Arrow's impossibility theorem

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The theorem is named after economist Kenneth Arrow, who demonstrated the theorem in his doctoral thesis and popularized it in his 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values. The original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare".[1]

In short, the theorem states that no rank-order voting system can be designed that satisfies these three "fairness" criteria:

  • If every voter's preference between X and Y remains unchanged, then the group's preference between X and Y will also remain unchanged (even if voters' preferences between other pairs like X and Z, Y and Z, or Z and W change).
  • There is no "dictator": no single voter possesses the power to always determine the group's preference.

Voting systems that use cardinal utility (which conveys more information than rank orders; see the subsection discussing the cardinal utility approach to overcoming the negative conclusion) are not covered by the theorem.[2] The theorem can also be sidestepped by weakening the notion of independence. Arrow rejected cardinal utility as a meaningful tool for expressing social welfare,[3] and so focused his theorem on preference rankings.

The axiomatic approach Arrow adopted can treat all conceivable rules (that are based on preferences) within one unified framework. In that sense, the approach is qualitatively different from the earlier one in voting theory, in which rules were investigated one by one. One can therefore say that the contemporary paradigm of social choice theory started from this theorem.[5]

Statement of the theorem[edit]


The framework for Arrow's theorem assumes that we need to extract a preference order on a given set of options (outcomes). Each individual in the society (or equivalently, each decision criterion) gives a particular order of preferences on the set of outcomes. We are searching for a ranked voting system, called a social welfare function (preference aggregation rule), which transforms the set of preferences (profile of preferences) into a single global societal preference order. The theorem considers the following properties, assumed to be reasonable requirements of a fair voting method:

Unrestricted domain
(or universality) For any set of individual voter preferences, the social welfare function should yield a unique and complete ranking of societal choices. Thus:
  • It must do so in a manner that results in a complete ranking of preferences for society.
  • It must deterministically provide the same ranking each time voters' preferences are presented the same way.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
The social preference between x and y should depend only on the individual preferences between x and y (Pairwise Independence). More generally, changes in individuals' rankings of irrelevant alternatives (ones outside a certain subset) should have no impact on the societal ranking of the subset. For example, the introduction of a third candidate to a two-candidate election should not affect the outcome of the election unless the third candidate wins. (See Remarks below.)
Positive association of social and individual values



Pareto efficiency

The later version of this theorem is stronger—has weaker conditions—since monotonicity, non-imposition, and independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply Pareto efficiency, whereas Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives together do not imply monotonicity. (Incidentally, Pareto efficiency on its own implies non-imposition.)

Remarks on IIA

  • The IIA condition can be justified for three reasons (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, page 794): (i) normative (irrelevant alternatives should not matter), (ii) practical (use of minimal information), and (iii) strategic (providing the right incentives for the truthful revelation of individual preferences). Though the strategic property is conceptually different from IIA, it is closely related.
  • Arrow's death-of-a-candidate example (1963, page 26) suggests that the agenda (the set of feasible alternatives) shrinks from, say, X = {a, b, c} to S = {a, b} because of the death of candidate c. This example is misleading since it can give the reader an impression that IIA is a condition involving two agenda and one profile. The fact is that IIA involves just one agendum ({x, y} in case of Pairwise Independence) but two profiles. If the condition is applied to this confusing example, it requires this: Suppose an aggregation rule satisfying IIA chooses b from the agenda {a, b} when the profile is given by (cab, cba), that is, individual 1 prefers c to a to b, 2 prefers c to b to a. Then, it must still choose b from {a, b} if the profile were, say, (abc, bac) or (acb, bca) or (acb, cba) or (abc, cba).

Formal statement of the theorem[edit]


A (strict) social welfare function (preference aggregation rule) is a function  F : \mathrm{L(A)}^N \to \mathrm{L(A)} which aggregates voters' preferences into a single preference order on  \mathrm{A} .[6] The  \mathrm{N} -tuple  (R_1, \ldots, R_N) of voters' preferences is called a preference profile. In its strongest and simplest form, Arrow's impossibility theorem states that whenever the set  \mathrm{A} of possible alternatives has more than 2 elements, then the following three conditions become incompatible:

unanimity, or Pareto efficiency
There is no individual i whose preferences always prevail. That is, there is no  i \in \{1, \ldots,N\} such that  \forall (R_1, \ldots, R_N) \in \mathrm{L(A)}^N, \quad F(R_1,R_2, \ldots, R_N) = R_i.
independence of irrelevant alternatives

Informal proof[edit]

Based on two proofs[7][8] appearing in Economic Theory. For simplicity we have presented all rankings as if ties are impossible. A complete proof taking possible ties into account is not essentially different from the one below, except that one ought to say "not above" instead of "below" or "not below" instead of "above" in some cases. Full details are given in the original articles.

We will prove that any social choice system respecting unrestricted domain, unanimity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a dictatorship. The key idea is to identify a pivotal voter whose ballot swings the societal outcome. We then prove that this voter is a partial dictator (in a specific technical sense, described below). Finally we conclude by showing that all of the partial dictators are the same person, hence this voter is a dictator.

Part One: There is a "pivotal" voter for B over A[edit]

Part One: Successively move B from the bottom to the top of voters' ballots. The voter whose change results in B being ranked over A is the pivotal voter for B over A.

Say there are three choices for society, call them A, B, and C. Suppose first that everyone prefers option B the least. That is, everyone prefers every other option to B. By unanimity, society must prefer every option to B. Specifically, society prefers A and C to B. Call this situation Profile 0.

On the other hand, if everyone preferred B to everything else, then society would have to prefer B to everything else by unanimity. Now arrange all the voters in some arbitrary but fixed order, and for each i let Profile i be the same as Profile 0, but move B to the top of the ballots for voters 1 through i. So Profile 1 has B at the top of the ballot for voter 1, but not for any of the others. Profile 2 has B at the top for voters 1 and 2, but no others, and so on.

Since B eventually moves to the top of the societal preference, there must be some profile, number k, for which B moves above A in the societal rank. We call the voter whose ballot change causes this to happen the pivotal voter for B over A. Note that the pivotal voter for B over A is not, a priori, the same as the pivotal voter for A over B. In Part Three of the proof we will show that these do turn out to be the same.

Also note that by IIA the same argument applies if Profile 0 is any profile in which A is ranked above B by every voter, and the pivotal voter for B over A will still be voter k. We will use this observation below.

Part Two: The pivotal voter for B over A is a dictator for B over C[edit]

In this part of the argument we refer to voter k, the pivotal voter for B over A, as Pivotal Voter for simplicity. We will show that Pivotal Voter dictates society's decision for B over C. That is, we show that no matter how the rest of society votes, if Pivotal Voter ranks B over C, then that is the societal outcome. Note again that the dictator for B over C is not a priori the same as that for C over B. In Part Three of the proof we will see that these turn out to be the same too.

In the following, we call voters 1 through k-1 "Segment One", and voters k+1 through N "Segment Two". To begin, suppose that the ballots are as follows:

Part Two: Switching A and B on the ballot of voter k causes the same switch to the societal outcome, by Part One of the argument. Making any or all of the indicated switches to the other ballots has no effect on the outcome.
  • Every voter in Segment One ranks B above C and C above A.
  • Pivotal Voter ranks A above B and B above C.
  • Every voter in Segment Two ranks A above B and B above C.

Then by the argument in Part One (and the last observation in that part), the societal outcome must rank A above B. This is because, except for a repositioning of C, this profile is the same as Profile k-1 from Part One. Furthermore, by unanimity the societal outcome must rank B above C. Therefore we know the outcome in this case completely.

Now suppose that Pivotal Voter moves B above A, but keeps C in the same position and imagine that any number (or all!) of the other voters change their ballots to move C above B, without changing the position of A. Then aside from a repositioning of C this is the same as Profile k from Part One and hence the societal outcome ranks B above A. Furthermore, by IIA the societal outcome must rank A above C, as in the previous case. In particular, the societal outcome ranks B above C, even though Pivotal Voter may have been the only voter to rank B above C. By IIA this conclusion holds independently of how A is positioned on the ballots, so Pivotal Voter is a dictator for B over C.

Part Three: There can be at most one dictator[edit]

Part Three: Since voter k is the dictator for B over C, the pivotal voter for B over C must appear among the first k voters. That is, outside of Segment Two. Likewise, the pivotal voter for C over B must appear among voters k through N. That is, outside of Segment One.

In this part of the argument we refer back to the original ordering of voters, and compare the positions of the different pivotal voters (identified by applying Parts One and Two to the other pairs of candidates). First, the pivotal voter for B over C must appear earlier (or at the same position) in the line than the dictator for B over C: As we consider the argument of Part One applied to B and C, successively moving B to the top of voters' ballots, the pivot point where society ranks B above C must come at or before we reach the dictator for B over C. Likewise, reversing the roles of B and C, the pivotal voter for C over B must at or later in line than the dictator for B over C. In short, if kX/Y denotes the position of the pivotal voter for X over Y (for any two candidates X and Y), then we have shown

kB/C ≤ kB/AkC/B.

Now repeating the entire argument above with B and C switched, we also have


Therefore we have

kB/C = kB/A = kC/B

and the same argument for other pairs shows that all the pivotal voters (and hence all the dictators) occur at the same position in the list of voters. This voter is the dictator for the whole election.

Interpretations of the theorem[edit]



  • 1 vote for A > B > C
  • 1 vote for B > C > A
  • 1 vote for C > A > B




Other possibilities[edit]

In an attempt to escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow's theorem, social choice theorists have investigated various possibilities ("ways out"). These investigations can be divided into the following two:

  • those investigating functions whose domain, like that of Arrow's social welfare functions, consists of profiles of preferences;
  • those investigating other kinds of rules.

Approaches investigating functions of preference profiles[edit]

This section includes approaches that deal with

  • aggregation rules (functions that map each preference profile into a social preference), and
  • other functions, such as functions that map each preference profile into an alternative.

Since these two approaches often overlap, we discuss them at the same time. What is characteristic of these approaches is that they investigate various possibilities by eliminating or weakening or replacing one or more conditions (criteria) that Arrow imposed.

Infinitely many individuals[edit]

Several theorists (e.g., Kirman and Sondermann, 1972[11]) point out that when one drops the assumption that there are only finitely many individuals, one can find aggregation rules that satisfy all of Arrow's other conditions.

However, such aggregation rules are practically of limited interest, since they are based on ultrafilters, highly nonconstructive mathematical objects. In particular, Kirman and Sondermann argue that there is an "invisible dictator" behind such a rule. Mihara (1997,[12] 1999[13]) shows that such a rule violates algorithmic computability.[14] These results can be seen to establish the robustness of Arrow's theorem.[16]

Limiting the number of alternatives[edit]

When there are only two alternatives to choose from, May's theorem shows that only simple majority rule satisfies a certain set of criteria (e.g., equal treatment of individuals and of alternatives; increased support for a winning alternative should not make it into a losing one). On the other hand, when there are at least three alternatives, Arrow's theorem points out the difficulty of collective decision making. Why is there such a sharp difference between the case of less than three alternatives and that of at least three alternatives?

Nakamura's theorem (about the core of simple games) gives an answer more generally. It establishes that if the number of alternatives is less than a certain integer called the Nakamura number, then the rule in question will identify "best" alternatives without any problem; if the number of alternatives is greater or equal to the Nakamura number, then the rule will not always work, since for some profile a voting paradox (a cycle such as alternative A socially preferred to alternative B, B to C, and C to A) will arise. Since the Nakamura number of majority rule is 3 (except the case of four individuals), one can conclude from Nakamura's theorem that majority rule can deal with up to two alternatives rationally. Some super-majority rules (such as those requiring 2/3 of the votes) can have a Nakamura number greater than 3, but such rules violate other conditions given by Arrow.[17]

Remark. A common way "around" Arrow's paradox is limiting the alternative set to two alternatives. Thus, whenever more than two alternatives should be put to the test, it seems very tempting to use a mechanism that pairs them and votes by pairs. As tempting as this mechanism seems at first glance, it is generally far from satisfying even Pareto efficiency, not to mention IIA. The specific order by which the pairs are decided strongly influences the outcome. This is not necessarily a bad feature of the mechanism. Many sports use the tournament mechanism—essentially a pairing mechanism—to choose a winner. This gives considerable opportunity for weaker teams to win, thus adding interest and tension throughout the tournament. This means that the person controlling the order by which the choices are paired (the agenda maker) has great control over the outcome. In any case, when viewing the entire voting process as one game, Arrow's theorem still applies.

Domain restrictions[edit]

Another approach is relaxing the universality condition, which means restricting the domain of aggregation rules. The best-known result along this line assumes "single peaked" preferences.

Duncan Black has shown that if there is only one dimension on which every individual has a "single-peaked" preference, then all of Arrow's conditions are met by majority rule. Suppose that there is some predetermined linear ordering of the alternative set. An individual's preference is single-peaked with respect to this ordering if he has some special place that he likes best along that line, and his dislike for an alternative grows larger as the alternative goes further away from that spot (i.e., the graph of his utility function has a single peak if alternatives are placed according to the linear ordering on the horizontal axis). For example, if voters were voting on where to set the volume for music, it would be reasonable to assume that each voter had their own ideal volume preference and that as the volume got progressively too loud or too quiet they would be increasingly dissatisfied. If the domain is restricted to profiles in which every individual has a single peaked preference with respect to the linear ordering, then simple ([9]) aggregation rules, which includes majority rule, have an acyclic (defined below) social preference, hence "best" alternatives.[18] In particular, when there are odd number of individuals, then the social preference becomes transitive, and the socially "best" alternative is equal to the median of all the peaks of the individuals (Black's median voter theorem[19]). Under single-peaked preferences, the majority rule is in some respects the most natural voting mechanism.

One can define the notion of "single-peaked" preferences on higher-dimensional sets of alternatives. However, one can identify the "median" of the peaks only in exceptional cases. Instead, we typically have the destructive situation suggested by McKelvey's Chaos Theorem (1976):[20] for any x and y, one can find a sequence of alternatives such that x is beaten by x_1 by a majority, x_1 by x_2, \ldots, x_k by y.

Relaxing transitivity[edit]

By relaxing the transitivity of social preferences, we can find aggregation rules that satisfy Arrow's other conditions. If we impose neutrality (equal treatment of alternatives) on such rules, however, there exists an individual who has a "veto". So the possibility provided by this approach is also very limited.

First, suppose that a social preference is quasi-transitive (instead of transitive); this means that the strict preference \succ ("better than") is transitive: if x \succ y and y \succ z, then x \succ z. Then, there do exist non-dictatorial aggregation rules satisfying Arrow's conditions, but such rules are oligarchic (Gibbard, 1969). This means that there exists a coalition L such that L is decisive (if every member in L prefers x to y, then the society prefers x to y), and each member in L has a veto (if she prefers x to y, then the society cannot prefer y to x).

Second, suppose that a social preference is acyclic (instead of transitive): there does not exist alternatives x_1, \ldots, x_k that form a cycle (x_1 \succ x_2, x_2 \succ x_3, \ldots, x_{k-1} \succ x_k, x_k \succ x_1). Then, provided that there are at least as many alternatives as individuals, an aggregation rule satisfying Arrow's other conditions is collegial (Brown, 1975[21]). This means that there are individuals who belong to the intersection ("collegium") of all decisive coalitions. If there is someone who has a veto, then he belongs to the collegium. If the rule is assumed to be neutral, then it does have someone who has a veto.[9]

Finally, Brown's theorem left open the case of acyclic social preferences where the number of alternatives is less than the number of individuals. One can give a definite answer for that case using the Nakamura number. See #Limiting the number of alternatives.

Relaxing IIA[edit]

There are numerous examples of aggregation rules satisfying Arrow's conditions except IIA. The Borda rule is one of them. These rules, however, are susceptible to strategic manipulation by individuals (Blair and Muller, 1983[22]).

See also Interpretations of the theorem above.

Relaxing the Pareto criterion[edit]

Wilson (1972) shows that if an aggregation rule is non-imposed and non-null, then there is either a dictator or an inverse dictator, provided that Arrow's conditions other than Pareto are also satisfied. Here, an inverse dictator is an individual i such that whenever i prefers x to y, then the society prefers y to x.

Remark. Amartya Sen offered both relaxation of transitivity and removal of the Pareto principle.[23] He demonstrated another interesting impossibility result, known as the "impossibility of the Paretian Liberal". (See liberal paradox for details). Sen went on to argue that this demonstrates the futility of demanding Pareto optimality in relation to voting mechanisms.

Social choice instead of social preference[edit]

In social decision making, to rank all alternatives is not usually a goal. It often suffices to find some alternative. The approach focusing on choosing an alternative investigates either social choice functions (functions that map each preference profile into an alternative) or social choice rules (functions that map each preference profile into a subset of alternatives).

As for social choice functions, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is well-known, which states that if a social choice function whose range contains at least three alternatives is strategy-proof, then it is dictatorial.

As for social choice rules, we should assume there is a social preference behind them. That is, we should regard a rule as choosing the maximal elements ("best" alternatives) of some social preference. The set of maximal elements of a social preference is called the core. Conditions for existence of an alternative in the core have been investigated in two approaches. The first approach assumes that preferences are at least acyclic (which is necessary and sufficient for the preferences to have a maximal element on any finite subset). For this reason, it is closely related to #Relaxing transitivity. The second approach drops the assumption of acyclic preferences. Kumabe and Mihara (2011[24]) adopt this approach. They make a more direct assumption that individual preferences have maximal elements, and examine conditions for the social preference to have a maximal element. See Nakamura number for details of these two approaches.

Rated voting systems and other approaches[edit]

Arrow's framework assumes that individual and social preferences are "orderings" (i.e., satisfy completeness and transitivity) on the set of alternatives. This means that if the preferences are represented by a utility function, its value is an ordinal utility in the sense that it is meaningful so far as the greater value indicates the better alternative. For instance, having ordinal utilities of 4, 3, 2, 1 for alternatives a, b, c, d, respectively, is the same as having 1000, 100.01, 100, 0, which in turn is the same as having 99, 98, 1, .997. They all represent the ordering in which a is preferred to b to c to d. The assumption of ordinal preferences, which precludes interpersonal comparisons of utility, is an integral part of Arrow's theorem.

For various reasons, an approach based on cardinal utility, where the utility has a meaning beyond just giving a ranking of alternatives, is not common in contemporary economics. However, once one adopts that approach, one can take intensities of preferences into consideration, or one can compare (i) gains and losses of utility or (ii) levels of utility, across different individuals. In particular, Harsanyi (1955) gives a justification of utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives in terms of the sum of individual utilities), originating from Jeremy Bentham. Hammond (1976) gives a justification of the maximin principle (which evaluates alternatives in terms of the utility of the worst-off individual), originating from John Rawls.

Not all voting methods use, as input, only an ordering of all candidates.[25] Methods which don't, often called "rated" or "cardinal" (as opposed to "ranked", "ordinal", or "preferential") voting systems, can be viewed as using information that only cardinal utility can convey. In that case, it is not surprising if some of them satisfy all of Arrow's conditions that are reformulated.[26] Range voting is such a method.[27][28] Whether such a claim is correct depends on how each condition is reformulated. [30] Other rated voting systems which pass certain generalizations of Arrow's criteria include Approval voting and Majority Judgment. Note that although Arrow's theorem does not apply to such methods, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem still does: no system is fully strategy-free, so the informal dictum that "no voting system is perfect" still has a mathematical basis.

Finally, though not an approach investigating some kind of rules, there is a criticism by James M. Buchanan and others. It argues that it is silly to think that there might be social preferences that are analogous to individual preferences. Arrow (1963, Chapter 8) answers this sort of criticism seen in the early period, which come at least partly from misunderstanding.

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Arrow, K.J., "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", Journal of Political Economy 58(4) (August, 1950), pp. 328–346.
  2. ^ Interview with Dr. Kenneth Arrow: "CES: Now, you mention that your theorem applies to preferential systems or ranking systems. Dr. Arrow: Yes CES: But the system that you’re just referring to, Approval Voting, falls within a class called cardinal systems. So not within ranking systems. Dr. Arrow: And as I said, that in effect implies more information.
  3. ^ "Modern economic theory has insisted on the ordinal concept of utility; that is, only orderings can be observed, and therefore no measurement of utility independent of these orderings has any significance. In the field of consumer's demand theory the ordinalist position turned out to create no problems; cardinal utility had no explanatory power above and beyond ordinal. Leibniz' Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernables demanded then the excision of cardinal utility from our thought patterns." Arrow (1967), as quoted on p. 33 by Racnchetti, Fabio (2002), "Choice without utility? Some reflections on the loose foundations of standard consumer theory", in Bianchi, Marina, The Active Consumer: Novelty and Surprise in Consumer Choice, Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy 20, Routledge, pp. 21–45 .
  4. ^ a b Suzumura, Kōtarō; Arrow, Kenneth Joseph; Sen, Amartya Kumar (2002). Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol 1. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-444-82914-6. 
  5. ^ Suzumura, 2002,[4] Introduction, page 10.
  6. ^ Note that by definition, a social welfare function as defined here satisfies the Unrestricted domain condition. Restricting the range to the social preferences that are never indifferent between distinct outcomes is probably a very restrictive assumption, but the goal here is to give a simple statement of the theorem. Even if the restriction is relaxed, the impossibility result will persist.
  7. ^ Three Brief Proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
  8. ^ Yu, Ning Neil (2012) A One-shot Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
  9. ^ a b c d Austen-Smith, David; Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999). Positive political theory I: Collective preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-08721-1. 
  10. ^ This does not mean various normative criteria will be satisfied if we use equilibrium concepts in game theory. Indeed, the mapping from profiles to equilibrium outcomes defines a social choice rule, whose performance can be investigated by social choice theory. See Austen-Smith and Banks (1999[9]), Section 7.2.
  11. ^ Kirman, A.; Sondermann, D. (1972). "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators". Journal of Economic Theory 5: 267. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90106-8.  edit
  12. ^ Mihara, H. R. (1997). "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability". Economic Theory 10 (2): 257–276. doi:10.1007/s001990050157Reprinted in K. V. Velupillai , S. Zambelli, and S. Kinsella, ed., Computable Economics, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Edward Elgar, 2011.  edit
  13. ^ Mihara, H. R. (1999). "Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators". Journal of Mathematical Economics 32: 267–277. doi:10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00061-5.  edit
  14. ^ Mihara's definition of a computable aggregation rule is based on computability of a simple game (see Rice's theorem).
  15. ^ Taylor, Alan D. (2005). Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-00883-2. 
  16. ^ See Taylor (2005,[15] Chapter 6) for a concise discussion of social choice for infinite societies.
  17. ^ Austen-Smith and Banks (1999,[9] Chapter 3) gives a detailed discussion of the approach trying to limit the number of alternatives.
  18. ^ Indeed, many different social welfare functions can meet Arrow's conditions under such restrictions of the domain. It has been proved, however, that under any such restriction, if there exists any social welfare function that adheres to Arrow's criteria, then the majority rule will adhere to Arrow's criteria. See Campbell, D. E.; Kelly, J. S. (2000). "A simple characterization of majority rule". Economic Theory 15 (3): 689–700. doi:10.1007/s001990050318. 
  19. ^ Black, Duncan (1968). The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. ISBN 0-89838-189-4. 
  20. ^ McKelvey, R. (1976). "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control". Journal of Economic Theory 12 (3): 472–482. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5.  edit
  21. ^ Brown, D. J. (1975). "Aggregation of Preferences". Quarterly Journal of Economics 89 (3): 456–469. JSTOR 1885263. 
  22. ^ Blair, D. (1983). "Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences*1". Journal of Economic Theory 30: 34–00. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90092-3.  edit
  23. ^ Sen, Amartya (1979). "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics". Economic Journal 89 (355): 537–588. JSTOR 2231867. 
  24. ^ Kumabe, M.; Mihara, H. R. (2011). "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction". Games and Economic Behavior 72: 187–201. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.008.  edit
  25. ^ It is sometimes asserted that such methods may trivially fail the universality criterion. However, it is more appropriate to consider that such methods fail Arrow's definition of an aggregation rule (or that of a function whose domain consists of preference profiles), if preference orderings cannot uniquely translate into a ballot.
  26. ^ However, a modified version of Arrow's theorem may still apply to such methods (e.g., Brams and Fishburn, 2002,[4] Chapter 4, Theorem 4.2).
  27. ^ Warren D. Smith, et al. "How can range voting accomplish the impossible?". 
  28. ^ New Scientist 12 April 2008 pages 30-33
  29. ^ Sen, Amartya Kumar (1979). Collective choice and social welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland. ISBN 978-0-444-85127-7. 
  30. ^ No voting method that nontrivially uses cardinal utility satisfies Arrow's IIA (in which preference profiles are replaced by lists of ballots or lists of utilities). For this reason, a weakened notion of IIA is proposed (e.g., Sen, 1979,[29] page 129). The notion requires that the social ranking of two alternatives depend only on the levels of utility attained by individuals at the two alternatives. (More formally, a social welfare functional F is a function that maps each list u=(u_1, \ldots, u_n) of utility functions into a social preference. F satisfies IIA (for social welfare functionals) if for all lists u, u' and for all alternatives x, y, if u_i(x)=u'_i(x) and u_i(y)=u'_i(y) for all i, then xF(u)y \text{ iff } xF(u')y.) Many cardinal voting methods (including Range voting) satisfy the weakened version of IIA.


  • Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S. (2002) Impossibility theorems in the Arrovian framework, in Handbook of social choice and welfare (ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen and Kotaro Suzumura), volume 1, pages 35–94, Elsevier. Surveys many of approaches discussed in #Approaches investigating functions of preference profiles.
  • Sen, A. K. (1979) “Personal utilities and public judgements: or what's wrong with welfare economics?” The Economic Journal, 89, 537-558, arguing that Arrow's theorem was wrong because it did not incorporate non-utility information and the utility information it did allow was impoverished
  • Yu, Ning Neil (2012) A one-shot proof of Arrow's theorem. Economic Theory, volume 50, issue 2, pages 523-525, Springer.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. The Journal of Political Economy (1950): 328-346.

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