We present a system for generating inconspicuous-looking textures that, when displayed in the physical world as digital or printed posters, cause visual object tracking systems to become confused. For instance, as a target being tracked by a robot's camera moves in front of such a poster, our generated texture makes the tracker lock onto it and allows the target to evade. This work aims to fool seldom-targeted regression tasks, and in particular compares diverse optimization strategies: non-targeted, targeted, and a new family of guided adversarial losses. While we use the Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) algorithm to generate physical adversaries that fool tracking models when imaged under diverse conditions, we compare the impacts of different conditioning variables, including viewpoint, lighting, and appearances, to find practical attack setups with high resulting adversarial strength and convergence speed. We further showcase textures optimized solely using simulated scenes can confuse real-world tracking systems.
CAMOU is a attack that also applied EOT to find adversarial textures for a car's 3-D model, such that object detection networks would ignore it in images produced by a photo-realistic rendering engine. CAMOU approximated the gradient of an adversarial objective through both the complex rendering process and opaque victim network, by using a learned surrogate mapping @cite_8 from the texture space directly onto the detector's confidence score. Despite their success, this method was not tested in real-world settings, and also incurs high computational costs and potential instability risks by alternating between the optimizations of the surrogate model and adversarial perturbations.
@cite_8
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Machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs), are vulnerable to adversarial examples: malicious inputs modified to yield erroneous model outputs, while appearing unmodified to human observers. Potential attacks include having malicious content like malware identified as legitimate or controlling vehicle behavior. Yet, all existing adversarial example attacks require knowledge of either the model internals or its training data. We introduce the first practical demonstration of an attacker controlling a remotely hosted DNN with no such knowledge. Indeed, the only capability of our black-box adversary is to observe labels given by the DNN to chosen inputs. Our attack strategy consists in training a local model to substitute for the target DNN, using inputs synthetically generated by an adversary and labeled by the target DNN. We use the local substitute to craft adversarial examples, and find that they are misclassified by the targeted DNN. To perform a real-world and properly-blinded evaluation, we attack a DNN hosted by MetaMind, an online deep learning API. We find that their DNN misclassifies 84.24 of the adversarial examples crafted with our substitute. We demonstrate the general applicability of our strategy to many ML techniques by conducting the same attack against models hosted by Amazon and Google, using logistic regression substitutes. They yield adversarial examples misclassified by Amazon and Google at rates of 96.19 and 88.94 . We also find that this black-box attack strategy is capable of evading defense strategies previously found to make adversarial example crafting harder.