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17 N.E.

3d 9 (2014)

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee

Joyce AMOS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-COA-01.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Ashland County.

July 14, 2014.

10*10 J. Jeffrey Holland, Sharon Center, OH, for plaintiff-appellee.

O. Joseph Murray, Ashland, OH, for defendant-appellant.


{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Joyce Amos appeals her conviction and

sentence on one count of abandoning animals after a bench trial in the
Ashland Municipal Court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Yvette Hyatt worked at the Claremont Veterinary Clinic in

Ashland, Ohio. On July 2, 2013, after 8:30 p.m., Hyatt and her
husband were driving by the Clinic after hours, when she noticed an
unfamiliar car at the rear of the building, parked at an odd angle by the

{¶ 3} Hyatt noticed Amos emerge from the area of the dumpster

holding an empty, wire cage animal trap, referred to as a "live trap." A
male individual was standing nearby, waving for Amos to come out.
Amos put the trap in the trunk of the car, got in the driver's seat and
drove away. Hyatt followed the car, with her husband driving. Hyatt
was able to get close enough to record the license plate number, and
called it in to the police.

{¶ 4} Hyatt returned to the Veterinary Clinic to look at the area where

Amos had been parked. There, under the dumpster, she and her
husband found a kitten with matted eyes that seemed unhealthy. The
kitten approached her husband readily. Hyatt took the kitten home
with her to try to nurse it back to health, and brought it to Dr. LaFever
when the clinic re-opened at 8 a.m. the next day. The kitten was then
placed with a foster home where it died shortly after arriving in the
home. Ms. Hyatt confirmed two adult cats, which were clinic cats,
were there at that time she saw Amos along with a calico kitten. The
adult clinic cats had a doghouse with 11*11 bedding to live in outside
the clinic. Hyatt and her husband were unable to capture the calico
kitten and eventually gave up their attempt.

{¶ 5} Sergeant Cindy Benner of the Ashland County Sheriff's

Department tracked down the license plate number of the vehicle and
traced it to Amos. Sergeant Benner interviewed Amos. Amos is a
seventy three year old widow on a small fixed income. Amos told the
officer that she had first noticed the kitten "crying all day" under her
porch. It also had diarrhea on Amos' blankets that were on the porch
of her home. Amos attempted to lure the cat from under her porch with
offers of food. Amos asked other individuals in the neighborhood if
they knew where the animal belonged or if they would consider taking
it. Amos related to the officer that an animal had died under her porch
in the past and she had to suffer the expense of tearing up portions of
the porch to retrieve the carcass due to the smell permeating
throughout her home.

{¶ 6} Amos placed a cage on the porch and on July 2, 2013, the kitten
got into the cage. Amos, who thought the kitten was going to die,
decided that the only thing she could do for it was to take it to a vet.
Amos drove a foreign student attending Ashland College, Jafar
Ashaea from Saudi Arabia, to and from college each day. On July 2,
she took Jafar to school and when it was time to pick him up, she
decided to take the kitten into Ashland to the vet because Jafar could
help her with the cage. When they arrived at the veterinarian office, it
was closed. Not knowing what to do, she decided to leave the kitten
with two outside adult cats and the kitten which she thought would
lead the vet to discover the kitten. She knew if she took the kitten
home, it would die.

{¶ 7} On September 17, 2013, Amos was charged with one of animal

abandonment in violation of R.C. 959.01. A bench trial was held on
December 11, 2013. Amos was found guilty. Amos was fined $150.00
and required to pay restitution to the Claremont Veterinary Clinic in the
amount of $170.50.

Assignments of Error.

{¶ 8} Amos raises two assignments of error,





I. & II.

{¶ 11} Because we find the issues raised in the state's first and second
assignments of error are closely related, for ease of discussion, we
shall address the assignments of error together.

Standard of Review

{¶ 12} Our review of the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to

support a criminal conviction is governed by Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which requires a
court of appeals to determine whether "after viewing the evidence in
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id.; see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120,
130 S.Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) (reaffirming this
standard); 12*12 State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 926 N.E.2d 1239,
2010-Ohio-1017, ¶ 146; State v. Clay, 187 Ohio App.3d 633, 933
N.E.2d 296, 2010-Ohio-2720, ¶ 68.

{¶ 13} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of

inducing belief.State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997),superseded by constitutional amendment on other
grounds as stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d
668 (1997). Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the
amount of credible evidence sustains the issue, which is to be
established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
depends on its effect in inducing belief." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 387,
678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) at

{¶ 14} When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on

appellate court sits as a "`thirteenth juror'" and disagrees with the fact
finder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d
541, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72
L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). However, an appellate court may not merely
substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that "`the jury
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" State v.
717, 720-721 (1st Dist.1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight
grounds is reserved for "`the exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.'" Id.

"[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the

weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and
the finding of facts."


"If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the

reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is
consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining
the verdict and judgment."

{¶ 15} Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461
N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate
Review, Section 60, at 191-192 (1978).


{¶ 16} Amos was convicted of abandoning animals. R.C. 959.01



abandon such animal.

A. "Keeper" of the animal.

{¶ 17} In the case at bar, a stray or feral kitten wanders upon the
property of a 73-year-old widow. The animal damages items of Amos'
personal property and its constant crying interferes with the use and
quiet enjoyment of her home. In other words, Amos did not willing
provide the animal with shelter, lure the animal onto her property or
attempt to prevent the animal from leaving her property. Each of these
facts would differentiate Amos' conduct from the conduct of an
individual that we would normally associate with being the "owner" or
"keeper" of the animal.

13*13 {¶ 18} The kitten was emaciated, dehydrated, malnourished, had

severe parasites and matted eyes. Obviously, the animal was no
one's house pet and had either been abandoned by its human owner
or born feral.

{¶ 19} Amos' only interaction with the animal was to lure it with food
from underneath her porch, place it in a live trap and drop it off in the
parking lot of the veterinary clinic, where it was admitted the veterinary
shelter provided outside housing for two adult cats. (T. at 39). Further,
a third cat was also hiding in the area of the dumpster. (Id.) An
employee of the clinic admitted to being unable to the catch this third
cat. (Id.)

{¶ 20} The evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports the fact

that Amos did not want the animal and had no intention of ever
assuming responsibility over it. Amos owed no legal duty to this
abandoned or feral animal. Had she done nothing and simply allowed
nature to take its course as it eventually did, she would not have a
criminal conviction. However, once Amos captured the animal in a
cage, she could not, for example, have tied a stone to the cage and
dropped it a lake. Rather, she assumed the responsibility that she
would treat the animal humanely. Thus, Amos could be found to be a
"keeper" for purposes of R.C. 959.01.

B. Abandonment of the animal.

{¶ 21} Abandonment will not be presumed but requires affirmative
proof of a person's intent to totally discard the property. Kiser v. Board
of Commrs, 85 Ohio St. 129, 97 N.E. 52 (1911). The conundrum in the
case at bar centers on how we interpret the concept of abandonment
under the circumstances of this case. On the one hand, Amos did not
own the animal and clearly did not want the animal on her property. In
that respect, she had nothing to abandon. On the other hand, Amos
did capture the animal and release it in another location. In this
respect, Amos did assume physical possession of the animal.

{¶ 22} It would seem resolution of this question in the case at bar must
turn upon whether Amos' actions in releasing the animal were humane
under the circumstances. Amos clearly did not simply ignore the
animal and let it die where she had discovered it. However, Amos did
not avail herself of methods of having the animal removed and its
injuries treated. Although, Amos testified that she had asked her
neighbors to care for the animal and had made several calls to various
animal shelters in an attempt to seek help, we note that the weight to
be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues
212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus;State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio
St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 118. Accord,Glasser v.
(1942);Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74
L.Ed.2d 646 (1983).

{¶ 23} We note that Amos did not take any steps to make sure the
animal would be found. She did not leave a note on the premises at
the time she released the animal; nor did she call the veterinary clinic
when it opened the next day to alert them to the fact the animal had
been left in the parking lot.

{¶ 24} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable person could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Amos was the "keeper" of and had
"abandoned" the animal. We hold, therefore, that the state met its
burden of production regarding each element of the crime
of 14*14abandoning animals and, accordingly, there was sufficient
evidence to support Amos' conviction.

{¶ 25} As an appellate court, we are not fact finders; we neither weigh

the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Our role is to
determine whether there is relevant, competent and credible evidence
upon which the fact finder could base his or her judgment. Cross
Truck v. Jeffries, 5th Dist. No. CA-5758, 1982 WL 2911 (Feb. 10,
1982). Accordingly, judgments supported by some competent,
credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will
not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction, 54 Ohio St.2d 279,
376 N.E.2d 578 (1978). The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized:
"`[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against
the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and
the finding of facts. * * *.'" Eastley v. Volkman,132 Ohio St.3d 328,
334, 972 N.E.2d 517, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting Seasons Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3,
quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at
191-192 (1978). Furthermore, it is well established that the trial court
is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses. See,
e.g., In re Brown, 9th Dist. No. 21004, 2002-Ohio-3405, 2002 WL
1454025, ¶ 9, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d
212 (1967).

{¶ 26} Ultimately, "the reviewing court must determine whether the

appellant or the appellee provided the more believable evidence, but
must not completely substitute its judgment for that of the original trier
of fact `unless it is patently apparent that the fact finder lost its
way.'" State v. Pallai, 7th Dist. No. 07 MA 198, 2008-Ohio-6635, 2008
WL 5245576, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Woullard, 158 Ohio App.3d 31,
2004-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 81. In other words, "[w]hen there
exist two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting
versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not our
province to choose which one we believe." State v. Dyke,7th Dist. No.
99 CA 149, 2002-Ohio-1152, 2002 WL 407847, at ¶ 13, citing State v.
Gore (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125.


{¶ 27} Based upon the foregoing and the entire record in this matter,
we find Amos' conviction was not against the sufficiency or the
manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the judge appears to
have fairly and impartially decided the matters before him. The trial
judge as a trier of fact can reach different conclusions concerning the
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses. This court will not disturb
the judge's finding so long as competent evidence was present to
support it. State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 378 N.E.2d 1049
(1978). The judge heard the witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and
was convinced of Amos' guilt.
{¶ 28} Amos' first and second assignments of error are overruled, and
the judgment of the Ashland County Municipal Court is affirmed.

FARMER, J., and BALDWIN, J., concur.