Indiana Supreme Court agrees to review case from 2016 traffic stop in Porter County

The Indiana Supreme Court has agreed to review a case from a 2016 traffic stop in Porter County.

A Hebron police reserve officer said he pulled over Zachariah Marshall for speeding, court records show, but the officer did not record or remember the exact speed Marshall was allegedly driving when Marshall was later charged.


In June, the state court of appeals decided that the stop violated Marshall’s Fourth Amendment rights. The state sought to transfer the decision to a higher court, and the supreme court agreed Thursday to look over Marshall’s case.

“At its core, this case is about a law enforcement officer who pulled a motorist over for allegedly speeding but did not know the speed of the vehicle (not even an estimate) or the applicable speed limit,” Michael Campbell, Marshall’s attorney, wrote in a brief. “Certainly the Fourth Amendment demands more of law enforcement...”

The state, represented by the Attorney General Curtis Hill’s office, countered that the officer had a specific reason for pulling over Marshall, which justified the stop.

“The burden for the stop here is merely a reasonable suspicion that a violation has occurred or is occurring, and the state clearly met that burden,” a brief submitted by Deputy Attorney General J.T. Whitehead states.

On Oct. 29, 2016, Officer Sean Dolan pulled over Marshall, who was in a Toyota Camry, as he was driving on 500 West toward Indiana 8 for “going over the posted speed limit,” court records show.

Dolan testified “he was ‘a hundred percent’ sure that the Toyota was speeding that night night and the speeding violation was Officer Dolan’s only reason for stopping the car,” Whitehead’s brief states.

Dolan’s supervisor was called to the scene, and the traffic stop turned to an investigation of operating while intoxicated, court records state. Because Marshall “had no prior traffic violations,” Dolan chose to give Marshall a warning instead of a speeding citation, according to a brief.

“Because Dolan issued a warning instead of a citation, he did not record (Marshall’s) speed in writing,” a brief states.

Marshall was charged Nov. 2, 2016, with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, endangering a person, a class A misdemeanor; operation of a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to 0.08 but less than 0.15, a class C misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a class C misdemeanor.

Marshall later filed a motion to suppress, “alleging the traffic stop was unlawful,” court records state. The trial court concluded that “an officer’s testimony of speeding, without radar, pacing or some number, when based upon his or her expertise and ability to draw conclusions about the excessive speed of the vehicle, in general terms, is sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction justifying a stop,” court records show.

Marshall appealed, and the court of appeals sided with the defense.

“Because Reserve Officer Dolan could not testify regarding the speed of Marshall’s vehicle in more specific terms, we hold he did not have specific articulable facts to support his initiation of a traffic stop, and therefore the traffic stop violated Marshall’s Fourth Amendment rights,” the decision states.

“The requirement that law enforcement have reasonable suspicion prior to pulling a motorist over may be a low standard, but it’s a standard,” Campbell said in a brief.

Campbell said “there is no acceptable reason for Reserve Officer Dolan to neglect making a record of Marshall’s vehicle speed, assuming he actually used his radar, because he would have needed that information had he decided to issue Marshall a citation for speeding to give him a written warning.”


Police stopped Marshall “because a properly calibrated radar reported” that Marshall was driving faster than the speed limit, Whitehead wrote.

“Police and prosecutors are not required to firmly prove guilt before an investigation has started, rather they must only demonstrate that the stop was reasonable by citing specific reasons for the officer’s belief,” Whitehead said.

“The officers may even ultimately be wrong about their belief that a crime has occurred: what only matters is the basis for the initial stop, not proof of a crime later discovered,” according to Whitehead.