Results for 'Harold Langsam'
Harold Langsam
The Wonder of Consciousness: Understanding the Mind through Philosophical Reflection. By Harold Langsam. (The MIT Press, 2011. Pp. x + 234, Price £24.95 cloth.). [REVIEW]Joe Morrison - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):195-197.details
The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.details
The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...) Harold Langsam—discuss how more precisely its answer to the challenge would go. (shrink)
Review of Langsam The Wonder of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Adam Pautz - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.details
Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds.Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2014 - In Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. MIT Press. pp. 1-10.details
In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, asking whether current systems are sufficient for effective diagnosis, treatment, and research. Doing so, they take up the question of whether mental disorders are natural kinds, grounded in something in the outside world. Psychiatric categories based on natural kinds should group phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of causal explanations and respond similarly to (...) the same type of causal interventions. When these categories do not evince such groupings, there is reason to revise existing classifications. The contributors all question current psychiatric classifications systems and the assumptions on which they are based. They differ, however, as to why and to what extent the categories are inadequate and how to address the problem. Topics discussed include taxometric methods for identifying natural kinds, the error and bias inherent in DSM categories, and the complexities involved in classifying such specific mental disorders as "oppositional defiance disorder" and pathological gambling. -/- Contributors George Graham, Nick Haslam, Allan Horwitz, Harold Kincaid, Dominic Murphy, Jeffrey Poland, Nancy Nyquist Potter, Don Ross, Dan Stein, Jacqueline Sullivan, Serife Tekin, Peter Zachar. (shrink)
Logicism and the ontological commitments of arithmetic.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):123-149.details
Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245.details
Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that 'Colours do not look like dispositions'. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in 'Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions', The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 , pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this does not show that dispositionalism about colours (...) is false. (shrink)
Why Ramify?Harold T. Hodes - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (2):379-415.details
This paper considers two reasons that might support Russell's choice of a ramified-type theory over a simple-type theory. The first reason is the existence of purported paradoxes that can be formulated in any simple-type language, including an argument that Russell considered in 1903. These arguments depend on certain converse-compositional principles. When we take account of Russell's doctrine that a propositional function is not a constituent of its values, these principles turn out to be too implausible to make these arguments troubling. (...) The second reason is conditional on a substitutional interpretation of quantification over types other than that of individuals. This reason stands up to investigation: a simple-type language will not sustain such an interpretation, but a ramified-type language will. And there is evidence that Russell was tacitly inclined towards such an interpretation. A strong construal of that interpretation opens a way to make sense of Russell's simultaneous repudiation of propositions and his willingness to quantify over them. But that way runs into trouble with Russell's commitment to the finitude of human understanding. (shrink)
Axioms for actuality.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1):27 - 34.details
Some theorems on the expressive limitations of modal languages.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1):13 - 26.details
On modal logics which enrich first-order S5.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (4):423 - 454.details
On The Sense and Reference of A Logical Constant.Harold Hodes - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):134-165.details
Logicism is, roughly speaking, the doctrine that mathematics is fancy logic. So getting clear about the nature of logic is a necessary step in an assessment of logicism. Logic is the study of logical concepts, how they are expressed in languages, their semantic values, and the relationships between these things and the rest of our concepts, linguistic expressions, and their semantic values. A logical concept is what can be expressed by a logical constant in a language. So the question "What (...) is logic?" drives us to the question "What is a logical constant?" Though what follows contains some argument, limitations of space constrain me in large part to express my Credo on this topic with the broad brush of bold assertion and some promissory gestures. (shrink)
One-step Modal Logics, Intuitionistic and Classical, Part 1.Harold T. Hodes - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):837-872.details
This paper and its sequel "look under the hood" of the usual sorts of proof-theoretic systems for certain well-known intuitionistic and classical propositional modal logics. Section 1 is preliminary. Of most importance: a marked formula will be the result of prefixing a formula in a propositional modal language with a step-marker, for this paper either 0 or 1. Think of 1 as indicating the taking of "one step away from 0." Deductions will be constructed using marked formulas. Section 2 presents (...) the model-theoretic concepts, based on those in [7], that guide the rest of this paper. Section 3 presents Natural Deduction systems IK and CK, formalizations of intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of K. In these systems, occurrences of step-markers allow deductions to display deductive structure that is covered over in familiar "no step" proof-theoretic systems for such logics. Box and Diamond are governed by Introduction and Elimination rules; the familiar K rule and Necessitation are derived (i.e. admissible) rules. CK will be the result of adding the 0-version of the Rule of Excluded Middle to the rules which generate IK. Note: IK is the result of merely dropping that rule from those generating CK, without addition of further rules or axioms (as was needed in [7]). These proof-theoretic systems yield intuitionistic and classical consequence relations by the obvious definition. Section 4 provides some examples of what can be deduced in IK. Section 5 defines some proof-theoretic concepts that are used in Section 6 to prove the soundness of the consequence relation for IK (relative to the class of models defined in Section 2.) Section 7 proves its completeness (relative to that class). Section 8 extends these results to the consequence relation for CK. (Looking ahead: Part 2 will investigate one-step proof-theoretic systems formalizing intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of some familiar logics stronger than K.). (shrink)
The composition of Fregean thoughts.Harold T. Hodes - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):161 - 178.details
Ontological Commitments, Thick and Thin.Harold T. Hodes - 1990 - In George Boolos (ed.), Method, Reason and Language: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. pp. 235-260.details
Discourse carries thin commitment to objects of a certain sort iff it says or implies that there are such objects. It carries a thick commitment to such objects iff an account of what determines truth-values for its sentences say or implies that there are such objects. This paper presents two model-theoretic semantics for mathematical discourse, one reflecting thick commitment to mathematical objects, the other reflecting only a thin commitment to them. According to the latter view, for example, the semantic role (...) of number-words is not designation but rather the encoding of cardinality-quantifiers. I also present some reasons for preferring this view. (shrink)
Where do sets come from?Harold T. Hodes - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):150-175.details
A model-theoretic approach to the semantics of set-theoretic discourse.
Cut-conditions on sets of multiple-alternative inferences.Harold T. Hodes - 2022 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 68 (1):95 - 106.details
I prove that the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem is equivalent, under some weak set-theoretic assumptions, to what I will call the Cut-for-Formulas to Cut-for-Sets Theorem: for a set F and a binary relation |- on Power(F), if |- is finitary, monotonic, and satisfies cut for formulas, then it also satisfies cut for sets. I deduce the CF/CS Theorem from the Ultrafilter Theorem twice; each proof uses a different order-theoretic variant of the Tukey- Teichmüller Lemma. I then discuss relationships between various (...) cut-conditions in the absence of finitariness or of monotonicity. (shrink)
In Defence of the Letter of Fictionalism.Harold Noonan - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):133-139.details
Three Value Logics: An Introduction, A Comparison of Various Logical Lexica and Some Philosophical Remarks.Harold Hodes - 1989 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 43 (2):99-145.details
Medical Models of Addiction.Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2010 - In Kincaid Ross (ed.), What is Addiction?details
Biomedical science has been remarkably successful in explaining illness by categorizing diseases and then by identifying localizable lesions such as a virus and neoplasm in the body that cause those diseases. Not surprisingly, researchers have aspired to apply this powerful paradigm to addiction. So, for example, in a review of the neuroscience of addiction literature, Hyman and Malenka (2001, p. 695) acknowledge a general consensus among addiction researchers that "[a]ddiction can appropriately be considered as a chronic medical illness." Like other (...) diseases, "Once addiction has taken hold, it tends to follow a chronic course." (Koob and La Moal 2006, p. ?). Working from this perspective, much effort has gone into characterizing the symptomology of addiction and the brain changes that underlie them. Evidence for involvement of dopamine transmission changes in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and nucleus accumbens (NAc) have received the greatest attention. Kauer and Malenka (2007, p. 844) put it well: "drugs of abuse can co-opt synaptic plasticity mechanisms in brain circuits involved in reinforcement and reward processing". Our goal in this chapter to provide an explicit description of the assumptions of medical models, the different forms they may take, and the challenges they face in providing explanations with solid evidence of addiction. <br>. (shrink)
Jumping through the transfinite: The master code hierarchy of Turing degrees.Harold T. Hodes - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (2):204-220.details
Where $\underline{a}$ is a Turing degree and ξ is an ordinal $ , the result of performing ξ jumps on $\underline{a},\underline{a}^{(\xi)}$ , is defined set-theoretically, using Jensen's fine-structure results. This operation appears to be the natural extension through $(\aleph_1)^{L^\underline{a}}$ of the ordinary jump operations. We describe this operation in more degree-theoretic terms, examine how much of it could be defined in degree-theoretic terms and compare it to the single jump operation.
Immoralism and the Valence Constraint.James Harold - 2008 - British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (1):45-64.details
Immoralists hold that in at least some cases, moral fl aws in artworks can increase their aesthetic value. They deny what I call the valence constraint: the view that any effect that an artwork's moral value has on its aesthetic merit must have the same valence. The immoralist offers three arguments against the valence constraint. In this paper I argue that these arguments fail, and that this failure reveals something deep and interesting about the relationship between cognitive and moral value. (...) In the fi nal section I offer a positive argument for the valence constraint. (shrink)
Autonomism Reconsidered.James Harold - 2011 - British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (2):137-147.details
This paper has three aims: to define autonomism clearly and charitably, to offer a positive argument in its favour, and to defend a larger view about what is at stake in the debate between autonomism and its critics. Autonomism is here understood as the claim that a valuer does not make an error in failing to bring her moral and aesthetic judgements together, unless she herself values doing so. The paper goes on to argue that reason does not require the (...) valuer to make coherent her aesthetic and moral evaluations. Finally, the paper shows that the denial of autonomism has realist commitments that autonomism does not have, and concludes that issues of value realism and irrealism are relevant to the debates about autonomism in ways that have not hitherto been recognized. (shrink)
In Support of Theory of Appearing: Defending Langsam against Djukic's Critique.Ali Far - 2015 - GSTF Journal of General Philosophy 1 (2).details
The purpose of this paper is to defend Langsam's Theory of Appearing (TA) against Djukic et al's critique. In strengthening Langsam's defense of TA, I adopt some of Le Morvan's arguments in defending Direct Realism. TA states that experiences are relations between material object and mind, and that phenomenal features are appearances of relations held between material objects and mind. Djukic objects to TA on three grounds of Hallucination, Causal Principle (CP), and Time-Gap: First, Djukic objects to TA (...) on the ground that perception and hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable, thus phenomenal features (or properties) instantiated in perception may not be relations either, and thus TA could fail. In defending TA, Langsam argues that indistinguishability does not entail that perception and hallucination instantiate the same appearance. Moreover, disjunctivist conception of experience supports TA in that phenomenal features are either a relation between a material object and mind, or it is something else (as in cases of hallucination). I aim to show that sense-data (or like) theories of perception, that Djukic favors as being superior, would fail Djukic's own scrutiny in cases of hallucination in addition to being against common-sense. Second objection is that perception and hallucination must have the same-cause because they are indistinguishable, and also CP requires that same-causes to produce the same-effects. But hallucination and perception are different experiences, and hence TA fails CP. Responding to CP objection, "same-cause same-effect" only applies to intrinsic changes and intrinsic changes are changes in intrinsic properties and relations between intrinsic properties. Third, TA is opposed because for a given Time-Gap we cannot experience objects as they are (were) at the time of our perception. TA defeats this objection because it does not claim that "we can now (experience) the no-longer existent object as it is now, but only that we can now (experience) the once-existent object as it used to be. Fourth, to further strengthen TA, I will raise objections to TA including from the vantage point of Durability, Perceptual Relativity, Illusion, and Partial Perception arguments, and respond to such objections accordingly. To explicate TA, I argue from the vantage points of common sense, realistic physical biological considerations, and non-miraculous expectations from any theory of perception, including from TA. (shrink)
Uniform Upper Bounds on Ideals of Turing Degrees.Harold T. Hodes - 1978 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 43 (3):601-612.details
Individual-actualism and three-valued modal logics, part 1: Model-theoretic semantics.Harold T. Hodes - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (4):369 - 401.details
Part 1 [Hodes, 2021] "looked under the hood" of the familiar versions of the classical propositional modal logic K and its intuitionistic counterpart. This paper continues that project, addressing some familiar classical strengthenings of K and GL), and their intuitionistic counterparts. Section 9 associates two intuitionistic one-step proof-theoretic systems to each of the just mentioned intuitionistic logics, this by adding for each a new rule to those which generated IK in Part 1. For the systems associated with the intuitionistic counterparts (...) of D and T, these rules are "pure one-step": their schematic formulations does not use □ or ♢. For the systems associated with the intuitionistic counterparts of K4, etc., these rules meet these conditions: neither □ nor ♢ is iterated; none use both □ and ♢. The join of the two systems associated with each of these familiar logics is the full one-step system for that intuitionistic logic. And further "blended" intuitionistic systems arise from joining these systems in various ways. Adding the 0-version of Excluded Middle to their intuitionistic counterparts yields the one-step systems corresponding to the familiar classical logics. Each proof-theoretic system defines a consequence relation in the obvious way. Section 10 examines inclusions between these consequence relations. Section 11 associates each of the above consequence relations with an appropriate class of models, and proves them sound with respect to their appropriate class. This allows proofs of some failures of inclusion between consequence relations. Section 12 proves that the each consequence relation is complete or weakly complete, that relative to its appropriate class of models. The Appendix presents three further results about some of the intuitionistic consequence relations discussed in the body of the paper. For Keywords, see Part 1. (shrink)
Cardinality logics, part I: inclusions between languages based on 'exactly'.Harold Hodes - 1988 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 39 (3):199-238.details
An Exact Pair for the Arithmetic Degrees Whose Join is Not a Weak Uniform Upper Bound.Harold T. Hodes - 1982 - Recursive Function Theory-Newsletters 28.details
Proof uses forcing on perfect trees for 2-quantifier sentences in the language of arithmetic. The result extends to exact pairs for the hyperarithmetic degrees.
More about uniform upper Bounds on ideals of Turing degrees.Harold T. Hodes - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):441-457.details
Let I be a countable jump ideal in $\mathscr{D} = \langle \text{The Turing degrees}, \leq\rangle$ . The central theorem of this paper is: a is a uniform upper bound on I iff a computes the join of an I-exact pair whose double jump a (1) computes. We may replace "the join of an I-exact pair" in the above theorem by "a weak uniform upper bound on I". We also answer two minimality questions: the class of uniform upper bounds on I (...) never has a minimal member; if ∪ I = L α [ A] ∩ ω ω for α admissible or a limit of admissibles, the same holds for nice uniform upper bounds. The central technique used in proving these theorems consists in this: by trial and error construct a generic sequence approximating the desired object; simultaneously settle definitely on finite pieces of that object; make sure that the guessing settles down to the object determined by the limit of these finite pieces. (shrink)
Individual-actualism and three-valued modal logics, part 2: Natural-deduction formalizations.Harold T. Hodes - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (1):17 - 63.details
Corrections to "where do sets come from?".Harold T. Hodes - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (4):1486.details
The Modal Theory Of Pure Identity And Some Related Decision Problems.Harold Hodes - 1984 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 30 (26-29):415-423.details
Relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability of modal quantificational formulae in which "= " is the sole predicate is undecidable; but if we restrict attention to satisfiability in structures with the expanding domain property, satisfiability relative to the familiar frames (K, K4, T, S4, B, S5) is decidable. Furthermore, relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability for modal quantificational formulae with a single monadic predicate is undecidable ; this improves the result of Kripke concerning formulae with two monadic predicates.
The Ethics of Non-Realist Fiction: Morality's Catch-22.James Harold - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):145-159.details
The topic of this essay is how non-realistic novels challenge our philosophical understanding of the moral significance of literature. I consider just one case: Joseph Heller's Catch-22. I argue that standard philosophical views, based as they are on realistic models of literature, fail to capture the moral significance of this work. I show that Catch-22 succeeds morally because of the ways it resists using standard realistic techniques, and suggest that philosophical discussion of ethics and literature must be pluralistic if it (...) is to include all morally salient literature, and not just novels in the "Great Tradition" and their ilk. (shrink)
Well-behaved modal logics.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1393-1402.details
Finite level borel games and a problem concerning the jump hierarchy.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1301-1318.details
On the Ancient Idea that Music Shapes Character.James Harold - 2016 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 15 (3):341-354.details
Ancient Chinese and Greek thinkers alike were preoccupied with the moral value of music; they distinguished between good and bad music by looking at the music's effect on moral character. The idea can be understood in terms of two closely related questions. Does music have the power to affect the ethical character of either listener or performer? If it does, is it better as music for doing so? I argue that an affirmative answers to both questions are more plausible than (...) it might seem at first. (shrink)
Upper bounds on locally countable admissible initial segments of a Turing degree hierarchy.Harold T. Hodes - 1981 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (4):753-760.details
Where AR is the set of arithmetic Turing degrees, 0 (ω ) is the least member of { $\mathbf{\alpha}^{(2)}|\mathbf{a}$ is an upper bound on AR}. This situation is quite different if we examine HYP, the set of hyperarithmetic degrees. We shall prove (Corollary 1) that there is an a, an upper bound on HYP, whose hyperjump is the degree of Kleene's O. This paper generalizes this example, using an iteration of the jump operation into the transfinite which is based on (...) results of Jensen and is detailed in [3] and [4]. In $\S1$ we review the basic definitions from [3] which are needed to state the general results. (shrink)
Cardinality logics. Part II: Definability in languages based on `exactly'.Harold Hodes - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (3):765-784.details
Literary Cognitivism.James Harold - 2015 - In Noel Carroll & John Gibson (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. Routledge.details
The Value of Fidelity in Adaptation.James Harold - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (1):89-100.details
© British Society of Aesthetics 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] adaptation of literary works into films has been almost completely neglected as a philosophical topic. I discuss two questions about this phenomenon:What do we mean when we say that a film is faithful to its source?Is being faithful to its source a merit in a film adaptation?In response to, I set out two distinct (...) senses of fidelity: story fidelity and thematic fidelity. I then argue, in response to, that thematic fidelity, but not story fidelity, is an aesthetic merit in a film adaptation. The key steps in this argument involve showing that merely preserving the story from one medium to another does not typically involve an aesthetically... (shrink)
Flexing the imagination.James Harold - 2003 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (3):247–258.details
I explore the claim that "fictive imagining" – imagining what it is like to be a character – can be morally dangerous. In particular, I consider the controversy over William Styron's imagining the revolutionary protagonist in his Confessions of Nat Turner. I employ Ted Cohen's model of fictive imagining to argue, following a generally Kantian line of thought, that fictive imagining can be dangerous if one has the wrong motives. After considering several possible motives, I argue that only internally directed (...) motives can satisfy the moral concern. Finally, I suggest that when one has the right motives, fictive imagining is morally praiseworthy since it improves one's ability to imagine the lives of others. (shrink)
Modal realism, still at your convenience.Harold Noonan & Mark Jago - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):299-303.details
Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
Reflections on Putnam, Wright and brains in vats.Harold W. Noonan - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):59-62.details
Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology.James Harold - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.details
In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize our (...) psychology: are moral judgments beliefs, or a kind of pro-attitude? In this paper, I argue that this distinction, too, is difficult to maintain in the light of a reasonable skepticism about folk psychology. I conclude by suggesting some new possibilities for the analysis of moral language that look beyond this distinction. I begin by briefly reviewing some contemporary positions in metaethics on cognitivism and non-cognitivism, that are intended to emphasize the supposed psychological differences between the two views. I show that the appearance of a clear difference between these views depends on one's having a very strong commitment to the context-independence and completeness of certain concepts of folk psychology. I then argue for a moderate skepticism about folk psychology. I conclude that folk concepts like ?belief? are not sufficiently well-defined to settle this metaethical dispute. (shrink)
Coin perception studies and the concept of schemata.Harold G. McCurdy - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (3):160-168.details
The proposition that perception is in- fluenced by object value and perceiver need has enjoyed an exciting career since it was given prominence by Bruner and Goodman in an oral and, later, a printed report (3) of dramatic differ- ences between rich and poor children in their judgments of coin sizes. Whether that study or subsequent ones can be said to have upheld the proposition may be questionable; but the effect on psy- chologists is beyond doubt. They were refreshed and (...) stimulated. The ideas, the experimental approach, and the re- sults were new, and quite obviously ap- pealed to current needs. (shrink)
Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity.Harold Tarrant, Danielle A. Layne, Dirk Baltzly & François Renaud (eds.) - 2017 - Leiden: Brill.details
31 chapters covering the Old Academy to Late Antiquity. See attached TOC.
Can Expressivists Tell the Difference Between Beauty and Moral Goodness?James Harold - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):289-300.details
One important but infrequently discussed difficulty with expressivism is the attitude type individuation problem.1 Expressivist theories purport to provide a unified account of normative states. Judgments of moral goodness, beauty, humor, prudence, and the like, are all explicated in the same way: as expressions of attitudes, what Allan Gibbard calls "states of norm-acceptance". However, expressivism also needs to explain the difference between these different sorts of attitude. It is possible to judge that a thing is both aesthetically good and morally (...) bad. While the realist can explain the difference by suggesting that each judgment makes reference to a different property (or set of properties), the expressivist cannot. She must show that what is expressed by the speaker is different in each case. This has proven to be difficult to do. (shrink)
How To Do Things With Signs: Semiotics in Legal Theory, Practice, and Education.Harold Anthony Lloyd - forthcoming - University of Richmond Law Review.details
Note: This draft was updated on November 10, 2020. Discussing federal statutes, Justice Scalia tells us that "[t]he stark reality is that the only thing that one can say for sure was agreed to by both houses and the president (on signing the bill) is the text of the statute. The rest is legal fiction." How should we take this claim? If we take "text" to mean the printed text, that text without more is just a series of marks. If (...) instead we take "text" (as we must) to refer to something off the page such as the "meaning" of the series of marks at issue, what is that meaning and how do we know that all the legislators "agreed" on that "meaning"? In seeking answers here, we necessarily delve into semiotics (i.e., the "general theory of signs") by noting that meaningful ink marks ("signifiers) signify a meaning beyond themselves (the "signified.") Thus, understanding how signs function is integral to lawyers' textual and linguistic analysis. Additionally, as this article demonstrates, legal analysis and rhetoric are much impoverished if lawyers ignore nonverbal signs such as icons, indices, and nonverbal symbols. In providing a broad overview of semiotics for lawyers, this article thus (1) begins with a general definition of signs and the related notion of intentionality. It then turns to, among other things, (2) the structure and concomitants of signs in more detail (including the signifier and the signified), (3) the possible correlations of the signifier and the signified that generate signs of interest to lawyers such as the index, the icon, and the symbol; (5) the expansion of legal rhetoric through use of the index, the icon, and the non-verbal as well as the verbal symbol, (6) the nature of various semiotic acts in public and private law (including assertives, commissives, directives, and verdictives); (7) the interpretation and construction of semiotic acts (including contracts as commissives and legislation as directives); (8) the role of speaker or reader meaning in the interpretation and construction of semiotic acts; (9) the semiotics of meaning, time, and the fixation of meaning debate; (10) the impact of signifier drift; (11) the distinction between sense and understanding; and (12) some brief reflections on semiotics and the First Amendment. This article also provides an Appendix of further terms and concepts useful to lawyers in their explorations of semiotics. (shrink)
Theory without practice is empty; Practice without theory is blind: The inherent inseparability of doctrine and skills.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2017 - In Linda H. Edwards (ed.), The Doctrine Skills Divide: Legal Education's Self-Inflicted Wound. Durham, NC, USA: pp. 77-90.details
This article maintains that the so-called theory-practice divide in legal education is not only factually false but semantically impossible. -/- As to the divide's falsity, practitioners have of course performed excellent scholarship and academics have excelled in practice. As to the divide's semantic impossibility, this article examines, among other things: -/- (1) the essential role of experience in meaning, -/- (2) the resulting inseparability of theory and practice in the world of experience, -/- (3) problems the divide shares in common (...) with debunked Cartesian dualism, and -/- (4) modern cognitive psychology's notions of embodied meaning which further underscore the semantic impossibility of separating theory from practice in the world of experience. -/- Using insights from such examinations, this article also explores implications of a debunked theory-practice divide for, among other things, law school curriculums and law school faculty hiring standards. -/- Keywords: legal education, legal writing, semantics, theory, practice, experience, Charles Sanders Peirce, embodied meaning, cognitive psychology, Cartesian dualism, affordance knowledge, metaphor, George Lakoff, category, humanities, Langdell, pragmatism, semiotics, philosophy. (shrink)
Here is Harold Pinter.Subhasis Chattopadhyay - 2005 - THE BULLETIN OF THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE (December):561-66.details
This essay interrogates the philosophy of Pinter through analyses of his language, religious understanding of life and through passing references to Buddhism.