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Released on 2012-10-16 17:00 GMT

Email-ID 976137
Date 2011-09-23 02:28:59

Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas is
scheduled to address the UN General Assembly on Friday, the same day he
Palestine to become the 194th member of the United Nations. He plans to
return to the West Bank on Saturday. Palestineians will still not have
its their own state by then, and nor will they have one if and whenever
the UN Security Council (UNSC) gets around to voting on the application.
The question is how severe the demonstrations that will ensue in the
Palestinian Territories will be, and when they will break out. Let us
caveat for the possibility that there aren't any demos of any

For months leading up to the current gathering of the UN General
Assembly in New York, "the September UN vote" has been causing headaches
for the Israelis and the U.S. in particular. But it has also created
stress for the ruling military council in Egypt and the leadership of
Gaza-based Islamist militant group Hamas that rules the Gaza Strip. None
of these four actors want to see Abbas and the PNA herald in the
creation of an independent Palestine, all for different reasons.

United States

The U.S. position is based upon the domestic political constraints that
are placed upon President Obama. Though he came into office with a
professed goal of helping bring about an independent Palestinian state
before the expiration of his first term, Obama found out early on [LINK]
the pitfalls of wading into the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and has
actually seen the U.S.' image in the Arab/Islamic world sink to a level
even lower than the position held during the nadir of the George W. Bush
administration. Obama now wants to get reelected, and with the campaign
season around the corner is not prepared to take the risk of taking the
Palestinians' side over Israel's on an issue of this magnitude. Need to
explain who siding with the Pals hurts him in the vote

statehood. It has reiterated this position several times, as it believes
that "peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the
U.N.," to quote an Obama line delivered during his address before the
General Assembly on Wednesday. If it comes to a vote in the UNSC, the
U.S. will follow through with its vow to veto. Obama would prefer that
it not reach that point, however, as the resulting demonstrations in the
Palestinian Territories and elsewhere in the Arab world would then take
on a markedly anti-American tone. He has thus tried in vain to convince
Abbas to avoid the UNSC altogether by seeking to merely elevate
Palestine's position in the UN to that of a non-state observer. This
would require Abbas to apply for a resolution in the wider UNGA, which
would not put the U.S. in a position to block a full membership


Abbas rejected the American proposal (which was also publicly enunciated
by French President Nicolas Sarkozy) because of the domestic political
constraints it, too, is under. Abbas represents the PNA, but is also the
leader of Fatah, the Palestinian organization that controls the West
Bank. Fatah's no. 1 adversary is not Israel, but actually Hamas, the
Islamist group that runs the Gaza Strip. The West by and large does not
want to deal with Hamas, however, due to its views on Israel's existence
(it shouldn't), and proclivity to use violence to express those views
(it does this often). Though Fatah already has more legitimacy than
Hamas in the eyes of the international community, the drive for
statehood at the UN has proven to be fruitful in cementing that even
further. It has also been fruitful in developing Fatah additional
credibility in the eyes of the Arab world. On the contrary legitimacy in
the eyes of the int'l community undermines credibility in the Arab world
Arab states are all under pressure to support a push for Palestinian
statehood, and thus, have been openly supporting Mahmoud Abbas and
Fatah. Need to distinguish between the views of Arab states and
societies vis-a-vis Fatah

has put too much time and political capital into the "September UN vote"
over the past few months; it would be risking political suicide and a
complete loss of legitimacy at home for Fatah to abandon the push now.
Even in the face of threats by Israel to withhold the tax revenues it
distributes to the PNA as per one of the agreements forged in Oslo in
1993, or some calls by American lawmakers to also withhold funds to the
PNA for its insistence on moving ahead, Abbas is under too much
political pressure to stop. No one (in the Palestinian Territories or
elsewhere) actually thinks they can obtain statehood in this manner, but
it is about being seen as standing up for the rights of Palestinians at
this point, not actual statehood. Point out that this is important
because for years Hamas has had a huge stick with which to beat Fatah
which is thatAbbas et al are quick to compromise with Israel and the


militant group whose raison d'etre is Israel's destruction. This places
Hamas in a difficult situation, however, because clearly it cannot be
seen as agreeing with Israel to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian

Hamas government in Gaza said on Monday that while Hamas opposes the UN
said bluntly on Thursday that if Palestine were to be recognized at the
UN, it would mean Hamas could no longer fight Israel, implying that this
alone was a reason to oppose the bid.

Zahar's words more faithfully capture the reality of Hamas' position.
Hamas' legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters lies in its
determination to fight Israel, and it cannot stand by and watch as Fatah
does exactly that through diplomatic means at the UN. It can thus throw
a wrench into the entire process by doing what it always does: launching
attacks against Israel, either through direct rocket fire, or through
rocket fire launched by a proxy group. Or, it could dispatch teams to
attack Israeli targets on foot, using porous borders with Egypt and the
lawlessness in the Egyptian Sinai to move people into the country.
Hamas' main aim is to prevent Fatah from taking the mantle of
Palestinian resistance to Israel while not being obvious about its
intention of doing so. Wait there is problems with the argument here. If
the vote is not going anywhere (as you state up above) then why should
Hamas have to do anything? Also, keep in mind that Zahar's statement is
a general one. It doesn't point to what Hamas will do in terms of
policy. Let us not et ahead of ourselves by talking of what Hamas would
do when it really doesn't need to do much other than sit back watch
Fatah fail and make an ass ou of itself.


The military council currently ruling Egypt, the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF), does not want a Palestinian statehood bid at the UN
because of the potential effects it could have on its own population.
The SCAF is committed to its decades-old peace treaty with Israel for
strategic reasons, and is not going to abandon the alliance. This rubs
against the expectations for change amongst many Egyptians, who are
increasingly coming to the realization that there was never a true
revolution in the country - Cairo's relationship with Israel simply
serving as one example of how things have not changed.

The Israel issue, though, is an emotional one for Egyptian people. Most
Egyptian people do not like Israel, and loathe the fact that their
government is willing to entertain such good relations with it. The
anti-Israel mood in the country is growing, too, especially following
the death of Egyptian security forces following the Aug. 18 Eilat
attacks [LINK] and the subsequent attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo
in September [LINK].

When and if Palestinian demonstrations break out in Israel as a result
of the UN vote, there will be demonstrations in Egypt as well. This will
put additional pressure on SCAF. Though SCAF has been able to handle the
demonstrations in its country fairly well up to now, the military's
concern is that this issue could be one that especially galvanizes the
Islamist segment of society, which thus far has not been as active in
protesting. Even worse, the SCAF fears that this could be an issue that
unites the Islamist and non-Islamist opposition, and snowballs into much
larger demonstrations than it has seen before.

you discuss Fatah