DPRK Nuclear Deal: Good, Bad, or Ugly?

We notice today that the six-party talks, ongoing lo these several years, have produced a deal with North Korea to stand down somewhat from its nuclear ambitions. I'd like to examine the deal, look at where it is deficient, how it contrasts with the Clinton-era deal.

First, the details. I've highlighted the parts I think are important:

U.S. officials on Tuesday defended the Bush administration's policy shift on North Korea, which coincided with an agreement by Pyongyang to begin to close down its nuclear program.

North Korea now has 60 days to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear complex and readmit nuclear inspectors. In return, it will get 50,000 tons of fuel oil or financial aid of an equal amount.

Once Pyongyang takes additional steps to disable its nuclear program, including taking inventory of its plutonium stockpile, it will qualify for another 950,000 tons of fuel oil or equivalent aid, according to the terms of the deal. The aid package is worth $300 million.

North Korean state media reported that the agreement called only for a "temporary suspension" of Pyongyang's nuclear program, according to wire reports.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice drew a distinction between the first 60-day period, when she said nuclear activities will be suspended, and the later "disablement phase."

"The disabling of these facilities is a sign that the North Koreans may, in fact, be ready to make a strategic choice," she said at a briefing in Washington. "I will not take it as a complete sign until we've seen that disablement, but obviously disablement is an important step forward."
OK, let's dispense with the easiest of these first: North Korean state media's analysis is of no interest at all. Insofar as they differ from everyone else, it's just because they're lying to their own people. That's the usual system for the DPRK, so it's no surprise; it has no relevance to the actual deal.

Now, a more important matter: plutonium. As China E-Lobby points out, we've seen no public mention of the highly enriched uranium project -- the one that the DPRK hid from Clinton-administration officials. Insofar as this was the form of cheating they used before, it's odd that it's not prominently addressed. One might almost think that we were intentionally leaving them a loophole.

That's the main thing to watch going forward. These "nuclear inspectors" -- are they going to have access to the HEU sites, or just Yongbyon? That site depends on unenriched uranium, which can be reprocessed into plutonium. But the HEU can be used for nukes too.

If we don't see an answer to that question in the press ASAP, we'll want to start pressing our representatives to get an answer.

I'll take a moment to address John Bolton's objection.
"It sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: If you hold out long enough and wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded," said Bolton, who was also involved with North Korea earlier as the State Department's undersecretary for arms control.

"It makes the [Bush] administration look very weak at a time in Iraq and dealing with Iran it needs to look strong," he said.
I see his point, which isn't without merit. On the other hand, it also sends a signal to Iran that we're not going to have our attention divided. The DPRK matter will be set aside for the moment: that means we are free to focus our attention on Iraq and Iran. That ought to be somewhat intimidating.

Next: how does this compare with the Clinton-era deal? The answer is that it compares favorably, for one reason. Unlike the Clinton-era deal, this one is brokered by China. You are not required to believe in Chinese good-faith to see the value in this. The Chinese want to be taken seriously as a world power. They have considerable "face" invested in this deal. For the DPRK, cheating against the US is one thing, a thing that in fact has no real downside. Cheating against the US and China both is another.

That is not to say they won't do it. The DPRK is right up against the wall, and desperate people do desperate things. What I am saying is, when they break faith with the deal, we will be in a position to manage their downfall more effectively. Because China will be embarrassed by their bad faith, they will offer less support to the regime when the time for confrontation arises.

Where does all this leave us? The DPRK is off the "Axis of Evil" list for a few years. They will be salvaged from the collapse they so richly deserve; in return, we don't have to devote resources to managing that collapse until we've had time to deal with Iraq and Iran, and China will be forced into a more supportive position when the time comes that we do have to manage the collapse. Iran has to deal with our undivided attention for the next period.

I'd call it a deal that borders on good and ugly, if the HEU issue is considered in a form not yet in the press. If that issue is not considered, it's just ugly -- although there are a few good points to be had from it, it's mostly about pushing the problems down the road to let us deal with other problems now.

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