Communist-Nationalist cooperation

By then, however, the CCP was in serious difficulty. The railway unions had been brutally suppressed, and there were few places in China where it was safe to be a known communist. In June 1923 the Third Congress of the CCP met in Guangzhou, where Sun Yat-sen provided a sanctuary. After long debate, this congress accepted the Comintern strategy pressed by Maring—that communists should join the KMT and make it the centre of the national revolutionary movement. Sun had rejected a multiparty alliance but had agreed to admit communists to his party, and several, including Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, had already joined the KMT. Even though communists would enter the other party as individuals, the CCP was determined to maintain its separate identity and autonomy and to attempt to control the labour union movement. The Comintern strategy called for a period of steering the Nationalist movement and building a base among the Chinese masses, followed by a second stage—a socialist revolution in which the proletariat would seize power from the capitalist class.

By mid-1923 the Soviets had decided to renew the effort to establish diplomatic relations with the Beijing government. Lev M. Karakhan, the deputy commissar for foreign affairs, was chosen as plenipotentiary for the negotiations. In addition to negotiating a treaty of mutual recognition, Karakhan was to try to regain for the Soviet Union control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. On the revolutionary front, the Soviets had decided to financially assist Sun in Guangzhou and to send a team of military men to help train an army in Guangdong. By June, five young Soviet officers were in Beijing for language training. More importantly, the Soviet leaders selected an old Bolshevik, Mikhail M. Borodin, as their principal adviser to Sun Yat-sen. The Soviet leaders also decided to replace Maring with Voytinsky as principal adviser to the CCP, which had its headquarters in Shanghai. Thereafter three men—Karakhan in Beijing, Borodin in Guangzhou, and Voytinsky in Shanghai—were the field directors of the Soviet effort to bring China into the anti-imperialist camp of “world revolution.” The offensive was aimed primarily at the positions in China of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States.

Reactions to warlords and foreigners

These countries too were moving toward a new, postwar relationship with China. At the Washington Conference (November 1921–February 1922), China put forth a 10-point proposal for relations between it and the other powers, which, after negotiations, became four points: to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, to give China opportunity to develop a stable government, to maintain the principle of equal opportunity in China for the commerce and industry of all countries, and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek exclusive privileges detrimental to the rights of friendly countries. The treaty was signed as the Nine-Power Pact on February 6. Two other Chinese proposals, tariff autonomy and abolishing extraterritoriality, were not included in the pact but were assigned to a committee for further study. In the meantime, separate negotiations between China and Japan produced a treaty in which Japan agreed to return the former German holdings in Shandong to China—although under conditions that left Japan with valuable privileges in the province.

For a few years thereafter, Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and France attempted to adjust their conflicting interests in China, cooperated in assisting the Beijing government, and generally refrained from aiding particular Chinese factions in the recurrent power struggles. But China was in turmoil, with regional militarism in full tide. Furthermore, a movement against the Unequal Treaties began to take shape.

Militarism in China

During the first years of the republic, China had been fractured by rival military regimes to the extent that no one authority was able to subordinate all rivals and create a unified and centralized political structure. Southern China was detached from Beijing’s control; even the southern provinces, and indeed districts within them, were run by different military factions (warlords). Sichuan was a world in itself, divided among several military rulers. The powerful Beiyang Army had split into two major factions whose semi-independent commanders controlled provinces in the Yangtze valley and in the north; these factions competed for control of Beijing. In Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin headed a separate Fengtian army. Shanxi was controlled by Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan). Each separate power group had to possess a territorial base from which to tax and recruit. Arms were produced in many scattered arsenals. Possession of an arsenal and control of ports through which foreign-made arms might be shipped were important elements of power. Most of the foreign powers had agreed in 1919 not to permit arms to be smuggled into China, but that embargo was not entirely effective.

The wealthier the territorial base, the greater the potential power of the controlling faction. Beijing was the great prize because of its symbolic importance as the capital and because the government there regularly received revenues collected by the Maritime Customs Service, administered by foreigners and protected by the powers. Competition for bases brought on innumerable wars, alliances, and betrayals. Conflict was continuous over spoils, even within each military system. To support their armies and conduct their wars, military commanders and their subordinates taxed the people heavily. Money for education and other government services was drained away; revenues intended for the central government were retained in the provinces. Regimes printed their own currency and forced “loans” from merchants and bankers. This chaotic situation partly accounts for the unwillingness of the maritime powers to give up the protection that the treaties with China afforded their nationals.

The foreign presence

As a result of several wars and many treaties with China since 1842, foreign powers had acquired a variety of unusual privileges for their nationals. These became collectively known as the Unequal Treaties, and patriotic Chinese bitterly resented them. Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Tibet, and vast areas in Siberia and Central Asia had been detached from China. Dependencies such as Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Vietnam had been separated. Leaseholds on Chinese territory were granted to separate powers—such as the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula and the territory in Shandong around Jiaozhou Bay, which Japan had seized from Germany, to Japan; the New Territories to the adjacent British crown colony of Hong Kong; Macau to Portugal; and the Kwangchow (Zhanjiang) Bay area to France. Most major cities had concession areas, not governed by China, that were set aside for the residence of foreigners. Nationals and subjects of the “treaty powers” (as they became known) were protected by extraterritoriality (i.e., they were subject only to the civil and criminal laws of their own countries); this status extended to foreign business enterprises in China, which provided a great advantage in competition with Chinese firms and was enhanced when foreign factories or banks were located in concession areas under foreign protection. The Chinese had to compete with foreign ships in Chinese rivers and coastal waters, with foreign mining companies in the interior, and with foreign banks that circulated their own notes. Foreign trade also had a great advantage because there could be no protective tariff to favour Chinese products.

Christian missionaries operated many schools, hospitals, and other philanthropic enterprises in China, all protected by extraterritoriality. The separate school system, outside of Chinese governmental control, was a sore point for Nationalists, who regarded the education of Chinese youth as a Chinese prerogative. There were foreign troops on Chinese soil and foreign naval vessels in its rivers and ports to enforce treaty rights. The Chinese government, bound by a variety of interlocking treaties, was not fully sovereign in China. Past regimes had accumulated a vast foreign debt against which central government revenues were pledged for repayment. All this was the foreign imperialism against which the KMT launched its attack after being reorganized along Bolshevist lines.

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