Total War Center Forums - Vestigia Vetustatis A place to discuss history. en Mon, 20 May 2019 18:55:54 GMT vBulletin 60 Total War Center Forums - Vestigia Vetustatis What was the Roman logistics system? Sun, 19 May 2019 02:58:35 GMT In order to maintain a steady supply of water, food, ammunition, weapons and... In order to maintain a steady supply of water, food, ammunition, weapons and more things for the Roman armies during campaigns. So, did their logistics system help them a lot in their conquests? ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis twgamer20197 <![CDATA[Cleopatra's endgame: what did she really hope to accomplish with Mark Antony?]]> Sat, 18 May 2019 00:14:22 GMT The full details of the life of Cleopatra VII Philopator and her immediate... The full details of the life of Cleopatra VII Philopator and her immediate Ptolemaic family members is somewhat garbled with the surviving accounts in Greco-Roman historiography if not tainted by the spurious claims and exaggerations of Augustan period Latin poetry. Octavian's claims that Antony's will included stipulations that Alexandria be made the new capital of the Roman Republic ring of partisan invective and propaganda, the sort that (falsely) claimed Antony stole books from the Library of Pergamon to restock the Library of Alexandria after it was partially burned down during the siege against Caesar by Ptolemy XIII. However, it is entirely reasonable to think Antony wanted to be buried alongside Cleopatra VII and that he wanted his children with her to directly benefit from the so-called Donations of Alexandria. In either case, these claims and following ones were allegedly censored from public view by consuls who were allied with Antony. They successfully blocked it until Octavian finally raided the Temple of Vesta in 32 BC where it was held, to acquire it and disclose selective passages instead of releasing it in full.

The donations were announced in 34 BC during Antony's mock Roman triumph celebrating his capture of the Armenian king Artavasdes II and his royal family. Antony, dressed like the Greek god Dionysos (and was often equated with the Egyptian Osiris), presented the prisoners to Cleopatra as she dressed up for the ritual as the Egyptian goddess Isis (with Aphrodite as the common Greek equivalent). Imitating the Achaemenid Persian King of Kings, Cleopatra was declared the Queen of Kings. In this feudal arrangement, Caesar's son Caesarion would be Cleopatra's groomed successor in Egypt as King of Kings, but her children with Antony would inherit other domains in the east under Antony's triumviral authority, ones that had recently been gained by Roman arms, treasure, and blood. Alexander Helios, dressed for the ceremony in the garb of a Median king of old, would inherit Armenia (recently brought under Roman control) and more ambitiously Parthia and Medes with hypothetical future campaigns of Antony funded by Cleopatra. Their other son Ptolemy Philadelphos was decked out in the clothes of a Macedonian Greek and typical Hellenistic ruler, a miniature Alexander the Great, and he was to rule Syria and Cilicia in place of the fallen Seleucids. Cleopatra Selene II would inherit the isle of Crete and the Greek colony of Cyrene in nearby Libya.

While still in office as an elected triumvir, Antony technically had the legal authority to delegate things and move chess pieces around in the eastern provinces, but he was really pushing his authority to the limit here and his actions were certainly unpopular back home. When war was finally declared by the Roman Senate, it was done so against Cleopatra VII instead of Antony, due to her financing and military aid given to a private Roman citizen who no longer held a relevant office. It was also orchestrated this way as to be more palatable to the Roman people, who were sick and tired of civil wars against fellow Romans by this point, but were always happy to fight foreigners who challenged Rome.

So then, what was Cleopatra's endgame here with Antony? What did she hope to achieve if she and Antony had won the Battle of Actium against Agrippa and managed to defeat Octavian or force him into a permanent truce or cementing a long-lasting negotiated settlement of splitting the Roman world between their two spheres of influence? Was she deluded enough to think she could keep this going forever? The assassination of Julius Caesar probably should have taught her to avoid getting involved directly in Roman politics, but instead she remained determined to wed and embed her Hellenistic monarchy into the existing Republican Roman political system. How would this even be sustainable going forward? The Romans only accepted Octavian as Augustus and Princeps because of the veneer of a Republic still being in place. If the Roman historians during and after Augustus are to be trusted, it doesn't seem like Antony was very much interested in maintaining the facade that the Republic mattered to him, if he was literally acting as a god emperor over his children who were literal kings and queens (albeit clients of the Roman Republic). ]]>
Vestigia Vetustatis Roma_Victrix
Did any tribe willingly join romans? Sun, 05 May 2019 18:42:30 GMT I am wondering if there were any peoples in history that wanted to actually be... I am wondering if there were any peoples in history that wanted to actually be romans and join them and discard their previous identity for a roman one and were accepted by romans. Seeing that romans were the superpower, i think many tribes would want to join in and assimilation was the roman way. They may be some that was attacked by their kin or just liking roman ways. ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis cenkiss Did Napoleon have any chance at Leipzig? Thu, 02 May 2019 20:11:03 GMT "One should not believe but they [Allies] are really attacking me."
- Napoleon at Leipzig

Known as the Battle of the Nations, the Battle of Leipzig was the largest battle ever fought during the Napoleonic Wars and the largest battle ever fought on the European continent until World War I. In all, some 600,000 soldiers, as well as 2,200 artillery pieces, and 50,000 horses took part at the Battle of Leipzig. Given Napoleon’s past brilliance and boldness (even with the Russian retreat) and sheer scale of the forces united against him (some 365,000 men vs 200,000 French and auxiliaries) one must ask the question; did Napoleon have any chance at Leipzig?

Battle of Leipzig - October 16 Actions

He most certainly thought he did, or at least that’s what the narrative of the first day of the battle seems to suggest. Undeterred that his army was now mostly inexperienced, and that most of his veterans had either deserted or perished during the Russian campaign (including highly trained cavalry mounts) Napoleon took to the offensive with classic divide & conqueror strategy – intending to destroy his foes quickly before they could unite. At this point one could criticize Napoleon for dividing his own army – leaving Marmot to hold off Blucher and the Prussians – yet Napoleon’s holding action to the north and attack to the south made excellent use of local terrain and interior highways, including rivers and bridges, which under Napoleon’s control allowed him to deploy more rapidly than his enemies. The geography around Leipzig, which was surrounded by villages and two adjoining rivers, also acted as a natural barrier against flanking and maneuver, a key point that made Napoleon’s attack and concentration to the south possible. Given the map then, and possibility of being outnumbered and surrounded by not doing anything, Napoleon’s gamble to the south and first day actions to the north appear to be tactically sound. In fact, he nearly did succeed in driving the Russian army back, and Marmot held his front as well as could be expected. Other than perhaps the strategic folly of once again enticing all the major European countries to unite against him, it doesn’t seem reasonable to charge Napoleon with too many mistakes for the first day of Leipzig.

Battle of Leipzig - October 18 Actions

From this point on however, Napoleon’s generalship is wide open to debate, and his decisions much harder to justify. Having failed to destroy any of the coalition armies, and having expended momentum, -now that the initiative was lost, and his cavalry and army worn down- why not retreat why you still can? Retreating on the 2nd day of Leipzig (without arguing the political or strategic picture), I’d argue is the correct tactical move. Napoleon’s cavalry was gone – from the Russian campaign and Leipzig’s Day 1 actions – even if he thought he could achieve a breakthrough, he had no ability to pursue or exploit a routed army. He was now slowly being pushed (and surrounded) on three sides, and what awaited him was an all-out assault where his enemies could still receive reinforcements. While Napoleon still had superior lines of communication, roadways, and probably overall quality, what awaited Napoleon, now that the coalition lines were united, was classic attrition. Even with trench and urban warfare, Napoleon does not have a shot at holding off 365,000 men without having any opportunity to maneuver or give up ground. Napoleon’s ammunition stock was also running low, and it still remains possible that collation forces could have crossed the Elster and completely cut off his supplies lines – in effect surrounding Napoleon and threatening his line of retreat.

In the end, Napoleon appears to have chosen attrition warfare – choosing to stay at Leipzig for three more days, fighting defensively against waves of enemies until superior numbers finally forced his hand. What happened next of course, was the great bridge blunder, retreat, traffic jam, scramble, and mad rout that usually follows when one’s luck finally runs out. Leipzig could thus be described as Napoleon’s greatest defeat, a bizarre battle against all of one’s enemies at once, and perhaps the end of Napoleon’s genius. ]]>
Vestigia Vetustatis Dick Cheney.
Ethnic structure of the Kingdom of Prussia in the 1800s, by province Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:27:50 GMT Encyclopedia Britannica 1842, gives 1825 data for West Prussia and Posen: ... Encyclopedia Britannica 1842, gives 1825 data for West Prussia and Posen:

images from Google books

Georg Hassel has a lot of data about ethnic structure in his book from 1823:

Provinz (Grand Duchy) Posen:

West Prussia, Georg Hassel:

West Prussia, Karl Andree*:

*Karl Andree, "Polen: in geographischer, geschichtlicher und culturhistorischer Hinsicht", 1831.


Oppeln Silesia:

Breslau Silesia:

Other authors give similar numbers of Poles in Breslau Silesia (Kamusella, Ladenberger and Michałkiewicz for year 1840 give 80,000 Poles in Breslau Regency and 566,000 in Oppeln Regency; S. Plater gives 600,000 Poles in all of Silesia in 1824).

more images from Google books
Liegnitz Silesia:


But according to T. Kamusella, in year 1815 there were still 200,000 Sorbian-speakers in Brandenburg (and 50,000 in Saxony):

another image

In the link below August von Haxthausen in his 1839 book has data on East Prussia, by county:

another google image

County Allenstein (Olsztyn) for example:

another image

Karl Andree* gives for East Prussia 480,000 Poles and Lithuanians (total population 1,080,000):

another google book image


Georg Hassel for some reason added East Prussian Poles to East Prussian Lithuanians. However, he also reported 20,000 Curonians and Latvians as well as 2,400 Jews in East Prussia (Andree's data for East Prussia is for year 1824, Hassel's data for year 1819).


Religious structure by Regierungsbezirk, in year 1817:
another google image

Ethnically German, Polish and Lithuanian areas in East Prussia:

"Ethnographische Karte von Europa", Heinrich Berghaus, Gotha, 1847:
another google image


And early 20th century:

Ethnic map by Ing. Jakob Spett (green: Poles), in 1910:

map image

Data on the Ruhrpolen (Polish-speaking migrants coming to West Germany from eastern provinces of Prussia after 1860).

In 1910-12, their numbers were as follows (note that the vast majority assimilated into Germans within few generations):

data image

There is also this book:
Karl Weinhold, "Die Verbreitung und die Herkunft der Deutschen in Schlesien"
("The Origins and Distribution of Germans in Silesia", published in 1887)

He gives some data on ethnic groups in Silesia in the mid-19th century:

data image

Please keep the posts of massive images in content boxes. This is hard to read on most smart phones - NorseThing ]]>
Vestigia Vetustatis Domen123
Documentary: Luther and the Protestant Revolution Mon, 29 Apr 2019 03:31:38 GMT The documentary is available in English on Vimeo, you have to pay a couple of... The documentary is available in English on Vimeo, you have to pay a couple of EUR/USD to watch it:

Here the author, G. Braun, is talking about his documentary, with English subs, a video from 2017:

Vestigia Vetustatis Domen123
<![CDATA[Wouldn't It Have Been Smarter If Thatcher Didn't Announce When The British Fleet Would Be Leaving For The Falklands?]]> Tue, 23 Apr 2019 18:00:08 GMT Good afternoon

I was recently re-watching 20th Century Battlefields episode on The Falklands War and on top of other documentaries watched over the years had a thought strike me for the first time, would things not have gone better for Britain if they had waited till the fleet arrived near The Falklands before publicly announcing the campaign?

​At a certain point it may become impossible to hide as they did have Argentinean military operated 707s shadowing the fleet along the route south who could have picked the fleet up on radar or visually regardless but at the least it would allow for around 20 days where the enemy wasn't preparing as hastily and possibly even allow for some landings before the full fleet and air response.

​The Argentinians had SAM missile batteries only days away from being fully active on the island and considering they also had Exocet missiles and nearly half the ships in the quickly assembled British Task Force consisted of vulnerable merchant vessels (including 2 troop carrying cruise liners) you would think they would want to avoid all possible contact with the enemy not alert them weeks beforehand they would be arriving. We know troops were moved quickly to The Falklands/Malvinas and it gave them time to prep the air force on the mainland being just in range of the islands, countering them were 46 British Harrier jets.

​In other documentaries I have seen British soldiers lament the fact they were a bit arrogant and while learning Spanish phrases for "surrender" or hands up" they never thought to learn things like "I surrender", could this have been part of the reason for Thatchers declaration? Thinking a 2nd or 3rd rate nation would be a walkover?

​Tl;Dr - Churchill would never have gone on radio and announced The Allied Fleet would be leaving for Normandy in a few weeks so when it comes to this case why did Thatcher give an enemy at that point enough information to be able to quickly move troops and equipment around, fortify, etc? ]]>
Vestigia Vetustatis Krieglord