Edition: U.S. / Global

AFTER THE WAR; Iraq's Shiite Majority: A Painful History of Revolt and Schism

By ELAINE SCIOLINO, Special to The New York Times
Published: March 30, 1991

The bloody rebellion in the towns and cities of southern Iraq represents the most serious uprising by Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority in 70 years. Not since the 1920-1921 revolt for independence against the British mandate in Iraq, which took British troops a year to crush, has Shiite opposition to the central authority in Baghdad been so widespread.

The current unrest has focused attention on the plight and the aspirations of the country's Shiites, estimated to number 10 million of the country's 18 million people. With Sunni Muslims predominant in the Government bureaucracy, the intelligence services and the officer corps, the Shiites have largely remained outsiders. In this respect the situation in Iraq is little different than in other Arab countries, like Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, which have large but downtrodden Shiite communities.

The Sunni-Shiite schism centers on the successor to the Prophet Mohammed, who died in the year 632. The Sunnis, whose name comes from the Arabic word for "tradition," argued that Mohammed's spiritual and political heir should be decided in the accepted tribal way in an election by the elders of the community. The Shiites, whose name in Arabic means "partisans," insisted that only the Prophet's relatives could succeed him. They demanded that his first cousin and son-in-law, Ali, be made the next leader of the Muslims.

Ali was stabbed to death in Kufa, in present-day Iraq, in 661. His followers called on his son, Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, to take over. But Hussein died in battle with the Sunnis in Karbala, also in Iraq, in 680. The Sunnis prevailed and the Shiites have carried the sense of being wrongly governed ever since. Brutal Repression Under Hussein

Although the Shiites have periodically rebelled against successive Iraqi Governments, they have been brutally repressed under the Baath Party of President Saddam Hussein, and their political leaders have been executed or forced into exile.

In 1974, following anti-Government demonstrations, more than two dozen Shiite leaders were executed on charges of plotting against the state. In 1977, anti-Government riots erupted in Karbala after it was closed to pilgrims in the midst of a Shiite religious ceremony.

Two years later, Shiites in Najaf and Karbala and in the Shiite slums of Baghdad rioted after Ayatollah Bakr al-Sadr, a Shiite religious leader who was active in the underground guerrilla movement, tried to lead a procession in honor of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which is solidly Shiite but ethnically Persian, not Arab.

Nervous about guerrilla activities and a popular Shiite revolution in Iraq, the Baghdad Government expelled no fewer than 200,000 Shiites, charging that they were an Iranian fifth column threatening the stability of Iraq. In 1980, Ayatollah Bakr al-Sadr, his sister and about 20 of their followers were executed. In the next few years, hundreds of politically active Shiites were executed.


Mr. Hussein has used the carrot as well as the stick. He pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into renovating Shiite shrines and rebuilding their towns and cities, particularly Najaf and Karbala. He also substantially increased Shiite participation in the Government and the officer corps.

In an effort to placate the Shiites, Mr. Hussein last week shuffled his Cabinet. He named Saadun Hamadi, a Shiite from Karbala and a founding member of the Baath Party, as Prime Minister, one of the titles that Mr. Hussein had nominally kept for himself.

The finance, transport and information ministries were also given to loyal Baath Party members who are Shiites. After the invasion of Kuwait in August, Mr. Hussein named a Shiite, Gen. Sadi Tuma Abbas, Minister of Defense. No Political Organization

Because of the continual repression of the Shiites during the 23 years of Baath Party rule, there is no significant Shiite political organization inside Iraq. The current revolt in the south is believed to be a largely spontaneous, popular reaction against the central Government in an area of somewhat loose central control that happened to be Shiite. Some of the unrest was sparked by Iraqi troops, the majority of whom are Shiite, who returned home from the Persian Gulf war with stories of terror and defeat.

All three main Iraqi Shiite opposition movements profess the aim of establishing an Islamic republic in Iraq, but there are divisions of both personality and substance among them. The best organized is the Teheran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a sort of umbrella group that functions under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim, with substantial material support from Iran.

The second group is the remnants of the Islamic Call, a guerrilla group whose members are scattered in capitals such as London and Damascus. The Islamic Call has generally favored a nationalist Islamic republic more independent from Iran.

The smallest group, the Teheran-based Organization for Islamic Action, was originally based in Karbala and is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi al-Mudarrisi. Unrest Concerns Gulf Arab States

The Islamic Call and the Organization for Islamic Action joined in a tactical alliance with the Supreme Council in the early 1980's, but they each continue to have their own following and the degree of cooperation among them is not clear.

Shiite unrest in Iraq deeply concerns other Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which has a Shiite majority in its oil-producing Eastern Province; Bahrain, whose population is 70 percent Shiite; and Kuwait, where the Call tried to assassinate the Emir several years ago.

The installation of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Iraq is unlikely. While Iran's Shiites make up 95 percent of the population, in Iraq they represent 55 percent. In addition, the Iraqi Shiite religious hierarchy is much smaller and not as well-organized as the clerics of Iran.

"Practically speaking, given the composition of the country, to install an Islamic government is far less realistic than it was in Iran," said Shaul Bakhash, a historian and author of a book about Iran's revolution. "To overthrow the Iraqi Government you need a rebellion that succeeds in the major cities, not just in the mountains of Kurdistan or the towns of the Shiite south. In the end, Baghdad has to join the rebellion."