V. Putin’s rapid emergence as Russia’s highest-ranking official and most popular person introduced sweeping change to the political situation not only in Russia, but also in Belarus. Shortly after V. Putin made his first moves in national politics, and the parliamentary bloc “Edinstvo” (Unity), which supported Putin, scored a brilliant success during the Russian State Duma elections, many observers concluded that A. Lukashenko’s aspirations to the Kremlin, which had been quite faint before, disappeared altogether. Now that V. Putin is new president of Russia, A. Lukashenko is losing the field in Belarus as well. Beginning from November 1997, IISEPS polls showed that A. Lukashenko scored highest against his foreign colleagues as politician and candidate for Russian-Belarusian leadership among the respondents. The “presidential ratings” of Belarusian politicians revealed a similar picture: A. Lukashenko’s rating was a lot higher than his competitors’ ratings.

However, in November 1999 V. Putin as candidate in hypothetical Russian-Belarusian presidential elections, had a rating that was only twice as low as that of A. Lukashenko. In April 2000 V. Putin had the highest rating (Table 1). In April the people, who thought V. Putin was an ideal politician outnumbered those who said they thought A. Lukashenko was (Table 2).

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question “If a post of the Russian-Belarusian president was introduced and elections wee held, whom would you support?”*, %

* Other Belarusian and Russian politicians were mentioned by less than 5% of respondents each
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question “Which celebrity politician do you like best and who do you think is an ideal politician”, % (more than one answer is possible)

* These names were missing from these surveys

Table 2 shows us an important trend: the ratings of all politicians except V. Putin went down during the period between November 1999 to April 2000. We think it is yet another indicator of the fact, that the Belarusians have found a new national idol, who attracts former supporters of various political forces.
It seems that the emergence of this idol was an indirect, yet very important reason behind a fall of A. Lukashenko’s rating in Belarus – in April 2000 it hit a record low in the last 1.5 years (Table 3).

Table 3. Respondents, who would vote for Alexander Lukashenko during the presidential elections in Belarus, %

Belarusian popular mentality does not differentiate between the Belarusian and Russian politics, they seem interconnected, therefore V. Putin could draw former supporters of A. Lukashenko support himself, even in the Belarusian “political field”.

Strange as it may seem, the attitude to V. Putin turned out to be unrelated to the respondents’ opinions about the second war in Chechnya, which normally brings the name of Russia’s new leader to mind (Table 4).

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question “What is your attitude to the military operation, which the Russian government has been conducting in Chechnya since September 1999?”, %

The table shows that the Belarusians’ attitude to the war that Russia wages in the Caucasus changed insignificantly during the last five months. Slightly more people disapprove of it. However, the attitude to Putin did change dramatically.
It seems that the emergence of a new idol had an impact on the attitude to Belarus’ integration with the country he took over (Table 5).

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question about the voting in a hypothetical referendum about a merger of Russia and Belarus, %

In April 2000, the number of integration proponents significantly exceeded the “normal” level and became almost equal to the figure back in June 1999 when the Belarusian society, cowed by the propaganda interpretation of NATO’s military action in Yugoslavia, liked the integration idea better than ever. There is no outer shock like that now. Moreover, logically the war in Chechnya must have averted Belarusians from thinking about integration with a country that wages that war. However, there is another “shock” which makes them like integration ideas. That “shock” is V. Putin.
Currently, it is often said that Putin’s Russia will be harsher and more pragmatic to Belarus, and that sentimentality and complexes will no longer play the role they used to in the Belarusian-Russian relations. However, people at large are still optimistic: only 3.9% of respondents to the April poll said that bilateral relations would be worse than they were during Yeltsin’s time, 22.5% said they would remain on the same level and over one third (34.4%) said they were going to improve.
A growth of integration optimism is also partially indicated by a high level of respondents’ readiness to vote in the elections to the Union parliament (Table 6).

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question “Are you going to vote in the elections to the joint Russian-Belarusian parliament?”

However, in this case people’s readiness to participate in the union elections may merely characterize their readiness to vote in any officially announced elections: roughly the same number of respondents (52.9%) said that they were going to take part in the elections to the Belarusian parliament this autumn.
However once it comes to practical, “technical” aspects of unification, the integration zeal lessens considerably, because the from this perspective attraction of a notion or a person, who embodies it, is less obvious. This idea can be illustrated with respondents’ answers to the question whether it is possible that Belarus quits the union as well as the single currency question (Table 7)

Table 7. Distribution of answers to the questions about Belarus’ possible quitting from the Union and about single currency, %

Can it happen so that after Russia and Belarus form a union state, Belarus may have to quit the union?
Yes, it may be necessary
No, it will not be necessary
Do you agree to making the Russian ruble, which would be issued only in Russia, a single currency of the Belarusian-Russian union?
Yes, I agree
No, I disagree
The answers to the question about a single currency are very meaningful. The Belarusian authorities go to great lengths to cultivate disrespect for the national currency in people. Therefore, the persons in charge of the monetary sphere in Russia seem economic sages against the Belarusian economy spin-doctors. Nevertheless, almost 33% of respondents objected to the idea of giving Moscow an exclusive right to print money. This may be a pure feeling of national identity. Or maybe this is the famous Belarusian prudence, which suggests that domestic and foreign idols can be worshipped, but it is better to keep the money in a safe place, just in case.