Growing U.s. Influence In Russia's Periphery

December 15, 1999|By Seth G. Jones. Seth G. Jones, former Europe editor for The Christian Science Monitor, is a PhD. candidate in political science at the University of Chicago.

When this century began, the great Russian empire extended from the Pacific Ocean in the east, across the vast Siberian expanse and the Ural Mountains, and pushed up to the borders of the Austro-Hungarian and German empires in the west.

As the 20th Century ends, however, Russia's global and regional influence has noticeably declined. But lost in some of the recent headlines--the rift over spies and Western criticism of Russia's use of force in Chechnya--is a deeper and more problematic issue.

The Clinton administration's foreign-policy decisions regarding Russia, particularly a growing U.S. influence in the Russian periphery, have been needlessly shortsighted and have unnecessarily increased Russia's security concerns. Neglecting the lessons of both world wars, U.S. actions may have very damaging and long-term consequences.

To begin with, U.S. influence now extends into Central Asia, the Baltic states and the Caucasus.

Kazahstan, nestled against the oil-rich Caspian Sea and linked to the critical geostrategic areas of Eurasia and the Middle East, has become an important ally of the U.S. On Monday, Vice President Al Gore is scheduled to meet with the Kazak president to discuss such issues as security links and oil and gas development in the region.

In the Caucasus, the U.S. has played a critical role in working toward a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been fighting over the tiny enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Resolving the crisis is especially crucial because Azerbaijan is the starting point of the 1,080-mile pipeline that the U.S. hopes will extend from the Azerbaijani capital of Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.

Just north of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the proposed pipeline must pass through Georgia on its way to Turkey. Following the Georgian government's recent request that Russia withdraw its border guards, who have been patrolling the Russian-Georgian border, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen offered helicopters to patrol the border, a Coast Guard cutter and help in training the Georgian army.

U.S. diplomats have stated that the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will be seriously considered for a future round of NATO expansion. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott remarked at a July session of the U.S.-Baltic commission that "the Baltic states are not only eligible for membership but desirable."

Furthermore, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, the Clinton administration's push to establish a national missile defense, NATO's recent excursion into Kosovo, and a strong U.S.-Japanese partnership on Russia's eastern flank have further aggravated Moscow's security fears.

As Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev indicated in November: "Western policy constitutes a challenge to Russia, a challenge aimed at weakening its international positions and edging it out of the strategically important regions of the world, primarily for the Caspian region, Transcaucasia and Central Asia."

Skeptics argue that an increasing U.S. presence in the Russian periphery shouldn't cause much consternation.

First, U.S. intentions are benign. America is motivated primarily by a desire to reap some of the region's economic benefits and to promote stability and democracy in the newly independent states.

And second, Russia is a paltry remnant of the global superpower it was during the Cold War. It has been weakened by severe economic, military and political problems. Why should the U.S. care what Russia thinks?

There are several problems with these arguments.

To begin with, the world would be a wonderful place if Russians simply took U.S. leaders at face value when those leaders stated that their intentions were unthreatening. Unfortunately, international politics doesn't work that way.

Russian history has taught its leaders that security must be the ultima ratio. The invasion forces of Napoleon I in the early 19th Century, and by German armies in both world wars, cost Russia more than 20 million lives. And during the Cold War, the Soviet Union faced a formidable Western military force on the European continent.

Following World War I, the United States and its European allies made a fatal mistake when they shunned Germany, helping facilitate Hitler's rise to power. Fortunately, after World War II the U.S. played a fundamental role in ensuring the security of Japan and Germany, allowing both states to rebuild politically and economically. West Germany was admitted to NATO, and Japan was included in a strong bilateral security alliance with the U.S.

There are obvious differences between the end of the Cold War and the end of both world wars. Nonetheless, great powers inevitably rise and fall. Though Russia is in a particularly severe downward swing, it has a large, well-educated population and abundant natural resources. America would be much more secure down the road to have Russia as a strategic partner than as a competitive foe.