Premier League tactics 2018/19 review: 4-4-2 returns, the power of full-backs and every team assessed

Jurgen Klopp gestures

Football, like fashion, works in cycles. It makes sense then that as the high-street borrows more and more from the 1990s, another stalwart of that era should make its way back into UK culture. All glory to the 4-4-2!

Formations only really denote the defensive shape of a team and depend entirely on the players, and the roles and instructions assigned to them. 

You can play any number of different tactical styles with the same team shape but the difference between a 4-2-3-1 and 4-4-2 is the sort of player you have in the hole behind the striker. If it's Romelu Lukaku you're playing a 4-4-2, if it's Gylfi Sigurdsson you're playing 4-2-3-1.

It wasn't so long ago that every team in the Premier League lined up with two strikers, four midfielders and four defenders. After a period where that structure was largely abandanoed it appears we've come full circle.

Two tactical trends of 2018/19

Why is 4-4-2 popular again?

Most Premier League teams deployed a variation on a 4-4-2 at some point this season, a logical response to the widespread adoption of three-man defensive formations in the past few years.

Shapes like 3-5-2 and 3-4-3 evolved from teams looking for a way to gain numerical superiority in defence against sides who played two strikers, most commonly in a 4-4-2 or version of it (Brazil's 1958/70 4-2-4, for example). If Team A were attacking Team B in a 4-4-2 with the full-backs not venturing too far forward, a 3-5-2 gives the defending team a three v two at the back. 

A 5-3-2 gives numerical superiority in defensive phases against a 4-4-2, which is why it first came to prominence

By the 2000s, teams played 4-4-1-1 or 4-5-1 before 4-2-3-1 eventually became the default for any Premier League side. Jose Mourinho destroyed opponents using this shape with his first Chelsea team.

After that the 4-3-3 re-emerged as the sexiest option, inspired by the all-obliterating Pep Guardiola Barcelona team and, again, as that shape gathered followers the weaker sides adjusted their shape to cope better in defence.

A back four has the advantage vs a forward three but as we've seen this season, some smaller clubs like Huddersfield are so terrified of Manchester City and Liverpool that they get as many men back as possible, resulting in defensive 5-4-1 formations which (rarely) turn into 5-2-3 counter-attack shapes in attack.

Modern full-backs are wing-backs

If a team plays three centre-backs it follows that they will have fewer players in attack or midfield, which allows the opposition manager to counter in a grand football-chess style by playing more midfielders and fewer defenders.

Three centre-backs allow for wing-backs in an advanced stratum, but this leaves space in the channels behind those players. If you have full-backs of high attacking quality who have enough stamina and pace to blitz the wings all day, there's no need for wing-backs or the third centre-back at all.

Dani Alves was the archetype for the full-backs dotted around most of the best clubs. Andrew Robertson, Trent Alexander-Arnold, Kyle Walker, Danny Rose, Aaron Wan-Bissaka, Ben Chilwell, Ricardo Pereira, Marcos Alonso and many more spend a large percentage of their time inside the opposition's half as a winger. That means teams can do away with traditional wingers and instead use inside-forwards - just like Barcelona did and do - or as Liverpool and Spurs have developed, play a 4-4-2 diamond.

Advanced full-backs meant teams could play inside-forwards rather than wingers

With strikers in the half-spaces and Roberto Firmino in the hole behind, Liverpool are both a 4-3-3 and a 4-4-2, something they can only do because their full/wing-backs are so good. With the template for a full-back smashed to bits by the performances of players like Robertson and Walker, plenty of clubs have begun playing natural attacking players in these defensive wide areas. Leicester's Pereira is more naturally a winger, Ashley Young is another, admittedly bad, example.

Now teams play two strikers and a 10 in behind because the full-backs get so far forward they are wingers - no need for inside-forwards

Now that clubs have *wingers* again, it's a good idea to have more than one central target attacking crosses into the box and chasing up second balls to make better use of delivery from wide. This is why so many clubs now use a 4-4-2. Portugal used it in the World Cup, Leicester won the league with it - even Barcelona have adjusted their shape.

How did each team play?


Unai Emery has mostly used a 3-4-1-2 this season, which is very un-Arsenal and suffers from a vulnerable defensive unit. However, it has yielded a top five finish one point from fourth so maybe he's onto something?

Antonio Conte was largely responsible for three-man defences gaining popularity in the Premier League but his was a defensive counter-attack style which Chelsea executed brilliantly. Arsenal's combination of fragile, mistake-laden centre-backs and mish-mash of midfielders hasn't offered much sense of identity.

Wenger's beloved 4-3-3 is gone and in its place a midfield diamond with two strikers has emerged:

This is a way for Emery to get Alexandre Lacazette and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang in the same team. A 4-2-2-2 (which again is just a 4-4-2) was on show against Brighton but a 1-1 draw suggests it needs a little work. Emery hasn't used a back three at any club consistently and the likelihood is next season he finds a way to best utilise the strike partnership available with a back four. 


Eddie Howe likes a 4-4-2. The full-backs get forward but only when Bournemouth have control of the ball and can move up the pitch. Their width comes from wide attacking players.

Callum Wilson and Joshua King usually start up front together, the wide midfielders tend to take it in turns to attack the wings so as not to leave the midfield outnumbered and can play on either side. Ryan Fraser is at times a winger, at others an inside forward. 

In defence and depending on the opposition shape, King will drop behind Wilson to make it a 4-5-1 but when Bournemouth get forward he looks to get on the end of crosses and through-balls.


Chris Hughton (before his sacking) depended on Glenn Murray scoring goals if Brighton were going to win. The best way to supply Murray with chances was from crosses but Brighton don't play wingers (preferring inside forwards) and the full-backs aren't the best, making it risky to have them fly up the pitch. Those crosses mostly came from Solly March, who assisted five goals in the league - the second most of any Brighton player. 

A 4-5-1 has been more commonly favoured (as more of a 4-2-3-1) with either a low block or a midway press, though when chasing a result Hughton occasionally stuck another forward up front to partner the lonely Murray.


Sean Dyche has the hard-to-break down, hit-long-diagonal-passes-to-the-target-men schtick absolutely nailed down and was ahead of the 4-4-2 trend a few seasons ago, before Leicester made it cool. It makes perfect use of the players available too: Dwight McNeil on the left and Jeff Hendrick on the right, a tight back four built for defending, and a fridge-freezer combo of Chris Wood and Ashley Barnes up front.

Burnley are a good team without stellar individuals so by having two banks of four defending deep and two strikers available to hit out-balls towards and relieve pressure, they can frustrate, escape and move up the pitch.

Without the kind of pace to launch blistering counter-attacks, Dyche has his team instead stay solid and construct attacks patiently over time until they can make use of the Big Lads from a set-piece or a cross.


Cardiff have fast wingers, a striker and like to keep bodies behind the ball in a block. Usually a 4-1-4-1 or 4-5-1 (4-2-3-1), the defensive lines were highly organised and cleared danger away all game long but the players just weren't talented enough individually or as a unit to stay up. Neil Warnock knows how to make teams hard to beat and Cardiff certainly were at times but with Callum Paterson, a natural right-back, leading the line for most of the season it was always going to be a struggle to survive. 


Maurizio Sarri doesn't care much for fashion, as his commitment to dressing like someone who lives in a snooker hall suggests. He stuck with a 4-3-3 for the entire season (with the exception of about 30 combined minutes in which Jorginho had a defensive midfield partner). 

The Italian is either married to this shape or so hip he's already setting the next trend, and if you consider that in a 4-4-2 there are only two central midfielders and a 4-3-3 allows for three... he's ahead of the curve. He's also definitely in love with one set style of play but a top four finish and two cup finals suggests there's nothing wrong with that whatsoever.

Crystal Palace

Roy Hodgson's early managerial success was built on a 4-4-2 and Crystal Palace are thriving with it, if not doing enough to consider their position within the league relatively safe.

An intriguing take on the shape was forced upon Hodgson due to injuries decimating his forward options. With no striker, he opted to play both Wilfried Zaha and Andros Townsend up front with both moving into channels and free to roam. In defensive situations the ball-side player would fall back to assist on the wing, with Townsend on the right and Zaha the right.

Crystal Palace's 4-4-2 has attacking full-backs but is a lot more defensive than many versions of the system

The emergence of Aaron Wan-Bissaka as flying full-back (along with Patrick Van Aanholt on the left) meant Palace could push their wide midfielders inside the pitch, giving better control of that area and ensuring the team has width as Bissaka and Van Aanholt overlap. The space behind is protected by the players they've run past - James McArthur often starts wide right of a midfield four but plays through the middle.


Marco Silva prefers a 4-2-3-1 but because Sigurdsson often ends up alongside the striker despite definitely being a midfielder, this becomes more of a 4-4-2. Everton have used a standard 4-4-2 at times during the season, sticking Richarlison next to Dominic Calvert-Lewin or Cenk Tosun, supplied by Theo Walcott and Ademola Lookman on the wings.


A shambles. Tried a 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 but were awful, went to 5-4-1, have used a 5-3-2 - so did at least adopt the striker partnership idea - but are deservedly gone from the league. Lacked a coherent strategy or any obvious identity this season and really suffered for it.


Karlan Grant broke into the team at the end of season, finishing as the club's top scorer on four goals. Before that Huddersfield didn't have anyone capable of taking or even finding chances and were forced to defend all game long as a result, in a 3-5-1-1 or something like it. Tried a 4-4-2 a few times but were simply not good enough regardless of formation to stay up.


Brendan Rodgers loves a 4 -1-4-1 and belongs to the same school of positional thought as Guardiola and Jurgen Klopp. Leicester's performance against Man City in the penultimate game of the season was superb, Leicester matching their opponent's shape at times but dropping into a low block when needed. Everything is now built around Jamie Vardy's pace and eye for goal.

In the days before Rodgers, Claude Puel used 4-2-3-1 and had the team only slightly more entertaining to watch than a midweek rerun of Doctors, having already seen the early afternoon showing after Neighbours. Weirdly, Leicester are one of the few teams who suit a one-man strike team, purely because Vardy makes early runs in behind - he darts around in space the width of the box and with a partner would have this cut in half.


Klopp's 4-3-3 is actually a 4-4-2 diamond, facilitated by Firmino's superb movement off the ball.

Two strikers run from wide positions straight at defenders, attacking the half-spaces to ensure that they can't really be man-marked. By standing in that space between defence and midfield but also between full-back and centre-back, the opposition has to carefully monitor their whereabouts or else be dragged out of position. If they are dragged away, Firmino floats in through the middle to score.

Manchester City

A 4-1-4-1 defensive shape turns into all sorts of attacking configurations. Sometimes City play two central midfielders to form a 3-2-2-3 formation and block the middle of the pitch - as they did against Spurs and Liverpool - but the shape constantly changes regardless of opposition.

Aymeric Laporte moves from centre-back to right-back, Oleksandr Zinchenko either runs wide to overlap the winger or stays in midfield next to Fernandinho, Kyle Walker can run to right wing or operate as another central defender in the diamond - the only constant is that when City have the ball in the final third they stretch the pitch and create a 'W' shape to enable the quick one-two moves which so often produce goals.

When in control of the game but unable to score, Gabriel Jesus comes on in place of the wide left or wide right player. The full-back becomes a legit winger and Jesus attacks through the middle alongside Sergio Aguero, so in a way it's a weird 4-4-2. City have attacked with a strike partnership all season long, just not a conventional one. Raheem Sterling ends up behind and beside Aguero to score tap-ins, Bernardo Silva does the same on the opposite side - everything depends on where the ball is and what the situation allows. Man City didn't win 198 points in two seasons through luck.

Manchester United

Ole Gunnar Solskjaer played under Sir Alex Ferguson in the glory days when 4-4-2 was all the rage. Jose Mourinho had Man Utd in a 4-2-3-1, a 4-4-2, 4-3-3, a 3-4-3 and basically everything before being asked to leave. Solskjaer hasn't actually changed that much, the players were just better for a few weeks.

United are still set up to counter-attack but a weak midfield ahead of a poor defensive unit has meant teams can get past them all too easily. In attack they have some great options and the 4-4-2 diamond worked really well for a short while. Romelu Lukaku pulled out wide right, Marcus Rashford wide left and Jesse Lingard attacked through the middle just like Liverpool's 4-3-3.

Player performances and injuries have meant Solskjaer (as Mourinho had) found it difficult to settle on a preferred XI or style. A 4-3-3 suits the wide players on the books but Lukaku hasn't shown he is the complete forward needed to lead the line for United, so might need a partner. However, with a partner, he's even more inclined to go missing, meaning the team is weaker in midfield and, naturally, defence. There's work to do at United but with a right-back who isn't Ashley Young, and some added midfield steel, a 4-4-2 diamond could really be the answer next season.

Newcastle United

Ayoze Perez is a second striker rather than straight 10 and often ends up next to Salomon Rondon in attack. Thus, 4-2-3-1 is a sneaky way of saying 4-2-4 or 4-4-2. Rafa Benitez is one of the league's greatest tacticians and always seems to find solutions for problems - Matt Ritchie has been converted from attacking inside-right forward to left-back this season.

Newcastle mostly used a 5-4-1 or 5-3-2 and were one of the most difficult teams to play against for the likes of Man City - who they beat 2-1 - and Liverpool who managed a nervy 3-2 win at the end of the season, with Benitez setting up a system that meant his players went man to man with Klopp's team.


Mark Hughes is surely done now at Premier League level, having played some middling 4-2-3-1 and then a 3-4-3 which didn't do much of anything and plunging Southampton into relegation trouble.

Ralph Hassenhuttl came in and quickly settled on a 3-5-2 and 3-4-1-2, introduced the concept of energy and non-passive defending, and turned Southampton into a non-stop pressing machine, rescuing them from a black hole at the bottom of the table.


Evolved from a 4-2-3-1 to a 4-4-2 diamond this season, able to play the now undroppable Heung-min Son alongside Harry Kane, get Dele Alli into a 10 role, put Christian Eriksen deeper back into space and utilise the sudden midfield brilliance of Moussa Sissoko.

Who saw that coming? Mauricio Pochettino did and Spurs' midfield diamond and compact, narrow attacking shape had them clinch a Champions League final place and a top four finish.


Watford are another team who adopted the ways of the 4-4-2, though their attacking shape is slightly more exotic and fluid than others.

The two central midfielders play in a box with the centre-backs as the full-backs advance, while the wide midfielders either attack the wing or move into central positions, making it a 4-2-2-2.

Strikers drift into channels too, depending on whether the full-backs can overlap. Out of possession they put up two walls of four as the creative forwards drop into wide defensive positions.

West Ham

Manuel Pellegrini is a big advocate of the 4-4-2, winning the league with Manchester City playing a version of it. West Ham are often in the same shape, with Marko Arnautovic partnering one of Michail Antonio, Andy Carroll (if ever fit) or Javier Hernandez up front. Arnautovic is expected to defend wide areas when necessary in this system.

Otherwise it's a fairly standard 4-2-3-1, the kind of setup that managers like Mourinho made successful in the early 2000s but which really suits a counter-attack strategy. West Ham don't have much of an identity at the moment but that will come.


Nuno Esperito Santo loved a 3-4-3 at the start of the season and changed to a 3-5-2/3-5-1-1 after results started slipping.

A key component of that 3-4-3 was the attacking movement of the wing-backs, who would make underlapping runs to exploit space created by the wide forward pulling out to the wing. Matt Doherty scored four goals and assisted five thanks to this trick. 

A midfield two of Ruben Neves and Joao Moutinho worked wonders until Christmas but adding Leander Dendoncker there resulted in Wolves regaining control of midfield and putting a run of form together that almost yielded an FA Cup final place and did win a seventh position finish in the league. The established top six should be concerned about Wolves next season.

What's next?

The players available decide everything and right now the modern full-back is dictating how teams set up.

The most likely thing we'll see next season is more teams adopting a form of the 4-4-2 to match the stronger teams already doing it. That in turn will mean others turn to a three man defence, which might eventually lead to a return of 4-2-3-1 and then 4-3-3 to complete the next cycle.

If number 10 is the next position with a wealth of emerging talent , perhaps everyone will try a Christmas tree 4-3-2-1 - something Leicester have already toyed with.

It is effectively a game of rock, paper, scissors. The best managers will be flexible enough to pick the right formations for the right occasions.