When asked to pinpoint where Jeb Bush’s presidential effort began running into trouble, many confidants utter a single word: Dallas. 
 
 Mike Murphy, Bush’s political alter ego, decided early on to hold regular senior staff meetings at an unusual location: a Hyatt hotel inside a terminal at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. The idea was that it was a central and relatively inexpensive gathering place for a team scattered from Los Angeles, where Murphy lives, to Miami, where the would-be candidate resides. 
 
 It went fine at first but quickly became an awkward routine. Donors and other Republicans found the setup ungainly for a campaign-in-waiting that was supposed to be based in Florida. 
 
 Older Bush hands also grew unhappy with rapid hiring by new advisers, and relationships frayed, according to Bush associates. And as the former Florida governor began to founder on the trail and in the polls, the discussions flared into arguments about how to divvy up money and resources between Bush’s allied super PAC and his official campaign. 
 
 “These things are always tug of wars,” Thomas D. Rath, a Bush family friend in New Hampshire, said of the initial sessions. “It’s almost like the first day of school, everyone trying to get to the right place and find the right seats.” 
 
 In a speech delivered in Berlin during a three country European tour aimed at promoting his foreign policy credentials, probable U.S. presidential candidate Jeb Bush also addressed campaign “shake-ups.” (Reuters) 
 
 The airport huddles were just one sign among many of a political operation going off course — disjointed in message and approach, torn between factions and more haphazard than it appeared on the surface. Bush’s first six months as an all-but-declared candidate have been defined by a series of miscalculations, leaving his standing considerably diminished ahead of his formal entry into the race on Monday. 
 
 [Debrief: For Jeb Bush, the challenge is making it about ‘Jeb,’ not ‘Bush’] 
 
 In interviews this week, dozens of Bush backers and informed Republicans — most of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to comment candidly — described an overly optimistic, even haughty exploratory operation. Strategic errors were exacerbated by unexpected stumbles by the would-be candidate and internal strife within his team, culminating in a staff shake-up this week. 
 
 The original premise of Bush’s candidacy — that a bold, fast start would scare off potential rivals and help him overcome the burden of his last name — has proved to be misguided. 
 
 His operation’s ability to rake in large checks also fueled inflated expectations. Supporters acknowledged this week that an allied super PAC was likely to fall short — perhaps substantially — of predictions that it would bring in $100 million in the first half of the year. 
 
 On the stump, Bush has stuck to his pledge not to shift to the right to win the nomination, but his middle-of-the-road positions on immigration and education have come off more as out of step with the base of his party than shrewdly pragmatic. His wonky question-and-answer exchanges with voters sometimes resemble college lectures rather than a disarming appeal for votes. 
 
 The troubles have eroded the image Bush has sought to present as the one Republican uniquely ready for the presidential stage. He has slipped in polls from presumed front-runner to one of several candidates jumbled toward the top of an increasingly crowded field. 
 
 “We’ve learned that the prospect of a big financial advantage is not going to keep people out of the race and that the notion of a new face is stronger than we might have thought,” Vin Weber, an outside Bush adviser, said in an interview. “That requires modest adjustments in strategy, not wholesale changes.” 
 
 [Jeb Bush shakes up team ahead of campaign launch] 
 
 After weeks of bad press, “donors were getting a little edgy,” Weber said. “No one is ready to jump ship. Nobody has lost heart. But they have watched other candidates rise in the polls.” 
 
 Speaking Wednesday in Berlin during an overseas trip, Bush expressed confidence. “It’s June, for crying out loud, so we’ve got a long way to go,” he said, adding later: “I’m going to compete everywhere. If I’m a candidate, there’s no fifth-place, you know, kind of mentality in my mind.” 
 
 Forced to make up lost ground, Bush, his aides and his super-PAC allies are now preparing plans to attack the records and experience of his GOP competition, especially Sens. Marco Rubio (Fla.) and Rand Paul (Ky.) and Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker. A summer envisioned as a season of slow and warm introductions to voters is poised to be a battle as Bush tries to recapture his place atop the pack. 
 
 “The Bushes have always underestimated the depth of the base’s dissatisfaction with their policies, and they take the criticism personally,” Laura Ingraham, a conservative radio host, said in an interview. “Jeb has to try to understand the reasons why conservatives have problems with him instead of crowing about how principled he is.” 
 
 Aides bristle at what they consider the media’s relentless focus on Bush’s personal and professional past. They say that out on the campaign trail, in visits to more than a dozen states, he has been doing exactly what he should. 
 
 “Interacting with people on the road who deal with real issues . . . that’s what brings true joy to Jeb,” Sally Bradshaw, a longtime consultant, said in a recent e-mail. 
 
 Bush started with an aggressive series of steps late last year and early this year — a kind of “shock and awe” entry that caught fellow contenders by surprise. The moves were designed to send an unambiguous cue to fundraisers and party activists and to re­inforce a natural advantage Bush had with establishment donors. 
 
 [Earlier: Awash in cash, Bush asks donors not to give more than $1 million] 
 
 At the same time, Bush’s inner circle operated on the theory that there was little that could be gained by trying to speed up the political clock and that most voters in early states would not begin paying attention until later in the year. 
 
 Bush revived a 650-member alumni network of aides who worked for him as governor, and he recruited 21 veterans of his father’s and brother’s administrations to advise him on foreign policy. He hired state directors in the first four early states, aides for outreach to evangelical Christians and Hispanics, and a spokeswoman dedicated to fielding questions from the Spanish-language press. 
 
 As Bush travels the country, he has fielded more than 900 questions from donors, reporters and voters, according to aides. He has maintained a busy schedule that stretches from the early-voting states of Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada — where conservative Republicans remain skeptical — to places visited less frequently at this early stage by presidential candidates, including Denver, Seattle and Puerto Rico. 
 
 Despite those efforts, some recent surveys put Bush in a five-way tie for the lead. Recent polls touted by his advisers give him a wide lead in New Hampshire, while others taken nationally and in the early states put him behind Rubio and Walker. 
 
 [Post-ABC poll: Bush lead evaporates in unsettled GOP race] 
 
 Sensing Bush’s vulnerabilities, Ohio Gov. John Kasich this week hired two experienced GOP operatives as he prepares to jump into the contest and make a play for the same donors Bush has already wooed. 
 
 “I didn’t think I was going to be back up here again, because frankly I thought Jeb was just going to suck all the air out of the room, and it just hasn’t happened,” Kasich told New Hampshire business leaders last week. 
 
 Bush dispatched one possible adversary early when Mitt Romney decided not to run again. His vigorous entrance also bruised the chances of New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, who is still pondering a bid. They did not regard Rubio as a likely opponent, thinking he would decide against challenging his onetime mentor, but were proved wrong when the young, telegenic Cuban American jumped in the race. 
 
 Early on, there were indications that Bush’s ability to command huge amounts of cash for his allied Right to Rise super PAC was emerging as the dominant characteristic of his potential candidacy. His team laid out presidential-style goals for fundraisers, asking them to pull in $50,000, $100,000, $250,000 or $500,000 by April 17. The money was flowing into the super PAC so briskly that his advisers issued an edict — no contributions of more than $1 million, for now. 
 
 “He was more of a super-PAC candidate than a retail candidate,” said one Republican close to the Bush operation. “. . . When was the last time he’s asked anyone for a vote? It’s been quite a few years.” 
 
 Those concerns, simmering under the surface, finally boiled over one week in mid-May with a series of interviews focused on the most obvious issue imaginable for a Bush: the Iraq war. 
 
 [On Iraq question, Jeb Bush stumbles and GOP rivals pounce] 
 
 Starting with an interview aired on Fox News on Monday, May 11, Bush struggled over four days to answer whether he would have authorized the war begun by his brother given what is known now about faulty intelligence. He first said yes, then said “maybe,” then refused to answer altogether. 
 
 Finally, that Thursday, he attempted to settle the issue at a campaign-style event in Arizona. “Here’s the deal,” he said. “If we’re all supposed to answer hypothetical questions — knowing what we know now, what would you have done — I would have not engaged. I would not have gone into Iraq.” 
 
 The episode served to crystallize some of the key concerns about Bush — his reluctance to criticize or distance himself from the unpopular policies of George W. Bush, and his tendency toward prickliness if pushed. 
 
 “We should have had that answer nailed down,” one donor said. “There were people who were really shaken by that.” 
 
 By the time major party donors gathered in Dallas in late May for a meeting of the Republican Governors Association’s executive roundtable, the overwhelming sentiment, according to several participants, was that Jeb Bush was less formidable than many thought he was going to be. Some flatly stated that they did not believe he could win the nomination. 
 
 People close to Bush started getting anxious, according to a top party fundraiser with close ties to his advisers — and things began to deteriorate inside the Bush camp. 
 
 David Kochel, an Iowa-based strategist and former Romney aide, had been brought aboard in January as a de facto campaign manager. As the months wore on, Bradshaw and Murphy became jittery about Kochel’s concentration on staffing issues rather than deflecting the shots being thrown Bush’s way. 
 
 Meanwhile, Bush was growing chummy with Danny Diaz, a 39-year-old Washington native and onetime plumber, who was spotted several times on the road with Bush while Kochel ground away at headquarters near the Miami airport. 
 
 By late May, Kochel’s grip on power had eroded. Bradshaw and Murphy moved with the candidate’s blessing to push Kochel into a lesser role and ensure they alone had final say about the allocation of funds. The candidate, urged on by his allies and donors, suggested that a more assertive tack was necessary. 
 
 On Monday, as Bush prepared to leave for Europe, Diaz was named the campaign manager. 
 
 Friends and donors are hopeful that Bush has corrected course and that his cash-flush political committees will carry him further than other candidates. 
 
 “He’s going to try to do it his way without acting with every change in the wind, without doing full face-plants on the pandering,” said Tallahassee lobbyist John “Mac” Stipanovich, a Bush ally. 
 
 Dan Balz, Scott Clement, Matea Gold, Tom Hamburger and Philip Rucker in Washington and Karen Tumulty in Berlin contributed to this report. ||||| Jeb Bush, the Republican establishment’s last, best hope, began his 2016 campaign rationally enough, with a painstakingly collated operational blueprint his team called, with NFL swagger, “The Playbook.” 
 
 On page after page kept safe in a binder, the playbook laid out a strategy for a race his advisers were certain would be played on Bush’s terms — an updated, if familiar version of previous Bush family campaigns where cash, organization and a Republican electorate ultimately committed to an electable center-right candidate would prevail. 
 
 Story Continued Below 
 
 The playbook, hatched by Sally Bradshaw, Mike Murphy and a handful of other Bush confidants in dozens of meetings during the first half of 2015 and described to POLITICO by some of Bush’s closest and most influential supporters, appealed to the Bush family penchant for shock-and-awe strategy. The campaign would commence with six months of fundraising for the Right to Rise super PAC and enough muscle to push aside Mitt Romney. There would be a massive, broad-based organizational effort to plant roots in March states at a time when other campaigns were mired in Iowa and New Hampshire. The plan outlined Bush’s positive, future-focused message with an emphasis on his decade-old record of accomplishment as Florida governor. 
 
 And it included several pages about Bush’s case to prosecute against top rivals — dire political threats such as Wisconsin’s Scott Walker. 
 
 The plan roundly underestimated threats: Bradshaw, his closest adviser and longtime defender, for example, told at least one campaign aide that Marco Rubio wouldn’t challenge Bush. Besides, Bradshaw and other top advisers believed, it would be next to impossible for someone with so little experience to beat him. “They thought there was going to be much more reverence and respect for the fact that Jeb Bush, a Bush, was getting into the race,” said one Florida-based supporter, an alumnus of Bush’s gubernatorial campaigns and former staffer. “When they got Romney to step aside, they figured everyone else would too.” 
 
 Most critically, the playbook, people who have read it tell POLITICO, contained nothing about Donald Trump, who would spend the next excruciating year turning Bush into his personal patrician piñata. 
 
 “The rules all changed this year. It was all about taking on the establishment,” said a Republican operative close to the Bush family. “When you’re the son and brother of former presidents, the grandson of a U.S. senator, how do you run in a year like this? It is just a year of personality, not message. All of a sudden, there was no path for him. They just kept falling back on his record as governor, which is all he has — and no one gives a shit.” 
 
 Bush suspended his campaign Saturday night after a fourth-place finish in the South Carolina primary. 
 
 Interviews with more than two dozen Bush insiders, donors and staff members illuminate the plight of an earnest and smart candidate who was tragicomically mismatched to the electorate of his own party and an unforgiving, mean media environment that broadcast his flaws. The entire premise of Bush’s candidacy, these insiders tell POLITICO, was an epic misread of a GOP base hostile to any establishment candidate, especially one with his baggage-weighted last name. 
 
 And Bush, known for toughness and hard-work ethic in Tallahassee, just couldn’t project the kind of Reagan-on-’roids strength demanded by Trump. 
 
 “They were just captive to it,” one Washington-based Bush donor said. “And they didn’t adjust very nimbly.” 
 
 *** 
 
 By August, just six weeks after officially launching his campaign, the only thing Bush’s staff could agree on was the problem: Donald J. Trump. 
 
 They’d paid no attention to the New York celebrity’s launch in June, just a day after their own. In early August, well after Trump began to dominate news coverage of the race, they still believed he was a blessing in disguise who would deprive Bush’s lesser-known rivals of the media oxygen needed to break through. But as Labor Day neared, Bush found himself on the defensive, peppered daily with questions from reporters asking him to react to Trump’s hard-line positions and seemingly outrageous statements on immigration. 
 
 But almost immediately, Trump baited Bush into a fight, staking out a position to the far right of the Floridian by calling for an end to automatic citizenship to any baby born in America. He ridiculed Bush’s earlier comment that immigrants who come to the United States illegally do it as an “act of love” for family, and called him unelectable. 
 
 Bush fired back, poorly. He went on conservative radio and used the derogatory term “anchor babies” when making the case that he would be a tough enforcer of immigration laws — opening the floodgates of criticism. 
 
 The following week, inside a Mexican restaurant in McAllen, Texas, just a few miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, Bush compounded the problem he was trying to clean up when he explained rather didactically that he was referring to Asians, not Mexicans, whom he argued were more guilty of taking advantage of the country’s birthright citizenship provision. 
 
 Inside his Miami headquarters, Bush’s senior staffers were coming to the collective realization that the race was veering out of their control. 
 
 But that’s where the consensus ended. 
 
 David Kochel, the early-state strategist initially hired to serve as campaign manager, and senior adviser Trent Wisecup, a protégé of Murphy’s, suggested that Bush challenge Trump to a one-hour, live televised debate on birthright citizenship, perhaps on “The O’Reilly Factor.” The Fox News host, they argued, supports birthright citizenship, and his show would offer a high-profile platform for Bush to demonstrate his policy knowledge and articulate his more unifying message, bringing the contrast between himself and Trump into sharper relief. 
 
 But Bradshaw, the most senior figure in the operation, and campaign manager Danny Diaz couldn’t be convinced it was a risk worth taking, according to high-level campaign staff. 
 
 
 
 By early August, Bush's team all agreed their main problem was Donald Trump, who had begun baiting Bush into fights almost immediately after his campaign launched. Above, the three candidates at the New Hampshire debate in early February. | AP 
 
 
 
 Days later, on Aug. 25, Trump was on stage at a rally in Dubuque, Iowa, when he offered an impression of Bush and characterized him as “low energy,” a critique he’d come up with after the first debate a few weeks earlier. 
 
 Bush’s team was stunned, first by the insult and then that it stuck. Kochel and Wisecup raced to respond and saw their already planned event that very same day — on the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina — as the perfect opportunity for Bush to respond forcefully and directly to Trump. They envisioned Bush in Pensacola, Florida, speaking straight to Trump: “You think I’m low energy, why don’t you come down here and talk to these people about how I took charge in a crisis.” 
 
 But once again, Bradshaw and Diaz couldn’t be convinced. Trump, they decided, wasn’t in Bush’s “lane” and so the campaign need not worry about responding to him. They went ahead with the event as planned, rolling out a two-minute video telling the story of Bush’s leadership during several hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. The following day, the headlines mainly served to remind readers of another Bush with a less-heralded record on Katrina—George W. “One Bush gets praise for his handling of hurricanes” was The Washington Post’s version. 
 
 They got defined as �?low energy’ by a guy who took an escalator to his own announcement.” 
 
 “The Jeb people knew that literally every day when he was governor, he’d walk the steps of the Capitol at a jog pace,” one longtime Bush bundler and confidant said recently. “The building was 30 stories high. You’d hide because you wouldn’t want him to catch you and make you walk the stairs. He’d email you at 5:30 a.m. This was not at all a low-energy guy. It wasn’t true, but it stuck.” 
 
 “They got defined as �?low energy’ by a guy who took an escalator to his own announcement.” 
 
 *** 
 
 Those pivotal days in late August were one of the most critical inflection points for Bush’s troubled presidential campaign—the moments when Bradshaw, Kochel and Diaz might have reconsidered the assumptions made months earlier and redirected their candidate. They didn’t, because that redirection wasn’t part of the playbook. 
 
 “You cannot run a political campaign and not have the ability to adapt, to pivot,” one longtime Bush donor who has supported all five of the family’s presidential campaigns. “To sit there and say �?We have a book’ just shows the immaturity.” 
 
 Bradshaw, who remained based in Tallahassee throughout the campaign, not the Miami headquarters, is exceedingly close to Bush. She has run all of his gubernatorial campaigns and served as his chief of staff. She acts as his strategist, his confidante and his muscle, defending him from critics and acting as a wall between Bush and almost everyone else. But some donors worried that she and other Bush loyalists wouldn’t be able to see his flaws as a candidate. 
 
 Early on, Murphy warned some incoming top aides about the loyalists. “If Jeb walks into a room and asks for a coconut,” Murphy told them, “the loyalists would drop everything to make sure Jeb got a coconut.” 
 
 When Bradshaw held her first meeting with about 40 of the campaign’s most connected donors in Washington, D.C., last spring, laying out the playbook, explaining the structure of the operation and confidently asserting the high likelihood of Bush becoming the GOP nominee, she left the sleek law-firm conference room without assuaging some donors’ doubts about the plan — specifically, the decision to focus the first half of 2015 almost exclusively on raising unlimited amounts of cash for the super PAC and the structure of the campaign itself — or her willingness to speak tough truths to Bush himself. 
 
 “She told this story about how Jeb upset the young kid tasked with collecting and distributing the [news] clips because he said he didn’t want anyone reading the clips, he wanted them focused,” a top Bush bundler who attended the meeting recalled. “And she said she told the kid, �?Don’t worry, just take Jeb off the list and keep doing them.’ She’s in a room with 40 of us basically saying that she’s hiding things from the principal. We were like, �?Why are you telling us this?’” 
 
 Bradshaw brushed off donors’ concerns that focusing so much on filling the super PAC’s coffers might leave the campaign cash-poor. At the time, so much money was rolling in, that situation was hard to imagine. Bush’s finance team, led by Heather Larrison and Jack Oliver, was confident it would have the money it needed and instructed Kochel, then serving as the unofficial campaign manager, to build out a massive campaign with ballot-access teams working every state and senior staffers earning more than $200,000 annual salaries. Early on in the campaign, for example, Bush hired scores of policy aides — a reflection, perhaps, of his own wonkiness. Yet it was a luxury: Most of the campaigns hired only a small number of policy aides. 
 
 Once Diaz was named campaign manager in June, he went on a cost-cutting spree — implementing painful across-the-board cuts that affected staffers at nearly every corner of the campaign. Even junior staffers making mid-five figures found their salaries reduced. By late fall, the campaign was no longer leasing a second office space on the sixth floor of its Miami headquarters, with so many staffers having been either laid off or relocated to Iowa and New Hampshire. 
 
 “[Sally] would be the one who could be direct with Jeb about his flaws — but she doesn’t see the flaws,” said a GOP operative who has worked with Bradshaw. “She doesn’t understand how other people don’t see it, and anyone who is critical of Jeb is dead to her.” 
 
 Bradshaw especially was obsessed with Rubio, whose audacity in simply entering the race and challenging his friend and former mentor was, to many Bush loyalists, unforgivable. Once the GOP debates began in August, sparking new interest in the golden-tongued Rubio, Bush’s team agreed it was time to engage with a challenger who, in its view, posed a greater obstacle to Bush consolidating support from mainstream Republicans. 
 
 In October, Bush began laying the groundwork to prosecute his case against Rubio, dinging the first-term senator for his poor attendance record and missed votes in the Senate. Heading into the third GOP debate in Boulder, Colorado, on Oct. 28, Bush and his entire team were on the same page — and brimming with confidence. They hinted at what was coming, planting stories and calling reporters on debate day to ensure that the attack on Rubio was the dominant storyline. 
 
 They’d rehearsed the attack on Rubio dozens of time during debate prep, but when it came time to execute on stage, Bush “just whiffed,” one senior staffer lamented later. “That stuff he said about being one of Marco’s constituents and being disappointed, that wasn’t anything we’d practiced,” the staffer continued. “He’s Jeb Bush. No one is going to empathize with him as someone who needs his senator to work on his behalf.” When Rubio hit back, dismissing Bush’s attack by citing the fact that “we’re now running for the same position,” Bush failed to respond. 
 
 “Sometimes you just fuck up,” the Bush staffer said. 
 
 It wasn’t until that debacle that Bush’s advisers decided to address the candidate’s poor performances themselves, hiring Jon Kraushar, who generally works with television anchors, as a public speaking coach. 
 
 *** 
 
 Looking back now after his early exit from a nomination battle he vowed to be in “for the long haul,” his slow, awkward stumble from August through October encapsulates everything that caused the operation viewed as “Jeb!, Inc.” to fail. Bush was on the wrong side of the most galvanizing issues for Republican primary voters; he himself was a rusty and maladroit campaigner and his campaign was riven by internal disagreements and a crippling fear that left it paralyzed and unable to react to Trump. 
 
 The problem, many donors say they believe, is that there wasn’t anyone on the team who both recognized his shortcomings and was willing to point them out to the principal himself. 
 
 “He did not put an adult as the chairman of the campaign and a lot of the mistakes flow from that,” said one longtime Bush donor. “Reagan put Bill Casey in that position. 41 put Jim Baker. 43 had Don Evans. You always had someone above the campaign manager who could tell people and the candidate what needed to happen, who could see the big picture. By putting Sally, who loves you, in charge, you don’t get the fair perspective, the right perspective.” 
 
 But the blame is not Bradshaw’s alone. The entire premise of Bush’s candidacy now looks like a misread of an electorate that wasn’t amenable to establishment candidates—and a misunderstanding of a modern media environment ill-suited to a policy wonk who speaks in paragraphs, not punchy sound bites. He couldn’t sell experience to an electorate that wanted emotion. He couldn’t escape his last name. His millions couldn’t buy popular support. 
 
 Given how the race has gone, the real mystery of Jeb Bush’s campaign isn’t why he failed — but why anyone ever thought he would succeed. 
 
 Glenn Thrush and Alex Isenstadt contributed to this report. 
 
 Eli Stokols is a national politics reporter. ||||| Former Florida governor Jeb Bush announced to supporters in South Carolina that he was suspending his presidential campaign after a disappointing performance in the state's GOP primary. (AP) 
 
 Former Florida governor Jeb Bush announced to supporters in South Carolina that he was suspending his presidential campaign after a disappointing performance in the state's GOP primary. (AP) 
 
 For Jeb Bush’s campaign, August was a cruel month. Donald Trump’s attacks on the former Florida governor as a ­“low-energy” politician were beginning to stick, and the two were bickering over immigration. The issue before the Bush team was what to do about it. 
 
 Some advisers argued for an aggressive response, even to the point of challenging Trump to some kind of one-on-one confrontation. Others resisted, believing Trump’s candidacy was unsustainable, while some cautioned against getting “into a pigpen with a pig,” as one adviser recalled. Others described it as “trying to wrestle with a stump.” 
 
 Those summer days crystallized the plight of a campaign that had begun with enormous expectations and extraordinary resources, as the scion of one of America’s dynastic political families sought to follow his father and brother to the presidency. 
 
 At what would become a crucial moment, Bush’s team had no clear strategy for a rival who was beginning to hijack the Republican Party that the Bush family had helped to build, other than to stay the course set months earlier of telling Bush’s story to voters. 
 
 “There was no consensus,” senior strategist David Kochel said of the discussions about how to combat the threat of Trump’s candidacy. Other campaigns were wrestling with the same problems, but as the front-runner in the polls at the time, Bush would suffer more than the others. 
 
 Jeb Bush suspended his campaign for president on Feb. 20. The Fix's Chris Cillizza breaks down why he was never going to be president. (Peter Stevenson/The Washington Post) 
 
 On Saturday night, the candidacy that had begun with such promise ended quietly after a disappointingly weak fourth-place finish in South Carolina. 
 
 Ever the gracious realist, Bush announced in his concession speech that he would end his campaign as Trump continued to soar as the GOP front-runner. “I have stood my ground, refusing to bend to the political winds,” he said. 
 
 Whether Jeb Bush ever had a chance to win the Republican nomination in a campaign year that proved so ill fitting for a rusty politician who preferred policy papers to political combat is a question that will be debated long after the 2016 race has ended. 
 
 “Donald Trump channeled the worst fears, frustrations and anxiety of voters, but he also magnified those same feelings,” Sally Bradshaw, Bush’s chief strategist and confidant, said Sunday in an email. “It would be difficult for any solutions-oriented conservative to tackle Trump in this environment, much less one who was seen as having been so much a part of the establishment. He was never going to be an angry guy — and voters wanted angry.” 
 
 Mike Murphy, the chief strategist for Bush’s super PAC, Right to Rise, explained what had happened this way on Sunday. “Our theory was to dominate the establishment lane into the actual voting primaries,” he said. “That was the strategy, and it did not work. I think it was the right strategy for Jeb. The problem was there was a huge anti-establishment wave. The establishment lane was smaller than we thought it would be. The marketplace was looking for something different, and we’ll find out how that ends when we have a nominee.” 
 
 The result is one of the most startling failures in the modern history of American politics: the fall of the House of Bush. It is a human story about the struggles of one of the most successful former governors in America in his bid to become president, like his father and brother, set against the backdrop of one of the strangest political cycles the country has seen in years. 
 
 Beyond underestimating the anger in the electorate, three other problems led to Bush’s downfall. First, the candidate and his team misjudged the degree of Bush fatigue among Republicans. 
 
 1 of 19 Full Screen Autoplay Close Skip Ad × Candidates who have dropped out of the 2016 race so far, and why View Photos With the primary season in full swing, several have dropped out in recent days. Caption With the primary season in full swing, several have dropped out in recent days. John Kasich Ohio Gov. John Kasich (R), who ran as a sunny, center-right “prince of light and hope” but won only his home-state primary, bowed out of the presidential race on Wednesday with a reflective speech in Columbus. Read the story Kyle Grillot/For the Washington Post Buy Photo Wait 1 second to continue. 
 
 Aides said an internal poll conducted last fall showed discouraging news: Roughly two-thirds of voters had issues with Bush’s family ties. “Bush stuff was holding him back,” said one aide who saw the polling data. “We obviously knew it was an issue, but even still, the gap between it and other issues — I don’t think we thought it would be that big.” 
 
 [For Jeb Bush, the challenge remains making it about ‘Jeb,’ not ‘Bush’] 
 
 Second, Bush and his team miscalculated the role and power of money and traditional television commercials in the 2016 race. During the first six months of 2015, Bush raised more than $100 million, most of it stockpiled in Right to Rise, a strategy that seemed right at the time but came at the cost of not dealing with other pressing needs. 
 
 “We didn’t use that time to introduce him as a unique brand,” said Vin Weber, an outside adviser. “We used it to raise money. I don’t want to say they made an obvious and clear mistake, but in retrospect, it was a mistake.” 
 
 The aggressive fundraising came to be known as “shock and awe,” an echo of the initial bombing of Iraq by U.S.-led forces before the 2003 invasion. In the campaign context, it could be read as code to other potential candidates to get out of the way. But the prodigious fundraising of Bush’s broad network scared off no one. As the Bush campaign would learn, every credible candidate today has a few billionaire friends who can enrich a super PAC. In the end, all that money came to symbolize frustration rather than power. 
 
 Third, Bush ran a campaign that, whether deliberate or not, was rooted in the past, managed by loyalists who admired Bush and enjoyed his confidence but who, like the candidate, found themselves in unfamiliar political terrain. 
 
 His advisers were convinced from the start that the more voters learned about what Bush had done as governor of Florida from 1999 to 2007, they would flock to him as their presidential candidate. Bush stubbornly held to that approach — even as evidence mounted that it was out of step with voters. 
 
 Doug Gross, a prominent Iowa Republican, recalled meeting with Bush in July 2014 in Kennebunkport, Maine, to talk about the impending campaign. “He definitely wanted to run. He’s always had it in him and knew this was his last chance,” Gross said. “He was trying to figure out how to do it his own way. I was struck by his obstinate avoidance of any political discussion. . . . He wanted to do it his way or no way.” 
 
 Skirmish, then turning away 
 
 In contrast to the doldrums of August 2015, July seemed a glorious time for the Bush team. Early that month, Team Jeb gathered in Kennebunkport to celebrate that the campaign and two allied political committees had together raised nearly an unprecedented $120 million. The numbers were made public as nearly 300 major Bush fundraisers assembled to mingle with the Bush family and campaign advisers. 
 
 Guests were transported in black-and-red trolleys to Walker’s Point, the Bush family compound. The group gathered for a photo with former president George H.W. Bush and Barbara Bush. 
 
 That evening, Bush touted the team’s record fundraising as guests dined on lobster rolls and hamburgers at a luxury resort tucked among a forest of birch groves and balsam fir. “It was incredibly memorable to be there with several generations,” said Jay Zeidman, a Houston-based investor who helped raise money from young professionals. 
 
 The next day, the donors got briefings from senior Bush aides including Bradshaw, campaign manager Danny Diaz and finance director Heather Larrison. They laid out how the campaign planned to take on contenders such as Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie. Throughout, there was little mention of Donald Trump. 
 
 [That time Jeb Bush invited 300 top donors to his parents’ house] 
 
 “None of us thought he would last the summer,” said one person who was in attendance. 
 
 At that moment, however, Trump was already in the process of undermining Bush’s candidacy. If Bush had ever gone up against someone like Trump, it didn’t show. Trump was a new and different kind of rival, one given to personal insults rather than policy debates, who monopolized media coverage and got away with provocative statements that would have sunk normal politicians. 
 
 After marching in two July 4 parades on a rainy Saturday in New Hampshire, reporters asked Bush about Trump’s claim that Mexico was allowing immigrants to illegally cross into the United States. It was one of the hundreds of times he would face such questions. 
 
 Bush said “absolutely” he was offended by Trump’s rhetoric. “We’re going to win when we’re hopeful and optimistic and big and broad rather than ‘grrrrrr’ ” he said — literally, growling – “just angry all the time.” 
 
 That very night, Trump attacked Bush as soft on immigration and took aim as well at Bush’s wife, Columba, who was born in Mexico and entered the country legally — retweeting and then deleting a disparaging comment about her. 
 
 Nothing, however, cut as close to the bone as Trump’s claim that Bush was too “low-energy” to serve as president. 
 
 The accusation was laughable — until it began to stick. Trump’s charge was in fact a proxy for a different and more difficult argument to combat: that Bush was neither strong nor edgy enough for a party seething with anger at the grass roots. 
 
 [Inside the Bush-Trump melodrama: Decades of tension and discomfort] 
 
 “Nobody tapped into it, for all the polling, all the focus groups,” said Theresa Kostrzewa, a North Carolina lobbyist who raised money for the campaign. “The biggest thing they did was miss was just how angry the American electorate was and that Trump would be their Captain Ahab.” 
 
 Bush’s advisers would contest that claim. They could see the anger, they said. The issue was what to do about it. “Donors, political operatives and big thinkers from around the country urged us to ignore Trump for months,” Bradshaw said. “There was no one in the news media or the operative class at the time who felt Trump would ultimately be a serious contender for the nomination.” 
 
 At the same time, others feared that engaging Trump was almost beneath Bush and would thrust the candidate into a never-ending game of charge-countercharge. “Jeb should be bigger than this,” another aide recalled thinking. 
 
 Over at Right to Rise, Murphy sent a clear signal: Trump is not our fight right now. 
 
 “If other campaigns wish that we’re going to uncork money on Donald Trump, they’ll be disappointed,” Murphy told The Washington Post in late August. “Trump is, frankly, other people’s problem.” 
 
 At that moment, the Bush team’s analysis showed that no Trump voters were likely to shift their support to Bush. On Sunday, Murphy said that attacking Trump would only have benefited other candidates. Bush’s campaign needed to consolidate the establishment lane while hoping that Trump and Cruz would sort out the competition among the anti-establishment candidates. 
 
 Bradshaw also dismissed complaints from some donors that she cut the candidate off from advice. Noting that Bush long has been active on email, Bradshaw responded in a message by saying: “Donors constantly gave conflicting advice — attack Trump, don’t attack Trump; smile more; smile less — you look like you are smirking. I didn’t tell people they were wrong — not my style — I did a lot of listening, and I’m sure there were things we could have done better — but withholding info from the Governor simply did not happen in our campaign.” 
 
 For much of the autumn, Bush’s engagement with Trump was on-again, off-again — skirmish, then turning away. Not until late last year did he truly start a concerted and sustained series of attacks. Aides said Bush was particularly affected by the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., and felt, as one adviser put it, that it was “time to stand up to the bully.” 
 
 “Jeb was the only candidate with the political courage at the time and frankly throughout the last six months to take on Trump directly for doing something that the governor felt was very harmful to the Party and to the country,” Bradshaw wrote. “There was no hesitation at that point given his comments about women, about Hispanics, his lack of knowledge on issues of national security and on and on.” 
 
 A flat-footed image 
 
 Bush’s failure to come to terms with one of the downsides of his family name came to a head over a four-day period in May, when he stumbled over the decision by his brother, former president George W. Bush, to go to war in Iraq. 
 
 [Jeb Bush faces hostile questions about Iraq war] 
 
 Changing his answer on a daily basis, Bush came across as a flat-footed campaigner clearly uncomfortable articulating his views on the most critical moment of his brother’s presidency. But it also highlighted the ­double-edged nature of being a candidate named Bush. 
 
 In a January Washington Post-ABC News poll, nearly 6 in 10 Americans held an unfavorable view of Bush. He was the only Republican with a negative favorability rating: 44 percent said they had a favorable impression of the former governor while 50 percent rated him negatively. His rankings grew worse as the campaign progressed. 
 
 A fundamental weakness, supporters said, was the lack of a coherent rationale for Bush’s candidacy and the failure to make inroads with activists on the right. “At the end of the day, it wasn’t clear the name was ever surmountable,” said a Bush donor. “If the name was going to be surmounted, it would have to be because there was a fresh set of ideas.” 
 
 Bush offered ideas, but in a campaign dominated by Trump, they were ignored or lost to most voters. 
 
 ‘The timing was not right’ 
 
 One of the biggest tactical advantages Bush appeared to have early on — a richly endowed super PAC — was not the invincible weapon his team thought it would be. It cut off his access to a key adviser, Murphy, whom he installed at the group’s helm. 
 
 It also meant that during the first six months of last year, nearly all of the coverage about Bush focused on how he was socking away millions into the super PAC, all while maintaining that he had not decided whether to run. In an election brimming with anger toward the wealthy elite, Bush seemed almost flippant about his pursuit of big dollars. 
 
 Murphy was convinced that much of what was taking place was noise and that when the voters began to check in, the super PAC’s financial might would be overpowering. 
 
 First, the committee would use it to lay out Bush’s biography. Then, as necessary, the group would turn its arsenal on his rivals. “Our job is just to amplify his story and what he’s saying and we banked enough cash that nobody’s turning our speaker off,” Murphy told Bloomberg Politics in October. 
 
 Back at campaign headquarters, the team hewed to that timetable and sensibility. Once the Bush record was burned into voters’ minds, attitudes would shift, Bradshaw said at the time. A Bush donor complained, “Murphy had a timetable, and nothing mattered until December and January.” 
 
 By the end of January, Right to Rise had raced through at least $95.7 million out of the $118.6 million it had collected, according to Federal Election Commission filings. Almost $87 million went into a barrage of television ads, online videos, slick mailers and voter phone calls—to no avail. 
 
 Mel Sembler, a former Bush ambassador who helped raise money for the super PAC and served on its governance board, said he believes the group’s strategy was sound. 
 
 “We had confidence in Mike, and I think we did the best we could in deploying of resources,” Sembler said. “That’s not where the problem is. . . . The timing was not right for Jeb. Our candidate was just not connecting with the electorate.” 
 
 Retaining his good humor 
 
 The final months were difficult for Bush. After a particularly weak performance during a debate in Boulder, Colo., in October in which Rubio appeared to get the better of him, there were suggestions that he might quit the campaign right then. 
 
 Reporters who made inquiries about the possibility were brushed off. In the middle of it all, Bush spotted a reporter who was a regular on the trail with him. “Hey — I didn’t drop out, did I?” he shouted. “You know, that kind of stuff really gets my juices going. I’m going to win this thing, and when I do — you’re going to give me a big hug.” 
 
 Through it all, Bush attempted to keep both good humor and determination in the face of the inevitable. 
 
 “I was stunned by how well he handled the last month of this campaign when the writing was on the wall,” said Tim Miller, Bush’s communications director. “It is hard to go out there every day and put on a fake smiley face. He was in really high spirits and didn’t lash out at people in private throughout the last two months.” 
 
 The final indignity in a campaign that had suffered through many came three days before Saturday’s primary, when South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley endorsed Rubio rather than a man she described as a friend and mentor. 
 
 When it ended Saturday night, Bush told saddened supporters: “We put forward details, innovative, conservative plans to address the mounting challenges that we face. Because despite what you might have heard, ideas matter, policy matters.” 
 
 His final remarks as a presidential candidate were a reflection of the campaign he had constructed from the start, one he had built to his unique specifications, which nonetheless proved to be a mismatch for a political environment that caught him by surprise — and for which he paid a hefty price.
– Jeb Bush has not yet announced his presidential candidacy, but some critics contend that his campaign is already struggling—and in a front-page piece, the Washington Post delves into why that might be. One of the first blunders may have been allowing his political consultant, Mike Murphy, to hold senior staff meetings in a hotel inside the Dallas/Fort Worth airport—odd for an almost-campaign that's technically based in Florida. The awkwardness that created is just one example of the splintered nature of the upcoming campaign: There have been conflicts, for instance, between longstanding staffers and newer ones, and disagreements over dividing funding between Bush’s super PAC and the campaign itself. “These things are always tug of wars,” Bush ally Thomas D. Rath says. “It’s almost like the first day of school, everyone trying to get to the right place and find the right seats.” The first day of school may have been more like musical chairs, as Republican Party strategist Danny Diaz was named campaign manager earlier this week over the more expected choice—David Kochel. The selection of Diaz just a week before Bush declares his candidacy Monday is evidence that his team is still working out serious kinks, write Ed O'Keefe and Robert Costa; their piece traces Bush's other apparent problems, including shortfalls in both fundraising and the polls, and of course, that Iraq blunder. "In interviews this week, dozens of Bush backers and informed Republicans ... described an overly optimistic, even haughty exploratory operation," they write. "Strategic errors were exacerbated by unexpected stumbles by the would-be candidate and internal strife within his team." As for Bush, he appears unconcerned. “It’s June, for crying out loud, so we’ve got a long way to go,” Bush said of the staffing swap at a news conference yesterday, per the New York Times. “I just urge everybody to be a little more patient about this.”