

Did not kill earlier

Responsibility of prison officials

Length of jury deliberations

Length of legal proceedings


Writes poetry, fiction and paints

Opposition to the death penalty

Circumstances surrounding prior convictions

No plea offer made that would have excluded the death penalty

Not causing his prior felonies

Germany does not have the death penalty

Previous caretaker


Jury foreman's affidavit

Original life sentence

Disproportionality of the death penalty

Defendant's race

Police negligence

Economic cost of death penalty

The defendant as the victim of codefendant Langston

Length of time on death row



Prosecutorial policy

High cost of execution

Ability to contribute to society


Pled guilty to avoid inflicting pain on family and victim’s family.

Christian Ministry Aiding Inmates





State v. (Christopher Mathew) Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 314 P.3d 1239 (2013)



State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, 321 P.3d 398 (2014)
In mitigation, defendant offered evidence of intellectual disability, mental illness, and difficult upbringing and argued that a life sentence would protect the public. The State cross-examined and rebutted each. The jury’s conclusion that mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency was not an abuse of discretion.

State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, 344 P.3d 303 (2015)
During the penalty phase, Burns presented mitigation evidence regarding his difficult childhood, his dysfunctional family, his diagnosed learning disabilities, his impulsivity, the personality disorders from which he suffered, and whether he would be able to be safely housed in prison while serving a life sentence.

NOTE: Not sentencing the defendant on the kidnapping, sexual assault, and misconduct involving weapons convictions before the jury returned a sentence for the first-degree murder conviction prevents the defendant from arguing to the jury at the penalty phase that any consecutive sentence on the non-capital counts imposed would effectively require that he spend the rest of his life in prison, this argument is irrelevant as a mitigating factor.

State v. Michael Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079
The jury also considered mitigation evidence, which included that Carlson had a difficult childhood and suffered several mental-health crises, lacked support systems, did not premeditate his crime, felt remorse, had a protective nature, and did not pose a risk of future dangerousness in prison. The jury’s conclusion that mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency was not an abuse of discretion.

State v. Andre Michael Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 354 P.3d 393 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 898 (2016).
Defendant presented extensive mitigation evidence, including that he was thirty-nine years old at the time of the murders; his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired; he was a good father and son and tried to be a good husband and a good provider for his family; he was a good friend and employee; he suffered from alcoholism; he suffered from bipolar disorder and other mental illnesses and did not receive proper treatment; he self-medicated with drugs and alcohol; he was devastated by the collapse of his marriage; he lacked support from his family; he suffered financial ruin, overwhelming stress, and abuse and neglect as a child; he tried to make the best of his life; he was a good student and consistently tried to improve himself; and he lacked a positive male role model.

Prison expert’s testimony – The trial court precluded in the penalty phase the testimony by Carson Williams, a former warden in the Department of Corrections, that Leteve would have a very difficult time in prison because he was a child-killer.  The Supreme Court found this speculative evidence did not constitute a mitigating circumstance and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding it.

State v. Vincent Joseph Guarino, 238 Ariz. 437, 362 P.3d 484 (2015)
The defendant presented mitigation evidence, that included his age, mental illness, severe cognitive impairment, low IQ, dysfunctional family background, drug abuse, genetic propensity for drug addiction, genetic propensity for mental illness, lack of future dangerousness, good behavior during pretrial incarceration, love of family, good conduct during the trial, and ability to adapt to a prison environment. The defendant also presented evidence that he had been the victim of bullying, had suffered a personal tragedy, and had acted under the influence of his brother and other members of the Aryan Brotherhood.

The Court determined that much of the defendant’s presented mitigation could reasonably be given little weight by jurors or was heavily rebutted by the State. Thus, reasonable jurors might conclude, in light of the four aggravating circumstances, that the evidence was insufficient to warrant leniency, despite the mitigation evidence presented.

State v. (Mark) Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 372 P.3d 945 (2016)
During trial, the defendant presented limited mitigation evidence through his mental health expert that he suffered from adverse developmental factors that affected his culpability, including “probable fetal alcohol exposure,” learning disorders, genetic predisposition to substance abuse and psychological disorders, neglect, inadequate supervision, and exposure to community violence and drug abuse. The expert further opined that the defendant would not pose a danger in prison.

On cross-examination, the State elicited evidence to rebut the alleged mitigating factors. 

State v. (Jasper) Rushing, 243 Ariz. 212, 404 P.3d 240 (2017)
Rushing presented mitigation evidence that he suffered from “bipolar mood disorder,” “unspecified trauma and stressor-related disorder,” “attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” drug-related disorders, and “unspecified personality disorder with antisocial traits.” He also offered evidence that his childhood was “extremely chaotic and filled with turmoil,” and that he suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from being sexually abused during childhood. He also presented evidence connecting his mitigation evidence to the murder: that he “just went crazy” and killed him. Dr. Grassian concluded that Rushing “snapped” as “happens to people with bipolar mood disorder, people in solitary confinement, [and] people with PTSD.” Dr. Jon Conte, an expert on child abuse, related similar testimony. He opined that Rushing was an “untreated victim” of child abuse who lacked the skills to refrain from “acting out” when confronted with distressing circumstances.

On the other hand, the State cross-examined the expert witnesses and discredited some of their assertions. And the jury may have concluded that Rushing had lied to his experts about being driven to kill Shannon by the latter’s talk about sex with children. The murder was committed in a disturbing manner and, at the time of the offense, Rushing was imprisoned for a different murder. Even if we assume that Rushing proved all his mitigating circumstances, we cannot find that the jury abused its discretion because a reasonable juror could have concluded that the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency.

The Court outlined the substantial mitigation evidence presented by Hulsey that included “evidence of mental illness and brain damage, his early childhood in a dysfunctional home, his father’s drug use, the transfer of guardianship to his cruel grandmother, then a transfer to his father’s strict household where he was physically abused.” Additionally, multiple family members also testified, and Hulsey presented evidence about his ability to function in a structured prison environment.

The State in closing called into question whether Hulsey’s difficult childhood was still having an effect on him, as he was thirty-three when he shot Officer Holly. The prosecutor also reminded the jury about Hulsey’s past instances of violence, rebutted his evidence of good behavior in prison, and stated that his mental tests showed he had an above-average IQ.  The Court found “even if we assume that each juror accepted all of the mitigating factors identified by Hulsey, a juror could reasonably have concluded they were not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency.”

State v. (Dauntorian Lydel) Sanders--- P.3d ---, CR-14-0302-AP, 2018 WL 4354906 (Sept. 13, 2018)  
Quoting the Court as to the mitigation presented, which the jury found not sufficiently substantial to merit leniency –

Defendant offered the following statutory mitigating circumstances:

(1) he suffered from PTSD, which impacted his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, see A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(1);
(2) he could not have reasonably foreseen that his actions would cause or create a grave risk of death because what he perceived as similar abuse/discipline that he suffered as a child did not cause his death, see A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(4); and
(3) his age and emotional immaturity, A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(5).

Defendant also offered the following non-statutory mitigating factors:

(4) he had no positive male role model to teach him how to be a proper caregiver;
(5) physical and emotional abuse by his mother;
(6) his mother is “emotionally bankrupt” and never wanted children;
(7) he was a good student and had appropriate relationships with peers;
(8) he served his country as a Marine and saw combat despite only being trained as a cook;
(9) he had no money or direction in life after the Marines, and Susan was a negative influence;
(10) he used the same punishment that was inflicted on him as a child; and
(11) remorsefulness and cooperation with police.

State v. (Jose Alejandro) Acuna Valenzuela, --- Ariz. ---, --- P.3d --- (2018), 2018 WL 4568950 (Sept. 25, 2018)
In its abuse of discretion review [Acuna did not allege any specific issues regarding the presentation of or the State’s rebuttal to any proffered mitigation], the Court found “[e]ven if we assume Acuna proved the various mitigating factors he argued to the jury, a reasonable juror could have concluded they were not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency.”

Continue to Impairment