




1. Transparency International;
2. Helsinški parlament građana Banje Luke;
3. Slobodna Republika;
4. BUKA;
5. GEA Centar za istraživanja i studije;
6. Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava;
7. The Srpska Times;
8. „Udruženje veterana Republike Srpske“;

as well as websites and individuals.



Not making sense of the Bosnian Protests: International reporting




Is Change coming (finally)? Thoughts on the Bosnian Protests

Bosnian presidency Photo by Nidžara Ahmetašević

Bosnian presidency, the day after
Photo by Nidžara Ahmetašević


Who protests?







Ditched Cars in Zenica, presumably from local politicians
Source: Twitter @YourAnonCentral




The International Response



What is next?





A train to nowhere: Talgo in Bosnia

Talgo parked in Sarajevo train station (source: thehindu.com)

The Talgo trains, made in Spain, belong to the high-end trains rolling around Europe, North America and Asia. They travel at high speeds on conventional tracks and offer comfortable intercity and international travel. Bosnia (together with Kazachstan and Uzbekistan) has nine such trains (bought in , so far the good news. While the website of the railways of the Bosnian Federation (ZFBiH, there is no single Bosnian rail company) even has a link to Talgo reserations (including the tempting offer to travel in time: Register for a free Ride from 1/Nov/2010 to 31/Dec/2011), none of the trains is going anywhere. The trains had some test runs, but never entred service. Instead, the trains have been languishing for years in Sarajevom, partly in storage, partly in the open. When they were tested, they achieved the incredible maximum speed of 70km per hour. Of course, for such great speeds, it is necessary to have a train that can go 220 km per hour… Samir Kadrić from the railways of the Federation described it “as if you bought nine Ferarris and you don’t have roads to drive them on”. Besides old tracks and no realistic plan to improve them to anywhere close to the speeds the Talgo can travel, it took years to negotiate the use of the train with neighboring countries and meanwhile, the train to Belgrade no longer operates and there is only one train per day that takes 9 hours for the journey. Now the railway company does not have the money to maintain the trains, so they are not even riding at 70 km per hour, but just standing and waiting. The Talgo thus share the same fate as the Croatian-made Končar trains the ZFBiH bought in 2009 to run local lines and which the company now seeks to return to Croatia. Just for the Talgo trains, the ZFBiH payed 67.5 mio Euro which is tries to pay for by renting the trains to Turkey.

There is hardly a better metaphor for what is wrong in Bosnia today. The country cannot move on, or only at the speed of 19th century train travel in 40-year old run down cars. The alternative is there (and even paid for) but there is no plan, no will and no resources to accelerate. Instead of leapfrogging several train-generations (or in extension reforms) with the Talgo, the episode highlights that Bosnia needs new tracks, and not just for trains. The fact that nobody had to resign over this affair that raises suspicions not just about tremedous stupidity, but also corruption, also is indicative of how the scale of bad governance has created an incredible degree of hopelessness in the country.

Bad Metaphors and The Mostar Bridge

Twenty years ago, the bridge in Mostar was destroyed by Bosnian Croat forces, since it has been rebuilt nearly ten years ago. In the mean time, the bridge became the symbol of Bosnia and countless books and posters of Bosnia feature the bridge. The bridge has become overburdened with symbolic value which does not reflect the bridge or Bosnia. The bridge was not a symbol of multiethnic Bosnia, but part of the country’s Ottoman heritage that remains strongly contested. When it was destroyed it did not link two communities, but two parts of Mostar held by Bosnian government forces with a Bosniak majority. Its reconstruction thus neither  mended interethnic ties, nor could it be an appropriate symbol for it. Furthermore, a bridge is an ill-fitting metaphor for cooperation. Bridges are edifices to get from one place to another, but they are not a place to stay, a meeting point. I remember asking a Slovak diplomat some 15 years ago whether he saw his country as a bridge between East and West and he dismissed this suggestion quickly, noting that one does not want to live on a bridge, it is neither here nor there. bridge4Beyond being a bad metaphor, should the Mostar bridge have been rebuilt. I understand that the reconstruction of the bridge sent the signal that the ethnonationalist leaders and they militias cannot destroy the countries heritage. Yet, it is a fake. Just like the Berlin Stadtschloss or the Old theater in Skopje, it is a re-construction of a building that had disappeared. In this sense, the building pretends to be old, but it is not.

In addition to being disingenuous, it also is a reflection of the larger “reconstruction” paradigm that has been dominant in Bosnia and in other post-conflict countries. The “reconstruction paradigm” focuses on both the physical and societal reconstruction after the war. However, the reconstruction might be possible in the material sense (and even here it near impossible), the societal reconstruction is not possible. Instead the emphasis should be more on construction, i.e. on the ways in which a post-war society and country can be built and build itself. Thus, most of the focus on international policy makers has been on refugee return in the first post-war decade, but little thought went to other ways in with divisions could be overcome based on the post-war realities.

As such, the bridge is Mostar is not a symbol of reconstructing Bosnia, but rather of faking the past that was destroyed rather than building a new reality.

Let the manipulation begin: First number claims of the Bosnian census

Less than two weeks since the end of the census (see my previous posts on the Bosnian census here and here), politicians have begun to claim to know the results of the Bosnian census. First the head of the HDZ Dragan Čović claimed that there are some 570,000 Croats in Bosnia “according to information he gets every day.” Afterwards, Sejfudin Tokić, a former Socialdemocrat and now a vigorous campaigner for Bosniak identity (and against Bosnian identity), coordinator of the “Bosniak movement for equality of nations” claims to know the number of Bosniaks: According to him, there are 54 percent Bosniaks in Bosnia and 17 percent in the Republika Srpska (and 32.5 percent Serbs, 11.5 percent Croats and 2 percent others, as reported here. See also here, and here).

While these numbers might turn out to be true, it is completely implausible that the two or anybody else already has such reliable numbers. Take some regional examples: The 2011 census in Montenegro was carried out in April, first results were released in May, but only pertained to the population numbers, not the break down by ethnicity, religion or language. These results were released in August, i.e. four months after the census was concluded. This is record breaking fast by regional standards and that is due to the fact that Montengro is, well, small. Montenegro, like Croatia and Serbia have also conducted one post-war census and are thus arguably better prepared than Bosnia. In Serbia the first results, again only pertaining to the overall population number were released a month after the census and results about ethnicity were released in November 2012, more than a year after the census in October 2011. In Croatia,two months passed to the publication of first results, and results on ethnicity where not published until 2013, well over a year and a half since the census was held in April 2011 .

Considering the complexity of any census and particularly the Bosnian one, numbers that are currently circulating cannot be considered reliable. The claim by Čović and Tokić that they have informers that provide them with data that would allow for a Bosnia-wide picture of the population distribution by ethnicity is implausible. First, this would require a very large number of informants to give such a comprehensive picture. Second, considering that lack of knowledge about the size of the population and other data, giving percentages of a particular community is inherently inaccurate. Third, a census is not like an election where you can have a parallel vote count based on a representative sample. First, one does not know what is representative (not just in terms of size, but also in terms of age, geographical distribution) in Bosnia and second, the results in the census and those given to third parties might very considerably, especially when it comes to identity questions (in the census somebody might call himself a Bosnian, but when somebody from the NGO “it is important to be Bosniak” knocks on the door to ask about identity, the answer might be different).

Thus, if statistical offices from neighboring countries with more experience in censuses, less complicated processes and structures take at least four months and usually more than one year to give the number of citizens identifying with one nation or ethnic group, claims to know this in ten days are at best a “guestimate” and at worst just made up. But why make up numbers or circulate such claims? It is a perfect example of setting expectations. This is called the anchoring effect in psychology,  well described in Thinking, Fast and Slow by David Kahnemann. If you are giving a number associated with a question (like a price tag for a product or the age of a person), you are likely to use it unconsciously as an anchor, no matter how random the number might be. If the price tag of jeans states 150 Euros and then you are told, they are on sale for 25 % off, they seem like a good deal, but that original number might as well be random and still we are influenced by it.

Circulating numbers about population shares is unlikely to be shaping the outcome of the census, but it is likely to shape the perception of the outcome. Thus, if you claim that 54 percent of the population are Bosniaks and the real number is 42 percent, the number seems wrong, too far away from the original claim and thus can be more easily challenged. This type of setting the agenda thus substitutes results with desired results. In the best case, the desired results turn out to be real, in the worst, they are lower and then their legitimacy can be challenged. Timing matters here: CeSID and others involved in the parallel vote count in 2000 in the Milošević elections know why: they were eager to get their first results out before the state election commission. By releasing the results first, they planned to set the agenda: They determined what is the standard results against which all others are measured, not the state election commission. When the state election commission produced their results, they seemed wrong also because they differed from the results first released by CeSID.

Whether those circulating numbers will succeed remains to be seen, but the season of number games has official opened.

When counting counts. The Bosnian Census

Today the Bosnian census official came to end: media from around the world (here, here and here) took this opportunity to devote some space to Bosnia that evokes little international attention as the permanent crisis of the country is no longer newsworthy.

So why the census? Formally, the results will have few immediate consequences. The quotas in the public administration for members of different “constituent people” are linked to the so called completion of Annex 7, i.e. the chapter to refugee return. These formal criteria are of course a farce. There is no significant refugee return in Bosnia for nearly a decade and while there continues to be a slow trickle, for all practical purposes this chapter is closed. Otherwise the distribution of offices is enshrined in Dayton that does not provide for any formal link between demographic distribution and power it endows group-representation. Of course, the census gives everybody something to hope for and fear of. This is probably the reason this census actually succeed despite high levels of political tension and minor irregularities . The census in Macedonia, a similarly sensitive context, had to be abandoned after a few days of counting. Neither has any particular group boycotted the census, as was the case among Albanians in South Serbia and most Serbs in Kosovo in 2011 (for an overview over the contestation in censuses see this recent article  by Gezim Visoka and Elvin Gjevori and by Dejan Jović in Političke analize).

1. The number of Bosnians

The number of Bosnians is probably the largest uncertainty. Unconfirmed numbers for the sample census suggested a high share of Bosnians (above 30%). This number seems unrealistic, at least on the Bosnian-wide level considering low levels of identification with supra-ethnonational identities in pre-war censuses and the degree of polarization after the war. Of course, a high number of Bosnians constitutes a threat to the currently dominating parties that derive their legitimacy and power from importance of the “constituent people” as the main Bosnian identifies categories. The more Bosnians, the less sustainable is the Dayton arrangement. However, two important questions emerge: First, who are the Bosnians? If most Bosnians are by background Muslim-Bosniaks, the ethnonationalist model is not equally threatened, but just among Bosniaks parties. Only if a significant number of Bosnians are also of Croat and Serb origin, can the number challenge the current arrangement. The second question is how to accommodate Bosnians in the current system. Of course, this will depend on the numbers, but this has been difficult in Yugoslav times, when in fact the authorities from the 1970s onward discouraged identification as Yugoslavs to the 1990 Bosnian election where one seat of the 7 member presidency was reserved for Yugoslavs and Others, resulting in the victory of the Muslim candidate Ejup Ganić for the post who was not particularly Yugoslav or Other. Treating Bosnians just like another ethnic group and thus replicating the system of representation for constituent people might be tempting, but is absurd. Instead, a large number of Bosnians would suggest that the levels of ethnic representation built into the system should be overall reduced.

2. The number of Croats

Croats were the smallest of the three constituent peoples already in 1991 and having obtained Croatian passports (as have many non-Croats as well), many left for Croatia over the past 18 years. Thus, a considerably smaller number of Croats is expected than in 1991. If the share of Croats would fall under 10 per cent, the demand for equal treatment to Bosniaks and Serbs would be less plausible and the bargaining power of Croat parties would diminish. Of course, a small population share is also in other divided societies not an obstacle for representation and the Turkish Cypriot community held considerable influence after independence and also in peace plans since (including the 2004 Annan plan), despite constituting less than 20%. Similarly in Kosovo, the Serb community constitutes around 6% of the population and enjoys reserved seats and extensive mechanisms to ensure its input in the decision-making process. Yet, a sharp drop among Croats would confirm that Bosnia is moving towards a bi-national state.

3. The number of Bosniaks

Bosniaks are the community with the least firm identity matrix and thus some of the most pronounced „campaigning“ during the census was among Bosniak citizens. No census has so far offered the possibility to declare as a Bosniak, so we do not know yet whether citizens agree to the switch from Muslim to Bosniak identiy made during the war by intellectuals and later ratified in Dayton. In neighbouring Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro a significant share of citizens opted for the older category of Muslims over Bosniaks. While the term Bosniak might have more traction in Bosnia itself—the problem for Muslims in Serbia, Montenegro or Croatia is that Bosnia is not a kin state and the affiliation with Bosnia is less obvious—the might be a substantial number of Muslims. In addition, probably most Bosnians would be otherwise identifying as Bosniaks. In theory a large number of Muslims or Bosnians could result in a situation that Bosniaks are not the largest community in Bosnia.

4. The number of non-Serbs in RS

Before Republika Srpska was established in 1991, only around 54% of the population were Serbs, the number climbed to well above 90% by the end of the war through ethnic cleansing, mass murder and genocide. However, as refugees did return, it is unclear what the numbers are today. While the RS hopes to “ratify“ ethnic cleansing through the census and to confirm that the RS is a proto-nation state a larger share of non-Serbs would challenge this ambition.

5. The congruence of nation, language and religion

The dominant understanding of ethnonational identity is that national, religion and language identity are linked. It is thus no surprise that these questions are grouped together in Bosnia, as in most other census of the region. Of course, this presumption is by no means certain. While it is unlikely to find more than a few Croats who also identify as Muslim, there is potential for non-Bosniaks and Bosnians to speak Bosnian and being an atheist is not inherently incompatible with being a Bosniak, Croat or Serb. If we look at census in recent years across the region, there is few heterodox combinations to be found, except for Montenegro, where language and national identity do not coincide.

6. How many Bosnians are there in Bosnia?

Nobody knows how many people live in Bosnia. The numbers given suggest around 3.8 million, but these are at best estimates. As a result, one does not really know that GDP per capita and other crucial data cannot be determined without the population size. In addition, the specific numbers across the country might correct some misconceptions. Generally speaking, one would except a trend in urbanisation as a result of the war and the post-war period as poor rural areas have been abandoned. Yet the cities might have not grown as much as some expect. This was one of the big surprises of the Kosovo census when it emerged that Prishtina was not as large as observers had thought. Similarly, the general depopulation of certain regions, in particular eastern Bosnia is an important question as these areas with a large Bosniak population have suffered from depopulation through the war and poor economic conditions have made the return particularly unattractive.

While some preliminary results will be published early next year, it would be unusual based on other censuses in the region that these preliminary results would contain any data on identity. This data will take considerably longer to process, and according the International Monitoring Operation (IMO) which includes representatives from Eurostat, the European Commission Directorate-General for Enlargement, the Council of Europe (CoE), United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the final results will be released between one and one and a half years from now. This waiting period unfortunately coincides with the next general elections meaning that leaked census results, real or made up might become a feature of next year’s electoral campaign. So the counting is over, the use and abuse of numbers has just begun.

Is Change Coming to Bosnia? Reflections on Protests and their Prospects

I want my ID number







New Roads to Reform in Bosnia

New proposals to make Bosnia’s Federation entity less dysfunctional and more democratic should not be ignored by the country’s squabbling political elites.

If Bosnia were governed by all the good ideas that have been articulated over the past decade or more on reforming Dayton, it would be one of the most innovative political systems. NGOs, think tanks, parties, experts and international organizations have produced dozens of constitutions for Bosnia, reform initiatives and ideas for making Bosnia a more functional state. It would thus be easy to dismiss the latest proposal of a working group set up by the US embassy on the Federation as just the latest in a long line of experts with good ideas and little connection to reality. However, the latest proposals that the working group of Bosnian experts put forth do merit further attention.

Instead of proposing the ideal solution for Bosnia or one of its entities, it is an encouraging document for its realism. Some 181 suggestions detail specific suggestions for reform that are based on the existing constitution and which are based on pragmatic consideration rather than on the principle “wouldn’t it be nice”. Rather than focusing on reforming the Bosnian state, they focus on the more dysfunctional of the two entities, the Federation. The Federation is an oddity, created during the war to end the war between the Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian government forces, it was a peace-settlement as much as Dayton and less concerned with its long term viability. Thus, a constitutional overhaul was not only overdue, but it constitution mirrors main feature at the state level and what works in the Federation might also work at the state level. The 181 suggestions are detailed, but can be grouped into several categories.

First, a number of suggestions focus on streamlining the entity, reducing both the administrative cost of the entity and also improving decision making. These include abolishing the president and his vice-presidents—a timely suggestion considering that the current president was recently arrested. Instead, they propose a president of parliament who would be assisted by two vice-presidents who are at the same time the presidents of each of the two chambers of parliament. While this is certainly an improvement in reducing the number of office holders, it is a bit of a strange suggestion. As the proposals transform the entity into a parliamentary system, it would make more sense to make the prime minister the undivided head of the executive who also represents the Federation.If one takes the German or Austrian Federal system, both have only prime ministers and no particular ceremonial role is given to the president of parliament.

Second, the proposals seek to recalibrate the balance between collective identities and citizens. While so for, constituent people (i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs), predominate, the proposal states that the Federation should define itself as a union of citizens who are comprised of three groups—members of the three constituent people, people who do not identify with these groups and national minorities. This suggestion is not just symbolic, but the proposals suggest that citizens who are not self-identified Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats have representation ensured at all levels (even if often less than the three nations). How that can be achieved without abuse that would just extend the arena of national competition to office-holders from this category remains unclear, however.

Third, the proposals seek to make the Federation more efficient by streamlining the division of competences between the entity and the cantons and also making decision making in the Federation easier (in the parliament and government). The proposal preserve the power-sharing system and veto rights, but define them better and also reduce the opportunities for abuse. Importantly, the proposals suggest that in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, all authorities (entity, cantonal and municipal) implement policies of the state (of course it is telling that this needs to be stated at all, after all this is what federal units are supposed to do). This implies, however, that the distribution of competences should not be used to block the process of EU integration, which has of course been the case so far.

Finally, the proposals suggest that the current map of the Federation needs to be changed. It clearly states that the current set up of ten cantons with great variation in size is undesirable. There are few concrete suggestions for change, except to expand the canton of Sarajevo with the current Bosnian Podrinje canton that includes the city of Gorazde and is by far the smaller canton (around 30,000 inhabitants). It also suggests that a few municipalities from other neighboring cantons might join Sarajevo. The problem with redrawing cantonal boundaries further is that the next three small cantons with less than 100,000 inhabitants are all with a Croat majority (Posavina, West Herzegovina and canton 10), making the redrawing of cantonal boundaries sensitive. Instead, the working group did suggest that smaller cantons might not have all institutions than larger cantons have, less ministers and also that all cantons would not pay full salaries to the members of parliaments to save costs.

It is unclear whether these suggestions will be put into law, but they are useful for being concrete, pragmatic and provide a clear guideline for reform that political elites will find hard to ignore. While they will not provide a way out of the many blockages that Bosnian politics has been experiencing in recent years, they make a convincing case for the pragmatic. Furthermore, many of the changes suggested for the Federation equally apply for the state. Of course, it might be hard to abolish the presidency at the state level, but the suggestion of putting citizens who do not identify with the three constituent people on equal footing with these constituent people, and many ideas in the proposal are applicable at the state level. The approach itself of identifying specific suggestions for reform might also serve as a template for Bosnia-wide reforms.

Republished from Balkan Insight (http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-roads-to-reform-in-bosnia)


What the Belgrade-Prishtina Agreement means for Bosnia





%d bloggers like this: