AbstractRecent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting coplayer should be subdued with full cooperation as their best response. In contrast, recent experiments demonstrate that human players often choose not to accede to extortion out of concern for fairness, actually causing extortioners to suffer more loss than themselves. In light of this, here we reveal fair-minded strategies that areunbendingto extortion such that any payoff-maximizing extortioner ultimately will concede in their own interest by offering a fair split in head-to-head matches. We find and characterize multiple general classes of such unbending strategies, including generous ZD strategies and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) as particular examples. When against fixed unbending players, extortioners are forced with consequentially increasing losses whenever intending to demand a more unfair share. Our analysis also pivots to the importance of payoff structure in determining the superiority of ZD strategies and in particular their extortion ability. We show that an extortionate ZD player can be even outperformed by, for example, WSLS, if the total payoff of unilateral cooperation is smaller than that of mutual defection. Unbending strategies can be used to outlearn evolutionary extortioners and catalyze the evolution of Tit-for-Tat-like strategies out of ZD players. Our work has implications for promoting fairness and resisting extortion so as to uphold a just and cooperative society.