@techreport{Clougherty2015Effective, abstract = {We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.}, address = {Berlin}, author = {Joseph Clougherty and Tomaso Duso and Miyu Lee and Jo Seldeslachts}, copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen}, keywords = {K21; K40; L40; 330; merger; deterrence; European Commission; merger policy; competition policy; antitrust}, language = {eng}, number = {1523}, publisher = {Deutsches Institut f\"{u}r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)}, title = {Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence?}, type = {DIW Discussion Papers}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125155}, year = {2015} }