Design, rationale, and baseline characteristics of a cluster randomized controlled trial of pay for performance for hypertension treatment: study protocol The impact of financial incentives and a patient registry on preventive care quality: increasing provider adherence to evidence-based smoking cessation practice guidelines. How to build and evaluate an integrated health care system for chronic patients: study design of a clustered randomised controlled trial in rural China The Use of Physician Financial Incentives and Feedback to Improve Pediatric Preventive Care in Medicaid Managed Care Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation Financial incentives to improve adherence to antipsychotic maintenance medication in non-adherent patients: a cluster randomised controlled trial. A systematic review of the use of financial incentives and penalties to encourage uptake of healthy behaviors: protocol Are financial incentives cost-effective to support smoking cessation during pregnancy? Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial. Recorded quality of primary care for patients with diabetes in England before and after the introduction of a financial incentive scheme: a longitudinal observational study Prepayment with office-based physicians in publicly funded programs: results from the Children's Medicaid Program.
Background Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment , hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens . Methods / design This r and omized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline -recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure ( BP ) control in the primary care setting . Using constrained r and omization , we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms : physician-level incentive ; group-level incentive ; combination of physician and group incentives ; and no incentives ( control ) . All participants at the hospital ( cluster ) were assigned to the same study arm . We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel . The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline -recommended care for hypertension , five audit and feedback reports , and five disbursements of incentive payments . Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline -recommended antihypertensive medications , BP control , and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention . To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives , the study team interviewed study participants , as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites . Chart review s included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension . To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives , the study design includes a washout period . Discussion We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied , as well as the major design choices . Rigorous research design s such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements . Trial Registration http://www . clinical BACKGROUND This study tested the effects of two organizational support processes , the provision of financial incentives for superior clinical performance and the availability of a  patient ( smoker ) registry and proactive telephone support system for smoking cessation , on provider adherence to accepted practice guidelines and associated patient outcomes . METHODS Forty clinics of a large multispecialty medical group practice providing primary care services were r and omly allocated to study conditions . Fifteen clinics each were assigned to the experimental conditions " control " ( distribution of printed versions of smoking cessation guidelines ) and " incentive " ( financial incentive pay-out for reaching preset clinical performance targets ) .  Ten clinics were r and omized to receive financial incentives combined with access to a central ized patient registry and intervention system ( " registry " ) . Main outcome measures were adherence to smoking cessation clinical practice guidelines and patients ' smoking cessation behaviors . RESULTS  Patients ' tobacco use status  was statistically significant ( P < 0.01 ) more frequently identified in clinics with the opportunity for incentives and access to a registry than in clinics in the control condition . Patients visiting registry clinics accessed counseling programs statistically significantly more often ( P < 0.001 ) than patients receiving care in the control condition . Other endpoints did not statistically significantly differ between the experimental conditions . CONCLUSIONS The impact of financial incentives and a patient registry/intervention system in improving smoking cessation clinical practice s and patient behaviors was mixed . Additional research is needed to identify conditions under which such organizational support processes result in significant health care quality improvement and warrant the investment Background While integrated health care system has been proved an effective way to help improving patient health and system efficiency , the exact behaviour model and motivation approach are not so clear in poor rural areas where health human re sources and continuous service provision are urgently needed . To gather solid evidence , we initiated a comprehensive intervention project in Qianjiang District , southwest part of rural China in 2012 . And after one-year 's pilot , we developed an intervention package of team service , comprehensive pathway and prospect ive- and performance-based payment system . Methods To testify the potential influence of payment interventions , we use clustered r and omised controlled trial , 60 clusters are grouped into two treatment groups and one control group to compare the time and group differences . Difference-in-differences model and structural equation modelling will be used to analyse the intervention effects and pathway . The outcomes are : quality of care , disease burden , supplier cooperative behaviour and patient utilisation behaviour and system efficiency . Repeated multivariate variance analysis will be used to statistically examine the outcome differences . Discussion This is the first trial of its kind to prove the effects and efficiency of integrated care . Though we adopted r and omised controlled trial to gather the highest rank of evidence , still the fully r and omisation was hard to realise in health policy reform experiment . To compensate , the design er should take efforts on control for the potential confounders as much as possible . With this trial , we assume the effects will come from : ( 1 ) improvement on the quality of life through risk factors control and lifestyles change on patient 's behaviours ; ( 2 ) improvement on quality of care through continuous care and coordinated supplier behaviours ; ( 3 ) improvement on the system efficiency through active interaction between suppliers and patients . Conclusion The integrated care system needs collaborative work from different levels of caregivers . So it is extremely important to consider the supplier cooperative behaviour . In this trial , we introduced payment system to help the delivery system integration through providing financial incentives to motivate people to play their roles . Also , the multidisciplinary team , the multi-institutional pathway and system global budget and pay-for-performance payment system could afford as a solution Objective . Immunizations and other cost-effective preventive services remain underused by many children , especially those living in poverty . Given the effectiveness of provider-based tracking systems and the widespread use by managed care organizations of financial incentives to influence physician practice patterns , we design ed and tested an intervention combining these strategies . We studied whether a system of semiannual assessment and feedback , coupled with financial incentives , could improve pediatric preventive care in a Medicaid health maintenance organization ( HMO ) . Methodology . We r and omly assigned primary care sites serving children in a Medicaid HMO to one of three groups : a feedback group ( where physicians received written feedback about compliance scores ) , a feedback and incentive group ( where physicians received feedback and a financial bonus when compliance criteria were met ) , and a control group . We evaluated compliance with pediatric preventive care guidelines  through semiannual chart audits during the years 1993 to 1995 . Results . Compliance with pediatric preventive care improved dramatically in the study period . Repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant increase in all three study groups throughout the time in total compliance scores ( from 56%–73 % ) , as well as scores for immunizations ( from 62%–79 % ) and other preventive care ( from 54%–71 % ) . However , no significant differences were observed between either intervention group and the control group , nor were there any interaction ( group-by-time ) effects . Conclusions . Feedback to physicians , with or without financial incentives , did not improve pediatric preventive care in this Medicaid HMO during a time of rapid , secular improvements in care . Possible explanations include the context and timing of the intervention , the magnitude of the financial incentives , and lack of physician awareness of the intervention BACKGROUND Evidence about the best methods with which to accelerate progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals is urgently needed . We assessed the effect of performance-based payment of health-care providers ( payment for performance ; P4P ) on use and quality of child and maternal care services in health-care facilities in Rw and a. METHODS 166 facilities were r and omly assigned at the district level either to begin P4P funding between June , 2006 , and October , 2006 ( intervention group ; n=80 ) , or to continue with the traditional input-based funding until 23 months after study baseline ( control group ; n=86 ) . R and omisation was done by coin toss . We surveyed facilities and 2158 households at baseline and after 23 months . The main outcome measures were prenatal care visits and institutional deliveries , quality of prenatal care , and child preventive care visits and immunisation . We isolated the incentive effect from the re source effect by increasing comparison facilities ' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments made to the treatment facilities . We estimated a multivariate regression specification of the difference-in-difference model in which an individual 's outcome is regressed against a dummy variable , indicating whether the facility received P4P that year , a facility-fixed effect , a year indicator , and a series of individual and household characteristics . FINDINGS Our model estimated that facilities in the intervention group had a 23 % increase in the number of institutional deliveries and increases in the number of preventive care visits by children aged 23 months or younger ( 56 % ) and aged between 24 months and 59 months ( 132 % ) . No improvements were seen in the number of women completing four prenatal care visits or of children receiving full immunisation schedules . We also estimate an increase of 0·157 st and ard deviations ( 95 % CI 0·026 - 0·289 ) in prenatal quality as measured by compliance with Rw and an prenatal care clinical practice guidelines . INTERPRETATION The P4P scheme in Rw and a had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the least effort from the service provider . P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use and quality of maternal and child health services , and could be a useful intervention to accelerate progress towards Millennium Development Goals for maternal and child health . FUNDING World Bank 's Bank-Netherl and s Partnership Program and Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund , the British Economic and Social Research Council , Government of Rw and a , and Global Development Network BACKGROUND Poor adherence to long-term antipsychotic injectable ( LAI ) medication in patients with psychotic disorders is associated with a range of negative outcomes . No psychosocial intervention has been found to be consistently effective in improving adherence . OBJECTIVES To test whether or not offering financial incentives is effective and cost-effective in improving adherence and to explore patient and clinician experiences with such incentives . DESIGN A cluster r and omised controlled trial with economic and nested qualitative evaluation . The intervention period lasted for 12 months with 24 months ' follow-up . The unit of r and omisation was mental health teams in the community . SETTING Community teams in secondary mental health care . PARTICIPANTS Patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia , schizoaffective psychosis or bipolar illness , receiving ≤ 75 % of their prescribed LAI medication . In total , 73 teams with 141 patients ( intervention n = 78 and control n = 63 ) were included . INTERVENTIONS Participants in the intervention group received £ 15 for each LAI medication . Patients in the control group  received treatment as usual . MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES PRIMARY OUTCOME adherence to LAI medication  ( the percentage of received out of those prescribed ) . SECONDARY OUTCOMES percentage of patients with at least 95 % adherence ; clinical global improvement ; subjective quality of life ; satisfaction with medication ; hospitalisation ; adverse events ; and costs . Qualitative evaluation : semistructured interviews with patients in the intervention group and their clinicians . RESULTS PRIMARY OUTCOME outcome data were available for 131 patients .  Baseline adherence was 69 % in the intervention group and 67 % in the control group . During the intervention period , adherence was significantly higher in the intervention group than in the control group ( 85 % vs. 71 % ) [ adjusted mean difference 11.5 % , 95 % confidence interval ( CI ) 3.9 % to 19.0 % ; p = 0.003 ] . Secondary outcome : patients in the intervention group showed statistically significant improvement in adherence of at least 95 % ( adjusted odds ratio 8.21 , 95 % CI 2.00 to 33.67 ; p = 0.003 ) and subjective quality of life ( difference in means 0.71 , 95 % CI 0.26 to 1.15 ; p = 0.002 ) . Follow-ups : after incentives stopped , adherence did not differ significantly between groups , neither during the first 6 months ( adjusted difference in means -7.4 % , 95 % CI -17.0 % to 2.1 % ; p = 0.175 ) nor during the period from month 7 to month 24 ( difference in means -5.7 % , 95 % CI -13.1 % to 1.7 % ; p = 0.130 ) . Cost-effectiveness : the average costs of the financial incentives was £ 303 . Overall costs per patient were somewhat higher in the intervention group , but the difference was not significant . Semistructured interviews : the majority of patients and clinicians reported positive experiences with the incentives beyond their monetary value . These included improvement in the therapeutic relationship . The majority of both patients and clinicians perceived no negative impact after the intervention was stopped after 1 year . CONCLUSIONS Financial incentives are effective in improving adherence to LAI medication . Health-care costs ( including costs of the financial incentive ) are unlikely to be increased substantially by this intervention . Once the incentives stop , the advantage is not maintained . The experiences of both patients and clinicians are largely , but not exclusively , positive . Whether or not financial incentives are effective for patients with more favourable background , those on oral mediation or for shorter or longer time periods remains unknown . TRIAL REGISTRATION Current Controlled Trials IS RCT N77769281 . FUNDING This project was funded by the National Institute for Health Research ( NIHR ) Health Technology Assessment programme and will be published in full in Health Technology Assessment ; Vol . 20 , No. 70 . See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information Background The use of financial incentives and penalties to encourage uptake of healthy behaviors is increasingly seen as a viable intervention in developed countries . Previous review s of the effectiveness of financial incentives and penalties for encouraging the uptake of healthy behaviors have focused on individual behaviors making it difficult to draw overall conclusions about the effectiveness of such interventions . This systematic review will explore the effectiveness of financial incentives and penalties for encouraging a wide range of behaviors , including : smoking cessation , increased physical activity , healthier dietary intake , sensible patterns of alcohol consumption , safe sun , safe sex , and primary preventive clinical behaviors . Methods Systematic methods will be used to search existing literature and screen studies for inclusion . All studies that meet the following inclusion criteria will be included in the review : participants were 18 years old or older and living in high-income countries ; interventions included cash or cash-like incentives to promote the uptake of healthy behaviors , or cash or cash-like penalties to discourage unhealthy behaviors ; the comparator was usual care or no intervention ; study design was r and omized controlled trial , cluster r and omized controlled trial , controlled before and after study , or interrupted time series analysis . Two review ers will independently screen the publications to ensure they meet the inclusion criteria . Quality will be assessed by two research ers , working independently , using the Cochrane risk of bias tool . Meta- analysis will be conducted , if appropriate . Any studies identified as at ‘ high risk of bias ’ will be excluded from meta- analysis . Discussion This systematic review will provide policy-relevant recommendations for the use of financial incentives and penalties as a method of encouraging uptake of healthy behaviors AIMS To investigate the cost-effectiveness of up to £ 400 worth of financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy as an adjunct to routine health care . DESIGN Cost-effectiveness analysis based on a Phase II r and omized controlled trial ( RCT ) and a cost-utility analysis using a life-time Markov model . SETTING The RCT was undertaken in Glasgow , Scotl and . The economic analysis was undertaken from the UK National Health Service ( NHS ) perspective . PARTICIPANTS A total of 612 pregnant women r and omized to receive usual cessation support plus or minus financial incentives of up to £ 400 vouchers ( US $ 609 ) , contingent upon smoking cessation . MEASUREMENTS Comparison of usual support and incentive interventions in terms of cotinine-vali date d quitters , quality -adjusted life years ( QALYs ) and direct costs to the NHS . FINDINGS The incremental cost per quitter at 34 - 38 weeks pregnant was £ 1127 ($1716).This is similar to the st and ard look-up value derived from Stapleton & West 's published ICER tables , £ 1390 per quitter , by looking up the Cessation in Pregnancy Incentives Trial ( CIPT ) incremental cost ( £ 157 ) and incremental 6-month quit outcome ( 0.14 ) . The life-time model result ed in an incremental cost of £ 17 [ 95 % confidence interval ( CI ) = -£93 , £ 107 ] and a gain of 0.04 QALYs ( 95 % CI = -0.058 , 0.145 ) , giving an ICER of £ 482/QALY ( $ 734/QALY ) . Probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicates uncertainty in these results , particularly regarding relapse after birth . The expected value of perfect information was £ 30 million ( at a willingness to pay of £ 30 000/QALY ) , so given current uncertainty , additional research is potentially worthwhile . CONCLUSION Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy are highly cost-effective , with an incremental cost per quality -adjusted life years of £ 482 , which is well below recommended decision thresholds IMPORTANCE Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high- quality care , but results have been contradictory . OBJECTIVE To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline -recommended hypertension care . DESIGN , SETTING , AND PARTICIPANTS Cluster r and omized trial of 12 Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics with 5 performance periods and a 12-month washout that enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 nonphysician personnel ( eg , nurses , pharmacists ) . INTERVENTIONS Physician-level ( individual ) incentives , practice -level incentives , both , or none . Intervention participants received up to 5 payments every 4 months ; all participants could access feedback reports . MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Among a r and om sample , number of patients achieving guideline -recommended blood pressure thresholds or receiving an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure , number of patients prescribed guideline -recommended medications , and number who developed hypotension . RESULTS Mean ( SD ) total payments over the study were $ 4270 ( $ 459 ) , $ 2672 ( $ 153 ) , and $ 1648 ( $ 248 ) for the combined , individual , and practice -level interventions , respectively . The unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure were 75 % to 84 % and 8.84 % ( 95 % CI , 4.20 % to 11.80 % ) for the individual group , 80 % to 85 % and 3.70 % ( 95 % CI , 0.24 % to 7.68 % ) for the practice -level group , 79 % to 88 % and 5.54 % ( 95 % CI , 1.92 % to 9.52 % ) for the combined group , and 86 % to 86 % and 0.47 % ( 95 % CI , -3.12 % to 4.04 % ) for the control group . The adjusted absolute estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36 % ( 95 % CI , 2.40 % to 13.00 % ; P=.005 ) . The other incentive groups did not show a significant change compared with controls for this outcome . For medications , the unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change were 61 % to 73 % and 9.07 % ( 95 % CI , 4.52 % to 13.44 % ) , 56 % to 65 % and 4.98 % ( 95 % CI , 0.64 % to 10.08 % ) , 65 % to 80 % and 7.26 % ( 95 % CI , 2.92 % to 12.48 % ) , and 63 % to 72 % and 4.35 % ( 95 % CI , -0.28 % to 9.28 % ) , respectively . These changes in the use of guideline -recommended medications were not significant in any of the incentive groups compared with controls , nor was the incidence of hypotension . The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout . CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE Individual financial incentives , but not practice -level or combined incentives , result ed in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure ; none of the incentives result ed in greater use of guideline -recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared with controls . Further research is needed on the factors that contributed to these findings . TRIAL REGISTRATION clinical trials.gov Identifier : NCT00302718 Background The UK 's Quality and Outcomes Framework ( QOF ) was introduced in 2004/5 , linking remuneration for general practice s to recorded quality of care for chronic conditions , including diabetes mellitus . We assessed the effect of the incentives on recorded quality of care for diabetes patients and its variation by patient and practice characteristics . Methods Using the General Practice Research Data base we selected a stratified sample of 148 English general practice s in Engl and , contributing data from 2000/1 to 2006/7 , and obtained a r and om sample of 653 500 patients in which 23 920 diabetes patients identified . We quantified annually recorded quality of care at the patient-level , as measured by the 17  QOF diabetes indicators , in a composite score and analysed it longitudinally using an Interrupted Time Series design . Results Recorded quality of care improved for all subgroups in the pre-incentive period . In the first year of the incentives , composite quality improved over- and -above this pre-incentive trend by 14.2 % ( 13.7–14.6 % ) . By the third year the improvement above trend was smaller , but still statistically significant , at 7.3 % ( 6.7–8.0 % ) . After 3 years of the incentives , recorded levels of care varied significantly for patient gender , age , years of previous care , number of co-morbid conditions and practice diabetes prevalence . Conclusions The introduction of financial incentives was associated with improvements in the recorded quality of diabetes care in the first year . These improvements included some measures of disease control , but most captured only documentation of recommended aspects of clinical assessment , not patient management or outcomes of care . Improvements in subsequent years were more modest . Variation in care between population groups diminished under the incentives , but remained substantial in some cases This paper is a report of the results of a demonstration design ed to provide empirical evidence regarding the effects of alternative approaches to paying physicians for serving children in the Medicaid program : ( 1 ) visit fees set at twice regular Medicaid fees in return for physician agreement to manage utilization and ( 2 ) capitation and financial risk-sharing along with the same physician agreement to manage utilization .  Participating physicians were assigned r and omly to either of the two payment groups . Comparisons of utilization and expenditures were made between these two plans and the regular Medicaid program ( fee-for-service , low fees ) . Results showed no adverse effect of capitation payments on primary care visits to office-based physicians . Capitation physician referrals to specialists decreased relative to all other groups studied , consistent with the theory that the financial incentives in capitation will lead primary care physicians to reduce referrals to specialists
The intervention sites admitted statistically significantly more severely ill patients  than nursing homes in the control group .
Despite the
In the report Crossing the Quality Chasm ( 1 ) , the Institute of Medicine called attention to the poor quality of health care in the United States .
The Institute identified numerous factors contributing to poor quality , including the structure of the present health care payment system .
The Institute found that , for certain clinical situations , health care payment arrangements may actually produce disincentives for quality .
The largely untapped potential of the health care payment system to change physician and health care system behavior has stimulated interest in both the scientific literature ( 2 , 3 ) and the popular press ( 4 - 6 ) for linking payments to performance on quality measures .
Several health plans ( 3 , 7 ) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services are using explicit financial incentives for quality ( 8 , 9 ) .
For example , what types of clinical conditions or health care services should be the target of financial incentives to improve quality : chronic diseases , acute care , or preventive care services ?
How effective ( and cost-effective ) are financial incentives for quality ?
What are the optimum magnitude , frequency , and duration of financial incentives for quality ?
What is the optimum package of nonfinancial interventions ( if any ) to include with financial incentives for quality , for example , audit and feedback , recognition , clinical reminders , academic detailing , or information technology support ( 12 , 13 ) ?
Can we expect the effect of financial incentives to persist after they are stopped ?
Because any effective intervention will have some unanticipated effects , will important patient care activities that are not rewarded financially be neglected ?
The purpose of this paper is to assess the relationship between explicit financial incentives and the provision of high- quality health care by systematic ally review ing empirical studies .
Because the evidence regarding the relationship between the financial incentives embedded in fee-for-service and capitation arrangements and the quality of health care has been thoroughly review ed in previous work ( 14 ) , we focused our review on literature that addresses explicit financial rewards for improving health care quality .
Methods Study Identification and Selection We conducted a systematic search of the English- language literature in PubMed to find articles published between 1 January 1980 and 14 November 2005 whose main objective was to assess the use of explicit financial incentives to improve health care quality .
Access to care is the patient 's attainment of timely and appropriate health care .
Structure of care is a feature of a health care organization or clinician relevant to the provision of health care .
Process of care is a health care service provided to or on behalf of a patient .
Outcome of care is a health state of a patient result ing from health care .
Concurrent comparison groups are important because some studies of quality may show dramatic improvement over time but no statistically significant differences between intervention and comparison groups .