Monday, November 5, 2012

DOM XSS on Google Plus One Button


DOMinatorPro can be very useful to find DOM Based XSS on complex JavaScript web applications. This post will describe a Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) abuse exploiting a flaw in the JavaScript Plus One code on
Just to be clear, yes, it's the +1 button present on billions of pages around the internet.
The issue affected the context of which is the context of the social network.

Before going further with any details, a picture is worth a thousand words:

In order to better explain the issue and show how DOMinatorPro helped me in finding the problem, and since a video is worth a thousand pictures, I recorded a video on Youtube MindedSecurity channel.

In the video I deliberately chose to not show a single line of JavaScript in order to demonstrate what DOMinatorPro can do for a tester with little knowledge of JavaScript.

In this post, on the other hand, I'd like to discuss about how the input was treated and how Google fixed the issue with input validation.

Code Issue Details

The offending URL in a simplified version was:;/_/apps-static/_/js/gapi/__features__/rt=j/ver=ZZZZ/sv=1/am=!YYYY/d=1/rs=XXX

First of all, a throw "Bad URL " exception can be spotted on line 425, which actually controls for the presence of multiple callbacks (/cb=/) in 'l' variable and  for the presence of classic  /[@"'<>#\?&%]/ metacharacters in 'ga'. If some of those conditions are satisfied then an exception (Bad URL) is thrown. 
That is called data validation.
420 d = m.split(";");
421 d = (i = M[d.shift()]) &&  i(d);
422 if (!d) throw "Bad hint:" + m;
423 i = d = d[q]("__features__", T(r))[q](/\/$/, "") + 
                   (e[s] ? "/ed=1/exm=" + T(e) : "")
                   + ("/cb=gapi." + J);
424 l = i.match(ha); // "".match(/\/cb=/g)
425 if (!l || !(1 === l[s] && 
                 ga[p](i) && !fa[p](i)))
                      throw "Bad URL " + d;
426 e[k].apply(e, r);
427 L("ml0", r, I);
428 c[R.f] || t.___gapisync ?
     (c = d, "loading" != u.readyState ? 
     W(c) :
     u.write("<" + S + ' src="' + encodeURI(c) + '"></' + S + ">")) :
     W(d, c, J) 

Line 428 is the call to the function that performs a XMLHttpRequest. By following the flow on Line 532 (beautified) the 'l' variable is tainted and it's the one that is traced by DOMinatorPro, originating by the location.href jsh parameter:

starting from: jsh=m;/_/apps-static/_/js/gapi/....

becomes "" and l[q] is the replace function :

function W(){
531 a = v.XMLHttpRequest,
532 l = l[q](/^https?:\/\/[^\/]+\//, "/"), 
533 m = new a;
534"GET", l, f)
So on line 532 is removed and 'l' becomes:


The reason why there is execution is that the response is evaluated using the following code:

Now, about the fix, I suggested Google to perform some input validation using A tag properties,
var aa=document.createElement("a");

and then use aa.pathname to be sure it's the browser doing the parsing job but probably it does not work perfectly for all browsers.

In fact Google devs decided to add more data validation

if (!l || !(1 === l[v] && ha[q](d) && 
            ga[q](d) && h && 1 === h[v]))
  throw "Bad URL " + a;
that code changes one check and adds another condition, to the previous one we already discussed.
In particular:
ga[q](d) changes from /[@"'><#\?&%]/ (blacklist) 
                 to  /^[\/_a-zA-Z0-9,.\-!:=]+$/ (whitelist)
1 === h[v] has been added and means if there is 
            only one "//"  (like http://  )
Which seems pretty solid to me, at least in the context of this specific issue; of course, bypasses are always around the corner, but I'm sure Google security guys took the best effort to be sure it's safe!


DOM Based XSS still remains quite untested, and that's because JavaScript is not easy to analyze in complex scenarios.
DOMinatorPro can really help in finding issue in the easy-to-hard-to-identify range of DOM Based XSS category, because DOMinatorPro is not as simple as you might think, it's a complex piece of software and with a large knowledge base in it.