Common-pool resource


Common property systems

A common property rights regime system (not to be confused with a common-pool resource) is a particular social arrangement regulating the preservation, maintenance, and consumption of a common-pool resource. The use of the term "common property resource" to designate a type of good has been criticized, because common-pool resources are not necessarily governed by common property protocols. Examples of common-pool resources include irrigation systems, fishing grounds, pastures, forests, water or the atmosphere. A pasture, for instance, allows for a certain amount of grazing to occur each year without the core resource being harmed. In the case of excessive grazing, however, the pasture may become more prone to erosion and eventually yield less benefit to its users. Because the core resources are vulnerable, common-pool resources are generally subject to problems of congestion, overuse, pollution, and potential destruction unless harvesting or use limits are devised and enforced.[2]





Definition matrix

Excludable Non-excludable
Rivalrous Private goods
food, clothing, cars, parking spaces
Common-pool resources
fish stocks, timber, coal
Non-rivalrous Club goods
cinemas, private parks, satellite television
Public goods
free-to-air television, air, national defense

Common property protocols

Common property systems of management arise when users acting independently threaten the total net benefit from common-pool resource. In order to maintain the resources, protocols coordinate strategies to maintain the resource as a common property instead of dividing it up into parcels of private property. Common property systems typically protect the core resource and allocate the fringe resources through complex community norms of consensus decision-making.[3] Common resource management has to face the difficult task of devising rules that limit the amount, timing, and technology used to withdraw various resource units from the resource system. Setting the limits too high would lead to overuse and eventually to the destruction of the core resource while setting the limits too low would unnecessarily reduce the benefits obtained by the users.



  1. Clearly defined boundaries
  2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
  5. Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect community rules
  6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms which are cheap and easy to access


Adaptive governance


  • Encouraging adaption and change to address errors and cope with new developments

Open access resources


An open access system is set up to continue the ideals of an open access resource in which everything is up for grabs, e.g., land. This occurred during the expansion of the U.S. west where thousands of acres were given away to the first one to claim and work the land.[8]

However, in a different setting, such as fishing, there will be drastically different consequences. Since fish are an open access resource, it is relatively simple to fish and profit. If fishing becomes profitable, there will be more fishers and fewer fish. Fewer fish lead to higher prices which will lead again to more fishers, as well as lower reproduction of fish. This is a negative externality and an example of problems that arise with open access goods.[9]

See also



  2. 1 2 3 4 Environmental Economics Dictionary (2008-04-30). "Open Access Resource definition | Environmental Economics Dictionary". Archived from the original on 2013-07-03. Retrieved 2014-01-19.
  5. "UNU-IAS. (2011). "Adaptive Governance". United Nations University". 2006-08-18. Archived from the original on 2012-08-02. Retrieved 2014-01-19.
  7. Tietenberg, T. (20 September 2006). "Open access resources". Encyclopedia of Earth. Retrieved 4 July 2017.
  8. Reggio, Michael H. (2009). "Cheyenne-Arapaho Opening". In Everett, Dianna. Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History and Culture. Oklahoma City, OK: Oklahoma Historical Society. ISBN 9780941498753. Retrieved 4 July 2017.
  9. Mackenzie, John (2014). "Market Failures: Open-Access Resources, Public Goods, Etc" (lecture notes). Retrieved 4 July 2017.


  • Araral, Eduardo. (2014). Ostrom, Hardin and the Commons. A Critical Appreciation and Revisionist View. Env Science and Policy. Volume 36, Pages 1-92 (February 2014)
  • Copeland, Brian R.; M. Scott Taylor (2009). "Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons". American Economic Review. 99 (3): 725–49. doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.725. Retrieved 2009-06-20.