Iran and the global nuclear picture: William Fickinger

A worker rides a bicycle in front of the reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. William Fickinger writes that the negotiations now taking place concerning Iran’s nuclear program can only be understood with knowledge of a few key facts about uranium enrichment, power production, and weapons, as found in dozens of "nuclear states" world-wide. (Majid Asgaripour, Mehr News Agency file via AP )
Guest Columnist/ By Guest Columnist/ The Plain Dealer
on February 09, 2014 at 3:16 PM, updated February 09, 2014 at 3:18 PM

The negotiations now taking place concerning Iran’s nuclear program can only be understood with knowledge of a few key facts about uranium enrichment, power production and weapons, as found in dozens of “nuclear states” worldwide.

Uranium ore is mined in many places ranging from Australia to Kazakhstan to Canada, and it is widely available on the world market. The ore contains two types of uranium: mostly the heavy isotope uranium-238 (U-238) and less than one percent of the lighter uranium-235 (U-235). The lighter form is needed to sustain a chain reaction in either power reactors or a bomb. A chain reaction is created when a neutron hits a uranium nucleus, breaking it apart, releasing a lot of energy and shooting out more neutrons which hit other nuclei. U-235 breaks apart more easily than U-238 because it has three fewer neutrons, and it’s largely the neutrons inside the nucleus which act as a glue holding it together.

Enrichment increases the fraction of U-235: the ore is converted to a gaseous form and put into spinning cylinders. The U-238 moves toward the outside; the desired U-235 is drawn out near the spin axis. The gas is then converted back to uranium metal. To function in energy production the fraction of U-235 must be increased to three percent -- low-enriched uranium, or LEU. For a bomb, it must be raised all the way to 90 percent -- highly-enriched uranium, or HEU.

The amount of enrichment which a centrifuge can do is measured in a unit called an SWU (Separative Work Unit). The Perry Nuclear Power Plant near Cleveland, which produces 1.3 gigawatts of power, needs about 120,000 SWU’s per year. A simple nuclear bomb requires about 10,000 SWU’s. In other words, any country that enriches uranium for its power plants will necessarily have the “capacity” to produce enough for a few nuclear bombs.

Let’s look at enrichment, power production and nuclear weapons all around the world. Currently there are 31 nations with significant nuclear power programs: the United States, Russia and Japan, each producing around one fifth of their electricity; France at three-quarters; the United Kingdom at about half; South Korea at one-third -- ranging down to India with less than 4 percent and Iran, less than 1 percent. Other nations will soon join in: For example, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have arranged with South Korean companies to build and operate reactors in their countries.

Among those 31, only 15 do their own enrichment. Nine of these produce some HEU for weapons: the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and, presumably, Israel. The other six limit their product to LEU: Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and, so far, Iran.

The remaining 16 countries have no enrichment facilities and must buy their LEU from commercial firms in other countries. There is currently more than enough LEU available on the world market to supply all potential buyers.

It should be pointed out that there are other ways to make a chain reaction without using enriched U-235, such as in “heavy water” reactors and in plutonium reactors. These have been developed in several countries and any effort to control nuclear weapon production must take these other techniques into consideration.

Iran has been working on expanding its enrichment facilities, but its only significant power reactor, at Bushehr, is still fueled entirely by uranium bought from Russian suppliers. Iran is getting more attention than other nuclear countries partly because of strained relations with Israel and with the Sunni states. The big question at the Geneva negotiations is whether Iran must discontinue all enrichment and buy LEU for power production, or whether intrusive and unannounced inspections will make it impossible for Iran to produce HEU.

Many arms control experts argue that, given the determination by many in the Iranian government to maintain their own source of LEU, intensive inspections provide the best deterrent available. It is unlikely that the imposition of additional sanctions will lead the Iranian leaders to discontinue their enrichment program or to allow effective inspections. Sanctions will only strengthen the position of those seeking a full nuclear weapons program.

William Fickinger is a professor emeritus of physics at Case Western Reserve University, and board member of Cleveland Peace Action.