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Re: S-Weekly For COMMENT- U.S. Human Intelligence, Liaison Relationships and Pakistan

Released on 2012-10-18 17:00 GMT

Email-ID 1815323
Date 2011-05-24 23:31:32
Nice job, a few comments below in green.


From: "Sean Noonan" <>
To: "Analyst List" <>
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 4:29:44 PM
Subject: S-Weekly For COMMENT- U.S. Human Intelligence, Liaison
Relationships and Pakistan

*Thanks to Nate and others who commented on the discussion. I've nailed
this down a lot more. Please make specific changes to the text as much as
you can, I'm pretty open to them.

U.S. Human Intelligence, Liaison Relationships and Pakistan

Since US Special Operations Forces raid crossed the border from
Afghanistan and headed to Abbottabad, Pakistan May 2, [LINK:]
there have been many media stories, leaks and discussions over how exactly
Osama bin Laden was killed. Officials from the United States and Pakistan
have squared off over the breach of Pakistani air space and the possible
hiding of bin Laden. In the midst of all this discussion, almost ten
years of intelligence development, recruiting and operations in the hunt
for bin Laden has been largely ignored.

While a cross-border raid deep into Pakistan no doubt was an extremely
challenging operation, the work to find that target- one person in a
country of 170 million full of multiple insurgent groups and a population
hostile to American activities may have been the greater challenge.
Conversely, the challenge of hiding the worlda**s most wanted man from the
best funded intelligence community created a clandestine competition,
potentially between intelligence services, that will remain classified for

Dissecting the intelligence challenge of finding bin Laden is difficult,
particularly because of its sensitivity and the possibility that much of
the public information could be disinformation to disguise sources and
methods. But from open source reporting and STRATFOR sources we can make
a few points that lead to some key questions.

The US Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, made it a mission to
capture or kill Osama bin Laden after a Sept. 17 Presidential finding
signed by George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks. By 2005 it
became clear that <bin Laden was deep inside Pakistan> [LINK:]. In order
to find him, US intelligence would have to work both with and against
Pakistani intelligence services.

Finding bin Laden represents the human intelligence challenge that the US
faced, while its adversaries attempted to protect him. While STRATFOR
maintains he was tactically irrelevant, [LINK:],
he was symbolically important [LINK:],
and served as a high profile focus for US intelligence officers. As a
result, public information on his case can illuminate the capabilities
that will be used to find other high-value targets [LINK:].
It seems the US intelligence community has passed the test, after a
decade, but ita**s not over.

The official story on Bin Laden- a reflection of US intelligence

The official story on the intelligence that led bin Ladena**s Abbottabad
compound has been told in numerous media reports, leaked from current and
former US officials. It focuses on a man with the cover name Abu Ahmed
Al-Kuwaiti, a Pakistani Pashtun born in Kuwait, who became bin Ladena**s
most trusted courier. The courier and his brother were the other two men
living in bin Ladena**s compound, and reportedly purchased the property
and had it built. With fluency in Pashto and Arabic he would be invaluable
to the Al-Qaeda organization and his status as reportedly bin Ladena**s
most trusted courier made him a key linchpin in disrupting the
organization. This man supposedly led [I think you are missing a word
here - like "U.S. intellligence officers" or something along those
lines] to bin Laden, but it was not until after a decade of revamping US
intelligence capabilities.

The first step for US intelligence services after Busha**s finding was
focusing its efforts on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda leadership, which had
already been ongoing but became the number one priority. Due to a lack of
human intelligence in the region, and allies for an invasion in
Afghanistan, the CIA reinvigorated connections with militant groups in
Afghanistan and Pakistana**s ISI in order to both oust the Taliban
government and provide intelligence for disrupting Al-Qaeda. The
connections were built in the 1980s as the CIA famously worked through the
ISI to fund militant groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet military.
Some of these links were lost, and others were maintained after 1989,
particularly after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings. While the US
Intelligence Community was looking for bin Laden at that time, it was not
a priority and its human intelligence capabilities were limited.

Intelligence budgets were severely cut during the 1990s peace dividend, as
some congressman argued there was no one left to fight after the Soviet
Union. Intelligence collection was a dirty ambiguous and dangerous game
that US politicians were not prepared to stomach. The Director of the CIA
from 1995 to 1996, Robert Deutch gutted the CIAa**s sources on what was
known as the a**Torricelli Principlea**- taking any unsavoury characters
off of the payroll. While the US has always had trouble with human
intelligence- clean-cut, white males at computers were less of a security
risk than risk-taking operatives in the field- by the end of the 1990s the
US relied on technological platforms for intelligence more than ever.

The US was in this state on September 12, 2001, when it began to ramp up
its abilities, and Al-Qaeda was aware of this. Bin Laden knew if he could
would be much harder to track. After invading AFghanistan, and work with
the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate in Pakistan, the US had a
large number of detainees that it hoped would have information to breach
bin Ladena**s operational security methods. From some mix of detainees
caught in operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan (particularly with the
help of the ISI), including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad [LINK:]
and Abu Faraj al-Libi [LINK:--], came information leading to an important
bin Laden courier, known by various names including Abu Ahmed Al-Kuwaiti
(his actual ID is still unconfirmed, maybe Sheikh Abu Ahmed).

The efficacy of enhanced interrogation and torture techniques will be
constantly debated, [LINK:]-
they may have helped or they may have obfuscated the couriera**s identity,
as some reports say KSM tried to lead investigators away from him. What is
clear is that US intelligence lacked the sophisticated and nuanced
understanding of Al-Qaeda, and most importantly human sources with access
to that information. Not knowing what Al-Qaeda was capable of, the fear
of a follow-on to the 9/11 attack loomed large.

Anonymous US intelligence officials told Reuters the breakthrough came
with man named Hassan Ghul, captured in Iraq in 2004 by Kurdish forces.
Little is known about Ghula**s identity except that he was believed to be
working with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi [LINK:---] and gave interrogators
information about a man called a**Al-Kuwaitia** who was a courier between
Zarqawi and Abu Zubaydah [LINK:--]. Ghul was given over to the Pakistani
security services, and believed to have been released in 2007 and now
fighting somewhere in the region.

While US intelligence services got confirmation of Abu Ahmeda**s role from
Abu Faraj Al-Libi, they could not find the courier. It is unknown if they
Again, according to leaks from US officials to AP, in 2010 the National
Security Agency, the main [U.S.] communications interception agency,
intercepted a call of Abu Ahmeda**s and began tracking him in Pakistan.
Another US official told CNN that the operational security exercised by
Abu Ahmed and his brother made them difficult to a**traila** but a**an
elaborate surveillance efforta** was organized to track them to the
Abbottabad compound.

From then on, the NSA monitored all of the couriers and their family
members cell phonesa**though they were often turned off and had batteries
removed when going to the compound or other important meetings. And we
can presume that the compound was monitored from the air, according to one
media report [FC], the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) built
a replica of the compound for the Director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, and
other officials. The NGA is the USa**s premier satellite observation
agency, which could have watched the goings-on at the compound, and even
spotted bin Laden though it would have been difficult to confirm his

Some of these leaks could be disingenuous in order to lead the public, and
more importantly adversary intelligence agencies, away from highly
classified sources and methods. But it does reflect long believed
assessments of the US intelligence communitya**its advanced capability in
technology-based intelligence such as satellite observation or telephone
intercepts, but challenges in human intelligence collection.

The utility and challenges of liaison relationships

Historically US intelligence officers are white males, though the CIA has
more recently driven to hire more minorities, including from various
that can pass background checks, a substantial barrier). Even when an
intelligence officer looks the part in the country she or he is operating
in, and has native understanding of the culture and language, and has
passed a background check, they need sources within the organizations they
are trying to penetrate. It is thus intelligence agents (recruits of the
officers who have no official, even secret, status) who provide
information required back at headquarters. The less one appears like a
local, the more difficult it is to meet with and develop those agents,
which has led the US to often depend on liaison services- local
intelligence services- in order to collect information.

Many intelligence services around the world were established with American
support or funding for just this purpose. The most dependent liaison
services essentially function as sources, acquiring information at the
local CIA stationa**s request. They are often long-serving officers in
the local countrya**s military, police or intelligence services, with a
nuanced understanding of local issues and the ability to maintain a
network of sources. With independent intelligence services, such as the
Israeli Mossad in the past, there is a roughly equal exchange of
intelligence, where Israeli sources may have recruited a human source
valuable to the US, and the CIA may have satellite imagery or
communications intercepts valuable to the Israelis.

Of course this is not a simple game, it involves sophisticated players
trying to collect intelligence while deceiving one another as to their
intentions and plans. Even the closest intelligence relationships, such
as that between the CIA and the UKa**s Secret Intelligence Service, have
been disrupted by moles like <Kim Philby> [LINK:], a long-time
Soviet plant who handled the liaison work between the two agencies.

As most intelligence officers serve on rotations of only one to three
years- out of concerns they will a**go nativea** or to allow them to
return to the comfort of home- it becomes even more challenging to develop
long-term human intelligence sources. While intelligence officers will
pass their sources off to their replacement, the liaision service becomes
even more valuable in being able to sustain source relationships, which
can take years to build. Liaision relationships, then, become a way to
efficiently use and extend US intelligence resources, which unlike most
countries have global requirements. As the global superpowers, ita**s
nearly impossible to maintain sources everywhere.

Liaison relationships and unilateral operations to hunt bin Laden

In recent history, work with the ISI has been notable in raids throughout
Pakistan on senior Al-Qaeda operatives like KSM and al-Libi. We can also
presume much of the information used for UAV strikes comes through sources
of Pakistani intelligence. Another example is the CIAa**s work with the
Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, also to find bin Laden, that
went awry in the Khost suicide attack [LINK:---]. And that is the risk
with liaison relationships- how much can one intelligence officer trust
anothera**s sources and motives. Nevertheless, these liaison networks
were the best the US had available, and huge amounts of resources were put
into developing intelligence through them in looking for major jihadists,
including bin Laden.

The US is particularly concerned about Pakistana**s intelligence services-
least sympathetic to, jihadists. Given the relationships with jihadists
maintained by former ISI officers such as Khalid Khawaja, Sultan Amir
Tarar (known as Colonel Imam) who were both held hostage and killed by
Pakistani militants, and most famously former director Hamid Gul, there is
cause for concern. While those former officers have little influence
within the ISI today, the question is whether there are others within the
ISI who have similar sympathies. In fact, it was liaison work with the
CIA and Saudi Arabia that helped to develop strong connections with Arab
and Afghan militants some of which would go on to become Al Qaeda and the
Taliban. The ISI was responsible for distributing the US- and
Saudi-supplied weapons to the various Afghan militant groups with weapons
to fight the Russians in the 1980s, and controlled contact with the
groups. If some of those contacts still remain, jihadists could be using
members of the ISI rather than the ISI using them.

Due to concerns like this, US intelligence officers never told their
Pakistani liaison about the forthcoming bin Laden raid, at least,
according to official and leaked statements. It appears the CIA developed
a unilateral capability to operate within Pakistan, demonstrated by the
Raymond Davis shooting and the bin Laden raid. Davis was providing
security for US intelligence officers working in Pakistan. The requests
by Pakistani officials to remove over 300 similar individuals from the
country show that there are a large number of US intelligence operatives
in Pakistan. And finally, the tracking of bin Laden, further confirmation
of his identity, and the leaked information that the CIA maintained a
safehouse in Abbottabad to monitor the compound for months shows there was
a large unilateral collection effort.

The CIA and the ISI

Even with liaison relationships, such as meetings between the CIA station
chief in Islamabad and senior members of the ISI, foreign intelligence
services run unilateral operations on the ground. This is where they are
in direct competition with counterintelligence services of the host
country- these may be a different organization, such as the FBI, or a
separate department within the liaison service. The counterintelligence
officers may want to disrupt any intelligence operations- such as
collecting information on their military, but may also simply monitor
their efforts, such as recruiting jihadists, and can also feed
disinformation to the foreign intelligence agency. This competition is
known to all players, and is not out of the ordinary.

But the US intelligence community is wondering if this was taken to
another levela**if the ISI, or elements of it, were protecting bin Laden.
The question of who was helping bin Laden, as well as other Al Qaeda
operatives and contacts, in Abbottabad [LINK:]
would explain who the CIA was competing against- simply the jihadists, or
a more resourceful and capable state intelligence agency. If the ISI as
an institution knew about bin Ladena**s location, it would mean they
mean that no ISI officers who knew his locations were turned by US
intelligence, no communications were intercepted, and no leaks reached the

On the other hand, if someone within the ISI was protecting bin Laden, and
beat internally and the CIA eventually caught up, by developing its own
sources, and found bin Laden on their own. But we must caveat to say the
official story on bin Laden intelligence may be disinformation to protect
sources and methods. Still, this seems a more plausible scenario as both
American and Pakistani sources[CAN I SAY THIS?] told STRATFOR that there
are likely to be jihadists sympathizers within the ISI who helped bin
bin Laden-inspired groups like the TTP, the top level administration has
no interest in protecting them. Furthermore, finding an individual
anywhere, especially a foreign country with multiple insurgencies, is an
extremely difficult intelligence challenge. [LINK:]

Assuming the official story is mostly true, the bin Laden raid
demonstrates that US intelligence has come full circle since the end of
the cold war. It was able to successfully collect and analyze
intelligence of all typesa**most importantly developing on-the-ground
capabilities it was lackinga**to find and individual who was hiding and
likely protected. It was able to quickly work with special operations
forces, under CIA command, to carry out an operation to capture or kill
him. The US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has developed its own
capabilities for capture and kill missions in Iraq and Afghanistan [LINK:].
When it comes to Pakistan, the CIA is responsible for the missions, where
similar to JSOC, it has developed efficient and devastating capability to
task UAV strikes and even cross-border raids- where the bin Laden raid was
the final proof of concept.

Ita**s unclear how exactly the US intelligence community has developed
better capabilities, beyond a huge influx of resources and hiring
post-2001 (and throwing resources at a problem is neer a complete
solution). Whatever the specific human intelligence capabilities may be,
it is no doubt some function of the new recruits gaining the experience
needed for these types of intelligence coups. The United States faced
September 11, 2001 without strategic warning of the attacks inspired by
bin Laden, and then was faced with a tactical threat it was unprepared to

The combination of technological resources, like those from the NSA and
NGA, combined with operations on the ground to track bin Laden show
evidence of US intelligence capabilities developed in the decade since
2001. Human intelligence is probably still the biggest weakness, but
given the evidence of unilateral operations in Pakitan, it has clearly
been expanded.

The ongoing and forthcoming intelligence battle between the US and

The competition between various intelligence agencies, and their
cooperation, does not end with the death of Osama bin Laden. The public
nature of the operation has led for calls within Pakistan to eject any and
all American interests within the country. In the past few years,
Pakistan has made it difficult for many Americans to get visas-
specifically those working under official status that may be cover for
intelligence operations. Raymond Davis [LINK:--] was one security officer
who faced this problem, and was also involved in protecting intelligence
officers conducting human intelligence missions.

The Interior Ministry announced May 19 placed a ban on foreign
diplomatsa** travel to cities outside where they are stationed without
permission from Pakistani authorities. May 20 reports in The News, a
Pakistani daily, said that Interior Minister Rehman Malik chaired a
meeting with provincial authorities on regulating foreigner travel,
approving (or not) their entry into the country, and monitoring
unregistered mobile phones. While some of these efforts are to deal with
jihadists- disguised within large groups of Afghan nationals- this also
places barriers on foreign intelligence officers in the country. While
non-official cover becoming for common CIA officers overseas, many are
still on various diplomatic documents, and thus require these approvals.

This dynamic will only continue, with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary,
Salman Bashir, telling the Wall Street Journal May 6 that any similar
raids would have a**terrible consequences,a** while US President Barack
Obama told BBC May 22 that he would authorize similar strikes in the
future, if they were called for. Pakistan, as should be expected by any
sovereign country, is trying to protect its territory, while the US will
continue to no doubt search for high value targets who are hiding there.
The bin Laden operation only brought these clandestine competition to the
public eye.

With the bin Laden mission a proof concept, the question is where the
United States will go after high-value targets next- places such as
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, while continuing operations in Iraq and


Sean Noonan

Tactical Analyst

Office: +1 512-279-9479

Mobile: +1 512-758-5967

Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

Ryan Abbey
Tactical Intern