This research examines the metacognitive awareness that people have about their reasoning performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The first two studies compare confidence judgments about the CRT vs. general knowledge (GK) questions. Results show that (1) people are generally able to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers, but this ability is far from perfect, and it is greater for GK questions than for CRT problems. Indeed, and strikingly, (2) incorrect responses to CRT problems are produced with approximately the same level of confidence ascorrectresponses to GK questions. However, (3) even though confidence is high for incorrect responses to CRT problems, it is even higher for correct responses. The results of two additional studies show that these differences in confidence are ultimately related to the conflict that CRT problems pose between intuition and deliberation. These findings have implications for the possibility of implicit error monitoring and dual-process models of overconfidence.