@techreport{Braun2012Implementing, abstract = {Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany.}, address = {Berlin}, author = {Sebastian Braun and Nadja Dwenger and Dorothea K\"{u}bler and Alexander Westkamp}, copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen}, keywords = {C78; C92; D78; I20; 330; college admissions; experiment; quotas; matching; Gale-Shapley mechanism; Boston mechanism; Hochschule; Studienfach; Angebot; Quotenregulierung; Studierende; Nachfrage; Matching; Shapley-Wert; Deutschland}, language = {eng}, number = {SP II 2012-201}, publisher = {Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f\"{u}r Sozialforschung (WZB)}, title = {Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis}, type = {WZB Discussion Paper}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55225}, year = {2012} }