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Executive presidential rule in Turkey moves closer

July 22nd 2016Following the failed coup attempt by factions in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) on July 15th, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, are taking unprecedented action to root out those thought to have been involved. Over 50,000 individuals in the military, the judiciary, the police force and academic institutions have been detained, dismissed, or placed on administrative leave, pending investigation. Widespread international condemnation of the coup attempt has quickly given way to strong criticism from the EU and the US of the government's uncompromising response, especially the introduction of a state of emergency for three months. We expect that Mr Erdogan will press ahead with actions to consolidate his position as a strong president, instituting de facto executive presidential rule.

The attempted coup launched on July 15th by elements of the TSK was suppressed within 12 hours. But the speed with which it was halted and the litany of operational errors committed by the coup-makers should not diminish the gravity of the event. The coup almost succeeded. Mr Erdogan escaped capture or death by as little as half an hour. The coup's failure can be largely attributed to three factors.

First, it had no public support—thousands of government supporters took to the streets in the middle of the night in response to an appeal from Mr Erdogan on social media from his mobile phone. Even though Mr Erdogan is deeply unpopular with almost one-half of the electorate, there is no appetite for suspending civilian rule in Turkey. Second, it enjoyed no political support either—it prompted a rare show of unity by the four parties in parliament, who condemned it jointly. And lastly, the instigators failed to obtain the backing of the military's top commanders.

Unprecedented government response

Following the coup attempt, the government of Turkey has decided to cast a wide net in an attempt to weed out any and all individuals who may have been associated with the coup. So far, over 50,000 individuals in many government positions, including the military, the judiciary, the police force and academic institutions have been detained, dismissed, or placed on administrative leave, pending investigation. On June 20th Mr Erdogan declared a state of emergency for three months. This will allow him and the cabinet to pass laws without the approval of parliament and without recourse to the Constitutional Court. The deputy prime minister, Numan Kurtulmus, followed up on July 21st by stating that Turkey was suspending the European Convention on Human Rights for at least six weeks.

These steps have been taken for two reasons: to ensure the continuity and security of civilian government and for Mr Erdogan to consolidate his position as a strong executive president. The risk is that if Mr Erdogan and the government go too far in their use of these powers, they are likely to do irreparable damage to Turkey's democratic institutions and governance structures. Although members of the government have sought to reassure international allies and investors that the use of the powers will not go beyond what is necessary to ensure the stability of the government, there is considerable concern that Mr Erdogan is seeking to capitalise on the fallout of the coup to exact purges in areas where he has faced challenges to his rule. The dismissal of hundreds of judges from all the high courts (including the arrest of two Constitutional Court members), the forced resignation of all university deans and travel bans on all members of the academic community are just some initial examples of Mr Erdogan's intent.

At war with Hizmet

Mr Erdogan and the government are also keen to send a clear signal to domestic and international audiences that dissent and opposition to their mandate to rule will not be tolerated. Primary responsibility for instigating this coup has been placed firmly on the doorstep of the reclusive Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, who lives in a self-imposed exile in the US. Mr Erdogan, as well as numerous senior analysts who follow Turkey, is of the opinion that the coup was attempted by members of the military who are loyal to Mr Gulen, possibly with the support of hardline secularist/nationalists unhappy with the government's treatment of the military. Until 2013 Mr Gulen's Hizmet movement had collaborated closely with the AKP to remove the military from the political sphere. However, the alliance ended bitterly when members of the judiciary and police allegedly belonging to Hizmet launched a corruption probe into Mr Erdogan's closest circle of friends and associates. Mr Erdogan responded with greater force, and before the failed coup on July 15th it was widely believed that he had won the power struggle. The attempted coup appears to have been a desperate last-gasp attempt to turn the tables on the president.

Tensions with the US and the EU

Widespread international condemnation of the attempted coup and praise for the manner in which the public and all political parties opposed it quickly gave way to strong criticism from the EU and the US of the government's clampdown. Turkey has formally requested the extradition of Mr Gulen from the US, but this risks fueling tensions with the US administration. The US Department of Justice insists that for the extradition to be approved the US needs incontrovertible evidence that Mr Gulen was directly involved with and/or associated with the attempted coup. The US has also asked for strong democratic standards to be upheld during the process of weeding out the coup-makers.

In addition, Mr Erdogan has indicated in several public speeches since the attempted coup that the death penalty being demanded by his followers may be reinstated in order to punish the coup plotters. Capital punishment, which was removed from the statute books in 2004, was directly related to Turkey's accession bid to join the EU. Although Mr Erdogan's toying with the idea of reinstating the death penalty resonates positively with his supporters, EU officials have been quick to respond that this would seriously harm Turkey's EU accession bid.

Ultimately, however, the US and the EU do not have much leverage over Turkey. Mr Erdogan and members of the government have been quick to remind their international allies of the gravity of the risk to political stability caused by the attempted coup.

Imposing de facto executive presidential rule

Under these circumstances, it is highly likely that Mr Erdogan will accelerate his plan to consolidate his position as a strong president. From a legal standpoint, constitutional changes are required for this to happen, but Mr Erdogan is likely to use the powers given to him and the cabinet under the state of emergency to establish de facto executive presidential rule. Emergency rule grants extensive powers of detainment, and curtailment of individual, associational and press freedoms, all for the sake preserving societal order and peace. Unaccountability and non-transparent rule are likely to be the salient features of the next few months, if not longer.

Eroding institutional capacity

The pace and extent of the purge of state institutions raise concerns that the government's post-coup response could inflict irreparable damage on Turkey's institutional capacity. The concern is particularly acute in the military sphere. At a time when the state is seeking to put down an insurgency by Kurdish militants and address the security risk posed by the jihadi extremism of IS, approximately one-third of the TSK's highest ranked officers have either been detained and/or dismissed. This potentially creates a severe operational capacity problem for the TSK, the second-largest military force in NATO.