. After a 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off the road, a police officer located the vehicle she identified during the call and executed a traffic stop. We hold that the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated. I On August 23, 2008, a Mendocino County 911 dispatch team for the California Highway Patrol (CHP) received a call from another CHP dispatcher in neighboring Humboldt County. The Humboldt County dispatcher relayed a tip from a 911 caller, which the Mendocino County team recorded as follows: “ ‘Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David-94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.’ ” App. 36a. The Mendocino County team then broadcast that information to CHP officers at 3:47 p.m. A CHP officer heading northbound toward the reported vehicle responded to the broadcast. At 4:00 p.m., the officer passed the truck near mile marker 69. At about 4:05 p.m., after making a U-turn, he pulled the truck over. A second officer, who had separately responded to the broadcast, also arrived on the scene. As the two officers approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. A search of the truck bed revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The officers arrested the driver, petitioner Lorenzo Prado Navarette, and the passenger, petitioner José Prado Navarette. Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Both the magistrate who presided over the suppression hearing and the Superior Court disagreed.[1] Petitioners pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and were sentenced to 90 days in jail plus three years ofprobation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. 2012 WL 4842651 (Oct. 12, 2012). The court reasoned that the content of the tip indicated that it came from an eyewitness victim of reckless driving, and that the officer’s corroboration of the truck’s description, location, and direction established that the tip was reliable enough to justify a traffic stop. Id., at *7. Finally, the court concluded that the caller reported driving that was sufficiently dangerous to merit an investigative stop without waiting for the officer to observe additional reckless driving himself. Id., at *9. The California Supreme Court denied review. We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. ___ (2013), and now affirm. II The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 –418 (1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 –22 (1968). The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990) . The standard takes into account “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Cortez, supra, at 417. Although a mere “ ‘hunch’ ” does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, supra, at 27, the level of suspicion the standard requires is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less” than is necessary for probable cause, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989) . A These principles apply with full force to investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips. We have firmly rejected the argument “that reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972) . Of course, “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” White, 496 U. S., at 329 (emphasis added). That is because “ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,” and an anonymous tipster’s veracity is “ ‘by hypoth-esis largely unknown, and unknowable.’ ” Ibid. But under appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop.” Id., at 327. Our decisions in Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325 (1990) , and Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) , are useful guides. In White, an anonymous tipster told the police that a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light. The tipster further asserted that the woman would be transporting cocaine. 496 U. S., at 327. After confirming the innocent details, officers stopped the station wagon as it neared the motel and found cocaine in the vehicle. Id., at 331. We held that the officers’ corroboration of certain details made the anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. By accurately predicting future behavior, the tipster demonstrated “a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs,” which in turn implied that the tipster had “access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities.” Id., at 332. We also recognized that an informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things, “including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” Id., at 331 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 244 (1983) ). In J. L., by contrast, we determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun. 529 U. S., at 268. The tipster did not explain how he knew about the gun, nor did he suggest that he had any special familiarity with the young man’s affairs. Id., at 271. As a result, police had no basis for believing “that the tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity.” Id., at 272. Furthermore, the tip included no predictions of future behavior that could be corroborated to assess the tipster’s credibility. Id., at 271. We accordingly concluded that the tip was insufficiently reliable to justify a stop and frisk. B The initial question in this case is whether the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to credit the allegation that petitioners’ truck “ran the [caller] off the roadway.” Even assuming for present purposes that the 911 call was anonymous, see n. 1, supra, we conclude that the call bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. The officer was therefore justified in proceeding from the premise that the truck had, in fact, caused the caller’s car to be dangerously diverted from the highway. By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925—the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving. That basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s reliability. See Gates, supra, at 234 (“[An informant’s] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case”); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 416 (1969) (a tip of illegal gambling is less reliable when “it is not alleged that the informant personally observed [the defendant] at work or that he had ever placed a bet with him”). This is in contrast to J. L., where the tip provided no basis for concluding that the tipster had actually seen the gun. 529 U. S., at 271. Even in White, where we upheld the stop, there was scant evidence that the tipster had actually observed cocaine in the station wagon. We called White a “ ‘close case’ ” because “[k]nowledge about a person’s future movements indicates some familiarity with that person’s affairs, but having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular, whether that person is carrying hidden contraband.” 529 U. S., at 271. A driver’s claim that another vehicle ran her off the road, however, necessarily implies that the informant knows the other car was driven dangerously. There is also reason to think that the 911 caller in this case was telling the truth. Police confirmed the truck’s location near mile marker 69 (roughly 19 highway miles south of the location reported in the 911 call) at 4:00 p.m. (roughly 18 minutes after the 911 call). That timeline of events suggests that the caller reported the incident soon after she was run off the road. That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable. In evidence law, we generally credit the proposition that statements about an event and made soon after perceiving that event are especially trustworthy because “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 803(1), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 371 (describing the rationale for the hearsay exception for “present sense impression[s]”). A similar rationale applies to a “statement relating to a startling event”—such as getting run off the road—“made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Fed. Rule Evid. 803(2) (hearsay exception for “excited utterances”). Unsurprisingly, 911 calls that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay have often been admitted on those grounds. See D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook §8.1, pp. 257–259 (4th ed. 2013–2014) (citing cases admitting 911 calls as present sense impressions); id., §9.1, at 274–275 (911 calls admitted as excited utterances). There was no indication that the tip in J. L. (or even in White) was contemporaneous with the observation of criminal activity or made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event, but those considerations weigh in favor of the caller’s veracity here. Another indicator of veracity is the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system. See Brief for Respondent 40–41, 44; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16–18. A 911 call has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity. See J. L., supra, at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As this case illustrates, see n. 1, supra, 911 calls can be recorded, which provides victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecution, see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §653x (West 2010) (makes “telephon[ing] the 911 emergency line with the intent to annoy or harass” punishable by imprisonment and fine); see also §148.3 (2014 West Cum. Supp.) (prohibits falsely reporting “that an ‘emergency’ exists”); §148.5 (prohibits falsely reporting “that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed”). The 911 system also permits law enforcement to verify important information about the caller. In 1998, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began to require cellular carriers to relay the caller’s phone number to 911 dispatchers. 47 CFR §20.18(d)(1) (2013) (FCC’s “Phase I enhanced 911 services” requirements). Beginning in 2001, carriers have been required to identify the caller’s geographic location with increasing specificity. §§20.18(e)–(h) (“Phase II enhanced 911 service” requirements). And although callers may ordinarily block call recipients from obtaining their identifying information, FCC regulations exempt 911 calls from that privilege. §§64.1601(b), (d)(4)(ii) (“911 emergency services” exemption from rule that, when a caller so requests, “a carrier may not reveal that caller’s number or name”). None of this is to suggest that tips in 911 calls are per se reliable. Given the foregoing technological and regulatory developments, however, a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system. The caller’s use of the 911 system is therefore one of the relevant circum-stances that, taken together, justified the officer’s reliance on the information reported in the 911 call. C Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 30. We must therefore determine whether the 911 caller’s report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness. See Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417 (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity”). We conclude that the behavior alleged by the 911 caller, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion” of drunk driving. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996) . The stop was therefore proper.[2] Reasonable suspicion depends on “ ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reason-able and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ ” Id., at 695. Under that commonsense approach, we can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indicia of drunk driving. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 38 Cal. 4th 1078, 1081, 136 P. 3d 810, 811 (2006) (“ ‘weaving all over the roadway’ ”); State v. Prendergast, 103 Haw. 451, 452–453, 83 P. 3d 714, 715–716 (2004) (“cross[ing] over the center line” on a highway and “almost caus[ing] several head-on collisions”); State v. Golotta, 178 N. J. 205, 209, 837 A. 2d 359, 361 (2003) (driving “ ‘all overthe road’ ” and “ ‘weaving back and forth’ ”); State v. Walshire, 634 N. W. 2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001) (“driving in the median”). Indeed, the accumulated experience of thousands of officers suggests that these sorts of erratic behaviors are strongly correlated with drunk driving. See Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., The Visual Detection of DWI Motorists 4–5 (Mar. 2010), online at http://nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/808677.pdf (as visited Apr. 18, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Of course, not all traffic infractions imply intoxication. Unconfirmed reports of driving without a seatbelt or slightly over the speed limit, for example, are so tenuously connected to drunk driving that a stop on those grounds alone would be constitutionally suspect. But a reliable tip alleging the dangerous behaviors discussed above gener-ally would justify a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving. The 911 caller in this case reported more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, she alleged a specific and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct: running another car off the highway. That conduct bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness. Running another vehicle off the road suggests lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues. See Visual Detection of DWI Motorists 4–5. And the experience of many officers suggests that a driver who almost strikes a vehicle or another object—the exact scenario that ordinarily causes “running [another vehicle] off the roadway”—is likely intoxicated. See id., at 5, 8.As a result, we cannot say that the officer acted unreasonably under these circumstances in stopping a driverwhose alleged conduct was a significant indicator of drunk driving. Petitioners’ attempts to second-guess the officer’s rea-sonable suspicion of drunk driving are unavailing. It is true that the reported behavior might also be explained by, for example, a driver responding to “an unruly child or other distraction.” Brief for Petitioners 21. But we have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277 (2002) . Nor did the absence of additional suspicious conduct, after the vehicle was first spotted by an officer, dispel the reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. Brief for Petitioners 23–24. It is hardly surprising that the appearance of a marked police car would inspire more careful driving for a time. Cf. Arvizu, supra, at 275 (“ ‘[s]lowing down after spotting a law enforcement vehicle’ ” does not dispel reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Extended observation of an allegedly drunk driver might eventually dispel a reasonable suspicion of intoxication, but the 5-minute period in this case hardly sufficed in that regard. Of course, an officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil a vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious driving. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 147 (repudiating the argument that “reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s personal observation”). Once reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises, “[t]he reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 11. This would be a particularly inappropriate context to depart from that settled rule, because allowing a drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have disastrousconsequences. III Like White, this is a “close case.” 496 U. S., at 332. As in that case, the indicia of the 911 caller’s reliability here are stronger than those in J. L., where we held that a bare-bones tip was unreliable. 529 U. S., at 271. Although the indicia present here are different from those we found sufficient in White, there is more than one way to demonstrate “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417–418. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the indicia of reliability in this case sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road. That made it reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to execute a traffic stop. We accordingly affirm. It is so ordered.Notes 1 At the suppression hearing, counsel for petitioners did not dispute that the reporting party identified herself by name in the 911 call recording. Because neither the caller nor the Humboldt County dispatcher who received the call was present at the hearing, however, the prosecution did not introduce the recording into evidence. The prosecution proceeded to treat the tip as anonymous, and the lower courts followed suit. See 2012 WL 4842651, *6 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 12, 2012). 2 Because we conclude that the 911 call created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime, we need not address under what circumstances a stop is justified by the need to investigate completed criminal activity. Cf. v. , .
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus PRADO NAVARETTE et al. v. CALIFORNIA certiorari to the court of appeal of california, first appellate district No. 12–9490. Argued January 21, 2014—Decided April 22, 2014 A California Highway Patrol officer stopped the pickup truck occupied by petitioners because it matched the description of a vehicle that a 911 caller had recently reported as having run her off the road. As he and a second officer approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. They searched the truck’s bed, found 30 pounds of marijuana, and arrested petitioners. Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Their motion was denied, and they pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. Held: The traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck’s driver was intoxicated. . (a) The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops when an officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418. Reasonable suspicion takes into account “the totality of the circumstances,” id., at 417, and depends “upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330. An anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates sufficient reliability, White, 496 U. S., at 329, but may do so under appropriate circumstances, id., at 327. . (b) The 911 call in this case bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle, the caller necessarily claimed an eyewitness basis of knowledge. The apparently short time between the reported incident and the 911 call suggests that the caller had little time to fabricate the report. And a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using the 911 system, which has several technological and regulatory features that safeguard against making false reports with immunity. . (c) Not only was the tip here reliable, but it also created reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. Running another car off the road suggests the sort of impairment that characterizes drunk driving. While that conduct might be explained by another cause such as driver distraction, reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277. Finally, the officer’s failure to observe additional suspicious conduct during the short period that he followed the truck did not dispel the reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, and the officer was not required to surveil the truck for a longer period. . Affirmed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
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