Tuesday, February 1, 2011

The Atypicality of U.S. Power and Influence, con.

. Tuesday, February 1, 2011


In his comment on my previous post he writes:
























John Quiggin said...

OK, some responses on the examples. I asked for cases when the EU and US were opposed and the US prevailed. Obviously, as you point out in 4, Iraq doesn't fit, since the EU was divided. Same for Basel 1, on the account you cite, since it lined up the US and UK against France and Germany.

On Copenhagen, your claim "the US has not wanted an agreement" contradicts the stated position of the US Administration. This is an example where, as I pointed out in my original post, the weak and divided nature of the US executive/legislative structure prevents it from putting forward a coherent position. Since climate change negotiations require broad agreement, that causes them to fail.

On point 5, if you want shrieks how about US commentary on the exchange rate policies of China and, before that, Japan. And you must be aware that the collapse of Bretton Woods was forced on the US by the development of the eurodollar market in the 1960s. The idea that the US economic ship sails on unaffected by the rest of the world is just silly.

To offer some examples going the other way

1. Bush steel tariffs. Humiliating climbdown forced by the EU on the US
2. International Criminal Court. US opposed, but Court was established anyway.
3. Law of the Sea - ditto
4. MAI - US supported, but French vetoed (admittedly, EU was not united on this, but the case is comparable to Copenhagen - the outcome reflects the existence of veto points, not some power specific to the US)

Kindred Winecoff said...

Rather than go point by point through selective examples that we each handpick to try and prove our points, let's take a step back and think more broadly.

(I interpret things like steel tariffs and Copenhagen and the collapse of Bretton Woods and EU political unity, or the lack thereof, much differently than you do anyway. Most of the things we've mentioned are very small potatoes in any case. We can continue those discussions if you like, but I doubt it will be productive.)

If the US had a significant power advantage, what state of the world would we expect to see? One in which there were many disputes of substantial importance between major states, or one in which there were few? IR people have argued about this, but I think the empirical/historical evidence as well as internal logic shows that major confrontations are less likely when power differentials are great, and more likely when they are not. I think, at this point, that most of the discipline agrees.

In other words, if I couldn't point out a convincing example where the US had subjugated the Japan, this is probably better evidence of the US' influence than if I could. Unless you think the US-Japan relationship is best described by mutual deterrence.

Now, what state of the world do we have now? I think (hope) we can agree that it is one in which the relationship between major powers is not conflictual. There are occasional disagreements on the margin, but no major disputes that could threaten stability. In other words, we're arguing about how much agricultural subsidies should be lowered, not whether there should be a more-or-less open trading system. Indeed, international cooperation has arguably never been higher.

I contend that this state of affairs exists because the US's power advantage is so large, and because the US has used that power to establish and maintain an international order that is accommodative, rather than exploitative, for the most part. Because of this, few states have an interest in challenging that order. So a lack of confrontation is itself evidence of pervasiveness of US influence. For more detail, I'd again recommend Ikenberry's After Victory.

As I've said several times already, this is not to say that the US' power is unlimited, or that states can't resist the US. Of course US power is limited, in many very important ways. *But so is everyone else's*. And the US' power is much less limited than everyone else's. Its reach is farther, its capabilities deeper, its centrality to the system without parallel.

If this wasn't true, then why does the international system by and large represent the US' values?

Anonymous said...

As a non-IR specialist, I have some questions for K. Winecoff:

1. Taking your notion of 'decline' as a given, I would say the USA's decline is due to developments within the USA, particularly the increase in income inequality since WWII, high unemployment, low wages coexisting with high managerial incomes, and poverty of a non-trivial part of USA citizens. My question is, how does IR theory and policy take these observables into account?

2. I take as given, your propositio that the USA is interested in getting international banking regulations which shifts costs to foreigners. My question is, how does IR theory and policy deal with the USA based rating agencies who rated junk bonds as investment quality paper? Furthermore, how does IR theory and policy deal with the credibility problem created by the series of USA originating financial crises?

Kindred Winecoff said...

Not sure if this is what you're looking for, but here's how I'd respond:

1. I don't actually think this is a great categorization. The US has a problem with stagnant median incomes, increasing inequality, etc. But these problems are probably more easily dealt with than the macro problems in China, Japan, or even much of the EU. If we're talking in relative terms, I'm not sure the US's position is really eroding all that much. If we're talking future prospects, I'll still take the US over the EU or Japan.

I'm also not too sure what you mean by "how does IR take these observables into account". Do you mean in a comparative context, looking at US inequality relative to Germany's? If so, there's a lot of research done on those types of questions. Or do you mean in terms of macro structure and power dynamics? If so, I think you're asking the wrong questions. An increase in the Gini from .40 to .45 (or whatever) just isn't that big of a deal when you're thinking in a global context.

2. Define what you mean by "credibility". Following the recent crisis everyone in world poured into T-bills. ("flight to safety") The US gov't borrowed at record low rates. The US poured liquidity into the international financial system, and mobilized the IMF to put out fires. Now US corporate profits are sky-rocketing, US equity markets are recovering quickly. US banks are better-capitalized than their foreign competitors. Meanwhile the euro is on the verge of collapse, the EU is enacting austerity, Japan's still in a depression but now with debt-to-GDP over 200% and rising, and China has a huge property bubble and inflation problem. Things are perfect in the US, but they're not great among most of the US' peers either.

Ratings agencies? Seriously? The problem wasn't ratings agencies. They were just one of the passengers on the ship when it went down.

The Atypicality of U.S. Power and Influence, con.




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