Can Great Britain Survive a Scottish “No” Vote?

Update, September 19th: Scotland voted “no,” by a margin of fifty-five to forty-five per cent. The turnout was eighty-five per cent. Scottish politicians attributed the result to the promises the national parties made late in the campaign, which they called on them to keep.

The obvious question about the referendum on Scottish independence is: Will the secessionists win? The answer looks likely to be no. Of all the opinion polls carried out in the run-up to the vote, only one has shown the pro-independence side in the lead, and that survey was taken almost two weeks ago. The vast majority of the polls show the "no" side narrowly ahead; two published on Wednesday gave the unionists fifty-two per cent and the "yes" side forty-eight per cent, though both found a fair number of undecideds.

I wouldn't rule out a last-minute swing toward independence. Some of the scare tactics employed by the British government and its allies over the past couple of weeks have been crude and clumsy: it's always possible that the Scots, a proud and obstinate people, will react against them. But, assuming that the polls are accurate, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will escape intact.

But for how long?

That is the really interesting question arising out of the vote. For, although the unionist side seems likely to win this round, in the longer term the impact of the referendum could well be disastrous for those who want to maintain the status quo. About the best they can hope for is a federalized Great Britain that retains the word "United" in its name but is, for most intents and purposes, two separate countries. And even that outcome may prove to be unsustainable. Indeed, the English, who today are lamenting the possible dissolution of their beloved union, may well end up kicking the Scots out of it.

To understand why, you need to recall a bit of history. Thursday's vote didn't come out of nowhere. Scottish nationalism has been growing in strength since the seventies and eighties, when Mrs. Thatcher's brand of free-market economics and militarism alienated many of those north of the border. In a 1999 referendum, the Scots voted for devolution of power to a Scottish Parliament, which came into existence two years later. Initially, the Scottish Labour Party held power. But, since 2007, the pro-independence Scottish National Party has been the biggest party. And, since 2011, it has held power alone.

Already, the Scottish government has the authority to set its own policies in many areas of domestic policy, such as education, housing, and health care. And it has started to exercise this power.  In the rest of the United Kingdom, students now pay for their college degrees. In Scotland, a university education is still free. In the rest of the United Kingdom, people pay for medical prescriptions. In Scotland, they don't. At the moment, the Parliament at Westminster still sets most tax rates and the level of state benefits, such as old-age pensions, for the entire country. But that is also changing. Beginning in 2016, the Scottish Parliament will be able to alter income-tax rates by up to ten pence in the pound. Scotland is also altering the way in which it taxes property sales, to make its methods more progressive, and it is taking over the setting of laws relating to speed limits and drunk driving.

That is only the beginning. Last week, in a desperate effort to persuade the Scots to reject independence, the three major parties in England—the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, and Labour—came together and promised them another big dose of devolution in exchange for a "no" vote. In making this offer, Gordon Brown, the former Prime Minister, who is Scottish, described it as "nothing less than a modern form of Home Rule" for Scotland. Since then, the British government has made clear that this so-called devo-max policy would including granting the Scottish government more powers to raise taxes and borrow money, as well as the right to change some benefits and guarantee spending levels for the National Health Service in Scotland. The writ of Westminster, which would still have a full contingent of Scottish M.P.s, would be largely confined to defense and foreign policy, immigration, energy, and business regulation.

Many Scots might be content with such an outcome. But what about the English, the Welsh, and the Northern Irish? Going forward, would they be content to allow Scottish M.P.s to vote on policy measures in Westminster that shape their lives when their own representatives aren't allowed to vote on similar issues involving Scotland, because those get decided in Edinburgh? This question was first posed in 1977, by Tam Dalyell, who was then the Labour M.P. for West Lothian. For many years, the West Lothian question, as it became known, was regarded as an interesting but hypothetical puzzler. But, as more and more powers are devolved to the Scottish Parliament, it is one that takes on great urgency. Eventually, it could lead to the breakup of Great Britain.

Imagine what will happen if there's a "no" vote, and, over the next few years, "devo-max" is enacted. "At that point," Janan Ganesh, a columnist for the Financial Times, notes, "MPs representing Scottish seats at Westminster, who are overwhelmingly Labour, will be voting on legislation that scarcely affects their constituents. Anybody who thinks this will be allowed to stand does not talk to enough Tory MPs, many of whose private views on Scottish independence already range from insouciance to glee."

Alternatively, Ganesh might have added, talk to some Englishmen down the local pub. Traditionally, the English have taken a phlegmatic approach to Scottish devolution. If the Jocks want to set their own school examinations and speed limits, let them get on with it—that's been the general view. But things are changing. Like Scottish nationalism, English nationalism is on the rise, and, in some quarters, it's starting to be directed at the restive Scots. Nigel Farage, the leader of the jingoistic U.K. Independence Party, which wants to pull Britain out of Europe, has accused the S.N.P. of stirring up "anti-English hatred" and has described some of its supporters as "hoodlums" out to intimidate "no" voters. On Wednesday, Farage said that Alex Salmond, the S.N.P.'s leader, was fueling "vitriol" and "aberrant behavior" that could lead to riots on voting day.

Farage represents an extreme view, but he has a knack for capturing popular sentiments and prejudices. An opinion poll quoted in this week's issue of The Economist showed that a majority of English voters already think Scottish M.P.s shouldn't be allowed to vote on laws affecting England. As more power gets devolved to Edinburgh, this sort of sentiment will only grow stronger. And Farage and other English politicians will be there to exploit it.

To be sure, there are ways of addressing the West Lothian question short of booting the Scots from Westminster and insuring the breakup of Great Britain. Historically, pragmatism and flexibility have been two of Britain's strengths. Last year, a parliamentary commission led by William McKay, the former clerk of the House of Commons, suggested introducing a requirement that laws affecting England alone obtain the backing of a majority of English M.P.s. More radical ideas have also been floated, including the setting up of an English Parliament, which would have powers similar to the Scottish one. But what, then, would be the point of retaining Westminster?

The Electoral Reform Society, a progressive group that wants to modernize Britain's ancient (and largely unwritten) constitution, is calling for the establishment of a "constitutional convention," drawing from a wide range of parties and interest groups. "If Scotland votes No, the future of the United Kingdom will still be up in the air," Katie Ghose, the Society's chief executive, said in a statement on Wednesday. "It can’t be right that this future is decided entirely by political leaders decreeing from on high where power should lie."

Despite the efforts of Ghose and other reformers, the creation of such a convention is highly unlikely. But the questions raised by the Scottish referendum can't be swept aside. Even after a "no" vote, the union, which goes back to 1707, would be looking shakier than ever.