[cabfpub] (Eventually) requiring id-kpServerAuth for all certs in the chain?

Gervase Markham gerv at mozilla.org
Thu Nov 6 03:41:51 MST 2014

On 05/11/14 21:31, Brian Smith wrote:
> Your proposal has the same issue. In both proposals, just by looking at
> the certificate chain, you can tell whether the intermediate is required
> to conform to the BRs or not. The only difference is that the way Ryan
> and I are suggesting already matches what Chrome (on Windows, at lesat),
> IE, and Firefox are already doing, whereas you are proposing that all
> browsers eventually (5-10 years from now?) be changed to do something
> new, without any protection for users until then.

So basically I'm proposing an opt-in, phased in over a fairly long time,
so that eventually we can programmatically determine whether a cert is
covered, and you are proposing opt-out, phased in over a shorter time?

I would be interested in hearing from CAs, then:

A) How many non-BR-covered non-technically-constrained intermediates
have you issued from your publicly trusted roots?

B) How many of those would need to be reissued if there were a
requirement that they contain an EKU that does not have id-kp-ServerAuth?

I suspect the answer to B) in almost all cases will be exactly the same
number as the answer to A).

C) What is your reaction to the idea of having to revoke+reissue all
such intermediates inside the timeframe of, say, a year?

The existence of CT means that I suspect most CAs are resigned to
numbers like the number in A) being public, but I could be wrong. So
answers by email are OK.


More information about the Public mailing list