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The best economic and social results are achieved in an environment of free competition.
Competition law prohibits unreasonable restraints on competition and acts of

EC Competition Law
The principal provisions of EC Competition Law are set forth in Articles 81 and 82 EC (ex
Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty) – as stated in the Annex. More detailed regulations are fixed in
various commission regulations and directives.
EC Competition Law applies to all companies doing business within the member states or
which may affect trade between the member states of the European Economic Area (EEA)
regardless of whether these companies are established in one of these countries or not.

US Antitrust Law
US Antitrust Law is set forth in four principal federal statutes: The Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, the Wilson Tariff Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. US Antitrust Law applies
to all companies and individuals doing business in the United States or affecting US

National competition laws

There are national competition laws to be considered by doing business in the corresponding
country. These national competition laws are generally similar to the EC Competition Law
and/or US Antitrust Law.

The most spectacular performers among the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia
did not follow pure policies of free trade but had in general low rates of protection and tried
to accept the challenge of surviving in the competitive environment of world trade. The
biggest losers, by contrast, can be identified as those countries that continuously followed an
import substitution approach in the process of industrialization, which resulted in heavy
protectionism. The experience of many developing countries supports the view that in the
long run competition enhances competitiveness and development, and in the short run
government support of national industries in their quest to be internationally competitive can
be crucial.

This is in line with the experiences in the United States, Japan and Europe, where the
development process began successfully under heavy government protection. High tariff
rates on manufacturing can be observed. We will have to analyse whether this is an
indication that nations have to do their homework on competitiveness before they can
successfully compete on an international level. We must also ask if competitiveness in the
short run can be achieved by an adequate competition policy and law.

Competition is the object fostered and protected by competition policy and law. It has to be
interpreted as a workable, respectively effective competition which is characterized by a
sequence of pushing and pursuing acts of the agents in a particular market. In following their
own interests entrepreneurs try to achieve preferential positions by using competitive
parameters such as price, quality, delivery conditions, service, marketing and so forth. But
any kind of advantage achieved within the sphere of an initiative competitive act will be
temporary since it will be abolished by imitating followers.
What do we need competition for? Competition is the foundation of an efficiently working
market system, which has several advantages over a planned economy. According to Adam
Smith, competition is the precondition which protects freedom of decision and action of self-
interested individuals from leading to anarchy or chaos but rather to economically optimal,
socially fair and desirable market results.

However, the competition process will run smoothly and thus lead to desirable results only if
several prerequisites are met, namely:
• Free market entry and exit;
• Freedom of trade and contract;
• An efficient monetary system;
• Protection from restrictive business practices (RBP);
• The existence of positive and negative sanctions; and
• Transparency of the market.

Competition on the consumer side exists when there is a certain responsiveness. Consumers
have to:
• Be able and willing to be informed about transparent markets;
Be free in their decisions;
• Have financial resources;
• React flexibly and quickly to competitive acts and not prefer a specific supplier or good;
• Want to maximize their utility.

Competition on the supply side exists when suppliers:

• Are able to see their chances on transparent markets;
• Are free in their decision making;
• Strive for profit maximization or loss reduction;
• Possess technical, economic and creative resources;
• React flexibly and quickly to changes in consumers’ demand and competitors’ actions;
• Are ready to look for success by facing competition, not by using RBPs; or if there is a
certain competitive spirit on the supply side.

Where these preconditions are met, competition can work effectively and the competition
process fulfils several economic and social functions.

A. Economic functions
First of all, competition has to coordinate production and consumers’ needs in such a way
that in the long run, supplied goods and services will be adequate to the demand. A
precondition for optimal coordination is an efficiently working price mechanism which
indicates the degree of scarcity of goods. Further, competition has to ensure allocative
resource efficiency by combining production factors in a way to attain the utmost

Competition also ensures distributive efficiency; production factors are remunerated

according to the value the market bestows on their performance. Since consumers and
producers control each other simply by following their own interests, the restriction of
economic power is immanent in the process of competition.

These basic economic functions are described as static. They are complemented by some
dynamic functions: competition is the driving force behind technological progress. Since
innovation of products and production processes is the key to attaining preferential positions
within the competition process, every company strives for modernization. Additionally,
companies are forced to adapt their competitive parameters continuously because market
conditions are in a never ending process of change.

B. Social functions
Competition also fulfils social functions by opening up opportunities to all market
participants: entrepreneurs have the possibility to decide to be solely responsible for the use
of their available resources; consumers have freedom of choice between several alternatives;
and workers have the chance to change jobs.

However, as mentioned above, these functions can be performed only if certain prerequisites
are met. We will thus ask whether this is the case in the developing countries. First of all, in
most such countries the price mechanism is not, or is only partially, intact because of
government intervention such as price controls and minimum wages. The slogan “getting
prices right” thus came into being, which recommends that the State should not tamper with
market prices. In many developing countries, the Government gets in the way of free
competition by restrictive regulation, whereas an effective competition policy should aim at
abolishing all distortional policy measures in order to make room for competitive activities.

• We cannot talk about consumers’ sovereignty in those parts of the population where
basic needs are not guaranteed and the only goal is to survive.
• Consumers do not possess adequate information; the acquisition of information
involves high transaction costs; and the evaluation of information is made difficult by
low educational levels.
• The struggle to survive hinders consumers from taking decisions freely; financial
resources are missing; and the possibility of obtaining information is hindered by the
lack of infrastructure and education.
• Progress in productivity is often hampered as well, since the educational level, or
technical and business knowledge, is rather low and the productivity of the working
force diminished because of malnutrition, disease and the like.
• Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular lack financial resources
because of the lack of credit facilities, face markets lacking in transparency because
information and infrastructure are missing, or are confronted with sometimes
omnipotent transnational corporations (TNCs).
• High initial fixed costs frequently build up market entry barriers because marginal
revenue is lower than marginal costs.
• Buying technology and know-how is costly, especially if sophisticated manufacturing
technology and management techniques are required and firms are not assisted in
covering the high initial costs of importing technology, training the labour force and
improving management.

Marginal costs may be then greater than the marginal productivity of labour and capital for
certain productive activities. We can thus conclude that most developing countries do not
possess a favourable climate for competition to perform its economic functions. Since
competition will not appear by itself but needs specific conditions and adequate care,
Governments bear great responsibility. In developing countries, where preconditions for a
working competition are missing, competition policy and law are even more necessary, not
only to face the danger imposed on competition through RBPs—the main problem in
developed countries—but above all to ensure a favourable environment for the development
of competition and national and international competitiveness.

Competition policy in developing countries has therefore to be seen in a broader context than
in industrialized countries. In general it can be defined as any set of government measures
aimed at stimulating competition, protecting consumers against monopolies and creating the
prerequisites by the competition process mentioned above. Policy areas include control of
dominant firms, control of mergers to prevent industries from becoming monopolized, and
control of anti-competitive acts.

In developing countries competition policy has to comprise the provision of a favourable

climate for competition and the development of competitiveness. Competitiveness can be
regarded as the set of skills and qualities required in order to engage in competition. Its
object is to gain, hold onto, and expand one’s market share. In order to do this producers tend
to use RBPs to restrict or eliminate their trade rivals, rather than to face competition by
means of lower prices, better quality, innovation, modernization and the like. Since
“competition kills competition”, which means that competition will not prevail if the market
is left alone, competition policy and law are further necessary to secure the nation’s welfare
gains brought about by national and international competitiveness.

How can competitiveness be achieved? First of all, Ricardo showed that comparative cost
advantages among nations determine their gains from trade. Quantity and quality of natural
resources build the basis for trading positions, especially in the primary sector. But why was
the economic performance of the Republic of Korea so much better than that of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or why that of the former Federal Republic of
Germany superior to that of the German Democratic Republic? A quick answer would be that
wherever market forces were left alone by Governments, competition necessarily led to
socially desirable market outcomes. This argument would short-sightedly neglect not only
those government actions taken in both successful countries to enhance industrial potential, it
would also disregard the historical experience of Japan's success story, where the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry was heavily involved in the economy via industrial and
trade policies and where in the 1950s and 1960s economic growth was initiated by import
substitution and domestic demand.

Trade policy measures in particular have a significant impact on competition in national and
international markets. It has been broadly accepted among economists that an international
free trade policy is desirable to increase world output and income levels in the long run.
However, most economists would also agree that under present conditions, complete freedom
of trade would not be desirable. Even if international trade serves to sharpen competition in
the domestic market in terms of price, quality and incentives towards innovation and the
development of new products and production processes, individual countries might not be
ready for it. Thus, although barriers to trade sheltering particular domestic industries may
have anti-competitive effects on national markets, they may provide domestic firms with the
time needed to increase their ability to compete internationally. Protection of infant industries
can therefore be an important component of a growth enhancing trade policy.

Most developing countries operate inside a production possibility curve which is backward in
terms of technology. Since technical innovation in the developed nations is pushing the
technological frontier outward at a rapid rate, the gap with developing countries is widening
over time. In order to close the gap new technologies must not only be imported but also
learned through the actual production experience.

Market failures and limits to competition in developing countries

What reasons can be used to justify infant industry protection? The main argument refers to
market failures. In poorer nations, market imperfections seem to be legion. Unemployment,
differences between rural and urban wage rates, a poorly developed infrastructure, capital
market imperfections and so forth—all these problems point to market failures. There is a
wide range of literature justifying regulation in case of natural monopoly, externalities, and
asymmetric information. We will therefore not focus on those well known cases but
concentrate instead on two areas which are especially important for developing countries,
namely, imperfect capital markets and the problem of the appropriateness of knowledge
generated by pioneering firms.

Since developing countries do not possess efficient financial institutions (banks or stock
markets), it is difficult to draw savings from the traditional sector to finance investment in
manufacturing. Low initial profits will be an obstacle for long-term investments. Many
investments will not be undertaken unless the Government supports the infant industry.

In addition to market failures there are other limits to competition in developing countries,
such as the limiting capabilities of competition authorities. Bureaucratic systems in most
such countries are rarely capable of formulating, implementing or controlling the use of
competition laws. The establishment, for example, of a national cartel supervision authority
can itself exceed existing capacities in terms of finances and human resources.

With regard to these realities the question arises as to whether developing countries are more
prone to market failures and competition limiting factors than industrialized countries.
Looking at the theoretical model of “perfect competition” we find developing countries quite
far from this ideal. This model of industrial structure, in which many small firms compete in
the supply of a single product, contains several major features which characterize a perfectly
competitive industry:
• There is a multitude of firms (buyers as well as sellers), all too small to have any individual
impact on the market price. Therefore, marginal revenue equals the price;
• All firms aim to maximize their profit;
• Firms can enter and exit the industry at no cost. Outputs traded are homogeneous and
produced without economies of scale;
• There exists complete and free market information and complete market transparency;
• The adaptation to changing market conditions is immediate.

Perfect competition is economically efficient in three ways:

• In the short run, profit maximization ensures that each firm will set its output in a way that
its marginal cost equals its marginal revenue. Under the profit-maximization assumption,
marginal cost is equal to the price. This is efficient in terms of the allocation of resources
because it ensures that no consumer will be deterred from buying something he values at
more than what it cost to make;
• In the long run, free entry and exit ensure that new entrants will be attracted to any industry
where high profits are made. New entrants will increase supply and bid down the price until
no profit is made—that is, when average revenue equals average cost. Thus no entrepreneur
or factor of production earns more than just what it needs to be persuaded into an industry;
• In the long run, perfect competition ensures minimum-cost production since average
revenue equals marginal cost and average revenue equals average cost. Marginal cost thus
equals average cost, and this is true for the bottom of the average cost curve, the lowest cost
point. In the absence of the above-mentioned conditions, imperfect markets exist and fail to
act efficiently. This is the case for all economies, yet it is obvious that developing countries
do not even come close to the ideal—for they lack even the most basic information of sellers
and buyers about the quality and price of goods. The Government is therefore challenged to
make up for the inefficiency of an imperfect market. However, the Government also has
other roles to play.

The role of government in fostering competition

Competition is always in danger. Since it is uncomfortable or even threatening, business tries
to avoid it. To use a metaphor: competition is not a weed that grows even if left alone; rather
it is a cultural plant and needs continuous government attention. As economic experience has
shown, competition has to be learned at home if a company is to be competitive in the world
market. Hence the Government has to supply a competitive framework. A national
competition law and policy can supply a competitive environment to national firms, which
can lead to competitiveness on an international level in the long run. The Government’s main
task can thus be seen as the establishment of a more favourable environment within an active
policy approach. What do we mean by this? A favourable environment must not be confused
with one which simply ensures higher profits for companies. Negative real interest rates,
downward wage trends and subsidized energy prices favour company profitability. But they
cannot be considered suitable elements of a favourable environment which is sustainable in
macroeconomic, social or environmental terms.

A passive approach would be the elimination of a restrictive environment, including price

liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization; the elimination of protectionist trade policies
and arbitrary and unclear industrial policies; the removal of market monopolies; and the
modernization and reduction of the civil service. Although necessary measures, they have to
be complemented by a more active approach which seeks to create conditions in the
environment which did not previously exist, in order to enable companies to compete
successfully on a macro economically, socially and environmentally sustainable basis. This
includes the provision of elements needed to face competition on open markets, some of the
most important being:
• Information on domestic and foreign market conditions, technology, prices, etc.;
• Efficient communication and transport systems;
• Technological and organizational know-how;
• Skilled human resources;
• Improvement of the physical, economic and social infrastructure to support production; and
• Promotion of improved entrepreneurial capacity.

Some of these elements could be developed through collaboration between the public and the
private sector, some by strengthening relations between the educational and academic
systems and production activities. Governments must also correct serious market distortions
in a way that fosters positive externalities (e.g. technological progress, human resource
training) and discourages negative externalities (e.g. any damage to the natural environment).
As mentioned above, Governments have to reduce financial market distortions in order to
make financial resources available for investment. This could be achieved through sound
monetary policies, the reform of the social security system, political stabilization and the like.
Private savings could be encouraged via market interest rates in order to raise national
savings and investment rates. A well balanced tax system could provide incentives for
(potential) entrepreneurs to engage in investments and further expand their business

In addition, the legal framework must protect both general property rights and intellectual
property rights in order to establish a competitive market system. Legal security is also
necessary for companies to take efficient long-term economic decisions. Companies will be
able to work more successfully and be more prone to invest if they can trust institutions to
guarantee stable conditions. This active approach is itself an ongoing learning process,
specific to each country, on the part of the competent institutions and actors of the production

Competition policy is also related to trade policy, the international aspect of competition.
One reason for this close relationship is the growing globalization of the world economy. The
increased share of exports of all trading nations in total world GDP, which grew from 11 per
cent to 20 per cent over the last quarter of a century, is only one indicator of globalization;
increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial market transactions can be added as
well. The main reasons lie in the acceleration of technological change, or specific
technological improvements, which have led to a reduction of the costs of transportation,
communication and information gathering.

This means nothing more than growing international competition. The implications for
developing countries do not only include the need for companies to adjust to technological
change and increased international competition but also the need for efficient international
competition policy and law. In the light of globalization, national competition policies alone
are insufficient to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. International coordination of such
problems as market power concentration, ecology, and other externalities has become a
necessity and an essential ingredient of a successful competition policy. The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of RBP was an
important step in this direction and should be further elaborated. Although today it is merely
a set of recommendations, tomorrow this codex could be the cornerstone of an internationally
agreed treaty on competition.

A widespread problem of trade policy in many developing countries is the persistence of

overvalued exchange rates which hamper exports, boost imports and diminish international
competitiveness. In this situation Governments often respond with foreign exchange control
instead of devaluation, with several negative impacts on economic development. First of all,
bureaucrats, not markets, decide—often according to a quantitative development plan—
which goods are imported and of what quality and quantity. Since they are in general unable
to determine ex ante the necessary investments, production and inputs required to reach a
specific growth rate, scarce resources are wasted. Secondly, foreign exchange is often
allotted preferentially to imports of investment goods which are thus artificially reduced in
price. This favours capital intensive industries and production processes and neglects the
most important comparative advantage of most developing countries: a large, low-cost labour
force. Thirdly, foreign exchange is not distributed according to the most efficient usage but
rather according to bureaucratic rationing systems, personal relations, or even the amount of
bribes. This leads to distorted resource allocation on the microeconomic level. According to
an empirical analysis of the impact of overvalued exchange rates and exchange controls on
the economic growth of developing countries, with growing overvaluation the growth rates
of the real GNP and of investment quotas decline, whereas the marginal capital coefficient

Although this advice is unpopular, overvalued exchange rates call for government action in
the form of corrective depreciation. Realistic or even short-term undervalued exchange rates
(via central bank interventions on the exchange market) can help strengthen export capacity
and the diversification of exports and support the development of branches which produce
and substitute those imports which had artificially low prices. This is a “natural” form of an
ISI process based on the use of comparative cost advantages. Between 1980 and 1985 Japan's
low interest rates led to an undervalued yen, which has provided for continued export
promotion and import retardation. Indonesia’s stabilization programme in the years 1966 to
1969 is just one example of the positive impact of depreciation combined with a general
liberalization of imports and reduction of government intervention, especially in the form of
price controls. The rate of inflation was reduced from 600 per cent in 1966 to 10 per cent in
1969; exports rose from US$ 633 million in 1965 to US$ 1,173 billion in 1970; the annual
average growth rate of real per capita GDP rose from 0.8 per cent in the period 1966-1969 to
5.7 per cent in the period 1970-1977.34 This shows how much government policy can
contribute to a favourable competitive environment on the international level.
These and other widespread government failures can provide a kind of guidance for policy
• Since no government action is gratis and always affects the allocation of resources, any
economic activity in the public sector and any regulation of the private sector should be
subject to a specified set of procedures or criteria by which intervention is administered.
First, second, and third best policy measures for the attainment of a given objective should be
identified, along with the administrative cost, feasibility of the activity and likelihood of
political pressures;
• If alternative mechanisms and policies might be able to achieve a given objective, a
presumption exists in favour of choosing a mechanism which provides the least scope for
rent-seeking. For example, if government subsidies for firms are selective and linked to
specific preconditions instead of overall distribution, firms have an incentive to meet the
necessary criteria. This leads to the assumption that policies directly controlling private
economic activity are likely to be less efficacious in terms of achieving their objectives than
those which provide incentives for individuals to undertake the activities deemed desirable
for their own benefit;
• It is preferable to choose policies and institutional arrangements that will force trade-offs to
be faced in the administration and implementation of policy. A Ministry of Trade (occupied
with different tasks, rather than a tariff commission, which would be responsible solely for
matters affecting tariffs), would be under the pressure of different constituencies (exporters,
protected industries, etc.) and budget restrictions;
• The costs of all policy measures should be transparent so that political pressure has less
opportunity to work unseen by the public;
• The domination of specific interest groups can be prevented through open and
institutionalized communication channels of a business-government partnership;
• To prevent the persistence of protection, certain mechanisms should be institutionalized.
Zero base budgeting, or sunset legislation, should be reviewed as potential budgetary
concepts. Policy makers should also constantly be reminded that previous decisions may not
have been optimal or first best solutions. In the United States, for example, subsidies and
other forms of protection are monitored and implemented by the Department of Commerce
and the Department of the Treasury. In addition, the United States International Trade
Commission conducts trade research investigations for Congress and the Executive upon
request, and participates in the process of determining whether United States industries have
been significantly hurt by the unfair trade practices of other countries.

Justification for waivers in developing countries

How can the adoption of waivers or exceptions be justified in developing countries? First of
all, as was shown above, those countries do not possess the prerequisites for the competition
process to run smoothly and thus for competition to fulfil its economic and social functions.
Looking at the aforementioned realities in developing countries—and specifically, the
unfavourable conditions for competition, including serious market failures— it is obvious
that they have substantial disadvantages for participating in world competition. Since those
unfavourable conditions and market failures cannot be overcome in the near future, waivers
have to be looked upon as second-best interim aid. Equals have to be treated equally and
unequals unequally. Since developing countries are unequal to developed countries, they
need special treatment. Waivers can thus be seen as compensation for their trade
disadvantages. They can be granted as temporary adjustment allowances to enable
developing countries to participate in world trade as equally matched competitors. This is in
line with a very simple argument for waivers: developing countries need help because they
cannot compete under the given circumstances. This might be an unpopular claim which is
less likely to meet with approval than the charge that the developed countries are gaining
because of unfair trade practices. But open trade is fair trade, and since free trade is not a
realistic option nowadays, temporary waivers can— within limits—be considered as an
instrument to allow developing countries to engage in international trade. Especially
nowadays, since on the one hand most developing countries have rashly reduced their
protective barriers without being competitive on an international level, and on the other hand
most industrialized countries are increasingly closing their economies, multilaterally
accepted rules of the game (including provisions for the disadvantaged) become all the more
Finally, waivers in competition policy can be looked upon as countermeasures to the neo-
protectionist behaviour of industrialized nations, since various policies of industrialized
countries, e.g. the artificial price reduction of exports, lead to competition distortions. The
main argument against waivers to be heard in industrialized countries will probably be that
this kind of protectionism will reduce their share of free trade gains. This involves the idea
that it is countries, and not firms, which compete with each other, which is not in fact the
case. On the company level, success for one firm within a particular market is almost
inevitably associated with losses for a rival firm. On the country level, international trade is a
positive-sum game, and success for one country usually translates into success for its partners
as well (although the gains from trade can be different). All partners now benefit from the
availability of new and better products, from larger markets abroad, and/or from more
favourable terms of trade. Thus, if waivers do increase international competitiveness and
hence participation in international trade, all countries will win in the long run, while
industries with low productivity will lose. In this context it is important to mention that the
United Nations Set of Principles does not contain any rules which protect international trade
from government intervention in competition. Since waivers can be seen as part of those
interventions, rules should be formulated which contain some minimum requirements for
governmental action. Since developing countries, too, are at times strongly positioned in
special markets, and since industrialized countries also have weak industries, it has to be
debated whether waivers should be allowed to developing countries as a group of nations
(fulfilling special criteria) or—better—only under certain unfavourable conditions. Here
some general criteria have to be found which allow temporary protection in the form of
restriction of competition without paving the way for discrimination or privileges.

Guidelines have to be carefully designed so that infant, and not ailing, industries are
supported. The resistance of many developing countries to opening their markets is
understandable in the light of the bad example set by the OECD countries, which keep up
non tariff barriers and at the same time encourage developing countries to abolish them.48
Economic theory on two country- models shows that waivers given in the form of export
subsidies or import restrictions will increase the country’s national income while decreasing
the national income of the other country. By this “beggarthy- neighbour policy” one country
keeps up its level of employment, to the disadvantage of the other. This will usually lead to
retaliation. The form of waivers will thus be decisive in the reaction of trading partners.

Forms of waivers (exceptions or exemptions)

Economic history, empirical research results, and economic theory cannot provide a final
answer to the question of whether the benefits of protection will outweigh or exceed its costs.
Since protectionist measures can have adverse effects on the allocation of resources, on the
rate of economic growth, and on the evolution of sustainable employment opportunities, the
forms of waivers (or exceptions to the rule) are decisive for success. Waivers can take the
form of tariffs and quotas, non tariff measures, and subsidies.

A. Tariffs and quotas

In the case of an ISI policy, which basically consists of import tariffs and quotas, but also of
foreign exchange controls and other measures, there is a direct increase in the costs to
consumers as imports and their local substitutes become more expensive than they would be
under free trade conditions. Higher prices, especially higher prices for basic goods, first of all
hurt low-income groups in the protecting country. Protectionist tariffs are thus often linked
with an income redistribution to the advantage of producers and to the disadvantage of
consumers, and even with a change in people's demand patterns.

In addition, the domestic prices of the protected goods amount to artificially distorted price
signals if they are raised beyond the level they would reach in the case of free entry of
imports and relative to the prices of other goods. This means that incentives are given to
concentrate labour, capital and entrepreneurship in the production of those goods. The
Government's choice of protected goods and industries will therefore determine whether
competitive or uncompetitive industries will be fostered and scarce resources used efficiently
on industries with a present or future comparative advantage, or wasted.

Since it is mainly consumer goods that are protected, while imports of intermediate and
capital goods are made cheaper for firms, the latter receive preferential treatment. This is
tantamount to an income redistribution in favour of high-income groups. This policy
eliminates incentives to improve efficiency for industries which are not privileged. Tariffs
will also push factor costs upwards, so that there is a danger of inflationary pressures and
hence a reduction of international competitiveness. Industries which depend on the protected
goods as input factors are discriminated against. This especially concerns the export sector.
Additional costs of protection via tariffs arise if other countries retaliate, in case of an
increase of smuggling activities and if tariff walls hinder the acquisition of foreign
B. Nontariff measures
Nontariff measures can be defined as “all government actions other than tariffs with a
potential trade-distorting impact, including quantitative restrictions, subsidies, government
procurement practices, and technical barriers to trade”. Some countries frequently use
nontariff measures as a major form of protection usually applied to all trading partners. They
are an expression of a more inward-looking development policy and restrain the scope of
participation in international trade relations, with all the adverse effects.

C. Subsidies
Subsidies can be defined as “government assistance to the development, production, or
export of specific goods. Subsidies can take the form of either direct financial support or
indirect support through tax exemptions, subsidized loans or loan write offs, government
procurement practices, and subsidies to the production of inputs”. They may allow firms to
achieve economies of scale without distorting relative price ratios and without altering
consumption patterns. In addition, costs for protection are visible within the fiscal budget and
thus place constant pressure on the Government to aim for the removal of protection.

Yet there are also some arguments against subsidies. First, they can distort the allocation of
resources because of a distorted price mechanism which hinders production factors from
moving into areas with higher productivity and hinders the supply of lower-cost products.
Secondly, the accuracy with which subsidies are granted to specific industries is limited,
since the impact of subsidies can be controlled only within certain limits, and the target group
might enjoy only part of its subsidies. This might, too, lead to a waste of scarce resources.
Thirdly, industries which do not belong to the target group and which have to grow and
adjust to the market on their own resources are discriminated against. This means that the
wrong incentives are given by the Government, which facilitates rent-seeking behaviour and
hampers self-sustaining independent attitudes. Fourthly, the Government is usually unable to
know its potential comparative advantages in advance.

Although there are some distinct disadvantages to using subsidies as protectionist measures,
in the light of the above-mentioned problems of tariffs, especially with regard to the
redistribution of income, temporary subsidies should be favoured. Therefore, it has to be
considered whether developing countries should receive differential and more favourable
treatment on the use of subsidies in international treaties.
Therefore, the following policy recommendations should be considered for subsidies as well
as for all kinds of waivers:
• Subsidies or other forms of governmental support are necessary only if the private sector
would otherwise not engage in business activities;
• Where no performance standards have been imposed upon the recipients of subsidies—i.e.
waivers—they were wasted;
• Subsidies have to be granted only for a limited period of time and in a degressive mode so
that firms have an incentive to “grow up”;
• If the Government's threats to remove subsidies in time or to remove them for firms not
meeting performance standards are not credible, subsidies tend to be ineffective;
• To avoid discriminatory distribution of subsidies maximum transparency is necessary. For
example, if the Government is forced to publicize its subsidies it would be under permanent
pressure of justification and public control;
• Potential infant industries vary in their need for selective protection, or in other words,
• Selected firms, industries or branches have to be reviewed constantly.
• Selective protection should be executed in such a way that the resulting discrimination
against all other industries is reduced to a minimum;
• A supranational authority (including all developing countries) in the form of a technology
centre could be envisaged to support individual countries in their search for future
comparative advantages;
offer technological know-how and the advice of specialists; and realize common projects
(e.g. bi- or multinational infrastructure projects). Such a concentration of know-how would
save scarce resources for all and open up opportunities to “weaker” members of the
community. Also, if international instead of national experts were entrusted with the
selection of industries, the pressure of national interest groups could be significantly reduced;
• If waivers are granted to all nations they will lose their impact; accordingly, they should be
granted carefully and only where necessary.
An independent institution should be assigned to establish specific criteria and in this way
limit the usage of waivers. Such an institution could also draft regulations to restrict the
number of infant industries selected in order to avoid misuse. The promotion of individual
sectors of the economy can be successful only if this leads to their national and international
competitiveness. However, some infants never do grow up!

We can draw the conclusion that history and economic theory seem to support the view that
at the beginning of economic development (industrialization), companies in developing
countries need temporary aid. Free trade is the first best solution in a world of perfect
competition. Yet, in the light of the existing disadvantages of developing countries and the
reality of existing trade barriers, free trade is insufficient to enhance competitiveness.

Governments need to be enabled to give shortterm, degressive, limited waivers (second best
solution) in order to help their industries become competitive on a national and international
level. These waivers must be reviewed continuously. It has to be ensured that the subsidies
paid, or any other kind of aid provided, do not continue for too long. Also, the procedure,
period of validity and size of waivers must be transparent, so that the recipients are informed
and can thus take long-term decisions and have an incentive to “grow up” quickly in order to
be competitive. Government protection might otherwise become an incentive for infants to
grow up too slowly! Although the theoretical benefits are convincing, there are technical
problems in implementing optimal infant industry protection. The institutional capacities of
many developing countries are too weak to follow such a policy successfully, and the power
of interest groups and danger of rent-seeking should not be underestimated. Hence, wherever
possible one should stick to free trade.