全文: "グルジア"
603件中 1-20の結果を表示しています
  • 北川 誠一
    2004年 2004 巻 138 号 142-156,L13
    発行日: 2004/09/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Between 1999 and 2004, the issue about Chechen and foreign fighters in and around the Pankisi Valley in one of the districts of the Eastern Georgia was a focus of political negotiations in the Georgia-Russia, Gerogia-USA, then Russia-USA relations.
    The majority of the residents of the valley are the Chechens and the Ingushes, who are called as the Kists there. Using historical and ethnographic literatures by Margoshivili, Shavkhelishvili and others which describe the immigration process of the Chechens and the Ingushes to the Pankisi Valley in the 19th century, this paper underlines the importance of traditional and national homogeneity between the Chechens and the Kists, which keeps their mutual relation and fellow feeling in the both sides of the Great Caucasus. As the Kists had no right as ethnic minority in the Soviet era, they could have merged into the Georgian masses, if they had no relation with the Chechno-Ingush Republic and the people living there. This is how the valley still remains as a semi-independent enclave of Chechnia within Georgia.
    The majority of the inhabitants of the valley are Sunni Muslims. Then the Pankisi Valley has a strategic value, as one of the Sunnite outputs from the Chechen and Daghestan into the South Caucasus. It is also witnessed there the re-islamization during and after the Perestroika era, the coming of the foreign missionaries and the rising in the popularity of the so called the Wahhabits among the local people.
    Even after the violent death of a Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev and the end of the War against the Terrorism in Georgia, the Kists remain as the Chechens and their majority are the Muslims. Excepting the Kists, there are the Georgian Pshavs, the Tushes and the Ossets in the valley. Any ethnic or confessional clash would be reflected in a wilder arena. With potential cause of discontents to the Georgian government, the strategic importance of the valley in the process of integrity of Georgia's ethnics and regions into one single civil society is still existing, as well as in the regional security of the South Caucasus as a whole.
  • 北川 誠一
    1997年 40 巻 2 号 69-84
    発行日: 1997年
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1236, the tamachi army of Chormaghan Noyan began to conquer the Georgian Kingdom. Starting at their traditonal winter encampment in Arran, they proceeded to the North West. Their first victims were the cities and districts of the western branches of the Middle Kur. In the Kazakh canton of the present Republic of Azerbaijan, their course was divided into three directions. The Nothern course led them to the central and eastern provinces of Georgia. To the south they advanced and conquered the cities of Ani, Kars and Surb Mari, and third course overran the territories of South-West Georgia. In this way almost all the territories of the Georgian Kingdom were conquered.
    In about 1240, the conquerd part of Georgia was divided among the six Georgian generals, called the generals of ten thousands (“tmanis mtavari” in Georgian) by the Mongols.
    After the coronation of Emperor Monke, the conquered part of Georgia was put under the physical administration of Arghun-Aqa who made a census in 1254, and Georgia's population was counted and the area was divided into nine tümens. Each of these tümens could afford ten thousand soldiers. It was after this census that a new tax system was introduced by Arghun-Aqa.
  • 北川 誠一
    1986年 1 巻 339-351
    発行日: 1986/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 橘 勝士
    2000年 95 巻 9 号 651-657
    発行日: 2000/09/15
    公開日: 2011/09/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    グルジアはワイン発祥地の一つと考えられているが, 冷戦終結前は旧ソ連に属していたために, 我々日本人には, その内情を知ることは困難であった。しかし, ソ連の崩壊で独立したため, 以前は困難であった入国が可能になった。1998年にグルジアを旅行した著者に気候, 風土およびワイン製造の実情について解説していただいた。
  • 北川 誠一
    1988年 3 巻 2 号 244-268
    発行日: 1988/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 北川 誠一
    1978年 87 巻 6 号 1007-1033,1097-
    発行日: 1978/06/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    This is a study of the role Sadun of the house of Artsruni and his son Khutlu-Bugha played in the expansion of the Il-Khanid rule over the Georgian Kingdom in the 13th century. Sadun was a great grandson of Amir K'urd (Abulasan), the governor of Tbilisi during Queen Tamar's reign in Georgia. In 1258 (or 1259), he won a wrestling match in the presence of Hulegu Khan and received the honorable status of t'arkhan. He joined Hulegu's Syrian campaign, which began in the autumn of 1259 and was placed in the vanguard. He distinguished himseif during the conquest of Sasun and the seizure of the citadel of Allepo. For these services, Sadun was awarded with an official commendation from Hulegu and was granted the district of Sasun. Sadun was originally a vassal of Avag Zak'arean, a Georgian King's prince (eristavi, or ishkhan in Armenian), and a seignior of Haghbat and Mahkanaberd. Around the time of the above promotions, he was an at'abak of Avag's heiress Khoshak but later, he became her chamberlain or khejub to guard and assist her. Under Hulegu, Sadun was never given any official titles of the Bagratid Kingdom. However, after the enthronement of Abaqa as the Il-Khan, Sadun received the titles of atabegi (or regent) and amir-spasarali (or commander in chief), and gained administrative power over the Batratid Kingdom. He was entrusted by the Kings with the power to control the royal domains of T'elavi, Belakani and Kars. In addition, he purchased the district of Dmanisi from King Dimitri II. Together, Sadun's estates made up the fourth political unit in Georgian Armenia in addition to the three units belonging to the branch families of the Zak'areans. we can assume that he was able to acquire wealth because he was a t'arkhan, After Sadun's death in 1282, one of his two titles, the amir-spasarali was given to his son Khutlu-Bugha, but the other, the atabegi was given to his rival Tarsayichi of the house of Orbelean. In 1289, Khutlu-Bugha recommended that Il-Khan Arghun kill King Dimitri (who had been arrested for being implicated in the plot of Bugha) and put Vakhtangi, the son of King Daviti IV on the throne. His plan succeeded. Under Vakhtangi, Khutlu-Bugha became both the atabegi and the amir-spasarali and secured political power over the Georgian Kingdom. In 1292, however, both Arghun and Vakhtangi died. As soon as Daviti, the son of Dimitri, ascended to the throne, Khutlu-Bugha was put to death by the order of the new khan Geikhatu. With his death, the power of the Artsrunis was eradicated from the entire Bagratid territory. The rise of Sadun Artsruni is a good example illustrating the pattern of socio-political control the Il-Khans had over the native dynasties. The Il-Khans' system of appointments as kings, vassals or arriere-vassals, of those who were faithful and useful to them, had worked effectively. They ruled over the Bagratid territory through the kingship, which was never handed outside the royal family of Bagratid and through the offices of the atabegi and the amir-spasarali. These latter were not confined to any one family, but were easily given to those, like Sadun, who were useful to the Il-Khans.
  • 前田 君江, 前田 弘毅
    2007年 50 巻 2 号 303-306
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐々木 孝博
    2010年 7 巻 1 号 15-26
    発行日: 2010/11/03
    公開日: 2014/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Georgian conflictoccurred in 2008, and on that occasion Russiamade military campaigns in order to protect its own national interests. Also Russia announced its “Initiative in Foreign Policy”before the conflict started and “Five Principles of Foreign Policy” after it ended. In accordance with these strategic measures, recently Russia adopted a strong policy towards the United States and Western countries. In this thesis, the present Russian “Initiative in Foreign Policy” and “Five Principles of Foreign Policy” are closely examined in order to make clear why Russia has taken strong oppositions to the US and Western countries. Through this analysis the author will consider the background against which the Georgian conflict took place and what problems the conflict has put on Russia in terms of its security.
  • 山崎 文枝
    2017年 60 巻 5 号 365-368
    発行日: 2017/08/01
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー HTML
  • 山口 三十四, 霍 靈光
    2004年 40 巻 3 号 339-347
    発行日: 2004/12/25
    公開日: 2011/09/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    An econometric study of the technical efficiency of agriculture in the Soviet Union before its collapse has not been done so far. In this paper, an attempt is made to measure the technical efficiency of agriculture for 15 republic countries of the Soviet Union from 1960 to 1990. We calculated four measurements of technical efficiency, ROIN, PTE, SE and MIX, and determined whether they converged or not. The measured total technical efficiency ROIN showed that these values were all very low and continued to decrease until 1990, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. We also checked the degree of convergence of these efficiencies, but found that most of them did not converge but instead diverged. The fall of the Soviet Union would be explained by many factors. Our study was able to show that the large scale agriculture conducted in Russia like kolkhoz and sovkhoz was very inefficient, and that the efficiency went from bad to worse over time. Therefore, they could not control the agriculture of other countries even if they had them adopt the same agricultural policy as that applied in the Soviet Union. In this paper, we showed that agricultural inefficiencies of 15 republic countries were one of the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed, by using the above econometric measurements.
  • 廣瀬 陽子, 六鹿 茂夫, 大西 富士夫, 兵頭 慎治
    2014年 2014 巻 43 号 43-68
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2016/09/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 志田 恭子
    2007年 81 巻 13-29
    発行日: 2007/11/07
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    The categories of domestic and diplomatic policies have been kept apart in extensive studies on the history of the Russian Empire in general. Internal policies toward the local regions, actually, were affected by foreign affairs in many cases. This paper attempts to prove that the analysis of diplomatic factors is helpful when studying the local rules of the Russian Empire by examinating two topics : Crimea' s Christianization and the Iviron monastery question. In concluding, 1) "The Athos Factor" promoted the Christianization of Crimea. Various internal and external factors (the predominance of Crimean Tatars in the region, Athos's religious authority and national conflict between Greek and Russian monks etc.) drove the local Archbishop and people to plan and accomplish the "Russian Athos" project in Crimea. 2) The friction between Greek and Georgian monks for possession of the Iviron monastery in Athos endangered not only Russian diplomacy to Holy places abroad, but also the rule over Georgia within the empire. Troubles in Holy Lands were capable of threatening domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Empire, which was engaged in an Orthodox policy toward "Eastern Christianity" and held extensive lands of foreign monasteries in it's territory.
  • 前田 弘毅
    2004年 113 巻 9 号 1491-1527
    発行日: 2004/09/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of the paper is to reveal the specific features of Shah 'Abbas I's policy towards the Caucasus and, using the description provided in newly discovered third volume of Afzal al-tavarikh of Fazil Khtuzani, to reconsider the 'slave soldiers' paradigm. Shah 'Abbas I tried to reinforce Safavid central authority through his policy towards the Caucasus. However, this policy did not lead simply to the enslavement of the indigenous population and the formation of a Caucasian slave army, as it has been previously supposed. The Caucasians joined the Safavid court in various ways, for example as war captives, political refugees and hostages, through marriage for political reasons, and through forced migration, and by paying annual tribute. These activities motivated the Caucasians to build an immigrant society which was put directly under Safavid imperial rule. The gholams were a new ruling elite selected among these new comers to Safavid society. Shah 'Abbas naturally recognized the importance of the social networks and individual connections among the Caucasians. Given 'Abbas's deliberate policy, it was only natural that the ethnic and national ties usually remained in tact, or were renewed and modified, instead of being erased. This is clearly one point that has usually been neglected,in the research on slave soldiers or foreign elites. Shah 'Abbas tried to reorganize the regional order in his favor. So the fate of Caucasian courtier elites was connected with his policy. In other words, the activities of the converted elites were influenced by the local political climate of the Caucasus. The old theory of slave soldiers is a one-sided view regarding them as absolute slaves cut off from their national network and identity. However, the Safavid foreign elite actually moved between the two cultures, taking active part in both. We see two faces of the Safavid gholams : as Safavid courtier elites and as representatives of the Caucasian immigrant society. Expansion of Safavid courtier power was realized after absorption of 'foreign' Caucasians and careful management of their ethno-social tensions. But stresses of assimilation and dissimilation reached to the top when 'Abbas I married his granddaughter to Georgian vdli-king Simon II. Large-scale revolt broke out. The paradoxical character of the Caucasus as a land both foreign and intimate to Safavid royals continued into next decade.
  • 北川 誠一
    1977年 20 巻 2 号 57-73,145
    発行日: 1977年
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    The revolt of Tegüder Oghul, whose name has been often misread as Nigüder, was a serious factor in the situation of war between Baraq Khan and Abaqa Khan in 1270.
    Tegüder was a grand son of Chaghatai Khan and ason of Muji Yabah. He came to Iran with Hülegü leading a tümen of army selected from the ulus of Chagatai and settled himself in the Il-Khanid territory. His summer camp was in Ayrarat in Armenia and winter quater was in Nakhchivan on the river Aras. He received high respect from the Il-Khans as a member of the Chingizids.
    In the summer of 1269 revolted against Abaqa Khan and forced himself in Gurjistan with the instigation of the Chaghataid Khan Baraq. Immediately Shiremün Noyan, who camped in the mountains of Artani, attacked and defeated his army and captured some of them. Tegüder fled into the Imeretian Kindom of Western Georgia and reorganized his troops there, then began subversive activites in central Georgia. In 1270, Shiremün was dispatched again and succeeded in the suppression and took him prisoner. He was deprived of his army and confined inthe Island of Shahi in the lake Urmiya. he was released and stayed in the Il-Khan's Ordo until death.
    Iu the war of 1269-1270, he hold in check the main body of the Il-Khanid army in west Iran, so they did not depart from Azarbaijian for the front before his surrender.
    Tegüder's defeat caused the dissolution of the Chaghataid army in Iran and strengthened the Hülegüid feature of Il-Khanid state. His short lived success of the revolt was due to the aids of Imeretien king Dimitri IV. We see native dynasties began to influence the poliical balance between Mongol antagonists.
  • 前田 弘毅
    2009年 51 巻 2 号 57-75
    発行日: 2009/03/31
    公開日: 2014/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the exact power the Safavid authority exercised over Georgia. Particular attention is paid to the activities of Papuna Tsitsishvili, a gholam who returned to Georgia and settled there. He served the Shah directly, but came back to Georgia around 1633 and recovered his fief. At the same time, he maintained the status of royal gholam with the special condition that King Rostom (Rostam Khan vali) of Georgia supervise him. He was receiving a stipend from neighboring Shirvan as a royal gholam.
     The way he rehabilitated his domain in Georgia is worthy of attention. King Rostom reconciled him with his close kin and foe Manuchar Tsitsishvili and his brothers. The document recording the reconciliation was written in Georgian. Papuna describes in detail how he was forced to leave his native country and depart for “the land of Qizilbash”. Furthermore, to defend the privileges (people and land) given by Safavid Shahs he repeatedly sought their confirmation by the Safavid authority. The petitions of Papuna and his successor to the Shah mostly coincided with the changes of Georgian rulers. Thus they were mostly concerned with internal changes of the Georgian circumstance, but the supreme authority of the Safavid Shah was also needed.
     These observations lead us to conclude that the internal dynamism of Georgian noble society was preserved under the supervision of the Safavid authority. However, there were many privileges given directly by the Safavid Shahs, especially at the times of the forceful reconstructions of the regional order by Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas I. Georgian nobility also exploited Safavid connections to preserve or broaden their interests. Thus on one hand, the institution of the royal gholam was a channel uniting the Safavid central court and the Georgian landed nobility. On the other hand, there was a vertain distance between the systems. It is clear that references to accumulated precedents were important, and mutilayered authorities functioned in Georgian society under Safavid suzerainty.
  • 斎藤 元秀
    2008年 2008 巻 37 号 3-16
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    As Russia seeks a resurgence of power under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev, its foreign policy reflects both internal and external influences, especially US and Chinese factors. The objectives of this paper are three-fold. The first is to illustrate key features of the Putin-Medvedev foreign policy, including a review of Richard Sakwa's remarks on Putin's “new realism.” The second is to trace how Russia's foreign policy has evolved in relation to the United States, Europe, Central Asia, China and Japan. The third is to assess Russia's diplomacy under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev.
    As to the external factors, the US factor plays a central role in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. Moscow tends to weigh the probable responses of Washington as it pursues its global foreign policy goals. Russia's policy towards an expanding Europe, including the eastward expansion of NATO, is no exception. Russia's policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, as well as in Central Asia, is increasingly influenced by the Chinese factor. In this regard, Moscow tries to maintain relations with Beijng on a good-neighborly basis, while trying to keep a rising China in check, making use of a combination of the Japanese, Indian, and US cards.
    According to Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Russia saw itself as the Pluto of a Western solar system in the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR. Now, however, it has begun to create its own Moscow-centered system. Although Russia has not been successful in this attempt, the foreign policy of the Putin-Medvedev regime has resulted in several achievements: (1) the prevention of the early entry of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO; (2) the alienation between Washington and its allies in the Old Europe; (3) the demonstration of a resurgent Russia in the Southern Caucasus through the realization of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia;
    (4) the closure of the US Manas Airbase in Kirgiz.
    Currently, Russia is facing significant challenges in dealing with the global economic crisis, ignited in the US. In this case, Russia appears to be attempting to mend fences with the US, while seeking, at the same time, to reduce US influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US and China factors, together with domestic concerns, are likely to continue to drive Russia's foreign policy under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev.
  • 角田 安正
    2002年 2002 巻 31 号 20-37
    発行日: 2002年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Maskhadov regime relied on Islam to resolve feuds among major leaders in Chechnya after the first Chechen war ended in 1996. Taking advantage of the situation, the Wahhabi expanded their influence in the republic. The Wahhabi were comprised mainly of Arabic political Islamists, who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and come to Chechnya to participate in the first Chechen war.
    In the summer of 1998, Osama Bin Laden, a new sponsor of the Wahhabi in Chechnya, began to establish a close relationship with anti-Maskhadov leaders (field commanders) attracting them by his abundant funds and his idea of establishing a unified Islamic republic in the north Caucasus. Encouraged by Bin Laden, Chechen armed forces attempted to invade the Russian republic of Dagestan in August 1999.
    As Moscow lost no time in launching a counter attack, another Chechen war commenced. The Chechen conflict posed a threat to Russia in that it might not have only undermined Russia's territorial integrity, but could have also become a pretext for western countries, including the United States, to meddle in Russia's domestic affairs. Russia tried in vain to persuade Washington that Chechen separatists were disguised international terrorists and that Russia suffered from the same terrorism as the U.S. had during 1998 with American embassy attacks in Africa. The United States continued to attach importance to the human-rights aspects of the Chechen issue. President Vladimir Putin, taking office in 2000, was not able to make the U.S. change its attitude toward the Chechen problem as his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had likewise found impossible.
    In Russia, moreover, some forces, especially the military elite, were opposed to cooperation with the United States. They alleged that none other than the U.S. had played a role in stirring up the situation in the north Caucasus. Thus, there would be no cooperation between the two countries for an anti-terrorist struggle.
    The situation abruptly changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. U.S.-Russian relations as concerned terrorism seemed to take a 180 degree turnabout. Close analysis of the relationship, however, would show that Russia gave way more in the U.S. direction than vice versa. President Putin allowed Central Asian countries to accept U.S. military presence two weeks after the terrorist attacks, with the Republic of Georgia to follow suit during the spring of 2002 in defiance of the resistance of the political and military elite in Russia. He expected to ease their frustrations by successfully suppressing Chechen armed forces as a result of promoting cooperation between Russia and the United States. He also expected that Washington would admit Russia's war in Chechnya to be a war on terrorism. Such expectations, however, were not met.
    The political forces in Russia, therefore, having assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the U.S., grew more frustrated. President Putin was forced to take steps to soothe their feelings. When he implied that he was ready to dispatch Russian troops to the Pankisskoye Gorge in the Republic of Georgia to eradicate Chechen fighters during September 2002, he intended to assuage the political and military elite which had not welcomed the U.S. military presence in Georgia from its inception.
  • 竹村 彰通
    2004年 14 巻 2 号 193-194
    発行日: 2004/06/25
    公開日: 2017/04/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 上平 初穂
    1984年 32 巻 3 号 190-
    発行日: 1984/06/20
    公開日: 2017/09/15
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー
  • 羽田 正
    1979年 88 巻 5 号 826-828
    発行日: 1979/05/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー