Books: Author explores theories on Confederate strategy

Edward Colimore
Knight Ridder Newspapers
Published Friday, June 15, 2001

'Retreat to Victory,' by Robert G. Tanner; SR Books (192 pages, $17.95)

For 136 years, historians and military thinkers have argued over the ''what ifs'' of Confederate strategy.

What if the South had been less aggressive on the battlefield, avoiding the epic, bloody battles that drained its limited manpower? What if it had chosen to use guerrilla strikes against isolated federal columns -- and forced the North to hold growing tracts of ultimately untenable real estate?

Could such a strategy have drawn out the war, exhausted Washington's resolve and compelled recognition of the Confederacy? Bottom line: Could the South have retreated to victory?

Robert G. Tanner puts these questions to rest in ''Retreat to Victory? Confederate Strategy Reconsidered.''

Tanner examines, then explodes the case in favor of the retreat theory, using Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's classic ''On War'' to evaluate Southern actions.

''As a comprehensive national strategy, it was unworkable in light of the South's war goals,'' writes Tanner. ''The Confederate States of America was not destined to retreat its way into existence.''

Historians have long pointed to the success of the Roman commander Fabius Maximus against Hannibal's Carthaginian army during the Second Punic War. Fabius avoided battle, surrendered rich provinces, used guerrilla tactics and instituted a scorched-earth policy. In the end, the Carthaginians left Italy -- and the defense Fabius used became known as the Fabian strategy.

Similar tactics were used by Washington during the American Revolution and by the Russian general Kutuzov during Napoleon's invasion. Fabian tactics also were employed by the Confederacy at times -- on a more limited scale. One good example can be seen in the Confederate cavalrymen under Nathan Bedford Forrest who menaced -- and tied up -- tens of thousands of federal troops in Mississippi and Tennessee in 1863.

The South sometimes resorted to such strategy because it did not have the manpower or the industrial might of the North and could ill afford the head-on clashes that sapped its strength much more quickly than its enemy's.

But guerrilla tactics and avoidance of battle were not congenial to the Southern temperament. The South's aggressive soldiers and populace would not have accepted a defensive posture with gray armies retreating into the interior to fight another day.

The Southern leadership rightly judged the political reality and was as aggressive on the battlefield as it needed to be. To do otherwise would have hurt national morale.

The South also lacked space for deep withdrawals and maneuverings. Confederate forces fought at the edge of indispensable territory. Areas where federals could be lured from supply lines were part of the Confederate heartland.

''Whether the South might have won its war by a different strategy can never be known, but surely the arguments advanced in support of a Fabian defense have flaws,'' Tanner concludes. ''And a good case can be made that, setting aside specific campaign decisions that hindsight shows to have been erroneous. ... Confederate leaders adopted the best overall approach available in light of the policies they strove to achieve.''

To be sure, the South's unwillingness to adopt a Fabian strategy ''was not without hope; the South did come near victory on occasion,'' Tanner writes.

''Retreat to Victory is a fascinating examination of Confederate strategy that makes an important contribution to an overall understanding of the Civil War. Tanner mounts effective arguments against a Confederate Fabian strategy, using history and Clausewitz as his witnesses. The result is persuasive and compelling.