July 4th 2019

Deciphering Sudan's politics

On June 30th Sudan witnessed a "million man march", which marked the resumption of large-scale social unrest after a few days of relative calm following the suspension of the civil disobedience movement on June 12th. The chances of the current military leadership retaining control are declining as public unrest escalates. With talks over the governance arrangements for the transitional period before elections deadlocked and neither side appearing willing to budge, the country's political stand‑off seems set to continue, which will mean a protracted period of political and economic uncertainty.

Omar al-Bashir was ousted as president on April 11th, three decades after coming to power. The army seized control and formed the Transitional Military Council (TMC) saying that it would govern the country for two years leading up to elections. But this plan has been repeatedly changed with the head of the TMC, Abdel Fattah Burhan, calling for elections within a year and refusing to transfer power to a civilian-dominated council in the interim. The army's reluctance to hand over power has prompted further large-scale public protests across the country, intensifying both domestic and international pressure on the TMC.

Bashir's ousting—how it happened?

During his time in office, Mr Bashir successfully consolidated power with support from the armed forces and from armed militias, who remained loyal to the regime and became an integral part of Sudan's political system. Their loyalty was mainly driven by economic gains and fear of arrest by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and atrocities committed by them under Mr Bashir's leadership, particularly the 2004 Darfur genocide. Persistent economic underperformance, inflation and the lack of democratic reform fuelled public anger against the regime and sparked nationwide protests, which began in December 2018. This eventually led to senior military officers seizing power from Mr Bashir and forming the TMC. However, notwithstanding the removal of Mr Bashir, the status quo has been broadly maintained with key elements of the regime remaining in place, whereas the protesters had sought to dismantle the system.

The not-so-transitional military council

Despite repeated assurances that the military just wants to oversee the transitional period for security reasons and that it does not intend to retain power, its actions suggest otherwise. The Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces (DFCF, a coalition of opposition groups) has rejected a two‑year transitional period led by the military and demanded a civilian council instead and a four‑year transitional period, in order to establish stronger democratic foundations before the elections are held. The TMC has argued that the country continues to face security threats, making military leadership essential.

The public have many reasons to distrust the military's assurances. The military has repeatedly called for a resumption of talks, only to later reject the DFCF's call for a civilian‑led council, most likely in a bid to stall negotiations and wait for the protests to die down. Moreover, many are aware that in recent years changes in the presidency in other African countries have failed to deliver lasting transitions to democratic civilian rule, particularly when elections are rushed into with weak democratic foundations. The TMC's strategy of waiting for the protests to subside has so far failed and appears instead to have increasingly frustrated the military. Indeed, as social unrest continued, the military launched a brutal crackdown on a peaceful sit‑in on June 3rd—led by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—that led to the death of over 100 protesters. After the crackdown, the military called for snap elections within a year. With poor democratic foundations after 30 years of authoritarian rule, low political participation and limited civil liberties, any elections held under military rule and after such a short transition are unlikely to be credible. This will extend military rule under a democratic pretence, which is most likely the TMC's plan.

Protests continue unabated

Both sides remain diametrically opposed in terms of where power should lie, with neither willing to concede ground. The protesters fear that the political transition was just a way for members of the old guard to retain power, particularly Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (deputy head of the TMC, known as Hemedti), who remains the clear influence behind Mr Burhan. Hemedti is the head of the RSF, which absorbed the janjaweed, a brutal militia. As it has become increasingly clear that the military is seeking to retain power, protests and other forms of public unrest have resumed on a large-scale following a brief lull across Sudan.

The protest moment died down for a while after the June 3rd crackdown and civil disobedience campaign from June 9th to June 11th, and was mainly limited to small-scale night-time rallies and marches. However, the "million man march" on June 30th was the biggest pro-democracy rally since June 3rd. A resurgence of social unrest has heightened pressure on the TMC. The DFCF has also announced mass protests on July 13th and a nationwide civil disobedience campaign on July 14th. We expect these planned protests to draw in massive crowds and to lead to a prompt further crackdown by the TMC, prolonging Sudan's uncertain political and economic situation.

What is the end game?

There is significant uncertainty about how the current situation might play out. The first scenario is that the military will try to retain its grip on power by choosing to rule by fear rather than consent and hold elections within a year. However, given the challenge that the protest movement has laid down to the entire political establishment, it is increasingly questionable whether the TMC would want to risk the consequences of an even more violent suppression of the protests that the elections would necessitate. A further escalation in violence will increase the risk of a reimposition of US economic and targeted sanctions. Moreover, the TMC lacks the funds to finance the elections. If elections are held within a year (which is not our core forecast), Sudan will continue to experience international opprobrium; meanwhile, heightened social tension will take the country to the brink of economic and political collapse.

A more likely scenario, in our view, is that the military accepts that its plan to hold elections while the crackdown continues is not feasible. Amid growing domestic and international pressure, we expect the military to accept a civilian-dominated joint council and a longer transitional period (two to three years) leading up to elections, but largely on the military's terms. The TMC will retain key posts within the council and largely direct Sudan's political transition. That said, a resolution to the political crisis engendered by the uprising does not appear to be on the horizon. With an open revolutionary protest movement targeting Sudan's entire established power structure and the military, and signs that some demonstrators are looking to a broader campaign of civil disobedience to achieve their demands, Sudan's political crisis will continue.

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