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US/AFGHANISTAN/IRAQ - Italian commentary argues new strategy needed for Afghanistan, Iraq

Released on 2012-10-16 17:00 GMT

Email-ID 710424
Date 2011-09-12 11:45:07
Italian commentary argues new strategy needed for Afghanistan, Iraq

Text of report by Italian privately-owned centrist newspaper La Stampa
website, on 10 September

[Commentary by Gian Enrico Rusconi: "The 'Just War' is Now Over -New
Strategies Are Called For in Afghanistan, Iraq"]

It was to have been a deadly blow to the power, prestige, and to the
moral resilience of the United States, instead the 9/11 attack produced
a backlash in terms of pride and moral censure that shows that America
remains a great and solid nation. But the terrorists missed their target
more on account of the moral reservations of the American people than
for the effectiveness of the strategic and military reaction served up
by the political and military world.

The intense media and public commemoration of 9/11 barely conceals the
permanence of a deep-seated trauma. This was seen a few weeks ago when
an earthquake hit the New York area, immediately reminding everyone of
the Twin Tower attack. An instinctive reaction even if controlled,
almost as if Americans felt ready to face a new challenge. A sign both
extraordinary and symptomatic of the fact that Americans have
metabolized their distrust of terrorism being preventable with military

That day, 9/11, irreversibly altered the traditional relationship
between power and security, more in psychological and moral than in
material terms, and also more in terms of a collective, subjective
perception than in terms of effective military security. A wound was
inflicted at the very heart of the American nation. Not a second Pearl
Harbour, as what happened in 1941 was a brutal act of conventional, even
if treacherous, warfare. That of 9/11 was an act of war against a civil
society, which struck at the very heart of a great metropolis.

It was the unmasking of terrorism as war that has "climbed to its
extreme," to use an expression by [Carl von] Clausewitz, the author of
the textbook on modern annihilation warfare, who however could not have
imagined such "extremes." Terrorism coincides with the annihilation of
the defenceless as such: there are no more defenceless innocents. In the
war of terror no one is innocent any more. Such is the revelation of

What we are witnessing is a radical alteration of the rationality and
morality of war, as understood by the liberal and democratic West, and
not only by the United States. But precisely in view of this alteration,
the West is in difficulty both in conceptual but above all in strategic
and operational terms. Especially in the initial phase that saw the West
divided over [former President] Bush's military initiatives, but also in
the successive phase of collective solidarity. Aside from any
philosophical, ideological, or political theorizing of the war on
terrorism, the only idea that can fully enjoy public consensus is that
of a "just war." Not an immediate reaction driven by the desire for
revenge or a hard-nosed response to the so-called "civilization clash."

The "just war" concept, however, is anything but simple, because it
involves "fighting an enemy," and at the same time "punishing a
criminal." How to make these two aspects dovetail? An explanation was
attempted by the President of the United States, Barack Obama, a few
months after his election and in the address he delivered in Oslo in
2998, when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The tenor of his discourse was nobly inspired, but extremely controlled
when it came to the war under way, and which he had inherited from Bush.
Obama, in fact, limited himself to saying that while the war in Iraq
"was about to end," that against terrorism was ongoing, because it is a
"conflict in which we have been joined by many other countries in the
attempt to defend our nation and all others from further attacks."
Clearly, the US President unwaveringly defines the war on terrorism as a
"war of defence," which is the pre-condition to qualifying it as a "just

Since its original formulation, this long-standing concept "suggests
that war is justifiable only when it meets certain requisites: if there
is recourse to war out of self-defence and as a last resort, if the
force utilized is proportional, and if -whenever possible - civilians
are spared the violence." In other words, terror is not to be met with
further terror.

The way of reacting to a "holy war" is with a "just war," and especially
with proportionate actions aimed at sparing civilians and defenceless
populations. Naturally Obama also holds dear the concept and objective
of a "just peace," one involving not only the restoration of political
and civil rights, but also economic security and social progress.

This is not the place to critically examine the Oslo address, which
still belongs to the magic moment of the greater expectations kindled by
the neo-President. But it is striking that his discourse failed to
announce any strategic discontinuity. Thus, 10 years after the Twin
Tower attack, the "war on terrorism" continues its bloody course without
any significant results. Bin Ladin's elimination in May 2011 surely was
not decisive. Recently, there have been changes at the top echelons of
the military, which however were not followed by a substantial strategy
change, other than that of gradual withdrawal, presented naturally as if
the "pacification mission" had been completed.

Does it make any sense to simply keep talking of "war on terrorism" to
justify the inconclusive, if not bankrupt, policy that has been pursued
in Afghanistan? When, 10 years after the New York attack, Western
soldiers -both Americans and Europeans -in Iraq or Afghanistan fall
victims to ambushes, suicide attacks, or devices that explode under
their vehicles, the newspapers and the media are tempted to write them
off as the work of "terrorists." Merely speaking of "guerrilla,"
"rebels," "insurgents," or "Taleban" (in Afghanistan) seems in a way to
water down the soldiers' sense of sacrifice. Thus, the war fought by
their soldiers is inertially presented to Western public opinion as the
prosecution of the war on terrorism, almost as a way of enjoying the
legitimacy stemming from 11 Sep. Instead, the situation has changed

Terrorist acts as expressed currently in the field in Afghanistan or
Iraq are not the equivalent of that of 11 Sep -nor however are they
effectively countered with the type of military strategy that is being
deployed. The real challenge is that of winning the trust of the people.
This can come about not with a missionary attitude (no matter how
subjectively sincere and generous), but by acknowledging the values of a
people's culture and civilization, besides their material interests. In
fact, it is precisely on the population that local terrorists, whether
out of conviction or by force, exercise their influence.

To speak of the "strategic irrationality" of Westerners -as do the
military analysts -is insufficient. We are witnessing a radical
alteration of the rationality and morality of war, one that started on
11 Sep of ten years ago, and which no military solution can put together
again without a profound act of political, cultural, and civil
soul-searching on the part of the West.

Source: La Stampa website, Turin, in Italian 10 Sep 11

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