By reducing discretionality, these technical mechanisms can act as barriers to the practices of clientelism which have characterized traditional welfare programmes (Sojo, 2007). Monitoring shared responsibility is perhaps one of the most demanding aspects of conditional transfer programmes in relation with the installed capacity of public services. Several authors have mentioned the considerable resources that countries have to use just to ensure that the transfer conditions are met (Villatoro, 2008, Parra Correa and Perez Ribas, 2008), but there is as yet no clear picture of the associated costs. A study on Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua (Caldes, Coady and Maluccio, 2006) shows that the cost of targeting and monitoring can be as much as 60% of the annual budget for a programme such as Progresa. Fiszbein and Schady (2009), however, point out that those costs depend on the stage that programme implementation has reached.