187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
D-day for the Chunchon airdrop was initially planned for 22 March. On 20 March, aerial reconnaissance reported that Chunchon was no longer occupied by the NKPA. The US 1st Cavalry Division’s armored columns drove into Chunchon without difficulty. The capture of Chunchon had placed EUSAK within 8 miles (13 km) of the 38th Parallel, and the 187th ARCT had lost its airborne assault objective. Meanwhile, Brigadier General John P. Henebry had been keeping his 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) troop carrier assets in readiness for an airborne operation.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
On 21 March, even though there was some doubt as to whether paratroopers would jump at Chunchon, General Henebry had brought 80 C–119’s and 55 C–46’s from Ashiya and Brady Air Bases in Japan to Taegu Airfield. Parked wingtip to wingtip, the big transports filled the dusty graveled parking area to overflowing.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
Even though he canceled the airdrop at Chunchon, General Ridgway soon had other employment in mind for the paratroopers. Because of the CPVA/NKPA withdrawal from Seoul, Ridgway had directed an expansion of Operation RIPPER, designated Operation COURAGEOUS, that was designed to trap large numbers of CPVA and NKPA between the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul. The intent of Operation COURAGEOUS was for EUSAK's I Corps to advance quickly to the Imjin River with all possible speed to trap the Reds fleeing northward.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
Designated Operation Tomahawk, Ridgway wanted the 187th ARCT, with two US Army Ranger companies attached, dropped behind the NKPA at Munsan-ni, a village on the south bank of the Imjin River, 20 miles (32 km) north of EUSAK’s front lines. D-day was planned for 23 March. Two armored task forces would attack to the north through Uijongbu and Munsan-ni, with the Munsan-ni task force linking up with the 187th ARCT, trapping the NKPA between the two forces. The ROK 1st Infantry Division and US 3rd Infantry Division would follow the armored task forces.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
On the afternoon of 21 March, the same day they were assigned the new objective, Generals Henebry and Bowen, along with the commanders of the 314th TCG (C–119) and 437th TCW (C–46), visually reconnoitered the Munsan-ni area from the vantage point of a low-flying C–46 and selected two small DZs, one about 1 mile (1.6 km) northeast of Munsan-ni and the other about 3 miles (4.8 km) southeast of the town. Returning to Taegu Airfield, they met with General Ridgway to confirm that they could execute the operation at 09:00 on 23 March, weather permitting.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
The delay of the airborne operation must have caused General Henebry some anxiety, for his transports would have to sit on the ground at Taegu Airfield an overly long time. Because of the dust problem, the transports would not be able to run up their engines before they took off. On the other hand, the same paratrooper and equipment loadings worked out for Chunchon would be used for Munsan-ni. Since some 12,000 CPVA and NKPA were believed to be in the vicinity of Munsan-ni, it was emphasized that there must be no slip-up in the timing of the airdrops – the 187th ARCT must be on the ground in the two DZs without delay once the drops began.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni
The bulk of the 187th ARCT would jump onto the north DZ: General Bowen and his staff, 3/187th, 2/187th, the two Ranger companies, and the 674th AFAB. 1/187th would jump onto the south DZ to provide early-on linkup with the armored task force moving north.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
At 03:00 on the morning of 23 March, under a full moon, the paratroopers rolled out of their sleeping bags and started their pre-jump rituals – breakfast, loading into their combat gear, forming into sticks, moving to their assigned aircraft, and putting on the parachutes that they had checked the previous day and left at the planes. Each paratrooper carried a full battle load: main and reserve parachutes, combat pack, water canteen, rations, first aid packet, basic ammunition load, hand grenades, pistol, and rifle. The paratroopers carried their combat packs slung in front of their knees.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
A few drifting clouds promised a weather-perfect day for the airborne operation. By 07:00, the 187th ARCT, US 2nd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), and US 4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) were loaded aboard their assigned aircraft. One after another, spinning propellers churned up the dust as the long line of transports begin to taxi to the runway, churning up even thicker blankets of dust that obscured much of the runway area. At 07:30, Operation TOMAHAWK, the largest single-day airborne operation of the war, got underway as General Henebry’s C–54 command and control aircraft led the way.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
The lead formation, led by Colonel Richard W. Henderson, the 314th TCG's commanding officer and commander of the airborne delivery phase of Operation TOMAHAWK, took off from Taegu Airfield, formed up, and headed for its rendezvous point over the Yellow Sea, west of the Munsan–ni objective area. Thereafter, at 10–second intervals, the rest of the transports followed in dust so thick that the pilots flew blind until after liftoff.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
FEAF filled the skies between Seoul and Munsan-ni. As the troop carriers began to climb out from Taegu Airfield, two groups of B–26s from Japan had already begun to soften the objective areas with 500-pound airbursting bombs and low-level strafing attacks. Thirty-two B–26s began working northward from the outskirts of Seoul against enemy troop positions along the road to Munsan-ni; twenty-four B–26s operated against enemy areas closer to the DZs. Sixteen P–51s joined the transports as they passed into enemy territory.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
As planned, 3/187th with the 4th Rangers attached jumped first at 09:00, having been given the mission of securing the north DZ. The second serial, with 1/187th aboard, had encountered bad luck shortly after takeoff when the formation leader’s C–46, with Colonel Wilson and his staff aboard, encountered engine trouble, forcing the pilot to return to Taegu for a replacement aircraft. The plan went awry when the deputy formation leader's C–46 mistakenly followed the lead serial and dropped 1/187th onto the north DZ. The other aircraft in the formation dropped their paratroopers based on the lead aircraft, compounding the problem.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
The operation got back on track when the third serial dropped 2/187th with the 2nd Rangers attached, General Bowen and his regimental staff, engineers, medics, and others squarely on target in the north DZ. The fourth serial, composed entirely of C–119’s, delivered the 674th AFAB’s paratroopers and the artillery heavy airdrop accurately in the north DZ. Colonel Munson, already on the ground with 3/187th, recalled "All those unscheduled people (1/187th) dropped on top of us, on a DZ that was already badly congested. It was like a Chinese fire drill. But what was more serious was that we didn't have a force on the south DZ, which was the linkup point for the armored task force."


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
Shortly after 10:00, a single stick of paratroopers jumped from a C–46 over the south DZ. The replacement aircraft carrying Colonel Wilson and party had finally reached Munsan-ni, and its passengers had jumped into the correct DZ, not knowing that they would be the only troops in the area. When Wilson arrived over the south DZ, he was startled to find no parachutes on the ground where his battalion had supposedly jumped. "There was nobody there," he recalled. "We thought that they must have picked up their chutes and moved on. So we jumped anyway." When they landed, Wilson and the 29 members of his battalion staff were greeted with machine-gun fire from nearby hills. Fortunately, the NKPA stayed in the hills.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
Overcrowding caused by the misdirected drop complicated the assembly, but 1/187th and 3/187th managed to sort themselves out and secure the north DZ. An unexpected annoyance was created by civilians who appeared in the DZ and began carrying away the parachutes. Shots fired over their heads ended the attempted theft. 2/187th proceeded to occupy the high ground northeast of the DZ, and under the command of its executive officer, 1/187th, less B/187th, moved north and northwest, clearing Munsan-ni itself in the process.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
B/187th proceeded on a rescue mission to the south DZ after learning that 1/187th’s command group had come under fire from a hill overlooking the DZ. B/187th forced the NKPA off the hill and reached the DZ by 15:00. The rescue force and the 1/187th command group arrived at the regimental CP in the north DZ about two hours later. By that time, General Bowen’s forces had secured all assigned objectives.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
Before the day was over, 72 C–119s dropped 2,011 paratroopers and 204 tons of supplies and equipment, while 48 C–46s unloaded 1,436 paratroopers and 15.5 tons of supplies and equipment. Delivery of the 187th ARCT’s heavy equipment posed a more difficult problem. Due to the shortage of C–119s, two equipment drops had to be scheduled for each aircraft. In the morning, a formation of 23 C–119’s made an excellent airdrop in the face of increasing NKPA ground fire.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
One C–119 caught fire after its drop; five crew members managed to bail out before an explosion destroyed the aircraft, killing the pilot and copilot. The other C–119s returned safely to Ashiya Air Base to take on another load of heavy equipment. Twenty-eight C–119s were able to muster for the afternoon drop. One C–119 received minor damage from small-arms fire, while a second dropped its load prematurely when a restraining strap broke while en route to the DZ. The two drops delivered 277 tons of heavy equipment to the 187th ARCT, including 27 jeeps and trailers, two 3/4-ton weapons carriers, four 105mm howitzers, twelve 75mm pack howitzers, and 15 load-bearing platforms each carrying 600 pounds (270 kg) of supplies.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
The 187th ARCT faced only weak opposition on the ground and established a defensive perimeter by noon at the cost of one KIA and 18 WIA. There were 84 jump casualties; almost half of the jump casualties returned to duty immediately after treatment. At about midmorning, Air Force H–19 helicopters landed on the DZs to evacuate the wounded. This was the first combat use of the Air Force H–19 for the evacuation of wounded.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Airborne assault, 23 March 1951
The point of the armored infantry task force reached Munsan-ni at 18:30 on 23 March, but the remainder of the extended column took several hours longer. The task force encountered no NKPA along its route of march but was kept to an intermittent crawl by having to lift or explode over 150 live land mines, some of them booby-trapped, and almost as many dummy mines, including a 5 miles (8.0 km) stretch of buried C-ration and beer cans. Four M46 Patton tanks, two jeeps, and a scout car were disabled by land mines. As the last of these tanks hit a mine below Munsan-ni, the explosion attracted NKPA artillery fire that damaged two more tanks. The tail of the task force finally arrived at the airborne position at 07:00 on 24 March.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Aftermath
Although the airborne operation at Munsan-ni enabled EUSAK's I Corps to close up to the Imjin River very rapidly, its results in terms of NKPA killed and captured were negligible. NKPA casualties included 136 dead counted on the field and 149 taken captive. Estimated NKPA losses raised the total considerably higher. Contrary to expectations, prisoner interrogations indicated that NKPA forces who had been in the objective area had numbered between 300 and 500 members of a second-rate combat outfit. Disturbingly enough, the NKPA prisoners insisted that as early as 21 March their regiment had received warnings that the 187th ARCT was going to drop at Munsan-ni on 23 March and most of the remainder had withdrawn above the Imjin River well before the airborne landing.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Aftermath
The Munsan-ni airdrop, like the earlier Sukchon-Sunchon operation, had little tactical value. Munsan-ni could have been taken easily by EUSAK's ground offensive. Like the Sukchon-Sunchon experience, however, the airdrop could be rated a success, at least as a realistic training exercise.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
I Corps' orders for 187th ARCT operations called only for patrolling. Having been given control of the armored infantry task force, General Bowen built his principal patrols around the task force's Patton tanks and sent them to investigate ferry sites on the Imjin River and to check Route 2Y, a dirt road running east from Munsan-ni as far as the village of Sinchon, 10 miles (16 km) away. One patrol made contact while checking an Imjin River ferry site and ford 10 miles (16 km) northeast of Munsan-ni. Six NKPA were killed and 22 captured. The patrol had no casualties, but a tank had to be destroyed after it bogged down at a stream crossing while approaching the river. Meanwhile, a few rounds of artillery fire fell in the north DZ but caused no casualties.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
With no profitable employment forthcoming for the 187th ARCT at the Imjin River, I Corps quickly ordered General Bowen to pull in his patrols and prepare to move northeast of Uijongbu to capture the high ground about 10 miles (16 km) north of Uijongbu behind the CPVA opposing the advance of the US 3rd Infantry Division up the road from Seoul toward Yonchon and prevent the CPVA from withdrawing. The 3rd Infantry Division was to continue its northward attack and drive the CPVA against Bowen’s position.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
Launched on this attack over inaccessible rain-soaked roads before its MSR was opened to Seoul, the 187th ARCT had a great need for continuing aerial resupply for the basics of combat: food and ammunition. On 24 March, 36 C–119s airdropped 40 men and 188 tons of supplies at Munsan-ni to get the paratroopers started.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
The 187th ARCT started east on Route 2Y at 18:00 on 24 March, intending to march as far as Sinchon during the night and open its attack the following morning. Only a single tank company was able to move out with the paratroopers; all others had too little fuel after patrolling and were directed to catch up with the column after being resupplied from Seoul. A force shaped around the tanks led the way toward Sinchon.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
But after 7 miles (11 km), as the column moved through a system of ridges, landslides in defiles twice trapped the leading tanks, and in the second instance, no bypass could be found. As engineers tried to open the road, rain began to fall and became steadily heavier. With the rain making a poor road even worse, General Bowen ordered the tanks back to Munsan-ni. After the engineers had cleared the road sufficiently, his remaining forces proceeded to Sinchon, arriving about 06:00 on 25 March.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
Half an hour later, Bowen ordered 2/187th, with 3/187th following in support, to seize Hill 228 on the west side of Route 33. Running into small-arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire from positions on several nearer heights and hampered by a continuing driving rain, the two battalions at day's end were some 2 miles (3.2 km) short of Hill 228, and Route 33 remained available to the CPVA in front of the 3rd Infantry Division if they chose to withdraw over it.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
Withdrawal seemed to be the CPVA intention. The 3rd Infantry Division met only light resistance when it resumed its attack from the south on 25 March and advanced beyond the hill masses where strong CPVA positions had delayed it the day before. A tank company moved ahead on Route 3X, a secondary road angling northwest off Route 33 to Sinchon, in an attempt to contact the 187th ARCT. Mines along the road disabled four tanks and kept the tank company from reaching its destination, but it encountered no CPVA positions.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
The CPVA withdrawal was confirmed on  26 March when the 3rd and 25th Infantry Divisions moved well forward against little or no opposition. To the north, the CPVA continued to oppose the 187th ARCT's efforts to capture Hill 228. Using Route 33 and a lesser road to the west, two tank columns from the 3rd Infantry Division joined the 187th ARCT during the afternoon of 26 March, but, even with armored support, it was 09:00 on 27 March before the paratroopers captured Hill 228.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
Using the remainder of the day for reorganization and resupply, General Bowen attacked the heights on the east side of Route 33 early on 28 March and occupied them after an all-day battle, suffering heavy casualties in eliminating stiff CPVA resistance. Meanwhile, the US 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division made contact with the 187th ARCT late in the afternoon of 27 March. Despite I Corps' hopes for the operation, the 3rd Infantry Division drove no CPVA into the 187th ARCT's guns. Either the CPVA resisting the eastward attack of the 187th ARCT had kept Route 33 open long enough for the forces withdrawing before the 3rd Infantry Division to pass north, or the withdrawing CPVA had used another road, perhaps Route 3.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
Once they were on the road, four C–46s airdropped an additional 10 tons of supplies to the 187th ARCT on 26 March, and 12 C–119s airdropped an additional 66 tons of supplies on 27 March. The last two days' airdrops were of vital importance, for the 187th ARCT's men and guns were getting hungry; many of the men had eaten only once in 36 hours, and one artillery battery was down to its last five rounds of ammunition.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Operations at Munsan-ni, Ground operations, 24–28 March 1951
After the linkup with the 3rd Infantry Division, the 187th ARCT moved back to Taegu to reorganize, reequip, reman, and retrain. General Ridgway made it clear that, in the future, he did not favor using the 187th ARCT in a strictly ground combat role; he felt that the highly trained paratroopers should be used primarily for airborne missions – dropping deep behind the enemy and boxing him in while ground forces moved forward for the kill.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
When the CPVA and NKPA withdrew in the face of Operation RIPPER, they fell back across the 38th Parallel to a strong line anchored by well-constructed fortifications along the southernmost edge of the "Iron Triangle" – the region bounded by Chorwon, Kumhwa (modern-day Gimhwa-eup), and Pyonggang. It was known that the Communists were preparing for another offensive, making use of the supply centers and transportation facilities around the Iron Triangle. Following the conclusion of Operation COURAGEOUS, General Ridgway notified General MacArthur that he was developing plans for an operation that would take EUSAK above the 38th Parallel.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
The first phase of this operation would be to occupy the ground that would serve as a base of operations for continuing toward the Iron Triangle and, given the enemy’s evident offensive preparations, for developing a defensive position. Known as the KANSAS Line, this defensive position followed the Imjin River to a point a few miles north of the 38th Parallel and then ran eastward to the Yangyang area on the coast. It would take advantage of a water barrier in the center, the Hwachon Reservoir.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
The US I and IX Corps would seize and occupy the western segment of the KANSAS Line between the Imjin River and the Hwachon Reservoir, the US X Corps would occupy the central portion, and the ROK III and I Corps were to take the eastern section. This plan was submitted to General MacArthur, who approved it without consulting Washington.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
The new advance, designated Operation RUGGED, began on 5 April 1951. On the same day, General Macarthur, in one of his last messages to the JCS, explained its objectives. He added that plans had already been drawn up for additional advances, at some future date, to bring UNC forces 10 to 20 miles (16 to 32 km) north of the 38th Parallel and enable them to dominate the Iron Triangle. Limitations of supply, weather, and terrain, together with the strength of the enemy, indicated that any farther advance "is not feasible at this time." Operation RUGGED proceeded generally according to plan. By 9 April, the US I and IX Corps had fought through shifting resistance to the KANSAS Line. I Corps and the left-flank IX Corps' units had continued the attack toward Chorwon.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
On 11 April, at the direction of President Truman, General Ridgway relieved General MacArthur as UNC and FEC Commander-in-Chief because of MacArthur’s insubordination and his determination to expand the war into China. MacArthur had, on several occasions, publicly criticized the administration’s war and foreign policies. General Ridgway was succeeded by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet as EUSAK's commander.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
By 19 April, I Corps' lead elements were prepared to attack the Iron Triangle. General Ridgway had called a 48-hour halt to bring supplies forward before moving north. He ordered the attack, designated Operation DAUNTLESS, to resume on the morning of 21 April. Ridgway felt that the operation would provoke a major Communist attack for which he was prepared to fall back in order, trading real estate for the opportunity to kill the enemy. On the morning of 22 April, the I and IX Corps' assault regiments were advancing. The capture and interrogation of several CPVA revealed that the CPVA would launch a major offensive that night.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
At 22:00 on 22 April, the CPVA, mobilizing three field armies totaling 700,000 troops for the operation, launched a massive offensive in the west and west-central operational areas that Radio Pyongyang confidently predicted would destroy the UNC. By dawn the next morning, CPVA were attacking cross the entire Korean peninsula. The major effort, mounted by almost half of the CPVA troops, making it the biggest battle of the Korean War, was a double envelopment designed to isolate and capture Seoul.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
The initial CPVA attack fell upon I Corps on the south bank of the Imjin River, near Yonchon, north of Seoul, and IX Corps, near Hwachon, northeast of Seoul. The UNC lines held firm across the front except in IX Corps' AO where the CPVA smashed against the ROK 6th Infantry Division, driving it back and leaving a 10 miles (16 km) gap in the line. Rather than see his army engulfed, General Van Fleet gave the order for I and IX Corps to fall back to the KANSAS Line.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
Van Fleet made plans to halt the CPVA in front of Seoul and north of the Han River. On 29 April, the Communist offensive was halted in the west 5 miles (8.0 km) short of Seoul and north of the Han River, but by the end of April, I and IX Corps had lost everything gained during the last six weeks. Aerial reconnaissance indicated that Red divisions were side slipping toward the east-central and eastern AOs.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
Despite the hindrance of air attacks, the Communists shifted their strength and completed a concentration against the Chunchon-Inje sector that was held by the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps. During the early evening hours of 16 May, twenty-one CPVA and nine NKPA divisions delivered a powerful blow down the center of the Korean peninsula, striking southward down the roads from Chunchon and Inje that converged on Hongchon. ROKA forces broke under the attack, exposing the flank of the US 2nd Infantry Division. X Corps faced serious trouble.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
The 2nd Infantry Division held off the Red tide until 18 May and then, with the US 1st Marine Division, moved east to fill the gap vacated by the ROKA. By 20 May, after gaining initial success, the Communist offensive was blunted, leaving the CPVA over-extended and under constant aerial attack. This would be the last all-out CPVA offensive operation for the duration of the war and paved the way for General Van Fleet to gain the initiative.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
In a meeting on the previous day, Generals Van Fleet and Ridgway discussed the possibility of an offensive with Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, X Corps' commanding general. General Almond believed that the time was ripe for a strong attack northeasterly up the Kansong road to Inje and beyond, cutting off the escape routes required by the CPVA moving northward in their long march up the coast., but he needed fresh troops. Almond reasoned that the 187th ARCT, which was in X Corps' reserve and had been out of combat for some time, was the unit he needed.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
He would equip the paratroopers with vehicles, tanks, and artillery, and when the CPVA had driven even deeper, strike with the 187th ARCT. Ridgway had previously forbidden the use of the 187th ARCT as a ground force. He reasoned that paratroopers near an airfield, launching on short notice, would be a constant threat, causing thousands of enemy troops to remain in rear areas to counter potential airborne attacks. Even so, Van Fleet recognized the possibilities in Almond's plan and, after a five-minute discussion with Ridgway, decided to give the 187th ARCT to Almond.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations
The plan, as developed by Ridgway and Van Fleet, would have X Corps hold the CPVA in place for a few more days and prepare to counterattack on 23 May. The 2nd Infantry Division, spearheaded by a task force consisting of the armor-reinforced 187th ARCT and X Corps artillery, would advance from Hangye toward Inje, then northeasterly to Kansong to encircle and trap the retreating CPVA and NKPA and retake the ground lost by the ROKA.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
At 09:40 on 24 May, General Almond arrived by helicopter at the 187th ARCT CP at Hangye. He told General Bowen that it was critical to move out the 187th ARCT for Inje with all due speed. Almond ordered Bowen to form a battalion-strength task force to advance to the Soyang River, 15 miles (24 km) away, and establish a bridgehead; the remainder of the 187th ARCT would follow as soon as possible in motor transport.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
The 2nd Infantry Division would furnish, according to Almond’s order, four half-tracks with quadruple .50 caliber heavy barrel machine guns, and not less than two tank companies for armored reinforcement. He ordered the task force, not yet formed, to jump off at noon – two hours twenty minutes later. Bowen gave command of the task force to Colonel George H. Gerhart, his executive officer.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
2/187th was the infantry battalion assigned to TF Gerhart. A company of Sherman tanks from the US 72nd Tank Battalion was already attached to the 187th ARCT and occupied indirect firing positions near Hangye. The 72nd Tank Battalion's eight remaining tanks assigned to TF Gerhart were approximately 20 miles (32 km) southeast of Hangye; the distance and the condition of the road were such that the tanks would need between three and four hours to reach Hangye, thereby making it impossible to be on hand at the appointed departure hour.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
The 72nd Tank Battalion's tanks would form up with the mounted 2/187th as soon as they arrived. The rest of the 187th ARCT would follow later in the day. To speed things up, Colonel Gerhart organized a lead-out force consisting of a reconnaissance squad from the regimental Intelligence & Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon and a combat engineer platoon from the 127th AEB.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
A platoon of four tanks from the 72nd Tank Battalion made up the TF Gerhart armored point and was directed to move forward about  3 miles (4.8 km) to a rendezvous point designated on the map as Puchaetul (Puchaedol) (modern-day Buchaedeul-gil), selected by Gerhart as the departure point for the task force.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
The hour for launching TF Gerhart passed, and the force was neither complete nor organized. About 12:30, Colonel Gerhart reached the departure point where the task force was forming. Gerhardt had sent the I&R squad and the engineers forward to search for land mines on the road, and he had obtained a company of twelve Patton tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion that would be ready to move out with the main task force body.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Gerhart ordered the lead Sherman tanks with Major Charles A. Newman, the 72nd Tank Battalion's assistant executive officer, in overall command of the armored point force, to get underway at about 13:00. About 2 miles (3.2 km) beyond the departure point, the tanks came upon the I&R squad and the engineers. The I&R squad consisted of 11 men riding in three jeeps; each jeep mounted a .30 caliber machine gun. The engineers had two 2 1/2-ton cargo trucks.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
The column was re-formed with two tanks in the lead, a jeep, two tanks, a jeep, and then the two trucks, followed by the third jeep. The column advanced another 1 mile (1.6 km) to a friendly advance outpost at Koritwi-ri (Koridwi-gol), where it halted at 14:00 while the engineers went forward to probe the road for land mines and Major Newman took time to correct faulty radio communications with the I&R squad.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Arriving over the scene by helicopter, General Almond, already unhappy over the tardy start of the operation, landed to learn the reason for the halt. Major Newman explained that the column had temporarily stopped to permit a check of the road by mine detectors and to establish communications between the tanks and the I&R squad. Almond was impatient. "I don’t care about communications !" he said, emphasizing this by shaking his swagger stick at Newman. "You get those tanks on the road and keep going until you hit a mine.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
I want you to keep going at 20 miles (32 km) an hour." Newman ordered the column to move forward, instructing the tank commanders to shift to fifth gear, which would be equal to about 22 miles (35 km) an hour. The small armored point column reached Umyang-ni on the south bank of the Soyang River at 16:30 and set up a perimeter. By the time the main body of TF Gerhart arrived two hours later, Newman's armored point was in full possession of the bridge site.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Meanwhile, General Almond had flown back south to the 187th ARCT CP at Hangye to check on the main body of TF Gerhart, which he found still forming. Standing in front of the CP tent was Major James H. Spann of the 72nd Tank Battalion who had been left behind to contact and guide forward the rest of the battalion's tanks when they arrived. Almond, in rapid succession, asked Major Spann to what outfit he belonged, why the tanks weren’t moving, and the name of his battalion commander.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Almond replied when Spann had answered these questions, "to get that tank column moving whether the tanks have infantry support or not." In the meantime, Colonel Gerhart had formed the elements of his task force in their relative positions in the column and had moved the column onto the road. Before Major Spann could relay Almond’s order through Lieutenant Colonel Elbridge Brubaker, the 72nd Tank Battalion's commanding officer, it reached Gerhart through his own staff.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Gerhart then told the commander of the assigned Sherman tank company to disregard the task force organization and to get the tanks up the road to the Soyang River as fast as possible. The tanks, however, were intermingled with 2 1/2-ton trucks, half-tracks, and jeeps throughout the task force column, and it was not possible to immediately separate the tanks from the rest of the column. After spending considerable time jockeying tanks and other vehicles around in the column, a platoon of tanks succeeded in separating and was sent along to join the tank platoon leading the armored point.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
By late afternoon, TF Gerhart had fought its way 13 miles (21 km) through enemy defenses along the road ridges to Morumegi (Molmegi) (modern-day Morubak-gil), about 2 miles (3.2 km) south of the Soyang River, and joined up in the point force perimeter at 18:30. 2/187th remained there in bridgehead defense until 26 May.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Late on 24 May, with TF Gerhart occupying the lower bank of the Soyang River at Umyang-ni, General Almond issued orders for the US 23rd Infantry Regiment to move up on the morning of 25 May, pass through TF Gerhart, throw a treadway bridge over the river, and seize Inje in order to block large CPVA concentrations that aerial observers had sighted withdrawing up the Pungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road ahead of the pursuing US 38th Infantry Regiment. On the morning of 26 May, after the 23rd Infantry established the Soyang River bridge, TF Gerhart and the remainder of the 187th ARCT were to assemble under corps control just south of Umyang-ni for a rapid drive to seize Kansong on the coast.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
On the morning of 25 May, the remainder of the 187th ARCT, in motor transport with 3/187th leading, began its move up the Hangye-Inje road. CPVA were dug in on the high ground along the route of advance. As the lead vehicles of the motorized column passed, CPVA would emerge from camouflaged foxholes, throw grenades, and retreat back under cover, knocking out vehicles that had to be pushed off the road to keep the column moving. K/187th deployed two rifle platoons to clear the high ground of CPVA at least 200 yards (180 m) deep.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Hundreds of CPVA died in their foxholes as K/187th probed the ground with fixed bayonets. With the hazard close to the road removed, the column progressed slowly forward at about 1 or 2 miles (1.6 or 3.2 km) an hour. As the terrain flattened out, the area had to be cleared on both sides of the road. I/187th used two rifle platoons to clear the area between the road and the river. Enemy defenses stiffened as the 187th ARCT closed on the CPVA supply base at Inje, receiving mortar, artillery, and automatic-weapons fire.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
CPVA fire knocked out several tanks on the road, but the other tanks pushed them aside. The 187th ARCT closed up with TF Gerhart by late evening on 25 May. That evening, General Bowen called Lieutenant Colonel Rye Mausert, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Munson as 3/187th's commanding officer, to the regimental CP and issued him orders to move out at dawn to clear the single-lane road that ran along the bank of the Soyang River that cut through the hills to Inje. Later that night, CPVA ambushed a supply and ammunition vehicle convoy moving up behind the infantry column.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Early on the morning of 26 May, 3/187th moved out with K/187th deployed along the high ground for flank security. As the column moved slowly along the narrow roadway, the point ran into a sizable CPVA roadblock. 3/187th attacked in force, killing and capturing many of the Chinese. The battalion moved a few miles farther up the road and ran into another strong CPVA defensive position. K/187th began taking heavy casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Mausert directed I/187th to pass through K/187th and take the CPVA position holding up the advance.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Supported by the heavy weapons platoons from both rifle companies and M/187th's fire support, I/187th assaulted the ridge, clearing it of CPVA. I/187th's 1st Platoon, riding on tanks, reached the outskirts of Inje just before dark; it had taken over ten hours to fight up 10 miles (16 km) of road.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
The next morning, CPVA attacked from the high ground. K/187th, with I/187th in reserve, was ordered to clear and hold the high ground. In taking the high ground, K/187th repelled three CPVA attacks, leaving only a hill summit to their front in CPVA hands. I/187th was directed to take up the attack. At the same time, G/187th mounted tanks and rode up the road until forced by intense fire to dismount and fight on foot. Hills dominated the left side of the road and the Soyang River was on the right.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
G/187th neared a river ford just beyond Kwandae-ri (Gwandae-ri) and started across with 2nd Platoon in the lead. 2nd Platoon secured the high ground on the riverbank as the remainder of G/187th waded ashore and moved on north up the road. Finally, the tanks crossed the ford and the attack continued ahead. Without the protection of the hills, G/187th began taking heavy casualties. F/187th continued the attack through G/187th, deploying in line and sweeping forward to clear the hills to the front.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
2/187th moved forward into the low hills east of the Soyang River and set up a defensive position for the night. At sunup on 28 May, 3/187th, supported by the quad-50 half-tracks of A Battery, 88th AAAB, continued the attack up the western side of the Soyang River. While 3/187th cleared the western side of the river along the primary road, 2/187th recrossed the river to the west side across a man-made rock footway. After reaching the road, 2/187th turned north and assumed the point of the 187th ARCT advance.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
On 29 May, G/187th attacked Hill 420 at Wontong-ni. CPVA artillery, located about 1,000 yards (910 m) behind the hill, had been shelling G/187th since daybreak. G/187th's leading 3rd Platoon crested Hill 420's summit with little opposition and destroyed the CPVA position on the reverse slope, but began taking on heavy fire from another knoll. 3rd Platoon was then caught in the open by a strong CPVA counterattack. The paratroopers organized in the face of the CPVA fire and managed to hold position; G/187th would be forced to hold Hill 420 for four days.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Just before midnight, 3rd Platoon was struck by another CPVA attack, followed by two more before daylight on 30 May. With nothing but machine guns, rifles, and grenades, 3rd Platoon held its position on the knoll. During the night of 30–31 May, G/187th was repeatedly attacked by CPVA so often that 3/187th was running short of ammunition. Resupply came forward just in time to fend off another assault.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
At 02:00 on 31 May, CPVA stormed 3rd Platoon frontally and 1st Platoon on the left flank of Hill 420. PFC Carl M. Hamrick occupied a foxhole with Corporal Rodolfo P. Hernandez on the forward slope of the sector of Hill 420 occupied by 3rd Platoon, G/187th. According to Hamrick, the CPVA attacked with artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons. The attack was aimed directly at the sector where Hamrick and Hernandez occupied their foxhole. The CPVA massed just beyond a drop-off on the slope, about 25 yards (23 m) from their position.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
As the CPVA charged up the slope, 3rd Platoon opened up with machine-gun and small-arms fire. A fierce hand grenade battle ensued in which both Hamrick and Hernandez were wounded. A 3rd Platoon machine gun position was knocked out of action and several men on both sides of Hamrick's and Hernandez's position began to withdraw. The CPVA fire grew heavier as Hamrick and Hernandez continued to return fire with their rifles until Hernandez's rifle jammed. Without a word, Hernandez jumped out of the foxhole and charged the CPVA with his jammed rifle, bayonet fixed.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
He threw hand grenades as he disappeared in the darkness. At daybreak, Hernandez was found about 25 yards (23 m) in front of the foxhole. He was lying head to head with a dead CPVA soldier. There were four other dead CPVA in the immediate vicinity. All of the dead CPVA had deep bayonet wounds in their upper bodies. Hernandez was badly wounded and unconscious and was evacuated to the rear. Hernandez survived his injuries and was awarded the Medal of Honor.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
Along the route to Inje, 1/187th fought the same determined CPVA forces that faced 2/187th and 3/187th, suffering 11 KIA and over 40 WIA.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
At month’s end, EUSAK had made rapid progress against the demoralized Reds. The US I Corps had easily advanced north of Seoul to Munsan-ni and Uijongbu, while the US IX and X Corps had converged toward Hwachon to cut off Red troops. EUSAK would regain the line just north of the 38th Parallel, around the towns of Hwachon and Inje. The UNC counterattack would be halted by the Chinese and a subsequent offensive stand-down would begin the stalemate that lasted until the armistice of 1953. The 187th ARCT had suffered severely - 286 KIA or WIA.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
General Almond pulled the 187th ARCT out of its hard-won positions near Inje and moved them to a rear area near Wonju. By early June, General Bowen received orders to move the 187th ARCT from Korea to Japan, where, in proximity to USAF troop carrier bases and transport aircraft, the paratroopers would remain in EUSAK reserve, ready to mount another airborne operation in short order to reinforce the troops in Korea.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
As the first year of the Korean War was coming to an end, South Korea had been cleared of the CPVA and NKPA and UNC forces had pushed north of the 38th Parallel. On 23 June, in a radio address delivered in New York City, Jacob A. Malik, deputy foreign commissar of the Soviet Union and its delegate to the UN, suggested that the time had come for a peaceful solution to the Korean problem. Calling for negotiations between representatives of the UNC and the CPVA/NKPA, Malik stated "The Soviet peoples believe that as the first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a ceasefire and an armistice providing for mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th Parallel."


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Bloody Inje and Wontong-ni
On 27 July, Colonel Thomas J. H. Trapnell replaced General Bowen as the Rakkasans' commanding officer. On 5 October, Colonel Trapnell became Brigadier General Trapnell.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Return to Japan
The 187th ARCT had been severely bloodied during its tour in Korea – two combat parachute jumps followed by weeks of sometimes savage, close-quarters combat in bitter cold and rain over steep, rocky ridges and hills against an enemy capable of seemingly endless replacement. The paratroopers gladly welcomed the order to leave Korea, return to Japan, set up camp, train replacements, prepare to return to battle by parachute, and remain EUSAK's reserve. Life in Japan consisted of training, jump school, parachute jumps at various camps, and nightlife in town. At the Camp Hakata jump school, the golf course was the DZ, and the golfers would have to wait while the paratroopers dropped onto the DZ. The small jump school shortly began parachute training for the Japanese Army Self-Defense Force.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
Koje-do is a rocky, hilly island in the Korea Strait 30 miles (48 km) southwest of Pusan. In June 1952, Koje-do Island was the location of United Nations Prisoner of War Camp No. 1. From its beginning in 1951, the prisoner-of-war camp produced nothing but problems for the UNC.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The camp consisted of four enclosures, each divided into eight compounds, with each compound designed to hold up to 1,200 prisoners. It was grossly overcrowded; by May 1952, around 150,000 NKPA/CPVA POWs and civilian internees were held in an area designed for 38,400, living in a mix of squad tents, Quonset huts, and great, flat one-story buildings with corrugated sheet metal roofs. High barbed wire fences surrounded the square compounds with sentry towers at each corner.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The camp administrators carefully carried out the principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions regarding POW rights and the International Red Cross frequently inspected the camp. Tunnels linked all the surrounding compounds and messages were openly sent between compounds by wigwagging or hurled by rocks from compound to compound. Amazingly, each compound was permitted to have a metalworking shop, prisoners were issued gasoline to start fires, and gates and sally ports were left unlocked to facilitate work details entering and leaving more easily. Guards were kept out of the grossly dangerous compounds after dark.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
There were constant clashes between pro- and anti-Communist factions. It was known that General Nam Il, the NKPA High Command's Chief of Staff and the Communists' chief delegate at the Panmunjom armistice talks, had infiltrated NKPA fifth columnists into the camp to plan, organize, and stage incidents and murder uncooperative POWs and civilians. As early as June 1951, violence became the norm in the camp when several NKPA officers in Compound 76, the POW headquarters, protested having to dig latrines and garbage pits.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
When a ROKA guard detail entered the compound, the prisoners stoned the guards and the soldiers opened fire, killing three prisoners. Two months later, a prisoner demonstration left eight dead and 21 wounded. In September, a pro-Communist POW "kangaroo court" ordered 15 of their own executed. Mass riots required UNC troops to rush in and save some 200 POWs whose lives were in danger. In October, in the face of increasing tension in the camp, General Van Fleet activated the 8137th Army Unit Military Police Group to assist the prison security forces in policing the camp.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
In November, a battalion of the US 23rd Infantry Regiment was added to supplement the security force. By December, more than 9,000 US and ROKA troops were guarding the camp; this was still some 6,000 fewer than the number requested by the US 2nd Logistical Command in charge of all POW camps. On 18 December, a fight broke out between compounds, followed by demonstrations and riots that left 14 dead and 24 injured.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
On 18 February 1952, over 1,000 inmates fought the 3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment that was providing security for teams screening POWs to extricate and release South Korean civilian conscripts, estimated to number around 38,000, who had been swept up with the NKPA. Fifty-five POWs were killed that day, 22 died later, and 140 were injured. One American was killed and 38 were wounded. On 23 February, the North Korean and Chinese delegations at Panmunjom protested against the "sanguinary incident of barbarously massacring large numbers of our personnel." The Reds managed the news to the extent that, thereafter, the camp became a prison run by the inmates, while the guards could do nothing more than stay outside the wire, under orders not to use force.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
On 8 April, the UNC began screening POWs to determine those who did not wish to return to North Korea or China. Because of this screening, carefully planned violence by the POW leaders escalated to savage proportions. Two days later, when medics went into a compound to retrieve a wounded man, they were surrounded by a wave of prisoners and taken hostage. Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, the camp commandant, rescued them by sending in a hundred unarmed ROKA troops. The pro-Communist POWs continued to forcibly resist the screening with mass demonstrations and riots.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
General Van Fleet warned General Ridgway that the screening could continue only by forced entry. The Communist prisoners and the UNC appeared to have reached a stalemate; the former had interior control of the compounds, but could not get out without violence; and the latter had exterior control, but could not get in without violence. With the cancellation of forced screening, the UNC indicated that it was willing to accept the status quo rather than initiate another wave of bloodshed in the camp.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The lack of discipline and anarchy reached a climax on 7 May when General Dodd, after talking to a group of prisoners through the wire, was grabbed and dragged into Compound 76. When Van Fleet got word of the incident, he sent Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, I Corps Chief of Staff, to take command of the camp and inform the prisoners that Dodd no longer was in command and could make no decisions. To further bolster his forces, Van Fleet sent the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment to Koje-do. During the night of 9–10 May, 20 Patton tanks, five equipped with flamethrowers, arrived on Koje-do and were brought into position. Dodd was finally freed on 10 May. On Dodd's release, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner took over command of the camp.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The time had finally arrived to put down the revolt in the compounds. In the early hours of 16 May, orders arrived at the 187th ARCT CP at Camp Chickamauga near Beppu, Japan for General Trapnell to move his regiment to Koje-do. At the same time, Major General Chester E. McCarty was notified that the 315th Air Division would airlift the 187th to Pusan, beginning that afternoon. General McCarty and his staff left Tachikawa Air Base for Ashiya Air Base. General Trapnell and his staff also flew to Ashiya.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
Together, the generals and their staffs, along with Colonel Maurice F. Casey, 403rd TCW commanding officer, set up a joint CP at Ashiya. The 187th moved out of its training areas and barracks at Camps Chickamauga and Wood in some haste. In an outstanding example of "off-the-cuff" unit movement by air, the 315th Air Division's C–119s, C–47s, and C–46s were marshaled for airlifting the 187th and its combat equipment, vehicles, and supplies from Ashiya and Brady Air Bases to Pusan East Airfield.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
Alerted at 09:00 hours on 16 May, the last of 160 transport aircraft landed at Pusan at noon on 17 May, taking only 17 hours to move 2,361 troops and 889.1 tons of equipment to South Korea in what airlift historian Annis G. Thompson termed "the fastest and most efficient air combat move of the entire war." The paratroopers assumed they were going to make another combat jump; they were displeased when, at Pusan, they were issued a basic ammunition load and shoved aboard LSTs.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
They learned that their target was the POW compounds at Koje-do on the overnight trip by water. The 187th arrived at Koje-do and unloaded from the LSTs, mounted up in motor transport, and drove through a series of dirt streets surrounded by the POW compounds. One A/187th rifleman's first impression of Koje-do was one of indignation – all the compounds were flying North Korean, Chinese Communist, and Russian flags; the barbed wire fences were strung with written epithets in English, and in each compound, the inmates had constructed a reviewing stand complete with prominent Red Stars. The POWs postured, marched, sang Communist songs, and practiced their own form of bayonet drill.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
During the next month, the 187th established itself on Koje-do in battalion areas some distance from the POW compounds. Then the paratroopers got into the construction business. Relieving the 38th Infantry, they began a mission of breaking up the 4,000-to-6,000-man compounds into smaller, more controllable units. To accomplish this, they first built 2,000-man compounds divided into four sections holding no more than 500 prisoners each. The sections that came under 187th control were Compounds 76, 77, 78, 80, and a female compound, totaling some 20,000 NKPA and CPVA prisoners. Compound 76 was the headquarters of the POWs on Koje-do.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
To block the view inside the compound, the prisoners began hanging blankets on the barbed wire fences, which the 187th paratroopers burned with flamethrowers. The POW leader complained to the Red Cross, but no more blankets were issued. The 187th would quell rioting and disturbances in the various compounds with tear-gas grenades that, because of their long-burning fuses, were sometimes picked up and thrown back by the prisoners. When the 187th received a shipment of fast-burning tear-gas grenades and used them, the prisoners grabbed them as usual, with the grenades exploding in their hands.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
During the weeks that the 187th had been on Koje-do, they had been gathering intelligence concerning the prisoners and their armaments. It was known that they had been saving their gasoline, storing it inside their buildings, and making Molotov cocktails for use against the guards. They had homemade knives and spears. They had dug a trench network inside and outside the tents and buildings. They were prepared to resist a takeover.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
By 9 June, the 187th was ready to move the prisoners from Compound 76 to the new, smaller compounds. General Trapnell’s OPLAN called for 3/187th to face the compound's entrance; 2/187th would support from the rear of the compound; and 1/187th would enter by force, if necessary, to move the 6,400 prisoners to the new area. On the afternoon of 9 June, General Boatner notified the POW commander that the transfer would take place the next day.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
At 06:00 on 10 June, the 187th took up its planned positions around Compound 76. General Boatner summoned the POW commander to the main gate and ordered him to have all his men put down their weapons, form into 150-man groups for the transfer, and sit on the ground with their hands on their heads, prepared for movement to the new compound. He refused. Boatner gave him a 30-minute ultimatum to form up the prisoners. Long after the 30 minutes had elapsed, the prisoners had still refused to comply. The 187th moved in.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
On order, tear-gas and concussion grenades were lobbed over the wire. The 127th AEB’s engineers had cut a hole in the wire for 1/187th to breach the compound. A/187th moved forward and made the initial breakthrough. When the Rakkasans moved through the wire, the prisoners took their positions in trenches, ready to resist. Others retreated to tent and barracks fortifications. Many were carrying spears made from tent poles with attached metal knives; the spears were 4 to 6 feet (1.2 to 1.8 m) long with blades up to 15 inches (38 cm). Others carried flails made from barbed wire.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
They had contrived homemade gas masks with eyepieces made from cigarette packages and filters made from tin cans filled with sugar and charcoal. The prisoners reacted frantically, throwing spears, Molotov cocktails, and rocks at the advancing Americans. They ignited hidden gasoline caches stored in the tents and huts, setting the compound ablaze.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
1/187th pushed through to the first trench line located 10 feet (3.0 m) inside the wire. A group of prisoners was spotted running into a tent that was ordered to be destroyed with flamethrowers. At this point, a prisoner speared a flamethrower carrier in the groin; he died before he could be evacuated from the compound. Another paratrooper seized the flamethrower and the 1/187th line moved to the first row of tents. The tents were well dug in with long, corrugated metal-roofed sunken burrows with 3 feet (0.91 m) high mud and stone walls behind them. These were the strong points from which the prisoners made their most determined stand.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
Prisoners were thick in the tents and trenches surrounding them. They stabbed at the paratroopers with their spears and threw Molotov cocktails amid the moving squads. Retaliating with thermite hand grenades and flamethrowers, the tents were soon on fire. The paratroopers drove or dragged the  screaming, slashing, and fighting prisoners out of the trenches; they pulled approximately 200 prisoners from the first tent. As quickly as they were subdued, the prisoners were moved to the rear and herded into the new enclosures.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
Meanwhile, 2/187th had moved into Compound 76 from the rear and had forced thousands of shouting, screaming prisoners into a huge, tightly massed mob. Within about 10 minutes, the 187th halted their advance at the center of the compound, and flamethrowing tanks moved in behind the infantry line. The Rakkasans could see prisoners who tried to surrender being murdered by the camp leaders. Finally, after about two hours, the 187th gained control of the compound. The prisoners threw down their arms and walked to the gates to be moved to the new areas. They were herded out of Compound 76, stripped naked, and stuffed into open semi-trailers with wire mesh stretched over the tops. At the new compound, they were issued new uniforms and a rice bowl.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The POWs suffered 31 killed, half by their own officers, and 139 wounded. The 187th lost one man and suffered 13 injured. After the burned-out, filthy compound was cleared, the 187th found 1,000 Molotov cocktails, 3,000 metal-tipped spears, 4.500 knives, thousands of dollars in currency, a working telegraph set, and mockups of rifles and machine guns. In an isolated part of the compound, they found the bodies of more than 50 anti-Communist prisoners who had been executed and thrown down wells. They found another 100 bodies in unmarked shallow graves. They also found plans for a POW breakout and the seizure on Koje-do Island, set for 20 June.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The next morning, the 187th deployed to Compound 78, ready and armed to clear that compound. The prisoners had witnessed the previous day’s onslaught and decided that peaceful surrender was the better course of action. General Trapnell gave the 6,000 prisoners a half-hour to form up and move out. After returning to their tents to gather personal effects, they peacefully complied on time. When the 187th searched the compound’s headquarters and mess areas, they found that every desk drawer, file cabinet, and scores of pots and pans on the still hot stoves were loaded with human excrement.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
The epitaph to the 187th’s Koje-do deployment was a Life magazine cover a couple of weeks after the burndown and reestablishment of UNC control over the POW camp: the cover pictured Major David Korn, the 187th’s Intelligence Officer, holding Colonel Lee Hak Ku by the hair of his head amid the carnage of Compound 76. Colonel Lee had been found cowering in a ditch, disguised as a female, before capture. Lee, who had expected to be killed, was placed in solitary confinement for the remainder of his imprisonment on Koje-do.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Koje-do
Koje-do was "mission accomplished" for the 187th ARCT. But it was not back to Japan for the Rakkasans. It was back to Korea and the defensive line near the Iron Triangle with a new commanding officer.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
After Koje-do, the 187th returned to South Korea and established a base of operations near Taegu Airfield. On 29 July 1952, Colonel William C. Westmoreland flew into Taegu to replace General Trapnell as the 187th ARCT's commanding officer. At this time, 1/187th was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Russell E. Whetstone, 2/187th by Major Charles M. Holland, 3/187th by Lieutenant Colonel Dow S. Grones, and the 674th AFAB by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart M. Seaton.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
When he joined the 187th ARCT, Colonel Westmoreland had more than 50 parachute jumps to his credit (he had commanded the 504th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division, in 1946 and 1947, but had not jumped in more than a year). On 30 July, one day after assuming command of the 187th ARCT, he participated in a training jump with one of his infantry battalions. He made a point to jump with each of the battalions. His second jump almost cost him his life. Westmoreland later recalled that he made a poor exit from the aircraft and his parachute failed to open. He finally succeeded in shaking the parachute loose, allowing it to fill with air and blossom about 300 feet (91 m) above the ground. "I should have pulled my reserve chute. I had flirted needlessly with death."


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
On 4 August, the Rakkasans moved north to the Chipo-ri marshaling area in preparation for movement up to the front line. On 8 August, Colonel Westmoreland, his staff, and the battalion commanders were briefed on the 187th ARCT's new mission at the 17th Infantry Regiment's CP. The OPLAN called for the 187th to secretly relieve the 17th Infantry in place above Changnim-ni in the Iron Triangle. The purpose of the secrecy was to prevent the CPVA/NKPA from knowing that the 187th ARCT was on the front line as a ground unit and not an airborne threat to their rear areas.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
All identifying unit patches and traces of unit designation were removed from their uniforms, vehicles, and equipment. The 17th Infantry screened the 187th ARCT's movement to the deployment areas selected by Westmoreland. The paratroopers came on line in the vicinity of the Hantan-gang River-Namdae-chon River valley area on the central front. The 187th ARCT settled into defensive positions for the next two months.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The UNC war of maneuver was over for the most part in Korea. Neither the 187th ARCT nor any other UNC unit was allowed to conduct more than limited offensive operations to gain control of dominating terrain, deny the CPVA or NKPA the use of forward OPs, capture prisoners, and keep their opponents off guard. Many of the 17th Infantry's positions inherited by the 187th were poorly sited and considered indefensible by Colonel Westmoreland. He adjusted and pushed out his lines, straightening bulges and covering avenues of approach. He also ordered platoon-sized combat patrols and raiding parties to strike enemy positions across the valley.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The 674th AFAB was deployed in firing battery order behind the 187th ARCT MLR, in direct support of the infantry battalions. Each rifle company had an artillery forward observer (FO) at an OP in a forward position from which the FO could see the terrain in front of the infantry and observe the enemy lines across the valley. The FO had a Battery Command (BC) Periscope used for both forward observation and measurement of angles of sight and azimuth for artillery fire, in addition to a 40X magnification spotting scope through which he could examine enemy positions in detail. The FOs were in direct radio contact with the 674th fire direction center (FDC) and each other.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
Early on the morning of 14 August, the 674th's A Battery FO team in support of C/187th was on duty in the team's OP bunker observing the valley to its front through the BC scope when it observed what appeared to be a 187th combat patrol walking near a known CPVA position in the vicinity of a preplanned artillery concentration point. C/187th's company commander was radioed about the patrol's location and the FDC was given the concentration point number. The patrol was observed walking back toward friendly lines when hundreds of CPVA suddenly ran out to cut them off.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The FDC was given the order for the 674th's three firing batteries to fire for effect on the preplanned concentration point. The artillery rounds landed squarely on the CPVA, stopping them in place. This gave the American patrol, now identified as belonging to A/187th, time to start running toward the 187th's lines, and putting them squarely in the path of another group of CPVA trying to trap them.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
Smoke and debris from the exploding artillery shells obscured the view from the FO bunker and visual contact was lost with the A/187th patrol. Without visual confirmation of the patrol's location, a ceasefire order was about to be given when a voice, later identified as that of Corporal Lester Hammond, the patrol's radio operator, came over the infantry radio net in the FO bunker. Hammond said "Keep firing. Your shells are landing right on them. I can see Chinese all over. There are many dead. You killed a lot. Keep firing."


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The FO passed the order to the FDC to keep firing, that the FO had radio contact with the patrol, and that the fire was effective. Hammond now called for several adjustments that were passed to the FDC. The artillery rounds now began cracking over the OP in rapid order as they traveled downrange to their targets. Hammond reported that he was shot in the leg but he continued to adjust the artillery fire. Within 15 minutes, the infantry radio net went silent. Hammond was no longer transmitting and he wasn't responding to calls from the FO bunker. It wasn't known if the CPVA were too close and he didn't want to reveal his position, or if he was KIA.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
Now, other groups of CPVA were running toward the scene of the battle, so the FO started directing artillery fire at them, splitting the 674th's three firing batteries. Still concerned about the lost A/187th patrol and Corporal Hammond's silence, the FO was about to request a ceasefire in that area when Hammond's voice again came over the infantry radio net, very weakly, saying "Keep shooting...the Chinese are all over...I can see hundreds dead," and then it faded out again. The FO could hear artillery shells exploding very close to Hammond when he pressed the radio's microphone button.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The FO continued to call in artillery knowing Hammond was hurt. Hammond's weak voice was heard again calling for an adjustment that the FO thought would result in the shells landing on him. Hammond's next words were to the effect, "Don't argue with me. Shift fire. The Chinese will kill me anyway." He was asked if the rest of the A/187th patrol was near him. Hammond replied that he was alone. His last words were "For God's sake, keep firing."


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The FO had a tough decision to make – shift fire onto Hammond's position and probably kill him, but save the lives of others, or not shift fire and maybe save Hammond, but lose the patrol. The decision was made to shift fire as Hammond requested. There was no response from Hammond after the artillery fire was shifted onto his position. Corporal Lester Hammond was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for giving the ultimate sacrifice.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
Lieutenant Colonel Whetstone, 1/187th's commanding officer, arrived at the OP to set up a C/187th relief force to find the A/187th patrol and bring it back. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Westmoreland appeared. More CPVA were spotted along the valley floor. The FO adjusted the firing batteries as targets came into view. From the valley, the relief force reported many CPVA dead and some "seemingly disorganized and disoriented." Later that day, the relief force made contact with the lost A/187th patrol and recovered Corporal Hammond's body. As the relief force was withdrawing, the CPVA attacked. At one time, six fire missions were being conducted on six separate targets, using the 674th's three 105mm firing batteries, 155mm howitzers from Corps Artillery, and 4.2-inch and 81mm mortars from several 187th units. CPVA counter-battery fire whistled over the OP and landed in the rear.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The battle raged on throughout the afternoon with the CPVA trying to block the escape of the C/187th relief force and the A/187th patrol. The FO called for 4.2-inch mortar fire on a CPVA-occupied hill to his front. Unfortunately, the mortar crews were out of high explosive rounds. The mortar crews were directed to fire whatever they had – "smoke, flares, or anything you got." The FO checked the area through his BC scope and saw hundreds of CPVA swarming over the hill.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
When the mortar smoke rounds landed, CPVA near the smoke halted since they knew from past experience that smoke usually preceded an airstrike. But no airstrike had been planned. Suddenly, all the CPVA stopped and squatted, knelt in place, or laid down. The FO saw a lone F–51 fighter-bomber descending out of the sky in a dive-bombing position. It released a bomb that landed on the CPVA in the white smoke area, causing the CPVA to turn and run back toward their own caves in complete panic. Later that afternoon, the C/187th relief force and the five surviving members of the A/187th patrol came back safely to friendly lines, carrying Corporal Hammond's body.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
Two days later, it was revealed that Corps Artillery had planned an airstrike deep in the Kumhwa Valley with the target identified by white smoke from a 155mm howitzer. The F–51 pilot missed the 155mm smoke round, dropped his bomb load on the 187th's 4.2-inch mortar smoke round, and saved the day for 1/187th.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
During this period of limited offensive operations, EUSAK directed all units along the line to capture CPVA soldiers for their intelligence value. The 187th ARCT's S-3 (Operations) staff devised a plan to send a liaison aircraft over CPVA lines, have it develop engine trouble, have the pilot bail out, then have the aircraft fly over a hill and crash  on the other side, out of sight of the CPVA lines. It was hoped that the CPVA would exit their caves to capture the pilot. With Colonel Westmoreland's enthusiastic approval, it fell on the Aviation Officer and the regimental I&R Platoon to implement the scam. They built a dummy and cannibalized an abandoned aircraft from the 7th Infantry Division's airstrip for parts to build a smoke screen.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
At midnight on 28 September, the I&R Platoon slipped out through friendly lines in squads five minutes apart and followed an abandoned aqueduct toward a CPVA-occupied hill. The I&R Platoon arrived at a small grove about 200 yards (180 m) from the base of the hill and took up watch positions throughout the day. At about 17:00, the I&R Platoon heard the liaison aircraft in the distance. CPVA on another hill took it under fire. Suddenly, the plane belched a cloud of white smoke, spun earthward, then leveled off and glided over the I&R Platoon's position.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The dummy pilot was thrown out, its parachute popped open, and came to rest about 600 yards (550 m) away from the American position. The plane wobbled out of sight behind a hill and the engineers set off an explosion with a barrel filled with napalm. The I&R Platoon waited in hiding. Soon, about two squads of CPVA came down a trail. The Rakkasans held their fire until the last minute, then the entire platoon opened up. It was over in seconds.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
When the order was given to cease fire, they had captured one wounded CPVA and immediately set out to return to their own lines, under covering fire from E/187th as they crossed the valley. Unfortunately, the CPVA prisoner died long the way. Colonel Westmoreland met the I&R Platoon behind the forward lines and congratulated them on the almost successful ruse.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The 187th ARCT was pulled off the line, moved to an airfield north of Seoul, and restored to its original airborne unit designation with the return of its unit insignia.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
The Rakkasans' last mission on its second tour in Korea involved a part in Operation FEINT, designed to lure CPVA/NKPA forces into the open, making them easier targets for airstrikes, naval gunfire, and artillery barrages. According to the OPLAN, EUSAK would "go through the motions" of preparing for a major offensive to link up with an amphibious landing over the beaches at Kojo on North Korea's east coast. The 187th ARCT would theoretically make a combat jump somewhere in the vicinity of the amphibious landing. Each battalion made a practice jump.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
1/187th hit the Taegu DZ in good order, occupied a nearby village, marched 5 miles (8.0 km), and boarded motor transport for the ride back to the airfield. High winds canceled the second day's jump. On the third day, the jump went as scheduled with the exception of a 3/4-ton weapons carrier that dropped without the restraint of parachutes. For the next two days, the 187th ARCT was confined in barbed wire enclosures around their tent city near Taegu, with no visitors or native laborers allowed in camp.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Subsequent Operations, Kumhwa Valley
On the fourth day of their isolation, the Kojo beachhead was pummeled by airstrikes. On 15 October, the US Navy launched mock amphibious landings along the east coast. The C–46s and C–119s, with only their flight crews aboard, flew over the mock DZ and headed out to sea. Waves of fighter-bombers then hit the area. All in all, enemy reaction was minimal. EUSAK called off the operation and Operation FEINT lived up to its designation. That night, C–124s began lifting the 187th ARCT back to its home bases in Japan.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
When they returned from Korea to Camps Chickamauga, Wood, and Kashii on Kyushu, they found their noncombat gear and personal effects about as they had left them in their barracks and footlockers. The 187th ARCT's mission, that of theater reserve, required that they remained in a state of readiness for rapid deployment back to Korea by parachute or other means.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
This mission complemented Colonel Westmoreland's training schedule, intended not only to keep the Rakkasans sharp in individual and unit combat skills, but also to wear them down so that by nightfall they had little energy left to search for off-post diversions. He ordered a stop to overnight passes that caused a momentary wave of complaints, but morale in the 187th ARCT reflected Westmoreland's concern for his soldiers, and their realization that his orders did not mean he was their antagonist.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Colonel Westmoreland was promoted to brigadier general on 7 November 1952 at the age of 38, making him one of the youngest US Army generals in the post-World War II era. The winter and spring of 1952–1953 was a period when General Westmoreland sharpened the 187th ARCT to a fine edge of military perfection and combat readiness.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
The paratroopers had always been proud and tough, believing that "legs," soldiers who were not in Airborne units that wore their dress uniform trousers with an unbroken front seam down to "low quarter" dress shoes rather than soldiers who were in jump-status Airborne units that bloused the legs of their dress uniforms into "jump boots," a boot that was  part of the Airborne tradition, were in a lower caste on the military scale. But in the Westmoreland period, he glazed the 187th with a new patina of the martial way of life.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
They were inspected in ranks at morning formation, had their barracks and lockers checked daily, paraded sometimes once a week, and, on occasion, stood full field inspections with their personal gear precisely laid out in front of their carefully aligned pup tents. Westmoreland saw to it that their parachuting proficiency, physical fitness, and combined arms skills were as sharp as their soldiering expertise.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Initially, parachute training jumps were limited in size, sometimes using just a single aircraft. At Camp Wood, an open field adjacent to the camp served as both an airfield and a DZ. A C–47 would arrive, take on a load of paratroopers, take off, make a pass over the field, drop the paratroopers, land, pick up another planeload, and repeat the process. Later, the jumps at Ashiya Air Base expanded into battalion-size and larger tactical maneuvers. One such jump was an airborne maneuver near Mount Fuji in the spring of 1953. Thirteen C–119s delivered a reinforced infantry company in a three-hour, nonstop flight from Ashiya and dropped the paratroopers on the slopes of the snow-covered, 13,090 feet (3,990 m) mountain. It was the first time paratroopers of any nation had ever jumped on the slopes of the sacred Japanese mountain.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Meanwhile, the war in Korea continued to fluctuate back and forth along the front lines up near the 38th Parallel. On 28 May 1953, while truce talks were again taking place at Panmunjom after a six-month hiatus, US hopes for an armistice faded when the CPVA launched a powerful offensive along the entire truce line that forced the US 25th Infantry Division to withdraw from five hilltop outposts east of Panmunjom. The main thrust of the offensive occurred on 10 June against the ROKA positions at the Kumsong Salient.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Under overwhelming force, several ROKA divisions wavered, broke, and ran, leaving large holes in the defensive line. Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, who had assumed command of EUSAK on 11 February, filled the gap with reserve divisions and stabilized the front by 18 June. Even so, he wanted additional forces from theater reserve deployed along the line – this meant, among others, the 187th ARCT in Japan. On 19 June, the alert order went out to all three camps. Within hours, unit commanders loaded their troops onto trains for the ride to Brady and Ashiya Air Bases. At the airfields, the men were issued green, camo-colored silk scarves, the 187th's personal combat trademark, signaling that they were headed back to the line in Korea.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
The 187th ARCT, less the 674th AFAB that was attached to IX Corps Artillery in support of the ROKA on the front line, went into theater reserve near Seoul and continued its training and practice parachute jumps along the banks of the Han River. On 13 July, the CPVA attacked IX Corps' right flank with three divisions and broke through the ROKA lines. All along the line, the ROKA retreated under heavy CPVA pressure. While the 187th was moving up on the line, the 674th AFAB moved to get into position to directly support the 187th.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
The 187th moved into defensive positions in the vicinity of Kumhwa, under the command of and on the US 2nd Infantry Division's right flank, in roughly the same area it had occupied in the fall of 1952. General Westmoreland, after extensively reconnoitering the area and aware of the CPVA presence to his front, placed Major Frederick J. Kroesen's 1/187th on a hill overlooking the entire IX Corps' front. From the hill, 1/187th could observe the east and west routes along which IX Corps' artillery echelon was deployed. The corps artillery covered one likely CPVA invasion corridor through the Kumhwa valley. Westmoreland deployed his other two battalions to the west of 1/187th, returned to the 187th ARCT CP, which was set up adjacent to the 674th AFAB's 105mm howitzer firing positions, and prepared to repel any CPVA attacks down the corridor defended by his paratroopers.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
When a CPVA attack during the middle of a rain-soaked night opened a gap in the line between two adjacent units, it left the 187th ARCT holding a critical section of terrain. The 2nd Infantry Division's CP telephoned General Westmoreland with an order to withdraw 1/187th from its current position and reposition it. Westmoreland considered the hill currently occupied by 1/187th key to his defensive strategy and objected to the order.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Additionally, he did not consider it advisable to move his battalion without reconnaissance into a new position at night without exposing his own CP, requiring it also to be moved. When the order was repeated, Westmoreland insisted that he deemed the move ill-advised and again requested the division commander to reconsider the order. When he was threatened with removal from his command, Westmoreland had no choice but to obey, but he made it clear that he was following the order under protest. Major Kroesen executed the 1/187th withdrawal flawlessly. To ensure the integrity of the 187th ARCT's position, Westmoreland organized a provisional force made up of service personnel to occupy a blocking position for 1/187th's withdrawal. As it turned out, American counterattacks eliminated the CPVA salient before they could occupy the key terrain vacated by the Rakkasans.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Even though the CPVA had launched their last major offensive of the war, skirmishes and artillery duels along the front did not stop. Patrols from both sides raided across the line, firefights and harassing sniper fire were routine, and night infiltration through the wire was common even as the armistice neared. On 27 July, the 187th ARCT received word that the truce would become effective at 22:00. Orders were passed to clear weapons at 18:00 so as to prevent any incident that might compromise the truce.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
The 187th was doomed to lose one more member, the last of the Korean War when, five hours before the ceasefire, Sergeant Carl A. Hammer, 22, was killed in a skirmish along the MLR. At the first light of dawn, the regiment began the burdensome job of policing up and getting gear together in preparation for departing their positions. Orders came down to dismantle the MLR bunkers and defenses, move back several thousand yards, and construct new and more elaborate positions. For the next three days, bunkers, strongpoints, and outposts on the old MLR were blown up. By 1 August, the 187th ARCT had moved to the new line and started construction of the "Blackjack Bastion," a system of bunkers and trenches straddling the "bowling alley" into Seoul.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
On 1 October, the 187th ARCT received orders to move back to Japan. On 3 October, the 187th boarded the USS General John Pope (AP-110) at Inchon for the trip back across the Yellow Sea to Kyushu, arriving at the port of Moji on 5 October. The next day, the troops assigned to Camp Chickamauga moved by train to Beppu. The Rakkasans staged an impressive 'combat dress' parade to the camp. The troops assigned to Camp Wood continued by water to Sasebo, arriving there on 7 October.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
The arrival of the 187th in Japan marked the end of the RCT's third and final combat tour in Korea. It also marked the end of General Westmoreland's command of the 187th ARCT. On 19 October, Brigadier General Roy E. Lindquist assumed command of the 187th in a change-of-command ceremony at Camp Chickamauga.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
For the next twenty-one months, the 187th went about its duties and training in Japan. New men arrived and were integrated into the units as "point" accumulation sent many of the combat veterans back to the States. The 187th conducted training exercises with the US Marines and, in a unique international training effort, opened a jump school for officers of the Japanese Army Self-Defense Force. In October 1954, the Camp Hakata jump school graduated the first Japanese paratroopers that became the nucleus for a Japanese parachute unit.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
By October 1954, rumors floated through the camps that the 187th was being transferred back stateside. The US Army had instituted Operation Gyroscope, whereby US units would replace their overseas counterparts. Unit rotation, thought the Army planners, was more efficient to maintain unit integrity than sending individual replacements every month to fill the vacancies left by rotating overseas personnel. The 508th ARCT from Fort Bragg, North Carolina was selected to replace the 187th ARCT in Japan on an equal basis. The exchange would involve one of the largest airlifts in US Air Force history.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
In February 1955, an advance party from the 508th ARCT arrived at Beppu to plan the major exchange. The Air Force planned to airlift both RCT's in C–124s for the 12,900 miles (20,800 km) trip from Fort Bragg to Japan and return to Fort Bragg. The 187th ARCT's leg of the round trip would involve stops along the way at Wake Island, Hickam Field in Hawaii, Travis Air Force Base in California, and the Camp Mackall airstrip, the original home of the 187th and adjacent to Fort Bragg, the 187th's final destination.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
Camp Hakata became the marshaling area and Itazuke (Brady) Air Base the departure airfield. The first element of 400 Rakkasans moved out on 27 May in commercial aircraft, while an equal number of 508th paratroopers arrived at Itazuke. On 30 May, the first C–124 carrying elements of the 508th landed at Itazuke; the waiting 187th advance elements immediately boarded the C–124. On 12 July, the first C–124 carrying the main body of 187th paratroopers taxied down the runway at Itazuke and was airborne at 10:00. A few minutes past Wake Island, Colonel Curtis J. Herrick, former deputy commanding officer of the 187th, assumed command of the 187th from General Lindquist. Colonel Herrick's command tour would only last until August when he was replaced by Colonel Joseph F. Ryneska.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
From Japan to California, across the Rocky Mountains and the Mississippi River, and to the pine-covered hills of North Carolina, the Rakkasans were finally home after five history-making years in the Far East, veterans of Korea, guardians of Japan, and the most mobile striking force in the Pacific. By 17 July, thousands of paratroopers and their dependents had made the 52-hour flight and the biggest airlift in history was over.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Korean War, Japan and Korea – The Third Time
The assignment of the 187th to the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg marked the end of the RCT's five years in the Far East and the beginning of a series of confusing assignments.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Post–Korean War and Air Mobility, Army Reorganizational Turmoil
The late 1950s and early 1960s were a turbulent time for the Rakkasans.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Post–Korean War and Air Mobility, Army Reorganizational Turmoil
Veterans left for reassignment or return to civilian life. For the next few months, the 187th ARCT's ranks were filled with new men who had to be trained in the unique and rigorous military expertise that had become the regimental standard, as well as indoctrinated in the Rakkasan spirit. At Fort Bragg, the 187th was under the direct command of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The stay at Fort Bragg would be relatively short-lived. In January 1956, another transfer loomed.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Post–Korean War and Air Mobility, Army Reorganizational Turmoil
After the Korean War, the US Army went through a major reorganization as it prepared to meet the challenges of the Cold War. Gyroscoping units moved back and forth across the Atlantic and Pacific. "Massive retaliation" became the strategic term of the day and resulted in drastic cuts in manpower during the Eisenhower years (1953–1961). The Army believed itself in danger of being completely overshadowed by the Air Force and attempted to accommodate the new strategy with two major divisional-level reorganizations that caused upheaval in the Army's ranks and command structure.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Post–Korean War and Air Mobility, Army Reorganizational Turmoil
First came the Pentomic Plan of 1957–1959, followed by the Reorganization of Army Divisions (ROAD) of 1962–1964. Central to these reorganizations were developments in tactical nuclear weapons, without loss of massed firepower, a mandatory characteristic for military forces. Combat areas in future nuclear wars were viewed differently than past battlefields, requiring small, self-contained, fast-moving units. Speed was essential, not only for the concentration of offensive forces, but also in force dispersion for defense. However, the Army had to retain the ability to fight limited or non-nuclear wars, where mobility and dispersion were not as important. The 187th ARCT found itself in the middle of these changes.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Post–Korean War and Air Mobility, Army Reorganizational Turmoil
In the spring of 1949, the 11th Airborne Division had arrived at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, after combat in the Philippines in World War II and almost four years in occupied Japan. In the spring of 1956, the 11th Airborne Division gyroscoped to Germany. Rumor had it that the 101st Airborne Division of World War II European Theater fame was about to be reactivated, and the 187th ARCT would have a major role in forming the new division. The rumor was true. At Fort Bragg, in January 1956, Colonel Ryneska received the order to move the 187th to Fort Campbell. The Rakkasans left Fort Bragg on 19 January by bus and truck convoy and settled into Fort Campbell in barracks only recently vacated by the 11th Airborne Division.


187th Infantry Regiment (United States), Post–Korean War and Air Mobility, Army Reorganizational Turmoil
On 27 March, the 187th ARCT formed a combat test group and began a series of training exercises and tests in the Army's new pentomic division concept. There were four tests over four months, during which the 187th rarely left the field. The tests included a parachute assault and a linkup with an armored force; an air transportability test; a raid in which the paratroopers dropped into a DZ, destroyed an enemy installation, and extracted by air transport. The fourth test was a final examination testing all aspects of ground combat.