The protection of privacy of individual-level information in genome-wide association study (GWAS) databases has been a major concern of researchers following the publication of “an attack” on GWAS data by Homer et al. (2008). Traditional statistical methods for confidentiality and privacy protection of statistical databases do not scale well to deal with GWAS data, especially in terms of guarantees regarding protection from linkage to external information. The more recent concept of differential privacy, introduced by the cryptographic community, is an approach that provides a rigorous definition of privacy with meaningful privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary external information, although the guarantees may come at a serious price in terms of data utility. Building on such notions, Uhler et al. (2013) proposed new methods to release aggregate GWAS data without compromising an individual’s privacy. We extend the methods developed in Uhler et al. (2013) for releasing differentially-private χ 2 -statistics by allowing for arbitrary number of cases and controls, and for releasing differentially-private allelic test statistics. We also provide a new interpretation by assuming the controls’ data are known, which is a realistic assumption because some GWAS use publicly available data as controls. We assess the performance of the proposed methods through a risk-utility analysis on a real data set consisting of DNA samples collected by the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium and compare the methods with the differentially-private release mechanism proposed by Johnson and Shmatikov (2013). 
Scalable privacy-preserving data sharing methodology for genome-wide association studies