In recent decades, there has been an increase in the volume and sophistication of works on compliance theory in international law in general, and in human rights in particular. This body of work is interdisciplinary, influenced by political science and international relations in substance and method. The typology of compliance theories, once formed of several separate strands, coalesced into two duelling perspectives. These were broadly characterised by rational choice approaches, focused on hegemony, sanctions, incentives and material self-interest, with Andrew T. Guzman’s addition of reputational concerns, and constructivist approaches, which argue that repeated interactions, argumentation and exposure to norms characterise and construct state practice. Each of the three works reviewed in this essay critically engages with constructivist research and incorporates some analysis of material incentives, suggesting that constructivism is eclectic and rigorous, willing to debate its own assumptions. Taken together, their contributions are evidence of modern constructivism’s sophistication and methodological breadth.