AbstractTraditional contrastive analysis has been the foundation of consciousness science, but its limitations due to the lack of a reliable method for measuring states of consciousness have prompted the exploration of alternative approaches. Structuralist theories have gained attention as an alternative that focuses on the structural properties of phenomenal experience and seeks to identify their neural encoding via structural similarities between quality spaces and neural state spaces. However, the intertwining of philosophical assumptions about structuralism and structuralist methodology may pose a challenge to those who are skeptical of the former. In this paper, I offer an analysis and defense of structuralism as a methodological approach in consciousness science, which is partly independent of structuralist assumptions on the nature of consciousness. By doing so, I aim to make structuralist methodology more accessible to a broader scientific and philosophical audience. I situate methodological structuralism in the context of questions concerning mental representation, psychophysical measurement, holism, and functional relevance of neural processes. At last, I analyze the relationship between the structural approach and the distinction between conscious and unconscious states.