Thursday, July 15, 2021

Sociosexuality, comfort with sex outside the confines of a committed relationship, and parent–child dynamics have been associated with experiences of sex guilt

The Experience of Sex Guilt: The Roles of Parenting, Adult Attachment, and Sociosexuality. Jana M. Hackathorn & Esther Malm. Sexuality & Culture, Jul 9 2021.

Abstract: Sociosexuality, comfort with sex outside the confines of a committed relationship, and parent–child dynamics have been associated with experiences of sex guilt. However, the mechanisms through which family dynamics are related to sociosexuality and sex guilt are still unclear. Using a developmental framework, in a cross-sectional study, we examined whether attachment styles and parent–child relationships would be associated with the development and maintenance of sociosexuality. We hypothesized that insecure attachment styles and sociosexuality would independently and positively mediate the relationship between parent–child relationship quality (accepting/rejecting) and sex guilt. Findings support past research and suggests that parental rejection predicts insecure attachments, which positively predicts unrestricted sociosexuality, and in turn, is negatively associated with sex guilt. This could suggest that sociosexuality may act as a buffer for sex guilt among this sample.

The cultural success of folk beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality

Folk-Economic Beliefs: An Evolutionary Cogniti­­ve Model. With Michael Bang Petersen. In Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens: Essays in Evolutionary Cognitive Anthropology. By Pascal Boyer.

Abstract: The domain of ‘folk-economics’ consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people’s political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices.

Both organisational & societal conspiracy beliefs are associated with sensation seeking (a preference for exciting and intense experiences); one reason why people believe conspiracy theories is because they find them entertaining

The entertainment value of conspiracy theories. Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Joline Ligthart, Sabine Rosema, Yang Xu. British Journal of Psychology, July 14 2021.

Abstract: Many citizens around the globe believe conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy theories so appealing? Here, we propose that conspiracy theories elicit intense emotions independent of emotional valence. People therefore find conspiracy theories entertaining – that is, narratives that people perceive as interesting, exciting, and attention-grabbing – and such entertainment appraisals are positively associated with belief in them. Five studies supported these ideas. Participants were exposed to either a conspiratorial or a non-conspiratorial text about the Notre Dame fire (Study 1) or the death of Jeffrey Epstein (preregistered Study 2). The conspiratorial text elicited stronger entertainment appraisals and intense emotions (independent of emotional valence) than the non-conspiratorial text; moreover, entertainment appraisals mediated the effects of the manipulation on conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 indicated that participants endorsed stronger conspiracy beliefs when an election event was described in an entertaining rather than a boring manner. Subsequent findings revealed that both organisational (Study 4) and societal conspiracy beliefs (Study 5) are positively associated with sensation seeking – a trait characterised by a preference for exciting and intense experiences. We conclude that one reason why people believe conspiracy theories is because they find them entertaining.

General discussion

The psychology of belief in conspiracy theories suggests a paradox: Conspiracy beliefs have harmful implications for perceivers and their social environment, yet many people hold such beliefs (Butter & Knight, 2020; Douglas et al., 2017; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a2014b; Van Prooijen, 2018; Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). The present research sought to illuminate that conspiracy theories have a psychological payoff for perceivers: People often perceive conspiracy theories as entertaining, which facilitates belief in them. Results of five studies are consistent with this notion. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated exposure to a conspiracy theory (about the Notre Dame fire and Jeffrey Epstein), and results revealed that entertainment appraisals mediated the effects of conspiracy exposure on conspiracy belief. Study 3 manipulated how entertaining or boring a description of an election event was, and this manipulation shaped conspiracy beliefs. Studies 4 and 5 investigated the implications of these insights for the personality trait sensation seeking, which was associated with both belief in organisational conspiracy theories (Study 4) and societal conspiracy theories (Study 5). Together, these studies support the idea that conspiracy theories have entertainment value, which helps explain belief in such theories.

Three more specific theoretical contributions for the emerging research domain of conspiracy beliefs follow from the present research. First, the present studies provide a novel answer to the question why conspiracy theories are so widespread in society. While we do not dispute that, quite often, conspiracy theories emerge from aversive experiences (e.g., societal crisis situations), the present studies expand on a range of recent finding suggesting that conspiracy beliefs sometimes also may have psychological benefits: Belief in conspiracy theories is associated with feeling unique and special (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al., 2017), an inflated evaluation of the self (i.e., narcissism; Cichocka et al., 2016) and an inflated evaluation of the groups that are central to a perceiver’s identity (i.e., collective narcissism; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). But while these previous findings clarify how conspiracy theories may be positively related with people’s self-perception and identity, the present research adds to these findings by revealing that people also may perceive conspiracy theories as entertaining – that is, interesting, exciting, and attention-grabbing narratives.

Second, and relatedly, the present research suggests that not necessarily negative emotions, but rather, intense emotional experiences predict conspiracy beliefs. While the majority of studies have focused on negative feelings and emotions to explain conspiracy beliefs (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Kofta et al., 2020; Newheiser et al., 2011; Van Prooijen, 2016; Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), research suggests that also various positive emotions can increase conspiracy beliefs (Whitson et al., 2015). Emotional intensity (independent of valence) may reconcile these previous findings, and provides a novel perspective on the role of emotions in conspiracy beliefs. Third, Studies 3 to 5 of the current contribution make the novel point that particularly people scoring high on sensation seeking are susceptible to conspiracy theories. These findings extend previous findings that conspiracy beliefs are associated with the narrower construct susceptibility to boredom (Brotherton & Eser, 2015), and contributes to a body of research suggesting that stable individual difference variables predict people’s susceptibility to conspiracy theories (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2011). Moreover, Study 3 suggests that particularly people high on sensation seeking associate conspiracy theories with entertainment, underscoring the more general point that the link between situational cues and conspiracy theories are often moderated by other contingencies such as individual difference variables.

The present findings also have broader implications for the role of negative affect in human cognition and behaviour. Feelings of anxiety, uncontrollability, and uncertainty often are interpreted as exclusively aversive experiences that people seek to avoid or regulate (e.g., Park, 2010; Van den Bos, 2009). It has been noted previously, however, that emotional intensity can counter the detrimental effects of negative emotions on overall well-being (e.g., Fujita et al., 1991). As a thought experiment, imagine a study comparing people who have just seen a horror movie (e.g., ‘the Exorcist’) with a neutral control group. We would be quite comfortable to pre-register the prediction that participants who have watched the horror movie provide higher ratings than the control group on variables such as anxiety, uncontrollability, and uncertainty. This does not mean that watching the movie was an aversive experience, however. On the contrary, people deliberately choose to expose themselves to such frightening experiences because they are entertaining. Many experiences in daily life yield emotions that are not only positive or negative but also intense, which have unique implications for human cognition and behaviour (see also Van Boven et al., 2010).

Of importance, the current propositions do not hold normative implications regarding the value of believing in conspiracy theories: Observing that people find conspiracy theories entertaining does not imply a recommendation to endorse them (as an analogy, some people find using drugs or excessive gambling entertaining, yet we do not recommend those activities either). It is well-known that conspiracy theories stimulate harmful behaviours, such as vaccine refusals or decreased efforts to reduce one’s carbon footprints (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Van der Linden, 2015). Rather, the present research was designed to shed light on the scientific question what makes conspiracy theories appealing to people, despite their harmful effects.

Strengths, limitations, and future research

The results across five studies supported a similar conclusion even though we investigated different conspiracy theories in different settings. This is in line with the notion that although conspiracy theories may differ widely in content, belief in such theories is rooted in similar and predictable underlying psychological processes (Douglas et al., 2017; Van Prooijen, 2020; Van Prooijen & Van Vugt, 2018). Furthermore, the studies combined experiments to reveal the effects of conspiracy exposure and entertainment value (Studies 1–3) with cross-sectional studies to investigate the implications of these findings for a role of sensation-seeking in conspiracy theories (Studies 4 and 5). Finally, all the studies reported here were well-powered, and one of the studies was preregistered, suggesting that the current findings are robust and likely to replicate in follow-up studies.

One limitation of the present studies is that in Studies 1–3, emotional valence and emotional intensity were assessed with general measures of only one item. It is possible that more sophisticated measures of specific, discrete emotions with negative valence (e.g., anger, anxiety) shape conspiracy thinking independent of intensity. Also, the scope of the present findings is yet unclear. For instance, the causal evidence for the link between entertainment appraisals and conspiracy beliefs depends on Study 3, but the emotional content of the entertainment condition may have had additional effects unaccounted for (e.g., in acrimonious social settings, actual corruption may be more likely). Furthermore, it is possible that these findings are moderated by stable individual difference variables. Moreover, entertainment is not the only factor predicting conspiracy belief, and quite often genuine distress (e.g., following social crisis situations such as a pandemic or terrorist attack) stimulates conspiracy thinking (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).

Finally, some conspiracy theories may be very entertaining yet not particularly credible (e.g., flat earth conspiracy theories). One might speculate that for the present effects to occur, entertainment appraisals need to include a serious fascination, rooted in the assumption that a conspiracy theory might be true. If one experiences a less serious form of entertainment (e.g., excessive humour after reading a ridiculous conspiracy theory), the effects observed in the present studies are unlikely to occur. At the same time, we should note that anecdotes exist of clearly fictional stories turning into far-fetched conspiracy theories that some people genuinely believe. For instance, the ‘alien lizard’ conspiracy theory (assuming that powerful politicians are a breed of alien lizards disguised as humans) shows strong parallels with the plotline of a science fiction series from the 1980s called ‘V’. Likewise, the novel ‘the Da Vinci Code’ has inspired people to believe the conspiracy theory described in the book (Newheiser et al., 2011). Future research may provide a more fine-grained analysis of the relationships between intense emotional experiences, entertainment appraisals, and conspiracy beliefs.

Compared to heterosexual couples, gay coupless, men and women, tend to have or be willing to accept larger age differences

Age-dissimilar couple relationships: 25 years in review. Lara McKenzie. Journal of Family Theory & Review, July 14 2021.

Abstract: This review explores research over the past quarter century on couples with age differences. I present recent global trends in age-dissimilar couplings, illustrating a shift away from statistical marriage studies focusing on relationships' motivations, inequalities, and challenges, and largely underpinned by biological, economic, or demographic outlooks. Since the last review of age-dissimilar couples in 1993, there have been substantive qualitative developments. Scholarship looking beyond Euro-American contexts is increasingly common, as are approaches examining class, race, sexuality, culture, religion, and nationality, as well as age, marital status, education, and employment. This transformation informs new perspectives on power and partner choice. I argue that research now needs more fluid definitions of age differences, greater range in qualitative studies' geographies and methodologies, and continued consideration of the life course and intersecting differences. Examinations of age-dissimilar couples should thus focus on these relationships' varied configurations, explored through a range of social analyses.