Where does the line lie between constitutional protection of religious exceptionalism and the need to enforce state laws ensuring fair treatment of employees? Which religious employees count as “ministers” and therefore as central enough to religious activities to enable religious bodies to deal with them outside of the bounds of state laws? Stanley Fish’s recent New York Times opinion piece chronicles Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, a case currently before the Supreme Court. In 2005, a teacher at a school affiliated with the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod was fired for bringing a case against her employer to court. The church argued that she had violated its theological belief in resolving disputes informally rather than through the court system. While most citizens have a right to sue employers in court, the church argued that because of the teacher’s central role in carrying out the church’s doctrines, she should be considered a “minister,” making the church’s ability to punish her breaching of its rules fall under the “ministerial exception” and the free exercise clause. But is a teacher the same thing as a minister? Fish writes:


Perhaps even more difficult than the question of who counts as a minister (and therefore which practices and duties are most central to religion) is the question of which doctrines are centrally religious and therefore appropriate points of regulation for religious institutions. Is the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod’s preference for resolving disputes informally really central to Lutheranism, such that if even a minister violates the rule, it is fair cause for termination of employment? Fish writes:


Read Fish’s piece in full here and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s recent TIF post on Hosanna-Tabor here. Also look out for upcoming TIF essays on this case.