Philosopher of Science
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Philosopher of Science



While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of Aristotle, philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm," the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.[1]




Defining science

Karl Popper in the 1980s

Distinguishing between science and non-science is referred to as the demarcation problem. For example, should psychoanalysis be considered science? How about so-called creation science, the inflationary multiverse hypothesis, or macroeconomics? Karl Popper called this the central question in the philosophy of science.[2] However, no unified account of the problem has won acceptance among philosophers, and some regard the problem as unsolvable or uninteresting.[3][4]Martin Gardner has argued for the use of a Potter Stewart standard ("I know it when I see it") for recognizing pseudoscience.[5]

Early attempts by the logical positivists grounded science in observation while non-science was non-observational and hence meaningless.[6] Popper argued that the central property of science is falsifiability. That is, every genuinely scientific claim is capable of being proven false, at least in principle.[7]


Scientific explanation


One early and influential theory of scientific explanation is the deductive-nomological model. It says that a successful scientific explanation must deduce the occurrence of the phenomena in question from a scientific law.[10] This view has been subjected to substantial criticism, resulting in several widely acknowledged counterexamples to the theory.[11] It is especially challenging to characterize what is meant by an explanation when the thing to be explained cannot be deduced from any law because it is a matter of chance, or otherwise cannot be perfectly predicted from what is known. Wesley Salmon developed a model in which a good scientific explanation must be statistically relevant to the outcome to be explained.[12][13] Others have argued that the key to a good explanation is unifying disparate phenomena or providing a causal mechanism.[13]

Justifying science





Observation inseparable from theory

Five balls of light are arranged in a cross shape.


All observation involves both perception and cognition. That is, one does not make an observation passively, but rather is actively engaged in distinguishing the phenomenon being observed from surrounding sensory data. Therefore, observations are affected by one's underlying understanding of the way in which the world functions, and that understanding may influence what is perceived, noticed, or deemed worthy of consideration. In this sense, it can be argued that all observation is theory-laden.[17]

The purpose of science


Realists often point to the success of recent scientific theories as evidence for the truth (or near truth) of current theories.[19][20] Antirealists point to either the many false theories in the history of science,[21][22] epistemic morals,[23] the success of false modeling assumptions,[24] or widely termed postmodern criticisms of objectivity as evidence against scientific realism.[19] Antirealists attempt to explain the success of scientific theories without reference to truth.[25] Some antirealists claim that scientific theories aim at being accurate only about observable objects and argue that their success is primarily judged by that criterion.[23]

Values and science


If it is unclear what counts as science, how the process of confirming theories works, and what the purpose of science is, there is considerable scope for values and other social influences to shape science. Indeed, values can play a role ranging from determining which research gets funded to influencing which theories achieve scientific consensus.[26] For example, in the 19th century, cultural values held by scientists about race shaped research on evolution, and values concerning social class influenced debates on phrenology (considered scientific at the time).[27]Feminist philosophers of science, sociologists of science, and others explore how social values affect science.



The origins of philosophy of science trace back to Plato and Aristotle[28] who distinguished the forms of approximate and exact reasoning, set out the threefold scheme of abductive, deductive, and inductive inference, and also analyzed reasoning by analogy. The eleventh century Arab polymath Ibn al-Haytham (known in Latin as Alhazen) conducted his research in optics by way of controlled experimental testing and applied geometry, especially in his investigations into the images resulting from the reflection and refraction of light. Roger Bacon (1214-1294), an English thinker and experimenter heavily influenced by al-Haytham, is recognized by many to be the father of modern scientific method.[29] His view that mathematics was essential to a correct understanding of natural philosophy was considered to be 400 years ahead of its time.[30]


Francis Bacon's statue at Gray's Inn, South Square, London

Francis Bacon (no direct relation to Roger, who lived 300 years earlier) was a seminal figure in philosophy of science at the time of the Scientific Revolution. In his work Novum Organum (1620)--an allusion to Aristotle's Organon--Bacon outlined a new system of logic to improve upon the old philosophical process of syllogism. Bacon's method relied on experimental histories to eliminate alternative theories.[31] In 1637, René Descartes established a new framework for grounding scientific knowledge in his treatise, Discourse on Method, advocating the central role of reason as opposed to sensory experience. By contrast, in 1713, the 2nd edition of Isaac Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica argued that "... hypotheses ... have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy[,] propositions are deduced from the phenomena and rendered general by induction. "[32] This passage influenced a "later generation of philosophically-inclined readers to pronounce a ban on causal hypotheses in natural philosophy." [32] In particular, later in the 18th century, David Hume would famously articulate skepticism about the ability of science to determine causality and gave a definitive formulation of the problem of induction. The 19th century writings of John Stuart Mill are also considered important in the formation of current conceptions of the scientific method, as well as anticipating later accounts of scientific explanation.[33]

Logical positivism


Interpreting Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy of language, logical positivists identified a verifiability principle or criterion of cognitive meaningfulness. From Bertrand Russell's logicism they sought reduction of mathematics to logic. They also embraced Russell's logical atomism, Ernst Mach's phenomenalism--whereby the mind knows only actual or potential sensory experience, which is the content of all sciences, whether physics or psychology--and Percy Bridgman's operationalism. Thereby, only the verifiable was scientific and cognitively meaningful, whereas the unverifiable was unscientific, cognitively meaningless "pseudostatements"--metaphysical, emotive, or such--not worthy of further review by philosophers, who were newly tasked to organize knowledge rather than develop new knowledge.


In the late 1930s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and America. By then, many had replaced Mach's phenomenalism with Otto Neurath's physicalism, and Rudolf Carnap had sought to replace verification with simply confirmation. With World War II's close in 1945, logical positivism became milder, logical empiricism, led largely by Carl Hempel, in America, who expounded the covering law model of scientific explanation as a way of identifying the logical form of explanations without any reference to the suspect notion of "causation". The logical positivist movement became a major underpinning of analytic philosophy,[35] and dominated Anglosphere philosophy, including philosophy of science, while influencing sciences, into the 1960s. Yet the movement failed to resolve its central problems,[36][37][38] and its doctrines were increasingly assaulted. Nevertheless, it brought about the establishment of philosophy of science as a distinct subdiscipline of philosophy, with Carl Hempel playing a key role.[39]


Thomas Kuhn




Current approaches

Naturalism's axiomatic assumptions

All scientific study inescapably builds on at least some essential assumptions that are untested by scientific processes.[42][43]Kuhn concurs that all science is based on an approved agenda of unprovable assumptions about the character of the universe, rather than merely on empirical facts. These assumptions--a paradigm--comprise a collection of beliefs, values and techniques that are held by a given scientific community, which legitimize their systems and set the limitations to their investigation.[44] For naturalists, nature is the only reality, the only paradigm. There is no such thing as 'supernatural'. The scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality.[45]

Naturalism is the implicit philosophy of working scientists.[46] The following basic assumptions are needed to justify the scientific method.[47]

  1. that there is an objective reality shared by all rational observers.[47][48] "The basis for rationality is acceptance of an external objective reality."[49] "Objective reality is clearly an essential thing if we are to develop a meaningful perspective of the world. Nevertheless its very existence is assumed." "Our belief that objective reality exist is an assumption that it arises from a real world outside of ourselves. As infants we made this assumption unconsciously. People are happy to make this assumption that adds meaning to our sensations and feelings, than live with solipsism."[50] Without this assumption, there would be only the thoughts and images in our own mind (which would be the only existing mind) and there would be no need of science, or anything else."[51]
  2. that this objective reality is governed by natural laws;[47][48] "Science, at least today, assumes that the universe obeys to knoweable principles that don't depend on time or place, nor on subjective parameters such as what we think, know or how we behave."[49] Hugh Gauch argues that science presupposes that "the physical world is orderly and comprehensible."[52]
  3. that reality can be discovered by means of systematic observation and experimentation.[47][48] Stanley Sobottka said, "The assumption of external reality is necessary for science to function and to flourish. For the most part, science is the discovering and explaining of the external world."[51] "Science attempts to produce knowledge that is as universal and objective as possible within the realm of human understanding."[49]
  4. that Nature has uniformity of laws and most if not all things in nature must have at least a natural cause.[48] Biologist Stephen Jay Gould referred to these two closely related propositions as the constancy of nature's laws and the operation of known processes.[53] Simpson agrees that the axiom of uniformity of law, an unprovable postulate, is necessary in order for scientists to extrapolate inductive inference into the unobservable past in order to meaningfully study it.[54]
  6. that experimenters won't be significantly biased by their presumptions.[48]
  7. that random sampling is representative of the entire population.[48] A simple random sample (SRS) is the most basic probabilistic option used for creating a sample from a population. The benefit of SRS is that the investigator is guaranteed to choose a sample that represents the population that ensures statistically valid conclusions.[55]






Anything goes methodology

Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) argued that no description of scientific method could possibly be broad enough to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free methodological rules governing the progress of science. He argued that "the only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes".[59]


Sociology of scientific knowledge methodology




The public backlash of scientists against such views, particularly in the 1990s, became known as the science wars.[63]

A major development in recent decades has been the study of the formation, structure, and evolution of scientific communities by sociologists and anthropologists - including David Bloor, Harry Collins, Bruno Latour, Ian Hacking and Anselm Strauss. Concepts and methods (such as rational choice, social choice or game theory) from economics have also been applied[by whom?] for understanding the efficiency of scientific communities in the production of knowledge. This interdisciplinary field has come to be known as science and technology studies.[64] Here the approach to the philosophy of science is to study how scientific communities actually operate.

Continental philosophy

Philosophers in the continental philosophical tradition are not traditionally categorized[by whom?] as philosophers of science. However, they have much to say about science, some of which has anticipated themes in the analytical tradition. For example, Friedrich Nietzsche advanced the thesis in his The Genealogy of Morals (1887) that the motive for the search for truth in sciences is a kind of ascetic ideal.[65]

Hegel with his Berlin students
Sketch by Franz Kugler

In general, continental philosophy views science from a world-historical perspective. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) became one of the first philosophers to support this view. Philosophers such as Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) and Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) also wrote their works with this world-historical approach to science, predating Kuhn' 1962 work by a generation or more. All of these approaches involve a historical and sociological turn to science, with a priority on lived experience (a kind of Husserlian "life-world"), rather than a progress-based or anti-historical approach as emphasised in the analytic tradition. One can trace this continental strand of thought through the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the late works of Merleau-Ponty (Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, 1956-1960), and the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).[66]

The largest effect on the continental tradition with respect to science came from Martin Heidegger's critique of the theoretical attitude in general, which of course includes the scientific attitude.[67] For this reason, the continental tradition has remained much more skeptical of the importance of science in human life and in philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, there have been a number of important works: especially those of a Kuhnian precursor, Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964). Another important development was that of Michel Foucault's analysis of historical and scientific thought in The Order of Things (1966) and his study of power and corruption within the "science" of madness.[68] Post-Heideggerian authors contributing to continental philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century include Jürgen Habermas (e.g., Truth and Justification, 1998), Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (The Unity of Nature, 1980; German: Die Einheit der Natur (1971)), and Wolfgang Stegmüller (Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschafttheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, 1973-1986).

Other topics



Social accountability


Philosophy of particular sciences


-- Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995


Philosophy of statistics


Philosophy of mathematics


Philosophy of physics

Question, Web Fundamentals.svg Unsolved problem in physics:
(more unsolved problems in physics)


Philosophy of chemistry


Philosophy of Earth sciences


Philosophy of biology

Peter Godfrey-Smith was awarded the Lakatos Award[78] for his 2009 book Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection, which discusses the philosophical foundations of the theory of evolution.[79][80]


Philosophy of medicine

A fragment of the Hippocratic Oath from the third century.

Beyond medical ethics and bioethics, the philosophy of medicine is a branch of philosophy that includes the epistemology and ontology/metaphysics of medicine. Within the epistemology of medicine, evidence-based medicine (EBM) (or evidence-based practice (EBP)) has attracted attention, most notably the roles of randomisation,[83][84][85]blinding and placebo controls. Related to these areas of investigation, ontologies of specific interest to the philosophy of medicine include Cartesian dualism, the monogenetic conception of disease[86] and the conceptualization of 'placebos' and 'placebo effects'.[87][88][89][90] There is also a growing interest in the metaphysics of medicine,[91] particularly the idea of causation. Philosophers of medicine might not only be interested in how medical knowledge is generated, but also in the nature of such phenomena. Causation is of interest because the purpose of much medical research is to establish causal relationships, e.g. what causes disease, or what causes people to get better.[92]

Philosophy of psychology





A notable recent development in Philosophy of Psychology is Functional Contextualism or Contextual Behavioural Science (CBS). Functional Contextualism is a modern philosophy of science rooted in philosophical pragmatism and contextualism. It is most actively developed in behavioral science in general, the field of behavior analysis, and contextual behavioral science in particular (see the entry for the Association for Contextual Behavioral Science). Functional contextualism serves as the basis of a theory of language known as relational frame theory[1] and its most prominent application, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT).[2] It is an extension and contextualistic interpretation of B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism first delineated by Steven C. Hayes which emphasizes the importance of predicting and influencing psychological events (including thoughts, feelings, and behaviors) with precision, scope, and depth, by focusing on manipulable variables in their context.

Philosophy of psychiatry


Philosophy of economics

Amartya Sen was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for "combining tools from economics and philosophy."[95]


Philosophy of social science

The philosophy of social science is the study of the logic and method of the social sciences, such as sociology, anthropology, and political science.[97] Philosophers of social science are concerned with the differences and similarities between the social and the natural sciences, causal relationships between social phenomena, the possible existence of social laws, and the ontological significance of structure and agency.




See also


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Further reading

  • Peter, Godfrey-Smith (2003), Theory and Reality: An Introduction the Philosophy of Science", University of Chicago Press
  • Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-45804-5.
  • Ziman, John (2000). Real Science: what it is, and what it means. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

External links




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