EARS shut to the impending chorus of international condemnation, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test on February 12th. It said the detonation was of a “smaller and light” atomic bomb that was different from its previous two, and that it had “great explosive power”. Figuratively speaking, the blast may have been meant to resonate loudest in Washington, DC.

Judging by the seismic activity that was detected near North Korea’s Punggye-ri testing site, experts said the blast may have been marginally more powerful than that created by previous tests, in October 2006 and May 2009. Data from the U.S. Geological Survey put the tremor at a magnitude of 4.9, bigger than either of those caused previously. South Korean officials said it may have been 6,000-7,000 tons in TNT equivalent—again, bigger than in the past.

But it is not so much the blast’s brute power as the words “smaller and light” that are most worrying. That is because international analysts suspect that the North is testing a bomb sufficiently miniaturised to fit on its recently launched Unha-3 rocket, which successfully put a satellite into orbit in December. If the bosses in Pyongyang can master the critical skills required to direct a re-entry, the boffins say it is possible that such a rocket could be used to deliver a small nuclear warhead to the United States.

In coming days and weeks technical experts will be trying to analyse what fissile material was used. There was no hard evidence provided in North Korea’s confirmation of the blast. They did boast of having developed a “diversified” programme, which may suggest North Korea has now tested highly enriched uranium, as well as plutonium. The test would have taken place in a sealed tunnel in a mountainside, so it may well prove impossible to tell which material was used (in 2006, evidence of plutonium is said to have escaped; in 2009 there was no conclusive leakage). Any suggestion that it is enriched uranium fuelled the blast will add to the concerns. James Acton of the Washington, DC-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote recently that North Korea’s uranium programme may enable it to build a significantly bigger arsenal than it was thought to have, which could explain why it would have been used in the third test.

In its announcement, KCNA, the North Korean news agency, said that the test was a reaction against American hostility, especially in response to the December satellite launch. Narushige Michishita of the Tokyo-based National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies reckons that the primary aim of the nuclear test was to bring America back to bargaining talks with North Korea. He said the timing may be aimed at catching the attention of a new Obama administration. It also occurred just before South Korea’s president-elect, Park Geun-hye, is due to take office, on February 25th. Mr Michishita surmises the test’s timing might make it easier for her to shrug it off in the long term.

But he acknowledged that in the short run North Korea’s relations with most foreign nations will freeze up. Ms Park was swift to condemn the test. China, which has long been North Korea’s strongest ally, had already issued not-so-veiled warnings to the North against conducting it.

The North Korean regime appears to be regularly underestimating the strength of international feeling against its nuclear programme. If North Korea's apoplectic reaction was any gauge, the strong condemnation its December rocket launch drew from the UN Security Council (UNSC) caught it by surprise. The UNSC is scheduled to discuss the regime’s latest antics early on February 12th in New York. South Korea’s foreign minister, Kim Sung-hwan, and America’s new secretary of state, John Kerry, had agreed beforehand to take "swift and unified" action in the event of another nuclear test.

The trouble is, the outside world has almost run out of the normal options for curbing the North’s nuclear ambitions: there are not many more sanctions it can impose. As our cover leader argued this week, efforts to stop the nuclear programme have “pretty much failed”. Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s fledgling dynast, is unlikely ever to give up his nuclear-weapons programme so long as it remains as his only claim to influence.

Instead, we argue for a new approach: one that seeks to undermine the regime by bombarding its people with information from the outside world, and encourages an emerging class of termite capitalists who are rooting their way through its underground black markets. They are gradually becoming a rival source of power to the regime, albeit only an economic power.

If this blast once again tests China’s patience with the rogue regime, and forces it to scale back its economic support for the Kim dynasty, perhaps that would be its one positive outcome.

(Picture credit: AFP)