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December 17, 2006


Gregg Rosenberg

Hi David,

From the beginning your 2-D views to me have always seemed Platonic, and I think the version in this current paper is the most Platonic of all. Yet in many of your writings you also come across as quite pragmatist in your views about ontology, meaning and truth. What's your attitude towards this appearance of Platonism in your work? Are you instrumentalist about it? If so, how do you explain the appearance of Platonism away? If not, what are your views about the existence of abstract objects, ideal limits, ideally rational decisions, etc.? I've always wanted to ask you this.



Hi Gregg,

It's true that I use a lot of abstract objects in this sort of work, but I don't think this commits me to Platonism any more than does the use of a lot of abstract objects by a mathematician. There's a lot more on this sort of thing in my new paper on "Ontological Anti-Realism". As for ideal rationality, I'm a kind of epistemic realist in that I think there are objective facts about justification and rationality, but again I don't think this commits me to a strong sort of Platonism.

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