who was heading indian army 1971 bangladesh war
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 On 23 November 1971, the Indian Army conventionally penetrated to the eastern fronts and cross the East Pakistan's borders to join their Bengali nationalist allies.:156[129] As contrary to 1965 war which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.:156[129] Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C of the India's Eastern Command, led the Indian full thrust into East Pakistan and as the Indian Eastern Command attacked the Pakistan Eastern Command, the Indian Air Force rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission.:156[129] In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.:156[129]
President of India The President of the Republic of India is the head of state of India and the commander-in-chief of the Indian Armed Forces.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 The Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community, but failing to elicit any response despite the External Affairs minister Swaran Singh meeting with foreign ministers of other countries.[72] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan and concluded that instead of taking in millions of refugees, it was economical to go to war against Pakistan.[63] On 28 April 1971, the Gandhi cabinet had ordered the Chief of the Army Staff General Sam Manekshaw to "Go into East Pakistan".[73][74][75] Defected East Pakistan military's officers and the elements of Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) immediately started using the Indian refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas that were to be trained against Pakistan.[76] In 1971, there was a strong wave of Indian-supported Bangladeshi nationalism in the East. The situation became violent and the systematic targeted killings of unarmed multi-ethic Pakistanis living in East started.:164[77] Vehicle bombings on government secretariats became a normal narrative in east with high-profile assassinations of number of those Bengali politicians who were loyal to Pakistan became common in the East.:164[77] According to Jussi Hanhimäki, Finnish historian of terrorism, the Bengali terrorism in East is somewhat "a forgotten episode of annals of terrorism.":164[77] The Hamoodur Rahman Commission endorsed the claims of Bengali terrorism when it critically penned that the ill-treatment of families of multi-ethnic Pakistanis led to the Pakistani military soldiers reacted violently in order to restore the writ of the government.[78]
Bangladesh Liberation War On 16 December 1971, Lt. Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, CO of Pakistan Army forces located in East Pakistan signed the Instrument of Surrender. At the time of surrender only a few countries had provided diplomatic recognition to the new nation. Over 93,000 Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian forces & Bangladesh Liberation forces, making it the largest surrender since World War II,[8][98] although the Pakistani Army had fought gallantly according to Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw.[99] Bangladesh sought admission in the UN with most voting in its favour, but China vetoed this as Pakistan was its key ally.[100] The United States, also a key ally of Pakistan, was one of the last nations to accord Bangladesh recognition.[101] To ensure a smooth transition, in 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan. The treaty ensured that Pakistan recognised the independence of Bangladesh in exchange for the return of the Pakistani PoWs. India treated all the PoWs in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925.[102] It released more than 93,000 Pakistani PoWs in five months.[8] Further, as a gesture of goodwill, nearly 200 soldiers who were sought for war crimes by Bengalis were also pardoned by India. The accord also gave back 13,000 km2 (5,019 sq mi) of land that Indian troops had seized in West Pakistan during the war, though India retained a few strategic areas;[103] most notably Kargil (which would in turn again be the focal point for a war between the two nations in 1999). This was done as a measure of promoting "lasting peace" and was acknowledged by many observers as a sign of maturity by India. However, some in India[104] felt that the treaty had been too lenient to Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis.