They assume a positive correlation between redistribution and growth. According to them, the pivotal voter (i.e. a voter who can change his choices in successive elections and, acting in a group, can play a decisive role) is often richer than the median voter, and therefore w'ould not benefit from redistributive policies. Thus, in less equal societies, characterized by low participation of the poor in elections, and/or by a disproportionately greater influence of the more wealthy in elections, there is an insufficient level of growth-enhancing redistributive policies. Models that emphasize the interactions between income inequality, imperfect capital markets and investment decisions suggest that risk-aversion and moral hazard are sources of capital market imperfection. They find that inequality reduces growth because it prevents some agents from investing in physical and/or human capital (Baneijee and Newman, 1991). Galor and Zeira (1993) postulate that access to education is costly, and even the poor need to pay a minimum fixed cost for it (possibly the opportunity cost of not having their children work).