You are on page 1of 5




United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 23 1997






No. 96-4118
(D.C. No. 95-CR-104-B)
(D. Utah)

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
In June, 1995, defendant-appellant Jerry House was arrested during a traffic
stop, and charged by grand jury indictment with possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1) (1994). House then filed a motion to suppress, which was referred to a
magistrate judge for recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B)
(1994). The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied. United

The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant

to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This order and judgment is not
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

States v. House, No. 95-CR-104-B (D. Utah Dec. 29, 1995) (Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge). After House failed to object, the district
court adopted the magistrate judges report and recommendation, and denied the
motion to suppress. United States v. House, No. 95-CR-104-B (D. Utah Jan. 24,
1996) (Order). Subsequently, on April 15, 1996, pursuant to a written and
negotiated plea agreement, House pled guilty to the charge contained in the
indictment. (R.O.A. Doc. 30-31). His plea was accepted, and a judgment of
conviction was entered on June 28, 1996. (R.O.A. Doc. 35).
House now seeks to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Although
he does not say so expressly, he presumably also seeks to vacate his guilty plea in
the event we agree that the motion to suppress was erroneously denied. For the
following reasons, however, we must dismiss Houses appeal.
In his plea agreement, House personally signed and executed his assent to
the following pertinent provisions:

I know I may appeal a sentence imposed under this plea of

guilty in the following circumstances:

If the sentence was imposed in violation of law;


If the sentence was a result of an incorrect application of

the sentencing guidelines;


If a sentence is imposed that is greater than the

sentencing guidelines as to fine or imprisonment, or
term of supervised release.


I know there is no appellate review of any lawful sentence

imposed under a plea of guilty.


The only terms and conditions pertaining to this plea

agreement between me and the government are as follows:



Defendant will plead guilty to the indictment;


The United States will recommend, based on information

now known to it, that defendant will be given a three
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under
U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, and the United States will recommend
the low end of the guideline range;


The United States believes that defendant may qualify

for treatment under U.S.S.G. 5C1.2 and if the court so
finds the United states agrees that defendant has
provided all the truthful information that he has.


My decision to enter this plea was made after full and careful
thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the
case and the consequences of the plea.

(R.O.A. Doc. 30 at 3-5).

In the same plea agreement, Houses attorney Lee C. Rasmussen signed his
assent to the following statement:
I certify that I have discussed this statement with the defendant; that
I have fully explained his rights to him and have assisted him in
completing this form. I believe that he is knowingly and voluntarily
entering the plea with full knowledge of his legal rights and that
there is a factual basis for the plea.
(Id. at 5-6).

Finally, in the same plea agreement, an Assistant United States Attorney

certified that this statement contains the complete agreement between the
defendant and the United States. (Id. at 6).
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), a defendant may under certain
circumstances enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to review the
adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion, and to withdraw the plea
if he prevails on appeal. The right to enter a conditional guilty plea is far from
absolute, however. As Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) clearly states, such a plea may
be entered only [w]ith the approval of the court and the consent of the
government, and only by reserving in writing the right [to] appeal. (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1994) (A
defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to his conviction. Having pleaded guilty, a defendants
only avenue for challenging his conviction is to claim that he did not voluntarily
or intelligently enter his plea.) (internal citations and footnote omitted).
As the preceding excerpts make clear, House simply did not enter a
conditional guilty plea. Houses plea agreement made reference neither to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(a)(2) nor to any right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
Similarly, the government has expressed no consent to any such conditional plea.


House has shown presented no evidence that any other written document modified
his plea agreement. His guilty plea was wholly unconditional.
The present appeal is therefore DISMISSED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.


David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge