an agreement, which was announced at 4:45 am on 2 July.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
Under the agreement, Castillo Armas and his subordinate Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva joined the three-person junta headed by Monzón, who remained president. On 7 July Colonels Dubois and Cruz Salazar, Monzón's supporters on the junta, resigned, according to the secret agreement they had made without Monzón's knowledge. Outnumbered, Monzón also resigned, allowing Castillo Armas to be unanimously elected president of the junta. The two colonels were paid 100,000 U.S. dollars apiece for their cooperation. The U.S. promptly recognized the new government on 13 July.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Military governments
Soon after taking office as president, Castillo Armas faced a coup from young army cadets, who were unhappy with the army's surrender to him. The coup was crushed, leaving 29 dead and 91 wounded. Elections were held in early October, from which all political parties were barred. Castillo Armas was the only candidate; he won the election with 99% of the vote, completing his transition into power.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Reactions
The Guatemalan coup d'état was reviled internationally. Le Monde of Paris and The Times of London attacked the United States' coup as a "modern form of economic colonialism". In Latin America, public and official opinion was sharply critical of the U.S., and for many Guatemala became a symbol of armed resistance to U.S. hegemony. Former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee called it "a plain act of aggression".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Reactions
When Allen Dulles described the coup as a victory of "democracy" over communism and claimed that the situation in Guatemala was "being cured by the Guatemalans themselves", a British official remarked that "in places, it might almost be Molotov speaking about ... Czechoslovakia or Hitler speaking about Austria". UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld said that the paramilitary invasion with which the U.S. deposed Guatemala's elected government was a geopolitical action that violated the human rights stipulations of the United Nations Charter. Even the usually pro-U.S. newspapers of West Germany condemned the coup. Kate Doyle, the Director of the Mexico Project of the National Security Archives, described the coup as the definitive deathblow to democracy in Guatemala.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Reactions
The coup had broad support among U.S. politicians. Historian Piero Gleijeses writes that the foreign policy of both Republican and Democratic parties expressed an intransigent assertion of U.S. hegemony over Central America, making them predisposed to seeing communist threats where none existed. Thus Eisenhower's continuation of the Monroe Doctrine had continued bipartisan support. The coup met with strong negative reactions in Latin America; a wave of anti-United States protests followed the overthrow of Árbenz.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Operation PBSuccess, Reactions
These sentiments persisted for several decades afterwards; historians have pointed to the coup as a reason for the hostile reception given to U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon when he visited Latin America four years later. A State Department study found that negative public reactions to the coup had occurred in eleven Latin American countries, including a few that were otherwise pro-American. Historian John Lewis Gaddis states that knowledge of the CIA's role in coups in Iran and Guatemala gave the agency "an almost mythic reputation throughout Latin America and the Middle East as an instrument with which the United States could depose governments it disliked, whenever it wished to do so".


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Operation PBHistory
Operation PBHistory was an effort by the CIA to analyze documents from the Árbenz government to justify the 1954 coup after the fact, in particular by finding evidence that Guatemalan communists had been under the influence of the Soviet Union. Because of the quick overthrow of the Árbenz government, the CIA believed that the administration would not have been able to destroy any incriminating documents, and that these could be analyzed to demonstrate Árbenz's supposed Soviet ties.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Operation PBHistory
The CIA also believed this would help it better understand the workings of Latin American communist parties, on which subject the CIA had very little real information. A final motivation was that international responses to the coup had been very negative, even among allies of the U.S., and the CIA wished to counteract this anti-U.S. sentiment. The operation began on 4 July 1954 with the arrival of four CIA agents in Guatemala City, led by a specialist in the structure of communist parties. Their targets included Árbenz's personal belongings, police documents, and the headquarters of the Guatemalan Party of Labour.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Operation PBHistory
Although the initial search failed to find any links to the Soviet Union, the CIA decided to extend the operation, and on 4 August a much larger team was deployed, with members from many government departments, including the State Department and the USIA. The task force was given the cover name Social Research Group. To avoid confrontation with Guatemalan nationalists, the CIA opted to leave the documents in Guatemalan possession, instead funding the creation of a Guatemalan intelligence agency that would try to dismantle the communist organizations.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Operation PBHistory
Thus the National Committee of Defense Against Communism (Comité de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo) was created on 20 July, and granted a great deal of power over military and police functions. The personnel of the new agency were also put to work analyzing the same documents. The document-processing phase of the operation was terminated on 28 September 1954, having examined 500,000 documents. There was tension between the different U.S. government agencies about using the information; the CIA wished to use it to subvert communists, the USIA for propaganda. The CIA's leadership of the operation allowed it to retain control over any documents deemed necessary for clandestine operations. A consequence of PBHistory was the opening of a CIA file on Argentine communist Ernesto Che Guevara.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Operation PBHistory
In the subsequent decade, the documents gathered were used by the authors of several books, most frequently with covert CIA assistance, which described the Guatemalan Revolution and the 1954 coup in terms favorable to the CIA. Despite the efforts of the CIA, both international and academic reaction to U.S. policy remained highly negative. Even books partially funded by the CIA were somewhat critical of its role. PBHistory failed in its chief objective of finding convincing evidence that the PGT had been instruments of the Soviet Union, or even that it had any connection to Moscow whatsoever.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Operation PBHistory
The Soviet description of the coup, that the U.S. had crushed a democratic revolution to protect the United Fruit Company's control over the Guatemalan economy, became much more widely accepted. Historian Mark Hove stated that "Operation PBHistory proved ineffective because of 'a new, smoldering resentment' that had emerged in Latin America over US intervention in Guatemala."


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Political legacy
The 1954 coup had significant political fallout both inside and outside Guatemala. The relatively easy overthrow of Árbenz, coming soon after the similar overthrow of the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister in 1953, made the CIA overconfident in its abilities, which led to the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion to overthrow the Cuban government in 1961. Throughout the years of the Guatemalan Revolution, both United States policy makers and the U.S. media had tended to believe the theory of a communist threat.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Political legacy
When Árbenz had announced that he had evidence of U.S. complicity in the Salamá incident, it had been dismissed, and virtually the entire U.S. press portrayed Castillo Armas' invasion as a dramatic victory against communism. The press in Latin America were less restrained in their criticism of the U.S., and the coup resulted in lasting anti-United States sentiment in the region.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Political legacy
Among the civilians living in Guatemala City during the coup was a 25-year-old Che Guevara. After a couple of abortive attempts to fight on the side of the government, Guevara took shelter at the embassy of Argentina, before eventually being granted safe passage to Mexico, where he would join the Cuban Revolution. His experience of the Guatemalan coup was a large factor in convincing him "of the necessity for armed struggle ... against imperialism", and would inform his successful military strategy during the Cuban Revolution. Árbenz's experience during the Guatemalan coup also helped Fidel Castro's Cuban regime in thwarting the CIA invasion.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Political legacy
Within Guatemala, Castillo Armas worried that he lacked popular support, and thus tried to eliminate all opposition. He promptly arrested several thousand opposition leaders, branding them communists, repealed the constitution of 1945, and granted himself virtually unbridled power. Concentration camps were built to hold the prisoners when the jails overflowed. Acting on the advice of Allen Dulles, Castillo Armas detained a number of citizens trying to flee the country. He also created the National Committee of Defense Against Communism, with sweeping powers of arrest, detention, and deportation. Over the next few years, the committee investigated nearly 70,000 people.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Political legacy
An insurgency in opposition to the junta soon developed. The government responded with a campaign of harsh suppression. Thousands were imprisoned arbitrarily, with few ever facing trial. Many were executed; "disappeared"; tortured; or maimed. He outlawed all labor unions, peasant organizations, and political parties, except for his own, the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN), which was the ruling party until 1957, and remained influential for decades after.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Political legacy
Castillo Armas' dependence on the officer corps and the mercenaries who had put him in power led to widespread corruption, and the Eisenhower administration was soon subsidizing the Guatemalan government with many millions of U.S. dollars. Castillo Armas also reversed the agrarian reforms of Árbenz, leading the U.S. embassy to comment that it was a "long step backwards" from the previous policy. The UFC did not profit from the coup; although it regained most of its privileges, its profits continued to decline, and it was eventually merged with another company to save itself from bankruptcy. Despite the influence which some of the local Catholic Church leaders had in the coup, anti-Catholic restrictions which had been enforced under previous governments in Guatemala would resume by the 1960s, as many anti-communist governments felt the Church had too much sympathy towards socialist parties.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Civil War
The rolling-back of the progressive policies of the civilian governments resulted in a series of leftist insurgencies in the countryside, beginning in 1960. This triggered the 36-year Guatemalan Civil War between the U.S.-backed military government of Guatemala and the leftist insurgents, who frequently had a large degree of popular support. The largest of these movements was led by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, which at its largest point had 270,000 members. During the civil war, atrocities against civilians were committed by both sides; 93% of these violations were committed by the U.S.-backed military, which included a genocidal scorched-earth campaign against the indigenous Maya population in the 1980s. The violence was particularly severe during the presidencies of Ríos Montt and Lucas García.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Civil War
Numerous other human rights violations were committed, including massacres of civilian populations, rape, aerial bombardment, and forced disappearances. Gleijeses wrote that Guatemala was "ruled by a culture of fear", and that it held the "macabre record for human rights violations in Latin America". These violations were partially the result of a particularly brutal counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the government. The ideological narrative that the 1954 coup had represented a battle against communism was often used to justify the violence in the 1980s.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Civil War
Historians have attributed the violence of the civil war to the 1954 coup, and the "anti-communist paranoia" that it generated. The civil war came to an end in 1996, with a peace accord between the guerrillas and the government of Guatemala, which included an amnesty for the fighters on both sides. The civil war claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 civilians in all.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Apologies
U.S. President Bill Clinton apologized to the nation of Guatemala in March 1999 for the atrocities committed by the U.S.-backed dictatorships. The apology occurred during a meeting in Guatemala which involved leaders from various sectors of the country's society, including indigenous people and women. Clinton stated "For the United States it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake." The apology came soon after the release of a truth commission report that documented U.S. support for the military forces that committed genocide.


1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Aftermath, Apologies
In May 2011 the Guatemalan government signed an agreement with Árbenz's surviving family to restore his legacy and publicly apologize for the government's role in ousting him. This included a financial settlement to the family. The formal apology was made at the National Palace by Guatemalan President Álvaro Colom on 20 October 2011, to Jacobo Árbenz Villanova, the son of the former president, and a Guatemalan politician. Colom stated, "It was a crime to Guatemalan society and it was an act of aggression to a government starting its democratic spring." The agreement established several forms of reparation for the next of kin of Árbenz Guzmán.


1954 Guatemalan general election
Constituent Assembly elections were held alongside a plebiscite on the presidency of Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala on 10 October 1954. A reported 99.92% of voters voted in favour of Armas' presidency, whilst the National Anti- Communist Front won 57 of the 65 seats in the Assembly.


1954 Guinea by-election
A by-election for one of the French National Assembly seats from Guinea was held on June 27, 1954. The socialist Yaciné Diallo, who had won one of the three Guinean seats in the 1951 French National Assembly election, died in April 1954, after which the by-election was called. The election was won by Diawadou Barry, but it also marked of the ascent of Sékou Touré's Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) in Guinean politics.


1954 Guinea by-election, Candidates
There were three main candidates taking part in the election; Barry Diawadou, Sékou Touré and Ibrahima Barry ('Barry III') of the newly founded Socialist Democracy of Guinea (DSG). Barry Diawadou was supported by a coordination committee of local formations during the run-up to the election. The coordination committee based on an agreement between the Fula (French: Peul; Fula: Fulɓe) chiefs of Futa Jalon and regional formations in lower Guinea.


1954 Guinea by-election, Candidates
Under the arrangement, the Fula chiefs would be able to select the candidate for the French National Assembly seat, whilst the groups from lower Guinea would select candidates for second-college senator (Fodé Mamadou Touré) and French Union assemblyman (Karim Bangoura). The Fula chiefs' candidate became Barry Diawadou, after Diawadou had received the backing of the Futa Jalon spiritual leader almami Ibrahima Sory Dara. Diawadou himself was the son of the almami of Dabola.


1954 Guinea by-election, Candidates
Sékou Touré (later the president of Guinea 1958-1984) was the candidate of the PDG, the Guinean branch of the African Democratic Rally (RDA). Touré was a prominent trade union leader. Touré and his party were popularly referred to as syli (susu for 'elephant'), a name given to symbolize strength.


1954 Guinea by-election, Conduct
The election was marred with irregularities. The principle of secrecy of vote was not respected. In many cases local chiefs were in charge of distributing voting cards, chiefs who simultaneously were campaigning for Barry Diawadou (the electoral law demanded that local committees be formed with representatives of all parties for the sake of distributing voting cards). On many occasions, the ballot for Barry Diawadou was attached to the voting cards. At the voting stations, PDG representatives were chased away or physically abused in many locations. With the PDG representatives gone, the fraud could go on without limitations. The irregularities were most widespread in Futa Jalon, the stronghold of Barry Diawadou.


1954 Guinea by-election, Aftermath
Immediately after the official results had been declared, the PDG cried foul and accused the French administration of having committed fraud to ensure the victory of Barry Diawadou. In the months following the vote, the PDG pinned its hopes to the possibility that the French National Assembly might refuse to validate the results. The party campaigned vigorously to show its force, and mass demonstrations were held throughout Guinea to condemn the electoral fraud. PDG followers composed various songs, sung at the public meetings.


1954 Guinea by-election, Aftermath
The stated that the Syli had been robbed of his legitimate victory, and that Barry Diawadou was a weak coward. Moreover, at the SFIO congress in July 1954 the actions of the French governor in Guinea were condemned. The SFIO congress charged that the governor had openly supported Diawadou's candidacy, in breach of the expected neutrality of the administration.


1954 Guinea by-election, Aftermath
Following the election, the committee that had supported Barry Diawadou's candidacy formed the African Bloc of Guinea (BAG) in late 1954.


1954 Guinea by-election, Aftermath
On January 21, 1955 a vote of validation was held in the French National Assembly regarding the 1954 election in Guinea. SFIO no longer voiced any opposition. Many of the Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (the parliamentary ally of RDA) assembly members were absent at the time of the vote. The validation was passed with a wide majority; only the assembly members of the French Communist Party and RDA voted against the validation.


1954 Guinea by-election, Aftermath
After the validation had passed, the situation became tense in lower Guinea. When Barry Diawadou's father visited Conakry on January 30, 1955, widespread riots broke out. Violent incidents also occurred in Dubréka and Boffa. These confrontations occurred in spite of appeals of the PDG to its followers to remain calm.


1954 Haltemprice by-election
The Haltemprice by-election was held on 11 February 1954. It was held due to the elevation to a hereditary peerage of the incumbent Conservative MP, Richard Kidston Law. The by-election was won by the Conservative candidate, Patrick Wall.


1954 Hardin–Simmons Cowboys football team
The 1954 Hardin–Simmons Cowboys football team was an American football team that represented Hardin–Simmons University in the Border Conference during the 1954 college football season. In its third and final season under head coach Murray Evans, the team compiled a 4–6 record (2–3 against conference opponents), finished in fifth place in the conference, and was outscored by a total of 204 to 153.


1954 Hardin–Simmons Cowboys football team
No Hardin-Simmons players were named to the 1954 All-Border Conference football team.


1954 Harrogate by-election
The Harrogate by-election was held on 11 March 1954. It was caused by the resignation of the incumbent Conservative MP, Christopher York. It was won by the Conservative candidate James Ramsden.


1954 Harvard Crimson football team
The 1954 Harvard Crimson football team was an American football team that represented Harvard University during the 1954 college football season. In their fifth year under head coach Lloyd Jordan, the Crimson compiled a 4–3–1 record and outscored opponents 108 to 97. J. Timothy Anderson was the team captain.


1954 Harvard Crimson football team
Harvard played its home games at Harvard Stadium in the Allston neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts.


1954 Harwich by-election
The Harwich by-election, 1954 was a parliamentary by-election held on 11 February 1954 for the House of Commons constituency of Harwich. The seat had become vacant when the National Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Stanley Holmes was elevated to the peerage as Baron Dovercourt, having held the seat since the 1935 general election. The Conservative and Liberal candidate, Julian Ridsdale held the seat for the government. He remained the constituency's MP until his retirement 38 years later at the 1992 general election. The Labour candidate Shirley Catlin would later, under her married name Shirley Williams; be elected as MP for Hitchin and would serve in the Cabinets of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan.


1954 Hawaii Rainbows football team
The 1954 Hawaii Rainbows football team represented the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa as an independent during the 1954 college football season. In their third season under head coach Hank Vasconcellos, the Rainbows compiled a 4–4 record.


1954 Hawthorn Football Club season
The 1954 season was the Hawthorn Football Club's 30th season in the Victorian Football League and the 53rd overall.


1954 Holy Cross Crusaders football team
The 1954 Holy Cross Crusaders football team was an American football team that represented the College of the Holy Cross as an independent during the 1954 college football season. In its 11th year under head coach Eddie Anderson, the team compiled an 3–7 record. The team played its home games at Fitton Field in Worcester, Massachusetts.


1954 Honduran general election
General elections were held in Honduras on 10 October 1954. The elections were relatively honest. and saw Ramón Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party emerge as the most popular presidential candidate with 48% of the vote. However, the constitution required Congress to confirm the president if no candidate received a majority in the popular vote. The Liberals did not have a majority in Congress, and the National Party and National Reformist Movement (MNR) agreed to block Villeda's candidacy, although they were unable to agree on a candidate of their own. The two parties boycotted the confirmation session in November – an idea proposed by US Ambassador Whitting Willauer – meaning those present did not form a quorum.


1954 Honduran general election
Amid the crisis, incumbent president Juan Manuel Gálvez handed over the presidency to his vice-president Julio Lozano Díaz due to illness. Lozano decided to remain in office, dissolved congress and appointed a  59-member State Advisory Council with representatives from the Liberal, National and MNR. It was to write a new constitution, labor code, social security law, and act merely in an advisory capacity to the president.


1954 Hong Kong municipal election
The 1954 Urban Council election was held on 24 March 1954 for the 2 of the 4 elected seats of the Urban Council of Hong Kong.


1954 Hong Kong municipal election
4,957 of about 13,700 eligible voters cast their votes, 3,887 ballots from the polling station at the Statue Square on Hong Kong Island and 1,070 from St. Andrew's Church on Kowloon. There were five candidates contesting in total. Two incumbents, Philip Au and Dr. Raymond Lee of the Reform Club were able to secure the seats they won in last year.


1954 Houston Cougars football team
The 1954 Houston Cougars football team was an American football team that represented the University of Houston in the Missouri Valley Conference (MVC) during the 1954 college football season. In its seventh and final season under head coach Clyde Lee, the team compiled a 5–5 record (3–1 against conference opponents) and finished in second place out of five teams in the MVC. George Patterson and George Hynes were the team captains. The team played its home games at Rice Stadium in Houston.


1954 Humboldt State Lumberjacks football team
The 1954 Humboldt State Lumberjacks football team represented Humboldt State College during the 1954 college football season. Humboldt State competed in the Far Western Conference (FWC).


1954 Humboldt State Lumberjacks football team
The 1954 Lumberjacks were led by fourth-year head coach Phil Sarboe. They played home games at the Redwood Bowl in Arcata, California. Humboldt State finished with a record of five wins and five losses (5–5, 3–2 FWC). The Lumberjacks outscored their opponents 174–116 for the season.


1954 Humboldt State Lumberjacks football team, Team players in the NFL
No Humboldt State players were selected in the 1955 NFL Draft.


1954 Hungary v England football match
Hungary v England (1954)  was an international football game played on 23 May 1954. The game was played between the Hungary national football team—then the world's number one ranked team and the Olympic champions—and the England national football team, hailing from the birthplace of the game of football and reputed "Kings of Football". The game was a return fixture from the 1953 game in the old Wembley Stadium, where Hungary had beaten England 6–3.


1954 Hungary v England football match
England approached the game in the hope that the 6–3 result had been an aberration; instead, Hungary provided a masterclass of football, and thrashed England 7–1.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Background
Under the stewardship of Gusztáv Sebes, Hungary had been unbeaten since May 1950, and had won the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki. They were rated the number one team in the world by FIFA and were firm favourites for the 1954 World Cup.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Background
England were rated the number four team in the world by FIFA, but were still existing in a climate of complacency; the Football Association (FA) saw their country as the originators of the game and assumed English players were technically and physically superior to their foreign counterparts. Coaching and tactical advances from abroad were ignored, with the English national side and the majority of clubs persisting with the outdated WM formation. Manager Walter Winterbottom had no prior managerial experience in professional football, and did not pick the England squad: that role remained with the FA's selection committee, who frequently displayed little or no consistency in their choice of player.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Background
Hungary had visited England in 1953 and delivered a 6–3 thrashing at Wembley—the first time a foreign team outside the British Isles had beaten England on home soil. The result had sent a shockwave through English football, with several prominent managers and players such as Matt Busby, Don Revie, Bill Nicholson and Ron Greenwood realising that the English game had to adapt if the national team was to compete at the highest levels. The FA on the other hand viewed the defeat as a "one-off", and retained Winterbottom and an outdated WM formation for the return game in Budapest.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Date, venue and attendance
The match was played on 23 May 1954 at Nepstadion in Budapest in front of a 92,000 crowd.


1954 Hungary v England football match, The England team
The England team lined up in its usual WM formation, and included captain Billy Wright, goalkeeper Gil Merrick, winger Tom Finney and inside forward Ivor Broadis. Centre forward Bedford Jezzard was given his debut England cap.


1954 Hungary v England football match, The Hungarian team
The Hungarian team lined up in the 4–2–4 formation pioneered by their coach, Gusztáv Sebes. József Bozsik played in the deep lying midfield position, with Nándor Hidegkuti free to roam between midfield and attack. Ferenc Puskás and Sándor Kocsis were the strikers, with width being provided by Zoltán Czibor and József Tóth.


1954 Hungary v England football match, First half
Hungary dominated the game; England were unable to obtain the ball for much of the time, and when they did they were unable to make any inroads against a fitter and more tactically adept Hungary side. No lessons had been learnt from the 6–3 defeat at Wembley; England were drawn out of position time and time again.


1954 Hungary v England football match, First half
Mihály Lantos scored for Hungary after 10 minutes; Ferenc Puskás added a second goal seven minutes later, before Sándor Kocsis made it 3–0 on 19 minutes. England were simply outclassed and outplayed for the rest of the half.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Second half
The second half continued in same vein; Kocsis added his second goal on 57 minutes, Nándor Hidegkuti scored two minutes later, Toth added a sixth and Puskas scored the final Hungarian goal on the 71st minute. It was a wretched tactical performance by England, with the sole highlight being Ivor Broadis scoring with a hooked shot when the Hungarians were 6–0 up.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Second half
The final result was Hungary 7 England 1—this still ranks as England's heaviest footballing defeat.


1954 Hungary v England football match, Long-term influences
The result confirmed what many in the English football world had suspected after the 6–3 defeat at Wembley: that England were no longer a major footballing force, and that the English game needed to look to the continent for tactical and training advances.


1954 I Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race
The 1st Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race was the first Cornwall MRC motor race, run to Formula One rules, held on 7 June 1954 at the Davidstow Circuit, Cornwall. The race was run over 20 laps of the little circuit, and was won by British driver John Riseley-Prichard in a Connaught Type A.


1954 I Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race
This was the first of three Formula One races held in Cornwall during 1954 and 1955, and was the first Formula One event to include a Kieft on the grid, driven by Horace Gould.


1954 I Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race
Gould later caused the entire meeting to be ended prematurely when he crashed his car transporter (a converted double-decker bus) into a footbridge, bringing it down on to the track.


1954 ICF Canoe Sprint World Championships
The 1954 ICF Canoe Sprint World Championships were held in Mâcon, France. This event was held under the auspices of the International Canoe Federation.


1954 ICF Canoe Sprint World Championships
The men's competition consisted of four Canadian (single paddle, open boat) and nine kayak events. Two events were held for the women, both in kayak. The type or number of events held at the championships remained unchanged from the previous championships.


1954 ICF Canoe Sprint World Championships, Note
Zenz competed for Saar, but is listed in official reports as competing for West Germany.


1954 II Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race
The 2nd Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race was a motor race, run to Formula One rules, held on 2 August 1954 at the Davidstow Circuit, Cornwall. The race was to be run over 30 laps of the little circuit, but this was reduced to 20 laps due to the bad weather. The race was won by British driver John Coombs in a Lotus Mk VIII.


1954 II Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race
This was the second of three Formula One races held in Cornwall during 1954 and 1955, and the first Formula One race to be won by a Lotus.


1954 II Cornwall MRC Formula 1 Race
Rodney Nuckey led the race until lap 17, when he suffered oil pressure problems, leaving Coombs and Tom Kyffin to battle for the lead until the end.


1954 IRFU College Draft
The 1954 IRFU College Draft was the second official sports draft held by the Interprovincial Rugby Football Union, a predecessor of the East Division of the Canadian Football League, in the spring of 1954. 32 players were chosen from among eligible players from five eastern universities, McGill University, Queen's University, University of Toronto, University of Western Ontario, and McMaster University. The Toronto Argonauts had the first selection, Bill McFarlane, in a draft where only six players would ever play in a professional football game.


1954 IRFU College Draft
The following list only includes the first three rounds due to historical limitations.


1954 ISSF World Shooting Championships
The 36th UIT World Shooting Championships was the contemporary name of the ISSF World Shooting Championships in all ISSF shooting events that were held in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1954. It was the first time Venezuela hosted the competition (which it did again in 1982), and a new military shooting range had been constructed in the suburbs of Caracas for the event.


1954 ISSF World Shooting Championships
After their successful debut in the 1952 Summer Olympics, the Soviet Union now participated for the first time in the World Championships, and won 20 of the 30 gold medals. Rifle shooter Anatoli Bogdanov, the star of the 1952 shooting competitions in Helsinki, dominated once again with six individual and four team victories. He broke the world record in the 300 metre rifle three positions match with a margin of nine points. In the shotgun events, the United States and Italy were still on top, but the shooting greatness of especially Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries had now diminished, shifting the tide eastward.


1954 ISSF World Shooting Championships
As in most other events, the Soviet team won the team championship in 25 metre center-fire pistol. The American marksman Arthur Jackson commented that the western shooters watched with a mixed sense of pity and relief as the Soviet team shot their archaic Nagant M1895 revolvers in the pre-event training. On the match day they revealed their practical joke and instead brought brand new American Smith & Wesson match revolvers, shooting the same kind of gun and ammunition as the individual champion, and winning three points ahead of the American team.


1954 Ice Hockey World Championships
The 21st Ice Hockey World Championships and 32nd European ice hockey championships were held from 26 February to 7 March 1954 in Stockholm, Sweden. Every team played each other once with the top three finishers receiving medals at the end. The USSR won in its first attempt, led by Vsevolod Bobrov who was recognized as the best forward of the tournament in the first ever presentation of Directorate Awards.


1954 Ice Hockey World Championships, Description
The USSR won their first five games before meeting up with the host, and defending champion, Sweden. Sweden, having already lost eight to nothing to Canada, desperately needed to beat the Soviets, but settled for a one all tie. The final game of the tournament pitted the East York Lyndhursts, representing Canada, against the USSR, both teams being undefeated. Tournament organizers believed the Canadians would cruise to their seventh straight win and had begun to sell tickets for a planned tie-breaking game between the Soviets and Swedes to determine the European Championship. However the Soviets "appeared to pass too much, check too little, and skate too fast" and "thoroughly dominated" in a 7–2 win before 16,000 fans.


1954 Ice Hockey World Championships, Description
Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA) president W. B. George stated that the final game was the worst he had seen the Lyndhursts play and that they seemed afraid of being penalized. The CAHA was heavily criticized by media in Canada for the failure to win the World Championships, and writer Michael McKinley stated the loss was a "day of reckoning" and a symbol of what went wrong with the CAHA's international strategy, and the beginning of a hockey rivalry with the Soviet Union.


1954 Ice Hockey World Championships, Description
Beginning with this year the IIHF began giving out official awards (known as the "directorate awards") to the best forward, defensemen, and goaltender, of the tournament.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team
The 1954 Idaho Vandals football team represented the University of Idaho in the 1954 college football season. The Vandals were led by first-year head coach Skip Stahley and were members of the Pacific Coast Conference. Three home games were played on campus at Neale Stadium in Moscow, with another in Boise at old Bronco Stadium at Boise Junior College.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team
Idaho compiled a 4–5 overall record and were 1–2 in the PCC. After five losses to open, they won their last four games. Six of the nine games were shutouts, with three wins and three losses. The four-game winning streak was the program's longest in decades.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team
In the Battle of the Palouse with neighbor Washington State, the 0–5 Vandals blanked the Cougars 10–0 in Pullman on October 23 for Stahley's first victory as head coach. It was Idaho's first win in the series in 29 years; the next came ten years later in 1964.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team
The annual game with Montana was not played this year; outside of wartime years (without teams), it was the first break in the rivalry in forty years. Idaho was three games into an eight-game streak over the Grizzlies and retained the Little Brown Stein until 1960.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team
After the win in Pullman, Idaho defeated favored Utah in Salt Lake City, then shut out North Dakota in Moscow and BYU in Boise.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team
A former head coach at Toledo and an assistant at Washington and in the NFL with the Cardinals, Stahley was hired in February, at an annual salary of $9,000. He remained as Idaho's head coach for eight seasons, then continued as athletic director for three more years.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team, All-conference
No Vandals were on the All-PCC team or the second team. Honorable mention were fullback Wilbur Gary and guard Burdette Hess.


1954 Idaho Vandals football team, NFL Draft
One senior from the 1954 Vandals was selected in the 1955 NFL Draft:


1954 Idaho Vandals football team, NFL Draft
Four members of the freshman team were selected in the 1958 NFL Draft:


1954 Idaho gubernatorial election
The 1954 Idaho gubernatorial election was held on November 2, 1954. Republican nominee Robert E. Smylie defeated Democratic nominee Clark Hamilton with 54.24% of the vote.


1954 Ilford North by-election
The Ilford North by-election of 3 February 1954 was held after the resignation of Conservative MP Geoffrey Hutchinson, who gave up his seat to become chairman of the National Assistance Board. He subsequently became Baron Ilford. The seat was retained for the Conservatives by Tom Iremonger, who held the seat at the General Election the following year, and who remained the constituency's MP until defeated at the October 1974 election.


1954 Illinois Fighting Illini football team
The 1954 Illinois Fighting Illini football team was an American football team that represented the University of Illinois during the 1954 Big Ten Conference football season. In their 13th year under head coach Ray Eliot, the Illini compiled a 1–8 record and finished in last place in the Big Ten Conference. Center Jack Chamblin was selected as the team's most valuable player.


1954 Illinois elections
Elections were held in Illinois on Tuesday, November 2, 1954.


1954 Illinois elections, Election information
1954 was a midterm election year in the United States.


1954 Illinois elections, Election information, Turnout
In the primary election, turnout was 32.06% with 1,695,491 ballots cast (957,042 Democratic and 738,449 Republican).


1954 Illinois elections, Election information, Turnout
In the general election, turnout was 65.34% with 3,455,173 ballots cast.


1954 Illinois elections, Federal elections, United States Senate
Democratic Senator Paul Douglas was reelected to a second term.


1954 Illinois elections, Federal elections, United States House
All 25 Illinois seats in the United States House of Representatives were up for election in 1954.


1954 Illinois elections, Federal elections, United States House
Democrats flipped three Republican-held seats, leaving the Illinois House delegation to consist of 13 Republicans and 12 Democrats.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Treasurer
Incumbent first-term Treasurer, Republican Elmer J. Hoffman, did not seek reelection. Republican Warren Wright, a former one-term holder of the office, was elected to succeed him.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Treasurer
This was the final Illinois Treasurer election to a two-year term, as voters also approved a a constitutional amendment which extended term length to four-years beginning in the following election.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Treasurer, Republican primary
Former Illinois Treasurer Warren Wright won the Republican primary. He defeated fellow former Illinois Treasurer Conrad F. Becker, as well as Robert J. Branson.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Superintendent of Public Instruction
Incumbent  Superintendent of Public Instruction Vernon L. Nickell, a Republican, was elected to a fourth term.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, State Senate
Seats in the Illinois Senate were up for election in 1954. Republicans retained control of the chamber.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, State House of Representatives
Seats in the Illinois House of Representatives were up for election in 1954. Republicans retained control of the chamber.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Trustees of University of Illinois
An election was held for three of nine seats for Trustees of University of Illinois.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Trustees of University of Illinois
The election saw the reelection of Democrat former member Kenney E. Williamson (who previously had served one full term and a partial term), and first-term Democratic incumbents George Wirt Herrick, Frances Best Watkins.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Judicial elections, Supreme Court
A judicial election was held on June 7, 1954 for the Fifth Supreme Court Judicial District. Republican Joseph E. Daily was unopposed.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Judicial elections, Lower courts
On November 2, 1954, a special election was held to fill a vacancy on the Circuit Court of Cook County.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Ballot measures
Three ballot measures were put before voters in 1954. One was a legislatively referred state statute and two were a legislatively referred constitutional amendment.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Ballot measures
In order to be approved, legislatively referred state statues required the support of a majority of those voting on the statute. In order to be placed on the ballot, proposed legislatively referred constitutional amendments needed to be approved by two-thirds of each house of the Illinois General Assembly. In order to be approved, they required approval of either two-thirds of those voting on the amendment itself or a majority of all ballots cast in the general elections.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Ballot measures, Legislative Apportionment
Legislative Apportionment, a legislatively referred constitutional amendment which amended Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Article IV of the 1870 Constitution of Illinois was approved by voters.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Ballot measures, Legislative Apportionment
In order for constitutional amendments to be passed by voters, they required either two-thirds support among those specifically voting on the measure or 50% support among all ballots cast in the elections.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Ballot measures, State Treasurer Amendment
State Treasurer Amendment, a legislatively referred constitutional amendment which amended Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article IV of the 1870 Constitution of Illinois was approved by voters. Among its changes was, beginning with the 1956 election, making the term of the State Treasurer be expanded from two to four years.


1954 Illinois elections, State elections, Ballot measures, State Treasurer Amendment
In order for constitutional amendments to be passed by voters, they required either two-thirds support among those specifically voting on the measure or 50% support among all ballots cast in the elections.


1954 Indian Rajya Sabha elections
Rajya Sabha elections were held in 1954, to elect members of the Rajya Sabha, Indian Parliament's upper chamber.


1954 Indian Rajya Sabha elections, Elections
Elections were held in 1954 to elect members from various states. The list is incomplete.


1954 Indian Rajya Sabha elections, Elections, Members elected
The following members are elected in the elections held in 1954. They are members for the term 1952-54 by luck as decided in 1952 and retire in year 1954, except in case of the resignation or death before the term.


1954 Indian Rajya Sabha elections, Bye-elections
The following bye elections were held in the year 1954.


1954 Indiana Hoosiers football team
The 1954 Indiana Hoosiers football team represented the Indiana Hoosiers in the 1954 Big Ten Conference football season. The Hoosiers played their home games at Memorial Stadium in Bloomington, Indiana. The team was coached by Bernie Crimmins, in his third year as head coach of the Hoosiers.


1954 Indianapolis 500
The 38th International 500-Mile Sweepstakes was held at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway on Monday, May 31, 1954. The event was part of the 1954 AAA National Championship Trail, and was also race 2 of 9 in the 1954 World Championship of Drivers.


1954 Indianapolis 500, Starting grid
R  = Indianapolis 500 rookie;  W  = Former Indianapolis 500 winner


1954 Indianapolis 500, Race summary
Bill Vukovich had to work much harder in this race due to his car was now 2 years old and the team had trouble getting it up to speed leading to a 19th place starting spot inside of row 7 for the race. Vukovich did not see the lead until lap 61 when he led 1 lap. He then after losing positions during pitstops worked his way forward, seeing the lead again on lap 92 leading for the next 38 laps until falling back due to another round of pitstops.


1954 Indianapolis 500, Race summary
Then Vukovich took the lead for good on 150 to win his second consecutive 500, setting a record (at the time) 130.840 mph average race speed. The record would stand until the 1957 Indianapolis 500. Sadly Vukovich died the following year attempting to win his third consecutive Indy 500. The race reportedly went 110 laps before the first yellow light.


1954 Indianapolis 500, Broadcasting, Radio
The race was carried live flag-to-flag on the Indianapolis Motor Speedway Radio Network. It was the second time the race was carried in its entirety. The broadcast was anchored by Sid Collins, his third as chief announcer, and seventh year overall with the crew. Charlie Brockman served as booth analyst and statistician, and also reported from victory lane.


1954 Indianapolis 500, Broadcasting, Radio
Of note, the network expanded its coverage to include four qualifying wrap-up shows during time trials weekends.


1954 Indianapolis 500, Broadcasting, Radio
The network expanded to include four qualifying wrap-up shows, and the number of affiliate stations increased to 210. All five major radio stations in Indianapolis carried the broadcast. The 1954 broadcast is notable in that it featured for the first time the famous phrase "Stay tuned for the Greatest Spectacle in Racing." Due to the increased number of affiliates at the time, the network needed a scripted "out-cue" to alert producers when to manually insert local commercials. A young WIBC marketing staff member named Alice Greene (née Bunger) is credited with inventing the phrase, and chief announcer Sid Collins coined it on-air. It has been used ever since, with all of the chief announcers proudly reciting it during their respective tenures.


1954 Indianapolis 500, Broadcasting, Radio
South Turns: Bill FroschBackstretch: Jack ShapiroNorth Turns: E. Z. Gwynn


1954 Individual Speedway World Championship
In the 1954 Individual Speedway World Championship was the ninth edition of the official World Championship to determine the world champion rider.


1954 Individual Speedway World Championship
Ronnie Moore a 21-year-old New Zealander won his first World Championship with a 15-point maximum in front of a 90,000 attendance. He defeated his main rival Olle Nygren in the final heat. Nygren then lost the silver medal ride off to Wembley's teenager Brian Crutcher. Moore's success was made all the more remarkable because he rode the meeting while still recovering from a broken leg. Moore's win made him New Zealand's first ever World Champion in all forms of motor racing.


1954 Individual Speedway World Championship, World final, Classification
m - exclusion for exceeding two minute time allowance •  t - exclusion for touching the tapes •  x - other exclusion •  e - retired or mechanical failure •  f - fell •  ns - non-starter •  nc - non-classify


1954 International Cross Country Championships
The 1954 International Cross Country Championships was held in Birmingham, England, at the Bromford Bridge Racecourse on 27 March 1954. In addition, an unofficial women's championship was held one week earlier at the same place on 20 March 1954. A preview on the men's event, a report on the men's results as well as the women's results was given in the Glasgow Herald.


1954 International Cross Country Championships
Complete results for men, and for women (unofficial), medallists,  and the results of British athletes were published.


1954 International Cross Country Championships, Participation, Men's
An unofficial count yields the participation of 62 athletes from 7 countries.


1954 International Cross Country Championships, Participation, Women's
An unofficial count yields the participation of 12 female athletes from 2 countries.


1954 Inverness by-election
The Inverness by-election, 1954 was a by-election held on 21 December 1954 for the British House of Commons constituency of Inverness.


1954 Inverness by-election
The by-election was caused by the resignation of the sitting Unionist Member of Parliament (MP) Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton, by his application for the Chiltern Hundreds. Douglas-Hamilton had held the seat since 1950.


1954 Inverness by-election
The result was a victory for the Unionist candidate Neil McLean. McLean held the seat until 1964 when he lost to the Liberal Russell Johnston.


1954 Inverness by-election, The constituency
In 1954 the constituency of Inverness was one of the largest Parliamentary constituencies in Britain spread across 4,000 square miles (10,000 km2) of Scottish Highland, from the county town of Inverness to the west coast of Scotland and included the Isle of Skye and some nearby islands. More than half the electorate lived in the town of Inverness itself however.


1954 Inverness by-election, Candidates
The Tories chose as their representative the 36-year-old, Eton and Sandhurst educated Lieutenant Colonel Neil McLean who had lived in the Highlands as a child. McLean had the advantage of knowing that Douglas-Hamilton was going to resign and had moved to the constituency in anticipation of the by-election. He had been installed as the prospective candidate for about 18 months, using the time to get to know the area well and establish a rapport with the electorate. Labour selected Dundee engine driver and trade union official, William Paterson, aged 44.


1954 Inverness by-election, Candidates
The former Labour candidate at the 1951 general election, Alexander Macnair had indicated he wished to stand again but the local Labour Party preferred a new man. Macnair then said he might put up as an Independent Labour candidate but did not do so in the end. The Liberals, who had not fought the seat at the previous general election in 1951 settled on John Bannerman a Gaelic speaking farmer and former Scotland Rugby international, who had been Liberal candidate for Argyll at the general elections of 1945 and 1950.


1954 Inverness by-election, Election issues
The first political controversy to emerge in relation to Inverness was the timing of the by-election itself. Labour in particular objected to what they called 'the sharp practice' of moving the by-election writ by the Tories when they did, based on the deliberate shortening of campaign time this would mean for opposition candidates, especially in a geographically large and electorally scattered constituency and at a difficult time of year - the dead of winter and just before Christmas. According to one account in a national newspaper the topical issues were the problems of depopulation, transport and midges.


1954 Inverness by-election, Election issues
However the Liberal candidate, John Bannerman, based his campaign on support for Home Rule for Scotland and an increase in old age pensions. Paterson received a letter of support from former prime minister Clement Attlee reminding voters that the Labour Party in office had developed hydro-electric power and a great programme of afforestation in the Highlands.


1954 Inverness by-election, Impact
The by-election result caused little stir at the time, although the Liberals were clearly pleased with their performance given they had not fought the seat in 1951 and had pushed Labour into third place. It does however seem that Inverness served as a portent of what was to come in Scotland over the next few general elections. One historian has commented that the "...Conservative Party was to suffer in the following decades from the effects of growing support for home rule, later translated into support for the Scottish National Party and a rise in support for the Liberals and Labour."


1954 Inverness by-election, Impact
Despite the opinion in The Times newspaper that ‘...it is possible to argue that if the Liberals could not recover Inverness this time, when all the circumstances and candidate favoured them, their best days there seem to be over for good' the Inverness result also pre-figured the Liberal revival of the late 1950s and 1960s when under the leadership of Jo Grimond the party won its first by-election victory since 1929 at Torrington in 1958 and more spectacularly at Orpington in 1962. As already noted, the Liberals best days in Inverness were hardly behind them as they won the seat in 1964 and the Liberal Democrats‘ Danny Alexander held the equivalent constituency until the 2015 general election.


1954 Iowa Hawkeyes football team
The 1954 Iowa Hawkeyes football team represented the University of Iowa in the 1954 Big Ten Conference football season.


1954 Iowa Senate election
The 1954 Iowa State Senate elections took place as part of the biennial 1954 United States elections. Iowa voters elected state senators in 21 of the state senate's 50 districts. State senators serve four-year terms in the Iowa State Senate.


1954 Iowa Senate election
A statewide map of the 50 state Senate districts in the 1954 elections is provided by the Iowa General Assembly


1954 Iowa Senate election
The primary election on June 7, 1954 determined which candidates appeared on the November 2, 1954 general election ballot.


1954 Iowa Senate election
Following the previous election, Republicans had control of the Iowa state Senate with 46 seats to Democrats' 4 seats.


1954 Iowa Senate election
To claim control of the chamber from Republicans, the Democrats needed to net 22 Senate seats.


1954 Iowa Senate election
Republicans maintained control of the Iowa State Senate following the 1954 general election with the balance of power shifting to Republicans holding 44 seats and Democrats having 6 seats (a net gain of 2 seats for Democrats).


1954 Iowa State Cyclones football team
The 1954 Iowa State Cyclones football team represented Iowa State College of Agricultural and Mechanic Arts (later renamed Iowa State University) in the Big Seven Conference during the 1954 college football season. In their first year under head coach Vince DiFrancesca, the Cyclones compiled a 3–6 record (1–5 against conference opponents), finished in sixth place in the conference, and were outscored by their opponents by a combined total of 182 to 151. They played their home games at Clyde Williams Field in Ames, Iowa.


1954 Iowa State Cyclones football team
The team's regular starting lineup on offense consisted of left end Mel Wostoupal, left tackle Ralph Brown, left guard Herb McDermott, center Elmer May, right guard Weldon Thalacker, right tackle Jim McMaulley, right end Barney Alleman, quarterback Jerry Finley, left halfback Gary Lutz, right halfback Bruce Alexander, and fullback Max Burkett. Max Burkett and Weldon Thalacker were the team captains.


1954 Iowa State Cyclones football team
The team's statistical leaders included Max Burkett with 528 rushing yards and 30 points (five touchdowns), John Breckenridge with 236 passing yards, and Mel Wostoupal with 151 receiving yards. No Iowa State players were selected as first-team all-conference players.


1954 Iowa State Cyclones football team
The November road game at Kansas State marked the first time that the Cyclones flew to a road contest.