CAREFUL what you ask for, advises the adage, because you might get it. Ron Williams, who challenged the Commonwealth's school chaplaincy program in the High Court, yesterday won his fight, though not necessarily in the way he would have preferred. Mr Williams, who said that he began the case to ensure that state schools would have ''freedom of religion and freedom from religion'', objected to the chaplaincy program on two grounds. He argued that it contravened section 116 of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion, prevents any establishment of religion and prohibits any religious test being imposed for holding office under the Commonwealth. And he objected under section 61, which vests the executive power of the Commonwealth in the Queen, i.e. in the government. It was this second objection that, for the present at least, has resulted in the court ruling against federal funding for chaplains in state schools, and perhaps much else besides.

The justices unanimously dismissed Mr Williams' argument that section 116 prohibits funding of chaplains because there is a religious test for their appointment. Chaplains appointed to his children's Queensland school, the court ruled, do not hold office under the Commonwealth because they are hired by a private contractor, Scripture Union Queensland. It is not the first time that cases brought under this section of the constitution have disappointed secularist campaigners, for the court has previously ruled that federal legislation granting money to the states for denominational schools is not a ''law for the establishment of religion''.

That ruling would not have surprised constitutional lawyers, but the court majority's interpretation of section 61 may well spark a rush to rewrite the textbooks. It has previously been assumed that if the Commonwealth has legislative power to do something, it has executive power to do so as well. The court has now ruled that for executive power to be validly exercised when entering into a contract such as that which funded Scripture Union Queensland, there must not only be legislative power but actual legislation. Moreover, the legislation must be more than ''parliamentary appropriation'', the statutes that provide the government's general operating funds. It has to be specific.

Since there is no such legislation in the case of school chaplains, the chaplaincy program is constitutionally invalid. The disturbing question raised by Mr Williams' victory is whether other federal programs may be unconstitutional, too. Attorney-General Nicola Roxon yesterday rushed to allay such fears, saying that the High Court had ruled only on the chaplaincy program. But Ms Roxon also said that the government was studying the implications of the ruling, as well it might. At least one eminent constitutional lawyer, Professor George Williams of the University of NSW, believes that the court's decision puts at risk spending as diverse as the local government Roads Recovery program, direct funding of private schools and perhaps some arts grants. The Commonwealth could still provide funding in these areas, but it might have to do so through the states or after enacting new legislation - which could in turn be tested in the court.

The government must find a path through this legislative and constitutional maze as quickly as possible, doing whatever is necessary to ensure continuity of funding for essential programs such as Roads Recovery. It should also take advantage of this opportunity to rethink its support for school chaplaincies.

The Age has argued with regard to religious education in state schools that it should be provided, but as teaching about the beliefs of all religions, not as a proselytising exercise. A similar principle should apply in the provision of pastoral care and counselling: in a secular school, these services should properly be provided by secular, trained professional staff.

Don't throw the girls off their game

IS IT discriminatory to ban a 13-year-old boy from taking part in an all-girls netball competition? A dry reading of anti-discrimination laws might suggest an answer in the affirmative, but such reasoning totally misunderstands, and effectively undermines, the very purpose of equal opportunity legislation.

Girls ought to have a right to excel at competitive sport, in this case netball, and for that to happen a level playing field is necessary. Allowing a boy, a 185-centimetre boy no less, to join an all-girl competition immediately distorts the field - or, in this case, the court - by unfairly encroaching on the girls' space, both physical and psychological.

This is the unfortunate impact of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal having granted interim permission, pending a hearing in September, for the boy to play for Banyule in the Parkville Netball Association's 15-and-under matches. Even as a holding position, the VCAT ruling is misconceived and damaging. Should the ruling become permanent, it would have potentially devastating consequences for adolescent girls across the state.

The boy himself merits a good deal of sympathy: as his father told The Age, the absence of a boys-only competition in the relevant age group is a source of frustration. That some sports are still associated with one sex or the other shows the cause of gender equality in sport has a way to run. But the proper response to the boy's predicament - though, sadly, it won't help him now - lies in encouraging more boys to play netball, and not in letting the boys join the girls' competition. To do otherwise risks correcting an existing injustice with an even bigger one.

The VCAT decision is only defensible if one turns a blind eye to social realities, such as the persistence of gender discrimination in sport (which at its most serious discourages women from playing and grossly undervalues their achievements when they do), the fact that allowing boys on the court would put the girls at a competitive disadvantage physically, and the sensitivities girls encounter during puberty. As Dianne McCormack, the head coach of rival team St Therese's of Essendon explained, when a boy is present on the court, the girls ''are faced with modifying their game to eliminate or reduce body contact, when they didn't sign up for a mixed competition''. In other words, the girls are thrown off their normally defensive and vigorous game, possibly for good.

A sensible reading of equal opportunity laws would affirm the choice of girls to play in a team of their own.