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The Limits of Spontaneity in Tunisia and Egypt

Although I have resisted writing about the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt on this blog, despite following them closely, I finally feel like I need to post something.  Like many of my fellow bloggers and readers, I have been excitedly following these popular insurgencies.  My misgivings about writing an analysis are generally a product of my contradictory feelings about these spontaneous and mass rebellions; I want to address these misgivings here.

On the one hand I cannot help but feel impressed and excited by the spectre of popular power.  When the masses take the streets, after all, the limits of the state are exposed: we are shown that it is not the government apparatus and its special armed bodies, nor the market and its reified forces, that allow society to function; we are forced to admit that society is determined by the masses, and these masses greatly outnumber the ruling classes and their security forces.

On the other hand, I also cannot help but feel the pessimism that results from a proper historical and scientific analysis of spontaneity.  No spontaneous uprising has succeeded without an organizational structure, however broadly understood, to give the authentic revolutionary sentiment of the masses an ideological focus and unity.  I get annoyed with myself for feeling this pessimism, because in most cases I try to resist the knee-jerk reaction to think according to the logic of capitalism/imperialism.  These are the limits of the end of history, socialized into us from birth, and we are taught to accept that there can be no rebellion, no rejection of the current state of affairs.  Thus, I want to believe that these spontaneous explosions of mass revolutionary sentiment will possibly lead to revolution.  I want to see spontaneity topple the state, to result in socialism.

The problem is that I often conflate revolutionary possibility with spontaneity.  This is a common mistake, one that so many of us make in the imperial centres of world capitalism.  When we see hundreds of thousands of people take the street in a short period of time we get over-excited, even in contexts when we should know better.  We prefer the spectacle over the structured mass-line politics: we focus on these supposed insurrections rather than the Peoples Wars of places like Nepal that have led to larger mass movements and have gone farther, ideologically and practically, in revolution than large-scale street demonstrations.

And then there are those of us who desperately want to believe that spontaneity is revolution, regardless of the historical evidence.  Why do we pretend that each spontaneous uprising will succeed against all evidence to the contrary?  No unorganized and unplanned uprising has ever transformed into a revolutionary movement, let alone revolutionary overthrow, and yet so many of us in North America and Europe (yes, this is a very eurocentric phenomenon) desperately want to believe that a revolution can emerge from spectacular spontaneity, that people will self-organize and build radical organizations after the fact, and that revolution will emerge from people suddenly figuring out the correct ideology as they go.  That they will remain in the streets, invent the focus and unity required to transform society, and resist all attempts by other sectors of the ruling classes to co-opt their revolutionary sentiment.

Even the Intifadas failed, and their spontaneous revolutionism was more organized and radical than the spontaneity in Egypt and Tunisia.  And the first Intifada, which was more successful than the second, did have a level of organization missing in its successor––organization betrayed by Fatah and the Oslo Accords.  Because Fatah possessed the structure to control the nascent Intifada organizations, after all, it could take control of them, focus them through its ideology, and use them for its petty bourgeois nationalist aims.

But Egypt and Tunisia are not the Palestinian Intifadas.  At the beginning they possessed the embryonic potential of the Intifadas but they never reached the same level of organization.  And now they are being claimed by other sectors of the ruling classes, and the mainstream international press can actually call ElBaradei, a liberal bourgeois aparatchik, a grass roots activist.  But since when was a Nobel Peace Prize winner––who joins the ranks of notables such as Golda Meir and Henry Kissinger––automatically a grass roots activist?  Since when is a man who shares the same class as Mubarak, separated only by his more liberal sentiments, a revolutionary?  The masses possess revolutionary sentiment but, lacking organization, are open to being organized by other sectors of the ruling class who still possess the resources and structure to take advantage of the unleashed popular power.

This is not to say that these spontaneous explosions of popular power cannot accomplish anything worthwhile.  Although there is always a danger that they can be co-opted by reactionary sectors of the ruling class, they can also be used to liberalize conservative states.  If anything the mass rebellion in Tunisia and Egypt can prove that every reform, everything that humanizes capitalism/imperialism, emerges not because of philanthropic governments or free market forces but because of popular power.  That is, all progressive changes come from some sort of revolutionary movement, however unfocused, on behalf of the people, not handed down from above.  We must always remember, and these explosions help us remember, that everything that ameliorates the standard of living of the masses comes from the actions of the masses and not their exploiters.  For the exploiters, if left unimpeded, would prefer to be Ben Alis and Mubaraks.

But those who argue that spontaneity is the automatic origin of revolution, and that organization will come after the fact, are utopic.  They imagine that the messiness of human social relations will magically cohere into revolutionary order despite the fact that there is no precedent for this belief!  And when you point this out, they argue that just because there is no precedent does not mean it won’t happen.  Fair enough: maybe it will happen, and I always hope that it will––it would certainly be great if capitalism could fall because of mass demonstrations and socialism emerge, mystically, because people are essentially perfect.  But this is a logical fallacy: it’s a bit like arguing that just because we haven’t discovered the sasquatch then we should believe that this is proof of the sasquatch’s existence.  The onus of proof is not on the people who have good reason to not believe in the fable Big Foot, but in the people trying to argue for the Big Foot’s existence.  So maybe spontaneity will work, and I would be super happy if it does, but you cannot argue that it is the basis of revolution when the onus of proof is on you to explain why it will work when judged against historical evidence.

Here in the centres of imperialism we tend to fetishize spontaneity, seeing it as synonymous with grass roots democracy.  We like to imagine that there is no dialectic between spontaneity and discipline and that we do not have to work hard to create deep-seeded structures that will either build towards mass movements or be respected enough to swim amongst the spontaneous upsurges as, to crib from Mao, fish in the sea.  There is a strength to spontaneous uprising, true, but as Fanon warned in The Wretched of the Earth, it also has its limits: it is good because it reveals the power of the masses but, by itself, can never be revolutionary and can easily be betrayed.  And though there will be times when it leaves certain sectors of the ruling class behind, other sectors can step into the void and neutralize its revolutionary potential.  As James Yaki Sayles points out in his gloss of Fanon's analysis of spontaneity:
"The spontaneous action sparks a widespread feeling of solidarity and accomplishment, as the people 'wills itself to sovereignty.' […] However, the enemy launches an all-out offensive (military, political and social), which calls the people's euphoria into question. […] Soon, the 'spontaneous impetuosity' is condemned to self-repudiation… Fanon now points again to the enemy's [infiltration] of spontaneity by taking advantage of the people's ideological and social weaknesses, and asserts that 'the political education of the masses is seen to be a social necessity.'" (Yaki Sayles, 236-237)
So I want to ask why we place all our hopes in those spectacles that, as courageous and important as they are, will at best only lead to reform rather than revolution.  We must support the spontaneous rebellion––I’m not arguing that we shouldn’t––but I am just curious as to why we support these struggles at the expense of those struggles that have actually, with much struggle and hard work, cohered around a revolutionary ideology.  Why does the left in North America and Europe, traditionally naval gazing and exceptionalist, embrace the spontaneism of the Tunisias and Egypts rather than the protracted revolutions––that also do have their spontaneist and chaotic elements––of Nepal or India?  (Even the long involvement of the Booker Prize winner Arundhati Roy in the latter has not, for all her prestige, succeeded in making the radical struggles in India as popular as Tunisia and Egypt became within a couple weeks.)

Is it because we hope that spontaneity will succeed so that we, comfortable in the centres of capitalism, can finally reject every shred of previous historical evidence to properly believe that we do not have to do any serious organizational work?  Or is it because the Egypts and Tunisias fit our eurocentric understanding of proper rebellion: they look like more violent versions of the May 68-ish uprisings always fashionable in Europe, after all.  They fit today’s radical chic vocabulary far better than those scary long marches towards revolutions we would prefer to ignore.  And though in some ways the spontaneous spectacles feed our desire to witness large-scale uprisings––and though we should still celebrate these uprisings––they ultimately reconfirm that capitalism is the end of history, something maybe we're socialized to accept, by failing to go beyond reform.


  1. Very interesting analysis. I especially appreciate the caution against spontaneity being derailed by reactionary forces. The examples of the spontaneous Palestinian Intifadas and the protracted revolutionary struggles of Nepal, and India are helpful.

  2. While I've been following the protests and have been posted some varied analysis of them, I agree with you 100% on this one.

    I was actually just talking about this very thing this morning with a Maoist comrade of mine from the U.S. We both agreed that because of the lack of true revolutionary leadership to give the protests an ideological direction towards socialism and cohesion beyond the initial spontaneous uprising at best they would probably result in reformism (like Mubarak firing his cabinet), or at worst, if it were to actually topple the Mubarak regieme, could end up like another 1979.

  3. Glad you liked it... I've been following the analysis on your site as well, and have enjoyed some of the pieces you've chosen to post. Yeah, at best reformism and at worst... well I don't want to consider the frightening possibilities at this second! But reformism still might mean something for actual material gains, and that is important, I'm just extremely shocked by the leftist desire to automatically name this a socialist overthrow of the state.

  4. I've been kinda waiting on this from you and I share your concerns. I had a conversation about the uprising in Egypt with Comrade Ma the other day. She said she'd been wondering how long it would take the bourgeoisie (foreign and domestic) to pull ElBaradei "out of their ass" and get the daily exploitation back on track. She also mentioned how "odd" it was that there have been no big demos in front of the U.S. embassy seeing how they are Mubarak's biggest supporters next to Israel.

    As much as I (like you) support these upheavals, especially the way they expose the contractions of the imperialists (for instance, look at the acrobatics his 'O'ness has been performing over this coupled with the fits and spasms coming out of Israel), I don't see any revolution in the offing.

    When the dust settles and the effect of the slogans wears off, it will be neo-liberal economics driven by a sorta (that's as "good" as it gets these days)liberal bourgeoisie. They'll be more parties and players to divide the spoils among, and some of the activists may get a piece, but for the vast majority it will be "back to the BS". Hopefully though, there will be more resistance from Egypt about Israel's treatment of the Palestinians; I am curious to see how much influence the MB will wield.

    Or maybe it's the start of something much more profound. In that case, no one will ever exist who will be as happy to be proven wrong as I...well, maybe Ma.



    people here don't actively support what's happening in India or Nepal because people here have been socialized against fighting a revolutionary war. Over here (among a lot of the left) Marxist/Maoist revolutionaries are seen at best as eccentric throwbacks, at worst baby eating homicidal maniacs who want to nationalize everything (even facebook!). The majority of leftists I have run into here want a white-gloved revolution. Violence against the bourgeoisie is just so...violent.

    I guess those of us who want revolutionary change here (and support revolutions "over there") have a lot of "changing the ideas in the heads" to do.

  5. Good to hear from you again RRH... Yeah, it's not like those of us who are cynical for good historical materialist reasons *want* the uprising to fail on the revolutionary front. If things like this become historical flukes and turn into authentic revolutions we would be elated.

    And not that I ever want to be "I told you so" to my elated friends in these contexts, but the counter-revolution has now publicly emerged in Egypt with tens of thousands of pro-Mubarak thugs fighting it out with the anti-Mubarak masses.

    Your point about the US Embassy is a good one, but I think people have also been so angry at their government for so long that they were just directing their anger at the government itself. Again, the lack of organization makes it difficult for masses and masses of angry an spontaneously mobilized people to focus on tactical and strategical targets.

    And yes I have leftist friends who think Nepal is "bad", even though they claim to be marxists, and get all excited by what you call "white-gloved revolutions"... I find that extremely problematic, and I'm saddened by these positions.

  6. What is your opinion however of the recently formed January 14th Front and the Tunisian Communist Workers' Party?

  7. Good to talk with you again.

    Yes, I've seen the counter-revolution as well. Al Jazeera has provided about the best coverage of this uprising I've seen yet (one can generally tell who is providing the best coverage by how often their signal is interrupted!) and often points to US and Israeli machinations as part of the problems Egyptians face. I must admit though, I busted up seeing that Anderson Cooper and CO. caught butt whoopins. Can you imagine it? Egyptian: "shouldn't you be at the airport with the the rest of them?" CNN reporter: " Can't you see we're CNN reporters." Egyptian: "That's your ass".

    Pro or Con Mubarak aside, that's one lickin' a comrade can get behind!

    Regardless, it looks like the army is going to make a move soon. If the way it's allowed the pro-Mubarak gang into contact with the protesters is any indication (as well as the televised statement by Ismail Etman which was laced with deliberately hazy statements--"you are capable of restoring normal life in Egypt" [which is the problem in the first place]... we are with you...Egypt will live on free, strong and peaceful"), there's going to be a big crackdown.

    Oh, did you see that Hosni Harper and Uncle Tombama are having a "meeting" over this? You can bet discussions about NGO organizing and funding, placating Israel, regional stability in terms of continued energy extraction and a "united front" for "democracy", "liberty", and "opportunity" (while we occupy Iraq/Afghanistan and prop up a Yemeni dictator)will be paramount.

    This is the problem with these spontaneous events; as you've noted, they're not organized enough to deal with the internal and external forces arrayed against them. Sadly, this means they are not prepared to exploit the contradictions that exist between their enemies. I have yet to see a true spokesperson or organization emerge (I think the MB is as close to a vanguard as we're going to get) to get the message of the protestors across or to present a clear poklitical program for a new Egypt. Additionally, I'm sincerely afraid for the people on the street as it seems to me their enemies are much better armed and prepared to use violence than they are.

    Aside from the above, I've been wanting to ask you what your take is on the Canadian Government re-patriating Canadians in Egypt right now?


  8. I have no opinions about it yet because it just emerged... Generally speaking, however, I don't think that these spontaneous insurgencies are utter failures, I just think they can't lead, by themselves, to a revolutionary overthrow. They can, and this has happened so often in history, lead to the formation of organizational structures that, after the spontaneous uprisings are defeated, might turn that spirit into a focus and prepare for further agitation - but in a more organized sense. The Tunisian Communist Workers Party might become something that, founded by the sentiment of the uprising, will produce a more organized assault on the state in the future. In Egypt there are also new unions emerging that could become important in the future.

  9. And RRH... At the very least, as ShineThePath's comments insinuated (and how I replied above), there could be structures that emerge from this spontaneity that, after the crackdown, could work towards a more sustainable and focused uprising. It is sad that the MB, an organization with reactionary politics, is as close to a "vanguard" as we're going to get: no progressive revolution (as we have also seen historically) can come of a revolution led by theocrats.

    And I don't yet have a take on the repatriation of Canadians in Egypt.

  10. Agreed about the MB. It's a bad state of affairs.

  11. The obvious flip of this argument is that the movements that are offered as counter-examples in the piece also have not abolished the state and capital (India, Nepal, etc -- granted Maoists don't want to abolish the state).

    As for why these recent uprisings are so popular, the first is obviously the speed and the fury, as well as the leaderlessness and the rejection of the mediation of the very parties that would seek to lead it (or, as the Maoists might say it, would seek to be the [self-appointed] "revolutionary vanguard"). Also, such moments provide exciting examples of self-organization of various types that do validate to various degrees the ability of the people to self-organize against and without the state and capital. I say various because not all examples are equal or go as far in each area since each obviously reflects particular circumstances.

    There are good things in the long slog, for instance, of the Zapatistas and there are good things in the explosive refusal of mediation in Egypt and Tunisia. Plus, as this thing churns on and on, from country to country, it becomes less "spontaneous", by the strict definition of the term, and instead gets informed by the struggles of those that preceded (on both sides).

    One of the hard things about Egypt is precisely that there aren't many anti-capitalist voices getting through to those of us here in the West and the journalists are not good at understanding or reporting on the struggle in the poor and working class sections, for class reasons amongst others, probably also fear of going to those areas. I've heard reports on AJ and other places of factory occupations and some self-management, but I have yet to see it in print anywhere. Of course the neighborhood committees seem to have a mixed character depending on where they are. I suppose that's to be expected. Stories that don't fit the capitalist media's story don't make it to print, I think. For instance, most the neighborhood committees I have seen written about have been either wealthy, bourgeois or mixed. Committees of the working class and poor have been mentioned but rarely discussed in specifics.

    However, I think the desire to have a formal vanguard is a mistake, and I don't see the Tunisian or Egyptian peoples' rejections of this as a failure. On the contrary, it is tremendously sophisticated, I think, as it has so far prevented the emergence of a hegemonic wolves in sheep's clothing type force that would defend capital while rhetorically attacking it, such as a left party or a dinosaur union bureaucracy. Indeed, some such organizations exist and they have been rejected by the people. I remember reading about chants after El Baradei spoke reported as, "Don't steal our revolution!" That's smart in my book.

    If there is a deeper questioning of capital beyond the simmering class tensions and the recognition that the state defends a wealthy, crony class at home and US imperialism abroad, it's in the sections of the country that are not getting much reporting in English, at least. For instance, I have repeatedly heard that things are much more radical in the rural areas. I wonder if land is being seized. Not much word from these parts. I am ever looking for more good information from those areas not well covered.

    I think the problem is not the form of the resistance. It is the content. Long and short, substituting a left vanguard that speaks the language of anti-capitalism but in the end reimposes it is no solution at all. I recognize that because of our different politics, we will disagree on that interpretation of the role of the vanguard left, but I submit it anyhow.

  12. Well the vanguard question is somewhat separate from my overall argument about spontaneity. Personally I don't believe that a vanguard, properly understood and properly revolutionary, is something that is substituted from mass struggle... But again, that's a whole other can of worms.

    My point is that spontaneity by itself is never going to lead to a revolutionary overthrow: in fact it never has at any historical period, though it has led to the eventual establishment of structures (like the ones you point out, and self-management is a form of structure - I'm not pushing, in this article, just the vanguard one) for future struggle. Every theorist who has ever been involved in these sorts of struggles, and has analyzed them through their experience, has come to this conclusion: if you don't have organizational avenues, however broadly understood, to focus the peoples' spontaneous sentiments, then those with the organizational structures will take them over. Look at what is now happening in Egypt, and how the crowds are falling apart - large portions of them thinking their demands "have been met." The Egyptian and broad Arabic left has been pointing this out from day one, but we 1st world activists have decided to ignore them.

    No, Nepal and India haven't fully seized power, though the former has de facto power and it's just a matter of transforming the state in a way that doesn't encourage India to invade. The point, though, is that they are revolutionary mass movements with clear revolutionary demands, that are sustainable and have sustained themselves... and both are in the process (well at least Nepal) of transforming social relations. Will the fail? Maybe: there's more at issue than just whether or not something is spontaneous.
    [cont in next comment]

  13. [continued from above]
    Again, the point is that spontaneity by itself has never led to large-scale revolution. Organization, and some sort of ideological/militant structure is definitely required. Whether this structure takes the form of a vanguard or not, however, is a separate debate but it should not be conflated with the debate of spontaneity-organization. The anarchists of the Spanish Revolution, after all, were organized and, even if you want to call it self-organization, it was not the sort of nebulous "I-suddenly-realized-I-was-revolutionary-with-revolutionary-demands-out-of-the-blue-after-years-of-not-giving-a-shit" utopic self-organizing that spontaneity fetishists promote.

    I do understand your complaints about vanguardism, however, because I used to be an anarchist and still, despite the zig-zags of my political radicalization, have my lingering anarchist sentiments regarding the concept of the party vanguard. The debate between methods of organizing is still worth having, and I still appreciate and look up to a lot of the great anarchist critiques (and also the autonomist marxist critiques) of the concept of the party vanguard.

    Yes, I've heard about factory occupation, etc. as well... I hope these will grow more organized and, after the spontaneous uprising has been restructured, remain to develop structures for future revolt. Like I replied to another commenter above, despite the fact that spontaneity fails to become a large-scale revolution without organizational structure, it does often promote new structures that learn from the uprising and can become something revolutionary in the future.

    The content is definitely important, but spontaneity is a form that by its very nature lacks coherent content - that is the issue regarding ideological unity that I was discussing. The "don't speak for us" knee-jerk reaction is fair enough, but the fact is that there was no organized left, really, before any of this because they're all dead or in prison. And who in the crowd is really yelling "don't speak for us" and to whom? To ElBaradei, well obviously. But would large sectors of the crowd say the same to reps of the Muslim Brotherhood? They might not and *that* is a vanguard that represents a reactionary set of politics. Moreover, now we see the crowd splitting into pro-Mubarak factions as the Egyptian petty-bourgeois are leaving the spontaneous insurgency and deciding that Mubarak speaks for them and ElBaradei doesn't...

  14. I should point out that a [bad] English translation of Samir Amin's assessment is now available on line:

    He is also cynical, and sees the MB as emerging as the most powerful parliamentary faction after this uprising. Moreover, he points out that the MB is more than willing to cooperate with US Imperialism. We should take his analysis seriously considering his long history as part of the Egyptian left.

  15. Dear Writer,

    Your analysis of the situation in Egypt shows not only an incorrect understanding of history, but of dialectics. Instead of seeing organizing and struggling as two ongoing things that, in a given moment, are more or less dominant, you view them as two completely separate things. Thus, you develop your straw-man theory that some people believe struggle comes first, and organization second, which you then rightfully refute with “show me the evidence of that ever happening,” which obviously nobody can, nor ever will, do. Then, worst of all, your opposite stance necessarily becomes, “first organize, then struggle,” which is 1) doomed to failure, and 2) is something that only people in the 1st World can afford to do.

    As far as history goes…

    Firstly, depending on your definition of “spontaneous,” you are either being patronizing or dehumanizing. These “supposed insurrections” in the Middle East are not “spontaneous.” These uprisings are very real, and have been a long time coming. They only seems “spontaneous” to people who started paying close attention to Middle Eastern politics a month ago. There are plenty of organizations, new and old, who are directly responsible for the uprisings. Sure, lots of unorganized people joined in, but only after the organized started it; and they, too, were quickly organized.

    The Middle East is not Nepal or India. Geographically/ecologically, they are as far apart it gets. India contains the most biologically lush environment in the world; Nepal comes close, and also contains the largest mountain range in the world. A guerilla war is the first of three stages of a Protracted People’s War; and practically every modern guerilla war has existed almost exclusively in an evergreen forest or a mountain range: usually both. It wasn’t until Mao’s army developed an airforce that they were able to leave the forests, at which point they were no longer a guerilla army, but a mobile army fighting a war of “strategic balance.” The Nepali Maoists, luckily, didn’t have to deal with an advanced airforce. The Indian Maoists are confined, as they have been for the last 43 years, to the jungles. Where are the Egyptians, Tunisians, etc. supposed to hide?

    The Arabian Peninsula and North Africa are two of the most inhospitable places on earth for life to exist. The only crop to be domesticated in the Arabian peninsula, until recently, was the date palm, which is why feudalism never developed there. Only human life can exist in these places on a large scale; and that human life is completely dependent on the human life around it for trading. Thus, the Middle East and North Africa have some of the world’s highest ratios of urban to non-urban population, making them, if you must follow a model, much more attuned to the Bolshevik model.


  16. (Cont...)

    However, in order to follow a model, it is absolutely essential to actually know what happened there. The leaders of the October revolution did not spend most of their time organizing on the ground. They spent most of their time in exile, in other imperialist nations that wanted to see the Tsar fall. They spent most of this time writing literature, in order to rally the masses. It wasn’t until the mass uprisings of 1905 and February 1917 that most Bolsheviks were even able able to enter Russia and organize on the ground. Furthermore, while the Bolsheviks and even the Mensheviks played a part, these mass uprisings were predominantly not their doing. Like the Egyptian labor unions and Muslim Brotherhood are doing now, the Bolsheviks took advantage of these uprisings, and the sudden, pro-organizing climate, to organize further, and then proceed, rapidly, to the next stage of the revolution.

    Even the Nepali Maoist revolution would likely have never happened were it not for mass urban uprisings. The “Maoists” in Nepal planned on having a Protracted People’s War for 42 years. It wasn’t until Jana Andolan I, in 1990, that they finally decided to go through with their plan. The people’s uprisings of 1990 gave the people the courage necessary to take part in a Protracted People’s War. The Protracted People’s War then went on to become the major reason that Gyanendra claimed all power for the monarchy and disenfranchised the political parties, which then became the major reason for the second urban uprising, Jana Andolan II.

    Jana Andolan II was an anti-monarchy and anti-war uprising. The Nepali Maoists were smart enough to listen to the demands of the people, call a ceasefire and engage in the coming democratic processes. However, the major difference between Nepal and Egypt is that the Maoists had an army, which meant that they could help facilitate the urban uprising by guaranteeing the lines of transportation, whereas Mubarak was able to shut down the Egyptian transportation, which didn’t matter nearly as much as in Nepal, because the Egyptian revolution just spread to all the cities; and most Egyptians live in cities. The other main benefit of the Nepali Maoists having an army is that they don’t have to hope the army gives into their demands; they can possibly smash the state themselves, whether the (former) Royal Nepal Army likes it or not. It isn’t hopeless, however, for the Egyptians, being that armies can be co-opted, like in Iran, or split, like in Russia.

    The Egyptians have now entered a new and necessary stage of their ongoing revolution: the stage in which they can now organize openly in the cities. This is the stage where the Nepali revolution is at as well.

    May they both go as well as we all hope them to go.

    Peace, love and revolution,

  17. Please actually read what I wrote before writing two long comments that aren't even replies to this posting, let alone the two other postings written above. It is utterly ironic that you accuse me of the straw-person fallacy when it's clear from your response that you're actually committing this in your reading.

    I do not have the time or energy to comb through your supposedly superior understanding of dialectics and history (the very fact that you imagine a Bolshevik party is waiting in Egypt to structure the uprisings is extremely problematic, and one that many members of the Egyptian left involved in these uprisings would argue against), because it's so wrapped up in a crazily strange misreading:

    1) I never once argued that there wasn't organizational elements behind this uprisings. What I do argue is that they were liberal at best (see the next post on this), although I ALSO point out that the rev. orgs. coming out of Tunisia demonstrate how these uprisings can produce revolutionary structures. Therefore I also never claim that organizing and struggling are two separate things;

    2) My argument is against the fetishization of spontaneism in the North American left, most specifically against people who believe: a) there was no organization in the Egyptian left; b) this is completely spontaneous therefore radical; c) spontaneity will create revolutionary structure immediately; d) these uprisings will result immediately in socialism. I have clarified this again and again in successive points... Here I concentrated on the incorrect view that spontaneity = automatic socialism. Please read, perhaps, my most reason post on this, my response to Mike Ely on Kasama WHO ALSO STRAW-PERSONED ME but at the same time wrote a better analysis of Egypt than yours in my opinion, before imagining again that I am saying something I'm not;

    3) I never once said that Egypt should follow the specific tactics/strategy of Nepal or that it was identical. Read the paragraph where I spoke about Nepal and India and you should be able to see that I was mentioning these revolutionary movements to ask the NA left a question: why do we ignore movements that have taken the question of structure seriously and then get over-excited at every [supposedly] spontaneous uprising that is presented to us as spectacle? That was where and how they were mentioned. Now there are successive discussions in the comments about Nepal and India, but these are very specific and contextual based on the arguments made by other commenters - who, by the way, actually bothered to fully read what I wrote rather than attributing positions to me that I never took;

    4) Stop name calling if you want to debate. My comments about the spontaneous elements and the fetishization of spontaneity are not some first world dictating that are meant to be patronizing and dehumanizing. They are aimed at the way people are cognizing the uprisings here. Furthermore, the discussion about the need for revolutionary structure versus spontaneity is one that has a long history in non-european radical theory because of these theorists' own encounter with these problems;

    5) If you want to comment on my site, read the comments policy - there is a reason I have it. A lot of other commenters disagree with my position(s) but they do not parachute in here, intentionally misread, and then write two long posts they could just post on their own blog if they want, that are filled with insulting language. I'm going to assume, since you like to throw around charges about history and dialectics, that you do know what you're talking about when you use these words - assume that I have the same requisite training, pay attention to what I write, and don't attribute false positions in a haze of name-calling, polemical bad-jacketing, and straw-person mudslinging.

  18. 1) I read your piece twice before replying, and have read it four times now. I’m sorry I didn’t quote you directly before. I will this time.
    2) I didn’t call you any names, like ‘patronizer’ or ‘dehumanizer.’ I merely pointed out that by calling these actions “spontaneous,” you are, whether you like it or not, being “patronizing” and “dehumanizing,” which I stand by. Every definition of spontaneous either implies, a) ‘without thought,’ which is patronizing, b) ‘happening naturally,’ which is dehumanizing, or c) ‘without external stimulus,’ which is so obviously wrong that I assumed you didn’t mean that. I’m sorry if my assumption was wrong.
    3) You say, “Is it because we hope that spontaneity will succeed so that we, comfortable in the centres of capitalism, can finally reject every shred of previous historical evidence to properly believe that we do not have to do any serious organizational work?” You may have been talking to North American comrades here. But referring to the uprisings in Egypt as “spontaneous” implies, whether you like it or not, a lack of “serious organizational work,” in Egypt, which is further backed up when you say, in your reply to me, “why do we ignore movements that have taken the question of structure seriously?” although, thankfully, this time you do go on to admit that the Egyptian uprisings are only, “[supposedly] spontaneous,” (though your brackets make me think you’re trying to have it both ways).
    4) Nowhere did I claim that there was a socialist or communist party in Egypt comparable to the Bolsheviks that may take over in the next year. Completely beside the point, Lenin didn’t think the Bolsheviks would take over so soon either. Sadly, because of the extreme uni-polarity of the world right now, the Egyptians have no anti-imperialist, socialist-sympathetic neighbor to harbor a vibrant, socialist exile community. And even if they did, those exiles would only be able to organize amongst themselves, and would need something along the lines of a mass uprising to bring them home, where they could actually organize lots of people. My point is that, if there ever is a socialist or communist revolution in Egypt, a pre-requisite for this will be a climate in which people, other than Muslims, can organize. Mubarak, the Tsar, and Gyanendra did not provide that, and so had to go.


  19. (cont...)

    5) You say, “no spontaneous uprising has succeeded without an organizational structure, however broadly understood, to give the authentic revolutionary sentiment of the masses an ideological focus and unity.” By “authentic revolutionary sentiment” I’m assuming you mean, in the Marxist sense, a transfer of power from one class to another. Am I right? If that is the case, Marx talked constantly about the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but not about a vanguard party. He said that the best way to mark the evolution of human society was to dig up, not the writings of old regimes, but the bones of human technology. He said that every historical epoch would have an economic system and a political superstructure that corresponded with the level of technology humanity had achieved. Because of the absence of the internet (which collapses space and time for communication) both the Bolsheviks and Chinese needed a centralized administrative apparatus. But Lenin admitted that the Soviet Union was not a “socialist state,” but a bureaucratic state that happened to represent the oppressed classes for the moment, but which could easily turn its back on them, which it did. Mao, too, clearly rebelled against the party system; this was the essence of his cultural revolution; it failed because there was nothing better to put in its place.
    Another reason why there is no vibrant socialist movement in Egypt is probably because too many Egyptians have seen that, in Russia and in China, the party went from representing the oppressed, to a reorganization of the bourgeoisie within the party, which was the state, which shares too much in common with fascism. The reason most Nepalis support “Maoism” is because most of them are illiterate and have no access to the internet or libraries if they are literate. Maoism, to them, meant Mohan Bikram Singh and land re-distribution. I’m not saying that this is likely to happen, but the Egyptians, if they rapidly create the infrastructure necessary for a more participatory democracy, have the chance to be some of the first people in the history of the world to go beyond the dictatorship of the vanguard party.
    6) You may “train” all you want in the study of dialectics; it doesn’t mean you’ll necessarily internalize it. Statements like “society is determined by the masses” are a clear indicator that you haven’t. a) There is no one determining factor in anything. There are dominant and lesser factors. Furthermore, there is no one factor that is always dominant. The Mubarak-led state was the dominant factor in society for 30 years. For the last 25 days, a very very large group of people with almost unprecedented focus and unity have been the dominant factor. Sooner or later, the popular revolutionary mentality will ebb, and one of the organizations involved, or an outside organization, such as Israel or the US, will become the dominant factor. b) Your massification of the oppressed classes is either dehumanizing or patronizing: one of the few things you have in common with Marx.

  20. My point about your misunderstanding of my article was based on a two-fold assumption: 1) you didn't read the other posts that clarified this article (and apparently still haven't); 2) you went on and on about my supposed comparison of Nepal and India to Egypt when I pointed out that I brought them up for an altogether different reason.

    I also have, which is a point you don't seem to be getting, great hope for the possibilities opened in Tunisia, Egypt, and wherever these uprisings may spread. My statement that "society is determined by the masses" was polemic at best - please read in context, especially with the other post about this. Combing through a blog post that was never intended to be academic, that was written in a style that was meant to be thoughts more than anything else (like most of this blog where a lot of it is ranty and attempts at bizarre leftist humour), for fragments of jargon to confirm your suspicions is rather dubious. Yes I used the word "determined" but that was probably a poor use of language. History/society is made by the masses (or maybe produced is more accurate?) and not individuals: that was my point, and if you read the context as you say you did then I do not understand how it could have been missed.

    I asked you before not to parachute into this blog and be insulting and/or arrogant, something other commenters who disagree with me are able to do. I really don't care about having a debate about who know dialectics better or if I've internalized it or you've internalized it - my complaint above was about the high-handed tone and self-righteousness. If we're on the same page politically, as I hope we are, we should be able to not sink to this level.

    With that being said, my comments about organization and spontaneity were not about the emergence of a vanguard party. Yes, I do believe in the concept of a vanguard in some sense, but I still am willing to hold it up to critique. I also think the concept of the vanguard did develop through Lenin, so agree that it's not in Marx (unless it's in germ form, maybe, but not necessarily), as other concepts from history developed through Mao. And maybe I do believe we should take these developments seriously. But does that mean they can be proved wrong? Sure, why not. On the whole I wrote this because of a lack of sober critique within my context, a lack of sober critique I was also guilty of at the time. Some of the more unsober positions I critiqued in a following post. And then, in a third post, went back to being excited as I originally was.


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